This is a report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice, and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. The views expressed herein do not represent official positions or policies of the Department of State or any other entity of the United States Government.
While all ISAB members have approved this report and its recommendations, and agree they merit consideration by policy-makers, some members may not subscribe to the particular wording on every point.
I am forwarding herewith the ISAB's report on Gray Zone Conflict. The report responds to former Under Secretary Gottemoeller's request of June 30, 2016 that the Board undertake a study of deterrence, dissuasion, conflict management, escalation, and de-escalation in the context of gray zone conflicts. The report was drafted by members of a Study Group co-chaired by the Honorable Walter Slocombe and Representative Harold Naughton, Jr. and was reviewed and approved by all ISAB members by December 27, 2016.
The report examines the nature of gray zone conflicts as well as the strategic and organizational challenges they pose to the Department of State and broader U.S. government. The ISAB believes that while the term "gray zone conflict" is relatively new to the vernacular, it is intended to describe a type of conflict that is not new and in fact is one that the United States has not only faced but excelled in for much of our history. What makes this concept particularly relevant today is both the greater extent to which these tactics are being utilized by our adversaries, and also the expanded technological tool kit that can be brought to bear in these efforts.
Among other recommendations, this report calls for: 1) taking a whole of government approach to countering gray zone efforts, including engaging agencies whose primary focus is not international security; 2) setting up an organizational structure for gray zone operations that will facilitate coordination and management across the full range of U.S. government agencies engaged; 3) a renewed focus on planning to face these challenges, including a sober assessment of our goals, objectives, and interests in different countries and regions around the world; 4) continuing U.S. efforts to address the fundamental underlying sources of violence and the conditions that make gray zone tactics potentially effective – by promoting economic opportunity, justice, human rights, good governance, public health, and the rule of law; and 5) developing, both at the Department of State and across the U.S. government, a better "after action/lessons learned" system as well as an additional focus on training and "war gaming" gray zone scenarios with stakeholders across government.
Given the relatively truncated timeframe of this report, the ISAB has identified numerous areas where further study and inquiry are needed; including further examination of the tools other U.S. agencies and stakeholders might muster in the gray zone. We hope the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security will consider recommending these additional lines of inquiry to the appropriate officials at a later date.
The report is intended to inform a broad audience within the United States and beyond. The Board stands ready to brief you and other members of the Administration on the report.
The study addresses the challenges facing the United States from the increasing use by rivals and adversaries – state and non-state alike – of what have come to be called "Gray Zone" techniques.
The term Gray Zone ("GZ") denotes the use of techniques to achieve a nation's goals and frustrate those of its rivals by employing instruments of power – often asymmetric and ambiguous in character – that are not direct use of acknowledged regular military forces.
The report is organized according to the specific subjects the ISAB was directed to consider by the Terms of Reference (TOR) – Characteristics of GZ Operations, Policy Options and Concepts, and Deterrence/Dissuasion.
Perhaps the most widely used definition of Gray Zone conflict is that established by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM): "gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interaction among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks." Read too broadly, this definition would embrace practically all international interaction, most of which is directed in some degree at affecting the actions or view of other countries. However, it is possible to describe the problem without seeking a universal and precise definition.
The term "Gray Zone" may be new; the phenomenon is not. Although many of the techniques used now are based on modern technology, notably cyber and networked communication, many are as old as history. What are now being called GZ methods have been conducted in the past under such names as "political warfare," "covert operations," "irregular or guerrilla warfare," "active measures," and the like. In some sense, the Cold War was one protracted GZ campaign on both sides on a global scale. The Trojan Horse exploited many of the instruments of a GZ operation – creating confusion and division in enemy opinion, extending ostensible inducements, implanting hidden military forces, deception, and clandestine infiltration of enemy territory.
Explicit or implicit threat use, or threats of use of armed force, terrorism, and abuse of civilian populations and of escalation.
Russia has mounted a variety of GZ operations, not only in Ukraine where it actually employed thinly disguised military force and support for local militias as well as other instruments, but also targeting the Baltics, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the United States, and a range of European countries with a massive campaign (including expansive use of cyber) to spread its narratives, undermine confidence in legal, economic, and electoral systems, and manipulate political action, exemplified by the FSB/GRU cyber operation that hacked into networks used by U.S. political figures and organizations in what is assessed by the U.S. intelligence community and the FBI as an effort intended to influence the recent U.S. presidential election.
China is aggressively advancing its disputed maritime claims in the South and East China Seas, by both incremental establishment of "facts on the ground," by construction and occupation of disputed features, providing material incentives to accommodate to Chinese desires, and undermining confidence in U.S. credibility by an extensive media effort.
Iran in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, and from Daesh and other radical Islamist groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere using terror, exploiting sectarian and ethnic divisions, and otherwise seeking to disrupt the established order in the region.
North Korea has over the years, repeatedly used ostensibly deniable violence, political infiltration, intimidation by threats of massive escalation, and hostage-taking to divide the Republic of Korea and the United States and protect its failing system.
Reliance on reluctance of the United States to risk (or sustain) escalation and potential ineffectiveness of an effort to respond to asymmetric attack on its own terms, instead of developing U.S. courses of action that are asymmetric with respect to the adversary.
The United States does have some comparative advantages. These include massive resources; economic and financial power; intellectual and cultural advantages; military strength of unsurpassed quality, power, and capacity for adaptation to new environments and tasks; technological capacity; experience of both success and failure in similar contexts; a global network of real allies and partners, wide-spread international official, and private sector presence; adherence to values and principles that have broad appeal in many areas of the globe; and capacity to conduct its own defensive operations that employ GZ techniques. Authoritarian governments seem to be both better at conducting GZ activities and yet may themselves be vulnerable to them because of those governments' strong – and therefore potentially rigid – chains of command and lack of political legitimacy.
Effective action requires both an appropriate organizational and operational structure for dealing with the general challenge and, for specific cases as they arise, a coherent policy framework and strategy to guide U.S. response – and indeed to determine if, and in what way, to respond. Establishing such a strategy must include assembling a comprehensive understanding of the local, regional, and global situation relevant to the case, including the characteristics and capabilities of "players" in the context, and a sober assessment of the scale and nature of U.S. national interests at stake, the resources that will be required, the costs likely to be incurred, the risks of escalation, plausible political objectives the United States can achieve, and possible outcomes – recognizing that GZ conflicts often end with a compromise political resolution, not absolute victory – and a candid appraisal of the means and commitment by the United States necessary to be successful.
For those GZ conflicts where these criteria are met, and the United States chooses to engage, the United States needs to give increased attention to improving its capabilities for such conflicts. This will require development of concepts for dealing with asymmetric threats, not within the boundaries established by the adversary, but with U.S. action that is asymmetric with respect to the adversary. It will also require an improved ability to use a very broad range of instruments of national power resident outside agencies with a primary focus on international security affairs. Decision-makers and planners must also recognize that, while the GZ conflict may be "about" a single country or movement, an effective response will usually transcend national and even regional boundaries.
A key organizational obstacle to achieving this highly integrated and wide-ranging effort is that there is no common chain of command short of the President, no capability for strategic planning for the whole government effort, and no established structure for management and coordination of implementation across the federal government. The ultimate authority for GZ operations is, of course, the President, and the National Security Council (NSC) Staff, as the President's immediate staff support for international affairs, needs to lead on defining strategic approaches, developing plans, and coordinating U.S. efforts.
The fact that a campaign to counter a GZ challenge will need to be a team effort – in military jargon "cross-domain" and in academic jargon "interdisciplinary" – and many agencies will need to contribute to a successful effort means that the NSC must have the lead on overall planning and coordination. However, no such strategic planning capability exists in the NSC Staff now, a gap that should be filled if the United States is to be as effective as needed in dealing with GZ conflicts.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between strategic assessment, policy formulation and planning, and the implementation of plans once they have been approved. It will be a sufficiently difficult and important task to create an improved capability for the former, without attempting to give the NSC Staff the additional task of managing execution of the plans. In any event, the NSC Staff is not structured or sized to play a command operational role in managing operations – nor should it be – so it cannot and should not attempt to be the venue for managing implementation.
The United States needs an organizational structure to take on that implementation task. This structure should not be primarily military. The Department of Defense (DoD) will almost always have an essential role in counter GZ efforts if only because reasonable physical security is a prerequisite for other instruments being effective. Actual military operations must be under a military chain of command. In many cases, the best military partner in the overall effort will be Special Operations Forces that are trained and doctrinally oriented for the sort of conflicts in which GZ tactics are employed by adversaries.
The military cannot, however, be expected to deliver alone even on all the security tasks. Often law enforcement, "rule of law" assistance, intelligence support, border control, and other critical – but non-military – security fields will be more important. Accordingly, the relevant U.S. agencies will need to contribute.
In any event, because the conflict is (mostly) non-military, DoD is not well-suited to be in operational charge overall. Rather there should be an effective civilian-led structure for planning and management of executing U.S. counter-GZ activities within a centrally determined strategy. Whatever structure is devised will need to be capable of managing the tricky task of coordinating military and civilian actions in the field.
At the single-country level the United States should make the Country Team – augmented as necessary to include representatives of all involved agencies – the structure for in-country coordination and management. The Country Team is, however, by its very nature, limited to a single nation. The GZ challenge will almost always require actions throughout the region, and indeed often encompassing more than one region. The United States lacks a regional-level civilian institution, comparable to the military's regional combatant command (CCMDs), to direct regional-level activities.
Such a structure needs to be established, and doing so should be a high priority as a new administration, like most new administrations, reviews and revises organizational arrangements. Whatever structure is adopted, it must assure participation by all relevant agencies and pre-crisis development of plans and procedures to set it up.
An integrated military-civilian structure, headed either by a senior civilian or a military officer, but co-located with a regional combatant command and with a single chain of command over both civilian efforts and military activities (other than strictly operational combat operations).
Each model has virtues and faults.
The Department of State-headed, Washington-based approach has the advantage of a global perspective and relatively easy involvement of all relevant agencies. However, it suffers from distance from the field, diversion of senior attention to other contemporaneous problems, and likely rivalry between the Department of State, as the implementation authority, and the NSC.
An ad hoc, region-based, all-civilian model would allow for tailoring the structure to the immediate problem, but its improvised nature would risk delays and inadequate pre-crisis planning. Moreover, it does not address the issue of parallel military and civilian chains of command.
There is a case for integrating a strong civilian management element with the military's regional CCMD structure, because of the need for close coordination between the two lines of effort. The strength of this model is that it makes use of a well-established, and generally effective, regional entity that has no real civilian counterpart and establishes a single authority in the field over all parts of the operation. The principal problem for such an integration is that it attempts to run both a military and a civilian chain of command through a single organization. This model would entail either (a) civilian control over military activities (other than purely combat operations which both legally and practically cannot be directed by a civilian, other than the President and SecDef), or (b) military control over civilian activities, which raises both a risk of over-reliance on military force and questions of civilian control over an effort that is not primarily military. Experience also suggests that the distinction between "combat operations" and other military action in support of an overall GZ effort may be easier to state in principle than to apply in practice.
No doubt many other possibilities exist. However, what is critical is that a definite decision be made on which model to adopt and a clear priority placed on preparing organizations based on the model and not leaving these critical command, management, and organizational issues to be resolved ad hoc in the midst of a crisis in which timely action is of the highest importance.
The Department of State's internal organization, training programs, exercise/ simulation programs, and personnel evaluation should be structured to reflect the new (and/or higher priority) responsibilities in the GZ area. To build a basis for effective interagency work, personnel from other agencies and other countries that are potential partners in counter-GZ efforts should be fully included in State training and exercise programs, as should individuals from inside and outside government with useful local and regional experience and expertise. Moreover, support should be given for education and training of students in language skills and cultural studies, as well as academic research in these domains so that the United States has an appropriately skilled workforce to address GZ issues in the Department of State and other agencies. Put another way, there needs to be investment at home as well as abroad in order to counter GZ actions.
The very complexity of GZ challenges means that the United States must be prepared to anticipate problems and be capable of rapid response across the government.
Too often, U.S. action in a GZ crisis is reactive rather than pro-active, and inadequate basis in local conditions. While no organizational structure can guarantee that it will be innovative, proactive, and successful, planning and exercises can increase the chances. A major deficiency in U.S. government GZ efforts is inadequate planning, which too often leaves the task to ad hoc arrangements in the midst of crisis.
To remedy the planning problems, the United States should establish, with cross-government participation and NSC oversight, an "on-the-shelf" structure for detailed planning and conducting rapid – and enduring and coordinated – counter-GZ operations. These would include stand-by interagency "task forces" with linked communications, access to resources, agreed detailing/funding mechanisms, training and exercise/simulation programs, arrangements for deployment of personnel and other assets, an inventory of personnel and assets – particularly from agencies not primarily focused on international security – that could be employed in a GZ operation, and provision of needed additional authorities and funding. Such a planning structure will establish an organization and management template for GZ operations.
GZ operations have a strong information element aimed at shaping public opinion both in the immediate theater and more broadly. The United States is not as effective as it should be in this dimension of GZ operations, despite the solid efforts of individual organizations. There needs to be a government-wide review led by NSC, with input from State's public diplomacy and the military's information operations stakeholders, of the current fragmented U.S. government public diplomacy structure, including its capacity for use of the full range of contemporary media. The review should examine whether there is a need for a single agency – a modernized United States Information Agency (USIA) – for civilian information efforts, and how to make better use of SOCOM's expertise and experience in information operations.
Countering GZ attacks successfully places a heavy demand on intelligence. In this context, "intelligence" will come not only from the Intelligence Community as such, but from other agencies and non-governmental sources (business, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic, and others) with contacts, skills, experience, and cultural/social understanding relevant to the problem. The need will be not only for day-to-day operational intelligence of both military and political action – but also to understand the dynamics of the nation and region in which the conflict is occurring, the character of the conflict, and the perspectives of adversaries, partners, and others with an interest in, or a potential for, affecting the course of events – and to identify in advance situations in which the United States is likely to have to deal with GZ operations. A key element of a GZ strategy should be a preventive approach that seeks to identify critical vulnerabilities in key countries at risk, to include energy, other natural resources (such as water), cyber, financial systems, and governance integrity (e.g. susceptibility to corruption). Preparation for and support of GZ defense should be a high priority for U.S. intelligence. In the effort to provide intelligence, broadly understood, the Department of State has, and should employ, its strong potential advantage arising from its world-wide presence and core mission of understanding, as well as conducting diplomacy with foreign nations.
Effectiveness requires people with a range of skills, and training and preparation to work in hostile environments. The Department of State has important contributions to make in this connection arising from its ability to quickly staff new lines of work in foreign countries with people with relevant skills and experience. However, many of the needed skills are found in other federal agencies and in state and local government, that (unlike the foreign/security agencies) lack an "expeditionary" orientation. A system needs to be established to inventory these skills and set up a mechanism to deploy the relevant personnel when needed.
Success may depend on engaging other nations and institutions not only for their direct contribution (including financial support, deployment of personnel, and assistance in the intelligence and information efforts) but to demonstrate that the effort is not an exclusively U.S. project. Other countries whose support and participation would be critical to success will often have different interests, both political and economic, and it will be a significant task to secure their cooperation. The Department of State is uniquely situated to engage foreign nations and international organizations like the UN, EU, NATO, and other regional security institutions and to engage NGOs and private business as resources and allies.
The United States needs to create a better system for institutional learning from experience to ensure that important insights, contacts, and local knowledge and practical knowledge of how to meet the challenges are accessible when future contingencies arise. Such a "lessons learned" program should build on the practices of those parts of the system that have made learning a central priority, notably but not exclusively, within the military.
This lessons learned effort should be government wide, but the Department of State – which does not have a strong "after action lessons learned" system – should put more emphasis on this task internally. An area ripe for additional study within State is to understand how to develop the resources needed for institutional learning. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) may have the capability to provide rigorous, consistent analytic support to such an activity. The Department of State should consider having such an organization support a whole of government assessment of GZ activity. At a minimum, the Department of State should establish an explicit protocol for recording and preserving what has been learned during individual staff members' work.
U.S. government operations that must be conducted on a rapid reaction basis and across a range of agencies notoriously suffer from rigid legislation and regulations regarding funding sources and authorities for agency action. Effective coordinated action will be facilitated if fiscal control systems permit easier transfer of funds among agencies and necessary authorities can be made available in pursuit of common goals. Any changes in this area will likely involve legislation and must in any case be made in close consultation with Congress. Congress cannot be asked or expected to give a blank check, but a careful process of consultation – and systems for notification and explanation – should make it possible to assure more flexibility without loss of transparency and accountability.
Understanding of the ways in which application of the Law of Armed Conflict and other recognized international laws and norms would delegitimize GZ tactics. Even when such norms are violated, appeals to their validity may be useful in winning the "narrative "and building support for defense against the operations.
Assessing possible new "GZ-specific" norms – the establishment of which would be helpful in meeting GZ challenges because they are adapted to the specific problem of GZ operations. At issue in this context is whether certain GZ techniques, such as interference in foreign political systems, should be banned by international law. However, the very breadth of instruments used in most GZ operations, and their existence in a "gray zone" between normal competition and open conflict, seem likely to make it difficult to find rules that can reasonably be applied universally (or even be acceptable to the United States given that the United States sometimes employ GZ tactics – such as use of covert action) and that will likely also be featured in any GZ operations against U.S. interests. In particular, potential connections between GZ operations and either terrorism or organized crime need to be addressed.
U.S. Law – A review of the legal foundation for GZ operations should be undertaken to develop an inventory of statutory and regulatory authorities that govern U.S. government activities in the GZ, including consideration of any inappropriate limitations these authorities impose and what statutory modifications would contribute to more effective, rapid response. A key issue is identifying the various funding mechanisms that exist for these activities, the opportunities and obstacles they present, and whether and how they can be made more flexible without losing accountability. In any effort along these lines, close consultation and collaboration with Congress will be essential because of legitimate concerns with ensuring that greater flexibility in funding and other authorities does not compromise congressional oversight and authorization of use of funds.
The international law part of this legal analysis falls naturally within the purview of the Department of State's Office of the Legal Adviser, as the international law authority for the Department. That office should also sponsor a review, working with the Department of Justice and other legal and policy offices concerned, of applicable domestic U.S. law.
In the GZ context as in others, the ideal U.S. goal is the prevention of conflict by convincing adversaries that it is not in their interest to use whatever tactics are within their command because such use has both high chance of failure and prospect of unacceptable costs/punishment. Moreover, local and regional support, which are normally essential for an effective GZ defense, will only be available – and thereby deter GZ attacks – if the people involved believe the United States (and local allies) can assure their safety and the defeat of the attacks.
Pre-conflict preventative defense – and pre-conflict political action – including clarity about U.S. commitments and demonstrated preparation and capacity to meet them.
Part of political action may include a measure of willingness to promote a compromise on the issues that give rise to the possible GZ attack.
Improved ability to anticipate GZ attacks will allow more time for both political/diplomatic action and for preparation for countermeasures.
Demonstration of U.S. capacity to defeat GZ challenges is a powerful instrument of dissuasion.
Building allied and local support.
Escalation is always a factor – sometimes a credible threat to increase or shift the scale and instruments the United States uses will increase the probability that the GZ campaign will fail, thereby contributing to dissuading the adversary from trying. However, a major U.S. concern will usually be to prevail without enlarging the conflict.
In the GZ context, it seems likely that dissuasion by the prospect of lack of success is more relevant to conflict prevention than deterrence by threat of unrelated punishment. The instances in which the United States can credibly or effectively deter GZ attacks by the prospect of in-kind response will be few and far between. U.S. actions are unlikely to deter, unless they also present heightened prospect of defeat, not just punishment. U.S. steps to increase its ability to counter GZ operations are detailed in the body of the report.
GZ campaigns are likely to be more common and potentially more dangerous in the future, including through the nexus with terrorism and organized crime, and the United States must improve its capacity to resist them. The U.S. government – and the Department of State as a part of it – should identify GZ operations as one of the high-priority challenges the United States will face in the coming years, and understand better the nature of the challenge and the steps needed to meet it.
Defining and setting realistic objectives and policy-driven pro-active plans of actions to meet those objectives.
In many cases, GZ challenges exploit genuine grievances and government and economic failures. While giving due attention to immediate operations, the United States should continue to address the fundamental underlying sources of violence and the conditions that make GZ tactics potentially effective – by promoting economic opportunity, justice, human rights, religious and ethnic tolerance, good governance, public health, and the rule of law.
The U.S. government must take a whole of government approach to counter-GZ efforts. This will require engaging a full range of agencies including agencies whose primary focus is not international security. Accordingly, the NSC should conduct broad planning for GZ operations and should be the entity to coordinate among agencies. However, it should not attempt to manage day-to-day operations or detailed implementation planning. Instead there should be an effective civilian-led planning and management structure for U.S. counter-GZ activities – with particular attention to cyber and other information issues – within a centrally determined strategy. At a single-nation level, the Country Team, augmented as necessary to include all agencies involved, should be the manager and coordinator in the field of the civilian aspects of a GZ operation. However, because virtually all GZ operations will involve more than one country, and often whole regions, there needs to be a regional structure – analogous to, but not part of, the military's regional combatant commands – for managing counter GZ operation. The options include a Washington-based mechanism (which is basically what we have relied on in the recent past) led by the Department of State, a deployable case-specific organization based in the region, and an integrated military-civilian structure co-located with a regional combatant command. (In general, our preference, based on the less than satisfactory experience with separate civilian and military chains of command, is for integration of the civilian and military regional structures, and for giving the Department of State the leadership civilian assignment in whatever structure is used.) There are a variety of models for the structure to conduct operations in the field, with varying degrees of integration of the civilian and military aspects of implementation. What is critical is that a definite decision be made on which model to adopt and a clear priority placed on preparing organizations based on the model and not leaving these critical command organizational issues to be resolved ad hoc in the midst of a crisis in which timely action is of the highest importance.
To remedy the planning problems, the United States should establish, with cross-government participation and NSC oversight, an "on-the-shelf" structure for detailed planning and conducting rapid – and enduring and coordinated – counter GZ operations. The U.S. government planning process should include formalizing structures, procedures, and operations so that instead of improvising its response to each new GZ challenge the U.S. government has an "on-the-shelf" structure allowing for a rapid, enduring, and coordinated response. These would include creating stand-by interagency "task forces" with linked communications, access to resources, agreed detailing/funding mechanisms, training and exercise/simulation programs, and designated personnel.
Plans to respond to GZ challenges should identify "asymmetric responses" available in each country or region, the contributions that can be made by agencies not primarily concerned with international security, international partners, private U.S. business and NGOs, and create an inventory of whole of government tools/resources that can be brought to bear when faced with a GZ challenge. The Department of State should make preparation for GZ situations an element of training in the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and elsewhere, including for Chiefs of Mission, and a core priority for posts, to prepare them to manage campaigns and coordinate with the military's combatant commanders within a centrally determined strategy.
In this connection, the Department of State should conduct and sponsor games and exercises addressing potential GZ challenges with participation by personnel from other agencies and other countries that are potential partners in counter-GZ efforts.
The U.S. government needs to be structured to learn from experience during GZ conflicts so it can adapt for the next one. To that end the United States needs to create a better system, drawing from "lessons learned" systems in the military and elsewhere, for institutional learning from experience. This lessons learned effort should be government wide, but the Department of State – which does not have a strong "after action/lessons learned" system – should put more emphasis on this task. For example, when staff rotates out from posts/assignments, the Department of State should have an explicit protocol for recording and preserving what has been learned during the individual staff members' work on the GZ problem.
The U.S. government needs to be able to systematically conduct assessments based on the "after action/lessons learned" collection of data, and use these assessments in a positive feedback loop for future GZ conflicts. FFRDCs may have the capability to provide rigorous, consistent analytic support to such an activity. The Department of State should consider having such an organization support a "whole of government" assessment of GZ activity. Furthermore, policymakers should make full use of the Department of State's Office of the Historian and consult professional historians to better inform themselves of the analogues and precedents of U.S. and foreign uses of GZ activities. Applying this history would prove useful in anticipating and planning for GZ challenges.
Preparation for and support of GZ defense should be a high priority for U.S. intelligence, on both a day-to-day basis to support operations, and on the fundamental dynamics of on-going and potential GZ conflicts to better understand when social, economic, and political conditions are such that a partner or ally may be susceptible to these challenges.
In the effort to provide intelligence, broadly understood, the Department of State has and should employ its strong potential advantage arising from its world-wide presence and core mission of understanding, as well as conducting diplomacy with foreign nations.
Understanding of the ways in which the Law of Armed Conflict and other recognized international laws and norms apply to GZ operations and how focus on such application could delegitimize GZ tactics.
Assessing possible new "GZ-specific" norms – the establishment of which would be helpful in meeting GZ challenges because they are adapted to the specific problem of GZ operations. Recognize that it is likely to be difficult to find rules that can reasonably be applied universally (or even be acceptable to the United States given that the United States sometimes employ GZ tactics, such as use of covert action) and that will likely also be featured in any GZ operations against its interest.
A review of the domestic U.S. legal foundation for GZ operations should be undertaken both to develop an inventory of statutory and regulatory authorities that govern U.S. government activities in the GZ and identify any inappropriate limitations these authorities impose and what statutory modifications would contribute to more effective, rapid response.
Identifying the funding mechanisms that exist for these activities and how, by legislative or regulatory action, they can be made more flexible without losing accountability.
The U.S. government, with NSC leadership and with the involvement of the Department of State's public diplomacy stakeholders and DoD's information operations, should review the current fragmented U.S. government public diplomacy structure, including its capacity for use of the full range of contemporary media. The review should examine whether there is a need for a single agency – a modernized USIA – for civilian information efforts, and how to make better use of SOCOM's expertise and experience in information operations.
Effectiveness requires people with a range of skills, and training and preparation to work in hostile environments. However, many of the needed skills are found in other federal agencies and in state and local government, that (unlike the foreign/security agencies) lack an "expeditionary" orientation. A system needs to be established to inventory these skills and set up a mechanism to deploy the relevant personnel when needed. This should include long-term support for language and culture studies, as well as academic research that can support U.S. capability in GZ conflicts.
The International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) is requested to undertake a study of deterrence, dissuasion, conflict management, escalation, and de-escalation in the context of gray zone conflicts. These situations can be defined as competitive interactions among state and non-state actors that fall beneath the level of armed conflict, but involve the use of coercion by one side, usually in a gradual and/or indirect manner, such as through the use of para-military personnel. It is intended that the ISAB study will complement and enrich other ongoing efforts in the interagency to better understand and more effectively address this form of asymmetrical challenge to U.S. interests.
The United States is developing its policy and implementation options to address the challenges posed by gray zone conflict. Gray zone conflicts typically involve some combination of military, political, and economic activities within a sovereign nation conducted by another state or its proxies, or the use of non-state actors within ungoverned territories or failing states. Other tactics include the exploitation of international institutions to advance activities or delay censure of them. While these tactics have long existed – and have frequently been favored by weaker powers – they are increasingly employed by countries that can back their risk-taking with the threat of imposing substantial costs should an ambiguous gray zone dispute escalate to overt conflict.
Such an actor may come to believe that the ambiguity associated with its tactics and its deeper stake in the ultimate outcome of the dispute will allow it to achieve its objectives without catalyzing explicit armed conflict. This risk-acceptant behavior can complicate the search for effective but proportional policy tools to counter this form of aggression, particularly when attempting to create off-ramps that de-escalate and return the situation to the status quo. The ability of a state to deny involvement in such a conflict because of its use of proxies and the indirect nature of the conflict complicates working with that state to de-escalate the conflict. The gradual unfolding of gray zone conflicts can mask the erosion of a situation until it is too late and the onus of possible escalation is faced.
The current state of analysis of gray zone conflict as it relates to dissuasion, deterrence, and de-escalation, and gaps in this work.
During its conduct of the study, the ISAB may expand these tasks, as it deems necessary. I request that you complete the study in 140 days. Completed work should be submitted to the ISAB Executive Directorate no later than December 1, 2016.
The Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security will sponsor the study. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs will support the study. Ms. Sita Sonty will serve as the Executive Secretary for the study and Chris Herrick will represent the ISAB Executive Directorate.
The study will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act." If the ISAB establishes a working group to assist in its study, the working group must present its report of findings to the full ISAB for consideration in a formal meeting, prior to presenting the report or findings to the Department.
 The TOR also directs a review of the "current state of analysis" of the subject. There is an extensive literature, governmental and academic, U.S. and foreign, on the GZ concept, including case studies and more general discussions. We have reviewed some part of this literature, but given time constraints, we have not performed a comprehensive literature search. We recommend that, as part of a comprehensive review of the GZ issue, the Department of State should commission such a review.
 See, e.g., U.S. Special Operations Command, "The Gray Zone", September 9 2015, pg. 1, available at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf.
 Not all use of these techniques can properly be considered "Gray Zone" operations. For example, SOF have many functions, such as engagement and peacekeeping, that are not Gray Zone efforts, if only because they lack the objective of gaining competitive advantage over an adversary.
 Cyber represents an instrument of GZ attacks that is particularly challenging, not only because of its novelty, but – in most contexts – greater U.S. dependence and vulnerability than of likely adversaries. Accordingly, preparing both organizationally and operationally to meet GZ challenges requires a focus on cyber issues.
 The study has focused on GZ actions directed against the United States. However, the term was, according to some accounts, initiated by an article by Russian General of the Army Valery Gerasimov in describing a "new" form of warfare being employed by the United States against Russia and to which Russia needed to develop better responses (See, e.g., Gerasimov, V., "The Value of Science is in The Foresight: New Challenges Demands Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations", Military Review, Jan. 2016, available at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf.) Whatever the merits of that claim, there are plenty of cases – including some current and very recent ones – where the United States has done things that could reasonably be said to fit within the concept. These include those being mounted to restrain the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea and Iran, and, those aimed at regime change in Iraq pre-2003. Indeed, it is arguable that the United States has been more successful in offensive use of GZ techniques than in defending against them.
 For example, conditions in an area of GZ conflict may be strongly affected by actions of U.S.-based NGOs, private businesses, and media organizations. Adversaries do not hesitate to use similar non-governmental entities in their campaigns, and both adversaries and others often view such entities as under U.S. government control, and they could in theory be enlisted in U.S. efforts. In practice, however, there are strong legal, normative, and practical constraints on U.S. government efforts to operate with or through such U.S.-based non-governmental entities.
 Such agencies may, depending on the specific case, include the Treasury Department (which has a strong international focus, but not traditionally one oriented toward security issues), the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and others.
 The need for a strategic planning and an implementation structure is not, of course, limited to the Gray Zone problem. The ISAB studies of epidemic disease, security capacity building, and Arctic policy have all pointed to the need for such structures for problems that extend across many fields and involve many agencies.
 For a detailed discussion of this proposal, see C. Lamb and E. Marks, "Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration" (Center for Research, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University) 2010.
 The case for such an arrangement, and discussion of its advantages, problems, and variations, is discussed in J. Jones, All Elements of National Power: Toward a New Interagency Balance For U.S. Global Engagement, (Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center) 2014.
 Indeed for the long run success of the U.S. in the international context we will face in the coming decades, the nation needs to invest education and training in these fields, with the same focus and priority as for science and technology.
 For example, the burden of sanctions will vary greatly among countries, as will dependence on sources of energy, and political, cultural, and other alignments and allegiances involved.
 One option might be to assign the "lessons learned" task to U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP).
 While our study has taken a whole of government approach, we have concentrated on the Department of State's role. With a few exceptions, we have not attempted to identify the particular element of the Department of State that should take the actions we recommend. We do, however, recommend that the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security ("T") undertake to ensure that the recommended actions be taken by the appropriate Department of State element and that it should be the default element responsible for overall GZ actions inside the Department.


Interpretation of Metallographic Structures, Second Edition describes the features of metallographic structures using an optical reflection microscope. This book is divided into six chapters and starts with an examination of the polycrystalline structures, subgrain boundaries, and an overview of cold and hot working, as well as recrystallization and grain growth. The next chapter explores the metallography of fracture, which involves visual inspection, low-power stereoptic light microscopy, polished-section light-reflection microscopy, and the scanning electron microscope. This topic is followed by discussions of the different types of crystallizations, the mechanism of solid-state transformation, and the diffusion and other transport processes. The last chapter involves the measurement aspects in metallography, including measurement of grain and particles sizes, as well as their distribution. This book is intended primarily to metallurgists and researchers.


text:
Industry Welcomes Four New Ocean-Going Vessels Capable of Running on Methanol
[February 14, 2018] -- Waterfront Shipping Company Ltd. (WFS), Marinvest/Skagerack Invest (Marinvest), IINO Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (IINO), Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (Mitsui), and the NYK Group (NYK) are proud to announce their investment to build four new ocean-going vessels powered by clean-burning methanol fuel.
These four 49,000 dead weight tonne vessels will be delivered in 2019 and built with MAN B&W ME-LGI 2-stroke dual-fuel engines that can run on methanol, fuel oil, marine diesel oil or gas oil.
The vessels will join the existing seven methanol-fueled vessels chartered by WFS. In 2016, WFS, Marinvest, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., and Westfal-Larsen Management announced the delivery of these seven fuel-efficient ocean-going vessels to the sea. These innovative vessels are built with the first-of-its kind MAN B&W ME-LGI 2-stroke dual fuel engines and have achieved accolades from the marine industry for their use of clean-burning methanol as an alternative fuel.
"We are very happy to be working with Waterfront Shipping again on this innovative technology. With seven engines already in operation and proven in the field, this new order confirms the ME-LGI concept as a mature technology. Since this dual-fuel engine entered the market in 2016, its price has dropped considerably, which makes it an even more attractive propulsion option. Allied with its environmental credentials and convenience of use when employing methanol as a fuel, we are confident the ME-LGI will continue its promising progress," states René Sejer Laursen, Promotion Manager, MAN Diesel & Turbo.
"It's been great working with MAN and our shipping partners who are as committed as we are in advancing sustainable clean marine technology. Our seven methanol-fueled vessels have been operating safely and reliably since 2016, and we expect these new vessels to benefit from ongoing technological advances that will continue to optimize performance and efficiency," says Paul Hexter, President, Waterfront Shipping. "We are proud to see 40 per cent of our fleet powered by methanol-fuel technology in the coming year."
As a safe, biodegradable and clean-burning fuel, methanol is a promising alternative marine fuel that can meet new and existing environmental regulations from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that require vessels to decrease emissions of sulphur oxide and nitrogen oxides. By using methanol rather than conventional marine fuel, the vessels produce significantly fewer emissions than conventional vessels.
The four new vessels will be built in Korea at Hyundai Mipo Dockyard, where several of the first generation of methanol-fueled vessels were built. WFS will charter the four vessels to replace older vessels and support growing demand for methanol around the world. Two of the vessels will be owned in a joint venture between WFS and Marinvest, one will be owned by NYK and the fourth will be owned in a joint venture between IINO and Mitsui.
"We have been very pleased by the performance of the vessels delivered in 2016 and excited to be investing in another two. Our overall focus in the development of the dual-fuel system concept has been safety and engine reliability. We have found the technology for handling methanol is well developed and offers a safe dual-fuel solution for low-flashpoint liquid fuels", states Patrik Mossberg, Chairman, Marinvest.
"For over 130 years, we have been guided by our commitment to pioneering innovation. Investing in this proven groundbreaking and innovative marine technology exemplifies our commitment to using leading clean technology to meet the safe and dependable transportation needs of our global customers", states Koji Kondo, Corporate Officer, NYK.
"With the growing demand for cleaner marine fuels to meet more stringent emission regulations, we're seeking ways to reduce our environmental footprint," says Ryuichi Osonoe, Director and Managing Executive Officer IINO. "Investing in the next generation of fuels is one way we'll continue to meet regulations while maintaining the efficiency of our operations."
"We are proud to be partnering with WFS to advance methanol as a sustainable marine fuel and be part of an innovative solution that meets the needs of the shipping industry and contributes to a more sustainable future", says Takeshi Setozaki, Chief Operating Officer, Mitsui.
About Waterfront Shipping
Waterfront Shipping, a wholly owned subsidiary of Methanex Corporation, is a global marine transportation company specializing in the safe, responsible and reliable transport of bulk chemicals and clean petroleum products to major international markets in North America, Asia Pacific, Europe and Latin America. Waterfront Shipping operates the world's largest methanol ocean tanker fleet with its fleet comprising vessels from 3,000 to 50,000 dwt. Its fleet of 28 modern, deep sea tankers forms a seamless transportation network dedicated to keeping an uninterrupted flow of methanol moving to storage terminals and customers' plant sites around the world. For more information, please visit www.wfs-cl.com/.
About Methanex Corporation
Methanex Corporation (TSX:MX)(NASDAQ:MEOH) is a Vancouver-based, publicly traded company and is the world's largest producer and supplier of methanol to major international markets in North America, Asia Pacific, Europe and South America. Methanex global production hubs are strategically positioned to supply every major global market and currently operates production sites in Canada, Chile, Egypt, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States. Its global operations are supported by an extensive global supply chain of terminals, storage facilities and the world's largest dedicated fleet of methanol ocean tankers. Methanex shares are listed for trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange in Canada under the trading symbol "MX" and on the NASDAQ Global Market in the United States under the trading symbol "MEOH". For more information, please visit www.methanex.com.
About Marinvest/Skagerack Invest
Marinvest is a private shipping and investment Group, part owners and managers of product and chemical tankers. Holdings include investments in tankers of about 80,000 dwt, chemical tankers between 20,000 to 50,000 dwt, a developing coastal shipping company and real estate. For more information, please visit http://www.marinvest.se/.
About NYK Group
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha is one of the world's leading transportation companies. At the end of March 2017, the NYK Group was operating 799 major ocean vessels, as well as fleets of planes and trucks. The company's shipping fleet includes 372 bulk carriers, 111 car carriers, 97 containerships (including semi-containerships), 70 LNG carriers (including those owned by equity method affiliates), 63 tankers, 43 wood-chip carriers, one cruise ship, and 42 other ships (including multipurpose and project cargo vessels). NYK's revenue in fiscal 2016 exceeded $17 billion, and as a group NYK employs about 36,000 people worldwide. NYK is based in Tokyo and has regional headquarters in London, New York, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Sao Paulo. For more information, please visit http://www.nyk.com/english/group/.
About IINO Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd
IINO Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. is a publicly-listed Japanese company with a history dating back to 1899. IINO currently operate global shipping business and real estate business. As of the end of December 2017, IINO group operates a diverse fleet of over 100 vessels including chemical tankers, oil tankers, drybulk carriers, LNG tankers, LPG tankers and small gas carriers, while also active in the real estimate business by owing five office buildings in central Tokyo. For Chemical tankers segment, IINO is one of the leading companies and operates various sizes of vessels trading world-wide. For more information, please visit http://www.iino.co.jp/kaiun/english/
About Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
Mitsui is one of the most diversified and comprehensive trading, investment and service enterprises in the world, with 138 offices in 66 countries as of Feb, 2018. Utilizing our global operating locations, network and information resources, we are multilaterally pursuing business that ranges from product sales, worldwide logistics and financing, through to the development of major international infrastructure and other projects in the following fields: Iron & Steel Products, Mineral & Metal Resources, Infrastructure Projects, Integrated Transportation Systems, Chemicals, Energy, Food, Food & Retail Management, Healthcare & Service, Consumer Business, IT & Communication Business, Corporate Development Business. Mitsui is actively taking on challenges for global business innovation around the world. For more information, please visit http://www.mitsui.com
About MAN Diesel & Turbo
MAN Diesel & Turbo SE, based in Augsburg, Germany, is the world's leading provider of large-bore diesel and gas engines and turbomachinery. The company employs around 15,000 staff at more than 100 international sites, primarily in Germany, Denmark, France, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, India and China. The company's product portfolio includes two-stroke and four-stroke engines for marine and stationary applications, turbochargers and propellers as well as gas and steam turbines, compressors and chemical reactors. The range of services and supplies is rounded off by complete solutions like ship propulsion systems, engine-based power plants and turbomachinery trains for the oil & gas as well as the process industries. Customers receive worldwide after-sales services marketed under the MAN PrimeServ brand.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
L'ammofila arenaria (Ammophila arenaria) è una pianta erbacea della famiglia delle Poaceae, diffusa nel bacino del Mediterraneo e sulle coste atlantiche di Francia, Spagna e Portogallo. Pur essendo originaria delle coste europee è stata introdotta negli altri continenti per stabilizzare le dune di sabbia, pertanto ora si trova sulle dune costiere di tutto il mondo.

Caratteristiche

È una pianta perenne con lunghi rizomi orizzontali e verticali, forma cespugli fitti, la sua altezza varia da 50 a 120 cm, ha foglie di colore grigio-verde, rigide, lineari e sottili, con una struttura cilindrica ed un apice pungente, raggiungono anche i 90 cm.

Nel punto d'attacco al fusto si nota una linguetta divisa in due segmenti sottili di 10–30 mm, l'infiorescenza è formata da una spiga di 7–30 cm e larga 1–2 cm, a sua volta costituita da altrettante spighette lunghe 9–14 mm ciascuna con un fiore.

Fiorisce da maggio ad agosto ed i frutti vengono dispersi in settembre e germogliano nella primavera seguente.

Habitat
Cresce su suoli ben drenati, che hanno anche diversa composizione minerale, tollera un pH del suolo che va da 4.5 a 9 ed una temperatura da 10° a 40°.

L'ammofila si insedia quando la duna embrionale raggiunge una certa consistenza e dà origine alla duna vera e propria, giocando un ruolo importante nel processo di formazione. L'ammofila, crescendo in altezza ed emergendo con i suoi germogli dai depositi di sabbia, permette alla duna di elevarsi in altezza e contemporaneamente la consolida al suo interno con un fitto apparato radicale. La duna cresce finché l'azione di deposito del vento non viene compensata da quella di erosione, stabilendo un equilibrio tra la crescita della pianta e la deposizione della sabbia.

La presenza della pianta, essendo fittamente cespugliosa, porta ad una diminuzione della velocità del vento e conseguentemente ad una deposizione dei granelli di sabbia che, a sua volta, favorisce la crescita dell'ammofila ed il successivo accumulo di sabbia. Tutto questo innesca un processo virtuoso che, in condizioni non disturbate ormai rare, le dune nei nostri litorali possono raggiungere altezze intorno ai 6–7 m e, disponendosi parallelamente alla costa, diminuiscono l'azione dei venti, degli agenti marini e permettono di ospitare altre specie vegetali più complesse.

La lunghezza dello spazio tra un nodo ed il successivo sui rizomi verticali varia in base alla quantità di sabbia accumulata ed indica l'accrescimento stagionale della sabbia.

Voci correlate
 Specie botaniche in Italia

Altri progetti

Collegamenti esterni

Pooideae

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


To find out more information about Dr. Delilah Williams, please review the contact information below in order speak with Dr. Delilah Williams.
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text:
Q: A pythonic way to remove all instances of an element without generating a new list There are many questions similar to this (here is one) but the solutions I've seen use list comprehension or filter and those ways generate a new list (or a new iterator in the case of filter in Python 3.x). There are solutions that remove instances by modifying the list itself (like this, and this), and those would be my last resort. However, I am asking to see if there a more elegant ("Pythonic" as another question calls it) way of doing it.
Why I am disregarding solutions that generate a new list: I am iterating over a collection of lists, and Python allows me to modify the "current" list I am iterating over, but not to replace it entirely:
>>> ll= [[1,2,3], [2,3,4], [4,5,6]]

>>> for l in ll:
        if l[0] == 2:
            l = [10]
>>> ll
[[1, 2, 3], [2, 3, 4], [4, 5, 6]]   #replacement didn't happen

>>> for l in ll:
        if l[0] == 2:
            l.remove(2)
>>> ll
[[1, 2, 3], [3, 4], [4, 5, 6]]   #modification succeeded

A: You need to use slice assignment to replace all list elements instead of the list itself:
for l in ll:
    if l[0] == 2:
        l[:] = [10]

The [:] part turns this into slice assignment; instead of replacing the reference l points to, you replace all elements contained in l with the new list.
Demo:
>>> ll= [[1,2,3], [2,3,4], [4,5,6]]
>>> for l in ll:
...     if l[0] == 2:
...         l[:] = [10]
...
>>> ll
[[1, 2, 3], [10], [4, 5, 6]]

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


I'm still trying to figure out if the book was better than the movie or it's the other way around.
The plot is easy: Nine year-old Bruno knows nothing of the Final Solution or the Holocaust. He is oblivious to the appalling cruelties being inflicted on the people of Europe by his country. All he knows is that he has been moved from a comfortable home in Berlin to a house in a desolate area where there is nothing to do and no one to play with. Until he meets Shmuel, a boy who lives a strange parallel existence on the other side of the adjoining wire fence and who, like the other people there, wears a uniform of striped pyjamas. Bruno's friendship with Shmuel will take him from innocence to revelation. And in exploring what he is unwittingly a part of, he will inevitably become subsumed by the terrible process.
The characters in the movie with the same name "The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas" (2008) are exacly chosen as they are in the book, this happends almost never. Oh, the lines, the lines are also the same ones as they are in the book. This is an exact reproduction, it's amazing, but exept for the ending, which is changed in the movie and in my opinion, it's better. You understand exacly what happend to Bruno and "the boy in stripped pyjamas".
I don't wanna spoil the ending, but you shouls really read the book and also watch the movie, they go on very well together.
Winner: Irish Book Award Children's Book of the Year, Irish Book Award People's Choice Book of the Year, Bisto Book of the Year, Que Leer Award Best International Novel of the Year (Spain), Orange Prize Readers Group Book of the Year. Shortlisted for British Book Award, the Border's New Voices Award; the Ottaker's Children's Book Prize, the Paolo Ungari Literary Award (Italy) , Irish Book Award Irish Novel of the Year Award]]; the Leeds Book Award; the North-East Book Award; the Berkshire Book Award; the Sheffield Book Award; the Lancashire Book Award; Prix Farniente (Belgium); Flemish Young Readers Award; Independent Booksellers Book of the Year; Deutschen Jugend Literatur Preis (Germany).
British Independent Film Awards 2008: Won – Best Actress Vera Farmiga, Nominated – Most Promising Newcomer Asa Butterfield and Best Director Mark Herman.
Chicago International Film Festival 2008: Won – Director Mark Herman and many others, you can see the full list on imdb.com.


text:
Ellen Corby
Ellen Corby Movies, TV Shows, & Awards
Racine, Wisconsin, USA
Emmy (Primetime), Outstanding Single Performance by a Supporting Actress in a Comedy or Drama Series for The Waltons
Emmy (Primetime), Outstanding Continuing Performance by a Supporting Actress in a Drama Series for The Waltons
Golden Globe, Best Performance by an Actress in a Supporting Role in a Series, Limited Series or Motion Picture Made for Television for The Waltons
Emmy (Primetime), Best Supporting Actress in Drama for The Waltons
Golden Globe, Best Performance by an Actress in a Television Series - Drama for The Waltons
Emmy (Primetime), Outstanding Performance by an Actress in a Supporting Role in a Drama for The Waltons
Academy Award, Actress in a Supporting Role for I Remember Mama
Golden Globe, Best Performance By an Actress in a Supporting Role in a Motion Picture for I Remember Mama
183 programs featuring Ellen Corby


Aller-All Total Seasonal Support is an excellent product for those battling seasonal lows or adrenal fatigue.
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Licorice Extract' an ingredient present in this supplement increases chemicals in the body that act as natural healers. While it thins mucous' it also decreases swelling in the body. Protect your body from seasonal changes with the natural formula Aller-All™ Total Seasonal Suppor Tablets from Protocol for Life Balance®.
As a dietary supplement take three tablets 1 to 2 times daily' preferably 20-30 minutes before meals.


text:
Home Community WCA Foundation Vince Messina Scholar Earns 2k
WCA Foundation
Vince Messina Scholar Earns 2k
Jamestown Gazette Staff
The Vincent Messina Memorial Scholarship was presented to Meghan O'Connell, a second-year student in the UPMC Chautauqua WCA School of Radiology. Shown from left are Dick and Cindy Tyler, O'Connell, Kathy Messina, wife of the late Vince Messina, and his sons, Andy and Marty Messina. All are volunteers for the Vincent Messina Memorial Golf Tournament that funds the scholarship.
Meghan O'Connell, a second-year student of the UPMC Chautauqua WCA School of Radiology, was selected the recipient of the scholarship that honors the life of Vincent Messina. The award is a $2,000 credit toward O'Connell's tuition at the hospital-based School of Radiology. It is the largest scholarship awarded by WCA Foundation which supports UPMC Chautauqua WCA, the education of its employees, and Starflight.
Messina was a member of the first graduating class of the radiology school and worked for the hospital for more than 30 years. His family chose to memorialize him with a scholarship for a student in the second year of their schooling because of the financial stress experienced by students in the 22-month continuous program. In addition to classroom instruction, students in the hospital-based program receive clinical rotations which prepare them with a richer, more in-depth education than those who attend college based radiology programs.
When applying for the WCA Foundation scholarship, O'Connell related her decision to enter the field of radiology stemmed from a desire to do something that made a difference in individual lives. She has found her decision to be a part of the UPMC Chautauqua WCA School of Radiology rewarding and the most beneficial decision she has made for herself.
Funding for the scholarship is generated from the Vincent Messina Memorial Scholarship Fund at WCA Foundation. The fund was started in 2013 and has grown to almost $97,000 through the efforts of the Messina family, their friends, Vince's colleagues at UPMC Chautauqua WCA, the staff of WCA Foundation, and the staff and students of the UPMC Chautauqua WCA School of Radiology. The sixth annual Vincent Messina Memorial Golf Tournament that helps grow the scholarship fund is planned for June 1, 2019 at Conewango Valley Country Club in Warren, PA.
Donations to this fund or any of the 42 other funds held at WCA Foundation may be done online at the foundation's website: www.wcafoundationjamestown.org or by sending a tax-exempt gift to WCA Foundation, P.O. Box 840, Jamestown, NY 14702-0840. For more information about the Messina Scholarship, WCA Foundation or the UPMC Chautauqua WCA School of Radiology, contact Brigetta Overcash, Executive Director of the foundation at 716-664-8665, Overcashbe@upmc.edu or Megan Barone, Director of Development of the hospital and foundation at 716-664-8423, Baronema3@upmc.edu.
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A recent addition to our property valuation and trends suite of solutions, CoreLogic Case-Shiller Indexesstrengthen our industry-leading home price index data, analytics, and services.
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Every month, we combine ZIP code-level public recordings of home sales, sale prices, and foreclosure filings with mortgage performance data into a single dataset that provides a unique monthly snapshot of market trends. MarketTrends helps you identify potential markets for expansion, spot valuation trends, analyze performance, and perform benchmarking.
With deep and broad coverage of U.S. Multiple-Listing Services (MLS) data, CoreLogic ListingTrendsprovides monthly snapshots of time-series housing data—at the ZIP Code-level and above—from 2007 forward. Used either alone or in conjunction with CoreLogic HPI™, CoreLogic HPI Forecasts™, or MarketTrends, CoreLogic ListingTrends provides unique insights for property appraisal, loan underwriting and origination, risk and fraud management, servicing management, government analysis, and real estate market forecasting.
Key CoreLogic ListingTrends metrics include leading indicators of house prices, listing inventories, days on market, and absorption rates by listing type—new, active, pending, closed, and sold.


I just finished reading Rob Manson's awesome book "Getting Started with WebRTC" and I can highly recommend it for any Web developer who is interested in WebRTC.
Rob explains very clearly how to create your first video, audio or data peer-connection using WebRTC in current Google Chrome or Firefox (I think it also now applies to Opera, though that wasn't the case when his book was published). He makes available example code, so you can replicate it in your own Web application easily, including the setup of a signalling server. He also points out that you need a ICE (STUN/TURN) server to punch through firewalls and gives recommendations for what software is available, but stops short of explaining how to set them up.
In fact, he provides the most in-depth demo of how to set up a good file sharing interface I have come across.
Rob then also extends his introduction to WebRTC to two key application areas: education and team communication. His recommendations are spot on and required reading for anyone developing applications in these spaces.
Before Rob's book, I have also read Alan Johnson and Dan Burnett's "WebRTC" book on APIs and RTCWEB protocols of the HTML5 Real-Time Web.
Alan and Dan's book was written more than a year ago and explains that state of standardisation at that time. It's probably a little out-dated now, but it still gives you good foundations on why some decisions were made the way they are and what are contentious issues (some of which still remain). If you really want to understand what happens behind the scenes when you call certain functions in the WebRTC APIs of browsers, then this is for you.
Alan and Dan's book explains in more details than Rob's book how IP addresses of communication partners are found, how firewall holepunching works, how sessions get negotiated, and how the standards process works. It's probably less useful to a Web developer who just wants to implement video call functionality into their Web application, though if something goes wrong you may find yourself digging into the details of SDP, SRTP, DTLS, and other cryptic abbreviations of protocols that all need to work together to get a WebRTC call working.
Overall, both books are worthwhile and cover different aspects of WebRTC that you will stumble across if you are directly dealing with WebRTC code.


Please print out and mail, or copy/paste and email, this form to us. It will help with your party planning and give us all the information we need to make your party a fabulous success.
Please specify your location or our location.
How many pony riders will there be?
How many ponies do you want?
What ages/weights will the riders be?
How long did you want the ponies for?
Did you want a party theme?
Are Google map directions to your location accurate?
Contact us with a credit card number we can charge the deposit to. After the party we will charge the remaining amount to the card or you can pay us by cash or check.
We come rain or shine. The ponies don't care if it's raining and neither will the kids when they are on the ponies. So put on the rain jackets and keep the fun going! I would hate to be the parent that told the kids the ponies weren't coming... Should there be a need for us to cancel due to a catastrophic pony illness ( making all our ponies unavailable) or some other unlikely event we will refund your money and give you a credit for a discounted Seattle Pony Party.
If you must cancel within one week of the party we request that you reschedule your party for a later date.
We reserve the right to refuse service in the highly unlikely event we find a situation dangerous to the kids or our ponies. Your safety is important to us. If this event or circumstance is beyond your control we will be delighted to refund your deposit.


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Most Chickasha dumpster rental companies will take care of securing this permit for you if you rent from them. Make sure that if you're planning to put the dumpster on the street, the company has made the appropriate arrangements. You should also ensure that you get the permit in a timely manner and at the correct cost. If you thought the dumpster company was getting a permit and they did not, you will be the one who will have to pay the fine that is issued by the authorities.
Another thing to be sure to check could be the convenience of the service. A few that the support has many vans that are able to carrying most things that you may be able to throw away.
To the cases when normal trash pickup truck just would not cut it, take into account . With this choice, you will enjoy the ease as well as convenience of at-home garbage collection, but you can eliminate large objects and large quantities of trash without difficulty.
Currently people research your business right online so it is easy for potential customers to tug up your business name and see just what others have got said about your service. When your customers are done using your goods and services you should inspire those that are exceedingly happy with your service to post an evaluation on your occupation site. It might be helpful to place your website handle and remember to leave an evaluation right on the balance information.
Any time a business or home owner decides the size of dumpster that their property demands, they then need to start evaluating rental companies. The most important thing that sets apart rental companies that may appear similar will be the service. The individual renting the dumpster should know if they would like the complete dumpster to be eliminated and a new one put in their place each and every pick up, or maybe if the dumpster they've got will be emptied into a pickup and put last its spot.
Something men and women often neglect to think about gets a enable. While taking part in 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK and having that placed on your individual property is a very important factor, if you plan to put it on the street, you'll need a enable. Check with any local government and see what you want to do to get this type of permit. Apparent all of this before you start the renting procedure. Some corporations will refuse to put your receptacle on the road unless you can reveal that you have the proper paperwork if you want.
Improper controlling of these enormous tons of trash onto dump leaves the consumer with incidents. The customer being unaware of the tonnage limits, overloads the container using the intention of clearing the trash on one head out. The customer is going to be dragged into a dangerous situation if it is not managed properly. A healthcare facility charges paid for to cure these injuries is going to be double the amount of your respective savings. In the end the person will find yourself spending enormous sum of money along with the suffering accrued due to incidents.
You can also rent any dumpster that is medium sized. The medium sized dumpster should hold up to three a lot of debris or about five pickup truck plenty.
Untidy spots surrounding your own hotel will offer a negative effect to readers. You cannot have the trash ales at your gateway waiting for the pickup coming from municipal authorities of the talk about. Relying on all of them for removing your trash would delay the task without a doubt because they come according to their own personal schedules and have limits within the tonnage of the trash disposed at intervals of interval.
The best way to dispose the solid waste materials quickly without your occupied schedules is to go for 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK Alaska; they help someone to dispose the trash in successful manner on affordable cost. Dumpster rental company Alaska will sell solid waste materials generated on completion of undertaking in enviromentally friendly friendly fashion and reduce the ill effects regarding pollution within the environment on the state. In renting a dumpster for your trash fingertips needs, the trash that is thrown away to the rubbish dumps will be reduced and the living space occupied by the trash in the landfills is definitely condensed which in turn will lower the release of harmful gases in to the atmosphere. Disposing the trash by means of 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK will prevent the trash from being dumped in to the water likewise. Dumpster rental Alaska performs a key position in reducing the impact of air pollution on the atmosphere of the talk about.
By renting a dumpster you may store everything that is not required and still have it migrated out in the event the work is finish. This not just keeps your house clean almost all helps keep this neighbors content. During a renovating process, if perhaps waste just isn't managed adequately, the bordering houses may also have to tolerate with dirt and debris. Therefore, the most effective way out is to rent a dumpster the moment the remodeling will begin.
Every type of economic requires some sort or other for dumpster rentals for its property. The type of dumpster rentals service along with size of dumpster essental to a specific enterprise depends on the nature of business. Dumpster rentals services offer you different pickup truck options like daily, every week, or function monthly pickup trucks. These companies in addition rent out specialty dumpsters (made particularly for recyclable merchandise) to the businesses. In the event you require a compacting dumpster with regard to boxes along with cardboard goods, you can rent these individuals from the exact same waste supervision company which rents available any other type regarding dumpster.
Dumpsters are significant trash bins that are utilized to dispose massive tons of junk on completion of major assignments. Containers usually arrive in a couple different types, roll off dumpster along with trash dumpster.
Generally, roll down dumpsters are hired out in line with the amount of junk they can carry in terms of central cubic yards, nevertheless heavier supplies will make this dumpster reach the edge long before it is completely loaded. The actual quantity of weight that may be put into any given container will depend on the size of this bin under consideration, so beneath is an summarize of the normal roll down container rental sizes, along with their utmost weight considerations.
These dumpsters is going to be of great help within situations regarding natural mishaps like floods, earth quakes. Expert 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha services will certainly pile up all of the waste in to dumpster and recycling them. The environmental friendly waste management strategies followed by this professional 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha service reduces the affect of the natural calamity within the environment at this time there by reducing vast spreading regarding infectious conditions across the involved area.
For more information on 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha services check out the Funds Dumpster company. These are a national company with a decent reputation for economical, upfront, complete pricing along with great customer satisfaction. 1-866-284-6164 Ideally the company has been around for around several years to really establish on their own. This will be sure that they are impossible to make mistakes in addition to their reputation would be more important to these individuals. They have invested too long constructing a name for on their own to simply rebrand when they get a great number of complaints.
Sorting through an entire residence, building, or maybe storage unit implies sifting through items to ascertain what's salvageable along with what's junk. Some goods can be held or sold; others get straight to this recycling middle or the neighborhood dump. You will want somewhere to put junk once it's outside the building-and chances are, there isn't the time or maybe energy to drive back and out to the landfill every hour. That's where an established junk elimination team will come in, to get that junk off the property and through your life. When you're dealing with the decline of a loved one, you wish the est cleanout to be while smooth along with painless as you possibly can. A rubbish hauling organization will endeavor to make that happen.
Just imagine how much place you'd have in your home in case you cleared apart all of the trash from your armoires, your cellar, your storage area, and even your yard. Right now make it happen having a cost-effective 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK from your neighborhood junk carting service.
Certainly with upgrading projects, in essence the final aim and being confident that it stays in the dark is of major benefits. So how can you cutback without worsening the final venture? Here are some tips how you can reduce costs without cutting quality.
Dumpster accommodations will benefit you actually in the above stated approaches only when you get associated with the excellent vendor who not present you with fault offer and work the just to fetch your dollars. The service agency will be very fast in their providers, fast pick up and fast delivery. The ideal 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK service provider are going to be transparent with it's rates to give the purchaser prior info on the cost which needs to be bared before the order is placed.
Anybody can own a truck and transport junk, though the professional could save you many head aches, hassle and your money. Don't let hard earned cash go to waste! You can now organize any devices and leave the worry of getting rid of that kitty to some businesses offering disposal bin and 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK services. All those big heaps of trash at the moment are out of your household in a few occasions only.
Ward off all the garbage that is built up in your apartments, and neighborhood, be informed as a first community to face up for the cleanliness. Block party cleanup will be an ideal way to increase the particular unity one of several neighbors when compared with any other suggests. Cleanup your area trash by hiring dumpster from a 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK company. Your mind may now pop up having a question, who does pay the price for 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK? The particular organizer with the event can certainly run a promotion about the obstruct party cleanup day and arrange volume through efforts from the home owner in the apartments. The rental price involves collected contribution coming from all the people in the neighborhood, so getting rid of unnecessary trash accumulated in your house would not cost you much. You can throw the aged matrices furniture as well as other accumulated trash in your home at very affordable charge on your obstruct party morning. The additional gain attached to the 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK is that you may start putting dump into trash dumpster once it is put in your location and turn into assured the rest will be managed by the 8 Yard Dumpster in Chickasha, OK provider company within a professional way.
You may want to change that shattered door as well as all of the aged doors in your home. The base board may need to substituted as well. The particular carpeting in your historical residence may need updating as well as several of the wooden surfaces. With such a major project you know that you will need to rent a new dumpster.
A dumpster is a big container, which can be mostly consisting of steel as well as plastic. These are generally used for the particular temporary storage space of mess and it helps in disposing the garbage generated in your house renovation as well as construction venture hassle free.


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Q: Defining Existence of Lebesgue Integral , Hypothesis Changes Depending on the course i was looking at, i could find different definition of "existence" of the lebesgue integral of a random sign function , and i can't really understand how they can be equivalent or what's the interest of choosing one or another : Here are two definition i could find
(There is a question on the forum that is similar to mine , but i couldn't really find what i was searching in it) [Translated from french , some vocabulary mistakes could appear]
Definition 1) Let $(X,T,µ)$ be a mesured space. Let $f$: $X\rightarrow R$ be a measurable function.
We define $f^+ = max (0,f)$ and $f^- = max(0,-f)$.
If $\displaystyle \int f^+ dµ $ AND $\displaystyle \int f^-dµ $ are both finite , we define the integral of f by $$\displaystyle \int f dµ = \int f^+dµ - \int f^-dµ$$
Definition 2)Let $(X,T,µ)$ be a mesured space. Let $f$: $X\rightarrow \overline{R}$ be a measurable function.
We define $f^+ = sup (0,f)$ and $f^- = sup(0,-f)$.
If $\displaystyle \int f^+ dµ $ OR $\displaystyle \int f^-dµ $ is finite, we define the integral of f by $$\displaystyle \int f dµ = \int f^+dµ - \int f^-dµ$$
Two things i notice : in the second definition , our f function has to be $\overline{R}$ valued, and the max notation is remplaced by a sup.
To sum up , i'll say my three questions are :
1)How can these two definitions exists simultaneously ? I mean , it's a pretty huge difference to say in one case, the lebesgue integral of a random sign function has to be finished to exist, and in the other case it can exists to the infinite sense.
2)About the sup , I don't really see how can sup be different to max in this particular case, as we are just comparing 0 to f(x) for x in X.(for the $f^+$ case as example).
3)Is the $\overline{R}$ difference in term of image space of f the reason why these two definition can exists ? To be more precise, what property is giving $\overline{R}$ instead of $R$ in this definition , is it related to the fact we are using the sup instead of the max ?

A: Let me start with your point 2): Using $\sup$ or $\max$ is is equivalent here. The function $f^+$ is defined pointwise so you are only comparing two values.
Regarding 1): If both $\int f^+\text{d}\mu$ and $\int f^-\text{d}\mu$ are finite then so is $\int f\text{d}\mu$. But if for example $\int f^+\text{d}\mu=\infty$ and $\int f^-\text{d}\mu<\infty$ it still makes sense to define $\int f\text{d}\mu=\infty$. So in this sense Definition 2 is just more general and not really contradicting Definition 2.
Regarding 3): $\overline{\mathbb{R}}$ refers to the extended real number line and is defined as $\overline{\mathbb{R}}:=\mathbb{R}\cup\{\infty\}\cup\{-\infty\}$. This means you allow functions where for some $x$ you have $f(x)=\infty$. An important convention here is $0*\infty=0$. This doesn't really change much in most cases since if for example you have $f(x)=\infty$ for $x\in A$ and $A$ isn't a null set this immediately implies that $\int f\text{d}\mu$ cannot be finite. What you need is of course a sigma algebra for $\overline{\mathbb{R}}$ which is given by $\mathcal{B}(\overline{\mathbb{R}})=\{A\cup C:A\in\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R}), C\subset\{-\infty,\infty\}\}$. As you see this looks very simlar to the usual $\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R})$ and the basic results regarding generating systems, measurability of functions, etc. are analogue.


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Arrieta (both in Basque and Spanish) is a town and municipality located in the province of Biscay, in the Basque Country, Spain. Arrieta is part of the comarca of Mungialdea. It had a population of 552 inhabitants as of 2007, and a population of 564 inhabitants as of 2017.

Toponym
This municipality has its origin in the elizate Líbano de Arrieta, which became a municipality in the 19th Century. The toponym Arrieta comes from the Basque word harrieta, which means "stony place".

Celebrities
 Santiago Arriaga y Arrien, Santiago de Jesús (1903-1936): was a priest of the Trinitarian Order. He was assassinated during the Spanish Civil war and beautified in 2007 by the Catholic Church.
 José Ramón Goyeneche Bilbao (1940): cyclist who participated in Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964.

References

External links
 ARRIETA in the Bernardo Estornés Lasa - Auñamendi Encyclopedia (Euskomedia Fundazioa)

Municipalities in Biscay


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