It's the holiday season again. Boney M and Mariah Carey (you know what I'm taking about, the shameful CD that you hide and pretend you never bought once upon a 90's day) is blasting through Clicks. Michael Buble has got another singing x-mas holiday special coming out. Everything smells like coconut tanning oil and those that can, and actually those that shouldn't really, start wearing their shirts unbuttoned with shorts and flip-flops in the shopping centers shamelessly.
AAAh the sweet smell and sounds of summer are here. Even M-Net has got their go-to-summer season song playing on endless adverts at every opportunity. Time to dust off the beach umbrellas, get out those dam silly paddle bat ball things that clog up most of the Clifton beaches available space and get sunburnt.
Most that might know me well know that I am a bit of a giddy x-mas fool. I love the lights, the tinsel, decorating a tree or the house or pretty much any available surface I can find all the while singing, "It's the most wonderful time of the year" on a manic loop. As much as I love all things x-mas related I have always never really connected with the image of x-mas that is projected at us through mainstream media this time of year, mostly (and to state the obvious) because it is unlike any kind of x-mas I have ever experienced. I don't know what a white X-mas is. There are no sleigh bells in the snow, there's no snow actually, and the thought of watching all these people huddled around fires wearing turtle necks and wooly socks makes me ill, mostly because we are going through a giant heat wave south of the equator.
X-mas time is blindly hot sunshine; the smell of braai's and family both wanted and unwanted arriving on doorsteps. And of course the beach, I mean just look at these amazing beaches we have in this country http://blueflag.org.za/wessa there is a reason that we are a top holiday destination and its etched in the silky soft white sands and dynamic vegetation that covers our coastlines from point to point.
So in the spirit of a South African x-mas filled with all things sun and surf I've put together some little tips and tricks for maximising your time spend at the coastline.
Every year across this coastline we have deaths related to drowning's and they are incredibly tragic and can often be avoided if you just do a few simple things.
-Parents, watch your kids. I cannot enforce this enough. To many times now I have had to be on the beach watching helplessly as a young child is being given CPR, sometimes with no result. It takes a fraction of a second for the little ones around us to get washed off their feet, even in the smallest of waves, and go under the foam.
- If you see that someone is in trouble in the water first up appoint someone as a spotter and then get another person to find/call help. Put the spotter at the best possible vantage point, and they need to point at the person constantly. Don't loose sight of whoever is in the water; this is so critical for a boat or lifesaver to get some kind of direction to find the person in trouble as quickly as possible.
-Rip Tides: If they draw you out to sea, conserve your energy and tread water. They normally dissipate after the backline of the surf, which means you are not going to drift out to the horizon. It's going to feel worse than what it is. Try and draw attention to yourself by waving your hands, but the main thing here is relax, especially if the water is cold. Once the currant dissipates and even while you are drifting, swim sideways or 90 degrees to the direction you are drifting. You can't swim against it, and this is where people land up in serious trouble. Once you have slowed down and stopped don't panic, you are not in the middle of the ocean and you will most likely be able to calmly get back to shore. To not get in this situation in the first place, look out for the lifeguard flags. Those lovely guys are not there to sit around in red shorts looking pretty. They put those flags on the beaches so that you can see what areas are best for bathing and they are there for your safety. Listen to them if they tell you to move. If in doubt, don't paddle out.
-Accidents happen when beginner surfers take their boards and try and surf where lots of small kids or groups of people are swimming. One ill-timed wave and suddenly you have a giant board careening through people's faces at pace. I've seen broken teeth and noses from these kinds of things. Be conscious of where you are surfing, especially if you are a beginner and don't have such great control over your board. Looking cool in the surf is going to drop down a few notches when you axe little jimmy in the nose and there's blood and angry parents on the shore.
-Even when you are swimming or surfing keep an eye out on everyone in the water. Take notice around you, just care a little because when/if something does happen your quick reaction can be the difference between someone drowning or going home to their families safe and sound.
-Don't dive into tidal pools. This is just asking for a spinal injury.
-Sunscreen, Sunscreen, Sunscreen. Don't feel like putting it on? You have been warned.
-Choppy, windy waters? Just put down that fun little inflatable dingy you got in your x-mas stocking because there's a good chance you are not a South African Olympic rower and you could end up drifting out to sea.
-Raise the alarm or assist depending on your capabilities. You know what you are capable of; don't create another person for the rescuer to have to look after if it's not necessary.
-Learn basic CPR, it's so easy and quick to learn and can save someone's life. I know, I've seen it first hand a few times.
Hands-Only CPR Instructional Video (For English-speakers outside the U.S.) New English Hands-Only CPR instructional video for people living outside the U.S.! You are watching the Hands-Only CPR instructional video from the American Heart Association http://www.international.heart.org/en/resources. Learn the steps of perform Hands-Only CPR in 60 seconds with this video that shows Hands-Only CPR in action.
By now anyone who is remotely ocean going might be aware of the Shark Spotters program in the Western Cape. They have those little huts with flags situated at specific beaches across the coastline. Pay attention to them, here is a quick guide to the flags for reference (above) If you hear a siren, don't go into a blind panic, just quietly swim back to shore- these amazing people are doing what they can to try and keep you safe on your holidays, so don't dismiss them or their warnings.
The NSRI is your first port of call if someone goes missing in the water, be it a swimmer, board rider or boat. Memorize or write down the time, place and direction that you last saw the missing boat/person and then phone them asap.
They also have a handy app if you are out on the sea boating and run into trouble called SAfeTrx. It works by having certain details of the trip you are taking at sea logged into the app and then if something happens you can hit an emergency button and an emergency contact will be called. They can then call the Maritime Rescue Co-Ordination Centre (MRCC) who will have your trip data over a server (which sends your location to their servers periodically anyway) allowing the NSRI to get to you.
112 - National Emergency from your cell phone.
-Clean up after yourself. Don't leave a giant mound of mess behind you because it's incredibly damaging to our amazing environment that we have and really you can be better than that. If there are not dustbins at the beach, or they are overflowing, bag it and take it home.
-Decant your drinks into anything that is not glass if you can. Ideally I would love everyone to only use reusable glass because it's better for the environment and for our oceans, but you also don't want to be that guy/girl who shatters glass all over the parking lot or on the beach sand so that the rest of us have to spend our holidays pulling out shards of glass bottle from our bleeding feet. Try using a water bottle, or anything that you can use again instead of buying mounds of plastic containers.
-I love music. You love music to I bet. But I might not like what you like, and here we need some mutual human respect. Don't play your soundbox or cell phone at full tilt. Just wear headphones or I'm going to have to strategically kick sand on you.
-Our sweet little four legged friends need to be on leashes. Never mind that on certain beaches if you are caught without your dog on a leash you face a very nice hefty fine. The beaches are going to be full and as much as you love fido, not everyone else wants a wet, hairy canine crashing through their neatly setup beach party. And don't even make me tell you to pick up any mess after you.
-If you are going to smoke, be a nice person and do it down wind or around the corner from the rest of the population. Just because you smoke doesn't mean everyone around you has to as well.
-Man don't you just love playing sports on the beach? Yay for you. But for god's sake, can you and your super selves please not demarcate your rugby field to include the rest of us who are also using the beach for normal activities, like sitting on a towel and eating sandwiches. Unless you are Victor Matfield with your top off I don't want you and your tennis/rugby/cricket/soccer ball crashing through everyone each time you miss.
-Shake that sandy beach towel downwind you heathen.
Right, so now at least after reading this you are going to be leaving for that perfect day out in the sun with hopefully a few more tools than when you started. Have a wonderful time soaking in some sand and sea everyone.


text:
Q: c# how to save an xml file in a different folder than app/bin/debug/ I just wanted to know if there's a way of saving an XML file containing chart data into a specific folder. I've got a button called SAVED that saves a png or jpeg file of the current state of the chart and saves an xml file of this chart in order to load it later. The problem is that that file goes by default into app/bin/debug/myXMLfile.xml
graph.SaveImage(save.FileName, System.Windows.Forms.DataVisualization.Charting.ChartImageFormat.Png);
graph.Serializer.Save(txtNom.Text + "_" + txtPrenom.Text + ".xml");

A: Have you tried giving a specified path by you to the method "save"??
For Ex
graph.Serializer.Save(C:\\txtNom.Text + "_" + txtPrenom.Text + ".xml");

A: I tried with
graph.Serializer.Save(save.FileName+".xml");

but i've got something ugly like myFile.png.xml so i just use the substring method in order to just get hte name of the file without the .png extention and then i add the xml extention. It give something like this
 graph.Serializer.Save(save.FileName.Substring(0,save.FileName.IndexOf('.')) + ".xml");

A: Here is a way to prompt the user for each file using a common function.  You will need to add references to these libraries in your form's code-behind section:
using System.Drawing.Imaging;
using System.IO;

Then add the event handler for the Save button and the common function for prompting the user for full file paths:
    private void btnSave_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
    {
        string imageFilePath = null;
        string dataFilePath = null;
        ImageFormat format = System.Drawing.Imaging.ImageFormat.Png;

        try
        {
            // Image data
            imageFilePath = promptForFilePath("Save Chart image", "PNG Files (*.png)|*.png|JPEG Files (*.jpg,*.jpeg)|*.jpg;*.jpeg|BMP Files (*.bmp)|*.bmp|All Files (*.*)|*.*");

            if (!String.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(imageFilePath))
            {
                switch (Path.GetExtension(imageFilePath).Replace(".", "").ToLower())
                {
                    case "jpeg":
                    case "jpg":
                                format = ImageFormat.Jpeg;
                        break;
                    case "png": format = ImageFormat.Png;
                        break;
                    case "bmp": format = ImageFormat.Bmp;
                        break;
                }

                this.graph.SaveImage(imageFilePath, format);
            }

            // XML data
            dataFilePath = promptForFilePath("Save Chart data","XML Files (*.xml)|*.xml|All Files (*.*)|*.*");

            if (!String.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(dataFilePath)) this.graph.Serializer.Save(dataFilePath);

        }
        catch (Exception ex)
        {
            MessageBox.Show("Error:  " + ex.Message, "btnSave_Click Error", MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Error);
        }
        finally
        {

        }
    }

    string promptForFilePath(string title = "Save File", string fileFilter = "All Files (*.*)|*.*")
    {
        string result = null;
        SaveFileDialog saveFileDialog = null;

        try
        {
            saveFileDialog = new SaveFileDialog();
            saveFileDialog.Title = title;
            saveFileDialog.Filter = fileFilter;

            if(saveFileDialog.ShowDialog(this) == System.Windows.Forms.DialogResult.OK)
            {
                result = saveFileDialog.FileName;
            }
        }
        catch (Exception ex)
        {
            MessageBox.Show("Error:  " + ex.Message, "saveChartData Error", MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Error);
        }
        finally
        {
            if (saveFileDialog != null)
            {
                saveFileDialog.Dispose();
                saveFileDialog = null;
            }
        }

        return result;
    }

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Darren Chester today confirmed reports that three new pieces of debris—two in Mauritius and one in Mozambique—have been found and are of interest in connection to the disappearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has today released a Technical Examination Report into the findings of the examination of debris recovered from beaches in South Africa and Mauritius.
The Federal Government has updated security arrangements for air cargo from Bangladesh, giving Australian businesses more options for trade while maintaining a robust aviation security regime.
Today the Turnbull Government can announce that we will continue long-standing pricing protections for regional airlines in New South Wales (NSW) when they access Sydney's Kingsford Smith Airport.
Australia's updated Aviation State Safety Programme was released by the Australian Government today.
The Government has re-appointed Mr Paul Binsted and appointed Mr Lucio Di Bartolomeo as non-executive directors of the Moorebank Intermodal Company (MIC) for terms of three years each.
Mr Greg Hood has been appointed Chief Commissioner of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) for a five year term commencing from 1 July 2016.
The National Heavy Vehicle Regulator (NHVR) has released Australia's first gazette Notice for Performance Based Standards (PBS) truck and dog combinations.
Federal Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Darren Chester MP has joined road safety advocates in calling on Australians to pause and reflect on the nation's road toll today.
Today the Australian Government marks the launch of 2016 Yellow Ribbon National Road Safety week (NRSW).


When faced with a stain, it's tempting to bust out the sponge and begin scrubbing. But do yourself a favor and take an additional two minutes to plan your attack, as the appropriate technique could mean the difference between a clean carpet and a stain that lingers forever.If you determine to steam clean carpets your self, verify the manufacturer's directions of the carpeting ahead of you do. Cleaning methods can vary by fibre. If you rent a carpet cleaning machine from a nearby property supply store, use the advisable cleaning goods which includes the pre-spot remover for the most visible spots.wide variety of carpet cleaners, priced from £100). When you've covered and cleaned the entire floor, make the room a strictly foot traffic-totally free zone to let it to dry - anything from two to 24 hours as essential - ensuring the space is properly ventilated throughout.The primary cause the spot comes back following you feel it is gone is that there is nevertheless some residual spotting material that you did not get out. There are treatments for this and they are very straightforward. Place cold water into a spray bottle. Spray the location and get it really moist, but not wet. Place a white towel over the dampened spot and place aluminum foil on leading of the towel. Than location some books, or related heavy objects, on leading of the foil. The foil protects the book from absorbing any moisture and becoming broken. Leave these layers in location for 24 hours. The carpet dries from the bottom up and stops on the final surface it comes in contact with, the carpet tips. The towel becomes the final surface and the stain travels into the towel and out of the carpet. In most circumstances, the pesky spot will be gone. If some nevertheless remains, repeat the process in 24 hours. Now you Suggested Studying - Www.Liveinternet.Ru - know why some spots come back.• Right after clearing the carpet Suggested Studying of the excess mashed potatoes, it is now time for you to use a carpet cleaning resolution on the stain. For this, you will need to develop a resolution using white vinegar and water. Take a teaspoon of the former and mix it with a cup of warm water and then use this on the mashed potato stain on the carpet.Some tips recommend mixing vinegar with baking soda. This will not get rid of dirt or stains either. Mixing vinegar with baking soda just creates a foamy salt water paste that then will also require to be removed from the carpet. You can also make your personal oven cleaner to save funds and time.You can add Eucalyptus Oil and water as a cleaning mix. It is a cleaner and disinfectant in itself and it is typically added utilized to perfume the cleaning mix. How about mixing up our personal carpet cleaners - a single for the SPOTS and one for general, ALL More than carpet cleaning.Other posts that might curiosity you:http://paulodaviluccanune.soup.io/post/651605599/Deixe-A-Barriga-Sarada-Com-Estes-6http://betof3206591541.wikidot.com/blog:46http://ojs.upmin.edu.ph/index.php/supplements/comment/view/256/0/17663http://periodicos.unicesumar.edu.br/index.php/saudpesq/comment/view/1700/0/47651http://elsamachado12. Here's more info on suggested Studying visit the site. soup.io/post/655843747/Os-Novos-Cremes-Seca-barrigaFrequent household items which can be employed to clean spots from carpets include dish soap, white vinegar, and ammonia mixed with water. It would be good to have a spray bottle you could place your mixtures into. You will also require paper towels or clean rags, and a brick or other heavy object which will press the paper towel down on the stain in order to absorb it.Mix equal parts hot water and vinegar and pour in your carpet cleaner's reservoir tank. Clean your carpets as per your cleaner's directions. Yes, vinegar may leave a temporary pickle smell in your house but it dissipates and disappears as your carpets dry. I can not take credit for this concoction - it was my specialist carpet cleaner that let me in on this tiny-known secret concoction.Usually, obtaining carpeting cleaned meant utilizing a steam cleaner and spraying a massive quantity of water on your floors. If you mix vinegar with water it is valuable as a organic disinfectant but it is not efficient as a carpet cleaning solution. Spread this mixture more than regions with stains. Let it dry for a couple of hours and removed residue employing a spatula then vacuum excess debris.Always manage carpet correctly and make confident that it receives the correct care and cleaning. Expel dirt each and every now and then to avoid worsening the difficulty. Ammonia and other high alkaline solutions will trigger permanent harm to wool carpet and rugs. Thornton, James "Cleaning Wool Carpets - Guidelines to Keep Your Wool Carpets." Cleaning Wool Carpets - Tips to Preserve Your Wool Carpets. 9 Nov. 2008 1 Might. 2018 .Do not panic if you spill red wine on your white carpet. While the red wine is nonetheless wet, pour some white wine on it to dilute the colour. Then clean the spot with a sponge and cold water. Sprinkle the region with salt and wait about 10 minutes. Now vacuum up the complete mess.


mod_geoip is a module for fast ip/location lookups. It uses MaxMind GeoIP / GeoCity databases.
If the IP was found in the database, the module sets the appropriate environment variables to the request, thus making this information available to other modules/fcgi.
mod_geoip uses two configuration options.
memory for very fast lookups. the only penalty is memory usage.
NOTE: mod_geoip will determine the database type automatically so if you enter GeoCity database path it will load GeoCity Env.
when using fastcgi (not only php) you can access mod_geoip env and do as you please. this example just prints all mod_geoip envs to the client, html.
Currently redirecting based on mod_geoip through the lighttpd config file is possible with some patches: http://trac.lighttpd.net/trac/ticket/1546. An alternative would be to use mod_magnet.


text:
SportsBiz & SportsTech
Breaking Myths
Mental Health Issues in cricket: Beyond depression and unhappiness
By Faraz Nabi
Recently, Glenn Maxwell, Nic Maddinson and Will Pucovski, withdrew from contention to play for Australia. Is the problem to do with cricket, specifically as a sport, and is Australian cricket alone in this battle against mental health?
It is often thought that mental health issues revolve around depression and unhappiness.
My last article centred on this very topic but with the new wave of mental health problems in Australian cricket, I wanted to dive further into this rabbit hole and explore what other psychological ailments plague sport.
Recently, Glenn Maxwell, Nic Maddinson and Will Pucovski, withdrew from contention to play for Australia. Before we look at these specific cases under the microscope, the close proximity of these announcements definitely raises some concerns. Is the problem to do with cricket, specifically as a sport, and is Australian cricket alone in this battle against mental health?
To answer the second question, I don't believe that Australian cricket is alone. However, due to the infrastructure and network available on mental health in Australia.
And the transition of Australian cricket's image as a mentally tough team that sledges to a more calming, supportive squad has enabled whistle-blowers to come up in recent times.
CC by BMN Network (Contact)
The great Indian batsman Virat Kohli also stated at a press conference that after his ill-fated tour of England in 2014, he too suffered from mental health issues but the lack of understanding and awareness in the sub-continent meant that he was unable to take time away from the game and work on these problems.
To answer the first question, in my opinion, mental health issues are not only limited to cricket, but this sport is definitely more prone to these issues.
I believe that athletes of team sports are more vulnerable to mental health problems because they may feel responsible in not only letting themselves down but the entire team as well.
In addition, the gaps between playing and performing are greater in cricket than most sports.
READ: Guy Walker: pro-cricketer, AFL player and retired before the age of 24
A batsman getting out on a golden duck or a bowler bowling an erratic first over that goes for 10-15 runs gets taken out of the attack for the entire match and has to wait till the next match to have any chance at redemption.
Compare this to a sport like tennis where an athlete, after losing a set, can quickly turn their form around and win the next set and match.
Or consider a motorsport driver, who after a poor lap can come back to lead the pack once more.
This gap to earn an opportunity at revival or recovery can cause players to spiral down mentally. Also, when a cricketer has this chance at redemption, they are again under tremendous pressure to perform, knowing the gap between the current match and the next.
CBT aims to combat negativity, self-doubt and low self-image thought patterns in hour-long sessions with a psychologist over many weeks.
In the world of psychology, this sort of problem falls under the anxiety spectrum and is known as performance anxiety.
Now, performance anxiety isn't limited to sport and can affect other things in life such as exams, sexual health etc.
Players suffering from performance anxiety in other areas of life are more likely to have this effect their sport as well. Looking at the Will Pucovski case, it can be speculated that this may be the reason for his withdrawal from contention.
Last summer, Pucovski was all but set to earn a place in the Australian Test squad but revoked his name at the last minute.
This summer, Pucovski was on the verge of a Test match debut against Pakistan after another stellar Sheffield Shield season, averaging 41, but again did not play. The pressure of not performing on his debut series and the fear of failure, before being dropped as a result may have played into Pucovski's mind.
For this reason, Cricket Australia must support Will and give him appropriate treatment such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). CBT aims to combat negativity, self-doubt and low self-image thought patterns in hour-long sessions with a psychologist over many weeks.
A treatment plan similar to this could benefit Will greatly.
CC NAPARAZZI (Contact)
Coming to the case of Glenn Maxwell, he has stated his withdrawal is due to being on the road for the last 18 months.
Working for long periods of time without any appropriate breaks can lead to a lack of motivation and in psychological terms, this is seen as being 'burnt out.'
However, an unlikely but possible differential, in this case, is that Maxwell could potentially be suffering from 'anhedonia' or the inability to feel pleasure in normally pleasurable activities, which is an underlying symptom for depression.
Time will tell which is the case as international and club commitments over the last 18 months finally have taken their toll on Maxwell, who according to coach, Justin Langer, lacked his usual enthusiasm, energy and zip at certain times over the past year.
READ: The Need for Mental Healthcare in Sport
Maxwell's case raises the question about cricket scheduling all around the world and emphasises the need for a greater off-season to ensure cricketers don't fall prey to the 'burnt out phenomenon.'
A little time away from the game, focusing on friends and family should bode well for Maxwell before his eventual return to the Australian Cricket fraternity.
Lastly, the case of Nic Maddinson is unrelated to cricket as off-field issues were behind his withdrawal.
The Maddinson case is just another example of how problems away from sport can have an impact on an athlete's career.
Due to the privacy of these matters, it is difficult to reflect on this specific case in detail. But targeting these specific issues hands-on will be key in ensuring Maddinson's return to the Australian domestic circuit.
CC by Joeyjackets
Other on-field mental health issues include the impact of an injury on a player's mind.
One prominent example is the case of Stuart Broad, whose nose broke from a Varun Aaron bouncer in 2014. Broad, who was a decent lower-order batsman with test match centuries to his name, really suffered from his confidence after this incident.
Broad had nightmares of the bouncer, which is an underlying symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Although with psychological help, Broad was able to recover, but his batting was never the same again.
Another cricketer who struggled with mental demons against the bouncer was Pakistani opener, Ahmed Shahzad. He suffered a facial fracture in the Abu Dhabi Test against New Zealand in 2014 due to a Corey Anderson surprise bouncer. Shahzad has admitted to problems with the bouncer after this incident as well.
The Pakistani top-order batsman was in career-best form, at the time, averaging 48 in Test cricket, 34 in ODIs and 27 in T20Is, before his average fell to 41, 32 and 25, respectively, after the incident.
Additionally, after being hit, Shahzad has only scored 1 international century. If he had received CBT or de-sensitization therapy, which includes graded exposure to the stressful stimulus to induce slow de-sensitization, he could've potentially have reached the same heights he once did.
CC by Nic Redhead (Contact)
Both these examples stress the importance of mental recovery from injuries to revitalise performances and eventually, careers as well.
Concluding this article, I would like to again highlight the importance of mental health in sport, this time for problems such as anxiety, motivational issues and PTSD and advocate further for increased research, funds and effort for this branch of sports medicine.
A physical injury would prompt immediate care and attention, so why not the same for the injuries of the mind?
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the official views of Sportageous or its founders. Assumptions made within the article are not reflective of the position of Sportageous as an organisation and its founders.
Faraz Nabi is a young doctor and an aspiring psychiatrist, merging both his passions for sport and mental health in this piece.
For more articles like this, visit Sportageous.
Faraz Nabi
Faraz Nabi, an aspiring psychiatrist and passionate sports fan who struggles to ball pace, rip forehands or score goals, but has just enough IQ to breakdown any play in most sports. Tweets - @fnabi2
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Site::Fermi]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.3232 seconds.
ENS 53883 19 February 2019 15:19:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 On February 19, 2019, at 1307 EST, with the reactor at 100 percent Core Thermal Power and steady state conditions, plant personnel notified the Main Control Room that both doors in the Secondary Containment Airlock on the Reactor Building Fifth Floor were opened simultaneously for a period of approximately five minutes (i.e., from 1253 to 1258 EST). The failure of this interlock, which is intended to prevent both doors from being opened simultaneously, resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 not being met. The maximum Secondary Containment pressure observed during that time remained within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring Secondary Containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.3 is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The repair to the failed interlock is in progress. As a compensatory measure signs are posted on the doors to notify personnel to not access the Reactor Building via those doors.
ENS 53830 16 January 2019 18:38:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 At 0900 EST on 01/16/2019, it was discovered that a licensee manager intentionally failed to re-approve the list of individuals granted unescorted access to verify each individual was subject to a behavioral observation program. Compensatory actions have been taken in response to this event. Personnel affected have had their access authorization suspended. This is reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3) as an intentional act that casts doubt on the integrity of the Fitness-For-Duty program. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
On 01/11/2019 at 0958 EST, the Fermi 2 Active Seismic Monitoring system was taken out of service for planned maintenance. During the maintenance activity, the Active Seismic Monitoring System failed a planned surveillance test and was not restored to operability within 72 hours. Compensatory measures to provide alternative methods for event classification of a seismic event were implemented in accordance with the Fermi 2 Emergency Plan procedures prior to the start of the planned maintenance outage. The planned outage time to restore operability exceeded 72 hours on January 14th, 2019, at 0958 EST. Repairs have been completed, the Active Seismic Monitoring System has been declared Functional at 1037 EST, January 14th, 2019, and declared Operable at 1109 EST, January 14th, 2019.
The loss of the Active Seismic Monitoring System is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the United States Geological Survey (USGS) recorded no seismic activity in the area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Femi 2 has two seismic monitors, one on the Reactor Pressure Vessel Pedestal and one in the High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) room. Only the HPCI room monitor was inoperable.
ENS 53822 11 January 2019 10:07:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 A non-licensed employee disclosed that he had previously used illegal drugs. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 53811 1 January 2019 11:02:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 On January 1, 2019 at approximately 0454 EST, while performing planned maintenance activities on the Feedwater Distributed Control System (FW DCS), it was discovered that the automatic trip instrumentation of the Gland Seal Exhauster (GSE) was inoperable. The automatic GSE trip is assumed in the safety analysis for the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) and is required when Thermal Power is less than or equal to 10%. The automatic trip function of the GSE was inoperable for 1 minute, 19 seconds. No Control Rod movement occurred while the automatic trip of the GSE was inoperable. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees and there was no radiological release. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO MECHANICAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER FAN BRAKE INVERTER FAILURE At 0935 EST on December 4, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Fermi 2 is in a 14-day LCO for inoperability of HPCI and a 72-hour LCO for UHS inoperability.
The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 53772 made on December 4, 2018. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and site Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed further. An evaluation determined that TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.9 for barriers could be applied to the MDCT fan brakes. As a result of applying TS LCO 3.0.9 to the MDCT fan brakes, it was not necessary to declare the UHS inoperable. With the Division 2 UHS operable on December 4, 2018, the HPCI system was also operable. With HPCI operable, there was no event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Therefore, EN 53772 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron).
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO MODIFICATION NOT ADDED TO PROCEDURE On November 1, 2018, at approximately 1300 EDT, Fermi 2 identified that a Station Blackout (SBO) procedure was deficient as a result of a modification installed during a recent refueling outage. A review identified that the performance of the SBO procedure could have resulted in a challenge to having an alternate AC source available within one hour as outlined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) 8.4.2. The alternate AC source was always available to be manually aligned in accordance with other standard operating procedures. The modification did not affect the function for Appendix R alternative shutdown. Immediate actions are underway to revise the impacted procedure. The health and safety of the public was not affected as offsite power has remained available since the modification was installed. Investigation into the cause and corrective actions is ongoing. Fermi 2 is reporting this event as an unanalyzed condition pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on November 1, 2018 (EN 53712) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Subsequent to the initial notification, the event, site procedures, and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) were reviewed further. The evaluation determined that at the time of the event, there were multiple methods defined in existing station procedures to establish an available alternate AC source within one hour as outlined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) 8.4.2. Under these circumstances, the event does not represent an unanalyzed condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Therefore, EN 53712 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer).
ENS 53674 19 October 2018 10:00:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 On 10/19/2018, at approximately 0400 EDT, during an investigation into a failed surveillance test for a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) coincident with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), it was identified that the Engineered Safety System Bus degraded voltage relay scheme contained a time delay setting that could inhibit all Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) pumps from automatically starting and operating during a LOP/LOCA, thus making LPCI incapable of meeting its functional requirement of automatic startup and operation regardless of the availability of offsite power supply (UFSAR Section 6.3.1.4 and Tech. Spec. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.17). The condition was identified during the first-time performance of a revised surveillance procedure for a LOP coincident with a LOCA signal. Fermi is currently in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) and LPCI auto start on a LOP/LOCA signal is not required. However, the initial investigation identified the condition likely existed in the past during modes of operation where LPCI auto start on LOP/LOCA was required. Investigation into the cause and corrective actions is ongoing. Since LPCI auto start is not required at the time of discovery (Mode 4), this event is being reported pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(b). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
At 0745 EDT on August 24, 2018, the Active Seismic Monitoring System failed a planned surveillance test and was declared inoperable. Compensatory measures to provide alternative methods for event classification of a seismic event have been implemented in accordance with the Fermi 2 Emergency Plan procedures. The compensatory measures include the use of information provided by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to confirm if an earthquake has occurred within a 100 mile radius. The loss of the Active Seismic Monitoring System is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the USGS recorded no seismic activity in the area. The NRC Resident Inspector bas been notified.
After further review the Active Seismic Monitoring system was removed from service for planned maintenance for a duration less than 72 hours with appropriate compensatory measures established. Therefore, no major loss of emergency assessment capability occurred. In addition, the surveillance tests were re-performed and the Active Seismic Monitoring System was declared Operable. Therefore, no reportable condition existed and EN 53562 reported on August 24, 20I8 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Hanna).
ENS 53554 21 August 2018 12:25:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 At 08/20/2018 at 1856 (EDT), it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a test specified by the FFD (fitness for duty) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 53537 3 August 2018 14:10:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 At 0940 EDT on August 3, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 53429 27 May 2018 12:42:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On May 27, 2018 at 0630 EDT, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation Differential Flow - High function was declared inoperable as a result of indicating downscale. This condition would have prevented the primary containment isolation valves for the RWCU system from automatically isolating on a high differential flow instrumentation signal. At 0753, RWCU was shutdown and the affected penetration flow paths were isolated in accordance with station procedures per Fermi Technical Specifications. The cause of the event is under investigation. There was no radiological release associated with this event. All other RWCU primary containment isolation instrumentation functions remained operable and the associated RWCU system primary containment isolation valves were capable of being remotely closed by the control room operators throughout the event. However, the condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 53385 4 May 2018 16:20:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 1412 EDT, a portable chemical toilet was found tipped over. Approximately 1 gallon of contents spilled to gravel only. A notification to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and local health department is required, as well as a press release. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1040 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed on RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) Level 3 following a loss of the Division 1 Station System Transformer (SST) #64. All control rods fully inserted. HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) automatically started as designed on Reactor Water Level (RWL) 2 and restored RWL. The lowest RWL reached was 101.8 inches (above Top of Active Fuel). HPCI injected for approximately 35 seconds. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with RCIC. No Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of SST #64 continues. At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in the actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical. Following the loss of power and reactor scram, the Division 2 EECW (Emergency Equipment Cooling Water) Temperature Control Valve (TCV) controller was in Emergency Manual and maintaining max cooling. Operators placed the controller in Auto and the TCV is controlling normally. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via Division 2 steam dumps to the condenser. The plant is in a modified shutdown electric lineup with offsite power available and stable. Emergency diesel generators did automatically start and load.
This update provides additional clarification of the applicable reporting criteria for this event associated with Primary Containment Isolation Actuations. All isolations and actuations for RWL (Groups 4, 13, and 15) and RWL 2 (Groups 2, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18) occurred as expected. This report is also being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B): RPS, HPCI, and RCIC. RPV pressure is being maintained by the bypass valves to the main condenser. All actuations that occurred were fully completed and restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).
This update provides additional information regarding the specified system actuations and an additional applicable reporting criteria. The loss of Division 1 Station System Transformer (SST) #64 at 1040 EDT on 4/14/2018 resulted in the automatic initiation of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 11 and 12. The EDGs started as expected and continue to supply their associated busses. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as an event or condition that resulted in a valid actuation of any system listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), including EDGs. In addition, the loss of the Division 1 SST #64 resulted in the expected transfer from the normal to alternate power source for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) swing bus, rendering LPCI loop select inoperable. The alternate power source continued to energize the LPCI swing bus throughout the event until the system was realigned to the normal power source at 1239 EDT on 4/14/2018. This condition is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).
ENS 53236 1 March 2018 13:53:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 A non-licensed, supervisory employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random test. The employee's unescorted access was terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 53214 15 February 2018 17:36:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 A can of alcohol (8.4 ounces) was discovered unopened in a refrigerator inside the protected area. Site security took possession of the can of alcohol. The owner of the can of alcohol is unknown. This report is being made under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) as a 24 hour telephone notification. The can had an expiration date of April 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Regional Inspector.
ENS 53178 22 January 2018 15:09:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 1115 EST, on 1/22/18, Fermi 2 determined that the site was in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit due to an oil sheen being observed in a overflow canal that had breached the installed oil booms and entered navigable waterways. Approximately 5-10 gallons of oil has reached navigable water, which resulted in exceeding State limits. The oil is currently contained with no additional leakage to navigable waters and cleanup is in progress. The cause of the oil entering the overflow canal is under investigation. Reports will be made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and other local agencies. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee has notified the National Response Center.
ENS 53165 11 January 2018 16:06:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On January 11, 2018, at 1041 EST, a planned train swap of the Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (RBHVAC) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for less than one minute. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.117 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge per TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1 by starting Division 1 of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) in addition to the RBHVAC system already in operation. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable. Secondary containment was declared Operable at 1045 EST. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 52958 9 September 2017 15:04:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 1000 EDT on September 9, 2017, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident based on a loss of a single train safety system. The licensee entered two (2) LCO Action Statements (AS); 14-day LCO AS 3.5.1 for ECCS (HPCI Inoperable) and 72-hour AS 3.7.2 for UHS. The licensee has two spare inverters on-site. After replacement and successful post-maintenance testing the licensee expects to exit both AS before 72-hours. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 52859 14 July 2017 15:45:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 This telephone notification, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system which occurred during the most recent refueling outage at Fermi 2. On 3/24/2017, at approximately 1548 EDT, when synchronizing an emergency diesel generator (EDG) to the grid during testing, an electrical perturbation occurred. Further investigation found that the EDG was slightly out of phase when it was attempted to be synchronized to the grid. The electrical perturbation resulted in an unexpected half-scram of Reactor Protection System (RPS) A and actuation (closure) of some containment isolation valves. The actuations were invalid as they were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Fermi 2 was shut down for a refueling outage at the time, and therefore, the half-scram of RPS A occurred after the safety function had already been completed. Containment isolation valves actuated (closed) in Division 1 of the Torus Water Management, Drywell Pneumatics, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps systems. All valves operated as expected. Since containment isolation valves in more than one system were actuated by this perturbation, this event constitutes an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the system listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 52837 1 July 2017 17:35:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 1420 EDT on 7/1/17, Fermi 2 determined that the site was in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit due to chemical addition pumps (for the cooling tower reservoir) being out of service for approximately seventeen hours. This resulted in sodium hypochlorite concentrations exceeding state limits. As of 0855 EDT (on) 7/1/17, the levels of sodium hypochlorite were restored to less than measureable values. Reports will be made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and other local agencies. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified Monroe County.
On May 2, 2017, while performing a past operability review associated with Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1, it was determined that a past configuration of CTG 11-1 could not have assured all of the applicable Appendix R success criteria under all of the postulated scenarios described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). From November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 when Mode 4 was entered, CTG 11-1 was in a configuration where it could not be started from the dedicated shutdown panel, although it could be started locally. One of the specific scenarios for Appendix R in the UFSAR credits CTG 11-1 to support a safe shutdown based on an assumed time required to start CTG 11-1 and then provide flow to the reactor pressure vessel using the Standby Feedwater System. During the time period where CTG 11-1 could only be started locally, this assumed time would have been exceeded. Therefore, this event is being reported as an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, CTG 11-1 was fully operable and the described condition had already been corrected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on May 2, 2017 (EN 52724) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The notification to the NRC involved an event where Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1 could only be started locally such that required operator actions during an Appendix R safe shutdown scenario could be delayed. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event, additional site documentation, and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) were reviewed further. lt was verified that Fermi 2 procedures contained actions to ensure Appendix R safe shutdown capability under the plant conditions during the relevant time period. A time validation study was performed (May 9, 2017) which verified that the operator actions could have been completed within the time described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for initiating Standby Feedwater flow to the reactor pressure vessel. In addition, a review of the supporting design calculation identified margin in the required time described in the UFSAR. Based on this information, the condition of CTG 11-1 during the time period from November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 would not have prevented compliance with the Appendix R safe shutdown requirements. Under these circumstances, the event does not represent an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) per the guidance in NUREG-1022. Therefore, EN 52724 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron).
On March 30, 2017 at 1710 EDT, with Reactor Building HVAC in service maintaining normal building pressure, Reactor Building pressure began to rise for an unknown reason. The Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met for approximately 50 seconds. Division 1 Standby Gas Treatment System was started and returned Secondary Containment pressure to the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). The highest pressure observed on the Main Control Room indications was 0.105 inches of vacuum water gauge. During the event, Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) were in progress. Actions to immediately suspend OPDRVs were taken. Investigation of the cause of the event is in progress. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on March 30, 2017 (EN 52651). The notification to the NRC involved an event where secondary containment momentarily exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) requirements during refueling activities which had been designated as operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). The notification was made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an 'event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to ... control the release of radioactive material.' Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) were reviewed further. At the time of the event, Fermi 2 was shutdown (Mode 5. Refueling). In Mode 5, the pressures and temperatures that could cause a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are not present. No movement of fuel was in progress such that the fuel handling accident (FHA) was also not applicable. Thus secondary containment was only required per TS 3.6.4.1 due to the ongoing OPDRVs. The Fermi 2 UFSAR does not describe OPDRVs as an accident that secondary containment is required to mitigate. Based on this information, secondary containment was not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident as described in the UFSAR during the event on March 30, 2017. Under these circumstances, the momentary exceedance of TS requirements for secondary containment is not considered a loss of safety function under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) per the guidance in NUREG-1022. Therefore, EN 52651 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) is required to be submitted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Cameron).
ENS 52481 10 January 2017 22:50:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On January 10, 2017, at approximately 2040 EST, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned. The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 2040 EST. The quantity of the spill is estimated to be five gallons. The spill contacted the ground but did not reach any waterways or storm drains. Cleanup efforts are in progress. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On December 15, 2016, at 1010 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.044 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4. 1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).
On December 14, 2016, starting at 2345 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0300 EST on December 15, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On December 14, 2016, at 1314 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.07 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 52430 14 December 2016 11:20:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 0945 EST on 12/14/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sanitary sewer system leaking through a covered manhole in the Owner Controlled Area. Approximately 100 gallons of the sewage has entered the storm drain system. The sewage leak was stopped at 1030. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The cause and extent of the sewage teak is under investigation. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On November 28, 2016, starting at 2105 hrs. EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0055 EST on November 29, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On November 29, 2016, at 0242 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times following the initial event notification. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure to within TS limits. High wind conditions are expected to decrease throughout the day. If additional instances are identified that require entry into the Technical Specifications (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met, another follow up notification will be performed. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).
On November 19, 2016, starting at 2150 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0430 EST, high wind conditions have subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On November 20, 2016, starting at 0654 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met on multiple different occasions as of event notification update time. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. Fermi 2 continues to remain in a gale force wind advisory for the local area of Lake Erie. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.
On November 20, 2016, at 1426 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second. The Fermi 2 local area of Lake Erie is no longer in a gale force wind advisory and the high wind conditions have subsided. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.
ENS 52364 14 November 2016 14:01:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 1106 EST on 11/14/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sewage leak from a temporary restroom trailer that had reached a permeable gravel surface. The majority of the spill was confined to the impermeable surface below the restroom trailer. lt was estimated that the quantity of the spill which reached the permeable gravel surface was less than approximately 5 gallons. None of the sewage entered the storm drain system. The source of the sewage leak was eliminated by 1126 EST. A local sanitary contractor will be contacted to respond to the site to clean the affected areas. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environment.al Quality, the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 52342 2 November 2016 15:05:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On November 2, 2016, while performing a re-evaluation of the radiological consequences of the Fermi 2 control rod drop accident (CRDA), DTE Electric Company (DTE) identified a non-conservatism in the current Fermi 2 design and licensing basis of the CRDA. As described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 15.4.9, the current design and licensing basis assumes that the post-CRDA release pathway consists of carryover with steam to the turbine condenser. The re-evaluation has identified that a forced release from the gland seal exhausters (GSEs) could also occur which could result in post-CRDA radiological consequences that exceed the current 10 CFR 100.11 offsite dose limits and Standard Review Plan 6.4 (General Design Criterion 19) main control room dose limits when operating at low power conditions. The unanalyzed condition described above only applies to low power operating conditions (i.e. less than 10% power) since the fuel damage postulated as a result of a CRDA is only credible under low power operating conditions when an individual control rod worth is high. Fermi 2 is currently at 97% power and, therefore, the plant condition is currently bounded by the design and licensing basis such that the condition currently does not exist and no immediate actions are required. However, Fermi 2 has operated at low power levels several times in the past three years. Those periods of operation at low power represent unanalyzed conditions that significantly degraded plant safety since the occurrence of a CRDA during those periods could have resulted in offsite and main control room doses exceeding regulatory limits. Therefore, this 8-hour notification is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 52331 28 October 2016 21:58:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On October 28, 2016, at 1500 EDT, the Standby Liquid Control system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.7 Condition B was entered due to sodium pentaborate concentration not within limits. Standby Liquid Control sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be low outside of the acceptable region following a Standby Liquid Control system tank high level alarm in the Main Control Room. Sodium pentaborate was added to the Standby Liquid Control tank by chemistry personnel and the concentration was then verified to be acceptable. Standby Liquid Control was declared Operable on 10/28/16 at 1935 EDT. The cause of the out-of-acceptable concentration was due to make-up water leaking by a closed valve. (The licensee cycled this valve and closed an upstream valve.) Declaring the Standby Liquid Control system inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (C), and (D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On October 26, 2016, at 2300 EDT, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 2300 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. A review indicates that this condition occurred earlier this shift during the high wind condition. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector .
In Event Notification (EN) 52202 on August 25, 2016, Fermi 2 identified an unanalyzed condition related to the inoperability of Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans due to nonfunctionality of the associated brakes that occurred on April 6, 2016. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) reservoir and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The EN noted that a past operability review was in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional resulted in additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the: three years prior to August 25, 2016. On August 31, 2016 at 1950 EDT, the past operability review identified five additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the past three years. These five instances are being reported in one EN since they are related and were all discovered and reported within 8 hours. Although these instances are related to the one previously reported in EN 52202, they are being reported in a new EN due to the time elapsed since EN 52202. The MDCT fans and fan brakes are currently operable. 1) February 2016 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0936 EST to 1344 EST on February 25, 2016. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage in Division 2. 2) March 2015 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1000 EDT on March 23, 2015, until 1447 EDT on April 9, 2015. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 systems, structures, or components (SSCs) out of service during a forced outage. 3) February 2014 - The Division 2 MDCT fan 'B' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1118 EST to 1529 EST on February 20, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'B' brake coincided with various Division 1 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage. 4) February 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1747 EST on February 14, 2014, until 1514 EST on February 24, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage. 5) January 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0915 EST on January 24, 2014, until 1537 EST on January 31, 2014. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with approximately 30 hours where various Division 2 safety-related SSCs were inoperable. The occurrences discussed above resulted in unanalyzed conditions because the plant configuration when equipment in one division was inoperable while a MCDT fan brake was nonfunctional in the opposite division would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The licensee is RETRACTING item 1 only of the 5 events listed above: 1) February 2016 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0936 EST to 1344 EST on February 25, 2016. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage in Division 2. Fermi 2 is retracting item 1 of the 8-hour event notification made on August 31, 2016, at 2332 EDT, (EN #52214). EN #52214 originally reported a non-functionality of the Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake on February 25, 2016, as an unanalyzed condition due to it coinciding with a Division 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that although the intermediate nitrogen bottle pressure was below its required limit, the pressure in the main nitrogen bottle was sufficient to ensure that the MDCT fan 'A' brake could have performed its intended function in the event of a tornado. Since the MDCT fan 'A' brake was determined to be functional, the MDCT fan 'A', the associated Division 1 UHS reservoir, and the Division 1 EDGs were all operable at that time. Therefore, no unanalyzed condition existed on February 25, 2016. The other four items (2-5) included in EN #52214 are not being retracted and are still considered unanalyzed conditions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth).
On August 27, 2016, at 1500 EDT a severe thunderstorm occurred in Monroe County, including the Fermi 2 site. Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 1540 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 52202 25 August 2016 21:39:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 1629 EDT on August 25, 2016, it was determined that a Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fan should be declared inoperable if its associated fan brake is nonfunctional. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). Currently, the MDCT fans and fan brakes are operable. A past operability evaluation is being performed and has initially identified that from 0855 EDT to 1738 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 1 'A' fan brake was nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Additionally, from 0856 EDT on April 6, 2016, to 1641 EDT on April 7, 2016, the Division 1 'C' fan brake was also nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Therefore, the Division 1 UHS and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) would have been inoperable. During this time, at 1347 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 2 EDG 14 was inoperable for 22 seconds for a planned testing. This resulted in an unanalyzed condition because the plant configuration during the 22 seconds when EDG 14 was inoperable would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. A past operability review is in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional results in any additional instances of unanalyzed condition within the past three years. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 52149 2 August 2016 20:33:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 1612 EDT on 08/02/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sanitary sewer system leak from underground lines beneath the parking lot near Warehouse B. Some of the sewage has entered the storm drain system. The sewage leak was stopped at approximately 1730 EDT. The duration and quantity of the spill is unknown. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 52146 2 August 2016 14:42:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On August 2, 2016 at 1015 EDT, while restoring the east train of Reactor Building HVAC (RBHVAC) after a surveillance test on Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met for a duration time of approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.120 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit by RBHVAC and SGTS already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The cause of the event is under investigation. The TS requirement is to maintain secondary containment vacuum greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident lnspector.
ENS 52085 14 July 2016 13:01:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 At 0915 EDT on July 14, 2016, Fermi 2 Environmental Engineering determined that a notification to the State of Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Bureau of Fire Services, Storage Tank Division is required regarding discovery of a leaking underground fuel oil storage tank. The underground fuel oil storage tank was unearthed while excavating for 120kv switchyard cable replacements. This is an underground fuel oil storage tank from the 1950s or earlier was not in service at the site, and it is unknown when the tank was last used. The size of the tank is estimated at 2,250 gallons. An unknown quantity of oil has leaked into the immediate surrounding ground and is currently contained in the soil. There is currently no indication of any of the leakage flowing beyond the site boundary or reaching any waterways. Fermi 2 is conducting an investigation to determine the appropriate steps to address the storage tank and impacted soil. A notification to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is not required. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency will be made. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On July 13, 2016, at 19:50 EDT a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 20:40 EDT secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On July 8 2016, at 19:09 (EDT) a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to the high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met two times during the storm for a duration time of 2 seconds total (one second for each event). At 20:05:21 Secondary Containment pressure went positive (0.22 inches of water gauge) and at 20:05:22 returned back below plant TS limits (-0.35 inches of water gauge). At 20:06:33 Secondary Containment pressure went greater than TS limits (-0.10 inches of water gauge) and at 20:06:34 returned below TS limits (-0.28 inches of water gauge). All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned the secondary containment pressure below the TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The severe thunderstorm warning for the area was cancelled at 20:30. The TS requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 52002 13 June 2016 13:21:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 A non-licensee employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On January 6, 2016, at approximately 1514 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the East and West Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) automatically opened for 3 minutes and 32 seconds in response to the number one High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) drifting from full open to 25 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.0 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valves closed. Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were not declared inoperable since the functions were verified to remain enabled. Since the RPS functions were not declared inoperable, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, after further evaluation, it was determined that this event met the reporting criterion. Accordingly, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve drifting was due to an actuator malfunction that has since been corrected. This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51756 for a similar event that occurred on 02/21/16.
Upon further review, it was determined that this event also meets the reporting criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Although this event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16, it met the reporting requirement on the date of the event (01/06/2016). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Valos).
On February 21, 2015, at approximately 0030 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the West Turbine Bypass Valve (TBV) automatically opened in response to the number two High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) cycling from full open to closed and then to 22 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.5 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valve closed. Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were declared inoperable. The Limiting Condition for Operation was exited at 0031 EST following TBV closure. Since the RPS functions were verified to remain enabled, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, this event was subsequently determined to meet the reporting criterion and is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve cycling was due to a communication card failure that has since been corrected. This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51755 for a similar event that occurred on 01/06/16.
Upon further review, it was determined that this event also meets the reporting criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Although this event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16, it met the reporting requirement on the date of the event (02/21/2015). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Valos).
ENS 51676 23 January 2016 00:20:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 While performing a Technical Specification surveillance functional test of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump and valve surveillance, the Division 1 LPCI outboard Isolation Valve E1150F017A was closed for stroke time testing and would not reopen. Not being able to be open this valve renders the LPCI Loop Select function inoperable. Time of the event was 1935 (EST). This inoperability of LPCI loop Select results in entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. Power reduction activities were briefed at time 2020, however, no power reduction commenced due to resolving the issue with the LPCI outboard Isolation Valve E1150F017A. During the investigation there was a loose screw found preventing the close contactor from fully releasing and allowing the open contactor to engage. No other abnormalities were found during this investigation. This screw was removed and the close contactor functioned normally and the valve was opened. The valve was retested satisfactory and the station exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 2145. This report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 51535 12 November 2015 18:59:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On 11/12/2015 at approximately 1500 EST, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to the state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned. The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 1440 EST. The contents and exact quantity of the spill are unknown but the toilet has a capacity of 60 gallons. The spill contacted the ground but did not reach any waterways. Cleanup efforts are in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.
ENS 51516 5 November 2015 10:32:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On November 5, 2015 at approximately 1000 EST, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service for planned maintenance on the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) vital bus power supply. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) resides on the IPCS platform and will be out of service and unavailable to Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) during the time that IPCS is removed from service. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored, including SPDS to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the IPCS and SPDS unavailability. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, as described in NEI 13-01. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 51449 4 October 2015 14:16:00 Fermi NRC Region 3 GE-4 On October 4th, at approximately 0956 EDT, 'Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Pressure Vessel' (OPDRV) was unintentionally initiated without secondary containment operable. Operators promptly identified the condition and immediately initiated actions to identify and suspend the source of the drain path. At approximately 1120 EDT the source of the OPDRV was isolated. Reactor cavity water level and spent fuel pool level remained constant throughout the event. An investigation is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.