text:
COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER
COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, 515 U.S. 323 (1995)
COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER(1995)
No. 94-500
Argued: March 27, 1995Decided: June 14, 1995
On his 1986 federal income tax return, Erich Schleier (hereinafter respondent) included as gross income the backpay portion, but not the liquidated damages portion, of an award that he received in settlement of a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). After the Commissioner issued a deficiency notice, asserting that the liquidated damages should have been included as income, respondent initiated Tax Court proceedings, contesting that ruling and seeking a refund for the tax he had paid on his backpay. The Tax Court agreed with respondent that the entire settlement constituted "damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness" within the meaning of 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code and was therefore excludable from gross income. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
Recovery under the ADEA is not excludable from gross income. A taxpayer must meet two independent requirements before a recovery may be excluded under 104(a)(2): the underlying cause of action giving rise to the recovery must be "based upon tort or tort type rights", and the damages must have been received "on account of personal injuries or sickness." Respondent has failed to satisfy either requirement. Pp. 4-14.
(a) No part of respondent's settlement is excludable under 104(a)(2)'s plain language. Recovery for back wages does not satisfy the critical requirement of being "on account of" any personal injury, and no personal injury affected the amount of back wages recovered. In addition, this Court explicitly held in Trans World Airlines, Inc v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 , that Congress intended the ADEA's liquidated damages to be punitive in nature; thus, Page II they serve no compensatory function and cannot be described as being "on account of personal injuries." Pp. 4-9.
(b) There is also no basis for excluding respondent's recovery from gross income under the Commissioner's regulation interpreting 104(a)(2). Even if respondent were correct that this action is based on "tort or tort type rights" within 26 CFR 1.104-1(c)'s meaning, this requirement is not a substitute for the statutory requirement that the amount be received "on account of personal injuries or sickness"; it is an additional requirement. Pp. 10-11.
(c) Nor is respondent's recovery based upon "tort or tort type rights" as that term was construed in Burke, where this Court rejected the argument that a taxpayer's backpay settlement under pre-1991 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be excluded from gross income. Two elements that distinguish the ADEA from pre-1991 Title VII - namely the ADEA rights to a jury trial and liquidated damages - are insufficient to bring the ADEA within Burke's conception of a "tort or tort type righ[t]," for the statute lacks the primary characteristic of such an action: the availability of compensatory damages. Moreover, satisfaction of Burke's "tort or tort type" inquiry does not eliminate the need to satisfy the other requirement for excludability discussed herein. Pp. 11-13.
26 F.3d 1119, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., concurred in the judgment. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, and in Part II of which SOUTER, J., joined. [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 1]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes a taxpayer to exclude from his gross income the amount received in settlement of a claim for backpay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
Erich Schleier (respondent) 1 is a former employee of United Airlines, Inc. (United). Pursuant to established policy, United fired respondent when he reached the age of 60. Respondent then filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging that his termination violated the ADEA.
The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age." Lorillard v. Pollard, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. __ (slip op., at 4) (1995). Subject to certain defenses, see 29 U.S.C. 623(f) (1988 ed. and Supp. V), 4 and 12 of [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 2] the ADEA make it unlawful for an employer, inter alia, to discharge any individual between the ages of 40 and 70 "because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1) and 631(a). The ADEA incorporates many of the enforcement and remedial mechanisms of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Like the FLSA, the ADEA provides for "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter." 626(b). That relief may include "without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion." Ibid. More importantly for respondent's purposes, the ADEA incorporates FLSA provisions that permit the recovery "of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." 216(b). See generally McKennon, 513 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 4-5).
Despite these broad remedial mechanisms, there are two important constraints on courts' remedial power under the ADEA. First, unlike the FLSA, the ADEA specifically provides that "liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. 626(b); see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S., at 125 . Second, the Courts of Appeals have unanimously held, and respondent does not contest, that the ADEA does not permit a separate recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress. 2 [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 3]
Respondent's ADEA complaint was consolidated with a class action brought by other former United employees challenging United's policy. The ADEA claims were tried before a jury, which determined that United had committed a willful violation of the ADEA. The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, but that judgment was reversed on appeal. See Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394 (CA7 1984). The parties then entered into a settlement, pursuant to which respondent received $145,629. Half of respondent's award was attributed to "backpay" and half to "liquidated damages." United did not withhold any payroll or income taxes from the portion of the settlement attributed to liquidated damages.
When respondent filed his 1986 federal income tax return, he included as gross income the backpay portion of the settlement, but excluded the portion attributed to liquidated damages. The Commissioner issued a deficiency notice, asserting that respondent should have included the liquidated damages as gross income. Respondent then initiated proceedings in the Tax Court, claiming that he had properly excluded the liquidated damages. Respondent also sought a refund for the tax he had paid on the backpay portion of the settlement. The Tax Court agreed with respondent that the entire settlement constituted "damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness" within the meaning of 104(a)(2) of the Code and was therefore excludable from gross income. Relying on a prior Circuit decision that had in turn relied on our decision in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Because the Courts of Appeals have reached inconsistent conclusions as to the [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 4] taxability of ADEA recoveries in general and of the United settlement in particular, compare Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (CA7 1994) (United settlement award is taxable) with Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (CA9 1994) (United settlement award is excludable), we granted certiorari, 513 U.S. __ (1994). Our consideration of the plain language of 104(a), the text of the regulation implementing 104(a)(2), and our reasoning in Burke convinces us that a recovery under the ADEA is not excludable from gross income.
Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a broad definition of "gross income": "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived." 26 U.S.C. 61(a). We have repeatedly emphasized the "sweeping scope" of this section and its statutory predecessors. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955). See also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S., at 233 ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). We have also emphasized the corollary to 61(a)'s broad construction, namely the "default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed." United States v. Burke, 504 U.S., at 248 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment); see United States v. Centennial Savings Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 583 -584 (1991); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S., at 244 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).
Respondent recognizes 61(a)'s "sweeping" definition and concedes that his settlement constitutes gross income unless it is expressly excepted by another provision in the Code. Respondent claims, however, that his settlement proceeds are excluded from 61(a)'s reach [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 5] by 26 U.S.C. 104(a). 3 Section 104(a) provides an exclusion for five categories of "compensation for personal injuries or sickness." Respondent argues that his settlement award falls within the second of those categories, which excludes from gross income "the amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness." 104(a)(2).
In our view, the plain language of the statute undermines respondent's contention. Consideration of a [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 6] typical recovery in a personal injury case illustrates the usual meaning of "on account of personal injuries." Assume that a taxpayer is in an automobile accident, is injured, and as a result of that injury suffers (a) medical expenses, (b) lost wages, and (c) pain, suffering, and emotional distress that cannot be measured with precision. If the taxpayer settles a resulting lawsuit for $30,000 (and if the taxpayer has not previously deducted her medical expenses, see 104(a)), the entire $30,000 would be excludable under 104(a)(2). The medical expenses for injuries arising out of the accident clearly constitute damages received "on account of personal injuries." Similarly, the portion of the settlement intended to compensate for pain and suffering constitutes damages "on account of personal injury." 4 Finally, the recovery for lost wages is also excludable as being "on account of personal injuries," as long as the lost wages resulted from time in which the taxpayer was out of work as a result of her injuries. See, e.g., Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T. C. 1294, 1300 (1986) (hypothetical surgeon who loses finger through tortious conduct may exclude any recovery for lost wages because "[t]his injury . . . will also undoubtedly cause special damages including loss of future income"), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (CA6 1988). The critical point this hypothetical illustrates is that each element of the settlement is recoverable not simply because the taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each element of the settlement satisfies the requirement set forth in 104(a)(2) (and in all of the other subsections of 104(a)) [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 7] that the damages were received "on account of personal injuries or sickness."
In contrast, no part of respondent's ADEA settlement is excludable under the plain language of 104(a)(2). Respondent's recovery of back wages, though at first glance comparable to our hypothetical accident victim's recovery of lost wages, does not fall within 104(a)(2)'s exclusion because it does not satisfy the critical requirement of being "on account of personal injury or sickness." Whether one treats respondent's attaining the age of 60 or his being laid off on account of his age as the proximate cause of respondent's loss of income, neither the birthday nor the discharge can fairly be described as a "personal injury" or "sickness." Moreover, though respondent's unlawful termination may have caused some psychological or "personal" injury comparable to the intangible pain and suffering caused by an automobile accident, it is clear that no part of respondent's recovery of back wages is attributable to that injury. Thus, in our automobile hypothetical, the accident causes a personal injury which in turn causes a loss of wages. In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The amount of back wages recovered is completely independent of the existence or extent of any personal injury. In short, 104(a)(2) does not permit the exclusion of respondent's back wages because the recovery of back wages was not "on account of" any personal injury and because no personal injury affected the amount of back wages recovered.
Respondent suggests, nonetheless, that the liquidated damages portion of his settlement fits comfortably within the plain language of 104(a)(2)'s exclusion. He cites our observation in Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942), that liquidated damages under the FLSA "are compensation, not a penalty or [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 8] punishment," and that such damages might compensate for "damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate." Id., at 584-585; see also Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945). He argues that Congress must be presumed to have known of our interpretation of liquidated damages when it incorporated FLSA's liquidated damages provision into the ADEA, and that Congress must therefore have intended that liquidated damages under the ADEA serve, at least in part, to compensate plaintiffs for personal injuries that are difficult to quantify.
We agree with respondent that if Congress had intended the ADEA's liquidated damages to compensate plaintiffs for personal injuries, those damages might well come within 104(a)(2)'s exclusion. There are, however, two weaknesses in respondent's argument. First, even if we assume that Congress was aware of the Court's observation in Overnight Motor that the liquidated damages authorized by the FLSA might provide compensation for some "obscure" injuries, it does not necessarily follow that Congress would have understood that observation as referring to injuries that were personal rather than economic. Second, and more importantly, we have previously rejected respondent's argument: We have already concluded that the liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA were a significant departure from those in the FLSA, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S., at 581 ; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S., at 126 , and we explicitly held in Thurston: "Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature." Id., at 125. 5 [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 9]
Our holding in Thurston disposes of respondent's argument and requires the conclusion that liquidated damages under the ADEA, like back wages under the ADEA, are not received "on account of personal injury or sickness." 6 [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 10]
Respondent seeks to circumvent the plain language of 104(a)(2) by relying on the Commissioner's regulation interpreting that section. Section 1.104-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations, 26 CFR 1.104-1(c) (1994), provides:
"Section 104(a)(2) [of the Internal Revenue Code] excludes from gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. The term `damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' means an amount received (other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution."
Respondent contends that an action to recover damages for a violation of the ADEA is "based upon tort or tort type rights" as those terms are used in that regulation, and that his settlement is thus excludable under the plain language of the regulation.
Even if we accept respondent's characterization of the action, but see infra, at __, there is no basis for excluding the proceeds of his settlement from his gross income. The regulatory requirement that the amount be received in a tort type action is not a substitute for the statutory requirement that the amount be received "on account of personal injuries or sickness"; it is an additional requirement. Indeed, the statutory requirement is repeated in the regulation. As the Commissioner argues in her brief, an exclusion from gross income is authorized by the regulation "only when it both (i) was received through prosecution or settlement of an `action based upon tort or tort type rights'. . . and (ii) was received `on account of personal injuries or sickness.'" Reply [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 11] Brief for Petitioner 2. 7 We need not decide whether the Commissioner would have authority to dispense entirely with the statutory requirement, because she disclaims any intent to do so, and the text of the regulation does not belie her disclaimer. Thus, respondent's reliance on the text of the regulation is unpersuasive.
Respondent also suggests that our decision in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), compels the conclusion that his settlement award is excludable. In Burke, we rejected the taxpayer's argument that the payment received in settlement of her backpay claim under the pre-1991 version of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was excludable from her gross income. Our decision rested on the conclusion that such a claim was not based upon "tort or tort type rights" within the meaning of the regulation quoted above. For two independent reasons, we think Burke provides no foundation for respondent's argument.
First, respondent's ADEA recovery is not based upon "tort or tort type rights" as that term was construed in Burke. In Burke, we examined the remedial scheme established by the pre-1991 version of Title VII. Noting that "Title VII does not allow awards for compensatory or punitive damages," and that "instead, it limits available remedies to backpay, injunctions, and other [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 12] equitable relief," we concluded that Title VII was not tort-like because it addressed "`legal injuries of an economic character.'" 504 U.S., at 238 , 239.
Respondent points to two elements of the ADEA that he argues distinguish it from the remedial scheme at issue in Burke: First, the ADEA provides for jury trial, see 29 U.S.C. 626(b); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S., at 585 ; but cf. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981); and second, the ADEA allows for liquidated damages. We do not believe that these features of the ADEA are sufficient to bring it within Burke's conception of a "tort type righ[t]." It is true, as respondent notes, that we emphasized in Burke the lack of a right to a jury trial and the absence of any provision for punitive damages as factors distinguishing the pre-1991 Title VII action from traditional tort litigation, id., at 238-240. We did not, however, indicate that the presence of either or both of those factors would be sufficient to bring a statutory claim within the coverage of the regulation.
In our view, respondent's argument gives insufficient attention to what the Burke Court recognized as the primary characteristic of an "action based upon . . . tort type rights": the availability of compensatory remedies. Indeed, we noted that "one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff `fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights.'" Id., at 235. We continued: "Although these damages often are described in compensatory terms . . . , in many cases they are larger than the amount necessary to reimburse actual monetary loss sustained or even anticipated by the plaintiff, and thus redress intangible elements of injury that are deemed important, even though not pecuniary in [their] immediate consequence[s]." Ibid (internal quotation marks omitted). Against this background, we found critical that the pre-1991 version of Title VII provided no compensation "for any of the [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 13] other traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages." Id., at 239.
Like the pre-1991 version of Title VII, the ADEA provides no compensation "for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury." Monetary remedies under the ADEA are limited to back wages, which are clearly of an "economic character," and liquidated damages, which we have already noted serve no compensatory function. Thus, though this is a closer case than Burke, we conclude that a recovery under the ADEA is not one that is "based upon tort or tort type rights."
Second, and more importantly, the holding of Burke is narrower than respondent suggests. In Burke, following the framework established in the IRS regulations, we noted that 104(a)(2) requires a determination whether the underlying action is "based upon tort or tort type rights." United States v. Burke, 504 U.S., at 234 . In so doing, however, we did not hold that the inquiry into "tort or tort type rights" constituted the beginning and end of the analysis. In particular, though Burke relied on Title VII's failure to qualify as an action based upon tort type rights, we did not intend to eliminate the basic requirement found in both the statute and the regulation that only amounts received "on account of personal injuries or sickness" come within 104(a)(2)'s exclusion. Thus, though satisfaction of Burke's "tort or tort type" inquiry is a necessary condition for excludability under 104(a)(2), it is not a sufficient condition. 8 [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 14]
In sum, the plain language of 104(a)(2), the text of the applicable regulation, and our decision in Burke establish two independent requirements that a taxpayer must meet before a recovery may be excluded under 104(a)(2). First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise to the recovery is "based upon tort or tort type rights"; and second, the taxpayer must show that the damages were received "on account of personal injuries or sickness." For the reasons discussed above, we believe that respondent has failed to satisfy either requirement, and thus no part of his settlement is excludable under 104(a)(2).
JUSTICE SCALIA concurs in the judgment.
[ Footnote 1 ] Helen Schleier is also a respondent because she and her husband Erich filed a joint return.
[ Footnote 2 ] See, e. g., Vasquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (CA1 1978); Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147 (CA2 1984); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834 (CA3 1977); Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d 1292) (CA4 1979); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (CA5 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (CA6 1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687-688 (CA7) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806 (CA8 1982); Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (CA9 1994); Perrell v. Finance America Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (CA10 1984); Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446 (CA11 [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 3] 1985). See generally, H. Eglit, 2 Age Discrimination 18.19 (1982 and Supp. 1984); J. Kalet, Age Discrimination in Employment Law 110-111 (1986).
[ Footnote 3 ] At the time of respondent's return, 104(a) provided in relevant part:
"Compensation for injuries or sickness
"(a) In general. - Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include -
"(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness;
"(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness;
"(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includable in the gross income of the employee, or (B) are paid by the employer);
"(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces of any country or in the Coast and Geodetic Survey or the Public Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable under the provisions of section 808 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980; and
"(5) amounts received by an individual as disability income attributable to injuries incurred as a direct result of a violent attack which the Secretary of State determines to be a terrorist attack and which occurred while such individual was an employee of the United States engaged in the performance of his official duties outside the United States." 26 U.S.C. 104 (1988 ed. and Supp. V).
In 1989, 104(a) was amended, adding, inter alia, the following provision: "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." Ibid.
[ Footnote 4 ] Though the text of 104(a)(2) might be considered ambiguous on this point, it is by now clear that 104(a)(2) encompasses recoveries based on intangible as well as tangible harms. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S., at 235 , n. 6; id., at 244, and n. 3 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (acknowledging that "`personal injuries or sickness'" includes nonphysical injuries).
[ Footnote 5 ] We find it noteworthy that the Court in Thurston was presented with many of the arguments offered by respondent today. For example, to counter the argument that "the ADEA liquidated damages provision is punitive," the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that "the legislative history of the liquidated damages provision [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 9] in the ADEA - as in the FLSA - shows that such damages are designed to provide full compensation to the employee, rather than primarily to punish the employer." Brief for the EEOC in Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, O. T. 1984, Nos. 83-997 and 83-1325, p. 36. The EEOC continued: "Thus, Congress focused on the need to be fair to the employee, and to provide him full compensation for nonpecuniary damages not readily calculable, including emotional injuries such as humiliation and loss of self respect." Id., at 36-37. See also id., at 37 (relying on Overnight Motor). Against this background, the Court's statement that "Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature" can only be taken as a rejection of the argument that those damages are also (or are exclusively) compensatory.
We recognize that the House Conference Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA contains language that supports respondent. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950 (1978). However, this evidence was before the Court in Thurston, see Brief for the EEOC 37, and the Court did not find it persuasive. We see no reason to reach a different result now.
Moreover, there is much force to the Court's conclusion in Thurston that the ADEA's liquidated damages provisions are punitive. Under our decision in Thurston, liquidated damages are only available under the ADEA if "the employer . . . knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 469 U.S., at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). If liquidated damages were designed to compensate ADEA victims, we see no reason why the employer's knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct should be the determinative factor in the award of liquidated damages.
[ Footnote 6 ] We find odd the dissent's suggestion, post, at 6, that our holding today assumes that the intangible harms of discrimination do not constitute personal injuries. We of course have no doubt that the intangible harms of discrimination can constitute personal injury, and that compensation for such harms may be excludable under 104(a)(2). However, to acknowledge that discrimination may cause intangible harms is not to say that the ADEA compensates for such harms, or that any of the damages received were on account of those harms.
[ Footnote 7 ] We recognize that the Commissioner has arguably in the past treated the regulation as though its second sentence superseded the first sentence. See, e. g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S., at 242 , n. 1 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). In this case, however, the Commissioner unambiguously contends that the regulation is not intended to eliminate the "on account of" requirement from the statutory language. In view of the Commissioner's differing interpretations of her own regulation, we do not accord her present litigating position any special deference. We do agree, however, that she reads the regulation correctly in this case.
[ Footnote 8 ] We recognize that a recent revenue ruling from the IRS seems to rely on the same reading of Burke urged by respondent. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 Cum. Bull. 61. Though this Revenue Ruling is not before us, we note that "the Service's interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations," Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990), and they may not be used to overturn the plain language of a statute, [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 14] see, e.g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947). [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 1]
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins and with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins with respect to Part II, dissenting.
Age discrimination inflicts a personal injury. Even under the principles set forth in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), the damages received from a claim of such discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) are received "on account of" that personal injury and therefore excludable from taxable income under 26 U.S.C. 104(a) (2). Unless the Court reads 104(a)(2) to permit exclusion only of damages received for tangible injuries (i. e., physical and mental injuries) - a reading rejected by eight Members of the Court in Burke and contradicted by an agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute it administers - the inescapable conclusion is that ADEA damage awards are excludable.
It is not disputed that the damages received by petitioners constitute gross income under 26 U.S.C. 61(a) unless excluded elsewhere; the question is whether such damages fall within 104(a)(2), which excludes from taxable income "the amount of any [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 2] damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sum or periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness . . . ." What constitutes "damages received on account of personal injuries" is not obvious from the text or history of the statute, and since 1960 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations have defined the phrase with reference to traditional tort principles: "The term `damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' means an amount received . . . through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution." 25 Fed. Reg. 11490 (1960); 26 CFR 1.104-1(c) (1994).
At one point in time, determining whether damages received from a lawsuit were excludable under 104(a)(2) and the applicable regulation was a fairly straightforward task. In Threldkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T. C. 1294, 1299 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (CA6 1988), the Tax Court, in a 15-1 decision, set forth the test as follows:
"Section 104(a)(2) excludes from income amounts received as damages on account of personal injuries. Therefore, whether the damages received are paid on account of `personal injuries' should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry. To determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the origin and character of the claim . . ., and not to the consequences of the injury." 87 T. C., at 1299.
Thus, under Threldkeld, damages from a lawsuit were excludable under 104(a)(2) so long as they were received "on account of any invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law." Id., at 1308.
Under this standard, ADEA damages surely are excludable. "[D]iscrimination in the workplace causes [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 3] personal injury cognizable for purposes of 104(a)(2), . . . and there can be little doubt on this point." Burke, supra, at 249 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). We have recognized that "racial discrimination . . . is a fundamental injury to the individual rights of a person." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987). Such offense to the rights and dignity of the individual attaches regardless of whether the discrimination is based on race, sex, age, or other suspect characteristics. See, e. g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]hatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and the individual"); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983) (Age discrimination "inflict[s] on individual workers the economic and psychological injury accompanying the loss of the opportunity to engage in productive and satisfying occupations"). Thus, prior to 1992, courts generally relied on Threldkeld to hold that damages awarded under the ADEA were excludable from income because they were received on account of personal injuries. See, e. g., Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (CA6 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (CA3 1990); Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542 (CA9 1991).
Things changed, however, with United States v. Burke, supra. In that case, the Court of Appeals, relying on Threldkeld, held that race discrimination violative of Title VII infringes upon a victim's personal rights and thus that damages received therefrom are properly excludable under 104(a)(2). Agreeing that discrimination violates personal rights, this Court nevertheless reversed because the statutory remedies do not "recompense a Title VII plaintiff for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 4] other consequential damages (e. g., a ruined credit rating)." 504 U.S., at 239 .
I dissented from the Court's decision in Burke because "the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs do not fix the character of the right they seek to enforce," id., at 249, and I remain of that view today. Dean Prosser presciently observed years ago that "[t]he relation between the remedies in contract and tort presents a very confusing field, still in process of development, in which few courts have made any attempt to chart a path." W. Prosser, Law of Torts 635 (3d ed. 1964) (footnote omitted). Three decades later, and despite the Court's attempt to chart a path in Burke (or perhaps because of it), whether a remedy sounds in tort often depends on arbitrary characterizations. Compare Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 794 (CA9 1994) (ADEA liquidated damages are tort like because they "compensate victims for damages which are too obscure and difficult to prove"), with Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840 (CA7 1994) (ADEA liquidated damages, "as the name implies, compensate a party for those difficult to prove losses that often arise from a delay in the performance of obligations - as a type of contract remedy").
The Court today sidesteps these difficulties by laying down a new per se rule: an illegal discharge based on age cannot "fairly be described as a `personal injury' or `sickness.'" Ante, at 7. To justify this conclusion, the Court offers a hypothetical car crash, the injuries from which cause the taxpayer to miss work. She would be able, in such circumstances, to exclude the recovered lost wages because they would constitute damages received "`on account of personal injuries.'" Ante, at 6. By contrast, in the Court's view, ADEA damages are not excludable because they are not "`on account of' any personal injury and because no personal injury affected the amount of back wages recovered." Ante, at 7. [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 5]
This reasoning assumes the wrong answer to the fundamental question of this case: What is a personal injury? Eight Justices in Burke agreed that discrimination inflicts a personal injury under 104(a)(2). See 504 U.S., at 239 -240; id., at 247 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 249 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). Only JUSTICE SCALIA disagreed, arguing instead that the phrase "personal injuries" under 104(a)(2) "is necessarily limited to injuries to physical or mental health," id., at 244; in his view, employment discrimination, without more, does not inflict a personal injury because it is only a legal injury that causes economic deprivation, ibid. Whatever the merits of this view, it was rejected by the Court in Burke and wisely not advanced by the Commissioner in this case, see Brief for Petitioner 10, 25, n. 15.
Although the Court professes agreement with the view that "personal injury" within the meaning of 104(a)(2) comprehends both tangible and intangible harms, ante, at 6, n. 4, the Court's analysis contradicts this fundamental premise. The Court's hypothetical contrast between wages lost due to a car crash and wages lost due to illegal discrimination would be significant only if one presumes that there is a relevant difference for purposes of 104(a)(2) between the car crash and the illegal discrimination. But such a difference exists only if one reads "personal injuries," as JUSTICE SCALIA did in Burke, to include only tangible injuries. Those physical and mental injuries, of course, differ from the economic and stigmatic harms that discrimination inflicts upon its victims, but it is a difference without relevance under 104(a)(2) - at least in the view of eight Justices in Burke, and the view that the Court professes to adopt today, ante, at 6, n. 4. The injuries from discrimination that the ADEA redresses - like the harm to reputation and loss of business caused by a dignitary tort like defamation, see Burke, supra, at 234-235; id. at 247 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment) - may not [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 6] always manifest themselves in physical symptoms, but they are no less personal, see supra, at 2-3, and thus no less worthy of excludability under 104(a)(2). The Court states: "Whether one treats respondent's attaining the age of 60 or his being laid off on account of his age as the proximate cause of respondent's loss of income, neither the birthday nor the discharge can fairly be described as a `personal injury' or `sickness.'" Ante, at 7. This assertion, the key to the Court's analysis, is not reconcilable with the Court's recognition that the intangible harms of illegal discrimination constitute "personal injuries" under 104(a)(2).
The Court argues that although "the intangible harms of discrimination can constitute personal injury" within the meaning of 104(a)(2), "to acknowledge that discrimination may cause intangible harms is not to say . . . that any of the damages received were on account of those harms." Ante, at 9, n. 6. The logic of this argument is rather hard to follow. If the harms caused by discrimination constitute personal injury, then amounts received as damages for such discrimination are received "on account of personal injuries" and should be excludable under 104(a)(2).
Even overlooking this fundamental defect in the Court's analysis, ADEA damages should be excludable from taxable income under our precedents. The Court in Burke deferred to the applicable IRS regulation, 26 CFR 1.104-1(c) (1994), and stated that "discrimination could constitute a `personal injury' for purposes of 104(a)(2) if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy." 504 U.S., at 239 . The Court held that a suit based on Title VII was not based upon "tort or tort type rights," 26 CFR 1.104-1(c) (1991), however, because Title VII does not entitle "victims of race-based employment discrimination [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 7] to obtain a jury trial at which `both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages may be awarded.'" 504 U.S., at 240 (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975)).
Unlike Title VII, the ADEA expressly provides that any person aggrieved may bring a civil action and "shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any . . . action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of this chapter," 29 U.S.C. 626(c)(2) (emphasis added). More important, the ADEA does not limit relief to back wages, but instead authorizes courts to grant the panoply of "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes" of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 626(c)(1) (emphasis added), and it expressly provides for liquidated damages in addition to back wages, 29 U.S.C. 626(b). The Court emphasizes that liquidated damages under the ADEA are punitive in nature, ante, at 8, but it is an emphasis without relevance. Punitive damages are traditionally available only in tort. See 3 Dobbs, Law of Remedies 118 (2d ed. 1993) ("The rule against punitive damages prevails even if the breach [of contract] is wilful or malicious, as long as the breach does not amount to an independent tort"). Thus, whether the liquidated damages available under the ADEA are characterized as compensatory, or as a form of punitive damages, it is clear that the remedies available under the ADEA go beyond Title VII's limited focus on "`legal injuries of an economic character,'" Burke, ___ U.S., at ___ (quoting Albemarle Paper Co v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). Plaintiffs claiming age discrimination, then, are not limited to the "circumscribed remedies available under Title VII," Burke, supra, at 240, but instead may sue under the ADEA, which appears to be one of the "other federal antidiscrimination statutes offering . . . broad remedies" distinguished by Burke, see id., at 241. [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 8]
These distinctions qualify an ADEA suit as a "tort type" action under Burke, and should entitle a prevailing plaintiff to exclude damages recovered therefrom from taxable income under 104(a)(2) and the applicable IRS regulation, 26 CFR 1.104-1(c) (1994). The Court seeks to avoid this conclusion by asserting that our decision in Burke and the IRS regulation that it interpreted do not conclusively determine the scope of 104(a)(2). Both, according to the Court, ante, at 13, impose a necessary condition that the suit be tort or tort like, but neither states that this showing is sufficient for excludability under 104(a)(2). This contention is untenable.
The Court's decision in Burke makes clear that it was deciding conclusively what 104(a)(2) permits to be excluded. After quoting the language of 104(a)(2), the Court introduced its analysis with the following: "Neither the text nor the legislative history of 104(a)(2) offers any explanation of the term `personal injuries.' Since 1960, however, IRS regulations formally have linked identification of a personal injury for purposes of 104(a)(2) to traditional tort principles." 504 U.S., at 234 . The Court then quoted language from the IRS regulation, 29 CFR 1.104-1(c), which identified recovery from a suit "based on tort or tort type rights" as the hallmark of excludability under 104(a)(2). Every member of the Court so understood the opinion - that the scope of 104(a)(2) is defined in terms of traditional tort principles. See id., at 246-247 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 249 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). Even JUSTICE SCALIA, who disagreed with the Court that "personal injury or sickness" included nonphysical injuries, see id., at 243-244 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), agreed that the IRS regulation is "descriptive of the ambit of 104(a)(2) as a whole," id., at 242, n. 1.
For 35 years the IRS has consistently interpreted its regulation, 29 CFR 1.104-1(c), as conclusively establishing the requirements of 104(a)(2). See Rev. Rul. 85-98, [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 9] 1985-2 Cum. Bull. 51. This was the interpretation the Commissioner pressed upon us in Burke, see Brief for United States in United States v. Burke, O. T. 1991, No. 91-42, pp. 22-23; formally affirmed after Burke, see Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 Cum. Bull. 61; presented to the courts below, see Brief for Appellant in No. 93-5555 (CA5), p. 28, n. 16; and advanced in the opening briefs before us, see Brief for Petitioner 14, n. 5, 16-17, n. 7. It is only in one sentence in her reply brief that the Commissioner expressed a view at odds with 35 years of administrative rulings, agency practice, and representations to the courts - a sentence that the Court expands into its holding today.
The Court states that it does not accord the Commissioner's reply brief any special deference in light of the "differing interpretations of her own regulation," ante, at 11, n. 7. But ignoring the Commissioner's off-hand assertion in this case does not wipe the slate clean. There still remain 35 years of formal interpretations upon which taxpayers have relied and of agency positions upon which courts, including this one, have based their decisions. Unless the Court is willing to declare these positions to be unreasonable, they cannot be ignored. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986). The Court asserts that "`the Service's interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations,'" ante, at 13, n. 7 (quoting Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990)). That is true; it also says nothing about the deference courts must give to such reasonable interpretations, and a fuller exposition of our precedent indicates that the level of deference is substantial. Davis states: "Although the Service's interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations, we give an agency's interpretations and practices considerable weight where they involve the contemporaneous construction of a statute and where they have been in long use." Ibid. (citations omitted). [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 10]
The Court states that the Commissioner "reads the regulation correctly in this case." Ante, at 11, n. 7. Even if true, that statement says nothing about whether her interpretation for the past 35 years is reasonable. Both may be reasonable; such is the nature of ambiguity. In any event, I do not agree that the Commissioner's reply brief correctly reads the regulation to impose a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for excludability under 104(a)(2). Although the regulation purports to interpret the term "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)," that term is unambiguous; it plainly includes all kinds of damages - inflicted on property or person, based on contract or tort, received by suit or agreement. Read in context, the regulation seeks to define the overall ambit of 104(a)(2) specifically the concept of "personal injuries," the ambiguity of which gives rise to controversies over the scope of the exclusion under 104(a)(2). The regulation is subtitled, "Damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness," and its first sentence reads: "Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness." 29 CFR 1.104-1(c) (1994). In light of the expansive scope of these statements and the futility of any attempt to define only "damages received," the regulation is more sensibly read as defining the entire scope of 104(a)(2).
Finally, the Court states that agency rules and regulations "may not be used to overturn the plain language of a statute." Ante, at 13, n. 7. But the language of the statute is anything but plain. As the Court noted in Burke, "[n]either the text nor the legislative history of 104(a)(2) offers any explanation of the term `personal injuries.'" 504 U.S., at 234 . That is why the IRS promulgated its regulation in 1960 linking the slippery concept of personal injury to traditional tort principles. The Court today stops short of declaring this regulation [ COMMISSIONER v. SCHLEIER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 11] unreasonable; it merely asserts that the regulation's requirement of a tort or tort like injury is in addition to, not in place of, the statutory requirement that the damages be received "on account of personal injuries or sickness." But, as noted above, it is not clear where besides the definition of personal injury there is room in the statute for the agency to graft on this additional requirement. It is surely more reasonable to read the regulation as defining an ambiguous statutory phrase, rather than as imposing a superfluous precondition without any statutory basis.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. Page I


text:
Q: How to restart python multi-thread I'm trying to design a control interface for my system which sends and receives some data through serial link. My searches related to GUI design took me to understand the "multi-threading" issue and code below shows the latest position I arrived.
This indicates similar parts (e.g try, run) with the ones I've seen on example GUIs. I planned to convert this to a GUI, once I understand how it exactly works.
So the problem is after I start, stop the code below I can't restart it again. Because, as I understand, multi-threading features only one cycle: start, stop and quit. I mean it doesn't accept start command after stop.
My question is how I can make this code to accept start after stopping?
Best wishes
import threading, random, time
class process(threading.Thread):
    def __init__(self):
        threading.Thread.__init__(self)
    def run(self):
        self.leave  = 0
        print("\n it's running ...\n\n")
        while self.leave != 1:
            print "Done!"
            time.sleep(1)

operate = process()

while True:
    inputt = input("   START : 1 \n   STOP\t : 0 \n   QUIT\t : 2 \n")
    try:
        if int(inputt) == 1:
            operate.start()
        elif int(inputt) == 0:
            operate.leave = 1
        elif int(inputt) == 2:
            break

    except:
        print(" Wrong input, try egain...\n")

A: Create process inside while True loop
    if int(inputt) == 1:
        operate = process()
        operate.start()

It should work.
... but your code may need other changes to make it safer - you will have to check if process exists before you try to stop it. You could use operate = None to control it.
import threading
import random
import time

class Process(threading.Thread):

    def __init__(self):
        threading.Thread.__init__(self)

    def run(self):
        self.leave = False
        print("\n it's running ...\n\n")
        while self.leave == False:
            print("Done!")
            time.sleep(1)

operate = None

while True:
    inputt = input("   START : 1 \n   STOP\t : 0 \n   QUIT\t : 2 \n")
    try:
        if int(inputt) == 1:
            if operate is None:
                operate = Process()
                operate.start()
        elif int(inputt) == 0:
            if operate is not None:
                operate.leave = True
                operate.join() # wait on process end
                operate = None
        elif int(inputt) == 2:
            if operate is not None:
                operate.leave = True
                operate.join() # wait on process end
            break
    except:
        print(" Wrong input, try egain...\n")

Other method is not to leave run() when you set leave = True but keep running thead. You would need two loops.
 def run(self):
    self.leave = False
    self.stoped = False
    print("\n it's running ...\n\n")
    while self.leave == False:
        while self.stoped == False:
             print("Done!")
        time.sleep(1)

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


31 thg 10, 2018 - Read inspiring messages, quotes, and sayings about the grief caused by the death of a mother, whether yours or that of someone you know. These are 33 examples of sympathy messages for loss of a mother. Use these examples of mother sympathy messages in a card to a friend or family member . Heartfelt remembrance poems about a mother's death. Find comfort with mother loss poems from those who've dealt with emotions of sadness, grief, anger, and . 22 thg 11, 2017 - Show your support for someone in their time of need with these message examples of words of sympathy for the loss of a mother. will give us some protection forever.' ~. In her book, The Goodbye Quilt, contemporary author Susan Wiggs puts into words the effect that the loss of a mother . His Mother's death distresses him and shakes him to the core. But despite the grief, everyday life continues. This funeral poem captures the reality that the world . 14 thg 2, 2018 - Losing your mother is a pain like no other pain. There are ways to make it easier to endure the pain and still honor your dear mother. Chuyển đến Loss of Mother - Sympathy Quotes for Loss of a Mother. Loss of Husband/Wife Loss of Child Loss of Father Loss of Pet Quotes and . I have found that grieving can make your life richer in unexpected ways. Here are 10 lessons my mother's death taught me about healing and happiness. This isn't my first loss, but it is the hardest. So here are a few things that happen when your mom dies, in case you wanted to know where my head has been .


text:
Q: How to keep count of different things in an array? I encountered a code which some parts I do not understand. It has something to do with keeping count of letters in a string. I have commented the part that I do not get. I would appreciate any help. Thank you!
I tried looking it up online but none seem to answer my question.
public class test2 {
    static int[] inventory;
    public static final int ALPHABET = 26;

    public static void main(String[] args) {
        inventory = new int [ALPHABET];
        String dog = "There goes the dog!";

        int size = count(dog);
        System.out.println(size);

    }

    private static int count(String data) {
        data = data.toLowerCase();
        int size = 0;
        for (int i = 0; i < data.length(); i++) {
            char ch = data.charAt(i);
            if (Character.isLetter(ch)) {
                size++;
                inventory[ch - 'a']++; // this I don't get
            }
        }
        return size;
    }
}

A: In this case, inventory is an array of size 26 which holds number of times each character appears in the string.
The statement you have put the comment on is trying to deduct the ASCII value of a which is 97 from the character in the string. For example, b's ASCII value is 98 and 'b' - 'a' is 1. So, inventory[1] is incremented i.e b appeared in your string once.

A: System.out.println(0 + 'c'); //ASCII value of 'c'; will print 99
System.out.println(0 + 'a'); //ASCII value of 'a'; will print 97
System.out.println('c' - 'a'); //Difference of ASCII values of characters; will print 99-97=2

In your case
inventory[ch - 'a']++;

ch will be some character.
ch - 'a' will be the distance of that character from 'a'. For example, as shown above, 'c' - 'a' = 2.
inventory[ch - 'a'] will point to the number at index ch - 'a' in the array.
inventory[ch - 'a']++ will increment that value by 1.

A: As per the above code, you're trying to count the number of each alphabets.
So, for each letter, let's assume you use a single bucket. Which is done by new int [ALPHABET];. So, you have 26 slots from 0 to 25.
Now, when you're counting the letters:  Each letter has a value assigned to it (ASCII value). ASCII value of lower case a a is 97. But, in your slot, you want to add a to slot 0. So, what do you do: you subtract 97 i.e. you subtract value of a for each letter.
So now, a is stored in slot 0, b in slot 1 and so on.


PROSPECT aims to create an easy and replicable peer to peer learning programme for regional and local authorities to learn with and from each other on how to finance and implement their sustainable energy and climate action plans using innovative schemes.
In these thematic modules, regional and local authorities, who can serve as mentors or mentees, will learn in two ways: through peer mentoring and study visits. The learning programme has three learning cycles; each learning cycle offers 5 peer mentoring and 5 study visit programmes.
We are looking for 150 local and regional authorities, who can join either as a mentor or a mentee. Participants can be individuals from cities and regions – and public entities who represent them (e.g. energy agencies) – in the European Union.
There is a lot of experience in innovative financing spread across regions and cities within Europe but there is still no structured learning plan available for those who would like to replicate this experience. Some of these innovative schemes are now well enough established to provide a good basis for peer to peer learning. Capacity building and training activities are needed from the demand (e.g. public authorities), as well as the supply side of financing sustainable energy projects, in order to increase synergies among public authorities.
A needs assessment of local authorities performed, based on a survey sent to the members of Energy Cities, EUROCITIES and FEDARENE, demonstrates that the most common barrier for financing public authorities' sustainable energy projects is the lack of internal capacity to develop and implement innovative financing schemes and investment programmes. Next, the high cost of access to financing, notably in the form of high interest rates, and the non-functioning ESCo markets are also identified as an important barrier in several Member States, followed by the lack of private financing and the issue of debt accounting. A similar study with 555 respondents from cities highlighted that 37% of respondents plan to consider some innovative financing methods, but only 11% have significant experience in a selection of these, which emphasises a need to increase knowledge and capacity-building in innovative financing and business models.


text:
Q: XML validation with xsd as Source I want to validate my xml with xsd sxheme. When I load xsd as new File() - al is ok.
But I can't do this 'xos of .jar. So i use this code to load xsd
public static boolean init() {
    try (InputStream isSchema = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResourceAsStream(XSD_PATH)) {
        System.out.println(getStringFromInputStream(isSchema));
        schemaSource = new StreamSource(isSchema);
    }
    catch (IOException e) {
        logger.debug(e.toString());
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}

isScheme object has valid content of .xsd file. But when I call it
    private boolean validateXML(File xmlFile) {
    try (InputStream stream = new FileInputStream(xmlFile)) {
        Source xmlSource = new StreamSource(stream);
        SchemaFactory.newInstance(XMLConstants.W3C_XML_SCHEMA_NS_URI)
            .newSchema(schemaSource)
            .newValidator()
            .validate(xmlSource);
    }
    catch (Exception e) {
        logger.debug("ERROR XML parsing for [" + xmlFile.getName() + "] : " + e.toString());
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}

An error occurs

DEBUG Task:82 - ERROR XML parsing for [test good 4 - копия - копия (380) - копия - копия - копия - копия - копия - копия.xml] : org.xml.sax.SAXParseException; schema_reference.4: Failed to read schema document 'null', because 1) could not find the document; 2) the document could not be read; 3) the root element of the document is not .

This is my XSD file
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xsd:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<xs:element name="Entry">
    <xs:complexType>
        <xs:all>
            <xs:element name="content">
                <xs:simpleType>
                    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
                        <xs:maxLength value="1024" />
                        <xs:minLength value="0" />
                    </xs:restriction>
                </xs:simpleType>
            </xs:element>
            <xs:element name="creationDate">
                <xs:simpleType>
                    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
                        <xs:length value="19" />
                        <xs:pattern value="[1-2][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[0-1][0-9]-[0-3][0-9] [0-2][0-9]:[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9]"></xs:pattern>
                    </xs:restriction>
                </xs:simpleType>
            </xs:element>
        </xs:all>
    </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xsd:schema>

Example of xml
  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <Entry>
    <content>any message</content>
    <creationDate>2016-06-15 20:20:20</creationDate>
  </Entry>

Help me please.
I change mu code to this
    try (InputStream stream = new FileInputStream(xmlFile)) {
        isSchema = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResourceAsStream(XSD_PATH);
        schemaSource = new StreamSource(isSchema);
        Source xmlSource = new StreamSource(stream);
        SchemaFactory.newInstance(XMLConstants.W3C_XML_SCHEMA_NS_URI)
            .newSchema(schemaSource)
            .newValidator()
            .validate(xmlSource);
    }

and to this
try (InputStream stream = new FileInputStream(xmlFile)) {
        InputStream isSchema = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResourceAsStream(XSD_PATH);
        Source schemaSource = new StreamSource(isSchema);
        Source xmlSource = new StreamSource(stream);
        SchemaFactory.newInstance(XMLConstants.W3C_XML_SCHEMA_NS_URI)
            .newSchema(schemaSource)
            .newValidator()
            .validate(xmlSource);
    }

But the same error.

A: Looking at the source of StreamSource here:
The StreamSource constructor which takes InputStream merely calls the setter. So the underlying inputstream must be kept open to be able to read from the streamSource.
When the try within your init() completes, it closes the inputstream, so I the streamsource instance (schemaSource) becomes useless at that point. You will have to open the schema file at the time of validating the XML.


Born 1847. Gender male. First recorded 14th December 1885.
3 records. England and Wales Criminal Registers. Free BMD Death Records. Old Bailey Proceedings.
The Digital Panopticon William Wren b. 1847, Life Archive ID obpdef1-120-18851214 (). Version 1.1, consulted 24th April 2019.
Tried at Old Bailey, London. Accused of burglary (, burglariously breaking and entering the dwelling house of william morris, with intent to steal therein.). Found guilty. Sentenced to penal servitude, imprisonment. Sentence outcome was unknown.
Name matched exactly. An associated region matched.


text:
NFTs adoption: hopes and aspirations
Drofa Comms attended Binance Blockchain Week 2022 based in Dubai from March 28 to March 30. It`s well known that Dubai has always been a magnet for global finance and investment, which has created a congenial climate for holding such events under the sunny skies of the United Arab Emirates. Speakers and representatives of fintech companies like Galaxy Digital Holdings, Binance, Tether and WAX gathered together to discuss the future of NFTs and their mass adoption.
Experts stressed that the attitude of regulators to NFTs at the moment is still controversial. For example, Richard Teng, CEO of Binance Singapore, stated that regulators treat fiat and traditional finance better than NFT and cryptocurrencies in general. This sphere continues to develop, proving its stability and profitability in many directions. However, this problem is not new. Misunderstanding of the principles of working with NFTs and a large number of frauds increase the level of distrust in this area. The speakers highlighted the importance of such events, as they convey the voice of the industry, contributing to increasing transparency and trust of such a complex phenomenon as NFTs for a wide audience.
The participants of the discussion demonstrated the special role of the younger generation in popularising the NFTs and FinTech as a whole. "More and more teenagers are interested in crypto and NFT. They want to make full use of their creative power, be free, and not depend on traditional financial systems and instruments. NFTs and cryptocurrencies are what can become a strong lever on the way to this goal" — said Tim Grant from Galaxy Digital Holdings. This opinion was shared by the majority of the panel discussion participants.
Some participants paid attention to another aspect of the NFTs` popularity in the modern world. For instance, William Quigley, co-founder and CEO of Tether and WAX, told about a thick blanket of hype and speculation around NFTs: "It seems to me now that all NFTs are quite simple, they are not focused on technology, but on speculation and hype. Businesses want to use NFTs, especially gaming companies. But at the same time, video game manufacturers do NOT want to use and create their own NFT. But they have to". Such a vision of the NFT industry is quite understandable. Now we can observe a lot of centralised systems, for example, Ubisoft. Companies like the mentioned one have always been like that. Many similar corporations now just want to make money, so they prefer centralisation since it is not anonymous unlike a decentralised system. Besides, people trust it more. But as a whole, the interest of gaming companies in NFTs will only grow, which will lead to its mass adoption. The video gaming sphere can become another potential driver of popularising NFTs around the globe. First, the entertainment industry pays attention to them, and then representatives of traditional spheres, such as banks, industrial enterprises and state machinery, will also be involved in this trend.
Summarising all the views on the future of the NFT sphere, it is worth mentioning that the current position of people on NFTs is part of a global pattern. Experts expressed strong confidence that centralised companies will begin to benefit from decentralisation. This is the future. Decentralisation will work better with NFTs and, in general, companies need to move away from total centralisation.
Crypto Industry
Binance Blockchain Week
Coinbold Io
According to Senator Cynthia Lummis, Ether is now considered a security.
T-Starter
T-Starter Beta Launched
Lewk.com
LEWK receives backing from XT.com Labs
Alex Stand
Why it's time to stop mining cryptocurrency and look to the future of blockchain
oluwafemi.okeowo
Photo by Jorvik Tricycles on Unsplash
Multi-Native Token Domain NFT on QuarkChain Mainnet 2.0 is Now Open to the Public
OIG Group
OIG AMA with Wizzare
Cryptoweek
20 Crypto Words That You Must Know Before The End Of Today

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


The pound declined against its major counterparts in the European session on Thursday, as investors awaited U.K. Parliamentary vote on Prime Minister Theresa May's latest Brexit motion and as Bank of England policy maker Gertjan Vlieghe remarked that monetary policy could be retained or even eased in the event of a no-deal scenario.
Speaking at the Resolution Foundation think-tank, Gertjan Vlieghe said that the appropriate pace of monetary tightening is likely to be slower than he judged last year, when he believed one or two quarter-point rate hikes a year was the most likely central case.
There was "considerable uncertainty" around the rate outlook, driven by global economic slowdown and weak domestic growth, Vlieghe said.
"I feel I can probably wait to see evidence of growth stabilising and inflation pressure rising before considering the next hike in Bank Rate," he said.
"In the case of a no-deal scenario, I judge that an easing or an extended pause in monetary policy is more likely to be the appropriate policy response than a tightening," he added.
On the Brexit front, MPs will vote on a government motion to "reiterate the support for the approach to leaving the EU expressed by this House on January 29, 2019" and to note that "discussions between the UK and the EU on the Northern Ireland backstop are ongoing."
The currency rose against its major counterparts in the Asian session, excepting the euro.
The pound depreciated to weekly low of 0.8804 against the euro, from a high of 0.8754 hit at 5:30 pm ET. Next key support for the pound is seen around the 0.90 region.
Preliminary data from the Federal Statistical Office showed that Germany's economy stagnated in the fourth quarter of 2018, thus it avoided a technical recession, which is two consecutive quarters of contraction.
Gross domestic product was unchanged from the third quarter, when the economy shrunk 0.2 percent. Economists were looking for a modest increase of 0.1 percent.
After rising to 143.03 against the yen at 2:00 am ET, the pound reversed direction and dipped to a 2-day low of 142.15. On the downside, 140.00 is likely seen as the next support level for the pound.
Data from the Cabinet Office showed that Japan's gross domestic product expanded a seasonally adjusted 0.3 percent on quarter in the fourth quarter of 2018.
That was shy of expectations for a gain of 0.4 percent following the 0.6 percent contraction in the three months prior.
The pound weakened to a 2-day low of 1.2909 against the Swiss franc, after rising to 1.2981 at 2:00 am ET. If the pound drops further, 1.28 is possibly seen as its next support level.
Looking ahead, Canada manufacturing sales and new housing price index for December, U.S. weekly jobless claims for the week ended February 9, retail sales for December, business inventories for November and producer price index for January are due in the New York session.


text:
Japan: All Options on the Table for North Korea
Micah Rate
Posted: Sep 18, 2017 12:00 PM
One of the United States's allies in Asia is becoming increasingly concerned with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un and his dictatorial regime, as the dictator continues to conduct intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear tests.
Japan's Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, wrote in a New York Times op-ed that "more dialogue with North Korea would be a dead end." Prime Minister Abe did not explicitly state that it was time for the world to take military action against North Korea, but he did say that he agreed with President Trump that "all options are on the table." While the United Nations and coalitions of countries have continuously slapped North Korea with sanctions or have made attempts to make deals to hamper the country's development of its nuclear program, North Korea has cheated, withdrawn from the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1994, and has conducted six nuclear tests in just over a decade.
The government of Japan has had to contend with the North Korean threat for some time. Two of North Korea's more recent missile tests had the missiles fly over Japan, which caused Japan to take emergency precautions and conduct military drills in case an attack is carried out. Kim Jong-Un stated himself that "The four islands of the archipelago should be sunken into the sea by the nuclear bomb of Juche. Japan is no longer needed to exist near us."
These threats from "Rocket Man," as President Trump dubbed him on Twitter, are nothing new. However, the increasing boldness of the ruthless dictator is putting the world on edge. Recent sanctions on North Korea by the United Nations have restricted the flow of oil and other resources into the country in another attempt to try and slow down the regime's missile development. Previous measures have failed to keep the nation in check, as the government would rather spend its money on increasing its military prowess than feeding its starving population.
I spoke with President Moon of South Korea last night. Asked him how Rocket Man is doing. Long gas lines forming in North Korea. Too bad!
North Korea's neighbor to the west is also displeased with Kim Jong-Un, as the international community ramps up pressure on China to play a bigger role in deterring its fellow communist neighbor from stirring up trouble. China does not want to see an escalation near its border or see the United States military at its doorstep. China would like to see how the new sanctions affect North Korea's future decision-making but, on Monday, China and Russia conducted naval drills in the Korean Peninsula.
Part of the reason why UN sanctions against North Korea have been unsuccessful is that, while the UN has asked other countries to cut their ties with the rogue state, North Korea still receives resources from sympathizing nations. The only way to de-escalate the situation is to have the countries of the world work together. As Prime Minister Abe says, "Solidarity and concerted effort among the international community, together with the effective role of the United Nations, are more vital than ever."


text:
package secondarysort

import org.apache.hadoop.io.{ WritableComparable, WritableComparator }

/**
 * Because our keys implement WritableComparable, we don't need a separate Comparator class
 * for the general case. However, in our specific case, we sort the keys in a particular way,
 * so specifying the comparator explicitly will tell Hadoop not to use the default comparison
 * function compareTo() that is implemented in the key class itself.
 */
class KeyComparator extends WritableComparator(classOf[YearYMDClose], true) {

  /**
   * We ignore the 2nd element of the tuple (the full date). We sort by the
   * year (1st element) ascending, then the price (3rd element) descending.
   */
  override def compare(w1: WritableComparable[_], w2: WritableComparable[_]): Int = {
    val t1 = w1.asInstanceOf[YearYMDClose];
    val t2 = w2.asInstanceOf[YearYMDClose];
    val cmp = t1.year.compareTo(t2.year);
    if (cmp != 0) {
      cmp
    } else {
      -t1.closingPrice.compareTo(t2.closingPrice);  // REVERSE!
    }
  }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


The Coding and Reimbursement Committee has updated the coding information available on the AAPM website. New charts have been posted that include information concerning Medicare's 2018 Relative Value Units (RVUs) for codes commonly reported by Pain Medicine Physicians. The title page provides links to CMS web pages that provide additional information and outlines the basis for the 2018 reimbursement rates.
The charts are organized according to the type of service (e.g. E/M, injections, radiology) with new and revised codes highlighted. As appropriate, some charts contain information indicating which codes include imaging guidance as well as which codes can be reported with the bilateral modifier. There is also a separate chart that lists all the new and revised codes for 2018. There were no significant changes impacting Pain Medicine Physicians.
The Relative Value Units in the charts reflect the combined RVUs for physician work, practice expense and professional liability (total RVUs). RVUs in the "facility" column are used to calculate payments in the hospital or other facility setting. RVUs in the "non-facility" column are used for services provided in a physician office.


text:
Q: Yii clientScript/assetManager issue when registering/rendering package I am having an issue with the clientScript and assetManager. I'm publishing a directory of files and then adding a package which I later register. The package gets added just fine but when it gets rendered the url is wrong.
Publishing the files and adding the package:
// Publish the directory
$scriptFiles = Yii::app()->assetManager->publish(Yii::getPathOfAlias('library').'/assets/jquery.plugins/jquery.dropdown/', true, 0);

// Add the package
Yii::app()->clientScript->packages = array(
        'jquery.dropdown'=>array(
                'baseURL'=>$scriptFiles,
                'js'=>array('jquery.dropdown.js', 'jgestures.min.js'),
                'depends'=>array('jquery'),
        ),
);

The package is added just fine and published to a asset directory in the application, this is the output from Yii::app()->clientScript->packages.
Array
(
    [jquery.dropdown] => Array
        (
            [baseURL] => /assets/a4017faa
            [js] => Array
                (
                    [0] => jquery.dropdown.js
                    [1] => jgestures.min.js
                )
            [depends] => Array
                (
                    [0] => jquery
                )
        )
)

Although, when I register the package width Yii::app()->clientScript->registerPackage('jquery.dropdown') this is what gets rendered:
<script type="text/javascript" src="/assets/961fc04/jquery.dropdown.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="/assets/961fc04/jgestures.min.js"></script>

Notice the URL in the src attribute, wrong directory. Have anyone encountered this before and/or know what's wrong?

A: Your problem lies with the following
$scriptFiles = Yii::app()->assetManager->publish(Yii::getPathOfAlias('library').'/assets/jquery.plugins/jquery.dropdown/', true, 0);

The package manager actually publishes the package for you, so what you're doing here is publishing the same file twice. Set $scriptFiles to Yii::getPathOfAlias('library').'/assets/jquery.plugins/jquery.dropdown/ instead and it should work fine.
Here's a basic article on Yii packages, if you feel like doing some more reading.
EDIT: I see now that you've tried setting baseUrl to avoid the auto publishing, you have however spelled it baseURL, this makes Yii auto publish it instead of using the path you want to give it.


text:
Intertentacular organ (dosł. narząd międzyczułkowy) − narząd występujący u mszywiołów z gromady krężelnic.

Narząd ten ma postać niewielkiej, orzęsionej rurki. Zlokalizowany jest poniżej podstawowych części czułków lofoforu. Funkcją tego narządu jest wyprowadzanie zapłodnionych jaj na zewnątrz organizmu.

Przypisy

Anatomia mszywiołów
Układ rozrodczy

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
NME Awards 2020
Best podcasts
Reviews Album Reviews
Africa Express – 'EGOLI' review
This collaborative record, featuring Damon Albarn, Gruff Rhys, Moonchild Sanelly and more, is a scattershot and hedonistic diary. It's the collective's best work to date
Earlier this year, Africa Express played one of their biggest gigs to date at Waltham Forest in Leytonstone, east London. It was a diverse jamboree of artists that included Wolf Alice's Ellie Rowsell, South Africa's Moonchild Sanelly – who describes her sound as "future ghetto punk" – and Blur's Damon Albarn, the collective's most recognisable name on these shores.
The date of the gig was particularly telling, too. It took place on March 29, 2019 – Britain's original date to leave the European Union. In the face of political uncertainty and division, Africa Express were showcasing a collaborative and joyous display of the very human ties that cannot be unbound.
'EGOLI', the group's fourth album, is a similar celebration of these complementing and contrasting sounds. It's a full-throttle album that sees big names and burgeoning stars rub shoulders for what may be the collective's most enjoyable to date. Damon Albarn, Nick Zinner (Yeah Yeah Yeahs) and Super Furry Animals' Gruff Rhys all feature, but you'll likely be left awe-inspired by artists both experienced and new from South Africa and beyond, including legendary vocal group the Mahotella Queens, hip-hop firebrand Moonchild Sanelly and more.
Recorded over a week-long period in Johannesburg, South Africa, 'EGOLI' operates in stark-contrast to the marathon-sized gigs that they've become accustomed to. The aforementioned London gig ran for nearly five-hours and in 2015, Albarn was removed from the stage in Denmark when the group's showtime had run well-over curfew. 'EGOLI' runs for 18-tracks, sure, but there's little chance if you'll be dragged away kicking and screaming from this album – it's a slick and polished affair.
'City In Lights', a pulsating disco-thumper that might be their biggest pop moment yet, was inspired by mbaqanga singer Hilda Tloubatla and her journey to Johannesburg. "I thought of all the women who come to the city to follow their dreams and make a better life for themselves," UK's rising dance queen Georgia says of the track. 'I Can't Move', meanwhile – starring Sanelly, Albarn, Mr Jukes (Bombay Bicycle Club's Jack Steadman), Sibot and Blue May – is a funk-laden groove, perfect for club-hopping wherever you are on the planet.
Some of the mellower moments are just as enjoyable. Sanelly, arguably the album's most exciting personality, lends her smoky vocals to 'Morals', a laid-back R&B-infused jam. The intertwining vocals from Gruff Rhys and Zolani Mahola on 'Absolutely Everything Is Pointing To The Light', meanwhile, offer a simply divine moment.
'EGOLI' is a scattershot and hedonistic diary of the collective's week-long recording sessions, and each song offers an insight into the vibrant sounds of Johannesburg and the city's unique twist on house, folk, jazz and beyond. Community and collaboration are a powerful force on this album, but perhaps Sanelly puts it best. "We were like kids in a candy store," she has said. "You could make any genre of music from futuristic rave to ballads with legendary stars. I loved every minute of it." We did too, Sanelly.
Release date: July 12
Record label: Africa Express
story of the day


Always one to enjoy trying out new recipes I was happy to bake some Easter gluten free treats for us over the weekend. Still with the main oven broke, I thought it would be great to see how our temporary mini oven fared as up to know I've been putting off using it for any cake, biscuit or in this case gorgeous gooey brownies.
2) Grease and line a 20cm square tin with baking parchment.
3) Combine the flaxseed with 6 tablespoons of water and set aside for at least 5 mins.
4) In a saucepan, melt the chocolate and coffee with 100ml water on a low heat. Allow to cool slightly.
5) Put the flour, almonds, cocoa nibs, baking powder and 1⁄4 teaspoon of salt in a bowl and stir to remove any lumps.
6) Using a hand whisk, mix the sugar into the melted chocolate mixture, and beat well until smooth and glossy, ensuring all the sugar is well dissolved. Stir in the flaxseed mixture and vanilla extract, the cherries and then the flour mixture. Stir until combined and spoon into the prepared tin.
7) Bake for 35-45 mins until a skewer inserted in the middle comes out clean with moist crumbs. Allow to cool in the tin completely, then cut into squares. Store in an airtight container and eat within 3 days.
Of course I had to add a sprinkle of edible glitter too! They were absolutely delicious and I would use the Naturya Organic Cocoa Nibs again, so versatile for lots of different recipes or sprinkling on ice cream or other desserts. The Linusit Premium Organic Flaxseed is another great addition to the food cupboard, a source of omega 3 and other nutrients that you can add to anything from soups to salads.


Melissa Kesterson began her role at MACF in June of 2015. Kesterson graduated from Southern Illinois University and worked in the broadcast industry for several years before relocating to Europe with her family. Returning to the US, she re-directed her career with a focus on literacy, access to healthy foods and community development. She is a Master Gardener and spearheaded the creation of the community garden located at the Greater Midland Community Center, where she serves as the garden's program director. She will be responsible for managing the community foundation's grantmaking process as well as several community projects.
Visiting and spending time with family and friends while we hike or cross country ski Michigan's lovely trails, canoe and kayak the beautiful rivers, swim in the lakes and explore by bike. Next to reading, gardening is right at the top of my favorite things – right up there with cooking the produce I grow in my garden!
Given the time of year it could be going to the Midland Farmers Market, walking at Pine Haven County Park, gardening at the Greater Midland Community Center's community garden, floating on Lake Sanford, going to a show at the Midland Center for the Arts or having a family Christmas Eve ski at City Forest.


text:
Q: Modulus division when first number is smaller than second number I apologize if this is a simple question but I'm having trouble grasping the concept of modulus division when the first number is smaller than the second number. For example when 1 % 4 my book says the remainder is 1. I don't understand how 1 is the remainder of  1  % 4.  1 / 4 is 0.25. Am I thinking about modulus division incorrectly?

A: First, in Java, % is the remainder (not modulo) operator, which has slightly different semantics.
That said, you need to think in terms of integer-only division, as if there were no fractional values. Think of it as storing items that cannot be divided: you can store zero items of size 4 in a storage of overall capacity one. Your remaining capacity after storing the maximum number of items is one. Similarly, 13%5 is 3, as you can fit 2 complete items of size 5 in a storage of size 13, and the remaining capacity is 13 - 2*5 = 3.

A: If you divide 1 by 4, you get 0 with a remainder of 1. That's all the modulus is, the remainder after division.

A: I am going to add a more practical example to what "Jean-Bernard Pellerin" already said.
It is correct that if you divide 1 by 4 you get 0 but, Why when you do 1 % 4 you have 1 as result?
Basically it is because this:
n = a / b (integer), and
m = a % b = a - ( b * n )

So,
 a    b    n = a/b  b * n  m = a%b
 1    4      0        0      1
 2    4      0        0      2
 3    4      0        0      3
 4    4      1        0      0
 5    4      1        4      1

Conclusion: While a < b, the result of a % b will be "a"

A: Another way to think of it as a representation of your number in multiples of another number. I.e, a = n*b + r, where b>r>=0. In this sense your case gives 1 = 0*4 + 1. (edit: talking about positive numbers only)

A: I think you are confused between %(Remainder) and /(Division) operators.
When you say %, you need to keep dividing the dividend until you get the remainder 0 or possible end. And what you get in the end is called Remainder.
When you say /, you divide the dividend until the divisor becomes 1. And the end product you get is called Quotient

A: Another nice method to clear things up,
In modulus, if the first number is > the second number, subtract the second number from the first until the first number is less than the second.
17 % 5 = ?
17 - 5 = 12
12 % 5 = ?
12 - 5 = 7
7 % 5 = ?
7 - 5 = 2
2 % 5  = 2

Therefore 17 % 5, 12 % 5, 7 % 5 all give the answer of 2.
This is because 2 / 5 = 0 (when working with integers) with 2 as a remainder.


Once again I found myself reaching for these Garden Party papers by Pebbles. They've been quite the favorite of mine this spring. I'm pretty sure this is the first time I've used the bee paper at least. And how could I not use that sentiment stamp with all those bees buzzing in the background... it was too perfect of a pairing, LOL!
Anywho, I hope you are enjoying a lovely week so far.
It's been a while since I've played along in the Farm Fresh challenge over at The Greeting Farm and since I recently got my hands on Frappi Anya it was the perfect time to join the fun. This week's challenge is to use pastel colors so I flipped through my paper scraps until this pretty stripe caught my eye... talk about pastel perfection, LOL!
Well, I should get a move on. Have a good one everybody!
We've had a totally fabulous UPS delivery lady for years and she is retiring this week so I thought it would be nice to make her a personalized card. While many will miss her smiling face as she dropped off our packages, I think the neighborhood pups may miss her most of all. She was always ready with a treat and not a single wagging tail was ever left out. Heck, I'm pretty sure she even new most of their names as well, LOL!
It also gave me a great excuse to ink up this little truck stamp set that I got recently. All I needed to go along with it was a "Delivery Anya". So I grabbed Picture Perfect Anya for her head and altered Twirl Anya's shirt just a bit until I had the perfect Anya for my card.
Alrighty, time for me to tackle another busy day.
I also got my hands on this great Doodlebug birthday paper pad in the same order and that balloon print was a natural choice to help showcase this party pup. Doesn't Pepper look like he's getting a bit carried away with the festivities? LOL!
Ok then, sorry to have to keep this one short and sweet but I'm on the run this morning.
Anywho... as for my card, more new stamps arrived in the mail Thursday so I was able to play with these two bunnies from Sister Stamps. One is called Jade and the other is Moon and they are both completely adorable. There is a slight alteration to Moon, I wiped away his bell collar so that they would both look like a couple of wild Easter bunnies. I then paired them up with an Amy R sentiment that I've been waiting to use on just the right card and this one was it.
Alrighty then, off to work I go.
All in all, a simple Easter card but hopefully it keeps my creativity flowing so I have more to share here. Ok, time to get myself ready for another day of work.
Ok, time for me to run.
I've been pretty swamped lately so not a lot of card making going on. Still, I hate seeing the blog empty day after day so I thought I would throw up a non-coloring card that I made last month. It's all just a bunch of Pebbles Garden Party papers that I fussy cut into accents and what not. Pretty simple but still bright and fun.
Ok, gotta run again... laters!
I paired Kaylee up with some Happy Go Lucky scraps that were hanging around and as always, colored her up to match. I think this color combo is so pretty, especially with that orangey yellow... love it! Some bling and a few little flowers and this card was done.
I cut into the fourth new My Mind's Eye paper pad that was on my desk, which also ended up inspiring me to use a yellow ink for the sky background rather than the traditional blue. Sure, I didn't use a whole lot of paper on this card but it always feels good to cut into a new paper pad sooner rather than later. A sprinkle of enamel dots and this one was done and ready to go into the pile of animal cards I've been collecting for my sister.
Alrighty, before I sign off for the day... any other Walking Dead fans out there? What did you think about the finale on Sunday? I've been reading the comics as well so as soon as Terminus was introduced this season I had a sneaking suspicion that they would be the show version of the cannibal group and it doesn't look like I was wrong. I really can't wait to see what happens next and find out what has happened to Beth because I don't think it is the Terminus group that snatched her... too bad October seems like such a long time!


text:
More articles from President's Column
Let's play, read and vote to advance public health in 2023
With gratitude as we look toward public health's future
Kaye Bender
The Nation's Health November/December 2022, 52 (9) 3;
Those we've lost: Standing on the shoulders of public health giants
The Nation's Health October 2022, 52 (8) 3;
Engaging the next generation of public health leaders in APHA
The Nation's Health September 2022, 52 (7) 3;
Applauding APHA's Affiliates: Public health's boots on ground
The Nation's Health August 2022, 52 (6) 3;
Addressing our national nursing shortage as a public health issue
The Nation's Health July 2022, 52 (5) 3;
Modernizing our public health system begins with each of us
The Nation's Health June 2022, 52 (4) 3;
Getting older should not mean necessarily getting sicker
The Nation's Health May 2022, 52 (3) 3;
When it comes to rural health, it's time for us to do better
The Nation's Health April 2022, 52 (2) 3;
Looking out for our workforce includes caring for ourselves
The Nation's Health February/March 2022, 52 (1) 3;