text:
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression
Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
For sale by the
Superintendent of Documents
Washington 25, D.C.
Translation of document 2239-PS
Secret State Police / State Police Precinct WEIMAR.
Received 3/12/1945 [red stamp]
FS.-NR. 2470 [blue stamp]
PRAG NR. 8005 2.3.45 1730KIL
To State Police DARMSTADT
Subject: Protective prisoner ALEX MUUL, born 11/1/1899 in KRIUSCH, Russia Estonia.
Reference: Report of 1/26/1945ROEM. 4-6 Kl. B2181/44SCHM.
Protective custody until further notice
Examination date 5/19/1945 Reason: Anti-German remarks As prisoner of grade to be left in concentration camp Buchenwald.
RSHA-ROEM. 4A 6 Kl. BNr. M 34 591DR. KALTENBRUNNER
File of Orders for Commitment to Concentration Camps All issued by RSHA, Amt IV A 6, Prague to Stapo Darmstadt signed by Dr. KALTENBRUNNER.
Date: 10/6/1944 Grounds: Vagrancy, suspected subversive activity, KL: Lachrenhausen, Class: I, Name: Vaculik, Nationality: Czech; 9/20/1944 Sex relations with Pole, Ravensbrueck, Hartmann, German; 9/30/1944 Refusal to work, Ravensbrueck, Hilbert, German; 10/19/1944 Religious propaganda, Dachau, I, Bruecher, German; 11/2/1944 Association with Frenchmen and suggesting breach of labor contract, Ravensbrueck, Wetzel, German; 11/22/1944 Sex relations with PW's, Ravensbrueck, Merz, German; 12/2/1944 Work sabotage and obstinacy, Dachau, I, Meriadec, French PW; 12/2/1944 Work sabotage, Dachau, I, Selderyk, Dutch; 12/20/1944 Sexual intercourse with Pole, Ravensbrueck, Dillmann, German; 12/20/1944 Work sabotage, Ravensbrueck, Francurchi, [French?] Corsican; 12/27/1944 Vagrancy; escape from transport, illegal use of RB, Dachau, I, Garco, Italian; 12/31/1944 Escape from transport, vagrancy, Dachau, I, Dellominut, Italian; 12/31/1944 Work sabotage and association with foreigners, Ravensbrueck Buettner, German; 1/12/1945 Molestation and threatening of German woman, Communist statements, Hossenburg, II, Nomkin, Lithuanian; 1/20/1945 Loafing on job repeatedly, Bergen-Belsen, Filber, German; 2/1/1945 Conduct inimical to Germany; spreading of enemy propaganda; suspected membership in resistance movement, Hossenburg, II, Leclair, French; 2/9/1945 Working against Reich, Buchenwald, I, Etie, French; 2/9/1945 Spreading of rumors detrimental to morale, Buchenwald, I, Farichon, French; 2/9/1945 Spreading of rumors detrimental to morale, KL transfer later, Farichon, French; 3/2/1945 "Aktion Gitter", Dachau, I, Laux, German; 3/2/1945 "Aktion Gitter" Dachau, I, Appel, German 3/2/1945 Creating public nuisance, (KL transfer later), Rauxloh, German; 3/2/1945 Black market, Buchenwald, I, Cau, French; 3/2/1945 Breach of work contract, Buchenwald, I, Coudoning, French; 3/2/1945 Sex relations with French PW, (Investigation cont'd), Meyer, German; 3/2/1945 Black market operator, Flossenburg, II, Biache, French; 3/2/1945 Black marketing of stolen goods, Dachau, I, Fruche, French; 3/2/1945 "Aktion Gitter", Dachau, I, Rueffer, German; 3/2/1945 Work sabotage; suspected activity, Buchenwald, I, Revenranius, Greek; 3/2/1945 Loafing on job; creating public nuisance, (KL transfer later), Oberle, German; 3/2/1945 Statements against Germany, Buchenwald, I, Agurini, Italian; 3/2/1945 Statements against Germany, Buchenwald, II, Muul, [USSR?]; 3/2/1945 Loafing on job, Thurenanstadt, Lang, Jew; 3/2/1945 "Aktion Gitter", Ravensbrueck, Maurer, Jew; 3/2/1945 "Aktion Gitter", Man and wife? Dachau, I, Maurer, German; 3/2/1945 Assault on foreman, Buchenwald, I, Toorn, Dutch; 3/2/1945 Theft of foodstuffs; resale at excess prices; or barter, Dachau, IA, Rouanet, French; 3/2/1945 Defeatist statements, (KL transfer later), Ezrenlaub, German; 3/2/1945 Working against Reich, Buchenwald, II, Bougoen, ?; 3/2/1945 Attempted looting after air raid, Buchenwald, II, Borge, ?; 3/2/1945 Theft and escape from jail, Buchenwald, I, Top, Dutch; 3/2/1945 Work sabotage, (KL later), Eberhardt, German.
"Document 2241-PS [translation]", pp. 923-924.
The employment of foreign labor forces in Germany.
Decree of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower on the execution of the transportation of workers, in this case: damage to and soiling of passenger coaches of the German Railways and their fittings.
In his letter of 8/10/194021 Bauer 106-the Reich Minister of Transport laid down that the management of the German Railway be directed that the costs of the repair of damage caused to railway coaches and their fittings by the careless or malicious behaviour of foreign workers in special labour trains be charged to the guilty persons, and where these are not determined, to the authorities responsible for the transportation. After the German Railway claimed again last winter considerable damage to and extraordinary soiling of railway coaches, it proposed to the management of the German Railway the demand of the costs of the repair of the damage and soiling from the Manpower Authorities. In this respect I direct, that it must definitely be left to the German Railway to pull up the guilty transport users. The writing off of the costs on the budget of the Reich stocks [Reichstocks] can only be considered exceptionally in the event of special circumstances. All cases are particularly to be refused in which the workers used normal trains or in which the damage was caused by deficiencies in the special trains provided.
According to reports of transportation commanders [Transportleiters] presented to me, the special trains provided by the German Railway have frequently been in a really deficient condition. Numerous windowpanes have been missing in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories have been partly employed, so that the workers had to fit up an emptied compartment as a lavatory. In other cases the coaches were not heated in winter so that the lavatories quickly became unusable because the water system was frozen and the flushing apparatus was therefore without water.
In order to obtain reliable records of the condition of special trains at the time of provision, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Transport, I beg to direct the transportation commanders, together with a representative of the station of departure, to determine in writing before the departure of a special train the deficiencies existing in the interior fittings of the railway coaches. The records are to be given up after completion of the transport operation to the labour reception office which has to present them to the competent state labour office. The transportation commanders will have to contact the office director of the station at least 1-2 hours before the departure of the train.
Simultaneously, I beg to direct the transportation commanders to give particular attention during the journey to the exclusion of damage and soiling of the railway carriages.
In view of the further tasks, involved in the winding up of the transport operation, incumbent on the transportation commander he will have to be relieved of the further mutual determination of the condition of railway carriages at the end of the journey.
I transfer the discharge of claims of the German Railway in respect of repairs to the state labour offices in whose area the special train was dispersed.
"Document 2246-PS [translation]", p. 930.
The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich on Special Mission
Vienna, 9/1/1936 To: The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin (by courier)
Subject: Report on Danube situation.
The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National Socialist officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances [Finanzkontrolle] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior.
As a guiding principle [Marschroute], I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In discussion with government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the agreement of July 11, I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the fatherland front [Vaterlaendischen Front] but nevertheless refraining from putting National-socialists in important positions for the time being. However such- positions are to be occupied only by personalities, having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.
(Signature) Papen
The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission
At present Berlin W.9, Lennestr. 9, 5/17/1935
Mein Führer:
The news, which I communicated to you the day before yesterday, that the Austrian Government would proclaim its intention to arm through an autonomous act and simultaneously on 2 June would announce a Starhemberg regency becomes more and more likely.
I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnig and his Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces.
There should follow a gradual disintegration of the barriers erected between the two countries. The rearmament of the army would have to be effected in close cooperation with the German army even if material aid from Germany would be limited.
A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube pact, which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European situation and especially on our relationship with England.
One may object, that Mr. Schuschnig will hardly be deter-mined to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.
Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting Schuschnig against Starhemberg through the use of "Go-betweens". The possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnig will finally say "no" and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse by that; but, on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria would be revealedwithout prejudice to other interests. Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government [Bundesregierung], Mr. Schuschnig will grasp this last strawalways under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria.
Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our active intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.
Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is necessary.
The Reich Army Minister shares the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister wanted to discuss it with you, my Führer.
(signed) Papen.
The Extraordinary Emissary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Special Mission.
Vienna, 7/27/1935.
To the Führer and Chancellor BERLIN by courier.
Contents: One year after the death of the Bundeskanzler Dollfuss. Review and Outlook.
It seems to me to be expedient to use this incident ourselves also to draw the balance.
National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is only a centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups of people of a different political make-up, the answer must rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not have been brought about in a different way. But when the creation of the people's community in the Reich will be completed, National socialism could, in a much wider sense than this is possible through the present party organizationat least apparentlycertainly become the rallying point for all racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day designated as "The German Day" as in old times and the proclamation of a national socialistic people's front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the legitimistic Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the "Anschluss": The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it, is unable to solve this task;
TOP SECRET Copy
The Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 1820/35 Top Secret L. II a
Berlin, 6/24/1935
To The Supreme Commander of the Army The Supreme Commander of the Navy The Supreme Commander of the Air Forces
In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the defense of the Reich of the 5/21/1935 and of a decision of the Reichs Cabinet of 5/21/1935 concerning the Reich's defense council. The publication of the Reich's defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the Führer and Reichchancellor.
The Führer and Reichschancellor has nominated the President of the directorate of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht to be "plenipotentiary-general for war economy".
I request that the copies of the Reich defense law needed within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 7/1/1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichministry of war.
I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.
(signed) von Blomberg.
No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a
Berlin, 9/3/1935
To Defense--Economic Group G-3 transmitted (copy)
(signed) Jodl
Reich Defense Law of 5/21/1935
The Reich Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made public:
Part I State of Defense
The Führer and Reichschancellor can declare a state of defense for the area of the Reich in case danger of war threatens.
(1) With the declaration of a state of defense the entire power of execution devolves upon the Führer and Reichschancellor. The Reichsminister of war exercises it by his orders.
(2) The Reichsminister is empowered in the carrying out of the power of execution to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws. He can, in order to enforce his regulation, threaten punishments and set up special courts.
(1) The Reichsministers are to observe the instructions of the Reichminister of war. They remain the highest Reich authorities within their realm of activity.
(2) The Reichministers will in case of a state of defense effect the necessary measures and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.
Part II Mobilization
(1) If conflict with an external enemy becomes unavoidable, the Führer and Reichschancellor can order mobilization.
(2) The ordering of mobilization includes in itself the declaration of a state of defense according to Part I, in case the latter is not already proclaimed, without prejudice to the directive of Article Six.
(3) With the ordering of mobilization a state of war in the definition of this law begins.
The Reichsministers will effect the necessary measures in case of mobilization and are empowered to issue legal regulations which may deviate from existing laws.
(1) The Führer and Reichschancellor will appoint a plenipotentiary-general for war economy to direct the entire war economy.
(2) It is the task of the plenipotentiary-general for war-economy to put all economic forces in the service of carrying on the war and to secure the life of the German people economically.
(3) Subordinate to him are:
The Reichsminister for economy
The Reichsminister for food and agriculture
The Reichs labor minister
The Reichs forest master and all Reichs' agents immediately subordinate to the Führer and Reichschancellor.
Furthermore the financing of the war effort (in the province of the Reichs finance ministry and of the Reichsbank) will be carried on under his responsibility.
(4) The plenipotentiary-general for war economy is authorized, within his realm of responsibility, to issue legal regulations, which may deviate from the existing laws.
Part III Setting of penalties and Conclusion
Whoever purposely or carelessly acts in violation of a decree issued by authority of this law will be, insofar as a more severe punishment is not stipulated according to other directives, punished with jail and with fine or with one of these penalties.
The Führer and Reichschancellor will issue the necessary legal and administrative directives for carrying out of this law.
The Führer and Reichschancellor (signed) ADOLF HITLER The Reichsminister of war (signed) VON BLOMBERG The Reichsminister of the Interior (signed) FRICK
Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 5/21/1935
The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 5/21/1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 5/21/1935.
The Führer and Reichschancellor (signed) ADOLF HITLER
Decision of the Reichcabinet of 5/21/1935 on the Council for the defense of the Reich
Supplementing the decision of the Reichscabinet of 4/4/1933 and 12/13/34 on formation of a council for defense of the Reich, the Reichscabinet has made the following decision:
1. The plenipotentiary-general for war economy appointed by the Führer and Reichschancellor will begin his work already in peacetime. At the suggestion of the chairman of the Council for the defense of the Reich, he will direct the economic preparations for war, insofar as they do not, in reference to the armament industry fall into the province of the Reichs' Ministry of war. In case of mobilization the following are subordinate to him:
Reichsministry of economic affairs Reichministry for food and agriculture Reichministry of Labor
Reich's forest-master and all Reichoffices immediately subordinate to the Führer.
In case of mobilization he will direct and be responsible for the financing of the war effort (in the province of the finance ministry and the Reichsbank).
Those ministries and the Reich's authorities are bound already in time of peace to observe his recommendations for the preparation of a war economy and the financing of the war-effort.
2. The Reichsminister of War and the plenipotentiary for war economy will effect the preparations for mobilization in closest cooperation on both sides.
3. The plenipotentiary-general for war-economy will be a permanent working committee he represents through his leadership staff the interests of war economy. The department heads [Referenten] for the defense of the Reich of the Ministries mentioned in Point I are bound by the recommendations of this leadership staff.
The State of War, an institution of the old law, as it was established in the old Reichsconstitution of 1871, the Prussian law on the state of siege of 6/4/1861 and the Bavarian law on the state of war of 11/5/1912, has been only incompletely replaced by Article 48 of the Reichsconstitution of 8/11/1919. Moreover, the provisions of Article 48 no longer correspond to the actual legal conditions.
The new law for the defense of the Reich should create clear legal bases for the transfer of the whole machinery of state from a state of peace to one of war. In this connection it was to be noted that a state of war can begin unexpectedly or from a state of foreign political tension. Since the time of such tension must be utilized as far as foreign political relations will bear, in order to create a readiness for war in time, the law for the defense of the Reich provides two steps for the transfer from state of peace to state of war:
1. The state of defense
2. The mobilization
For both steps of war preparation, the law gives the legal basis, upon which the individual measures of the Reichsdepartments can be built up as the council for the defense of the Reich instructs.
It is to be mentioned in regard to the provisions of the law in detail:
To Article 2
The exercise of the power of execution by the Reichsminister of war under the Führer and Reichschancellor should emphasize the pressing necessity of all demands of the immediate conduct of the war and should guarantee their fulfillment.
To Article 4, Section 3
In numerous laws special provisions for war are contained. It is therefore necessary, to establish the beginning of a state of war, in respect to times in order to create clear conditions for the administration of justice etc. Since, however, in a future war official declarations of war are not to be expected, as a result of which Article 42 Section 2 of the Reichsconstitution also is obsolete, the beginning of a state of war is to be considered as being at the same time as the beginning of the mobilization.
The experiences of the great war have demonstrated the necessity of including during a war the entire economy an the financing of the conduct of the war under unified leadership. The plenipotenary-general for war-economy should according to the will of the Führer and Reichschancellor take over the responsible leadership and stands thereby independently along side the Reichsminister of war, the possessor of the power of execution, and responsible for his realm of activity under the Führer and Reichschancellor.
"Document 2271-PS: ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP [Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] [translation]", pp. 940-941.
Editions of 1936, 1938, 1940, and 1943
Editor the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley). Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. [Pages 185-187]. The NSBO The National Socialistic Factory Cells Organization. [Die Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation]
The NSBO is a union of the political leaders of the NSDAP in the DAF [German Labor Front].
The NSBO is the carrier of the organization [Organisationstraeger] of the DAF.
The duties and responsibilities of the NSBO have passed over to the DAF.
The political leaders who have been transferred from the NSBO to the DAF guarantee the ideological education of the DAF in the spirit of the National Socialistic idea.
The German Labor Front
Including the NS Community Strength through Joy [Kraft Durch Freude] Decree of the Führer on the Nature and Goal of the German Labor Front, dated 10/24/1934
Nature and Goal
The German Labor Front is the organization of creative Germans of brain and fist.
In the main, the members of the former unions, the former employee unions and the former employer unions are united in it as members with equal rights.
Membership in the German Labor Front cannot be substituted by memberships in professional, social political, industrial or ideological organizations.
The Chancellor of the Reich can decree that class-organizations which have been recognized by the law should belong corporatively to the German Labor Front.
The aim of the German Labor Front is to create a true social and productive community of all Germans [Volks- und Leistungsgemeinschaft].
Its task is to see that every single individual should be able to take his place in the industrial life of the nation in that intellectual or physical capacity which enables him to perform maximum work and thus guarantees a maximum of benefit for the community of the nation.
The German Labor Front is a branch of the NSDAP according to the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State, issued on 12/1/1933. (According to the law, issued 3/29/1935, the DAF will be designated as an affiliated organization [Verband] of the NSDAP. The editor.)
Leadership and Organization
The NSDAP has the leadership of the German Labor Front.
The Staff leader of the Political Organization [PO] is the leader of the German Labor Front. He is assigned by the Führer and Reich Chancellor.
He assigns and dismisses the other leaders of the German Labor Front.
These posts should be given in the first place to members of the existing branches of the NSBO and of the NS-Hago [NS Handelsund Gewerkbetreibenden Organization, or the National Socialist Organization of Tradesmen and Commercial Men] who are in the NSDAP, and further to members of the SA and SS.
The regional organization of the German Labor Front corresponds to that of the NSDAP.
The aim toward an organic order as laid down in the program of the NSDAP determines the professional organization of the German Labor Front.
The staff leader of the Political Organization determines the regional and professional organization of the German Labor Front; they will be published in the service book of the German Labor Front. [In the 1943 edition the following is added: "Organization Book of the NSDAP"].
The accounts [Kassenfuehrung] of the German Labor Front are under the control of the treasurer of the NSDAP on the basis of the. first executive decree to the law securing the unity of Party and State, issued 3/23/1934.
The German Labor Front has to secure the peace of labor by creating understanding among the enterprise leaders for the justified claims of their following [Gefolgschaft] understanding among the following for the situation and possibilities of their enterprise.
The German Labor Front has the task of finding the common basis between the justified interests of all participants which is in accordance with the national socialistic basic principles and which reduces the number of the cases which are to be referred to the State agencies alone in charge on the basis of the law of 1/20/1934.
It is the exclusive task of the German Labor Front to represent all the parties which are required for the conciliation. It is prohibited to create other organizations in this domain or to permit their activities in this field.
The German Labor Front is the carrier of the National Socialist Organization "Strength Through Joy."
The German Labor Front has to provide for professional training.
Furthermore, it has to fulfill the tasks which have been assigned to it by the law of 1/20/1934.
The property of the former organizations as mentioned in Article 1 of this decree, including their help and compensation organizations, property managements and industrial enterprises, constitutes the property of the German Labor Front. This property is the original capital for the self-help organization of the German Labor Front.
The German Labor Front, through its self-help organization, should guarantee the existence of each of its members in emergency cases in order to facilitate the progress of the most qualified Germans [Volksgenossen] or to help them to secure an independent life, if possible, on their own ground and soil.
This order becomes valid on the day of its publication.
Berlin, 10/24/1934.
Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler
My decree, issued 10/24/1934 about the German Labor Front will be changed so that Article 4 will read as follows:
The NSDAP has the leadership of the German Labor Front. The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP is the leader of the German Labor Front. He is designated by the Führer and Reich Chancellor.
He designates and dismisses the other leaders of the German Labor Front.
These posts should be given in the first place to members of the branches NSBO and NS Hago who are in the NSDAP and further to members of the SA and SS.
Furthermore: In Article 5, Par. 3, the word "Staff Leader of the PO" will be substituted by "Reich Organization Leader" of the NSDAP.
"Document 2273-PS [partial translation]", pp. 944-946.
TOP SECRET [Geheime Reichssache]
SPECIAL PURPOSE GROUP "A" [Einsatzgruppe A]
The systematic mopping up of the Eastern Territories embraced, in accordance with the basic orders, the complete removal if possible, of Jewry. This goal has been substantially attainedwith the exception of White Russiaas a result of the execution up to the present time of 229,052 Jews (see Appendix). The remainder still left in the Baltic Provinces is urgently required as labour and housed in Ghettos.
To attain this object various kinds of measures were necessary in the different areas of the [Ostland].
In the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Jewry did not make itself decisively felt until the Bolsheviks had come into power there. But even before that the Jewish influence on the one hand and the anti-Jewish feeling of the population on the other hand, were very strong.
In the following the various areas of the Eastern Territories will be dealt with separately:
As Estonia, until the middle of the last century, was part of a closed zone of the Russian Empire, into which it was forbidden for Jews to immigrate, the number of Jews in the country has always been insignificant.
At the beginning of 1940 there were living in Estonia about 4500 Jews out of a total population of 1.2 millions. Their influence on the economic life of the country was considerably stronger than the proportion of Jews to the whole population. For instance 11% of Estonian industry was in Jewish hands. During the Bolshevik time it is true Jewish private property was nationalized, but nevertheless the Jews themselves were almost everywhere left as Directors of their former enterprises. By means of connections with the NKWD the Jews got themselves into a very strong position. They controlled the Press, cultural institutions, forced their way into the open professions, and were the only minority besides the Germans to have the right to cultural autonomy.
With the advance of the German troops the majority of the Jews, together with the Soviet-Russian authorities, left the country. Approx. 2000 Jews remained behind in the country. Out of these almost 1000 lived in Reval alone.
The Estonian Self Protection Movement [Selbstschutz], formed as the Germans advanced, did begin to arrest Jews, but there were no spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and the SD were the Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work.
Today there are no longer any Jews in Estonia.
The total number of Jews in Latvia amounted in 6/1935 to 93479 or 4.79% of the total population.
When the Bolsheviks came into power in Latvia in 6/1940, their Soviet-Russian racial comrades succeeded in obtaining authoritative influence for the Latvian Jews, who previously had been predominantly Zionist. Whereas before 1940 there were no Jews as State officials in Latvia, in fact were no Jews in the State Administration at all, in the Soviet Russian Republic all the influential State positions were quickly in the hands of the Jews. Half of the total number of Judges were Jewish. The number was up to 80% in the Higher Courts and in particular on the Tribunal. Equally strong was the influence of the Jews on the economy and cultural life.
When the German troops marched in there were still 70,000 Jews in Latvia. The remainder had fled with the Bolsheviks. The Jews left behind were actively engaged in sabotage and setting fire to places. In Duenaburg so many fires of this kind were started by the Jews that a large part of the Town was destroyed.
After the terror of the Jewish-Bolshevik rulealtogether 33,038 Letts were transported, imprisoned or murderedan extensive pogrom carried out by the population might have been expected. In fact, however, only a few thousand Jews were eliminated by local forces on their own initiative. In Latvia it was necessary to carry out extensive mopping-up operations by means of Sonderkommandos with the help of forces picked from the Latvian Auxiliary Police (mostly relations of the Letts who had been carried off or murdered).
Up to 10/1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed by these Sonderkommandos. The remaining Jews who were still indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.
As a result of punishments instituted for not wearing the Jewish star, black market, thieving, fraud, but also to prevent the danger of epidemics in the Ghettos, further executions were subsequently carried out. In this way 11,034 Jews were executed in Duenaburg on 9.11.41, ad, as the result of an action ordered and carried out by high authorities and Police chiefs, 27,800 were executed in Riga at the beginning of 12/1941, and, in the middle of 12/1941, 2,350 were executed in Libau. At the moment there are in the Ghettos (other than Jews from the Reich) Latvian Jews in Riga approximately 2,500 Duenaburg approximately 950 Libau approximately 300.
These are indispensable at the moment as they are specialized workers necessary for maintaining the country's economy.
3. Lithuania
Until the Bolsheviks marched in, according to a census taken in 1923 there were 153,743 Jews living in Lithuania, forming 7.58% of the total population. Whereas their influence had previously for the greater part been restricted to the business world, the Lithuanian Jews, who had already been working illegally for Bolshevism, now quickly became a dominating influence in public life. In particular Jews of both sexes supported the activities of the NKWD. The transporting of 40,000 Lithuanians to Siberia is traceable to the preliminary work done by the Jews.
When the German troops marched in the Lithuanians expressed their hatred of the Jews in active pogroms, at the same time Jewish communist youths set fire to many towns, through which the German armoured units had passed leaving them little damaged, by means of tins of petrol which they had previously put ready.
As a result of the pogroms carried out by the Lithuanians, who were nevertheless substantially assisted by Sipo and SD, 3,800 Jews in Kauen and 1,200 in the smaller towns were eliminated.
Where Jews were able to escape they were not infrequently handed over to the authorities by the farmers.
These spontaneous mopping-up actions were, however, insufficient to stabilize this rear section of the Front, and at the same time the enthusiasm of the local inhabitants waned
Therefore by means of selected unitsmostly in the proportion of 1:8first of all the prisons, and then systematically district by district the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a great number of single actions. It is worthy of note that many of the Jews used force against the officials and Lithuanian auxiliaries who were carrying this out, and before their execution still expressed their Bolshevik convictions by cheering Stalin and abusing Germany.
As the complete liquidation of the Jews was not feasible as they were needed for labour, Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows:
Kauen approximately 15,000 Jews.
Wilna approximately 15,000 Jews.
Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews.
These Jews are used primarily for work of military importance. For example up to 5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen on earth-works and work of that sort.
4. White Russia
The White Russian Sector is more thickly populated by Jews than all the other States in the Ostland. In the year 1926, far more than 400,000 Jews were counted in the then BSSR. The last Polish census showed more than 500,000 Jews in the provinces [Wojwodschaften] of Bialystock, Nowo Grodlek, Polesien and Wilna. These figures are however approximate and most certainly too low, which is further apparent from the fact that far more people have given "Yiddish" as their mother tongue than there were supposed to be Jews counted in the same area. Quite half of the Jews in the White Russian Settlement Area lived at the beginning of the war in the larger towns. Minsk was occupied to a very particular extent by Jews, in 1939 there were approximately 100,000 out of a total population of 238,000.
The social structure of the Jews shows a broad lower stratum of very poor Jews, both in the area formerly Polish, and in the White Russian Sector which was Bolshevik before the Russo-Polish war.
The proportionately thin upper stratum dominated simply every sphere of life in the former Polish sector, mainly as a result of its strong economic position, and in the former Soviet-Russian sector as a result of their influence in the leading party positions. The Jew in the area formerly Polish is a particularly dangerous element, because of his intelligence and activity. But even the Soviet-Russian Jew has during the 25 years of Bolshevik domination assumed a very self-sufficient and arrogant air, which he has even retained after the entry of the German troops.
The final and fundamental elimination of the Jews remaining in the White Russian sector after the entry of the Germans is fraught with certain difficulties. Just in this place the Jews form an extremely high percentage of the specialized workers, who are indispensable because of the shortage in other reserves in this area.
Furthermore Einsatzgruppe A did not take over this area until after the heavy frost had set in, which made mass executions much more difficult. A further difficulty is that the Jews live widely scattered over the whole country. In view of the enormous distances, the bad conditions of the roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol and the small forces of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort in order to be able to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews have been shot up to now. This number does not include those shot in operations by the former Einsatzkommandos. From estimated figures about 19,000 partisans and criminals, that is in the majority Jews, were shot by the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] up to 12/1941. At the moment approximately 128,000 Jews must still be reckoned with in the area of the Commissariat-General. In Minsk itself exclusive of Reich Germansthere are about 1,800 Jews living, whose shooting must be postponed in consideration of their being used as labour.
The Commander in White Russia is instructed to liquidate the Jewish question as soon as possible, despite the difficult situation. However a period of about 2 months is still requiredaccording to the weather.
The shutting up of all the remaining Jews in special Ghettos is also almost completed in the towns in White Russia too. They will be used for work to the fullest extent by the authorities of the Armed Forces, the Civil Administration and German Authorities.
The feeding of the Jews in the Ghettos causes considerable difficulty, especially in White Russia but also in Lithuania. Together with the general decrease in working capacity, there is increased susceptibility to all contagious diseases.
5. Jews from the Reich.
Since 12/1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at short intervals from the Reich. Of these 20,000 Jews were directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. The first 10,000 Jews evacuated to Riga were housed partly in a provisionally erected reception camp and partly in a newly established hut encampment near Riga. The remaining transports have for the time being been directed into a separate part of the Riga Ghetto.
The building of the hut encampment, as a result of the employment of all Jews fit for work, is so advanced that all evacuated Jews who survive the winter can be put into this camp in the spring.
Only a small section of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80% are women and children or old people unfit for work. The death rate is rising continually, also as a result of the extraordinarily hard winter.
The amount done by those few Jews from the Reich who are fit for work is satisfactory. They are preferred as Tabour to the Russian Jews, because they are German speaking and because of their comparatively greater cleanliness. Worthy of note is the adaptability of the Jews, with which they attempt to form their life in accordance with the circumstances.
The crowding together of the Jews into the smallest space, which occurs in all the Ghettos, naturally causes greater danger of epidemics, which is being combatted as much as possible by the employment of Jewish doctors. In isolated instances sick Jews with contagious diseases were selected under the pretext of putting them into a home for the aged or a hospital and executed.
CHART [See Chart Number 4 in the last volume of this publication]
Judenfreifree of Jews
Jewish Executions carried out by Special Purpose Group A.
Estimated number of Jews still remaining 128,000.
of Gustav Schiefer, born 7/17/1876, residence: Munich 9, No. 3 Armanspergstrasse, about what happened to him when the Nazis came on 3/9/1933.
I was employed as part time worker [Hilfsarbeiter] by the former Trade Union Society, Munich, beginning 11/11/1911. During the years 1914-1918, I was in the World War.
After the revolution in 11/1918 I was elected Executive Chairman of the General German Trade Union Association [Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund], Local Committee, Munich. I held this position without interruption until 3/9/1933.
On that day the Nazis stormed the Munich Trade Union Headquarters Building, 40/42 Pestalozzistrasse. The offices remained closed until 15 March. On 13 March my late colleague Erhard Kupfer, former District Secretary of the General German Trade Union Association [ADGB] and I had to report to the, then, State Commissar Wagner, and were ordered to reopen the Munich Trade Union Headquarters Building, and with it the offices, by 15 March, and to resume normal activity within the framework of the trade unions.
Since I was at the same time chairman of the Munich Trade Union Headquarters Building, Inc., it became my task to take over the house in its entirety, and with it the individual offices of the trade unions.
Because safes and strong-boxes, in fact everything that was locked, had been smashed open, and because safes and tills, in the main, were empty, I refused to take over the house and offices in their present condition. I stated that I would take over the house only in the condition in which it was when it was taken away from us on 9 March.
The house had been taken over on 3/9/1933 by Herr Kurt Frey, and returned to us on 16 March by the former executive secretary of the Hotel, Restaurant, etc. Employees' Association, Herr Reichart. This Nazi, with whom I did not get along too well because of his equivocal attitude, believed that the opportunity had arrived to wreak his vengeance on me.
I was dragged to the great hall, paper and pencil put before me with the challenge to designate these Nazis who had committed thefts during the period of 3/9-15/1933. I could not do that, since I did not know the individuals. As I refused my signature about 10 Nazis beat me promiscuously and indiscriminately until I collapsed. Upon that they seized me and threw me into the bottom of the light shaft of the Trade Union Headquarters Building. After lying there for some time I summoned up my strength and tried to rouse myself. When the Nazis noted that, they again dragged me into the hall and beat me until I collapsed and fainted. My colleagues Josef Gessl, former executive secretary of the Cobblers' Association, and Richard Moses, employee of the General Mutual Benefit Local Pay Office [Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse], Munich, grabbed me and brought me in this condition to the Munich-Schwabing hospital. In addition to many other injuries, Professor Dr. Kerschensteiner, director of this institution, diagnosed serious concussion of the brain with hemorrhage into the brain. I remained from 15 March to 5/5/1933. On 5 May the Precinct Physician, at that time already a Nazi, certified that I was sufficiently fit for arrest. On 5 May I was transported to the Ettstrasse Police Prison, and from there to Stadelheim. I remained in Stadelheim until 8/25/1933.
It is due to an extraordinarily fortunate circumstance that I was saved from Dachau in 1933. Medical Privy Councillor Dr. Geisendoerfer, who was chief physician in Stadelheim, knew me from the Cooperative Sickness Benefit movement (I had been on the Committee of the General Mutual Insurance Local Pay Office [Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse], Munich, for 25 years). Through the many negotiations with the physician I had been in close touch with the above-named gentleman. During my stay in Stadelheim the Gestapo had me examined five times by the chief physician, who always held a protective hand over me, and to whom I am also indebted for my early release, due to a serious illness (intestinal gap of 15 cm depth and 7-8 cm length). I was then sick and unable to work until 12/24/1933. On that day I was sent away by the Trustee Physician of the General Mutual Benefit Local Pay Office, Munich (city), in spite of my request to allow me to draw sickness benefits until the eve of the New Year. He said that there was no reason to grant the request. As far as I know this Trustee Physician was Medical Councillor Dr. Plate. I was then unemployed until 5-6/1934 and then accepted various jobs as representative. After my release from Stadelheim I had to report to the police every third day for almost 2 years. Constant police supervision was one of the simplest cases of chicanery.
Upon the initiative of my colleague Wilhelm Leuschner, Berlin, I joined the movement against the Nazi system in good time; and it was exclusively due to he steadfastness of my colleague Leuschner that I, like many other friends, am still alive.
After the assassination attempt on Hitler on 7/20/1944, I was again arrested and shipped to Dachau Concentration Camp. As is well known, that project was called "Gitter."
On 10/6/1944 I was released without any interrogation. I was extraordinarily fortunate. Since 5/2/1945 I am again active, in the trade union as well as the political movement and also in social work and life.
As witnesses for the correctness of my statements I name the persons already mentioned above, who brought me to the Schwabing hospital (Josef Gessl and Richard Moses).
And how decent were we once more in the year 1945. Not a hair on the head of any of these swine was harmed on behalf of the trade unions. We bore witness, and still bear witness today, for human dignity and justice.
Other liberated colleagues of the Free Trade Unions got away with beatings in the cellar of the Trade Union Headquarters Building in the beginning. Among others my colleague, Anton Friebl, now living at 4 Gabrielenstrasse, 2nd floor. Many deceased colleagues, such as Georg Kandlbinder, Josef Ertl, Heinrich Gassner and many others.
Munich, 10/17/1945
[signed] G. SCHIEFER
Today on 11/19/1945, I have re-read and signed every single page of the statement given by me on 10/17/1945. I declare hereby under oath that this statement is true.
[signed] Gustav Schiefer Gustav Schiefer
SWORN TO BEFORE ME 11/19/1945, Munich, Germany.
[signed] Kurt A. Baer, 0-1041959 Captain, CAC 3rd Military Government Regiment APO 403, U.S. Army
Official tour of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart to the districts of Warsaw, Lublin, and Radom from 11/17-22/1939
Those taking part were:
1. Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
2. Dr. Sild.
3. Dr. Rahn, department of food and agriculture in the office of the General Governor.
4. Legation Councillor [LGR] Dr. Goetze, economic department. 17.11. Departure at 7.0 a.m. from Burg Cracow in a car. To Warsaw via Mislowitz, Sosnowitz, Czestochau, Radomsko, Petrikau, Lodz, Tomaszow and Rawa. Arrival 1.0 p.m. Received by the governor, Dr. Fischer and the gentlemen of his staff, followed by a small luncheon party.
At 3.0 p.m., Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart addressed the department heads of the District Chief and stated, among other things, that the chief guiding rule for carrying out the German administration in the General Government must be solely the interests of the German Reich. A stern and inflexible administration must make the area of use to German economy and so that excessive clemency may be guarded against, the results of the intrusion of the Polish race into German territory must be brought to mind.
Following that the Reich Minister held conferences with the governor, Dr. Fischer, and Section Head, Dr. Barth, on administrative and economic questions; later on, experts and heads of departments were called into the conferences to make reports.
Among other specifications, Dr. Fischer submitted to the Reich Minister the specification attached to the plan for the preliminary arrangement of the departments in the office of the District Chief and of the authorities in Warsaw.
Dr. Fischer reported that, in particular, the number of personnel was still considerably too small. Three out of 14 Sub-Prefects [Landraete] were also missing. Of the departments in the District Office, only a few had their full complement; that was also the case with the department of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and the Labour department. Of important experts, there were still none for taxes and monopolies. In the Health Service, one medical advisor was, at the same time, head of the Health Department and district physician. The accommodation of the authorities also left much still to be desired.
Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart then stated that a large sum for the productive support of unemployed would be made available. This sum could be used for erecting or repairing any buildings required by the administration.
The governor, Dr. F., reported that further German administrative and municipal officials were also required for the administration of the city of Warsaw. Then a discussion took place on the organization of the district authorities, the occupation of the rural districts [Landkreise] and on the question of transferring the remaining 5 communities of the Gtojec district from the district of Radom, and a further 5 communities of the Garwolin district from the district of Lublin, to the district of Warsaw. Reich Minister S. I. promised to look into this affair. After that, general questions on the division and personnel to occupy the districts were discussed. Reich Minister S. I. agreed that should the District captain [Kreishauptmann] not be a lawyer the best arrangement for a district captaincy [Kreishauptmannschaft] was to assign to him a representative who was trained in legal matters. Dr. Fischer reported that, up to now, the German administration had been set up as essentially a supervising authority over a Polish administration. Questions arose from this as to what range of subjects should be included in the functions of the District chief. It was superfluous to draw up any building regulations, for should accommodation be had, it concerned only the Poles themselves. Then the question of using Polish employees at the German administrative courts was touched upon. There were some 300 Polish employees working at the office of the District Chief of Warsaw. The administration by the German authorities would have especially to serve for the utilization of the Government's sphere for German economy, so the administration of agriculture, Labour, and Roads especially would have to be well-ordered, on the other hand, trade, settlements, or even the accountancy of the Polish communities are of less importance.
Dr. Fischer then raised the question of prices. Price commissars were to be sent from the Reich and they would equalize the standard of prices with that in the Reich. Wages would then, however, have to be adapted to his standard and this might have unforeseen consequences. Reich Minister S.I., on the other hand, stated that Generaloberst v. Brauchitsch wished to place army orders for textiles cheaply in Lodz and suitable industrial centres. Dr. F. thought that higher prices had their good points as at Warsaw, for instance which had only been fed because of higher prices which gave the farmers an incentive to bring their goods into the city. Thereupon, Reich Minister S.I. put the question of how a definite influence could be obtained on the price system and on the system of distributing goods by setting up monopolies for essential goods such as salt, sugar, coal, petrol, and tobacco. If these goods are in one's hands and if it be possible to make them available to the farmer for a definite price, he would also be prepared to sell his products for a corresponding price in order to obtain the goods he requires. Moreover for the time being it could not be a question of furnishing better living conditions for the Poles, but merely of securing the minimum of existence for them. However, it could not be regarded in that light when a forced laborer was paid nine Zloty per week.
Hereupon Reichsminister Dr. S.I. received the report of the City President [Stadtpraesidenten] of Warsaw, Dr. Dengel. He declared the problem of the unemployed to be the m.t urgent one. Until now taxes to the amount of 150000 RM had been received, but this would not be nearly sufficient, not even for the reconstruction of the most urgently needed public buildings. The city budget was now in preparation, but already it became apparent, that a loan to the amount of 50 million Zloty from the Reich Credit Bank [Reichskreditkasse], was needed. Sufficient city property was available as security, of which an inventory was being prepared. Later on the tax revenue would probably be sufficient for regular interest on the loan. Regarding the tax system, the City President reported that the cities received shares and additional payments over and above the remittances [Ueberweisungen] of State taxes, about the same as in the old Austria. The administration of property taxes would be partially difficult, since during this mix-up no status of persons or assets could be established.
On the question being put by Reichsminister Dr. S.I. the City President reported that in Warsaw about 40% of the buildings would be again habitable, after part of them had been repaired. Dr. F. thought, one would leave one quarter of the destroyed city for inspection, but otherwise lay out grass plots in place of the debris. The City President then mentioned the question of the Polish City officials. For their necessities they have been receiving so far up to 250 Zlotys a month and those with higher salaries half of the surplus up to 1200 Zloty. Dr. F. pointed to the decree of the Governor General, whereby 100% of the basic salaries and not over 1000 Zloty could be paid. The activity of the banks was then mentioned. Stocks in gold, precious metals, and foreign currencies had been. delivered by them to the Reichsbank. The inhabitants were obliged to deposit all their money at the bank, withdrawals depending on the approval of the City President. Dr. F. explained that the banking system was now attached to the Department of Economic Affairs at the office of the District Chief.
The City President now reported on welfare questions. Specific difficulties had arisen from the sudden departure, on higher authority, of the relief train Bavaria. Workers who could buy no food for themselves, were frequently unable to continue working. The welfare service of the NSV confined itself to the racial Germans, whereby certain difficulties were caused by the question of determining who were racial Germans, of which about nine to ten thousand were now living in Warsaw. Jews were not aided, even out of municipal funds.
For the care of the Poles, the Polish social Self-Help was to be called into activity again, and was to be continued by the men who had formerly directed it. The supervisor was to be supplied, against payment, with motor cars and trucks with fuel, and permission was to be granted to the organization to accept voluntary contributions in the country. The confiscated bank accounts of about 9 million Zloty are to be at the disposal of the organization.
The City President then pointed to the absolute necessity of the speediest establishment of criminal justice officials as well as a civil court. An orderly continuation of economic life depended on the latter. He then also reported on the Court of Corporal Punishment [Pruegelstrafengericht], which had been established for the punishment of crimes amongst the Poles.
Dr. F. pointed out that possibly greater treasures might be hidden in the Jewish quarter.
Reichsminister S.I. commented then that the building up of the administration to be effected in Poland, was a good school for those participating in it.
The ideal arrangement would be that a Party man with strong initiative should stand at the head of the administration, at whose side would be experts and an experienced administrator, in order to include the work in the general system.
The head of the department, Labour Oberregierungsrat Dr. Epse then spoke. He expressed the hope that it would later on be possible to exchange forced labor by normal labor. There was a definite lack of tools; he had therefore started a small factory for the manufacture of tools, and now construction of the most primitive sort was going on at the airport and on the highways. The question of transport was the most important and would have to be tackled ahead of the clearing-up work. At present a survey was being made of all undertakings which were at all capable of production, and, after the Reich had decided what was to he manufactured, they were to begin operations. Possibly three shifts were to work in these factories to equalize the destruction.
A difficult problem was the multitude of the new unemployed Polish intellectuals. The students could still be trained in handicraft, but for the 80000-90000 Polish officials, one must, if occasion arises, revert to reconstruction of the Polish Administration Departments.
Reichminister S.I. then stated clearly that a second Polish subadministration would be considered by the German authorities solely in the form of a welfare organization.
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe remarked that the activity of the sick fund and of social welfare would largely be dependent on the functionaries of the railroad and postal systems. Both welfare branches were controlled by a head institution for social security which was already again showing a certain profit. The administrative office could also be rebuilt with available materials. The property of the head institution is said to have been largely transferred to Russia in the form of securities. Fortunately, it was largely a question of mortgages, which could be declared invalid.
As an added difficulty, Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe then also mentioned that wages had been brought down below the former level, due to surplus labour.
Reichsminister Dr. S.I. asked if the proclaimed tariffs were really to be enforced. In any case no official Polish State should be set up. Oberregierungsrat Dr. Espe thought that, on the basis of tax collection, this decree was advantageous, and one could naturally not suffer the obvious ignoring of regulations which we had promulgated. Reichsminister Dr. S.I. thought that this was no further problem east of the Reich border. One could, at an opportune moment, seize upon a case of border violation for corresponding exemplary and also otherwise useful action.
Then the representative of the Reich Railways at the office of the District Chief, Oberreichs Bahnrat Prasch, appeared to give a report. He said now that military transport had come to an end, traffic from the west was going on well. Also trains to Cracow went through Kattowitz. The number of locomotives taken over was fairly satisfactory, the major part, however, had gone to Russia where they possibly would not even be needed because of the change in the railway gauge, which had already been started to great extent. Trains were already going to Lublin, also. Today, two railroad bridges were in operation. Reichsminister S. I. pointed out that, above all, the tracks to Cracow which do not go through Kattowitz, had to be restored in order that the necessary gasoline and petroleum could be brought from the oil field region to Warsaw. Admittedly, an increased amount of suitable freight cars was still necessary, but that could be accomplished by repairing the existing damaged tank cars.
The director of the "Trade Economy" Department, Regierungsrat Dr. von Coelln now came forward to give a report. He i stated that, in the district of Warsaw, almost all branches of industry were represented. French and Dutch capital was invested in the oil field enterprises. Dr. von Coelln then said that in the district of Warsaw still considerable supplies of raw materials were stored in soap factories. These soap factories should again be put into operation. The produced soap was made of a higher solution of fat acid than was at present stipulated in the Reich. Reichminister Dr. S. I. said the Order of the Governor General according to which the factories were permitted to produce one third of their pre-war production, must be amended and the soap should be confiscated. Furthermore, it was agreed that war economic works, car factories, the chemical and optical industries, etc., should be put quickly into operation. Dr. von Coelln then also raised the question of how the import and export between the Reich and the "Government" should be arranged, if the coal region with Sosnowic, Dabrowa, and Trzebinia also becomes German territory and, after the 20th the control of foreign currencies and customs will be carried out. He then reported that the electrical plants in Warsaw were in working order. In spite of an order to the contrary, there were about 30 night clubs in Warsaw.
Of primary importance was the question of safeguarding the still existing supplies of soap, tea, etc. The control of such goods as petroleum, light, salt, fertilizers, etc., by some method of monopoly, could best be accomplished through consumer co-operatives.
Now appeared State Farmer Leader Koerner. He reported that the supplying of Warsaw with food from Lublin and Radom must be made to operate better. Up to now, Warsaw had been supplied in that respect by Posen. Five thousand tons of grain were now going to be supplied to Warsaw, 15000 of which were already on the way. 20% of the grain in the "Government" was destroyed through military action. There was also a shortage of meat and similar commodities. In this case, however, as a matter of principle, nothing should be sent in from the Reich. Until the next harvest, the Polish population should be principally provided with sufficient amounts of grain and potatoes only. It would take about from 3-4 years to build up the stock of cattle again. The prices of grain should be kept on a level of from 25-30% above those of 9/1/1939. Such prices were sufficient for the farmers.
At 8.00 P. M. supper with the commanding officer of the cit garrison.
18. 11. 8 o'clock departure from Hotel Europejski in Warsaw for a drive of inspection within the Warsaw district accompanied by the Governor Dr. Fischer. Survey of the destroyed bridges over the Bug at Wyszkow, and then on via Lochow to Ostrow.
At Ostrow visit to the Sub-Prefect [Landrat] von Boehnau, who reports on his work to Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Boehnau sees a special difficulty in the fact that the administrative services of the Wehrmacht will be recalled in the very near future. The Sub-Prefects [Landraete] have relied mainly on these units. After they have gone away they will be very short of labor.
In the Ostrow district there are also special food difficulties to be noted, since the district on whose agricultural authorities Ostrow's supplies depended was said to have come under the Russians. There was some talk that the Russians here would withdraw 5 kilometers.
A particular nuisance also was the badly guarded frontier, due to the shortage of police, which made possible a continuous uncontrolled running backwards and forwards, and a considerable removal of property, particularly by the Jews.
After Ostrow the refugee camp at Malkinia was visited in which there were no refugees at the time. It was reported that up to now about 10000 German nationals had crossed over the frontier there. Frequently displaced Germans from Posen and West Prussia were concerned. Near the frontier we saw the countless Jews and similar rabble that were on the 200 meters or so of no man's land between the German and the Russian frontier posts waiting to cross over into Russian Territory in the darkness. Frequently it is said the Russians themselves bring such refugees back again after a few days. Recently 150 Tax collectors have arrived who will be installed in this section. Above all it is essential that when the administrative services of the Wehrmacht leave, replacements should be put in in good time.
The police officer reported that when settling the frontier zone of interests the Russian officers made an excellent impression and were distinctly better informed than the Germans were.
After lunch at the Landrat von Boehnau's in Ostrow we set out at 1400 hours on the drive via Siedlce, Sokolow to Biala-Podlaska where we spent the night at the operations command of the Security Service there.
On 19.11. At 7.30 A. M. departure in the direction of Brest-Litovsk to the Bug frontier. We drove past the airdrome of Terespol where we could see numbers of airplanes destroyed by German bombers. The land there is partly marshy, the villages produce a distinctly Russian impression. In the afternoon we drove on from Biala via Radzyn, Lubartow to Lublin. On the way, lunch at Major General von Courbiere's the commander of the 213th Division.
1900 hours, arrival in Lublin, received by the Governor, SS. Brigadeführer Schmidt, at the town council building where the Sub-Prefects, the divisional leaders and the police leaders attached to the District chief were gathered together.
SS. Brigadeführer Schmidt welcomed the Reich Minister "in the easternmost corner of the territory of German interests." Dr. Seyss-Inquart, after having had the collaborators of the Governor's introduced, conveyed the good wishes of the Governor General whose forthcoming visit to Lublin he announced. He then expounded the Principles in accordance with which the administration in the "Government" must be conducted. This administration would require above all the ability to pull through on its own strength without being a burden to the Reich. This could be attained especially by the firm comradeship of the men stationed there. The resources and inhabitants of this country would have to be made of service to the Reich, and only within these Limits could they prosper. Independent political thought should no longer be allowed to develop. The Vistula area might perhaps be still more important to German destiny than the Rhine.
The Minister then gave us a guiding theme to the District Leaders: We will further everything which is of service to the Reich and will. put an end to everything which may harm the Reich. Dr. Seyss-Inquart then added, that the General Governor wished that those men who were fulfilling a task for the Reich here should receive a material post in keeping with their responsibility and achievements.
Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart then touched on the question of Ukrainians, who could be allowed a certain cultural life of their own, which must never, however, be allowed to lead to a national movement. In conclusion Dr. Seyss-Inquart invited the District Leaders to bring their troubles and questions at any time to the Governor, so that he can find the best solution in co-operation with them.
District Chef Schmidt replied that these political directives should also be worked out in the course of the present conference. Personality was more necessary for the tasks before them than the knowledge required for a usual administration. The area embracing the district of Lublin required special consideration, for on account of the re-settlement it was a collecting point for Germans, who were no longer allowed to live in Germany, and for other destructive elements. Here iron firmness must be brought to bear. It would be a good idea if the General Governor were personally to gain an insight into the particular conditions existing in this region. Here also, a guard of collaborators was being trained, who would carry out the most valuable work in German Eastern Politics.
We had dinner with SS. Sturmbannführer Hasselberger where we also spent the night (until the arrival of Brigadeführer Globocznik, police Assistant to the District Chief).
Hasselberger is of the opinion, in answering to questions by Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart, that the (racial German) individual protection is an encumbrance. He did not dream it possible to organize the Ukrainians as an auxiliary Police Force.
11/20/1939. 08.30 Sight-seeing tour of Lublin, University Cracow Gate and the part of the city, built by the GermansOld Lublinas well as the prison. Then a conference with the District Chief. At first questions were discussed concerning the division into districts and the supplying with personnel of the offices of the District Leaders. Here also the lack of staff again stood first. Especially after the withdrawal of the construction battalion the Sub-Prefects be left without police and without any office help. Here also Dr. Seyss-Inquart raised the question, as to what tasks should belong to the sphere of the German administration. On the question of the setting up of the councils of the District leaders, many District Leaders thought it necessary, to have a legal representative. Furthermore clerical staff and interpreters would be required. In the administrative services of the Wehrmacht were some people who, in case of need, were willing to remain on there as employees. Also the Wehrmacht might be willing to transfer certain people, for instance as trustees for agricultural estates, and so on. Also individual teachers badly needed for schools could e obtained in this way. After the departure of the administrative troops, there might also be a lack of motor vehicles, as they had very often brought their own vehicles with them.
Governor Schmidt had learned that the petrol of the Government was to be included in the Reich Syndicate. Petrol here costs 8 Pfg. more than in the Reich. Therefore 8 Pfg. more will have to be paid to the German Petrol accounts for which the Government will be charged. Then questions were discussed concerning the general construction of the office of the District Chief in Lublin. As to taxes, it was to be confirmed, that the revenue offices had re-employed 80% of the Polish revenue officials, many of whom were to be in sole charge of the tax administration out in the country. Now inspectors are to be appointed for the supervision of these posts. The District Chief should handle the supervision of the revenue offices.
The office work of the District Chief is much delayed by the lack of expert workers. Partly also there was no control over the work of the people who had already arrived. Thus Mr. Ziere, the veterinary surgeon, had gone to Cracow, and said he had to look after the wollynian cattle there.
Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart suggested that Junkers from Ordensburgen should be asked for as assistants for the administration of the General Government. This would be excellent training for them. Besides higher officials, the District Chief is still in need of a magistrate, four inspectors, and a larger number of clerical staff and typewriters.
Of petrol the office of the District Chief would need 10000 litres per month, and each Sub-Prefect's Office would need 2000 litres. But one of the greatest nuisances was the poor communications. One hardly could get any connection with Cracow by telephone, also the mail service was very poor. Till now no replies have been received to letters or orders sent to Cracow. The installation of a teleprinter was urgently needed. But above all, the telephone or police communication from Lublin to the frontier district should function.
With regard to the necessary force of the police, that should be at the disposal of the Sub-Prefects. Governor Schmidt said, that 25 for each District Chief did not seem sufficient.
In the afternoon, a sight-seeing tour was made to Wlodawa, Cycow. Cycow is a German village. About 300000 German nationals, who made a very poor impression were gathered in the streets, and they sang national songs conducted by the German Travelling Teacher [Wanderlehrer] Lindner who is leader of the German nationals there. Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart made a speech, on which he pointed out that the fidelity of these Germans to their nationality now found its justification and reward through strength of Adolf Hitler. This district with its very marshy character could, according to District Governor Schmidt's deliberations, serve as a reservation for the Jews, a measure which might possibly lead to heavy mortality among the Jews.
35000 German nationals are said to be living in the Lublin government district. As to the problem which concerns schools, the Landrat Kalmus in Oyew said he held the view that no salaries should be paid to the Polish teachers at all, as the Poles in his district represented a minority in comparison with the Jews.
In the evening dinner with the Commissar of the city, Mr. Hagerer, in Cholm, where we spent the night.
21.11.1939. 8 A.M. Sight-seeing tour of the city and visit to the camp for German refugees. For this purpose a big, newly built house belonging to the Polish railways was reserved, which however is not ready yet to be occupied, as the heating especially cannot be brought into working order on account of the lack of parts, which cannot be procured in Lublin.
Then followed a drive to the famous cathedral of Cholm that used to have a golden dome. After that, we drove off to Hrubieszow, where we found Ukrainian settlements, which are fine compared to the poor Polish huts. The soil also is better. Here also we visited the frontier of the Bug at Uszilug. The Jews are said to have removed much property here, also owing to the poor guarding of the frontier. In this vicinity too is the best soil for wheat in Poland. From this section, some time ago 4000 refugees were taken over from the Russian side. But still thousands are beyond on the border, and many of them are dying, as they cannot be housed or fed. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out the refugees could be allowed to enter if they, themselves, took measures to guarantee that only German nationals entered the district of the Government.
According to the report of the District Chief the Ukrainians attempted to form a self-administration against or without the German administration. Further the District Chief criticized the Reich-Credit-Bank for not granting a credit, which is necessary for the starting of a sugar refinery, to make use of the harvested sugar beets. Then we continued our journey via Zamost, Tomaszow to the border near Belzek. Then there is a refugee camp with Jews. The staff-Surgeon there fears that an epidemic may break out in the camp, which then would endanger the whole neighborhood.
These Jewish refugees who have crossed the frontier secretly, are often sent back again by the Russians days after.
Also there is much concern in this district at the mustering of horses by the Wehrmacht. This mustering would affect the cultivation of the fields.
Governor Schmidt also reported that, in his district, collaboration with the Wehrmacht was poor. Lieutenant General Buechs, Lublin, was giving the "Government"administration and police all possible trouble.
In the evening, supper, and night spent at Sturmbannführer Hasselberger's house.
Departure for Radom
In Radom, reception by District Chief Dr. Lasch. The latter reported, that on his arrival in Radom, he had found a very unpleasant situation there. His predecessor, Regierungspraesident Ruediger, had put himself into strongly opposed the Wehrmacht, and Dr. Lasch had first to bring about a better understanding. Dr. Lasch introduced SS-Oberführer Katzmann to the Reichsminister as Senior SS and Police Chief attached to the District Chief of Radom. Brigadeführer Globocznik who had been nominated to that position in Lublin and was just travelling through, also reported to Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
Dr. Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Lasch now discussed the plan to establish a messenger center in Radom in order to remedy the bad communication system between Cracow and Lublin and between Cracow and Warsaw. According to this plan, mail for all the three northern districts of Cracow should be taken in 5 hours to Radom by train and from there, according to the weather, to the respective places of destination either by NSKK [Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer (Motorists) Korps] messenger or otherwise. The same procedure should be used for the return journey. The agency should be called, perhaps: "Messenger agency of the Governor General in Radom".
Next, Dr. Lasch gave a report on the work which had already been done and on that which should still have to be done in the work of reconstruction and improvement. Here also, lack of personnel and difficulties in transportation were particularly prominent. Furthermore, in the district of Radom, the Polish Squadron was said to be still roving about. The people in question were said to be men who, during the day, attend to their occupations in civilian clothes and, at night, commit excesses in uniform. An encounter with the Wehrmacht was said to have had no success. With the help of a map given the Reichsminister, Dr. Lasch then explained the consolidation of the existing 16 districts into 10. Dr. Lasch will not comply with Governor Dr. Fischer's expressed wishes to hand over a few communities on the border of the northern district, as those were the most fertile ones of the district which, as a whole, was a shortage area.
Regarding the economic question, it was reported that the gun and iron works in Stachachowitsche had already been taken over by the "Hermann-Göring-Werke". Provision should also be made for the restarting of the whole economy, not only the war economy. In order to do that, it was particularly necessary that unemployment pay should no longer be at the rate of 7 Zloty per day or wages at the rate of 3 Zloty. Such a margin offered insufficient incentive to earn one's livelihood through work.
The Governor urgently needed experts and other personnel. A medical officer was especially urgently needed. There was no German physician in the entire district. Individual cases of epidemics such as typhus and dysentery had occurred.
Furthermore, a man for the press and propaganda was necessary. There were eight Polish newspapers in the district who were being attended to by the District Leaders, but with such a procedure a thorough check was not possible. The District Chief then stated his intention to submit to Cracow in the near future a detailed list of the personnel required.
After that, the Governor reported on the set-up of his office which had several Departments:
1. the Department of Internal Affairs: Supervision over the District Leaders, Supreme Supervision over the Polish Administration, Justice, School Affairs, Veterinary Affairs, Medical Affairs, and General Matters.
2. Department of Forestry and Game Preservation: Preservation of Forests and Game, Control of the Entire Timber Industry which was here of particular importance.
3. Department of Economic Affairs: Industry, Commerce Handicrafts, Price Control, industrial Market Regulations, Collaboration with the Agencies of the Four-Year-Plan and the War Economy Inspection [Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion].
4. Traffic Department: Highway System, Railroad System Postal System, Waterways (shall the river Vistula be controlled) Control of the Biliecza, the boundary between the districts of Radom and Warsaw, which could have a favorable result upon agricultural productiveness.
5. Department of Food and Agriculture: The district is an agricultural shortage area. Cultivation must therefore be intensified. For this purpose a good agricultural organization is necessary. The avoidance of difficulties in the food supply this winter is mainly a question of transport. In some areas there is still corn but it must be threshed. There is no coal for the working of the threshing machines. The salt mine at Wiliczka delivers salt only in compensation against natural products.
6. Finance Department: Revenue and expenditure. Concerning "justice" the governor remarked that too many are being condemned to gaol and penal servitude, which hereby burdens the district with costs. The criminals found in the convict prisons were shot. The shootings, however, were no longer carried out in public but in isolated wooded regions.
The majority of the intelligentsia have been imprisoned, one must be careful, however, because the cooperation of these people cannot be dispensed with, especially the doctors, as they are needed for the health of the people and as they also must treat the Germans in many instances. He asks that the governor general issue an order that caution and reserve be exercised when arresting doctors. Concerning the Polish jurisdiction the District Chief suggested an "organisation" in three legal administrative branches:
1. Baronial court [Burggericht]
2. District court [Bezirksgericht]
3. Court of appeals [Kassationsgericht]
The question was then discussed as to in whose name sentences were to be pronounced and if the Polish authorities were to have some kind of official seal.
In regard to the communal administration the appointment of Polish governors (Staros) to administer parts of the district as deputies of the District Chief with headquarters at his office was discussed. There are Polish majors in Radom and Czenstochau, and they would also be appointed to the towns subordinate to the districts. Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out that delegates of the District Chief must be associated with them. Dr. Lasch added, furthermore, that he intended to make the communities pay something towards the repair of roads and other work, executed by means of compulsory labour service or of forced labour, as expense was caused to districts by such work. The wages also for free work must be established uniformly for the whole General Government, as otherwise undesirable movement of workers seeking the highest salaries would result.
At this point the question of the monopoly of important exchange goods for the acquiring of agricultural products was discussed.
Dr. Lasch then declared that it was not possible to transport all scrap metal to the Reich. In the Government there was also a need of scrap metal for the existing foundries.
Dr. Lasch stated furthermore that he had received a petition to send 5000 specialists to the Reich.
Regarding the Polish police the opinion was expressed that arming in a modest way could be carried out and was necessary. The foresters needed at least a fowling piece to defend themselves against wood thieves and peasants.
In the case of the founding of an "individual protection" (Selbstschutz) unit of racial Germans a careful selection and military training of those selected must take place. According to information given by Dr. Lasch the Ukrainians are said to be specially qualified to be policemen.
Dr. Lasch brought up the question as to what should be done with the destroyed villages.
The tax system could consist mainly of indirect taxes and contributions, which were to be borne by the communities. A contribution of 6 Million Zloty must be borne by the Jews in the district of Radom. In the district of Radom a co-operative buying and selling society will be founded in order to eliminate the entire Jewish Commission business.
Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart then spoke of the regulation provided, according to which the government should not receive any more motor fuel from the Reich, but must be dependent on the production of Jaslo and Kresno the utilization of which, however, was to be determined in accordance with the principles of the Reich. In this connection the formation of a trading organization was also discussed.
Dr. Lasch and Brigade-Leader Schmidt then spoke of the intention of the Wehrmacht to confiscate 54000 horses. Two studs in the district- he declared district studs. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out that the possessions of the Polish government were confiscated by decree and therefore are out of the reach of the Wehrmacht. Finally Dr. Seyss-Inquart spoke of the plan to publish a general administration decree for the General Government after a period of development and elucidation.
Cracow, 11/22/1939.
The Reich Commissioner for the Ostland [ Baltic countries and White Russia] Dept. III Labor policy and social Administration
Riga, 5/3/1943
Labor Group Labor Mobilization 2 F 1/4 b. 1 (O) Kue Ty
To the Commissioner General in Riga [stamp] Commissioner General Dept. Social Administration 5/8/1943 in Riga 2]
Re: Recruiting of Manpower in the Baltic Countries for the Reich territories; here: New quotas agreed upon with GBA Gauleiter Sauckel on 4/21/1943.
In reference to the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary General for manpower, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occasion of his visit to Riga on 4/21/1943, and in view of the critical situation and in disregard of all contrary considerations, it was decided that a total of 183000 workers have to be supplied from the Ostland for the Reich territory. This task must absolutely be accomplished within the next four months and at the latest must be completed by the end of August. The following sub-quotas have been established:
White Ruthenia: 30000 youthful workers and 100000 workers including families.
Of the families only members capable of productive work will be counted. All persons 10 years old and up are considered as productive manpower.
Lithuania: 15000 female workers. 15000 male workers. 10000 productive workers from about 2000-3000 families
Latvia: 10000 female workers, no male workers
Estonia: 3000 female workers, no male workers
For the benefit of volunteers [Hilfswilligen] no male manpower will be recruited in Latvia and Estonia. For Estonia also in favor of the Legion.
All permissible means shall be used to obtain the manpower from White Ruthenia. Do not hesitate to apply unusual measures.
In Lithuania the 15000 men shall be taken from the current recruitment of the year groups 19-24. The placement of the manpower for the Reich, excluding volunteers should be one half for the Baltic countries' own requirements and one half for Reich requirements. In case the number of 15000 workers cannot be thus obtained, the year groups 12-18 shall be recruited until this number has been reached.
The 15000 female workers shall be obtained from the year groups of 20-25. For this purpose the release of 10% of the women from factories suitable for this purpose, even outside of the age limits set, has been contemplated. The recruitment of females of the year groups 20-25 will follow the examination of males of the year groups 19-24.
Furthermore, the recruitment of about 2000-3000 families- from Lithuania is contemplated, which should contain a total of 10000 productive workers.
In consideration of local requirements and the already accomplished recruiting for the Legion and volunteers and of those volunteers still to be provided by means of re-examining the year groups 19-24, the recruitment of male manpower in Latvia has been dispensed with.
The 10000 female workers will be recruited from the year groups 20-25. Here also a release of 10 from factories is provided for, should the age limits fail to provide sufficient workers.
Estonia will provide 3000 women, also to be recruited from the year groups 20-25, or by release from factories. Otherwise the same applies as for Latvia.
To these workers I have promised the following special social advantages:
1. Limited engagement, generally 2 years' duration.
2. Granting of furloughs and return of families according to the general regulations for foreigners in the Reich.
3. Appointment of special trustees of the same nationality for the female workers.
4. Granting of special diplomas for services rendered in war work in the Reich.
In order to accomplish these measures I have sent a decree, of which a copy is enclosed, to the President of the employment offices. Furthermore, I have asked the Labor Mobilization Office of the German Labor Front, in a letter of which a copy is also enclosed, to arrange for the appointment of special trustees of the same nationality.
Please take notice of this, inform my special purpose staffs (Einsatzstiaebe) accordingly, and take care of the immediate placing of the manpower.
On this occasion I shall like to point out that in the past year the enclosed leaflet was used in hiring Lithuanian manpower. Since this pamphlet contains inaccuracies, please see to it that it is no longer used for recruiting purposes. In view of the explanations in my enclosed decree to the Presidents of provincial labor offices, I do not believe it necessary to provide a special leaflet for Plant-Managers. I refer to your report of 3/25/1943 and to my letter of 4/14/19435783. 28/148about which I should like to have your opinion soon. By reason of a suggestion of the German Labor Front, I should furthermore like to know whether you consider it necessary to conclude individual work contracts for the workers from the districts (Generalbezirke) of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
Copy sent to take notice with reference to in Riga.
Signed: Sauckel
Certified: Mueller Clerk
[seal] Certified: (sig:) Reinkmann 6/18/1943
VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER
The Munich (Southern German) Edition Nr. 258, 9/14/1936, page 11.
THE 5TH DAY OF THE PARTY CONGRESS ADOLF HITLER HAS CARRIED OUT THE TRUE SOCIALISM REICH ORGANIZATION LEADER DR. LEY RENDERS AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT
Nurnberg, 13 September.
Again 20000 stirred people filled the big hall in the Luitpold Park on Saturday for the penultimate session of the Party Congress.
At this session, too, the Führer was present from the beginning. Again enthusiastic shouts of exultation lasting for minutes roared around the Führer when he strode through the long stretched hall with his deputy, his constant retinue and several Reich Leaders and District Leaders. On this evening Congress participants listened to grandly-conceived accounts by Reich Organization Leader Dr. Ley about the accomplishments of the German Labor Front, by Reich Leader Hierl about the Labor Service, and by Plenary Inspector for German Highways, Dr. Todt, about progress in building the highways of Adolf Hitler.
After the parade of the Blood Banner and of the Party Standards the solemn prelude was the overture to "Oberon", played by the Reich Symphony Orchestra. The Congress was opened by the Führer's Deputy, Rudolf Hess, who immediately introduced Reich Agency Leader [Reichsamtsleiter] Dressler-Andress for reading of the account of Reich Organization Leader Dr. Ley.
When you, my Führer, ordered me in mid-4/1933 to take over the trade unions I could not understand why you gave this order to me, since I could not see any connection between my task as Organizational Leader of the Party and my new task. Very soon, however, your decision, my Führer, became clear to me and I recognized that the organizational measures of the Party could only come to full fruition when supplemented by the organization of the people, that is to say by the mobilization of the energies of the people and by their concentration and alignment. If the Party represents the concentration of the political leaders of the peopleas you, my Führer, have taught us again and againthen the people in the retinue [Gefolgschaft] and must be organized and trained according to the same principles. Leader and retinue, elite and community at large [Führer und Gefolgschaft, Orden und Gemeinde]those words the clear directives for my work. These were the consequences:
1. My tasks as Organizational Leader of the Party and as Leader of the German Labor Front were a completely homogeneous task, in other words, in everything I did I acted as Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP.
2. The German Labor Front was an institution of the Party and was led by it.
3. The German Labor Front had to be organized regionally and professional according to the same principles as the Party.
That is why trade union and employer associations had to be smashed unrelentingly, and the basis of construction was formed, as in the Party, by the cell and the local section.
The idea of the Factory Troops [Werkschar] is making good progress in the plants, and I am able to report to you, my Führer, that security and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not only in normal times, but that also in times of the most serious crises, disturbances, such as the munition strikes of the traitors Ebert and his confederates, are out of the question. National Socialism has conquered the factories. Factory troops [Die Werkschar] are the Nationalist Socialist shock troops within the factory, and their motto is:
THE FÜHRER IS ALWAYS RIGHT!
"Document 2284-PS: Writings Of The Hochschule For Politics [translation]", pp.
Edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein II. The Organizational structure of the Third Reich Brochure 33
History, Mission, and Organization of the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP
Compiled on the Commission of the Reichsführer-SS by SS-Standartenführer Gunter d'Alquen 1939 Junker and Duennhaupt Press, Berlin
1. History and Structure of the SS Path of Proof
The great National Socialist Movement, as a party, did not step into German or even world history as a complete framework at the time of its formal founding.
Originating from the rebellion against the downfall, from a fervent belief in the German people, which was born in the trenches of the battle-fields in the whole world, Adolf Hitler began to conquer the new Reich, both in thought and through deeds, with a few comrades, upon the simple, strong fundamentals of his firm belief and to form it anew, stone upon stone.
Decisive actions, like the outbreak of 11/9/1923 for which we today, in all its great tragedy and in all its pain, nevertheless have to thank a forcible fate, impressed the inner and external features into the power and into the structure of the Third Reich. Parts and powers of this living marching growing movement, components and men in it, acquired in proof faith, and reliability which was daily the positions, missions and powers which then determined in the powerful structural branch their course toward victory over external power.
Therefore, he who wants to understand the growing mission and living essence of the SS must first glance over its history and pursue therein how it quite consequentially grew out of the smallest beginnings through tough, clear work into an ever-enlarging mission. Therefore the growth of the SS, as a firmly rooted member of the great Movement is in many respects symbolic of the development of National Socialism, as well as of a spiritual position and of the consequent practical application of this unmistakably clear position in the life of the folk and of its state.
Not the chance incidents of the fighting years and also not the tactical eventualities rounded out the form and brought about the individual developments of this Black Corps, but from the beginning on, the National Socialist of this organization, man upon man, was quite consciously raised again and again above every day affairs which are often petty and full of compromise; thereby raised above his own w-weaknesses into the consciousness which is always new and living, that he serves a powerful mission which is quite unique in the lengthy annals of German history.
The SS originated in the quite early time of the National Socialist Movement in the year 1923. Then later, as the "Stosstrupp Hitler [Shock Troop Hitler]" on 11/8/1923 it was forbidden and dissolved automatically along with the entire movement.
When the Party was again set up in the year 1925, the SA, as the protective organization of the Movement, still remained forbidden. Furthermore, besides these limiting coercive measures, there still existed a prohibition against speeches as well as assemblies for the Führer in Prussia and also in Bavaria. The National Socialist assemblies were at that time only allowed in Saxony and Thuringia which were at that time fully Red. And no in order at least here to hold the necessary assemblies with success, in order to gain a foothold, it was necessary to protect them under all circumstances from explosive missiles and premature disbandment.
The Protective Echelons [Die Schutzstafflen]
For this reason, the Führer ordered in 1/1925 that a small mobile organization be constructed for the protection of these meetings: The Protective Echelons. They were in the best sense of the word at this time, therefore, echelons, which means, quite small formations, most of them only in strength of one leader and ten men, which had been set up in single places which at that time already were important for the first forward march of the Movement. Even such a large city as Berlin had only one "Schutzstaffel" of two leaders and twenty men in those days. With these Schutzstaffeln then in the years 1925-1926, the Movement had held the assemblies of the Führer and also of other champions of the Party in Saxony and Thuringia, and always held fast against each oppositional attempt in every case.
The year 1926 brought the renewed permission to organize the SA and for this reason, the Schutzstaffeln stepped more into the background in the following years.
This year 1926, however, is of great significance for the SS which at that time consisted of about 200 men in its entire strength, when namely Adolf Hitler gave the most sacred symbol of the Movement, the Blood Banner [Blutfahne] of 11/9/1923 into faithful hands at the Party Congress [Parteitag] in Weimar, the second Reichsparteitag of the NSDAP.
On 1/6/1929, Adolf Hitler appointed his tested comrade of long standing, Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsführer-SS. Heinrich Himmler assumed charge therewith, of the en;tire Schutzstaffeln, totaling at the time 280 men, with the express and particular commission of the Führer to form of this organization an elite troop of the Party, a troop dependable in every circumstance.
The New Division
With this day, the real history of the SS begins as it stands before us today in all its deeper essential features, firmly anchored into the National Socialistic Movement. For the SS and its Reichsführer, Heinrich Himmler, its first SS man, have both become inseparable in the course of these battle-filled years. When the command of the Führer had been given for the organization on a greater scale of this component of the movement, it had to be clear from the beginning that this mission could only then be solved in the real significance of its occasion if, in pursuit of the last essentials, the directives given by Adolf Hitler to the movement were grasped and carried out.
We National Socialists are, firmly convinced of the ideology that in the final over-all objective only good blood, as seen in the long run, produces the best accomplishments. Sustained by this conviction, the Reichsführer SS went at that time, beginning with this basic criterion of the National Socialist, into the execution of the command of the Führer of 1/6/1929.
One of the last soldiers of the old army and, at the same time, also one of the oldest co-champions of the Führer began, as a tough and energetic organizer, to collect a troop, a troop of the best, not only the best physically, but also most dependable, most faithful, in the last analysis the most characteristically worthwhile men from all parts of the movement, in order in the first place to satisfy the fundamental demand made of this formation, namely: the greatest good of the movement, to protect the Führer himself.
It remains as one of the greatest and decisive services of the Reichsführer SS that he inserted the theoretical concepts of the National Socialist ideology, courageously and consequentially especially in this field, into this, his own organizational mission of the construction of the SS and then clearly carried them out even at a time when the racial question was a negative concept deriving from a self-evident anti-semitism.
The Marriage Law [Heiratsbefehl]
It would naturally be meaningless and also, after a short time be worthless, to undertake the experiment to assemble a male racial elite and while so doing to by-pass present or, indeed, the future families of the men. Corresponding to this quite simple and clear perception, for which, moreover, German history affords sufficient menacing lessons in all of its periods, the SS has given itself its own appropriate fundamental laws. As the first and most important of these basic requirements, the Reichsführer-SS in the year 1931 gave to the Schutzstaffeln the law which prescribes an engagement and marriage certificate for SS men.
This order has the following wording:
"Reichsführer-SS SS Command-A-No. 65 Munich, 12/31/1931
1. The SS is a band of definitely Nordic German men chosen according to certain viewpoints.
2. Corresponding to the National Socialist ideology and to the perception that the future of our folk rests in the selectiveness and preservation of the race and of the healthy inheritance of good blood, I install with effectiveness from 1/1/1932 the 'Marriage Certificate' for all unmarried members of the SS.
3. The aim striven for is the hereditarily healthy clan of a definitely Nordic German sort.
4. The marriage certificate will be distributed or denied solely and alone from a racial and hereditarily healthy viewpoint.
5. Every SS man who has the object of getting married has to procure for this purpose the marriage certificate of the Reichsführer-SS.
6. SS members who though denied marriage certificates marry in spite of it, will be stricken from the SS; they will be given the choice of withdrawing.
7. The working out of the details of marriage petitions is the tasks of the 'Race Office' of the SS.
8. The Race Office of the SS directs the 'Clan Book of the SS' in which the families of SS members will be entered after distribution of the marriage certificate or acquiescence to the petition to enter into marriage.
9. The Reichsführer-SS, the manager of the Race Office, and the specialists (Referenten) of this office are duty bound on their word of honor to secrecy.
10. It is clear to the SS that with this command it has taken step of great significance. Derision, scorn, and failure to understand do not move us; the future belongs to us!
The Reichsführer-SS H. Himmler"
This incisive command and the self-evidence of its execution demonstrate, even in the difficult years before the first victory, the self-confidence of this voluntary partnership for a determination which even at the time in which it was ordered must mean an eternal, inconceivable, encroachment on the so-called personal freedom of the individual.
The Instrument of the Führer
Inside and outside of the movement, in these years, the SS had to intervene, repeatedly called upon for the protection of the National Socialist fundamental principles. From disunity over the attempt at a schism to the betrayal of the Führer himself, under immeasurable difficulties and grave human sacrifices, the SS fulfilled its various missions as the instrument for unconditional preparedness for intervention for the Führer. It earned for itself at this time the slogan of Adolf Hitler: "SS-man, your honor is faithfulness".
In the whole broad Reich, in village and city, the SS, in good and self-evident comradeship with the SA in the fighting years, broke the Red and Black Terror. Long and stirring is the list of all those brave soldiers of the Black Corps who gave their lives as a pledge of their faithfulness.
They did not die in open battle, eye to eye with the opponent; they fell singly and deserted, pursued, hunted; harassed, beaten, trampled to death, in dark alleys and courtyards, shot in the back, murdered by hostile superior forces; they gave their mortal life, and their names shine forth today, from banners and standards, their earthly immortality as a symbol of a great example which they fulfilled, completely and purely, everywhere, including those unforgettable heroes who fought against the choking gallows of an inhuman system, until even Austria returned home into the greater Reich through their sacrifice.
Responsibility for the Future
But not only the revolutionary fighting and sacrificial spirit of this National Socialist formation, its daily application and by this means the best and clear cut selectiveness, determined its existence and its ever clearer course. Far and beyond this, it was the penetrating feeling of responsibility of its leadership for a distant future which decisively determined its course.
Here, in that difficult moment, those solutions were found for all necessary questions which, indeed in the first place must be justified for the day, far and above that, however, without compromise, bore complete responsibility at the same time in itself for the way of future development.
Apart from the green table, not for the sake of momentary results, distinct from all dogma, a great eternal view of German history and a chaste consciousness of the inheritance of ancestry and the genesis of the future at the decisive point of the fighting period, and of the selectiveness of this partnership, have the peculiar and deep meaning for all missions and their execution.
When the day of the grasping of power had finally come, there were 52000 SS men who in this spirit, bore the revolution in the van, marched into the new State which they began to help form, everywhere: in their stations and positions, in profession and in service, and in all their essential tasks.
The firm, devout ties to this great blood stream of the nation [Volk], the perception of the fulfillment of the deepest German longing for service to the nation, this welding to the firm internal unity of the exclusiveness which the SS was able to achieve, in the course of hard and full years, was the presupposition for the succeeding further greater task of the Black Corps. Only the absolute understanding of the emptiness of all personnel objectives and the final recognition of this valuelessness of smaller interests gave this formation the right to be the protective corps in State and Party as the strong arm of the Führer for the internal security of the Reich in all good and evil times.
Protective Corps of Party and State
The prerequisites for this mighty mission were severe discipline and the highest sort of self-confidence as the result of continuous selection within its own ranks, but were, as well, a fanatical and convinced consciousness of duty to coming generations. Here, the hardiness of the best soldierly traditions met a new and harmonious formation with the keenness of a crystal-clear political consciousness as well as the pure, devout heart of a revolutionary of the living German Movement.
The missions which were given to the SS in the present day National Socialist State can be understood only in the knowledge of this evolution.
The protective organization of the Movement became the internal protective organization of the State after the seizure of power and after the Schutzstaffel, by renewed proof of its essentiality and the testing of its dependability on 7/20/1934, was elevated to be an independent component of the Party directly subordinate to the Führer.
Out of the above evolution, all the latter events could fashion themselves in apparent self-evidence along these principles. With the acquisition of power within the Reich, the protective organization of the Party became, feature by feature, as a consequence of the broadening of its mission, the protective organization of the National Socialist State. In this capacity, it took over step by step the remaining usable and valuable parts of the old police. Out of the 16 state police forces, a large and strong Reich police came into existence; and, that which even the old National Socialists themselves had hardly thought to expect: out of the jailer of the rubber cudgel regime there came in existence in the new police, an active friend of the people; and even more than that, in this slow and qualitative evolution the police itself has become, in the completion of National Socialism and in the leadership of National Socialism, through this Black Corps, a part of the proud formations of the Movement.
Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police
The Reichsführer-SS became Chief of the German Police and united its mission, as elastic as operative, with its formations into a comprehensive line of defense for fighting political as well as criminal enemies of the Nation; a line of defense in which State and Party, civil servant and political soldier labor in a complete and, therefore, for the first time in a positive manner hand in hand.
For the first time the newly attained meaning of the Police, as representative, protector, and helper of the community of the people, and thereby as real soldiers of that community of the people and of the National Socialist ideology, impressed the new features of this clear, sober countenance. For out of this original police, employed with a negative aim, an active friend and helper of the people has come into being, a rejuvenated people's troop, whose successors are provided from the SS, so that the civil servant, both within and outside of his service, is and remains an SS-man, a champion and protector of the new State, of the community of the people and of the movement.
The Troops in Barracks
The conceivable danger, that an organization destined only for internal employment sees itself hampered in the fulfilling of the large, all-embracing missions in difficult times which demand the employment of the whole nation toward the outside. The Führer met this by the creation of an active troop of the SS lodged in barracks and chosen from the SS members of long military service and politically of the best training.
Early in the year 1933 the Body Guard Regiment [Leibstandarte] of the SS, "Adolf Hitler", arose and in the further enlargement of this SS Military Service Troop [SS-Verfuegungstruppe] there were added the active SS regiments: SS 1, "Deutschland", in Munich; SS 2, "Germania", in Hamburg; Aroken, Radolfszell. As well as these, there were the Technical Storm Unit [Sturmbanne], the SS Pioneer Storm Unit in Dresden and the SS Signal Corps Unit [Nachrichtensturmbanne] in Unna. The SS Junker schools in Toelz and Braunschweig provided for the training of those to become leaders of these SS Military Service Troops.
In 3/1938, after the return of Austria home into the Reich, the Führer gave the order to establish a fourth active SS regiment of SS General Service Troops, SS 3, "The Führer", with its stations in Vienna, Graz, and Klagenfurt. All these troops have received the finest reward for their labor: they are allowed to cooperate prominently in the creation and protection of the Greater Germany.
This chosen SS-Troop, trained during four years service under the severest conditions, offers, equally, the best rising generation for future leaders and subordinate leaders of the General SS, the Police, and the Security Service.
II. Organization
In addition to the General SS, so to speak the mother of all the other SS formations, there are the SS-militarized forces, the SS-Death Head regiments, and further, the Security Service and the Race and Settlement organizations.
The supreme headquarters of the Reichsführer SS for the General SS is the SS Main Office in Berlin.
The supreme headquarters for the Security Service is the SS-Main Security Office in Berlin.
The supreme headquarters for the Race and Settlement organization is the Main Race and Settlement agency SS in Berlin.
Aside from these main offices there are the following offices which likewise are directly under the Reichsführer SS and which have the same characteristics of a main office:
Personal Staff of the Reichsführer SS.
Administration Chief of the SS.
Personnel Chief of the SS (these three in Berlin).
Head of the SS courts, Munich.
Chief of the Constabulary, SS-Lt. Gen. of the police Daluege, with the rank of a Chief of a Main Office [Hauptamtschef].
The SS Main Office
The SS Main Office consists of the following 13 offices which have to fulfill the following missions:
The central chancellery [ZK] is the headquarters of the Chief of the SS Main Office. It provides for the cooperation among all of its subordinate offices and examines the whole direction of management within the SS Main Office.
The management office [Fuehrungsamt] (I) deals with all affairs which pertain to the training, organization, and deployment of units of the General SS.
The personnel office (II) deals with the personnel affairs for all SS führers of the General SS from SS-Second Lieutenants to SS-Captains inclusive.
The SS Administrative Office (IV) handles all the administrative affairs of the SS Main Office. It is of the same level as the Administrative Office Security Service (SD) and the Administrative Office Race and Settlement (R and S) and just as these, it is subordinate to the SS Administrative Chief as the highest administrative court of the SS.
The medical office (V) deals with all things concerned with hygienic conditions and accommodations for the SS.
The SS-Recruiting Office (VI) handles the preliminary and final acceptance of SS applicants and SS candidates into the SS. Here also, the conviction and discharge of men and non-commissioned officers is regulated as well as re-enlistment measures among other things. Its missions further include the planning and execution of all recruiting methods, the systematic comprehension and compiling of personal data of all SS members as well as the compilation of the total strength of the SS and of corresponding statistics.
The office for Security Missions (VII) handles the employment of SS units in special instances for example, at Führer appearances and for visits of leading foreign government officials. In addition it is responsible for the mobilization preparations for the SS which it completes in collaboration with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. Among these also come the taking in of reserves of the SS Death Head regiments for special practices in peace and the liability. of military service of SS members.
The Reserve Office (VIII) is, as the name implies, responsible for the Reserve of all the SS units.
The Procurement Office (IX) provides for the procurement of articles of equipment for the whole SS.
The Office for Recreation (X) directs all measures for sport participation of the SS in all forms of sports and supervises the athletic training of the SS.
The Office of Communication (XI), the Supply Office and the Public Welfare Office (XII) and also the Educational Office (XIII) fulfill their missions which are expressed by their title.
Aside from the above named 13 offices, the following are also placed under the Chief of the SS Main Office. The Inspector of the SS Militarized force. The Führer of the SS Death Head regiment. The Inspector of the SS Border and Patrol units. The Inspector of the SS Cavalry. The Inspector of the SS Cavalry schools.
In addition, the following are under the appropriate inspectors. The Auxiliary Work Camp Schleissheim. The SS-VT professional school St. George. The SS-Training Camp Dachau. The SS-Rest Home, Sasbachwalden. The SS-Motor School Berne. The SS-Main Cavalry school Munich. The SS-Cavalry supply institution Hamburg.
Formation structure of the General SS
The strength of the General SS, 240000 men, is sub-divided today into 14 corps, 38 divisions, 104 infantry regiments, 19 mounted regiments, 14 communication battalions, and 9 Engineer battalions as well as-motorized and medical units. This General SS stands fully and wholly on call as in the fighting years except for one small part of chief Führers and men.
The Corps which are presently lead by a Lt. Gen. or Maj. Gen. are subdivided into Divisions, Regiments, Battalions and Companies.
The steps in becoming an SS-man
The steps in becoming an SS man are the following:
After confirming his SS suitability and SS worthiness, the Hitler Youth upon reaching 18 becomes an SS applicant. Then he is taken over into the SS as an SS candidate on the Reichsparteitag of the same year upon presentation of the SS certificate. Then after a short period of probation he is administered the Führer oath on the 9th November.
As SS candidate he earns his Army sport badge and the bronze Reich sport badge. Then he goes into the Labor service [Arbeitsdienst] and finally to the Wehrmacht either at the age of 19-19.5according to whichever way his age group is absorbed.
After two years, he returns from the Wehrmacht in as far as he does not want to remain as non-commissioned candidate or reenlistee. Whoever returns to the SS is still, however, a candidate. In the following period up until his coming final acceptance he will be schooled again specially and ideologically at which time he will be thoroughly taught and instructed in the fundamentals of the SS, especially regarding the marriage law and the honor laws of the SS. The SS candidate will be recognized as SS man upon fulfillment of other requirements on the 9th of November following his return from the armed forces and thereby will be finally taken into the SS.
At the same time, on this 9th of November, he has the right to wear the SS dagger and solemnly promises upon this occasion that he and his pin will always hold to the basic laws of the SS. From this day on he assumes the right and duty to defend his honor according to the honor laws of the Black Corps as is specified in the SS code.
He then remains in the active General SS as SS man until he is 35. Upon request, he then will enter the SS Reserve and upon reaching 45 he will transfer into the SS inactive Corps.
The SS Militarized forces [Verfuegungstruppen, VT]
Out of the General SS, the foundation of all SS, after the seizing of power the SS militarized forces appeared, on account of considerations which are indicated in another reference, in a slow and organizational development.
Its garrison and construction are also described in another place.
The militarized forces are constructed after the experiences of the SS upon the fundamental basis of National Socialist perception of selection, direction and education.
The SS militarized forces, in their present day form which clearly delineated, are an active garrisoned and armed part of the SS. Those men selected and tested according to the standards of the SS have obligated themselves to a period of service of at least four years. In addition to the indoctrination for the SS man, these troops receive a full military education. The service in the militarized force counts toward the fulfillment of military service.
After termination of their obligations in the militarized forces, the SS men naturally go back into the General SS from which they came.
The SS Death Head Units
The SS Death Head units form one part of the garrisoned SS. They arose from volunteers of the General SS who were recruited for the guarding of concentration camps in 1933.
Their mission, aside from the indoctrination of the armed political soldier, is the guarding of enemies of the Sate who are held in concentration camps.
The SS Death Head units obligate their members to 12 years (service). It is composed mainly of men who already have fulfilled their duty to serve in the Wehrmacht. This time of service is counted completely.
The Death Head units are fundamentally similar to the SS militarized forces in construction and equipment. They consist of four regiments.
Personnel Chief of the SS
The Office of the personnel Chief of the SS is the SS-Personnel Chancellery. It handles all personnel affairs of the Führer Corps of the whole SS.
Further, the Personnel Chief is Inspector of the SS Junker schools in Braunschweig and Toelz. He is responsible for the continuation of education of the forthcoming young Führers from these schools.
The Führer school of the General SS Munich-Dachau is also placed under the Personnel Chief.
Chief of the SS Courts
The SS-Courts, directly under the Reichsführer SS, is the highest office of the SS in all cases of disciplinary or honorary jurisdiction. Its activity therefore consists, above all, in the handling of disciplinary actions; in cases of less severe nature it acts as court of appeal.
Further, the SS-Court is solely competent for the handling of cases of clemency as well as of disciplinary and also of punitive nature.
As the highest office of disciplinary penal affairs of the SS, at the same time the SS-Court is the liaison office for all offices of the Party and Reich which are essentially connected with its area of jurisdiction.
A penal jurisdiction will be introduced for the members of the SS militarized forces, the SS Death Head units, the main offices of the Security Service of the SS and for these main official members of the General SS who are placed over these units. Its construction is undertaken at present.
During the fighting years, the scope of jurisdiction of the SS had experienced an expansion in the course of time to such an extent that more and more the necessity for discovering and knowing of opposing tendencies developed as an absolute requirement for their operational campaign. Originally, the SS served as the personal protection for the Führer and for leading personalities of the National Socialistic Movement.
Beyond the steady growth of the party, the original relatively simple mission of the protection of persons has further developed to a problem of the Security of the Party and its manifold functions. For this purpose, intelligence services were installed in the Party and all of its components with the mission: to counter the significance of the opposing aggressive and destructive intentions through exploration and judging of the threatening menaces.
However, there was no uniform planning, and a central collaboration of intelligence services was hardly attempted.
The SS had also acquired an intelligence service at this time for the fulfillment of its missions. Contrary to the rest of the intelligence services of the Party, a far-reaching systematic political intelligence service grew out of the so-called I.C. Service, the later P.I. Service [Press and Information] of the Reichsführer SS.
This intelligence service developed upon the fundamentals of racial selection and ideological rearing in conformity with the general fundamentals of the SS in deviation from all limitations of scope, of momentary or personal nature in connection with an all embracing positive setting of a goal, toward a true Security Service at first for the SS and the Party and later thereby, for the people and the Reich.
This became clear after the taking over of power, as the "Security Service of the Reichsführer SS" proved that it had seized all opponents and living provinces which were or could become significant for the new National Socialist State. This was done by a planned construction of the organization, which kept itself free from personal dependency.
From this development, in the field of Party intelligence service, the Deputy of the Führer drew the deduction which he made in his decree of 6/9/1934 that "no intelligence or counterintelligence service of the Party may exist outside of the Security Service of the Reichsführer SS." From the promulgation of this decree on, the Security Service of the Reichsführer SS is the only political intelligence service of the National Socialist German Workers' Party.
Since the Security Service of the Reichsführer SS delivered information on the situation and its connection through constant observation of the open and secret enemies of the National Socialistic ideology, it more and more became an organ for protection of the State and of the people which stood in closest cooperation with the Secret State Police.
The head of the organization of the Security Service Reichsführer SS is the Main Security Office which stands next to the main offices of the Reichsführer SS. The Chief of the Main Security Office is the present SS-Maj. Gen. Heydrich, who is at the same time Chief of the Security Police, and who was entrusted at that time with the construction of the I.C., as well as, the P.I. Service.
The regional construction of the Security Service Reichsführer SS is close to that of the General SS in its subdivision into Corps and sectors.
The constant observation of the course of working methods of the opponent, and his technique in the alternate forms of appearance, his ideologies and methods of work compulsorily lead thereto, that the work of the Security Service Reichsführer SS cannot only be intended for the hour but must be expansive and far-reaching.
The Race and Settlement Affairs
After the Main Security Office comes the Main Race and Settlement Agency as the next pillar of the Reichsführer SS.
In this Race and Settlement Agency the marriage applications of the SS men is handled in the Relations Office, because no SS man can openly marry without the permission of the Reichsführer SS under the stipulations of the marriage law of 1931. For this, a medical examination is required for man and wife. Guarantees for ideological and personal rearing are to be brought for the bride. Further, the family tree is now required of man and wifeby officers [Führers] back to 1750 and by noncoms [unterführer] back to 1800. A copy of the hereditary health certificate is likewise required.
In order to make possible a rapid gathering of the necessary requirements, Relation Officers are established and provided in the infantry battalions of the General SS. They, like the Main Race and Settlement Agency, are to help the SS man in the gathering of all required papers.
This naturally entails a gigantic work and extensive organizational preparations in order to meet quickly the requests which today are very pressing since people are being married in greate numbers.
The Settlements Office within the Main Race and Settlement Agency handles and brings about the idea of blood and earth [Blut und Boden] by settling valuable SS families in connection with the new creation of German peasantry and homestead settlement.
Further, the Race office in the Main Race and Settlement Agency watches over the uniformity of the racial acceptance examinations and over the schooling of these specialists who are to be employed for these acceptance examinations within SS units.
Personal Staff Reichsführer SS
The "Personal Staff Reichsführer SS" was formed as a central headquarters for the Reichsführer SS and at the same time, as an essential main office.
This office developed out of the Adjutants Office of the Reichsführer SS in the course of increased missions. Today it is placed under the Chief Adjutants' Office and the Police Adjutant's Office of the Reichsführer SS. The Personal Staff, through its business experts, handles the normal traffic, it administers the press section of the Reichsführer SS as well as the cultural section. Among other, it also has the porcelain manufacture in Allach under its jurisdiction.
In addition, the SS barracks, that is the summation of all SS men in the higher institutes of learning, are placed under the Personal Staff Reichsführer SS.
In addition, the following working areas are combined in the following divisions in the Personal Staff.
The section of Economic Aid (it handles encumbrance problems which developed out of the fighting years).
The section for cultural Research (prehistoric works, expeditions with the support of the Reichsführer SS, excavations as well as foundations).
The society "The Ancestral heritage" [Das Ahuenerbe].
The society "The Well of Life" [Lebensborn]. This consists mainly of members of the SS. It makes possible to women with many children the best possible care in ideal homes before, during and after child birth. Furthermore, it makes possible the painless delivery for good racial, unmarried, and about-to-be married mothers.
At present, several homes in Steinhoering Polzen, Klosterheide (Mark), Hoheharst bei Bremen and in Wiener Wald belongs to the society "Well of Life."
The office "Four Year Plan" fulfills the mission of regulation of the labor employment which was assigned by the Director of the Four Year Plan.
Finally, the liaison officers to the Ministries and Offices of the Party are assembled under the Personal Staff.
The Motto [Kernsatz] of the SS
There is no mission for its own sake. How can there, therefore, be missions for the sake of an organization. There is only one mission which everything in Germany serves and that is the life of this people through Adolf Hitler.
"So we fell in and are marching, according to unchangeable laws as a national socialistic, soldierly order of men designated as Nordic and as an avowed association of their kindred, along the way into a distant future. We wish and believe that we should not only be the descendants, who have fought it out better, but especially the ancestors of those later generations necessary for the perpetual life of the German teutonic people."
This motto of the SS which was given to it by the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, is the direction for this troop within the framework of the movement. This is the sense by which everything which concerns the SS consequent, steadfast, and thrifty, today, maintains a happy and positive appearance.
If the individual tasks in the framework of this great Protective Corpsoften limited in nature by the tasks themselves may occasionally be heavy and represent the harshest human requirements then the filling of all necessities with this consciousness of a great duty and a clean and concrete association of this concept gives every duty the gleam and happiness which the National Socialist heart needs and is continuously needing.
III The Inner Security
After the outward conclusion of the revolution of our ideology, in possession of power and thereby in the continuous, unlimited responsibility for the fundamentals of the idea, there began the greater, although externally less heroic, phase of the penetration.
All divisional fields in inner or outer positions of the State concept or of State presentation had now to be convincingly and continually filled with our new philosophy or newly indoctrinated by it. We had to carry the revolution, the vivaciousness of an extensive movement, into the stark hardened institutions and concepts with all means, with and against the law. We had to overthrow that which did not seem fit to live according to this process, we had to fill anew with a living spirit that which seemed to be useful and employable.
Few divisional fields of the conquered State had to face from the beginning so much opposition in relation to the life and expression of the new Power as the Police.
All our hate and all our rebellion had opposed it as the most outspoken symbol of the night of the system for us.
Rubber hoses, house searchings, imprisonment, terror, persecutions, all the counter concepts of the harshness and gruesomeness of the period behind us seem to crystallize and assemble themselves under the term "Police." Entirely necessarily the term "Police" was already at that time a term of the things hated and cursed. Therefore, at the beginning it seemed almost impossible to actuate the thought of reaching the identical presentation of National Socialist law, of National Socialist community authority with the term and institution "Police." Also within the movement itself, it naturally necessitated considerable authority in order to allow the forceful wish to become an act.
The SS as formation, the association made up of leader, men, and kindred of consequent National Socialists, possessed this authority in the course of the history and development of the Party. Out of its original mission within the Party it now obtained the same broadened mission within the whole people and State: the inner security, the inner protection of the National Socialist people, the consequent repulsion of its inner enemies in all phases of public life.
Viewed from this standpoint, it seemed as if unsurmountable obstacles arose as the Reichsführer SS, upon command of the Führer, obtained the task, in addition to the SS, of concentrating the whole German Police into his hand and thereby into the real special meaning of the SS.
This transfer proceeded under the sole valid law, the living right of the German Volk, not only against old ideas but often enough against still existing regulations.
In few fields of State and People the solution of the big problem of Party and State has been so revolutionary and extensively thoroughly undertaken, and scarcely anywhere except for just this difficult ground was it demonstrated so successfully that, according to the Führer's will, it is the idea which must determine the State.
The personal authority of the Reichsführer SS and that of his men, who were of a single mind, carried the beginning of this new construction, while the success of the National Socialist measures taken guaranteed the further course.
From the traditional concept of Police has arisen the new concept of a protective Corps of the German people. And just as the old idea was typically personified in the bailiff, the new idea also demands a new man.
We do not need a mere official, just as we do not consider the unpolitical soldier suitable here. The new type shall be representative of the SS man, who grows out of the Principle of the indoctrination and out of the way of the SS and who already today has clearly developed himself before the people. Just in this post the people want and must possess a political soldier in the best meaning of this National Socialist conception.
Instead of the duplicity of a liberal Police law the man of the Police was given the powerful living authority of clear fundamentals and removed from the hatred and mistrust of the best part of our people by means of the National Socialist authority of the SS. Thereby, the Police again was carried into the midst of the people as an important member for the protection and defense of the community.
It is clear and naturally necessary that completely new judgment of the concept of enemy of the State would come from the new type of its (Police) man and its youthful clear idea. Out of the limitation in the general defense, a far-reaching prevention had to ensue from the clear grasping of the State concepts, a clarification of the concept of State enemies, a setting up of tasks which thereby assigns to the National Socialist Protective Corps a historical mission of unheard of proportions in the sound development of the people.
The spirit of discipline and of companionship, the knowledge of the source of our being and its single teaching, this vast train of thought of the SS as expression of the developing factors of an inner National Socialist securing and safeguarding of all possibilities of coming eventsall this is more and more the meaning and spirit of all great new formations in this section of inner security.
To guarantee the intensive security of this new Reich, that is the great duty of the SS and with it, and within its scope, also of the Police in all its categories. That is the comprehensive mission the Führer-gave to the SS. It will attack this job anew every day, with the utmost seriousness, fully conscious that this is an immense National Socialist task and firmly convinced that only the ideologically best education of its men and its selection of members will enable it to solve this task completely.
"Document 2288-PS: Adolf Hitler's Great Speech Before The Reichstag [partial translation]", pp. 993-994.
Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern Germany Special Edition No. 142 a. of 5/22/1935. [Pages 1, 3, 4]
Deputies! Members of the German Reichstag!
Leaving these general conclusions now and arriving at a precise fixation of the present current problems for me the Position of the German Reich Government results as follows:
1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolutions of 17 March.
The treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well known paragraphs of the dictate of Versailles were violated and consequently invalidated by those Powers who could not make up their mind to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as agreed upon by the treaty.
2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles which are nothing but a discrimination against the German Nation for an unlimited period of time, since through them Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral manner, contrary to a the spirit of the agreement.
But it solemnly declares t.hat this measure is being taken only with regard to those well known paragraphs which are discriminating against the German people in a moral and factual way.
Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation [Zusammenleben] of the various nations including territorial agreements; revision which will be unavoidable as time goes by, it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.
3. The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even if it was composed before this Government took over. Therefore, it will in particular adhere to all the allegations under the Locarno pact as long as the other partners of the pact also adhere to it.
The Government of the German Reich regards the fact that it has to respect the demilitarized zone, as an extremely difficult contribution by a sovereign power, to the pacification, and it believes to be compelled to call attention to the fact that the constant increase in the number of troops on the other side may not just be regarded to be of great comfort to these efforts.
Berlin edition No. 68 Berlin, Sunday, 3/8/1936
The important speech of the Führer in the Reichstag on 7 March reads as follows:
Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing on the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union, exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as no longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government are now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet Treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, exactly parallel in form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and insure its possibilities of defense, the German Government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
After a hard inner struggle I have, therefore, decided in the name of the German Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung] to submit the following memorandum to the French Government and the other signatory powers of the Locarno Pact today.
We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above all that all the tensions resulting either from false territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers Or inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be solved by war.
THE ARCHIVE [Das Archiv], 3/1935, Page 1830.
The German Air Force
The Reich Minister for Aviation [Luftfahrt], General of the Airmen, Göring, in his talk with the special correspondent of the Daily Mail, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air Force.
10.3. S i 35
General Göring said:
In the extension of our national defense, [Sicherheit] it was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of defense in the air. As far as that is concerned I restricted myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a military aviation [Luftfahrt] which would be strong enough to repel, at any time, attacks on Germany.
Until the present moment, this has been accomplished on a general basis, as so far we have been discussing airmen in general only without making any definite distinction from the military point of view. The British government, among other proposals, asked Germany to join an Air-Pact, whose object is to take joint action in the air against an aggressor who disturbs the peace, i.e. to put our own Air Force at the disposal of the threatened country. This is the British demand. Germany, trying to do everything and trying to collaborate everywhere where peace can be ensured, replied by a Note expressing her agreement with such an effective protection as is represented by the air-convention.
In this Note Germany expressed to Britain the view that Germany would be prepared to send her Air Force to the help of the threatened country.
After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became officers. This involves only a part of the persons who up to the present moment have worked in the common German aviation. Therefore the difference between our Air Force and our civilian aviation shows itself clearly and distinctly in the various badges of rank and in the designation of rank.
I sum up: Our willingness to share in the effective defense of world peace, our assent to hasten with help to the hard pressed country, made the creation of a military aviation imperative, if our assent should not remain merely an empty phrase.
Answering the correspondent's question about the hierarchy in the new Air Force, its uniforms and its ranks the general said: "The Air Force is under the orders of the Reich Minister for Aviation who controls also civil aviation. His military rank is General of the Airmen [General der Flieger]. The uniform remains similar to the uniform of the sport aviation organization but outwardly it will be marked clearly by military badges of rank. Similarly the names of rank correspond with the military designation of rank from Lieutenant upwards to General of the Airmen." To the question concerning the nomination of German Air-attaches in foreign missions General Göring replied that the preparations for it were pending. Also about the numerical strength of the Air Force he said that he could not yet give final figures. As far as the percentage ratio to the Air Forces of other powers is concerned, every sensible and decent man ought to realize that Germany, being particularly threatened, needed such figures as would guarantee the absolute safety of the German people. Asked about the role of the Air Force within the Armed Forces, General Göring stated that at the present moment, it was impossible to make a clear appreciation of the situation. But that it was definite that the Air Force must be an integral part of any defense and that without an Air Force the Army and Navy, no matter how strong, were useless.
In conclusion, the correspondent asked whether the German Air Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General Göring replied to that exactly as follows: "The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to threaten the peace of other nations."
"Document 2306-PS: Revolution of Education [translation]", p. 997.
Baldur von Schirach [Page 51]
The struggle for the unification of the German youth is finished. I considered it as my duty to conduct it in a hard and uncompromising manner. Many might not have realized why we went through so much trouble for the sake of our youth. And yet: The National Socialist German Workers' Party, whose trustee I felt I always was and always will be, this party considered the struggle for the youth as the decisive element for the future of the German nation.
And I promise the German public that the youth of the German Reich, the youth of Adolf Hitler will accomplish its duty in the spirit of the man to whom alone their lives belong.
I am responsible to the Reich that the entire youth of Germany will be educated physically, morally, and spiritually in the spirit of the National Socialist Idea of the State.
"Document 2319-PS: Organization Book Of The NSDAP [translation]", pp. 1009-1011.
Edited by The Reichsorganisationsleiter of the NSDAP (4th edition, 1937) Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher's Successor.
[Pages 143-144] The Organization of the NSDAP in Foreign Countries
The organization of the NSDAP in foreign countries (AO) is regulated from the standpoint of organization along district lines. The Director of the AO (with the rank of Gauleiter) is immediately subordinated to the Führer's Deputy. The AO has its headquarters in Berlin. The Director of the organization in foreign countries is at the same time Chief of the Foreign Service Organization in the Foreign Office and directs the unified supervision of German nationals in foreign countries.
Duties and Authority
The duty of the AO is to win over the German nationals in foreign lands and in the shipping world to the National Socialist point of view and to keep alive the idea of a racial community over all classes, professions, and confessions in every single German, living in a foreign country.
The AO will keep itself aloof from all non-German issues.
The AO is the only competent party office for all Party Organizations abroad (with the exception of Danzig and Memel) and on board German ships. The Director of the AO is responsible for all measures, principles, and directives given in this sphere of activity. He is further responsible for seeing that the Special directives issued by all the competent offices of the Reich government are modified in such a way that they are suitable for conditions abroad in order that German interests are not under any circumstances endangered or damaged.
All party members domiciled abroad, who take up permanent residence there or who are employed in seagoing ships, are subordinate to the AO and are not to be considered party members of districts within the Reich. Party members engaged in shipping, who leave their work afloat and are without work for at least six months, are to be transferred to the appropriate Gau within Germany, also party members abroad who return and take-up permanent residence in the fatherland.
Members of the families of German seamen, residing at home and who belong to the NS Women's Organization are administered by the NS Women's groupshippingof the organization of the NSDAP in foreign countries. This pertains to all districts in which the AOshipping has divisions, subdivisions, and branches.
The Staff of the AO carries the designation "Supervision of the Organization of the NSDAP in Foreign Countries."
The AO of the NSDAP is subdivided into national groups, national districts, districts, local groups, and branches. The term "national group" is to be used only for those countries which are particularly important as far as German nationals abroad are concerned. To all other countries the term "national district" applies.
The Party functionaries of the AO are:
1. The Director with the rank of Gauleiter.
2. The Deputy Director with the rank of Deputy Gauleiter.
3. The heads of the national groups (on account of different conditions in all of the different countries of the world in which the organization is to be found) with the rank of a district office leader.
4. The heads of national districts with the rank of a district leader.
5. The district leaders.
6. The leaders of local groups.
7. The leaders of branches.
The Office Chiefs in the Head Office of the AO, the commissioners for foreign countries, under whom are several national groups and national districts (partly in our part of the earth), and the leaders of the national groups have the rank of a Gauamtsleiter. Subordinate to the Director of the Office of AO Shipping Section of the NSDAP are:
1. The divisional leaders in Bremen, Hamburg, Luebeck, and Stettin with the rank of a Gauhaupt Stellenleiter.
2. Local group and branch leaders on board German ships.
In order to identify the political leaders and party members of the AO, the leader has permitted the members of the AO to wear a special badge. (See picture.) It portrays a black diamond which, set up on its point, is worn on the left arm (lower end 2 centimeters above the cuff). Within the black diamond are the two letters AO, for the Party Functionaries in gold and for all others in silver. Party members wear the badge on the brown shirt. The badge may only be worn, as long as the party member in question belongs to the AO. It is to be discarded as soon as he returns home and is transferred to a local group.
The graphical plan of organization serves to illustrate the organization in detail.
The entire business of all party offices with the organizations of the NSDAP abroad and in the shipping service must be carried out through the Director of the AO. The associations belonging to the party, who in the course of their operations endeavor to enlist German nationals abroad may only do this within the framework of the AO.
[Pages 295-312] The Reichpropaganda Leader of the NSDAP and Propaganda Leader
The propaganda of the NSDAP, its organizations and associate groups is the responsibility of the Reichpropaganda leader of the Reich:
1. He determines the entire propaganda aspect of the movement including its organizations and associate groups.
2. He lays down the directions to be followed by the party including the organizations and associate groups as far as realizing the Führer's wishes as regards culture are concerned.
3. He exercises control over the entire German radio system in regard to its interior organizational, cultural, and economic development.
4. The saturating of the German nation with national socialist ideology is his concern.
5. He enlightens the people concerning the Führer's accomplishments both as regards party and State.
For propaganda purposes, the press, the radio, and films are put into use.
The Chief of Staff and adjutant are subordinate to the Reich propaganda leader.
The sphere of activity of the Reich propaganda leader can be divided into five groups, and each group is under the control of an office of its own.
1. Active propaganda.
5. Liaison Office.
Directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff are:
1. The "Reich ring for national socialist propaganda and national enlightenment."
2. The "Reichsautozug Deutschland" and the "Hilfszug" Bavaria.
3. The business center of the Reichpropaganda office.
4. The main office of press propaganda.
5. The main office for exhibitions and fairs.
The duty of the Reich ring for National Socialist Propaganda and national enlightenment is to insure the uniform direction of the propaganda of all organizations and associated groups, through the party. Through the duly qualified party functionaries one representative from the propaganda offices of all organizations and groups is allotted to the Reich ring. To these representatives are added representatives of certain offices of the Reich government, etc.
Office of press propaganda. The duty of the central office of the press propaganda is to revise, on the basis of newspaper technique, propaganda measures resulting from the general work of all offices of the Reich-propaganda leader and to submit them to the competent authorities of the national socialist party press as well as the rest of the press.
Central office for exhibitions and fairs. The duty of the central office for exhibitions and fairs is to supervise all exhibitions in which the party intends to participate, from a propaganda point of view.
1. The Office of active propaganda. The duty of active propaganda is to effect the uniform execution of all active propaganda measures from the large scale organizations of gigantic size with their architectural-like structure down to the organizations of local groups, and branches.
This means that the whole propaganda organization of the movement, its organizations and associated groups are combined.
Parallel with the daily handling of current political questions, there is the supplying of the entire speakers' staff with information and the provision of all propagandists of the Reich with the monthly magazine "Our Will and Way."
As a supplement to speaking, there must be the designing and distribution of appropriate placards and pamphlets as well as the careful examination of convention reports on the part of the speakers and the directors of propaganda.
A complete picture of the propaganda can be seen from the statistical survey of all reports coming from districts and Gaus (in regard to propaganda).
Central office of speaker's organization. The central office of speaker's organization comprises by way of its subordinate office "Speakers' organization" all Reich, Gau, and district speakers of the NSDAP as well as all Specialist Speakers of the organizations and associated groups. This staff of speakers for the whole movement is constantly furnished with material by the office of "Speakers' information," which counts as the only material for speeches and the only material for information by the party.
The "Speakers' Agency" of Reich speakers, shock troop speakers of the Reich propaganda Directorate and cadets for the Shock troops operates through the office of "Speakers' Agency." The "Speakers School" subordinate to the central office does not only provide for a further supply of political and specialized speakers but also for constantly enriching the knowledge of all actively engaged speakers. For this purpose a special "Reich School for Speakers" has been installed.
The Party Speakers
Speakers are classified as follows:
1. Reich speaker.
2. Speaker for the Shock troops and cadets.
3. Gau speaker.
4. District speaker.
5. Specialized speaker.
(When announcing meetings, the speakers designations as they appear above are to be strictly adhered to).
Their employment is decided as follows:
a. The principle of capability
b. The merits of the veteran fighter.
On principle, it is to be differentiated between political and technical speakers.
2. Central office of the film industry. The duty of the central office of the film industry is to exhibit such films regularly as adequately serve to enlighten and educate the masses and strengthen national socialist ideology. Associated with the film division is the office of photography.
The central office of the film industry is divided into:
Organization, Finance administration, Production and technique, Dramatic theory, Cultural films, Newsfilms, Photography
3. Central Radio office. The radio organization of the NSDAP must exercise a constant control over the entire German radio system in order to synchronize the internal organization, cultural, technical, and economic development of the radio system with national socialist principles.
The effects of radio propaganda are assured through the organization of radio technicians with the assistance of all technical possibilities as regards transmission, for the coordinating of the entire nation in every corner of the Reichwhether listening in at home, in a community, to a national broadcast.
Central Bureau of Cultural Political Radio Activities and Radio Organization: Transmitting and receiving system, cultural productions on the radio, broadcasts to schools, scientific radio work, radio for youth.
Organization of the broadcasting personnel (Reich radio association, individual association of the Reich Kultur Association associations of people interested in radio) radio exhibitions.
Central office of radio technique, technical transmission service (loud speaker system), technical training in radio, short wave and amateur transmission, telegraphy and ultra-short wave system, technical production questions.
Central office of radio propaganda. Propaganda operations by radio, the recruiting of listeners, radio news system, political Reichtransmissions.
4. Central voice for culture. The duty of the central office for culture is to stimulate, to preserve, to supervise artistic creation in the sense of the formal expression of the national socialist ideology and to incorporate into the Party Propaganda its organizations, and associate groups. The following serve this purpose among other things:
Central office of Architecture. The issuing of general directions and regulations concerning questions as regards the architectural structure of monuments and such edifices which serve the public activity of the national socialist movement.
Central office for artistic designs. The issuing of general directions and orders in regard to all other questions of the artistic designing of symbols, objects, etc., which are used in the public activities of the national socialist movement.
The issuing of general directions and rules for the artistic setting for demonstration and the organizing of National Socialist celebrations making use of cultural means.
Central office of selection. Part of the duties in this sphere of activity are the screening and selecting of musical and poetical works with the aim in view of using them at national socialist demonstrations and celebrations.
Central office of program organization. The drawing up of model programs for celebrations of the national socialist movement and for organizing settings for national socialist demonstrations on the basis of the type of tradition formed in the fighting days [Kampfzeit].
Elimination of unsuitable settings which may find their way into the movement through unauthorized agencies. War against trash, preservation of definite national socialist aspect in the settings for celebrations, the prevention of mystic and pseudoreligious falsification of our ideology, as a result of prodigious constructions by misguided cult devotees. Professional artists to be put to work following above-mentioned directives. Suitable persons will be chosen by the Reichpropaganda leader in the central office of culture, as permanent coworkers, especially for the purpose of operating in specialized fields. Practical courses for cultivation of folk songs for the purpose of finding the proper personnel for the planning of activities in all organizations of the movement. The "Proposals for the Planning of National Socialist Celebrations" issued monthly by the Central Office for Culture will furnish the leaders of propaganda and central offices for culture, with the necessary material. Therein are also found appropriate instructions for the planning of discussion evenings, membership meetings, evening meetings of the Hitler Youth, evening gatherings of SA and SS comrades, in a manner befitting our creed and to avoid monotony. The unity of the Party and legitimate cohesion within the cultural sphere is guaranteed through the coordination of the important offices. The Reich propaganda leader of the NSDAP is also president of the cultural association.
The Director of the office for culture of the Reich propaganda Directorate is also the director of Reich culture in the Reich Cultural Association.
5. Liaison officer. The duty of the liaison officer is to centralize all business with Reichministries, officials, and public bodies, etc. Thus it is assured that the general principles of propaganda are brought to the knowledge of the appropriate Reich officials. In reverse, the liaison office brings all problems and instructions, that emanate from the Reich propaganda ministry to the knowledge of the Reich propaganda Directorate.
In order to coordinate the propaganda of both the party and the state, it is the duty of the liaison office to bring the general principles of the Reich propaganda directorate to the knowledge of the bodies subordinate to the Reichministry for national enlightenment and propaganda which are also associated with and administered by this Ministry.
The Gau Office of Propaganda, as commissioner of the Gauleiter for the entire propaganda aspect of the national socialist movement, the Gauleiter Propaganda takes precedence over the Gau Propaganda Office.
For the purpose of carrying out the work of the district, the following leaders are under his jurisdiction as is the case with the Reich propaganda Directorate.
1. Director of active propaganda.
2. Director of films.
3. Director of radio.
4. Director of culture.
5. Director of The Gauring for national socialist propaganda and popular enlightenment.
6. Liaison officer.
The duties technically correspond to those of the Reichpropaganda Directorate.
The Gauleiter Propaganda is also director of national culture of the Reich cultural association. In this way it is assured that the cultural will of the national socialist movement is carried out even in the most insignificant parts of the Reich Cultural association (Reich Music Association, Reich Association of Fine Arts, Reich Literary Association, Reich Press Association, Reich Film Association, Reich Radio Association).
The Gauleiter Propaganda is also, in most instances, Director of the National Office for enlightenment of the people and propaganda.
The District Propaganda Office.
The Director of District propaganda is the commissioner of the Kreisleiter for the entire propaganda aspect of the party within this district.
The following are the responsibility of the Director:
5. Kreisring for national socialist propaganda and popular enlightenment.
The liaison office maintains the connection between the Landrats and Regional [Bezirk] offices.
The duties technically correspond to those of the Gau Propaganda Office (according to need).
The Director of the Local Group Propaganda.
The Director of the Local Group Propaganda is responsible to the Party Functionary of the local group for the entire propaganda aspect of the movement.
In order to execute his duties, specialists on culture, films and radio are subordinate to him. He solves all problems of active propaganda direct, and he must also remain in constant communication with the appropriate mayor and chairman of the district council, respectively. In addition to that he maintains contact with the organizations and associate groups.
The duties technically correspond to those of the office of district propaganda as may be needed.
The Leader of the Branch [Stuetzpunkt] Propaganda
His sphere of activity corresponds with that of the leader of the local group propaganda.
The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP Offices of the Press and Commissioners
In his decree of 2/28/1934, the Führer formulated the sphere of activity reserved for the Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP, the decree of the Führer is as follows:
I. The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP is vested with the following powers:
1. He determines on my behalf the general policy of the entire editorial work within the party press. Moreover, he is as my Chief of press the final authority for all press releases of the party and all offices.
2. The editorial Staff of the Party Press as well as Gau journalists of the NSDAP are subordinate to the Chief of the Reich press as far as work is concerned. He has the right to interfere in all personal questions.
3. All existing press divisions, press bureaus, etc., existing within the party or within its subsidiary or subordinate organizations (political organization, SA and SS, Hitler Youth, German labor front), regardless of the particular organizational status of their work in the field of publishing, are subordinate to the Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP and responsible to him.
4. The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP approves all news services and correspondence, which are issued by one of the offices of the NSDAP or regarded as national socialist.
The Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP can take all necessary measures for the execution of his duties.
Berlin, 2/28/1934.
Signed: Adolf Hitler.
Corresponding with this order of the Führer, the Office of the Chief of the Reich press of the NSDAP is the central office for all the political publishing activity of the party.
II. The technical authorities directly subordinate are:
1. The Chief editors of the party press. They are the responsible editorial leaders of the National Socialist party papers owned by the party and are directly responsible to the Chief of the Reich press as regards their editorial work. They have to be confirmed by the Chief of the Reich press and they can have the rank of a leader of a district office.
2. The press representatives of the individual offices of the Reich Government. They take care of the press interests of the larger organizations and party offices within the framework of the editorial and political principles of the Chief of the Reich press.
3. The journalistic-political organ of the NSDAP.
a. Editor-in-Chief of the Office of the District Press: The office of the district press is that office of the district which with the help of the party offices of the district, subordinate to it and associated with it as regards problems of journalism, represents the interests of the party through the medium of the papers and periodicals published in this district. This representation of interests involves particularly the progressive cooperation of the whole journalistic life of the district.
The office of the district press has the following functions to perform:
News and Information Service
The office of the district press furnishes the newspapers, by means of the regularly appearing National Socialist Gau Service, with all the news material in regard to all Party arrangements and events in the district. Moreover, its news information service, based on records is at the disposal of all papers for dealing with all questions, concerning the party.
The Personal News Service
The office of the district press makes information accessible to editors through press conferences, receptions with functionaries of the individual party offices, etc. It informs the editorial boards of the-district of the special journalist political wishes of the Gauleitungen.
Information given to the party press:
The office of the district press, on the basis of reports of the political press organ, informs the editorial boards of the party press about the wishes of the readers in regard to newspaper technique. Moreover, it is in charge of local reporting of party affairs and educates the editorial board and press officials as regards newspaper technique.
b. The editor of the district press and the head of the local group:
The editor of the district press and the head of the local group respectively, have duties that are technically derived from those of the Head of the Office of the district press. Permission to publish must, however, in all cases be granted through the head of the office of the district press. Press representatives of the organizations and offices can also be requested here. In the hands of the press chiefs of the local groups, who can have the rank of a head of the office of a local group, there lies, above all, the reporting of local party news, namely, the journalistic evaluation of the entire social service work of the local group, formulated in accord with the directives of the political journalistic service.
III. In order to carry out his duties, the Chief of the Reich press has established the following bureaus in Berlin, as well as in Munich:
1. The press personnel bureau with its office in Munich. The press personnel bureau works out all personal questions, especially that concerning the conferring of the "party press armband" upon proved national socialist editors. (The armband is to be worn on the left forearm only on special occasions). Moreover in a special department the official gazette of the Reich Government is being prepared.
2. The political press bureau with its office in Berlin. The political press bureau concerns itself with the general principles regarding the work of the party press as well as the entire use of the political press organ of the party.
The head of the political press bureau has also been chosen by the chief of the Reich press as his commissioner for the entire press service system of the party and exercises the right of controlling and vetoing all press releases, which are issued by party bureaus or those which are regarded as national socialist.
The head of the political press bureau is editor-in-chief of the national socialist party press service [N.S.K.] The NSK is the only official press service of the NSDAP and it alone is empowered to publish in the name of the party, for all Reich Government offices, including their subsidiary and subordinate organizations. The NSK as press service is at the disposal of all the editorial staffs of the whole German press.
The political press bureau has its headquarters in the NS press House in Berlin. In the NS Press House all party papers are represented by their own Berlin editors.
[Pages 307-310]. The Reich Director of the Press
The Reich Director of the Press has to perform the duties of a publisher and politician [verlagspolitische Aufgaben].
He is commissioned to furnish the German people with a press, which owes allegiance to them and is responsible to them and which is to reflect the life and the experiences of the German community. Furthermore, the Reich Director of the Press has the duty of taking the necessary measures to enforce the demands made on him as publisher and politician which are laid down in the program of the NSDAP under point 23 and to see that they are carried out. The latter applies especially to the decree of 4/25/1935 relative to "the preservation of the independence of the newspaper publishing business" and to the "closing of newspaper publishing houses for the purpose of eliminating unhealthy conditions of competition." Finally he is commissioned to publish all the standard literature for the national socialist movement.
The Reich Director of the Press is authorized by the Führer to take all necessary measures for the execution of his duty and he has the following powers:
1. The recognition of periodic publications as official party organs.
2. The decision concerning the founding and the appearance of periodic publications, which are published by party members, even when they do not aspire to recognition as official party organs.
3. a. The issue of general regulations for the whole publishing business to the entire press published by party members. The regulations are valid as orders, as long as nothing else is laid down by the Reich Director of the Press.
b. The decision over all questions of publication whose significance is a matter of principle and extends beyond the individual publication, when he takes this decision upon himself. The publications in these instances are obliged to submit these questions to the final decision of the Reich Director of the Press.
c. The inspection at any time of all official party publications and their economic organization and direction, as well as the right and power of exercising influence.
The responsibility of the individual publishers for the direction of the publishing business is not affected thereby.
4. The employment of responsible directors and their deputies only takes place by the Reich Director of the press, who has to decide the person and the contract. The Reich Director of the Press decides whether the existing contract is to be continued or dissolved. The Reich Director of the Press is also empowered to appoint commissioners for directing publication, and their directives are to be followed by the publishers' staffs and by the entire firm. The right of appointing commissioners over the publishers' staffs is reserved for the Reich Director.
The following are subordinate to the Reich Director of the Press:
1. The governing board of the Reich Director of the Press. The governing board sponsors and inspects the NS district publications. These are the ones recognized as party organs and as party newspapers which are exclusively party property. The directors of the NS district publications are political leaders on the staff of the district leader and are personally and officially subordinate to him. From a professional point of view the directors of the NS district publications are exclusively subordinate to the Reich Director of the Press. His approval is necessary for changes of personnel. Lower classifications in districts, etc., do not exist.
2. The central publishing house of the NSDAP with its publications: Voelkischer Beobachter, Der Angriff, Illustrierter Beobachter, Der SAMann, das Schwarze Korps, N.S. Funk und Bewegung, Funktechnischer Vorwaerts, Der Arbeitsmann, Die H.J., Die Bewegung, Die Brennessel, N.S. Monatshefte, Die N.S. Gemeinde, Der Schulungsbrief, Unser Wille und Weg, Aufklaerungs und Rednerinformations Material, Reichsplanung, Deutsche Presse, Verordnungsblatt der Reichsleitung der NSDAP, Der Parteirichter, Mitteilungsblatt der Kommission fuer Wirtschaftspolitik, Das Parteiarchiv, Der SAFührer (as well as the entire literature of the movement.)
The Reich director of the press is at the same time President of the Reich Press Association. In the following organizations, which are not party bureaus, the Reich Director of the Press is represented by a commissioner who has to direct the supervision of and the liaison with these organizations:
Reichassociation of German Newspaper Publishers. Reichassociation of German Publishers of Periodicals. Professional Association of the Radio-Press. Professional Group of Student Publications. Professional Group of the Youth Press. Professional Staff of the Catholic Church Press. Reich Association of the Evangelical Press. Reich Association of the German Press and Information Bureau, Incorporated. Association of German Newspaper and Periodical Wholesalers. Reich Association for the Recruiting of Periodical Trade. Reich Professional Staff of the German Newspaper and Periodical Trade. Reich Association of German Railway Station Booksellers. Reich Association of German Reading Circle Proprietors. Reich Association of German Newspaper Stenographers. Reich Association of the German Press. Professional Staff of Publishing House Employees. German Book Publishers. (Organized Brokers' Association and League of Reich German Book Publishers). Recruiting Office of German Economy.
The Chief of the Foreign Press
I. The Chief of the Foreign Press of the NSDAP is the highest party functionary for all matters affecting the foreign press. He is subordinate to the Führer and his deputy. He is in charge of the governing body of all foreign Party Press Bureaus.
II. The offices of the chief of the foreign press are at the disposal of all party offices, organizations, and associated groups in all matters affecting the foreign press. (For example, instruction concerning German and foreign papers and periodicals abroad as well as foreign press correspondents in Germany.)
III. The Chief of the foreign press has offices in Berlin, corresponding to the office of the Führer and his deputy in Berlin (with Referat: United States of North America) and Munich. The main office is in Berlin.
Foreign Political Office of the NSDAP
I. 1. The foreign political office (APA) of the NSDAP includes two different fields of operation: one domestic, the other foreign, in character.
2. In the domestic field, the APA is entrusted with the task of introducing the foreign political aims and endeavors of the National Socialist State into all offices and organizations of the party.
3. In the foreign field, the APA is entrusted with the task of enlightening those in foreign lands and especially the foreigners who visit Germany or remain there as foreign correspondents, of the nature and aims of National Socialism in order to arouse thereby the understanding of other people for the fundamental needs of the German people and to convince foreign nations that National Socialism in Germany desires peace for progress and peace with other nations without at the same time rejecting the defence of their right to existence.
II. 1. The APA is divided into three main offices:
A. Office for Foreign Referants with the Main Offices.
a. England and Far East.
b. Near East.
c. South East.
e. Old Orient.
f. Controls, personnel questions, etc.
B. Office of the German Academic Exchange Service.
In order to effect as close cooperation as possible between the German academic exchange service and the party, the president of the German academic exchange service is chief official in the APA.
C. Office of Foreign Commerce.
2. Moreover, there is in the APA a main office for the press service and an educational office.
[Page 312] The Commissioner of the Führer for the Surveillance of the Whole Spiritual and Ideological Education of the NSDAP.
In order to effect the surveillance of the whole spiritual and ideological education of the NSDAP the Commissioner makes use of the following offices:
1. Chief of Staff.
2. Office of artistic development.
3. Philosophy and pedagogy.
4. Central office of national and ancient history.
5. Historical Referat.
6. Referat for Aryan ideology.
7. Referat for Nordic questions.
8. Central office for educational questions.
9. Referat for collection of material and curriculum (surveillance).
10. Referat Organizations.
11. Central office for the cultivation of literature.
12. Referat ideological information.
13. Organization and business administration.
14. Press Office.
15. Association for the Education of the whole movement.
For the purpose of promulgating an ideological train of thought, the Commissioner publishes the periodical "NS Monthly Magazine."
[Page 327] Colonialpolitical Office
For the treatment of all colonialpolitical and colonial economic questions within the national socialist movement and its press, the colonialpolitical office only issues general principles and instructions (see point 2 of the decree of the Führer's Deputy 17/34, series 71).
The colonialpolitical office is operated only as an office in the Reich Government of the NSDAP.
[Page 337] Official Party Board of Examiners for the Protection of NS Literature
I. The official Party Board of Examiners is not a censorship office, but an office for the protection and defense against pseudonational socialist literature and it insures that the National Socialist ideology is not misused by an unqualified man and commercially exploited in a way that deceives the public:
II. The official Party Board of Examiners gives an opinion on:
1. The NS literature in a narrower sense.
To this belongs the NS literature that has come into existence by its immediate identification with the movement. This literature, corresponding with national socialist ideology, is exclusively political.
2. Literature related to national socialism.
From the point of view of time, this covers a very broad field and includes the literature dealing with political thoughts and demands that lie within the line of national socialist development.
III. A reliable staff of lecturers is at the disposal of the official examining Party Board of Examiners in an advisory capacity. Writings which have been considered satisfactory by the examiners will be added to the NS Library [NSB]. The chairman of the PPK leaves the publishing to the decision of the report by the lecturers. It is stated in this:
1. The work is unobjectionable from the standpoint of the political will represented by the party. The work will be marked unobjectionable in this case, i.e. the following sentence may be printed in the work. No objections are raised by the NSDAP against the publication of this writing.
2. Against the contents of a work no objections are offered. However, it cannot be classified as belonging to national socialist literature in a more narrow sense.
Here however, there is the possibility that the work will be added to the NSB under the category of literature related to national socialism. Such a work embodies in its text no notice that it has been examined.
3. The work does not agree with the principles of the NSDAP; hence it is rejected. Here there are the following possibilities:
a. The work may be put on sale but not brought into relationship with national socialism.
b. The writing may no longer be distributed. More detailed instructions are given by the president of the Reich Chamber of Literature.
4. Construction & Organization of PPK see Plan of Organization.
"Document 2322-PS: Hitler's Speech Before The Reichstag 9/1/1939 [translation]", pp. 1026-1029.
Members of the German Reichstag:
For months we have been tormented by a problem once imposed upon us by the Dictate of Versailles and which, in its deterioration and corruption, had now become utterly intolerable. Danzig is a German City. The Corridor was and is German. All these territories owe their cultural development exclusively to the German people, without whom absolute barbarism would reign in these Eastern territories. Danzig was separated from us. The Corridor was annexed by Poland. The German minorities living there were mistreated in the most appalling manner. Already during the years 1919/20 more than one million people of German blood were driven from their homes. As usual, I have tried to change this intolerable state of affairs through proposals for a peaceful revision. It is a lie if it is claimed throughout the world that we insure all our revisions only by applying pressure. There was ample opportunity for fifteen years before National Socialism assumed power to carry through revisions by means of a peaceful understanding. This was not done. In every single case did I then take the initiative, not once but many times, to bring forward proposals for the revision of absolutely intolerable conditions.
As you know, all these proposals were rejected. I need not enumerate them in detail: proposals for a limitation of armaments, if necessary even for the abolition of armaments, proposals for restrictions on methods of warfare, proposals for eliminating methods of modern warfare which, in my opinion, are scarcely compatible with international law. You know my proposals for the necessity of the restoration of German sovereign rights over the territories of the German Reich, the countless attempts for a peaceful solution of the Austrian problem which I have made, and later, on the problem of the Sudetenland, Bohemia, and Moravia. It was all in vain. One thing, however, is impossible: to demand that a peaceful revision should be made of an intolerable state of affairs, and then obstinately refuse such a peaceful revision. It is equally impossible to assert that in such a situation to act on one's own initiative in making a revision is to violate a law. For us Germans the Dictate of Versailles is not a law. It does not work to force somebody at the point of a pistol and by threatening to starve millions of people into signing a document and afterwards proclaim that this document with its forced signature was a solemn law.
In the case of Danzig and the Corridor I have again tried to solve the problems by proposing peaceful discussions. It was obvious that they had to be solved! That the deadline for this solution may perhaps be of little interest to the Western Powers is conceivable. But for us this deadline is not a matter of indifference! First and foremost, it was not and could not-be a matter of indifference to the suffering victims. In Conferences with Polish diplomats I have discussed the ideas which you have heard me express here in my last speech before the Reichstag. No one can say that this was an improper procedure or even unreasonable pressure.
I then had the German proposals clearly stated and I feel bound to repeat once more that nothing could be fairer or more modest than those proposals submitted by me. And now I want to tell the world that only I could afford to make such proposals. Because I know very well that at that time I placed myself in a position contrary to the conception of millions of Germans by acting the way I did.
Those proposals were rejected. But not only that! They were answered by mobilization, by increased terrorism, by intensified pressure on the people of German blood living in these territories, and by a gradual economic, political and, during the past few weeks, even military strangulation and blockade of the Free City of Danzig. Furthermore, Poland virtually began the war against the Free City of Danzig. Furthermore, she was not prepared to settle the problems of the Corridor in a fair manner satisfying the interests of both parties. And lastly, she did not even dream of fulfilling her obligations with regard to the minorities. I have to state here that Germany has fulfilled her obligations in this respect!
Minorities living in Germany are not subject to persecution. Let any Frenchman get up and declare that French citizens living in the Saar territory are being oppressed, ill-treated, or deprived of their rights. No one can make such an assertion.
For four months I have watched these developments without taking action but not without issuing repeated warnings. Recently I have made these warnings more and more emphatic. Over three weeks ago, the Polish ambassador was, at my request informed that if Poland persisted in sending further notes in the nature of an ultimatum to Danzig and in further oppressing the people of German blood, or if she should attempt to ruin Danzig economically through customs measures, Germany could no longer look on without taking action. I have left no room for doubt that in this respect the Germany of today is not to be confused with the Germany that existed before.
Attempts have been made to justify the action against the German minorities by declaring that they had provoked them. I am wondering in what the "provocation" through the women and children who are being mistreated and deported, consisted, or the "provocations" of those who were tortured in the most beastly and most sadistic manner and finally killed! One thing, however, I do know: there is not one single great power with any honor who would tolerate such conditions for any length of time.
In spite of it all I have made one last attempt. Although I am deeply convinced that the Polish Governmentperhaps also because of its being dependent on an unrestraint, wild military rabbleis not seriously interested in a real understanding, I have nevertheless accepted a proposal by the British Government for mediation. The latter proposed that it would not carry on any negotiations but assured me that it would establish a direct contact between Poland and Germany in order to get the discussion going once more.
I must here state the following: I accepted that proposal. For these discussions I had drawn up the fundamentals which are known to you. And then I and my Government were sitting for two whole days waiting for the Polish Government to make up its mind whether to finally dispatch a plenipotentiary or not! Until last night it had not sent any plenipotentiary but informed us through its ambassador that at present it was considering the question whether and to what extent it might be able to accept the British proposals; it would inform England of its decision.
Members of the Reichstag! If such treatment is meted out to the German Reich and its Chief, and the German Reich and its Chief were to submit to such treatment, then the German Nation would deserve no better than to disappear from the political scene. My love of Peace and my endless patience must not be mistaken for weakness, much less for cowardice. Therefore, I have last night informed the British Government that things being as they are, I have found it impossible to detect any inclination on the part of the Polish Government to enter into a really serious discussion with us.
Thus, these proposals for mediation are wrecked, for in the meantime the answer to these offers had been, firstly, the order for Polish general mobilization, and secondly new grave atrocities. Repetitions of the latter incidents occurred last night. Only recently twenty-one frontier incidents had occurred, there were fourteen last night. Three of them were very grave.
For that reason, I have now decided to talk to Poland in the same language Poland has been using toward us for months.
If there are statesmen in the West who declare that their interests are involved, I can only regret such a declaration; however, not for one single minute could that persuade me to deviate from the execution of my duties. I have solemnly declared and repeat once more that we have no claims at all on these Western powers, and shall never demand anything from them. I repeatedly offered Britain our friendship, and if necessary closest cooperation. Love, however, is not to be offered by one partner only; it'll have to find response from the other. Germany has no interests in the West, our fortifications in the West shall be the frontiers of the Reich for all times. We have no other aims in the future, and this attitude of the Reich will remain unchanged.
Some of the other European powers understand our attitude. First of all I'd like to thank Italy for having supported us all this time. But you'll also understand that we do not want to make an appeal for any foreign help in this struggle. This task of ours we shall solve ourselves.
The neutral powers have assured us of their neutrality just like we have previously guaranteed their neutrality. This assurance we consider a sacred obligation, and as long as nobody breaks their neutrality, we, too, shall observe it painstakingly. What could we desire or want from them?
I am happy to be able to inform you here of an event of special importance. You are aware of it that Russia and Germany are governed by two different doctrines. There was only one single question to be cleared up: Germany has no intention of exporting her doctrine, and the minute Russia does not intend to export er own doctrine to Germany, I no longer see any reason why we should ever be opponents again. Both of us agreed on this one point: any struggle between our two people would only result in benefits for others. We have therefore resolved to enter into an agreement which will exclude any application of force between us in the future, which compels us to consult each other in certain European questions, which makes economic cooperation possible and above all makes sure that these two great powers don't exhaust their energies in fighting each other.
Any attempt on the part of the Western Powers to alter these facts will prove futile, and in that connection I should like to state one thing: this political decision signifies an enormous change for the future and is absolutely final.
I believe that the whole German people will welcome this political attitude. In the World War, Russia and Germany fought each other and up to the end they both suffered. That shall not happen a second time! The nonaggression and consultation pact was yesterday finally ratified in Moscow and in Berlin.
In Moscow, the pact was acclaimed just as you have acclaimed it here. I approve of every word in the speech made by Mr. Molotov, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
Our aims I am determined to solve:
Firstly, the question of Danzig;
Secondly, the question of the Corridor
Thirdly, to see to it that a change shall take place in Germany's relations to Poland, which will insure a peaceful coexistence of the two powers.
I am determined to fight until either the present Polish Government is willing to effect this change or another Poland Government is prepared to do so.
I am determined to eliminate from the German frontiers the element of insecurity, the atmosphere which permanently resembles civil war. I shall see to it that peace on the Eastern frontier shall be the same as it is on our other frontiers.
I shall carry out all necessary actions in such a manner that they shall not contradict the proposals which I have made known to you here, members of the Reichstag, as my proposals to the rest of the world.
That is, I will not wage war against women and children ! I have instructed my air force to limit their attacks to military objectives. However, if the enemy should conclude from this that he might get away with v.aging war in a different manner he will receive an answer that he'll be knocked out of his wits !
Last night for the first time regular soldiers of the Polish Army fired shots on our territory. Since 5.45 a.m. we have been returning their fire. From now on, every bomb will be answered by another bomb. Whoever fights with poison gas will be fought with poison gas. Whoever disregards the rules of human warfare can but expect us to do the same.
I will carry on this fight, no matter against whom, until such time as the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured!
For more than 6 years now I have been engaged in building up the German armed forces. During this period more than 90 billion Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best equipped armed forces in the world and they are far superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken.
If I call upon the Wehrmacht and if I ask sacrifices of the German people and, if necessary, unlimited sacrifices, then I am in the right to do so, for I myself am just as ready today as I was in the past to make every personal sacrifice. I don't ask anything of any German which I myself was not prepared to do at any moment for more than four years. There shall not be any deprivations for Germans in which I myself shall not immediately share. From this moment on my whole life shall belong more than ever to my people. I now want to be nothing but the first soldier of the German Reich.
Thus I have put on once again the coat which has always been the most sacred and dearest to me. I shall not put it aside until after victoryor I shall not live to see the end.
Should anything happen to me in this war, my first successor shall be Party member Göring. Should anything happen to Party member Göring, his successor shall be Party member Hess. To these men as your leaders you would then owe the same absolute loyalty and obedience that you owe to me. In the event that something fatal should happen to Party Member Hess, I am about to make legal provisions for the convocation of a senate appointed by me, who shall then elect the worthiest, that is to say the most valiant among themselves.
As a National Socialist and a German soldier I enter upon this fight with a stout heart! My whole life has been but one continuous struggle for my people, for its resurrection, for Germany, and this whole struggle has been inspired by one single conviction: faith in this people!
One word I have never known: capitulation. And if there was anybody who'd think that hard times are ahead of us I'd like him not to forget the fact that at one time a Prussian king with a ridiculously small staff confronted one of the greatest coalitions ever known and came forth victoriously after three campaigns because he possessed that strong and firm faith which is required of us in these times.
As for the rest of the world, I can only assure them that a 11/1918 shall never occur again in German history.
I ask of every German what I myself am prepared to do at any moment: to be ready to pay with his life for his people and for his country.
Whoever believes to have a chance to evade this patriotic duty directly or indirectly, shall perish. We will have nothing to do with traitors. We all are acting only in accordance with our old principle: our own life matters nothing, all that matters is that our people, that Germany shall live.
I expect of you, as deputies of the Reich, that you will do your duty in whatever position you are called upon to fill. You must carry the banner of resistance, cost what may. Let no one report to me at any time that in his province in his district or in his group or in his cell the morale is low. Bearers, responsible bearers of the morale are you! I am responsible for the province your district! None has the right to shun this responsibility. The sacrifice that is demanded of us is not greater than the sacrifice which has been made by many generations in the past. All those men who before us have traveled the most bitter and hardest road did nothing different from what we are called upon to do; the sacrifice they made was no less costly, no less painful, and therefore no easier than the sacrifice that may be demanded of us.
I also expect every German woman to take her place with unflinching discipline in this great fighting community.
German youth, needless to say, will do with heart and soul what is expected and demanded of it by the nation and by the National Socialist State.
If we form this community, forged together, ready for everything, determined never to capitulate, then our strong will shall master every emergency.
I conclude with the words with which I once started my fight for power in the Reich. At that time I said: "If our will is so strong that it cannot be broken through any distress, then our will and our German state will be able to master and subjugate distress."
GermanySieg Heil!
"Document 2324-PS: Reconstruction of a Nation [partial translation]", p. 1033.
Hermann Göring, Aufbau Einer Nation (1934)
[Pages 86-87]
I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans, each bullet which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now, is my bullet. If one calls this murder, then I have murdered; I ordered all this, I back it up; I assume the responsibility, and I am not afraid to do so.
Through a network of outer offices converging into the headquarters in Berlin, I am daily, one could almost say hourly, informed about everything that happens in widespread Prussia.
We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the state. It must not be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure of power over 6 million people officially voted for communism and about 8 million for marxism in the Reichstag elections in March.
Thus the concentration camps were created, to which we had to send first all the thousands of functionaries of the Communist and Social Democratic parties.
The Gestapo deserves a great deal of credit for the success of the revolution and for the consolidation of its achievements. Right in the middle of this constructive work, occurred the blaze that destroyed the high cupola and the auditorium of the Reichstag. Criminal hands had set this fire, had put the German Reichstag in flames, in order to give a last beacon to dying Communism, so that it could make one last desperate thrust before the Hitler government was consolidated. The blaze was to be the signal for the Communist party for general terror, for a general uprising and for civil war. That it did not have these consequences, Germany and the world owe not to the noble motives of Communism, but solely to the iron resolution and the hard fist of Adolf Hitler and his closest collaborators, who struck more quickly than the enemy had expected, and harder than he could imagine, and with the first blow suppressed Communism once and for all.
That night, when I ordered the arrest of 4000 Communist functionaries, I knew that by dawn Communism had lost a great battle.
"Document 2327-PS [translation]", pp. 1035-1036.
Third Army Group Ia Nr. 150/39 g.K. Chiefs
Re: Fall Weiss Top Secret (Chefsache) "Only by officer"
Dresden 6.14.1939
20 Copies Control No. 8
1. The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes in account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success.
2. The order of deployment by the High Command, "Fall Weiss" authorizes the Third Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th Army Headquarters) to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for "Fall Weiss."
3. Enclosed are sent:
a. Aims of the operation (Enclosure 1). b. Organization of the forces (Enclosure 2). c. Survey of arrival (Enclosure 3). d. Signal Communication (Enclosure 4). e. Regulations for the supply (Enclosure 5 will follow). f. Enemy situation (Enclosure 6). g. Directions for execution (Enclosure 7).
4. The order of deployment "Fall Weiss" will be put into operation on 8/20/1939; all preparations have to be concluded by this date.
The former deployments "Case West" and "Case East" are valid until 8/19/1939.
5. For the instruction on the tasks due to this order for deployment, the principles of order OKH Genstb d.H.1 Division (Ib Nr. 2000/36 top secret of 12/19/1936) are to be applied.
The instruction can be carried down to the responsible officers of the corps commands to the Division Commanders (G-3 (Ia) and G-4 (Ib) of the divisions and the commandants and staff officers of the Garrison Headquarters. Permission to inform further persons must be requested by names. Communication with the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler must be instituted only by special order. The order for their commitment is to be prepared.
6. Tenth Corps Command (Gen KdX) and XIII Corps and lo. Div. can perform the necessary reconnaissance in Silesia while observing the appropriate precautionary measures (civilian clothes, motor vehicle, with civilian license number).
7. The whole correspondence on "Fall Weiss" has to be conducted under the classification Top Secret [Chefsache]. This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every wayeven in connection with other documents.
8. For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 July.
9. I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the information, and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting information.
Commander-in-Chief of Army Group 3
Signed F. Blaskowitz.
TOP SECRET Enclosure 1 to 3rd Army Group
Ia Nr. 150/39 g-Kdo. Chefs of 6/14/1939
TOP SECRET [GKdos] "Only by officer" Top Secret [ChefSache]
Aims of Operation "Fall Weiss"
1. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the marching up of the Polish Army.
Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick acting and ruthless attacks.
b. If the development of the Political situation should show that a surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question, because of well advanced defense preparations on the part of the Polish Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the army will order the opening of the hostilities only after the assembling of sufficient additional forces. The basis of all preparations will be to surprise the enemy.
Case bis to be prepared in theory by the High Command only so that necessary changes can be quickly carried out.
"Document 2329-PS [translation]", pp. 1037-38.
[Stamp] Top Secret Through officers only The Commander in Chief of the Army Operations Section (Ia) General Staff of the Army
HQ, Army High Command
No- 4402/39 Secret
10/7/1939. 11 copies, 2nd copy
General von Beck takes over command of the newly formed Army Group B on 10/10/1939 at 12.00 hours.
Task of Army Group B is the protection of the German boundary from the mouth of the Ems to the line of demarcation with Army Group C. For this task Army Group B holds the western fortifications; the resistance begins on the border.
The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.
At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so demands.
The order for the occupation is given by the Army High Command; until then, any border isolation of Dutch or Belgian territory must be avoided most carefully.
signed von Brauchitsch
certified Hensinger. [signature] Jaiymyer
Distribution Army Group B Army Group C by telegraph
[Handwritten notes] Chief J. N. W 8-10-39
Supreme Hq Chief of Army Signal Corps Chief of Quartermaster IV Org Department Gen of Air Force with Commander in Chief of the Army operation
Insp F 9/10 Me 10oo2/39 g. K. Ju 8-10
Department (1a, 11, 111) [Hand written notes] Archives of the Army. 21st Army Group 6623 (9) F A LIL
Nurnberg 8/29/1935
Police Headquarters; Nurnberg-Fuerth
Re: Protective Custody.
Order for Protective Custody
On the basis of Article 1 of the VI of the Reich President for the protection of people and state, of 2/28/1933 (RGBl. I p. 83) the ministerial decree of 5/2/1934, No. 2186 a 39, herewith is taken into protective custody:
Effective as of 3 August 35:
First and last name: Josef Simon
Place and date of birth: 5/23/1865 in Schneppenbach, B. A. Alzenan.
Marital Status and Profession: Widowed, former Trade Union Secretary.
Citizenship: Subject of the German Reich.
Religion: Free thinker.
Place of residence: NurnbergN. Ziegelsteinstr. 106
The arrestee has no right to appeal against the decreed protective custody.
Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party and temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire. From 1907-1918 he was Landtag deputy of the Socialist Party; from 1908-1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor [Stadtrat] in Nurnberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in the international trade unions and in regard to his connection with international Marxist leaders and central agencies, which he continued after the national recovery, he was placed under protective custody on 5/3/1933, and was kept, until 1/25/1934, in the Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon is under the urgent suspicion that even after this date he played an active part in the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party. He took part in meetings which aimed at the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party and propagation of illegal marxist printed matter in Germany.
Through this radical attitude which is hostile to the State, Simon directly endangers public security and order.
"Document 2331-PS [translation]", p. 1039.
Bavarian Political Police
Nurnberg, 12/20/1935
I have been informed that I shall be released from protective custody, and that I have to expect to be taken into protective custody again in case that I should behave in a manner inimical to the State, or if I should be active in this sense.
I have been informed that, for my physical protection I may return into protective custody upon my own request.
I have been informed that I have to report in person at the Gend. Station Ziegelstein, competent for my residence, on every second day of the week at the same hour.
[signed] Josef Simon
Simon Josef, residing Nurnberg-N, Ziegelstein St. 106, widower, trade union secretary; born 23 May 1865 at Schneppenbach.
Concentration Camp Flossenbuerg Az II. Political Department/Sch.
Flossenbuerg, 12/22/1941.
To Frau Grete Staimer, Nurnberg.
In reply to your letter of 12/12/1941, enclosed please find the desired death certificate. At the same time I certify that the cremation has taken place in the crematorium of Flossenbuerg.
After the submission of a burial certificate from the competent cemetery officials the urn with the ashes can be sent to you free of charge.
The Camp Commander By order of (Signed) Fassbinder
Official Secretary.
Police Presidium, Nurnberg-Fuerth
Protective Police [Schutzpolizei] 3rd Police District
To Frau Elise Herrmann, Nurnberg, Juvenllestr. No. 26
Your husband, Paul Herrmann, died of an infection in the concentration camp, Flossenbuerg, on 12/28/1941.
The corpse cannot be inspected because of the danger of infection.
The cremation will take place in the crematory of Flossenbuerg. The Secret State Police Office Nurnberg-Fuerth
Authenticated [illegible] District Police Lt.
Death-certificate
The baker Karl Herrmann, Lutheran Religion Residence: Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp died on 12/28/1941 at 1400 hours in Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp The deceased was born 11/24/1873 in Wassertruedingen. The deceased was married to Elise, nee Steiner, Nurnberg.
Flossenbuerg, 1/2/1942 [Stamp of Registrar, Flossenbuerg/Oberpfalz]
The Registrar: /s/ Jaum
Statement of Lorenz Hagen
During the night of 3/17-18/1933, the offices of the ADGB [Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; German Trade Unions], which are located in Nurnberg, Breite Gasse 25/27, as well as the offices of the Builders' Union and the Unions of the Bookbinders, Bookprinters, Lithographers, Textile Workers and Carpenters were completely destroyed by the SA under the leadership of SA-Brigadier General [SA-Oberführer] Wurzbacher. All the office furniture was smashed and thrown into the courtyard, the safes overturned, forced open from the back and robbed. The typewriters, adding machines, mimeograph machines, etc., were stolen.
The ADGB possessed a huge library of about 10000 volumes for the use of its members. Every single book was torn and thrown into the courtyard.
The Workers' Secretariat, which was joined to the AGBD, had an extensive professional library of about 500 volumes, among them valuable works on literature of social security and labor legislation. These were also thrown out and torn to pieces. A similar fate met about 750-800 files covering the cases of beneficiaries of pensions (social, war and accident cases) whose claims for pensions were being worked on.
The SA posted continuous guards in the office building and nobody was permitted to enter. When I made the attempt to enter in spite of it, Wurzbacher said: "The Red rascal will get in but will not come out alive." When I got in later in spite of him, the SA tried to catch me, but I escaped.
In order to guarantee the continued function of the trade union, which was most urgently needed at that time, I set up an emergency office in Nurnberg, Hummelsteinerweg. This was occupied on 5/2/1933 by SA, led by Pessler who was the District-leader Gauobmann] of the NSBO [National Socialist Factory Cell Organization; Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen Organisation later DAF; the German Labor Front]. Erhardt Kupfer, the district secretary of the ADGB, was arrested at that time, kicked with rifle butts and led away by the SA in shackles. As the deputy of NSBO, a certain Mueller was appointed. Three SA men guarded the office day and night. Upon seizure, Pessler's first question to me was: "Where do you have your cars? I know you have three cars." When I answered that I never had a personal car, he threatened to put me in jail until I would confess. When he finally realized that I did not have a car, he asked me what funds the Nurnberg local committee of the ADGB possessed. I said truthfully: "235000 RM minus the sum stolen by the SA from the safes when they broke into the offices on the Breite Gasse and which amounted to about 4000 RM." Whereupon he threatened again to have me arrested but he did not do so, probably on the basis of the general order not to arrest the chairmen of the local committees [Ortsausschussvorsitzende]. I learned about this order only a few days ago.
On 6/1/1933, the deputy Mueller came into the office and asked me whether I had not been arrested yet. I said no and indicated that the night before I had been in the apartment of my mother-in-law who was severely ill. I left the office without being noticed, hurried home, packed the most necessary things, and left by bicycle with my wife. We stayed away for about five weeks, traveling from one place to another.
After returning, I was arrested towards the end of 8/1933, under the charge that I had agitated against the National Government and had conducted illegal recruiting for the forbidden ADGB and the Socialdemocratic Party. When no proof could be produced, I was released, but arrested again after 3 days. This time I was accused of having had knowledge of the arsenal of the Reichsbanner (Militant Organization of German Social democrats), and that I had organized the arming of the members of the Trade Union Offices. In cross-examinations conducted over many weeks, they tried to force a confession out of me. When I did not confess anything, I was to go to the concentration camp in Dachau. However, my wife succeeded in preventing this. After 3 1/2 months, I was released again. After this release I tried to start a business, no matter of what kind. It was in vain. Similarly, it was impossible for me to find work in my former line as engine-builder. Reason: political unreliability. Thus I lived on a weekly unemployment benefit of 14.40 marks, with my wife, until my further arrest in 8/1935. At this time I was charged with participation in the so-called middle-German insurrection of 1934, and with the smuggling of illegal writings from abroad. In spite of the greatest efforts and the application of the foulest methods, such as the poorest and most inadequate food, depriving me of fresh air, threatening me with being shot and beaten, again the Gestapo did not succeed in proving anything against me. I was again set free after 12½ weeks. During this period of confinement, Kriminalrat Otto, the Gestapo-chief, tried to persuade my wife to convert me to National Socialism. He told her: "If your husband comes to us, this will be of greater value for us than the adherence of 1000 other people. Your husband would get a position in which he would earn 3 times as much as ever before." My wife refused consistently.
The same story as before: unemployment, occasional meagre earnings, until the next arrest on 1/26/1938. This time they did a fullsized job and arrested my wife too. We were accused of preparing high treason against the country [Hoch- und Landesverrat] as well as maintaining connections abroad. The interrogations lasted until the middle of April. The Gestapo agent Beetz had a predilection for interrogations at night. Five searchlights illuminated the spot where you were sitting. Behind and before me, and on both sides, four men sat a distance of a few meters, pointing their revolvers at me and clicking the triggers. The interrogations, which were of course always fruitless, were repeated sometimes two or three times in one night. Terms like "Greatest scoundrel," "most common criminal," and others were used. One morning at five o'clock, Beetz called me and said: "You know your wife has been arrested too. She had a complete breakdown and struggles with death in her cell. She expressed the wish to see you once more before her death. I am willing to grant her wish, but only if you make a full confession." When I refused he had me taken back into my cell and in an indescribable psychic condition. Beetz asserted several times that the material at hand condemning me was sufficient for 5 years in the penitentiary. I then demanded to be taken before the investigating judge. This, however, was refused, and on 4/20/1938, I was shipped to Dachau Concentration Camp. There I came immediately into solitary confinement and had to undergo 32 days of severe bunker (strenger Bunker)-punishment. During this time I had to sleep on a wooden board without blankets, and received warm food only every 4th day. On 9 July, I was released from the bunker and taken into the camp. There I had to perform the heaviest work, in spite of my greatly weakened physical condition. One day I received from an SS guard a kick in the back which threw me against a lorry which was just passing by, and thus I broke my lower right rib. Once when a prisoner had escaped from the camp, all of the camp-inmates had to fall out after work and stand at attention in ranks throughout the night. There were 17 dead next morning. On 7/13/1939, on order of the Nurnberg-Gestapo, I was taken off work and again put into the bunker and received again 64 days of rigid bunker-arrest until 9/28/1939, and was then shipped to Buchenwald Concentration Camp. There I came into the bunker again and stayed there until my release. During the whole time in Buchenwald I had to sleep on a board without a blanket. The food in the Buchenwald camp was so inadequate and inferior that at the time of my release I was a skeleton with skin over it. I wish to add that during my transfer to Camp Buchenwald, I suffered an inguinal rupture on the left side when jumping from a railroad car.
The release from the camp was accompanied by the express warning not to reveal anything about happenings in the camp. Otherwise, I would be returned there and never would have a chance to get out again. After my return to Nurnberg, I had to report daily at 10 o'clock sharp at the main office of the Gestapo. From 7/1941, I had to report twice weekly to the police station in my district. After I was completely bombed out, on 3/9/1943, the order to report was rescinded.
After this release from Camp Buchenwald, I again could not find a job anywhere, although the Gestapo had told me that if I could not show that I had a job within 6 weeks, I would be returned to the camp, since my release was tentative only. It was only due to the kindness of a textile shop owner who employed me in spite of the warnings of the Gestapo that I was not taken into protective custody again.
On 8/22/1944, I was again taken to Dachau Concentration Camp because of the attempt against Hitler's life, and I remained there for six weeks.
I may add that I had to undergo 6 house-searches during which everything in my apartment was upset. In these instances, all books which seemed to be dangerous, magazines, pamphlets, etc., were taken away.
I was chairman of the A.D.G.B., Local Committee of Nurnberg, 1930-1933.
signed) Lorenz Hagen Chairman of ADGB, Local Committee of Nurnberg
formerly: Karthaeusergassergasse Residence: Furth, Ritter v. Aldebertstr. 3.
Today on 11/17/1945, I have reread each single page of the statement given by me on 10/19/1945 and I have signed it. I declare hereby under oath that this statement is true. Signed: Lorenz Hagen
Sworn to before me 11/17/1945 at the Justice Building, Nurnberg, Germany. Signed: D. A. Sprecher, 02055516 Captain, AUS
Appendix to the Statement of the Chairman o the ADGB, Local Committee of Nurnberg
When I arrived at the concentration camp at Dachau, the manager of the Stokers and Machinists Union, Josef Staimer, who had been active in the above organization until 1933, was still in the Dachau camp. He had been arrested in 3/1933 and shipped to Dachau. He was released from there near the end of 1938 or the beginning of 1939.
Karl Hermann, manager of the Union of Factory Workers, pay office [Zahlstelle] of Nurnberg, was for several weeks imprisoned in the same cell with me when I was taken into protective custody in 1935 in the prison of Nurnberg. The total period of his imprisonment was about 7 weeks at that time. The reason for his arrest was to force him to give his approval of the notarial transfer of the house of the Factory Union to the DAF. As private owner of the house, Hermann had been appointed together with another colleague of his organization to be the trustee of this house by the organization. In 1943 the two above mentioned men were taken to the Concentration Camp Flensburg. In 1944 they died in the camp.
During my stay in Dachau, we had Brigadier-General [Oberführer] Loritz, who was the commander of the SS-Death Head Unit [Totenkopfstandarte] and chief camp commandant. He was a violent, brutal man. Here is only one example for this:
For a while I was occupied in an SS clothing camp with a prisoner-detachment. An SS 1st Lt. who was in the tailoring section, whose name I unfortunately do not recall, sent a prisoner to the gate of the building on which there was a clock to find out what time it was. Loritz caught sight of the man, struck at him with his riding-whip and had his name taken. When the detachment returned at noon, the man was led away and without being allowed to defend himself, he received 25 lashings [stockhiebe] and 3 days arrest with water and bread. The rest of the detachment had to stand at attention during the noon recess and return to work without eating. The camp commander of Dachau at that time was Captain Koegel, who was transferred in 9/1938 to the concentration camp for women in Lichtenburg, near Prettin, where my wife was at the time of this transfer.
Captain Gruenewald followed him as camp commander. Gruenewald was transport commander when we were shipped to Buchenwald. I myself saw, during the unloading of the train at Weimar, how Gruenewald hit Czech arrestees, older people, in the face and neck with his fist. One of the men fell to the ground and could rise only with difficulty.
In my time, the SS-First Sergeants [Rapportführer; work detail-leaders] were Hofmann from Bamberg and Luedtkemeyer, from Northern Germany. These two were also very brutal fellows, with whom beating and smacking on the pettiest grounds were the order of the day for satisfying their sadistic inclinations.
[signed] Lorenz Hagen
Residence: Furth, Ritter v. Aldebertstr. 3.
Office: Nurnberg, formerly Krathausergasse 12.
Today, on 11/17/1945, I have reread a duplicate copy of the appendix, which is an exact copy of the appendix to my statement of 10/19/1945. I have found that this statement is true. I declare this hereby under oath.
[signed] Lorenz Hagen Lorenz Hagen
Sworn to before me 11/17/1945 at the Justice Building, Nurnberg, Germany. D. A. Sprecher, 02055516 Captain, AUS
Josef Simon, born 5/23/1865
Since 1900, first chairman of the German shoemakers Union, located in Nurnberg.
In 4/1933, Georg Pessler, Nurnberg, Guntherstr. 33/I, the deputy assigned by the Nazis for the trade unions, came into our office, Essenweinstrasse 1 and declared that trade union dues were embezzled there. When we asserted that no embezzlements had occurred in our office, he asked for the cash book which we submitted to him. After turning the pages for a short while, he declared: "25000 Marks are missing". He put the cash book into the safe, closed the safe and gave the key to the policeman, who had come with him.
We asked for an official public accountant to examine the books. A few days later the accountant, who had been assigned by Pessler, arrived and after checking he ascertained that with a cash amount of 4.5 millions there was a surplus of 13 pfennigs in the safe. In spite of this testimony, Pessler did not return the keys of the safe to us, closed our bank and checking accounts and asserted in meetings of factories that we had embezzled union dues. Only 3 weeks later could we get the keys of the safe again with the aid of the police.
On 5/2/1933, our office in Nurnberg was occupied; I myself had gone to Berlin on 1 May, because a meeting of the ADGB [Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: German Trade Unions] was to take place there on 2 May. The trade union building there was occupied and the majority of the officials were arrested.
I was arrested on 3 May at 6 a. m., in my apartment in Berlin at the request of the Criminal Police of Nurnberg. After being kept in police custody in Berlin until 9 May, I was taken to the prison in Nurnberg and was shipped to the Dachau concentration camp on 30 June together with other arrested people (the socialdemocratic City Counsellors [Stadtraete] of Nurnberg). In Dachau the SS Guards had stirred up the Communists who had been imprisoned there for quite some time with these words: "Today your tormentors [Bonzen] will arrive, give them a nice welcome". It was only due to the insight of a few reasonable Communists that they kept their comrades from violent acts; nevertheless, we were greeted in the camp with the vilest invectives. If it had come to acts of violence, we would of course have defended ourselves and then the SS would have shot at the people, fighting with each other. That was the intention of the SS as we learned later.
The Communist Scheberle from Roothenbach near Lauf was Camp Senior and was in charge of assigning work details. He made us who had come in on 30 June fall out early on 1 July; we had to form ranks and then he shouted: "Reichstag deputy Simon step forward!" In this way a considerable number, particularly those who had had some responsible job, were called up and then we were led by the SS to work. I was ordered to collect horse dung which was lying on the roads of the camp with my bare hands, without shovel or broom and to carry it to a nearby container. Since I did not bend down fast enough in the opinion of my guard, an SS man about 19-20 years, he yelled at me and demanded faster work. I answered: "When you will be 68 years old and have sciatica, you will not bend down so fast either". By collecting the partly wet horse dung, my hands were soiled very much. When the work was finished, I asked the guard whether I could wash my hands at the water hydrant. He refused with the words: "No, you can go and eat with them". In the afternoon we had to fall out again and were assigned for work. I was ordered together with 19 other prisoners (among them, the mean while deceased "Kupfer", district leader of the ADGB) for work in the kitchen. There we had to clean the still very hot foodkettles. Since the circumference of the kettle was so big that we could not reach the other end, we had to crawl into the hot kettles which almost burnt our shoes. Bathed in sweat, we had to perform the work. When this was over, we had to line up in a group to have our photographs taken. I was in the center and a readymade sign was hung around my neck which bore the inscription: "I am a class conscious Socialdemocratic tormentor [Bonze]." Twice I tore the sign off and left it hanging only after having been threatened with beatings. After the pictures were taken, the younger ones had to fall in line and after the command "Attention" was given, the commander went to the rear and commanded "Forward march", then "halt", and said: "Repeat the following words: Führer, we thank you that today for the first time we were able to perform some honest work". Then I was to go with the penal company to the gravel-pit. My son who was also in Dachau asked to go to the penal company instead of me. That was granted. Gradually, I was no longer assigned to work details. Anyhow there was a regulation that people over 65 should not be assigned to work any longer. In spite of this regulation, I, with my 68 years, was treated as mentioned above.
I was not mistreated, but at each and every opportunity abused with vile invectives. After almost 9 months of protective custody, among them 7 months in Dachau, I was released on 1/25/1934. Though I had to report every other day in Nurnberg to the police and was watched by the Gestapo.
At the beginning of 8/1935, I was rearrested on the following grounds: "Simon was for many years a member of the Socialdemocratic Party and for a while of the Independent Socialdemocratic Party. From 1907-1918 he was Landtagdeputy of the Socialdemocratic Party and from 1908-1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor [Stadtrat] in Nurnberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in international trade unionism and in regard to his connections to international Marxist leaders and central agencies which he continued after the National Revolution, he was placed under protective custody on 5/3/1933 and was kept until 1/25/1934 in the Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon is under the grave suspicion that even after this date he worked for the illegal continuation of the Socialdemocratic. He took part in meetings which aimed at the illegal continuation of the Socialdemocratic Party and at the propagation of illegal Marxist printed matter in Germany.
Through this radical attitude, hostile to the State, Simon directly endangers public order and safety."
I was released from this protective custody on 12/20/1935. But it was this protective custody which caused much psychic suffering to me and undermined my health.
When in 1934 we were released from Dachau, the commander "Eicke" delivered an address, at the end of which he said: "Remember this, whoever returns here does not get out any more." Now I was afraid every day to get to Dachau again, and I was repeatedly threatened with it. Therefore, I suffered strongly in E body and soul. My heart and nerves were particularly affected and there was in addition the bad food. When I was released on 20 December, I was already sick. Nevertheless, I had to report to the police every other day. When on 27 December I wanted to fulfill again my obligation to report there, I collapsed and lost -consciousness in the garden of the police building. The ambulance took me home and I was unconscious for almost 3 hours. I recovered only gradually but since that time I suffer from a weak heart.
I hereby declare under oath the correctness of the above statement which oath is given by me on 11/13/1945 at Nurnberg, Justice Building, before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS.
[signed] Josef Simon Josef Simon
Sworn to before me, 11/13/1945 in the Justice Building, in Nurnberg, Germany. [signed] D. A. Sprecher D. A. Sprecher, 02055516, Capt., AUS
Josef Simon, Nurnberg, Ziegelsteinstr. 106
As above already stated in my report on my arrest, my son Willi was also arrested on 29 June and taken to Dachau Concentration Comp. Nothing could be proved against him, except that he was my son. My son "Josef" was to be arrested also and taken to Dachau. He avoided being arrested by fleeing and going via Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, where he lives and works at present as a refugee.
My son Willi was asked by the SS guards in Dachau what sort of post he held. When he answered that he had had none, he was slapped in the face and ordered to confess, and at each declaration that he had no post he was slapped in the face again and again. Then the SS men poured water out in the basement of the washhouse and while my son had to wipe it off with a little rag he was beaten several times. After he had wiped up the water, the basement was drenched again with water and under further beatings he again had to wipe up the water.
During bathings in the winter of 1933 the prisoners who in the opinion of the SS did not get ready soon enough in the cold washroom were sprayed with a hose while half-dressed and chased outside. Because of the wet clothing my son contracted a severe cold in the form of an arthritis of the hip. He came into the dispensary. The pains became worse all the time and finally he was taken to a clinic in Munich for examination. The physician declared that my son had to remain in the clinic for treatment. This, however, was refused by the accompanying SS and he was taken to Dachau again, where he was again taken to the dispensary. I visited him in the dispensary and asked the medic to put his bed near the stove, a request that was granted. Only after several weeks did the condition of my son improve, and on 1/18/1934 he was released from Dachau.
For the truth of the above statements vouches.
[signed] Josef Simon Nurnberg, 10/23/1945
I have again read carefully the report submitted by me on 10/23/1945 and I hereby declare under oath that the content is true. This statement is herewith made by me today, the 11/13/1945 at Nurnberg, in the Justice Building before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS.
Sworn to before me, 11/13/1945 in the Justice Building, Nurnberg, Germany.
[signed] D. A. Sprecher D. A. Sprecher 02055516 Captain, Army of the United States
Josef Simon, Nurnberg, Ziegelsteinstr. 106.
Karl Hermann, official of the Union of the Factory Workers, was arrested together with Staimer, on the denunciation by his nephew that he had together with Staimer, listened to foreign radio stations; they were shipped to the concentration camp Flossenbuerg in the Oberpfalz. There he was slain and the ashes were sent to his family.
I cannot name witnesses for this deed, but I attach a death certificate sent to his family. [See Document 2333-PS]
I vouch for the truth of the above statements.
Josef Simon Nurnberg Ziegelsteinstr. 106
When I was shipped on 6/30/1933 to the Dachau Concentration Camp, I met there Josef Staimer, an official of the Unions of Stokers and Machinists, who had already been arrested in April and sent to Dachau. As far as I remember, he was not released from Dachau until 1938.
In 1940, Staimer together with Hermann was arrested again on the basis of a denunciation and came to Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp in the Oberpfalz. He was slain there after a few months and burned in the Crematorium. The ashes were sent to his family.
I have reread carefully both reports, as submitted by me on 10/23/1945, and declare herewith under oath, that the content is true. This statement is herewith made by me today, 11/13/1945 at Nurnberg, in the Justice Building before Captain D. A. Sprecher, AUS.
Sworn to before me, 11/13/1945 in the Justice Building in Nurnberg, Germany.
[signed] D. A. Sprecher D. A. Sprecher, 02055516, Captain, AUS.
"Document 2344-PS: reconstruction of a Nation [translation]", p. 1065.
[Aufbau Einer Nation]
by Hermann Göring, 2nd Edition, Published by E. S. Mittler & Son, Berlin 1934, [Page 89].
Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. It cannot be forgotten that at the moment of our rise to power, according to the official election figures of 3/1933, six million people still confess their sympathy for Communism and eight million for Marxism …. Therefore, the concentration camps have been created, where we have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat functionaries.
1935 REICHSVERWALTUNGSBLATT, Vol. 56, No. 29, Pages 577-578, dated 7/20/1935
(Editorial Board: A. Mirow, Dr. H. H. Lammers, H. Pfundtner, Dr. O. Koellreutter, Dr. F. A. Medicus)
II. COURT DECISIONS
Survey of decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court [Oberverwaltungsgericht]
Police in General (Rush-reprint)
Since the Law on the Secret State Police [Geheime Staatspolizei] of 11/30/1933 (GSS 419) became effective, decisions of the Office of the Secret State Police [Geheimes Staats Polizeiamt] can no longer be contested according to the provisions of the Law on the Administration of Police. The only remedy against them is a complaint to the superior authority.
Legal status of the Bureau of the Secret State Police according to the Law on the Secret State Police of 30 November 33.
On 9/4/1934 the Association Secretary filed a suit against the Secret State-Police at the District-Administrative Court in Berlin. The association asserted that on 8/23/1934 their president had been informed by two officials of the office of the Secret State-Police that the assets of the association would be sequestrated for the purpose of an eventual confiscation.
With the decision of 11/1/1934 the District-Administrative Court decided to dismiss the suit.
The appeal of the plaintiff against this decision could not have any success.
The District-Administrative Court in this case dismissed the suit on the ground of the inadmissibility of such an action to this court. According to the principle of enumeration quoted by the judge of first instance a suit can be filed with the administrative courts only if legal provisions expressively rule to that effect. The right of legal redress as provided by the law relating to the Police-Administration applies according to the wording of this law only to the police orders issued by the ordinary police-authorities, i.e. the police-authorities of the community, the district, or the province. The sequestration order in question has not been issued by an ordinary police-authority; on the contrary it had been issued by the Office of Secret State-Police, the legal status of which has been provided by the Law of 11/30/1933.
With this law an authoritative status was given to the Secret State-Police which was basically different from the one at the time it was created, based on the Law of 4/26/1933. By virtue of this last-mentioned law, the Office of the Secret State-Police should act in political matters "at the side of or in the place of the ordinary police-authorities" and "should have the status of a Province-Police-Authority"….
This legal status was changed, as the District-Administrative Court properly recognized, when the "Secret State-Police" was created. An authoritative organization was created thus, the status of which is expressly determined by law to be exempt from the sphere of the Minister of Interior, otherwise competent in all Police matters.
Section 1, sub-section 1, sentence 1 and 2 of the Law of 11/30/1933 quotes:
"The Secret State Police is forming an independent branch of the interior administration. Its chief is the Prime Minister". The conception "interior administration" here is not used in the usual meaning of today according to which this word designates the specified affairs within the sphere of the Minister of the Interioras for instance in comparison with the administration of commerce or public instruction, etc….
That the Secret State Police became an independent organization is clearly shown on one side by the fact that it is subordinated as a whole to the Prime Minister, and then by the creation of special authorities designated with specific names.
Concluding from all this the legal status of the Office of the Secret State Police since the Law of 11/30/1933 became effective is the following: The office is part of a special authoritative organization, the "Secret State Police" which forms an independent branch of the Administration of the Prussian State. It has, like the Secret State Police as a whole, its special field as to the nature of its tasks: the management of affairs of the political police. Therewith the characteristic signs are given of a "Special Police Authority" within the purview of Section 2, subsection 2 and section 8 of the Law relating to the Administration of the Police, an authority detached from the organization of the ordinary police-authorities entrusted with a special police task. It cannot be considered part of the limited circle of police authorities, i.e. State [Landes] authorities, Kreis or local authorities, pursuant to Section 2, sub-section 1 of the Law relating to Police-Administration, as in relation to them it figures rather as a central authority pursuant to the mentioned provisions of Section 3, sub-section 2 of the law of 11/30/1933.
From the thus signified character of the Office of the Secret State Police, which therefore doubtlessly forms a special-police authority, it can be concluded that its orders as mentioned before, are not subject to the provisions of the law relating to the Police Administration in regard to means of redress. Neither does the Law of 11/30/1933 provide for the contesting of a decision by a suit (filing an appeal) at the administrative court. Therefore the party affected by such orders has only the general legal remedy of a complaint to the supervisory authority.
Decree of 5/2/1935 III. C. 43/35
"Document 2349-PS: The Myth of the 20th Century [partial translation]", pp. 1069-1070.
Published by Hoheneichen Publishing House, Muenchen 1941. [Page 215]
We recognize today that the central maximum values of the Roman and the Protestant Church as negative Christianity do not correspond to our soul, that they are in the way of the organic forces of the Nordic racially determined peoples, must give way to them (these forces), and must let themselves be re-evaluated in the sense of a Germanic Christianity. That is the thought behind today's religious searching.
The idea of honornational honoris for us the beginning and end of our entire thinking and doing. It does not admit of any equal-valued center of force alongside of it, no matter of what kind. neither Christian love, nor the Free-Masonic humanity, nor the Roman philosophy.
A German religious movement which would like to develop into a folk-church will have to declare that the idea of neighborly love is unconditionally to be subordinated to the idea of national honor, that no act of a German church may be approved which does not primarily serve the safeguarding of the folkdom.
A German religion will, bit by bit, present in the churches transferred to it, in place of the crucifixion the spirit of firethe heroicin the highest sense.
THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 43-45, Page 1029 compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin, Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt. Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, 11/1937
[Kerrl said in a speech at Fulda, 11/27/1937:]
We cannot recognize that the Church has a right to insure that the individual should be educated in all respects in the way in which it holds to be right; but we must leave it to the National Socialist State to educate the child in the way it regards as right.
"Document 2353-PS: Basic Facts For A History Of German War And Armaments Economy [translation]", pp. 1071-1073.
[Page 35]
The influence of central organization on development and activities of the war economy organization
Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activities of the war economy organization to such an extent, that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the Supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war, prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the national socialists came into power and especially by the decease of Reichpresident von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense law of 5/21/1935, supposed to be published only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law (see Appendix IV, 1) fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization.
War and Armament Economic Measures from entry into Austria (1938 till mobilization 1939)
The discussion between the Führer and the Austrian Chancellor of State Schuschnigg on February 12, led to the military political measures against Austria, which concluded with the entry into Austria on March 13. This action against Austria, disguised under the code name "Action Otto" prepared in a short time, has resulted in a wealth of experience of utmost importance, for the preparation of mobilization and especially for the economic preparations, and has in the course of the year led to changes in the regulations regarding mobilization.
The action was prepared and started without the cooperation of the WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great confusion in the economic sphere lading to unpleasant conditions for the army and also for the economy for the time being.
The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to issue new regulations, preparing the separating of the mobilization of the Armed Forces from the mobilization of the civilian elements. Mobilization of the Armed Forces without public announcement (X-case) was prepared; nevertheless there should be the possibility of proceeding at any time from the mobilization of the Armed Forces only, to a general mobilization of State, Nation and Economy. The basic idea is, that all actions and regulations in case-X are based on Civil law, a state of defense has not been declared and martial law has not been proclaimed. The appropriate measures were ordered on July 5 by the OKW. WStb and GBW expressed justifiable misgivings regarding these new regulations, as mobilization of the Armed Forces before mobilization of economy would create considerable confusion and endanger the smooth running of the economic mobilization. On the demand for a divided mobilization was necessary from a military-political point of view, it was accepted in spite of the objections of the WStb and GBW.
The first planned action of the war economy organization during an actual operation was at the time of the entry into the Sudeten territory. Liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] were attached to the corps commandos, they were in charge of technical war economy units and finally, War Economy Offices for special missions were created to take over definite Economic departments. The military-political developments during the occupation of the Sudeten German territory evolved in such a manner, that the liaison officers as well as the technical war economy units and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations. Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the installation of the liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] at the corps commandos is of great value not only to the troops but also for OKW, and is a necessity in modern warfare. This proved especially valuable insofar as the chiefs of the Civil government were as a rule not instructed in their duties and authority, and the offices for special missions, first had to give them the necessary directives for their task.
At the beginning of the year 1939 a new level was reached as regards the military-political situationthe occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the German army and the abrogation of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. These operations also were prepared "war economically" by the creation of war economy units, who had, as in the case Sudetenland, a very small scope for action. Immediately after the occupation, a war economy inspectorate for special missions was set up, which took over all the duties of the Czechoslovak secretaryship general for National Defense and which was transformed into the Inspectorate of War Economy Prague on 3/30/1939 already. The main duties of the Inspectorate are:
Utilization of the total industrial economy of the Protectorate for the purpose of Reichdefense;
Control of manufacture of war material for at home and abroad and
Effect synchronization of demands to be made by military and civilian Reich authorities and the industrial economy of the Protectorate.
Furthermore they are assigned:
The instruction of the Reichprotector on the economic demands to be made in the interest of Reichdefense and to advise him concerning legislation resulting therefrom;
Air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the Defence Measures [Abwehrmassnahmen] in the factories.
[Pages 181-184]
Execution of the economic mobilization
Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization I regard it as my duty, to give my opinion on the possibility of successful warfare as regards war economy, from my experience as Chief of the WStb gained during 8/1939. During this time many conferences were held with the then Generaloberst Keitel discussing our readiness for war and conditions in regard to armaments as compared with that of the prospective enemy states. During all these discussions I maintained the point of view, that a war with Poland would present no problem for us, but that for a great world war of long duration, our economic structure would be too weak and that, in the case of a world war, decisive measures, conforming to a total war, would have to be carried out immediately. These objections and the resulting demands were nevertheless ignored.
The process of German mobilization in 1939 was most intensively influenced by the progress of the military-political situation and was carried out with the idea of surprising the enemy, at the right moment. The experience gained during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, which led to separate and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis for the measures to be taken. The tension, existing between Germany and Poland since July, was used to take all the measures, necessary for a surprise attack on Poland. Some of these preparations as far as war economy was concerned were the acceleration of the delivery of armaments, which in particular was carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces and, for the organization of War-economy, the forming of war economy units to be attached to the attacking armies.
After August 1, the formation and distribution of VO of WStb took place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In this manner the form of mobilization was ordered, which represented the most unfavorable form for the mobilization of war economy. Reiterated objections against divided mobilization, submitted by WStb as late as August 24, were overridden by the Chief of OKW, while the Supreme Command was of the opinion, that a war with Poland did not necessitate a General mobilization, and any other form of mobilization was out of question for political reasons.
On August 25 18.30 a copy of case X was remitted to the inspectorates of War economy (copy, see Appendix XVIII, 3).
The decree of August 25 orders expressly that case X shall not be extended in its entirety to civilian matters. Even though it was ordered that future proposed mob measures must not be endangered by unplanned demands, requisitions and commandeerings, there was still considerable danger in the mobilization being divided and carried out at different times. This was especially applicable as far as economy was concerned insofar as regulations for economy read that with the utmost consideration of economy in general only the most important war factories should be maintained at their former level and that only isolated war factories should be immediately speeded up to produce a large output. These regulations, in consideration of the Economic Policy which was to oppose every unnecessary change, and also of the kind of propaganda adopted were bound to endanger the planned process of economic mobilization.
The preparations, covering many years of work, for the mobilization of Economy were consequently, for the most part, invalid. This regulation was unfortunately to become an inconvenience later on when starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even noticeable for the first four years of the war up to the declaration of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the preparation for mobilization of the WStb and invalidated by the above regulation, were not executed until 1943 as a result of demands by the Reichminister for Armaments and ammunition.
On 8/27/1939, the regulation on the administration of economy was issued, whereby the Oberpraesidenten were charged with executing and directing all economic measures of the GBW. Included in this was the official founding of the District Economy offices, the Provincial Food offices [Landesernaehrungsaemter], Offices of forestry and economy of timber [Holzwirtschaftsaemter] forming finally the organization, that should have been in force long ago as a result of the mobilization order by GBW.
B. War Economy
The year 1940 was the first acid test for the value and necessity of the War Economy organization. After it had proved its value at home by the measures taken to strengthen the war economy of Germany especially in reestablishing the German war industry and reconstructing the armament industry and had earned the constant appreciation of Field Marshal Göring and the Reichminister for War, it now remained to prove that the organization was also able to support the combat troops, to administer the economy of occupied countries and put it into operation again, and that there was an absolute necessity for such an organization in the present war. That this point of view is correct, is proved by the fact, that all allied as well as enemy states constructed similar organizations, imitating the German pattern.
The operations against Denmark and Norway and the western campaign against Holland, Belgium and France brought full proof; the year 1942 has more than confirmed this point of view.
1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway
The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rue was informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of February, and thereupon ordered the preparation of the measures to be taken as regards war economy. It was decided, that a small staff under the direction of Major Neef (Group leader in the dept. of raw materials Wi Rue) should carry out the appropriate, preliminary preparations, for the organization which were to be carried out in accordance with the directives of OKW-WFA and the Oberquartiermeisters of group XXI charged with the operational preparations. Commander in chief of Group XXI was von Falkenhorst, General in the infantry; Colonel of General staff Baentsch, Oberquartiermeister. The war economy specialists, coordinated under Major Neef, was assimilated into the staff of group XXI on March 20, under the title "Group War Economy" and VO of OKW/Wi Rue office.
The first performance of the group was the compilation of material on the economic structure of Denmark and Norway. Then it worked on the war economy and armament part of the "Demands of OKW to the political plenipotentiaries of the Führer in the Danish and Norwegian Governments", and the economic measures in the "Special instructions on conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway".
Furthermore, special tasks were given to the war economy officers concerned and their first duties defined as follows:
a. Support of the military commanders in the utilization of the economy of the country in the interest of the armed forces;
b. Identification and safeguarding of supplies against unauthorized seizure or transport;
c. Starting or restarting of production plants; any further war economy and armament tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW.
The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders, directives and so forth were issued in a special calendar in order of mobilization.
On April 2 it was decided to select April 9 as the day on which the operation should be carried out.
The execution of the operation was on the whole carried out according to plan. Provision was made that the WO should reach their posts together with their respective staffs, namely, Major Neef by air, the WO Osbjerg and Aarhus over-land, the remaining gentlemen in the warships in which the staffs were transported, while all WO, though partly under heavy fighting, reached their objective on April 9, Major Neef was not able to reach Oslo until April 12, because of the opposition near Oslo.
The unified War Economy Organization which had been prepared for Norway and Denmark depended upon the regulation that the Senior Command for special missions XXXI in Denmark was subordinate to group XXI in Norway. When it soon became evident that this arrangement did not work because of distances and because of the conflicting behavior of the Norwegian and Danish governments, it was decided on April 10 to make the Senior Command for Denmark directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army, while group XXI together with the forces operating in Norway was to remain subordinate to the OKW. As a result of this change it also became necessary to divide the War Economy organization. The War Economy Liaison Office Denmark was placed under the supervision of the administrator of Danish economy, on the staff of the political plenipotentiary of the Führer in Copenhagen; the organization Norway under Major Neef remained attached to group XXI.
In Norway as well as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work.
As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and the most important military problems had been settled, they quickly attended to the construction of the War Economy Organization.
In Norway for the first few days after the occupation, the German Ambassador Dr. Braeuer, remained the political plenipotentiary of the Führer. As Foreign Office commissioner, dealing with economic problems, Min. Direktor Sarnow of the Reich Wi. M. was attached to him. Major Neef immediately tried to secure a definition of the fields of work. However, when this did not meet with any success, for the sake of the work, he arranged with Min. Dir. Sarnow that the office of WO Norway as should be incorporated into the Staff of the commissioner dealing with economic problems, as Main Division II. This measure, however, was never carried out, because both Dr. Braeuer and Min. Dir. Sarnow were recalled on April 22 and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP Terboven was named by the Führer as Reichcommissioner of the occupied Norwegian territories. All attempts by Major Neef to clarify the status and spheres of activity with the 2nd in Command of the Reich Commissar Gauwirtschaftsberater Otte, were for the time being unsuccessful. On April 27 the former Liaison Office was changed to the War Economy Staff Norway. The WO as a branch office was subordinate to the latter.
In Denmark, Commander Dr. Forstmann quickly succeeded in coming to an understanding with the German Ambassador von Renthe-Fink and his commercial attache Dr. Krueger in regard to the spheres of activity. On May 27 the office was renamed "War Economy Staff Denmark."
The details concerning the establishing of the War Economy offices, their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short, attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most important experiences during this first large-scale operation of the War Economy Organization.
The problems which faced the war economy officers during the occupation of Denmark and Norway were very extensive and embraced both military as well as economic problems in all fields of economy. The military leaders were glad that officers trained in war economy were at their disposal, who were qualified to solve questions of an economic-organizational character and, as authorities, could negotiate with Danish and Norwegian Officials. At this moment the manner in which the War Economy Organization had been formed, proved its worth in that there was personnel trained in military as well as industrial and commercial fields. Thus it happened that problems were entrusted to the WO which really lay beyond the scope of their activities. The following may be named:
Supplying troops with food, Motor vehicles and fuel, Procuring billeting possibilities for the troops, Securing money and regulating the currency problem, Procuring material (cement, wood, etc.), Providing coal, Regulating transportation, Loading troops onto ships, Procuring raw materials and finished products, Putting the fishing industry into operation, Rationing food for the armed forces and the civilian population, Rationing of fuel, Cooperating with the sailings of ships putting in and out, Administering the loading of ships, Checking over claims for compensation for war damage and requisitions, Utilization of fish garbage and the manufacture of fish flour, Price regulations for the purchase and renting of real estate for the armed forces, The loaning of horses and seed for agriculture.
These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or were not in the position to solve these problems.
Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the WO to cope with the real problems affecting war economy, which dealt immediately with the seizing and securing of the most important agricultural supplies and the reestablishing of the means of subsistence.
Then the problems in Denmark and Norway shaped themselves in different ways as a result of the war situation (see appendix XX, 6). As early as June 15 the order could be issued regarding Denmark that the country be treated as being in the domestic theatre of operations; and therefore it was possible to quickly begin to make full use of the Danish defense and armament industry. The exploitation of the armament industry in Norway could only follow at a slower pace and at a later period, because it was regarded as being enemy territory. The utilization of the Danish and Norwegian economy followed within the framework of the "Proposals by the armed forces for the regulating of the general questions in regard to war and armament economy." (see appendix XX, 7).
Very soon it was necessary for the Wi Rue department and the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway to take sharp measures in order to avoid duplication of work and the overlapping of the WT in Danish and Norwegian concerns. Above all, it was important for the sake of currency stabilization to keep a firm hand over the buyers of the WT, because they were causing danger to the currencies of the countries by flooding them with fiduciary monetary tender. It very soon became finally necessary to adopt measures to make the raw material available for those orders placed with Denmark and Norway, because, in part, the raw materials needed for the purpose of filling these orders were not to be had there.
In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into operation again, the Wi Rue Amt. sent German industrial and economic personnel to Norway, who, as middlemen, were to quickly establish confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge were to accelerate the revival of Norwegian Economy.
The experiences of the first months of the occupation show that it is absolutely necessary to provide units operating independently with War Economy Offices, since in a modern war economic problems are submitted to the commanders which can only be solved by trained personnel. It is self evident that, later on, a major portion of the problems must be transferred to the civilian Economic departments, which will be set up, and that the soldier confines himself to the solution of economic problems that serve the troops, as long as no solution is found, as later proved to be the case, in the Netherlands.
The staffing of the WO for Denmark and Norway was in most cases too small, because the problems were too complex and the fields of operation allotted to them were too large.
Yet it is an established fact that the War Economy Offices, in Denmark and Norway especially, rendered invaluable services to the troops during the first months and that an organization for the reopening of industrial operations and to carry out the commissions of the WT was an absolute necessity.
Moreover, the outstanding work of the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway was the main reason for the fact that, in 1941, it was possible to carry out, according to plan, the enormous work for the defense of the country, which was required of the Economies of Denmark and Norway by the Supreme Command.
2. Campaign in the West
The operations against France, Holland and Belgium brought about the first real use of the war economy organization in enemy territory. It was accomplished in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army.
At the start of the war, the Armed Forces operating in the West were, by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland, supplied with Army Economic Officers [Armeewirtschaftsführer-A Wi Fue] who simultaneously were the liaison with the armament offices in the border territory.
The primary duties of the A Wi Fue attached to the Western armies were the tasks of economic evacuation and immobilization and only at the end of 1939 did the preparations for the entry into Holland, Belgium and France come to the foreground. The process of economic evacuation in the homeland rested mainly with the competent Rue commandos of the homeland, who had arranged the necessary preparations by way of mobilization, in accordance with the clearance measures already prepared during peacetime.
Especially in the Saar territory the VO had a complicated task to perform, and was able to demonstrate the value of its existence-for defense also.
Negotiations with friendly and neutral states on war economy and also delivery of war material.
The year 1940 brought special problems for the office of Wi Rue as far as trade in war material was concerned as a result of the deliveries, necessitated by the military political situation, to Russia, Finland, Roumania and Italy.
As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty of 8/19/1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM, 120 millions RM, thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries of material to the value of 100 millions RM were desired during the first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparatus, etc., could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their request, the preponderent desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of the Russians as much finished war material as possible.
As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons cereals, 500000 tons wheat, 900000 tons of oil by-products, 100000 tons of cotton, 500000 tons phosphates, 80 millions RM of timber, 10000 tons of flax, manganese, platinum, and the transit for 1 million tons of Soybeans), and in consideration of the importance of these quantities to the German war economy and the importance which the Supreme Command attached to the maintaining of pleasant relations with Soviet Russia, the question of immediate reciprocal deliveries became steadily more pressing.
The desire to produce war material became stronger from week to week, so strong that OKW created a special Referat at Wi Rue charged with working on the Russian demands and arranging them in accordance with the German production program. Appendix XX, 21 and XX, 22 gives an idea of the progress of the arrangements.
As the Russians delivered quickly and well, it was imperative to accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command decided to offer the Russians even more war material that was already manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was great. The great cruiser Luetzow especially came into this category, other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery and tanks and important patents [lizenzen] for war material. As these contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the Führer ordered, on March 30, thatas far as necessarythe delivery of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery to the German Armed Forces.
This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position, as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements stepped up and demanded punctual delivery.
On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with Reichmarshal Göring, was informed, that the Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy.
By the end of 10/1940, Reichmarshal Göring insisted once more, on pressure being exerted for accelerated deliveries to the Russians according to plan. (file notice from Oct. 5, see Appendix XX, 23).
Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way.
The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains.
The production program ordered by decree of the Führer on Aug. 20, and instituted by reason of urgency, on Sept. 20, was stepped up again on Sept. 27, and amended insofar as the equipment under the code word "Achse" (African campaign) was to be given priority over all other equipment, including the ones in the special category.
As both the Army and Minister Todt were urging the high priority of the Panzer-and Achse-program, the Navy demanded its "Seeloewe"-measures accelerated and aerial armaments were being even more intensified, the Chief of Wi Rue office, at a conference of Chiefs of departments, presided over by Fieldmarshal Keitel, pointed to the difficulties of accelerating everything at the same time, with the bad situation as regards manpower. He demanded once more a clarification of the organization, which was really the most important thing. Resulting from this the following decision was made by the WFSt on Dec. 3.40, enclosed as Appendix XX, 35.
This decision affected future measures as follows:
1. there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of a siege of England,.
2. aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for the first time.
3. the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned for the first time, and its postponement to some later date admitted as possible.
Shortly beforeon 11/6/1940Reichmarshal Göring, for the first time made a statement to the effect, that we should prepare ourselves for a long war, and therefore planning of raw material should be considered in this perspective. (see file on Report at Beauvais on Nov. 6.40, Appendix XX, 36).
At the beginning of December, instructions were received, that for the time being there was no question of an Invasion of England, and that the "Seeloewe"-preparations should merely be concluded.
The year 1941 was, as far as war economy was concerned, mostly dominated by the preparations, respectively the execution of the action in the Balkans, the war in the East and the war in Africa.
The respective preparations go back to the year 1940. The development of the Italo-Albanian-Greco war, the establishing of a German military mission in Roumania and the possibility of German participation in the Italian war in Africa had led as early as 8/1940 to a War Economy Staff Roumania and in October a War Economy Staff Afriea being created by the office of Wi Rue to deal with the problems connected with these theatres of war and charged with working out all the questions appertaining thereto. By the middle of 11/1940 Colonel Gen. staff Spalcke was delegated to Roumania as member of the German military mission, and charged with the representation for war economy in the Balkan countries and in Africa and the completion of the necessary basis as regards war economy for an operation were intensively processed in the office of the Wi. Rue.
In 11/1940, the Chief of Wi Rue together with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.
By reason of-these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at the end of 1940.
The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks:
1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.
2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.
3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.
4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and Petroleum (crude oil).
5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.
These points were concentrated in one big compilation, "War Economy of the Soviet Union" and illustrated with detailed maps, etc.
Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization.
For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.
Simultaneously detailed investigations were made of the situation as regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed later on.
Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war economic nature connected with the Balkans and Africa.
While the preparations for the Russian Campaign could be completed as planned, the measures for the action in the Balkans had to be improvisioned on account of the unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak in Yugoslavia. Only Colonel Wendt, as VO was sent to AOK12 in Roumania at the beginning of January as planned, and given charge of T. B. 13. The preparations were arranged for an entry into Greece only. When the revolt in Yugoslavia started, the preparations had to be altered. Department IV of VO AOK12 was divided, the one half under Colonel Wendt to follow the assault of AOK12, direction Belgrad, the other half under Captain v. Illberg to accompany the forces attacking towards Greece. Half a battalion each of T.B. 13 was put at the disposal of Colonel Wendt and Capt. v. Illberg, respectively.
With the arrival of the second army Col. Fach was installed VO in charge of T. B. 6 and 8. Furthermore he had specialists at his disposal, familiar with the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece. Dr. Pook of the Wi Rue Office was dispatched to manage copper mines at Bor.
Details of operations and results of the war economy units during the action in the Balkans; (see report of OKW (Wi Rue Bureau) No. 27438/41 secret, of June 4,1941, Appendix XXI, 10).
Even during the operations, organization of a War Economy Staff Serbia with a Wi. Commando at Belgrade was ordered, the staff was closely connected with Consul General Neuhausen charged with the Economic Administration of Serbia, by the Reichmarshal.
a. a war economy officer Agram for the territory of Croatia and
b. a Rue-commando Klagerfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11).
The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved much credit for the utilization and securing of the Yugoslavian raw materials, important for German armaments and by organizing the transport of these raw materials. The seizing of the still usable factories in Serbia and Croatia for assimilation into the German Armament Industry had already been started in April (s. Wi Rue Bureau No. 22-261/62 of April 29, 41. Appendix XXI, 12 and XXI, 13) and represented useful support for the W. T. especially for repair work but also for the manufacture of material of all kinds. The concerns processing raw material could be built up in the course of time to form a valuable support for the German war economy, the deliveries of copper, bauxite, tin, chromium, asbestos and mica were of considerable importance.
As the territory of Greece, by order of the Führer (see appendix, Wi Rue Bureau No. 22-263/412 of May 29, Appendix XXI, 14) was ceded to the Italians for economic exploitation, war economy offices were only installed in Greece where needed by the Army or for the security of transportation.
There was one Wi Kdo each established in Salonica and Athens. At the same time the confiscation and utilization was ordered of the factories, in the areas of Salonica and Athens occupied by German troops, necessary for war economy and armament (see Wi Rue Bureau, No. 22-263/41 s. file XXI, 15). The factories in Athens were especially important as repair plants for the airforce. But also by the delivery of oil and tobacco to the army and to the homeland the war economy offices rendered considerable
The compilation was the result of the deliberations concerning the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall in 11/1940. The Office of Economy and Armament [Wi Rue Amt] had taken pains to give a completely objective picture of the situation regarding Defense and armament economy [wehrund Ruestungswirtschaftliche Lage] of the USSR and had held it necessary, to refer to the points which might cause difficulties for a military operation.
The result of this work compiled carefully on the basis of safely proved facts is summed up at the end as follows:
"Any operation leading to the occupation of the European part of USSR (without the Ural territory), will bring the following results:
I. During the first months Germany will be relieved in the field of nutrition and raw materials, if a quick seizure should succeed in
a. preventing the destruction of stocks
b. capturing the mineral oilfields of the Caucasus undestroyed and
c. solving the problem of transportation.
II. For longer duration of the war an effective relief is dependent on the following pre-requisites:
a. in all fields:
1. on the solution of the transportation problem,
2. On the staying [verblieb; translator's note: may also mean: "whereabouts"] of the people (population) and winning them over to collaborate.
b. in the field of agriculture:
1. on preventing destruction of the "M.T.S." and the possibility of replacing their pool of tractors and machines by taking up production again in the USSR.
2. on the possibility of fuel supply.
c. in the industrial field:
1. on the capture of powerworks undestroyed or on their fast restoration.
2. on securing the delivery of raw materials not existing in the European part of the USSR to the industry.
III. The supplying of Germany with India-rubber tungsten, copper, platinum, tin, asbestos and manila hemp remains unsolved until communication with the Far East will be established.
IV. The territory south of the mouth of Volga and Don inclusive of the Caucasus must be included in the operation. The Caucasian fuel supply is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories.
V. In the field of just the armament-industry it will lead to taking possession of about 75% of the total Russian armament industry and almost 100% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry. The USSR will keep about 25% of the mere armament and scarcely 1% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry.
In addition to the Italian negotiations, until 6/1941 the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.
As a result of the visit of the Hungarian Minister, Excellence Bartha, the trade in war material with Hungary came once more into the foreground. Above all, the Hungarians demanded German help in equipping their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and listening devices, tanks, artillery and communications equipment, and heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture of gauges and fuses, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks. The Hungarians were promised help in almost all fields, however, not until the summer of 1942 because it was thought that by this time the campaign in the East would have come to an end. Technical help for the saving of raw material with the issuing of licenses was offered them immediately. The shifting of German orders to Hungary was put into effect.
The negotiations with Roumania and Finland covered more ground, because both states made considerable demands for the improvement of the equipment of their units designed to fight against Russia. First of all, the Roumanians asked for anti-aircraft equipment, prime movers, and trucks for the motorization and artillery equipment of all kind; moreover, they asked that the artillery and munition orders placed in France and with the Boehler works be executed. The Finns demanded long-range guns, anti-aircraft guns, fuses, airplanes and help in carrying out motorization. In accordance with the directive from the Führer, the Roumanians were promised help as much as possible, while the Finns were to be put off until later.
When the operations opened in the East, the demands became greater and more urgent; the Finns, especially, called for raw materials and fuel. These demands were met in the case of both these countries as much as possible.
Bulgarian wishes lay, particularly, in the field of motorization and communications and in the delivery of armoured reconnaissance cars and tanks. Only small deliveries could be made; in general the Bulgarians were instructed that these states, which were actually in the battle, must receive first delivery.
Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey were of special importance. The office of Wi Rue was instructed to specially cultivate these negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chromium. Since the Foreign Office wanted in full to assure the treaty for deliveries of Turkish chromium for the year 1942/43, more deliveries of war material, which partly constituted former Turkish orders, were promised for 1942.
[Page 479] History will know only a few examples of cases where a country has directed even in peacetime all its economic forces so deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two world wars.
[Page 38] In the (Reich Defense) Law the appointment of a General Plenipotentiary for the Economy was provided for, a post for which Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was contemplated. He was to have the right to give directions on economic questions to all ministries concerned with economic problems. He was charged with the preparation of all economic war measures with the exception of the armament industry which was to be handled by the Army High Command.
[Page 59] If it is said for example, that "not the economy, but politics represents fate", this principle should be recognized only with the reservation that politics may receive its decisive impulse from the economic necessities of a nation. The fundamental urge to expand a nation which does not find the basis for its food production in its own soil, is an imperative for the shaping of policy.
[Page 87] If it was possible in a few years to develop the thirty-two monopoly factories of the Treaty of Versailles into an armament industry sufficient for our large army, this is due very largely to the work of the offices of the Military Economy Organization.
[Page 127] In spite of the limitations in rearmament ordered by the Minister of War in 1937, the demands of the Army for steel remained so high that the Minister of Economics announced his misgivings regarding the economy as a whole. The War Minister stated that, in view of the existing foreign exchange situation, the condition of the whole economy, and thereby of rearmament, was jeopardized by a continuous fall of exports, and consequently he requested the introduction of raw material quotas, by means of which the management of rearmament and of other important programs was to be accomplished.
[Page 145] Complaints about excessive loads of work at factories and about continuous modifications of order schedules were received all the time from industry. By means of the spreading of orders and the admission of new firms, the Military Economy Organization and the armament offices succeeded in carrying out the armament programs more or less according to plan and to fulfill the demands of the leaders.
[Pages 173-174] The enlargement of gunpowder and explosives production was started as a large scale action. At the suggestion of the Economy Staff, Field Marshal Göring ordered the drafting of a plan for the manufacture of gunpowder and explosives in 1938 and charged General-Director Krauch of IG Farben with the execution of this plan. The plan was set up on 7/12/1938, as the so-called "Karinhall" plan and scheduled the creation of a capacity of 12000 tons of gunpowder per month, 19000 tons of explosives, and 4000 tons of poison gas until 10/1/1940. By October 1st the capacity was to be Gunpowder 18000 tons, Explosives 24000 tons, Poison gas 8000 tons, per month. In view of numerous difficulties, particularly due to the lack of foreign exchange for the purchase of machines, due further to a smaller allocation of raw materials and shortage of workers, the speed of production contemplated by Dr. Krauch could not be maintained; consequently the scheduled figures could not be reached by the time of the outbreak of war.
The course of German mobilization in 1939 was greatly influenced by the development of the military-political situation and was guided by the idea of a surprise of the enemy. The experiences made during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia, which led to a partial and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis of the measures to be taken. The tension existing between Germany and Poland since July was used in order to prepare all measures necessary for a surprise attack against Poland.
[Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] 5th, 6th and 7th Edition, Central NSDAP Press, 1938, Munich
[Fifth Edition, Pages 367-371a]
Training of the SA
In order to obtain uniform training, a systematical arrangement of three major groups is provided:
a ideological education and training
b general training
c active service
These groups comprise essentially the following individual fields:
1. Education and training according to the doctrines and aims of the Führer as they are set forth in the "Kampf" and in the party program for all phases of our lives and our National Socialist ideology. 2. The teachings of the history of the German people for the tasks of our time. 3. Exercise of the National Socialist doctrine of duty.
1. Security police service, 2. Physical exercises, 3. Marching exercises, 4. Terrain service, 5. Small-caliber shooting practice, 6. Gas and air-raid protection, 7. Service of special units, (Maritime, Communications, Engineers, and Cavalry units).
1. Assemblies and demonstrations 2. Contests and performance examinations for SA sport insignia 3. Security service 4. Home service (catastrophe service, etc.)
The training of leaders is the prerequisite for the total training. The suitability of the SA leaders for their positions was first established through examinations.
Leaders designated as suitable will be educated and trained step by step according to the previously mentioned points of view and according to the special educational guidance of the Office of the Chief of Storm Troops [Oberste SA-Fuehrung].
The SA Sport Insignia [Page 369]
The new state demands a resistant, hardened generation. In addition to the ideological education of the mind, a fighting training of the body must be required by means of simple, useful, and natural body exercises.
In order to create increased incentive and aims for the endeavors of youth, I re-establish the SA Sport Insignia for the entire SA and for all its former branches, which is earned by means of a performance test after a conscientiously executed period of training.
In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a valiant spirit in all parts of the German people, I further decide that this SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn by persons who are not members of the movement, in as far as they comply racially and ideologically with the National Socialist requirements.
Enforcement regulations are decreed by the Chief of Staff.
Chief of Storm Troops [Der Oberste SA-Führer]
Signed: Adolf Hitler
The performance test includes three groups of exercises: Body exercises, Military sports, Topographical (naval) services.
Group I Body exercises: 100-meter race, Broad jump, Shot-put, Throwing of hand grenades, 3000-meter race.
Group II Military sports: 25-Kilometer march with pack, Firing of small-caliber arms, Aimed throwing of hand grenades, 200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles, Swimming or bicycle riding, Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents.
Group III Terrain service: Orientation, Terrain observation, Estimate of terrain, Estimate of distance, Camouflage, Observing and reporting, Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain service.
Special regulations for SA naval units:
Group I Body exercises: unchanged
Group II Military sports: 15-kilometer march with pack instead of 25-kilometer
Group III Naval service: 25 minutes of long-distance rowing in cutter seamanship in and on the boat, throwing of lines, knotting and splicing, signaling and transmitting of Morse code messages, compass, designation of navigable water, navigation lights, rules on turning aside, general seamanlike behavior while in naval service.
[Sixth Edition, Pages 359, 364a, 364b, 365]
Structure of the SA
The SA extends over the whole Reich territory.
It is organized according to political and local [Landsmannschaftlich] viewpoints into SA groups as follows:
SA GroupAlpenland
SA Group-Bavarian Ostmark (Govt. Dist. lower Bavaria, upper Palatinate and upper Franconia)
SA GroupBerlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater Berlin)
SA GroupDanube
SA GroupFranconia (Govt. Dist. central and lower Franconia)
SA GroupHansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg)
SA GroupHesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse, upper Hesse, the Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau)
SA GroupHighland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. upper Bavaria and Swabia)
SA GroupPalatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar, and Rhenish Hesse)
SA GroupMiddle (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt)
SA GroupLower Rhine (Parts of Rhine Province and the Ruhr District)
SA GroupLower Saxony (Parts of Province of Hannover and Free State of Brunswick)
SA GroupNordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holsten, Free City of Luebeck)
SA GroupNorth Sea (parts of Province of Hannover and Westphalia, Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen)
SA GroupOstland (Province of East Prussia and Free State of Danzig)
SA GroupOstmark (Province of Grenzmark)
SA GroupPomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Grenzmark)
SA GroupSaxony (Free State of Saxony)
SA GroupSilesia (Province of upper and lower Silesia)
SA GroupSudeten SA GroupSuedmark
SA GroupSouthwest (Free State of Baden and Wurttemberg)
SA GroupThuringia (Free State of Thuringia)
SA GroupWarthe
SA GroupVistula
SA GroupWestphalia (Province of Westphalia)
SA GroupWestmark (Rhine Province and part of the Province of Hesse-Nassau)
2. Special Units [Identical with corresponding passage in 5th and 7th editions]
In order to comply with the manifold demands on the services of the SA during demonstrations, assemblies, catastrophes, and accidents, as well as to preserve the efficiency of SA men, SA members have been organized into special and technical units. There are: Marine, Mounted, Communications, Engineer and Medical units.
Their organization into companies, battalions, and so forth, and their subordination are variously regulated according to location and the given circumstances.
a. Marine SA: The Marine SA includes all SA men who by occupation are or have been sailors of the merchant marine, the navy, or interior shipping, as well as men who are connected with shipping in any way or particularly interested in it.
The seagoing SA men, who come into contact with the population of other countries, should represent National Socialist will and thought [Wollen and Denken].
For this reason their ideological education and professional training is a main mission of the marine SA
This schooling and training is given aboard ship in the board troops [Bordtrupps] and on land in the marine SA units.
Further tasks are service in catastrophes and accidents, especially those caused by water. For this purpose thorough training in seamanship is given each marine SA man.
b. Mounted SA: As the mainstay of the national socialist riding corps [NSRK], the SA cavalry is responsible for the training of German youth in riding and driving, before military service, as well as additional training in riding for men already in the service (compare discussion on Page 373 "National Socialist Riding Corps"). The SA cavalry further cultivates riding and driving activities within the SA
c. Communications SA: The task of the Communications SA is to enable the responsible leader during assemblies and other demonstrations and in the catastrophe service to exercise control over subordinated or employed units. The training therefore extends primarily to telephone service. Beyond that, however, the communications SA men are also trained in sending and receiving Morse Code signals. The "Communications Certificate of the SA" is a certificate of merit for those SA men who wish to enlist in the signal corps of the armed forces.
d. Engineers SA: The tasks of the SA engineers include catastrophe protective service during incidents capable of damaging the German national property.
Every SA engineer has to prove in thorough technical examinations his degree of training and his initiative [Einsatsbereitschaft].
The examinations are entered in a performance book, which also contains the "SA Engineers Certificate" as certificate of merit.
e. Medical SA: The SA doctors and SA medical personnel organized into medical units will supervise and care for the bodily health and efficiency of the individual SA man as well as units under their jurisdiction.
Schools of the SA for special units
a. Marine SA Schools: The following schools are available for training the marine SA: Marine SA school "DUSTERNBROCK" and the training sailing ship "DUHNEN." The school "DUSTERNBROCK" has to accomplish above all practical and theoretical training in boat service, in row, sail and power boat, according to the regulations of the navy.
The continuation of seamanship training takes place on the seagoing training ship "DUHNEN." Here one gets used to the ship and learns to know and serve it in all its parts and equipment, and here also knowledge of weather and steering is taught and applied.
b. Reich Riding Leadership School. (See under REICHSREITERFÜHRERSCHULE on page 373).
c. Reich Communications School of the SA: Here the SA leaders of communications units are trained in all particulars of communications. Here they also become eligible through examinations for the "SA Communications Certificate."
THE SA REGIMENT "FELDHERRNHALLE"
The SA Regiment "Felderrnhalle" has its seat in Berlin, Voss Strasse 1. It consists of six garrisoned battalions stationed in: Berlin, Munich, Hattingen, Krefeld, Stettin, and Stuttgart.
SA General [Obergruppenführer] Hermann Göring was appointed by the Führer on 1/12/1937, as Chief of the SA Regiment "Feldherrnhalle". The SA regiment is directly subordinated to the chief of staff. Its mission, beyond regular SA service, is to supervise bureaus of the SA, the party, and the state. It is to be ready at all times for any and all purposes.
[Seventh Edition, page 359, 367]
BRANCHES OF THE SA
The SA embraces the entire territory of the Reich. It is divided according to political and local (LANDSMANNSCHAFTLICH) points of view into the following groups:
SA GroupAlpenland (District /Gau/ Upper Danube, Salzburg, Tyrol-Vorarlberg)
SA GroupBayernwald (Govt. Dist. Lower Bavaria, Upper Palatinate and Upper Franconia)
SA GroupDanube (Gau Lower Danube, Vienna)
SA GroupElbe (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt)
SA GroupHesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse /Upper Hesse/, the Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau)
SA GroupPalatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar District, Rhenish Hesse, Lorraine)
SA Group-Central Rhine (Rhine Province, Part of the Province of Hesse-Nassau, Luxemburg)
SA GroupNeckar (Part of the Free State of Baden and Wuerttenberg)
SA GroupLower Rhine (Parts of the Rhine Province and of the Ruhr District)
SA GroupLower Saxony (Part of the Province of Hannover and Free State of Brunswick)
SA GroupNordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of Luebeck)
SA GroupNorth Sea (Parts of the Province of Hannover and Westphalia, Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen)
SA GroupUpper Rhine (Parts of the Free State of Baden and Alsace)
SA GroupOder (Province of Grenzmark)
SA GroupPomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Granzmark)
SA GroupSaxony ( Free State of Saxony)
SA GroupSudeten (Reich Gau Sudetenland)
SA GroupSuedmark (Gau Styria and Carinthia)
SA GroupTannenberg(Province of East Prussia)
SA GroupWarthe (Reich Gau Wartheland)
SA GroupVistula (Reich Gau DanzigWest Prussia)
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SA
Service with the SA is and remains voluntary. As in recruitment for the SA no advantages may be promised and no pressure whatsoever may be exerted, the SA man should have the possibility to withdraw from the SA if he believes that he can no longer agree with SA views or if he is not in a position to fulfill completely the duties imposed on him as a member of the SA On presentation of honorable reasons in a corresponding written petition, the SA member can be "released from the SA by own request." However, if he shows no interest or if he has joined the ranks of the SA merely because of a whim or for the sake of a good opportunity, there ensues a "discharge from the SA according to number 127b of the SADV/1" (official measures for insuitability for service in the SA). If he is guilty of any disciplinary or political or possibly criminal offenses, the competent disciplinary officer can declare him as "punished with permanent discharge from the SA" In serious cases "exclusion from the SA" can be declared.
"Document 2357-PS: Speech By Hitler Before Reichstag, 2/20/1938 [translation]", pp. 1099-1100.
DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part VI, 1, Pages 50-52.
In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the State with which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a detente, but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement in relations, This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that, since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions by this State, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.
Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of uspeace.
"Document 2368-PS: Extracts From Speech By Hitler Before Reichstag 1/30/1937 [translation]", p. 1102.
DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part VI, 2, Page 42.
"By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of both sides.
"True statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them. The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities The German nation and the German Reich are equally realities And to my own fellow-citizens, I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become a reality.
"The German Reich with its strong Army will protect her own security and her own honor. But, fully convinced that there is or Europe no greater good than peace, the German Reich will always be a responsible and conscious promoter of the European peace idea."
"Document 2371-PS: Ministerial Gazette For The Prussian Internal Administration [partial translation]", pp. 1102-1105.
[Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische Innere Verwaltung] Page 503
Execution of ordinance for security of people and state (national security) Dated: 2/28/1933 (RGBl. I, Page 83) Rd. Erl. d. M.d. J. (KdR) 3/3/1933-II-21 (Circular)
As a defense against the criminal, communist activities and a means of ruthless suppression of this source of peril, whose extremely dangerous scope has been revealed at the last minute the Reich president decided on 2/28/1933 to proclaim the decree for the protection of the people and the state. Reichsgesetzblatt Part I, page 83.
For the actual application of the measures authorized in this decree, I give the following directions:
1. Sect. 1 of the decree not only suspends temporarily articles 114-115, 117-118, 123-124 and 153 of the constitution; it rather eliminates all other Reich and state limitations in this matter, as far as this is necessary or practical in order to reach the aims of this decree. Within this framework police officials thus may go beyond the restrictions laid down by the provisions of sections 14 and 41 of the Prussian police code, their orders still remain police ordinances of police warrants and thus as far as form is concerned remain subject to the applicable regulations. However, violations are punished according to sect. 4 of the decree which in this respect prevails, according to p. 4 of the preceding decree. Conforming to the aim and purpose of the decree, the additional permissible actions will be directed primarily against the communists, but also against all those working with the communists or even indirectly supporting or promoting their criminal aims. To avoid any blunder, I remind you that the decree for the protection of the people and state, dated 2/28/1933, should be used against members or institutions other than communist, anarchist or social democratic parties or organizations, when such measures serve for the defense against such communist tendencies in their broadest meaning. In other cases the decree of 4/2/1933 shall be applied. Labor unions shall not be put on the same level with social-democratic organizations.
2. The local police has principal jurisdiction for all those police measures, which are permissible after the legal limitations mentioned under 1. have been removed. The jurisdiction has been changed by my decree of 2/3/1933, (G.S. page 33) based on section 3 par. 5 of the Prussian police Code. Consequently all regulations dealing with the suspension of a periodical or the restriction of property have to be issued from the state police offices. Regulations concerning personal liberty, the right to assemble and congregate, or restrictions concerning the secrecy of mails, communications, telegraph and cable may be ordered by the district police only, (Section 3, part 2, P.V.G.).
3. All orders under Section 1 of the decree of 2/28/1933 must be in writing and signed by the competent chief of police of his general appointed deputies or a deputy appointed for such a measure. In cases of restriction of personal liberty, freedom of speech including freedom of press and property rights the involved person is to be served at the latest at the beginning of the procedure with a certified copy of such an order statement. In cases of interferences with the secrecy of mail, postal service, telegraph and cable one certified copy of the order is to be sent immediately to the post office concerned, as well as to the regional postal office. This order does not affect the existing formal requirements and prerequisites under which restrictions of personal liberty, of free speech incl. free press, of the right to organize and assemble, interference in the secrecy of postal, telegraph, and cable services,orders of search and seizure, and limitations upon property rights, could be carried out m accordance with prevailing legal provisions.
4. The state police departments have to keep themselves informed on all measures taken in their districts in accordance with sect. 1, of the decree of 2/28/1933, and they have to report to me on the 5th and 20th of each month on measures taken in the second, resp. first half of the preceding month. Unless specially ordered, individual measures, including the suspension of periodicals in accordance with section 1 of this decree need not be reported unless it concerns a very important case.
5. If on principle (see figure 1, par. 2 of this circular) or for some special reason the application of the decree for the protection of the people and state (RGBl I, Page 83) dated 2/28/1933, seems out of question or not advisable, the provisions of the decree for the protection of the German people (RGBl I, page 35) dated 2/4/1933, and the applicable executive directions remain in effect unchanged.
To all police dept. M Bli v. 1, page 233.
Reorganization of the political police
Circular decree of the Ministry for the Interior of 4/26/1933II 1000/53
In order to guarantee effective countermeasures against all activities endangering the existence and security of the state, the state government has decided to reform the organization of the political police more severely than before and to create the necessary conditions for speedy and successful operations. For this purpose and for the benefit of a uniform supreme management of the political police the Office of Secret State Police (which is) directly subordinated to myself has been established in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrechtstrasse 8 by the law of 4/26/1933 printed in annex 1 (Gesetz-Sammlung, Seite 122) (collection of laws, page 122). Its duty is to investigate all political activities endangering the state by special executors with the assistance of outside bureaus for the individual provincial police districts (State-Police-Bureaus) and with the support of the ordinary police authorities within the entire territory of the state, to collect and exploit the results of these investigations, to keep myself, the Minister for the Interior, permanently informed, to prepare and provide at all times the necessary proofs for my decisions, and finally to report all politically important observations and statements also to other police authorities and provide them with suggestions. Furthermore the Office of the Secret State Police is authorized within the sphere of its activity to request political measures from other police-authorities and to give them instructions.
"Document 1417-PS [translation]" pp. 8-10.
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1333 First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of 11/14/1935 On the basis of Article 3, Reichs Citizenship Law, of 9/15/1935 (RGBl I, page 146) the following is ordered:
1. Until further issue of regulations regarding citizenship papers, all subjects of German or kindred blood, who possessed the right to vote in the Reichstag elections, at the time the Citizenship Law came into effect, shall, for the time being, possess the rights of Reich citizens. The same shall be true of those whom the Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy of the Führer, has given the preliminary citizenship.
2. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy of the Führer, can withdraw the preliminary citizenship.
1. The regulations in Article 1 are also valid for Reichs subjects of mixed, Jewish blood.
2. An individual of mixed Jewish blood, is one who descended from one or two grandparents who were racially full Jews, insofar as does not count as a Jew according to Article 5, paragraph 2. One grandparent shall be considered as full-blooded if he or she belonged to the Jewish religious community.
Only the Reich citizen, as bearer of full political rights, exercises the right to vote in political affairs, and can hold a public office. The Reich Minister of the Interior, or any agency empowered by him, can make exceptions during the transition period, with regard to occupying public offices. The affairs of religious organizations will not be touched upon.
1. A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no right to vote in political affairs, he cannot occupy a public office.
2. Jewish officials will retire as of 12/31/1935. If these officials served at the front in the World War, either for Germany or her allies, they will receive in full, until they reach the age limit, the pension to which they were entitled according to last received wages; they will, however, not advance in seniority. After reaching the age limit, their pension will be calculated anew, according to the last received salary, on the basis of which their pension was computed.
3. The affairs of religious organizations will not be touched upon.
4. The conditions of service of teachers in Jewish public schools remain unchanged, until new regulations of the Jewish school systems are issued.
1. A Jew is anyone who descended from at least three grandparents who were racially full Jews. Article 2, par. 2, second sentence will apply.
2. A Jew is also one who descended from two full Jewish parents, if: (a) he belonged to the Jewish religious community at the time this law was issued, or who joined the community later; (b) he was married to a Jewish person, at the time the law was issued or married one subsequently; (c) he is the offspring from a marriage with a Jew, in the sense of Section 1, which was contracted after the Law for the protection of German blood and German honor became effective (RGBl. I, page 1146 of 9/15/1935); (d) he is the offspring of an extramarital relationship, with a Jew, according to Section 1, and will be born out of wedlock after 7/31/1936.
1. As far as demands are concerned for the pureness of blood as laid down in Reichs law or in orders of the NSDAP and its echelonsnot covered in Article 5they will not be touched upon.
2. Any other demands on pureness of blood, not covered in Article 5, can only be made with permission from the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Deputy of the Führer. If any such demands have been made, they will be void as of 1/1/1936, if they have not been requested from the Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Deputy of the Führer. These requests must be made from the Reich Minister of the Interior.
The Führer and Reichs Chancellor can grant exemptions from the regulations laid down in the law.
Berlin, 11/14/1935 The Führer and Reichs Chancellor Adolf Hitler The Reich Minister of the Interior Frick The Deputy of the Führer R. Hess (Reich Minister without Portfolio)
"Document 1435-PS: Speech Of Min. Speer On 2/24/1942 To The Gauleiter Meeting [partial translation]" pp. 16-17.
From Vol. 381
Gauleiter meeting 2/24/1942. Munich
[Page 1] I am grateful to fact that, also Party member Dr. Todt, in January, personally ordered the complete stoppage of work on his Reichsautobahnen as well as released all specialists and German Workers for the railroad construction in the East and his PW for the armament industry.
[Page 8] I therefore proposed to the Führer at the end of December that all my labor force, including specialists, be released for mass employment in the East.
Subsequently the remaining PW's about 10000, were put at disposal of the armaments industry by me.
"Document 1439-PS: Treaty Of Protection Concluded Between The German Reich And The State Of Slovakia, 3/23/1939 [translation]" pp. 18-19.
[From 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART II, PAGE 606.]
Between the German Government and the Slovak Government, a treaty was signed on 3/18/1939 in Vienna and on 3/23/1939 in Berlin extending protection by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia.
The treaty became effective on 3/23/1939; its text is published hereinafter.
VON RIBBENTROP Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia
The German Government and the Slovak Government ha e agreed, after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequence resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments have agreed on the following provisions.
ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its territory.
ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have the right, at all times, to construct military installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary in an area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains.
The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore, the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military installations.
Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.
German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.
ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German Government.
ARTICLE 5. This treaty shall become effective as of the date of its signature and shall be valid for a period of twenty-five years. The two governments will reach an understanding on the extension of this treaty in due time before the expiration of that period.
In witness whereof the representatives of the two parties have Signed the above treaty in duplicate.
Vienna, 3/18/1939. Berlin, 3/23/1939.
For the German Government: VON RIBBENTROP
For the Slovak Government: DR. JOZEF TISO DR. VOJTECH TUKA DR. F. DURCANSKY
[Cf. Document 2793-PS, which is the secret protocol to this treaty.]
"Document 1456-PS [partial translation]" pp. 21-22.
Chief of Agency for Armament Economy [Chef Wi-Rue Amt] Colonel Jansen
Following is the new conception of the Führer, which Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel:
The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarchical endeavors. It is impossible, to try and manufacture everything we lack, by synthetic procedures or other measures. For instance, it is impossible, to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these autarchical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs, one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war economy by conquering them.
At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the statement where I made it clear that a completely autarchical economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great nevertheless my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves for missing stocks resp. to secure the delivery in wartime through economic alliances.
In a conference between TodtPleigerThomas, it was determined: Matter: "Detailed orders to the mining industries".
Todt suggests the construction of heavy special machinery at Krupp's and Skoda's.
[Signed] THOMAS
"Document 1458-PS: The Hitler Youth [partial translation]" pp.
By Baldur von Schirach
Published by Koehler und Amelag, Leipzig 1934.
In place of a foreword.
My Führer! It is five years now since you gave me the mission to take over leadership of the National Socialist youth. At that time you explained to my collaborators and to me the idea of this youth organization. What you preached to us at that time as aim and demand, my Führer, has taken on shape here before you. You asked at that time from me and my collaborators that we should create a community of youth in which no other law should be binding for the process of reconstruction but the law of achievement.
Here, among the leaders of the Hitler youth are the sons of the poorest who exercise command over hundreds of thousands. What do the conceptions of poverty and richness mean in face of the reality of this community? In future days only those will be called poor who did not belong in their youth to this community. And further, my Führer, you demanded from my collaborator and from me that we should not only unite the youth in enthusiasm, but also by discipline and order. We fought for years laboriously for this end, but today even this demand is fulfilled and proudly we feel ourselves as a worthy part of your great National Socialist Movement.
But we were powerless regarding one of your demands. You told us then it would appear as a great success to you if we succeeded to hold together in one organization of the German on hundred thousand German youth. My Führer, you forgot, that you had given this organization your name.
You asked for one hundred thousand, and it was all who came. There is one thing which is stronger than you, my Führer, that is the love of the young Germany for you.
There are many gay hours in the year of the youth. This one, however, is in every year our happiest. Because more than other people, my Führer, we feel to be chained to your person by our name. Your name is the happiness of the youth, your name, my Führer, is our immortality.
Baldur von Schirach to the Führer at the occasion of the inspection of the Hitler Youth at the Reichs party day 1936.
Chapter 1 From Union [Bund] to Nation [pp. 13-19]
That which was formerly called the German youth movement [Jugendbewegung] is dead. This statement has nothing to do with ill will.
No youth leader of our time will deny the merits of the scout [Wandervogel] Karl Fischers in his work with the German youth movement. That youth movement was as right for its own time as the Hitler Youth is right for the present. Without any doubt, many ideas and the form of life [Lebensform] of the Youth Movement helped to create the prerequisites on which the H J is building: The idea of self-leadership on the part of the youth, the declaration to fight against the standards of bourgeois society, the will to folkdom, homeland, or comradeship and many others, are akin to the feelings of the H. J. And yet: The first step into public life, the meeting which took place on 10/11-12/1913 on the "Hohen Meissner", remained only an impulse. The best thing about the speech on the "Hohen Meissner" were the people who listened to it [p. 14]. What today's youth is looking for in this, for the youth movement so important meeting, is the sincere will to form, to create.
We, today, see clearer than the generation of that time that the value of their youth movement was in their silent work. The greater German idea and the really valuable return to folkdom and simplicity are achievements of the youth movement which seem to us more significant than the numerous manifestoes which were handed down to us. They had the courage to let themselves be ridiculed a courage which the National Socialist Fighter of a decade later also had to have. And we must, if we want to do justice to this youth movement, look less to the picture of their aCtual appearance but more to the determination with which they followed their ideals. The political reality of youth was their Cleanness their decent behaviour, their political change [Umbruch]. The Youth movement was one of the few pleasant phenomena of the Wilhelmman era and it is characteristic for that time that youth was so delightful because it declared war on its time. Few leagues [Buende] of the postwar time have a right to refer to the former youth movement. They were a true copy of its weaknesses without its virtues. They ignored the lesson of the great war. They forgot that the time of a free and easy youth movement had undergone a break by the death of two million, which imposed on them the duties of unity and masculine constraint [Gebundenheit und maennliche Zuchtp. 15] What was right up to 8/1/1914 was wrong after 11/9/1918.
Some attempts were made to create a synthesis of youth and a militant movement [Wehrbewegung], attempts which started from the right principles. These attempts failed because their leaders were either representatives of pure militarism or at best of some lesser political ideas. Therefore, it was reserved to Adolf Hitler the creator and supporter of an ideology [Weltanschauung], to determine the road of German youth. From the former youth movement the Hitler youth took over this or that form, out of the front of the World War it was given its content by Adolf Hitler. Its organization also has its prerequisite in the great war; its bearing is military, as was the bearing of those who came from the youth movement and who died in their gray coats in Flanders.
Just as the youth of the "Hohen Meissner" felt, the front as the more important, so do we. Between the summer of 1914 and the spring of today lies a long dreary time through which we all passed consciously or unconsciously. Even those of us who had not been born at that time know it, every German knows it. As long as the German people will live, this time will live in their minds [p. 16].
That at that time a whole nation stood in arms, Catholics and Protestants, beggars and millionaires, peasants and clerks, merchants and laborers, and that they all obeyed one will and were only Germans, nothing but Germans, that also started us on the march. No title, no privilege of birth, not a lot of money nor anything special of any kind made a difference then.
We also want the same thing. The black years of war have passed, the spirit of the warrior remains. Again youth in Germany does not want profits, nor personal gain, but renders service and sacrifices to the community. That is the idea of the HJ: A comradeship of those Germans who do not want anything for themselves. Because they do not want anything for themselves they can do everything for their great nation. Not a youth with new rightsa generation of strict fulfillment of duty.
The postwar period showed a sad picture of party-bound youth "Whoever controls youth, controls the future" was the slogan, given the German National club to the Communist thieves' den. Every lobby was dealing in youth. And they were successful. Young Germany took everything for gospel truth, sold itself today to this one, tomorrow to that one till finally, disappointed and disgusted, it turned its back on all these activities. Then came the time of exclusive sports, of exclusive indulging in entertainments and living to the fullest, the time of exclusive study. [p 17]. "Politics is nonsense," was the reply given to party functionaries.
When Adolf Hitler began to speak this attitude was shaken. But now the satisfied citizen used the same argument which youth had found against him. He called for peace, for self-possession, for order. "Youth should not mix in politics," because the defensive slogan of all the bourgeois parties which began to lose their young people to the Führer. Anyone who at that time, 1924-25, among youth stood up for Adolf Hitler might have found that even youth leaders anxiously tried to avoid the alleged danger of influencing youth politically in the direction of National Socialism. Many comrades and I myself had to leave a militant organization [Wehrorganisation] to which I had become quite attached, because I had made a speech for Adolf Hitler there. At that time, many, like myself drew a dividing line between themselves and their friends and relatives and exchanged fight for the new ideal for the quiet life of a well protected home.
We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail, we simply believed. And when Hitler's book, "Mein Kampf" was published it was our bible which we almost learned by heart in order to be able to answer the questions of the doubters and superior critics. Almost every one who today is leading youth in a responsible position joined us during those years [p. 18].
Again Youth was divided by politics but this time the problem was different. It was no longer a matter of national parties, of liberal and democratic ideas, it was this: Germany or Marxism, Germany or reaction. But youth also had been slightly infected With party ideas. Youth did not want to be convinced, it wanted to be overruled. Not the accuracy of the idea was questioned but an attempt was made to prove that with such a small following it could not be successful. The National Socialist movement was regarded as a fractional party, the honest but, because of its pettiness, hopeless attempt of a man of whom it was not known if he had the necessary knowledge, the essential education. A bricklayer from Vienna, a man without college education, a self-taught person should liberate Germany? That was at best very doubtful.
As there are old people who are young, there are also among the youth some who are old. I have met them in the universities, in the youth movement, everywhere. The people who are old in their hearts are like a pestilence to a healthy people. They represent the tenacious and embittered resistance against every new idea. But youth is an attitude. The paralyzed Chamberlain whose lips are forming words which only his wife can read and transcribe represents eternal youth as much as the old Goethe in his last days. His Faust, the Ninth Symphony and the will of Adolf Hitler are eternal youth and know neither time nor death [p. 19].
Yet there are men who are born old and are living their lives as if they were 70 years old. During the years of our fight we overcame those people and we fight them again and again. They are the living dead. Their coldness kills ever slight stir of a new life. Only the collective force of passionate youth is able to destroy them.
Let us do away with the old! Only eternal youth shall have it home in our Germany.
The development of the Hitler Youth movement [p. 20, par. 1].
The idea for the foundation of a National Socialist youth organization came from the Führer himself, while the name Hitler Youth was originated by Julius Streicher, who also named the Brown House. The name of the man who deserves the credit for having set up the first groups of the H. J. is Kurt Gruber.
At the time of the beginning of the H. J. Kurt Gruber had just graduated from Law School. He devoted himself with great energy to his new task. From a small cellar in Plenen which served as Reichs office, we first organized a number of Saxonian HJ groups, energetically assisted by the present Reich Governor in Saxony, Martin Mutschinanon.
Here I would also like to mention that since 1928, Alfred Rosenberg also took a special interest in the National Socialist Youth. At that time we were trying to come to an understanding with the leagues. Alfred Rosenberg negotiated with the Eagles and Falcons, the "bensen", and other leagues-without fundamental results. I realized at that time that an understanding with the leaders of the leagues would never be possible [p. 23] and devoted myself to the principle of the totality of the Hitler Youth, which in the year 1933 cost all those leagues their independent existence.
When in 1930, the Führer himself took over the high command of the SA [Storm Troups] and Ernst Roehm started his new office as Chief of Staff, the National Socialist Youth organizations were centralized in the SA. Kurt Gruber resigned. His nervous state was such that he was physically unable to continue his work. On 10/30/1931, the Führer appointed me as Reichs youth leader of the NSDAP with the rank of a Lt. General [Gruppenführer] in the SA. My old comrade, Dr. von Reuteln was given the leadership of the students' league and also the leadership of the HJ, under my command. Now the organization of the HJ was thoroughly overhanded, which was necessary because Kurt Gruber had not been able to fully devote himself to his tasks as a leader especially during the last months of his activities. Dr. von Reuteln continued his work as a consultant for economic questions in the Executive Office [Reichsleitung] of the NSDAP but still found time for official trips and for night work at his desk to which the HJ owes the tightening of the threads of its organization which had become rather loose. At that time I had to go temporarily to Kufstein where I stayed with friends in a little mountain inn in order to avoid a prison term of three months [p. 24]. The previous year I had spoken against the Versailles dictate from the steps of Cologne University, violating a government order and, to begin with, was locked up in the Cologne prison, the so-called "Klingelpuetz", which then often housed Dr. Robert Ley, at that time regional leader of Koeln-Aachen and another leading party comrade, Tom Winkelnkemper. There I stayed for 8 days till my case came up in court and was then sentenced to 3 months in prison without a time of probation according to the emergency decree by the Reichs President. I was very lucky to be set free after the sentence was passed With great joy I still think of the dear Cologne party comrades who, headed by Dr. Ley stood in a mass before the gates of the prison when I was released. It was high time, I flew to Munich. The following day I took the train to Graz and was able to give to the Graz Student meeting the directive which was needed by the Führer. The National Socialist Student League [Studentenbund] won its decisive victory. A National Socialist was unanimously elected leader of the German student body [Studentenschaft].
Since that time around 12 months had gone by and I had reason to fear that I would be torn away any day now from my organizational work with the National Socialist Youth. My co-workers came to Kufstein for the most important conferences and I frequently crossed the border at night, raced through [p. 25] Germany in our "Nurnberg", announced a meeting in Chemnitz while I made a speech in Berlin, and thus I escaped my well-deserve "vacation" in Cologne. Then came the time of Groener. One evening the Führer came to my apartment in Munich and informed me that he intended to appoint me Reichsleader of the NSDAP the following day, and to take the National Socialist Youth organizations out of the SA. Since prohibition of the SA was threaten ing we might have avoided the simultaneous prohibition of the HJ. The Führer bases the necessity of such a measure on the principle for which he stood from the beginning, and which I have used in this book as a motto: "Youth must be led by Youth".
By some accident the prompt announcement of my appointment was held up. Soon after this conversation the SA and with it the HJ were forbidden by Mr. Groener. Through Reuteln I raised some half-hearted objections with Groener, referring to the fact that at the time of prohibition I was no longer a member of the SA, but, of course, without results. There was no other way out but to continue work underground. Thus originated the National Socialist Youth movement, the NSJB [NS Jugendbewegung] without uniform, without insignia. At that time we traveled through Germany dressed like bandits. Blue sailor cap white shirts [p. 26] and a brown sweater or some kind of civilian coat. But we recognized each other everywhere. At this time the HJ gained its best human material. Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy or girl, risked everything. Thousand upon thousands were thrown out of their schools or became unemployedbut they clung the more tenaciously to our flag. It was a great time and as strange as it might seem we were never happier than at that time when we lived in constant danger. With pistols in our pockets we drove through the Ruhr district while stones came flying after us. We jumped every time we heard a bell ring because we lived in constant fear of arrests and expected our houses to be searched. I have hardly one piece of furniture in my possession that was not attached.
One day even my "Nurnberg" was confiscated. That was going too far. They could have all the wardrobes and chests as far as I was concerned, but the car to us meant freedom, mobility, our work. The Führer was then at Obersalzberg. I called him up and out of his own pocket he gave me the money to pay the printer who had the car attached. I breathed freely again, we were able to continue our work.
At about this time I had a conference with Dr. von Reuteln, as a result of which I also took over the leadership of the Students' League and the HJ as [p. 27] such. This came about in the most friendly manner Reuteln wanted to get free anyhow to devote himself to his great tasks in the economic-political field, I myself wanted to exchange my somewhat formal responsibility for the HJ into a real one. We parted as the comrades which we still are today. Between us never existed any fundamental difference on essential points and The National Socialist Youth owes a deep gratitude to the man who outlined their road in a severe and straightforward manner.
The membership of the National Socialist Youth organisation had grown to about 35000. The number of applications was mounting day by day. We requested more office space from Reichs Treasurer Schwarz and he created generous working possibilities for us by putting at our disposal the entire top floor of the hotel "Der Reichsadler" in Munich. For the time being we had some space.
With the moving into the hotel "Reichsadler" an unpleasant tension began to make itself felt which existed between the youth and Gregor Strasser, who had installed the offices of the organizational department in the same building. In my apartment on Koenigenstrasse I was lucky enough to be able to express my apprehensions about Strasser to the Führer. Otherwise I never discussed these things with anybody, with the exception of Julius Streicher. But I received [p. 28] reports from all parts of the Reich through the youth organization. I knew what course Strasser was taking, who, at that time, was at the heights of his power. I knew of his connections and, from the beginning on, I was instinctively convinced of his unreliability in regard to his character. Gregor Strasser was an enemy of the National Socialist Youth out of the same instinct. It was, after all, a Hitler Youth and not a Strasser Youth.
The greatest worry of the years of struggle of 1930/31 was the lack of money. Very often we did not have the few gallons of gasoline which we needed for traveling. Another drawback was that none of us was, at that time, a member of the Reichstag and, therefore had no free transportation. The reason was that we had not reached the necessary age of 25. Our compensation for expenses was just sufficient to cover our bare living expenses. By writing and lecturing I was able to make enough money to pay own fare. Despite all the difficulties we were able to make all necessary trips. The success of my staff was based on its mobility. Good leadership is not characterized by answering letters on time but by its contact with the fighting community. Thus the Führer had brought us up and he preached again and again not to lose myself in paper workone of the greatest and wisest teachings which I received from him.
The HJ [Hitler Youth] used the winter of 1932/33 for many demonstrations [p. 31]. We drove through all of Germany and called the youth to the HJ. I will never forget a Führer appeal in the beginning of January in Berlin, at the start of which I wa searched for weapons by the police. Twenty days later we were in power. The most magnificent success was the conquest of the formerly marxist industrial workers youth of the German West. Here my co-worker Hartmann Lauterbacher achieved great things.
I will never forget the hour when we were sitting in the office of the district Ruhr-Niederrhein during an intermission between demonstrations on 30 January and received the news of Adolf Hitler's appointment to the post of Reichs Chancellor. That same night I spoke in Herford in Westphalia. We all felt saved. The policemen [Schupos] who, on the previous day, were still persecuting us, greeted us with raised hands. It was one great fraternization. I spoke in two meetings, and going from one to the other I caught such a cold that shivering with fever I had [p. 32] to go home the next day, but in all my fever phantasies one thing remained vivid, that which we had won on that day: Hitler in power, Hitler in power. As soon as I had recovered I went to Berlin via Wuerzberg, Nurnberg where we had 2 demonstrations. Now the problem was to apply the victory of the movement to the entire youth. Our cabinet ministers were overburdened with their new tasks and were working day and night. We could not wait till they would find time to solve the youth question by their own initiative. Therefore, we had to act ourselves. My co-workers met in my Munich apartment and advised me to occupy the Reichs committee [Reichsausschuss] of the German Youth Leagues. I commissioned General [Obergebietsführer] Nabersberg with 50 members of the Berlin HJ to make a surprise raid on the Reichs Committee in the Alsenstrasse early the next morning. This wa done and at noon the press had the report that the HJ had taken over the leadership of the Reichs Committee. The Reichs Committee was headed by an excellent man, General Vogt. As much as a surprise the turn of events was to him at first as quickly did this Prussian officer adjust himself to the new situation. I took his job away from him but he understood that this was a necessity and that only from the HJ the great unification of German youth would be possible, on which, after all, he had worked all his life. General Vogt did not step aside [p. 33] and was not offended but remained intensely and truly interested in the objectives of the HJ and its aims. His book, "The German Boy-Service" [Der deutsche Jungendienst] is one of the most valuable books of German youth literature. And we are all proud of the fact that General Vogt today belongs to the Reichs Youth leadership and wears the Gold Honor insignia of the HJ.
In the Reichs Committee [Reichsausschuss] we got a tremendous amount of material. All at once we were able to determine the strength of all the German youth leagues and to summon the influential personalities in these youth leagues. From this point I recognized the necessity of coming to grips with the Greater German Union. I appointed my co-worker Karl Nabersberg as my representative on the Reichs Committee and traveled through Germany in order to take a stand against The Greater German Union in many demonstrations. In the meantime I gained control over The Reichs league for German youth hostels [Reichsverband fuer deutsche Jugendherbergen] in a manner similar to the one employed with the Reichs Committee; with its leadership I commissioned a young merchant from Hamburg and bearer of the Golden Honor Insignia [Goldenes Ehrenzerchen] of the NSDAP, Johannes Rodatz.
The Greater German Youth League [Grossdeutscher Jugendbund] was a combination of various leagues and organizations which came under the leadership of the deserving chief of staff of the fleet, Admiral von Trotha. This admirable man, who had served our Fatherland in war and peace with unselfish [p. 34] devotion fundamentally had the same ideas and plans for the Greater German League as I had for the Hitler Youth. That the Greater German League [Grossdeutscher Bund] could not fulfill these tasks was not the fault of the "Admiral", as he was respectfully called by his Youth, the difficulties lay in the period itself. The Greater German League was not a political union hat is, leagues which partly were opposed to National Socialism were to be found in the Greater German League as well as organizations which ideologically were in agreement with the NSDAP, without, however, drawing any conclusions from it. The unification of youth could never be achieved by the external centralization of partly opposed leagues, but only by a philosophy life which had to be accepted by the young generation as a new law for life. Only the Hitler Youth represented this idea.
The differences between the Greater German League and the HJ grew from day to day. Friction, even frequently actual fighting, were day-by-day occurrences. This state of affairs could not be settled by compromise. We could not be satisfied with incorporation of the Greater German League as, always the incorporation of a youth league into the HJ for us was not even discussed. As all of us once, and that during difficult times, gave our unconditional pledge to Adolf Hitler, especially today every young German must be able to do so [p. 35]. The so-called and often praised individual life ["Eigenleben"] of such leagues is, in the last analysis, nothing but another form of "joiner tendency". "Either all or nothing" is the principle of National Socialism.
The position which I gave to the HJ was not strong enough to overcome the last quaint introspection [Eigenbroetelei] within the youth. Nobody saw that as clearly as the Führer who was convinced of the necessity of giving to the leader of the HJ that backing by the state which he needed for his work. When we discussed these things I asked the Führer to refrain from attachment to one specific ministry, a wish which was readily recognized by the Führer. The Führer himself stated that a ministry cannot exist without bureaucracy, but bureaucracy is death to youth. He intended to create an agency which in its freedom should have the possibility to work. Thus, in the Reichs Chancellory, in the middle of 6/1933, he appointed me Youth leader of the German Reich [Jugend führer des deutschen Reiches] by clasping hands. Reich Minister Dr. Frick, as their competent minister for youth questions, drew up the respective document. I was given authority to appoint representatives of the states [Landesbeauftragte] to carry out my instructions and I appointed the district leaders to these positions in all the states in execution of my right.
The first thing I did was to dissolve the Great German league. Since I headed all [p. 3] German youth organizations and I had the right to decide on their leadership, I did not hesitate for a moment to take this step, which was for the HJ the elimination of an unbearable state of affairs. The leader of the Great German Bund, Admiral von Trotha, set an example of rare human greatness to German youth when he, after the incorporation of all leagues and organizations had been completed, one day made all end to all the fights and quarrels of the past years and, after his appointment to Honorary Leader [Ehrenführer] of the Nav Hitler Youth, devoted himself unconditionally to the service in Adolf Hitler's youth movement. Only to great personalities it is given to put youth to shame and at the same time obligate by a noble example At that time many a German boy will have asked himself if he would be able to act in the same way in a similar situation and honestly answered with a "no". From an educational point of view it was the most important deed that the Admiral after his organization had been smashed, again adjusted himself to the tasks of the new generation out of his militarY sense of duty and his love for youth. When, today, the blue columns of our Navy Hitler Youth pass by their honorary leader, their eyes are not only shining with enthusiasm for the Admiral who once at a grave hour won eternal honor for the German Reich, but they also know in their hearts that this man is part of [p. 37] themselves. Following the incorporation of the "Stahlhelm" into the SA we were able to carry out the incorporation of the "Scharnhorst", the youth organization of the "Stahlhelm". But the "Scharnhorst" had to give up it individual existence when it joined the HJ. The individual "Scharnhorst" boys were detailed to the local branches of the HJ. This step would never have been possible without the initiative of Reichsminister Saldte who was completely convinced of the necessity to create a large youth organization, which, also according to his opinion, could only be the HJ. That the many small and unimportant groups and leagues were incorporated goes without saying and took place without any resistance. The Marxist youth as well as all political youth organization I prohibited after the occupation of the Reichs Committee. The one million members of the HJ which we had on 1/30/1933 had now grown to a round three million. Only the two large confessional groups, the Protestant and the Catholic youth, were opposed to us. They already had lost a great number of their members to us but they still remained powerful factors in the life of German youth. Again and again I called together the district leaders [Gebietsführer] of the HJ in order to discuss this subject. Again and again these true and tenacious fighters announced: We won't stop now. From the last boy to the Reichs Youth leader we agreed that the HJ never should and would give in as regards this question.
Chapter 3 Hitler Youth and Confessional Youth [p. 38]
Towards the end of 1933 discussion about the eventual incorporation of the evangelical youth took place between the newly appointed Reichs Bishop Ludwig Mueller and myself. With great satisfaction we from the HJ could ascertain that the Reichs Bishop was fundamentally ready to lead the members of the evangelical youth leagues into the HJ, a point of view which differed somewhat from that of the chairman of the Young Men; Protestant Work [Evangelisches Jungmaennerwerk], Dr. Stange Dr. Stange actually tried to interfere with this new development against the will of the majority of his followers, but without success. And in 12/1933 the Reichs Bishop and myself were able to inform the Führer that incorporation of the protestant youth into the HJ had become a reality.
Through the agreement with the Reichs Bishop the HJ believes to have shown the way by which a later understanding with the Catholic Youth Leagues also would be possible. By this agreement evangelical youth organizations in the old sense, that is leagues, which overlap the activities of the HJ are no longer in existence. As spiritual communities the Protestant [P. 39] groups continue to live in their innate field, namely that of the Protestant creed. The HJ guarantees their protestant members l certain evening each week for their confessional, religious activities. The agreement with the Reichs Bishop follows verbatim:
1. The Protestant Youth Work [Evangelisches Jugendwerk] recognizes the unified state political education of German youth by the National Socialist State and the HJ [Hitler Youth as representatives of the philosophy of the State.
The youth of the Protestant Youth Work below 18 years of age is to be incorporated into the Hitler Youth and its subordinated branches. Anyone within this age group who does not become a member of the HJ, from now on shall not be a member of the Protestant Youth Work.
2. Education in regard to open air sports (including gymnastics and sports) and in regard to state politics, up to 18 years of age, shall take place only within the HJ.
3. All members of the Protestant Youth Work shall wear the official uniform of the Hitler Youth according to their membership in the HJ.
According to this agreement the Protestant youth was incorporated into the Hitler Youth. With very few exceptions the young followers of the Reichs Bishop were glad to be freed from the inner struggle of the past months [p. 40]. The Reichs Bishop acted like a true spiritual advisor of this young community when he, by this agreement, opened for them the doors to the HJ and thus the doors to the people and the State.
The confessional youth league [Konfessioneller Jugendbund] has no right of existence in our time. While the young German in the period of National Socialism is drawn to the community and thereby the attitude and way of living of the HJ, sometimes some dark pang of conscience holds him back to give in to this urge, to follow really his innermost thoughts. Particularly the catholic youth societies led their members into moral conflicts for which an educator of the youth cannot account. By promises for a life beyond they tried to hold the youth back from the disinterested surrender to the state. As if the all powerful would condemn this service on the people and could see anything objectionable in it. Because the youth does not make any difference between poor and rich, Protestant and Catholic, I am accused of being a "heathen" who does not believe in anything and instills the seed of the antichrist in the hearts of the unsuspecting youth. And yet, considering the confessional composition of our people, a real community of our youth can only exist if confessional questions are not discussed in this community, special confessional leagues are not tolerated. The Christian doctrine is attacked in the HJ as little as any [p. 41] other doctrine; the HJ does not care for class or confession but only for the Germandom. In this sense my slogan is to be understood; "The HJ is neither Protestant nor Catholic, it is German".
The church proclaims its right for a religious education. An uncontested and uncontestable right. The state, on the other side, demands through the HJ to exercise the ideological, political education and here the state has a claim which is as valid as that of the church. In fact a number of Catholic youth leaders are not concerned with this religious education. They occupy their youth organizations with tasks, accomplishment of which falls into the domain of the HJ. Home evenings (social gatherings), hikes, camps, games, sports, and training do not need a confessionally directed leadership, and yet it is exercised stubbornly by a certain circle of catholic youth leaders. Instead of bringing the German youth together where it can be united and should be united, these so called educators and youth leaders try to present even the cooking on hikes as a religious matter and think the young boy's soul could be harmed if he saw that outside of the Catholic youth organization other people lived. The fact that once National Socialism seized the power, about 1 1/2 millions of youths from the camp of the Catholic youth organizations joined the HJ manifests that the spirit of the followers is better than ghat of the leadership and shows how in the long run confessional, bourgeois thinking must capitulate before German socialism.
A short while after the National Socialist revolution the beaten political parties undertook another feeble attempt to keep at least the youth somehow. The attempt failed; the youth of the bourgeois parties pledged itself to the socialism of Adolf Hitler. The youth leagues followed this example. Even the Protestant youth recognized the demand of the time and followed in faithful fulfillment of their duties the voice of their conscience. But on the spot where once the proud Zentrum stood that we could see work hand in hand with the Marxist traitors of the people in the Reichstag, there stands today a group of the Catholic youth organizations and opposes the "We" of our community with the "I" of their societies.
Who wants Germany without compromise is an arch-enemy of any confessional principle in a state organization. Who would retreat here a hand's width and be he a minister of the new Germany, would betray the tragic fight of the German people for its freedom. May the German people recognize the lesson of the last thousand years and for the first time proclaim an unconditional negation of all separating forces.
There is no reason why there should not be found a solution in the question of the youth education to the satisfaction of the church as well as of the HJ, so much the more as the HJ does not restrict in any way the religious activities of its member. Neither attendance at the Sunday services nor participation in other church gatherings is being made difficult for the Catholic Hitler boys on the part of the leadership of the HJ. If, on the occasion of some big youth demonstrations which don't take place too often, it was occasionally difficult for technical reasons to make it possible for the young people to attend church services it is by no means an indication of a sometimes alleged "antireligious" attitude of the HJ. I even am of the opinion that religious meetings and arrangements in particular religious youth leagues are not at all in contradiction to the totalitarian claim of the HJ. Every effort which aims to deepen and intensify religious life must not only be welcomed by a responsible youth leadership but also be furthered. I believe to have shown by the treaty with the Reich bishop of the Protestant church that the HJ is willing to concede necessary space to the religious youth education. However, it must be demanded that under the cover-name of religious education the youth should in no way be influenced politically. The experiences of the past taught us that the confessional youth organizations do not occupy themselves exclusively with religious questions. The National Socialist movement as pillar of the state cannot be blamed if by reason of past experiences it makes security arrangements which should ban all dangers for the future.
If the church visits of the youths do not correspond the expectations of the churches, it is not the fault of the youth. The real cause of this attitude of the youth is to be looked for in the want of comprehension with which some catholic youth leaders and unfortunately too many priests oppose the education of the HJ. They believe not to be able to part with the sport education of the catholic youth and overlook that the religious education itself suffers by the fight over the competences.
Many Catholic Germans look with disgust at the mean fight which certain catholic youth leaders lead today for their existence and hundreds of thousands of catholic Hitler boys don't have any appreciatiOn of it that there should exist outside the HJ sport a catholic sport and catholic calisthenics. As faithful catholics they stick to the church but they cannot see why this church demands all of a sudden territory which has nothing to do with religious education.
No reasonable man in Germany can give a reason for the necessity of the existence of catholic youth organizations in their present form (catholic boys scouts, "German Jugendkraft", etc.) and many important leaders of the catholic church have long been of the opinion that these organizations have no right of existence in the National Socialist state. The catholic youth itselfthis I maintain by reason of the continuous going over, even of whole groups to the HJwants to cooperate in the National Socialist state. And not as confessional specialist league but as HJ.
Catholics and Protestants have the same rights in Germany. This is not only valid for their relationship to the state but especially for their relationship to the National Socialist movement. If, however, the catholic youth is advised not to join the HJ, then this part of the German youth is deprived of a right which today every other young member of the community possesses. "Give to the emperor what is the emperor's and to God what is God's". This profound wisdom of Christ shows us even today the possibility to terminate the tension between HJ and confessional youth organization. If the HJ leader works exclusively according to the Instructions given to him and only cares for the ideological (that is to say the physical, mental and moral) education of the youth in his charge in Adolf Hitler's sense and the priest just as exclusively for the religious, moral education within direction of the church and is nothing but a German servant of God, all prerequisites of a peaceful and confident work are given.
For the solution of the catholic youth question in Germany there is but one way, which is agreeable to both parties; The Catholic youth organization restricts itself to the spiritual realm and gives up the expensive and unnecessary administration and leadership apparatus of the general presidents and secretaries [General praesidenten und sekretaere. If the priest of every locality cares spiritually for the youth as part of his community, the church has sufficient occasion to exercise its religious education The thought, to appoint Protestant and Catholic so called field chaplains or HJ chaplain is against our comradeship and therefore cannot be accepted. If a celebration of the National Socialist youth is held by a catholic and protestant clergyman, every boy and every girl feels the difference of the confession as a wall between them. Where a short while ago two young Germans marched shoulder to shoulder goes then a Catholic and a Protestant and with them the sorrow of the German history.
Unity and community then becomes disunity and cleavage. Then the two millions of the great war would really have died in vain and so would the dead of the Feldherrnhalle [p. 47]. And those twenty one who as pioneers of the new unity were hunted to death by the Marxists and "Zentrum" leaders won't belong to us any more.
But we are spirit of their spirit. The idea for which they died is also the idea of our life. Their fight is our destiny [pp. 64-65].
Self-leadership of youth is not to be understood from the bureaucratic point of view that every one at the age of 30 must resign from leadership. The principle: "Youth must be led by youth" is to be understood according to its meaning and not literally. Therefore, I principally do not apply any age limit. All set patterns are deadening.
Germany is the country of the youth movement. Youth movement and youth self-leadership of youth are inseparable. It is not the purpose of the youth movement to give to young people a possibility to satisfy any power instincts. On the contrary, youth leadership means to be more severe with oneself than with the following. The HJ is a school for leaders. A leader in the true sense of the word is always the creative, the disciplined one.
Therefore, the way to leadership shall be made difficult for a boy. If he is destined for it he will overcome the difficulties. But never shall there be another key to the gate of leadership than achievement. It is a matter of indifference who holds the key, the son of a worker, the son of a peasant or the son of a scientist Only one thing is decisive: He must be of the aristocracy of achievement, of the only aristocracy which is known to the new youth [pp. 68-69].
A single will leads the HJ. The power of authority of the HJ leaders, that of the smallest as well as of the largest unit is absolute, i.e., he has the unlimited right to give orders because he bears the unlimited responsibility. He knows that the responsibility of the higher one comes before that of the lower ones. Therefore he submits silently to the instructions of his leaders even if they are directed against him personally. To him as well as to all young Germany the history of the HJ is proof of the fact that a youth community also can only be successful if it unconditionally recognized the authority of leadership. The success of National Socialism is a success of discipline. The structure of National Socialist Youth is built on the foundation of discipline and obedience. The teachings of the time of persecution apply even more to the period of victory and power. The small boy [Jungvolkjunge] who joins the movement of Adolf Hitler at the age of ten learns to subordinate his own little will to the laws which, strictly followed, are building states and making nations happy but which, when violated, result in the loss of freedom, in the collapse of folkdom. In the course of the following years he learns that discipline and subordination are not inventions of despotism that they have not been created by a few with a lust for power in order to secure their personal positions but that they are the prerequisites for the life of the nation and thereby for his own life.
The great value of the organization for the youth lies in the following. In the circle of boys of his own age he gains, partly while playing, a knowledge which must be employed, especially to the life of the adult. And while he is being trained for discipline in a manner corresponding to his emotional life and his capacity to learn, he will see that his blind obedience affords the possibility of success to his group [Gefogschaft]. What is acquired in young years in the struggle with small tasks later serves the state in its big tasks.
Chapter 4 Work Abroad [pp. 154-162]
The Reich Youth leadership does not pursue foreign politics.
The Führer created the Office of Foreign Affairs for the for activities of the National Socialism. What is done within the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth leadership never means an overcrossing of Party offices and State offices. The HJ deals with the youth and not with big politics. And even where the youth contacts the youth of other nations to exchange young people for study trips or camps, contact is made outside the political sphere. It is the purely human agreement of youth among themself which in this way the Reich Youth leadership attempts to achieve.
During the last year the most important meetings between German and foreign youth were:
The visit of the HJ in Hungary.
The counter visit of the Levente youth in Germany.
The German-English Youth Camp near Hamburg.
The trip of Department Leader Nabersberg to England and Turkey.
A lecture of Karl Nabersberg in Paris on the occasion of a meeting of the "Sohlbergkreis".
The visit of a Finnish Study Group [Studiengesellschaft].
Also on the occasion of the visits of foreign youth leaders (i.e. Greek, Chinese and Japanese) to the Reich Youth leadership, contacts were made with foreign youth organizations.
Every nation has the interest that its youth has a political outlook reaching as far as possible. Especially the National Socialist Germany is strongly interested that her youth knows and respects other nations as early as possible. The better the youth of Europe understands each other, the nicer for the future. A basic principle of the youth exchange is: no propaganda. Hitler boys who go abroad do not travel as propagandists of National Socialism; their task is not to teach but to learn. They should see the beauty of the foreign landscape and explore the national characteristic of the host-country. I believe in a cooperation of the European youth at the basis of an agreement; its only program point should be: to know each other. It would be an utopian idea to believe that such a cooperation would improve the world. Probably the world would not improve but the people could become juster. In this connection we welcome the international exchange of pupils and only desire that it might be extended beyond the circle of pupils to the youth of all professions. The activity of the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth leadership is not only concerned with the relationship of the HJ to the youth of other nations, although this field is most clearly in evidence It cares, in close cooperation with the League for Germandom Abroad [Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im Ausland], for the youth of the German settlements abroad, in Europe and South America, and awakens in the Reich German Youth the under standing for the brothers and sisters abroad.
In a special main branch, the Central Office for Volksdeutsche Youth Work [Mittelstelle fuer Volksdeutsche Jugendarbeit], which took over the main tasks of the Central Office of German Youth in Europe which in 1933 was attached to the organization of the Reich Youth leadership, the following fields are being worked on:
1. Borderland trips and trips abroad of the entire German youth.
2. "Volksdeutscher" labor service.
3. Schooling in the Reich of German youths living abroad.
The borderland trips and trips abroad offer the possibility to give the young Germans abroad the contact with the new Germany by Reich German Youth hiking groups in form of performances (folk songs, folk dances and plays performed by laymen). At the same time, a selection by these youth hiking groups should be made in the German settlements abroad among those who appear suitable as youth leaders and therefore are to be called to the Reich for schooling.
All borderland trips and trips abroad of youth hiking groups and individual youth hikers have to be authorized by the hike office of the central office. Thereby the hikes of the "wild hikers" should finally be prevented which were not always to the good of the German reputation abroad. On the other side the hikes should be arranged according to a certain plan, so that they can be directed into certain sections where a visit seems really appropriate.
A special task of the central office is the so-called Volksdeutsche Labor Service which has the task of a systematic schooling of German Youth leaders living abroad. In four specially suited labor camps the sense of the labor service is clearly demonstrated to the Germans living abroad by special schooling methods, in order that they can apply what they learned in their home organization.
Another branch of the Foreign Department has the task to combine the Reich German boys and girls inasmuch as is possible in youth groups in which National Socialist ideas are conveyed to them. To this effect the groups receive books and youth literature free of charge and especially such which establish the spiritual contact with the Reich German HJ. The work program provides the establishment of schooling camps of several weeks duration for German youths from abroad who above all should convey to the future leaders the experience of the present fatherland. Through our own press service, the Foreign Department tries to protect the rights of the German youth abroad in the Reich German Press. The daily appearing press service "Space of the East [Ostraum] brings short news about the movement of the German youth organizations abroad and the German school abroad for Lithuania, Letland, Esthonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Another paper "The School Review for Germans Abroad" [Die Auslandsdeutsche Schulschau] is delivered to a great number of German schools of higher learning. Furthermore the branch participates in the youth periodicals published by the Reich Youth leadership or in cooperation with it, and furnishes the German daily newspapers with articles of a principle nature about questions of the youth abroad, as well as the German newspapers abroad with news from the Reich and the German groups beyond the frontier. The branch "Press" in the Foreign Department is thereby the rallying point for the news on the movement of the German Youth abroad and the schools in the Reich for the Germans abroad.
The branch "School" of the Foreign Department is of special importance. Its task is essentially to communicate to the HJ sufficient knowledge about the Germandom of the borders abroad and of foreign politics. To carry through the schooling in the units, borderland and foreign lecturers were appointed who on central instruction of the chief lecturer had to carry out the schooling in the individual units. The first instruction week for lecturers abroad on a systematic execution of the training program, was held from 12/4-10/1933 in Potsdam. The training program uses the following aides:
1. A regularly appearing schooling-letter with a publication of 65000
2. Literature on the subject in general which is distributed to the lecturers abroad
3. The periodical "People and Reich"
4. Contributions in newspapers and periodicals
The training of the co-workers staff is to be extended by a number of additional training weeks and by supply of training material and establishment of competent libraries in the Oberbanne. Furthermore, special attention for the localities less than 100 km from the frontier is intended.
The colonial branch keeps awake the memory of the cultural, scientific, economic and military achievements in the former German colonial territory within the organizations under the order of the Reich Youth leadership. Beyond this, the German youth shall be informed about the importance of colonial possession for the supply of the home economy with colonial products and raw materials. It will be taken into consideration concerning this schooling that the guiding line of the German population policy which aims at the utilization of the space in the East will not be violated. In the historical schooling the "colonial-guilt-lie and the thereby intended defamation of the German peoplealso in regard before the colored nationswill be emphasized and it will be pointed out that equal terms for the German people are only obtained when these parts of the Versailles shame dictate are also rectified.
Special colonial lecturers who are assigned to the headquarters of the HJ and BDM down to the Bann and Unterbann will attend to the carrying out of these tasks. These lecturers also will be prepared for the solution of their tasks in courses in the Reich Leader School in Potsdam and within the districts and subdistricts. The literature at present on hand about colonial questions which, however, is only for limited use for the schooling within the HJ since it was written under different political conditions, will be put at the disposal as work material. New material, in accordance with timely requirements, is in preparation and will serve in the future as basis for all work. The youth should be informed every three months by a "schooling-letter" about everything worth while in the field of the colonial question which should come down to the sub-leaders of the whole HJ and BDM. In this direction, friendly cooperation with the biggest society, the German Colonial Society, takes place; material is exchanged. As much as the promised shipping space is available, members of the HJ (colonial lecturers) should be sent to the former German colonial territories so that they can learn at the spot the present-day conditions and give the Germans there a sign of our attachment. Supported by what they have seen and lived, they should after their return work here to enlighten the HJ in the country.
It would lead us astray to go into the details of the activities the Foreign Department. Generalobergebietsführer Karl Nabersberg devoted much energy to these duties and gave up even the leadership of the staff of the Reich Youth leadership with which he was charged for a time in favor of this task which had his particular interest. The thought that every Hitler boy and every BDM girl regardless in which part of the world they are, form a great comradeship and march together in spite of local separation in one direction and live and work in the same spirit was realized by the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth leadership.
"Document 1463-PS: Diary of the Navy 1944 [translation]" pp. 45-47.
The Commander in Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz. "This war is a naval war and it will be decided on the High Seas."Admiral Doenitz.
Admiral Karl Doenitz was born in Berlin-Gruenau on 9/16/1891, the son of an Engineer. He attended school in Berlin, Jena and Weimar. He entered the Imperial German Navy as a cadet on 4/1/1910 and was promoted to Lieutenant on 9/27/1913. As an ensign he was ordered to the light cruiser "Breslau". There he witnessed the outbreak of the first world war when he was in the Mediterranean sea. His experiences while on this cruiser which later became the "Midilli" of the Turkish Navy he described in a little book published during the last war while he was a lieutenant (jg). The title of the book was "The cruises of the 'Breslau' in the Black Sea". Doenitz who served as watch officer and adjutant received the Iron Cross 2nd class on 1/7/1915. For a time he was air observer near the Dardanelles and subsequently in charge of a naval aviation squadron near San Stefano. On 5/5/1916 he received the Iron Cross first class and in the fall of that year returned to Germany.
For a long time it had been the young officer's burning desire to become an officer on a submarine. This wish of the young lieutenant (jg) was fulfilled when he was ordered to submarine school 12/2/1916. This proved decisive in the life of this officer who indefatigably worked for the development of his weapon. Doenitz became at first watch officer on the Submarine "U-39" whose commanding officer, Lt (sg) Forstman was one of the most successful submarine officers of the last war. Inspired with great daring, Forstmann was an officer who knew how to train aggressive and responsible commanders. Doenitz always remembers with special gratitude the decisive influence of hi former teacher. After an artillery course Doenitz on 3/1/1918 became Commander of "UC-25" and later "UB-68". With these boats he carried on successful warfare against merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
Lt. (jg) Doenitz placed himself at the disposal of the German Navy, dishonorably mutilated by the Versailles dictate, and aided in its reconstruction. He became a staff officer; he tool over, during the attempted coup d'etat of Kaff the command of the torpedo boat V5 which was usable but without a commander For three years then he was commander of a torpedo boat, and became afterwards officer in charge of torpedo inspection and for another three years filled a responsible position with the Naval High Command. After one year's sea duty as navigation officer on the light cruiser "Nymphe" Doenitz became chief of the first squadron of Torpedo boats newly built for the German Navy. In the fall of 1928 Doenitz was promoted to lieutenant commander. While Doenitz already earlier was making plans for the reconstruction of the German U-boat fleet his new position for the first time, gave him the opportunity to put down his experiences an suggestions in the form of memoranda written for his superiors and other influential personalities. During this time, the organizational plans and other prerequisites were already formulated which made possible the subsequent rapid construction of new German U-boats. This was followed by another period during which he attended service schools and undertook sea duty. On one of his trips he went to India for several months. In 1931 he became Commanding officer of the Light cruiser "Emden" which at that time undertook a cruise in the Indian Ocean.
When in 1935 Doenitz returned from this trip the Commander in Chief of the German Navy during a tour of inspection in Wilhelmshaven told him to his surprise that he was appointed Chief of the "Weddigen" U-boat flotilla. From this date, 9/27/1935, started the ceaseless construction of the new U-boats. At first two 250-ton boats were built. Doenitz lately promoted to Commander, devoted himself to his new duties with passionate zeal and after untiring day and night work he was able in a very short time to present an extensive plan for the re-organization of U-boat warfare. Again Doenitz donned his working clothes to drill and train his young officers, personally and with pitiless pace He succeeded in closing a gap of 17 years, during which no training took place, with a few months of tireless work. Day after day, night after night, week after week he stood on the bridge of one of his U-boats indoctrinating the men in his charge, by hard thorough training, with the spirit of the men who manned the submarines during World War I. At the same time he collected new technical experience and new improvements in the development of different submarine types. Doenitz knew no let-down for himself. Regardless of weather, season or time of day he went with the boats, instructed and trained their crews, and led them through thousands of miles in the Baltic and North Sea.
One must recall, that after World War I a skillfully directed British propaganda campaign created a world-wide general impression that the submarine as a naval weapon was a thing of the past since superior defensive measures had been instituted, namely the convoy system, and that in future naval engagements, submarines would be of only secondary importance. Commander Doenitz' opinion was diametrically opposite; "The massing of boats in convoy must be answered by massing of U-boats to attack the convoy." This maxim became the basis of his whole training program. The wolf pack tactics which later became so famous were originated and tested at a time of complete peace. The cruises in the Baltic and North Sea were followed by the first Atlantic maneuvers. Doenitz surrendered personal command over the U-Boat only after the number of flotillas increased in order to devote himself to higher tasks of leadership. After the outbreak of the war, about 4 years after the first U-boats were commissioned, the new weapon was in excellent condition and carried the stamp of a personality which was our ideal combination between commander and frontline officer. Doenitz on 1/28/1939 was promoted Commodore of U-boats and entered the war with but 40 of his elite boats. They attacked immediately within the first day. And at once this new weapon was a brilliant success. On 9/18/1939, Doenitz received a cluster to the Iron Cross 1st class, for his success in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. When the position of "leader of U-boats" was changed into that of "Commander" Doenitz was promoted to Rear Admiral on 10/1/1939. Prien went to Scapa Flow. There was a fighter. He knew it and said over and over: "I was only the paw of the Big Lion. What I did, I could do because I was his disciple." All the "old guard" thought the same way and so did the commanding officers who returned to their bases with flags of victory flying. The crew likewise was inspired by the old man. With unparalleled enthusiasm and matter of factness, they undertook every dangerous mission against the life-line of the enemy who controlled the sea, a control which they undermined, and brought again the terror of the U-boats to the Seven Seas to the surprise of the whole world. In an endless chain, the U-boat Commander reported success after success to their chief. In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program the Chief was what he always was and always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. A clear regard for the essential and the decisive, power to act and aggressiveness are his main characteristics. In spite of all his duties he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war.
Doenitz was in charge of the Naval operations Command Post situated on land. It is one of the strange and difficult characteristics of this form of Naval warfare that the Commander cannot be with his men, cannot make decisions on the spot but is forced to study the situation and give orders thousands of miles away from the actual location. The very strong ties between Doenitz and his men proved themselves in this case. They never felt, and that was said many times in mess halls and on enemy missions, that they had to make any of their difficult decisions alone. Tiny brief answers following rendered radio reports proved that the Chief day and night was monitoring painstakingly their reports just as if he was with them, as if he stood on the bridge beside them.
On 4/21/1940 Doenitz received the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross, a reward of the Führer, which put the unique accomplishments of this battle-tested officer in its true light. On 9/1940, he was promoted to Vice Admiral, a year and a half later on 3/14/1942 he was promoted to Admiral, a reward for the heavy damages inflicted on the new enemy, the USA On 1/30/1943 Doenitz received the Supreme Command of the Germany Navy from the Führer and concurrently was promoted to Gross Admiral.
For the huge successes of the U-boats Doenitz received on 4/7/1943 in recognition of his unique achievements in U-boat warfare from the Führer personally as the 223rd Soldier of the Wehrmacht, the Oak Wreath to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross.
Even though the field of activity of the in C of the German Navy has experienced a tremendous extent on his personal leadership in U-boat warfare and the personal care for his submarines, sailors, and for all units of the German Navy will also in the future remain the supreme law of all his action. Confidence merits confidence- The navy of Greater Germany will prove that it is worthy of its C in C.
"Document 1472-PS [translation]" p. 49.
[CABLE]
URGENTSECRET
TEXT: In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into the concentration camps, which was ordered by 1/30/1943, the following may be applied in the Jewish sector.
1. Total amount: 45000 Jews.
2. Start of transportation 1/11/1943.
3. Completion of transportation 1/31/1943.
The Reichsbahn [German State owned railway] cannot make available special trains for the evacuation during the period 12/15/1942-1/10/1943 on account of the increased leave traffic of the Armed Forces.
4. Breakdown: The 45000 Jews consist of 30000 Jews from the Bialystock district, 10000 Jews from the Theresienstadt Ghetto. Among those are 5000 able-bodied Jews who, so far, have been utilized in the Ghetto for necessary minor jobs, and 5000 Jews who are generally incapacitated; also Jews over sixty years of age, in order to reduce in the interest of the extension of the Ghetto the excessive number of inmates to slightly below 48000. I request special permission for this. As heretofore, only the Jews who have no special connections and relations, and who have no important decorations, have been earmarked for deportation; 3000 Jews from the occupied areas in the Netherlands, 2000 Jews from Berlin which equals 45000. In the total of 45000 are included physically handicapped [underlined] and others (old Jews and children). In making a distribution for this purpose at least 10000-15000 laborers [underlined], will be available when the Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.
The Chief of the security police and the SD
Dept. IV, Div. B, Sec. 4, a-2093/42 g (391)
By Order of MUELLER SS Gruppenführer
"Document 1481-PS [translation]" pp. 50-51.
Secret State Police Munich State Police District Office B. No. 52401/37 11 B.
3.2.28 [in pencil], Fi 6/25 1.
Munich, 1/20/1938.
By virtue of par. 1 of the Reich President's order for the protection of people and state of the 2/28/1933 (RGBl. 1 p. 83) the following decree is issued:
The Guild of the Virgin Mary [die Marianische Jungfrauenkongregation] of the Bavarian diocese, including the diocese of Speyer, together with its branches and associations and the Societies of Our Lady [Jungfrauenvereinen] attached to it, is by police order to be dissolved and forbidden with immediate effect.
The property belonging to the dissolved Guild is to be confiscated by the police. Not only is property in cash to be confiscated, but also any stock on hand and other objects of value. All further activity is forbidden the dissolved Guilds, particularly the foundation of any organization intended as a successor or as a cover. Incorporation as a body into other women's societies is also to be looked on as a forbidden continuation of activity. Infringement against the above prohibition will be punished according to para. 4 of the order of 28.2.1933.
In a parish in Nurnberg the Guild of the Virgin Mary, going outside the sphere of the work proper to it, has occupied itself for years, to a most far reaching degree, with arrangements of a worldly and popular sporting character. Furthermore the president of the society has continuously supplied the Guild of the Virgin Mary, from its committee-members down to the women in charge of its groups, with seditious material, which served for seditious discussions. Furthermore the Guild of the Virgin Mary, particularly its leading circles, were trained and mobilized for purely political and seditious tasks.
The whole behaviour of the Guild of the Virgin Mary had therefore to be objected to from various points of view. It could be repeatedly observed that the Guild engaged in purely worldly affairs, such as community games, and then in the holding of "Social Evenings".
This proves incontestably that the Guild of the Virgin Mary was active to a very great degree in a manner unecclesiastical and therefore worldly. By so doing it has- left the sphere of its proper religious task and entered a sphere of activity to which it has no statutory right. The organization has therefore to be dissolved and forbidden.
Signed. Beutel.
certified copy[signature illegible]
The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior III P 3701/5
Special Delivery Letter!
[Stamp] The Reich Governor in Bavaria 7/22/1935one enclosure Sign: Fi 6 July 22 [apparently signature, illegible]
SUBJECT: Confessional youth organizations.
A direct endangering of public security and order has resulted from the recently observed intensive activity of confessional, particularly Catholic youth organizations, which have in numerous cases considerably overstepped the limits imposed on them by political development and therefore in many places led to clashes with the organizations which stand behind the government, particularly the Hitler youth.
I therefore respectfully request that, on the basis of paragraph 1 of the decree of 2/28/1933, the confessional youth organizations be forbidden to wear uniforms or uniform-like clothing and to assemble publicly with pennants and flags and that the wearing of insignia and the wearing of uniform costume as a substitute for uniforms as well as any outdoor sport activity be prohibited.
I respectfully request that I be immediately informed of your disposition (of the matter).
Signed: Dr. FRICK certified: [signature illegible] Ministerial Chancellery Secretary [stamp] settled 1 August
To the provincial governments (for Prussia: to the deputy chief and inspector of the Prussian secret state police)
Munich M [signature illegible]
To Reich Minister Kerrl, Reich Minister for Science, Education and Public Training, and the Reich governors with a request for cognizance.
The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, VI 7770/3014
Berlin NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 11/6/1934 [telephone numbers, cable address] [stamp]
Reich Governor of Bavaria 11/7/1934-enclosures GG 1/7 .m.
SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER
To the State Governments for Prussia:
a. The Prime Ministeroffice of Secret State Police. b. The Minister of Science, Art and Public Education. c. The provincial Presidents and District Presidents.
To The State Secretary and Head of the Praesidium Chancellery. The State Secretary and Head of the Reich Chancellery. The Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. Reich Governors (of the States). Executive Board of the NSDAP, Division for the Cultural peace in Berlin. The Reich Bishop in Berlin-Charlottenburg.
Subject: Evangelical Church Controversy.
Lately there is an increase in cases in which ill-timed reports regarding the Evangelical Church reach the public. I therefore forbidtill further noticeall publications in the daily newspapers, in pamphlets or handbills, which are concerned with questions of the Evangelical Church, except only official announcements of the Church Government of the Reich. My edicts of 8/1/1934III 3033/3014and of 11/1/1934III 7570/ 3014are to that extent abrogated.
[signed] FRICK
Command of Mil. District VI Dept. of Prisoners of War V Az. K 3 Nr. 1417/44 secret. Soest, Westphalia, 7/27/1944 Phone: 1455/140.
Reference: 1. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b Chief of PW/general (Id) Nr. 1998/44 secret of 7/16/1944
2. OKW Az. 2f 24.19b AWA/PW general I (VIb) Nr. 2339/42 secret of 8/27/1942
3. Mil. District VI, dept PW's Az. K 8/a Nr. 751/42 secret of 9/4/1942
4. Mil. District VI, dept PW's V Az. K 18/VI Nr. 1948/44 of 7/11/1944
5. OKW Az. 2f 24. 11 Chief of PW/general (VIa) Nr. 979/43 secret of 4/19/1943reported by decree Mil. District VI, dept PW's Nr. 1015/43 secret.
6. Mil. District VI, dept PW's Az. K 8 R Nr. 314/42 secret of 4/7/1942
7. Mil. District VI, dept PW's V, Az. K 11 Nr. 1125/44 secret of 7/11/1944
Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the secret state police.
Enclosed is the decree I referred to.
The following, summarizing ruling is issued with respect to the delivery to the secret state police:
1. a. According to the decrees 2 and 3, the commander of the camp has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war in case of punishable offenses to the secret state police and to dismiss them from imprisonment of war, if he does not believe that his disciplinary functions suffice to prescribe punishment for violations committed. Report of the facts is not necessary.
b. Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered first the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether punishable offenses have been committed during the escape. The dismissal from imprisonment of war takes place upon suggestion of Police office, Section A 6 of the decree referred to in No. 4 regarding the contraction of all regulations on the Arbeitseinsatz prisoners of war who have been recaptured and refuse to work.
c. Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war, have to be delivered to the Gestapo and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 1 of the decree referred to under 4 and under 5).
d. Soviet officer prisoners of war, who refuse to work and tho who distinguish themselves as agitators and have an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be delivered by the responsible Stalag to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war (Section C 1 of the decree referred to under 4 and 5).
e. Soviet enlisted prisoners of war, refusing to work who are ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and therefore have an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war, have to be delivered to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 2 of the decree, referred to in 4).
f. Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers), who with respect to their political attitude have been sifted out by the special purpose command [Einsatzkommando] of the security police and the security service, have to be delivered upon request by the camp commander to the special purpose command and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Decree referred to in 6).
g. Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered if acts of sabotage are proven, to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. The decision rests with the camp commander. Report of the deed is not necessary. (Decree referred to under 7).
2. A report on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment o war in the cases mentioned under number 1 of this decree, to the Mil. District Command VI, dept of prisoners of war, is not necessary.
3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered to the secret state police and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war if a special order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, department for Prisoners of War, is issued.
4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participating in illegal organizations and resistance movements have to be left upon request to the Gestapo for the purpose of interrogation. They remain prisoners of war and have to be treated as such. The delivery to the Gestapo and their dismissal from imprisonment of war has to take place only by order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, dept of prisoners of war.
In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned Italian military personnel, approval of Mil. District command VI, dept of prisoners of war, has to be obtainedif necessary by phonebefore delivery to the Gestapo for the purposes of interrogation.
By order of the Mil. District Commander The commander of prisoners of war
The deputy [signed] FLEMM
1 enclosure. Distribution: Oflag VI/A, B, C, D.6, Stalag VI/A, C, D, F, G, J.326 (VI/K) Construction work battalion of PW (AB) 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 26, 35, 39, 45, 46, 106. PW Roof repair battalion VI, XVI PW Glass installation Battalion VI, XVI District commander rear area of PW/Z.V. Staff/Counter intelligence officer file 5
MEMORANDUM About Discussions [of Rosenberg] with the Führer on 12/4/1941
To begin with, I [Rosenberg] asked the Führer about my speech in the Sportpalast and referred to several points which seemed to call for further discussion. The Führer was of the opinion that the speech was given prior to the declaration of war by Japan and therefore under different suppositions, but in view of this, still desires to think over several points. It probably would not be appropriate if I were to officially say that the provinces in the East were to remain under Germany. I said thereupon that I, too, had considered this point, that one can probably only say that the Eastern Provinces [Ostland] will remain under German protection. The Führer was of the opinion, only to go so far that the provinces never would come under communism now from the German side appear as secured.
I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the conclusion (of matters in the East). I took the standpoint, not to speak of the extermination [Ausrottung] of the Jews. The Führer affirmed this and said that they had burdened the war upon us and that they had brought the destruction; it is no wonder if the results would strike them first.
The Führer further said that he did not deem it necessary to order forth the other nations to contribute as yet, since they can produce therein a legal claim for later. He does that from time to time in single negotiations. I told him that I, too, had written that down as a question. I would comply with these instructions to edit more carefully the corresponding paragraphs in my speech. The Führer agreed throughout that I had touched upon the Asiatic conflict.
Following, I laid before the Führer the outline of a religious tolerance decree, to which the Führer consented after careful consideration.
Then I came to talk about the lecture of Professor Schuessler, to whom Dr. Dietrich had given instructions to evaluate the political testament of Peter the Great in an address. Dr. Dietrich had not previously informed me thereon. Upon my indication that this testament is a forgery out of the 18th Century, the Führer thought that the authenticity was contradicted by a German scholar in the 19th Century. Thereupon I pointed out that this so-called testament was written in Polish circles and that it then was converted and changed by Napoleon in the political strife. However, I would make an accurate check. I asked the Führer for a general rule that if the Führer had specific desires over the press to have Dr. Dietrich inform me of these to insure a regulated working arrangement.
The Führer replied to the question by the military commanders in the occupied Eastern territories about the marriage of persons belonging to the Armed Forces with inhabitants of these territories that no marriages will be permitted during this war. After the war a relaxation could be introduced to agree with the political limits and blood relationship.
I then spoke about the relation with Reich Commissioner Koch and told the Führer that Koch had, through various declarations, created the impression among the officers of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) as if he dealt directly with the Führer and otherwise decided to rule without Berlin. Similar utterances that he made the law were made to collaborators and he also told me once that he regarded himself as coordinated. I made it clear to him that here exists a distinct official relation. I spoke with him regarding the above and I hope that clarification over the cooperation will result. I have only the wish that the Führer no longer will receive Koch alone but only in my presence. The Führer agreed immediately.
Then I told the Führer of the visit by General Kitzinger, who said that he was assigned with the thrashing of the harvest. For this purpose he was promised several divisions which have not yet arrived. Moreover, they took from him other units. The Führer said that he would see to it that a change will be enforced and that divisions will be given him. On the conditions of the captured prisoners Kitzinger remarked that because of malnutrition [Entkraeftung] in the camps in his territory, some 2500 prisoners die daily. Anyhow, they are already unable to consume good food and one must count on it that not very many will remain. Aside from that, the manpower in the country is large enoughthe land even partly over-populated.
I further asked the Führer if he had scrutinized the memoir on the establishment of Turkish legions. What I surmise, since the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) issued an order, is that beside the Turkish-Aserbeidschander Legion, other Caucasian legions will be set up also. The Führer affirmed the question, and I once more referred to the danger of a panturanian movement. I reported further about the petition of the Crimean tartars from Constantinople and the request to visit the prison camps and to inspect the countrymen. I told the Führer that I had denied this request which he absolutely affirmed. The only thing one could do would be to segregate the 250 captured Crimean tartars with respect to Turkey, and to handle them accordingly. In conclusion, the Führer once more emphasized that he later wished to have the Crimea cleaned out. I told him that I, too, had given much consideration to the renaming of the towns and thought to rename Simferopol to Gotenburg and Sevastopol to Theodorichhafenthis according to the instructions of the Führer himself.
Then I suggested a boundary settlement between Nikolajew and Transministry to the Führer, because the way things are, the Rumanians can look into all the ship-building installations; just an insignificant regulation will prevent this. I had also made this suggestion to General Field Marshal Keitel. The Führer looked at the map and agreed to such a boundary regulation.
Finally, I told the Führer that I had in mind to go to Riga in January and to visit other territories during the next year. I begged the Führer to allow me to obtain several coaches for a special train. I have already started dealings over the procurement of such coaches in Holland. The Führer thought this all right and agreed with my wish.
Thereupon I gave the Führer an aforementioned letter of a Japanese scholar over the Japanese and National Socialistic Philosophy of Life as related to Christianity, over which we talked for a long time. The Führer took the memoir with him, which immediately engrossed him.
Berlin, 12/16/1941 R/H
The National Socialist German Workers Party Party Chancellery Führer Headquarters 9/30/1941
The Director of the Party Chancellery [Stamp] Gau Training Office, Franken No. 2131 Received 10/8/1941 Sent
CONFIDENTIAL Circular No. 21/41 Confidential (not for publication)
Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War
For your information please find enclosed a regulation of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 8.9.1941 on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of War. This regulation is confidential!
One appendix overleaf Certified:
Distribution: Gauleiters Kreisleiters
Heil Hitler! sgd. Bormann
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Az. 2f 21.11 General Armed Forces Dept./P.W. (I)
No. 3058 41 Confidential BerlinSchoeneberg, 8.9.1941 2 Appendices Badenschestrasse 51
Subject: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
Reference: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16.6.1941 (only for the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the General Government).
2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26.6.1941.
4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2.8.1941
Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders alreadY issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The directives, already issued by Supreme Command General Headquarters for the operational areas, have been considered. By this order any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct reference is made to them in the appendix.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By order of Reinecke
Appendix to DiaryNo. 3058/41 Confidential dated 8.9.1941.
Regulation for the treatment of Soviet PWs in all prisoner of war camps.
1 Treatment of Soviet PWs in general.
Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany. For the first time, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, steeped in the ideas of Bolshevism so pernicious to the people. The fight against National Socialism has become part of his system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage, seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable opponent in accordance with Geneva Convention.
It is therefore in keeping with the respect and honour of the German Armed Forces, that every German soldier should hold itself severely aloof when dealing with Soviet prisoners of war. Treatment must be cool but correct. Any indulgence or even friendly disposition is to be punished very severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet PWs, must at all times be visible even in public.
The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of bolshevik fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resistance must immediately be broken completely by force of arms (bayonets, butts and firearms). The regulations on the use of arms in the Armed Forces can be applied only to a limited extent as these regulations apply under the assumption that conditions will be generally peaceful. With Soviet PWs it is already necessary for reasons of discipline, that the use of arms should be severe. Anyone carrying out an order, who does not use his weapons or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable.
PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired. The regulations already made, in particular H. Dv. 38/1, page 13, etc., are invalid with regard to that point. On the other hand, no arbitrary action is permitted. PWs who are obedient and willing to work are to be treated correctly. However, caution and mistrust must never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal.
Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented. This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered impossible.
Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire fence, the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use of this kind of weapon by German soldiers is absolutely forbidden. With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the work of the German guard personnel.
II. Treatment of members of racial groups.
In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been divided up, according to their race, in the "Home Organisation" [heimatorganisation] (General Government and Service Command I) as well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are concerned: Racial Germans, Ukrainians, White Russians, Pales, Lithuanians, Latvians, Esthonians, Rumanians, Finns, Georgians.
In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in particular, to PWs newly captured in the Area of the Armed Forces Commanders.
Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home:
Racial Germans, Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Latvians, Esthonians, Rumanians, Finns, Lithuanians
Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to be effected.
Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release and will be dealt with in accordance with section III.
III. Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken during the Eastern campaign.
1. Intentions. The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign demand special measures which can be carried out on their own responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences.
2. The way to reach the appointed goal. A. Apart from directing PWs into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also members of racial groups) and any civilian in the camps are to be divided as follows:
a. those politically undesirable
b. those politically harmless
c. those especially reliable in the political sense (ho could be employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas).
B. Whereas the work of separation according to nationality-, rank, etc., is undertaken by the camp organisation itself, the Reichsführer-SS has assigned Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security Service for the work of classifying PWs according to their political opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD have received special training for their special duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework of the camp organisation, according to regulations which they have already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD.
There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants, especially their defense officers, and the special purpose units.
3. Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No. 2. A. Military personnel. The special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as "politically undesirable elements". Should individuals, considered as suspicious, later prove themselves to be unsuspicious, the should be sent back to the camp with the other--PWs. Request made by the special purpose units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with. Officers will very often be liable for segregation as "political undesirables". Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as military personnel.
B. Civilians. If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time this is to be brought about with the approval of the competent office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown or in specially created Labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as under A.
C. Reliable persons are to be separated from politically undesirable persons and directed into some other work of camp administration.
(Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite possible that, even among these, there may be elements that must be considered as "politically undesirable".)
should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from the point of view of defense.
IV. Employment of Soviet PWs.
1. General. Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these where the PWs can work under the constant supervision of the guard personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons out of consideration for a third person.
2. Special regulations for employment within the Reich. The main principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the assured security of German life and German property.
The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the ole responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs.
Therefore employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in Work connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions but the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the civilian population cannot plied with by a civilian place of work employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith.
In addition the instructions OKW/PW (15) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be punished.
3. Guard duties. The best possible trained energetic and prudent guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp [A. O. des M. Stammlagers].
At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must, however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail consist of no more than 10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or sub-machine guns.
Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the orders given are carried out to the letter.
The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for thorough and detailed perusal.
The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the supervising authorities.
V. Final remarks.
PW-commandants are to be made personally responsible that under all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the content of the regulations.
Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. PW section No. 3058/41 Secret dated 9/8/1941 (for free distribution!) Notes on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War.
Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany
For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism, his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism, every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust.
The principles to be followed by guard personnel are:
1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately (without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them.
2. Any conversation-even on the march to and from the place of workunless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions is utterly forbidden. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to and from the places of workas well as during work. In the same way, all conversation between PWs and civilians is to be prevented, if necessary by force of armseven against the civilians.
3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always keep a sufficient distance from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use his weapons without delay. Never turn your back on a PW.
4. Slackness is out of place even with a PW who is obedient and willing to work. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own conclusions.
5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and, above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men.
6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions.
Notes about a discussion with the Führer at the Führer Headquarters on 5/8/1942. Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers [also Bormann and Rosenberg, the author of the notes].
I began with reporting to the Führer about the results of the 1941/42 collection of the NSDAP of books for the German Armed Forces resulting in more than 9 million books, from which 46000 libraries were formed.
Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East. The article in the "information service" of the Ministry for Propaganda concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle, agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked about the "Policy of Colonisation" in the East.Then it was also said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 officers without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that, because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair. Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved.
As regards the re-settlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Führer said that he was under the impression that people who had already settled here would have to be re-settled again. I told the Führer that it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30000 settlers capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were worn down by the prolonged camp life.
At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers to some statements in the so-called "Green Folder" of the economic staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed fighting the partisans.
Thereafter I described to the Führer the considerations which caused me to grant self-administration to the Baltic countries. First of all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only m decree to the Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In practice it meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human material. However, frequently efforts were noticeable to meddle with the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors' open for some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there were enough safety clauses whereby the self-administration could not undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General. In order to eliminate any possible political danger an exception has been made with Riga. Riga has 12000 officials and was to receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the Lithuanian Directorate would be avoided. By this measure Riga would be an experiment for annexed administration.
We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more drastically. The Führer kept all decrees and regulations in order to examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments.
Afterwards the Führer asked how all those economical measures were looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of course, the entire economical management was in German hands, and that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally speaking the monopolistic companies ad the ZHO [Zentralhandelsges. 0stEastern Central Trade], are fundamentally necessary, only they have to be supervised. Dr. Lammers interjected that private profits had to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers. I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to ascertain whether the Führer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily be a direct state monopoly. I told the Führer that I shall have the whole question examined once again.
Then the problem of religious freedom for the occupied Eastern territories was discussed. The Führer consulted Reichsleiter Bormann, who already had gathered much experience by the reparations for the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the situations in the East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but that one should not allow such development to take place without supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was to be understood under "religious freedom" was to be interpreted by the Churches, and he could anticipate, that such a law would produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the Reich. The Führer considered a number of twists and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing its suitability the Führer read the decree and gave his consent. Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled by myself in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary. The Führer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported from Kiev to Berlin the "Atheist Museum". In this the writings of the national writer of the Ukraine, Schewischenko, are quoted and may be possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which in truth was not for the church. Also such freedom of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Führer emphasized that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the war. I told the Führer that I carried out church political lectures in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary ideological fight would also be carried out with the necessary knowledge and on the necessary scale.
Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany's wards was discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically. Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for the Orientals "the losing of face." Even the Bolshevics mistreated the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view. A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how to keep silent. The Führer read the draft of my decree for the Reich Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.
I then described to the Führer the reception of the three delegations of farmers in grateful acknowledgment of our agrarian legislation and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets, posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here, too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 wagons could be transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole action was very successful. I then submitted to the Führer photographs of Ukrainian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The Führer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even beauty of the people.
I then dealt with the employment of foreign workers in the occupied Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who had been very active lately to cultivate all those existing connections and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister Larsen had travelled the Eastland with the General Director Junker who was the chief of the Danish committee for employment in the East. This journey already had produced tangible, practical results: in Port Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be delivered within a few weeks. After an initial starting time about 75000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erections of cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two experts had to be sent there, and within a few weeks one could start with the installations. The same applies to large plaster factory, to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a daily output of 10000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business plannings are also being considered. Especially the oil factory at Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants, etc. All those works thus promise considerable increase in production for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with the Dutch, and Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart had just now submitted a first draft regarding the employment of Dutch people in the region of Libau. It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500000 ha of land to be cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export the surplus to Holland. Some of the details had still to be settled. The Führer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover the DAF German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the building of concrete ships.
I then reported to the Führer the planning of central office for planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich had sent their emissaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this stage in which might somehow hamper the war production.
Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and the policy of the AA [Foreign Ministry] towards the Eastern territories. I reported to the Führer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with us. According to my information received from the manager of chief section "Policy", the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has learned the Turkestan language, and the Turkestans have accepted German military terms and have an anti-Bolshevist attitude. The legions of the Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the beginning on the part of the SD, called all those peoples "Asiatics", had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place put bow and arrow. I showed the Führer the individual symbols for the designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians, Cubancossacks, and Kalmucks. The Führer had no objections against these designs, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians. I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a Panturanian movement towards the East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary, a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.
I then described to the Führer our relationship with the Foreign Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I read to the Führer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin. Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants from all parts of the world. The Führer listened in surprise. I said that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question. In this connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. Benzing and assigned him upon request for a certain period to the AA. The AA then created for him a separate department for planning and appointed him to be a Regierungsrat [Advisor of the Government]. It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the case of the Turkestanian Kayum. The questions had long been discussed with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA for the purpose of broadcasting propaganda. Now the AA was sending him to Paris, in order to collect emigrants. The Führer gave the strictest instructions to the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, to inform the AA officially that it had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked to State Secretary v. Weizsaecker a few weeks ago and requested him to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to speaking to him personally. Weizsaecker said that the two points of view offered. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he said that he did not understand from this talk that he was to arrange the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this remark that the matter was to be put off until after the Congress of emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed by a liaison man of the AA that they did not at all consider the attitude which I had reported to the Führer in regard to the Caucasian people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private character. The Führer once more emphasized his point of view.
I then reported to the Führer on the work of the preparatory reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom the Führer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used in Germany the Führer accepted the proposed list of personalities. The tasks of Reich Minister Speer and his relationship with me were then thoroughly discussed. The Führer said that he, for example, had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused. The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions resulted, if the entire administration of railroad traffic had not been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has control, and Speer already proved at the beginning of his official duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have taken months, and he, the Führer, was most satisfied with this choice. I told the Führer that I had promised my utmost support to Speer from the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that is this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the war and secondly, that the department Chief of the O.T. [Organisation Todt], who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners.
The Führer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry Speer would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads. through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate war effort. Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which are not war essential. Dr. Lammers suggested to include by way of agreement or decree of the Führer that this decree was only for the duration of the war. I then described to the Führer the present general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the Führer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration of the commissioner-in-chief, with the result that in certain towns a flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not beto use their own phrasedeported. Those men would decidedly increase the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves, the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable deterioration of the situation and ill feeling of the population. I already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners-in-chief, these conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister Speer would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in any case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation would worsen very decisively thereby. The Führer listened to the report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that, in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments however, were so convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction of the East could only be carried out centrally If this painfully achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree for Speer, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The Führer said that under no circumstances should that happen, and he instructed Dr. Lammers, that he was to reject such demands on the Führer's orders.
Dr. Lammers was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich Minister Speer in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to myself for the duration of the war.
In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also dealt with. The Führer approved the final version regarding uniforms of the occupied territories. I reported to him the results of the exhibition in Agram, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the exhibition "Fight for Europe".
The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the OKW. The Armed Forces are in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections. The Führer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future complications the bearer of the EK [iron cross] might have to be subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explained that soldiers of the Baltic nationsaccording to many utteranceslooked upon an award as a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of a Germanisation and on the other hand the skimming of nationalistic forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again.
I informed the Führer of my intention to start my first official journey into the Eastland on the 14th May. The Führer authorized me to extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps.
I then reported to the Führer the results of metal collection in the Eastland which produced 2500 tons. By collecting those metals still available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3500 tons. The collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich.
I handed the Führer a file note regarding the development of rubber plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of the NSDAP since 1936. Despite all the official refusals the plants were at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from 1943 on more than 100000 ha will be worked. The harvest will then provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from synthetic rubber production.
During the report I turned the conversation toward the planning departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party member Cranz who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to rant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. Lammers was of the opinion that one could not tart right away with the highest ranks. If Cranz was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Nor was it a question of appointing the major Cranz, but of the journalist who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations with the Reich Commissar. This was not an ordinary Special department ministry [Ressortministerium], but it had other, far more extended tasks. The Führer agreed with this point of view and asked about how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the Führer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not much in favor to create a ministry for the East Commission. I was surprised, because Dr. Lammers had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was the wish of the Führer. I told the Führer that at that time I had made special propositions. I then requested Dr. Lammers to give me his support in this matter.
Berlin, 5/13/1942. R/H.
Copy Munich, Briennerstr. 50, 8/24/1934 Telephone 28341-46
Reg. No. 33668 I 1 Nh must be quoted in further correspondence To the Bureau of Secret State PoliceCentral Office
Berlin S.W. 11 Prinz Albrecht St. 8.
National mourning on the occasion of the death of Reich President and Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg; herethe carrying out of para. III of the decree of the Reich Government dated 8/2/1934.
Enclosure 1 Copy
Several telephone reports which reached here as early as the evening of 8/2/1934, from offices of the Party and regional [Bezirk] authorities, concerning refusal to sound the funeral knell ordered by the Reich Government, and also numerous written reports, caused the Bavarian Political Police to come to the decision, a copy of which is enclosed, and which has already been submitted to your office.
The result was as follows: In more than 70 parishes bells were not tolled on the 2nd of August, in 20 parishes on the 2nd and 3rd of August, and in 4 parishes on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of August. The reason given in about 56 cases was that no definite order had been issued from the responsible diocesan office, or dean's office. Of the clergy involved, 32 in all are politically taintedtwo of them read holy mass on the 26th of July for the deceased Chancellor of the Austrian Confederation Dollfuss, or remembered him in a sermon and had prayers said for him. It appears that no special order of the senior church authorities was necessary for this. In one case the sacristan was interrupted in ringing the knell by the priest.
When asked for an explanation by enraged fellow Germans and fellow party members, every possible excuse was usedlet us only call attention to the following ones, to show what type they were:
Alleged disturbance of the religious service.
Nothing is done on orders from lay authorities.
Absence, either accidental, or alleged to be by reason of duty.
Alleged state of decay of the belfry.
Alleged defectiveness of the bells.
Alleged ignorance of the decree of the Reich Government.
Hindenburg was a Protestant; by a decree of the Bavarian Ministry of Public Worship and Education (Resolution of the State Minister for Education and Public Worship, dated 29.6.34, No. I 19763) the vicar was only pledged to obey the order of the church authorities with respect to the ringing of church bells.
Alleged incompetency.
Bells had only been rung in the morning on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of war.
On his own authority, the bishop of Wuerzburg. Matthias Ehrenfried, a sufficiently well-known cleric, fixed the ringing of bells for the morning, between 11-0 and 12-0 o'clock. [pencil note referring to underling] How so?
Another minister had the incredible lack of taste to point out that the enforced ringing of church bells when Kurt Eisner was shot, had been the occasion of the order that this should in future only be done by order of the church authorities. The mentioning of the name of the immortal President of the Reich von Hindenburg in the same breath as an incident connected with Eisner, the traitor and Jew, is the most despicable feature [Gemeinheit] of the affair.
From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the Catholic clergy in their intolerance, have done their utmost to disturb the peace between laymen and clergy. There is no doubt that the obstructive attitude of the clergy is due, on the one hand, to that fact that the deceased Reichpresident was a Protestant, and on the other, to the fact that the Catholic Church was to obey a suggestion made by the National-Socialist Reich Government. The conduct shown in this case provides once more a clear evidence of the international attitude and lack of German feeling and perception in Catholic clerical circles.
In three cases the taking into protective custody, in order to guarantee them personal safety, of refractory clergy could not be avoided, in the interests of the maintenance of public security and order, and on account of the anger of the people.
The following clergy are in question:
The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA., Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3.8 on the express order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because he assaulted SA leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells against his wishes. He was released from custody on 10.8.34.
The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden BA Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from 2400 hours on the 2.8.34, till 1000 hours on 3.8.34. On 5.8.34 he said sarcastically in his sermon, referring to the SA men who bad carried out the ringing of the funeral knell on their own account "Lord forgive them, for they know not what they do!"
The Parish priest, Father Johann Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdolf, BA., Burglengenfeld, refused to ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd. He is badly tainted politically and had to be taken into protective custody from the 5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his own safety.
The behaviour of the diocesan office of the archbishophric of Munich and Freising, [underlined in red pencil], which is in accordance with the principle "Attack is the best defence" deserves special note. In two letters of 8/10-11/1934 a touching complaint is lodged about the behaviour of members of the SA and the Party on ringing the church bells without authorization, and also about the fact that the clergymen named above were restricted in their personal liberty. In this connection it should be stressed that the clergy concerned were treated with extreme leniency. We could refer here to the case of Quinger, where the SA men, in spite of the injuries which the clergyman inflicted on them, with exemplary discipline did not return the assaults. The State authorities did everything to ensure the continuance of worship undisturbed. Moreover, the length of imprisonment was confined in all cases to the minimum.
It must again be pointed out, most emphatically, that the unspeakable behaviour of the clergy concerned in this matter leads us to deduce the existence of a very special frame of mind, and spotlights the true internal attitude of the Catholic clergy to the National-Socialist State. It is not to be wondered at if her and there, in face of the incredible behaviour of the clergy and the threadbare excuses they used, the people and the SA resorted to an act of self-defense which was not perhaps in conformity with strict law, but was very understandable. Narrow-minded jurisprudence, as the elders of the church choose to practice it, is not in place here, and is not understood by the mass of the people, as events have shown.
Since the diocesan office of the archbishopric of Munich and Freising has announced that it will also "report" the incidents to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, it is absolutely necessary to acquaint the above office with the contents of the present report.
By order signed Brunner [stamp]
Reich Governor of Bavaria
8/28/1934 1/1 enclosures Mark Ge 2/28.8
(Above) Copy to the Reich Governor of Bavaria, for the attention of State Secretary Hofmann, Munich, requesting that it should be noted.
By order Jenner [?] [Several illegible initials] Copy checked 9/24/1934.
copy prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch, Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee.
Cracow, 2/1943. To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank. Your Excellency:
Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings which create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within the General-Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary of State Dr. Buehler as far back as 12/1942. In that letter I stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the uncertainty bout their national future within the New Europe. Here I would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them.
The center of these is the question: Shall the Ukrainians work successfully in favor of final victory; they must be granted the security which, while absolutely necessary to them, unfortunately does not exist. For under the present conditions the Ukrainians are neither sure of their possessions nor of their lives. The matter of reprivatisation has not yet been settled. Inhuman treatment, severe pressure to forced labor, unfounded arrests, and lastly the shootings of great numbers are happenings not too infrequent these days.
1. Question of Re-Privatisation.
Of primary importance for the further shaping of German-Ukrainian relations is the problem of re-privatisation. The whole Ukrainian people have connected with the German victory in the East their hope that now all remainders of the Bolshevist Regime shall be extinguished finally.
The views of the Ukrainian people are basically those of private property and economy. The Ukrainian peasant is prepared to undergo the greatest privations and sacrifices in favor of the State if only he be allowed to work in tranquility; this feeling of inner tranquility he can but gain in the knowledge that the soil on which he and his ancestors have toiled, will remain his property in the future. The Ukrainian population received with gratitude the Proclamation of your Excellency of 8/1/1941 in which, you Sir, have solved this problem at its roots and have stated re-privatisation to be the general rule for the economy of the State.
Now, however, the attitude of some authorities looks as if the re-privatisation would be questioned still and as if in the new social order there was no place for private property. This situation is very cleverly made use of by the hostile whispering propaganda. Especially widely has the rumor been spread that private property has not yet been reintroduced for the reason that a large action of resettlement of the Ukrainians from Galicia to the East is to be expected.
Actions, such as measures of adjusting real property at the expense of peasant property (in the districts of Tarnopol, Rawa Ruska, Kalusch, etc.), survey of real property of peasants (in the district of Czortkow) and imposing of fees for the use of land ( Czortkow Zloczow, etc.) give such rumors the appearance of probability (enclosure 1).
It is clear that for this reason there appears a great alarm and nervousness amongst the rural population which must badly influence the inclination for work and the output of agricultural production.
The uncertainty as well as all the consciously false interpretations of such measures through the whispering propaganda, could only be ended by a definite carrying out of the principle of the Proclamation mentioned.
II. Measures for finding labor.
The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of finding labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and to be brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him only months later one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.
I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:
a. During such an action a pupil in Sokol lost his life and another one was wounded (enclosure 2).
b. 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity cards, were assigned in Cracow to a transport of "Russian prisoners-of-war" and delivered into a punitive camp in Graz (enclosure 3).
c. 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by the labor offices in the middle of January, were sent to Pskow in Russia, via Eastern Prussia, where most of them died under distress (enclosure 4).
d. Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment (Zalesczyki; kidnapping schoolboys during school time (Biala Podloaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieschow) (enclosure 5).
III. Question of Personal Security.
Treatment of human beings.
Already the kind of treatment meted out to our compatriots by the lower instruments of the German authority, adds much to make the general situation more grave. The Ukrainians expected the treatment of members of those nations who fought against Germany because they belong to a people who have never done anything against the Germans and their interests. Now every Ukrainian cannot fail to become convinced that most of the Germans do not make any distinction, and that they are accustomed to treat all peoples of the East similarly, whether friend or foe. Too often the Ukrainian is exposed to the danger, when dealing with the lower authorities, to be personally insulted, to be slandered, even to be ill-treated. Innumerable instances could be mentioned proving this sort of treatment. In the enclosure I give only a small selection of especially grave cases (enclosure 6).
Wholesale shootings.
Of much worse character are the wholesale shootings of absolutely innocent persons, such as happened in Lubycza Koroliwska and then in Lwow and Czortkow.
In Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska, 46 peasants, including 31 Ukrainians, were shot without trial (10/41942) (enclosure 7).
During the second half of 11/1943, 28 Ukrainians were sot in Lwow, 56 in Czortkow, also without trial. (enclosure 8).
Arrests in 12/1942.
In 12/1942 the police undertook a cleansing action among the so-called disturbing elements, leading very soon, however, to wholesale arrests of innocent, quiet citizens. They are under arrest and in danger to lose their good health for certain, if not their life. (enclosure 9).
How acute and well founded this fear is, is proved by what happened to 6 Ukrainian girls from Kolomea, who were arrested in 2/1942 and who disappeared without leaving any trace. (enclosure 10).
Revision in the St. George Cathedral, Lwow.
In connection with the cleansing action mentioned above a raid was carried out even in the St. George's cathedral in Lwow. The fact itself, especially because of the behavior of the police at this place which is sacred to the Ukrainians, produced a deep resentment and bad feelings amongst the population. This was used by hostile propaganda at once. Generally, it is pointed out that not even during the Bolshevist occupation raids took place on the hill of St. George, and that several visits by Bolshevist professors and students were always undertaken with great respect for the place and the person of the Metropolitan.
Special action against the asocial elements.
Since 15 January a special action began against the so-called asocial elements in Galicia. In the whole area about 5000 persons were arrested. The purpose of this action was said to be the removal of those elements, who did not wish to work, were active in the black market and by so doing made the work of the authorities more difficult. This action however, did not obtain the right result, and the victims were leading personalities of the Ukrainian cultural and economic life as well as employees of several state authorities and members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee.
These wholesale arrests raised an extraordinary nervousness and anxiety among the delegates of our committee and in large spheres of the Ukrainian population.
IV. Irregular conditions and Partisan nuisance in the District of Lublin.
[This chapter deals with partisan activity and the risks to which the loyal Ukrainian population is exposed thereby. Irrelevant].
V. Collective responsibility.
General remarks.
The Ukrainian people consider as particularly painful the application of methods of collective responsibility. The large masses of the people generally have no understanding for the principle of collective responsibility; they take it as absence of justice to be punished for a deed one has neither done nor approved of. Generally, the principle of collective responsibility may be considered as justified if applied to a racial community which is homogenous. The partisan nuisance, however, is particularly spread out in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian areas, and the Ukrainian community can by no means bear any responsibility for misdeeds done by Poles. But even in areas with the almost homogenous population as e.g in Galicia, the Ukrainian people could only be held responsible if they were possessed of some means of executive power towards those members. Today they have no such means For the reasons stated, the application of the principle of collective responsibility against the Ukrainian people is unjust and inexpedient in its present state of organization and especially in the mixed areas. The collective responsibility often hits the leading circles in town and country whose feelings are pro-German, but who are powerless against both the Polish dissenters and against their own irresponsible hot-heads and despairing persons.
Thus it happens that the collective responsibility which has the purpose of exterminating anti-German elements quite to the contrary annihilates or weakens positively pro-German elements and creates bad feelings and bitterness. Thus in the district of Lublin about 400 such Ukrainians perished.
We mention but some of the most convincing instances:
On 12/25/1942 the military police surrounded the village of Przewale, in the district of Zamose, area of Lublin, herded together a large number of Ukrainians and Poles. When the manager of the estate declared he needed the Poles for work, the Poles were set free, the Ukrainians, however, numbering 16 were shot dead; among the persons shot was a 15 years old girl, Eugenie Tybyczuk (encl. 15).
In the village of Nodosow (district of Lubin) 8 pro-German Ukrainians who had been persecuted by the Poles because of their patriotic views in pre-war time, were shot on 10/30/1942.
On 1/29/1943 in the village of Sumyn (collective community of Tarnowatka, district of Lublin) 45 Ukrainians, including 18 children between the ages of 3-15 were shot, and on 2/2/1943 in the villages of Pankow and Scharowola (collective community of Tarnowatka) 19 Ukrainians were shot, including 8 children, aged 1-13 years (encl. 16).
The greatest bitterness is created by the killing of innocent children, because the population is unable to understand that the German authorities could consent to or order such deeds.
The tragic events in Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubycza Kniazi districts of Rawa Ruska, area of Lublin) have been mentioned above (encl. 7).
The happenings in Galicia mentioned in this report have been submitted to Governor Dr. Waechter and the Department Head Dr. Bauer in writing and verbally. We repeat them herein, in order to complete the picture of the General Government.
Cracow, 2/25/1943.
Table of Enclosures.
1. The surveying measures in the area of Czortkow.
2. The events at Sokal.
3. The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office.
4. Minutes (fate of the Ukrainian workers in Pskow).
5. Memorandum for the files (false recruiting of workers to the Reich).
6. Memorandum for the files (ill-treatment of Ukrainians).
7. Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska.
8. Shootings in Lwow and Czortkow in 11/1942.
9. Arrests in Galicia in 12/1942.
10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students from Kolomea.
11. List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, arrested in 1/1943 in the area of Kolomea, Stryj, and Kamionka Strumilowa.
12. Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the district of Sanok.
13. Anti-Ukrainian activities of persons unfit for work in the district Biljoraj.
14. Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlasko during the second half of the year 1942.
15. Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in the village of Przewale.
16. List of the Ukrainians shot in the village of Sumin, community of Tarnowatka on 1/29/1943.
Enclosure 1.
The Surveying Measure in the District of Czortkow.
In September of last year the Chief Inspectorate of agricultural land [Hauptlandinspektion] in Czortkow was formed under the management of the former District Surveyor Kreislandinspektor].
Employed were the engineers-surveyor Jwanenko, a Russian, and the draughtsman Sach, a Pole; further the land-surveyors from Brzezany and Tarnaopol and some other German employee who were brought to Czortkow. Travelling in the district of czortkow they drew maps showing the position of the communities with special regard to all farms and marking the better farms About the middle of December the activities of this institution ceased, probably up till the end of 4/1943. Rumor has it that German peasants to the number of 50000 who are to be transferred from Germany into this district should be settled on these better farms.
The Events at Sokal.
On 10/24/1942 between 13 and 14 hours, when the school boys went home from school, they were stopped by detachments of military police on the street and together with other people were formed into one unit. There was a panic as nobody knew what was going to happen to these people. People began to flee from the streets. The school boy Jaroslau Meda who was just passing with his father, the secretary of the collective community of Parchacz also started to run. The father tried to calm him and called him back as there was no danger. A military policeman, however, saw him fleeing and shot at him wounding him fatally, so that he died in the local hospital half an hour later.
At the same time two military policemen went into the Ukrainian hostel for schoolboys and took away some boys. The others were at lunch in the dining-room and therefore remained unnoticed. In front of the schoolboys' hostel the schoolboy Wassyl Krawtschuk was caught by a military policeman and wounded so seriously in the thigh by a bayonet that he had to be taken to hospital.
The student of theology Osyyp Karawan was severely beaten until he fainted.
The public school teacher Michael Duliba was beaten publicly.
It is to be stressed that nobody knew that this action of collecting people was to procure workers to load carrots at the station. Then the headmaster of the public school informed the manager of the local labor office by phone and asked for his help, the latter replied he had no time to spare for this matter at the moment. Thereafter, the headmasters of the Ukrainian schools informed the manager of the local labor office that they would put their boys at the disposal of the authorities in every case there was unforeseen and undelayable work to be done in town after having received fair warning provided no other labor was available.
Zborow, 10/6/1942
Ukrainian Aid Committee, Branch Zborow.
To the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow. Department for food.
Subject: The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office in Cracow towards our laborers.
We present the minutes prepared by our office together with Mr. Procyk Lukas on 9/28/1942 who returned from Germany.
Ukrainian laborers coming to Cracow, though provided with certificates and identification papers, are being transferred by the Polish employees of the labor office together with the transports of Russian civilian and brought to punitive camps.
Many Ukrainians fell victim to such Polish provocations. The situation of these people is all the more tragic, as they do not know the German language and their certificates and identification papers were destroyed by the above mentioned Polish employees.
Below we give a list of the Ukrainian laborers who are in the punitive camp in Graz as Russians and refugees:
[Follows a list of 19 names].
The situation of the above named is tragic. I was lucky to escape. With complete confidence in me and tears in their eye they asked me to report their condition to the Committee.
[signed] Procyk Lukas.
Enclosure 4. Minutes.
Michaljlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran (son of Iwan), Iwan Baran (son of Mykola) and Olexa Chimjak, all from Koniuschky, Koroliwiski, district of Komarow, were sent by the labor office for work to Germany on 1/12/1942.
They came to Pwzemysk, where they stayed for a whole week awaiting medical inspection. After the medical inspection they were joined to the transport which was to go to Germany. However, they were driven via Warsaw, East Prussia to Russia and were brought to the town of Pskow. With them were 95 Ukrainian lads from Galicia, including 18 lads from the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski. They were accompanied by a military escort. On 1/28/1942 they arrived in Pskow. At first, they worked in the woods felling trees, later building a bath-house.
In the beginning they received half a loaf of bread as daily ration, and later one loaf for seven persons daily, black coffee breakfast and supper and soup at dinner time.
They never had a day off, they had to work even on Sundays. Terrible frost persisted throughoutto 58 centigrades (below zero), but the lads got no warm clothes, they worked in the clothes they had brought with them. After arriving in Pskow he workers lived in unheated huts without beds. The huts were made from wood and it was very cold there; only after two weeks were they billetted in a hall with beds, but they were unable to get warm with the blankets they had brought with them. Many of them fell ill from hunger and cold, 18 had to be taken to hospital (there was no room for several persons) where they remained for 2 to 3 weeks. The sick were refused bread, because they were said to be simulants. In the hospital the sick received 50 grammes of bread and some warm water and some soup and potatoes at about 16 hours.
Anyone unfit for work was sent away forcibly. Many escaped from the huts during the winter, one died. 13 lads from the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski escaped, three were arrested, and we know nothing about the others; they certainly did not turn home.
5 of the above mentioned lads were declared unfit for work by a military commission and sent to Lwow and then home where they arrived completely exhausted. Of the 95 persons in the hutments in Pskow up to April, only 14 remained, 8 from the district of Jarowiw and 1 from Grodek. Those 14 persons, hungry and weak, were released to go home.
These workers received no pay.
Komarow. 4/22/1942. Confirmed by signature: Mychajlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran.
Enclosure 5. Memorandum for the files.
In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age groups 1910-1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared for inspection, all those who were chosen were arrested at once, loaded into trains and sent to the Reich. Such recruiting of laborers for the Reich also took place in other areas of this district. Following some interventions the action was then stopped.
The labor office in Biala Podlaska carried out the recruiting for work of the students at the commercial college. When the officials recruited more students than ordered, the main doors and doors to the class-rooms were locked; consequently a panic amongst the students broke out, and even some students fled through the windows.
Similar events occurred in Wlodawa and Hrubieschow in consequence of which the schools were closed for some time.
Enclosure 6. Memo for the files. Re: Ill-treatment of Ukrainians.
a. On 11/11/1942 Irene Malaschtschuk, a public school girl working in a German food store in Czortkow, was, whilst working (attending to German customers) hit in the face several times by a Security Policeman without any reason whatsoever. When questioned why he did it, she received the answer: because you did not pay any special attention to me.
b. In 9/1942 a meeting took place in Chodorow in the presence of the District Farmer of Stryj, the District Agricultural Expert, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Aid Committee, the Land Commissioner, the District Farmer, the Chairman of the Delegation in Chodorow, and mayors and bailiffs of the district of Chodorow concerning the delivery quotas. During the discussion of the quota action the District Farmer said that the communities of Hranky, Kuty, and Bortniky had not delivered their ordered quota of vegetables, then he ordered the Mayor of Hranky, Kuty to come up and hit him in the face in front of the assembly.
c. The chief of the price control office in Zloczow, H. Mok, who personally controls the delivery of foodstuffs into the town, stopped a woman on the way who was carrying a few kilos of carrots. Mr. Mok ordered his interpreter, a Jew, to search the woman; the Jew did it in such a manner as to offend the dignity of a human being and of the woman.
d. The District Farmer Benzin in Biala Polaska shot at innocent Ukrainian peasants from the villages of Polenow and Nosow, whilst on duty on 7/30/1942, two of whom died. Benzin was arrested, but the event caused great indignation in the whole area.
e. On 8/9/1942 the Ukrainian student Iwan Wowtschyschyn was beaten without any reason whatsoever by a Polish railroad policeman on the station in Przemysl; when the student tried to defend himself, he was fatally wounded with the bayonet.
Generally, there are strong complaints all over the country about the way Polish members of the railroad police treated Ukrainians.
Enclosure 7. Shootings of 46 peasants in Lubycza, district of Rawa Ruska.
In the early morning on Sunday, 10/4/1942, some groups of the Special Service detachments, stationed near Belsez, came to the village of Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubysca Kniazi and called out all male villagers. The men were convinced that it was a matter of some urgent work for the village and obligingly hurried to the place of assembly. There they were formed in rank and file and requested to name 2 saboteurs within two minutes otherwise every fifth man would be shot. As, however no acts of sabotage had been committed in the village, no saboteurs could be named. Then, 45 men and 1 woman were chosen from the crowd and shot dead in two groups in the presence of their relatives, viz. in Lubycza, Koroliwska and Kubycza, Kniazi.
Amongst the 46 shot were 31 Ukrainians.
The pretence for these tragic mass-shootings was a fire which occurred in the stables of the said Special Service detachments near Belsez during the night of 3-4 October, when 3 horses were said to have perished. Probably this fire was set alight by the carelessness of the stable-boys and v.as extinguished at once.
The community of Lubycza, Koroliwska has been known as one of the most loyal of the whole district. The very same day (10/4/1942) the Governor of the province of Galicia, during a celebration in Lwow, especially mentioned the community as one conscious of their duties regarding the delivery of their quotas; this was officially published (Lwiwski Wisti) (Lemberger, Nachchten 10/6/1942).
The village Kubycza is 8 km. away from the place where the fire took place. The above mentioned stable is not within the village boundaries of Lubycza, Koroliwska
It should be noted here that in spite of repeated assurances given by the District Captain [Kreishauptmann] the injured families in Lubycza, Koroliwska have so far not received any compensation.
As a reprisal for the shooting of a member of the German police in Lwow who was killed by an unknown perpetrator in the second half of 11/1942, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, and 56 in Czortkow who were at the time in prison in these towns. Nobody was told the reason for the shooting, and the shootings in Czortkow were carried out in broad day-light before the eyes of the frightened population. Among the persons shot were many suffering from typhoid who were taken from the hospital whilst unconscious, loaded on to trucks, and taken to the place of execution.
These shootings were to be considered as reprisals against the so-called "Bandera" group. Among the persons shot were elderly citizens who had no connection whatever with the activities of this group, as for instance Dr. Olexa Kossak, lawyer from Kolomea, engineer Andrij Pjaseckyj, head-gamekeeper in Janiw near Lwow all of whom had been vouched for not only by myself and Dr. Kost Pankiskyj, but by Reich Germans as well.
Enclosure 9. Arrests in Galicia in 12/1942.
In 12/1942 the police made arrests among the so-called restless elements.
In the whole province of Galicia arrests were made, especially among the young people among whom followers of the partisans were looked for. On this occasion a number of elderly citizens were arrested, who were but vaguely connected with the suspects. Thus, for instance, the owners of houses where the suspect lived as a lodger were arrested as well as guests present in the house at the time of arrest. On interventions by the representatives of the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow the police answered in order to release the persons arrested by mistake. Since then 2.5 months have passed and the persons arrested by mistake are still in prison. They are treated there as criminals and are not certain of their lives.
A typical example of this is the fact that 50 Ukrainians died of misery and hunger in the prison in Czortkow. The Ukrainian Aid Committee in Czortkow tried to obtain a permit to send food to the prisoners, but without success; although the commander of the police agreed, the prison-commander insisted that the command of the Lwow police had to grant permission.
Enclosure 10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students.
On 2/5/1942, 6 Ukrainian women students and school girls from Kolomea were arrested and in the spring sent on to Czortkow. Since then their relatives are unable to obtain any news about their fate.
The personal date of the arrested: [follow 6 names together with names of respective parents and date and place of birth].
Enclosure 11.
List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee and employees of the State Administration, the Self-Government and the Economic Authorities, also of the old men and students who were arrested in 1/1943 in the districts of Kolomea, Stryj, and Komionka, Strumilowa: [follows names by localities.]
Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the District of Sanok.
During the period from 1/18-24/1943 about 300 persons were arrested in the neighborhood of Sanok in accordance with lists compiled some time before by the local mayors on orders of the authorities. Some of them were soon set free, but the fate of the rest is unknown to us and their families. The shootings which are daily taking place on the Jewish cemetery promise no good.
On 1/17-18/1943 many persons from the districts Sanok and Jaslo were arrested in the station in Tarnow whilst riding in the direction of Cracow; so far their families have no news about their fate. Thus, for instance 4 persons were arrested from the village of Losie, district Jaslo, viz.: [follow 4 names and addresses.]
One of them went to see a doctor in Cracow, the others were on Business trips to Warsaw.
On 1/18/1943, 14 persons who were unfit for work were shot together with 80 Jews in Ustrzyki Dolne; they were buried together in a ditch. Among these 14 were old men and invalids or instance from Lutswyska; Iwan Lesky, 68-70 years old, invalid of the Austrian Army who worked as a tiler, Jurko Schkrabak and his wife, both about 70 years of age, and 3 other unknown persons, a female beggar from Ustrzky called "Haramsymka" We do not know the names of the other people shot. It should be pointed out that the Ukrainians celebrated a second Christmas evening on that day called "Schtschedryj Wetschir".
As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews come to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian "Schtschedryj Wetschir" (the case in Ustrzyki).
The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German authority and even keep away from the soup kitchens, for fear that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.
Anti-Ukranian activities of partisans in the District of Bilgoraj.
Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlaska during the second half of 1942.
Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in Przewala.
On 12/1/1942 the population of Zubowice, district of Tyschowce was moved away and racial Germans were settled in their place. The Polish population of Zubowice, warned the day before by a certain Kolesche of the coming evacuation fled, but the Ukrainians stayed and were evacuated to the little town of Tyszowce and its suburbs, with the help of the representatives of he Ukrainian Aid Committee. This evacuation affected 128 Ukrainian families, 486 persons in all.
Some days later a few farms in Zubowice and the surrounding Country as far as the village of Przewale were burnt down. It is obvious that these fires were started by escaped Poles who hid in the forests or the neighboring Polish villages, for all farms burnt down belonged to Poles prior to the evacuation; the Ukrainians ho were evacuated in an organized manner and went willingly to destinations far off, viz. Zamlynie and Dubyna, were certainly not interested in burning down farms in Zubowice, particularly not their own farms.
As reprisal the arrests in Zamlynie and the shooting of persons in the village Przewale, near Zubowice, were carried out on 12/24/1942. This village is inhabited by 337 Poles and only 122 Ukrainians. On intervention by the Local Farm Administrator Poles have been separated and released from amongst the people arrested at random, the remaining Ukrainians, however, among them the 58 years old Ukrainian teacher and trustee of the Aid Committee in Zamosc, Banda Onofer, and his 75 years old mother-in-law Marie Rewus were shot. The names of the other Ukrainians who were shot are: (follows a list of 10 names including one of a person aged 80 years).
List of the Ukrainians shot on 1/29/1943 in the village of Sumin community of Taranwatka.
[Follows a list of 45 names, giving family state, age, and re. marks. Remarks to No. 16: Wounded, in hospital, to No. 19: Village Mayor, to No. 31: Wounded, in hospital, No's: 39 and 45: wounded, in hospital.]
Total 8 men, 19 women, 18 children.
The delegate: Pastor Matwijtschuk.
List of Ukrainians shot 2/2/1943 in the villages of Pankow and Scharowola.
[Follows a list of 19 names, giving family state, age and remarks. Remarks to No's: 4, 14, 15, 16, 17: Wounded].
Total 4 men, 7 women, 8 children. In the village Pankow 5 Poles have been shot. In the village Scharowola 6 Poles have been shot.
Delegation Ukrainian Aid Committee Tomascho Lubelsko. Delegate: Matwijtschuk.
I. Reich Security Head Office Amt IV Bk. No. 409/39 Top Secret Berlin, 10/26/1939
a. To all State Police District Offices.
b. To the Gestapo office (according to restricted distribution C.)
a. To all inspectors of the Security police and the SD.
b. To the Inspector-General of the reinforced SS-Death's Head Units (with 8 copies for the camps).
Subject Execution of protective custody.
By order of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German police, all prisoners under protective custody due for transference to a concentration camp will, during the war, be assigned to a special penal section. The only exceptions will be prisoners under protective custody, who are assigned to a camp as a preventative police measure, ( particularly those under index A ), or those who are expressly exempt on the nominal role.
In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following must, in future, be observed in each individual case.
3. The length of the period of custody must in no case be made known, even if the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police or the Chief of the Security Police and the SD has already fixed it.
The term of A commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly announced as "until further notice."
In serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing of the deterrent effect by the spreading of a cleverly carried out rumor propaganda, more or less to the effect that, according to hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested man will not be released for 2 or 3 years.
4. In certain cases, the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be transmitted to the State Police District Office concerned. In this case too, there is no objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment as laid down in Section 3, paragraph 3, in so far as this appears suitable, to add to the deterrent effect.
5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to be chosen for the spreading of such news.
By Order (signed) Mueller Authenticated: (signed) Bleeck Chancellery employee
II Chief of the Security Police and the SD Bk. No. IV226/42 Top Secret Berlin, 6/12/1942
120 Copies 110th Copy
As Top Secret to all Chiefs of the Security Police and the SD to all Directors of Groups IV A, IV B, IV C, and IV E of the Reich Security Head Office to all Commanding Officers of the Security Police and the SD to all Heads of the State Police District Offices
For Information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD
Subject: Third degree
Enclosure: 1 receipt
In order to simplify things the Decree of the Chief of the Security police and the SD of 7/1/1937 Bk. No. 28 (II) 301/37 Secret (to be destroyed according to sealed orders) will be superseded by the following new ruling, with immediate effect:
1. Third degree may only be applied if it is clear from preliminary investigation that the prisoner can give information on important facts, as social or subversive to the State and to the Reich, but will not disclose what he knows, and the information cannot be obtained by investigation.
2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first be obtained.
3. Third degree may not be used to extort confessions of a prisoner's own crimes. Also this method may not be employed against persons who are temporarily detained by law for further investigations.
My previous permission is also necessary in exceptional cases.
4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist, among other methods, of very simple diet (water and bread), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustion drill, but also in the administration of flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be consulted).
(signed) Mueller Authenticated: (signed) Nellmuth Registered Secretary (Female)
Berlin, W.8., Wilhelm Street 79, 1/30/1937
I thank you for the confidence which you have placed into me during the four years of your leadership and for the honour you do me in offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me however to accept this offer. I believe in the principles of positive christianity and must remain faithful to my Lord and to myself. Party membership however would mean that I should have to face without contradiction the steadily aggravating attacks by party offices on the Christian confessions and those who want to remain faithful to their religious convictions.
This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never in my life I have performed my duty with greater joy and satisfaction than under your wise state leadership.
I ask to be permitted to resign.
With German Greetings!
Your very obedient, (signed) Baron v. Eltz.
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force [initials written in ink]
Draft 8/12/1938 General Officers only 2 copies 2nd Copy Access only through officer General Staff 5.Division No. 21/38. only (Ic)
Top Secret General Officer
Re: Freudenthal Affair Ref: Abwehr II No. 42/38. Top Secret General Officers only.
A. As Appendix 1 please find enclosed a translation by Major d.G. Moericke on which the following comment is made:
1. The report from the Abwehrstelle Breslau still does not prove that the real circumstances are known to the two Sudeten Germans or even widely in Sudeten German circles. Nevertheless, there is still no need for Czech authorities to have any knowledge of them.
If the worst comes to the worst it is a question, in eventual remarks made by Macholdt to Pilz, of suppositions which are nevertheless very near to the truth of the matter.
2. For the time being there is no reason for stopping preparations for the Fr. operation.
3. Punishable behaviour on the part of Major Moericke cannot be deduced purely from the Abwehrstelle report. Rather, as far as can be seen from here, has Major Moericke carried out the task allotted to him skillfully and provided good evidence.
B. In the course of further preparations, the following measures are recommended
1. Not a single word on the matter will be mentioned to informers [V-Leute]
2. The fields will not be purchased through middlemen. Neither will any influence be brought to bear on the owners in order to effect any change in the cultivation of the land according to local custom and the time of the year.
3. In the event of the suspected endangering of our plans, as a result of treachery, then it will be a question of sham reconnoitering of landing grounds in other areas and spreading of rumors as a camouflage.
4. It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily.
C. Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe:
1. Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural cultivation of the landing grounds in question, in accordance with Appendices 2, 3, 4.
2. Continual supervision of the area around Freudenthal with regard to whether Czech defence measures against their intended employment are being undertaken.
Reconnoitering of further landing grounds, if possible by 10 September, in the following areas:
a. FreudenthalSpachendorfHofBraunseifenFreudenthal.
b. Around Sternberg (up to a radius of 5 km).
c. Around Olmuetz (up to a radius of 10 km).
As landing grounds are considered flat open stretches, above all dry meadows and clay strips with a surface area of approximately 500 x 500 m. and larger.
If possible it is requested that photographs similar to Appendices 3 and 4 are brought along.
By order of Schmidt
Distribution: Abwehr II, 1st Copy received with 4 appendices General Staff 5th Division (Ic), 2nd Copy 13/8 [signature illegible]
Appendix 1 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force. General Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 8/12/1938.
Berlin 8/4/1938 General Officers only Access through Officer only
Major of the General Staff Moericke, Air Attache at the German Legation, Prague, states:
I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing possibilities.
For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.
I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, particularly about my official position.
I used my official car [Dienst Pkw] for the journey to Fr. taking precautions against being observed.
The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in Fr. and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M's private car for the trip.
As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the F.S., a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with thiswithout actually saying so.
As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said "Aha, so you're looking for airfields!" I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfield immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view.
To my question as to when the farmers in this part were generally in the habit of ploughing up the fields he answered: "Always immediately after the harvest."
I thought that in this way he wanted to express the fact that the Czechs would no longer be able to use the fields as airfields even shortly after harvest.
Before leaving Fr. I bound M. to absolute secrecy as regards what he had seen.
From the conversation between M. and the Leader of the F.S. in Beneschau, whose name I do not know, I noticed that they knew several of the Abwehr informers [V-Leute] in Freudenthal and Beneschau Both M. and the 2nd companion are minor informers [V-Leute].
As I have at the moment no incentive to believe that M. has not kept his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the leader of the F. S. in Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time, and a subordinate informer [V-Mann] to the informer [V-Mann] in the Security Office [Abwehrstelle] at Breslau.
I believe it to be out of the question that the real purpose of my reconnaissance be known.
Should measures be invoked against Macholdt or Rilz on the grounds of the report from the Security Office at Breslau, I urgently request a hearing beforehand.
Moericke, Major d. G.H. g. w. o. Schmidt, Maj. d. G.
Appendix 2 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C, of the Air Force, General Staff the Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38. [Section of map]
General Officers only Access through Officer only Appendix 3 to Reich Minister for Air, etc. [photograph] Landing-ground south of Freudenthal; taken from southern edge of Freudenthal looking west. Appendix 4, Sectional picture of airfields a and b [4 photographs].
"Document 1538-PS [translation]" p. 100.
Office Foreign Intelligence Dept Foreign Affairs Nr 173/41 (g.K.Chefs III org)
[Stamp] Air-Corps-Operational, 7 copies Staff I a, 2 copies 5/24/1941 No. 279.
[Stamp] TOP SECRET (to be forwarded) By Officer only
To be presented to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
[Marginal note:] The Military Attache Tokio reports with No. T 47 signed May 23.
In interview with Akita on handling of relations between Japan and USA in the press, desire was expressed to hear Okamoto on the form in which Japan would start hostilities in case of a war between USA and Germany. Instead of a reception by Okamoto visit with Akita who explained:
[Marginal note:] To be presented to the Chief of the Office Foreign Intelligence (simultaneously for ZL).
1. In case USA enters war, Japan acknowledges treaty obligations at once. However, would not open hostilities immediately. Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.
2. Possible war Russia-Germany causes USA entry into war. Japanese action as mentioned under 1 plus preparation of possible attacks (on) Vladivostok and Blagowesqensk.
[Marginal note:] (To be presented to the) Operational Staff of the Air-Forces I. C.
3. Conclusion of conflict with China important before new tasks for Japanese Armed Forces. I am stressing first that Japanese recognition of obligations under treaty needs confirmation by immediate opening of hostilities.
Signature: Bueckner U R Ia Schmid [in crayon] May 24
Copy to: L. 3 Skl Sonderstb H.H.K.
"Document 1541-PS [translation]" pp. 101-103.
TOP MILITARY SECRET The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces. Command Staff/armed forces, Section L Nr. 33 406/40
TOP SECRET Matter of Chief Only through Officer [illegible notations] Führer number 9 Direction 12/13/1940 12 Copies, 9th Copy
Direction Number 20 Operation Marita
1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create airbases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.
2. My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months.
(b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.
3. For the concentration of the task force in Rumania are necessary:
(a) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army mission, and whose task remains unchanged.
(b) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final wave) to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.
(c) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions).
(d) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumanian soil.
4. The Operation Malita itself is to be prepared on the following basis:
(a) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
(b) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the alerting of German Forces.
(c) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly determined.
(d) It will be the mission of the Air Force to support the drive of the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands through airborne landings.
(e) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations is to take place, awaits a later decision.
5. The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff.
The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the Germany Army mission in Rumania.
Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent; also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.
6. After the completion of the Operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces used therein for a new undertaking.
7. I anticipate reports from the Chiefs concerning their plans, which has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented with exact timetables for the planned preparations, as well as for the necessary recallings from the armament industry (reconstruction of Furlough Divisions).
Witnessed: [signature illegible] Captain in the General Staff Distribution: Commander of the Armies (Operational Section), 1st Copy, Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction), 2nd Copy, Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff), 3rd Copy, Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania, 4th Copy, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces: Command Staff, 5th Copy, Section L, 6-9 Copies, UNV, 10th Copy Chief of Army Transport Forces, 11th Copy, Foreign Counter Intelligence Office, 12th Copy
File Memorandum on my parting visit with the Chancellor
After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned to the speech of the Chancellor [Bundeskanzler]. I said to him that though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent, to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate yesterday in the French Chamber. In my opinion it was greatly to be regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently.
The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper "Wiener Zeitung" (Viennese Newspaper) in which he would clearly detach the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the debate in the Chamber.
I then introduced into the conversation the wide-spread opinion bat he had acted under "brutal pressure" in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: "To be honest, no!" It appears to me of importance to record this statement.
In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European combinations. This question would be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly.
Vienna, 2/19/1938 /s/ Papen
Report on Sterilization in Germany and occupied countries to be sent to the members of Committee I Submitted by Dr. B. Ecer ANNEX B
Detailed Statement on the murdering of ill and aged people in Germany
1. The murdering can be traced back to a secret law which was released sometime in Summer 1940.
2. Besides the Chief Physician of the Reich Dr. L. Conti, the Reichsführer SS Himmler, the Reichs Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick as well as other men, the following participate on the introduction of this secret law:
a. The Councillor of the Ministry Dr. Herbert Linden of the Reich's Ministry of the Interior.
b. Dr. Staehle-Nagold, the Chief Physician of Wuerttemberg.
c. Councillor of Medicine /Obermedizinalrat/ Dr. Hermann Pfannmueller, Director of the Sanatorium and Nursing Institution Eglfing-Haar near Munich.
d. Professor Dr. Werner Heyde, Director of the Psychiatric and Neurological Clinic in Wuerzburg.
3. As I have already stated, there were / after careful calculation/ at least 200000 mainly mentally deficient, imbeciles, besides neurological cases and medically unfit people / these were not only incurable cases /, and at least 75000 aged people.
4. The murders were mainly accomplished in Muensingen/ Wuerttemberg and Linz o/Danube; several gas-chambers with -cremation chambers directly attached were constructed there. As the gas-chambers are next to the training grounds of the troops in Muensingen, it is believed that the mentally deficient who were murdered there, were used for experimenting with new poison-gases.
5. The transport from the institutions to the gas-chambers is carried out by SS Kommandos. These call themselves "Gemeinuetzige Transport A. G., Berlin, Luetzowufer." This Limited Company also stores the individual medical case histories of the murdered inmates of the institutions.
6. The inmates of the many smaller and middle-sized institutions were murdered almost without exception. The larger institutions are partlyto keep up the pretence to the outside worldstill at hand, but they now only have a fraction of the original number of their inmates; for example there are now only some 500 inmates instead of 2500 in Berlin-Buch; in Stadtroda/Thueringen only about 150 instead of 600; in Kaufbeuren/Bayern only 200 instead of 1000, etc. Of the larger Sanatoriums and Nursing Institutions the following were already closed down completely some time ago; Illenau/Baden 800 inmates; Berlin/Herzberge 2500 inmates, Kreutzburg/Oberschlesien 1500 inmates; Sonnenstein/Sachsen 800 inmates; Werneck/Unterfranken-Bayern 111 inmates; Steinhof/Wien 3000 inmates, and others, most probably now also Schleswig with 1000 beds. Guenzburg with 400 etc. etc.
Written in 12/1941, /sgd/ Dr. T. Lang
This is to certify, that the above report by Dr. T. Lang dated 12/1941 is part of the original report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission. Nurnberg 12/8/1945 for Col. Dr. Ecer Capt. Dr. Hochwald
SECRET Copy
The chief of the Security Police and the Security Service.IV D 3-3 B/41 g.Rs.
Express letter To all state police Administrative office (To the State Police, attention SS Stubaf. RR. Nosske or representative at Aachen)
Subject: Measures to be taken against Emigrants and civilian workers who came from the great Russian areas and against Foreign workers.
Reference: None
To prevent the unauthorized and arbitrary return of Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenians, Cossack and Caucasian emigrants and civilian workers from the territory of the Reich to the East and to prevent attempts at disorder by foreign workers in the German production, I decide as follows:
1. The managers of the branch offices [Stuetzpunkt] of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Caucasians trustee office [Vertrauensstellen] as well as the relief committee and the leading members of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian. Cossack and Caucasian emigration organisations are to be notified immediately that they are not allowed to leave their domicile without permission of the security police until further notice. Also they are to be told to apply the same measures to the members who are under their care. Their attention is to be called to the fact that they will be arrested because of unauthorized leaving of the place of work and domicile. I request you to have a check up of the attendance of branch office leaders if possible by daily requests in these concerns.
2. Emigrants and foreign workers are to be arrested if it seems necessary in the situation if there is no doubt of their guilt and if they are under the suspicion of having been active for the U.SSR. in transmitting news. The measure is to be in readiness, however, it should not be executed before the pass word "Fremdvoelker" has been transmitted by means of Urgent telegram.
3. In case of refusals to work or in making propaganda for the enemy or suspicion of sabotage among all foreign laborers arrests and protective custody should be applied most strictly.
4. Persons who violate issued decrees or who try to provoke disturbances in factories or meetings by inflammatory speeches to the emigrants or foreign workers are also to be arrested.
5. It is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of German production to its capacity that emigrants and foreign workers remain at their places of work. In case, conditions in certain communities require that special measures be taken to reach this objective. I ask for appropriate action and report.
The RSHA to be kept posted how these measures are carried out. The decree also is to be applied to emigrants who came from the Baltic statesLithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.
By order /s/ MUELLER
Certified correct: /s/ Signature (L.S.) Chancellery clerk.
Aachen, 7/3/1941
Note: The original decree can be found under IIIc under File No. 20/41 top secret Koernert Krim-Assistent
Secret State Police, State Police Bldg.-Aachen I E br.-No. 6/41. top Secret Aachen, 1/22/1942
1. The written record of these proceedings was worked out and sent through as a secret matter under II E under No. 303/41. 2. R II deliver 3. To the Top Secret File taken care of 22.Jan. By order [illegible] Koer
Bra/V SS-Untersturmführer Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER MUNICH, Trogerstr. 56
Dear Dr. Rascher:
Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsführer SS gave me your letter of 5/15/1941, for partial reply.
I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made available for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsführer SS, and requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch with you.
I want to use the opportunity to extend my cordial wishes to you on the birth of your son.
I shall refer as soon as possible to the second part of your letter. Heil Hitler
By order [initials] R Br SS-Sturmbannführer
SECRET Reichsführer SS. RG/V
Field Command Post 11/16/1942 Personal Headquarters, Reichsführer SS
1. To SS Lt.Gen OHL, BERLIN
The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 11/13/1942 regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people whose lives are endangered through exposure [Unterkuhlung] in ice, snow or water and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or means:
I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of those who were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the Concentration Camp due to loose living, and being prostitutes, they formulate a danger of contagion. Among those four was a 21 year old girl named Ursula Kraus, who naturally was not to be set aside for this. Krause was a person under the care of the State [Fuersorgezoegling] and has already been sick twice with venereal disease. Nevertheless she belongs to that type of girl upon whom the attempt must be made in order to save her for the German people and for her own later life.
In addition, I found during this opportunity that some madmen in the women's Concentration Camp had told the feminine prisoners at the time of selection of prostitutes for the Camp brothel, that those who volunteered would be released after a half year.
1. Only such prostitutes are to be selected for the Camp brothel who from the beginning can be taken for granted as not being able to be saved for a later regulated life, judging from their previous living and bearing. Also, that we are not guilty of spoiling a person who could still be saved for the German people. Such women can only be released from the Concentration Camp if they according to their age, do not constitute a destruction to the youth, to health (by contagion), or to the public welfare and security. The money which they earn in the camp brothel shall be an old-age security for them.
2. Fundamentally, all youths who can still be saved are to be segregated from the older prostitutes in living quarters and work. A difference must be made between those who cannot be reformed,who must remain isolated in the camps, and those who came into the camp to be reformed and can eventually be saved. The best and most ideologically inclined custodians are to be employed for the latter.
In addition, I refer to the fact that the whipping penalty as a whole but especially for women, is to be the last measure, it is only to be used
a. if all other punishment such as arrest, solitary confinement, diet of bread and water, hard labor, were of no avail.
b. in individual cases of desertion or in actual attacks, which must be inflicted for intimidating and especially exemplatory reasons. The whipping penalty is no instrument for responsible commanders or supervising custodians who are too lazy or incompetent to reeducate. In all cases in which food was stolen, the guilty one is to be placed on bread and water from 3 to 5 days as punishment for first offense. The whipping penalty is only then to be inflicted upon repeated offenses.
I ask you to personally check the conditions in the women's concentration camps. Otherwise we must feel guilty since girls who could still be saved will be ruined for always through false treatment and repeated bad company in which we placed them (exactly as is the case in the prisons and reform schools of the law).
Heil Hitler!
Your (signed) H. Himmler
2. Inspector of the Concentration Camps, Oranienburg
Carbon copy with request for acknowledgment.
SS Lt. Col.
"Document 1584-I-PS [translation]" p. 117.
Teletype Göring to Himmler, dated 2/14/1944
TOP SECRET CHIEF REICH SECURITY OFFICE Teletype Section
URGENT Transmitted by [Initials] Received Hour 240 Day 15 Month 2 Year 44 from E2 by [Initials]
FSNo. 24411 t-KR-RM Asien Nr. 0170 14/2 2030QEMGKDOLto Reichsführer-SS Reichs Minister Himmler, Berlin SW 11-Reference: Letter Journal No. 72/44.
Subject: Formation of the 7th Airforce group squadron for special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7)
I received your request to form another squadron of airforce group for special purposes 7(Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination by the air force operational staff [Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab]. At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a number of Concentration Camp [K Z] convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of this kind Concentration Camp [KZ] convicts can be especially well concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations are necessary in order to secure production of the now fully developed most modern airplanes. The Führer upon his visit in Insterbrug has attached great value to these airplanes. Intermediate negotiations have already been held between my and your departments. I would be especially grateful for your support in carrying out this task.
Heil HitlerYours Göring, Reich Marshal of Greater Germany. ADF 391/44 GKDOS.
"Document 1584-III-PS [translation]" pp. 118-119.
The Reichsführer-SS Personal Staff Diary No. Field Command Post. 3/10/1944
Subject: Use of Prisoners in the air craft industry-M. To the SS-Brigadeführer FEGELEIN Führer Headquarters
Dear Hermann!
Enclosed I am sending you copy of a letter for your information. It was given to the Reich marshal on 3/9/1944 by the Reichsführer-SS.
Heil Hitler! (initialled) DR 1 enclosure
3/9/1944 Field-command office
1879/44 secret
Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
Reference: Teletype of 2/14/1944. Top Reich Secret
Most honored Reichsmarshal
Following my teletype letter of the 2/18/1944 I herewith transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
This survey indicates that at the present time about 36000 prisoners are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total of 90000 prisoners is contemplated.
The production is being discussed, established and executed between the Reich ministry of aviation and the chief of my economic-administrative main office, SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl respectively.
We assist with all forces at our disposal.
The task of my economic-administrative main office, however. is not solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation industry as SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl and his assistants take care of the required working speed thru constant control and supervision of the workgroups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the results of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact that in enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total work, better results can definitely be expected.
We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near Weiden the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg, which saw in the availability of our stone-mason shops and labor forces after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4000 prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2000 men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120000 single parts of various kinds for the fighter ME 109.
In Oranienburg we are employing 6000 prisoners at the Heinkel works now for construction of the HE 177. With that we have supplied 60 of the total crew of the plant.
The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8000 prisoners.
We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2500 women are working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and rudder control. The plant has adjusted the total serial production to employ prisoners. In the month of January 30000 devices as well as 500 rudder controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are increasing employment to 4000 women. The performance of the women is excellent.
In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn [Brno] we produce also for the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant supplies 14000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for ME 109 to the Messerschmitt corporation, Augsburg.
The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to subterranean locations requires further employment of about 100000 prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of 2/14/1944 are already under way.
I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently informed on this subject.
Heil Hitler (initialed) HH
Use of Prisoners for the Aircraft Industry.
Camp and Plant: Auschwitz: AA fortification staff, Auschwitz Number of Prisoners: planned: 250 used: 191 Man-Hrs, January 48788 Production: Construction of AA positions. Auschwitz: Ost-Maschinenbau GmbH, (Factory), Schwientochlowitz: 1,500, 730, 196067, AA gun production: prod. result Jan: 105 guns. Auschwitz: Siemens & Schuckert, Auschwitz: 1500, 90, 19240, at first completion of plant, later switch and control instruments for night fighters. Buchenwald: Erla-Maschinenwerk GmbH., Leipzig: 2800, 1550, 176105, air plane parts production prod. result Jan: 360 wings for BF 109, 290 fuselages BF 109, 304 tail assemblies. Buchenwald: Junkers-Flug-& Motorenwerke AG., Schoenebeck: 2000, 1310, 362619, air plane parts production. Buchenwald: Polte, Arnstadt: 100, 87, 24112, finishing of AA cartridge cases; prod. result Jan: 181000 cartridge cases. Buchenwald: Leichtmetallwerke Rautenbach Wernigerode: 1200, 772, 189832, production of cylinder blocks for airplane motors. Dachau: High frequency research: 15, 15, 3290, high frequency development. Dachau: BMW, Munich-Allach: 12000, 3434, 908606, air plane motor productionconstruction and subterranean building. Dachau: Dornier Works GmbH., Neuaubing: 3000, 60, 9527, at first construction of workers' camp, later plane part production. Dachau: Engineer Kimmel, Munich: 25, 23, 7925, building of radio measuring instruments prod. result Jan: 35 RC-generators. Dachau: Air force research institute, Munich: 400, 40, building of air force research institute Ottobrunn. Dachau: Messerschmitt AG., Augsburg-Haunstetten: 3400, 2695, 740640, air plane production Me. Dachau: Messerschmitt AG., Gablingen: 600, 352, air plane production Me. Messerschmitt AG., Dachau: 600, 192, 35766, manufacture of plane parts parts production. Dachau: Messerschmitt AG., Kottern: 1000, 341, 55750, first building of factory, then plants part production. Dachau: Air force planning office, Sudelfeld: 25, 25, 4660, building of experimental station for high frequency. Dachau: Praezifix, Dachau: 400, 356, 94067, production of standard plane parts and screws. Dachau: H. Sachse KG. Kempten. 1000, 374, 91630, first building of factory/start production of propeller control instruments.
Camp and Plant: Flossenbuerg: Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke GmbH, Floss. Number of Prisoners: planned: 4000, used: 1911, Man-Hrs January: 422158, Production: plane parts production for Me prod. result Jan: 900 noses & radiator covering; 120000 parts. Flossenbuerg: Erla-Maschinenwerk GmbH, Johanngeorgenstadt: 600, 564, 117,524, air plane parts production. Flossenbuerg: Erla-Maschinenwerk GmbH, Milsen: 500, 30, air plane parts production. Flossenbuerg: Geramic Works Bohemia, Neurohlau 100 100 10,764 plane parts production. Flossenbuerg: Luftfahrtgeraetewerk, Zwodau: 1500, 199, 28314, instrument prod. for air force. Herzogenbusch: Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke GmbH. Herzogenbusch: 600, 411, 35,248, air plane disassembling plant prod. result Jan: 12 planes disassembled, 35 motors disassembled, 120 wings disassembled. Herzogenbusch: Air force field construction office 3: 1000, 265, 64800, runway construction for airport. Mauthausen: Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke GmbH., Mauthausen: 500, 423, 82,632, plane parts construction for Me prod. results January: 25 plane fuselages. Mauthausen: Flugmotoren GmbH., Wiener-Neudorf: 3000, 1983, 417328, first building, later plane parts prod. Mauthausen: Heinkel-Werke AG, Schwechat: 3200, 2065, 486206, air plane parts production. Natzweiler: Dt Erd- & Steinwerke GmbH, Natzweiler: 400, 261, 63221, disassembling of Ju motors and welding of air torpedoes. Neuengamme: Jastram, Hamburg-Bergedorf: 80, 80, 21554, air plane parts production. Neuengamme: Messap GmbH., Hamburg-Langenhorn: 120, 110, 31422, production of fuse mechanisms prod. result Jan: 16800 balance wheels S30, 53900 balance wheels S60, 15600 time fuses, S30 46700 time fuses S60. Ravensbrueck: Air ministry testing ground, Peenamuende-W: 600, 598 125000, building. Ravensbrueck: Geraetewerk Pommern GmbH, Stargard: 550, 283, 81129, production of aerial torpedoes. Ravensbrueck: Heinkel-Werke AG, Barth. 2000, 1721, 435155, air plane production. Ravensbrueck: Mechan Werkstaetten GmbH. Neubrandenburg: 4000, 1981, 529126, production of bomb release mechanism and Fz.G.76; prod. Jan. 23000 lock 50/X, 1500 lock 2000, 150 PVC 1006, 500 rudder machines, 400 ER 4 L-"2".
Camp and Plant: Ravensbrueck: Siemens & Halske, Berlin, work Ravensbrueck: Number of Prisoners: planned: 2400, used: 872, Man-Hrs: 242867, communication equipment product (e.g. throat microphones). Ravensbrueck: Silva-Metallwerke GmbH, Genthin: 600, 596, 154224, production of AA ammunition prod. result Jan.: 518 200 2-cm shells, 927500 2-cm shells, (various styles) 965 000 13-mm shells. Ravensbrueck: Veltener-Maschinenbau GmbH., Volten 600, 596, 146873, production of plane parts. Sachsenhausen: Heinkel-Werke AG, Oranienburg: 6500, 5939, 1699978, plane mass production. Prod. result 15 plane bodies He 177. Sachsenhausen: Luftschiffbau Zepplin GmbH, Oranienburg: 300, 221, 54006, production and repair of balloons prod. result Jan: 120 balloons repaired and part work for 40 new balloons. Ostland Concentration Camp: Air force field building direction. Spilve: 1000, 1000, 280776, building of airport. Ostland Concentration Camp: Field building direction 3/I, Kauen: 1000, 829, 222186, building of airport. Ostland Concentration Camp: AA booty repair-shop, Kauen: 200, 162, 4920, re-building of booty AA. Ostland Concentration Camp: Kopperschmidt & Soehne, Riga: 20, 20, 6160, production of plane turrets.
It was recently agreed to use further: Buchenwald: Anhydrit: planned: 10,000, plane production of Ju underground. Buchenwald: Ago, Oschersleben: planned: 1500, plane production Focke-Wulf fighters. Gross-Rosen: Famo, Bunzlau: planned: 1500, servicing of FW night fighters, Ta 154. Mauthausen: Esche II: planned: 10000, kind of production to be decided by air Ministry. Natzweiler: Geraetewerk Pommern GmbH., branch Diedenhofen: planned: 600, production of aerial torpedoes.
[total planned]: 90785 [total used]: 35839 [total man-hrs]:8733495
The Chief of the SS Economics Administration Main Office Berlin, 2/21/1944 (signed) Pohl I. [?] SS Obergruppenführer and General of Armed Forces SS.
The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production TAE-No. 475/44 top secret (Signed) Pohl [Initialled] HH
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3, 4/17/1944. Phone : 11 00 52 Pohl
Fighter staff, attention: Field Marshal MILCH Fighter staff, attention: Chief of office SWR
For Information Reichsführer-SS and chief of the German Police, Reich-leader HIMMLER
Head of armament office Lt Gen Dr Ing. h. c. Waeger Plenipotentiary-General for Construction, Director Stobbe-Dethleffsen
1. Using tables and drawings as an illustration I have in conjunction with Field Marshal Milch informed the Führer on the work of the fighter staff in pointing to the extraordinarily pleasing and successful cooperation of the newly created organization with all offices and works. He is cognizant of the fact that the greatest part of the transfer has been fixed according to plan and that as the first step the decentralization above the ground can be concluded by approximately August and that the second step aiming at the total subterranean security of the most sensitive works will be concluded by the end of the year.
2. Field Marshal Milch has reported as a result of the meeting on construction of the "central planning" to the Führer, that of the amount of construction demanded, because of the extraordinary aggravation of the all-over situation, only the most important part of the construction work could be accomplished. The Führer demands that in spite of that both the large plants. each of at least 600000 qm, which he demanded should be constructed with all energy. He consents that one of these works will not be built in concrete but in accordance with the proposal as an enlargement and in the immediate vicinity of the present central works as the so-called central construction and will come under the management of the Junkers works.
The Führer agrees to the suggestion that the second large building project will, because of lack in labor and material, not be carried out on German territory, but on suitable ground (first of all gravel foundation and possibilities for transportation) in the immediate proximity of the border, on French, Belgian or Dutch territory, as long as the plant is constructed behind a fortified zone. The suggestion to build on French territory is favored by the fact that it will then be much easier to make the necessary labor available. In spite of that the Führer asks to try to construct this second works in an essentially secure territory namely in the Protectorate. If the labor can not be supplied there either, the Führer wants to get in touch in person with the Reichsführer SS and will cause him to provide the approximately 100000 men required, thru the securing of corresponding Jewish contingents from Hungary. The Führer demands that a meeting take place with him shortly in order to discuss the details in the presence of the men concerned.
3. An immediate task for the central construction besides assuring the supply of the bottleneck products of the Junkers works which is to be executed step by step, is the planning and securing of ME 262 at the rate of 1000 a month and of an additional fighterplane at the rate of 2000 a month.
Heil Hitler signed: SPEER Certified: Capt. Stein
[Several illegible notations] Re: Taking of hostages OKH received: 10/1/1941
5 copiescopy OKH/Gen. Qn. (W. Bfh. Suedost) Military Commander, South-East
Attacks on members of the Armed Forces lately committed in the occupied territories gave reason to point out that it is advisable that military commanders always have at their disposal a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely:
1. nationalist
2. democratic-bourgeois, and
3. communist
It is important that among them shall be well-known leading personalities or members of their families, whose names are to be made public.
Depending on the membership of the culprit, hostages of the corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.
It is asked that commanders be accordingly instructed. [partly illegible notation] Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
(signed) Keitel. Complied with in France and Belgium.
The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden Dresden-Al, 6/1/1940. The Director. To: Ministerialrat Dr. Hanssen Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
Dear Ministerialrat!
Permit me to express my thanks for having sent me the copy of the letter of the State Secretary Dr. Landfried.
I herewith enclose a copy of my letter of 3/16/1940 to Reichsleiter Bormann, referring mainly to the confiscated property of of the convents in the Ostmark. In accordance with the Führer's decree on Jewish property, a generally applicable procedure may be recommended in this case, too; the Führer should have the final word in the distribution to the individual consumers, rather the first option on any purchase. This regulation should be made to be retroactive as of the time of the assumption of power if possible.
Heil Hitler! Yours faithfully H. Posse.
1 enclosure.
At the Führer's present HQ, 16 Jan 41 Bo/Fu RL.M.B. 1. Director Dr. Posse, Dresden-Hellera Tunnigtweg 14 Personal! Registered!
Dear Dr. Posse!
Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar from the convent in Hohenfurth near-Kruman. The convent and its entire property shall be confiscated in the immediate future because of the attitude, hostile towards the State, of its inhabitants.
It shall be up to you to decide whether the pictures shall remain in the convent at Hohenfurth or be transferred to the museum in Linz after the latter shall be completed.
I await your decision in the matter.
Faithfully yours, [initialed by Bormann]
Enclosures 2. Presented again: 5/3/1941.
Dresden-Al, 5/16/1941
The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden. The Director. The Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
Dear Reichsleiter!
I report that I have returned today from a weeks trip to Oberdonau and Vienna. Besides checking on the confiscated convents and monasteries, the main reason for my trip to Linz and Oberdonau was to find out whether any of the confiscated convents offered facilities suitable for temporarily storing the collections acquired by the Führer.
After having seen the convents at Hohenfurth, St. Florian, Krenesmunster, Schloegel, Wilhering etc., and after having discussed the matter with Gauleiter Eigruber and his deputies, I found that the convent in Krenesmunster is extremely suited for this purpose. There are in this convent 50-60 rooms that can be locked; the various new acquisitions can be stored there temporarily. There is also the "Emperor's Stall" there, 25 m long, and a flight of 7 rooms in good shape, at present the picture gallery of the convent, not very valuable, is on exposition. From time to time, the newly acquired collections may be presented to the Führer there.
Krenesmunster is situated in the woods, far away from industrial area; therefore, a threat from the air hardly exists.
In case the Führer should agree with the proposal to have Krenesmunster as a depot for Linz, it is suggested that the Germans from Bessarabia who are at present living in the convent, be moved into another convent, in order to safeguard the stocks, Particularly against fire.
Therefore, I beg to have the Führer state his intentions regarding their proposal which is also supported by Gauleiter Eigruber not only is the collection Lanz in Amsterdam, packed in the meantime, awaiting, also several other collections of paintings for which there'd hardly be space enough in Munich, are ready, and so is Dr. Topfer's library which was bought in Switzerland. Also very rich stocks, already packed and stored in Vienna, confiscated from Jewish owners, and many new acquisitions from Vienna could be brought to Krenesmunster. This way, room could be made in Vienna and what remains of confiscated art-treasures could be distributed.
Report on the trip, undertaken on orders to Cracow and Warsaw, so as to ascertain the kind and the amount of confiscated art-treasures.
It was impossible to carry out the order as such, as well as that part of it which drafting of a plan as to how to dispose of the confiscated art treasures, since most of them were still packed away in cases and were either stored in Cracow, or in other places, particularly in Warsaw ready for shipment to Cracow.
Since 6 October, under the direction of Understate secretary Dr. Muhlmann, as the special deputy of General Field Marshall Göring and as the Director of the Department of Science and Training, the storing of all the valuable Art treasures has been in full swing with assistance of suitable experts from Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau, and, so far as I could determine it has been almost completely carried out.
Works of art and culture, mainly from Warsaw were saved, particularly from the badly damaged chateau of the Kings whose furniture and interior decorations were salvaged to a large extent. In Cracow, box-cars containing the works of art secured from public, clerical and private ownership arrived almost daily. The Art treasures are being collected in the particularly suitable building of the Jagellonic Library in Cracow and are being set up there properly, a task which may be finished by 2/1940. As soon as the task of collecting shall be finished and an inventory is made so that a complete survey of the entire valuable Polish Art-treasure can be made, I shall again travel to Cracow so as to carry out the order given me.
The official pictorial service is photographing all important works of art little by little. The governor general shall present these pictures in the form of a photo-Album to the Führer.
I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of great Art works of paintings and sculptures there with the exception of the Veit Stoss-altar and the plates of Hans von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt from the collection Czarborpki and several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw works of a rather high value of whose existence we in Germany had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish stock of "objects d'art", such as handicraft in gold and silver of German origin to a large part, (particularly from the Church of Maria and the cathedral of Wawel) tapestries, arms, porcelains, furniture, bronzes, coins, valuable parchment-scrips, books, etc. Those were the principal fields of interest for Polish collectors, besides their interest in Polish National Art, particularly of the -19th century. It is characteristic that apart from original paintings so many copies can be found in Polish castles and private collections (for example Czartoryski, Wilano etc) . However, many thousand works of art of all kinds ought to be found in the Jagellonic Library.
As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals regarding the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire material does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for the museum in Linz the three most important paintings of the Czartoryski collection, namely the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt which are at present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in Berlin. We in Dresden are particularly interested in the interior decorations of the castle of the Kings in Warsaw since Saxonian architects and artists have created them; therefore, the suggestion is made that the salvaged parts of it (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors, glass-chandeliers, porcelains etc) be used for the interior decoration of the Pavillion of the "Zivinges" in Dresden.
A number of fine drawings of Albrecht Durer's and other old German masters kept in the Ossolinemm in Lemberg, has fallen into Russian hands. Maybe at least Durer's 27 pieces could still be salvaged for Germany.
While in Warsaw, a Polish colleague of mine whom I have known, for quite some time told me that the storing of the art treasures was begun already in 6/1939; by the end of July the entire official museum property was packed in cases and ready for shipment. In spite of that the Poles did not manage to carry any important stocks away and save them for themselves, with the exception of the famous tapestry, collection of Wawel, the riding costumes kept there also, arms and historically valuable pieces like the bloodbanner of the Prophet which, as far as I could ascertain, fell into Russian hands.
/s/ Hans Posse.
Dr. Med. Sigmund RASCHER MUNICH, 5/15/1941 Trogerstrasse 6
Dear Reichsführer,
My sincere thanks for your cordial wishes and flowers on the birth of my second son. This time, too, it is a strong boy, though he has come 3 weeks too early. I may send you a picture of both children incidentally.
For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgaukommando VII, Munich, for a medical course. During this course. where researches on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes) considerable regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the serious question: can you make available two or three professional criminals for these experiments? The experiments are made at "Bodenstaendige Pruefstelle fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe", Munich. The experiments, by which the subjects can, of course, die, would take place with my cooperation. They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a representative of the air forces Surgeon who makes these experiments. He is also of the opinion that the problems in question could only be solved by experiments on human persons. ( Feeble-minded could also be used as test material).
I hope sincerely, highly esteemed Reichsführer that, in spite of the immense burden of work you carry, you are in the pink of health.
With my heartiest wishes, I am with Heil Hitler your gratefully devoted
(signature) S. RASCHER (Z2)
SECRET The Reichführer SS Berlin SW 11, B. Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8 Field Command Post
Dear Comrade Milch!
You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended to you for your consideration the work of a certain SS Führer, Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on leave [Arzt des Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe].
These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged cooling of the human body in cold water, and similar problems which are of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed by us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals who deserve only to die [todeswuerdig] from concentration camps for these experiments.
Unfortunately you had no time recently when Dr. Rascher wanted to report on the experiments at the Ministry for Aviation. I had put great hopes in that report, because I believed that in this way the difficulties, based mainly on religious objections, which oppose Dr. Rascher's experimentsfor which I assumed responsibilitycould be eliminated.
The difficulties are still the same now as before. In these "Christian medical circles" the standpoint is being taken that it goes without saying that a young German aviator should be allowed to risk his life but that the life of a criminalwho is not drafted into military serviceis too sacred for this purpose and one should not stain oneself with this guilt; at the same time it is interesting to note that credit is taken for the results of the experiments while excluding the scientist who performed them.
I personally have inspected the experiments, and haveI can say this without exaggerationparticipated in every phase of this scientific work in a helpful and inspiring manner.
We two should not get angry about these difficulties. It will take at least another ten years until we can get such narrow-mindedness out of our people. But this should not affect the research work which is necessary for our young and splendid soldiers and aviators.
I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I would then assume the sole responsibility for having these experiments made in this field, and would put the results, of which we in the SS need only a part for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of the air force. However, in this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you and Wolff a "non-Christian" physician should be charged, who should be at the same time honorable as a scientist and not prone to intellectual theft and who could be informed of the results. This physician should also have good contacts with the administrative authorities, so that the results would really obtain a hearing.
I believe that this solutionto transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS, so that he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility and under my ordersis the best way. The experiments should not be stopped; we owe that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air force, there would certainly be much annoyance; because then I would have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you, because of the arrogance and assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed in the post of Dachauwho is under my commandabout me in utterances delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the Waffen SS as quickly as possible.
I would be grateful to you if you would give the order to put the low pressure chamber at our disposal again, together with step-up pumps, because the experiments should be extended to include even greater altitudes.
Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!
S. RASCHER
Intermediate report on intense chilling experiments in the Dachau Camp, started on 8/15/1942
Experimental procedure
The experimental subjects (V P) were placed in the water, -dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an aviator's helmet. A life jacket made of rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5 degrees to 12 degrees. In one experimental series, Occiput and brain stem protruded above the water, while in another series of experiments the Occiput (brain stem) and back of the head were submerged in water.
Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4 degrees in the stomach and 26.5 degrees in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only when the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled. Autopsies of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of free blood, up to 1/2 liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed extreme dilation of the night chamber. As soon as the temperature in these experiments reached 28 degrees, the experimental subjects (VP) died invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation. The above discussed autopsy finding conclusively proved the importance of a warming protective device for head and Occiput when designing the planned protective clothing of the foam type.
Other important findings, common in all experiments, to be mentioned. Marked increase of the viscosity of the blood, marked increase of hemoglobin, an approximate five fold increase of the leukocytes, invariable rise of blood sugar to twice its normal value. Auricular fibrillation made its appearance regularly at 30 degrees.
During attempts to save severely chilled persons, it was shown that rapid re-warming was in all cases preferable to slow rewarming, because after removal from the cold water, the body temperature continued to sink rapidly. I think that for this reason we can dispense with the attempt to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal heat.
Rewarming by animal warmthanimal bodies or women's bodieswould be too slow. As auxiliary measures for the prevention of intense chilling, improvements in the clothing of aviators come alone into consideration. The foam suit with suitable neck protector which is being prepared by the German Institution for textile research [Deutsches Textilforschungsinstitut] Muenchen-Gladbach deserves first priority in this connection. The experiments have shown that pharmaceutical measures are probably unnecessary if the flier is still alive at the time of rescue.
(signed) Dr. S. Rascher MuenchenDachau, 9/10/1942.
"Document 1639-A-PS: Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration 1939 Edition [translation]" pp. 143-145.
[Pages 2-18]
Armed Forces High Command No. 265/39 g.Kdos. I IVa. Berlin, 2/18/1939 125 copies, 101st copy
Re: Reprint of Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration.
1. Enclosed is the Reprint for 1939 of the "Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration" with the request to destroy Mobilization Books (Z), hereby made obsolete, at the beginning of the new mobilization year.
2. The Reprint takes effect on the 4/1/1939. The annexes V, XIX, and XX will be forwarded after their completion.
3. An expression of opinion on the proposals handed in here will not take place in detail any more, insofar as the expression has not already been made.
4. The necessity of cooperation between Ministers and the highest Reich agencies is not always pointed out in the column "Remarks". It is to be understood that the cooperation needed for preparations and carrying out of the measures must be guaranteed, even without an express directive.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. Keitel.
Distribution list on the next page.
Distribution's List: Führer and Reich Chancellor: Copy 1, Deputy of the Führer Attention SS Brigadier General Knoblauch: 2-3, Prussian State-Ministry -Attention Counsellor of the Ministry Bergbohm: 4-5, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Attention Counsellor of the Legation Dr. Freiherr v.d. Heyden-Rynsch: 6-7, GBV [Plenipotentiary-General for Administration] Chief of Operational Staff, Attention State Secretary Dr. Struckart for Reich Ministry of the Interior: 8-9, for Reich Ministry of Justice: 11-12, for Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Popular Culture: 13-14, for Central Reich Office for regional planning: 15-16, GBW [Plenipotentiary-General for Economics] Chief of the Operational Staff, Attention Ministerial Director Sarnow for GBW [Operational Staff]: 17-18, for Reich Ministry of Economics: 19-20, for Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture: 21-22, for Reich Labor Ministry: 23-24, for Reich Chief Forester: 25-26, Reich Ministry of Finance, Attention Counsellor of the Minister, Privy Counsellor Dr. Bender: 27-28, Reich Ministry of Finance, Attention Finance President von Dietz: 29-30, Reich Ministry of Communications Attention Chief of Section of the Ministry Baur: 31-33, Reich Ministry of Communications, Attention State Railway Director Dr. Ebeling: 34-35, Reich Postal Ministry Attention Counsellor of the Ministry Honold: 36-37, Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Attention Lt Colonel Wentscher: 38-39, Reichbank Directorate, Attention Reichsbank Director Dr. Meller: 40-41, Inspector General of the German Highways, Attention Government Construction Counsellor Henne: 42-43, OKH (Army High Command) (2nd Section of the General Staff of the Army): 44-73, OKM (Navy High Command) (A.II): 74-81, Reich Ministry for Air Travel and Air Force High Command (2nd Section of the General Staff of the Air Force): 82-93, OKW: (Armed Forces High Command) L. Ia: 94, L Ia Prop.: 95, L II: 96, L IVa: 97, L IVb: 98, L IVd: 99, WNV: 100, W Stb: 101-103, A Ausl./Abw. (Foreign Intelligence Section): 104-106, AWA (J): 107, WH: 108, Being kept by L IVa: 109-125
Part I of the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative Authorities
Introduction to the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative Authorities.
A. Principles and Concepts
1. Preparedness for defense on the part of the whole nation is the condition for an effective defense of the Reich.
2. It is through mobilization that Wehrmacht, Economy, State and People are carried over from a state of peace to a state of war.
The mobilization of the Wehrmacht comprises:
(a) The securing of the necessary foundations for the establishment, leadership and supplying of the needs of the war-Wehrmacht,
(b) the building up of peace units to war strength,
(c) the establishment of new war units,
(d) the establishment of the reserve Wehrmacht.
The Mobilization of Economy comprises the collecting of all economic forces and holding them in readiness to work at their highest capacity in the service of the conduct of the war.
The Mobilization of State and People comprises:
(a) the turn-over of State Leadership and the life of the people to the requirements of the conduct of the war as regards politics, sociology and constitutional law; and
(b) making available for the conduct of the war all the material forces of the people.
3. A case of war can arise instantaneously or start as a result of foreign political tension. The preparation and schedule of mobilization must take both possibilities into account.
The "state of defense" and the "state of war" in the sense of R.V. Law will be ordered expressly in accordance with the Reichs defense law by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor.
With the declaration of the "state of war", the war laws and regulations come into force without further orders. The legal consequences provided in other laws for the state of war also become effective.
If no "state of defense" has previously been ordered, the regulations concerning the state of defense will come into force with the declaration of the state of war.
It is to be reckoned with that foreign political considerations (war guilt question, etc.) will not give rise to a declaration of a state of war, even if it should come to armed conflict with a foreign enemy. Legal provision is therefore to be made by which regulations for "war" in various laws will come into force for the case in question. These regulations must be formulated in such a way that no "war" exists as understood in international law.
For this reason the legal consequences provided in the various laws for the "the case of war" will not come into force with the mobilization decree (X or mobilization case).
4. The period of tension possibly preceding a case of war must be exploited to the limit of foreign political endurance in order that the Reich may be made ready for war.
For these reasons the 3 following stages must be distinguished from each other in the schedule of mobilization.
4. a. "The period of tension"
During the period of tension the fundamentals for the reliable execution of the mobilization proper should be created, and individual measures for mobilization should be taken in advance whereby as far as possible foreign political liability and any kin of provocation abroad are to be avoided.
These "advance measures" will be arranged in the mobilization plans of the armed forces, according to stages of tension Within these advance measures there will be no distinction of special stages for the civil administration, since it is necessary to have a much more flexible regulation.
The advance measures will be executed on the basis of peace legislation. The fact and the purpose of the advance measure are to be camouflaged as much as possible within the civil administration concerned.
The "period of tension" as such will not be ordered; it is merely the technical term for a period of special political tension in foreign relations, during which preparatory measures (advance measures) can be ordered.
4. b. Mobilization without public announcement ("X case")
While its purpose is to be camouflaged as far as possible, it is to bring about the systematic mobilization of the armed forces, and if necessary the camouflaged mobilization of the state, economy and people. A possibility exists that "Case X" will only be ordered for the armed forces or parts of it.
If no official announcement of the state of defense is made, the execution of the mobilization must be assured through administrative channels. The peace time laws: Law relating to Participation in Defense measures, emergency service decree, etc. (Wehrleistungsgesetz, Notdienstverordnung, u.a.) adapted for camouflaged mobilization will serve as legal basis.
Case X may be ordered without being preceded by the measures provided in sub 4a.
4. c. General mobilization with public announcement. ("Mobilization case""Mob case"):
This includes the mobilization of the armed forces and the state of the national economy as well as of the entire people, if no special limitations have been ordered in the mobilization decree (for instance local limitations). In the normal case, the order for general mobilization initiates the provided mobilization measures of the armed forces, and of all civil authorities and offices, with the exception however of specially designated measures for the supervision and checking of the information service.
In all cases these measures will only come into force by a special order of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces.
Just as in Case X, the execution of general mobilization is based on the peace laws adapted for a camouflaged mobilization.
The general mobilization (Mob case) can be ordered without being preceded by the period of tension or by mobilization without official announcement (Case X).
5. Publication and Execution of Mobilization Measures.
5. a. The measures provided for the period of tension will be ordered singly, in groups or in their entirety by the Führer and Reich Chancellor (after considering proposals from the appropriate Reich Dept.) on the application of the Chief of the OKW, or of the Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration or the Plenipotentiary for Economy who will act in conjunction with the Chief of the OKW. The measures ordered by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor will be communicated to the highest civil administrative authorities through the OKW, and to the Departments under the Plenipotentiaries for the Reich Administration and Economy through the latter.
The measures ordered have to be carried out according to the instructions of the highest Reich authorities, provided that the authorities of the Armed Forces have not been specially ordered to charge the intermediate and lower civil authorities with the execution of the measures.
This is applicable for the following cases (or, as circumstances may dictate, not till the incidence of Case X or general mobilization).
(1) Evacuation and clearing of battle territory according to directives for the "evacuation of Reichs territory threatened by the enemy", Vol. 1, Nos. 14 and 15, or (respectively) "clearing of the battle territory of the west" and the corresponding provisions for the East.
(2) Establishment of the Frontier Guards incl. initiation of the attached special intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the VGAD of 9/1937 No. 24 and Appendix 10, No. 12.
(3) Establishment of the VGAD incl. initiation of the special intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the VGAD of S9/1937, App. 1, No. 2 and App. 10, No. 12.
(4) Establishment of Field Police UnitsKey Words (not code numbers) may be agreed with the military authorities for these measures.
The purpose of all other key words made known to the civil authorities by the military commands is exclusively that of informing the authorities concerned about measures coming within the military sphere. Those key words are not to be entered in the mobilization calendar, but are to be added on a special sheet.
Notwithstanding all this, a mutual understanding with military authorities concerning the preparation of the various measures in time of peace and their execution (after proclamation through civilian channels) in war time is absolutely necessary wherever military and civil measures come into contact.
5. b. Case X (Mobilization without public announcement) is ordered by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor. Publication to the highest Reichs authorities is carried out in the same manner as for the "advance measures".
Various mobilization measures will be decreed within the civil sphere through release [Ausloesung] of code words, or through special order if Case X applies only to the armed forces or parts of it.
The measures for mobilization are carried out by the highest Reichs authorities under their exclusive responsibility with the limitation that the fact of mobilization must not be mentioned publicly (diplomatic channels, press, public proclamations and announcements, radio, etc.). To achieve this purpose it must be stressed that it is necessary to camouflage the individual measures as much as possible without endangering their execution … The main purpose is not to offer legal grounds to the prospective enemy for the opening of hostilities or their own mobilization. For that purpose, the necessary suspension of various measures contained in Section II (mobilization) of the mob. calendar will be ordered by the High Command of the Armed Forces.
In principle every proclamation and suspension of code numbers during the period of tension or in case X must be made known to the High Commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces by the High Command of the Armed Forces.
5. c. General mobilization with public announcement (case of mobilization):
The general mobilization will be decreed publicly by the "Mobilization-order" of the Führer and Reichs Chancellor.
5. d. Preparations are being made to enable parts of the Wehrmacht to move out at increased speed. In order that the units of the Army and the Navy to whom this applies may be prepared to move out and the Luftwaffe prepared to take off, the civil administration authorities are required to render special assistance. This measure may be ordered during the period of tension.
As this preparedness (for moving out or taking off) only applies to certain territories of the Reich and only affects certain administrative authorities, the latter will receive their instructions direct from those Wehrmacht authorities in whose territory the preparedness for moving out or taking off is being established. In addition, the order to prepare for the march-out or take-off will be communicated to the appropriate Reich ministries, the G.B. and so on, by the OKW.
6. Dissemination of the mobilization orders through the various administrative channels:
In case of mobilization the general mobilization with public announcement ( case of mob. ) will be announced to the Reichs authorities etc, the intermediate and lower civil authorities by a mob. cable through the DRP [German Reichs Postal Service].
The DRP organizes for that purpose a dissemination plan in agreement with the other Reichs authorities. The "general mobilization will also be made public by means of radio, public announcements, etc.
The highest Reichs authorities will issue individual orders in their spheres for the "period of tension" and for "Case X". Announcements concerning the stages of mobilization and the measures to be taken therefor will not he circulated through district cables by the DRP.
All mobilization orders are to be passed on by the quickest means to the subordinate authorities.
If the orders are passed on by phone, the identity of the civil servant transmitting the order is to be ascertained by appropriate questioning, in order to guard against deception. If doubts remain as to the identity of the person calling, they are to be dispelled by a further call.
The ordering of measures which concern, directly or indirectly, offices of the armed forces or authorities of other departments must be made known to those authorities.
If an authority learns about the stages of mobilization through unofficial channels, then it must immediately be ascertained through contact with superior authorities whether measures ma be taken. The means of dissemination of mob. orders must be defined in the mob. calendars of the authorities. It is assumed that the night and day telephone service will be organized within the framework of the advance measures for the period of tension.
B. Preparations for Mobilization.
Principles for the drafting of the "Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative Authorities".
7. The mobilization plans of the Wehrmacht and the Mobilization Schedule for the civil administration provide the responsible State Government with a general survey of the volume of preparations for mobilization and of their political scope. They have been so adjusted to each other that the unification of the entire mobilization is secured.
8. The mobilization schedule for the civil administrative authorities comprises in general all the measures of the civil state administration which on the one hand directly support the operational capacity of the Wehrmacht, or on the other hand serve the preparedness for war on the part of state, economy and people.
9. The mobilization stages discussed sub. no. 4
(a) period of tension
(b) mobilization without public announcement (Case X)
(c) general mobilization with public announcement (mob case)
form the basis for the drafting of the "mobilization schedule for the civil administration".
9. a. The advance measures for the period of tension form the content of Section I in every part of the mobilization schedule.
The advance measures for the civil administrative authorities in the period of tension are made flexible to conform to any development of the political and economic situation. Insofar as the advance measures for the civil administration give direct support to the Wehrmacht, they will be ordered from case to case so as to conform to the advance measures of the Wehrmacht.
9. b. The measures for mobilization form the content of Section II in every part of the mob. schedule, with the proviso that in the case of "mobilization without public announcement (Case X)" they will be carried out according to the provisions of No. 4.b) without publication, whereas in the case of general mobilization with public announcement (mob. case) they will as a rule be subject to no restrictions. The specially designated measures (code number) for the supervision and checking of the intelligence service will in no case, however, come into force except by special order of the OKW (No. 4.c).
The advance measures for the period of tension are printed in red in Section II (mobilization).
The purpose of the said summary in Section II is to afford a complete survey in case mobilization should arise suddenly without a previous period of tension).
The mob. measures common to all administrative authorities are listed in a special Part 11 of the mobilization schedule. They are not included in the separate parts of the mob. schedule.
10. Every part of the "Mobilization Schedule for the civil administrative authorities" (and therewith all the highest Reich Departments) is furnished with certain code numbers with which the various measures are to be designated at all times.
The purpose of these code numbers is to enable certain measures to be put into effect quickly and under certain circumstances to be camouflaged. In order to guard against confusion with the code numbers of the Wehrmacht units, the letter Z (for Zivilverwaltungen- i.e. civil administration) is to be set before the code number wherever code numbers are given in the mob. schedule of the civil administration.
11. The "mobilization schedule for the civil administrative authorities" contains in
Part I The introduction to the mob. schedule for the civil administrative authorities No. 1100
Measures applicable to all administrations and in its subsequent parts measures of the various supreme Reich Departments. Code No. 01010500
Part III Foreign Office Code No. 05011000
Part IV Reich Ministry of the Interior Code No. 10011500
Part V Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda Code No. 15012000
Part VI Reich Ministry of Justice Code No. 20012500
Part VII Reich Ministry for Science, Education and Popular Culture Code No. 25013000
Part VIII Reich Traffic Ministry (Motor traffic, shipping and waterways) Code No. 30013500
Part IX Reich Post Code No. 3501-4000
Part X Reich Traffic Ministry (Railway Sections ) Code No. 40014500
Part XI General Inspector for German roadways Code No. 45015000
Part XII Special measures of the Plenipotentiary for Economy Code No. 50015500
Part XIII Reich Ministry for Economy Code No. 55016000
Part XIV Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture Code No. 60016500
Part XV Reich Ministry of Finance Code No. 65017000
Part XVI Reich Ministry of Labor Code No. 70017500
Part XVII Reich Forests Director Code No. 75018000
Part XVIII Reichbank Directorate Code No. 80018500
Part XIX Reich Department for Space Regulation Code No. 85019000
Part XX NSDAP Code No. 90019500
12. The various civil administrations will in their own sphere of authority keep mobilization calendars based on the general measures set forth in the "mobilization schedule for civil administrative authorities".
These calendars will comprise the individual measures and explanations necessary for the execution of the general measures in the same order and with the same code numbers as in the mobilization schedule.
That the code numbers of the mobilization schedule should agree with those on all mob. calendars is necessary to enable the measures ordered in accordance with the mob. schedule to be passed on quickly and camouflaged.
The mobilization calendars of the civil administrative authorities shall be drafted and passed on in the same way in compliance with the executory provisions laid down by the OKW.
c. Securing of sufficient money to cover mobilization.
13. The money set aside in the Reichsbank establishments for the purposes of the armed forces and the civil administration in the case of mobilization may be used for the advance measures and for the mobilization without public announcement ("Case X ).
The absolutely necessary payments before the publication of mobilization order are to be entered under a special section of the present budget appropriations for the time being and will be transferred to the war budget later on, unless otherwise directed. This regulation is to be added to all mobilization calendars.
D. Dates for Mob. Preparations in the Civil Administration.
14. In order that a new measure should be included in the mobilization schedule for the civil administrative authorities, application must be made to the Chief of the Reich Defense Committee (Section Defense of the Reich in the OKW).
15. In order that consistency may be preserved in preparing measures for the calendar for any mobilization year, alterations, and where possible, new measures should only be applied for once a yearat the latestNovember 1st.
On the basis of such applications the mob. schedule will be altered by the following 1st of February in such a way that it will be decisive for calendar preparations for the current mob. year (April 1-March 31).
"Document 1643-PS [synopsis and translation]" pp. 155-158.
Synopsis of letter written 1129/1942 by Dr. Casdorf to various Reich officials: Leader of the SS; Chief of the German police; Main Government Office of Economics of the SS.
Invitation extended to various responsible officials for a meeting to be held on 12/17/1942 at 10 o'clock, for the purpose of discussing the legal aspects of the confiscation of property by the SS for enlarging the concentration camp at Auschwitz as suggested in the attached letter.
Synopsis of letter written 11/7/1942 by SS General Pohl to the Reich Minister of Finance for the enlargement of the concentration camp at Auschwitz.
The Reichsführer of the SS expressed the wish that the territory of Auschwitz concentration camp should be increased to about 4640 acres and become a private estate owned by the Reich. The area in question (to be confiscated as soon as possible) belonged to various owners such as (1) Jewish and Polish private land owners, (2) towns in which most of the industrial property belonged to the Poles and the Jews, (3) the Polish State, (4) the community, (5) the church, (6) racial Germans.
Different authorities were in charge and different rules had to be applied which made the transfer of property an impractical legal procedure. For this reason, the Minister of Justice introduced a new regulation on 5/23/1942 which made a new system of property registration possible.
The SS suggests that the Reichskommissar, for the securing of the German element, should be authorized to transfer estates under categories 2-6. Racial Germans should be compensated for their estates in money or in allotting other ground properties to them.
It is desired that all authorities concerned should be notified and invited for a discussion on this subject. In this meeting, Dr. Fiedler (Office of the Reichskommissar for the strengthening of the German element) and Mr. Korch [Zentralbodenamt] should participate.
Synopsis of teletype letter from the Chief of the ORPO to the Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz, 12/8/1942, forwarded to the Reich Minister on 12/9/1942.
The chief of police orders:
The creation of an independent police district for the concentration camp and quarters [Lager und Wehnsiedlung] for inmates in Auschwitz, headed by the camp commandant. This new regulation will not affect the police functions of the Landsrat in Bielitz or of the Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz. The commander of the camp will be the police chief of the town of Auschwitz. The disciplinary measures ordered by the camp commander against the camp inmates should not have the character of police measures, and his functions as camp commander and police chief should be kept distinct. The field police can be ordered by the camp commandant for special duty within the camp itself; but such an order can be given only by the camp commander.
Synopsis of a copy of minutes of meeting held on 12/17-18/1942 about the confiscation of territory for the enlargement of the Auschwitz concentration camp.
In order to be able to enlarge the territory of the Auschwitz concentration camp, it would be expedient to transfer all the estates to be confiscated to the "Zentralbodenamt" which is an agency of the Reichsführer SS. However, in order to carry out this transaction, all those agencies which are at present responsible for the various types of real estate in question, have to give their approval.
The officials in charge of the church property and of the former Polish State property gave their consent to release the estates under their jurisdiction to the Zentralbodenamt. However, the representative of the Reich Minister of the Interior claimed that he had no authority to dispose of the property.
Of the community, in spite of arguments to the contrary from other officials, a further discussion on 12/21/1942 was to be held between the representatives of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Reichsführer SS.
On 12/18/1942 the representative of the Haupttreuhandstelle 0st agreed to release the estates under their jurisdiction and empower the officials in charge to initiate the transactions. The still remaining legal requirements for the release of properties belonging to industrial enterprises, racial Germans, and the town of Auschwitz were finally discussed. The list of participants appears on page 4. Attached, an authorization from the Reich Minister of Finance (Haupttreuhandstelle Ost) issued 1/12/1943, giving full power of attorney to the Bodenamt of the Reichsführer SS to make out the necessary declarations in regard to the real estates.
Synopsis of teletype letter from Dr. Hoffman, representing the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to the Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz, dated 1/22/1943.
The territory of the Auschwitz concentration camp will be changed into an independent estate. For this purpose it must become the property of the Reich, represented by the Reichsführer SS. This transaction must be carried out quickly. Land belonging to the Auschwitz district or to former Reich communities will be transferred after individual agreements have been made between the owners and the Reichsführer SS or his agencies. The other community property will be transferred to the Bodenamt from the respective communities through the mediation of the Regierungspraesident. Regardless of how much of a property will become part of the new concentration camp estate, it will have to be purchased in its entirety. After the measurements have been completed, the part not needed for the camp estate will be returned to the original owner. In the Interior the Reichsführer will administer the property. Finally the legal aspects of the compensation are discussed.
Synopsis of letter from Dr Hoffman, representative of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to the Oberpraesident of Kattowitz, dated 6/9/1943.
Inquiry as to whether the new Auschwitz estate has already been formed.
Synopsis of letter from the Chief President of Upper Silesia to the Reich Minister of the Interior, dated 8/16/1943.
Since the new estate of the concentration camp Auschwitz could not be created fast enough because two private properties could not be purchased, the President of Upper Silesia issued a decree creating a new district for Auschwitz. This decree, issued 5/31/1943, is attached in two copies. It gives a detailed description of the border line of the newly created Auschwitz district Relevant maps are enclosed in folder.
SECRET STATE POLICESTATE POLICE OFFICE COLOGNE Branch Office, Aachen
To be transmitted in secretTo be handled as a secret government matter.
DOR. BERLIN NUE 19 507 3/4/1944 1430WFTo all State Police Directorates except PRAGUE and BRUNNInspectors of the Security Police and of the Security Service.
Subject: Measures to be taken against captured escaped prisoners of war who are officers or not working non-commissioned officers, except British and American prisoners of war.
The Supreme Command of the Army has ordered as follows:
1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or a not working non-commissioned officer, except British and American prisoners of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service under the classification "Step III" regardless of whether the escape occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass escape or an individual one.
2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the security police and security service may not become officially known to the outside under any circumstances other prisoners of war may by no means be informed of the capture. The captured prisoner. are to be reported to the Army Information Bureau as "escaped and not captured". Their mail is to be handled accordingly. Inquiries of representatives of the Protective Power of the International Red Cross, and of other aid societies will be given the same answer.
3. If escaped British and American prisoners of war who arE officers or not working non-commissioned officers, respectively, art captured they are to be detained at first outside the prisoner of war camps and out of sight of prisoners of war; if Army owned buildings are unavailable they are to be placed in police custody. In every instance the Corps Area Command will request speedily the Supreme Command of the Army (Chief, Prisoner of War Section) for a decision as to whether they are to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.
In reference to this, I order as follows:
1. The State Police Directorates will accept the captured escaped officer prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camp commandants and will transport them to the Concentration Camp Mauthausen following the procedure previously used, unless the circumstances render a special transport imperative. The prisoners of war are to be put in irons on the transportnot on the station if it is subject to view by the public. The camp commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the transfer occurs within the scope of the action "Kugel" [translator's note: the literal translation of "Kugel" is "bullet"] The State Police Directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on these transfers giving merely the figures, the first report being due on 7/5/1944 (sharp). The report is to be made under the reference "Treatment of Captured Escaped Prisoners of War who are officers within the Scope of the Action 'Kugel'." In the case of special events, reports are to be submitted immediately. The State Police Directorates will maintain exact records.
2. For the sake of secrecy, the Supreme Command of the Armed Force has been requested to inform the prisoner of war camps to turn the captured prisoners over to the local State Police Office and not to send them directly to Mauthausen.
3. Captured escaped British and American officers and not working non-commissioned officers are to be detained in police custody in a city in which a State Police office is located provided the Army has no suitable quarters. In view of the existing crowding of police prisons, the State Police officer will accept captured 57 prisoners only if the Army actually does not dispose of any suitable space. The prisoner of war camp commandants are to be contacted in reference to their quarters immediately after the receipt of this order. In the interest of the secrecy of this order, confinement outside of police jails, e.g. in Labor Education Camps is not permissible.
4. If escaped prisoners of war who are officers and not working non-commissioned officers except British and American prisoners of war are captured by police authorities, reasons of practicability render it unnecessary to return the prisoner to the prisoner of war camp commandant once the facts have been clarified adequately The prisoner of war camp is to be informed of the capture and is to be requested for a transfer under the classification "Step III". Captured escaped British and American prisoners of war who are officers and non-commissioned officers are always to be turned over to the Army.
5. The city and county police authorities are not to be informed of this order.
Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service IV D5dB.NR. 61/44 GRS.For the Chief(signed) Mueller. SS General. Branch Office Aachen. IVDNo.26/44gRs
Aachen 3/6/1944
1. Two extract copies were made of this order. 1st Copy to IV A6 March. 2nd Copy to IV D2 March.
2. To be filed with IV C.IV 3 Noted.
ROSCHER 19 June [two illegible signatures]
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 179
Decree of the Führer concerning a plenipotentiary general for the utilization of labor of 3/21/1942
In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited [angeworbenen] abroad and of prisoners of war should be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized manpower in the Great German Reich, including the Protectorate, and in the General Gouvernement and in the Occupied Territories, should be mobilized.
Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out this task within the framework of the Four Years Plan, as Plenipotentiary General for the utilization of labor. In that capaciy the will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for the Four Years Plan.
Section III (wages) and Section V (utilization of labor) of the Reich Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for the accomplishment of his task.
Führer-Headquarters, 3/21/1942
The Führer Adolf Hitler The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery Dr. Lammers The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Keitel
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT. PART I. PAGE 180
Ordinance for the execution of the Führer's decree concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz of 3/27/1942
In pursuance of the Führer's Decree of 3/21/1942 (RGBl I, 179), I decree as follows:
1. My manpower sections [Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz] are hereby abolished. (Circular letter of 10/22/1936/St. M. Dev. 265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor conditions [Arbeitsbedingungen]) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.
2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.
3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws require to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.
4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated to me by the Führer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated organisms and also to the Reich protector, the General Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations.
In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance report is to be submitted to me, in advance.
The Deputy for the Four Year Plan Göring Reich Marshal
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY Deputy of the Führer H/J
Munich, Briennerstrasse 45 Tel: 54901 and 58344 Munich, 8/28/1933.
Mr. Dr. Albrecht Hanshofer
Society of Geography, Wilhelmstr, BERLIN
My dear Doctor:
Many thanks for both your letters of the 23 and 24 of this month. I made all necessary arrangements concerning the Standartenführers, immediately.
I would like very much to speak to Haselblatt before his convention starts. Probably I will be at Berlin around September 7. I don't know yet if I shall be able to attend the Convention myself.
Concerning the American, would you please tell him, that in one case it is no longer the question of a "party" in the sense of the "custom" practiced since Washington's time, that we are striving for, but this party is a section of the State itself. It is of utmost interest to me to know, whether any American official representatives ever attended meetings of the fascist party.
I reported the statements of the Polish Chief of Staff.
With hearty greetings your [Signature] Rudolf Hess.
Berlin, 8/1933.
Dear Mr. Hess:
Today I have only two reports to pass on to you, having received them from a generally well informed source.
Primarily: Assertion of the Polish Chief of staff: "Once the damned civilians thwarted our East Prussian aim with their scruples and hesitation. That will not happen again. Precaution has been taken that these people are sent to a Concentration Camp if they should still dare to obstruct us."
Secondly: A very delicate matter. It is known to yourself, that at some place in your organization, there are people, unable to subordinate their personal initiative for the benefit of the common good. I am informed that a personage very highly esteemed abroad but completely retired at home, H h B g has to fear for her individual safety. The source of this insecurity, I was told is SA Standartleader Schoeneberg. I don't have to point out to you the repercussions, abroad, which any personal accident would provoke. Could you take care of internal curbing.
With hearty Greetings Always Your
Voelkischer Beobachter Southern Germany Edition 5/28-29/1944
A Word on the enemy air-terror by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels
Nowadays, it is no longer disputed by anyone that the enemy air-terror pursues almost exclusively the aim of breaking the morale of the German civil population. The enemy wages against the defenseless, against women and children in particular, in order to compel the men of our country to yield. This in intention of his is proved on one hand by the facts themselves and on the other hand by the abundance of existing statements by enemy publicists. As far as the facts are concerned one needs only to visit one of the often bombed towns in the Reich or in the occupied territory in order to determine without doubt by one's own examination that our war potential is damaged by perhaps at the most only 1% by enemy air-terror and the remaining 90% plainly falls upon the civil sector.
A short time ago, the leading representatives of the French, and Belgian Episcopate, who certainly cannot be suspected of acting according to German orders, objected with flaming protest directed to the international public against the enemy's barbarous methods of aerial warfare, which kills old people, women and children, as well as destroys churches, venerable cultural monuments and thickly settled civilian residential sections, without any military objectives being apparent. To this we need to add nothing more.
Our enemies do not try to conceal their intentions in this matter. One does not need to look far in British and American press in order to find substantial proof of this. "Lay the great cities in ruins and you will crush the will to fight". Thus wrote he English air expert T. M. Epaight in his book "Air power and he cities" in 1930. Nothing in this tendency of the British aerial warfare has changed since then. "It is not possible to draw a boundary-line between the civil population and the combatants". With this cowardly excuse the "Daily Mail" attempts to justify publicly this rough and low method of the enemy aerial warfare. Much more explicit becomes influential British naval officer who states in the English military publication "The Army Quarterly": Does the concept of non-combatants exist at all ? A small child neither in peace nor in war a useful member of the national community. No one has in reality the right to demand inviolability for himself eve if he can attempt to do so in the name of humanity. Germany must become more desolate than the Sahara Desert".
The well known London's newspaper "News Chronicle" is not missing in this choir of hatred. It adds "We favor that every living being in Germany be wiped out. Man, woman, child, bird and insect. We would not let even a blade of grass grow". This causes the respected British author H G. Wells to name the following demand: "Treat the German people like a troublesome native tribe". The American publicists are no less robust. One of their leading spokesmen Raymond Clapper writes with evident pleasure "Terror and brutality are the best sides of aerial warfare!" One might object, perhaps, that not all influential Americans and Englishmen think this way. Wrong! Even the Anglican High Church declares in its official organ "Church of England" on 5/28/1943: "It is a perverse view of Christianity to suppose that civilians must not be killed". Even the Archbishop of York, Dr. Cysill Barbett, blesses the barbaric methods of the Anglo-American aerial terrorism in his pastoral letter of 6/1943 with the words: "It is only a small evil to bomb German civilians."
We had so far desisted from making known to the German people the meanest of the statements from which we have only presented a small selection and which all together represent a simple demand for the murder of women and children, because we were afraid that in view of this cynicism it would take measures of self-defense and revenge itself with the same measures upon the enemy pilots who bail out of shot down enemy planes. In the meantime, however, circumstances have arisen which prevent us from continuing to maintain this reserve in the future.
The Anglo-American terror flyers in the last few weeks, besides indiscriminately bombarding the residential quarters of our cities have taken to attacking the German civilian population openly, directly and without even any superficial respect, for the international rules of warfare, by strafing them and slaughtering them in cold blood. No more excuses can be brought toward in this matter because the enemy planes sweep low over villages, fields and highways, and direct their machine-guns upon harmless groups of people who are minding their own business. This has nothing more to do with war. This is naked murder. There is no rule of international law which the enemy can call on in this matter. The Anglo-American pilots place themselves through such a criminal mode of warfare, outside the pale of every internationally recognized rule of warfare. On last Sunday, for example, to take only one of a thousand examples, in the rural countries of Saxony, groups of playing children were attacked by strafing, and suffered considerable casualties.
No one will be astonished by the fact that the population concerned which, as is known in the whole world, can understand any soldierly type of warfare has been seized with a terrible rage on account of these cynical crimes. It is only possible with the aid of arms to secure the lives of enemy pilots who were shot down during such attacks, for they would otherwise be killed by the sorely tired population. Who is right here? The murderers who after their cowardly misdeeds await a humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the victims who wish to defend themselves according to the principle: "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"? This question is not hard to answer. In any case it would be demanding too much of us if it were asked of us that we use German Soldiers for the defense of murderers of children against the parents who seized with blind rage, having just lost their most valuable treasure through the brutal cynicism of the enemy, take measures of self-defense. If the English and Americans as they themselves say, regard and treat us as troublesome native tribes, then it is our business whether we stand for it. The German people is known in the whole world for the fact that it gives to war what war demands from it. But too much is too much and here the boundaries of what can be borne have been far overstepped.
It seems to ushardly possible and tolerable to use German police and soldiers against the German people when it treats murderers of children as they deserve. Even the arbitrary methods of warfare of the Anglo-Americans must end somewhere. The pilots cannot say that they as soldiers acted upon orders. It is not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a despicable crime is exempt from punishment because he passes the responsibility to his superior, especially if the orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human morality and every international usage of warfare. Our century has obliterated to a great extent the boundaries between warfare and crime on the part of the enemy. It would be demanding too much of us to expect that we should silently accommodate ourselves as victims to this unlimited barbarity.
We reach these conclusions in a completely objective manner. In these questions our people think much more radically than its government. It has always been our wish that the war should be conducted in a chivalrous manner. The enemy, apparently, does not want this. The whole world is a witness for that. If this revolting condition continues, it will also be witness for the fact that we can find ways and means to defend ourselves against these criminals. We owe this to our people which decently and bravely defend its life and therefore has in no way deserved to be declared fair game for the enemy killers.
DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS, VOLUME 5, PAGES 372, 373 and 376
Statement of accounts of the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, Dr. Ley, at the the 5th yearly session of the German Labor Front in Nurnberg, on 9/11/1937.
In speaking of "Soldiers of Labor" I have to demand that such soldiers of labor exist in reality. I have to demand that everybody march at the same cadence and in the same spirit. The factory-community is only then complete when every manager takes his place as an ordinary work-crew member among his crew. We shall not rest or relax before this is accomplished. Otherwise everything would be reduced to beautiful phrases resulting only in beer sessions and distribution of cigarettes. No, same cadence and stride, same pack and same marching, then no outward distinction between the entrepreneur and the worker shall exist anymore, and sometimes a worker might even look better from a racial point of view than the entrepreneur. And if the latter was adequately polished and drilled, he will lose h;s feeling of superiority and "curse" exactly like the others. That is necessary, and with this I come to another point.
My collaborators and myself found no rest. We too wanted to to have laws and legal foundations, I was constantly pursued with that request. I asked the Führer myself: "My Führer can't we too get a law?"
The Führer refused. That's why I say: He was of greatest help to us. Had the Führer given in at the time, we would be in bad shape now. The Führer said: "I think it's wrong. For once I want you to make a law through habit in Germany. For once I want to try if it isn't possible in Germany to set up an authority without having to issue laws and decrees on the part of the State. It must be possible to create a great institution and establishment, based only on a law through habit and it must be possible to make this law through habit of a much greater force than any other law and justice."
Once I said to the Führer: "My Führer, actually I am standing with one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of the comrades "Leipart" and "Imbusch", and should they some day ask me to return their money, then it will be found that I have spent it, either by building things, or otherwise. But they shall never again find their property in the condition in which the handed it over to me. Therefore I would have to be convicted."
The Führer laughed then and remarked that apparently I felt extremely well in this condition.
It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it.
We have only 70 million altogether. Therefore we must use everybody. We have work for at least 300 million and that figure is increasing from year to year. We must have new space. We want to repeat that again and again. We have told the world often enough. We are a people without space and we shall never forget that factor in all our social measures.
We need space, and we must never give this up in all our measures. We must never lose sight of that. That's why we need a healthy people and healthy men.
We succeededand this is about the most important accomplishment for the German Labor Frontin eliminating the association-character of the trade unions and the employer-associations, and for it we have substituted the conception "Soldier of Labor" [Soldat der Arbeit].
"Document 1680-PS: 10 Years Security Police and SDDie Deutsche Polizei, 2/1/1943 [translation]" pp. 191-193.
When the Führer assumed the direction of the fate of the German Reich and people on 1/30/1933, he found in the -domain of the police, as in all other fields, a situation which bore all the signs of the irresponsible incapability of the Weimar system. The concept of a police force, together with the Marxist-Liberal tendency and their characteristic practices were the main reasons for the insufficiently organized and therefore in many respects helpless condition of the police.
This was particularly obvious in that part of the police system to which was assigned the task of the safekeeping of the community against inner-political dangers from the beginning of all historical state activity. The activities to which we are accustomed today under the concept of "Security Police" was, under the "Weimar Interim State" in its political police field, exclusively directed towards a prevention of the unavoidable collapse of its system, especially against the National Socialist movement, with the use of more or less brutal means of power of the state, and was decisively handicapped in the domain of criminal police by the organizational splintering as well as the liberalistic sympathy towards crimes and criminals which existed at that time.
The task of the New National Socialist Security Police, which became apparent with the assumption of power in 1933, had to include as a nucleus the creation of an organism with the view towards the vital necessities of the people and without consideration of the individual interest the safeguarding of the communities against all disturbances and destructions. The prerequisite for its organization was the strict coordination of the political and criminal police, which were split through the federal state regulations and which alone could provide the necessary striking power for the struggle against the enemies of the nation and in the service of the commands of the leadership. The foundation for this achievement of restoration were the National Socialist views of the world, the occupation of important positions by proved national socialistic fighters and the inner core of a large part of the police officials which had remained unharmed in spite of all the attempts to rouse them.
The fight against the political, as well as the individual criminal which was the responsibility of the political departments of the police administration and of the criminal police and which is now combined under the term of "Security Police" took a continuously developing form in the execution of its central goal, as well as in its content as in its organization. With the knowledge that the police in the National Socialistic State, of which it is a distinguished representative, must not only be the best friend of the people but also, and just for the same reason, the most pitiless adversary of all the enemies of the nation, the preventive fight against criminals was added to the activities of the security police which was previously mainly punitive and executive. This constitutes a decisive innovation in the general development of the police. The activities of the security police were furthermore considerably supported by the communication service, and partially made possible only by the development of the security service of the Reichsführer SS, which was created upon the assumption of power which came into ever closer personal and organizational contact with the security police in the course of years.
The general development of the police since 1933 was outwardly characterized by:
The Reichs Reconstruction Law [Reichsneuaufbaugesetz] of 1934 (central directive law for the federal states in individual domains).
The merger of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior and the Prussian Ministry of Interior of 1934.
The Führer decree concerning the creation of a Chief of the German Police dated 6/17/1936.
The law about finance measures in the domain of the police of 1937, the German Police official law of 1937.
Within the general development of the police since 1933, the following regulations were of decisive importance for the security police and SD:
Decree of the Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the German Police in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior of 6/26/1936 (Transfer of Direction of the Security Police, newly created from the political, secret state and criminal police to the SS Gruppenführer HEYDRICH as chief of the Security Police.) Decree of the Reich and Prussian Ministers of the Interior concerning appointment of inspectors of the Security Police, dated 9/20/1936,
Decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police of 9/27/1939, concerning the merger of the central bureaus of the security police and the SD along with the Decree of execution of the chief of the Security Police and the SD of the same date concerning the creation of a Central Bureau of Reich Security [RSHA].
The organizational development of the three branches, Secret State Police [Gestapo], Criminal Police, and Security Service [SD] of the Reichsführer SS, which are now merged under the leadership of the Chief of the Security Police and SD took place in its details, as follows:
1. The Secret State Police [GESTAPO]
The first step towards the creation of a Secret State Police replacing the Political Police Forces of the various federal states was undertaken in Prussia by the law concerning the establishment of a Secret State Police, dated 4/26/1933. The same day a circular decree was issued by the Prussian Ministers of the Interior regulating the tasks and responsibilities of the Secret State Police and establishing a State Police Bureau in each government district of Prussia as a subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau. The creator and Chief of the Secret State Police in Prussia was Prime Minister Hermann GÖRING. The State Police Bureaus were separated from their organizational connection with the District Government or the police administrations of the State and appointed as independent authorities of the Secret State Police, in the spring of 1934 by a circular decree of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Secret State Police.
Parallel to that development in Prussia, the Reichsführer SS Heinrich HIMMLER created in Bavaria, the Bavarian Political Police, and also suggested and directed in the other federal states outside of Prussia the establishment of Political Police. The unification of the Political Police, of all the federal states, took place in the spring of 1934 when Hermann GÖRING appointed Reichsführer SS Heinrich HIMMLER, who had meanwhile been nominated as Commander of the Political Police Forces of all the federal states possible. The Prussian law about the Secret State Police, dated 2/10/1936, then summed up the developments hitherto and determined the position and responsibilities of the Secret State Police in the executive regulations issued the same day.
A new decisive chapter of the development began with the appointment of the Reichsführer SS as Chief of the German Police by means of the Decree of the Führer mentioned above dated 6/17/1936, and the nomination which followed of SS Gruppenführer Maj Gen HEYDRICH, who up to then, had been Chief of the Secret State Police Bureau and Chief of the Central Security Bureau of the SS, as Chief of the Security Police (Secret State Police and Criminal Police). The term "Secret State Police" was decreed by the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police on 8/28/1936 in the process of establishing uniformity for all the political police forces of the federal states and their organization adapted to the one existing in Prussia by the creation of State Police Bureaus. The Chiefs of the State Police Bureaus assumed the functions of the political executive with the current "Oberpraesident" (later on also with the Reich Governor), that is the president of the Government, according to the decree of the Reich and Prussian Ministers of the Interior, dated 9/20/1936.
On the basis of these forms of organization and with the help of the powers bound up with them, the fight against the open and hidden political enemies of the National Socialist peoples State was taken up by the Secret State Police after the assumption o power and is still being tried on today. Its activity is not only limited to solving political crimes already committed or to seizing their perpetrators, but they are equally interested in the prevention of these crimes, thus eliminating these dangers for the community at their very start. Constant investigation and observation of the enemies of the State and quick action in the case of recognition or after commitment of the act, thus go hand in hand. The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks, contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist construction work could be executed in the past ten years without any serious attempts of interference by the political enemies of the nation.
2. The Criminal Police
The subordination of the Criminal Police of the Reich under the Chief of the Security Police, as decreed on 6/26/1936 became the fundamental basis for the uniform development throughout all Germany of the Criminal Police, which had been organized differently in all the federal states up to this time, namely for the establishment of the Reich Criminal Police in its present form of organization. The circular decree of 9/20/1936 stated the first fundamental regulations for the reorganization of the Criminal Police of the State, separating the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau, in locality as well as function, from the Police Presidency in Berlin and charging it with the professional direction of the Criminal Police of all the German federal states, State as well as communal. The Reich Central Bureau for the struggle against the international and professional criminals as well as against habitual instinctive criminals, which was attached to the State Criminal Police Bureau, was particularly characterized in the course of this process by its close relationship to the practices of the Criminal Police.
The whole territory of the Reich was simultaneously divided into Criminal Police Bureaus on the basis of criminal geographical delineation of spheres of competence in place of the State Criminal [Police] offices. The new spheres occasionally combined several criminal police offices. Insofar as Criminal Police District Offices are not affiliated to State Police Administrative Offices, local duties falling within criminal police jurisdiction are to be taken care of by the crime sections of these State Police Administrative Officers.
In the course of further organizational development, the title of Reichskriminalpolizeiamt [Reich Criminal Police Bureau] was conferred on the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau through a decree of 7/16/1937. This bureau was directly subordinated to the Chief of Security Police.
This newly created organizational system rendered possible the successful activity of the German Criminal Police, which also became increasingly more perfect in technical fields. From then on Criminal Police did not limit itself to repressive activity, but paid much attention to preventive combatting of crime on the basis of national protective ideology. The correctness of planning and development is demonstrated most clearly in the decline of criminality in the subsequent period.
3. The Security Service of the Reichsführer SS (SD)
Recognizing that accurate knowledge of the enemy, of his methods and aims, is one of the most important bases of any successful struggle the Reichsführer SS created an intelligence service organization as early as 1932 under the then SS-Standartenführer (Colonel) Reinhard HEYDRICH. From the beginning members of the SS were the full-time agents of the SD, which had emerged from the SS.
After the seizure of power the leaders of the National-Socialist movement felt the necessity for current objective information about newsworthy events. This caused the NSDAP to issue an ordinance on 6/9/1934 which merged all information facilities then existing within the Party organization with the SD, and declared the latter to be sole Party information service. The original task of intelligence coverage of the enemy was thereby expanded to general intelligence activity.
In the course of the development as a whole, an increasingly closer cooperation of the SD with the offices of the Security Police resulted as a matter of course. The successful combatting of all activity hostile to the state by the Security Police can be traced back to a considerable extent to the intelligence groundwork of the SD. In addition the field of activity of the SD was progressively expanded, because top Reich authorities delegated to the SD in a series of agreements the task of informing these authorities about the effects of official measures upon popular morale. These agreements also regulated the details of cooperation between these top Reich authorities and the SD. Today the exploration of the situation in all fields of life from the information point of view is incumbent upon the Security Service (SD) of the Reichsführer SS, with special consideration of the morale factors and repercussions among the population. The results of its variegated and responsible activity transmit an objective, always up-to-date picture of the situation to the leading authorities of Party and State. In addition they form valuable hints for current planning of the competent authorities.
The organizational structure within which the SD became active during the first years of its existence and was headed by the Chief of the Main Security Bureau of the SS, to whom in turn the regional sub-divisions were subordinate. The elimination of SD-Oberabschnitte in 9/1939 resulted in direct functional connection between the SD-Abschnitte, as the regional sub-divisions were now termed, and the Main Security Bureau as central authority. The current close personal and organizational connection between the SD and the Security Police resulted from the Decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German police, dated 9/27/1939. This Decree amalgamated the central authorities of the security police and of the SD, and vested it in the newly-created Chief of Security Police and SD, and above him in the Reich Main Security Bureau. Since that time the SD-(Leit)-Abschnitte and their subordinate offices have been under the jurisdiction of the Reich Main Security Bureau.
The above description of the history of the Secret State Police [Gestapo] of the Criminal Police and of the Security Service [SD] of the Reichsführer SS only recounts the external stages of development. It can express only incompletely the great degree of personal initiative and unlimited National-Socialist prowess in work and organization which was brought to bear by the authoritative leadership personalities in building up the undertaking. However, the result of this concentrated effort is such that in these decisive times an apparatus was created on an entirely new basis which was from the beginning a necessary and effective instrument in the hands of the nation's leadership and proved that it is capable of protecting the national community against protracted interference with communal life. It is obvious that these entire tasks could be handled only by men who are deeply rooted in National Socialist ideology, and who are ready to devote not only their total working capacity, but also their life to the comprehensive realization of the National Socialist idea in the course of the fulfilment of their duties which is frequently dangerous. Because of this, and according to the wish of the Reichsführer SS and of their late Chief, General Heydrich, it is the duty of the Security Police and of the SD not only to form a perfectly working administrative machinery, but in addition it is their duty to form a battle community sworn to a common ideology and brotherhood. The currents of strength generated by this battle community in fulfilling its difficult task of continuous combatting of everything inimical to the nation, a task which has to be accomplished in inglorious silence, shape the National Socialist idea ideologically. These currents of strength also shape the basic law of the SS, from the members of which Security Police and SD are recruited in increasing measure. Tangibly they shape the continuous work in thoroughly training the individual. Ideological schooling, comradeship, professional education and physical fitness are inculcated without cease; they take up a prominent position side by side with the professional daily routine proper, especially in the schools of the Security Service and the SD established for these purposes.
Trained in such a manner, Security Police and SD could do justice even to the great additional requirements, which the four year battle for the living rights of the German people brought in its train. In all battle areas, and in all occupied territories, the men of the Security Police and of the SD stand side by side with the Armed Forces. In a struggle full of sacrifice they devote all their strength to keep the rear of the front free, and to help make secure German reconstruction in occupied territory. In the offices of the home front, on the other hand, the men employed make certain that the fight for life of the German people is not impaired by criminal elements. Through increased effort they equalize the additional tasks and the additional work, which are necessitated by the war as such and especially by the reduced number of personnel due to drafting of men for front-line duty. All faithful to the words of the Reichsführer SS, to do more than their duty in time of war.
"Document 1689-PS: Czechoslovakia Fights Back: A Document of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs Published by American Council on Public Affairs Washington DC, 1943 [partial copy]" pp. 198-99.
[Pages 110, 111, and 114]
On 12/2/1942, a special order issued by the "Protectorate" Ministry of Agriculture excluded the Jews not only from buying unrationed foods, but even from receiving them as a gift from any private citizen. The same order has left it to the discretion of the Ministry of Agriculture to exclude Jews entirely or partially from obtaining rationed food, thus exposing the remnants of the Jewish community to death by starvation.
One hour on five days a week has been allowed for shopping, this hour being fixed at a time when after, first the Germans and then the Czechs, have done their buying, the small stocks are mostly exhausted.
After the occupation of Poland, Hitler designated Lublin and its immediate district as a reservation in which all Jews from the occupied countries were to be concentrated. Some 2000 Jews of Moravska Ostrava were the first to be sent there. A year later, at the end of 10/1941, 48000 Czech Jews were already picked out for deportation. Men between the ages of sixteen to fifty were sent to labor camps, while their womenfolk and children were taken to special settlements in Eastern Poland.
At the end of 6/1942, deportation to Poland began on a large scale. The Gestapo was instructed to prepare by every Monday and Thursday contingents of a thousand Jews each. Those to leave were given a day or two's notice. The Nazi records of the Jewish registration were out of date and it often happened that the call-up cards were addressed to persons who had died years ago, had left the country or had already been deported. In such cases the daily quota of a thousand was made up by people simply picked up from the streets or dragged from their beds at night-time. The Gestapo took a delight in so selecting the deportees that families were split, wives separated from their husbands, and even small children from their mothers. Those left at home were never allowed to bid farewell to their relatives or friends. But sometimes, on early summer mornings, their Czech friends could watch those gloomy processions of the outlawed marching to the railway station and passing for the last time through the streets of Prague.
At the end of 1942, no Jewish life in Bohemia and Moravia was left. Out of the 90000 Czech Jews more than 72000 have been deported.
Although the deportations went on, leaving at the end of 9/1942, only some 20000 Jews in Slovakia, most of them in ghettos the Nazis were still not satisfied. At the end of 11/1942, a special committee was set up to consider the final expulsion of the remainder of the Jews. By then, out of the 95000 Jews, 76000 had already been deported.
Copies distributed to Gauleiter Dr. Wilhelm von Allwoerden [?] 11 Aug. H Berlin, 8/9/1943
The Reich Minister of the Interior Pol. SVA I No 844/43
To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory in Berlin W8 For the information of the other Reich ministers
Subj: Law on the treatment of enemies of the society In addition to my letter of 3/19/1942Enclosures: 55.
After the draft of the law on the treatment of enemies of the society has been completely rewritten, I am sending the enclosed new draft with the consent of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack and ask that the law be approved in a circulatory manner. The necessary number of prints is attached.
The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration has again agreed on the importance of the law in war, considering the existing directions for curbing the making of laws and the administrative activity. Furthermore I refer to my letter of 3/19/1942 and to the reasons attached to the draft.
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Berlin W 35, 12/22/1943
Teleletter To the Reich Minister of the Interior for the information of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory and the other Reich Ministers.
Subject: Law on the Treatment of Enemies of Society. To Pol. SVA 1 No. 844/43 of 8/9/1943
I have basic objections against the draft of the law. In Par 2, Dir. 4, I assume that the police will inform the penal prosecuting authority also of such cases in which it does not considerfor legal or actual reasonsthat a punishable act has been committed or can be proved, especially if it wants to connect the behavior of the culprit with consequences adverse to him. The penal prosecuting authority should be able to determine also in dubious cases whether the possibility of penal prosecution exists. I therefore suggest to formulate Par. 2, Dir. 4, of the law draft about as follows:
"If there is suspicion of a punishable act by enemies of society, the police will inform the penal prosecuting authorities about it."
Because, in the framework of the draft, the basic regulation of the connections between penal justice and police has become mandatory, an exact definition of the respective competence seems necessary to me. In the expected executory decree it should hence be made clear, as it was already provided in the draft of the executory decree (Par. 4) for the first draft of the law, that police actions because of the same matter are not admissible anymore if a court has freed (a party) because of proven innocence or lack of proofs, except for custody measures in case of freeing for lack of proofs. Furthermore, it should be determined that the police can not take other than custody measures after the penal term of a person judged by a court because of the same facts. Further, I think it necessary to have a fundamental clearing of the question whether, and if soto what degree police measures are admissible after refusal of a decree of custody or other judicial directions, regardless of the reason for refusal.
Finally, I mention for consideration if the words "the regime of the time of the system" in Dir. 3 of the official document, taken from the newspaper language, could not be replaced to advantage by another expression.
I especially direct your attention to the printing mistake in the last but two dir. of the reason, in which in the third line it should probably read "protective surveillance" instead of "protective custody".
Rosenberg attested: chancellery employee
Offic. Stamp
Rec'd: 1025/44g encl: 8/1/1944 Copy SECRET II 1C
Evacuation Report of District Commissariat of Kasatin [Illegible notes] REPORTER: District Commissar STEUDEL, Kasatin. Time of report: 11/8-12/28/1943.
1. The military situation in 11-12/1943.
Immediately following the capture of Kiev by the Soviets on 7 November, the district town of Wassilkow as well as the important railroad center Fastow, belonging to the district of Wassilkow, fell into enemy hands, (8-9 November). The following day, the Soviets attempted to advance farther along the rail line Fastow-Kasatin They succeeded in capturing with weak armored and infantry spearheads in one move, the stations of Kozanka, Popilnva and Browki, situated along this line, and to execute further sudden advances past the station of Czernorudka. For this reason the district of Wtscheraische had to be evacuated on 15 November. I withdrew the Germans committed there to the district of Rushin situated 20 kilometers to the South. The withdrawal was effected according to plan and without friction, with all implements, after all camps had been evacuated previously; the cattleabove all the valuable breeds (Oxen and colt stables) led back. German tractors and farm machines transported away and all businesses had been crippled. (Fundamentally, the chief command of the 4th Armored Army, in whose zone these battles took place, had ordered that in the district West of the Dnjepr, in contrast to the ones to the East, no destructions of farm goods or businesses should take place).
The results of the hereby described military events between 8 November and 20 December were as follows:
In.a conference, called by me, of the authoritative leaders of all offices of the civilian sector on 8 November, I ordered the immediate start of, and discussed in detail, measures for the most far-reaching decentralization. At the same time, the leaders of all vital, above all of the economic food industry, were informed to effect, in case of an evacuation, the crippling of factories (by taking away important and hard-to-replace machine parts, belts, etc.,) and to prepare this already now. Up till then, however, all factories had to be kept running at full capacity. It should be emphasized here, praisingly, that all measures ordered by me in strictest accordance with the army economic leader [A.W.F.] of the chief command of the 4th Armored Army, were executed by the responsible parties and their staff in an exemplary manner, and with the greatest conscientiousness. Although the delivery of cars, for conceivable reasons, did meet with considerable difficulties, we succeeded, due to the splendid cooperation of the authoritative Reich German organizations of military and civil government, in transporting to the West approximately 80 of the most vital goods (grain, cattle, sugar, etc), or in making them available for the armed forces for immediate use as provisions for the fighting troops.
5. In the midst of the conditions, almost restored to normal, I received a call on the eve of the 25th of December from the Army according to which the Soviets with super or forces of tanks and motorized troops, had exerted a strong renewed pressure on the line of Kotscherowo-Brusilow-Fastow and along the street Kiev-Shitomir with the main advance in a South West direction. Shortly afterwards, the long distance calls, as per attached inclosure number 2, was put through according to which the able-bodied male population in the ages between 15 and 65 as well as the cattle had to be led back in the direction East of the line Kililowka-Berkitschew-Shitomir. The transporting of the able-bodied population was charged to the military authorities by the chief quartermaster of the army, while beginning with the morning of 26 December. I discussed and ordered in detail, during an immediate conference for the whole district the shipment of all the cattle. This action started successfully on that day according to plan, while the discussions over the seizure of the male population were not yet concluded in the afternoon hours of the 26th of December and no positive measures of any kind were taken.
Enclosure II SECRET
Kdt. rueckw. A. Geb. 585 Abt. Qu. Nr. 452/43 geh.
In the field 12/25/1943 To the District Commissar KASATIN
1. The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age and the cattle are to be shipped back from the district East of the line Belilowka-Berditschen-Shitomir (places excluded).
4. Destruction of farm goods and factories in all places must not take place, only a crippling of factories for several weeks will be executed by army economic leader (A.Wi.Fue.).
In charge [signature illegible] Lt. General
Distribution: See original.
Enclosure III
High Command of the 4th Armored Army 0. Qu/Qu 2 Nr. 1662/43/ secret Army Headquarters, 12/26/1943
Re: Evacuation measures.
1. The city of Berditschew is to be evacuated of Reich Germans, German [Volksdeutschen] agencies of the civil government, government of the country, able-bodied population. The cattle is to be taken away. Execution of evacuation measures is charged to the civil government.
4. No destructions are to take place as far as they are not expressly ordered by the armored army. All factories are to be prepared for crippling so that this can be accomplished in the shortest possible time. The electricity and water plants are to be taken over by the technical troops.
6. The same measures are to be prepared for Kasatin in such a way that they can be started at once at the command of the armored army.
For the High Command of the Armored Army
The Chief of the General Staff In charge Original signed MUELLER Colonel, General Staff
Correct: [signature illegible] Lt Colonel, General Staff.
National Socialistic Yearbook 1941 Edited by: Dr. Robert Ley Published by: Central Publishing House of the NSDAP Franz Eher, successor Munich
The program of the NSDAP
The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and accordingly the primary political law of the State. It has been made brief and clear intentionally.
All legal precepts must be applied in the spirit of the party program.
Since the taking over of control, the Führer has succeeded in the realization of essential portions of the Party program from the fundamentals to the detail.
The Party Program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on the 2/24/1920 by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party gathering in Munich and since that day has remained unaltered. Within the national socialist philosophy is summarized in 25 points:
1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples.
2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in reSpect to the other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.
3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance of our people, and colonization for our surplus population.
4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can only be one who is of German blood, without consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race.
5. Whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as a guest, and must be under the authority of legislation for foreigners.
6. The right to determine matters concerning administration and law belongs only to the citizen. Therefore we demand that every public office, of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the county or municipality, be filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting parliamentary economy, office-holding only according to party inclinations without consideration of character or abilities.
7. We demand that the state be charged first with providing the opportunity for a livelihood and way of life for the citizens. If it is impossible to sustain the total population of the State, then the members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled from the Reich.
8. Any further immigration of non-citizens is to be prevented We demand that all non-Germans, who have immigrated to Germany since the 8/2/1914, be forced immediately to leave the Reich.
9. All citizens must have equal rights and obligations.
10. The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals is not to counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result within the framework of the whole for the benefit of all
Consequently we demand:
11. Abolition of unearned (work and labour) incomes. Breaking of rent-slavery.
12. In consideration of the monstrous sacrifice in property and blood that each war demands of the people personal enrichment through a war must be designated as a crime against the people. Therefore we demand the total confiscation of all war profits.
13. We demand the nationalization of all (previous) associated industries (trusts).
14. We demand a division of profits of all heavy industries.
15. We demand an expansion on a large scale of old age welfare.
16. We demand the creation of a healthy middle class and its conservation, immediate communalization of the great warehouses and their being leased at low cost to small firms, the utmost consideration of all small firms in contracts with the State, county or municipality.
17. We demand a land reform suitable to our needs, provision of a law for the free expropriation of land for the purposes of public utility, abolition of taxes on land and prevention of all speculation in land.
18. We demand struggle without consideration against those whose activity is injurious to the general interest. Common national criminals, usurers, Schieber and so forth are to be punished with death, without consideration of confession or race.
19. We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman Law serving a materialistic world-order.
20. The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction of our whole national education program, to enable every capable and industrious German to obtain higher education and subsequently introduction into leading positions. The plans of instruction of all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences of practical life. The comprehension of the concept of the State must be striven for by the school [Staatsbuergerkunde] as early as the beginning of understanding. We demand the education at the expense of the State of outstanding intellectually gifted children of poor parents without consideration of position or profession.
21. The State is to care for the elevating national health by protecting the mother and child, by outlawing child-labor, by the encouragement of physical fitness, by means of the legal establishment of a gymnastic and sport obligation, by the utmost support of all organizations concerned with the physical instruction of the young.
22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a national army.
23. We demand legal opposition to known lies and their promulgation through the press. In order to enable the provision of a German press, we demand, that: a. All writers and employees of the newspapers appearing in the German language be members of the race: b. Non-German newspapers be required to have the express permission of the State to be published. The may not be printed in the German language: c. Non-Germans are forbidden by law any financial interest in German publications, or any influence on them, and as punishment for violations the closing of such a publication as well as the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the non-German concerned. Publications which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary forms which exert a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of organizations opposing the above made demands.
24. We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence or oppose the moral senses of the Germanic race. The Party as such advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding itself confessionally to any one denomination. It combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only succeed from within on the framework: common utility precedes individual utility.
25. For the execution of all of this we demand the formation of a strong central power in the Reich. Unlimited authority of the central parliament over the whole Reich and its organizations in general. The forming of state and profession chambers for the execution of the laws made by the Reich within the various states of the confederation. The leaders of the Party promise if necessary by sacrificing their own lives, to support by the execution of the points set forth above without consideration.
Adolf Hitler proclaimed the following explanation for this program on the 4/13/1928:
Regarding the false interpretations of Point 17 of the program of the NSDAP on the part of our opponents, the following definition is necessary:
"Since the NSDAP stands on the platform of private ownership it happens that the passage" gratuitous expropriation concerns only the creation of legal opportunities to expropriate if necessary land which has been illegally acquired or is not administered from the view-point of the national welfare. This is directed primarily against the Jewish land-speculation companies.
"Document 1709-PS: [Report of Special Delegate for Art Seizures, 7/1943] [partial translation]" pp. 211-213.
[Page 68 Par. 1]
The collection Lubomierski in Lemberg contained among others 31 valuable hand drawings by Albrecht Duerer. An offer made in the spring of 1940 by a special commissioner through the foreign office to the Russian government, to exchange these drawings by Duerer for equally valuable Russian works of arts and literary monument, was refused. On the day of the capture of Lemberg, the special commissioner, Dr. Muehlmann and the museum director Dr. Kudlich went there by order of the Reichmarshal, to conduct a search for the hand drawings. The investigation encountered considerable difficulties, because the Russians had reorganized the system of museums in Lemberg and because the collection Lubomierski did not exist any more.
In the course of further investigations Prof. Gebarowicz of the Bawarowski-museum, who had publicized the drawings in the past, was thoroughly interrogated also. Finally he explained that he kept the drawings carefully hidden from the Russians in the Bawarowski-museum. On demand, he also brought them out from concealment.
After thorough examination, the sequestration was announced, and a regular receipt was issued.
The special commissioner has turned over these hand drawings in 7/1941 to the Reichmarshal in person, who brought them to the Führer into the headquarters, where they still are. By specific order of the Führer, they remain temporarily in his possession.
The following single drawings are affected, which were entered in the supplement of the catalogue (31 drawings on 23 cartons):
Carton I 1. Self portrait 2. 6 pillows
Carton II 3. The young steer
Carton III 4. Nude with mirror 5. Partial sketch of the same figure
Carton IV 6. Nude woman with headscarf in a niche on a sphere
Carton V 7. Nude man with lion 8. Nude man with mirror 9. Attached weak reprint of the same figure
Carton VI 10. Corner ornament with eagle 11. The holy family
Carton VII 12. Drapery study 13. Nude man lying down
Carton VIII 14. Oarsman
Carton IX 15. Horse
Carton X 16. Europa on the steer
Carton XI 17. Corpus Christi
Carton XII 18. Nude woman with a staff
Carton XIII 19. Sampson with the city gates of Gaza
Carton XIV 20. Mary and child 21. Childhead
Carton XV 22. Pictures of the emperors Charlemagne and Sigismund
Carton XVI 23. The holy family in a hut
Carton XVII 24. Study for a Madonna and the head of an old man 25. Two geometric drawings
Carton XVIII 26. Mary with a child in an indicated renaissance hall
Carton XIX 27. Christ as king of the universe
Carton XX 28. Man's head with a cap
Carton XXI 29. Lamentations over Christ
Carton XXII 30. Head of a deer
Carton XXIII 31. Study for an adoration, left kneeling Mary, right Holy Joseph
[Page 77, Par. 148]
Works of art for decorative purposes
On the desire of the Governor General, a number of 2nd and 3rd class art objects was made available to him for exhibition and decorative purposes,Reference Paragraph 141 and 142.The architect Franz Koettgen in Krakau was charged with the execution of this mission, especially the furnishing of Castle Kressendorf and the castle in Krakau. A list was made by the special commissioner, in which all objects, put at the disposal of architect Koettgen, were exactly listed in detail.
During the conference with the architect Koettgen, on 7/30/1942, the latter promised, to continue the inventory, already started by him, more rapidly, and to conclude by the end of 1942 at the latest. He furthermore said he was willing, to provide the special commissioner after the completion of the inventories with a directory of the location of the individual objects. The completeness of the transferred art objects and their careful storing can only be examined after the completion of the inventories.
A copy of the above mentioned lists on the object, put at the disposal of Goettgen is added to the report as enclosure Nr. 8
[Page 80] Of the objects, taken from the depot of the special commissioner in the state library in Krakau as of 8/1/1942, the following were inspected:
I. In Berlin in the depot of the special Commissioner and in the safe of the German Bank:
East German Master 1430 "Picture of the Vesper": Catalogue No. 4, German Master 16th century "Picture of a bearded man": 17, Master von Kappenberg "Mary with child": 27, Dirk Bouts "Annunciation of Mary": 35, Netherlands Master "Lamentation over Christ": 42, Berckheyde "Small Houtpoort in Haarlem": 45, Breughel "Folksfestival": 47, Gerrit Dou "Rembrandt's mother": 51, Pinturicchio "Madonna and child": 138, Raffael "Picture of a young man": 141, Venetian Master "Mary and child": 145, de Largilliere "Portrait of a lady": 158, Further two 2nd class pictures, namely "The lustful old man" (unequal lovers) "Fugger's Portrait".
Supreme SA Command FO No 82/277-38 n.f.D. Ha/Hbl. MUNICH, 11/29/1938 For Use of the Services Only Distributor I
Subject: Measures against the Jews.
The Stabsleiter of the Führer's deputy, in Order No. 189/38 (not to be made public), makes the following announcement:
"In connection with the actions against the Jews arising from the public, valuable objects had to be safe-guarded here and there by the offices of the Party and its branches for the protection of German public property. I order that such objects be turned over at once to the nearest office of the Secret State Police, and receipts be given therefor."
"If, in connection with these actions, the offices of the Party and their branches should become aware or have been aware of thefts, which unfortunately may have occurred, it is to be reported at once to the nearest Police Station. The same is to be done upon the appearance of suspicious objects."
"The offices of the police are to be aided to the fullest extent in accomplishing their assignment."
Chief of the Fuehrungshauptamt: Signed: JUETTNER Obergruppenführer Official /s/ [Illegible] Standartenführer STAMPED: SA Group Kurpfalz 1543 /s/ [Illegible] 11/30/1938
SA der NSDAP
50th Brigade (Starkenburg) Division F Reference No 4309
DARMSTADT, 2 Moosbergstrasse 11/11/1938 Tel. 7042 and 7043 Postal checking account: Frankfurt on the Main 234-38 Bankaccount City Savings Bank 155
To: SA Group Electoral Palatinate [Kurpfalz] Mannheim
The following order reached me at 3 o'clock on 11/10/1938.
"On the order of the Gruppenführer, all the Jewish synagogues within the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set on fire immediately."
"Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged. The action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and plundering are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to reach Brigade Führer or office by 8:30."
I immediately alerted the Standartenführer and gave them the most exact instructions; the execution of the order began at once.
I hereby report that the following were destroyed in the area of:
Standarte 115 1. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Fuchsstrasse destroyed by fire.
3. Synagogue at Ober/Ramstadt interior and furnishings wrecked.
4. Synagogue at Graefenhausen interior and furnishings wrecked.
5. Synagogue at Griesheim interior and furnishings wrecked.
6. Synagogue at Pfungstadt interior and furnishings wrecked.
7. Synagogue at Eberstadt destroyed by fire.
Standarte 145 1. Synagogue at Bensheim destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue at Lorsch in Hessen destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue at Heppenheim destroyed by fire and blown up.
3. Synagogue at Birkenau destroyed by fire.
4. Prayer House Alsbach destroyed by fire.
5. Meeting room Alsbach destroyed by fire.
6. Synagogue at Rimbach furnishings completely destroyed.
Standarte 168 1. Synagogue in Seligenstadt destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue in Offenbach destroyed by fire.
3. Synagogue in Klein-Krotzenburg destroyed by fire.
4. Synagogue in Steinheim on the Main destroyed by fire.
5. Synagogue in Muehlheim on the Main destroyed by fire.
6. Synagogue in Sprendlingen destroyed by fire.
7. Synagogue in Langen destroyed by fire.
8. Synagogue in Egelsbach destroyed by fire.
Standarte 186 1. Synagogue in Beerfelden blown up.
2. Synagogue in Michelstadt furnishings wrecked.
3. Synagogue in Koenig furnishings wrecked.
4. Synagogue in Hoechst i/Odenwald furnishings wrecked.
5. Synagogue in Gross-Umstadt furnishings wrecked.
6. Synagogue in Dieburg furnishings wrecked.
7. Synagogue in Babenhausen furnishings wrecked.
8. Synagogue in Gross-Bieberau destroyed by fire.
9. Synagogue in Fraenk. Crumbach furnishings destroyed.
10. Synagogue in Reichelsheim furnishings destroyed.
Standarte 221 1. Synagogue and Chapel in Gross Gerau destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue in Ruesselheim torn down and furnishings destroyed.
3. Synagogue in Dornheim furnishings destroyed.
4. Synagogue in Wolfskehlen furnishings destroyed.
The Führer of Brigade 50 (Starkenburg) /s/ [Illegible] Brigadeführer Stamped: SA Group Electoral Palatinate (Kurpfalz) 11/11/1938 /s/ [Illegible]
CONFIDENTIAL Notice!
8.35 Oberführer Durein [?] for the area of Brigade 51 reports completion of the matter of the Synagogues.
Everything has been carried out up to Roelsheim [?] near Germersheim. 10 Nov 38 (s) [Illegible]
CONFIDENTIAL Note for Files Telephone call by the Führer of Brigade 50, Darmstadt. Brigadeführer Lucke.
Brigadeführer Lucke reports at 9 o'clock on 11/10/1938: The Jewish church at Darmstadt, the Synagogue at Darmstadt, and the Synagogue at Eberstadt were destroyed by fire. The Synagogue in Darmstadt destroyed and burned out. The Synagogue in Eberstadt destroyed and burned out. The Synagogues in Griesheim, in Graefenhausen and Oberramstadt destroyed. The Synagogue in Bensheim destroyed by fire. The Synagogue in Lorsch near Bensheim destroyed by fire. The Synagogue in Heppenheim blown up. The Synagogues in Rimbach and Birkenau destroyed. The Prayer Hall at Alsbach a.d.B. destroyed. Meeting-room in the Jewish cemetery in Haehnlein destroyed. The Synagogue and Church in Gross-Gerau destroyed by fire. The Synagogue in Ruesselsheim wrecked. In addition, the Synagogue and wooden church in Dornheim were demolished In Offenbach the big Church and the Synagogue were destroyed by fire. Synagogues that may still exist will also be found and destroyed.
Mannheim, 11/10/1938
/s/ LOHMANN Sturmhauptführer
Copied: CONFIDENTIAL Note for Files
Telephone call from Brigade 151, Saarbruecken, by Sturmhauptführer Rossel.
Sturmhauptführer Rossel reports at 9.15 on the morning of 11/10/1938. Tonight the Synagogue in Saarbruecken was set on fire, and the Synagogues in Dillingen, Merzig, Saarlautern, Saarwillingen and Broddorf were also destroyed. Jews were taken into protective custody. The fire departments are occupied with extinguishing the fires. In the area of Standarte 174 all Synagogues were destroyed.
MANNHEIM, 11/10/1938 Copied:
/s/ ZIMMERMANN Standartenführer
CONFIDENTIAL Note for Files
Telephone call from the Führer of Standarte 250, Bruchsal, Standartenführer Ritter von Eberlein.
Standartenführer Ritter von Eberlein reports at 9.00 on the morning of 11/10/1938. In the early morning of 11/10/1938, between the hours of 4.30 and 6.00 o'clock, the Synagogue at Bruchsal burned down to the foundations. The crowd broke all shopwindows of the Jewish stores in the city; the alerted SA put guards before the Jewish stores to prevent plundering. The Rabbi and several prominent Jews had to be taken into protective custody for their own safety. This was done by the Gestapo. The Synagogue at Philippsburg also burned down at the same time. The infamous Rabbi Neuburger, who is known because of his foreign connections was taken into protective custody by instigation of the SA. During the night the Synagogues at Wiesloch, Walldorf and Malsch were also destroyed. The male Jews had to be taken into protective custody for their personal safety. In the area of Sturmbann III/250 the Synagogues at Sinsheim, Neidenstein, Neckar-Bischofsheim, Hoffenheim, Wollenberg and Ittlingen were also destroyed.
Standarte 17 reports by telephone call from Sturmbannführer Then at 10.13 o'clock in the morning of 11/10/1938: The Synagogues at Ludwigshafen and Frankenthal were burned down completely this morning between 7 and 8 o'clock. Several Jewish stores were demolished.
/s/ [Illegible] Standartenführer
"Document 1723-PS: Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [The German Publication Entitled "Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben"] partial [translation]" pp. 219-221.
pp. 430-39.
Security Police
Cooperation of the Party offices with the Secret State Police [Gestapo].
In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the cooperation between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the following and ordain:
1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Führer to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of all kinds directed against both. The successful solution of this mission forms one of the most essential pre-requisites for the unhampered and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in their extremely difficult task, is to be granted support and assistance in every possible way by the NSDAP. The supervision of the Party,itself does not come under the jurisdiction of the Gestapo.
I prohibit all offices of the Party, its organizations and associated groups to conduct investigations and interrogations regarding affairs which concern the Gestapo only. All occurrences of a political criminalistic nature are to be reported without prejudice along Party channels and as ever brought to the knowledge of the Gestapo immediately.
2. The secret state police must report automatically all occurrences of a criminal nature, even if it includes Party Members, to the responsible public prosecutor according to the laws of the National Socialist State, in force for all nationals. In such cases, the State police offices will notify, as before, the county and Gauleiters concerned, of the reports- made to the public prosecutor. Reports will include reasons for the incidents. In the interest of the movement the functionaries [Hoheitstrager] are obliged to suspend, if necessary, the party members, after contacting the responsible Party Court; the latter will hold a public hearing, to decide on the temporary suspension.
Invitation of the leaders of offices in the Security Police and the Security Service to attend Party meetings.
In order to establish closer connections between all the offices of the Party and their organizations and the office leader of the Security Police and SD, the leader of the Party Chancellor asks that they should be invited in the future to all large official meetings of the Party.
The taking over of political offices by officials of the Gestapo
The Secret State police has the mission to safeguard the unhampered development of all forces active in the party and released by it in the National Socialistic State.
Since it is still in a state of being organised and the available officials and employees are very much in demand they are only to be employed in order to take over positions in the Party in as much as it is compatible with their official duties in the Secret State Police.
I, therefore, ask to check in every single case and in close harmony with the department of the Secret State Police concerned, whose leader welcomes the taking over of political functions by officials and employees of the Secret State Police, whether the transfer of political missions into the Party can be justified in the interest of the official obligations of the Secret State Police.
Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party offices
The Chief of the Security Police and SD has issued the annexed decrees of 3/29/1940 and 11/4/1940. It is ordered herewith that departments of the Secret State Police will be obliged to execute the presentation request when the same emanates from the Reichsleiters or the Gauleiters. If the request for presentation originates from subordinate departments of the party it will only be granted if particular interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.
In the future the county administration and local administrations are to direct all requests through the district administration to the responsible department of the Secret State police.
Berlin, 3/29/1940 The Chief of the Security Police and SD I A 1 NR. 102/40176 To all State police departments By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD.
Subject: Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party 11 offices.
Repeated requests by Party offices for presentation to the State Police of Volksgenossen who did not heed the summons of the Party offices, cause the following regulations to be decreed:
1. If the district administration makes the request the same is to be granted as long as no important interests of the State Police interfere.
2. If a party office subordinate to the district administration requests the presentation, the same has to be denied in as far as no important interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.
Signed: HEYDRICH Verified: Schoenbrunn of the Chancellery
Berlin SW 11 11/4/1940
The Chief of the Security Police and SD IB 1 NR 763/40-151 To All State Police Departments By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD
Subject: Presentation to State Police upon request of Party Offices Reference: Decree of 3/29/1940 IA 1 NR 102/40-176
In supplement to my decree of 3/29/1940 I order that presentation requests by Reichsleiters be granted in so far as important interests of the State Police do not interfere.
Signed: HEYDRICH
Protective Custody
Protective custody must be viewed as the strongest measure in order to impressively instruct the Volksgenossen, who maliciously neglect their duties toward the community or endanger the security of the State, that they have to conform themselves to the universal interests and to adapt themselves to State discipline. Therefore it should only serve as a means of combatting real enemies of the Reich, but should never be used for the clarification or punishment of different or insignificant offenses.
An excessive use of protective custody, as well as its infliction without previous indisputable clarification of the state of affairs and the question of guilt, is neither justified with regard to the future of the one involved nor with respect to the reduction of its moral effect.
Therefore it must be expected that protective custody is only to be employed in really pressing and substantial cases.
I request that the county leaders be instructed orally to avoid any written communications; special emphasis on secrecy.
Protective Custody (Regulations)
Through the circular of the 1/25/1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior has issued new regulations regarding the introduction of protective custody. In the following, I announce the wording of this decree for confidential information.
Berlin 1/25/1938
The Reich Minister of the Interior
The following regulations regarding protective custody go into effect on the 2/1/1938. At the same time, the following are rescinded:
a. My decree of 4/12/1934I 3311 A/28.2 along with the supplement of 4/26/1934 and 10 July 1934 (directed to governments of the states and to the Reichstatthalters).
b. My decree of 4/12/1935VI B 757A/3014 along with the supplementary decree of 6/1/1935 VI B 11568/3014 (directed to the governments of the states, Reichstatthalter, Prussian presidents of government districts).
c. My decree of 6/17/1935III P 3311/329 (directed to the state government and the Reichstatthalter.)
d. The decree of office of Secret State Police of 7/3/1934B Nr. 19582 II I D (directed to the presidents of the Prussian government districts).
e. The decree of the Political Police Commander of the Lands of the 9/9/1935B. Nr. 37840/35 II 1 D (direct to the Political police of the states and the Prussian State Police offices).
Article 1 Admissibility
Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against persons who endanger the security of the people and the state through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and state.
Protective Custody shall not be decreed for penal purposes or as a substitute for punitive arrest. Punishable offenses have to be decided finally by the courts.
Article 2 Competence
1. The Secret State Police exclusively is competent for the application of protective custody.
2. Motions in behalf of the application of protective custody have to be directed to the Secret State police through the State police offices. Every motion has to be substantiated in detail; the statements of the arrested person have to be considered in it. A copy of the hearing of the person temporarily apprehended has to be forwarded immediately.
3. Protective custody may only be inflicted if the accused has previously had a hearing on offenses imputed to him.
Article 3 Temporary Arrest
1. The Secret State police bureau, the offices of the State police director and of the State Police are authorized under the provisions of par. 1 to order the temporary arrest of persons:
a. If it is feared that the freedom will be abused for activities hostile to the state.
b. If danger of under-cover activities exists.
c. If there is suspicion of escape.
2. The accused has to be notified at the latest within 24 hours after the arrest. He is to be heard on the grounds for the infliction of the temporary arrest according to protocol.
3. A temporarily arrested person has to be released at the latest after an elapse of 10 days from the day of apprehension if the Secret State police bureau has in the meantime not decreed protective custody (5).
Article 6 Execution
The protective custody has to be executed generally in the State Concentration Camps.
Article 7 Duration
1. Protective custody shall only be upheld as long as it serves its purpose.
2. The Secret State police bureau authorizes release from protective custody. For that reason the bureau investigates periodically but not exceeding 3 months, whether the protective custody should be cancelled. The release must have taken place, at the latest, on the third day after the lifting of the protective custody.
Article 8 Foreigners
As a matter of principle deportation procedure has to be carried out against foreigners who have been taken into protective custody unless particular reasons interfere.
Article 9 Executory Regulations
The Chief of the Security Police issues the necessary regulations for the execution.
"Document 1724-PS: Press Conference on 8/4/1938 Headed by Regional Leader [Gauamtsleiter] Schoeller [translation]" p. 224.
[Page 1, par. 4] The breaking up of the synagogue (information must still be secret) .
On 8/10/1938 at 10 o'clock A. M. the breakup of the synagogues will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will personally set the crane into motion with which the Jewish symbols (Star of David etc.) will be torn down. This should be arranged in a big way. Closer details are still unknown.
The Reichmarshal of the Greater German Reich. V.P. 18727/6/3
Berlin, 10/26/1942 W-8 No. 3, Leipziger Street
Distribution: OKW W.F.St. OKW Wi Amt, OKH Gen.St.d.H. OKW Gen. Qu. Chef d. Gen.St.d. Luftw. Reichsführer SS, Ostmin. Reichsernaehrungsmin. Chef wi Srab Ost Gen. Bev. f. d. Arb. Eins., Org. Todt, Reischsarbeitsdienst, Chefgr. Ernaehrung.
Simultaneously with the intensified combating of gang activities, [Bandentaetigkeit] ordered by the Führer, and with the cleaning up of the Hinterland in particular that behind the Army Group Middle, I request that the following aspects are taken into consideration and that the deductions drawn therefrom are put into practice.
1. During combating of the underground and the combing through of the areas contaminated by them, all the available cattle stock there, must simultaneously be driven off to safe areas. Food supplies are to be evacuated and protected similarly, so that they will no more be accessible to the bands.
2. All masculine and feminine labour which can be considered for some kind of employment, must be seized by force and transported to the plenipotentiary Chief of the Labour Exchange who will employ them in the safe areas of the hinterland or at home. The accommodation of the children in the hinterland camps is to be regulated separately.
3. In the execution of the directives outlined under pars 1 and 2, no regard is to be paid to whether the agricultural or any other production in these areas will suffer or succumb owing to these measures. Since up to now these band infested areas have nothing to show in the way of production anyway, but were directly or indirectly useful to the bands.
I request all authorities concerned, in as far as it is necessary, in mutual agreement, to effect the requisites within their spheres of competence, in order to act according to the directives outlined by me.
About the detailed delimitation of areas an Agreement must be reached between the various head groups of agriculture of the Economy Offices [Wirtschaftsdienststellen].
(signed) Göring attested: Schwimpe Registrar of the Ministry.
"Document 1743-PS: Economic Operations Staff East [partial translation]" pp.
[Page 1]
TOP SECRET Note: Up to mobilization day these instructions are to be treated as "Top secret", as of mobilization day open for "Restricted".
Guiding Principles for the Economic operations in the newly occupied Eastern territories (Green portfolio)
Section I Assignments and organization of the Economy Berlin, 6/1941 Printed at the Armed Forces High Command
Introductory remark. [page 3]
The "green portfolio", Section I, serves the military leadership and the Economic offices for orientation in the Economic assignments in the Eastern territories to be newly occupied. It contains instructions concerning the supplying of the troops from that land and provides the guiding principles for the troops to assist the Economy.
The instructions and guiding principles contained in the "green portfolio" correspond to the military orders issued by the armed forces high command and the branches of the armed forces.
The Major Economic Assignments
The following executions are first of all intended for orientation during the course of operations. But they contain simultaneously the guiding principles, which serve for the duration of the occupation as a fundamental principle. The Economic arrangements necessary in the further progress of the occupation will be released as soon as the great political aim is publicized, which will be determined in connection with the necessary improvement of the German war Economy.
I. In accordance with the commands given by the Führer, all measures are to be taken which are necessary, to bring about the immediate and highest possible exploitation of the occupied territories in favor of Germany. On the contrary all measures are to be refrained or to be held back that could be harmful to this goal.
II. The Exploitation of the territories to be newly occupied must be executed first of all in the realm of food and mineral oil economy. To gain for Germany as much food stuff and mineral oil as possible is the main goal of this action. Aside of that order raw materials are to be transported from the occupied-territories for the German War Economy, insofar as it is technically possible and with a view towards the production to be maintained outside. As far as kind and amount of the factory production to be maintained the occupied territory, to be reconstructed or newly ordered is concerned, this likewise is also in the very first line to be decided according to the needs, provided by the exploitation of the agriculture and the mineral oil Economy for the German War Economy.
For the Economic leadership in the occupied territories the main points are to be clearly outlined in accordance with this. This is valid with regards to the main aim as well as for the individual assignments and those that serve to aid their execution. From that it can be further concluded, that these assignments, that cannot agree with the given basic direction toward the goal, respectively those that may make their retention difficult, must be left out of consideration, no matter if their individual compilation does appear desirable. The conception would be totally of the track, if it would come to the point to uniformly pursue the idea in the occupied territories, that it can be directly restored to order and reconstructed with the greatest expediency. The treatment of the individual districts of the country will have to r be on the contrary, entirely varied. Only those territories must be economically promoted and urgently kept in order in which considerable food and mineral oils can be rendered accessible for us. In other sections of the country, which cannot feed themselvestherefore in big sections of north and middle Russiathe economic operations must be limited to the available supplies.
Which mobilization factories are to be maintained or reconstructed, is reserved for later decision.
III. The individual fields consist of the following [Page 4]: a. Food and agriculture:
1. The main assignments to be accomplished as soon as possible, is the uninterrupted supply of the German troops, in order thereby to relieve the supply situation in Europe and to ease the burden on the means of transport. The entire need of oats for the armed forces is to be taken care of from middle Russia, the main section for the growth of oats, insofar as it cannot be obtained from other occupied territories. In South-Russia it is to be achieved to feed barley and corn instead of oats.
2. The main weight in procuring of food stuff for the domestic economy has to be placed on grain and oil fruits. The surplus of the crop that can be obtained and stocks in the southern territories are to be secured by all means, the proper handling of the harvest is to be watched, the removal into agricultural deficient Middle and North Russia has to be stopped ruthlessly, insofar as exceptions are not ordered or made necessary in order to feed the troops.
b. The main weight as far as industrial raw materials are concerned, is to be placed on mineral oil. Under these measures, which do not serve the food management, all tasks connected with the production and shipment of mineral oil, will have first priority, by all means. For the execution of the decrees in the mineral oil field, especially to be issued for the Caucasus, the Continental Oil Company will be appointed.
The industries which provide for the functioning in the German interest, of agricultural production in surplus territories, the production of mineral oil and raw material production, are to be put into operation immediately.
d. In order to tackle the transportation problem in the German interest, particular attention is to be paid to
1. Street buildings in South territories and the thoroughfares,
2. The extension of the railroad tracks, especially the building of two track lines in the most important traffic districts,
3. The improvement of canals, unloading facilities in the inland waterways, especially in the North and South traffic,
4. Rebuilding of harbor facilities.
Organisation of the Economy [Page 5]
The Reichsmarschall has formed the "Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost" which is under his immediate jurisdiction and which will be run by Staatssekretaer Koerner, as his representative, for the uniform management of the Economy administration in the zone of operations and in administration districts, to be established later. For the representation of the military interests, for the preparation and for the duration of the military operations, the Chief of the War Economy and Armament Office, General of the Infantry Thomas, has the authority which he exercises as a Member of the Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes Ost.
The directives of the Reichsmarschall include all phases of the Economy incl. food and agriculture. They will be carried out by the subordinate economy agencies (see B).
The orders of the "Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes 0st" will be transmitted by the Chief of the Wi Rue office to the advanced "Wirtschaftsstab Ost" in the occupied territory which will be located during the operations in the vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu.
B. Organization of the Economy in the zone of operations.
The subordinate Economy agencies of the "Wirtschaftsstab Ost" are, as far as they are active in the zone of operation, assigned to the Command agencies of the Army and militarily under their jurisdiction, namely:
a. In the rear area of the army:
One each economy inspection team with the Commanders of the army rear area,
One each of several economy Commands with the security divisions,
One group IV Wi each with the field administration headquarters.
b. in the Army zone:
One each group IV Wi [V.O. Wi Rue Office] with the AOK's [Army high commands]
One each group IV Wi with the field administration headquarters, who have advanced into the Army zone and who are under the jurisdiction of the AOK's, also in case of need, economy commands advanced into the Army zone militarily under the jurisdiction of the AOK's.
C. Organization of the Economy for the political Administration districts.
Regulation will follow later by the Reichsmarschall.
The execution of the economic detailed tasks [Page 9].
1. Within the food economy, the procurement of grain and oil
. containing plants is the foremost task. All measures for this will be taken with a view of long duration (bringing in of the harvest, safe storage, preparation and cultivation of the fields for autumn, to make available manpower and machines, the seed, fertilizer, throttling of the consumption of the domestic population. As much use as possible, is to be made of the setting up of simple community kitchens.)
The supplying of the troops from the land [Page 14].
As far as the troops have to be supplied from the land, attention is called to the following:
I. Food, Clothes, housing needs and consumer goods.
2. The food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes found in the zone of combat and in the rear areas, are in the first place at the disposal of IVa in order to satisfy the immediate needs of the troops. (notice par. 3)
3. In order to facilitate the possibility of transfer of food stocks at a later date, the required supplies for the immediate needs of the troops, are if possible not to be taken from stocks which are in a general favorable locality for the shipment to Germany. (At railroad stations and waterways, in harbor, especially baltic harbor, the border states, in the vicinity of the German borders.)
4. All food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes stocks which have not been taken over in the zone of combat and the Army rear areas by IVa and its agencies for the immediate use of the troops, will be put at the disposal of IV Wi, who thereby will be responsible for the care and Transfer to the economy agencies next in line.
5. In the Army rear area the economy agencies who are taking over the preliminary work done by IV Wi will be charged with reconnaissance, security and care of the food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes stocks. The assignment to the troops will be made through the Wi agencies to the permanent local food supply agencies, who will determine the requirements of all troops of the different branches and report them to the local competent economy agencies. These will regulate the supply demands.
II. Fuel and tireSA The troops will resort to the stocks found by them. Only in an emergency can be used: a. stocks of the gas, water, electricity and mine facilities b. gasoline and lubricants for farm and vital Industries c. stocks of the motor tractor stations.
War-Booty, Services for pay, Army booty, prize [Page 19].
1. Although according to the Hague Convention the entire movable property of the enemy country can be taken away without compensation, however for the time being only the movable property of the enemy army shall be treated as booty. Other movable property of the state may however be used by the troops in case of need, it is however to be treated as private property and to be paid for in case of use or acquisition.
2. The payment is to be made in case of values up to 1000 RM in Reichskassennotes, amounts exceeding 1000 RM by issuance of receipts.
Receipts may be issued by every agency in the rank of battalion or higher, unless exceptions have to be made due to a situation of the fighting or in case different directives have not been given by the OKH.
3. When taking over property for which there is no owner a receipt will be given to the Senior member of the community or a report will be made to the field administration headquarters.
4. With the establishment of the Field administration headquarters [Feldkommandanturen] and the permanent local economy agencies, the latter will be charged, in connection with the military agencies, with the procurement and making available the requirements of the troops from the Economy. In urgent cases the troops may even then secure their immediate needs independently. If possible, the local competent Field administration headquarters will be notified in such a case.
Raw materials, Management of goods [Page 23]. An exact regulated production and distribution of goods by interpolation of special merchandise pools will be out of question as far as the new territories to be occupied are concerned, with the exception perhaps of the Baltic states.
C. All raw materials, processed and half processed goods, useful to us will be withdrawn from the market. This will be initiated by IV Wi's and the economy agencies through suitable measures such as appeals and orders, through decrees for confiscation or through military guard or both.
Money and Credit system [Page 24].
2. Gold reserves and foreign currency are to be secured. Further action will be taken by the Economy command upon notification.
5. Reichskreditkassen will be established as soon as possible. They are personally and in fact under the jurisdiction of the Chief administration of the Reichskreditkassen in Berlin. The Reichskreditkassen are charged with the regulation of the Money and Credit system. They will discharge their duties with Reichskreditkassen notes which will be issued in 50, 20, 5, 2, 1 and 0.50 RM denominations. The Reichskreditkassen notes are legal tender along with the currency of the country. The ratio of the Reichsmark in relation to the currency of the Country will be fixed through decrees by the authorities in charge.
The Reichskreditkassen notes serve as well the purpose to keep the economy of the occupied country intact, as far as this is important for us in the interest of peace and order, as well as to satisfy and balance the money requirements of the German troops. The first will be achieved by granting credits to industrial and other enterprises also to financial institutions or also to state and district administrations, if the granting of credits is in the German interest (compare 3).
The financial institutions of the occupied countries are also to be induced to open accounts with the Reichskreditkassen.
The Army has been ordered to pay its troops, after they cross the border, only with Reichskreditkassen notes or with the currency of the country and to use German change only in the smallest denominations of 10, 5, 2 and 1 Reichspfenning if the foreign change is not available. The money in the hands of the soldiers at the time of the invasion, in the amount of more than 0.50 RM, has to be exchanged into Reichskreditkassen notes at the nearest Reichskreditkasse by the Finance office of the troops.
6. The Army has the order to see to it that the soldiers on their part pay in the occupied territory only with Reichskreditkassen notes or in the currency of the foreign country at the established rate of exchange. A decree will be issued in due time to the effect that in the occupied territory along with the currency of the foreign country, the Reichsmark in the form of Reichskreditkassen notes will also be a legal tender and what the rate of exchange will be.
7. The maintenance of the rate of exchange of the Reichskreditkassen notes is especially important. The way of their acceptance by the population is therefore carefully to be observed. Should any difficulties arise of the kind that the population refuses to accept Reichskreditkassen notes at all or only to another than the fixed rate of exchange, so if necessary it must be counteracted by punishment. The Economy agencies will report about such incidents.
To the maintenance of the rate of exchange pertains also that in case of subscription to forced loans and also when selling merchandise to the population not only the currency of the foreign country is demanded, but also Reichskreditkassen notes will be accepted at the rate of exchange by us.
9. The Reichskreditkassen will work in closest co-operation with the Economy agencies. They have, notwithstanding the fact that they are under the jurisdiction of the Chief administration of the Reichskreditkassen, to bring in line their measures with the intentions of the Economy inspector with regard to the Money and Credit system.
Foreign Trade and Exchange [Page 25].
With regard to the question of Trade and Exchange between the occupied territories and third countries is to be taken into account, that all surplus of goods are in principle destined for German consumption. So far as removal is not possible, the goods will be, for the time being, stocked and secured, and be held ready for later removal. Therefore trade between the occupied territories and third countries is for the time being, fundamentally not possible. Directives for carrying on trade at a later date, with third countries in the interest of Germany, will be given as soon as the situation is clearer.
Price Control [Page 26].
A decree or announcement of a most simple character will prohibit the raise of prices and other compensations (also wages) and make it a punishable offense. This is only a temporary solution. A change of prices which are subject to political conditions will have to be considered.
For agricultural products, the following rates are fixed, which may not be exceeded in the occupied territories.
The IV Wi and the economy agencies will take care of their publication. Food purchases for the troops as well are to be made at the established prices only.
1. Field products, prices for 1 dz: Wheat: 140 Ruble, Rye: 120, 100% Grain: 145, Barley: 110, Oats: 120, Corn: 100, Peas: 160, Buckwheat: 130, Potatoes: 50, Hay: 30, Straw: 15
2. Processed Products, prices for 1 dz: 80% Wheat flour: 200 Ruble, 85% Rye flour: 155, Sugar: 400
3. Animals (living): Cattle (for each dz.): 500 Ruble, Hogs (for each dz.): 600, Calves (for each dz.): 250, Sheep (for each dz.): 200
4. Dairy products: Milk (each 1.) 1 Ruble, Butter (each kg.) 44
"Document 1746-PS: Conference between Field Marshal List and Representatives of the Bulgarian General Staff (Agreement between Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania for Attacking Greece and Eventually Turkey) [translation]" pp. 272-274.
Dated 2/8/1941
[Page 1, Line 5-14:] Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme CommandGeneral Field Marshal Listin connection with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war.
[Page 1, Line 19Page 2, Line 24:] 1. During the operation of the German troops against Greece or Turkey, the Bulgarian army will not be committed in an offensive way against the two mentioned countries, according to an agreement between the two governments. It will be reinforced, in order to safeguard the new order on the Balkan.
2. Up to the arrival of German troops on the Bulgarian South and Southeast border, the Bulgarian army will alone defend its territory with its own troops for the beginning, with about the following deployment:
at least 6 Bulgarian divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border
sufficient forces for the protection of the border, on the Greek border,
reinforced border protection on the Yugoslavian border
Later on, the Bulgarian army is also responsible for adequate protection along those fronts where German forces will not become offensive.
The mobilization and the deployment of these forces may start immediately in a camouflaged way. However, in order that these measures will have the desired effect, the deliveries to Bulgaria must be fulfilled immediately by Germany (enclosure I).
The German supreme command will do everything in its power, so that its troops will appear on the Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Greek border in sufficient numbers in the shortest time.
For this purpose, from the beginning a sufficient amount of German forcesmainly armored and motorized divisionswill be moved in the shortest time behind the Bulgarian border protection troops. This move will start with the deployment of the two armored divisions which already are in the Dobrudscha as well as with the armored and motorized divisions which are in Walachia. The other forces provided for the operations, that means more infantry and armored divisions, will follow behind, depending on weather, road, and bridge situation.
[Page 3, Line 3-12:] 3. The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned.
The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration, when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria in order to assure the success of the military operations.
[Page 3, Line 13Page 4, Line 27:] 4. In order to protect Bulgaria from any possible enemy before and after the beginning of the operations, the German supreme command will take the following measures:
a. Against Turkey: From the beginning, sufficient German forces, mainly armored divisions, will be thrown against the Turkish border behind the Bulgarian defensive front. At the same time, the German air force will stand ready for active defense.
If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, while the German operations against Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian army will defend itself, supported by sufficient German forces. The German supreme command will take all necessary measures immediately, in order to beat and throw back the Turkish army with German troops, so that an extended defense by Bulgarian troops will be avoided on the Turkish front.
The same also goes for Greece, if the Greeks should attack Bulgaria during the German operations against Turkey.
b. Against Greece: Motorized advance units shall thrust immediately against the Greek-Bulgarian border as fast as possible, in order to stand there as support for the protection of the Bulgarian border.
c. Against Yugoslavia: If Yugoslavia should attack, the columns of the German infantry divisions would take over the protection against the West, at first, which are deployed on the right flank to the rear. Other German forces would get at Yugoslavia from another side, too. It is assumed in this case, that a reinforced Bulgarian border protection exists also along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border.
d. Against Russia: Sufficient German forces are ready on the German Eastern border, to be used for any purpose. Moreover, German instructor troops are available in Rumania, in addition to the Rumanian army.
e. Against landing attempts: The German troops are in a position to take a hand at any time in the defense against a possible landing on the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with the air force. Besides, the supreme command of the army List will make its suggestions at the competent German navy office, in order to strengthen the protection of the two ports Varna and Burgas, according to the already known wishes of the Bulgarian supreme command.
The Bulgarian army will also do its part to guarantee the protection of the two ports by providing forces there.
[Page 4, Line 32Page 5, Line 27:] 6. The supply of the German troops on their march through Bulgaria and during their operations against Greece or Turkey will be provided from their own German stocks. However, in order to relieve the railroad and transportation system, especially with regard to feeding facilities, assistance from the Bulgarian side is necessary. This assistance will only be within the limits of the so-called "Contingents" [Kontingent]. The details about the installation of the necessary dumps, about purchases, payment of work, etc., as well as export and import control, will be regulated by a special commission.
[Remark in pencil] (L IV Is taken care of)
7. It will be necessary to use the Bulgarian national installations (railroad, postal system, etc.), for the purposes of the German armed forces, as far as it will be bearable for the Bulgarian economy. The details about it will be regulated by the special commissions which are already in Sofia. It is presumed that especially the railroad net and the rolling stock will be placed at the disposal of the German army for its requirements. For that purpose it is necessary that the Bulgarian railroad receives an extra allowance of about 100 locomotives, 1500 freight cars and 30 km rail material, in order to satisfy all requirements of the Bulgarian army, the Bulgarian economy and the German army. Operation and management of the Bulgarian national railroad, postal and telegraphic service are to remain in Bulgarian hands. Transportation required by the German army will be organized by the Bulgarian general staff. The details about the service of the railroads, postal and telegraphic systems will be discussed and regulated by a special commission
[Page 6, Line 6-11:] 10. The activity of the counter intelligence service [Abwehr Dienst] of the German and Bulgarian general staffs is already regulated by a special commission.
11. The question of command function in Bulgaria could not yet be finally settled. The German high command will come back to this question in the near future.
[Page 6, Line 15-26:] 13. Questions which might come up later will be taken care of by further conferences.
14. The conditions laid down above, as far as political questions are concerned, will be in effect only after the approval by the German supreme command of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the preparations for the execution of the operations will be made with all energy, regardless of the above fact.
In order to enable the Bulgarians to carry out in time the last preparations for the deployment, it is necessary that the Bulgarian general staff should be informed of the crossing of the border by the Germans 10 days ahead of time.
PART II Conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation n Yugoslavia. Dated 3/27/1941
[Page 1Page 4, Line 1:] W F St
Berlin, 3/27/1941 Top Secret 1st copy W F St 2nd copy L 3rd copy W Kr G
Only for general officers To be transmitted by officers only. Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia [stamp] [several pencil marks and initials] OKW/W F St Dept L (I M I) 3/29/1941 No 44391/41 top secret
Present: Führer, Reich Marshal El Chief OKW, Chief W F St, Major General Bodenschatz, Colonel Schmundt, Commander von Puttkamer Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff Major von Below, Major Christian
Later on the following persons were added: Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H,), Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H), Colonel Hensinger, Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth, Reich Foreign Minister, Ambassador Hewel, Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Waldan, Colonel Schmidt, Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.
The Führer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which is always inclined to start a coup d'etat. In the present time, the country had only one strong man, namely Stojodinowitsch, and Regent Prince Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage.
The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.
The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted any how in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.
It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Rumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a message will still be addressed to the Duce.
Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time.
In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa-operation will have to be postponed up to 4 weeks.
The military operations are to be carried out in the following way:
1. Begin the operation Marita as early as possible with the limited aim to capture Greek-Thracia and the basin of Saoloniki and to win the high terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march [Ausholen] across Yugoslav territory.
2. Push from neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania.
3. Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction towards Nis, then towards Belgrad, in cooperation with
4. Stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and Klagenfurt in direction South-East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslav army.
[Page 5, Line 3-9:] 5. The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrad in attacks by waves; besides the air force has to support the advance of the army. For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground installations.
[Page 6, Line 7-12] The Führer orders the immediate starting of all preparations. He expects the plans of the different parts of the armed forces during the evening of March 27th. General von Pintelen is ordered to receive the message and verbal orders from the Führer during the night of March 27.
[illegible pencil initial]
Subject: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia. Dated: 3/28/1941 The Chief of the operational staff of the Armed Forces of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
[in pencil] Handed over to Gen. von Rintelen on 3/28/1941 at 4 P. M. Only for general officers To be transmitted by officers only KW/W F St [Stamp] [several pencil marks]
Tentative Plan for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia.
1. In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.
2. For this purpose, the following units are being formed:
a. One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the danger for the rear of the Italian front in Albania.
b. One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under certain circumstances also in the Southwest Hungary, in order to penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.
c. Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both sides of Belgrad.
3. If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain of Edessa.
4. Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the Italian armed forces:
a. Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing towards the line Split-Yajele, with forces as strong as possible.
b. Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed around Skoplje and South.
c. Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.
d. Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in Albania.
For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy troops fighting there.
5. The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be expected:
a. Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd
b. Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th
c. Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.
[illegible initial]
"Document 1751-PS [partial translation]" pp. 279-280.
SS Main Office Economy Administration [SS Wirtschafts-Verwallungs Hauptamt] Department Chief [Amtsgruppenchef]
Concentration Camps Dramenburg, 5/12/1944 DI/Az,:14 h 2/Na/s-Geheim Tgb-Nr. 605/44
Re: assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes
To the Camp Commanders of Concentration camps Da, Sah, Bu,
Mau, Flo, Neu, Au.I III, br-Ro, Natz, Stu, Rav, Herz, Aufenth, Camp Bergen, Belsen
Group leader D Riga, one copy each for KL Riga, Kauen, Vaivara SS Wirtschafter Ost, Krakau with one copy each for KL Lublin, Warschau and Plaszow.
There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case permission for assignment has to be requested here before assignment of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.
To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Main Reich's Security Office and reason for detainment in the concentration camp.
Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes without permission.
[signature illegible] (Waffen) SS Lt Gen and Lt Gen of the SS
"Document 1752-PS: Preparations Already Made For The International Congress [Anti-Jewish Congress] [translation]" pp. 280-281.
Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg received the order from the Führer to stage an anti-Jewish congress. The date for this congress was fixed for 11.7. after a discussion, and after the corresponding preparations had been made.
The following preparations for the congress have been undertaken:
1. In Germany.
1. Preparations in Germany.
a. The financing of the congress has been taken on by the Reich Treasury of Chief, Schwarz. Further, after the Führer had decided on Cracow as the site of the congress, Reich Minister and General Governor Frank has taken over all the costs that arise within his General Government.
b. The site of the meeting.
All negotiations concerning billeting, feeding and welfare of the guests, the lecture rooms etc. have been readily settled with the offices of the General governor. (Instead of Cracow, a place that is safe from air raids, for instance Zakopane, can be selected at any time.)
c. The program of lectures has been discussed with the appropriate offices,
1. Foreign Office
2. Propaganda Ministry
3. Head Office for internal security and has met with general approval. The Reich Foreign Minister as well as Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels have given their assent to the program.
d. German speakers and lecturers have been visualized, among others three German Ministers. The promise of these three gentlemen to attend seems certain. Some lectures are already on hand.
The final preparations, those for the cultural extra items on the programme, have been taken in hand. (See the letter from Reichsleader Rosenberg to Reichsleader Bormann concerning the appearance of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, with Furtwaengler as conductor.)
Even the formation of international organisations for investigating and combatting Jewry, which have been provided for in connection with the congress, have been brought about, and scientific presidents of the organisations have been earmarked. Some individual personalities have already been approached. Amongst others we already have the promise of Geheimrat Professor Dr. Eugen Fischer to be president of the European organisation for the "racial-biological questions of Jewry".
e. The following have been entered as honorary members:
Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
Reich Minister of the Interior and Reichsleader of the SS Heinrich Himmler
Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels Reich Minister and Governor Dr. Frank
2. Preparations abroad
The Foreign Office has accepted the task of contacting the prominent European people, with the exception of a few of the occupied territories in Europe, via its representatives abroad.
The German representatives abroad have received several official instructions, according to which they are
a. to propose delegates to be invited,
b. nominate lecturers,
c. approach the representatives of governments with a view to their participating at the congress.
In the course of these instructions being carried out, the following have promised their participation, or membership of the congress-committee and membership of the honorary committee:
Italy: Minister for National Enlightenment Mezzasoma (honorary committee ) The former Minister of State Preziosi (congress-committee and congress lecturer) France: Minister for Education Abel Bonnard (Honorary committee) Secretary of State Paul Marion (congress-committee) Hungary: Minister for the Interior von Jarossh (honorary committee and congress lecturer) Holland: The leader of the NSB, Mussert (Personally invited by Reichsleader Rosenberg during the latter's stay in Holland) Arabia: The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (honorary committee and congress lecturer) Iraq: Prime Minister Gailani (honorary committee) Norway: At the present moment a representative of Reichsleader Rosenberg has arrived here, in order personally to convey an invitation to Prime Minister Quisling to attend the congress.
Contacts have also been established with countless other countries. For the time being the promises to attend of the prominent representatives are not yet at hand. On the other hand promises have been received from delegates from Sweden, Roumania, Slovakia and illegal delegates from Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Further the office of General in the SS Berger has undertaken to invite renowned leaders of the Germanic volunteers in the SS to take part in the congress. Amongst others, Britons and Americans are visualised in this connection, who are also willing to speak.
The occupied eastern territory is included via the Ministry for the East. A number of promises to attend have been received from renowned personalities in this territory. Lectures have already been received from foreign speakers, amongst others from the former Minister of State Preziosi.
3. Reason for the importance of the Congress at the present time. The reports from outside Germany and the anti-German allied propaganda tries to make believe beyond all doubt that the whole war is being kindled by the other side more and more as a crusade, because the German nation plans to destroy the "Jewish People".
The Soviet Union: We refer to the pro-semitic Molotov-congress in Moscow.
USA: We refer to permanent session of the Jewish Congress.
The last new beginning 5/6/1944.
England: We refer to the English failure to pay attention to their own White Paper regarding Palestine problem.
At the same time, we point out the slowly rising anti-Semitic feeling in the countries of our opponents. It seems necessary that the feeling caused by enemy propaganda that National Socialism is retreating on all fronts, be reputed by this great anti-Jewish Congress.
The invasion army is not fighting against the barbarian Germany of annihilation of Jews but it is fighting for world Jewry!
What kind of propaganda is being duly turned out on the German side?
To give up this plan or to postpone this International Congress to an indefinite date, after half of Europe has already been won for this plan would support or strengthen the propaganda conducted against us.
It must be borne in mind that not a German authority but an international assembly is responsible for the Congress and issues invitations to it.
The preparations for the Congress have so far progressed with the greatest possibilities of disguise.
An arrangement, which has been made on general lines, mentions only an International historic and scientific congress taking place in a Town in the East of the Reich.
Berlin, 6/15/1944. Hg/We
/s/ Hans Hagemeyer, Head of the Department.
"Document 1757-PS: Report Of Göring's Commission For The Investigation Of The Aryanisations Carried Out In The Gau Of Franconia Between 11/9/1938 And 2/9/1939 And The Irregularities Connected Therewith Which Have Been Established [translation]" pp. 283-285.
[P.9] k. By an order of the Reich Chancellor of the Exchequer of 9/2/1938, No. 57/38, issued with the agreement of the Führer's deputy, all party offices, including organisations and attached formations, are forbidden to accept administrative dues, donations, gifts, bequests or material payments of any other kind for the participation of the party in economic tasks, including the transfer of Jewish firms to persons of German race, nor are they allowed to make the fulfillment of such tasks dependent on the payment of contributions, etc. The order was addressed to all Gau treasurers and reached the Gauleaders as well, among others.
[P.12] From the course of events one can only assume that the Reich Chancellor of the Exchequer's order of 9/2/1938 No. 57/38 about the ban on financial payments for the cooperation of the Party in Aryanisation and other economic tasks was considered in Franconia to be superseded, and that they thought themselves entitled to obtain considerable sums of money for the Gau of Franconia in connection with Aryanisation.
[P.13] 1. Following upon the November demonstrations, the deputy Gauleader, Holz, took up the Jewish questions. His reasons can be given here in detail on the basis of his statement of the 3/25/1939:
"The 11/9-10/1938. In the night of the 9/10 November and on 11/10/1938 events took place throughout Germany which I considered to be the signal for a completely different treatment of the Jewish question in Germany. Synagogues and Jewish schools were burnt down and Jewish property was smashed both in shops and in private houses. Besides this, a large number of particular Jews were taken to concentration camps by the police. Towards midday we discussed these events in the Gauleiter's house. All of us were of the opinion that we now faced a completely new state of affairs on the Jewish question. By the great action against the Jews, carried out in the night and morning of the 10th November, all guiding principles and all laws on this subject had been made illusory. We were of the opinion (particularly myself) that we should now act on our own initiative in this respect. I proposed to the Gauleiter that, in view of the great existing lack of houses, the best thing would be to put the Jews into a kind of internment camp. Then the houses would become free in a twinkling and the housing shortage would be relieved, at least in part. Besides that, we would have the Jews under control and supervision. I added "The same thing happened to our prisoners of war and war internees." The Gauleiter said that this suggestion was, for the time being, impossible to carry out. Thereupon I made a new proposal to him: I said to him that I considered it unthinkable that, after the Jews had had their property smashed they should continue to be able to own houses and land. I proposed that these houses and this land ought to be taken away from them, and declared myself ready to carry through such an action. I declared that by the Aryanisation of Jewish land and houses a large sum could accrue to the Gau out of the proceeds. I named some millions of marks. I stated that in my opinion, this Aryanisation could be carried out as legally as the Aryanisation of shops. The Gauleiter's answer was something to this effect: "If you think you can carry this out, do so. The sum gained will then be used to build a Gau school." The very same afternoon I began to organize the Aryanization of land. I stated here as in my memorandum, too, that I considered this Aryanisation of Jewish land as a logical continuation of the events of the 9th and 10th November. I was of the opinion that I was doing a service to the Party by trying to bring it money. I was further of the opinion that the transfer of the land and houses from Jewish to German hands was a National-Socialist action."
[P.16] Holz appointed commissioners for Nurnberg and Furth to carry out the Aryanisation of Jewish landed property
[P.18] 2. The Aryanisation was accomplished by the alienation of properties, the surrender of claims, especially mortgage claims, and reductions in buying price.
The payment allowed the Jews was basically 10% of the nominal value or nominal sum of the claim. As a justification for these low prices, Holz claimed at the Berlin meeting of 2/6/1939 that the Jews had mostly bought their property during the inflation period for a tenth of its value. As has been shown by investigating a large number of individual cases selected at random, this claim is not true.
[P.70] Favoritism shown to third parties and irregularities during the Aryanization of properties.
[P.72] Schoeller case. c. Gauamtsleiter Fritz Schoeller bought Grimmstrasse 3, Nurnberg by a contract of 11/15/1938. The house has a nominal value of RM 43300 and an exchange value of RM 50000. The buying price was fixed at RM 10000. Holz admitted (statement of 3/27/1939) that he was in agreement with the buying of the property. He based his agreement on the fact that Schoeller was an old and deserving party member and deserved particular consideration owing to his family circumstances.
Report of German Commission to Göring on Streicher. [Extract from Part II]
[P. 139] On the other hand, the minority of the shares of the Mars-Werke, Nurnberg, with a face value of Reichsmark 112500, were acquired through publishing house manager Fink for the Gauleiter according to the latter's instructions at the instigation of the deceased SA Brigadier General Koenig. These shares were in the possession of the Jewish banking house Kohn, the proprietor of which was at that time in protective custody. Verlagsdirektor Fink, as agent for the Gauleiter, acquired the parcel of Mars-Werke shares from this Jew at 5% of the face value, i.e., the sum of RM 5600.
In the presence of Fink, Koenig informed the Gauleiter in detail of the completed transaction. The Gauleiter gave his complete assent and, in addition, gave the order to transfer the parcel of shares from the account of the banking firm Kohn to the account of Fink at the Dresdner Bank. He further ordered that his name should not be mentioned at all in connection with the transaction.
By order of the Gauleiter, Fink withdrew Reichsmark 5,600 from a Stuermer account, and later, also acting for the Gauleiter, he bought the remainder of the shares of the Mars-Dresdner Bank, at 60 per cent for the Gauleiter with Stuermer funds. After Fink learned of the investigating commission he discussed the matter with Gauleiter Streicher. Streicher told Fink that he would keep the shares, because they had no connection with the Aryanization of estates, and if the purchase of the Mars shares should be contested he would simply pay over the required sum to the Reich.
After the investigating commission had started to work Gauleiter Streicher sent for Fink and told him the following: "The police have found out about the Mars shares. We will simply say that the shares were not bought for me but for the Fraenkische Tageszeitung!!" [P. 145] Thanks to the efforts of the district economic adviser and president of the chamber of commerce Strobl, it was possible to persuade the Hungarian consul Pfaller to buy the estate of the Gauleiter on Lake Constance without ever having seen it, for a price of Reichsmark 240000. It is noteworthy that the Gauleiter and people close to him had a very bad opinion of Consul Pfaller, but after the purchase of the estate the Gauleiter sent him a picture. In order to avoid the Gauleiter's appearing personally as the seller, a sham contract was made with publisher Willmy, so that the latter would appear to the outside world as the seller of the estate.
[P. 152] Gauleiter Streicher likes to beat people with a riding whip, but only if he is in the company of several persons assisting him. Usually the beatings are carried out with sadistic brutality.
The best known case is that of Steinruck, whom he beat bloodily in the prison cell, together with deputy Gauleiter Holz and SA Brigadier General Koenig. After returning from this scene to the "Deutscher Hof" he said: "Now I am relieved. I needed that again!" Later he also stated several times that he needed another Steinruck case in order to "relieve" [erloesen] himself.
In 8/1938 he beat editor Burker at the district house, together with district office leader Schoeller and his adjutant Koenig.
On 12/2/1938 he asked to have three youthful criminals (15-17 years old) who had been arrested for robbery brought to the room of the director of the criminal police office in Nurnberg-Fuerth. Streicher, who was accompanied by his son Lothar, had the youths brought in singly and questioned them about their sex life and in particular, through clear and detailed questioning, he laid stress on determining whether and since when they masturbated. One of the youths did not know the word, whereupon Streicher gave him a vivid description. The last one of these three boys he beat with his riding whip, with blows on the head and the rest of the body.
[P. 151] From 1934-1938 Gauleiter Streicher employed the Jew Jonas Wolk as contributor to the Stuermer. Wolk wrote for the Stuermer under the pseudonym of "Fritz Brandt". In addition, Wolk did spy work for the Gauleiter abroad. From 2/1937-8/1938 the Stuermer paid the Jew Wolk a fee of Reichsmark 8262.39. Wolk was previously convicted six times, among other things with loss of civic rights. It is especially significant that Streicher had the Jew Wolk paid by the Fraenkische Tageszeitung from 1934-1937. The Fraenkische Tageszeitung paid Wolk the sum of Reichmark 9623.65.
[P. 160] According to the statement of the district treasurer [Gauschatzmeister], his financial adviser, and several other persons, Streicher is regarded as extremely brutal. The statements made by Verlagsdirektor Fink are especially significant. He declared that he was convinced that the Gauleiter would have him bumped off one of these days, as soon as he found out that Fink had told the truth to the investigating commission.
[P. 161] According to reports of reliable witnesses, Gauleiter Streicher is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For instance, at a meeting in the Collosseum in Nurnberg in 1935 he said that nobody could remove him from office. In a meeting at Herkules Hall, where he described how he had beaten Prof. Steinruck, he emphasized that he would not let himself be beaten by anybody, not even by an Adolf Hitler.
[P. 166] For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to approve.
[P. 172] In general it is to be said that Koenig was regarded as the evil spirit in Franconia. In an unheard-of-manner he tyrannized the Gau leader, the authorities and the population, and he knew how to make the influence of his power felt everywhere. Koenig's word carried the weight of that of the Gauleiter.
[P. 174] In favor of Strobl [pencil note: Director of the AEG, Gau economic adviser, and president of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce] it must be said that he, in contrast to almost all other defendants, immediately told the truth on all points in his interrogations. It is primarily thanks to him that clearness was quickly reached in many cases which could be verified.
As an excuse for his incorrect acts Strobl states that he like all other persons in the Gau of Franconia was to such an extent under the pressure of Gauleiter Streicher and his adjutant Koenig that he would never have dared to do anything against the orders of the two men mentioned.
[P. 179] By the law of 4/1938 it is decreed that all applications for Aryanization shall be submitted to the competent Gauleiter. From that time on Strobl submitted the applications, which he had up to that time handled by himself, to the adjutant of the Gauleiter, SA Brigadier General Koenig for approval. He makes the excuse that it had been the practice in Franconia for the adjutant to take care of almost all matters as agent for and deputy of the Gauleiter. Every order of Brigadier General Koenig was equivalent to an order of the Gauleiter.
"Document 1773-PS: The Law Of The General Government [Das Recht des Generalgouvernements] [translation]" pp. 346-348.
Krakau, 1941
E 8. Impounding of Valuables
E 800. Decree on the Sequestration of Property of the Former Polish State in the General Gouvernement.11/15/1939
On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor governing the administration of occupied Polish territory dated 10/12/1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the following order:
Article 11. All movable and stationary property of the former Polish State with accessories, including all demands, participation, rights and other interests inside the General Gouvernement, will be sequestered for the purpose of securing all manner of public valuables.
2. The seizure, administration, and utilization of the sequestered property is the duty of the department "Trusteeship for the General Gouvernement" in the office of the Governor General.
Article 2The director of the department "Trusteeship for the General Gouvernement" will in agreement with the director of the finance department in the office of the Governor General issue the regulations required to execute this decree, in particular on the duty to make a declaration of the wealth belonging to the former Polish State as well as the treatment of rights of third persons on the wealth of the former Polish State and of claims against this wealth.
Article 3This regulation will be effective on the day of its publication.
The Governor General for the Occupied Polish Territories FRANK
E 810. Decree on the Right of Ownership of Wealth of the former Polish Territories. 9/24/1940
On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Führer and chancellor of the Reich of 10/12/1939 (RGBl I, page 2077) I issue the following order:
Article 1The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1, section 1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State within the General Gouvernement of 11/15/1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, page 37) will be transferred to the ownership of the General Gouvernement. A legal right of the General Gouvernement will not be established by this transaction.
Article 21. Rights of third persons in the property mentioned in Article 1 expire insofar as they existed before 11/20/1939.
2. It will be determined later on whether and to what extent an indemnification can be granted to persons, especially to rightful foreign claimants, for legal losses suffered through the action.
Article 3The seizure and administration of the property mentioned in Article 1 will be executed until further notice on the basis of the regulation on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State within the General Gouvernement of 11/15/1939 (Verordnungsblatt, GGP, page 37) and of the first executionory decree issued on 3/16/1940 (Verordnungsblatt GGP II, page 175).
Article 4The director of the department "Trusteeship for the General Gouvernement" in agreement with the director of the finance department in the office of the governor general will be in charge of the property mentioned in Article 1.
The Governor General FRANK
E 845. Decree on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General Gouvernement.12/16/1939
On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich on the administration of the occupied Polish territories of 10/12/1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I order the following:
Article 1All art objects in public possession in the General Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public tasks of common interest insofar as it has not already been seized under the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State in the General Gouvernement of 11/15/1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, page 37).
Article 2With the exception of art collections and art objects which were the property of the former Polish State, art objects will be considered as owned by the public:
1. private art collections which have been taken under protection by the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures.
2. all ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those objects required for the daily performance of liturgic actions.
Article 31. In order to determine whether art objects are public property in the sense of this regulation, every private and ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with exact data on the kind, nature and number of pieces.
2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in possession of or else is entitled to dispose of such objects of art since 3/15/1939, is obliged to register the same.
3. Everyone is obliged to make upon request truthful and appropriate statements.
Article 4The special commissioner appointed by me for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will determine in cases of doubt what art collections and art objects in detail will have to be regarded on the basis of Article 2 of this regulation as public art property. He also will decide on the eventual necessary exceptions.
Article 51. He will be punished with imprisonment
1. Who undertakes to conceal, sell or remove objects of art from the General Gouvernement..
2. Who refuses or else gives incorrect or incomplete information required from him on the basis of this decree.
2. The special court is competent for the trial.
Article 6The special commissioner appointed for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will issue the regulations necessary for the execution of this decree.
Article 7This regulation will be put into effect immediately.
E 846. First Enforcement Regulation for the Order of 12/16/1939 on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General Gouvernement.
In order to execute the decree on the confiscation of art objects in the General Gouvernement of 12/16/1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, page 209), I order the following:
Article 1The registration decree in Article 3, section 1 of the regulation must be carried out by 2/15/1940 with the office of the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural objects, Cracow, Bergakademie.
Article 21. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and historical value which originate from the time before 1850, have to be registered.
2. The registration includes the following: a. paintings b. sculpture c. products of handicraft (for instance antique furniture, china ware, glass, golden and silver objects, Gobelins, rugs, embroideries, lace-work, paramente, etc.) d. drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc. e. rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs, book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc. f. weapons, armors, etc. g. coins, medals, seals, etc.
3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed information has to be given, if possible, on the master, the time of production, the contents of the representation, measurements and material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.)
Article 3The special commissioner will send in writing his decision in doubtful cases or in the eventual necessary exceptions as provided for in Article 4 of the decree. The decision will be final.
Article 4Scientific experts will be entrusted with the execution of the decree.
The Governor General for the Occupied Polish Territories By order: Dr. MUEHLMANN
"Document 1774-PS: Organizational Laws Of The Greater German Reich Verfassungsrecht Des Grossdeutschen Reiches [translation]" pp. 349-351.
By Ernst Rudolf Huber.
FÜHRER, AND REICH-CABINET [REICHREGIERUNG, Page 223]
a. The Structure of the Reich-Cabinet
The political direction of the Reich is the task of the Führer. The Führer selects, in all fields of political developments the goals which should be attained, determines the methods to be used and makes all fundamental decisions when necessary. The authority of the Führer [Führergewalt] is the "Political Authority" in the new Reich. The term "Leadership" expresses better the mobilization of the collective political force of the people towards the achievement of the common goal, than the term "Government" which has been used heretofore for the highest authority of the State. The Führer has the only final power to decide in all matters concerning movement [party], people, and Reich. He possesses and bears the historical responsibility to his people. Even in instances, where the law assigns certain tasks to the "Reichsregierung", it is the Führer who is responsible for the final decision.
The Führer avails himself, however, in his decisions of the counsel and the constructive cooperation of his collaborators, especially the Reich-Cabinet, which combines the Subordinate Führers [Unterführer] of the various departments of the State. The legal position of the Reich-Minister was originally laid down by the Reich-Minister Law of 3/27/1930 (RGBl I 96). In its place Section XIII of the German Civil Servant Law is now applicable, with the exception of the regulations concerning the official salaries, service quarters, movingand travel expenses, where the old law remains valid. The Reich-Ministers are appointed by the Führer and maintain a public service relationship towards him and the Reich. They take a special oath before the Führer when they assume their functions. They cannot belong to any economic enterprise as chairmen or members of administrative or supervisory councils while they hold office ("economic incompatibility"). The Reich-Ministers can be dismissed from their offices at any time by the-Führer. No disciplinary action against them will be taken. Special treatment of the Reich Ministers is based on the fact that they are not "Civil Servants". Civil Servants are only the members of the Bureaus which are sub- and co-ordinated to the hierarchic administrative structure, but not those who occupy immediate state-directing positions to whom the Reich-Ministers belong according to the present constitutional law.
The Führer and -Reich-Chancellor is at the top of the ReichCabinet. He hands down the directives for the overall operation of the Government and the basic principles for the various departments. A number of Bureaus are subordinated to him for direct counsel and assistance, as follows:
1 . The Reich-Chancellery ( Chief: Reich-Minister, Dr. Lammers)
2. The Supreme-Command of the Armed Forces (Chief: Generaloberst (Gen.) Keitel)
3. The Presidential Chancellery (Chief: State Minister Dr. Meissner)
4. The Privy Cabinet Council (President: Reich-Minister Frh. von Neurath)
The Reich-Cabinet [Reich Regierung] comprises furthermore the department ministries proper. It is constituted in the following manner according to the official order of rank laid down in the year 1939:
1. The Deputy Commander for the Führer (Reich-Minister Hess)
2. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Generaloberst (Gen.) Keitel)
3. General Field-Marshal Göring (Deputy for the 4 Year Plan)
4. Foreign Office (v. Ribbentrop)
5. Reich-Minister of the Interior (Dr. Frick)
6. Reich-Minister for Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda (Dr. Goebbels)
7. Reich Air-Minister (Gen. Field-Marshal Göring)
8. Reich Finance Minister (v. Schwerin-Krosigk)
9. Reich-Minister of Justice (Dr. Guertner)
10. Reich-Minister of Economy (Funk)
11. Reich-Minister for Food and Agriculture (Darre)
12. Reich-Minister of Labor (Seldte)
13. Reich-Minister for Science, Education and National Culture (Dr. Rust)
14. Reich-Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl)
16. Reich-Minister of Transportation (Dr. Dorpmueller)
16. Reich Postal Minister (Ohnesorge)
17. Reich-Minister Frank (Legal Affairs Reich-Führer)
18. Reich-Minister Schacht
19. Reich-Minister Seyss-Inquart
20. Reich Forest-Office (Gen. Field-Marshal Göring)
The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army (Generaloberst (Gen.) v. Brauchitsch) and of the Navy (Great-Admiral Raeder) have also the rank of Ministers. Furthermore, the following participate regularly in the sessions of the Government, whenever matters of their department are being discussed:
1. The Prussian Finance Minister, Dr. Popitz.
2. The Reich-Führer SS and the Chief of the German Police, Himmler.
3. The Reich Labor Leader in the Reich-Ministry of the Interior, Hierl.
4. The Chief of the Organization in Foreign Countries in the Foreign Office, Bohle. In addition, the following Supreme Reich-Bureaus are immediately subordinate to the Führer:
1. Court of Accounts of the German Reich (State-Minister, retired, Mueller).
2. Inspector General for the German Road System (Dr. Todt).
3. Reich Office for Area Control [Raumordnung] (Kerrl).
4. Youth-Führer of the German Reich (v. Schirach).
Furthermore, the following are immediately subordinate to the Führer:
1. The German Reich-Bank, (President Reich-Minister Funk).
2. Inspector General of Constructions for the Reich Capital (Professor Speer).
3. Counsellor General of Constructions for the Capital of the (party) movement (Professor Giesler).
4. Reich Construction Counsellor for the town of Linz on the Danube.
The directors of these Reich Bureaus act as direct advisers and collaborators of the Führer in their department without being members of the Reich-Government by authority of their office.
A privy cabinet council, to advise the Führer in the basic problems of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 2/4/1938 (RGBl I 112). This privy cabinet council is under the direction of Reich-Minister v. Neurath, and includes the Foreign Minister, the Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for the Führer, the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of-the Reich-Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The privy cabinet council constitutes a select staff of collaborators of the Führer which consist exclusively of members of the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a select committee of the Reich Government for the deliberation on foreign affairs.
The law on the Supreme Leader of the State makes provision for the nomination of a Deputy Commander for the Führer and also a Vice-Chancellor. Up to 7/1934, von Papen, then Reich Minister, was Vice-Chancellor. Since then, no such nomination has been promulgated. The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan has a sort of representation in all matters concerning the 4 Year Plan, "all competent instances of party and state" being combined in his person, and he has been given the power to "issue directives to all authorities, including the highest Reich-Authorities and all offices of the party, its sub-divisions and its affiliated associations". The deputy for the 4 Year Plan is therefore within the limits of his authority superior to the other Reich Ministers, particularly to the economic and military departments. But he is not only superior to the offices of the State but also to those of the party. He is (with the exception of the Führer) the only central authority which by virtue of an office (and not by virtue of a personal union of a party and State office) can issue binding directives to the offices of the party and the State. Considering the tremendous importance of the 4 Year Plan, this position of the deputy is an important means for securing unity between party and State.
This same object is furthermore pursued by the Office of the Deputy Commander for the Führer. While the Deputy for the 4 Year Plan constitutes an authority of the State with the power to issue directives to the party, the Deputy Commander for the Führer represents a party instance with authority to co-operate in State affairs to a large extent. The "Ministry Hess", with its Liaison-Staff is charged to assert the influence of the party in the legislation and administration of the State. All projects of politically important laws have to be submitted to the Deputy Commander for the Führer for his preliminary examination. He naturally has the power to propose laws from his side. His influence on the administration affects particularly the selection of personnel. All appointments to be made by the Führer have to be examined first by the Deputy Commander for the Führer. Besides these individual powers, it is the duty of the Deputy Commander for the Führer to assert the will of the (party) movement in the organization of the State, to settle difficulties which develop, to investigate complaints, and thus to guarantee unity of party and State.
Unity of party and Reich-Cabinet is furthermore secured by the numerous personal unions i. e. association of Central State Offices with corresponding party offices. Such personal unions exist in the cases of the Food Minister and the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the German Police and the Reich Labor Leader, the Chief of the Organization in the foreign countries, and the Reich Youth Führer. Furthermore, the majority of the Reich Ministries is occupied by leading old party members. Finally, all Reich Ministers have been accepted by the party on 1/30/1937 and have been decorated with golden party insignia.
b. The Reich-Cabinet as the bearer of responsible collaboration. The relationship between the Führer and the Reich-Cabinet differs from the Weimar colleague-like system as well as from Bismarcks Chancellor System. The great political principles are determined by the Führer; the will of the government is not expressed by vote, as under the colleague-like system; doubts and differences of opinion are also settled by the Führer (in contrast to the provisions of Section 57 of the Weimar Constitution). The Reich-Ministers who act as advisers to the Führer owe him loyalty and obedience in accordance with the oath they have to take by virtue of the law of 10/16/1934. The Führer is therefore not "primus inter pares" (first among equal ones), as it was featured in the colleague-like system, but he is absolutely superior to the other Reich-Ministers. But, if therefore the principle of authority prevails within the Reich-Cabinet it is not permitted in this case in the least to become a formal bureaucratic mechanism like the one that characterized the Chancellor System of Bismarck. In the latter, the collaborators of the Reich-Chancellor, the State-Secretaries, were not independent and responsible chiefs of their departments, but they were the sub-ordinates of the Chancellor and administered in his name and by his orders the various Reich-Offices, at the top of which stood the Chancellor. Even the law of 17 March 1878 concerning deputies did not change that state of affairs to any extent. Such a bureaucratic system does not permit the collaborators to develop a sense of enjoying responsible action and power of resolution and prevents genuine deliberation, the prerequisite of which is independence of the advisor. This is characteristic of an administrative state, where everything depends on the authoritarian technical functioning of the State apparatus. In the Reich of the Führer the decisive factors are that the collaborators are subordinate leaders, that they are therefore possessed themselves with the desire for creative leadership and responsibility.
The Führer does not avail himself of the Reich-Ministers as subordinate executive organs. The Reich-Cabinet is not a technical apparatus. It is therefore inadmissible to consider the ReichMinisters as mere "Chiefs of Reich Offices" who preside over bureaucratic institutions, rather Reich-Ministers in particular must become genuine sub-leaders if the entire Reich is to be imbued with the spirit of the Führer system. In the Reich Cabinet, the Führer procures for himself the independent and responsible collaborators who do not only technically direct the various offices but who are also capable to act in a constructive and creative manner, within the scope of their assignments. The Reich-Ministers are therefore not only advisors but at the same time responsible creative assistants of the Führer, who administer their offices independently under the direction of the Führer. The prerequisite for the Führer Principle which has been realized in the Reich-Cabinet, is independent co-operation based on confidence and responsibility, of the Führer's closest followers. Thus, the Führer Principle presents far higher requirements than the bureaucratic absolutism and its not too different Chancellor System of Bismarck.
In view of this structure of the Reich-Cabinet it is only natural that the counter-signature, prescribed in Section 50 of the Weimar Constitution for all decrees and regulations issued by the Reich President, becomes unnecessary for the decisions of the Führer. They do not require the counter-signature of the Minister of the respective department. Compulsory counter-signature was an institution of the constitutional and parliamentary system. The Minister who counter-signed the orders of the Chief of State assumed thereby responsibility before parliament. The countersignature was thus inseparably connected with the parliamentary responsibility of the Ministers; it lost its political foundation with the revolutionary elimination of parliamentarianism of any form. However, also in the New Reich during the period of Reich President Hindenburg's administration, counter-signature of presidential acts by the Reich-Chancellor was maintained. Of course, the counter-signing Reich-Chancellor or Reich-Minister did not assume any more the "responsibility before the Reichstag", as was the case within the limits of the Weimar parliamentary system. he counter-signature was used in this case rather as a suitable technical form for safe-guarding the unified direction of the State as long as a dual Chief of State existed. This technical reason for maintaining the counter-signature was rendered unnecessary with the assumption of the presidential powers by the Führer. Today, it is not necessary any more according to constitutional law. The decrees of the Führer have legal force, even if they are not counter-signed by a Reich-Minister. Such was particularly the order of execution of the 4 Year Plan of 10/18/1936 (RGBl I 887) which in fact contains a law issued by the Führer a without any counter-signature.
As a rule, the decrees of the Führer, are on the other hand, even today co-signed by the Minister of the department concerned. Authorized to co-sign are the Reich-Ministers, within the limits of their departments. Furthermore the Chiefs of the Presidential-chancellery and of the Reich-Chancellery for their departments (Decree of 11/22/1934, not published), and also the State-Secretaries of a Reich-Minister who is temporarily unavailable (Decree of 3/20/1935, RMinBl. 423). The decrees concerning the party are co-signed by the Deputy Commander of the Führer, decrees concerning the range of problems of the 4 Year Plan by the Deputy of the 4 Year Plan and the military decrees by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The Chiefs of the Supreme Reich-Bureaus who are not Reich-Ministers are not authorized to co-sign.
Co-signature is being regularly maintained for two reasons. For once, the co-signature brings out the fact that the Minister of the department is more than a mere technical auxiliary tool of the Führer, that he performs rather independent and objective work which requires of course the approval of the Führer but which is nevertheless the Minister's own work and performance. Thus, the co-signature gives prominence to the fact that the Minister is an independent collaborator and not only an executive instrument. Also, the co-signature is therefore documentary proofand this is the second reasonfor the responsibility of the Minister of the department, naturally not before the Parliament but before the Führer himself. By co-signing the Minister accepts the responsibility before the Führer that the decree is practical, has been carefully considered and thoroughly worked out. Such a responsibility of the Minister before the Chief of the State could not exist under the radical parliamentary Republic. The independence of the Minister from the Chief of State and his responsibility before the Parliament would have been weakened in that way. Under the old constitutional system, on the other hand, (as well as under the presidential system formed after the constitutional system) this responsibility of the counter-signing Minister also before the Chief of State was in existence. This type of "Minister responsibility" is indispensable under the Führer Constitution. In view of the number and the importance of affairs, it is-self-evident that the Führer needs the advice, the suggestions, and the proposals of his collaborators; political leadership is impossible without reliable collaborators. The Ministers are responsible to the Führer by their oath for competent and reliable counsel and preparation of his decisions. This responsibility of the Ministers of the various departments finds its public expression by their counter-signature. This counter-signature is not necessary, nevertheless. The Führer can do without it and issue all decrees and decisions which have full legal effect by his own accord.
The OKW is asking the Führer's decision, concerning the following proposals:
Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.
1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.
2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,
a. through V-man [V-Maenner] in Austria,
b. through our customs personnel at the frontier,
c. through traveling agents.
3. Such news could be:
a. Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the VII A.K.
b. Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.
c. Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is the case).
d. The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have called up reinforcements.
e. Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden.
4. Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.
5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.
6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.
7. An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the Reich-Chancery.
SignedKeitel.
14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone, that the Führer has given his approval in all points. Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellery.
9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in Munich
"Document 1778-PS: The Poisonous Mushroom [Der Giftpilz], A Stuermer Book for Young and Old Fables [translation]" pp. 358-360.
By Ernst Hiemer Pictures by Fips Published by Der StuermerNurnberg copyright 1938
[P.6] "It is almost noon," he said, "now we want to summarize what we have learned in this lesson. What did we discuss?"
All children raise their hands. The teacher calls on Karl Scholz, a little boy on the first bench. "We talked about how to recognize a Jew."
"Good! Now tell us about it!"
Little Karl takes the pointer, goes to the black board and points to the sketches.
"One usually recognizes a Jew by his nose. The Jewish nose is crooked at the end. It looks like the figure 6. Therefore it is called the "Jewish Six". Many non-Jews have crooked noses, too. But their noses are bent, not at the end but further up. Such a nose is called a hook nose or eagle's beak. It has nothing to do with a Jewish nose."
"Right!" says the teacher. "But the Jew is recognized not only by his nose …" The boy continues. The Jew is also recognized by his lips. His lips are usually thick. Often the lower lip hangs down. That is called "sloppy". And the Jew is also recognized by his eyes. His eyelids are usually thicker and more fleshy than ours. The look of the Jew is lurking and sharp.
[P.9] Then the teacher goes to the desk and turns over the black board, on its back is a verse. The children recite it in chorus:
From a Jew's countenance--the evil devil talks to us, The devil, who in every landis known as evil plague.
If we shall be free of the Jewand again will be happy and glad, Then the youth must struggle with usto subdue the Jew devil.
[P.32] Inge sits in the reception room of the Jew doctor. She has to wait a long time. She looks through the journals which are on the table. But she is most too nervous to read even a few sentences. Again and again she remembers the talk with her mother. And again and again her mind reflects on the warnings of her leader of the BDM [League of German Girls]: "A German must not consult a Jew doctor! And particularly not a German girl! Many a girl that went to a Jew doctor to be cured, found disease and disgrace!"
When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an extraordinary incident. From the doctor's consulting room she could hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young girl: "Doctor, doctor leave me alone!"
Then she heard the scornful laughing of a man. And then all of a sudden it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened breathlessly.
"What may be the meaning of all this ?" she asked herself and her heart was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of her leader in the BDM.
Inge was already waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Frightened she jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this face is the face of the devil. In the middle of this devil's face is a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles two criminal eyes. And the thick lips are grinning. A grinning that expresses: "Now I got you at last, you little German girl!"
And then the Jew approaches her. His fleshy fingers stretch out after her. But now Inge has her wits. Before the Jew can grab hold of her, she hits the fat face of the Jew doctor with her hand. Then one jump to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the stairs. Breathlessly she escapes the Jew house.
The pimpf [Hitler boy between 10 — 14] so far has not said anything. Suddenly he stops. Then he grasps his two friends by the arm and pulls them away. They stop in front of a bill-board.
They read a large poster. It says Julius Streicher makes an address in the People's Hall about "The Jews are our misfortune".
"That is where we go!" shouts Konrad, "I wanted to hear him speak for a long time." "I have heard him once before at a meeting two years ago," says Erich. "Do tell us all about it!" the two pimpfs beg.
The Hitler youth recounts:
"The meeting was overcrowded. Many thousands of people attended. To begin with, Streicher talked of his experiences in the wars of struggle, and of the tremendous achievements of the Hitler Reich. Then he began to talk about the Jewish question. All he said was so clear and simple that even we boys could follow it. Again and again he told about examples taken from life. At one time he talked most amusingly and cracked jokes, making all of us laugh. Then again he became most serious, and it was so quiet in the hall that one could hear a needle drop. He talked of the Jews and their horrible crimes. He talked of the serious danger which Judaism is for the whole world.
"Without a solution of the Jewish question there will be no salvation of mankind".
That is what he shouted to us. All of us could understand him. And when, at the end, he shouted the "Sieg-Heil" for the Führer, we all acclaimed him with tremendous enthusiasm. For two hours Streicher spoke at that occasion. To us it appeared to have been but a few minutes.
"Document 1780-PS: Excerpts from General Jodl's Handwritten Diary, 2/1937-8/1939 [partial translation]" pp. 360-61.
2/4/1937:
Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.
Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.
The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.
Bad harvest and [illegible], especially bread grain [Brotgetreide], demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.
Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented. .
Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) [des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)] and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).
Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.
1938 11 February:
In the evening and on 12 February General K., with General v. Reichenau and Sperrle, at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
13 February:
In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Führer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval.
At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Führer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.
The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.
In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.
Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.
At 1300 hours General K. sees the Führer in order to inform him about the planned advances [Vorstoesse].
The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Führer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.
By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which would bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.
Führer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the District leader [Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."
1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.
Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Führer to take action.
1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.
Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron [Jagdgruppe], 3 bomber groups [Kampfgeschwader] and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports [Friedensflugplatze] in Bavaria.
Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt. General Göring.
Instruction No. 1 of the Führer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.
The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V. T.) by regiments, 40000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper Bavaria as second wave.
1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.
1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment.
Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.
1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberführer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.
Decision: yes.
2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.
Later undated entry.
After annexation of Austria, the Führer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Führer on 21 April.
The intention of the Führer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.
Because of Germany's self-restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Führer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.
22 May:
Fundamental conference between the Führer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).
Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Führer. Further conferences which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Führer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)
The Führer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day [X-Tag], combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Führer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.
The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt.Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Führer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Führer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt] that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Führer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Führer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Führer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Führer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.
21-26 August:
Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent [Reichsverweser]. Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz [?].
They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.
Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.
6 September:
Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Führerespecially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.
General Stuelpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore, the plans may be changed up to this moment. (D-day-2) [X-2 Tage].
General Stuelpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and Italy reserved.
I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.
In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people now the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulated through anterooms as heretofore.
1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).
We agree about the promulgation of the D-day order [X-Befehl] (X-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.
10 September:
General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Führer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions [3 words illegible].
In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.
The joint preparations for refutation [Wiederlegung] of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important. 15 September:
In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Führer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.
General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Führer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.
With consent of the Führer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.
In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.
Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Führer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.
Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.
England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about, consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of border). By check, ing with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.
Toward the evening the Führer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.
The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.
1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Führer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Führer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."
1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed. 22 September:
1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stuelpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.
By order of the Führer, two Death Head [Totenkopf] SS battalions have moved into the panhandle territory near Asch [Acher Zipfel] to the rear of the Free Corps.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Führer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.
Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.
1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Führer's opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.
A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.
The Führer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.
The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Führer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
2000 hours: The Führer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast.
1320 hours: The Führer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.
Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Göring where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.
1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Führer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce, and Daladier in Munich.
The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Führer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.
Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).
1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.
"Document 1786-PS: War Diary Of The Deputy Chief Of The Armed Forces Operations Staff [translation]" pp. 369-370.
WF. St. KTB (1) 1943 3/14/1943
The treatment of captured partisans has been laid down in the combat directive for the combatting of partisans in the East [Kampfanweisung fuer die Bandenbekaempfung] of 11/27/1942 (cf. 27.11/11/1) and Hitler's order [Führerbefehl] of 16.12 (cf. 16.12/1). On the basis of the foregoing the Reichsführer SS ordered on the 30.12 that persons suspected of being partisans or their assistants, who are not to be executed, are to be transferred to concentration camps in Germany.
This order, which corresponds to the terms of reference already decreed, differs from an order already given on the 10/30/1942 by the Commander in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the 18th Army, which calls for the shooting without discrimination of all members of partisan groups and which is covered by the subsequent orders of the 15.11 and 16.12 only on their strictest interpretation. The Reichsführer SS therefore sent to the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungstab] on the 21.1 a letter of the Chef der S.P. and S.D. in which it is requested that, in the area of the 18th Army also, partisan helpers and persons suspected of such activity, should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of reference of 30.12.
The Armed Forces Operations Staff handed the matter over on the 2'5.1 to the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] competent for the combatting of partisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given by the Reichsführer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces [Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht].
Since the ruling of the combat directive, figs. 85, 86 and 104, provides for work in Germany as a punitive measure for partisan helpers and suspects and has proved to be disadvantageous for the enlistment of voluntary workers, the General Plenipotentiary for Labour [Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz], has requested that no threat of forced labour in Germany as a punitive measure should be made, or that at least, suspects should be described as such to the labour authorities for the purpose of supervision.
The General Quartermaster together with the Economic Staff (East) [Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to "training centers in their own area", and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the "peaceful population" which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsführer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders that the difference between "punitive work" and "work in Germany" is to be made clear to the population.
"Document 1799-PS: War Diary; Armed Forces Operations Staff [partial translation]" pp.
(L/K.T.B. WFSt, Volume 6A, 8/1/1940-3/26/1941)
ANNEX 1 Report to the Führer on 12/5/1940
The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.
The Führer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.
The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.
It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.
8/1/1940-3/26/1941
"Document 1807-PS: [Extract From Jodl's Diary.] 6/16/1942 [translation]" p. 377.
The operational staff of the Navy [Skl], applied on the 29th May, for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defence measures are still incomplete (b) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.
"Document 1809-PS: General Jodl's Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 2/1-5/26/1940 [translation]" pp. 377-378.
The Führer requests that Major Kieritz be sent from here in good time with special mission.
Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West. Conclusion:
1. Morale and disciplineexcellent
2. Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot withdraw more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the contrary, deems weather excellent to overcome floods.
3. In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automotive position is very bad. Up to 40 are missing each of these 40 divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.
1700 hours General Jeschonnek.
1. Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th division intends to drop units near the town.
2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.
3. Walcheren Ioland will have to be occupied as soon as possible.
4. Immediate use requires some arrangements. To be eliminated:
Commitment of K against Eben Emael against bridge C
"Fieselor Stork" airplane in front of Army Group A.
The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if possible.
7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up position without further orders.
5. Question about general intentions? Time.
6. Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare.
7. The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial shipping in the 30-mile zone as well as everything anywhere making use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats.
Führer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed 8 days-to demonstrate to himnot by actual constructing but only theoreticallythat the Czech 4.7-cm anti-tank gun is not usable with armored car 3.
Führer decides as to Jeschonnek's questions of 1 February:
a. one has to employ in the Hague [d.H.] forces of such strength that they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that, a landing can be made in the center of the Hague.
Unlimited use of arms against airfields and antiaircraft guns is authorized.
Relative to an attack against all ships, found between the English East Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by air, the Foreign Office is still to be consulted and Admiral Schuster, Chief Air Force, 1700 hours, states in that matter that he does not want any exception.
Italian and Japanese ships to be considered, which were sailing to Newcastle, until a short time ago.
Important, that, though we signed an agreement about submarine warfare, we never signed one about manner of air warfare.
Reported to the Führer on 3 February
The Spanish have supplied a German submarine and convoyed a merchant ship from Bilbao to Santander.
Opinions of the newspapers: Spain is not ungrateful. Photos of Church Services, does Führer agree with them?
The Foreign Office wants that within the 30 mile zone the Air Force shall not attack
a. Japanese and Italian ships.
b. Danish Maltesian cross ships.
c. All passenger boats which do not fire.
General Gerke: Railroads are unable to accomplish big tasks. No reaction to our transports. It seems possible that he got news about the reliefs. Opportune to keep movement going. Proposal to prepare again an A-movement to deceive the enemy. Empty rolling stock for 6 divisions available, organization transports are rolling. Will head of transportation service be able to release state of readiness, so that he can gather empty rolling stock during 4 days.
To consult Führer. The chief of Transportation Corps West requires one week's time (225 trains). 70 trains are at the disposal of the armies.
315 trains are needed for second echelon. An order will be issued on this matter on D-day.
Afterwards remain 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon.
Total 660 trains, including 80 for tanks and 70 for armies (among them 10000 army cars).
Altogether 60 fewer trains ready than before. Air raid protection.
Ammunition train has no special protection. If machine gun car is added, the enemy flier will be aware of the fact, that this is an important train. The wave before the trains should attack the enemy plane with best results. Ammunition trains often remain for weeks, personnel for its protection become demoralized.
Ammunition trains, regulating stations and storage areas to be spread out and protected. Assembly stations are enlarged to assembly areas.
Maintenance units are kept in readiness in the most endangered areas between the Rhine and the line Kassel-Hanover.
Ruhr area has 15 different ways to give way.
Rumania wants to get supply of rail track material (from Poland.)
1340 locomotives and 40000 cars will be manufactured by the end of 1940 or maybe beginning of 1941. Stock 2000 locomotives, 8000 of which are heavy freight train locomotives for Armed Forces transports. This will only replace the loss.
4 February:
Will the Court-Martial be re-activated?
Bodenschatz: Army Group C should not get out of hand [Keinen zauber machen] on minus-1 day.
Führer gives his agreement that 225 trains in position of readiness may be used for other purposes by the chief of transportation corps until 12 February.
Proposal to the Führer about continuation of aerial warfare within the 30 mile zone. Führer agrees with proposal and talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the afternoon.
Special staff "Weser Exercise" meets and is welcomed by Chief of Armed Forces High Command, gets instructions.
Representative of Air Force is still missing.
Consumption of gasoline is not reduced. Stocks further diminished by 30000 tons.
Deception even of Armed Forces High Command.
Office Reinicke and Thomas, that is to say Chief of Armed Force High Command,
W Pr that is to say Chief of Armed Forces Operational Office.
Führer leaves in the evening.
15:30 hours conference with General Jeschonnek, Col. v. Waldau and Col. Warlimont.
Air Force submits following questions:
Does X time remain unchanged? Yes. Deceptive action intolerable for Army Group C on A-1 day. Navy is not interested in Walcheren. Does not see any danger from the English side. New idea: carry out actions H and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war.
Discussed once more affair Risberg with Chief of Armed Forces High Command.
Chief of Transportation Corps reports: Reich Railroads now admit that they cannot handle any additional burden at this moment. They are not ready for war. Although they hardly got any military requests, they cannot supply the domestic economy right now.
It is only a question of engines, now, there are enough cars available everywhere.
Transportation: 80% railroad. 18% water transport. 2% road transport.
Transportation by water has to be brought to double of current capacity.
Radio receivers can be transformed into transmitters without particular difficulties.
Paris probably only by Gen. F…. [Fermont?], rue de Louvre. 9 February:
Chief of Armed Forces High Command received by Field Marshal Göring at 10 o'clock. Newspaper correspondents from the Protectorate may be sent to the West Wall (Führer gave permission on 10 February).
The difficult situation in Transportation is presented by me in written form to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
13:00 hours: Conference of Führer with General Halder. Before that, inspection of 4.7 tank destroyer on tank I, chassis satisfying [befriedigt].
Field Marshal has explained, that he is able to start at night anyhow. Flying into the area of … from the sea.
During the World War, we have dropped 28000 tons. Thus, the Air Forces does not want to anticipate, but prefers start at night. Planes shall not fly over Luettich and Eben Emael in order to avoid any alarm there.
113000 trucks driving in the W 45000 of them are suited for Armed Forces. We are able to produce 4000 trucks. Führer states, all the iron has been taken away from Todt, even that put aside by him (he wanted to build 3000 additional ones).
For the first time, the problems of transportation, motor vehicles and gasoline have been reported to the Führer more impressively.
Führer agrees that the 225 trains for the first wave of Army High Command reserves may still be used further on by the Chief of the Transportation Corps.
First report from France about our troop movements and reinforcements in the west, which were terminated on 1 February already.
Führer has a cold. No report. 1 February:
The Army requested survey about the strength of the armies and reserves, divided into batteries, battalions and tanks [Btn. Btlen u. Kampfwagen], induces the Führer again to open the question of the center of gravity.
He says: Most of the armed tanks [Geschuetzkampfwagen] have been directed to areas of secondary importance. Armored Divisions at 4th Army can do little in barricaded and fortified area.
They will be stopped at the latest on the Maas river and must be withdrawn. The 16th or 12th Army will then miss them. One should lead them together in direction of Sedan. The enemy does not expect our main assault there. The documents of fliers, who landed, have convinced them [the enemy] still further in their opinion that our intention is only to take possession of the Dutch and Belgian channel coast.
A great number of tanks with 8th Tank Division does not seem necessary, a mechanized division in 3 or 4 parts with tanks assigned, should suffice. (It may be that this is a wish of the SSV division. )
I hand over to the Führer a summarized report, from which the great possibility for formation of a center of gravity south of the line Luettich-Namur becomes obvious (at least 5 times the strength of the forces committed north of that line). I bring to his attention that the thrust against Sedan is a tactical secret path, where one can be surprised by the God of War. If the French attack from the south flank, we must veer to the south.
Führer still thinks it possible, that the enemy will not engage the battle at all. Anyhow he will do it automatically. After half a day the news from Holland and Belgium may be so threatening already that he will decide to stand still.
I don't believe it.
At 17:30 hours Col. v. Greifenberg and Lt. Col. Heusniger are summoned to discuss these questions.
The Führer disapproves of the wearing of regular army uniforms by persons who are not members of the army or the Führer's headquarters.
Recommends taking care of motor vehicles and fuel. Higher speeds result in doubled tire consumption.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command has a cold and will remain at home in the afternoon.
Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated.
Inquiries made to the Chief of the Operational Division: whether there is a sufficient quantity of cloth for flags on hand? Change of position of the Army High Commands
Proper designation of own troops: (a) Front line: white. (b) In line of company CPs: swastika flag. (c) Rear echelons: yellow rectangle.
Communicated Führer's ideas to Col. Warlimont, von Greifenberg and to Lt. Col. Heusniger, at 17:30 hours. Instructions requested how we should proceed in future.
Ziegenberg plant cannot be completed before June due to technical difficulties. Emergency installation can be made ready for operation by the middle of March, but in that case the Air Force must be in Nauheim or on the train.
Colonel Schmundt must make a report on the distribution of personnel to WNV.
Copper advance from Wifo stocks now to WNV, later back to Wifo.
Political action against the increase in frontier road-blocks [?] in Luxemburg.
Dr. Dorpmueller telegraphed to the chief of the Transportation Corps: The condition of the Reich Railroads requires that all nonessential transportation of the Armed Forces be postponed until warmer weather sets in.
The Führer approves my article on the Finnish-Russian conflict. Is to be published in the Voelkischer-Beobachter. Backlog congestion of railroads increased by 200 trains.
Certainty that nothing will happen to W.
Instructions to the 18th Army.
Corps on left flank of 16th and not 6th Army. Landing at the Hague ….. Capture Fort Hendrik. 10 divisions of the 8th wave [must receive 3 batteries].
No off-standard types of vehicles must be permitted to be used at the front, as long as standard army models are still being used in industry.
To the Chief of the Luftwaffe [taken care of].
Air raid protection ……
Speakers for troops, danger if commanders order the speeches themselves.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
WNV training of 300 to 400 men land postal clerks at Verst. [?] Not yet at present
from the Chief of the Air Force 6 new German consuls appointed in Scandinavia. C. has given orders for large-scale preparations for offensive. Fortress [Fest] drill of "Grafemvoeln". Special security by counterintelligence coordination of press.
Brief reports in the provincial newspapers for enemy intelligence service. Request authorization to land at Myden with a load of machines. Alternative preparations at C. should work in the same direction. Pr. Battleship "Repulse" in dock. Complete flop of this news report. Altmark in Bergen, British submarines expected. Burgedeyk submarine 48 Schulz unsuccessful [?] submarines.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command. Press Conference at Foreign Office.
Chief of the Navy High Command wishes to talk the Halifax problem over once more and then speak to the Führer. Now applications of mines only. Chief of Navy, High Command will take this matter up again with the Führer. L. ask what with report of General Staff Officers.
Incident with tankship "Altmark", 6 dead, 4 seriously injured. 1700 hours: Newly promoted Commanding Generals and General Rommel at Führer's table for dinner. (Geyr, Manstein, Schmidt, Reinhardt, Glumne). Complaints that guns in armored cars IV only have not to 2000 m. After dinner Manstein reports his ideas about the operations of Army Group A. He says, the decisive blow will not fall west of the Maas, but it must be overcome between Sedan-Charleville. If the enemy crosses the river, we are able to beat him and cross the River Maas together with him. In the south therefore, we must have strong armor or c none at all. What is in the rear cannot reach the battlefield in time.
On the basis of my discussion with Greifenberg on 13 February Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and General Halder reported to the Führer the following intention:
1. To shift the demarcation line between Army Group A and B in line Luettich-Namur.
2. To employ stronger armored forces in front of the 12th and
16th army, weakening by the measure Army Group B (1st and 5th armored) and ground forces reserved (9th armored division)
3. Intention to go to the front any way with a very small staff one night preceding A Day.
Führer approves all three suggestions but insists that in distributing the heavy tanks III, III t and IV due consideration should be given to the tasks to be expected. That is to say not such a large number of heavy tanks as it is the case now with the 8th Armored and 6th Armored Division.
Führer displeased with behavior of Graf Spee crew on the Altmark. No resistance, no British losses.
Führer presses energetically, preparations for the Weser Exercise Equip steamships. Put units in readiness. Will talk to staff.
In order to speed up preparations I advise to appoint one of newly promoted commanding generals with his staff as leader.
Führer approves.
Chief of Army reports about problems of organization. 20 February:
Discussion and consideration how case "Weser Exercise" is to be carried through. Equipment is to be taken on board ships ahead of the troops. Designation of units depends on equipment on hand.
1500 hours discussion concerning that matter through Chief of Armed Forces High Command with General Fromm. Intention, to take two divisions with technical equipment as second wave.
Führer talks to General von Falkenhorst and charges him with preparation of the Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions to each of the 3 branches of the armed forces.
Proposal from Fromm to use only units with German material. Therefore 7th Fl. Div., 22nd Division, one regiment of the 1st mountain division, Two divisions of the 7th wave, motorized brigade, (rifle brigade. 11 with armored car 1).
Führer wishes tat western connections of the "Spicherer Hoehen" be advanced and fortified with pillboxes.
Colonel v. Greifenberg transmits.
Führer expresses his intention to go to Munich for Sunday.
At the beginning of operations he does not want to go to Ziegenberg but to the Eagle's Nest [Felsen].
Colonel Juppe ordered:
a. to have a drawing made of the chain of command.
b. to consider, in what way the communications can be technically improved at the Eagle's Nest and vicinity.
Commander Junge informed about proposed points in his report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Important 3 points:
a. Submarines into the Mediterranean.
b. Esthonian submarines.
c. Discordance Navy-Airforce about the moment for the beginning of mine laying. Air force beginning 1 May with 3000, Navy with Heinckel 115 now, already 1845 hours Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informed.
Noon. Todt reports to the Führer concerning extension of railroad gauges [?] [Schienenhoehen]. Führer approves that extension will be built according to schedule.
Navy High Command reports that during last night 2 destroyers were sunk by our own planes [Leberecht Maas and … ]. Navy High Command stresses that this is the consequence of uncoordinated conduct of sea warfare, regardless whether it is conducted under, on or above the sea. One takes pains not to get excited; what would happen if there should be heavy losses. Führer is furious. He is right. He says: "I would not say anything if the whole Navy were sunk in battle with the enemy, but it is inexcusable if that happens on account of lack of coordination."
Gasoline reserve for motor vehicles.
Clear up, whether Navy is authorized to start already now with mine laying. Who will ask Duce, whether our own submarines have to enter the Mediterranean?
Engel informs about inquiry results Todt and Schmundt. The latter calls long distance from Munich. Führer has ordered completion of Eagle's Nest for Armed Forces Operational Staff and Air Force. [Zug] (air group [?] ) Heinrich will have to stay east of the Rhine.
Army High Command as strongly as possible in forests. Officer from the General Staff and an officer from Intelligence Service are to go to Eagle's Nest 26 February. There to reconnoiter together with Todt.
1430 hours. Orally transmitted to Chief of Operational Department and to Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger the matter. Chief of the High Command is informed. Staff Falkenhorst arrives in and starts to function XXIst Corps.
Disturbing reports from Turkey. Communication apparently cut off.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command inform General Halder about Führer's intention to have an Operational Staff of the Army High Command near the Eagle's Nest also.
Führer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case "Yellow".
Chief of the Air Force charged with examining this problem.
Führer decides that Navy will have to wait with starting of mine laying by means of planes, until situation will permit large-scale employment of air force. [transmitted to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force].
Talked with Chief of Air Force and Chief of Staff about work and about housing of Air Force near Eagle's Nest at the beginning. Air Force to Rodert or Muenstereifel or train nearby.
60 Tons of leaflets shall be dropped down in the near future. Führer approves the schedule but will not issue proclamation to Armed Forces from here on A Day.
I make the following proposition to the Chief of the Armed
Forces High Command and after that to Führer: Case "Yellow" And Weser Exercise have to be prepared in such a manner that they will become quite independent from another regarding time and strength. Führer completely agrees with that proposition there is any possibility for it.
1500 hours, staff Falkenhorst reports about preparations made so far. In this connection I explain to him the new basis of preparations.
Proposition for employment of forces
N 4 airborne companies 2 Mountain divisions
D 1 corps headquarters 22 infantry divisions less 2 division, 7th wave pol. division 1 div. 3rd wave regional defense unit.
It has yet to be decided, whether reinforcement 11th rifle brigade is to be directed first to group D and then to group N or to group N immediately.
Proposition as regards combat planes too high.
1500 hours, Report of staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buschenhagen, Dnaus very satisfactory to Führer. He approves the suggestions.
Führer wishes also to have a strong group at Copenhagen and detailed elaboration in which way the individual coastal batteries are to be overpowered. Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces is instructed to make out immediately the order for Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chief "WZ" order concerning increasing of the staff.
According to my proposal outfit transport ships immediately and with them bring horses over here from East Prussia.
1300 hours; Order to Juppe to speed up construction of Eagle's Nest, 11 March according to interim solution (operational staff of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in hunting lodge and at the same time permanent solution. (Army High Command with operational department and parts of O.A.IV.)
The same evening order concerning personal requirements of the staff and requisition to the branches of the armed forces.
Fury at Army High Command because transfers. Consultation with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. After my discussion with Jeschonnek scaling-down of requisitions.
Agreement with Army. Field Marshal rages and gets unfriendly towards Chief of Armed Forces High Command, goes to see Führer at 1300 hours. During the afternoon new requisitions are put forward which are somewhat reduced after consulting with Army and Air Force.
1100 hours: Assistant Secretary of State Welles wit Führer. The appointment of a new Minister for Ordnance is to be expected because Führer is dissatisfied with product equipment and munition.
Letter from the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to the Field Marshal.
Führer expresses his opinion about the necessity of prompt and strong action in Norway very sharply. No delay by branches of Armed Forces. Rapid acceleration is necessary.
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to subordinate Air Force units to XXI Corps.
Führer decides to undertake Weser Exercise before case "Yellow", with several days interval.
4 March:
Discussion with General Jeschonnek. All units of the Air are subordinated to X Fl. K. This receives its order through High Command of the Air Forces, upon demand of the Staff of Corps.
Führer orders that the Air Force shall provide the anti-aircraft battalion for the Weser exercise South.
3rd mountain division to be in Berlin already on March
1000 hours: Chief of the Air Force is informed.
1300 hours: Chief WNV is charged with securing communications from Falkenhorst to us. The former has to go to Luebeck to the X Fl. K.
1500 hours: Chief WNV is instructed to set up platoon company only after X-day. After that time, use expedients and send some men with the tactical troops.
1700 hours: General Bodenschatz complains about exclusion of the Field Marshal from Weser exercise. He said that 110 of the Air Force had been consulted in advance. Such subordination is intolerable.
Mad at General K I certify this error. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is informed General Rundstedt is supposed to feel sick. Intend to talk about it with Commander-in-Chief of the Army. If it is true, v.R. would have to be replaced by List in good time.
Himmler or Canaris are to provide personnel who are familiar with the Hague. These to Wenninger and are grabbed there by Kiertz.
Proclamations: a. faked ones, b. proclamations that everything is going well.
Student wants separate proclamations for Holland.
5 March: 1500 hours:
Big conference with the 3 Supreme Commanders about Weser exercise. Field Marshal vents his spleen, because he was not consulted beforehand. He dominates the discussion and tries to prove that all previous preparations are good for nothing.
Result: a. Stronger forces to Narvik,
b. Navy shall leave warships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in Trondheim),
c. Christian and may be excluded, for the beginning
d. 6 divisions should be calculated for Norway.
e. To get a foothold immediately in Copenhagen, too.
After this, the following make a report: General von Kesselring, Student, Sp Richthofen, Captain Koch, 1st lieutenant Witzig about the case "Festung" [fortress] and actions by glider-borne troops against the bridges of Vroenhofen and Veldvezelt, furthermore against Fort Eben-Emael. Accusations are made that Army Group B is supposed to have said that it would take 3-4 days until forces of the army could attack the fort.
Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations have now materialized. The Führer signs a directive containing all changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be changed any more now.
Führer wishes to have issued special orders for the Weser exercise in another form. They are to be divided into military orders which have to be made known to the tactical troops and into general instructions concerning actions of the Plenipotentiary of the Reich.
Führer is outraged about report of the Field Marshal that the Army does not care for occupation of the area in front of the left wing of the Army led by Busch by airborne troops dropped from "Stork" planes, because divisions can get there only after several days. I object that it will naturally be better to employ these troops there, where armored divisions will arrive faster.
Führer is outraged when he learns that Prince Oskar is commanding officer of a regiment. Schmidt was just about to suggest that he should be given command of a division, but he managed not to mention it.
Buschenhagen reports to me about the preparations for W and submits the schedule.
Führer does not appear at table.
In the evening of March 8th, I again bring seriousness of the gasoline situation to the attention of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. Nothing efficacious has been done to improve the situation. Industry regularly uses up 80000 tons a month.
There is pressing need for the appointment of a Deputy-General for Fuel Economy (General von Schell).
Führer makes his wonderful speech in the arsenal on the occasion of Memorial day.
The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very favorable, from a political point of view.
The French press rages about it because they consider it necessary to cut Germany off from the Swedish ore. In a military way, the situation is disturbing for us, because, if peace should be concluded soon, the motivation for the prepared action of the group Falkenhorst will be difficult.
Führer has objections against the iron cross in gold (color effect black-gold), as it means abandoning tradition. Rather create a new decoration.
On the other hand, he agrees with the Oak-Leaves for the Knight's Cross. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presents a list of the tanks at hand in the armed forces.
Führer wants a basic ruling that only such people should be appointed in the Armed Forces and in Civil Service who have no relatives abroad. The danger is too great that they will get into conflict with their own conscience. The schedule (for the Weser exercises) is presented to the Führer. Also the special orders which the Führer takes along.
Führer is very much satisfied with Ribbentrop's conference in Rome. Duce remains steadfast, wants to talk with Führer personally next week on the Brenner. Conclusion of peace between Finland and Russia deprives England, but us, too, of any political basis to occupy Norway.
The preparations are ready to the extent that March 20th could be W-day. However, unfavorable ice conditions compel postponement by 1-2 days.
Führer does not yet give order for "W". He is still looking for some justification.
English keep vigil in the North-Sea with 15-16 submarines; the reason is doubtful, either to prevent a German action. Führer has not yet decided, how to justify the Weser exercise. Wrong news report in the American newspapers.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is in doubt, whether it is still important to play at preventive war [?] in Norway. The question is, if it wouldn't be better to carry out case "Yellow" before the Weser exercise.
The danger in that case is that the English will immediately get a foothold in Narvik, because we would have started with neutrality violation.
At noon, Colin Rosz visits the Führer. Interesting explanations about Japan-China and Russia.
15 March:
Führer wants the following material for the conference with the Duce on March 18th:
1. Large-scale map of the distribution of our own forces (207 divisions).
2. Maps about the distribution of enemy and neutral forces. France, England, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary.
3. Terminal map of the Finnish-Russian conflict.
4. Strength of our own Air Force.
1330 hours: Lunch with Army Group A and with Chief of the General Staff.
1500 hours: Reports of Army Group Commander and Army Commanders, including Group Kleist; very satisfactory.
Worries that the English will proceed against Norway, as overhead radio messages indicate. As the English have retired 7 submarines, such an action does not seem probable any longer.
Army Group B reports about its evaluation of the situation and its intentions.
Detailed preparations are done very well. Displeasure about disconnection of the 4th army. Mutual assistance is eliminated.
Lack of reinforcements, if the 6th army should be successful, after all. 6th army shifts its center of gravity to 4th Corps, and also draws 3 armored divisions of the 2nd echelon there. 10th and 9th Corps have no anti-aircraft protection.
Jeschonnek transmits that Army Bush needs another 25 "stork" planes.
Führer leaves at noon for conference with Duce on the Brenner.
News of the successful raid of the Air Force against Scapa Flow. Führer is in high spirits.
Nothing important. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Chef L) is informed about the report of the commanders in the West. 19 March:
Führer returns from the conference with the Duce beaming with joy and very much satisfied. Complete harmony, Duce is resolute; but he cannot fight a long war Duce is highly impressed and agrees with the opinion of the Führer's that the decision against France is being made. Whatever happens at the periphery in the meantime is unimportant. At the end, Duce told Ciano: "My decision is made. Did you hear, Führer?" Balkan should and must remain quiet. Complete understanding for Führer's cooperation with Stalin.
Führer deeply moved by enthusiasm of the Tyrolians England song ["We will sail against England …"translator's note]. Chief of Armed Forces High Command very much depressed because of Todt's appointment. I try to persuade him not to insist on the "agreement". It is much better, to separate the tasks clearly. The quests of the Armed Forces are laid down by the Führer and transmitted to Dr. Todt by the Armed Forces High Command. Dr. Todt has full powers to fulfill these requests.
During the night, the English attack Sylt and Hoermann [?] No success.
At noon, the Führer signs an order which appoints Todt as Minister for Ordnance.
Wedel is instructed by the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to celebrate the 40th anniversary of service by the Commander-in-chief of the Army in a modest way only. The achievements of individual personalities can be appreciated only during or after the war.
In the evening, annihilating blow against an English convoy; 42000 tons of big boats (10-12000 tons) have been sunk.
Objections of Group 21 [Grp. XXI] about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05,30 hours and finishing of the diplomatic action. Führer rejects any earlier negotiations, because otherwise calls for help will be offered, it has to be broken ruthlessly. The political plenipotentiaries will have to strongly emphasize the military measures taken, and will even have to exaggerate them.
Reported to Führer, how we want to proceed at the proposed discussions with the Italian General Staff. First, inquiry by attache in Rome, how they believe they can take some burden off us. Only then to proceed to possibility of an operation across the Upper Rhine. Discussion with General Staff only once our cards are on the table.
American newspaper correspondents inspect the small damage on Sylt.
24-25 March:
Führer at Obersalzberg. No special events.
The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian territorial waters, or even fire at them.
The Führer is back.
Discussion about deadlines for operations.
Führer sticks to it: first Weser exercise, dark nights necessary for it. Thus about 4-5 days later. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports, urges to start laying mines with planes, as 1270 mines will already be at hand by end of April. Führer wants to think it over some more.
Our own submarine stranded near Lindesnaes, one submarine and boat 37 come to help. Are to ask for permission to stay in Norwegian waters, if necessary, 2300 PM. Discussion of the Führer with Commander-in-Chief of the Army and of Army Group C. First and Seventh army.
Führer explains his intentions with the Italians about to strike. Operational aim plateau Langres.
Deceptive actions of First Army in case "Yellow" agreed to. Attacks proposed in case of 95th, 93rd, 75th, 268th, 215th, and 246th divisions. These have favorable effects, but deceptive measures of the 7th army will not take place, because of the preparation of case Brown (Italy.)
Duce attaches importance to General Staff talks, Graziani intends to send General Roatta to B. in April. The Norwegians are interning U 21 seemingly because of awkward statements by the commander, who did not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be a mistake made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need stimulus. The three chiefs von Falkenhorst are also pondering matters, which are none of their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages.
In the evening, the Führer steps into the map room and explains sharply that he will not be content with the Navy again quitting the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on ground forces.
Talk with Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants decision about commitment of air mines.
Führer talks to him alone about retaining of ships. Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] rejects Narvik, but wants to examine, if Trondheim cannot be set up as a base immediately.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy draws attention to the fact that they want fuel from him, because the army will run out of it by the end of May. This is the consequence of the wrong arrangements with Shell and not to buy in Mexico, like the Navy did it.
3 PM: Commander-in-Chief of the Force with the Führer.
U-21 not set free yet by the Norwegians. Negotiations under way.
Führer thinks about activation of another 10-12 new divisions. Where are the mortars committed?
L II ordered to present an outline of personnel and materiel, from which it could be determined, if and when new activations are possible.
Nothing of importance. 1 April:
German fighters shoot 7 enemy fighters down. 1300 hours:
Falkenhorst again gives general report about Weser exercise. 1300 hours: Breakfast, then discussion with all commanding officers primarily concerned.
Führer has a very good impression about thoroughness of preparations.
1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Führer. All confirm end of the preparations. Führer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise for April 9th.
Protests of the commanding officer of the Air Force that some warships leave ports again right away. Führer, too, disapproves of that, but does not want to intervene too much in an exclusive concern of naval warfare.
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force agrees to plan to start aerial torpedo war [LM-Krieg] now.
Führer wants that Luetzow shall be used for the transport of troops to Trondheim, in spite of tasks later on.
Find out, if it is not possible to land debarkation troops by fishing boat, in order to capture the bridge strong point of Vordingborg.
Movements of the first 3 ships of the leading echelon [Ausfuhrstaffel] started at 0200 hours. Lt. Commdr. Junge reports at 1600 hours that the 3 ships have instructions how to act against Norwegians. I immediately instruct Councillor of Legation Hewel in order to inform the Foreign Minister what the situation is, in case one of the ships of the leading echelon should be examined by Norwegians. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command also informs the Führer at 1815 hours about it.
1830 hours Reich Foreign Minister informed by Führer. Chief of Armed Forces High Command asked to join discussion.
Slight alarm, as some news from Norway indicates increased preparedness. Sweden has asked what preparations for troops shipments in Stettin are supposed to mean (boats under Reich Naval Ensign) [Reichsdienstflagge].
Führer drafts the proclamations. Piepenbrock, Chief of Counter-Intelligence service 1, returns with good results of the talk with Quisling from Copenhagen.
News that 2 armored coastal vessels [Kuestenpanzer] are in Narvik and that 2 submarines are expected.
Weser exercise runs according to plan. Some alarm report from the source of a Belgian agent [V-Mann] appear unworthy of belief. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command instructs General von Rintelen at 1930 hours.
6 April:
Weser exercise runs according to plan. The high-pressure weather area over the Northern North-Sea, which was predicted yesterday, is not taking place and that favors the action of the navy. Führer puts great emphasis on the fact that the families of all deserters will be checked carefully. Navy records long English radio message, but is unable to decipher it.
1500 hours: General Gerke reports that his movements according to plan.
1600 hours: Talks in room of the Chief of the section for Foreign Countries in presence of Chef L and Military Attache in Rome with General Marras.
1700 hours: Report that Luetzow is dropping out and can go to Oslo only, because auxiliary engines did not take part. Führer agrees to this decision.
No disquieting news. Hipper with destroyers seems to have been reported by an English submarine on Sunday morning, April 7th.
Prince Axel of Denmark has the intention to visit Field Marshal Göring on Monday.
Day of highest tension. The English put 3 mine fields in the Norwegian territorial waters and make that public.
Leading echelon is far off with several ships because of lack of pilots.
Only 1 ship near Narvik, everything else seems to be hardly beyond Bergen.
Boat Rio de Janeiro is torpedoed; since horses and men in uniform are landed, the impending project becomes known to the Norwegians.
Group Hipper gets into a battle with an English destroyer and annihilates it.
The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the air in Stavanger. Not at Christiansand and in Oslo.
Bluecher sinks after a heroic fight. Commanding Admiral and Commander 103 (Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land.
Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats.
Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand fought to surrender by planes and Karlsruhe.
Chief of naval forces [Flottenchef] report 2 turrets gone, only 25 miles.
First breaking through of British destroyers in Narvik.
The Koenigsberg destroyed by enemy dive bombers. Bornholm occupied.
Luetzow on voyage home. Oslo hit by torpedo.
Norwegians warships are put into service.
Denmark does not belong any longer to jurisdiction of XXIst Corps. Railroads Oslo-Bergen and Oslo-Drontheim destroyed.
12 April: Still 6 destroyers left ready for use in Narvik, Freighter [Treckdampfer] Jon Wellom in N., otherwise no ship of the leading echelon. Bulk of the submarines ordered outside the ports occupied by us.
Hundalen on the iron-ore railroad reached. Strong enemy air attack on Bergen.
Mountain battery flown to lake near Narvik with Ju 52 planes. Concentration of strong English naval forces near Harstadt in process. Much booty in Oslo. 1650 hours naval battle in Narvik. Battleships and Hipper arrived in home ports.
14 April: Dietl is not being attacked, but is separated from Northern group. Terrible excitement. All details are to be ordered from here.
Steamship Baerenfelsis sunk in the course of attack on Bergen.
Another 3 air-force antiaircraft batteries on board ship torpedoed by submarine. Führer wants that Dietl tries to fight his way through to the South. I argue against this impossible idea.
Reproaches against the navy, especially because the battle was not engaged by battleships and because she does not succeed in speeding up the transports (UnjustifiedI strongly argue against it).
During the night from the 16th to 17th Staff Officer from Admiralty arrives in Narvik and delivers written report by Dietl with call for help from Stavanger, since English naval forces are firing there. Air-Force notified. The Führer again states in a temperamental way that the Gr. Dietl will have to march South or will have to be picked up. I advocate again in a very strong way that
a. a march South is impossible,
b. even a transport can evacuate only very small units, leads to the loss of many planes and breaks the moral backbone of the Dietl group.
They will continue to fight on the Swedish border for a long time. A thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost. 1200 hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig. 1530 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] with Admiralty Staff Officer from Narvik who reports verbally about his experiences in Narvik. Each piece of bad news leads to the worst fears. Chief of Air-Force and of L IH [Army Air-Forces?] presents an evaluation of the situation I fully agree to. I present to the Führer this and the proof that we do not have enough long range planes to pick up troops from Narvik, anyhow. Furthermore, an order which is delivered by courier and composed in our sense. To fight and tie down forces and not to give up.
Even a professor who knows Norway is fetched from Innsbruck and asked whether mountain troops can get from Narvik to Fauske is impossible judging from my mountain experience.
In the evening, the Führer signs the order to Dietl which I had prepared, to hold out as long as possible.
Führer is again calm. He gives orders to Captain von Sternburg in a way conforming entirely with our point of view. It might even be possible to change last night's order even more towards a sense of holding out and tying down forces.
The situation, too, looks better. The strong shipping losses of the English give them something to think about.
Quiet day which does our somewhat strained nerves good.
Sternburg leaves by plane with additional verbal orders.
1600 hours: General Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should to Bardufoss. I refuse that. The troops cannot hold out.
Important is [sic] of the forces on hand, most important the thorough destruction of the railroad.
2. He expresses doubts whether the landing of the 22nd division which takes several days still runs satisfactorily in view of the preparations in Holland. I emphasize that we have to open for ourselves at least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and that we have to keep it open.
Renewed crisis. Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled; since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is finished. According to the Führer's opinion, force has to be used. Gauleiter Terboven is supposed to be put in charge.
Field Marshal works in the same direction; he criticizes that the behavior against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that it was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough troops are brought up by the navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above, and all orderly work of the competent military leadership (Navy High Command and Gr. XXI) is in vain.
In the evening, Terboven arrives; after supper, the Führer instructs him alone. It is doubtful, if it will be possible to limit him to the activity of a Civilian Commissar [Zivilkommissar], as I suggest it; we will have to talk to him personally.
Führer's birthday. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the Supreme Commanders congratulate. All the tempests has quieted down.
The movements to Oslo and Narvik make progress. No English landings. Führer has a discussion with the Field-Marshal, with Himmler, Terboven, Reichsleiter Bormann.
Before that, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has told the Führer about all possible points of friction between an independent head of the government and the Military Commander in Norway. It seems that reports of the Air Force have induced the Führer to form the opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and sabotage on a large scale. Already on the 19th, I contradicted such an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all.
Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos become more tangible.
On the evening of April 20th, the General [Generaloberst] leads a long fight in order to word the text of the order to Terboven in such a way that the military necessities are taken into account.
Führer would like to bring big vessel with personnel and materiel to Trondheim.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy considers that to be impossible, especially now.
Führer is increasingly worried about the English landings and the consequent impossibility to set up ground communications with Trondheim. Without success, I compare the difficult situation of the English, who have no usable port and no airdrome at their disposal.
The Field-Marshal somewhat quieter, in view of the good weather forecasts for the Air Force today. 2 April:
The excitement grows, because the 163d and 196th divisions are making small progress towards the North and new bridge demolitions are being reported. Führer orders that no more motorized units [11th rifle brigade] are to be sent to stavanger, but immediately 2 mountain divisions instead. 3rd is to be brought up to full strength again. 4 ships of the Iller class, in addition a 5000t steamer, later 2 larger East Asia boats are to be brought to Bergen convoyed by capital ships, in order to make the troops there mobile and ready for battle.
Forces in Narvik to be reorganized right away, in order to make the 3d mountain division again steadfast for battle.
No heavy artillery is to go to Norway for ground combat. The heavy battalion of the 2nd mountain division remains in the West, those of the 3d mountain and 69th division are at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Führer talks to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
a. Anti-aircraft reinforcements for Stavanger.
b. Bombers for ground fighting in Oslo,
Fighters for ground fighting in Oslo.
In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order.
The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right flank is to be expected with mechanized Battalion Göring.
Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme confirms that picture after his return from the front. He brings collected orders of the captured English brigade detachment along. Very great political success to be anticipated with that.
110 hours: Field-Marshal reports, especially the situation in Trondheim. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme, back from the battle field, reports favorably, rapid progress. Führer regrets the halting of the 11th rifle brigade. I refuse to send them again now.
2300 hours: Schmundt back, even more favorable news. Boehme brings English orders for the entire project of Norway's occupation by the English. Complaint about lack of clear orders in the Air Force.
Optimistic mood continues. Führer very happy about Schmundt's report and about exact orientation. Talks adversely about Lossberg to Bodenschatz; Lossberg's somewhat braggard report has created displeasure, although he did not know any details. Preparation of an action on the basis of the orders found on captured Englishmen.
Order to Kraatzer W Pr and Counter Intelligence Bureau for foreign countries [Amt Abwehr/Ausland].
Report by Sternberg about his task in Narvik.
Order by me to Chief L to give out a strong directive that nobody but Armed Forces High Command will give orders to Gr. Narvik. All men there are subordinated General Dietl exclusively.
The Belgian government resigned.
Suggestion to the Führer to omit naval transport to Bergen with battleships and to bring these mobile parts of the 69th Division back to Oslo. Italian ambassador Atolico is recalled, because he does not take a clear pro-German attitude.
At 1500 hours the Commander-in-Chief of the navy reports.
Führer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by heavy naval forces.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of the Westwall will be extended solidified.
Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the English-men, and delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of command [Rangliste]. At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign Office.
Until 0330 in the Reich Chancellery, where Führer formulates the government statement together with Foreign Minister. It will be published on the [sic]
Führer voices intention to start with case "Yellow" between 1st and 7th May. I point out that the Air Force and the Transportation Chief have to be initially notified 3 days ahead of time.
Motor column [Mot.Kol.] Fischer gets stuck 100 miles [Km ?] south of Drontheim in front of many destroyed bridges.
Group (Gr) XXI is crying for engineers and cross-Country l motor vehicles. They will have to get along with their own engineers. After all, there are 19 engineer companies. Order to get all engineers up to the front.
Advance movement direction Drontheim is halting. Nevertheless the English are retiring fast according to their communiques.
29 April:
Führer decides: Air Force can commit another 2 groups (new) in Norway on Tuesday and Wednesday, but must be ready for Yellow on Sunday.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy commits heaviest flat for the safeguarding of [?]
Emden still to be left in Baltic (O), Employ 2 East Asia steamboats for Oslo-transport.
Falkenhorst wants his motorized and mountain battalion with engineer platoon and battalion brought to Drontheim by air.
Commander-in-Chief of the Army has to be compelled first to set up the missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapidly than it can roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division.
Führer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain division for Norway.
At 13.35 hours I am able to report to the Führer that line of communication on land between Oslo and Drontheim has been established. Führer is happy with joy. At noon, I have to sit next to him.
The special communique is released right away. It remains to be decided now, whether to keep in readiness the 1st mountain division (no) and heavy artillery (no). At 18.30 hours the report comes in that Dombaas has been reached, too, and that the enemy is retiring. Opdal on the railroad Drontheim-Dombaas has also been occupied. Führer releases order of the day to the soldiers in Norway.
More big successes in Norway on land and in the air.
Führer orders that starting Saturday, May 4th, everything must be in readiness to start operations for case Yellow the following day, when ordered.
Victory report from Norway. Pursuit direction Andalsnes. The English flee to the boats. Norwegians give up the Commander of Moeren-Romsdal, Gen. Hang offers capitulation.
Field Marshall with Kesselring, Joschonnek, Student, Sponek again report about case "Festung" [fortress]. It will be carried out. Landing on super-highway possible.
Difficulty is the strong echelonment in depth [Tiefenstaffelung] of the bridge position near Moerdyk and north of it.
Air Force is to get order on the 3rd at noon, whether to guide in [einweisen] or not to guide in, that whether means to use or not to use parachutists and airborne units.
After evaluation of weather, Führer decides that X-day will not be before Monday, 6 May.
Air Force notified by code word "Do not guide in." ["Nicht einweisen"]
Field Marshal protests against draft of the comprehensive description of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces High Command is mentioned and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch.
Führer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post [Horchstelle] in the Caucasus.
Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Belgium does not seem to satisfy the Foreign Office completely. To my mind the material is more than sufficient.
A new order goes out to group XXI, especially as several foreign news reports say that Namsos, too, will be evacuated.
Dr. Todt transmits exact details.
4 May:
Reports about evacuation of Namsos by the English. Great successes of the Air Force against the English fleet. Battleship, heavy cruiser and destroyer, in addition to 12000 ton transport sunk.
Führer himself wants to make comprehensive report about the campaign in Norway. He is furious about it that people other than himself meddle with this reporting. He stated that the Armed Forces High Command is his staff. Führer designates 1 Tuesday, May 7th as X-day.
The flanks of Gr. Dietl are being pressed hard in Narvik. I am afraid he remains too long in front.
Field Marshal reports that an English 1500 ton submarine minelayer was sighted on the Swedish coast. He makes an onslaught aimed at subordinating all Naval Air units under the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
Führer has finished justification [ Begruendung] for case "Yellow". Wednesday, May 8th, is designated as A-day.
Detailed orders for May 8th for A-day are issued, and for transmission of the codewords Augsburg and Danzig.
Führer railroad train was scheduled to leave Finkenkrug at 16.38 hours.
But weather remains uncertain and therefore, the order valid up to this time is rescinded. Next decision May 8th until 1200 hours.
1100 hours: The Field Marshal with Bodenschatz and Jeschonnek at the Führer's.
1500 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] Raeder.
Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing.
Führer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger of treachery particularly in brown leaflets [in braunen Blaettern]. Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who left Berlin for Rome on April 29th.
Führer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance [Dauerleistung] is that of the foot-slogging combat-soldier.
Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the counter-intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in but the Dutch have refused.
According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture, whether the Dutch don't work hand in hand with the English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow improvement of the whole situation, but development fog in the next days still have to be taken into consideration.
Führer does not want to wait any longer. Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action. Führer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May 10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day longer. Departure of Envoy Kieritz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May 9th.
In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him.
Führer decides to fall in on May 10th for sure. Departure with Führer train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug.
After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 2100 hours.
The same to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness. At 0530 hours in the Eagle's nest.
The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gemrep falls into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. However, the different units hold out. On the R., the junction of the 9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is being broken into.
Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored and mechanized units in front of the 4th army.
Holland capitulates.
Führer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these units out from B and to add them . via F … to the fifteenth corps as new Armored Group Hoeppner. According to report Reichau, there are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle position or its Southern part, at least. Therefore, Army High Command receives the option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoeppner also in front, of Nanner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating.
Engle reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle.
1600-1830 hours: Field Marshal Göring with the Führer, talk with Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force end intentions concerning Navik, utilizing the new airdrome near [sic]
Day of great tension. The commanders-in-chief of the Army has not carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in the defensive flanking positions.
The commander-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called immediately and ordered to adopt the necessary measures immediately. (see note in the files)
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is flying immediately by plane to General Rundstedt at Bastogne.
I further give an order supplementing the previous directive. It veers the 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the South and South-West for an attack.
Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group "B", respectively Chief are very vexed because -their Armored Corps was taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we already have all armored and mechanized divisions, except the 9th one, in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still afraid on the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than 20 divisions are still north of the Somme.
Now everything depends on sealing off the Abbeville gap and the Army Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of the 20th, at the Army High Commands conference, the Führer declares the new directive for continuation of operations against the French Army.
1. Annihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea coast.
2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until Seine river is reached.
3. Principal Attack on both sides of Reims in south-westerly direction, accompanied on the right flank east of Paris by heavy forces.
4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in direction of Nancy-Luneville.
General von Stuelpnagel is ordered, not to follow up any more former intention, to attack the Plateau of Langres with 20 Italian Divisions crossing the Upper Rhine. The Italians rather should attack the French Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities.
Führer is beside himself with joy. Talks in words of highest appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory robbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and other values.
First negotiations in the forest of Compiegne like in 1918.
British can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the colonies.
A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command containing the emotion-chocked words of the Führer when receiving the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the capture of Abbeville, is in the files.
Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45 about situations and later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire Armored and mechanized units under
Reichman's command, and in addition to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18 divisions. This would change the intentions of the Führer, expressed by him on the 20th. Führer declares his agreement for the time being.
In the afternoon the Führer explains to Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris, that it would be better to direct the main thrust, also with the bulk of Armored Forces, to by-pass Paris in the east, (transmitted by me to Greifenberg in the evening).
Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Führer at 1200 hours. In the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek.
The Führer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that infantry divisions are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the VIth and VIIth Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups.
Führer stays in map room until 0130 hours.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command decides after that to fly to Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes apparent that Headquarters of 4th Army has ordered General Kluge to commit the 1st Army Corps south of Sombre, so that it will be in front rather than in the rear of the French border fortifications.
The Führer approves at 1300 hours directive, submitted by me, concerning sparing of human lives of the 10th Army by disengagement from the Maginot line, cessation of unnecessary attacks, bringing up of all Divisions and mobile CHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army.
Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Führer furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in Narvik.
Army High Command draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at 1700 hours and intends to continue at 1200 hours on left wing West of Arras towards North.
But Jeschonnek reports at 1900 hours, that French tanks reached point 3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive bombers, pursuit planes and Anti Aircraft Artillery.
The Führer flies together with me and Schmundt to Army Group A to Charleville.
He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High Command, without informing the Führer and the High Command of the Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions to its rear, to Army Group B. Führer is very much displeased and thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in military respect but also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered to report, and shifting of dividing-line is rescinded. New crisis of confidence, especially since Field Marshal reports earlier that an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B onward, but even invites it to make available reserves that can be spared.
For that reason a new order is issued in the evening (a) not to advance beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that each change regarding the Chain of command among the Armies is subject to approval of the Führer.
The Führer signs Order number 13 regarding continuation of operations.
He prohibits the proposed talk by General von Melsch in the Foreign Office to foreign journalists about the war situation, if necessary this shall be done by W PR [Armed Forces Propaganda?]
Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation.
It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of concerted action.
Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian concentration of forces against Bessarabia.
In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrived and asks permission armored mechanized division to push forward from the High terrain Vimy-St.Omer-Graveline towards in the West into the level terrain. Führer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be ready for tasks in the South.
At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek, reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible.
Air Force reports great successes near Narvik.
The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension. Lutz protests in a letter to the General [Generaloberst] against mentioning of the Armed-SS [Waffen-SS] in Armed forces High Command communiques. But this came from the Führer in a proclamation to the troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting only 10 days, no losses. 26 May:
In the morning the Führer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army and agrees because 18th and 6th army advance slowly and because, resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened, that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of Tournai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjunction therewith the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his intentions for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the 12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31 May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C will be in readiness starting 15 June.
The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but also from a political point of view.
If Paris is surrendered or if revolutionary features come to the fore, then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will strongly disengage ourselves for the time being.
"Document 1814-PS: Organization Book Of The Nsdap Editions Of 1936, 1938 And 1940 [translation]" pp. 411-413.
Editor, the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley). Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Pages 86-88.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NSDAP AND ITS AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS
The Party was created by the Führer out of the realization that if our people were to live and advance towards an era of prosperity they had to be led according to an ideology suitable for our race. They must have as supporters men above average, that means, men who surpass others in self-control, discipline, efficiency, and greater judgment. The party will therefore always constitute a minority, the order of the National Socialist ideology which comprises the leading elements of our people.
Therefore the party comprises only fighters, at all times prepared to assume and to give everything for the furtherance of the National Socialist ideology. Men and women whose primary and most sacred duty is to serve the people.
The NSDAP as the leading element of the German people control the entire public life, from an organizational point of view, as well as from that of affiliates, the organizations of the State administration, and so forth.
In the long run it will be impossible to let leaders retain responsible offices if they have not been recognized by the Party.
Furthermore, the party shall create the prerequisites for a systematic selection of potential "Führers".
The reconstruction of the National Socialist organizational structure itself is demonstrated by the observation of the following principles:
The Führer Principle
The subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire organization.
The regional unity
The expression of the practical community thought.
I. FÜHRER PRINCIPLE [Führerprinzip]
The Führer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in its details as well as in its entirety.
The Führer is at the top.
He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of the Reich's direction, the Party apparatus and the State administration.
Thus a clear picture of the tasks of the party is given.
The Party is the order of "Führers". It is furthermore responsible for the spiritual-ideological National Socialist direction of the German people. The right to organize people for their own sake emanates from these reasons.
This also justifies the subordination to the party of the organizations concerned with the welfare of the people, besides the inclusion of people in the affiliates of the party, the SA, SS, NSKK, the Hitler Youth, the NS Womanhood, the NS German Student Association and the NS German "Dozentenbund" [University teachers association].
This is where the National Socialist Führer structure becomes more strongly apparent.
Every single affiliate is cared for by an office of the NSDAP.
The leadership of the individual affiliates is appointed by the Party.
The Reich Organization Leader [Reichsorgnisationsleiter] of the NSDAP is simultaneously leader of the DAF. The NSBO is the organization bearer of the DAF.
The Leader of the Head-Office for Public Welfare also handles within the "Personalunion" the National Socialist Welfare and the Winter Relief.
The same applies to: The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS "Rechtswahrerbund", The head office for public health for the NS. German Medical Association, The head office for educators for the NS Teachers Association, The head office for civil servants for the Reich Association of Civil Servants, The head office for war victims for the NS. War Victim Relief, The head office for technology for the NS. Association of German Technology.
The Racial Political Office handles the Reich Association of families with many children, the NS Womanhood [Frauenschaft] and the "Deutsches Frauenwerk".
The Reich Office for agrarian politics of the NSDAP remains therefore in closest touch with the "Reichnaehrstand" [Reich Nutrition Office] which is anchored in the State. Direct handling and personal contact of the leaders is also provided in this manner.
All attached affiliates, as well as the offices of the Party, have their foundation, in the same manner as in the Reich direction, in the sovereign territories, in the "Gaue" and furthermore in the districts (Kreise) and if required in the local groups of the NSDAP. This applies also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Womanhood, the DAF, and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included in local administrations, respectively district sectors or district comradeships which correspond geographically to local groups of the Party.
II. FÜHRER PRINCIPLE. SUBORDINATION AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE TOTAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The Führer structure would be split, though, if all subdivisions, including attached affiliates were completely independent in their structure from the smallest unit up to the "Reichsfuehrung" and were they to come only at the top directly under the Führer.
Like a four-story building, if we consider the four Sovereign territories [Reich, Gau, etc] whose pillars and walls go up to the roof without having supporting joists (wooden stays) or connections on the various floors. Furthermore, it would not be reconcilable with the Führer principle, which assumes complete responsibility, to assume that the Leader of a sub-division, as well as of an affiliated organization, would be in the position to guarantee beyond a professional and factual responsibility the political and ideological attitude of all the sub-leaders down to the smallest unit on the basis of his Reich leadership. The total independence of individual organizations would necessitate furthermore, the creation of an organizational, personal and educational apparatus for each one of them. This, in turn, would create eventually, in spite of the best will of the responsible "Reichsleiters" [Reich Leaders], central offices and office leaders in the Reich Leadership [Reichsfuehrung] of the party, differences in the various organizations. Those differences would later on of necessity take the shape of completely different systems in regional, vertical, and personal respects, etc. within the National Socialist regime.
The Subdivisions NS German Student Association, NS Womanhood Association, NSD [Dozentenbund] and the affiliates and their leaders come therefore under the authority of the competent sovereign leaders of the NSDAP. At the same time their structure is professionally effectuated from the bottom up and they are subordinated to their immediately superior organization in the sovereign divisions of the Party, from a disciplinary point of view, that is to say insofar as organization, ideology, politics, supervision and personal questions are concerned.
Thus a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the party structure is provided and a firm connection with the sovereign leaders of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the Führer Principle.
[In the 1943 edition the text remains the same, but the topical sentences "I. Führer Principle" and "II. Führer Principle. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational Structure" are changed to "I. Construction of the Organization" and "II. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational Structure".]
Berlin 5/12/1941 R.S.H.A. IVB I To all Staatspolizei-leit-stellen
For information: The SD-Leit-Abschnitten -The Inspekteuren der Sipo/SD
Concerning: The Study and Treatment of Church Politics
The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has issued an order, which is to come into immediate operation, in which the Sipo and SD Study and Treatment of Church Politics, which has hitherto been divided between the SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be taken over entirely by the Stapostellen. See the plan for the division of work issued by the R.S.H.A. on 3/1/1941. In addition to combatting opposition, the Stapostellen thus take over the entire 'Gegnernachrichtendienst' in this sphere.)
In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take over this work, the Chief of the Sipo/SD has ordered that 'Church Specialists' hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, should be temporarily transferred to the same posts at Stapostellen, and operate the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service in the Church Political Sphere) there.
On the orders of the Chief of the R.S.H.A., and after reaching agreement with the heads of Amts III, II, and I, these 'Church Specialists' specified in the attached lists will thus be transferred from the SD-Abschnitten to the Stapostellen, quoted. Further instructions for transference or removal will be issued by Amt. I. Those Stapostellen which are unable to obtain any SD-'Specialists' must immediately train those of their specialists who appear most suitable for Nachrichtendienst work.
The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has furthermore ordered that Nachrichtendienst files concerning Church Political Opposition, hitherto the property of the SD-Abschnitte should be handed over to the Stapostellen. However, material concerning Confessional influence on the lives of the people is to remain with the SD-Abschnitten. In doubtful cases the Stapostellen are to be given an opportunity of making copies or photostats of these reports.
Since it is essential that in this particular sphere the opposition should be kept under constant observation, with no possibility of loopholes, I am endeavoring to ensure that the changeover in organization should take place immediately.
On I.VI.1941 all Stapostellen are to send in reports on the completion of the actual change-over of organization, and, at the same time, draw up a list of personnel, giving the names of those 'Specialists' who, after the reorganization, are doing executive work in the Stapostellen, and of those who are conducting the intelligence proper of the Nachrichtendienst.
I then intend, at the end of June, to summon all these specialists to a conference [Arbeitstagung] in Berlin, at which they will receive important instructions for the carrying-out of their work.
Signed Mueller Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte Berlin 14.8.1941 R.S.H.A. IV B To all Stapo-leit-stellen Information: From the Inspectors of the Sipo/SD
Concerning: Conference of the Specialists in Church Affairs [Kirchenbearbeiter] attached to the Stapostellen.
On 9/22-23/1941 a Conference for Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen will take place in the Lecture-Hall of the Stapoamt, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8, Berlin SW II. Date of arrival: 9/21/1941. Uniform: Brownshirt and trousers worn with jackboots.
I leave it to the heads of the Stapo-leit-stellen as to whether they send those officials responsible for the entire 'Kirchenbearbeitung' (Treatment and Study of Church Politics) to this conference, or officials in charge of both the executive and intelligence branches (SD-members). In each case those taking part in the conference must have their names sent in before 9/10/1941, in order that accommodation may be found for them. Billeting forms will be issued on arrival in Berlin on the 21st at the Stapoamt Watchroom, Room I. Passes are to be given up at the entrance of the lecture-hall at the opening of the conference at 9 hrs.22.9.41.. Heydrich Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte
Aachen, 10/8/1941 Report of Hammes on Conference dated 10/8/1941 at Aachen
Notes on the Conference of Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen
On 9/22-23/1941 a Conference of Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen was held in the Lecture Hall of the R.S.H.A. in Berlin, in which 141 Specialists took part.
I. On 22.9.1941
1. The latest developments in the Church Political situation, nd our outstanding tasks at this momentSS-Stubaf. Hartl.
2. Sipo measures for combating the Political Church and Sects-Regierungsrat Rotu & Reg. Ass. Harnensbruch.
8. Nachrichtendienst tasks in the conflict with Political Catholicism in the ReichSS-Ostuf. Kunze.
4. Vatican world-politics, and our nachrichtendienst tasks Untersturmführer Jakobs.
II. On 9/23/1941
5. Present conditions within the German Protestant Church S-Obersturmführer Stiller.
6. Treatment of the Sect problem, and the combating of Sects SS-Hauptscharführer Ehrhardt.
7. World-Protestantism and the Oxford MovementNachrichtendienst work evolving from these subjectsSS-Obersturmführer Stiller.
8. The problem of the Church in the Eastern regions, and Nachrichtendienst measuresSS-Untersturmführer Wandesleben.
9. The present Nachrichtendienst problem of Freemasonry SS-Hauptsturmführer Kolrep.
10. Summary of the most important points in the treatment of Church Political oppositionSS-Sturmbannführer Hartl.
In the absence of SS-ObergruPpenführer Heydrich, the Conference was opened by SS-Brigadeführer Mueller, who, after a short speech of welcome, and introduction handed over to the first lecturer. The most important lecturesthose under I, items 2 and 3, have been noted down and filed.
The main aim and object of the conference has been to familiarize the specialists as thoroughly as possible with their material, and, by stimulating their interest, enable them to fulfill their duties to the best of their ability.
Nothing of great moment came to light in the discussions. Finally SS-Stub. Hartl, also deputizing for the absent Heydrich, summed up the most important points in the treatment of Church Political affairs. He summarized the culminating points as follows:
1. Avoidance of all sweeping measures and actions against the Church and its establishments.
2. Suspension of measures taken against monasteries/convents, including "camouflaged" measures of this type.
3. Action is still to be taken as before in individual cases, but the R.S.H.A. is to be informed in each case. In particularly serious cases the decision of the Führer will be sought.
4. Above all it must be ensured that the Church does not win back any lost ground. We must see to it that we retain any position won.
5. The greatest importance is to be attached to Church Political activity. Any material that is of the slightest significance, or could become of significance, is to be carefully examined. On the Führer's instructions photostats are to be made of all documents seized, and other material of this type, as in such cases duplicate copies are in no way sufficient for the introduction of decisive measures.
The "Nachrichtennetz" is to be fostered with the greatest of care, and enlarged through the recruitment of new V-Personen. Particular value is attached to contacts between Church circles and "Staatsstellen."
The lecturer closed with the following words:
Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of this work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes are made everywhere. The main thing is that the enemy should be constantly tackled with determination, will, and effective initiative.
Signed: HEINZE Kriminal-Secretaer Signed: HAMMES Kriminal-Kommissar z. Pr.
Aachen, 9/26/1941
Report of Regierungsrat Roth's speech before Conference dated 9/26/1941
Sicherheitspolizei measures for combating Church Politics and Sects
While describing the aim and methods of the Political Church in its oppositional activities, the executive measures which, in accordance with the Concordat, are at the disposal of the Stapo, were discussed.
a. Punishable offences and infringements of the law by members of the Church are to be submitted to the Kripo for processing. Nachrichtendienst evaluation, and the compiling of evidence for a final breakdown is the responsibility of the Stapo.
b. It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with political offences (malicious) under normal legal procedures owing to the lack of political perception which still prevails among the legal authorities, suspension of this procedure must be reckoned with. The so-called "Agitator-Priests" must therefore be dealt with in future by Stapo measures, and, if the occasion arises, be removed to a Concentration Camp, if agreed upon by the RSHA.
c. Offences and crimes against the "Sammlungsgesetz" [Order to contribute to Party Funds] and the "Flaggenerlass" [Order to beflag Churches etc.,] come under normal procedure. [A penciled note states that this is not always so, and that it depends on the case in question.]
d. The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon according to local conditions, the status of the person accused, and the seriousness of the caseas follows:
1. Warnung (Warning)
2. Sicherungsgeld (Fine)
3. Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach)
4. Aufenthaltsverbot (Forbidden to remain in parish)
5. Betaetigungsverbot (Forbidden all activity as a Priest)
6. Kurzfristige Festnahme (Short-term arrest)
7. Schutzhaft (Protective custody)
The instructions for the application of individual measures are known. The following points must be remembered:
The Aufenthaltsverbot (Forbidden to remain in parish) is very much feared by all the clergy. In one case a Vicar-General appealed to the RSHA for the lifting of the ban, and begged that they would rather place the priest under short-term arrest. The "Aufenthaltsverbot" is to be enforced in any case where the continued stay of the priest in his former parish is likely to bring about dissension and for disquiet among the population. It should be applied, for instance, in the event of a priest returning from arrest, in order to prevent him from being feted as a martyr. Care must be taken that the measure is only enforced where really expedient (encumbering of another Stapostelle).
Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach) is intended chiefly as a measure against itinerant preachers, and will only be brought against residential ones when they exceed their normal offices as priests, and preach much injurious matter.
Betaetigungsverbot (Forbidden all activities as a priest) has not yet been applied, but is possible.
Schutzshaft (Protective custody). As already stated, in accordance with the Order issued by the RSHA on 24.8.36 the "Agitator Priest" is to be taken into long-term imprisonment. The technical execution of this lies in the hands of the Referat IV C 2, while it is IV B I's responsibility to present the charges.
Actions against societies are not at the moment possible as a widespread State measure. However, in cases where the Society has been involved in anti-state activity, or appears superfluous or undesirable, local measures may be applied. Small funds/properties may be liquidated. Funds may also be handed over to the NSV. In cases of activities against the State the only method is confiscation of funds. Proposals for "Declaration of Enmity to People and State" with the object of confiscation of property, are principally to be directed to the RSHA, which works nonexecutively, and directs the necessary negotiations with the MdI.
Monasteries/Convents. It is not expected at the present that they will be declared as hostile to the State. During the process of "Dissolution" it should be remembered that the Law of 10.2.36 suffices as a legal basis for the disposal. It is not essential that the Order of 28.2.33 should be quoted, and it will only be brought up if the Stapo measures are to come under "legal justification" (Betaetigungsverbot 4).
Actions against Monasteries/Convents. About 100 monasteries in the Reich have been dissolved. Various incidents which may be traced back to bad tactical procedure by Stapo officials, have led to disagreeable consequences. Should the inmates of the monasteries put questions to the appointed officials, those officials must refer them to the Aktionsleiter [officer in charge of the proceedings].
Churches are to be seized at the same time, but, if possible, should not be closed. As long as the confiscation is not absolute, any action which interferes with property, or causes any alteration to it should be avoided. The principle is to be followed during the period of "Sicherstellung" is that life should go on within the framework of an ordered administration.
Further points made were:
Retreats, recreational organizations, etc., may now be forbidden on grounds of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly only a worldly activity could be given as a basis.
Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on principle. Church organizations in the evening may be prevented on grounds of the black-out regulations.
Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason of the overburdened transport conditions. For local events too technical traffic troubles and the danger of air attack may serve as grounds for their prohibition (one Referent forbade a procession, on the grounds of it wearing out shoe leather).
There are no new regulations regarding the despatch of Confessional literature to the troops, and the restrictions on Confessional publications.
Visas are always to be denied where the applicant cannot offer the excuse that he will dedicate himself unreservedly to working for the Fatherland while abroad. There are, however, possible exceptions. In principle the intention still holds good, that no foreign priest should enter the Reich, and that no German priest should travel abroad, above all, not to the "Aufbaugebiet."
In the meantime the Church Ministry has adopted the view of the RSHA, in which it was decided that Polish civilian workers and prisoners-of-war must definitely be separated at Services.
The RSHA requests that questions of policy should be submitted to them, but that, on the other hand, they should not be bothered with unnecessary inquiries. Above all, definite proposals on how to handle the case in question should always be given, and not just requests for direction or decision.
The immediate aim: The Church must not regain one inch of the ground it has lost.
The ultimate aim. Destruction of the Confessional Churches to be brought about by the collection of all material obtained through Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given time, be produced as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German fight for existence.
Signed: HAMMES Kriminal-Kommissar z.Pr.
SECRET Excerpt from Note 16 concerning the Conference held by the Inspector in Dusseldorf on 23.9.41. (Pp. 26, 27, 28.)
14. Cooperation between Stapo/and SD in the sphere of Church Politics
The study and treatment of the efforts of the Catholic Church in its opposition to the present State is, from both a communication and executive angle, the responsibility of the Stapo ('Gegnerbekampfung'). The treatment of the efforts of the Church, and their repercussions in the sphere of 'religious life' is, however, the task of the SD.
From this it can be seen that a close cooperation in the future within the sphere of the "Catholic Church" is especially necessary. It is the duty of the Stapostellen to inform the SD-Abschnitte of any general points to be observed during the course of 'Gegnerbekampfung,' in order that the SD-Abschnitte can evaluate these facts from a religious angle. The SD-Abschnitte are to inform the Stapostellen of any observations which might be of assistance to them in their fight against the church as an opponent of the State. Gegnerbekampfung and research in the religious sphere must go hand in hand. The SD-Abschnitte must hand over to the Stapostellen those V-Maenner who are working entirely, or for the greater part, in 'Gegnerbekampfung.' However, if mutually agreed upon, the SD-Abschnitte, who may still have a certain claim on these V-Maenner by virtue of their work in the religious sphere, may retain one or another of them to contribute work in this sphere. It is desirable, however, that the appropriate official attached to the Stapostelle should start taking over the direction of the V-Maenner by stages as soon as possible.
The Inspector has asked for a general ruling from RSHA concerning the direction of the 'Kirchenreferat' by the Stapo offices, and at the same time expressed the opinion that it was not absolutely essential that the responsibility of this should rest principally on the executive officials. The RSHA has made a corresponding decision in which it shall be left to the Stapoleiter in every individual case to choose who should be entrusted with the general direction and control of the 'Kirchenreferat.' It is therefore up to the Stapo leader [leiter] to decide, by the efficiency of his work, who is the more capable, and to appoint him head of the Referat. (Order of the Chief of Sipo/SD 18.9.41 IV B.) The Inspector is to be informed as soon as possible of the subsequent decision.
Berlin, 10/22/1941
Reichssicherheitshauptamt IV B 12744/41 g
To all Stapostellen For information to: a. The Führers of all SD-(Leit) Abschnitte b. To all Inspectors of the Sipo/SD c. To the "Befehlshaber der Sipo/SD in Generalgouvernement KRAKAU" d. To the "Kommandeure der Sipo/SDKRAKAU, LUBLIN, RADOM, WARSCHAU.
Concerning: Present Conditions within the Organization of the Catholic Church. Enclosure: I Report.
I am inclosing a report on the present position of the Organization of the Catholic Church. This report is designed to serve as a basis for:
a. The education of the appropriate Specialist.
b. To aid "Nachrichtendienst" activity.
The following directions must be followed concerning Nachrichtendienst activity:
1. If at all possible to verify that Bishops are using the papal nunciate courier to deliver their report to Rome, and vice versa, we should be informed.
2. It should be found out which priests, members of Holy Orrs, and Laymen are used by the Bishops to bring their reports to and from Rome. Wherever possible, attempts should be made to intercept this method of reporting through V-Maenner.
3. If possible, the reports submitted to Rome every 5 years should be intercepted, especially when an opportunity arises in connection with Stapo action.
4. Where tension is known to exist between Bishops, the Bishop and Nuncio, or the Bishops and the "Instanzen" subordinate to them, this is to be utilized for Nachrichten purposes.
5. Since there are at the moment 13 Arch- and Bishoprics vacant in Greater Germany, efforts must be made to obtain the lists of Bishop candidates.
6. If not already known, it must be found out with what particular department the individual Bishops are concerned, under the aegis of the Bishops Fulda Conference. Those Stapostellen in whose area there is a Bishop entrusted with special duties(The Bishop of Berlin with Press work, the Bishop of Mainz with "Jugendseelsorge," the Archbishop of Freiburg with charity work, the Bishop of Passau with work connected with the Church in the Eastern regions … etc …) have Nachrichtendienst tasks of especial Reich importance.
7. Points discussed during the Diocesan Synodes are to be obtained wherever possible, and should be immediately submitted to IV B 1 at the R.S.H.A.
8. The following directive is given for local Nachrichtendienst activity
a. In every case where a Sachbearbeiter attached to a Stapostelle has an Archbishopric in his area, he must have a thorough knowledge of the particular sphere of work in which the individual Referenten of the appropriate Ordinarists are engaged.
b. The Episcopal Chancery is of particular importance within the Episcopal Ordinariat. Similarly, and especially in the case of an "Action," the diocesan archives and the Episcopal secret archives are of especial significance.
c. The Deans are of particular importance to Aussenstellen, since they are described as the eyes and ears of the Bishop. Should the opportunity arise, the yearly reports which they have to submit to the Bishop, should be obtained and evaluated locally.
d. In order to ensure that the Nachrichtendienst organization is as comprehensive as possible, an all-embracing Nachrichtennetz should be spread among the more insignificant members of the clergy.
9. It must be discovered which of those members of Orders, and priests of German origin are employed in important posts at the Vaticanother than those named in the report; we must be immediately informed of this.
10. The Specialists of the individual Stapo(leit)stellen have to extract the names of those Papal "Protonotare," Chamberlains, Prelates, and Chaplains who are officiating in their districts, and devote extra attention to them in the course of their Nachrichtendienst duties. Especial watch must be kept in order to discover to what extent they are employed as "agents" to and from the Vatican.
11. Reports are also to be submitted on those theological students destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing someone for Nachrichtendienst purposes in one of these institutes, in the guise of a theological student, we should receive immediate notification.
Signed: Heydrich Attested: KLANN [?] Chancellery Clerk
"Document 1816-PS: Stenographic Report Of The Meeting On The Jewish Question Under The Chairmanship Of Field Marshall Göring In The Reichs Air Force [translation]" pp. 425-427.
(11/12/193811 o'clock)
Göring: Gentlemen! Today's meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a letter written on the Führer's orders by the Stabsleiter of the Führer's deputy Bormann, requesting that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another. And yesterday once again did the Führer request by phone for me to take coordinated action in the matter.
Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the economic angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a number of legal measures shall have to be taken which fall into the sphere of the Minister for Justice and into that of the Minister of the Interior; and certain propaganda measures shall be taken care of by the Minister for Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic Affairs shall take care of problems falling in their respective resorts.
In the meeting, in which we first talked about this question and came to the decision to aryanize German economy, to take the Jew out of it, and put him into our debit ledger, was one in which, to our shame, we only made pretty plans, which were executed very slowly. We then had a demonstration, right here in Berlin, we told the people that something decisive would be done, but gain nothing happened. We have had this affair in Paris now, more demonstrations followed and this time something decisive must be done!
Because, gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations! They don't harm the Jew but me, who is the last authority for coordinating the German economy.
If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which the Jew does not even have; and furthermore goods of the consumer goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future, demonstrations which are necessary, occur, then, I pray, that they be directed, so as not to hurt us.
Because it's insane to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse then have a German insurance company make good the loss. And the goods which I need desperately, whole bales of clothing and what-not are being burned; and I miss them everywhere.
I may as well burn the raw materials before they arrive. The people of course, do not understand that: therefore we must make laws which will show the people once and for all, that something is being done.
I should appreciate it very much if for once, our propaganda would make it clear that it is unfortunately not the Jew who has to suffer in all this, but the German insurance companies.
I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the insurance companies are the ones who suffer. Under the authority invested in me, I shall issue a decree, and I am, of course, requesting the support of the competent Government agencies, so that everything shall be processed through the right channels and the insurance companies will not be the ones who suffer.
It may be, though, that these insurance companies may have insurance in foreign countries. If that is the case, foreign bills of exchange would be available which I would not want to lose. That shall have to be checked. For that reason, I have asked Mr. Hilgard of the insurance company, to attend, since he is best qualified to tell us to what extent the insurance companies are protected against damage, by having taken out insurance with other companies. I would not want to miss this, under any circumstances.
I should not want to leave any doubt, gentlemen, as to the aim of today's meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again, but to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all measures for the elimination of the Jew from German economy and to submit them to me, as far as it is necessary.
The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from German economy is first, the Jew being ejected from the Economy transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated. The compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in Berlin. That way, we would never finish.
On the other hand, it is very necessary to have safety precautions so that the lower echelons, Statthalter, and Gauleiter will not do things unreasonably. One must issue correction directives, immediately.
The aryanizing of all the larger establishments, naturally, is to be my lotthe Ministry for Economy will designate, which and how many there areit must not be done by a Statthalter or his lower echelons, since these things reach into the export trade, and cause great problems, which the Statthalter can neither observe, nor solve from his place.
It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the profit, which we are striving for.
It is obvious gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the people, and not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here, according to the rules previously laid down.
The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores he'll want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from aryanizing at once. Their stocks are to be made available for sale in other stores; what cannot be sold, shall be processed through the "Winterhilfe" or taken care of otherwise. However, the sales values of these articles shall always be considered, since the State is not to suffer but should profit through this transformation. For the chain and department storesI speak now only of that, what can be seen, certain categories have to be established, according to the importance of the various branches.
The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the property and decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount is to be set as low as possible. The representative of the State shall then turn the establishment over to the "Aryan" proprietor, that is, the property shall be sold according to its real value.
There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that strong attempts will be made to get all these stores to party-members and to let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible things in the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so much by these transactions that they have now about half a million. You, gentlemen, know it. Is that correct? (Assent)
Of course, things like that are impossible. I shall not hesitate to act ruthlessly in any case where such a trick is played. If the individual involved is prominent, I shall see the Führer within two hours and report to him.
We shall have to insist upon it, that the Aryan taking over the establishment is of the branch and knows his job. Generally speaking he is the one who must pay for the store with his own money. In other words, an ordinary business transaction is to be soughtone merchant selling, the other one buying a business. If there are party members among the contenders, they are to be preferred, that is if they have the same qualifications: first shall come the one who had the most damage, and secondly, selection should be according to length of Party membership.
Of course, there may be exceptions. There are party-members who, as may be proven, lost their business concessions by action of the Schuschnigg or Prague Government, and so went bankrupt. Such a man has naturally first option on a store for sale, and he shall receive help if he does not have the means to help himself. The trustee of the State can justify this help, if he is more business like in the transfer. This party-member should have the chance to buy the store for as cheap a price as possible. In such a case the State will not receive the full price, but only the amount the Jew received. Such a buyer may even receive a loan besides, so that he will get off to a good start.
I wish to make it clear that such a proceeding shall only be legal if the party-member has once owned such a store. For example, a party-member was the owner of a stationery store, and Schuschnigg took away the concession to operate it so that the man lost the store and went bankrupt. Now, if a Jewish stationery store is being aryanized, this party-member should get the store on conditions which he'll be able to fulfill. Such a case shall be the only exception though, in all other cases the procedure shall be of a strictly businesslike nature whereby the party-member, like I said before, shall have the preference, if he has the same qualifications as any other candidate, who is not a member of the party.
When selling for the actual value we shall find only about 60 Aryans ready to take over 100 Jewish stores. I don't think that we have a German for every Jewish store. You must not forget that the Jew sees his main activity in the field of trade, and that he owns 90 of it. I doubt that we'd have a demand big enough. I even doubt that we'd have enough people, particularly now since everybody has found his field of work.
Therefore, I ask the Minister for Economy to go beyond what we think ought to be done for the sake of the principle, in liquidating the establishments. I ask him to go further, even though there won't be any candidates. That'll be perfectly alright.
The transfer of stores and establishments shall have to be executed by the lower echelons, not through Berlin but through the Gaue and through the Reichstatthalterschaft. Therein shall be the seat of the members of the Board of Trustees, even if it consists of a few people only. The Statthalter and his people cannot do this job; the trustees will have to tackle it. But the Statthalter shall be the authority which supervises, according to the regulations given him, the trustees, particularly in dealings such as the transfer to party-members.
Naturally, these establishments cannot disappear all at once but we'll have to start by Monday, in a manner that shall make it obvious that a change has begun to materialize. Besides that, certain stores could be closed which will make things here easier.
Another point! I have noticed that Aryans took over a Jewish store and were then so clever to keep the name of the Jewish store as "formerly," or kept it altogether. That must not be; I cannot permit it. Because it may happenwhat has just happenedstores were looted because their signboards bore Jewish namesbecause they had once been Jewish, but had been "aryanized" a long time ago. Names of former Jewish firms shall have to disappear completely, and the German shall have to come forward with his or his firm's name. I ask you to carry this out quite definitely. That much then regarding aryanizing stores and wholesale establishments, particularly in regard to signboards and of all that is obvious!
Of the consequences resulting from this for the Jew, I shall speak later, because this is connected with other things.
Now for the factories. As for the smaller and medium ones, two things shall have to be made clear.
1. Which factories do I not need at allwhich are the ones where productions could be suspended? Could they not be put another use? If not, the factories will be razed immediately.
2. In case the factory should be needed, it will be turned over to Aryans in the same manner as the stores. All these measures have to be taken quickly, since Aryan employees are concerned everywhere. I'd like to say right now that Aryan employees shall have to be given employment immediately after the Jewish factory is closed. Considering the amount of labor we need these days, it should be a trifle to keep these people, even in their own branches. As I have just said; if the factory is necessary, it will be aryanized. If there is no need for it, it being abandoned shall be part of the procedure of transforming establishments not essential, for our national welfare into one that is essential for ita procedure that shall take place within the next few weeks. For it, I shall still need very much space and very many factories.
If such a factory is to be transformed or razed, the first thing to be done is check the equipment. The questions arising will be: Where can this equipment be used? Could it be used after the place is transformed? Where else might it be needed badly? Where could the machinery be set up again? It follows that aryanizing factories will be an even more difficult task than the aryanizing of stores.
Take now the larger factories which are run solely by a Jewish owner, without control by a Board of Directors; or take corporations where the Jews might be in the Supervisory Council or Board of Directors. There the solution is very simple: the factory can be compensated in the same manner as in the sale of stores and factories; that is, at a rate which we shall determine, and the trustee shall take over the Jew's interest as well as his shares, which he in turn may sell or transfer to the State, which will then dispose of them. So, if I have a big factory, which belonged to a Jew or a Jewish corporation, and the Jew leaves, perhaps with his sons who were employed there, the factory will still continue to operate. Maybe a director will have to be appointed because the Jew has run the factory himself. But otherwise, particularly if the maintenance of the establishment is very essential everything will run smoothly.
Everything is very simple. I now have his shares. I may give them to some Aryan or to another group or I may keep them. The State takes them over and offers them at the stock market, if they are acceptable there and if it so desires, or it makes use of them in some other way.
Now, I shall talk of the very big establishments, those in which the Jew is in the Board of Directors, in which he holds shares etc., and so is either the owner or one of the coowners; in any case in which he is greatly interested. There too, things are comparatively simple; he delivers all of his shares which shall be bought at a price fixed by the trustee. So the Jew gets into the account book. The shares shall be handled like I've just explained. These cases cannot be taken care of by the Gaue and Reichsstatthalter, but only by us here on top; because we are the only ones to decide where these factories are to be transferred to, how they may be affiliated with other establishments or to what an extent the State shall keep them or hand them over to another establishment belonging to the State. All this can only be decided here. Of course, the Gauleiter and Statthalter will be glad to get hold of the shares, and they'll make great promises to beautify our capital cities, etc. I know it all! It won't go! We must agree on a clear action that shall be profitable to the Reich.
The same procedure shall be applied where the Jew has a share in, or owns property of German economy. I am not competent enough to tell off hand in what forms that might be the case, and to what an extent he'll have to lose it. Anyway, the Jew must be evicted pretty fast from German economy.
Now, the foreign Jews. There we'll have to make distinctions between the Jews who have always been foreignersand who shall have to be treated according to the laws we arranged with their respective countries. But regarding those Jews who were Germans have always lived in Germany and have acquired foreign citizenship during the last year, only because they wanted to play safe. I ask you not to give them any consideration. We'll finish with these. Or have you any misgivings? We shall try to induce them through slight, and then through stronger pressure, and through clever maneuveringto let themselves be pushed out voluntarily.
Woermann: I'd like the Foreign Office to be included, since a generally valid decision could hardly be made.
Göring: We cannot consult you in every case, but on the whole will.
Woermann: Anyway, I'd like to make known the claim of the Foreign Office to participate. One never knows what steps may become necessary.
Göring: Only for important cases! I do not like to take this category under special consideration. I have learned only now to what extent that has been done, particularly in Austria and Czechoslovakia. If somebody was a Czech in Sudetenland, we do t have to consider him at all, and the Foreign Office doesn't have to be consulted because that person now belongs to us. And in Austria and also in Sudetenland, too many become all of a sudden Englishmen or Americans or what-notand generally speaking we cannot consider that a great deal.
[Part II is missing] Part III
Funk: That is quite a decisive question for us: should the Jewish stores be reopened?
Goebbels: If they will be reopened is another question. The question is will they be restored ? I have set the deadline for Monday.
Göring: You don't have to ask whether they'll be reopened. That is up to us to decide.
Goebbels: Number 2. In almost all German cities synagogues are burned. New, various possibilities exist to utilize the space where the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build parks in their place, others want to put up new buildings.
Göring: How many synagogues were actually burned?
Heydrich: Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by fire; 76 synagogues demolished; and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich.
Göring: What do you mean "destroyed by fire?"
Heydrich: Partly, they are razed, and partly gutted.
Goebbels: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dissolve the synagogues. All these not completely intact, shall be razed by the Jews. The Jews shall pay for it. There in Berlin, the Jews are ready to do that. The synagogues which burned in Berlin are being leveled by the Jews themselves. We shall build parking lots in their places or new buildings. That ought to be the criterion for the whole country, the Jews shall have to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall have to provide us with ready free space.
Number 3: I deem it necessary to issue a decree forbidding the Jews to enter German theaters, moving houses, and circuses. I have already issued such a decree under the authority of the law of the chamber for culture. Considering the present situation of the theaters, I believe we can afford that. Our theaters are overcrowded, we have hardly any room. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to have Jews sitting next to Germans in movies and theaters. One might consider, later on, to let the Jews have one or two movie houses here in Berlin, where they may see Jewish movies. But in German theaters they have no business anymore.
Furthermore, I advocate that the Jews be eliminated from all positions in public life in which they may prove.to be provocative. It is still possible today that a Jew shares a compartment in a sleeping car with a German. Therefore, we need a decree by the Reich Ministry for Communications stating that separate compartments for Jews shall be available; in case where compartments are filled up, Jews cannot claim a seat. They shall be given a separate compartment only after all Germans have secured seats. They shall not mix with Germans, and if there is no more room, they shall have to stand in the corridor.
Göring: In that case, I think it would make more sense to give them separate compartments.
Goebbels: Not if the train is overcrowded!
Göring: Just a moment. There'll be only one Jewish coach If that is filled up, the other Jews will have to stay at home.
Goebbels: Suppose, though, there won't be many Jews going on the express train to Munich, suppose there would be two Jews in the train and the other compartments would be overcrowded. These two Jews would then have a compartment all themselves. Therefore, Jews may claim a seat only after all Germans have cured a seat.
Göring: I'd give the Jews one coach or one compartment. And should a case like you mention arise and the train be overcrowded, believe me, we won't need a law. We'll kick him out and he'll have to sit all alone in the toilet all the way!
Goebbels: I don't agree. I don't believe in this. There ought to be a law. Furthermore, there ought to be a decree barring Jews from German beaches and resorts. Last summer
Göring: Particularly here in the Admiralspalast very disgusting things have happened lately.
Goebbels: Also at the Wannsee beach. A law which definitely forbids the Jews to visit German resorts!
Göring: We could give them their own.
Goebbels: It would have to be considered whether we'd give hem their own or whether we should turn a few German resorts over to them, but not the finest and best, so we cannot say the Jews go there for recreation.
It'll also have to be considered if it might not become necessary to forbid the Jews to enter the German forests. In the Grunewald, whole herds of them are running around. It is a constant provocation and we are having incidents all the time. The behavior of the Jews is so inciting and provocative that brawls are a daily routine.
Göring: We shall give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and the Alpers shall take care of it that various animals that look damned much like Jews,the Elk has such a crooked nose,get there also and become acclimated.
Goebbels: I think this behavior is provocative. Furthermore, Jews should not be allowed to sit around in German parks. I am thinking of the whispering campaign on the part of Jewish women in the public gardens at Fehrbelliner Platz. They go and sit with German mothers and their children and begin to gossip and incite.
Goebbels: I see in this a particularly grave danger. I think it is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best onesand tell them: "You may sit on these benches" these benches shall be marked "For Jews only." Besides that they have no business in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed in German schools. That's impossible. It is out of the question that any boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German gymnasium and receive lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own communities.
Göring: I suggest that Mr. Hilgard from the insurance company be called in; he is waiting outside. As soon as he'll be finished with his report, he may go, and we can continue to talk. At the time Gustloff died, a compensation for the damage Germany had suffered, was prepared. But I believe that at present we should not work it through raised taxes but with a contribution paid only once. That serves my purpose, better.
(Hilgard appears)
Mr. Hilgard, the following is our case. Because of the justified anger of the people against the Jew, the Reich has suffered a certain amount of damage. Windows were broken, goods were damaged and people hurt, synagogues burned, etc. I suppose that the Jews, many of them are also insured against damage committed by public disorder, etc.
(Hilgard: "Yes")
If that is so, the following situation arises; the people, in their justified anger, meant to harm the Jew; but it is the German insurance companies that will compensate the Jew for damage. This situation is simple enough; I'd only have to issue a decree to that effect that damage, resulting from these risks, shall not have to be paid by the insurance companies. But the question that interests me primarily, and because of which I have asked you to come here, is this one: In case of reinsurance policies in foreign countries, I should not like to lose these, and that is why I'd like to discuss with you ways and means by which profit from reinsurance, possibly in foreign currency will go to the German economy, instead of the Jew. I'd like to hear from you, and that is the first question I want to ask: In your opinion, are the Jews insured against such damage to a large extent?
Hilgard: Permit me to answer right away. We are concerned with three kinds of insurances. Not with the insurance against damage resulting from revolt or from risks. But with the ordinary fire insurance, the ordinary glass insurance, and the ordinary insurance against theft. The people, because of their contracts, who have a right to claim compensation are partly Jews, partly Aryans. As for the fire insurance, they are practically all Jewish, I suppose. As for the department stores, the victim is identical with the Jew, the owner and that applies more to the synagogues, except for neighbors to whose places the fire may have spread. Although the damage done to the latter's property seems to be rather slight, according to the inquiries I made late last night.
As for the glass insurance which plays a very important part in this, the situation is completely different. The majority of the victims, mostly the owners of the buildings are Aryans. The Jew has usually rented the store, a procedure which you may observe all over, for example on Kurfuerstendamm.
Göring: That is what we've said.
Goebbels: In these cases, the Jew will have to pay.
Göring: It doesn't make sense, we have no raw materials. It is all glass imported from foreign countries and has to be paid for in foreign currency! One could go nuts.
Hilgard: May I draw your attention to the following facts: the glass for the shop windows is not being manufactured by the Bohemian, but by the Belgian glass industry. In my estimation, the approximate money-value to which these damages amount is $6 millionthat includes the broken glass, glass which we shall have to replace, mainly to Aryans because they have the insurance policies. Of course I have to reserve final judgment in all this, Your Excellency, because I have had only one day to make my inquiries. Even counting on about half of the $6 million being spent in transacting the business-specialists from the industry itself are more confident in this matter than I am, we might well have to import glass for approximately $3 million. Incidentally, the amount of the damage equals about half a whole year's production of the Belgian glass industry. We believe that half a year will be necessary for the manufacturers to deliver the glass.
Göring: The people will have to be enlightened on this.
Goebbels: We cannot do this right now.
Göring: This cannot continue! We won't be able to last with all this. Impossible! Go on then! You suggest that the Aryan is the one who suffers the damage; is that right?
Hilgard: Yes, to a large extent, as far as the glass insurance goes.
Göring: Which would have to replace the glass.
Hilgard: Yes. Of course there are cases in which the Aryan the owner of the store is identical with the owner of the building. That is so with all department stores. In the case of the department store Israel, the owner is the Jew.
Göring: And now the third category.
Hilgard: Under this fall the victims of thievery.
Göring: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of goods were taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would that also be thievery?
Hilgard: I don't think so.
Göring: Could that be termed as "Riot"?
Hilgard: That is just the question which we are unable to decide at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a dwelling or a container of any kind is forced and something is taken away?
Göring: That is a case of "Riot."
Hilgard: Riot does not mean much since we have very little insurance against damage caused by riotsthese were discarded by us long ago.
Göring: But this here is "Rioting." That is the legal term. There was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But a mob rushes in and knocks everything to pieces, or "Public Disturbances."
Hilgard: Public disturbance. It is no riot.
Göring: Are they insured against damages caused by public disturbances?
Hilgard: No, no more. May I show this by an example. The most remarkable of these cases is the case Margraf Unter Den Linden. The Jewelry store of Margraf, is insured with us through a so-called combined policy. That covers practically any damage that may occur. This damage was reported to us as amounting to $1.7 million because the store was completely stripped.
Göring: Daluege and Heydrich, you'll have to get me this jewelry through raids, staged on a tremendous scale!
Daluege: The order has already been given. The people are being controlled all the time. According to reports, 150 were arrested by yesterday afternoon.
Göring: These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody comes to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them, they'll be confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them in all right.
Heydrich: Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in more than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed; but we have already several hundred people who were plundering, and we are trying to get the loot back.
Göring: And the jewels?
Heydrich: That is very difficult to say. They were partly thrown into the street and picked up there. Similar things happened with furriers, for example, in Friedrichstrasse, district C, there the crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks, etc. It'll be very difficult to recover that. Even children have filled their pockets, just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler Youth is not to be employed and to participate in such actions without the Party's consent. Such things are very easily destroyed.
Daluege: The Party should issue an order to the effect that the police will immediately receive a report in case the neighbor's wife, (everybody knows his neighbor) has a fur coat altered or in case somebody appears wearing new rings or bracelets. We'd like the Party to support us here.
Hilgard: These damages are not covered by the policy, I believe; May I say a word in general about our liabilities and a "Petidum" of the Versicherungswirkschaft report. We'd like to make it our point, Mr. General Field Marshall, that we shall not be hindered in fulfilling the obligations for which our contracts call.
Göring: But I have to. That is important for me.
Hilgard: If I may give reasons for this request, I'd like to say that it simply has to do with the fact that we carry out, to a large extent, quite a number of international transactions. We have a very good international basis for our business transactions, and in the interest of the equilibrium of the Foreign exchange in Germany, we have to make sure that the confidence in the German insurance shall not be ruined. If we now refuse to honor clear-cut obligations, imposed upon us through lawful contract, it would be a black spot on the shield of honor of the German insurance.
Göring: It wouldn't the minute I issue a decree-a law sanctioned by the State.
Hilgard: I was leading up to that.
Heydrich: The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is to be paid, it'll be confiscated. That way we'll have saved face.
Hilgard: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich just said. First of all, use the mechanism of the insurance company to check on the damage, to regulate it and even pay, but give the insurance company the chance to
Göring: One moment! You'll have to pay in any case because it is the Germans who suffered the damage. But there'll be a lawful order forbidding you to make any direct payments to the Jews. You shall also have to make payment for the damage the Jews have suffered, but not to the Jews, but to the Minister of Finance.
(Hilgard: Aha!) What he does with the money is his business.
Schmer: Your Excellency, I should like to make a proposal. A certain rate should be fixed, say 15% or maybe a little higher, of all the registered wealth, I understand one billion is to be confiscated so that all Jews shall pay equally, and from the money raised this way, the insurance companies shall be refunded.
Göring: No. I don't even dream of refunding the insurance companies the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the State. That's quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You'll fulfill your obligations, you may count on that.
Kerl: It seems that in one respect, we'll have to arrange this somewhat differently. As far as the glass insurance goes, the fact of the matter is that the owners of the buildings will definitely have to be paid for the damage, as stipulated. The majority of these companies, with the exception of one Joint Stock Company in Cologne, are all very small reciprocity companies [Gegenseitsvereine]. They won't be able to make up for the damage. We'll have to find out how far they are covered by reinsurance which I cannot tell at the moment.
Hilgard: In this connection, the reinsurance plays a relatively small role, except for the large fire-insurance policies taken out by department stores. There is not reinsurance in the glass insurances, for the simple reason that, under normal conditions glass insurance is one of our best branches in the insurance business; and therefore does not need reinsurance. I have to add, though, that the amount of this damage is approximately twice as high as the amount of damage for an average year. It makes all our calculations wrong and completely wipes out our chance for profit.
(Interrupted by Kerl)
No, sir, that is the way it is. The whole premium of the German glass insurance amounts to $14 million, if I am not wrong. Under normal conditions it amounted to 4-5 million. The glass insurance is our greatest asset. So far, the greatest profits were made in it. But now, the amount of this damage is alone twice as high as the amount for one ordinary year. With the various special glass insurances, it is altogether different.
Göring: One moment! 4 to 5 millions normally. Twice as much would be about 10 million. You suggested 14 million. There are still 4 million left.
Hilgard: We'll also have to pay for the expenses. No, it is a very great catastrophe for us. Let me point out that the damage in the whole of Germany, in my estimation, shall amount to approximately 25 million mark. I wanted to be careful.
Heydrich: We estimate that the damage to property, to furniture and to consumer-goods amounts to several hundred million; although that includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from loss of taxessales taxes, taxes on property, and on income. I assume that the Minister for Finance too, has been informed of all this.
V. Krosigk: I have no idea about the extent.
Heydrich: 7,500 destroyed stores in the Reich.
Daluege: One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of the goods in the stores were not the property of the owner but were kept on the books of other firms, which had delivered them. Then there are the unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which definitely are not all Jewish but Aryan, those goods that were delivered on the basis of commission.
Hilgard: We'll have to pay for them, too.
Göring: I wished you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed such values.
Heydrich: There were 35 killed.
Kerl: I think we could do the following: Jews we don't pay anyhow. As for Aryans, payment shall have to be made. The insurance company may contact us through the "Reichsgruppe" and we shall investigate each case. I am thinking of the small reciprocity companies; it should be easy to find out whether they are capable of paying or not. In their cases, the amounts involved are not too large. We may find an arrangement for this later on; I am thinking of one in which the insurance companies arrange for recompensation exclusively to Aryan, and once they know the results of their inquiries, contact us. We shall then find a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases where it is absolutely necessary.
Funk: That is not necessary. I'd like to refer to what I've said before about the decree. That seems to be the easiest solution.
Göring: We cannot do that. These people make a point of their ability to pay.
Funk: If the Jews pay for it, the insurance companies don't have to pay.
Göring: Right, well, gentlemen, this is all very clear. We'll stick to it. At this moment every insurance company, except Mr. Hilgard who is here, counts on having to pay for the damage. They want to pay too, and I understand this very well. They'll have to want that, so they cannot be reproached for not being secure enough to pay. The glass insurance, and a point was made of that, has brought the highest profits so far. That means they'd have enough surplus money, and if they haven't divided it all up in dividends, they'll have savings enough for the compensation. Such an insurance company will have to be in a position to pay for a damage of 10, 12, 15 million, that is three times the amount paid in the normal year. If they are unable to do that, then we'll have to wonder whether we should let small companies live at all. It would be insane to keep insurance companies which would be unable to pay for such a damage. To permit an insurance company like that to exist would simply mean to cheat the people. I suggest now the following. The damage shall be determined in each case. And for the time being, the insurance companies shall have to honor their contract in every respect and shall have to pay.
[Part IV is missing] Part V
Göring: Now for the damage the Jew has had. At Margraf's the jewels disappeared, etc. Well, they are gone, and he won't get them refunded. He is the one who has to suffer the damage. As far as the jewels may be returned again by the police, they belong to the State. Now for the consumer foods which were thrown into the street, stolen, or burned. There too, the Jew will be the one who has the damage.
As for the goods that were kept on the basis of commissions, the Jew shall have to make good for the damage.
Goebbels: That doesn't have to be put in the decree, though. This decree is quite sufficient the way it is.
Hilgard: I wonder to what an extent insurance companies in foreign countries might be involved in this.
Göring: Well, they'll have to pay. And we'll confiscate that.
Hilgard: As for this merchandise sold on the basis of commissions, I can imagine that the American supplier of fur coats, shipping them from England or from America would in many cases insure it with English or American insurance companies!
Göring: Then they'll pay him for the damage. The question merely is the following: do you think there are reinsurances for all this damage in foreign countries?
Hilgard: Very few, amounting to very little.
Göring: Of course, the Aryan cannot report any damage because he hasn't had any. The Jew will make good.
The Jew shall have to report the damage. He'll get the refund from the insurance company but the refund will be confiscated. After it's all said and done, there will remain some profit for the insurance companies since they can't have to make good for all the damage. Mr. Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself.
Hilgard: I have no reason for thatthe fact that we won't have to pay for all the damage is called profit!
Göring: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay 5 million and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat corpulent form before you, and tells you: you may keep 1 millionwhy, cannot that be called making a profit? I should actually split with you, or whatever you'd call it. I can see it, looking at you. Your whole body grins. You made a big profit.
(Remark: Let's initiate a tax for damages, resulting from public disturbance, to be paid by the insurance companies)
Hilgard: For me it goes without saying that the honorable German merchant cannot be the one who suffers. I have discussed this matter with the enterprises and I have spoken for it that the Aryan must not be the one who has the damage. But it is decidedly he who has it, because all the insurance companies, not one insurance company, are the ones that shall have to pay higher rates and at the same time shall receive lower dividends. Therefore, all the insurance companies are the losers. That is so, and that'll remain so, and nobody can tell me differently.
Göring: Then why don't you take care of it that a few windows less are being smashed! You belong to the people too! Send your representatives out. Let them instruct the people. If there should be any more questions speak to Mr. Lange.
(Reichsgruppenleiter Hilgard leaves the meeting) Gentlemen, let us continue.
Woermann: I think that the foreign Jews are left out completely in Article 1. They are covered only by Article 2. But they should also be taken care of in Article 1. Otherwise they can be dealt with only if they are insured, and not if they are not insured.
Göring: Well, they'll have to insure themselvesor what else do you mean?
Woermann: As for insurance, the foreign Jews are, to my understanding, mentioned only in Article 2 and 3, and not in Article 1. If I remember correctly, you were going to say in Article 1: "Jews inside the country." Well, we'll have plenty of complaints then.
Göring: Pardon me. According to Article 2, they'll receive their compensation.
(Woermann: If they are insured!) The number of those who are not insured is negligible.
Heydrich: I'd like to say one more thing of primary importance. In the decree we should not mention the confiscation. We can do that easily.
Göring: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal procedure will have to be employed there. But that is not what Mr. Woermann means, he is talking about these foreign Jews who are not insured. As far as they are insured, they are covered. This here concerns those who are not insured. That may be the case here and there.
Woermann: We shall then have plenty of complaints.
Göring: I'd like to avoid paying too much attention to the foreign Jews.
Woermann: But if Article 2 contains that provision, Article 1 may as well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice covered it all very nicely.
Guertner: Now, if I don't misunderstand, Mr. Woermann, he is primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which shall be valid generally while only Jews who have German citizenship are mentioned regarding the insurance.
I'd like to know whether there are any objections against compelling also the foreign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he shall not be paid the money from the insurance.
Göring: He is quite able to do that.
Woermann: Even if he is not insured?
Guertner. Oh!
Göring: There should hardly be such instances. Let's take a chance on it.
Stuckart: If he is not insured, he'll have to have the damage restored anyway. How can he then make claims against anybody?
Göring: He cannot.
Woermann: He can file claims against the State.
Stuckart: According to which law? Damage caused by riots? We won't recognize riots.
Göring: Perfectly right.
Woermann: Generally speaking, may I say: regarding foreign Jews, the reservation that the contract is to be taken into consideration was made only for the organization. That is valid for all branches which we have discussed today, and also for the expropriation.
Göring: Like the Führer says, we'll have to find a way to talk this over with the countries which also do something against their Jews. That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position here and we have to stand himthat ought to cease. The Führer was not very happy about the agreement that was made with the Poles. He thinks we should take a few chances and just tell the Poles; all right, we are not going to do that; let's talk over what we may be able to accomplish together; you are doing something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole! I'd like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little.
Woermann: It ought to be considered whether or not, the U S might take measures against German property. This question cannot be handled equally for all countries. I have to make a formal and general reservation.
Göring: I have always said and I'd like to repeat it that our teamship companies and German companies in general should finally catch on and liquidate their investments in the U S, sell them, etc. That country of scoundrels does not do business with us according to any legal rules. Once before they stole everything from us, that is why I don't understand how we could do it again, just for some temporary profit. It is dangerous. You can do it with a regular country but not with one that cares for the Right as little as the U S. The other day I had the American ambassador with me, we talked about the zeppelin and I told him: "We don't need any helium, I fly without helium but the prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized countries where the Right prevails. It goes without saying that one cannot fly to such gangster-states." He had a rather silly look on his face. One ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr. Woermann, it ought to be considered.
Woermann: In other words, the foreign office is granted the right to be consulted.
Göring: Granted, but I'd like to avoid mentioning the foreign Jews as long as we can help it. We'd rather have the foreign office take part in these cases where that question becomes acute, so that some compromise can be reached.
Woermann: Generally, and in particular cases.
Funk: The decisive question is: Are the Jewish stores to be reopened or not?
Göring: That depends on how big a turnover these Jewish stores have. If it is big, it is an indication that the German people are compelled to buy there, in spite of its being a Jewish store, because a need exists. If we'd close all Jewish stores which are not open right now, altogether before Christmas, we'd be in a nice mess.
Fishboeck: Your Excellency, in this matter we have already a very complete plan for Austria. There are 12000 Jewish artisan and 5000 Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17000 stores. Of the shops of the 12000 artisans, about 10000 were to be closed definitely and 2000 were to be kept open. 4000 of the 5000 retail stores should be closed and 1000 should be kept open, that is, were to be aryanized. According to this plan, between 3000-3600 of the total of 17000 stores would be kept open, all others closed. This was decided following investigations in every single branch and according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, and is ready for publication as soon as we shall receive the law which we requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw licenses from artisans, quite independently from the Jewish question.
Göring: I shall have this decree issued today.
Fischboeck: It was granted us in connection with the economic plan for Austria. I believe the only reason why it was not yet published was that negotiations between the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs and the National Food Corporation were going on. A basic agreement had already been reached. We'll be able to close these 10000 stores as a matter of mere routine as soon as the decree will be issued. As for the actual execution of the matter, somebody will have to take care of the merchandise in these stores. Until last week we had intended to more or less leave it up to the Jews themselves to liquidate the warehouses. We cannot do that anymore. We intend to create a central agency which shall take care of the merchandise to be used. Generally, the best procedure might be to turn the merchandise over to the particular branch which in turn shall divide it up among the Aryan stores. These, in turn, shall resell it on the basis of commissions or for a fixed price.
If this is carried out as planned, it'll concern only the approximately 3000 remaining stores which shall be aryanized, according to the investigations made in the various branches. Actual buyers for about half of these stores are waiting: their contracts have been checked and are ready to be approved. If many of these cases were not approved sooner, it is only because the decision on the planning had not yet been made. As for the remaining 15000 stores, negotiations have also gone rather far in many cases. We think that a deadline should be set, say until the end of the year. If, by the end of the year, definite buyers for the stores designated for Aryans, cannot be found, it'll have to be examined once more whether the stores should not be liquidated. In most cases that will be possible; an artisan's shop is of a rather individual character. As for retail stores, it would never be urgent enough, so as to say that the economic worth was too big. The very few stores which would still remain and found to be necessary but for which no buyer was available, could be taken over by trustees. This way, I believe that fewer than 100 stores would be left, and by the end of the year we would have liquidated all the Jewish-owned businesses which so far have been obvious as ch in the eyes of the public.
Göring: That would be excellent.
Fischboeck: Out of 17000 stores 12000 or 14000 would be shut down and the remainder aryanized or handed over to the bureau of trustees which is operated by the State.
Göring: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way, the whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals, so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year.
Funk: We can do the same thing over here. I have prepared a law elaborating that, effective 1/1/1939, Jews shall be prohibited to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as independent artisan shops. They shall be further prohibited from keeping employees or offer any ready products on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1/1/1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser as stipulated in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 1/20/1934. If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract all claims of the employee including all claims to maintenance, become obliterated. That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a member of a corporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to be retired by 12/31/1938. A special authorization is unnecessary. The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the provision necessary for the execution of this law.
Göring: I believe that we can agree with this law. (Remark: Yes)
Of course there remain a few things to be straightened out even after 1 January. We shall be able to handle them with these general methods which we shall have to employ for handling all other Jewish property. As for the Jewish stores, we may proceed vigorously; we believe that by Christmas enough buyers shall be found to take over the stores which from now on shall be entirely under pressure. Also the merchandise may be taken the way you have proposed it. To me, all this seems to be prepared in an excellent manner.
Funk: In every single store everything is there.
Schmer: Everything is there, except that we have no control, anymore, over this business with the trustees. I personally am of the opinion that we don't need it at all; so far we have managed quite well with the aryanization. For those few stores that are to be kept open, we shall easily find buyers. All other rooms shall be rented without much ado. There is a great need for this right here in Berlin.
Göring: But my dear friend, that way the Jew will receive the full amount.
Schmer: He will receive the amount that is far below the value, and the aryanizing shall have to be authorized, as before.
Göring: The Jew will receive the amount which won't be put into the account book.
Schmer: No. We can arrange that later. He cannot swallow the money. The amount is fixed, and under the law the Jew is compelled to report every change in his financial status, so that it can easily be controlled. He won't run away; we'll keep it in the Reich. The only thing you'd have to do is to issue a decree, or to transfer the provisions of Article 7 on to the Ministry for Economic Affairs in order to confiscate the Jewish property. He cannot run away from us.
Göring: Mr. Schmer, could not the following be done: Somebody will become aryanized and get 300000 marks into his hands. He runs into the next best jewelry store around the corner and buys one piece of jewelry after another, and on the same day disappears across the border.
Schmer: In that case, we'll have to report this change in his property.
Göring: But if he wants to scram!
Fischboeck: The OK on the aryanizing is not being given the minute the price for the purchase is being paid. We do that the following way. The aryanizing is being authorized only under the condition that the price for the purchase is to be paid in installments lasting over a long period of time, in case the buyer is unable to pay; or, in case payment is being made, that the amount is to be put in the bank of a frozen account.
Göring: We could do the same thing here.
Schmer: In the provisions for the execution of the law we may stipulate that from a certain level on, payment shall have to be made in bonds of the Reich or something similar. That would have to be a decree made by the authorities which OK the aryanizing.
Daluege: The number of Jewish stores is unknown. Until yesterday 7,500 were reported to us and the number does not increase.
Fischboeck: Because of what has happened the day before yesterday in Vienna, 5000 were shut down there. There were 40000 altogether.
Schmer: Shall the arrangement made in Austria remain?
Göring: Nothing will be changed there.
Fischboeck: Everything can be shut down at any time.
Heydrich: I know that a very high limit has been set for registering, 3000 I believe.
Fischboeck: More than 5000.
Göring: Is that the same in the Reich?
Fischboeck: Yes, in the Reich too. In this connection, I'd like to make a few more remarks. What we are very much concerned with, is the situation regarding the Jewish apartment houses which contribute a large percentage of Jewish wealth. Surprisingly enough, the Jewish national wealth in Austria is reported to amount to 320 million marks only; the value of the apartment houses alone amounts to 500 million. We should appreciate it very much if the regulation which makes it possible to requisition Jewish property would be made to be valid also for the apartment buildings; thus we would be enabled to have these houses administered by a board of trustees and to give the Jews the right to have a claim on the debit ledger of the Reich. That could also be an occasion to cash the contribution, which might be deducted this way in advance. The administration of these blocks of apartment buildings wouldn't be a problem at all. The only thing we'd need for it would be managers, and there'd be plenty of them We'd like to requisition the apartment buildings and also any bonds that way. This question of the bonds has been left open so far. In Austria, a very large part of Jewish wealth, 266 billion Reichsmarks, is invested in bonds of all kinds, in shares or simply in bonds bringing a fixed rate of interest. In my opinion, a danger for the market does not exist because the Ministry for Economic Affairs would have control over these bonds. We'll pay by handling out claims, on the debit-ledger of the Reich. Therefore, the finances of the Reich won't be affected, the Minister for Finance shall only pay 3 for the claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich. He in turn receives internal loans, that means saves money. And if the bonds are not being sold, one might keep them 30 years until those claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich shall be expired.
Funk: Why should Jews not be allowed to keep bonds?
Göring: Because that way he would actually be given a share.
Funk: That is entirely new.
Göring: No. I said very clearly before; bonds and shares.
Funk: Shares yes, but not internal loans.
Fischboeck: It is certainly better to pay the Jew 3% instead of 4%. We'd have no possibility to control Jewish wealth the minute we'd let him have shares.
Göring: Gentlemen, no arguments. It is out of the question that he'd keep the shares. He'll have to turn them in.
Fischboeck: In that case I'd like you to arrange this by calling the shares in so that the stock market won't be ruined. That can very easily be done. They'll be turned in. Administering the shares is also much simpler. The trustee turns the shares over to the depot and receives claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich in their place. With this, the whole affair is settled. The only question is whether you want to recall the shares or not.
Funk: This way, the Reich will become possessor of half a billion shares.
Göring: Yes, yes.
Goebbels: He'll be able to get rid of them according to its needs.
Fischboeck: But it is a business based on profits.
V. Krosigk: I am wondering, first whether it will bring us profits. I grant you that, though. But secondly, an entirely new point of view has to be entered here. I can very well see the point in what the Minister, Mr. Fischboeck, says. As for the values that otherwise bring fixed rates of interest, it is an entirely new idea to expropriate the Jew also in this, though the intention had been to refrain his status as the owner of the shares.
Fischboeck: The reason why this is so very important is that our whole action shall remain without success as long as the Jews shall be in the possession of values, which they may realize quickly and employ for any other undertaking.
Göring: That's it. We want to prevent the Jews from again secretly manipulating against us.
Fishboeck: For example, if we don't want the Jews to possess jewelry we can prevent them from having it by allowing them to possess only Internal Loan bonds, that means that they could acquire the jewelry only by paying with bonds.
Göring: Nobody would pay them claims on the debit-ledger.
Fischboeck: They are not transferable.
Göring: Only if authorized.
Heydrich: Is it not possible to issue an order forbidding the Jew to invest his money in certain values, such as art treasures ?
Göring: The arrangement with the registration in the debit-ledger is much simpler. Claims on the debit-ledger are not transferable. He cannot do anything with them, and he cannot do much with those 3.5%.
Heydrich: But we'll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation of valuable objects in Jewish possession.
Göring: What he has now in his possession, that'll come.
Schmer: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan.
Göring: I think Fischboeck's proposal is very good. We should give it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the res, etc.
Fischboeck: I should also like to have a decision made on the following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested money in a way we don't like. That is money which they have loaned out to other Jews, oftener enough to an Aryan. This way, a dependency of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid. So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won't simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship.
Funk: If word of this debate should reach the public, we'd have a run on the capital market tomorrow.
Fischboeck: That's why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of internal loans, shares and everything they had.
Göring: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do it any other way.
[Part VI is missing] Part VII
Frick: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it. Göring: I have said so before.
(Shout by Goebbels) that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled? Therefore, I shouldn't like to have anybody else in the Committee, in order to keep it as small as possible.
Buerkel: Is the plan for the aryanizing to be discussed also?
Göring: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau! Of course, I too am of the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this week right and left.
Heydrich: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic life, the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains. May I make a few proposals to that effect?
Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way we have eliminated 50000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich only 19000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign charitable organizations.
Göring: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of the "Green Frontier."
Heydrich: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency. Illegal
Göring: This story has gone through the whole world press. During the first night the Jews were expulsed into Czechoslovakia. The next morning, the Czechs grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary. From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into Czechoslovakia. They traveled around and around that way. They landed finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever they tried to go ashore, they were barred.
Heydrich: That was the report. There weren't even 100 Jews.
Göring: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every midnight. That was in the Burgenland.
Heydrich: At least 45000 Jews were made to leave the country by legal measures.
Göring: How was that possible?
Heydrich: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.
Göring: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn't help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you ever thought of it that this procedure may cost so much foreign currency that in the end we won't be able to hold out.
Heydrich: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency. (Göring: agreed) This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies and that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences, after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so rightly pointed out to us.
(Göring: agreed)
As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8000-10000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of the aryanizing and other restrictions Jewry will become unemployed. The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians. Therefore, I shall have to take steps; to isolate the Jew so he won't enter into the German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors, barbers, etc. This question shall also have to be examined.
As for the isolation, I'd like to make a few proposals regarding police measures which are important also because of their psychological effect on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg laws shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which shall facilitate many other things. I don't see any danger of excuses, and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier.
Göring: A uniform?
Heydrich: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that the foreign Jews who don't look different from ours, are being molested.
Göring: But, my dear Heydrich, you won't be able to avoid the creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They shall have to be created.
Heydrich: As for the question of ghettos, I'd like to make my position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I don't think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemics and the like. We don't want to let the Jew live in the same house with the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control over his daily life through uniformed agents.
Göring: We'd only have to forbid long-distance calls.
Heydrich: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from communicating out of their districts.
Göring: And in towns all of their own?
Heydrich: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that they would be a terrific danger. I'd take different steps. I'd restrict the movement of the Jews and would say; in Munich, the governmental district and the district
Göring: Wait a minute! I don't care so much for it that the Jews don't appear in spots where I don't want them. My point is this one; if one Jew won't have any more work, he'll have to live modestly. He won't be able to go far on his 3.5%to restaurants, etc. He'll have to work more. That'll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers, grocers, etc., in certain streets. The question is of course whether we want to go on tolerating that. If not, the Jew shall have to buy from the Aryan.
Heydrich: No, I'd say that for the necessities in daily life, the German won't serve the Jew anymore.
Göring: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there'll be the following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have so and so many retail stores, then they'll again be in business, and they'll continually have to sell for the wholesaler.
Schmer: In a small town that wouldn't work at all.
Göring: It could only be worked out if you'd reserve in advance whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you'll have to have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them. You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy food and stockings.
Heydrich: We'll have to decide whether we want that or not.
Göring: I'd like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot make another subdivision here We cannot argue: so and so many stores will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores. I'd say, all stores should be Aryan stores, and the Jew may buy there. One may go one step rather and say that these and these stores will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But not stores.
Heydrich: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Aryan district to buy.
Göring: No I'd say that enough German storekeepers would love to dwell in the ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn't alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German economy.
Heydrich: I shouldn't like to comment on that. Now a few things which are important also from a psychological angle.
Göring: Once we'd have a ghetto, we'd find out what stores ought to be in there, and we'd be able to say; you, the Jew so and so, together with so and so, shall take care of the delivery of goods. And a German wholesale firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish store. This store would then not be a retail shop but a cooperative store, a cooperative one for Jews.
Heydrich: All these measures would eventually lead to the institution of the ghetto. I'd say one shouldn't want to build a ghetto. But these measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically drive the Jews into a ghetto.
Funk: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are 3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The individual alone will starve.
Göring: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together.
Heydrich: As an additional measure, I'd propose to withdraw from the Jews all personal papers such as permits and drivers licenses. No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted to drive because that way he'd endanger German life. By not being permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore restricted to move about so freely. I'd say the Royal Square in Munich, the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border fences, military installations. Furthermore, like Minister Vr. Goebbels has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie houses, etc. As for cultural activities, I'd like to say this; cultural activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature, not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenessen are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I don't see why the Jew should go to these places at all.
Göring: To health spas, no.
Heydrich: Well, then I'd like to propose the same thing for hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Aryan Volkgenossen.
Göring: We'll have to manage that gradually.
Heydrich: The same applies to public conveyances.
Göring: Are there no Jewish Sanatoriums and Jewish hospitals?
(RemarksYes!)
We'll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be straightened out one right after another.
Heydrich: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that we may start out on all this.
Göring: One more question, gentlemen: What would you think the situation would be if I'd announce today that Jewry should have to contribute this 1 billion as a punishment?
Buerckel: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly.
Goebbels: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of this, and to put something on the side.
Brinkmann: They'd be subject to punishment.
V. Krosigk: Mr. Fischboeck, one question: Could this authorization be ordered without their closing out their securities ?
Funk: They are all registered. They'll also have to register the money.
V. Krosigk: But for the time being they may dispose of it.
Göring: It won't help them to cash them all. They can't get rid of the money.
Funk: They'll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their stocks and bonds.
Fischboeck: There is a certain danger, but I don't think it is very great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be carried out during next week.
V. Krosigk: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest.
Göring: I would make that a condition.
Fischboeck: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure this way.
Göring : I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shall, as punishment for their abominable crimes etc., have to make a contribution of 1 billion. That'll work. The pigs won't commit another murder. Incidentally, I'd like to say in that I would not like to be a Jew in Germany.
V. Krosigk: Therefore, I'd like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has said in the beginning; that we'll have to try everything possible, by way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries. The decisive factor is that we don't want the society-proletariat here. They'll always be a terrific liability for us.
(Frick: "and a danger!")
I don't imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be, like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can!
Göring: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German Reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown with the Jews. Besides that, the Führer shall now make an attempt with those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me on 9 November. There is no other way. He'll tell the other countries. "What are you talking about the Jew for?Take him!" Another proposal may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their "coreligionists" in North America, Canada, or elsewhere.
I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary within the next few days.
Blerning: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday, the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we control the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, the Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should have to back this internal loan.
Göring: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market?
(Remark: "Sell them") To whom?
(Remark: "on the stock markethe orders a bank to do it.") Well, I'll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days.
Blerning: That could be done only through a decree.
Göring: I can't see any advantage for the Jew. He won't know himself how and he'll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won't move.
Goebbels: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home.
Göring: I don't think it would be logical. Otherwise we'll have to do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won't be new trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate individual acts. The Reich has taken the affairs in its own hand. The Jew can only sell. He can't do a thing. He'll have to pay. At this moment, the individual Jew won't think of throwing anything on the market. There'll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run to us. They'll look for those great Aryans with whom, they'll think they may have some luck, the so-called various mailboxes of the Reich with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door in. All that takes some time, and by then we'll be ready.
Daluege: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?
Göring: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you.
[Conference closed at 2.40 PM]
"Document 1818-PS: Organization Book Of The Nsdap, 1940 Edition [partial translation]" pp.
The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley] published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Pages 195-196b.
BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS AND TRAINING
The Bureau of Factory Troops and Training [Werkschar und Schulung] is simultaneously a Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAPMain Training Bureau.
The education and training of the Bureau of Factory Troops and Training has in mind the totality of the tasks of the NSDAP and of the German labor front. It comprises political shaping of the will, and conveying trade knowledge, and includes the whole labor policy on an ideological basis, character education, and creation of a soldierly attitude [Soldatisch-haltungsmaessige Ausrichtung].
It is the aim of the German labor front training to enable the factory troops and the German labor front functionaries to lead the workers of the German people, and thereby to render real the National Socialist community of factory, accomplishment and people.
THE FACTORY TROOPS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT IN THE FACTORY
Regulations for its building:
The Factory Troop as an organization exists only in the factory. It is the nucleus of the factory community. The Factory Troops Leader:
The confirmed factory chairman [Betriebsobmann] of the German Labor Front leads, under the same title, the Factory Troops of the factory. For training and commitment of the shock squad [Stosstrupp] the factory chairman deputizes a shock squad leader [Stosstruppführer]. Membership in the Factory Troops:
Membership in the Factory Troops is voluntary and it presupposes readiness to fight for a National Socialist conception of work and for a German worker's community.
TASK OF THE FACTORY TROOPS
Under the leadership of the factory chairman, it is the task of the Factory Troops to guarantee, under all circumstances and by all means, the political security and readiness of the factory to commit itself.
Not through words and speeches alone, but primarily through their example, the Factory Troops shall convince the community of their fellow-workers of the justice of the National Socialist will, and educate them to utmost effort, to highest accomplishments, and to most extreme devotion.
It must remain the aim of the Factory Troops to fuse the factory into a closely-meshed, single-willed community capable of the highest accomplishments for the people and the Reich.
Directives and regulations for physical coordination, commitment and utilization of the Factory Troops are issued by the Reich Organizational Leader, or on his behalf by the head of the Central bureau, or the German Labor Front chairmen of district [Gau] county [Kreis] and locality [Ort], so far as it is not a question of Factory Troops tasks falling within the professional sphere of activity of the factory.
The competent regional chairmen (district, county and locality) are solely responsible for the over-all commitment of the Factory Troops.
BTSCH/KR NOTE
On behalf of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, VLR Kordt calls at 11, 15 with the information that two telegrams, numbered 439 and 440 are on the way to me. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests that I should get in touch with the postal authorities to have these telegrams delivered to me with greatest possible speed. They contained the text of two letters by the Führer to the Duce, but I was to keep this information to myself. I was to hand these to the Duce personally as quickly as possible. When I asked when were the telegrams sent off and how long they were which I had to know in order to estimate for when to make an appointment with the Duce, Mr. Kordt stated that until then only No. 439 had been sent off at 10:30, whereas No. 440 was still being in the process of coding. One of the telegrams was about half a page long, the other, two. I told Mr. Kordt that I would take the necessary steps, but that I had to Point out already now that one should not entertain any false hopes as to the time that would elapse.
At 11:50 the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs calls me up from the Reich Chancellery personally and requests me to have the Führers two letters to the Duce received immediately by telephone, as their transmission by telegraph would presumably take too long and then to deliver the letters to the Duce with greatest speed. Then the telephonic transmission of the text of the two telegrams followed immediately.
Immediately afterwards VLR Kordt called me and told me that he had just transmitted to us the Führer's two letters to the Duce by telephone. Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the Minister for Foreign Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received the text of the letters over the telephone through another line. We ascertained together that thus the text of these letters has arrived here over three routes.
At 12:15, I informed the office RM by telephone that the Duce would receive me at 1 o'clock.
After the audience with the Duce, I informed by telephone the Office RM at 1:50 about the delivery of the letters, adding that a telegram about my conversation with the Duce would be sent immediately.
ROME, 9/1/1939
(Signed) Mackensen
Coded Telegram (Copy) From Berlin: 9/3/1939, 2:50 hours Arr. Rome: 9/2/1939, 3:00 hours. Arr. Embassy: 9/3/1939, 6:30 hours
DECODING No. 450 dated 9/2/1939. For High Officials or their representatives in person. Top Secret. To be decoded in person. Top Secret. For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential information.
The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce's order following copy for the Führer and Reich Chancellor and for The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the Führer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France.
Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already its "moral satisfaction." If it would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long duration.
Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of the Führer.
The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September.
Woermann telegram Heading in Italian 73 S Berlin AW1/2 977 630/626 3/9 2051 Etat q59 For the Ambassador
I request that the following message from the Führer be forwarded to the Duce personally:
I first want to thank you for your-last attempt at a mediation.
I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that he conference would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than 1/2 year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a vouch. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I believe alsoeven if we march now over different roads that fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in the future.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler End of message. Cable report is requested Ribbentrop
Rome, 9/4/1939 Foreign Berlin No. 418 of 9/4/1939 Telegram, secret code procedure (good) CITISSIME to telegram No. 495 of 3rd of this month and in connection with telegram No. 414 of 3 September.
Duce remarked during the presentation of the Führer's message, which took place in Ciano's presence at 0940, that he would forward his view point by letter. He explained somewhat as follows, during the ensuing conversation of a half an hour: they never had considered in the least to let himself be used in an action of arbitration, which had as pre-requisite the withdrawal of German troops. No man on earth can seriously consider the thought as worthy of discussion, to make such an offer to troops, which, furthermore, are advancing successfully. He refused such ideas with actual indignation, also he would not consider the "symbolic withdrawal" suggested by Paris. In view of the strong appeal by France to make one last attempt, he had forwarded the suggestion under the self-evidence supposition, that he remaining of the army corps, where it should be a prerequisite. In this case, if we had considered the agreement of the Führer to the suggestion possible, he would perhaps even have advised it. However, England, which is guilty for the entire development of the German-Polish conflict, did apparently not want to let it come to a compromise. He seemed to know, that the Polish Ambassador in London still exercised in the last minutes a decisive influence on the position at the British Cabinet. The declaration by England, which brought about the stage of war, and which France followed up the last, only hesitantly, is absolutely "diotic," brought about by people who apparently have never even studied a map. For what form should such a war take? It can only be waged on water, on land or in the air. Breaking out of the Maginot Line on land, over-running of the West Wall would be a hopeless undertaking, which will hardly be attempted by the French. Even if our fleet is modest, in any case the Navy cannot undertake anything decisive. The air force would attempt to drop a few bombs, maybe it would destroy this and that installation, but even that has nothing to do with the decision, especially if we limit ourselves in the air as well to the defensive. In brief, the declaration of war is an absolutely absurd undertaking, because the only thing actually left would be the war of attrition and that would also be harmful to the one who declares it.
If the Führer's message says that the Führer and the Duce "would now go separate ways", he is of an entirely different opinion. On the contrary, the most complete agreement in respect to methods and goal prevails, and especially militarily, he has done everything to the last, what the Führer desired of him, and he continues his preparation most intensively. In Lybya, the critical months for him is September, after which even there, he will be armed for a successful defense. Already today, he ties down 400000 men of the opponent by his measures on the Alpine frontier and in Africa. He will send to the Führer, via the military attache (who is invited this evening to the home of Gen. Pariani) all the details of his military measures with appropriate carbographic material, which he also showed me and explained most thoroughly. I can leave the reporting on this to the military attache. I only wish to emphasize the Duce's remark, that the mobilization measures did not only pass without any friction, but also that the spirit of those conscripted and of their families, thanks to the generous subsidy allotted to them, is excellent.
At the end, the Duce repeated his assurance of every assistance desired by us, particularly, in the question of workers and (on a suggestion of mine) by the press.
Duce was in a confidential mood.
/s/ MACKENSEN.
FOREIGN OFFICE RAM NO. 56/R Berlin, 3/2/1941
STRICTLY SECRET Personal
In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 2/23/1941. These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.
Signed: Ribbentrop
To: The German Embassy in Mackensen, Ankara, Madrid, Moscow, Rome (Qr.), Rome (Vat;), The German Legation in Athens, Belgrade, Bern, Budapest, Bukarest, Helsinki, Lisbon, Pressburg (Bratislava), Sofia, Stockholm one each 65215
Enclosure To RAM No. 56/R
STRICTLY SECRET Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 2/13/1941
After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the RAM) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.
Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Führer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Führer decided on a treaty with Russia necessity for avoiding a two-font war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German-Japanese relationship. Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?
As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further developments.
At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.
Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The vast spaces of he oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an air duelEurope vs. England . Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers.
The Führer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. he same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Führer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines airplanes and antiaircraft guns.
Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Führer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:
1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.
2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.
3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.
The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Powers Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan's entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press, radio, etc. of these countries were already synchronized with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.
Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power act was concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.
Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the USA, concerning Japan's attitude in case of America's entry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the USA Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U.S. realized that they were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The people in the U.S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore our politics with the U.S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In the U.S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for the American people, but that should the USA have any aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy propaganda.
The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with his thought. The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the USA, break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the USA to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.
Urgent. To Ambassador:
Führer and RAM request you immediately to transmit the following letter by Führer to Duce.
Report execution. Berlin, 3/28/1941. 0,5-
Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this quickest means, my estimatiOn of the situation and the consequences which may result from it.
1. From the beginning, I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front.
2. For this reason, I've done everything and honestly have endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today's reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.
3. I don't consider this situation as being catastrophic but nevertheless a difficult one, and we, on our part, must avoid any mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole position.
4. Therefore, I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available force.
These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.
I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed.
5. I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified, know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known.
6. Today I called in the Bulgarian and the Hungarian ministers and outlined to them my thoughts on the situation and, with view to military developments, to arouse their interest by explaining to both of them, the negative and positive effects which would arise for them in this case. Since without the aid of Hungary and Bulgaria, operations, Duce, cannot develop with the swiftness which might be necessary under the circumstances.
If possibly in the course of tomorrow, I will inform you, Duce, more thoroughly about all this.
7. Therefore, General von Rintelen will report to you, Duce, tomorrow if the weather is suitable for flying and will tell you the military dispositions which are being prepared, and which we shall carry out.
Duce, should secrecy be observed as to these measures, then in case action on our part should become necessary, I have no doubt that we will both achieve a success no less than the success in Norway a year ago. This is my unshaken conviction.
Accept my heartfelt and friendly greetings. Yours.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
End of letter, Bureau of Minister.
With the directive that Ambassador Mackensen transmit this letter tonight to Duce.
Howel 27.3.41 2400
"Document 1842-PS: Notes On The Discussion Of The Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop With The Duce In The Presence Of Count Ciano As Well As The Ambassadors Von Mackensen And Alfieri, In Rome On 9/19/1940 [partial translation]" pp.
All the same, Germany had won air superiority, and was bombing England, and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. On one occasion the German Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as August. But this attack had to be called off because of bad weather. A really large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Führer wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain, that such an attack would mean the beginning of England's destruction. Although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air, their results for England had already been extraordinarily serious. With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a short time. The British armament factories had been seriously affected, and important ports, such as Portland, had been entirely crippled. Moreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made unusable.
With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed, that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be certain of Germany's sympathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.
The Reich Foreign Minister further announced a statement by the Führer regarding the military part of the Spanish problem, i.e., the conquest of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves. But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few squadrons of planes. The Führer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from the military point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the Spaniards were to be given assistance.
The Reich Foreign Minister then showed the Duce the German map regarding the Spanish territorial demands, and this was duly noted by the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the Reich Foreign Minister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not clash with Italy's in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister announced Serrano Suner's intention, also to make a visit to Rome.
On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) intended to sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing with Spain's entry into the war, as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforementioned materials, recognizing the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack against Gibraltar as a declaration of war. The protocol would also state, that Spain's entry into the war would be left to the judgment of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would come into the war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.
"Document 1850-PS: Negotiation between Obergruppenführer Krueger, Oberst Karmann, Oberst Lorenz in the Chambers of the Reich Board of Trustees on 7/8/1933 [translation]" pp. 478-481.
Filing reference 11 C-2 [in ink].
Oberst Karmann stated that the Armed Forces had so far maintained no contact whatsoever with the ex-service men. The only contact which the ex-service men have, is the vote of their maintenance at the Reich Ministry of Labor. Oberst Karmann intends to establish an Ex-service men's Association for which membership of the SA is laid down as a condition. Ex-service men wait for about 3 years from the time their active service ends until they obtain a Civil Service post. Roughly estimated, they number about 20000 men. In addition, approximately 8000 non-commissioned officers and men are released yearly. The demand for these ex-service men is so great that, for example, Oberst Karmann has difficulty in obtaining personnel for his establishment. Oberst Karmann however, wishes to send ex-service men compulsorily to the SA, as soon as this is required by the Chief of Training. As a rule, the ex-service men go where they receive the best pay. Furthermore, Oberst Karmann explained his ideas on the recruitment of non-commissioned officers of the reserve. Forestry and customs officials should, for example, do several years military service with the Reichswehr. A similar provision should be made for officials of other categories. The settling of the question regarding the disadvantages of ex-service men in the SA, compared to those in the Labor Service has been postponed until a later date. Oberst Karmann mentioned that ex-service men, who were not appointed to good, regularly paid positions in the SA would, when they claimed their right to maintenance, be at a great practical disadvantage as regards their financial circumstances by reason of their SA service. He would see that there was official compensation for this.
Berlin, 7/8/1933.
131 Fl [ink] C002167
Confidential filing reference [in ink] 5 July 33 [ink]
Discussion with Oberst v. Vietinghoff, Chief of Armed Forces Division, on Wednesday the 5th July 3.
1. Leadership of Reich Youth [Reichsjugendfuehrung]. The question of the powers of the Head of the Reich Youth in connection with pre-military training.
I state that, by a decision of the Führer, the spheres of duty of the Head of the Reich Youth, the Reich Commissar for Sport and the Chief of Training are sharply defined. I sent a draft to Munich to that effect.
2. Students. A discussion is taking place today between oberst v. Vietinghoff and Gerullis regarding the question of military sports for students. Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that these matters also should be placed under the control of the Chief of Training.
I mentioned my preliminary negotiations with Herr Schwab, formerly with the General Armed Forces Office [AWA-All-gemeines Wehrmachtsamt] who, as liaison official on the Staff, was arranging this matter of military sports for students on the right lines.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff believes that the Prussian Ministry of Education and Public Worship, will make certain difficulties and would very much like to take a service-officer into the ministry as technical advisor. He suggested Hauptmann von Bernuth for this purpose.
3. I then gave an extensive outline of Bernuth's duties; he was working out the guiding principles for the training of men and the leaders for the military camps and schools for leaders in accordance with the wishes of the Reich Minister for Defense [Reichswehrministerium] with regard to pre-military training, in addition, however, he should make the technical preparations for weapon-training. Oberst v. Vietinghoff declared himself in agreement.
Hauptmann v. Bernuth is being given a long-term appointment to my staff. 002168 131 F2 [ink]
4. Labor Service. Military sports in Labor service camps are suspended for considerations of foreign policy. Dr. Stellbrecht has been to Oberst v. Vietinghoff to inform him that the Labor Service is being organized on the wrong lines.
5. The Office for Defence Policy [Wehrpolitisches Amt]. My answer to Oberst v. Vietinghoff's question was that of the "Wehrpolitisches Amt" must not interfere with my sphere of duties and that I considered it advisable to dissolve it.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that the "Wehrpolitisches Amt" has become superfluous and that all questions relating to military sports should again be decided by the Chief of Training.
6. The budget. I drew Oberst von Vietinghoff's attention to the fact that the budget question must find its solution through the SA, that it was not advisable for the Reich Ministry for Defence to put the care for the budget on behalf of the Chief of Training, for that might cause difficulties. I drew attention to Oberst v. Reichenau's suggestion and how it would work out.
Oberst v. Reichenau recommends that the budget adviser to the Chief of Training should contact Major Osterkamp, the expert of the Reich Ministry for Defense, who is very experienced in these matters. It would then be easier to get the budget passed by the Reich Ministry for Finance.
I declared myself ready to examine the budget, in conjunction with the Reich Ministry for Defense, as soon as it was decided upon. Furthermore, the Führer's demand in Reichenhall that I should train 250000 SA men and leaders within a year so that they would be at the disposal of the Reichswehr in case of emergency, is the basis on which I shall act.
In accordance with this demand of Hitler's I should have to examine the possibilities of instructional training and draw up my budget accordingly. Deductions from the budget made by the Reich Ministry would not be allowed.
7. The Reich Trusteeship. Oberst v. Vietinghoff asked when I as taking over the Trusteeship of the Reich, to which I answered at I had had a talk with Neuville today and that he had requested me in the course of this discussion to go with him the next morning to Minister Seldte to obtain information regarding the winding-up of affairs.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff considers this step superfluous, and