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Sweet Memories, Where do all These Thoughts Come From?
June 19, 1995: Sarah went to the hall closet to get her flip-flops, and then Rhoda came upstairs. Sarah came running into my room sayingRhoda was chasing her. (Sarah was still nervous about the kitty.) I asked if she had her flip-flops. She said she just had one. I said she needed to get two. She said, "No,because I want to be Diddle diddle Dumplin'."
June 27, 1995: Last night Rebecca asked us, "When it gets dark outside, and it's time to go to sleep, does Jesus turn the light off? Is there a switch?"
June 27, 1995: This afternoon Sarah and I were doing Humpty Dumpty,and Sarah said, "All the kings horses and all the kings men, had scrambled eggs for breakfast."
June 30, 1995: This morning Rebecca asked if they could take their flip-flops and their tennis shoes on our trip, and I said yes. Sarah asked, "How can we take tennis shoes and flip-flops because we justhave two legs and two feet?"
We were talking about how the people of Israel walked in the wilderness, and God had to give them water out of rocks and food fromHeaven. Sarah asked if God cooked, and I said yes. Sarah or Caleb asked if there was a kitchen in Heaven, and Rebecca said, "A holy kitchen."
Caleb was in the bathtub, and I went in to help him. I asked,"Are you ready young man?" He said, "I'm a big o frog."
July 3, 1995: Last year, Caleb went to school after lunch, just for the afternoon. Last week we were talking about how next year he will go all day, from after breakfast until almost supper time. The nextday or so he asked me, "Do you know why I want to go to school after lunch?" "Why?" "So it will be quicker." Murray said he'd like to goto work after lunch, too.
This afternoon, we were talking about how chickens gave us eggs, and cows gave us milk, and Caleb asked who gave us bananas. I said banana trees, or banana plants. Caleb said, no, that wasn't right. I asked him, "Then who does give us bananas?" He replied, "Monkeys."
July 6, 1995: One night Rebecca asked when she and Sarah were sleeping on thecouch in the living room, "When Rhoda grows up, will she be a lion?"
Yesterday Caleb said, "I'm the vehicle guy. I drive tractors, lawn tractors, trains and mopeds."
July 12, 1995: Today at lunch the kids were talking about birthdays and how old people are, and I said Grandpa Brinkmann is 67. Caleb said excitedly, "He's gonna have a bunch of candles!" and Rebecca said he would have a big cake.
July 15, 1995: We were talking about who my Mommy is, and I said it is GrandmaBrinkmann. Rebecca asked, "Does she tell you what to do?"
July 20, 1995: Last night at Vacation Bible School, the kids made telescopes out of construction paper rolled into spirals with papercups at the large end. Caleb excitedly showed us his, and we askedhim what it was. "It's a paper long thing with a cup!" he replied.
This morning I was telling the kids the story of Adam and Eve. Rebecca asked me if sometime I would make up a story about Adam andEve living in the garden, and the devil asked them to eat the fruit,and they said, No.
July 24, 1995: We told the kids that missionaries are people who go around telling people about Jesus. Yesterday we asked Caleb to prayfor missionaries. He prayed, "Help us to go around telling peopleabout missionaries."
July 28, 1995: At breakfast Rebecca asked, "If all the people who love Jesus tell all the other people, is Heaven big enough for everybody?"
At lunch Caleb said, "If we turn the house over, and put thecarpet in the air, we'll walk on the roof."
August 4, 1995: One day Rebecca was being mean to one of the other kids, and I reminded her that Jesus wanted her to be kind to them. She said, "But Mommy, everybody does sins." I said yes, but we needto try not to. She said, "But it's hard." (God bless her—isn't that true?)
It's been raining a lot this week. The other day Rebecca asked,"Mommy, you know our shower hose? Does God have a great big hose to make it rain?" I talked a little bit about clouds and how they work,and she asked, "Does God have a button He pushes to make the cloudsrain?"
Rebecca has been playing songs on the piano, and we always sing a lot. The other day she said that we are like computers for God. He gives us music and we print it out when we sing or play the piano.
August 5, 1995: The people from Taiwan were here today, (Ping-Hwei came to visit us first the year before we adopted him, to make sure that was what we, and he, really wanted.) and we were discussing how they eat rats there sometimes. Rebecca asked why they ate animals. I told her that we ate animals. She said no, we didn't. I said sure we did, like hamburger is from cows. She said, "That's food; it's not an animal." (This was probably the beginning of her decision to be a vegetarian.)
Sarah was sitting on my shoulders tonight, and she called,"Daddy, look how cute I am!)
August 8, 1995: Tonight Rebecca had fixed up something she wanted to show Murray. She said to him, "It's ready for you. Your treasuresare laid up."
August 15, 1995: Last night Rebecca called down after she was in bed, "At night-time, if we didn't go to sleep, and just played, wouldit still get to be another day?"
Posted by Kathy McKinsey at 7:23 AM
Labels: Kathy McKinsey, Sweet Memories, Where do all These Thoughts Come From?
My Mother Taught Me Better Than That
Beloved, Let Us Love One Another
Such a Big Part of Our Lives
Sweet Memories, Where do all These Thoughts Come F...

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


ETH price traded below the $260 support area against the US Dollar before finding bids near $255.
There is an ascending channel forming with support at $274 on the hourly chart of ETH/USD (data feed via SimpleFX).
The price might break the channel support and decline once again towards $260.
Ethereum price remains in the bearish zone against the US Dollar and Bitcoin. ETH/USD might complete correction and move lower once again towards $260-255.
There was no major correction in ETH price yesterday as it failed to remain above the $290 level against the US Dollar. The price started a correction from the $280 level and formed an ascending channel on the hourly chart. It corrected above the $310 level, but failed near $315. After the failure, the price started declining once again and broke the channel support at $297. There was a sharp decline in ETH and the price even broke the $270 and $260 support levels.
A low was formed near $255.54 from where the price is currently correcting. It has moved above the 23.6% Fib retracement level of the last decline from the $315.21 high to $255.54 low. There is also an ascending channel forming with support at $274 on the hourly chart of ETH/USD. The pair is currently struggling to clear the 38.2% Fib retracement level of the last decline from the $315.21 high to $255.54 low.
Therefore, there is a chance that ETH would break the channel support at $274. Once the price $274, it could trade back towards $260 or even $255. On the upside, a break above $290 and the 100 hourly simple moving average is needed for more gains.
Hourly MACD – The MACD is still placed well in the bearish zone.
Hourly RSI – The RSI is retreating from the 50 level and heading lower.


Comair Rotron has extensive development capabilities that allow us to be a full service provider to our customers. We are an engineering-based company and are able to design, develop, gain approvals, and manufacture integrated custom cooling solutions based on the customer's individual cooling specifications. All solutions incorporate internationally recognized standards in their designs.
A Comair Rotron turnkey solution can include a complete assembly comprising fans, controllers, blowers, impellers, PCB's, plastic moldings, sheet metal enclosures, wiring harnesses, RFI suppression, air filtering or whatever your thermal needs dictate.


Several Super League clubs are believed to be chasing the signature of St George Illawarra Dragons full-back Matt Dufty for 2019.
Dufty's asking price also reflects a fullback who boasts a passing and kicking game – none of which he currently has in his arsenal.
Reports have suggested that the Dragons are trying to offload the 22-year-old ahead of next season because they don't like his work ethic. Dufty made his NRL debut in 2017 and has scored 15 tries in 32 games for the club, but he appears to be on his way out and four Super League teams are understood to be interested in him.


Roughly 2,400 of Pizza Hut's 6,300 domestic locations will begin selling gluten-free pizzas on January 26.
Today, it seems everyone is a celiac, or at the very least they're gluten intolerant. Which is exactly why roughly 2,400 of Pizza Hut's 6,300 domestic locations will begin selling gluten-free pizzas on January 26.
Pizza Hut will be the first major pizza chain to sell a pizza that is certified gluten-free. Two years ago, Domino's rolled out a pizza sold with a gluten-free crust—but it wasn't entirely gluten free.
The GF Pizza Hut pie is in partnership with Udi's Gluten Free Foods—the largest gluten-free company in the world. A 10-inch, six-slice GF pizza at Pizza Hut will sell for $9.99. A slice is roughly 150 calories—about 100 calories less than the brand's "Skinny Slice" pizza.
Hollywood will be the first market to experience Pizza Hut's GF pizza, which seems appropriate. The chain will be serving Cheese Gluten-Free Pizza and Pepperoni Gluten-Free Pizza at A&E's official after party for the 20th Annual Critics' Choice Movie Awards on Thursday, reports USA Today.
Pizza Hut execs don't expect gluten-free to have a huge market, but it will appeal to a niche—"and eliminate the 'veto vote' for consumers who only want gluten-free options," said David Gibbs, CEO at Pizza Hut, in a phone interview with USA Today.


I bought myself this little necklace when I visited the Country Living fair in March. The beads are handmade Venetian glass and as soon as I clapped eyes on it I loved it very much. No two necklaces were the same as as all the beads are handmade and randomly strung, which pleases me no end. And yes don't you all just know how much I love these jewel-bright colours, don't you think it's so very me?! It makes me really happy to wear this necklace (I'm wearing it now in fact) and I often get complimented on it.
I would so love to give credit to the person/company I bought it from but it was one of those times when I saw/handled and purchased in ooooh about 47 seconds flat, paying no attention whatsoever to any names, only my desire to own this little beady treasure.
That is a beautiful necklace. I never saw anything so nice at the Country Living fair this year. I struggled to find anything 'different'. I am sure I would have loved the stand you got your necklace from!
Hi I found you blog a while ago and then lost you! Found you again via another newish blogger - funky monkey. will now add oyu to my sidebar before I lose you again. I live in NY too.
Thank you for showing us the delightful necklace. I am so enjoying reading your blog. I check in to see every day.


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Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating
Jing Wang, Siddharth Suri, and Duncan J. Watts
PNAS September 4, 2012 109 (36) 14363-14368; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1120867109
aDepartment of Information, Operations and Management Sciences, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012; and
For correspondence: jwang5@stern.nyu.edu suri@microsoft.com duncan@microsoft.com
Siddharth Suri
bMicrosoft Research New York City, New York, NY 10104
Duncan J. Watts
Edited by Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, and accepted by the Editorial Board July 10, 2012 (received for review December 19, 2011)
The natural tendency for humans to make and break relationships is thought to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. In particular, allowing conditional cooperators to choose with whom they interact is believed to reinforce the rewards accruing to mutual cooperation while simultaneously excluding defectors. Here we report on a series of human subjects experiments in which groups of 24 participants played an iterated prisoner's dilemma game where, critically, they were also allowed to propose and delete links to players of their own choosing at some variable rate. Over a wide variety of parameter settings and initial conditions, we found that dynamic partner updating significantly increased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooperators. Even relatively slow update rates were sufficient to produce large effects, while subsequent increases to the update rate had progressively smaller, but still positive, effects. For standard prisoner's dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predominantly from cooperators avoiding defectors, not by severing ties with defecting partners, and that cooperation correspondingly suffered. Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that cooperators did punish defectors by severing ties, leading to higher levels of cooperation that persisted for longer.
network science
dynamic networks
web-based experiments
Why, and under what circumstances, presumptively selfish individuals cooperate is a question of longstanding interest to social science (1, 2) and one that has been studied extensively in laboratory experiments, often as some variant of a public goods game (also called a voluntary contribution mechanism) or a prisoner's dilemma (see refs. 2 and 3 for surveys). One broadly replicated result from this literature is that in unmodified, finitely repeated games cooperation levels typically start around 50–60% and steadily decline to around 10% in the final few rounds (2). The explanation for this decline is that when conditional cooperators, who are thought to constitute as much as 50% of the population (4), are forced to interact with a heterogeneous mix of other types, in particular free riders, the conditional cooperators tend to reduce their contributions over time (3).
Previous work has shown that explicit enforcement mechanisms such as punishment (5) and reward (6) can alleviate the observed decline in cooperation in fixed groups. Here we investigate a related but distinct mechanism that exploits a well-known feature of human social interactions—namely that they change over time, as individuals form new relationships or sever existing ones (7). By allowing participants engaged in a repeated game of cooperation to update their interaction partners dynamically, cooperation levels might be enhanced in two ways. First, conditional cooperators could implicitly punish defectors by denying them a partner, thereby encouraging potential defectors to cooperate. Second, conditional cooperators could benefit from assortative mixing (1) by avoiding defectors and seeking cooperators, thus sustaining their own cooperative tendencies.
Two recent studies have argued that dynamic partner updating is capable of promoting cooperation (8, 9); however, the studies, in fact, reached somewhat different conclusions. In particular, whereas one study (8) found that allowing individuals to update one partner every round led to a significant increase in cooperation, the other study (9) found no significant increase at that rate. The latter result has been interpreted as supporting prior theoretical claims that dynamic partner updating enhances cooperation only when it exceeds a critical threshold rate (10). Because the former study considered only one rate, however, and the latter study considered only two rates, and because in both cases the effect sizes were small, the existence or otherwise of a threshold rate remains ambiguous. Moreover, both studies used an "active linking" (10) design in which players were offered opportunities to make and break links with randomly chosen partners, but were not allowed to choose with whom they wished to make and break links; moreover, players were unable to refuse new links proposed by others. Although appealingly simple, active linking is somewhat unrealistic. In real-world social networks individuals can generally select among a multiplicity of potential partners (11) and hence can choose new partners selectively. Moreover, social networks are typified by high levels of reciprocity (12⇓⇓–15), implying that mutual acceptance of new links is the social norm.
Our study builds upon this work in three ways. First, our design is fully endogenous, allowing individuals to decide with whom they will make and break ties. As we explain below, the resulting effect sizes are much larger than in previous studies of dynamic networks (8, 9), reaching close to 100% cooperation in some cases. Second, we consider an extremely wide range of update rates, affording us a much clearer understanding of the importance of varying rates. We find no evidence of the hypothesized threshold effect (9, 10), instead finding significant and positive increases in cooperation at rates well below those previously reported. Finally, and in contrast to both previous studies that considered only one set of payoffs, we manipulate the payoff structure itself, effectively varying the attractiveness of the "outside option" (16), meaning roughly the payoff associated with choosing not to interact with a potential partner. We find that only in the presence of an attractive outside option do conditional cooperators punish defectors (by proactively deleting ties with them). By contrast, when the outside option is less attractive, we find that cooperators tolerate defecting partners, eventually leading them to defect themselves.
Our work is also related more generally to a number of recent experiments that have investigated various aspects of the relationship between cooperation and partner selection, such as unilateral vs. bilateral choice (17, 18), the effect of introducing an outside option of varying attractiveness (16), and the attributes of the individuals (age, sex, race, etc.) as predictors of selection and cooperation (19, 20). Although our treatment of the outside option is consistent with previous work (16), it is distinct in that it extends it to the case of a dynamic network. Finally, other related work (21, 22) has examined how individuals select groups or are excluded by them. Although at a high level these papers clearly resemble both the partner selection literature and dynamic updating studies such as ours, they differ substantially from both literatures in that the object of selection (21) or the actor (22) is the group, not the individual.
Experimental Setup
We conducted a series of online human subjects experiments in which groups of 24 participants played an iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, where in addition to choosing their action each round—cooperate or defect—they also were given the opportunity to update their interaction partners at some specified rate, which was varied across experimental conditions. (See SI Appendix, Figs. S1 and S2 for details of the experimental platform and recruiting.) All games comprised 12 "strategy update" rounds during which players could update their strategy: cooperate (C) or defect (D). Consistent with standard PD conditions, a cooperator received four points when interacting with another cooperator, but lost one point when interacting with a defector. A defector received seven points when interacting with a cooperator and one point when interacting with another defector (see SI Appendix for details).
In addition, after every r strategy update rounds, players entered a "partner updating" turn in which they were permitted to make up to k partner updates. By adjusting r and k we were therefore able to explore an extremely wide range of relative updating rates, from one opportunity every several strategy update rounds to several opportunities every round. A single partner update comprised either severing a link with an existing partner or proposing a link to a new partner, where, importantly, players could choose the partner in question. Also of importance, our design specified that severing a link was a unilateral action, requiring no consent from the corresponding partner; however, proposing a link was a bilateral action that required acceptance for the edge to be formed. These requirements in turn necessitated that each partner-updating turn consist of two phases: a proposal phase, during which players submitted their link proposals and link deletions, and an approval phase during which they were required to accept or reject any outstanding link proposals. If a proposal was rejected, the proposing player could not reuse that action, and hence players had an incentive to make proposals they thought would be accepted. After each partner-updating turn was completed, the network of partners was updated to reflect severed and accepted links, and a new strategy update round commenced.
Players were shown the identities (anonymous player IDs) and strategy choices for up to the previous five rounds for all players. Players were also shown who they were and were not connected to, their current cumulative payoff, their payoff from the previous round, and the time remaining in the current round. Consistent with previous work (23, 24), players were not given explicit information about the structure of the network beyond their immediate network neighbors (see SI Appendix, Figs. S3–S5 for screenshots). Nevertheless, to test for the possibility that initial conditions could affect outcomes, players were randomly assigned to positions in one of two initial network topologies: "cliques" composed of four cliques of six players each; and "random" comprising a random regular graph, where in both initial graphs, each player had exactly five neighbors (i.e., partners). These topologies were chosen because they are as different as possible in terms of standard network metrics such as path length and clustering coefficient (25, 26) while still maintaining the same number of ties per person.
Fig. 1 shows the average fraction of cooperators by round for k = 1, 3, 5 and r = 1, 3, 6 (Top, Middle, and Bottom rows, respectively) and for the cliques (Left column) and random (Right column) initial conditions, respectively. For r = 1 and r = 3, we observe three striking features of networks with dynamic partner updating: first, cooperation levels start significantly higher than in fixed networks; second, cooperation levels remain between 80% and 100% in the presence of updates even as they decline in fixed networks; and third, cooperation declines rapidly as the game nears its end, finishing as low as in the absence of partner updates. Taken as a whole this behavior is far from the Nash prediction of all players defecting on all turns (see SI Appendix for the theorems and proofs). We note, however, that for r = 6, the initial increase is largely absent, and the persistence effect is present only for the higher values of k = 3, 5. This lack of effect for the r = 6 case can be understood by noting that the players experienced only one partner-updating opportunity (because round 12 was the final round of the game); thus for the r = 6, k = 1 case, players were permitted to update just one partnership in the entire game. Because this treatment is only slightly different from the static case, it is unsurprising that its effect, if any, was small.
Fraction of cooperation by round for the cliques (A, C, and E) and random (B, D, and F) initial conditions. (Top row) r = 1; (Middle row) r = 3; (Bottom row) r = 6. Symbols indicate different values of k (solid triangles, k = 1; open circles, k = 3; solid squares, k = 5).
Next, Fig. 2A summarizes these findings for all values of r and k, showing the average rate of cooperation as a function of the total number of updates u per player over the course of a game [i.e., u = k*(12/r − 1)]. Consistent with Fig. 1, Fig. 2A shows that increases in cooperation rates were relatively small for the very lowest (r = 6) rates of updating (i.e., compared with the variation between the two static cases). However, when r = 1, 3 the average cooperation rate was substantially higher than the static (i.e., no partner updating) case. Correspondingly, average payoffs also increased severalfold over the static case (see SI Appendix, Fig. S6A for details). To account for subject- and game-level variations, the treatment effects in Fig. 2A were estimated using a nonnested, multilevel model (27) with error terms for treatment, subject, and game as well as the experience level of a given subject in a given game (see Materials and Methods for more details). To test for significance, Fig. 2B shows the estimated difference in average cooperation levels between the various treatments and the corresponding static case, where error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. For the cliques initial condition all r = 1 and r = 3 treatments yield positive effects that are significant at the 5% level, and for the random regular initial condition the r = 6, k = 3, 5 conditions are also positive and significant. In general, regardless of initial condition, allowing as few as one update every three rounds was sufficient to significantly increase cooperation (see SI Appendix, Fig. S6B for a similar analysis of average payoff levels), a rate that is well below the previously reported threshold for a positive effect (9).
Average fraction of cooperation as a function of partner update rate (A) and estimated difference in fraction of cooperation from the corresponding static cases as a function of k (B) for cliques (dashed lines) and random (solid lines) initial conditions, for r = 1, 3, 6 and k = 0, 1, 3, 5. Symbols indicate different values of k (triangles, k = 1; circles, k = 3; squares, k = 5). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals (see Materials and Methods for details).
Next, Fig. 3 shows the relationship between assortativity and cooperation for r = 1 (see SI Appendix, Figs. S7 and S8 for equivalent r = 3, 6 results). To quantify assortativity, we first label each link in the network as CC, CD, or DD according to the states of the players who share the link. Then we define CC, CD, and DD assortativity as the difference between the observed fraction of CC, CD, and DD links and the corresponding fraction that would be expected under a random permutation of the player IDs. The difference is necessary to account for "baseline assortativity" (also called baseline homophily) (28), which varies dramatically over the course of the game as the overall fraction of cooperators changes. Fig. 3 A and B show that for both cliques and random initial conditions CC assortativity is positive for most of the game and CD assortativity is negative, whereas DD assortativity is essentially absent. In other words cooperators displayed a tendency to avoid defectors and gravitate to other cooperators, whereas defectors were neutral with respect to other defectors.
Assortativity by round for cliques (A) and random (B) initial conditions for r = 1. The differences between observed and baseline homophily for CC, CD, and DD links are shown by dark blue, light blue, and magenta lines, respectively. k = 1, 3, 5 is shown by triangles, circles, and squares, respectively. Average degree by round for cliques (C) and random (D) initial conditions: r = 1 and k = 0, 1, 3, 5.
Finally, Fig. 3 C and D show that players continued to add links throughout the game (see also SI Appendix, Figs. S7 and S8 for r = 3, 6). Although the addition of links is superficially consistent with the Nash prediction (see SI Appendix for details), the equilibrium analysis also predicts that all players defect on all turns; hence players form links with each other on the grounds that the payoff to (D, D) exceeds their outside option (16) (a payoff of zero for having no links). In reality, however, it is not only defectors who accept and maintain ties with other defectors. For the r = 1 case, for example, cooperators also accepted proposals from defectors roughly 40% of the time and rarely deleted them, even though such ties were costly. Overall, deletions accounted only for 10% of updates (see SI Appendix, Table S1 and Figs. S9–S11 for more details). Moreover, defectors were also more than twice as likely to propose links to other defectors than to cooperators (0.24 for D → D vs. 0.1 for D → C). Together, these results suggest that observed assortativity derived less from cooperators "punishing" defectors by deleting ties and more from two related mechanisms: (i) cooperators avoiding defectors and (ii) defectors failing to propose links to cooperators in the first place. A striking illustration of the lack of punitive deletion can be seen in the cases of r = 1 and k = 3, 5 in Fig. 3 C and D. By round 4 the graph was close to, and in some trials precisely, a clique. Because in these cases there were almost no edges available to be added, deleting edges exerted no opportunity cost. Nevertheless when exposed to a small number of defectors in later rounds, cooperators chose to defect rather than cut ties to the defectors, resulting in a defection cascade (see SI Appendix, Fig. S12 for an illustrative example).
Although surprising in light of simulation and theoretical models that assume punitive partner deletion (10, 29⇓⇓⇓–33), its relative rarity can be understood in terms of two related conditions of the payoff matrix. First, because the benefit to a cooperator forming an additional tie with another cooperator (four points) outweighed the loss of maintaining a tie with a defector (minus one point), when a cooperator was faced with a choice to sever a tie with a defector or add new tie to a cooperator, players rationally chose the latter. Second, because defectors gained a positive amount from all interactions (i.e., seven points when interacting with cooperators and one point when interacting with defectors), defecting players rationally preferred to maintain all their ties, even with other defecting players.
The upshot of these two conditions of the payoff matrix was that early on in the game, when most players were cooperating, all players wished to add links as fast as possible, even if that required tolerating occasional defectors. Defectors, therefore, were not punished for their actions, thereby persisting and encouraging cooperators to switch. Finally, as the end game neared, and the availability of other cooperators diminished, all players preferred to defect rather than cooperate and cut ties with defectors. One can conclude that dynamic partner updating combined with these payoffs resulted in cooperation being promoted, but not sustained.
To quantify the effect of these conditions on cooperation and assortativity, we conducted a new set of experiments with modified payoffs such that cooperators were penalized five points when interacting with defectors instead of just one point, and defectors lost one point each when interacting with each other, rather than gaining one point each. These payoffs still fulfilled the usual requirements of the PD, but had two additional properties: (i) maintaining a tie with a defector was more costly for a cooperator than creating a new tie with another cooperator; and (ii) defectors could no longer profit by interacting with other defectors. In addition, because the results from the k = 3 condition were not substantively different from k = 1, 5, we replaced this condition with k = (N − 1) = 23 to explore more of the parameter space (as before, a static condition was also included for comparison). By permitting every player to propose or delete an edge with every other player each round, the k = 23 condition effectively removed any budget constraint on deleting links, hence further increasing the likelihood of deleting links to defectors. Also, because it was previously established that initial conditions did not have a qualitative impact on cooperation levels, only the cliques initial condition was studied for the modified payoffs.
For these new payoffs, equilibrium analysis again predicts that all players will defect on all rounds; however, in contrast to the initial payoffs, the analysis predicts that players will delete as many links as possible, leading to an empty graph for the parameters we tested (see SI Appendix for details). Clearly, we did not expect all players to defect on all rounds; hence the equilibrium prediction regarding the network is again best viewed as a baseline for comparison rather than a hypothesis. We emphasize, however, that although the new payoffs were designed to make interacting with defectors less attractive, it is not obvious that they would lead either to higher levels of cooperation or to longer persistence. The reason is that the punishment for a cooperator interacting with a defector was also greater than in the original payoffs and could easily have increased the prevalence of strategic defections (i.e., in anticipation of others defecting or to exploit cooperators), especially for low rewiring rates.
It is therefore striking that, as Fig. 4A shows, the modified payoffs led to significantly higher rates of cooperation and longer persistence of cooperation for all rewiring rates. Cooperation levels approached and in many treatments reached 100% and were sustained at that level until close to the end of the game. In fact, in seven of the nine trials performed with the modified payoffs, cooperation levels were over 90% in 9 of the 12 rounds. Fig. 4B, Upper summarizes the effects, showing that a small amount of dynamic partner updating, r = 1, k = 1, resulted in large increases in cooperation levels over the static case. As before, further increases in update rate resulted in smaller increases in cooperation levels, where, interestingly, the highest rate of rewiring, k = 23 did not lead to appreciably more cooperation or higher average payoffs than were obtained in the k = 5 condition, consistent with our hypothesis that the earlier payoff structure, not the constraints on partner updating imposed by the update rate, was responsible for the previous absence of punitive deletions. Fig. 4B, Lower, meanwhile, shows that the differences between the average cooperation levels of the r = 1, k = 1, 5, 23 and the static case were significant at the 5% level (see Materials and Methods for more details and SI Appendix, Fig. S13 for the corresponding analysis of player earnings).
Results for modified payoffs, r = 1 and k = 0, 1, 5, 23, cliques initial condition. (A) Fraction of cooperation by round. (B) Aggregate fraction of cooperation as a function of total number of partner updates (Upper) and estimated difference in fraction of cooperation from the static case as a function of k (Lower). (C) Average degree by round. (D) CC (dark blue), CD (light blue), and (DD) (magenta) assortativity by round, where k = 1, 5, 23 is shown by triangles, circles and squares, respectively. In B the error bars are 95% confidence intervals (Materials and Methods).
Fig. 4 C and D also shows interesting similarities with and differences from the original payoffs: In early rounds, players added edges much as they did previously, leading in fact to even denser networks; however, unlike in the previous case, they deleted edges as rapidly as possible toward the end of the game as defection began to spread. In fact, in the modified payoffs 22% of the partner update actions were deletions, compared with only 10% in the original payoffs (see SI Appendix, Table S2 and Fig. S14 for more details). The increased amount of deletions suggests that the amount of exploitation of cooperators by defectors was mitigated as a result of these new payoffs. CC and CD assortativity, meanwhile, had the same signs as before, but much lower magnitudes in the early rounds for the simple reason that cooperation levels were close to 100%, and hence baseline CC assortativity was also close to 100%. As the end of the game approached, however, the assortativity measure increased dramatically as cooperators attempted to segregate themselves from defectors, and defectors also began cutting ties with other defectors—an effect that is illustrated graphically in SI Appendix, Fig. S15. Thus, in the modified payoffs cooperators and conditional cooperators were able to separate themselves from defectors, further helping cooperation to be promoted and sustained.
At a high level, our results are consistent with prior work (8⇓–10, 30⇓⇓⇓⇓–35), in that allowing players to form new ties and sever existing ones generates assortative mixing between cooperators along with increased cooperation. However, our results advance upon previous work in three key respects.
First, in spanning a wide range of update rates, Fig. 2 goes beyond the qualitative claim that updating should aid cooperation, revealing the functional form of the relationship. Interestingly, for both cooperation and payoffs the effect of updating is strongly concave, meaning that small increases in the update rate near zero correspond to much larger effects than subsequent increases (i.e., the marginal return to increasing update rate is strongly decreasing). This finding therefore helps clarify previous theoretical and experimental work, which has made conflicting claims regarding the importance of the update rate. In some cases (31, 32) cooperation has been claimed to increase smoothly with update rate, whereas in others (9, 10, 34, 35) partner updating has been claimed to impact cooperation only when the rate exceeds a critical threshold. We found that both cooperation and payoffs were sensitive to the update rate across the entire range and that the effects became very large and significant at much lower rates than had been found previously. Thus, high rates of updating are not required to realize measurable improvements.
Second, our results revealed that the effect of dynamic partner selection on cooperation levels depends on a novel condition of the PD payoffs. Unlike in static games, where only the relative payoffs matter, in games with partner updating the absolute payoff that a tie yields becomes highly relevant. The rationale behind this result is obvious—when faced with a choice between adding a profitable link and severing a costly one, players rationally chose the action that yielded the higher aggregate payoff. Cooperators did not sever ties to defectors when the result of cutting a tie to a defector yielded less than the gain of a link to another cooperator. But the resulting failure to punish defectors also had a less obvious consequence: Network density increased even as defectors proliferated, thereby further increasing the temptation to defect, leading ultimately to a sudden and irreversible collapse in cooperation. Because cooperators could not segregate themselves from defectors, cooperation was promoted early but not sustained. Only when the cost of interacting with defectors outweighed the benefits to cooperators of forming new ties with each other did we see punitive deletion of links with defectors. This increased willingness to sever links with defectors in turn isolated from cooperators, leading ultimately to higher levels of cooperation that were sustained until almost the end of the game.
Third, we attribute the much greater sensitivity and effectiveness of the update rate, relative to previous results (8, 9), to two features of our design that capture important elements of real-world social networks: first, that players could choose which others they wish to make or break ties with (as opposed to having those choices imposed exogenously); and, second, that new partnerships required the consent of both partners, whereas existing partnerships could be terminated unilaterally. Allowing participants to choose their partners allowed cooperators to separate themselves from defectors more effectively than with random partner choices. As a result, cooperation levels approached and in some cases were sustained at nearly 100%, a rate far higher than prior work which showed only a slight increase in cooperation over the baseline (9).
In closing, we note that our focus on dynamic partner updating complements previous experimental work that has explored related mechanisms for increasing cooperation, such as punishment (36), reward (6), assortative group formation (21), and ostracism (22, 37). Although clearly analogous in some respects, dynamic partner updating is distinct in others. First, in contrast to explicit punishment and reward mechanisms, fully endogenous partner updating of the kind we have studied effectively uses implicit punishment, by link deletion, and implicit reward, by proposing or maintaining links. Clearly it is not always feasible for individuals to choose with whom they interact, in which case explicit mechanisms may be required; however, our results suggest that when they are free to choose, other, more explicit, forms of punishment and reward may be unnecessary. Second, in contrast to assortative group formation and ostracism, both of which require coordination among a group of individuals, partner updating can be accomplished in an entirely distributed manner, via the natural process of individuals making and breaking ties with their choice of others. For both these reasons, along with the frequently large size of the effects we observe, dynamic partner updating deserves to be considered among the most promising levers for eliciting cooperation between humans, especially in informal settings. Nevertheless, the specific conditions under which different forms of feedback—punishment, reward, ostracism, or dynamic partner selection—are most realistic and/or effective in practice remain an important question for future work.
This research was reviewed and approved by Yahoo! Labs' Human Subjects Research process. Correspondingly, informed consent was obtained from all participants (see SI Appendix for informed consent statement). All experiments were conducted online using Amazon's Mechanical Turk, a crowd-sourcing platform that is increasingly used to conduct experimental behavioral research (9, 23, 38⇓⇓–41). Over the course of 4 wk, a total of 108 unique subjects participated in a total of 94 experiments (82 for the initial payoffs and 12 for the modified payoffs), where each experiment required 24 subjects to participate simultaneously (see SI Appendix text and SI Appendix, Figs. S1 and S2 for details of recruiting). One consequence of this recruiting strategy was that some individuals played many games, whereas others played only once; hence the possibility arises that overrepresented individuals will bias our results, either because they are systematically different from those who play rarely or because they learn to play differently with experience. In addition, it is well known that cooperation levels in iterated games of cooperation exhibit temporal dependencies, in the sense that random differences in initial cooperation levels persist over many rounds. To mitigate potential interactions between treatment and other (e.g., learning, time of day) effects, the order in which the various treatments were applied was randomized. In our analysis, moreover, we accounted for the various forms of nonindependence across observations (repeated observations of individual subjects, game effects, and learning effects), by fitting the data to the following nonnested, multilevel model (27):
where yi is the expected cooperation level for the ith observation (i = 1, … nobs, and t[i], s[i], g[i], and h[i] are all index variables that map the ith observation to a particular treatment, subject, game, and experience level, respectively. Each observation refers to the average contribution of a particular player in a single game; hence for the initial payoffs, we have nobs = 82 × 24 = 1,968, and for the modified payoffs, nobs = 12 × 24 = 288). Moreover, is a dummy variable for treatment, where t[i] = 1, … , 20 for the initial payoffs (we have two initial conditions, a static case for each, and r = 1, 3, 6 and k = 1, 3, 5; hence 2 × 3 × 3 + 2 = 20 treatments), and for the modified payoffs t[i] = 1, … , 4 (we have one initial condition, a single static case, and r = 1 and k = 1, 5, 23, and hence 4 treatments); is a group-level predictor for subjects; is a group-level predictor for games; and is a group-level predictor for the number of games played by player s[i] at the time of the g[i]th game. Note that unlike for subject, game, and history effects, we do not model the treatment effects, preferring the simpler and more conservative approach of using a dummy variable for each treatment and hence avoiding the need to worry about potentially erroneous distributional assumptions (27). To test for significance, we computed 95% confidence intervals for the difference between each treatment and its corresponding static case; hence if zero is not contained in the interval, then the null hypothesis that they are the same can be rejected at the 5% level. As described in the main text, for the initial payoffs the null hypothesis can be rejected for all treatments except for r = 6 and k = 1, 3, 5 for the cliques initial conditions and r = 6 and k = 1 for the random initial condition. For the modified payoffs, all treatments had a significant and positive effect.
The authors thank Andrew Gelman for advice on statistical modeling and Winter Mason and Daniel Goldstein for helpful conversations.
↵1To whom correspondence may be addressed. E-mail: jwang5{at}stern.nyu.edu, suri{at}microsoft.com, or duncan{at}microsoft.com.
Author contributions: J.W., S.S., and D.J.W. designed research; J.W. and S.S. performed research; J.W., S.S., and D.J.W. analyzed data; and S.S. and D.J.W. wrote the paper.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission. M.O.J. is a guest editor invited by the Editorial Board.
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You are going to email the following Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating
Cooperation with dynamic partner updating
Jing Wang, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Sep 2012, 109 (36) 14363-14368; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1120867109


The New Renaissance: BlazeVox Acceptance!
I have work forthcoming in BlazeVox's Spring issue 2010! This is an honor for me because I love the work that the journal produces as well as their chapbooks. I have friends who have published there and I wanted my name to be added to the list. The day has come! Oh happy day. Writers if you are looking for a choice journal to for your work send it over to BlazeVox. You can check them out at http://www.blazevox.org/.


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"It's a very intense period and we're getting ready to experience in a few days an even longer and more delicate one, between the Champions League debut and the World Club Championship - he explained - . We have tried to take advantage of these last four days to recharge our batteries and to put some gas in the tank that was almost in reserve. Our championship so far is in line with the expectations we had before the start of the season, both in terms of the rankings and the playing system we are developing. The basic formation is the one that has three middle hitters on the court at the same time; it takes time to develop this idea but the first results are definitely positive, without forgetting that, at the same time, we must also pursue a classic alternative that involves the use of a pure opposite hitter. I'm happy and satisfied with the group we have at our disposal; the mix of experienced and young players is proving to be right, I see in training a great desire to grow and the right spirit.
"We will be making our debut on Thursday night in Perugia in the Champions League in a group where we will inevitably have to play well against opponents like Fenerbahce and Cannes if we want to stay in the running for qualification to the quarters - continued Lorenzetti - . We have been inserted in a Pool that includes a very strong team like Perugia, against which we will always try to give our best to collect points, but it is obvious that we will have to focus on the other two teams and on having the best possible ranking compared to the other four groups. The Club World Cup is a legacy of last season's team; we were admitted thanks to the second place we got in the 2021 CEV Champions League. This is a particular event, which changes formula often, but with the presence of Civitanova it grows a lot in level. We are honored and proud to take part in it, we will try to go all the way and, immediately after, we will try to keep the bar straight also in the next matches to be played in Trento and Milan. We like the current ranking very much; it's true that the regular season doesn't count much but it's also true that our goal is always to stay on top as long as possible".


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Exercise before planned surgery for abdominal aortic aneurysm
The abdominal aorta is a major blood vessel in the body that carries blood from the heart to the major organs in the chest and abdomen. An abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) is a balloon-like bulge of the aorta. If an AAA grows to over 5.5 cm in diameter (the length from one side to the other), the chance of the AAA rupturing (bursting) is increased. Ruptured AAAs cause death unless surgery is carried out soon after the event to repair the rupture. Surgery is recommended for people with AAAs bigger than 5.5 cm in diameter or who have pain due to the AAA, to decrease the risk of rupture and death. Complications following planned surgery for AAA are common. Exercise before surgery for AAA could help people make a better recovery from surgery. At the moment we do not know if exercise before surgery will help people make a better recovery after AAA surgery. We found only a few trials which looked at whether exercise before AAA surgery helps people make a better recovery, so more trials are needed before we can be certain the exercise helps.
Study characteristics and key results
We searched the literature on 6 July 2020, and we found four trials that included 232 participants with AAA who were on a waiting list for AAA surgery. The trials randomly assigned participants into two groups, one with exercise before surgery and another with usual care (no exercise before surgery, participants maintained normal physical activity). The types of exercise included circuit training, moderate-intensity continuous exercise and high-intensity interval training. In three of the four trials, the participants in the exercise group were supervised by healthcare professionals in hospital when they did their exercise sessions. In the other trial, the first exercise session was supervised in hospital, and the following sessions were completed by the participants on their own in their own homes. The number and length of the exercise sessions was different in the trials. Some exercise sessions took place three times a week and some took place six times a week. In some trials participants exercised for one week and some trials' participants exercised for six weeks before their surgery.
Limited information from a small number of trials showed that exercise before AAA surgery might slightly reduce heart and kidney complications after surgery, compared to no exercise (usual care) before AAA surgery. We are uncertain whether exercise before AAA surgery reduces death within 30 days of AAA surgery, lung complications, the need for further treatment or bleeding after surgery, compared to no exercise before AAA surgery. There was little or no difference between the exercise and usual care groups in length of intensive care unit stay, length of hospital stay and quality of life. None of the studies reported information for the number of days participants were on a ventilator and change in AAA size before and after exercise.
Certainty of the evidence
The certainty of the evidence is low or very low because of the way the studies were designed (risk of bias), and small number of people in the trials. Larger, well-designed trials are needed in order to increase our confidence in any benefits of exercising before AAA surgery for reducing complications.
Authors' conclusions:
Due to very low-certainty evidence, we are uncertain whether prehabilitation exercise therapy reduces 30-day mortality, pulmonary complications, need for re-intervention or postoperative bleeding. Prehabilitation exercise therapy might slightly reduce cardiac and renal complications compared with usual care (no exercise). More RCTs of high methodological quality, with large sample sizes and long-term follow-up, are needed. Important questions should include the type and cost-effectiveness of exercise programmes, the minimum number of sessions and programme duration needed to effect clinically important benefits, and which groups of participants and types of repair benefit most.
Read the full abstract...
An abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) is an abnormal dilation in the diameter of the abdominal aorta of 50% or more of the normal diameter or greater than 3 cm in total. The risk of rupture increases with the diameter of the aneurysm, particularly above a diameter of approximately 5.5 cm. Perioperative and postoperative morbidity is common following elective repair in people with AAA. Prehabilitation or preoperative exercise is the process of enhancing an individual's functional capacity before surgery to improve postoperative outcomes. Studies have evaluated exercise interventions for people waiting for AAA repair, but the results of these studies are conflicting.
To assess the effects of exercise programmes on perioperative and postoperative morbidity and mortality associated with elective abdominal aortic aneurysm repair.
Search strategy:
We searched the Cochrane Vascular Specialised register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, MEDLINE, Embase, CINAHL (Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature), and Physiotherapy Evidence Database (PEDro) databases, and the World Health Organization International Clinical Trials Registry Platform and ClinicalTrials.gov trials registers to 6 July 2020. We also examined the included study reports' bibliographies to identify other relevant articles.
We considered randomised controlled trials (RCTs) examining exercise interventions compared with usual care (no exercise; participants maintained normal physical activity) for people waiting for AAA repair.
Data collection and analysis:
Two review authors independently selected studies for inclusion, assessed the included studies, extracted data and resolved disagreements by discussion. We assessed the methodological quality of studies using the Cochrane risk of bias tool and collected results related to the outcomes of interest: post-AAA repair mortality; perioperative and postoperative complications; length of intensive care unit (ICU) stay; length of hospital stay; number of days on a ventilator; change in aneurysm size pre- and post-exercise; and quality of life. We used GRADE to evaluate certainty of the evidence. For dichotomous outcomes, we calculated the risk ratio (RR) with the corresponding 95% confidence interval (CI).
Main results:
This review identified four RCTs with a total of 232 participants with clinically diagnosed AAA deemed suitable for elective intervention, comparing prehabilitation exercise therapy with usual care (no exercise). The prehabilitation exercise therapy was supervised and hospital-based in three of the four included trials, and in the remaining trial the first session was supervised in hospital, but subsequent sessions were completed unsupervised in the participants' homes. The dose and schedule of the prehabilitation exercise therapy varied across the trials with three to six sessions per week and a duration of one hour per session for a period of one to six weeks. The types of exercise therapy included circuit training, moderate-intensity continuous exercise and high-intensity interval training.
All trials were at a high risk of bias. The certainty of the evidence for each of our outcomes was low to very low. We downgraded the certainty of the evidence because of risk of bias and imprecision (small sample sizes). Overall, we are uncertain whether prehabilitation exercise compared to usual care (no exercise) reduces the occurrence of 30-day (or longer if reported) mortality post-AAA repair (RR 1.33, 95% CI 0.31 to 5.77; 3 trials, 192 participants; very low-certainty evidence). Compared to usual care (no exercise), prehabilitation exercise may decrease the occurrence of cardiac complications (RR 0.36, 95% CI 0.14 to 0.92; 1 trial, 124 participants; low-certainty evidence) and the occurrence of renal complications (RR 0.31, 95% CI 0.11 to 0.88; 1 trial, 124 participants; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether prehabilitation exercise, compared to usual care (no exercise), decreases the occurrence of pulmonary complications (RR 0.49, 95% 0.26 to 0.92; 2 trials, 144 participants; very low-certainty evidence), decreases the need for re-intervention (RR 1.29, 95% 0.33 to 4.96; 2 trials, 144 participants; very low-certainty evidence) or decreases postoperative bleeding (RR 0.57, 95% CI 0.18 to 1.80; 1 trial, 124 participants; very low-certainty evidence). There was little or no difference between the exercise and usual care (no exercise) groups in length of ICU stay, length of hospital stay and quality of life.
None of the studies reported data for the number of days on a ventilator and change in aneurysm size pre- and post-exercise outcomes.
Health topics:
Heart & circulation > Aortic aneurysm
Insurance medicine > Sick Leave > Heart & circulation
Fenton C, Tan AR, Abaraogu UO, McCaslin JE
Primary Review Group:
Vascular Group
See the full Review on
the Cochrane Library
Fenton C, Tan AR, Abaraogu UO, McCaslin JE. Prehabilitation exercise therapy before elective abdominal aortic aneurysm repair. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2021, Issue 7. Art. No.: CD013662. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD013662.pub2.
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Canada's Early Women Writers (CEWW) began in the pre-digital 1980s, with research using snail mail and typewriters; this now-static database is still available through the Simon Fraser University library, but has been superseded by the updated CEWW housed within the Canadian Writing Research Collaboratory.
With the development of the internet and its ever-expanding online resources, we have augmented the original 471 authors of a book of poetry or fiction (such were the self-imposed limitations required in the pre-digital world) to include rich bio-bibliographic entries for over 730 early Canadian women writers. CEWW now includes notable Canadian English-language female writers who first published before 1950 in any format. Their audiences and genres range from travel journalism and scientific writing to the previously included poetry and fiction.
While CEWW offers extensive bio-bibliographic entries on a selection of early Canadian women writers for whom sufficient information can be found, the DoCEWW is a simpler, easily navigable database of all Canadian women writers who have been identified by our project. Built by the Digital Humanities Innovation Lab at the Simon Fraser University library, DoCEWW records (as available) each author's name, alternative names, dates and places of birth and death, places of residence, titles published, and collections and periodicals contributed to. While DoCEWW already contains some 4800 authors, the list is far from comprehensive, and we invite the public to contribute new names, or additional information about the women who are already listed.
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Seite 5 - The beacons below the level of high-water, and all warping buoys, are painted white. The small rocky heads in the frequented channels are painted in the same manner as the beacons, when they have a conspicuous surface. Every buoy or beacon bears in full length, or abbreviated characters, the name of the shoal or rock which it is meant to distinguish, and also its number, showing its numerical order in the same channel.
Seite 5 - The letters and numbers are painted white on the most conspicuous parts of the buoys, and from ten to twelve inches in length. The masts of the beacons which do not present sufficient surface are surmounted for this purpose by a small board. All the jetty-heads and turrets are painted above the half-tide level, and on the former a scale of metres is marked commencing from the same leveL LOCAL MEASURES. The "last," used as a measure for herrings in the following French portn, varies.
Seite 411 - English feet above the level of the sea, and should be visible in clear weather from a distance of 12 miles. The illuminating apparatus is dioptric, or by lenses, of the third order.
Seite 236 - THE company shall cause the length of the railway to be measured, and milestones, posts, or other conspicuous objects to be set up and maintained, along the whole line thereof, at the distance of one quarter of a mile from each other, with numbers or marks inscribed thereon denoting such distances.


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Turner Broadcasting's TBS and Adult Swim Top All of Basic Cable's Entertainment Networks in Live + 7 Delivery of Key Demos for the Week of January 12
Turner further spins the numbers for the week of January 12-18.
[via press release from Turner]
Adult Swim ranked #1 for the week vs. all basic cable in Total Day delivery of adults 18-24 & 18-34 and men 18-24.
Adult Swim telecasts accounted for 20 of the Top 50 telecasts of the week on basic cable among adults 18-34 and men 18-34, both more than any other network.
On Sunday, Bob's Burgers (10p) was #1 in its timeslot with adults 18-24, and year-over-year delivery grew between +9% and +62% among all key adults and men. Mike Tyson Mysteries (11:30p) also won its time period among adults 18-24.
The season finales of TNT's Major Crimes and The Librarians both ranked among basic cable's Top 3 most-watched scripted series in Live + 7 delivery for the week of Jan. 12.
TNT's hit series Major Crimes closed out its third season with back-to-back episodes on Jan. 12, garnering 7.1 million viewers in Live + 7 delivery, including 2.2 million adults 25-54 and 1.6 million adults 18-49. For the entire third season, Major Crimes' linear premiere and encores delivered 8.2 million viewers in Live + 7, with 2.5 million adults 25-54 and 1.9 million adults 18-49. Overall, the show reached an average of 11.6 million viewers per episode in season 3 for its linear telecasts and DVR, VOD, digital and mobile plays.
The Jan. 18 season finale of TNT's The Librariansbooked 6.3 million viewers in Live + 7 delivery for the premiere and encore telecasts of back-to-back episodes. In key demos, the show grabbed 2.9 million adults 25-54, +8% over the prior week, and 2.2 million adults 18-49. For the entire first season, The Librarians scored 6.9 million viewers in Live + 7 delivery, including 3.0 million adults 25-54 and 2.3 million adults 18-49. The hit series reached an average of 11.4 million viewers per episode across TNT's multiple platforms.
The Jan. 16 episode of TNT's investigative series Cold Justice drew a combined delivery of 2.7 million viewers in Live + 7 delivery for its premiere telecast and encore. So far this season, the show is reaching an average of 3.5 million viewers per episode across all of TNT's television, digital and mobile platforms.
Cartoon Network ranked as basic cable's #1 network among all targeted boys (6-11/9-14) in Total Day Live + 7 delivery.
Total Day delivery grew year over year across the board, with kids 2-11 up by +18%, kids 6-11 by +32%, and kids 9-14 by +25%. Prime was also up by +12% among kids 2-11, +19% among kids 6-11 and +28% among kids 9-14.
Cartoon Network's powerhouse Thursday Night was the #1 destination vs. all TV among all key kids demos and grew by double and triple digits across all targeted demos (+73% to +135%). Teen Titans Go! ranked as the #1 telecast of the day vs. all TV with all targeted kids & boys.
Saturday morning cartoons are alive and well on Cartoon Network, with the time period posting year-to-year gains across all key kids & boys, ranging from +40% to +68%.
TBS ranked as basic cable's #1 entertainment network in Live + 7 delivery of adults 18-49 for the third week of January. It also ranked second to Adult Swim among entertainment networks in primetime delivery of adults 18-34.
TBS's Ground Floor scored growth across the board with its Jan. 13 episode. The show drew 2.1 million viewers in Live + 7 delivery for the episode's premiere telecast and encore, +5% compared to the prior week. In key demos, Ground Floor nabbed 1.3 million adults 18-49 (+18% vs. the prior week) and 517,000 adults 18-34 (+15%). For the season-to-date, the show is reaching an average of 3.2 million viewers per episode across TBS's linear telecasts and DVR, VOD, digital and mobile plays.
Cougar Town's Jan. 13 episode garnered a combined audience of 2.1 million viewers in Live + 7 delivery for its linear premiere and encore, up slightly over the prior week. In key demos, the show drew 1.3 million adults 18-49. And across TBS's multiple platforms, Cougar Town is reaching an average of 2.9 million viewers per episode.
NBA TV delivered total day audience increases of +8% last week, when compared with the comparable week in 2014, including a +9% improvement among Men 18-49. Additionally, the last week's NBA Inside Stuff telecasts were +8% over the corresponding Saturday last year.
[february 2015]
· COLD JUSTICE (OXYGEN)
· COUGAR TOWN (TBS)
· GROUND FLOOR (TBS)
· LIBRARIANS, THE (TNT)
· MAJOR CRIMES (TNT)
· MIKE TYSON MYSTERIES (ADULT SWIM)
· TEEN TITANS GO! (CARTOON)


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Map showing the location of this live webcam from Birdland in Gloucester.


If you pay close attention to any NFL, NBA, or MLB player talk about professionalism there are some common themes. The true professionals are prepared. They're organized. They're on time. They're disciplined. My first seasons as a pro in Greece I learned difficult lessons in time management. With practice from 6-8PM everyday and optional weights everyday, there was a ton of flexibility. It's a personal choice that every player has to make, and one that I sometimes struggle with. Some weeks I lifted everyday, and others not at all. Some weeks I went in early in the morning to get reps, other weeks not at all. Some weeks my nutrition was good, other weeks not at all. It's a simple yet challenging choice that separates players.
Growing up the son of two athletic directors, the gymnasium was my babysitter. Basketball and volleyball were the games most played to pass the time. There was always a strict practice regimen and even a mandatory off season lifting schedule. College provided me with state of the art lifting, training, and volleyball facilities. Competition was fierce. One consistent theme throughout my career was that the opportunity to get better planned by someone else. Coaches planning great practices, weight coaches providing lifting plans and proper nutrition, sports psychologists an email away. It seemed like all I had to do was follow their plan and I would win championships. It was already a challenging journey, and it all became increasingly more difficult when that support and that structure was taken away.
Currently, I am playing professional beach volleyball where I have to do/schedule everything largely on my own. I don't have a coach. I don't have a trainer. I don't have a manager to book my travel and tournaments. Very few people do in this profession. I've learned to take control of my own plan through my experience in Greece. The first step in becoming a true professional is coming up with a plan. Whether they be long term goals, or short term inspiration, planning is essential for professionals to not only find their destination (All-Pro/All-Star/All-League or starting), but also determine their route.
It is very easy to plateau as a pro. A lot of time spent as a pro is as an individual in the offseason or during down time. How much better can you get when nobody is pushing you? How much focus can you have when there isn't a weight coach to count your reps? The answer to these questions comes down to whether you're intrinsically motivated or extrinsically. I learned really quickly that I was the latter. If there wasn't someone to hold me accountable for lifting or getting reps in the gym, then I would come up with an excuse and flat out skip it. I learned that by partnering up, I could hold myself accountable. I learned that I needed to schedule time with a trainer. I pay hundreds of dollars a month for the services of a trainer. Partly because he knows what he's doing and partly because if I didn't schedule something, then I would skip it.
Turning pro is an amazing feeling because all of a sudden you get paid to do something you had previously done for free your entire life. It seems like it is almost "free money" and worthy of being spent on frivolous things (bottle service, shoes, cars, etc.) True professionals know that their careers are limited in time. I've been the guy who spends money at the club and I've been the one watching guys spend too much money at the club. The former is fun, the latter is responsible. It can be frustrating watching teammates splurge irresponsibly. Often times these players sacrifice a good morning practice/lift due to late night activities. Now don't get me wrong, I love the dance floor as much as anyone, but there's a time and place.
People might hate the thought of this, but professionals are out for numero uno first and foremost. They HAVE to be! Teams are always looking to get the most out of you for the cheapest amount of money. I had a team refuse to pay for heating in my apartment for weeks after we lost a match. If players don't look out for themselves, then who will? The only person who would look out for you would be an agent, but that's only after they get theirs. I didn't get paid for several months in Greece, so I told them I was going to quit. Unfortunately, I did that on Christmas Eve. But when my agent is in the Netherlands and can only send threatening emails, I decided to look out for #1. The team didn't take too kindly to my Christmas wish-list, but I had to make sure they weren't taking advantage of me.


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PSA: Pixar's Terrific Short 'Bao' Is Now Available to Watch Free On YouTube
'World' Investigation Alleges Ongoing Culture of Deception at Harvest Bible Chapel Megachurch
This week, the Oscars released their shortlists of the films they're considering for the deeper categories this year, like Best Documentary Short, Best Foreign Language Film and Best Animated Short. In the latter category you'll find Pixar's sweet, poignant "Bao" from director Domee Shi. The short, which was shown before Incredibles 2 this summer, is the clear frontrunner for the category.
"Bao" was actually rather controversial upon release, with some viewers not understanding the mid-short twist. If you're one of those who was baffled by the late turn things take, give it another watch. It makes more sense the second time around.
Keeping things spoiler-free, though, "Bao" deserves the Oscar for its exceptional craft and heartfelt story. The food shots look amazing, and the way objects interact with each other, like in the dumplings montage and the cooking montage later on, is truly gorgeous and impressive. It's also a huge testament to the short that it tells an entire story without dialogue — standard for these Pixar projects now, but still no easy feat.
Michael Bay Already Has a COVID Thriller in the Can
Rumor is "Bao" won't be available on YouTube long, so catch it again while it's hot and fresh from the steamer. Then tune into the Academy Awards in late February to see it (hopefully) bring home the hardware.
RELEVANT December 18, 2018
Sorry Weird YouTubers, But No One in Hollywood Is 'Aghast' at Chris Pratt's Christmas Sermon


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Excellent in a salad served cold or hot with ham hocks or chicken meat. They are a very good source of protein and fiber.
We feature them in our White Bean Soups and in our Three Bean Chili Mix.


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Auburn must turn to Plan B at quarterback after Kelly Bryant chooses Missouri
Josh Vitale
AUBURN — Plan A just fell through.
Kelly Bryant, the highly sought-after Clemson graduate transfer quarterback, announced Tuesday evening that he had chosen Missouri over a list of five finalists that also included Auburn, Arkansas, Mississippi State and North Carolina.
Gus Malzahn and whoever he hires to be his next offensive coordinator — Chip Lindsey left for the same job at Kansas — will have to turn to Plan B at quarterback.
That plan will not include Jarrett Stidham: The incumbent two-year starter announced hours before Bryant did on Tuesday that he plans to forgo his final season of eligibility and enter the 2019 NFL Draft, which has been the expectation all along after he came so close to doing so following the 2017 season.
MORE:Auburn quarterback Jarrett Stidham declares for 2019 NFL Draft
Stidham shined in his first season on the Plains in 2017 after transferring in from Baylor (by way of McLennan Community College), completing 66.5 percent of his passes and becoming the just the second 3,000-yard passer in program history for a team that won 10 games and the SEC West. His play regressed this past season, though, during which he has completed just 60.1 percent of his passes for 2,421 yards.
Bryant, who took an official visit to the Plains this past weekend, would have been Stidham's immediate and unquestioned replacement had he chosen Auburn. The former three-star quarterback out of Piedmont, S.C., was the full-time starter for one season at Clemson in 2017, when he completed 65.8 percent of his passes for 2,802 yards and 13 touchdowns and rushed 192 times for 665 yards and 11 more scores for a team that went 12-2, won the ACC Championship and lost a College Football Playoff semifinal to Alabama.
The reason Bryant was on the transfer market was because Clemson coach Dabo Swinney informed him after Week 4 of this season that he would be turning over the starting job to five-star true freshman and former No. 1 overall recruit Trevor Lawrence. Auburn doesn't exactly have one of those waiting in the wings.
What the Tigers do have right now, though, are four quarterbacks with varying degrees of experience and promise.
The longest-tenured and most tested of those quarterbacks is rising junior Malik Willis, who has served as Stidham's backup for most of the past two seasons. The former three-star dual-threat recruit out of Atlanta has appeared in 14 games in his career, completing 10 of 13 passes for 64 yards and a touchdown and rushing 25 times for 257 yards and another score, though the bulk of that production came late in blowout victories during the 2017 campaign.
"Just seeing him grow from week to week, year to year now with our second year being together, Malik has come a long way," Stidham said after Auburn's Nov. 17 win over Liberty. "Mentally, he's understanding the game how a quarterback should, and physically, he's obviously very, very gifted. He's making strides every week, and I can see it in practice. You guys don't get to see all of that, but he's making strides in practice. He's very gifted, so he has a bright future."
Behind Willis on the depth chart this season were Joey Gatewood and Cord Sandberg, who will both be redshirt freshmen next year.
Malzahn made headlines when he described Gatewood, a former four-star recruit out of St. Augustine, Fla., as being "the closest thing to Cam Newton physically that I've seen," but the 6-foot-5, 237-pound rookie suffered a thumb injury during fall camp and did not appear in a game during the 2018 season.
Sandberg, a 23-year-old former minor baseball player who spent six seasons in the Philadelphia Phillies organization, appeared in one game this season after six years away from the football field (Week 2 against Alabama State). He completed one pass for 22 yards and rushed three times for 35 yards.
"It will probably be a little bit of a learning curve, he knows that," Malzahn said in August after Sandberg signed. "I know we're excited to see what he can do. But it's hard for me to say right now and predict how quick his progression will be. He's a guy that can really throw it, he can really run and he's a smart guy."
And then there's the quarterback who is not quite yet an Auburn Tiger: Bo Nix. He might have more promise than any of those returning signal-callers — many view him as the future at the position and believe he'll have a chance to start as a true freshman.
The four-star recruit out of Pinson Valley High — where he is coached by father and former Auburn quarterback Patrick Nix — is the No. 1-ranked dual-threat quarterback in the Class of 2019 and is expected to sign later this month and enroll in school early. Before that, the AHSAA's newly minted career leader in total offensive yards (more than 12,000) will try to lead his team to the Class 6A state championship Friday at Jordan-Hare Stadium.
Those are Doors No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 for Auburn. Door No. 5 would be going after another transfer, though it's not yet clear which quarterbacks, if any, might be available.
There are rumors that Arizona quarterback Khalil Tate could transfer, though it hasn't happened yet. It'sat least possible that Alabama backup Jalen Hurts could decide transfer rather than spending his final season of eligibility backing up Tua Tagovailoa, but that's far from a guarantee. And even if it does happen, it wouldn't until later this month at the earliest — the Crimson Tide is the No. 1 overall seed in the CFP in part because of Hurts' off-the-bench heroics in Saturday's SEC Championship game.
What is clear after Tuesday, though, is that Bryant will not be Auburn's starting quarterback in 2019. Stidham won't be, either.
The Tigers will have to come up with a Plan B.


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Home Nigeria Lawyers Writing Exams for Students at Law School, Says DG
Lawyers Writing Exams for Students at Law School, Says DG
Ernest Chinwo in Port Harcourt
The Director General of the Nigerian Law School (NLA), Professor Olanrewaju Onadeko (SAN), has lamented that some lawyers were now in the habit of sitting for examinations for students in the law school.
He said some had already been caught in the act and the students involved awaiting disciplinary measures.
Onadeko made the disclosure in Port Harcourt on Thursday while presenting the report of the school at the on-going 56th Annual General Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA).
"Some lawyers were caught sitting as surrogates for students at the Nigerian Law School. In other words, they were caught writing examination for students at the school", he said.
He however did not disclose the number of lawyers and students caught in the act but said the students involved had been sent to NBA for appropriate actions.
He also urged the NBA leadership to take serious and drastic actions against such erring legal practitioners to serve as a deterrent to others who may want to follow similar path.
Also speaking on the incident, a legal practitioner with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Rotimi Jacob (SAN), frowned at such an occurrence.
Charging NBA to take serious punitive measures against those lawyers caught in the act, he said, "such lawyers should be punished after the due process had been followed".
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