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Home » Context of 'October 11, 2002: US Ambassador Warns Indonesian Leaders about Imminent Attack; Publicly Threatens to Withdraw Some US Personnel'
Context of 'October 11, 2002: US Ambassador Warns Indonesian Leaders about Imminent Attack; Publicly Threatens to Withdraw Some US Personnel'
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April 1991-Late 2000: Hambali Lives Openly with Other Key Southeast Asian Militant Leaders and Indonesian Government Mole
Hambali, an important future al-Qaeda leader, moves to the village of Sungai Manggis, Malaysia, about an hour north of the capital of Kuala Lumpur. Hambali is from nearby Indonesia and fought in Afghanistan with Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s. He starts off poor, working at odd jobs, but soon is frequently traveling and has many overseas visitors. Intriguingly, Hambali's landlord will later say of Hambali's visitors, "Some looked Arab and others white." Hambali plays a major role in the 1995 Bojinka plot in the Philippines (see January 6, 1995), and after that plot is foiled he continues to live in his simple Sungai Manggis house. [Time, 4/1/2002; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] Living near Hambali in this village are other regional Islamist militant leaders such as Abdullah Sungkar, Imam Samudra (allegedly a key figure in the 2000 Christmas bombings (see December 24-30, 2000) and the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002)), Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah, and Abu Jibril. So many militants live in this village that it becomes known as "Terror HQ" to intelligence agencies. Sungkar and Bashir are considered the two most well-known militant leaders in Southeast Asia at the time (Sungkar dies of old age in 1999). Hambali's house is directly across from Bashir's and they are considered friends. [Tempo, 10/29/2002; Ressa, 2003] Interestingly, Fauzi Hasbi, an Indonesian government mole posing as a militant leader, lives next door to Bashir as well. [SBS Dateline, 10/12/2005] Despite his role in the Bojinka plot, Hambali continues to live there very openly. Beginning in March 1995, just two months after the plot was foiled, Hambali throws his first feast for several hundred guests to mark a Muslim holiday. This becomes an annual party. He also sometimes travels to Indonesia. [Time, 4/1/2002] By May 1999, if not earlier, the FBI connects Hambali to the Bojinka plot (see May 23, 1999). In January 2000, he attends a key al-Qaeda summit in nearby Kuala Lumpur. The CIA gets pictures and video footage of him at the meeting and already has pictures of him from a computer linked to the Bojinka plot (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 5, 2000). However, there is no apparent effort to apprehend him, extradite him, or even put him on a public wanted list. He continues to live in Sungai Manggis until at least late 2000. [Conboy, 2003]
Entity Tags: Fauzi Hasbi, Abu Bakar Bashir, Hambali, Abdullah Sungkar, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Jibril, Imam Samudra
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
1994: Al-Qaeda Helps Form Militant Training Camps in Philippines
MILF forces on parade in Camp Abubakar, February 1999. [Source: Romeo Gacad / AFP / Getty Images]The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a large Philippine militant group, sets up a major training camp with al-Qaeda help. According to Philippine investigators, a sprawling complex and set of camps known as Camp Abubakar is built this year in a remote part of the southern island of Mindanao. One camp within the complex called Camp Palestine trains Arabs exclusively. Another is Camp Hodeibia, and is used by Jemaah Islamiyah, the al-Qaeda-linked group based in Indonesia. [Ressa, 2003] Al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida is said to send al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq with one other al-Qaeda camp instructor to help recruit and train in these camps. Al-Faruq will remain the head of al-Qaeda's operations in Southeast Asia until his capture in 2002 (see June 5, 2002). [Time, 9/15/2002; CNN, 10/28/2002] Philipppine officials will claim that over the next few years Camp Abubakar continues to grow and over twenty other MILF camps are used and supported by al-Qaeda operatives (see February 1999). The Philippine military will raze Camp Abubakar during a brief offensive against the MILF in 2000, but the camp will be quickly rebuilt and still be used to train foreign militants. [Ressa, 2003] The Philippine government has had a series of negotiations, cease fires, and peace treaties with the MILF. The MILF has generally denied ties to al-Qaeda, but in 1999 the head of the MILF will say his group had received non-military aid from bin Laden (see February 1999). In 2003, President Bush will pledge $30 million to MILF regions of the Philippines to promote a new peace treaty with the group. [Asia Times, 10/30/2003]
Entity Tags: Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Zubaida, Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Omar al-Faruq
August 1, 2000: Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Attacks Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia
The bombing of the Jakarta residence of Philippine ambassador Leonides Caday. [Source: CNN]The Jakarta residence of Leonides Caday, the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia, is bombed. Caday is seriously injured and two people are killed. The bombing is later blamed on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda's main affiliate in Southeast Asia. In 2003, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, on trial for the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), will admit that he bought the bomb-making materials and built the bomb that targeted Caday. He will also admit to buying materials for the Christmas Eve bombings later in 2000 and the 2002 Bali bombings. [Associated Press, 6/12/2003] Also in 2003, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, an Indonesian imprisoned in the Philippines and linked to both al-Qaeda and JI, will admit to taking part in the attack on Caday as well. He will further say that the attack was ordered by Hambali, a key leader of both al-Qaeda and JI, and that Hambali ordered it in retaliation for the Philippine government attacking Camp Abubakar in the Southern Philippines earlier in the year. The camp is run by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a Philippine militant group, but is allegedly used by other groups, including JI. [Associated Press, 6/10/2003] This is possibly the first violent attack attributed to JI, even though the group has been in existence since about 1992 (see 1992).
Entity Tags: Leonides Caday, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, Jemaah Islamiyah, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Hambali
October 2000-November 2001: Spanish Intelligence Monitors Al-Qaeda Setting Up Training Camp in Indonesia, but Does Not Tell Indonesian Government
Parlindungan Siregar. [Source: El Pais]Parlindungan Siregar, an Indonesian, has been studying in Spain since 1987, and has begun working with Barakat Yarkas, head of the al-Qaeda cell in Madrid. In October 2000, he returns to Indonesia, but remains in constant phone contact with Yarkas. Spanish intelligence has been monitoring Yarkas's phone calls for years (see 1995 and After). Linking with Indonesian militants, Siregar begins organizing an al-Qaeda training camp near the town of Poso, on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi. [Conboy, 2003, pp. 224-225] Soon thereafter, Madrid cell member Yusuf Galan is monitored as he receives e-mails from Siregar assessing the situation in Indonesia. For instance, one e-mail says, "You can do many things here. With only five million pesetas ($50,000 dollars), we can buy an island of 200 hectares that would be very useful. But our main need now is the weapons. Remember that everything we do should approach toward jihad." [El Pais, 7/15/2007] In May 2001, Yarkas travels to Indonesia to assess the new camp, called Camp Mujahidin. By the time he arrives, there already are some recruits being trained, including an Australian citizen. Impressed, Yarkas returns to Spain and makes arrangements for al-Qaeda to properly fund the camp. Galan brings the money to Siregar at the camp in July 2001. However, the Spanish government does not share any of what it learned with the Indonesian government until November 2001, when the allegations are made public as part of some Spanish indictments (see November 13, 2001). But the camp is shut down shortly after the 9/11 attacks, and by November, Siregar and other operatives cannot be found. [Conboy, 2003, pp. 224-225] Siregar will later be linked to the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002). In 2007, it will be reported that he is one of the most wanted al-Qaeda figures world-wide and on many wanted lists. [El Pais, 7/15/2007]
Entity Tags: Parlindungan Siregar, Barakat Yarkas, Al-Qaeda, Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, Yusuf Galan
Early September 2001: Hambali Aware of Attack Date for 9/11 Plot
A courtroom sketch of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: Andrea Shepard / Associated Press]Hambali, a top al-Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia, appears aware of the date of the 9/11 attacks. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a young Canadian citizen who recently joined al-Qaeda, meets Hambali in Karachi, Pakistan, to get instructions in carrying out an attack in Southeast Asia. Hambali tells him, "Make sure you leave before Tuesday" - September 11. Jabarah does heed the warning and flies to Southeast Asian on September 10. He will be arrested in 2002 and deported to Canada, where he will make a full confession about his al-Qaeda contacts (including an unheeded warning about the October 2002 Bali bombings (see August 21, 2002). [National Post, 1/18/2003] Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is also in Karachi and working with Jabarah and Hambali on future Southeast Asian plots, and KSM also warns Jabarah to travel before September 11. [CBC News, 10/2004]
Entity Tags: Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, Hambali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
June 5, 2002: Al-Qaeda Operative Omar Al-Faruq Arrested, Heavily Interrogated
Omar al-Faruq. [Source: Getty Images]On June 5, 2002, Omar al-Faruq, a top al-Qaeda senior operative in Southeast Asia, is captured in the town of Bogor, Indonesia, by Indonesian agents after receiving a tip from the CIA. Curiously, later in the year, A.C. Manulang, the recently retired head of the Indonesian intelligence agency, will suggest that al-Faruq was actually a CIA mole assigned to infiltrate Islamic radical groups. Manulang will claim that the bombings that took place in Indonesia were actually the work of anti-Islamic intelligence agencies. [Tempo, 9/19/2002] In any case, al-Faruq is flown to the CIA interrogation center at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan where is subjected to months of intense interrogations. "It is likely, experts say, that… al-Faruq [was] left naked most of the time, his hands and feet bound. [He] may also have been hooked up to sensors, then asked questions to which interrogators knew the answers, so they could gauge his truthfulness," the New York Times will later report. One Western intelligence official will tell the newspaper that al-Faruq's interrogation was "not quite torture, but about as close as you can get." For three months he is provided with very little food, subjected to sleep and light deprivation, prolonged isolation and temperatures ranging from 100 degrees to 10 degrees. On September 9, 2002, he reportedly breaks down and begins freely confessing all he knows (see September-October 2002). He provides information about "plans to drive explosives-laden trucks into American diplomatic centers [and] detailed information about people involved in those operations and other plots, writing out lengthy descriptions." [New York Times, 3/9/2003]
Entity Tags: Omar al-Faruq
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline
August 21, 2002: US Warns Governments that Al-Qaeda Wants to Attack Nightclubs and Restaurants in Southeast Asia, Possibly in Bali
Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: CBC]A number of governments are given warnings suggesting an upcoming attack on nightclubs on the island of Bali, Indonesia, but this does not prevent the bombing of two nightclubs in Bali in October 2002 (see October 12, 2002). Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, an al-Qaeda operative with Canadian citizenship, attended a meeting held in January 2002 in southern Thailand led by Hambali, an al-Qaeda leader who also heads the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Hambali announces a new plan to target nightclubs and restaurants in Southeast Asia. A second meeting held shortly thereafter also attended by Jabarah (but not Hambali) narrowed the target to nightclubs in Bali. Jabarah was arrested in Oman in April 2002 and deported to Canada. By August, he is in the US and is interrogated by US agents, and he reveals this attack plan. He also reveals code phrases, such as the use of "white meat" to refer to US targets. As a result, the FBI completes an intelligence report on his interrogation on August 21, and passes a warning to all Southeast Asian governments immediately thereafter. A leading counterterrorism expert will later say, "There is absolutely no question [Australia] would have received [the report] under our intelligence-sharing agreement with the US, [Britain], and Canada." [Age (Melbourne), 1/23/2003; Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/2003] A US intelligence report in early September will list six likely targets, including two nightclubs in Bali (see Early September 2002).
Entity Tags: Jemaah Islamiyah, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hambali, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah
August 31, 2002: Indonesian Military Shoots US Teachers, Blames Attack on Rebel Group
Patsy Spier, an American teacher wounded in the attack. Her husband Rick Spier was killed. [Source: US Department of Justice]A group of US teachers traveling in the Indonesian province of Papua (also known as Irian Jaya) are ambushed on a jungle road. Two American teachers and one Indonesian teacher are killed, and eight American teachers are injured. The ambush takes place on a road owned by the company Freeport-McMoRan, which owns an extremely lucrative gold and copper mine nearby. The road is tightly controlled by the Indonesian military, the TNI, and a military check point is only 500 yards away. The TNI quickly blames the killings on the Free Papua Movement (OPM), a separatist group in the province. But a preliminary Indonesian police investigation finds that "there is a strong possibility" the ambush was carried out by members of the Indonesian military. Other classified reports presented to Congress by the CIA and FBI suggest the TNI was behind the ambush. [Washington Post, 6/22/2003] The weeks later, a US intelligence report suggests that senior Indonesian military officials discussed an operation against Freeport shortly before the ambush (see Mid-September 2002). [Washington Post, 11/3/2002] Matthew P. Daley, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, later says: "The preponderance of evidence indicates to us that members of the Indonesian army were responsible for the murders in Papua. The question of what level and for what motive did these murders take place is of deep interest to the United States." At the time, over 2,000 security personnel were guarding the Freeport mine, and this has been a lucrative business for the TNI. However, Freeport had made recent comments in the local media that they were planning on cutting the security forces. The Washington Post will report in 2003 that the FBI is investigating the possibility that the ambush was designed to make Freeport increase its payments to the TNI. The Post will additionally report US officials also believe that "elements of the military may have wanted to frame the [OPM] in the hope of prompting the State Department to add the group to the department's terrorist list. If the separatists were listed as a terrorist group, it would almost guarantee an increase in US counterterrorism aid to the Indonesian military." [Washington Post, 6/22/2003] In 2006, the New York Times will report that, despite all the evidence, "Bush administration officials [have] consistently sought to absolve the Indonesian military of any link to the killings." In November 2005, the US officially restores ties to the TNI despite the unresolved nature of the killings. The ties had been cut for 12 years due to widespread human rights abuses by the TNI. Also in 2006, Anthonius Wamang, the main suspect in the killings who was recently arrested, will confess that he did shoot at the teachers, but so did three men in Indonesian military uniforms. Furthermore, he says he was given his bullets by a senior Indonesian soldier. Wamang is said to belong to the OPM, but a human rights group connects him to the TNI. [New York Times, 1/14/2006] After the Bali bombings less than two months later (see October 12, 2002), the Asia Times will point to the Papua ambush to suggest that elements in the TNI could have had a role in the Bali bombings as well. [Asia Times, 11/7/2002]
Entity Tags: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Free Papua Movement, Freeport-McMoRan, Bush administration (43), Anthonius Wamang, Matthew P. Daley
Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Complete 911 Timeline
September-October 2002: Saudi Government Charity Stays Open Despite Link to Bali Bombings
Al Haramain logo. [Source: Reuters / Corbis]In June 2002, al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq was captured by the US and interrogated with techniques described as close to torture (see June 5, 2002). On September 9, 2002, he reportedly breaks down and immediately begins spilling secrets in great detail. He confesses that he is al-Qaeda's senior representative in Southeast Asia. He says that al-Qaeda leaders Abu Zubaida and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi had ordered him to "plan large-scale attacks against US interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, [the] Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia." In particular, he had a plan to launch truck bomb attacks on US embassies in Southeast Asia around the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The US issues a code orange alert, and the attacks never happen. He also says that much of the money for al-Qaeda's operations in the region comes from the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, a charity closely linked to the Saudi government. Al-Faruq's confessions are immediately leaked to Time magazine, which publishes a story about them on September 15. US investigators tell Time that Al Haramain is a "significant" source of funding for al-Qaeda linked groups in the region and they also say they are investigating possible links between al-Qaeda and top al-Haramain officials in Saudi Arabia. [Time, 9/15/2002] However, Al Haramain offices are not shut down in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Early the next month, a car bomb and a backpack bomb hit two discotheques in Bali, Indonesia, killing over 200 people (see October 12, 2002). The London Times reports later in the month that $74,000 was sent to Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda's main affiliate in the region. The money was spent to buy the explosives for the bombing from the Indonesian military. Furthermore, Jemaah Islamiyah was mainly funded by money from Al Haramain. [London Times, 10/20/2002] However, Al Haramain still is not shut down. In late 2003, it is announced that the charity's Indonesian branch is shutting down, but in fact it secretly changes locations and stays open. All Al Haramain branches worldwide will finally be shut down in 2004 (see March 2002-September 2004). [Burr and Collins, 2006, pp. 38-41]
Entity Tags: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Omar al-Faruq, Abu Bakar Bashir, Abu Zubaida, Jemaah Islamiyah
September 16, 2002: US Allegedly Pressures Indonesia to Rendition Accused Spiritual Leader of Al-Qaeda-Linked Group
US officials hold a secret meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri and strongly urge her to allow the US to rendition Abu Bakar Bashir out of the country. Bashir is a radical Islamist imam alleged to be the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda's main Southeast Asian affiliate. US ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce, National Security Council official Karen Brooks, and a CIA official meet with Megawati at her home in Jakarta. The interpreter is an American named Fred Burks, who will later reveal details of the meeting during an Indonesian trial. Burks claims the CIA official tells Megawati that Bashir was responsible for a series of Christmas Eve bombings in Indonesia in 2000 and asks to rendition him. Megawati had allowed the US to rendition two suspects earlier in the year, Omar al-Faruq and Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni (see June 5, 2002 and Early January-January 9, 2002). But neither of them are Indonesian citizens, whereas Bashir is. Megawati rejects the request, saying Bashir is too popular to simply disappear without repercussions. (Megawati's Vice President Hamzah Haz describes himself as "very close" to Bashir, and shortly after this meeting he says publicly, "If you want to arrest Abu Bakar Bashir, you will have to deal with me first" (see July 23, 2001-October 20, 2004).) Burks claims that Megawati says: "I can't render somebody like him. People will find out." Boyce will later claim that the US did press forcefully for Indonesia to arrest Bashir because the CIA had just learned from interrogating al-Faruq that Bashir was the head of a terrorist network that was about to attack Indonesia. However, he will deny the US wanted to rendition him. Boyce will later call the meeting the centerpiece of a month-long series of meetings with Indonesian officials in an attempt to prevent a terrorist attack in Indonesia. [BBC, 1/3/2005; Boston Globe, 3/2/2005] However, the Bali bombings take place one month later, killing over 200 (see October 12, 2002). In 2005, Bashir will be acquitted of charges that he was involved in any terrorist acts and set free after serving a year in prison on minor charges (see March 3, 2005).
Entity Tags: Megawati Sukarnoputri, Fred Burks, Central Intelligence Agency, Abu Bakar Bashir, Hamzah Haz, Karen Brooks, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni, Omar al-Faruq, Jemaah Islamiyah, Ralph Boyce
Late September 2002: US Intelligence Intercepts Uncover Planned Attack on Tourist Sites in Bali; No Public Warning Results
Shortly after the Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), the Washington Post will report: "US intelligence officials said they intercepted communications in late September [2002] signaling a strike on a Western tourist site. Bali was mentioned in the US intelligence report…" [Washington Post, 10/15/2002] In response to the Post story, the State Department will issue a statement saying they did share this information with the Australian government. The statement admits their warning discussed tourists as potential targets, but says the warning did no specify an attack on Bali on the weekend that it took place. No government urgently warns tourists to stay away from likely targets in Bali before the bombings. Australian Prime Minister John Howard will later admit that Australia received this warning, but he will claim his intelligence agency analyzed it and decided no upgrade in alert status or any special warning was warranted. [Age (Melbourne), 10/17/2002]
Entity Tags: John Howard, US Department of State, US intelligence
October 11, 2002: US Ambassador Warns Indonesian Leaders about Imminent Attack; Publicly Threatens to Withdraw Some US Personnel
Ralph Boyce meeting with Megawati Sukarnoputri in September 2004. [Source: Reuters / Corbis]Ralph Boyce, the US ambassador to Indonesia, warns Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her top advisers that a group linked to al-Qaeda is planning an attack in Indonesia. The warning does not specify when and where an attack might occur, but it is the latest of several warnings based on the interrogations of al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq and Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (see June 5, 2002 and August 21, 2002). Boyce gives Megawati until October 24 to take action. He says that if Indonesia does not take action by then, the US is going to order all but the most essential US diplomats out of the country as a public warning that Indonesia is a safe haven for terrorists. An unnamed US official will later tell the New York Times: "We told them: 'Wrap it up. Block it. Demonstrate that you are serious about eliminating the threat against us.'" Boyce publicly warns that the US is considering withdrawing non-essential personnel just hours before two bombs explode in Bali on October 12 (see October 12, 2002). As part of an effort to convince Megawati of the threat, the US allows Indonesian intelligence and police officials to interview al-Faruq, who is in US custody and being held in a secret location. Their interrogation of al-Faruq is still taking place when the Bali bombings occur. [Australian Financial Review, 10/14/2002; New York Times, 10/16/2002]
Entity Tags: Ralph Boyce, Megawati Sukarnoputri
October 12, 2002: Bali Bombings Kill Over 200; Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Is Blamed
An explosion lights up the sky on the island of Bali, Indonesia. [Source: Agence France-Presse]A car bomb detonates in front of a discotheque at Kuta Beach, on the Indonesian resort island of Bali, starting a fire that rages through a dozen buildings. A backpack-mounted device carried by a suicide bomber explodes in another Kuta Beach discotheque. 202 people are killed and 209 are injured. Eighty-eight of those killed are Australian, while most of the rest are Indonesian. A much smaller device explodes outside the US consulate in nearby Denpasar, causing only minor damage and no casualties. No group claims responsibility, but Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda's main affiliate in Southeast Asia, is believed to be behind the bombings. [New York Times, 10/13/2002; New York Times, 10/14/2002; BBC, 2/19/2003] Hambali, a key leader in both al-Qaeda and JI, is said to have been involved. He will be arrested in 2003 and taken into US custody (see August 12, 2003). [Chicago Tribune, 12/7/2003] Three alleged JI operatives, Ali Gufron (a.k.a. Mukhlas), Imam Samudra, and Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, will be arrested in Indonesia and sentenced to death in 2003 for their roles in the Bali bombings. Ali Imron, brother to both Gufron and Amrozi, will be sentenced to life in prison. [New York Times, 9/19/2003; New York Times, 10/3/2003] JI operatives Dulmatin, Azhari Husin, and Noordin Mohammed Top also are said to have major roles in the bombings. Husin will be killed in a police shootout in 2005, while Dulmatin and Top remain at large (see October 6, 2005 and After). It will later turn out that the US was given a "stunningly explicit and specific" advanced warning that Hambali and JI were planning to attack nightclubs in Bali (see August 21, 2002).
Entity Tags: Ali Gufron, Azhari Husin, Dulmatin, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Imam Samudra, Ali Imron, Hambali, Noordin Mohammed Top, Jemaah Islamiyah
October 16, 2002: Former Indonesian Military Officer Reportedly Confesses Role in Bali Bombings
The Washington Post reports that a former Indonesian military official has confessed to assembling the main bomb that blew up a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, several days earlier (see October 12, 2002). According to an unnamed Indonesian security official, former Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Dedy Masrukhin says he regrets the loss of life, but will not disclose who ordered him to make the bomb. He was discharged from the military in September 2001 for involvement in a drug case. He received explosives training in the US while he was still in the military. However, less than 24 hours later, an Indonesian military spokesman acknowledges Masrukhin was intensively interrogated but denies that he confessed. [Jakarta Post, 10/16/2002; Washington Post, 10/16/2002] Several days later, the Jakarta Post, an English language newspaper in Indonesia, reports that their sources say "the police received orders to release [Masrukhin] although suspicions of his link to the Bali blasts remain strong." [Jakarta Post, 10/21/2002] Interestingly, the London Times reports that the explosives used in the bombings were bought from the Indonesian military (see September-October 2002). [London Times, 10/20/2002]
Entity Tags: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Dedy Masrukhin
October 24, 2002: US and UN Declare Jemaah Islamiyah a Terrorist Organization
The US and the United Nations officially declare Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to be a terrorist organization. JI is considered to be al-Qaeda's main affiliate in Southeast Asia. Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and other nations support the UN declaration. The Indonesian government had previously maintained that JI did not even exist, but immediately changed its position on JI after the Bali bombings earlier in the month (see October 12, 2002). However, even though the Indonesian government supports the UN declaration, it does not actually declare JI an illegal organization within Indonesia. [New York Times, 10/24/2002; Associated Press, 10/31/2002] It will take until 2008 for an Indonesian court to officially declare JI an illegal organization (see April 21, 2008). The key breakthrough to identifying the bombers takes place on November 2, 2002. The first suspect, an alleged JI operative named Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, is arrested on November 5. [BBC, 12/3/2002] Indonesia officially declares JI the prime suspect in the bombings on November 16. [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003]
Entity Tags: United States, Jemaah Islamiyah, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, United Nations
October 28, 2002: Indonesian Newspapers Suspect Several High-Ranking Indonesian Government Figures Were Involved in Bali Bombings
Six of Indonesia's main newspapers, including the Jakarta Post, Jawa Pos, and Bali Pos, suggest that several high-ranking Indonesian government figures could be suspects in the Bali bombings that took place earlier in the month (see October 12, 2002). These newspapers note that Gen. Djaja Suparman and former Jakarta police chief Nugroho Jayusman had flown to Bali just before the bombings. Army chief of staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was also reportedly in Bali at the time of the bombings. [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003; Pacific Media Watch, 3/31/2003] Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, head of the Indonesian military, admits to the movements, but claims that Suparman was on vacation, while Riyacudu was in Bali for "health reasons." An Indonesian human-rights activist says, "General Suparman is one of the generals who was behind the extremist jihad groups. He set up militias composed of gangsters and religious fanatics to counter student demonstrations in 1998. One of these militias, Pram Swarkasa, became the embryo of Laskar Jihad." Laskar Jihad collaborated with the Indonesian military to kill thousands of Christians in the Indonesian province of Maluku in previous years (see January 1999-July 2001); al-Qaeda and its Southeast Asian affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah provided assistance (see Late 2000-Mid-2001). [Asia Times, 11/7/2002] Wimar Witoelar, spokesman for the previous Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid, also says around this time, "The plot is probably hatched by hardline military rogues. This is certainly an excuse for a military takeover unless it is pre-empted." Suparman threatens to sue for libel, as does Sutarto, who is accused by the Washington Post around the same time for tacitly approving the killing of a group of US citizens in Indonesia less than two months before the Bali bombings (see Mid-September 2002). But the lawsuits apparently never occur, and an Indonesian press council apparently never rules if the newspapers were irresponsible for making the allegations. None of the government figures are ever charged or officially named as suspects in the bombings. [Jakarta Post, 11/9/2002; Pacific Media Watch, 3/31/2003; Reporters without Borders, 6/3/2004]
Entity Tags: Laskar Jihad, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Nugroho Jayusman, Wimar Witoelar, Djaja Suparman, Ryamizard Ryacudu
November 2-17, 2002: All Debris from Bali Bombings Dumped in Ocean Only about One Month after Bombings
On November 2, 2002, only three weeks after the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), the Australian and Indonesian teams investigating the attacks say they have finished their initial forensic analysis of the bomb site. One forensic team member says, "We have all we need to nail these bad guys down." [New York Times, 11/2/2002; Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003] That same day, investigators get their first big break when they discover the vehicle identification number of the chassis of the van used by some of the bombers. [BBC, 12/3/2002] The first arrest of an officially suspected bomber, Amrozi, takes place on November 5. He had bought the van. He immediately confesses to taking part in the bombings. Other arrests, including the arrest of an alleged mastermind of the bombings, Imam Samudra, follow in the next weeks and months. [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003] Most Balinese are Hindu, and on November 15, the island holds a large public Hindu ritual purifying the bomb sites. The next day, bulldozers begin dumping the debris into the ocean, and they dump all the bomb site wreckage into the ocean over the next several days. [Jakarta Post, 11/17/2002; New York Times, 5/4/2003] Robert S. Finnegan, editor for the English-language Jakarta Post newspaper, will later sarcastically comment on how quickly the investigators finished their on-site work: "Astounding work, as it must have set a world record for crime scene forensic analysis." He will also note, "Given the scope of the bombing and the sheer size of the primary and secondary blast areas - where traces from a plethora of different explosive compounds were swabbed from - this was a feat that escaped even the vaunted investigators working the World Trade Center [9/11] crime scene in New York, who spent nearly a year literally sifting by hand for evidence at the site." [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003]
Entity Tags: Imam Samudra, Robert S. Finnegan, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim
November 12, 2002: Bin Laden Possibly Says Attacks against the West are Based on Principles of Reciprocity, Promises More Attacks
Following six attacks by different radical Islamic groups in Tunisia (see April 11, 2002), Pakistan, Yemen (see October 6, 2002), Kuwait, Bali (see October 12, 2002), and Moscow, a new audio message is released by a man said by some to be Osama bin Laden, although the identity of the speaker will be disputed (see November 29, 2002). The voice on the tape outlines a principle he says he and his allies are using: reciprocity. He comments: "If it pains you to see your victims and your allies' victims in Tunisia, Karachi, Failaka, and Oman, then remember that our children are murdered daily in Palestine and Iraq… If it pains you to see your victims in Moscow, then remember ours in Chechnya. How long will fear, killing, destruction, displacement, orphaning, and widowing be our sole destiny, while security, stability, and happiness is yours? This is injustice. The time has come to settle accounts. Just as you kill, so you shall be killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be more to come." [Laden, 2005, pp. 173-5]
November 25, 2002: Indonesian President Refuses to Denounce Theories of CIA Involvement in Bali Bombings
Megawati Sukarnoputri. [Source: Secretary of Vice President of Republic of Indonesia]The New York Times reports that Indonesia's intelligence agency and its director are well regarded by the US. "But there are still senior intelligence officers here who believe that the CIA was behind the bombing," according to a Western security official. As a result, the Bush administration has asked Megawati Sukarnoputri, president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004, to publicly refute theories, popular in Indonesia, that the CIA was involved in the Bali bombings that took place one month earlier (see October 12, 2002). Megawati refuses to do so, and in fact condemns the US, saying, "a superpower that forced the rest of the world to go along with it," adding, "We see how ambition to conquer other nations has led to a situation where there is no more peace unless the whole world is complying with the will of the one with the power and strength." [New York Times, 11/25/2002]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Megawati Sukarnoputri, Central Intelligence Agency
December 29, 2002: US Military Denies Abusing Prisoners in Afghanistan, Says Treatment Better than before Capture
The US military responds to recent media stories about the torture and abuse of suspected al-Qaeda detainees in Afghanistan by denying that any such treatment takes place. Recent articles in the Washington Post have claimed that detainees held at Bagram Air Force Base were subjected to "stress and duress" techniques (see December 26, 2002). These techniques include "stress positions," where detainees are shackled or strapped into painful positions and kept there for hours, and sleep deprivation. US military spokesman Major Steve Clutter denies the allegations. "The article was false on several points, the first being that there is no CIA detention facility on Bagram; there is a facility run by the US Army," he says (see October 2001). "However, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that persons under control of the US Army have been mistreated. The United States Army is treating enemy combatants under government control, humanely, and in conditions that are generally better than they were experiencing before we placed them under our control" (see December 2001 and After, Late 2002, January 2002, March 15, 2002, April-May 2002, April-May 2002, Late May 2002, June 4, 2002-early August 2002, June 5, 2002, July 2002, August 22, 2002, November 30-December 3, 2002, Late 2002-February 2004, Late 2002 - March 15, 2004, December 2002, December 2002, December 1, 2002, December 5-9, 2002, December 8, 2002-March 2003, and December 10, 2002). Clutter also denies that detainees have been subjected to "rendition"—being turned over to foreign governments who routinely torture prisoners. Instead, he says, most prisoners held at Bagram were released after being interrogated in a process overseen by the International Committee of the Red Cross. "I would like to point out that persons under US government control who come to Bagram are not automatically deemed to be terrorists or enemy combatants," Clutter says. "When they arrive, they go through an interview process to determine whether they are enemy combatants or have information that can help us prevent terrorist attacks against Americans or attacks against US forces. If they are deemed to be enemy combatants or pose a danger, they become detainees. If they are not, they are ultimately released." [Agence France-Presse, 12/29/2002]
Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, Central Intelligence Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, Stephen Clutter, US Department of Defense
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives
Early 2003-September 5, 2003: US Slow to Freeze Assets in Southeast Asia
In early 2003, the Treasury Department draws up a list of 300 individuals, charities, and corporations in Southeast Asia believed to be funding al-Qaeda and its suspected Indonesian affiliate Jemaah Islamiya. "Due to inter-agency politics, the list [is] winnowed down to 18 individuals and 10 companies." [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 8/1/2003] Later, the number of suspected financiers is narrowed down even further, and on September 5, 2003, only 10 individuals, all connected to Jemaah Islamiya, have their assets frozen. [Associated Press, 9/5/2003] The assets of Jemaah Islamiya itself were frozen shortly after the October 2002 Bali bombings was blamed on the group (see October 12, 2002), though ties between the group and al-Qaeda were first publicly reported in January 2002. [Associated Press, 1/18/2002; United Press International, 1/25/2003] Hambali, a notorious leader of both al-Qaeda's Southeast Asia operations and Jemaah Islamiya, only had his assets frozen in January 2003, even though he was publicly mentioned as a major figure as far back as January 2001. [New Straits Times, 1/25/2001; Associated Press, 1/18/2002]
Entity Tags: Hambali, Al-Qaeda, US Department of the Treasury, Jemaah Islamiyah
August 12, 2003: Hambali and Aides Arrested in Thailand; Handed to US
Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie). [Source: Defense Department]Hambali (a.k.a. Riduan Isamuddin) is arrested in Thailand in a joint US-Thai operation. He has been considered the operational leader of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. He was involved in the Bojinka plot in 1995, attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), and was said to be involved in the 2002 bombing of two nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia (see October 12, 2002), the 2003 bombing of a Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (see August 5, 2003), and other similar acts. He is taken into US custody and is said to quickly and fully cooperate with his captors. [Chicago Tribune, 12/7/2003] According to the Washington Post, at some point he will be transferred to the US naval base at the British island colony of Diego Garcia, where the CIA is believed to have a secret interrogation center. [Washington Post, 12/17/2004; Washington Post, 1/2/2005, pp. A01] Two of Hambali's associates - Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair), and Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) - are arrested with him. Both are Malaysians and are said to be al-Qaeda operatives. Supposedly they were members of a four person suicide squad working for Hambali and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to hijack an airplane (see October 2001-February 2002). [Time, 10/6/2003] The US will later classify both of them, and Hambali, as about a dozen of the top al-Qaeda operatives in US custody (see September 2-3, 2006).
Entity Tags: United States, Thailand, Hambali, Mohamad Farik Amin, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep
October 23, 2003: President Bush Falsely Promises to Let Hambali Be Tried in Indonesia
Omar al-Faruq. [Source: Public domain]In a meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, President Bush falsely promises to let Hambali stand trial in Indonesia. Hambali, an Indonesian citizen wanted for a string of attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), was recently arrested in Thailand and taken in US custody (see August 12, 2003). White House communications director Dan Bartlett tells reporters that Bush has "committed to work with [the Indonesian authorities] at an appropriate time, that he would work to make sure that Hambali was handed over." An Indonesian foreign ministry spokesman adds: "Absolutely, Bush promised to hand over Hambali to Indonesia for trial. The only condition is that the process of interrogation (by US agents) has to be completed. Bush said that still needed more time." The US has been sharing some information from Hambali's interrogation with Indonesian authorities, but does not allow them to question him directly, allegedly for fear of information leaks. [Associated Press, 10/24/2003] In 2002, the US did allow Indonesian investigators to directly interrogate another Indonesian in US custody, Omar al-Faruq. Ironically, it appears that extensive details of al-Faruq's interrogation were leaked to the media, but by US officials, not Indonesian ones (see June 5, 2002). The US will not allow Indonesian officials to directly interrogate Hambali during a 2005 trial of his alleged close associate Abu Bakar Bashir, allowing Bashir to go free (see March 3, 2005). In late 2005, Hank Crumpton, a senior State Department official visiting Indonesia, again makes the promise that the US will eventually turn Hambali over to the Indonesian government. [New York Times, 10/19/2005] But in 2006, the US transfers Hambali to the Guantanamo prison with the intention of eventually trying him before a military tribunal (see September 2-3, 2006).
Entity Tags: Hambali, Dan Bartlett, George W. Bush, Hank Crumpton, Megawati Sukarnoputri
March 3, 2005: Important Alleged Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam Acquitted in Indonesia after US Fails to Provide Access to Prisoners
Abu Bakar Bashir. [Source: US National Counterterrorism Center]Abu Bakar Bashir, allegedly the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda's main affiliate in Southeast Asia, is acquitted of most charges in a trial in Indonesia. Bashir, a well-known radical imam, had been accused of involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002) and 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing (see August 5, 2003). However, he is only convicted of one charge of criminal conspiracy, because the judges say he knew the bombers and his words may have encouraged them. Bashir is sentenced to 30 months in prison, but is released after serving only one year due to good behavior. In late 2006, the Indonesian supreme court will void his one conviction altogther. [New York Times, 3/4/2005; Associated Press, 12/26/2006] The New York Times will later report: "Legal observers here said the case against Mr. Bashir was weak. The strongest evidence linking him to the Bali terrorist attacks was never heard by the five-judge panel because of a decision by the Bush administration that the Indonesian government would not be allowed to interview two senior al-Qaeda operatives, Riudan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, and Omar al-Faruq." The CIA has been holding Hambali and al-Faruq in secret prisons since 2003 and 2002 respectively (see August 12, 2003 and June 5, 2002). [New York Times, 6/14/2006] One Indonesian counterterrorism official says: "We need[ed] Hambali very much. We [fought] to get access to him, but we have failed." An unnamed Australian official complains that the US was hypocritical in pressing Indonesia to prosecute Bashir and then doing nothing to help convict him. [New York Times, 3/4/2005] Al-Faruq allegedly told the CIA that Bashir had provided logistical and financial support for several terrorist attacks, but he was also interrogated by techniques considered close to torture. The US allowed Indonesian officials to directly interrogate al-Faruq in 2002, but then prohibited any later access to him (see June 5, 2002). And shortly after Hambali's arrest in 2003, President Bush promised to allow Hambali to be tried in Indonesia, but then failed to even give Indonesians any access to him (see October 23, 2003).
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Omar al-Faruq, Hambali, Abu Bakar Bashir
July 11, 2005: Four Al-Qaeda Operatives Escape from US-Run High-Security Prison in Afghanistan
The Bagram escapees, clockwise from top left: Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani, Abdullah Hashimi, Omar al-Faruq, and Sheikh Abu Yahia al-Libi. [Source: Ahmad Masood / Reuters]Four al-Qaeda operatives escape the high-security US-controlled prison in Bagram, Afghanistan. The four men—Omar al-Faruq, Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani, Abdullah Hashimi, and Sheikh Abu Yahia al-Libi (a.k.a. Mahmoud Ahmad Muhammad)—were all being held in a remote cell for troublesome prisoners. They allegedly pick the lock on their cell, take off their bright orange uniforms, walk through the prison under the cover of darkness, and then crawl over a faulty wall to where a getaway car is waiting for them. One US official later says: "It is embarrassing and amazing at the same time. It was a disaster." [New York Times, 12/4/2005] The Independent will later comment: "The escape was so remarkable that serious doubts have been raised over whether it can possibly have happened the way it is described. At the very least, analysts have suggested, the four escapees must have had help on the inside, in order to know about the gap in the fence, and to find their way there so easily through a maze of buildings." [Independent, 9/27/2006] Al-Faruq is considered an important al-Qaeda leader who served as a link between al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia until he was captured in 2002 (see June 5, 2002). Al-Kahtani is also considered an important al-Qaeda operative, but not on the same level as al-Faruq. Both of them were scheduled to be transported to Guantanamo.
Deliberately Let Go? - In late 2005, former Bagram prisoner Moazzam Begg will claim that he heard in Bagram that US intelligence officers had proposed staging an escape to release a detainee who would act as a double agent against al-Qaeda. US officials strongly deny that that happened with this escape.
US Hides Identities of Some Escapees - The US soon releases pictures of the four escapees, but strangely does not identify which escapees match which prisoners. Furthermore, as the New York Times will later note, "For reasons they have not explained, the military authorities gave different names for [al-Faruq and al-Kahtani] in announcing the escape." [New York Times, 12/4/2005] The fact that al-Faruq was one of the escapees only comes out during a November 2005 US military trial of a sergeant who had been accused of mistreating him in 2002.
Fates of Escapees - Al-Faruq will later release a video on the Internet boasting of his role in the escape. He will be killed in Iraq in 2006 (see September 25, 2006). [New York Times, 9/26/2006] Al-Kahtani will be recaptured by US forces in Khost, Afghanistan, in December 2006. He is a Saudi and will be extradited to Saudi Arabia in May 2007. [Agence France-Presse, 5/7/2007] Sheikh Abu Yahia al-Libi will have what the New York Times later will call a "meteoric ascent within the leadership of al-Qaeda" in the three years after his escape. He will become very popular within Islamist militant circles for his propaganda videos. In 2008, Jarret Brachman, a former CIA analyst, will say of him: "He's a warrior. He's a poet. He's a scholar. He's a pundit. He's a military commander. And he's a very charismatic, young, brash rising star within [al-Qaeda], and I think he has become the heir apparent to Osama bin Laden in terms of taking over the entire global jihadist movement." As of 2008, he and Abdullah Hashimi apparently remain free. [New York Times, 4/4/2008]
Entity Tags: Sheikh Abu Yahia al-Libi, Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani, Jarret Brachman, Abdullah Hashimi, Omar al-Faruq, Moazzam Begg
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan
October 1, 2005: Bali Bombings by Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures Kills 22
Damage to a restaurant in Kuta, Bali, in 2005. [Source: Associated Press]Three suicide bombers blow themselves up in restaurants on the island of Bali, Indonesia. Twenty-two people are killed and over 100 are injured. No group takes credit for the bombings, but Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda's main affiliate in Southeast Asia, is widely blamed. Several days later, Indonesian police announce they are searching for five men linked to Imam Samudra, who has been sentenced to death for his role in the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002). Three of the five had already served jail sentences for holding explosives linked to Samudra and were under police surveillance but somehow escaped. The Indonesian government also blames Noordin Mohammed Top and Azhari Husin for masterminding the bombing. [CNN, 10/5/2005] The two men had been members of JI and acted on direction from al-Qaeda, but JI's leadership has largely been destroyed through arrests and killings, and it is believed they now form ad hoc groups to carry out new attacks. [New York Times, 10/7/2005] Husin is killed in a raid on his hideout in Java two months later, but Top remains at large. One year later, it will be revealed that a computer laptop and a cell phone were smuggled to Samudra in his death row prison cell several months before the bombings, and he raised funds and communicated with the bombers while remaining imprisoned. An unnamed prison warden will reportedly be detained for helping Samudra get the laptop, but no one will be tried for any involvement in the bombings. [London Times, 8/24/2006; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/24/2006]
Entity Tags: Azhari Husin, Noordin Mohammed Top, Imam Samudra, Jemaah Islamiyah
October 6, 2005 and After: US Offers Large Reward for One Bali Bomber, but Not Other, Seemingly More Deadly Bali Bombers
Dulmatin. [Source: Rewards for Justice]The US announces a $10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Dulmatin, a leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda's main affiliate in Southeast Asia. A $1 million reward is also offered for Umar Patek, who apparently is a little-known aide to Dulmatin. The reward for Dulmatin is as large as any other cash reward the US has offered for any al-Qaeda linked figure, except for $25 million rewards for Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Dulmatin is believed to have been one of the masterminds of the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002). Since then, it is believed that he is hiding out in the Philippines and has not been linked to any other bombings. [Associated Press, 10/7/2005] The announcement is met with puzzlement in Indonesia, because it comes just six days after a second set of bombings in Bali (see October 1, 2005), and Dulmatin has no known role in those bombings. However, Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top were quickly found to be the masterminds of the bombings. Furthermore, Husin and Top have been named as masterminds to the 2002 Bali bombings and every major bombing in Indonesia since then, including the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing (see August 5, 2003) and the 2004 Australian embassy bombing (see September 9, 2004). Later in the month, Hank Crumpton, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, is asked by an Indonesian journalist why cash rewards have been given for Dulmatin and even Patek but not Husin or Top. Crumpton replies, "We believe [Dulmatin] is a threat to the region," but he declines to be more specific or to explain why there were no rewards for Husin or Top. [New York Times, 10/19/2005] Husin is killed in a shootout in Indonesia one month later (see October 1, 2005). Dulmatin is listed on the US Rewards for Justice website, but he is one of only two out of the 37 suspects listed without actual rewards given for them. The other is Zulkarnaen, who is also said to be involved in the 2002 Bali bombings and 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. [Rewards for Justice, 8/10/2007; Rewards for Justice, 8/10/2007; Rewards for Justice, 8/11/2007]
Entity Tags: Zulkarnaen, Noordin Mohammed Top, Umar Patek, Azhari Husin, Hank Crumpton, Dulmatin
October 12, 2005: Bali Bombings May Have Been Orchestrated the Military, Says Former President of Indonesia
Abdurrahman Wahid. [Source: Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands]In an interview with the Australian public television station SBS, Abdurrahman Wahid, president of Indonesia from 1999 to 2001, suggests that the country's military or police may have been behind the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002). The Australian reports: "Wahid told SBS's Dateline program that he had grave concerns about links between Indonesian authorities and terrorist groups and believed that authorities may have organized the larger of the two 2002 Bali bombings which hit the Sari Club, killing the bulk of the 202 people who died.… Asked who he thought planted the Sari Club bomb, Mr Wahid said: 'Maybe the police… or the armed forces. The orders to do this or that came from within our armed forces, not from the fundamentalist people.'" Wahid believes the smaller bomb was indeed planted by Islamist militants. [SBS Dateline, 10/12/2005; Australian, 10/13/2005] Counterterrorism expert John Mempi also comments, "Why this endless violence [in Indonesia]? Why are there acts of terrorism year in, year out? Regimes change, governments change, but violence continues. Why? Because there is a sort of shadow state in this country. A state within a state ruling this country." [SBS Dateline, 10/12/2005] In 2008, Imam Samudra, imprisoned and sentenced to death for being one of the Bali bombings masterminds, will make comments similar to Wahid's. While he admits being involved in the bombings, he claims that they never meant to kill so many people. He says the second explosion was much bigger than they had expected and suggests that "the CIA or KGB or Mossad" had somehow tampered with the bomb. [Sunday Times (London), 3/2/2008]
Entity Tags: Imam Samudra, Abdurrahman Wahid, John Mempi
September 2-3, 2006: US Temporarily Closes Secret CIA Prisons, Transfers Top Suspects to Guantanamo for Military Tribunals
Mohamad Farik Amin. [Source: FBI]The US temporarily closes a network of secret CIA prisons around the world and transfers the most valuable prisoners to the US prison in Guantanamo, Cuba, for eventual military tribunals. The prison network will be reopened a short time later (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). There were reportedly fewer than 100 suspects in the CIA prisons; most of them are apparently sent back to their home countries while fourteen are sent to Guantanamo. All fourteen have some connection to al-Qaeda. Seven of them reportedly had some connection to the 9/11 attacks. Here are their names, nationalities, and the allegations against them.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) (Pakistani, raised in Kuwait). He is the suspected mastermind of 9/11 attacks and many other al-Qaeda attacks. A CIA biography of KSM calls him "one of history's most infamous terrorists."
Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (Saudi). He allegedly helped finance the 9/11 attacks.
Hambali (Indonesian). He attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and is accused of involvement in many other plots, including the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002).
Khallad bin Attash (a.k.a. Tawfiq bin Attash) (Yemeni). He also attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and had a role in other plots such as the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000).
Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (Pakistani, raised in Kuwait). He allegedly helped finance the 9/11 attacks and arranged transportation for some hijackers. His uncle is KSM.
Ramzi bin al-Shibh (Yemeni). A member of the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell with Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers. The CIA calls him the "primary communications intermediary" between the hijackers and KSM. He also attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (Saudi). He is said to have been one of the masterminds of the USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). He also attended a key planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000).
The remaining seven suspects are alleged to have been involved in other al-Qaeda plots:
Abu Zubaida (Palestinian, raised in Saudi Arabia). He is said to be a facilitator who helped make travel arrangements for al-Qaeda operatives. He is also alleged to have organized a series of planned millennium attacks.
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (Tanzanian). He was indicted for a role in the 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He is also said to be an expert document forger.
Majid Khan (Pakistani). He lived in the US since 1996 and is said to have worked with KSM on some US bomb plots (see March 5, 2003).
Abu Faraj al-Libbi (a.k.a. Mustafa al-'Uzayti) (Libyan). He allegedly became al-Qaeda's top operations officer after KSM was captured.
Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair) (Malaysian). He is a key Hambali associate and was allegedly tapped for a suicide mission targeting Los Angeles.
Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) (Malaysian). He is a key Hambali associate. He is accused of providing funds for the 2003 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (see August 5, 2003). He was allegedly tapped for a suicide mission targeting Los Angeles.
Gouled Hassan Dourad (Somali). He allegedly scouted a US military base in Djibouti for a planned terrorist attack.
The fourteen are expected to go on trial in 2007. [Knight Ridder, 9/6/2006; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006; USA Today, 9/7/2006]
Entity Tags: Majid Khan, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Mohamad Farik Amin, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Hambali, Gouled Hassan Dourad, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Khallad bin Attash, Abu Zubaida, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
March 10, 2007: KSM Admits to Long List of Plots, Defends Actions at Military Hearing
A photo of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed allegedly taken during his capture in 2003 (there are controversies about the capture). [Source: FBI]Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) attends his combat status review tribunal at Guantanamo Bay (see March 9-April 28, 2007), where he admits participating in the 9/11 attacks and numerous other plots, and offers a defense of his actions. He claims responsibility or co-responsibility for a list of 31 plots, including:
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993);
The 9/11 operation: "I was responsible for the 9/11 operation from A to Z";
The murder of Daniel Pearl (see January 31, 2002): "I decapitated with my blessed right hand the head of the American Jew, Daniel Pearl";
The late 2001 shoe bombing operation (see December 22, 2001);
The 2002 Bali nightclub bombings (see October 12, 2002);
A series of ship-bombing operations (see Mid-1996-September 11, 2001 and June 2001);
Failed plots to assassinate several former US presidents;
Planned attacks on bridges in New York;
Various other failed attacks in the US, UK, Israel, Indonesia, Australia, Japan, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, India, South Korea, and Turkey;
The planned destruction of an El-Al flight in Bangkok;
The Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995), and assassination plans for President Clinton (see September 18-November 14, 1994) and the Pope (see September 1998-January 1999); and
Planned attacks on the Library Tower in California, the Sears Tower in Chicago, the Empire State Building in New York, and the "Plaza Bank" in Washington State (see October 2001-February 2002). [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ] However, the Plaza Bank was not founded until 2006, three years after KSM was captured. The bank's president comments: "We're confused as to how we got on that list. We've had a little bit of fun with it over here." [Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 3/15/2007]
On the other hand, KSM denies receiving funds from Kuwait or ever heading al-Qaeda's military committee; he says this was a reporting error by Yosri Fouda, who interviewed him in 2002 (see April, June, or August 2002). In addition, he claims he was tortured, his children were abused in detention, and that he lied to his interrogators (see June 16, 2004). He also complains that the tribunal system is unfair and that many people who are not "enemy combatants" are being held in Guantanamo Bay. For example, a team sent by a Sunni government to assassinate bin Laden was captured by the Taliban, then by the US, and is being held in Guantanamo Bay. He says that his membership of al-Qaeda is related to the Bojinka operation, but that even after he became involved with al-Qaeda he continued to work with another organization, which he calls the "Mujaheddin," was based in Pakistan, and for which he says he killed Daniel Pearl. [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ] (Note: KSM's cousin Ramzi Yousef was involved with the militant Pakistani organization Sipah-e-Sahaba.) [Reeve, 1999, pp. 50, 54, 67] Mohammed says he was waterboarded by his interrogators. He is asked: "Were any statements you made as the result of any of the treatment that you received during that time frame from 2003 to 2006? Did you make those statements because of the treatment you receive from these people?" He responds, "CIA peoples. Yes. At the beginning, when they transferred me." [ABC News, 4/11/2008] He goes on to compare radical Islamists fighting to free the Middle East from US influence to George Washington, hero of the American War of Independence, and says the US is oppressing Muslims in the same way the British are alleged by some to have oppressed Americans. Regarding the fatalities on 9/11, he says: "I'm not happy that three thousand been killed in America. I feel sorry even. I don't like to kill children and the kids." Although Islam prohibits killing, KSM argues that there is an exception because "you are killing people in Iraq.… Same language you use, I use.… The language of war is victims." [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ] The hearing is watched from an adjoining room on closed circuit television by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and former Senator Bob Graham (D-FL). [US Congress, 3/10/2007] KSM's confession arouses a great deal of interest in the media, which is skeptical of it (see March 15-23, 2007 and Shortly After).
Entity Tags: Daniel Robert ("Bob") Graham, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Carl Levin
April 21, 2008: Indonesia Finally Declares Jemaah Islamiyah an Illegal Organization
An Indonesian court officially declares Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) an illegal organization. JI is believed to be al-Qaeda's main affiliate in Southeast Asia. The Indonesian government had previously refused to ban JI, even though it supported a United Nations ban on JI shortly after the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002 and October 24, 2002). This court decision takes place during a trial of two high-ranking JI leaders, Zarkasih and Abu Dujana, both of whom were arrested the year before. Both are sentenced to 15 years in prison for supporting terrorist activities. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna calls the decision "a huge victory against terrorism." He adds: "This will have a direct impact on the leadership of JI, the most lethal terrorist group in Southeast Asia. Unless a terrorist was about to commit an attack, or had committed an attack, the Indonesian police couldn't arrest them. Today if anyone is distributing propaganda and that person is linked to JI, that person can be arrested." [Sydney Morning Herald, 4/22/2008]
Entity Tags: Zarkasih, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Dujana, Rohan Gunaratna
March 5, 2009: Law Expert Calls for Reclassification of Bagram Detention Facility
Karen Greenberg, the executive director of the Center on Law and Security at the New York University School of Law, asks when the Obama administration intends on closing down the detention facility at Bagram Air Force Base (see October 2001). The facility has been the site of repeated torture and brutalization of prisoners (see January 2002, March 15, 2002, April-May 2002, Late May 2002, June 4, 2002-early August 2002, June 5, 2002, July 2002, August 22, 2002, Late 2002-February 2004, Late 2002 - March 15, 2004, December 2002, December 2002, December 1, 2002, December 5-9, 2002, December 8, 2002-March 2003, December 26, 2002, Beginning 2003, February 2003, Spring 2003, October 2004, and May 20, 2005). Greenberg calls it a "far grimmer and more important American detention facility" than Guantanamo.
Little Information on Prisoners - Greenberg is unable to elicit specific information about how many prisoners are currently incarcerated at Bagram, who they are, where they are from, how they are classified—prisoners of war, enemy combatants, "ghost" detainees—how they are being treated, what human rights organizations have access to them, or what, if any, legal proceedings they have been put through. "It turns out that we can say very little with precision or confidence about that prison facility or even the exact number of prisoners there," she writes. "News sources had often reported approximately 500-600 prisoners in custody at Bagram, but an accurate count is not available. A federal judge recently asked for 'the number of detainees held at Bagram Air Base; the number of Bagram detainees who were captured outside Afghanistan; and the number of Bagram detainees who are Afghan citizens,' but the information the Obama administration offered the court in response remains classified and redacted from the public record. We don't even know the exact size of the prison or much about the conditions there, although they have been described as more spartan and far cruder than Guantanamo's in its worst days. The International Committee of the Red Cross has visited the prison, but it remains unclear whether they were able to inspect all of it. A confidential Red Cross report from 2008 supposedly highlighted overcrowding, the use of extreme isolation as a punishment technique, and various violations of the Geneva Convention."
Plans to Expand Facility - Greenberg says that the government is planning a large expansion of the Bagram facility, which is envisioned as holding up to 1,100 prisoners. She recommends:
The administration stop being secretive about Bagram and release complete information on the prisoners being held there, or at the very least admit why some information cannot be released. "Otherwise, the suspicion will always arise that such withheld information might be part of a cover-up of government incompetence or illegality."
The reclassification of all detainees as "prisoners of war" who are protected under the Geneva Conventions. "Currently, they are classified as enemy combatants, as are the prisoners at Guantanamo, and so, in the perverse universe of the Bush administration, free from any of the constraints of international law. The idea that the conventions are too 'rigid' for our moment and need to be put aside for this new extra-legal category has always been false and pernicious, primarily paving the way for the use of 'enhanced interrogation techniques.'"
The rejection of the idea of "ghost prisoners" at Bagram or anywhere else. "The International Committee of the Red Cross must be granted access to all of the prisons or prison areas at Bagram, while conditions of detention there should be brought into accordance with humane treatment and standards."
The re-establishment of a presumption of innocence. "The belief that there is a categorical difference between guilt and innocence, which went by the wayside in the last seven years, must be restored. All too often, the military brass still assumes that if you were rounded up by US forces, you are, by definition, guilty. It's time to change this attitude and return to legal standards of guilt."
Greenberg concludes: "In the Bush years, we taught the world a series of harmful lessons: Americans can be as cruel as others. Americans can turn their backs on law and reciprocity among nations as efficiently as any tribally organized dictatorship. Americans, relying on fear and the human impulse toward vengeance, can dehumanize other human beings with a fervor equal to that of others on this planet. It's time for a change. It's time, in fact, to face the first and last legacy of Bush detention era, our prison at Bagram Air Base, and deal with it." [TomDispatch (.com), 3/5/2009]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Geneva Conventions, Obama administration, Karen Greenberg
September 17, 2009: Key Al-Qaeda Linked Indonesian Militant Top Is Killed
Noordin Mohammed Top, the most wanted Islamist militant left in Indonesia, is killed in a shootout with police in Surakarta on the island of Java, Indonesia. Top was an expert bomb maker and planner, and was wanted for a role in a series of bombings in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), a 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta (see August 5, 2003), a 2004 Australian embassy bombing (see September 9, 2004), a 2005 Bali bombing (see October 1, 2005), and two Jakarta hotel bombings in 2009 (see July 17, 2009). He first was a leader of the al-Qaeda linked and Southeast Asia-based militant group Jemaah Islamiyah. But in 2005, he former a splinter group Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, whose name in English means "Al-Qaeda Jihad Organization for the Malay Archipelago," after some other Jemaah Islamiah leaders drifted away from a policy of violent attacks. Counterterrorism expert Sidney Jones says, "There isn't another radical leader in Indonesia who has given that same [pro-Osama bin Laden] message so consistently." She calls his death "a huge blow for the extremist organizations in Indonesia and the region." [Reuters, 9/17/2009]
Entity Tags: Sidney Jones, Al-Qaeda, Noordin Mohammed Top, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Miss me yet? Well here's a peak at what I've been up to!
My Designer/Producer Extraordinaire boss (this guy) has launched a series of DIY-meets high-end design videos with HGTV, and the first video is now up! In this first project you'll have a chance to watch Brian in action as he takes an old family photo and turns it into a backsplash. The idea is simple and stunning, not to mention the fact that you'll get some glimpses of his beautiful home, so you should probably make it your business to take a look! Unfortunately I couldn't embed the video, but you can click the link below and watch the goodness for yourself!
Click here to learn more about Brian Patrick Flynn (and Gidget).
I hope you all enjoyed your Halloween! I didn't dress up, but I saw some great costumes--I guess one of these years I'm going to have to get in on the action!


text:
Algorithms Pack
Optimizing Algorithms 101	How to Become an Optibot (aka an "Optimizing Robot"!) and Program Yourself to Reach Your Infinite Potential
To watch the rest of this class, start your 14 day free trial.
Download Workbook
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Brian's Notes
Watch the full Optimal Living 101 Master Classes with a FREE 14-day trial
A Brief History of Tomorrow
by Yuval Noah Harari
Yuval Noah Harari is a brilliant historian and thinker. He has a PhD in history from Oxford and is a tenured professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. After finishing my Note on his first bestselling book Sapiens I immediately picked up this one. While Sapiens features a "A Brief History of Humankind," Homo Deus gives us "A Brief History of Tomorrow." Wonder what the future might look like and how artificial intelligence and biotechnology will fundamentally change the world and our species? Well, this is the book for you. It's incredibly well-written and thoughtful and thought provoking. I HIGHLY recommend it. Big Ideas we explore include how Harari developed such an extraordinary mind (hint: 10,000+ hours of meditation and no smartphone), why we should study history (hint: to reimagine a better future), the 21st century's Big 3: Immortality + Happiness + Divinity (which results in an upgrade from Homo sapiens to Homo deus!), and algorithms--"arguably the single most important concept of the 21st century.
Algorithms	& Nutrition
History	Nutrition	science
How Successful People Think
by John C. Maxwell
John Maxwell is one of the world's authorities on leadership. He's sold over 25 million (!) books. This is a quick-reading 127 pages packed with wisdom and Big Ideas on Maxwell's eleven essential types of thinking—ranging from Big-Picture thinking to Realistic Thinking and everything in between. Big Ideas we explore include the power of targets for focused thinking, becoming a possibility thinker and anxietivity—how creativity and anxiety go together.
Algorithms	& Leadership	& Peak Performance
Modern Classic	success	Top 101	Work
How to Fail at Almost Everything and Still Win Big
Kind of the Story of My Life
by Scott Adams
What does Scott Adams have to teach us about success? A lot. And this hilarious book is packed with wisdom. Learn why goals are for losers (and systems are for super-crushers), how to move from merely wishing for success to DECIDING you will be successful and other helpful tips on how to program your moist robot for optimal performance. Um. Yah.
Algorithms	& Creativity	& Habits	& Productivity
Biography	Deep Work	Energy	Modern Classic	success	Top 101	Work
Principles: Life
by Ray Dalio
Ray Dalio is one of the most successful people alive. In fact, Time magazine says that he's one of the 100 most influential people on the planet while Fortune magazine tells us his company (Bridgewater Associates) is the 5th most impactful private company in the U.S. and Forbes tells us that he's one of the 100 wealthiest people on the planet. All of which makes Dalio, to use his words, "believable" when it comes to discussing how to get what we want in life and work. Enter: Principles. Big Ideas we explore: how to evolve, what's most important, meet the shapers, Principles #1 (Embrace reality and deal with it) + #2 (5-Step process to getting what you want in life), and the two AI's: Artificial Intelligence + Ancient Intelligence.
Abundance	& Algorithms	& Business	& Goals
abundance	Best of Optimize	goals	Systems	Top 101
The Checklist Manifesto
How to Get Things Right
Atul Gawande is a surgeon, writer, and public health researcher. He's also an extraordinary, best-selling author of a number of books. Short story: Want to get things right? Use a checklist. Sounds too silly to work but… It does. Period. Big Ideas we explore include two reasons we err (ignorance + ineptitude), what to do about it (checklists!), how to reduce your Masterpiece Day mortality rate by at least 47% (checklists!), why Van Halen doesn't like brown M&M's (checklists!), and your Big 3 Keystone Initiative (checklist!).
Algorithms	& Habits	& Peak Performance
Discipline	Fundamentals	Habits	productivity	Top 101
Little Things That Can Change Your Life...And Maybe the World
by Admiral William H. McRaven
Admiral William H. McRaven is a Retired U.S. Navy SEAL who served for thirty-seven years and commanded at every level. As a Four-Star Admiral, his final assignment was as Commander of all U.S. Special Operations Forces. (During this time, he oversaw the covert mission that killed Osama bin Laden.) In 2014, he gave the commencement address to the graduates of the University of Texas at Austin. Millions of people wound up watching his speech on ten lessons he learned from his Navy SEAL training. This book takes a deeper look at those ten lessons. It's a super-quick read—packed with simple, yet profound wisdom along with moving stories of moral exemplars. It's FANTASTIC.
Algorithms	& Antifragility
algorithms	Habits	Mastery	Mental Toughness	Military	SEAL
The Small Changes That Change Everything
by B. J. Fogg
BJ Fogg founded the Behavior Design Lab at Stanford University. He is one of the world's leading authorities on the science of behavior change. In this book, he introduces us to the core elements of his Fogg Behavior Model as we learn that habit change doesn't need to be as hard as we make it. As BJ tells us: "We are not the problem. Our approach to change is. It's a design flaw—not a personal flaw." Big Ideas we explore include the three elements that drive behavior (B = MAP!), the ABCs of Tiny Habits (Anchor + (Tiny) Behavior + Celebration!), the power of anchor prompts (After I (ANCHOR), I will (NEW HABIT), and the power of celebration (get your Shine on!).
Algorithms	& Habits
algorithms	Best of Optimize	Celebrate	Habits	willpower
Hyperfocus
How to Be More Productive in a World of Distraction
by Chris Bailey
Hyperfocus. Just looking at the cover of this book makes me smile. I got it after Cal Newport connected me with Chris Bailey. Chris is the author of The Productivity Project and a full-time productivity researcher/writer/practitioner. Although the book is called "Hyperfocus," it's ultimately about learning how to control our attention—turning it on AND off at will as we master the process of intentionally entering what Chris calls "Hyperfocus" (think: getting things done/being present mode) AND what he calls "Scatterfocus" (deliberately allowing our minds to wander to enter creative mode). As per the inside flap, it's "a practical guide to managing your attention—the most powerful resource you have to become more creative, get stuff done, and live a meaningful life." Big Ideas we explore include defining Hyperfocus, establishing how to get into it (including the #1 rule!), the power of specific implementation intentions (vs. "vague" intentions) and how to expand our productivity potential.
Algorithms	& Productivity
Atomic Habits
An Easy & Proven Way to Build Good Habits & Break Bad Ones
by James Clear
James Clear has a super-popular website (jamesclear.com). Millions of people visit it every month and hundreds of thousands subscribe to his email newsletter. After reading this book, I can see why. He's a great writer and distills the essence of habit formation into, well, its fundamental components—the "atomic" structure if you will—while showing us how those TINY little incremental improvements add up to MIGHTY results. I rarely say a book is a must-read but this one's as close as it gets. Big Ideas we explore include: The math behind 1% gains compounding over a year (and a decade!), navigating the Plateau of Latent Potential (ever given up on a habit? Take note!), the importance (and etymology) of our Identity (get this: it *literally* means 'repeated being ness'), The 4 Laws of Behavior Change (remember: cue + craving + response + reward and... make it obvious, make it attractive, make it easy, make it satisfying), and the Sorites Paradox (can a single habit change your life?).
Best of Optimize	Habits	Identity	purpose	willpower
All PhilosophersNotes from the Algorithms Pack Loaded
<- It's "Arguably the Single Most Important Concept in Our World"
Continuing our tour through Professor Harari's big brain and its vision of our future, let's talk about what he considers "arguably the single most important concept in our world." What would you guess? Given what we've discussed about the past and the future, what would you th...
+1 inspired by Note: Sapiens
algorithms	Discipline	Habits	productivity	Strategy	Systems	Work
Goals Are for WINers
Except When They're for Losers
Scott Adams created Dilbert in 1989. According to my quick math, assuming he's done a strip every day since Jan 1, 1990, then he's created over 10,000 Dilbert's. I find that astonis...
+1 inspired by Note: How to Fail at Almost Everything and Still Win Big
algorithms	process	productivity	Systems	wildly-important-goals	Work
You, Horseshoes & Autonomous Cars
Elon Musk and Yuval Noah Harari on Your Future
In our last +1, we talked about the fact that Americans check their phones 8 BILLION times every day. (Wow.) We also talked about the fact that (at least 5 billion of) those 8 billion checks are essentially kryptonite for the love in your life. Today I want to talk about some more
+1 inspired by Note: 21 Lessons for the 21st Century
Algorithms	& Modern Hērō
algorithms	big-picture	Gratitude	modern-hero	optimism	technology	Work
All Optimize +1s from the Algorithms Pack Loaded
Related Packs in Productivity / Crushing It


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text:
The Voice of Measurement and Testing
Versailles Project on Advanced Materials and Standards (VAMAS)
VAMAS supports world trade in products dependent on advanced materials technologies, through International collaborative projects aimed at providing the technical basis for harmonized measurements, testing, specifications, and standards.
Formation and Objectives
The Versailles Project on Advanced Materials and Standards (VAMAS) was established following an economic summit in 1982 held at Versailles by the Heads of State of the G7 group of nations and representatives from the Commission of the European Communities. The membership has expanded over the last few years.
The main objective of VAMAS is to promote world trade by innovation and adoption of advanced materials through international collaborations that provide the technical basis for harmonisation of measurement methods, leading to best practices and standards.
Overall management of VAMAS is through a Steering Committee (SC) with up to three representatives from each of the members. The Chair and Secretariat of VAMAS alternates on a three-year cycle. The current Chair of VAMAS is Dr. Michael Fasolka from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA.
The pre-standards research activities of VAMAS are organized into technical committees called Technical Working Areas (TWA), which are overseen by the SC and led by International Chairs. The SC is responsible for policy, programme planning, approval of new TWAs and projects, appointment of TWA Chairs and monitoring the progress of the TWAs. Management of the research activities is vested in the Chairs and Project Leaders within the TWAs. Each TWA has SC Coordinators who represent and provide liaison to the SC.
Since the inception of VAMAS, 39 TWAs have been set up, covering a wide range of pre-standards research needs for the application of advanced materials. Over 500 individuals from many research groups including reseachers from outside the original founding countries have participated in over 80 individual projects.
Typically, international collaboration takes place to agree the technical basis for test method development and, using round robin intercomparisons, the test methods are checked to ensure that consistent results are obtainable at different laboratories, and provide precision (repeatability and reproducibility) data.
International Standards Bodies
VAMAS has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with both ISO and IEC under which these international standards development organizations (SDO) have agreed to publish Technology Trends Assessments (TTAs) based on the work of VAMAS to accelerate the development of standards in advanced materials.
ISO/TTA 1:1994 Advanced technical ceramics -- Unified classification system. Also adopted in
ISO TC206: 15165 on Fine Ceramics.
ISO/TTA 2:1997 Tensile tests for discontinuously reinforced metal matrix composites at ambient temperatures
ISO/TTA 3:2001 Polycrystalline materials -- Determination of residual stresses by neutron diffraction
ISO/TTA 4:2002 Measurement of thermal conductivity of thin films on silicon substrates
SO/TTA 5:2007 Code of practice for creep/fatigue testing of cracked components
World Materials Research Institute Forum (WMRIF)
In July 2008, VAMAS and the World Material Research Institute Forum (WMRIF) signed a Memorandum of Understanding that will encourage information exchange and possible joint work items between the two organizations.
Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM)
A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation has been signed with the BIPM. This leads the way to collaborate and identify key metrological traceability issues affecting the comparability and accuracy of the measurement of materials properties.
Contact Vamas
If your query is related to an active Technical Working Area (TWA) or would like to find out details about participation in the projects, you may contact the relevant TWA Chair directly. Please email Vamas us using the link below.
Vamas have created a guideline for the Design and Operation of Interlaboratory Comparisons - Gert Roebben, (Report No 50), 2017. To obtain a free electronic copy, please email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..
Click here to download the last annual report for the year ended 31st December 2018


these two are all about the holiday cheer! one of many in home sessions for rose photo this season, brothers b + l did an amazing job helping me create timeless, photographic memories. one of my favorite things about winter- I think I have one other thing I like about it but that includes whiskey and hot tea! I do so love the cable knit sweater; especially when worn by tiny humans called kiddos. melt. my heart!! certainly though, I have to give props to our wardrobe department on every shoot, she is most notably called Mom! my clients are so great to entrust their family, heirloom photos with my studio but just as great is there dedication to styling the shoot. often times I'll chat on the phone with Mom a few times before our session to make sure the look is just perfect and share emails of inspire from recent shopping trips to secure the best boat neck sweater to match the tiny cable knits of the kiddos. once again, Mom, you nailed it!! I love this lil set of sweaters and sweetness.
boys, you did great! Mom + Dad, so did you!! looking forward to more fantastic photo shoots in 2015. keep up the goofy giggles!


text:
Musician's ideas brought jazz fest to PSC 30 years ago
By Marilyn Thomas on February 9, 2018 - 11:06pm
On Feb. 15, 16 and 17, Valerie Nicholson and friends will mark 30 years of the Prairie State College Jazz Fest.
The highlight of the three-day event will be the 7:30 p.m. concert with leading jazz musicians in the PSC Barnes & Noble Auditorium on the campus at 202 S. Halsted St. in Chicago Heights.
Valerie Nicholson
But Nicholson is especially proud of the training sessions that will bring middle school and high school students to campus to perform for music legends who then offer their words of advice to the young jazz players.
The PSC music professor admits she didn't really know how things were going to go when she proposed the idea of a jazz fest in 1987, but she brought the idea to fruition and has nurtured it ever since.
"Jazz is an American art form that's bloomed throughout the world and there's all these different interpretations of it," she said. "One of the beautiful things about music — it doesn't exclude anybody."
Nicholson, who is classically trained on piano, started taking lessons at age 4. It was in junior high that she auditioned for the jazz band "and I made it and it was recommended I take some lessons with Art Hodes." She was a pupil of the world-famous jazz pianist for three years.
She received a bachelor's degree from Murray State University and came back to her hometown of Park Forest with a degree in music education. While earning a master's degree at Governors State University, she started composing music there and interacting with top artists, including Wynton and Bradford Marsalis before they earned renown, leading trumpeters Clark Terry and Thad Jones and others.
"They would stay a week or two and I'd get to play with them and we played at the Jazz Showcase" in Chicago, Nicholson recalls. "That was a life-changing experience."
When jazz left the GSU scene, Nicholson, then on staff at PSC, was unhappy enough that she decided she'd try and revive an interest in the genre. She went to Bob Anderson in the PSC Foundation Office who offered monetary support and encouragement.
The first jazz fests were in the PSC gym. Then they moved to the cafeteria where she remembers they really started to gain a following. Nicholson has memories of the maintenance staff building a stage that was specially reinforced by master carpenter Joe Apponi to take the weight of the 1,000 pound grand piano.
Nicholson wanted the jazz fest to include a learning component for young musicians. "It seemed to me an opportunity to lift up that population," she said. The first jazz fest had four bands — the PSC Band, a high school jazz band and two middle school bands.
This year, Nicholson has added Saturday time slots to accommodate the 24 school jazz programs and community members to come perform a few selections for the professional musicians. Homewood's James Hart School jazz band will be on stage Thursday, Feb. 15, and Flossmoor's Parker Junior High will perform on Friday, Feb. 16.
"We focused only on the schools bringing their groups, but we kind of marginalized everybody else who might want to be involved to observe, attend, participate … so this year we're hoping some community members, homeschooled musicians, musicians who go to a school but aren't in the music program will want to join us," she said.
The public is invited to open jam sessions from 11:15 a.m. to noon on Feb. 15, and 11:30 a.m. to noon on Feb. 16.
Afro-Cuban rhythm and percussion clinics are from 10 to 11 a.m. on Feb. 15, 10:30 to 11:15 a.m. on Feb. 16 and 10:20 to 11 a.m. on Feb. 17.
The clinicians' concerts are 12:45 to 1:15 p.m. on Feb. 15, 12:20 to 12:50 p.m. on Feb. 16 and 11:15 to noon on Feb. 17. The Feb. 17 program will have special guests from a local veterans home.
Nicholson finds students and their teachers gain so much from the sessions, and she recognizes the benefit of the mentorship the students get "from these really seasoned musicians, world-class professionals who are talking to 12-year-olds but talking to them not in any condescending or arrogant way.
"In a way, that's going to hopefully get that (young musician), or help that person to figure out who they are and what they're doing," she stressed.
"It's hard to know what you're doing if you're not sure who you are. That's why those questions of 'What were you trying to accomplish?' are important. What's the madness to the method."
Nicholson points to the arts for its "longstanding legacy of passing down knowledge and technique from one person to another. There's nothing secretive about it.
"It's not unique to music. The arts are a model for how we should be doing everything. It's cool if there's more than one way to do things," she said.


I'm writing again because things change so quickly – and at the 33-month mark exactly, no less!
When kiddo was just shy of 32 months, he changed from toddler daycare with 11 other classmates who as he grew older, were all younger than him, to pre-school age daycare where he's four months younger than the minimum entry age, with twice as many kids, and they are older (topping out at over five years old) who speak like little adults and have expansive English vocabulary. Those are his new peers.
And the amount of English he gets exposed to! Things haven't changed in that he spends two days with grandparents and I suspect that environment got more Anglophone as the grandparents struggle to keep two active toddlers in line. So it's a constant effort to maintain that the language at home is peppered with Chinese in general and that I'm the Chinese speaker – no sliding into English when situations become more dramatic. NPY thinks he's trying but I'm always thinking it's not enough.
As you've heard every parent of a toddler exclaim, they are such sponges and they listen to everything you say. Which means that in some situations when he's not playing and I know he's just intently listening to us talking, I will say things to NPY in Chinese instead. It's good practice for me speaking about different topics, good practice for NPY to hear Chinese directed at him, and enriches E's Chinese language environment. I really hope that could become a thing, to the point that NPY isn't so shocked and dismayed when I switch to Chinese.
That makes weekends really important to immerse him in Chinese. It's still going okay so far and he's as Chinese speaking in response to me as I can expect. We're talking about some complete sentences, so I'm thrilled.
What's awesome is that he knows he has several words for the same thing, especially colours and numbers. I still vehemently deny teaching him even basic English words like "car" and "dog" but I know he knows them.
Since he's developing a sense of humour, we're having fun with wordplay, either exaggerating sounds and finding some fun Cantonese words funny, like "armpit"/胳肋底 (gaak3 laak6 dai2), making funny switches like 底褲/dai2 fu3 (underwear) for 豆腐/dau6 fu6 (tofu) and playing with tones like 媽媽 馬馬 (maa1 maa1 maa5 maa5) when I (mama) am carrying him like a horse or 媽媽 嬷嬷 (maa1 maa1 maa4 maa4) when I refer to my grandmother.
Some Mandarin is sticking and we heard him singing the Frere Jacques song, Mandarin version. And whether it's from videos (Kai Lan) or basic word training with grandma who will drill colours in Mandarin (if not conduct conversation), he is sneaking some Mandarin there. I think he's appreciative that Cantonese and Mandarin words sometimes tend to be really similar like 紅/red is hóng/hung4 (Pinyin/Jyutping), 藍/blue is lán/laam4, etc. And he doesn't say sik1 (Jyutping/Cantonese) for 色/colour and says sè/Pinyin, so it's Canto-Mandarin along with a lot of Chinglish.
He still recognizes the character for "car" and I could barely teach him 1 through 5 and a few other characters (person, mountain, door) but that was a few months now and he'd probably absorb more when I try again soon!