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January 19, 2021 January 20, 2021 / CPR Staff	/ Leave a comment
By Krzysztof Wierzbowski and Aleksander Szostak
In line with the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (referred to here as the "CJEU") in Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia (the Achmea Decision) and the political declaration issued by the governments of the European Union member states on Jan. 15, 2019, most of the EU member states, with the exception of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland, have entered into a plurilateral treaty for the termination of bilateral investment treaties between the EU Member States (referred to in this article as "intra-EU BITs" and the Termination Treaty).
The Termination Treaty was signed on May 5, 2020, and entered into force on Aug. 29, 2020. See Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT] (available at http://bit.ly/3iqsTn3).
Portugal, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have made the following formal declarations concerning the Termination Treaty:
"Luxembourg calls upon the European Commission and all member states to start, without any delay, a process with the aim to ensure complete, strong and effective protection of investments within the EU and adequate instruments in this regard." It requests the European Commission to create a plan for such a process. Declaration of Luxembourg to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
Portugal appears to endorse a view similar to that of Luxembourg and emphasizes its "support to the intensifying of the discussions between the European Commission and Member States with the aim of better ensuring a sound and effective protection of investments within the European Union. To this end, calls to assess the establishment of new or better tools under European Union law and to carry out an assessment of the current dispute settlement mechanisms which are essential to ensure legal certainty and the protection of interests of investors." Declaration of Portugal to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
The Dutch government confirms that although the Achmea Decision does not affect the Caribbean parts of the Netherlands (as Overseas Countries and Territories), BITs concluded with those territories shall also be terminated pursuant to the Termination Treaty. In this sense and irrespective of the Achmea Decision, the effects of the Termination Treaty will extend to all parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Declaration of the Netherlands to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
So what will be the fate of intra-EU BITs and intra-EU investment arbitration?
The conclusion of the Termination Treaty is a direct consequence of the Achmea Decision, in which the CJEU declared that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (the "ISDS") clauses in intra-EU BITs are not compatible with the EU law. (The decision is available at http://bit.ly/2Kf8OmM.)
In general, the Termination Treaty is based on the premise that all intra-EU BITs shall be terminated and their sunset clauses, providing for the temporarily continued protection of investments existing prior to the termination of the relevant BIT, shall be terminated together with the respective intra-EU BIT and thereby shall not produce legal effects.
Furthermore, it stipulates that new intra-EU investor-state arbitrations may not be initiated and that pending proceedings shall be subject to the management procedure described below.
Interestingly, the Termination Treaty does not resolve the issue of application and compatibility with the EU law of the Energy Charter Treaty (the "ECT") in the intra-EU investment protection context. In particular, the Termination Treaty stipulates that it does not cover intra-EU arbitrations initiated based on ECT Article 26 and that this issue will be dealt with at a later stage. Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT] at 2. The ECT is available at http://bit.ly/3nUL2u7.
Considering that in recent years we have witnessed rise of the number of intra-EU ECT arbitrations, the uncertainty introduced by the Termination Treaty may put the parties engaged in pending arbitrations, or anticipating initiation of new proceedings pursuant to ECT Article 26, in an adverse position. See,. e.g., Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/45, Decision on the Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection [25 February 2019]; Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018]; Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Award [16 May 2018]; Statistics of ECT Cases (as of Oct. 23, 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/3oGCeJz).
Notably, as argued by the Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe in his recently issued opinion in joined cases C‑798/18 and C‑799/18, the ECT ISDS clause does not apply in the intra-EU context, and the ECT may be entirely inapplicable to intra-EU proceedings. This indicates that if the CJEU follows the Advocate General's reasoning, EU investors may be deprived of procedural and substantive protection under the ECT in the intra-EU relations. Joined Cases C 798/18 and C 799/18, Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe [29 October 2020] (available at http://bit.ly/3bEYEHk).
Management of the pending intra-EU proceedings
Pending proceedings, defined as intra-EU investment arbitration proceedings initiated prior to March 6, 2018—the Achmea Decision linked above–and which have not ended with a settlement agreement or with a final award issued prior to March 6, 2018, where the award was duly executed prior to March 6, 2018, or the award was set aside or annulled before August 29, 2020, shall in principle be subject to the so-called Structured Dialogue, which is a mechanism that aims to assist disputing parties in finding an amicable settlement of a dispute. Art. 1(4) and (5) and Art. 9 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
The settlement procedure is overseen by an impartial facilitator who shall find an amicable, lawful, and fair out-of-court and out-of-arbitration settlement of the dispute. Settlement of the dispute shall in principle be reached within six months. Art. 9 (1) – (14) Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT]. It can be observed that the mechanism resembles investor-state mediation.
Going a step further, the Termination Treaty implements an option for investors engaged in pending arbitrations to seek judicial remedies under national law before domestic courts against the host state measure contested in such arbitration proceedings. This option is available to investors under the condition that they withdraw pending arbitration proceedings and waive rights and claims under the relevant intra-EU BIT, or renounce execution of the issued award and commit to refrain from instituting any new arbitration proceedings. Art. 10 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT]. In such case, limitation periods would not apply to bringing legal action before domestic courts.
This may have a severe impact on the prospect of lodging a successful claim against a state by the investor, since the legal framework of intra-EU BITs that provided a substantive and procedural legal basis in a pending arbitration will not be applicable in domestic court proceedings.
Doubtful recognition and enforcement of awards
Decisions and/or awards issued in pending, or, as the case may be, new arbitration proceedings may not be effective, because the Termination Treaty stipulates that contracting states shall, in case of domestic court proceedings, request the domestic court, including in any third country, to set the arbitral award aside, annul it, or to refrain from recognizing and enforcing it. Art. 7 (b) Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
This raises a threat to the effectiveness of guarantees provided under, among others, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the "ICSID Convention").
It can be recalled that ICSID Convention Article 54 stipulates that each contracting state shall recognize an award rendered by an ICSID Tribunal as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of a court where recognition is sought. This unique recognition mechanism does not leave room for any ground on which the recognition could be refused.
Considering a rather likely scenario in which a domestic court of an EU member state is faced with a request for recognition of award or decision issued by a tribunal in an intra-EU investment arbitration case, it can be noted that such domestic court will need to resolve uncertain and complex situation concerning the conflict of treaty norms. The domestic court will need to decide whether to recognize the award, or issue a decision in accordance with the ICSID Convention, or to comply with the EU law and refuse recognition and thereby, to undermine the ICSID Convention.
Although not addressed in the Termination Treaty, it appears that the CJEU argument in the Achmea Decision regarding incompatibility of the ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs with the EU law may potentially extend to extra-EU BITs and arbitrations between EU members states and investors from third states.
Clearly, arbitrations initiated on a basis of ISDS clauses contained in such BITs may concern treatment of investors from third states investing in the EU, and therefore the subject matter of such arbitrations may relate to interpretation and application of the EU law.
Such arbitrations may also pose a risk to the proper interpretation and application of the EU law and have an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU law. See Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018]. Such reasoning, if followed, which is rather unlikely, would further deepen the crisis concerning European Union investment treaty arbitration.
It might be further noted that the competence of the court where the arbitration is seated to set aside the arbitration award may lead to the situation where such court would be a non-EU court and would not be bound by the Termination Treaty.
Furthermore, the winning investor may seek to have the arbitration award recognized and enforced in a non-EU jurisdiction where the defendant's assets are located.
Taming the lion: The tendency of arbitral tribunals
to reject intra-EU jurisdictional objections
Despite the Achmea Decision and clear commitment of EU member states on terminating the intra-EU BITs, arbitral tribunals in intra-EU arbitrations generally reject jurisdictional objections asserting incompatibility of intra-EU BITs.vSee, e.g., Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, ICSID Case No. ADHOC/15/1, Partial Award on Jurisdiction [4 March 2020]; Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018]; Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Award [16 May 2018]; UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Award [9 October 2018]; Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on Croatia's Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis [12 June 2020].
As emphasized by the tribunal in the partial award on jurisdiction in Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, EU law does not form part of the law applicable to questions of the tribunal's jurisdiction, and no extrinsic elements of interpretation under Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can trump the clear expression of the parties' common intention to arbitrate. Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, at par. 8.143. It should be noted, however, that the intention of capital importing states to arbitrate disputes may be considered as no longer existent due to the signing and entry into force of the Termination Treaty.
Notably, the tribunal further considered the issue of the enforceability of an award issued in intra-EU arbitration and recognized its duty to render an enforceable award. It noted, however, that it is not able to predict the future validity, or enforceability of the award before enforcing courts. Id. at par. 8.140-8.142.
More recently, the tribunal in Addiko Bank v. Croatia raised several interesting points when rejecting Croatia's jurisdictional objection related to the incompatibility of the Austria-Croatia BIT with the EU acquis.
The tribunal reasoned that in light of Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the law applicable to the Austria-Croatia BIT consists of the terms of that BIT itself and general principles of international law, which are the sources of law not considered by the CJEU as incompatible with the EU law.
Furthermore, the tribunal noted that contrary to the BIT concluded between the Netherlands and Slovakia, considered by the CJEU in the Achmea Decision as incompatible with the EU law, the Austria-Croatia BIT does not incorporate EU law as part of its applicable law. Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on Croatia's Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis [12 June 2020] par.267. The tribunal concluded that the Austria-Croatia BIT does not give rise to the same functional concerns, which the CJEU found to be present in the context of the Achmea Decision. Id. at par.269.
This indicates that intra-EU BITs whose applicable law is limited to the terms of the intra-EU BIT itself and general principles of international law are not incompatible with the EU law. Following this reasoning, it can be assumed that the tribunal would reach a different conclusion if the Austria-Croatia BIT included a provision expressly or impliedly incorporating EU law as the applicable law.
Some of the solutions implemented under the Termination Treaty may indeed be considered controversial. This is particularly the case with respect to the mode of termination of legal effects of sunset clauses, or more broadly, the retroactive effect of the Termination Treaty.
Investors may decide to seek protection under existing BITs concluded with non-EU states and, thereby, engage in the treaty shopping practice. It remains an open question whether such BITs will be affected by the Achmea Decision.
While the Achmea Decision argument has become a popular strategy for defendants in investment arbitration proceedings to challenge jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, jurisprudence indicates that such arguments are generally rejected.
Although developments contained in mega-regional treaties, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (available at http://bit.ly/2LXjQh3), may provide a model for the creation of standing investment court, which could replace the ISDS mechanism so far in place, the institutional design of the body must comply with the EU law in order to provide an effective alternative to domestic courts. In this regard, it is important to monitor development of the EU's initiative concerning the so-called Investment Court System, which could be further developed into a Multilateral Investment Court.
Krzysztof Wierzbowski is a Senior Partner at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski in Warsaw, Poland. Aleksander Szostak LL.M. is a lawyer at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski. This article was produced in cooperation with the CPR European Advisory Board.
Approach of the European Union to Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded Between the Member States: Initial Thoughts on Draft Plurilateral Agreement for the Termination of Intra-EU BITs
April 9, 2020 April 9, 2020 / CPR Staff	/ Leave a comment
By Krzysztof Wierzbowski[1] and Aleksander Szostak[2]
The compatibility of investment protection treaties entered into between EU member states (the 'Intra-EU BITs) with the regulatory framework of European Union law has been a controversial issue for quite some time. It can be recalled that the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the 'CJEU') in Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia (the 'Achmea Decision') declared investor-state dispute settlement clauses in intra-EU BITs as contrary to EU law. In particular the CJEU stated that disputes before arbitral tribunals based on intra-EU BITs may relate to matters of interpretation and/or application of the EU law. While a preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 TFEU enables courts and tribunals of member states to file a request pertaining to the interpretation and application of the EU law, no arbitral tribunal constitutes a court or tribunal under the meaning of the provision and, therefore, such arbitral tribunal cannot request a preliminary ruling.
As decisions of arbitral tribunals are final and, therefore, in principle, cannot be appealed to the national courts, the CJEU has found here a threat to proper interpretation and application of the EU law, which in turn has an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU law .
The direct implication of the Achmea Decision is that investor-state arbitrations based on intra-EU BITs are not compatible with the EU law and should not be initiated. This may have a severe impact on foreign investors engaging in the European market and the foreign direct investment protection system in the EU.
In line with commitments contained in political declarations issued by the representatives of the governments of the EU member states on 15 January 2019, EU member states have quite recently reached an agreement on the text of a plurilateral treaty for the termination of intra-EU BITs.[3] Although it appears that the official text of the plurilateral treaty is not publicly available, its draft text has been leaked (the "Termination Treaty") and may provide much needed insight into the future shape of EU policy towards protection of EU investors in the EU and the fate of intra-EU BITs. [4]
The fate of intra-EU BITs
According to the text of the Termination Treaty, intra-EU BITs listed in an annex to the Termination Treaty are to be terminated and shall not produce legal effects. Intra-EU BITS will therefore be terminated by means of mutual consent of contracting parties through a plurilateral treaty, which may prove to be the most efficient method of terminating all of intra-EU treaties in a consistent manner.
As a matter of certain standard, investment protection treaties provide for a solution applicable in the case of termination of the treaty. Investors enjoy continued protection for a set period of time, thereby not being surprisingly deprived of certain rights that might have been taken into account when the investment decision was made and implemented.
Interestingly, the Termination Treaty provides that such sunset clauses contained in intra-EU BITs, gguaranteeing the continued protection of investments existing prior to the termination of the relevant BIT, shall be terminated together with respective intra-EU BIT and shall not produce legal effects. Whether such termination by the Termination Treaty, without modification of intra-EU BITs by removing the sunset clauses from the legal framework and, subsequently, terminating each of BITs entirely, will be effective may be debatable (in particular by affected investors).
The Termination Treaty adds a degree of uncertainty with respect to the application of the Energy Charter Treaty (the 'ECT') in intra-EU relations. The Termination Treaty provides that it does not cover intra-EU proceedings initiated on the basis of the ECT and that this matter will be dealt with at a later stage. This may put many EU member states and foreign investors currently engaged, or considering engaging in intra-EU proceedings based on the ECT, in a disadvantageous position. It is noteworthy that recent years have witnessed a number of intra-EU ECT claims directed by foreign investors against for instance Spain (concerning reform of renewable energy sector).
The Termination Treaty appears to endorse the view that the legal framework of the EU sufficiently protects investors engaging in the European market. After all, by exercising some of the fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, investors from EU member state fall within the scope of application of the EU law and enjoy protection under inter alia primary and secondary EU law as well as general principles of EU law.[5] It may however be doubtful that EU law and the national law of member states will always be perceived to de facto guarantee effective procedural and substantive protection to foreign investors engaging in the European market. One may identify a number of concerns associated with the potential bias of national judges, political pressure exerted by governments, corruption and malfunctioning of the domestic judiciary in general, which indicates that the view expressed in the Termination Treaty may be debatable.
One size does not fit all: concluded, pending and new arbitration proceedings
Although the Termination Treaty stipulates that all intra-EU BITs listed in an annex shall be terminated and shall not produce legal effects, it additionally addresses the status of arbitration proceedings under intra-EU BITs. In particular, the Termination Treaty distinguishes between three categories of arbitration proceedings under intra-EU BITs:
New arbitration proceedings
The Termination Treaty defines these as arbitration proceedings initiated on or after 6 March 2018 (i.e., on or after the date of Achmea Decision).
The Termination Treaty stipulates that arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs shall not serve as legal basis for new arbitration proceedings as defined above.[6] This indicates that any intra-EU investment treaty arbitration initiated after the Achmea Decision will be declared as ineffective.
Concluded arbitration proceedings
The Termination Treaty defines these as:
Arbitration Proceedings which ended with a settlement agreement or with a final award issued prior to 6 March 2018 [the date of Achmea Decision] where:
the award was duly executed prior to 6 March 2018, even where a related claim for legal costs has not been executed or enforced, and no challenge, review, set-aside, annulment, enforcement, revision or other similar proceedings in relation to such final award was pending on 6 March 2018, or
the award was set aside or annulled before the date of entry into force of this Agreement;[7]
These intra-EU investment treaty arbitration proceedings will not be affected by the Termination Treaty. Accordingly, any award, final decision, or settlement issued before 6 March 2018 will not be considered as invalid, or not effective.
Pending arbitration proceedings
The Termination Treaty defines pending arbitration proceedings as arbitration proceedings initiated prior to Achmea Decision (i.e. 6 March 2018), which do not qualify as concluded.[8]
For this category of arbitration proceedings, the Termination Treaty provides a mechanism which aims at assisting the parties to the pending proceedings in finding an amicable settlement of a dispute – the so-called Structured Dialogue.[9] At the outset, it is interesting to note that the Structured Dialogue mechanism to a large extent resembles procedure for investor-state mediation.
The mechanism enables foreign investors to initiate settlement procedure with a state party to the pending arbitration proceedings within six months from the termination of intra-EU BITs, thereby providing the legal basis for respective pending arbitration proceedings to become converted to or substituted by, the specific kind of mediation.[10] The settlement procedure is overseen by an impartial facilitator whose task is to find an amicable, lawful and out of court and out of arbitration settlement of the dispute. Settlement of the dispute shall be reached within 6 months.
While the facilitator shall be designated by an agreement of parties (i.e. foreign investor and state), and shall possess in-depth knowledge of EU law, the Termination Treaty does not seem to require an in-depth knowledge of public international law, or, more importantly, international investment law.[11] Although it is doubtful that parties would appoint a facilitator that is not an expert in public international and international investment law, the lack of express requirement in this respect may lead to undesirable situations that may undermine of the Structured Dialogue mechanism.
Interestingly, the Termination Treaty provides an additional option to foreign investors that enables them to seek the judicial remedies under national law against a measure adopted by the state, such measure being subject to such initiated arbitration proceedings. In such case, national time limits for bringing legal action do not apply provided that investor satisfies several conditions.[12] It is noteworthy that the provisions of intra-EU BITs that initially provided legal basis for the parties to settle their dispute, will not be considered as part of applicable law in proceedings before a national court. Clearly, this implies that investors will not be able to base their claims on substantive provisions of intra-EU BITs, which may severely limit the possibility to lodge a successful claim against a state.
Pending and New Arbitration Proceedings: what about recognition and/or enforcement?
The Termination Treaty provides that state parties to intra-EU BITs on the basis of which pending and/or new arbitration proceedings were initiated, shall inter alia request the national court of EU state and any 3rd state, to set aside an award issued in such proceedings, or to annul it or to refrain from recognizing and/or enforcing it, as applicable.[13]
Therefore, many arbitration awards issued after Achmea decision will, at least in EU member states, be ineffective.
Although the Termination Treaty covers intra-EU BITs only (as listed in the Annex to the Treaty), it deserves to be noted that one may extend the reasoning of the CJEU in Achmea Decision regarding incompatibility of investor-state dispute settlement clauses in intra-EU BITs with EU law to BITs concluded between EU member states and 3rd states.
In particular, disputes covered by such BITs and settled through investor-state arbitration may relate to matters concerning treatment of foreign investors engaging in the European market and, thereby, interpretation and application of EU law. While it is rather doubtful that tribunals constituted on the basis of such BITs will reject jurisdiction over a dispute, there is a threat to effective recognition and enforcement in the European Union of awards issued in such arbitrations.
The national court faced with a request for recognition or enforcement of such arbitral award, or the CJEU faced with a request for a preliminary ruling, may declare that the arbitration between a non-EU foreign investor and EU member state adversely affects the autonomy of the EU law and, therefore, recognition and enforcement of such awards should be refused. It can be expected that a request for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on this matter will be made.
This would have a devastating impact on the effectiveness of guarantees contained in such BITs. In addition, this approach, if adopted, would severely impact recognition and enforcement mechanism contained in the ICSID Convention. Namely, Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention provides that each contracting state shall recognize an award rendered by an ICSID Tribunal as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of a court where recognition is sought. As the mechanism does not leave room for any ground on which the recognition could be refused, potential refusal by national courts to recognize awards issued in arbitrations under ICSID rules would adversely affect the effectiveness of the ICSID Convention and possibly pose a threat to its existence.
Although the official text of the Termination Treaty is not publicly available, its leaked draft may serve as a valuable source indicating the fate of intra-EU BITs.
Some of the solutions provided under the Termination Treaty, such as the mode of termination of legal effects of sunset clauses, or retroactive effect of the Termination Treaty with respect to the claims that arose and could constitute the basis of New Arbitration Proceedings, may be controversial and will most probably be contested by affected investors. It remains a matter of separate discussion what avenue the investors may have in order to effectively contest the ex post deprivation of their rights.
Some investors may decide to engage in the treaty shopping practice and seek protection under BITs other than intra-EU ones. It remains an open question whether BITs concluded between EU member states and 3rd states will be affected by the reasoning of the CJEU in Achmea Decision.
[1] Krzysztof Wierzbowski is Senior Partner at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski in Warsaw, Poland.
[2] Aleksander Szostak LL.M. is a lawyer at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski.
[3] See. Statement: EU Member States agree on a plurilateral treaty to terminate bilateral investment treaties [24 October 2019] available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/191024-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.
[4] Draft text of the treaty is available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/revealed-previously-unseen-draft-text-of-eu-termination-treaty-reveals-how-intra-eu-bits-and-sunset-clauses-are-to-be-terminated-treaty-also-creates-eu-law-focused-facilitation-p/.
[5] See. Point XI of the preamble to Termination Treaty.
[6] Art. 5 Termination Treaty.
[7] Art.1(4) Termination Treaty.
[9] Art.9 Termination Treaty.
[10] Art.9(1) Termination Treaty.
[12] Art.10 Termination Treaty.
[13] Art.7 Termination Treaty.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The CPR Institute.
A Report on the 2019 CPR European Congress on Business Dispute Management (Part II)
October 1, 2019 October 1, 2019 / CPR Staff	/ Leave a comment
By Vanessa Alarcón Duvanel and Kathleen Fadden
On 15 May 2019, CPR held its third annual European Congress on Business Dispute Management, in London. Organized by CPR's European Advisory Board (the "EAB") and kindly hosted once more by SwissRe in the magnificent Gherkin building, the Congress inspired thought provoking considerations on topics of dispute prevention and resolution. As with last year's summary, we have split this reporting in two parts; Part I sharing the morning panel sessions can be found HERE.
The afternoon's session began with a keynote address by Teresa Giovannini of LALIVE in Geneva, Switzerland. Teresa Giovannini has a wealth of experience in international arbitration having served as an arbitrator in over 200 arbitrations and held leadership positions in various institutions. In a captivating speech entitled "what happens behind the curtains", she gave the audience a glimpse of how arbitral tribunals operate. The integrity of the arbitral process has often been criticized and bias, in particular, be it unconscious or conscious, can impact throughout the process. Complete elimination of bias may be difficult and Teresa Giovannini outlined some simple steps that can minimize bias: adopting the screen selection process in the CPR Rules whereby the arbitrators do not know which party has appointed them; ensuring that the issues to be determined are identified at the outset of the proceeding and put to the parties; and strictly adhering to the principle that a case must be put aside if a party does not adduce sufficient evidence to support its case.
"Master Mediators Answer the Most Intriguing Mediation Questions"
The first panel of the afternoon proved to be a lively discussion about mediation challenges. The panel was moderated by Isabelle Robinet-Muguet (Orange) and Alexander Oddy (Herbert Smith Freehills). The panelists were: Eileen Carroll (Mediator and CPR Neutral), Renate Dendorfer-Ditges (Ditges and CPR Neutral), Diego Faleck (Mediator and CPR Neutral) and Birgit Sambeth Glasner (Altenburger and CPR Neutral)
The panel addressed three intriguing mediation questions:
What are the challenges when dealing with cross border mediation and what advice would you offer?
Obviously good preparation is table stakes. It is essential to take time to talk to the clients in order to understand what might be driving the dynamics, including whether the parties are being guided by lawyers and – in either joint or evaluative sessions – what the expectations are including how active they expect the mediator to be. The mediator must establish the process and set a substantive agenda for the clients. In this respect, another challenge that often arises in cross border mediations is that cross border frequently means cross-cultural. Mediators must therefore be sensitive to, and familiar with, cultural differences as such awareness can guide the mediator in selecting negotiation strategies/tactics that are more likely to be successful.
A second challenge is one of timing of the mediation hearing. Increasingly, mediations are being forced into short time frames, typically a day and no more. Master mediators however criticized the efficiency of this template – check the box – practice. It has proven helpful to require the parties to resume the following day because the interim night often provides valuable time for reflection. Where does this 24-hour model come from? The audience contributed suggestions pointing the finger to mediators who in most cases are lawyers and have other cases to attend to or at the insurers who tend to drive the 24-hour template.
Is the concept of a mediated settlement changing?
The concept itself may not have changed but its implementation suffers difficulties. In line with its remarks to the first question, the panel noted that the purpose of mediation is unfortunately too often gravitating towards setting the stage for arbitration rather than settling the dispute. It may be a function of the compressed time frames in which mediations increasingly take place (see above).
How do you deal with a conflict within a conflict?
There was no question that conflicts within conflicts impact the mediation process and therefore it is critical they be addressed effectively. It is not an easy situation to navigate. Good mediation process management and managing expectations are key as each case is different. Master mediators on the panel shared illustrative examples of what can generate a conflict within a dispute such as the imbalance in the parties' levels of sophistication and/or resourcing. One often finds the weaker party being aggressive and/or irrational. From a process perspective, a mediator should be equipped to handle such situation proactively by taking the time to understand the concerns (the party may be missing information or believing that its interests are unmet) and by warning the stronger side to be patient.
Mediation is an art – it requires skills, training and practice!
"The Resolution of Complex, Multi-Stakeholder, Multi-Jurisdictional Disputes"
The final panel of the day examining the use of ADR tools in large complex disputes was moderated by Cliff Hendel (Hendel IDR) and the panelists were: Gavin Chesney (Debevoise & Plimpton), James Cowan (Shell International), Ania Farren (Vannin Capital), Albert Hilber (Swiss Reinsurance) and Richard Little (Eversheds Sutherland).
Setting the stage for the discussion, Cliff Hendel offered a couple of interesting preliminary remarks. Firstly, he reminded everyone that in large and complex disputes culture eats process for breakfast. In other words, culture counts! Failures often stem from the inability to understand one another. Engaging in active listening is therefore key. Secondly, there are of course trade-offs inherent to the co-existence of different legal systems. Notwithstanding some European laws in the ADR field, national laws are not particularly harmonized, leading to the risk of forum shopping (among others).
This panel addressed two main issues:
What are your views on the use of co-mediation in complex disputes?
The overall view was that generally mediation, per se, remains difficult in many jurisdictions and that is for cultural reasons. For many Europeans resorting to non-binding ADR is still perceived as a sign of weakness and many parties adopt a mindset whereby if they are to spend money on a dispute resolution process, they want a binding result. It is important to work to help parties overcome this hurdle. There is really no substitute for having all the parties in one room and giving all stakeholders visibility as to the whole picture. In the panel's experience, this tends to produce more creative solutions. On co-mediation specifically, experience shows that it works well when all involved mediators are well prepared and even better if they have worked together in the past.
Does litigation/arbitration funding have an impact on mediation?
There is an often referred to "traditional" view that third party funder involvement will make settlement less likely. The panel did not entirely agree with that. Ania Farren, offering a funder's perspective, explained that having a funder on board signaled a strong case. Funders typically do not influence the dispute resolution process and do not normally attend settlement discussions. Funders in fact do favor early settlement often preferring less money early than more money later. That said, and unsurprisingly, different third-party funders have different risk appetites. This diversity while beneficial to parties seeking funding for their case brings uncertainty and raises concerns as to the funders' impact on the parties' ability to settle or mediate the dispute. In international arbitration there is no formal regulation of the use of third-party funding and the panel agreed on the need for more transparency concerning funder involvement particularly given the potential for conflicts of interest.
The Conference concluded with closing remarks from Noah Hanft, CPR's outgoing President and CEO and James South, Managing Director of CEDR. This was an opportunity to outline the fruitful collaboration between CEDR and CPR.
Noah was thanked profusely for his phenomenal contribution to CPR.
Vanessa Alarcon Duvanel is an attorney admitted to practice in New York and Switzerland and specializing in international arbitration. She is based in Geneva and serves as the Secretary to the European Advisory Board.
Kathleen Fadden is a legal consultant and member of the CPR's European Advisory Board.
A Report on the 2019 CPR European Congress on Business Dispute Management (Part I)
September 24, 2019 September 24, 2019 / CPR Staff	/ 1 Comment
On 15 May 2019, CPR held its third annual European Congress on Business Dispute Management, in London. Organized by CPR's European Advisory Board (the "EAB") and kindly hosted once more by SwissRe in the magnificent Gherkin building, the Congress inspired thought provoking considerations on topics of dispute prevention and resolution. As with last year's summary, we have split this reporting in two parts: a Part I sharing the morning panel sessions, and a Part II covering the afternoon panels.
"The Future of ADR"
The first panel examined how the ADR community was responding to recent attacks on traditional arbitration and mediation and how ADR can remain relevant. It was moderated by Mark McNeill (EAB member, Quinn Emmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan (then Sherman & Sterling). The panelists sharing their perspectives were: Stefano Catelani (DuPont), Ferdinando Emanuele (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton), Jennifer Glasser (White & Case) and Noah Hanft (CPR).
Considering the recent developments in dispute resolution, the panel's remit was to consider whether ADR was approaching crisis point or, whether in fact, there were new opportunities to be seized. The panel tackled a variety of topics:
Driving mediation into the arbitration process and whether arbitrators should encourage mediation.
Some jurisdictions still have limited acceptance of mediation for multifarious reasons: it can be difficult to find qualified mediators, arbitrators are reluctant to promote mediation and model escalation clauses often force a "check the box" type approach where mediation is not given adequate consideration and viewed solely as a mandatory step. CPR has been actively encouraging mediation over the world and made a particular push in Brazil. It has been considering a more flexible model escalation clause that whilst mandating mediation, is not prescriptive about when it shall occur – provided it is before the case is heard. The use of mediation is referenced in the new 2019 CPR Rules for Administered Arbitration of International Disputes and mediation is now a topic for discussion within the preliminary conference (Rule 9.3e).
How will this change the ADR landscape in the coming years?
Noah Hanft offered his perspective on the evolution of ADR: In his view there is no dispute that mediation is effective so it really is in companies' interests to adopt mediation. He anticipates a growth in mediation even though he noted that user complaints have succeeded in driving down the average time it takes to conclude an arbitration. But there will also be more use of hybrid approaches and the desire for efficiency and cost containment will drive innovation in the area. These thoughtful comments led the panel to add that mediation was in fact being used nowadays in various stages of a commercial relationship. For example, mediation is resorted to in transactions to facilitate deals and in the joint venture space consideration was being given to the early identification of those issues that may lead to a dispute with the engagement of a standing neutral and/or the introduction of turnkey provisions requiring stakeholders to focus on the health of the joint venture.
Is ADR at all relevant in investor state disputes?
When it comes to mediation or settlement negotiation, it is often politically very difficult for states to settle disputes with investors. Andy Rogers of CEDR reported on an interesting development whereby CEDR, in collaboration with other organisations, is currently organizing training for mediators, ISDS practitioners and government officials to equip them with the knowledge and skills necessary to mediate investment disputes.
Will Brexit change the ADR landscape?
Since the Congress was hosted in the United Kingdom (UK) it would have been remiss not to consider the impact of Brexit on ADR! English governing law and jurisdiction clauses have historically been popular choices for commercial parties and panelists were asked for their views on whether businesses should rethink this choice in light of Brexit. The overall reaction was that there is no clear answer to the question and the area of greatest uncertainty likely concerns the enforcement of judgments. Currently, under the Recast Brussels Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) also known as the "Brussels regime"), a judgment rendered in an EU member state and enforceable in that member state is enforceable in all other member states. If the UK exits the EU without an agreement on the continued operation of the Brussels regime, the latter will cease to apply and the reciprocity will be lost. This could be remedied – to some extent – as the UK is seeking to become a member, in its own right, of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. As the panel noted, if the UK accedes to this international instrument, then as contracting state its courts must give effect to exclusive jurisdiction clauses and enforce any judgments resulting from such clauses. This blog cautions that the Hague Convention is narrower in scope than the Recast Brussels Regulation and questions still remain about the application of the Convention in circumstances where an exclusive jurisdiction clause has been entered into prior to the U.K.'s exit from the EU. Post Congress, a new "Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters" was adopted on 2 July 2019. The UK adherence to this new treaty would resolve many of the enforcement issues triggered by Brexit. Although the 2018 Queen Mary & White & Case International Arbitration Survey reported that London remained the most preferred seat of arbitration and over half of the respondents thought that Brexit will have no impact on the use of London as a seat, it is clear, Brexit has created doubts and given rise to many questions that only time will answer.
This led panelists to move naturally to another new development in ADR, namely the introduction in various jurisdictions of "international" courts. The Netherlands, Germany and Singapore to name just a few have created or contemplated the opportunity of creating "international" commercial courts. Typically, these courts – which are established under national law rather than by international treaty – operate in English and adopt arbitration type rules. Do these represent a threat or a challenge to arbitration? In general, the panel did not see a significant threat. There are, of course, pros and cons with national courts and arbitration tribunals. A key benefit of arbitral proceedings is confidentiality, which is not necessarily guaranteed in court proceedings. With respect to enforcement, currently, there is no global convention for the enforcement of court judgments in the same way that the New York Convention facilitates enforcement of arbitral awards. On the other hand, summary disposition of issues is available in some court systems but historically arbitrators have been cautious about their use – even though recent revisions to most leading arbitral rules (including the CPR Rules) permit such procedures. In summary, there is space for both fora and the panel noted that certainly from a user perspective, competition and choice could only be positive.
The last aspect concerning the future of ADR which the panel considered was: the Prague Rules and whether they will lead to increased efficiencies in arbitration.
The Rules are intended to be an alternative to the well-known IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (IBA Rules) and to bridge the gap between common and civil law approaches. The panel's position was not too optimistic. Neither document production nor the taking of witness evidence are likely to be more efficient under the Prague Rules and the costs of arbitration proceedings are unlikely to reduce. This is so because the Prague Rules provide a framework and do not exist in a vacuum; in many respects the level of efficiency and the nature of document production is driven more by the arbitrator. In the panel's view, rather than a new set of rules, it would be more useful to increase the pool of arbitrators and even better, arbitrators that are more active! The panel shared four examples as to why in its view the Prague Rules would not deliver efficiencies. I) there is a conflict between article 2.1 which requires that the arbitral tribunal "shall" convene a case management conference "without any unjustified delay," and the requirement in article 2.2 that the arbitral tribunal "shall" clarify at that same case management conference, undisputed / disputed facts and the legal grounds of the parties' respective cases (among others). Indeed, experience shows that it would be inefficient (perhaps impossible) to clarify disputed and undisputed facts or legal positions on the basis of a Request for Arbitration and Answer to the Request since these typically do not contain sufficient detail. II) article 4.2 on documentary evidence discourages document production but the rest of the provisions in the same section retreat from this position. III) with respect to fact witnesses, articles 5.2 and 5.3 empower arbitrators to make determinations about calling witnesses but article 5.7 then rather diminishes that power by providing that if a party insists on calling a witness whose statement has been submitted by the other party, the arbitral tribunal should call the witness to testify at the hearing. Finally, iv) in respect of experts, article 6.1 appears to make tribunal-appointed experts the default rule. However article 6.5 states that a party may nonetheless submit a report from an expert appointed by that party. Given that in practice many tribunals hear only party-appointed experts, the Prague Rules' regime is likely to lead to arbitrations with both tribunal-appointed and party-appointed experts which will increase the volume of the parties' submission, hearing time, and inevitably costs.
The future of ADR is in some respects uncertain (Brexit being an example) but at the same time full of interesting challenges and novelties.
"Preparing for the Robo-Revolution"
The second panel of the morning was similarly looking to the future but this time with a legal-tech focus. The panel was moderated by Javier Fernández-Samaniego (Samaniego Law) and the panelists were: Ulyana Bardyn (Dentons US LLP), Diana Bowman (VINCI Energies), Sarah Ellington (DLA Piper) and Ralph Lindbäck (Wärtsila Corporation).
Should ADR practitioners be concerned about robots? Or do we consider that robots and computer arbitrators are still in the realm of science fiction?
To answer this question, the panel started by looking at the state and use of legal-tech today. Certain types of dispute and several aspects of dispute management can be automated and in fact there are already automated tools deployed to handle routine and administrative tasks. EBay was cited as an example, as it uses algorithms to generate decisions in e-commerce disputes. Currently, automation is however mostly applied in low value disputes rather than complex cases. Whilst appropriate deployment of automated tools can bring benefits in terms of speed and accuracy, the panel noted that it also carries disadvantages and has its limitations. For instance, it is not necessarily clear how due process will be respected if a computer arbitrator presides in an arbitration, or how algorithms could be created and comply with the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings, or how the parties would know how to pick the right algorithms for their dispute. One significant limitation highlighted by the panel was the inescapable fact that disputes involve human beings and one cannot automate the relationship management aspect of dispute resolution! Even if artificial intelligence were able to accurately predict the verdict in a dispute, some litigants simply want their day in court or their day in arbitration, an experience that no robot can satisfy.
Notwithstanding the challenges, law firms are preparing for the robot revolution and some have already achieved significant milestones in this respect. Law firm practitioners on the panel provided real insights into the approaches taken by their respective organizations. Ulyana Bardyn shared with the audience some of Dentons' leading efforts in this space including its collaborative innovation platform "Nextlaw Labs"; various programmes focused on case management enabling clients to see spending in real time, or assisting clients with finding the best pro bono help available; and the "Libryo platform" which aims to simplify legal complexity by providing a curated collection of all laws relevant to specific business sectors enabling lawyers to understand their organisation's legal obligations in any given situation.
Sarah Ellington reported on DLA Piper's own investments in technology and elaborated on three of the DLA tools, all of which are aimed at dispute avoidance. A first tool is a guided pathway app geared to IT outsourcing projects and intended for commercial managers, it contains questions about project progress and status and produces a report with red flags if problems are detected. The second is a virtual secondment tool which enables businesses to submit questions and have a response within 24 hours. Finally, the firm has an immersive business simulation, essentially a training tool, geared toward infrastructure projects where users can engage in a facilitated session where they take on a particular role within a simulated project.
These tools are impressive from the lawyers' perspective. How is the business community reacting to this technology assisting their counsel? Corporate counsels on the panel all agreed that dispute resolution should be looked upon as a value stream with a significant focus on dispute avoidance. To reach this goal and develop successful tools, collaboration between law firms and their clients is key. That is all the more relevant as the business community is making its own progresses in the digital arena. Many businesses are entering into collaborations, partnerships and campus initiatives – e.g., sandbox environments where universities, startups and investors can come together to innovate– are growing. Dispute resolution though is not always part of the picture. Would it ever be possible to predict that a dispute was coming? In certain sectors, that Holy Grail may not be too far off. As Diana Bowman described, VINCI Energies already attempts to obtain information about events that occur on site and shares it with the back office in real time. With good record keeping and quality information there may be opportunities to both predict and resolve issues early before a dispute escalates.
Shifting gears slightly, the panel touched on another technology hot topic: cyber security. Cyber attacks are a significant and rapidly evolving peril for today's businesses but the levels of security deployed, particularly in the arbitration field, varies significantly between, for example, sole practitioners and top tier international law firms. Regardless of size, all can fall victim to an attack. Speaking from experience, Sarah Ellington shared some of the lessons learned after DLA Piper suffered from the NotPetya malware attack in June 2017 resulting in all the firm's IT systems globally being taken offline. The risks are real and the consequences of an attack can be devastating. To cope with a potential problem, it is fundamental to have: an up-to-date business continuity plan including practical solutions for work continuation, a clear communication protocol, emergency contact groups, back up email, calendar and document management systems.
The digital revolution has arrived although not necessarily in all legal departments! In some of the most sophisticated companies the legal department does not even have a suite of templates. Readers of this blog, as the audience at the Congress, are encouraged to think about the digital revolution as a wave: do you want to be bowled over by it or do you choose to ride it on a surf board?
Stay tuned for part II…
A Report on the CPR European Congress on Business Dispute Management (Part II)
August 24, 2018 August 24, 2018 / CPR Staff	/ Leave a comment
By Vanessa Alarcón Duvanel
This is the third post of a new CPR Speaks feature, "The European View," offering valuable insights and perspectives from CPR's European Advisory Board (EAB).
On 31 May 2018, CPR held its annual European Congress on Business Dispute Management in London. Organized by CPR's European Advisory Board (the "EAB") and kindly hosted by SwissRe in the incredible Gherkin building, the event convened European and American practitioners for a successful day of discussion led by four interesting panels.
This blog piece reports on two panel discussions that took place in the afternoon of the European Congress on Business Dispute Management on 31 May 2018 in London, in the Gherkin Building, kindly hosted by SwissRe.
The afternoon session started with the keynote address of MasterCard Europe President Javier Perez who shared with the audience the important role of ADR in MasterCard's business worldwide. In a thought-provoking speech, Mr. Perez emphasized MasterCard's partnership approach with its clients according to which MasterCard does not initiate disputes (litigation or arbitration) against its clients, and rather uses ADR as a means to save the trust relationship.
"Climate change and ADR"
Moderated by Daniel Schimmel (CPR EAB member, Foley Hoag), the first panel of the European Congress' afternoon session had four speakers: Kate Cook (Matrix Chambers); Dr. Karl Mackie CBE (CEDR); Nicola Peart (Three Crowns LLP); and Peter Stewart (Interfax Global Energy). Starting from the 2015 Paris Agreement, the panelists discussed how climate change may affect ADR.
The 2015 Paris Agreement signals a significant change and represents concrete actions and timeframes to reduce emissions and adapt to the impact of climate change. It contains strong procedural rules and verification obligations and tells States what to do in respect to climate change. Things have evolved in recent years and changes have been implemented. All States recognize nonetheless that there is a significant gap between where we are and where we should be.
Almost everything in the Paris Agreement is measurable: one can establish whether water is clean/cleaner, what the average temperature is, the number of miscarriages, etc. Liability can be disputed. Climate change matters are therefore likely to generate disputes and ADR processes. Below are a couple of scenarios mentioned by the panelists:
The risk of investment-treaty claims. Under the Paris Agreement, States must each year implement measures towards the overall long-term objective of stabilization of the temperature; also known as the 2o C global temperature target. The means to maintain the average temperature increase well below 2o C are multiple and include, g., low carbon, no carbon, renewable energyand new building standards.
These measures and changes in legislation may affect investments and lead to investment treaty claims by foreign investors. The measures may also create incentives for foreign investment such as when a State implements incentives on renewable energy. The arrival of foreign renewable energy firms may not please everyone and if the State subsequently takes a step back and imposes a moratorium on foreign investment, this policy change may constitute a breach of the doctrine of legitimate expectations and lead to a fair and equitable treatment claim by the foreign investor (subject to an applicable treaty). This was the case in the NAFTA case Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada (PCA Case No. 2013-22, 27 September 2016).
New contracts with ADR clauses. The obligations imposed upon States by the Paris Agreement and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol have led to new contracts, many of which contain ADR clauses. One example of this is an international emission system developed under the Kyoto Protocol, whereby parties that exceeded their emission reduction commitments may sell the excess so-called "assigned amount units" (AAUs). Disputes arising out of this system are resolved by arbitration under the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)'s Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Environment and/or Natural Resources ("Environmental Rules").[1] For example, a dispute could arise in respect to a carbon emission registered project if, after the investor has invested, it turns out that the carbon credit was miscalculated, which could affect the value of the investment.
Investment funds. Several investment funds are dedicated to climate change, including the Green Climate Fund (GCF). States, corporations and individuals who contribute to such a 'green planet' fund sign a contribution agreement with ADR clauses. In turn, the fund enters into contracts for its investments and these transactions contain arbitration clauses.
Data available to the panelists show that not all companies have reacted to climate change in the same manner. The measures required can be important and may give management the feeling that they are losing the agenda. The panelists praised certain companies, including CPR members in the oil & gas industry, for their efforts in lowering emissions from both their own operations as well as from the plants they operate on.
The entire panel agreed that climate-related disputes involve complex issues that ordinary state courts cannot deal with and require a very thoughtful and structured process. In this context, mediation is here again an efficient solution able to address the specificities of climate-change cases, such as the need for a fast resolution, the political implications, the status of the parties (NGOs, multinationals, government), etc.
Climate change is one of the new fields to watch and learn about, for ADR practitioners.
"Complex financing of dispute resolution"
The last panel of the day was moderated by Mark McNeil (EAB member, Sherman & Sterling) and composed of two lawyers, Matthew Bate (Winston & Strawn) and Robert Wheal (White & Case), along with a representative of litigation finance and funding providers, Leeor Cohen (Burford Capital).
Starting with a short reminder of the origin of disputes financing, the panel then discussed the important aspects to consider when working with third party funders, the advantages and downsides of financing of claims, the impact on arbitration and the concept of portfolios of claims.
Initially, ADR financing was developed for parties who could afford the costs of "access to justice." The concept has evolved and increased in many respects and all claimants now have the option to consider whether they wish their claim to be funded, insured, or otherwise monetarized. More and more well-financed companies use third party funders who have become a risk management tool, most particularly in so-called fee-shifting jurisdictions where court and arbitrators apply the loser-pays rule.
From the perspective of the lawyer trialing the case, the success of ADR financing depends on the good relationship with the funder; a good collaboration is important to avoid the risk that the funder withdraws its funding.
The rapid expansion of ADR financing testifies to its success. Yet, the panel identified potential downsides and risks associated with third party funding:
Financing of ADR is a complex world and the panelists described funding contracts as a "nightmare." Getting to a funding contract also takes significant time and involves lengthy due diligence, questionnaires and the signing of NDAs. Third party beauty contests quickly multiply the work as funders have different approaches and hence different sets of questions.
The use of a party funder often limits the party's ability to negotiate a settlement. By the time the parties reach a settlement, the funder will have spent money and will often want to be involved and approve any settlement amount. A so-called "waterfall provision," according to which the funder gets first a portion of any settlement amount and the client receives something only if anything is left, impacts on settlement negotiation.
A funder may influence the conduct of the proceedings. Some funding agreements contain language reserving the funder's right participate in decisions relating to the conduct of the proceedings, including with a right to agree to finance the case only as long as it is satisfied that it is worth pursuing. According to the panelists, this could translate negatively on the conduct of the proceedings and the claim must remain 100% with the claimant.
The financing of claims affects the arbitral proceedings in various ways. Respondents have sought disclosure of third party funding agreements, or applied for security for cost on the ground that the claimant's need for funding suggests that it will not have the necessary funds to pay the costs of the arbitration if it is ordered to. Claimants have sought in their statement of costs recovery of funding costs, which the panelists confirmed, under most arbitration rules the arbitrators have the power to award.
Finally, the panel discussed the debated concept of portfolios of claims, i.e., the financing of multiple claims together. Under this structure, the funder calculates its return based on the performance of the entire portfolio and not each individual claim. Portfolio financing brings down the cost of financing by grouping several claims of a single claimant; it also secures the availability of financing throughout the proceedings. Several law firms have preferred to stay away from portfolios of claims and favor the financing of claims individually.
The European Advisory Board will share the date of 2019 CPR European Congress on Business Dispute Management within the coming months.
[1] https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-the-Environment-and_or-Natural-Resources.pdf ; see also, for more details: https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/environmental-dispute-resolution/
Vanessa Alarcon Duvanel is a member of White & Case's international arbitration group and is based in the firm's Geneva office. She is also the Secretary of CPR's European Advisory Board. She can be reached at vanessa.alarcon@whitecase.com.
A Report on the CPR European Congress on Business Dispute Management (Part I)
August 16, 2018 / CPR Staff	/ Leave a comment
This is the second post of a new CPR Speaks feature, "The European View," offering valuable insights and perspectives from CPR's European Advisory Board (EAB).
This blog piece reports on the exchanges and discussions heard at the European Congress. Summarizing this full day and four panels into one blog article would have deprived the readers of too many insightful views and ideas shared at the Congress. Therefore, we have split this reporting in two parts: a Part I sharing the morning panel sessions, and a Part II covering the afternoon panels.
The event kicked off with welcoming remarks by Maurice Kuitems, (EAB Chair, Fluor Corporation) and Olivier André (CPR), following by Elena Jelmini Cellerini, (EAB Member, SwissRe), and Nicola Parton (Swiss Re). Ms. Parton offered an inspiring message on the role of ADR and the importance of sustainable dispute resolution mechanisms, a goal that requires full respect of transparency principles and responsiveness to issues raised by our counterparts.
"Make ADR great again! The in-house counsel's perspective"
Kenneth B. Reisenfeld (BakerHostetler) moderated the first panel of the day, which was exclusively composed of in-house counsels: James Cowan (CPR EAB Member, Shell International Ltd); Noah J. Hanft (CPR); Isabelle Robinet-Muguet (EAB Vice-Chair, Orange); and Gill Mansfield (Media Law Services).
The first question put to the panelists was whether there was a past renaissance about ADR, or has the ADR process gotten off track. The industry has come a long way since its early years. Many concepts have developed and there are now growing concerns that arbitration is not fulfilling its promises of being fast, confidential and efficient. These criticisms are legitimate and impossible to ignore in light of the high costs and duration of certain arbitral proceedings or the inclusion of U.S.-style disclosures in arbitral proceedings.
There is consequently a real need to make ADR great again, and to find business solutions to business disputes. The panel shared the in-house perspective on some of the means to improve the ADR process:
Involving the business people
All speakers agreed that involving their colleagues from the "business side" is certainly not an easy step, yet it is important and a critical task of the legal department. When a dispute arises, the company's business does not freeze and the project team has little time to devote to a dispute. The business team's approach to the dispute will be different from that of the litigators and their early involvement can help define the ADR process in a more business sensitive manner, as opposed to a pure litigation proceeding.
Achieving adequate collaboration from the business people in a dispute requires a cultural environment sensitive to ADR and its benefits. This is only possible with sufficient trainings and an overall commitment of the management to ADR. As the panelists phrased it several times, the business people must be able to understand the "importance of taking ownership of the matter."
For the panel, an early case assessment (ECA) is a critical element to any dispute resolution mechanism. It should be the first step in any dispute and is fundamental to understanding the business needs. A good ECA will serve in many ways: it will help shape the ADR process; guide the relationship with outside counsel; and highlight the skills and expertise to look for in the designation of a mediator or arbitrator, or in the selection of experts.
According to the panel, using mediation and appointing a commercially minded neutral can improve the efficiency of the dispute resolution mechanism. The financial savings can be significant, particularly in cases where the appointment of a neutral with relevant skills allows the parties to negotiate entirely (or partially) without having to involve outside counsel.
Multi-tier / Step dispute resolution clauses
The speakers briefly touched upon multi-tier dispute resolution clauses, whereby in case of a dispute the parties undertake to take certain steps prior to commencing arbitration in an attempt to amicably settle the dispute. Some of the panelists view such clauses as a thoughtful way of bringing mediation into the process early, and a means to facilitate the involvement of the business people. Other panelists do not consider mandatory mediation as an efficient tool. Every dispute is different and settlement negotiations and/or mediation may sometimes be more appropriate at a later stage. An ADR-friendly corporate culture should also render multi-tier clauses unnecessary.
All panelists concurred that a lot of work has been done but so much remains to be accomplished in order to bring more diversity to the ADR process—particularly with respect to age and geographical location. From the panel's perspective, the in-house counsels have a central role to play in this issue. They can, for example, ask the lawyers to "dig deeper" and present new names on the list of arbitrators, to encourage new appointments, which in turn will contribute to broadening the existing pool of experienced arbitrators for large and complex commercial disputes and will consequently increase the efficiency of arbitral proceedings.
"The Progress and impact of the European Directive on mediation: Where do we stand and what's next?"
The panel was composed of mediation experts from various European horizons: Alexander Oddy (EAB Member, Herbert Smith Freehills) who served as moderator; Vanja Bilić, PhD (Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia); Professor Pablo Cortés (Leicester Law School, University of Leicester; Martin Brink, PhD (Van Benthem & Keulen); Ivana Gabrić (Končar – Electrical Industry, Inc.); and Tsisana Shamlikashvili (President, Russian National organization of Mediators, Founder of the Center for Mediation and Law, Head of Federal Institute of Mediation).
The European Union has enacted two "mediation" directives, namely: (1) the "European Directive 2005/52/EC on the facilitation and access to ADR and the promotion of amicable settlement" (the "EU Directive on mediation"), following which some member States have amended their domestic rules to impose mediation prior to litigation; and (2) the "Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes" (the "Consumer Directive on ADR") which imposes mandatory mediation to all businesses with consumers.
The panelists extended the scope of their discussion beyond its title and the impact of the EU Directive on mediation to include private initiatives taken by corporations to impose mandatory mediation, independently from legislation.
Both the European Mediation Directive and the Consumer Directive on ADR have had a positive impact on ADR. There is, however, still room for improvement. As with any major change, it will take time. All speakers agreed that improving the use of mediation requires increasing awareness of the benefits of mediation. The potential to save money and time and to salvage the business relationship is significant with mediation, and users need more knowledge of these advantages. One avenue mentioned by different speakers to raise awareness about mediation consists of allowing the management to witness a mediation proceeding in order to understand concretely how it works and how it deploys its benefits for the company.
Ivana Gabrić shared Končar's success story of imposing mandatory mediation. In 2005, unrelated to any legislative action, the company decided to introduce a mandatory mediation policy for all of its contracts. Within a few years, the policy led to the elimination of all court litigation. Today, Končar has no pending litigations. In light of the success, the management extended the policy to labor disputes.
The EU Mediation Directive also triggered changes beyond the borders of the EU, such as in Russia where—Tsisana Shamlikashvili reported—mediation represents a big cultural change. In a country where courts are very busy and obtaining a judgment has become part of the ordinary business (regardless of the time it takes and any ability to enforce upon such judgement), introducing mediation is equivalent to changing mentalities and requires significant effort. But, the progress is on-going and the efforts deployed to convince the users of the benefits of mediation are starting to pay off.
Stay tuned for part II reporting on the panels discussing "Climate change and ADR" and "Complex financing of ADR."
The Preliminary Ruling in the Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia Case: the Uncertain Future of Intra-EU BITs
July 11, 2018 July 13, 2018 / CPR Staff	/ 1 Comment
Welcome to the inaugural post of a new CPR Speaks feature, "The European View," offering valuable insights and perspectives from CPR's European Advisory Board (EAB).
The compatibility of investment protection treaties with the regulatory framework of European Union law has been a controversial issue for quite some time. A recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia clarifies the matter and raises several concerns with respect to the future of intra-EU investment protection treaties. This article aims to shed a light on the potential implications of the decision on foreign investors engaging in the European market and the foreign direct investment protection system in the European Union.
Krzysztof Wierzbowski
Aleksander Szostak
On March 6, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) clause in the Slovakia-Netherlands bilateral investment treaty (BIT) had an adverse effect on the autonomy of European Union (EU) law. Accordingly, the CJEU declared that the clause was incompatible with EU law.[3]
Background to the decision
Slovakia challenged the Arbitration Tribunal's award in Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia and applied to the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt to set the award aside. After the Court rejected its application, Slovakia turned to the Federal Court of Justice in Germany with a motion to set aside the award.
Slovakia claimed that the Tribunal lacked necessary jurisdiction in the dispute because the Slovakia-Netherlands BIT, providing for the ISDS mechanism, violated several provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).[4]
Germany's Federal Court of Justice (Federal Court) in Achmea v Slovak Republic turned to the CJEU with a request for a preliminary ruling to resolve as a matter of principle the issue of compatibility of investment protection treaties between Member States and the law of the European Union. In particular, the Federal Court asked whether Art. 267 and 344 TFEU precludes ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs.[5]
The approach of the Advocate General
On Sept. 19, 2017, Melchior Wathelet, the Advocate General (AG) to the CJEU, issued its opinion with regard to issues raised in the request for a preliminary ruling. The AG demonstrated interesting reasoning, which, however, was not followed by the CJEU. The AG concluded that the ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs are compatible with EU law.
As stipulated in the AG's opinion, arbitral tribunals constitute courts or tribunals within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, which implies that arbitral tribunals can, and in fact have the obligation to, accept the supremacy of the EU law and, thereby use the preliminary ruling procedure in appropriate situations.[6]
The AG failed to observe that arbitral tribunals, both in commercial and investment treaty disputes, lack basic features of courts, or tribunals within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU and, therefore, cannot use the procedure contained therein. As established by the CJEU in its case law, entities submitting a request for a preliminary ruling should, among other things:
be established by law;
be permanent;
have compulsory jurisdiction;
apply the rules of law;
be independent[7]
in order to be considered courts or tribunals under Art. 267 TFEU.
While the list is not absolute and the jurisprudence of the CJEU is not consistent, it is clear that parties to a dispute are under no legal obligation to settle it through arbitration. In principle, arbitral tribunals do not have a compulsory jurisdiction.[8] Although, it may be argued that investment treaty tribunals, contrary to tribunals in commercial arbitration disputes, can be considered as having compulsory jurisdiction conferred by a treaty, or domestic legislation implementing a treaty. Nonetheless, arbitral tribunals are established by parties for the purpose of settling a particular dispute and therefore do not have a permanent character, which prevents them from using the procedure envisaged under Art. 267 TFEU.[9]
Decision of the CJEU
The CJEU stated that disputes before arbitral tribunals based on intra-EU BITs may relate to matters of interpretation and/or application of the EU law. Nonetheless, while a preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 TFEU enables courts and tribunals of Member States to file a request pertaining to the interpretation and application of the EU law, arbitral tribunals do not constitute a court or tribunal within the meaning of the provision and, therefore, cannot request a preliminary ruling.
As decisions of arbitral tribunals are final and, therefore, in principle, cannot be appealed to the national courts, a threat now exists to the proper interpretation and application of the EU law, which in turn has an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU law.[10]
The CJEU concluded that the ISDS mechanism in the Slovakia-Netherlands BIT is incompatible with the EU law since the mechanism prevents investment treaty disputes from being decided within the judicial system of the EU.[11]
Infringement proceedings against Member States
On June 18, 2015, the European Commission (EC) initiated infringement proceedings against Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. The EC asked Member States to terminate their intra-EU BITs with the aim of resolving the conflict between the intra-EU BITs and European treaties.[12]
It is yet to be seen whether the EC will decide to bring the matter before the CJEU. Nonetheless, considering the approach of Poland, which is likely to terminate its intra-EU BITs, as well as that of Romania, Italy and Ireland, which already terminated their intra-EU BITs, it is probable that Member States, especially given the position of the CJEU, will cooperate with the EC.
Resolving the conflict
In light of Art. 351 TFEU, Member States are required to resolve any incompatibilities between their international agreements and EU treaties. Failure to fulfil this obligation may lead to the initiation of infringement proceedings by the EC under Art. 258 TFEU.
While it would be favourable to foreign investors to maintain the extra-level of protection by merely removing ISDS mechanism but preserving the substantive protection of investors under the BIT, it is apparent that the EC would prefer Member States to terminate intra-EU BITs entirely.
Art. 54(a) and 54(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provide that an international treaty can be terminated unilaterally or by mutual consent of the contracting parties. While termination by mutual consent, unless otherwise specified in a treaty, leads to the immediate cessation of any effects of the agreement, unilateral termination often requires a notice period. Treaties provide for different notice periods; and some agreements provide for a waiting period upon expiry of which notice may be given. Because unilateral termination of intra-EU BITs may not have immediate effect, it likely will not be a desirable termination method because it does not mitigate the risk of infringement proceedings during the notice period.
Even termination of intra-EU BITs by mutual consent may not lead to the immediate cessation of protection of already existing investments. The existence of the so-called sunset clauses guarantees the continued protection of investments existing prior to the termination of the relevant BIT. In this sense, for a period of time specified in a relevant sunset clause the effectiveness of intra-EU BITs in general and ISDS clauses in particular will not be affected by termination. Accordingly, the termination as such will not resolve the issue and might not prevent the EC from initiating infringement proceedings against relevant Member States.
However, it seems possible to either terminate intra-EU BITs together with sunset clauses by mutual consent of contracting parties, or to modify the agreements with the aim of removing the sunset clauses from the legal framework and, subsequently, terminating the agreement. This method would enable the immediate termination of intra-EU BITs without the waiting period established by sunset clauses. While the effectiveness of such a termination or modification may be debatable (in particular by affected investors), the reading of Art. 70 (1) VCLT indicates that the parties' (EU Member States) consent may prevail over the guarantees contained in sunset clauses.[13]
Paradox in the reasoning of the CJEU
The CJEU based its reasoning on the argument that arbitral tribunals cannot refer a question on the interpretation and application of the EU law to the CJEU under Art. 267 TFEU. Nonetheless, the CJEU had the opportunity to decide on the request for a preliminary ruling in the Achmea case.
While it was the Federal Court that relied on Art. 267 TFEU, the argument that ISDS clauses have an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU law and prevent investment treaty disputes from being decided within the judicial system of the EU is misguided. The CJEU may issue a preliminary ruling in the context of arbitration if it is approached by a court exercising supervision over arbitral proceedings, or a court enforcing or annulling the arbitral award (as in Achmea), which demonstrates that ISDS clauses do not entirely prevent investment treaty disputes from being decided within the judicial system of the EU.
Implications of the decision
The Achmea decision has important implications for investors engaging on the European market. The incompatibility of the ISDS clauses with the EU law deny investors the recourse of investment treaty arbitration.
In particular, the decision indicates that the domestic judicial system of Member States is the only appropriate forum for the settlement of their disputes. This raises several concerns associated with the potential bias of national judges, political pressure exerted by governments, corruption and malfunctioning of domestic courts in general. Depriving investors of the benefits of the ISDS mechanism will also likely affect their decision to invest in the European market and limit the FDI capital flow, which may be disadvantageous for the European economy. Accordingly, it is apparent that the domestic judiciary for various reasons attributable to a given Member State may not provide a desirable alternative to the ISDS mechanism contained in intra-EU BITs.
As the CJEU in the Achmea decision referred to the incompatibility of ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs only, one may consider that such clauses contained in BITs with non-EU States will be deemed as compatible with EU law. For that reason, investors may decide to engage in "treaty shopping" through, for instance, corporate restructuring with the aim of changing corporate nationality in order to benefit from BITs concluded between non-EU and EU States. Depending on the wording of a relevant BIT, treaty shopping may relate to a transfer of the seat or place of incorporation of investor to a non-EU State. While investment protection treaties provide for prevention mechanisms against treaty shopping through denial of benefits clauses or determination of corporate nationality on the basis of the nationality of the entity exercising direct or indirect control, treaty shopping is, in principle, permissible for legitimate purposes.
While treaty shopping could potentially mitigate the negative consequences of the Achmea decision, two issues may impair the effectiveness of such practice.
In certain situations, treaty shopping may constitute abuse of process which may deprive an investment tribunal of jurisdiction ratione temporis and, thereby, prevent an investor from resolving a dispute through investment arbitration. In light of the Pac Rim and Philip Morris cases, abuse of process will arise if an investor engaged in treaty shopping in order to obtain access for a dispute that is foreseeable, even if it has not yet materialised. A dispute must be foreseeable before the restructuring and there must be a reasonable prospect that it will in fact arise.[14] Tribunals, therefore, take into consideration matters such as the degree of foreseeability of a dispute, the timing of investment and restructuring.
The restructuring of investment must be legitimate and justified independent of the possibility of occurrence of a BIT dispute in order for a tribunal to accept its jurisdiction. This leads to a conclusion that depending on a number of factors, restructuring of investments by European investors with the aim of obtaining access to protection granted under investment protection treaties concluded with non-EU States may pose a risk of denial of jurisdiction by an investment tribunal.
In addition, the Achmea decision raises a concern with respect to enforcement of arbitral awards in the EU Member States. While the CJEU focused on the incompatibility of ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs, the approach of the CJEU may be adopted in relation to clauses in BITs concluded by Member States with non-EU States. The issue may be particularly relevant in case of enforcement of awards issued in arbitrations concerning disputes between foreign investors engaging on the European market, and the EU Member States in the matters relating to the EU law. The argument of the CJEU and the approach of the EU Commission may apply to such situations as well, thereby preventing enforcement of such awards within the EU.
The above raises a risk that the EU Commission or the CJEU, faced with a request for a preliminary ruling, may intervene in the enforcement proceedings of such awards and claim that the arbitration between a foreign investor and EU Member State adversely affects the autonomy of the EU law and, therefore, domestic courts of EU Member States should refuse the enforcement of such awards. This would have a devastating impact on the effectiveness of guarantees contained in investment protection treaties.
In particular, if a dispute relates to a benefit obtained by an investor and such benefit constitutes state aid, based on the Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v Romania case and position adopted by the EC, it is most likely that exclusive jurisdiction of the EC in such matters will constitute an argument against ISDS clauses, no matter which States would be parties to a given BIT.[15]
The same issue arises with respect to arbitrations initiated under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) by investors engaging on the EU market against a host Member State. It is possible that the reasoning demonstrated in the Achmea decision would apply due to the fact that such disputes will, essentially, constitute intra-EU arbitrations, which in turn raises a concern as to the enforcement of arbitral awards on the territory of the EU as well as to the effectiveness of the ECT.
One may only speculate on the future of settlement of investor-State disputes and investment protection treaties in general. But recent developments in the mega-regional treaties indicate the direction in which the issue is developing. The Investment Court System (ICS), initially proposed in the context of the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), adopted in Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), may provide a foundation for the creation of a European or Multilateral Investment Court. Such a system would need to be specifically designed to ensure the final and ultimate authority of the CJEU over the EU law as well as to enable the Investment Court to request binding preliminary rulings within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. However, the very structure and design of the ICS in CETA, which is a transparent two-tier body with quasi-permanent adjudicators chosen by a joint committee consisting of representatives of contracting States, could operate as a model for the establishment of European investment court, which could offer an effective and desirable alternative to the existing ISDS mechanism.
The CJEU's decision in the Achmea case has important repercussions for the intra-EU BITs and functioning of the ISDS mechanism. ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs are now considered incompatible with the EU law, which necessitates that Member States take appropriate actions with the aim of ensuring compatibility. Member States may choose to terminate their intra-EU BITs, rather than modify them in order to delete the ISDS clauses.
The decision rendered will likely reduce the level of the investor protection in intra-EU relations, which in turn could weaken investor's perception of legal certainty and the rule of law in the EU and affect the FDI capital flows.
Looking forward, some investors may seek protection under existing BITs other than intra-EU ones. Paradoxically, perception of a broader (or at least recognized) protection enjoyed by non-EU investors can weaken the competitive position of EU investors. Such imbalance in protection of EU-based and non-EU based investors may adversely affect the functioning of one of the cornerstones of the EU: the free and non-discriminatory flow of capital.
It would be difficult to expect investors to sue any of the EU Member States under an applicable intra-EU BIT. While they could reasonably predict the time necessary to obtain an award and assume the cost of arbitration, which could amount to tens of millions of euros, at the end, the award would not be enforceable. Similarly, it is difficult to assume that there would be any developments with respect to third-party funding of such matters.
Some investors may engage in treaty shopping by changing the nationality of an entity that once was protected by an intra-EU BIT to a non-EU State so as to benefit from protection granted under a BIT concluded between that State and EU Member State.
Finally, while developments contained in mega-regional treaties, such as CETA, may provide a model for the creation of the European investment court, the institutional design of the body must comply with the EU law in order to provide an effective alternative to domestic courts and ISDS mechanism currently in place.
[1] Krzysztof Wierzbowski is the senior partner at Wierzbowski Eversheds Sutherland. He is also a member of CPR's European Advisory Board (EAB).
[2] Aleksander Szostak LL.M., LL.B. is a trainee lawyer at Wierzbowski Eversheds Sutherland.
[3] Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018] par. 59-60.
[4] Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018] par. 6-23.
[5] Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018] par.23 and 31.
[6] Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018], Opinion of AG Wathelet [2017] par. 84-89, 134.
[7] E.g. Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] par. 23; Case C-125/04 Guy Denuit and Betty Cordenier v. Transorient-Mosaique Voyages et Culture SA [2005] par.12-17; Case C-416/96 Nour Eddline El-Yassini v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] par.17-22.
[8] E.g. Case C-377/13 Ascendi Beiras Litoral e Alta, Auto Estradas das Beiras Litoral e Alta SA v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira [2014] par.27.
[9] See. E.g. Case C-125/04 Guy Denuit and Betty Cordenier v. Transorient-Mosaique Voyages et Culture SA [2005] par.14-17; Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] par.28,34.
[10] Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018] par. 55-59.
[12] European Commission – Press release: Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties Brussels, 18 June 2015.
[13] See. E.g. Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell and James Munro, 'Parting Ways: The Impact of Mutual Termination of Investment Treaties on Investor Rights' [2014] 29(2) ICSID Review, 461-463 and 465-467.
[14] Pac Rim Cayman v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 [2012] Decision on the Respondent's Jurisdictional Objections par. 2.96-2.100; Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12 [2015] Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility par.566, 570, 584, 585-588.
[15] See. Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20;