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419 F. 2d 651 - Pettyjohn v. United States
419 F2d 651 Pettyjohn v. United States
Carl D. PETTYJOHN, Appellant,
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 21666.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued January 17, 1969.
Rehearing En Banc Denied November 19, 1969.
Mr. Martin S. Thaler, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), with whom Mr. Walter B. Laessig, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Daniel E. Toomey, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Victor W. Caputy, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BURGER, TAMM and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
TAMM, Circuit Judge:
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of first degree murder (22 D.C.Code § 2401 (1967)).1 Since we find that none of appellant's three allegations of error necessitate reversal, his conviction must be affirmed. Only two of these allegations require discussion.
Undisputed testimony adduced at trial reveals that at approximately 1:30 a. m. on August 4, 1966, appellant drove his car alongside another vehicle in the northwest section of Washington, D. C., and twice fired a shotgun into that vehicle wounding one of its three occupants. Appellant then "pulled" Miss Barbara Thomas, one of the occupants, into his own automobile and drove away. At approximately 2:40 a. m. appellant entered the Twelfth Police Precinct in the District of Columbia. Sergeant Brown testified that appellant approached him and stated that "he wanted to turn himself in" because he had shot and killed one man and "ha[d] also killed his girl friend." Upon query by the officer as to where his girlfriend was appellant answered "She's on the front seat of my car and my car's parked on the rear lot." Sergeant Brown left appellant in the custody of another officer and proceeded to the parking lot where he discovered Miss Thomas strangled to death on the front seat of appellant's car. Upon returning to the precinct house Sergeant Brown formally placed appellant under arrest.2
At this point there is somewhat of a conflict in testimony. A pretrial hearing on appellant's motion to suppress was conducted by the court. During this hearing Sergeant Brown testified that immediately after placing appellant under arrest he produced his PD-47 card3 and began to read it. A telephone interruption intervened and the officer handed appellant the card to read. Upon completion of the telephone call Sergeant Brown testified that he asked appellant if he had read and understood the card and appellant responded in the affirmative (Tr. 46). Sergeant Brown testified that he then queried appellant as to whether he wanted a "legal neighborhood lawyer." Appellant answered in the negative.
Detective-Sergeant Crooke (a member of the Homicide Squad who was called to the Twelfth Precinct by Sergeant Brown) testified that he approached appellant, advised him that he was under arrest, and told him that he was charged with homicide. Next, Detective-Sergeant Crooke asked appellant if he had been advised of his rights. Upon an affirmative response the officer testified that he read his PD-47 card to appellant (Tr. 61). In addition, the officer testified that he specifically told appellant that "if he couldn't afford a lawyer * * a lawyer would be obtained for him" (Tr. 62). After issuing these warnings, Detective-Sergeant Crooke asked appellant if he wanted to "talk about" the crime (Tr. 76). Appellant said that he did and the officer testified that they conversed from approximately 2:50 a. m. until shortly after 3:00 a. m. The officer testified that he took notes during the conversation. The officer further testified that appellant described generally the events leading up to the murder. Included within this narrative was appellant's statement that "[s]he already knew I was going to kill her. I told her I was going to kill her * * * last Sunday" (Tr. 67). At the conclusion of this discussion the officer asked appellant if he "wanted to give a typewritten statement of what he had said" (Tr. 67). Appellant responded in the negative and the officer testified that appellant said: "No, I already told you about it and you wrote it down" (Tr. 67). At this time the discussion was terminated and the officer left the Twelfth Precinct with appellant and took him to the Homicide Squad office. Upon arrival at the homicide office at approximately 3:15 a. m. the officer produced police form PD-544 and read it to appellant. Appellant signed this form (see Tr. 70-71, Government exhibit No. 2) after it was read to him. Upon completion of this signing the officer again asked appellant if he wished to make a typewritten statement. Appellant again answered "no" and was locked up until 10:00 a. m. the following morning, at which time he was arraigned before a United States Commissioner. Detective-Sergeant Crooke testified that he did not take appellant before a commissioner at 3:00 a. m. because he was not "aware that a United States Commissioner * * * is available at any time of the day or night to arraign defendants charged with a crime." (Tr. 64.)
Appellant took the stand during this pre-trial hearing.5 Appellant's counsel sought to suppress all of appellant's statements other than the initial threshold admission that he had killed his girl friend. During this hearing appellant testified that he did make such an admission. He initially denied, however, that Sergeant Brown ever gave him the PD-47 card to read (Tr. 79) but on cross-examination admitted that he did receive the card, but never read it (Tr. 79C-D). Appellant testified further that no one ever read the card to him and that when the officers asked him if he wanted a lawyer he thought they meant his own "personal lawyer" (Tr. 83). Since appellant could not afford to pay for such a lawyer he said he didn't want one. Appellant denied that either officer ever told him that he could have a "free one" (Tr. 79-B). In essence, the main thrust of appellant's testimony was to contradict the officer's testimony while simultaneously asserting a claim that he did not understand what was happening.
After oral argument by both counsel the trial judge ruled that appellant's statements to Detective-Sergeant Crooke were admissible but that the PD-54 form and testimony regarding it were inadmissible. In explanation, the trial judge stated that the questioning at the Twelfth Precinct was not a violation of appellant's constitutional rights but that he should have been brought before a commissioner as soon as he indicated he didn't wish to discuss the matter any more. We affirm the trial judge's ruling.
* Appellant's first allegation of error is that all statements made by him to Detective-Sergeant Crooke were inadmissible at trial because they were given in violation of appellant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We recognize and certainly agree that
[i]f * * * interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. (Citation omitted.)
384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.
At the outset of our discussion we wish to reject, as did the trial judge, a proposition submerged in the murky waters that surround meaningful waivers. We are unable to accept the thesis that no one can ever intelligently waive an important constitutional right voluntarily or that no one who is reasonable or intelligent would ever commit a criminal act. A quick glance at the upper echelon of organized crime in this country should suffice to undercut the credence of the latter portion of this proposition. Thus, we conclude that, under the law today, it is possible for a person to waive his right to remain silent and to wish to voluntarily discuss the action that he had so recently taken which must have weighed so heavily on his mind.
Since it is possible, we must now look to see if appellant did meaningfully waive his right to counsel. At this point we note that this is a case, unlike Miranda, of a person entering a police station and, before the utterance of a word by the police, confessing to a murder. In fact, the Court in Miranda specifically stated that it did not
purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime (footnote omitted) * * *. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.6
We, of course, are unable to and do not endeavor to probe appellant's mind in an attempt to discover whether he made a meaningful waiver. Instead, we must apply an objective standard7 in determining the proper resolution of this issue. Appellant proffers no allegations of coercion by the police, he never repudiated his confession or altered the details thereof, and he did not make prior denials before confessing. In addition, appellant was not harassed or intensely interrogated as was the defendant in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Rather, the officer approached appellant and asked him if "he wanted to talk about it." Appellant answered all questions freely and easily, all the while observing but not objecting to, the officer taking notes. It was only at the conclusion of the discussion, unlike our recent decision in Frazier v. United States,8 that appellant expressed a view that he did not wish to make a typewritten statement.9 At this point the questioning ceased.
Thus, we must reject appellant's contention that his unwillingness to make a typewritten statement, at the end of the officer's questioning, clearly indicates that he never meaningfully waived his constitutional right to remain silent. What appellant said exactly was: "No, I already told you about it and you wrote it down." This language coupled with testimony that Detective-Sergeant Crooke specifically told appellant several times that (1) he was entitled to remain silent and (2) if he could not afford a lawyer one would be obtained for him, convinces us that appellant did meaningfully and knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. In reality, after an objective analysis of all the factors and circumstances involved in appellant's waiver, his position is really reduced not to a claim that he did not understand what he was doing but that what he did was, in retrospect, an unwise thing for him to do. A reversal based upon such a claim would be equally unwise.
Appellant's second contention is that after his arrest he was not promptly taken before a United States Commissioner in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as construed by Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). The standard applicable in this area of the law has been enunciated by the Supreme Court. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), the Court made it clear that officers of the law could not detain a person for unreasonable periods of time in an effort to obtain a confession by a "third degree" method. Subsequently, Rule 5(a) was promulgated requiring that an arrested person be arraigned "without unnecessary delay." The Court then held in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100 (1948) and Mallory that the "standard of `without unnecessary delay' implied no relaxation of the McNabb doctrine" (Mallory v. United States, supra, at 453, 77 S.Ct. at 1359).
Upon inspection of the record below, we find that appellant cannot prevail on his Mallory contention for two reasons. First, we disagree with appellant's claim that he has a right to be given his "warnings" by an impartial judicial magistrate despite the fact that he had already been informed of his rights by the police and had agreed to discuss the crime with them. We feel that appellant's argument here borders on the absurd. Surely the law does not allow a person to voluntarily discuss the crime to which he has just confessed for a period of some twenty minutes and then claim on appeal that the twenty minute period during which they spoke constituted a prejudicial delay in violation of his right to rapid arraignment. What appellant has lost sight of and what needs illumination in this area of the law is the interplay between Miranda and Mallory. We find that appellant, by validly waiving his Miranda right to silence and an attorney, and by agreeing to speak with the police, has thereby also waived any Mallory right to be brought before a magistrate "as quickly as possible." Mallory, supra, at 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356. Indeed, we had occasion recently to articulate this limitation that Miranda has effected upon the earlier Mallory decision. In short, we held that [a] valid Miranda waiver is necessarily * * * also a waiver of an immediate judicial warning of constitutional rights (footnote omitted.)10
Thus, in this case, we hold that appellant waived any Mallory claim to immediate arraignment by voluntarily agreeing to speak with the police. Accordingly appellant's statements, given during this period, were properly admitted into evidence.
Secondly, appellant's Mallory contention cannot prevail because, notwithstanding any Miranda waiver, the statements complained of here were not given during a period of unnecessary delay and hence the delay of seven hours in bringing appellant before a magistrate cannot retroactively vitiate an otherwise valid confession.11 The Supreme Court held long ago, in a case where the accused confessed to the police within a few minutes after his arrival at the police station and then was detained for eight days prior to arraignment, that
the illegality of Mitchell's detention does not retroactively change the circumstances under which he made the disclosures. These * * * were not elicited through illegality. Their admission, therefore, would not be use by the Government of the fruits of wrongdoing by its officers. Being relevant, they could be excluded only as a punitive measure against unrelated wrongdoing by the police. Our duty in shaping rules of evidence relates to the propriety of admitting evidence. This power is not to be used as an indirect mode of disciplining misconduct.
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71, 64 S.Ct. 896, 898, 88 L.Ed. 1140 (1944). We agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's (the author of both McNabb and Mallory) eloquent description of the proper use of judicial power with regard to the promotion of justice in the society in which we live.
Lastly, appellant seems to argue tacitly that Mallory is an absolute bar to any questions, regardless of the accused's willingness to discuss the crime, between arrest and appearance before a magistrate. We put this contention to rest in 1965 in Alston v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 68, 348 F.2d 72, 74 (opinion of Judge McGowan):
this literalness in the reading of Mallory (the argument that no question may be asked of the accused between arrest and arraignment) is an excessive exaltation of opinion over decision, and that, absent a further direct admonition from the Supreme Court that there can be no questioning whatsoever, its earlier opinion in Mitchell * * * continues to have vitality and provides the warrant for the admissibility of so-called threshold confessions.
Such further admonition has not emanated from the Supreme Court since 1965.
In sum, we hold today that appellant's statements to the police were properly admitted since the record reveals that appellant did voluntarily and meaningfully waive his right to remain silent. Further, this waiver was also thereby a waiver of his right to immediate arraignment and, in any event, appellant's statements were not given during a period of unnecessary delay. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is
Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on this count. He was also convicted on two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (22 D.C.Code § 502) and was sentenced to three to nine years on each count, to run concurrently with his life sentence on the first count
Exactly when the arrest occurred is not crucial to our disposition. It is at least arguable that as soon as appellant announced he had taken someone's life he was no longer free to leave the precinct
The PD-47 card states as follows:
WARNING AS TO YOUR RIGHTS
You are under arrest. Before we ask you any questions, you must understand what your rights are. You have the right to remain silent. You are not required to say anything to us at any time or to answer any questions. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we question you and to have him with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be provided for you. If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
The PD-54 form is identical to the PD-47 card with the addition of the following paragraph:
Consent to speak
I know what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questons, I do not want a lawyer. I understand what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me or used against me.
Appellant testified at this pre-trial motion to suppress hearing for the limited purposes of that hearing alone and he did not waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 389 F. 2d 305 (1967)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
By objective standard we mean that the validity of anyMiranda waiver must be determined by the court's inspection of the particular circumstances involved, including the education, experience and conduct of the accused as well as the credibility of the police officer(s) testimony. The court will then objectively assess all the aforementioned factors and determine whether the waiver was valid. The Supreme Court set down this type of standard even before Miranda in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Thereafter, the Court in Miranda re-asserted this standard. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. See also United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006, 88 S.Ct. 1250, 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968).
136 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 419 F.2d 1161 (decided March 14, 1969)
At the time this case was argued theFrazier decision had not yet issued and was not relied upon by appellant's counsel. The court, of course, is fully cognizant of Frazier's teaching and we find that appellant's waiver was "voluntary in the full sense of the word." Frazier v. United States, supra note 8, 136 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 419 F.2d 1166, n. 24. In so finding we have determined that appellant was "adequately and effectively apprised of his rights." Id. 136 U.S.App.D.C. at ___, 419 F.2d 1168, n. 31, quoting from Miranda v. Arizona, supra, note 6, at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Thus, we feel that under the test set out in Frazier appellant knowingly and meaningfully waived his right to remain silent.
Frazier v. United States,supra note 8, 136 U.S.App.D.C. at ___, 419 F.2d at 1166.
Since we find that there was noMallory violation, we do not reach the thorny questions of whether Mallory has been limited by recent Congressional enactments or whether the statutory standards should be applied retroactively. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197 (1968); District of Columbia Crime Bill, 81 Stat. 734 (1967). In this regard, see also Frazier v. United States, supra note 8, 136 U.S.App.D.C. at ___, 419 F.2d at 1171, nn. 2, 3 (dissenting opinion of Judge Burger).
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge (concurring in the result):
I join my colleagues in affirmance of appellant's conviction, but for reasons not entirely coinciding with those they express. Hence the occasion for this separate opinion.
Appellant does not contest the admissibility of his unsolicited utterances to Sergeant Brown made immediately upon his entry into the Twelfth Precinct stationhouse.1 Instead, the controversy rages over his beyond-the-threshold statements to Sergeant Crooke, which contained damaging admissions highly cogent to the deliberative and premeditative elements of first degree murder. Framed in two broad aspects of this appeal, the questions are whether appellant was duly given the warnings constitutionally prerequisite to in-custody police interrogation and, if so, whether he voluntarily and understandably waived his right to have counsel present during his conversation with Sergeant Crooke.
These are Miranda2 questions and if each is properly to be answered in the affirmative, I perceive no crucial involvement with Mallory.3 For "[a] valid Miranda waiver is necessarily, for the duration of the waiver, also a waiver of an immediate judicial warning of constitutional rights. And what Miranda, as a constitutional interpretation, leaves an accused at liberty to yield, he may * * forego equally under Mallory. Provided the exacting standards for waiver are met, the overriding purpose of Mallory has been served."4 And if Miranda requirements were satisfied in this case, the statements to Sergeant Crooke qualified for introduction into evidence, unaffected by subsequent delay incidental to appellant's appearance before a judicial officer.5
The testimony adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress those statements conflicted sharply on the issue as to whether the Miranda warnings were given. Sergeant Brown said he handed appellant a card on which the warnings were written, and that appellant, after apparently having read the card, stated that he understood the warnings and that he did not desire counsel. It is unnecessary to express a view as to whether this procedure is acceptable as a compliance with Miranda, for Sergeant Crooke testified that he himself read the warnings to appellant and that he responded by declining a lawyer. True it is that appellant avowed that he was too "upset" to read the card tendered by Sergeant Brown, that Sergeant Crooke never warned him, and that he understood the latter's proffer of an attorney to refer to a "personal lawyer," which he did not have. But it is evident that, with credibility resolved in the Government's favor, the evidence was sufficient to support its thesis that the warnings were actually given.6
Also introduced was evidence tending to establish appellant's comprehension of the warnings. Then 34 years of age, he had attended school through the ninth grade, and had served in the Army for three years, during two of which he had held the rank of corporal. There was little to suggest that he lacked capacity to fathom the rather simple advice and admonitions incorporated into the warnings.7 Sergeant Brown testified that appellant appeared normal and rational when questioned at the stationhouse, and Sergeant Crooke described him as "calm," "coherent" and "very cooperative."8 There is nothing in the surrounding circumstances peculiarly susceptible to the interpretation that appellant misapprehended what the officers said he was told.9 This evidence afforded ample foundation for an affirmative conclusion as to appellant's understanding of the warnings if actually given.10
It was for the Government to prove that appellant was suitably warned.11 Beyond that, "a heavy burden rest[ed] on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel,"12 and that demonstration involved application of a subjective test.13 Both issues were submitted to the trial judge, and his decision on the motion leaves no plausible basis for doubting that on each he found decisively against appellant.
The suppression hearing focused sharply on the question whether the warnings were given, engendering a major factual dispute. Disposition of the motion involved unavoidably the resolution of that dispute. The trial judge, passing on the motion, also remained acutely alert to the problem of waiver as regards appellant's statements to Sergeant Crooke. He emphatically rejected the argument that under no circumstances is an intelligent waiver possible. He distinguished appellant's conduct at the precinct stationhouse, which he decided to let into evidence, from his subsequent execution of the waiver form at police headquarters, which he excluded on Mallory grounds. He attached particular weight to the uncontroverted fact that appellant voluntarily walked into the stationhouse for the purpose of informing the police of the homicide and surrendering himself,14 a circumstance other tribunals as well have considered significant in the determination as to waiver.15 His ruling on the motion embraced the conclusion that Miranda as well as Mallory requirements had been observed.
Thus the Miranda facets urged here were fully explored in a hearing, and the trial judge's conclusion that Miranda demands were met draws ready support from the evidence. The intensity of the litigation over warnings and the trial judge's sensitivity to the matter of waiver demonstrate satisfactorily that his ruling encompassed the factual conclusions which suffice to sustain the Government's position. Certainly for the future, after the experience in this case, it is the better part of wisdom for trial judges to rule expressly on waiver and to delineate on the record the reasons inducing whatever decision is reached. Here, however, the judge's statement so far explicated his treatment as to afford a reliable basis for acceptance of the ruling as embracing intrinsically the findings vital to the problems of warnings and waiver.
Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69-70, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140 (1944)
Miranda v. Arizona,supra note 1.
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957)
Frazier v. United States, 136 U.S.App. D.C. ___, 419 F.2d 1161, 1166 (March 14, 1969)
United States v. Mitchell,supra note 1, 322 U.S. at 70, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140; Mathies v. United States, 126 U.S. App.D.C. 98, 101, 374 F.2d 312, 315 (1967); Coor v. United States, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 259, 260, 340 F.2d 784, 785 (1964), cert. denied 382 U.S. 1013, 86 S. Ct. 621, 15 L.Ed.2d 527 (1966); Bailey v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 244, 328 F.2d 542, 544-545, cert. denied 377 U.S. 972, 84 S.Ct. 1655, 12 L.Ed.2d 741 (1964).
Appellant does not contend that the warnings written on the card did not satisfyMiranda exactions as to content.
Not before the District Court at the suppression hearing, nor apparently at any time during the trial, was the report of a psychological examination of appellant conducted within a month of his trial. Appellant tendered that report for our consideration, to which the Government has no objection. The report discloses,inter alia, an evaluation "of low average to average intelligence" without "any serious defects in attention, memory, general knowledge or knowledge of social norms and culturally prescribed behavior."
The most that can be found in appellant's favor on this score is Sergeant Crooke's statement that appellant seemed to be "a little depressed," a reaction quite normal after what had happened
Such a conclusion is hardly suggested by appellant's refusal to reveal his difficulties with the deceased or to sign a written confession of the events he had orally related to Sergeant Crooke. In the light of his willingness to delineate how and where he committed the homicide, his unwillingness to explain why he did it logically indicates merely that the topic was painful for reasons other than the impending legal consequences of talking about it. The refusal to sign a written statement came only after appellant had completed his oral version to Sergeant Crooke, on which the sergeant took notes without protest by appellant, and the discussion with appellant terminated immediately upon the refusalCf. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, 384 U.S. at 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Moreover, the reason appellant gave for declining to sign was simply that "I already told you about it and you wrote it down." Significantly, when at police headquarters appellant again refused to sign a written statement — once more for the stated reason, related by Sergeant Crooke, that "I already had his statement and that he had already told me what had happened * * *" — he nevertheless signed a waiver form containing the Miranda warnings that he had been given at the stationhouse. These circumstances distinguish our remand in Frazier v. United States, supra note 4, where the accused refused to permit note-taking on his narrative and we had neither evidence nor findings to dissipate the potential of that development as an indication that he misunderstood the legal efficacy of an oral confession. See id. at 10-13.
A finding of knowledgeable and intelligent waiver rests properly on "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, exerience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). See also United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 1006, 88 S.Ct. 1250, 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968); Narro v. United States, 370 F. 2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 946, 87 S.Ct. 2081, 18 L.Ed.2d 1334 (1967)
There was little contest at the hearing specifically on the issue of comprehension. Appellant's claim was not that the warnings were misunderstood but that they were not forthcoming at all, and his evidentiary presentation was concentrated on that claim. The trial judge expressly declined to credit the testimony of a friend of appellant that he had smoked a cigarette containing some kind of "dope" on some undefined date during the month on which the homicide occurred.
Miranda v. Arizona,supra note 1, 384 U.S. at 475, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694.
Id. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602
Frazier v. United States,supra note 4, 136 U.S.App.D.C. at ___, 419 F.2d 1168 n. 31.
"[H]ow any information at all with respect to this defendant first came to the attention of the police authorities," said the judge, "has a bearing with respect to the defendant's state of mind, and as that state of mind continued throughout whatever period of questioning, interrogation, was undertaken on the morning of his arrest."
"Of prime importance in determining whether there was an effective waiver of these rights is the fact that appellant, apparently acting under some parental guidance, voluntarily surrendered himself to police with the intention of telling them `what had happened.' That he did so tell the police within a very short time after the interrogation had begun is likewise significant. In considering the conduct of the appellant, therefore, as it bears on the question of waiver, we think it manifest that he was not a person, such as contemplated by theMiranda decision, who, by reason of the custodial interrogation, is suddenly placed under a compulsion to speak where he might not otherwise do so." Brown v. State, 3 Md.App. 313, 239 A.2d 761, 762, 766 (1968). Compare Davidson v. United States, 371 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1966).
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, WRIGHT, McGOWAN, TAMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKINNON and ROBB, Circuit Judges, in Chambers.
Per Curiam.
On consideration of appellant's suggestion for rehearing en banc, it is
Ordered by the Court en banc that appellant's aforesaid suggestion is denied.
Statement of Chief Judge Bazelon as to why he would grant rehearing en banc.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
Indicted for first-degree murder, appellant attempted before trial and with the full consent of the government to withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge and plead guilty to second-degree murder. During the course of questioning to determine the validity of the plea, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: All right. What is it you want to say? You want to say something and I do not want to take your plea unless you tell me what is on your mind.
DEFENDANT: It is nothing anyone else has done. It is the time over at the jail. I have been there about 14 months.
THE COURT: Since when?
DEFENDANT: About 14 months.
THE COURT: Are you tired of being over there?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is that why you are pleading?
THE COURT: I will not take your plea. All right. Thank you very much. I am sorry, Mr. [Defense Counsel].
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
Subsequently, the defendant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.1
We are therefore faced with a difficult but important question concerning the standards to be used by the District Courts in accepting or rejecting bargained pleas of guilty.2 It seems clear that appellant's attempt to plead guilty to second-degree murder was, in fact, a bargained plea. Yet it also seems likely that, had the District Court accepted his plea without further inquiry, it would have been open to collateral attack on the grounds of involuntariness.3 This last statement might seem to support the result in this case. But if it does, we have established a doctrine that defendants free on bail may avail themselves of the substantial benefits4 of plea bargaining, whereas those who have theretofore been subjected to the inhuman conditions all too common in detention facilities5 may not, unless they are willing to lie to the trial judge and say that these conditions have played no part in their decision to plead guilty.
I do not believe that we are faced with a problem impossible of resolution, although I do believe that resolution will not be easy. In the context of the present case, at least two possibilities present themselves:
1. The plea here was properly rejected because allowing a defendant to plead guilty to second-degree murder in return for dismissal of the charge of first-degree is an unnecessary and therefore unconstitutional6 encouragement of guilty pleas and their attendant waivers of the rights to trial, to trial by jury, and against self-incrimination; or
2. The practice mentioned above is constitutional, and the plea was improperly rejected because the trial judge should have continued inquiring into the circumstances surrounding the tendered quilty plea to determine whether the defendant's desire to plead guilty had a basis independent of his apparent desire simply to be transferred to an institution other than the D.C. jail.7
The practice of plea bargaining has been widely discussed, praised and damned.8 It is vulnerable to at least two lines of constitutional attack. The first of these would focus upon the individual defendant. A plea of guilty operates as a waiver of the right to trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine one's accusers, and the right against self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.2d 274 (1969). To be effective, any waiver of these rights must be "voluntary and knowing." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969).
A plea of guilty is "more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts." Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711.9 If this is so, then at the very least those standards developed to test the voluntariness of confessions should apply to guilty pleas. In this field, classical coercion theory has developed a rigorous test: "the constitutional inquiry is * * * whether the confession was `free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.'" Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). Therefore, any plea of guilty that was in fact induced by promises of leniency would be vulnerable to attack as an involuntary confession.10 This approach is in essence the one taken by the Fourth Circuit in Bailey v. MacDougall,11 and by the two dissenting judges in Shelton v. United States.12
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968), is the starting point for a second line of attack on plea bargaining. The Court there was dealing with a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act that allowed only defendants who insisted on trial by jury to be sentenced to death. Rather than considering the effect of the statute on a particular defendant who had waived his rights,13 the Court examined the system as a whole. It held that
the evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them.
390 U.S. at 583, 88 S.Ct. at 1217 (emphasis in original). It can hardly be denied that offering defendants shorter sentences (or, as in the case before us, a guaranteed escape from the death penalty)14 in exchange for pleas of guilty "encourages" such pleas. Under Jackson, then, the practice of plea bargaining can be constitutionally justified only on grounds of necessity.15
If plea bargaining is constitutional, it should not go unsupervised.16 Yet the present state of the law places even the most conscientious trial judge in a difficult position. As I have already noted, the trial judge in this case was almost certainly correct in not accepting the plea on the basis of the evidence before him.17 The problem is that by remaining silent on the constitutionality of plea bargaining, we do not provide any indication that further inquiry might have validated the plea. If we are to uphold bargained pleas, I think we must also delineate the power and the duty of trial courts, faced with a situation such as the present one, to conduct a further inquiry.
Of course, Rule 11 already requires an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea to make certain that the bargain, if any, is fully spread upon the record.18 When it appears that a proffered guilty plea is the result of a bargain,19 particular care must be exercised not only in accepting it,20 but in rejecting it as well. If the bargain itself is not a factor that vitiates the plea, it should not be rejected simply because other, impermissible factors may have been acting upon the defendant as well. Particularly when a plea is to a lesser offense than the one charged,21 we should be slow to deny both the defendant and the government the disposition that both believe to be in their best interests.22
Plea bargaining should not be held constitutional sub silentio. If it is permissible, defendants should not be deprived of its benefits either arbitrarily or through governmental misconduct. It is one thing to say that extended incarceration, or despicable prison conditions, may void a plea of guilty and allow a defendant subsequently to demand a trial. It is quite another for us to hold that incarceration or despicable conditions may prevent a defendant from availing himself of the benefits of a system available to defendants who are more comfortable, either because they are out on bail or because they are in a better prison.
A full examination of appellant's reasons for pleading guilty might well have established that the plea was voluntary and should have been accepted. By terminating the inquiry, we simply punish appellant for his lengthy imprisonment in the D.C. Jail.
It does not appear from the transcript that the plea was invalid except insofar as the statements quoted in text may indicate
See Griffin v. United States, 132 U.S. App.D.C. 108, 405 F.2d 1378 (1968); McCoy v. United States, 124 U.S.App. D.C. 177, 363 F.2d 306 (1966). For a different aspect of the same problem, see Scott v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. ___, at ___ - ___, 419 F.2d 264 (Feb. 13, 1969).
In at least one case, the Solicitor General based his conclusion that a plea of guilty was improperly obtained at least partly on the fact that the defendant had been in jail for 18 months and his insistence on trial was likely to result in further incarceration in "county jails" pending trial. Memorandum for the United States at 13, Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958)
See A. Amsterdam, B. Segal, & M. Miller, Trial Manual for the Defense of Criminal Cases §§ 206-219 (1967)
Speaking of long-term detention facilities, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice concluded that "[o]vercrowding and idleness are the salient features of some, brutality and corruption of a few others." It then added that "local jails [in which most pretrial incarceration takes place] are generally the most inadequate in every way." Task Force Report: Corrections 4 (1967)
See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-585, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968). Of course this would support the result in the present case; but if this is the ground for decision, it should certainly be made explicit.
The result in the present case could also be supported on the ground that counsel waived his client's right not to have his guilty plea rejected by failing (a) to object to the rejection at the time it was made, (b) to renew the motion to plead guilty at the commencement of trial, and (c) to renew the motion at the close of the government's case. While dubious about the validity of any such argument, I note here only that if that is the ground for decision the bar should be told
See D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (1966) (extensive empirical study); Note, Official Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 167 (1964) (practice constitutional and proper absent judicial participation); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 865 (1964) (practice proper and limited judicial participation encouraged); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. 144 (1968) (practice unconstitutional).
See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed. 2d 473 (1963); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927).
That a guilty plea was made subsequent to a promise of leniency would, under this approach, not necessarily imply that it was the product of the promise, and therefore taintedSee United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583, 88 S.Ct. 1209 (1968). But if the plea was influenced by the promise, it would be involuntary.
392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1968)
242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), reverseden banc, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), reversed on confession of error by the Solicitor General, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958). Admitting that in his view the plea was tainted, the Solicitor General relied on petitioner's long confinement and on the government's at least arguably improper conduct (aside from the mere bargain itself). Memorandum for the United States, at 13-14.
For a more extensive discussion of these cases, see Scott v. United States, supra note 2, at 135 U.S.App.D.C. at ___ - ___, 419 F.2d 264 at 272-274.
"[T]he fact that the Federal Kidnapping Act tends to discourage defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so involuntarily." 390 U.S. at 583, 88 S.Ct. at 1217
A defendant who pleads guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for dismissal of first-degree murder charges escapes all possibility of being put to death and is subject to precisely the pressures condemned inJackson.
The briefs inJackson devoted considerable space to a discussion of the possible impact of the decision on the practice of plea bargaining. See Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U.Pa. L.Rev. 144, 179-180 (1968). Although the Court in Jackson took some pains to emphasize the importance of guilty pleas to the criminal process, it did not mention plea bargaining. 390 U.S. at 584-585, 88 S.Ct. 1209.
See Scott v. United States, supra note 2, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at ___ - ___, 419 F. 2d at 264; id. at 274-278, 419 F.2d 264 at 279-281 (concurring opinion of Judge Wright).
See pp. 1-2 supra.
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed. 2d 418 (1969): "Rule [11] is intended to produce acomplete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to [the] voluntariness determination." (emphasis added). See also Scott v. United States, supra note 2, 135 U.S.App. D.C. ___ at ___ - ___, ___, 419 F.2d 264, at 274-275, 279.
This should not be a difficult determination, since it appears that most plea bargaining in the District of Columbia involves a plea of guilty to a lesser offense than the one chargedSee Scott v. United States, supra note 2.
This is so because the line between permissible and impermissible bargains may be a fine oneSee pp. 661-662 supra and cases there cited.
If a plea is sought to be entered only to the offense charged, its rejection will have far less serious consequences for the defendant. Although he will be forced to the uncertainty and expense of trial, he will not be liable to punishment greater than could have been imposed upon his guilty plea, and even judges who normally impose a greater sentence upon defendants who insist on trial would seem unlikely to apply the same sentencing differential to defendants whose plea of guilty was rejected
Courts normally shy away from anything deemed to be an interference with prosecutorial discretion, except in the most extreme casesSee the cases collected in Washington v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 401 F.2d 915, 922-925 (1968); United States v. Foster, 226 A.2d 164 (D.C.Mun.App.1967), and cases cited. If judges are free to reject bargained pleas, the result is that judicial control of prosecutorial discretion is minimal when it is exercised to an individual's detriment, but substantial when exercised in his favor.


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text:
Colin Kaepernick to make anti-police documentary 'Killing County'
By Joseph Jr. On Jan 26, 2023
National anthem protester Colin Kaepernick is the executive producer of a new ABC News Studios documentary that examines police-involved deaths in Bakersfield, California, specifically the case of a police informant. the police were killed by the police.
The three-part miniseries follows the case of Jorge Ramirez Jr., who was killed in a 2013 incident involving police, even though he was an unofficial informant for them.
According to the text of the presentation of the issue, the Ramirez family will be very large.
"The series takes a look at Bakersfield, a big city with a small-town soul in the heart of California, where things aren't always what they seem," the synopsis reads. People. "During the hotel shooting, the Ramirez family questioned everything they knew about their town. Desperate to find out what really happened to their loved one, they soon discover that they are not alone in the house. tragedy and the struggle for truth.
"Killing County is a story of twists and turns, alleged corruption and cover-up. Ask the question: When the people you are meant to serve and protect are people you can't trust, who do you turn to? add a synopsis.
The trailer for the series features allegations by family members of some of the people shot by officers at the Bakersfield Police Department, but no police statements.
The series premieres on Hulu on February 3rd.
Kaepernick has several spin-off film projects through his RA Vision Media and other companies, including a documentary about his life with Disney and a six-episode 2021 Netflix series, Black and white quail.
In 2022, Kaepernick published his first children's book; I Paint me differently. Amazon describes the book as:
Based on the true events of young Colin's life, this joyous ode to black and brown life is perfect for every reader's library. It's about getting to know yourself, being true to yourself and advocating for change… even if you're very young!
In 2016, Kaepernick became one of the first players to protest the United States, the flag, the police, the military and American history by refusing to play the national anthem. His yearlong tirade against the nation coincided with the worst NFL ratings in history.
Follow Warner Todd Huston on Facebook: facebook.com/Warner.Todd.Huston or Truth Social @WarnerToddHuston
All news on the site does not represent the views of the site, but we automatically submit this news and translate it through software technology on the site rather than a human editor.
antipoliceColinCountydocumentaryKaepernickkilling
Joseph Jr. 1351 posts 0 comments
Jim Cramer Investment Club Meeting Wednesday: Microsoft, P&G
1 shooting, multiple suspects on the loose after armed robbery near Campbell's Camera Store
How Russia correctly understood the growing influence of Germany
At least 20 suicide bombers killed, 96 injured in Pakistan mosque blast
The Chicago forecast calls for a freezing cold start to the week with zero wind…
NFL Playoffs: Chiefs beat Bengals in thriller to face Eagles in Super Bowl.
Popular drugs used as "diet pills" have been classified as toxic after 33 deaths
Radical NHS plan promises more beds, 800 new A&Es and video "cures".
Elon Musk is under investigation by the SEC over allegations related to Tesla's self-driving car, according to a report

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
53•Sept/Oct 2008
NLR 53, September–October 2008
53 , Sept Oct 2008
Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr and the Fall of Iraq
Faber: London 2008
Sadrist Stratagems
On 7 April 2003, Iraqi guerrillas in Amara, 180 miles southeast of Baghdad, threw Ba'ath Party officials out of their offices and seized control of the city—the first, and only, act of indigenous rebellion in that region during the us–uk invasion of Iraq.footnote1 The occupying forces soon obliged the guerrillas to turn the city over to them, under threat of bombardment. The man who handed the British the keys to the city was Abdel Karim Mahmoud al-Mohammedawi, a veteran of struggle against the Ba'ath regime who had spent seven years in Abu Ghraib, and many more fighting the Iraqi Army in the marshlands of southern Iraq. Known as Abu Hatem—'father of justice'—he commanded much respect locally, and securing his participation in the Iraqi Governing Council in the summer of 2003 was something of a coup for the Occupation. But by mid-2004, he had resigned from the igc in protest at the us pursuit of a thirty-one-year-old cleric from Najaf, whose anti-Occupation, nationalist stance had attracted massive popular support. The shift in Abu Hatem's position not only demonstrates the growing unpopularity of the Occupation, even among those initially willing to work with it; it is also indicative of the surprisingly central role played in the fortunes of post-Saddam Iraq by Muqtada al-Sadr.
The latest book by Patrick Cockburn, who has reported from Iraq since the 1970s and has long been one of the most astute commentators on the country, provides a measured portrait of this pivotal, yet enigmatic figure—countering journalistic clichés of the 'firebrand cleric' by stressing Muqtada's caution and capacity for strategic calculation. He provides a fluent, largely chronological narrative, the first half focusing on the political traditions to which Muqtada is heir, before turning to a relatively detailed évènementiel account of the period since the fall of Saddam, up to the beginning of 2008. Indeed, more than a biography, Cockburn has produced an account of the deeper lineages of Shia Islamist politics, and of the social forces that sustain present-day Sadrism. The resurgence of the former is among the least well understood of the wider dynamics unleashed by the 2003 invasion, making Cockburn's contribution all the more welcome; the sociological dimensions of his account, meanwhile, highlight forces that are sure to have a defining influence on Iraq's future.
Born in 1973, Muqtada al-Sadr comes from a line of martyrs: his father's cousin, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, was assassinated by the Ba'ath regime in 1980, while his father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, met the same fate in 1999, along with two of Muqtada's brothers. While Muhammad Baqir—Sadr I—had been the leading intellectual of the Shia political awakening in Iraq after 1958, Muhammad Sadiq—Sadr II—had, in the limited oxygen of the 1990s, laid the organizational bases for the movement that would burst into life in 2003. Sadr I progressed up the ladder of the Shia clergy, the marji'iya, at a time when it was coming under sustained threat from the advance of secularism, and from the appeal of pan-Arabist sentiment, linked to the modernizing projects of early Ba'athism. After the 1958 Revolution, concepts such as exploitation (istighlal) and injustice (zulm) had gained currency, most notably in the platforms put forward by secular nationalists and Marxists. Baqir al-Sadr drew on this vocabulary in a considerable corpus of texts after 1959, but to promote a revival of Islam in face of the twin threats of secularist and materialist thought. For example, the first third of his Iqtisaduna (Our Economy, 1960) is a critique of Capital Volume 1, attempting to demonstrate that Marx underplays spiritualism in favour of economic reductionism. (The book thus forms an interesting parallel with the attack on Marxism by Michel 'Aflaq, founder of the Ba'ath, in his 1948 book Fikratuna, Our Idea).
In a series of works—others include Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy, 1959)—Baqir al-Sadr advocated the Islamization of society, and an Islamic state, as the best solution to the plight of the population. Unlike Khomeini, who was later to advocate the wilayat al-faqih—'rule of the jurists'—al-Sadr accorded the clergy only a supervisory function, and popular elections retained a prominent role. Cockburn does not discuss his output in any detail, but it is important in order to grasp the way in which Iraqi Shia Islamism emerged as a counter to the visions offered by Marxists and secular nationalists. Sadr's ideological interventions were complemented by his political activity: through the Dawa al-Islamiyah (Islamic Call) Party, established in 1957 to challenge the Iraqi Communist Party's advance among Shia youth, he was able to promote a social programme that did not appear reactionary or lethargic. Not only did the Dawa take up many of the urgent questions posed by the icp, it also drew organizational lessons from it, building clandestine cells at local level.
The Ba'athist crackdown on the icp in the 1960s and 70s opened further space for Sadr's views to circulate. However, by this time Baqir al-Sadr had become isolated among the marji'iya, who saw the activism of the Dawa as a threat on two levels—undermining clerical sway over the Shia populace, but also provocative to a regime they did not wish to challenge too directly. In 1978 Saddam Hussein and his clique consolidated their dominance, and thereafter would not tolerate the existence of any independent power centre. The Shia clergy retreated into the practice of taqiyya, dissimulation in face of a hostile regime. But when the Iranian Revolution began in 1979, while the Shia clerical establishment remained cautious, al-Sadr sent a jubilant telegram to Tehran, declared a three-day holiday at his Najaf seminary, and penned a series of tracts justifying the new Islamic state. With these acts of defiance he in effect wrote his own death sentence. Detentions of Dawa activists had already begun to multiply when a grenade attack in Baghdad by an Islamist militant provided the pretext for Baqir's arrest. His body was returned to Najaf a few days later, making him the first Grand Ayatollah to be executed.
Though Baqir al-Sadr left an intellectual legacy, there was now no organization within Iraq that could carry forward the Shia Islamist political project. Five months after the execution of Sadr I, Saddam Hussein launched his 'whirlwind war' on Iran, which was to last until 1988, and in which as many as a million people were killed on both sides. Cockburn estimates that 80 per cent of rank-and-file Iraqi troops were Shia, forced to fight their co-religionists at close quarters; meanwhile, exiled Iraqi Shia groups who had been funded and armed by Tehran—most notably the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (sciri)—took part on the Iranian side, and developed a reputation for torturing Shia prisoners even more severely than other Iraqis. This laid the basis for enmities that were to simmer throughout the 1990s, and which re-emerged in force after 2003.
Despite Saudi funds and us weapons, the war ground down the gears of the Ba'ath state. By the time a ceasefire was agreed in 1988, the regime appeared exhausted, and Iraqi nationalism had been discredited to the point that, as Cockburn puts it, 'when Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990 he found the patriotic well had run dry'. Troops abandoned their positions no sooner had fighting in the Gulf War begun, but the ferocious air and ground assault of the us military machine continued. In the aftermath of Saddam's withdrawal there were spontaneous risings among the Shia of southern Iraq—encouraged by American exhortations to topple Saddam. Actual support, however, was not forthcoming, and President Bush retreated from 'regime change'; Saddam was given free rein to suppress the Shia uprising. The retribution was harsh. Iraqi government troops rounded up tens of thousands of men, women and children and summarily executed them—the aim, as Cockburn describes it, being 'to terrorize the Shia population of Iraq by inflicting on them a collective punishment so bloody that they would never rise again'.
Roads to Renegacy
Tom Hazeldine
Plenty beyond Power


Society: While solitary, non-evil hill giants are very rare, they can sometimes be found in other humanoid societies, though most are not accepted in central cities or population centers. They do best as laborers and soldiers in outlying frontier towns, and often serve as rudimentary diplomats to negotiate with marauding hill giant bands. Unfortunately, hill giants who shed their racial lifestyle for civilization are mocked and often killed on sight by their nomadic brethren. Still, these "civilized" hill giants can find their place within society and many have managed to live peaceful, uneventful lives.
Physical Description: Skin color among hill giants ranges from light tan to deep, ruddy brown. Their hair is brown or black, with eyes the same color. Hill giants wear layers of crudely prepared hides with the fur left on. They seldom wash or repair their garments, preferring simply to add more hides as their old ones wear out. Adults are around 10 feet tall and weigh about 1,100 pounds. Hill giants can live to be 200 years old, but almost never do.
Ability Score Modifiers: Hill giants are big, but dumb. They gain +2 Strength and +2 Constitution but suffer –2 Intelligence and –2 Charisma.
Size Hill giants are Medium creatures and have no bonuses or penalties due to their size.
Type Hill giants are humanoids with the giant subtype.
Speed: Hill giants have a base speed of 30 feet.
Languages: Hill giants begin play speaking Common and Giant. Hill giants with high Intelligence scores can choose from the following: Draconic, Dwarven, Goblin, Gnoll, Orc, and Sylvan. See the Linguistics skill page for more information about these languages.
A hill giant is proficient with all simple weapons, light armor, and medium armor, but not with shields.
As a hill giant gains levels, its ability scores increase or decrease as noted on Table: Hill Giant. These increases stack and are gained as if through level advancement.
At 1st level, a hill giant gains 2 slam attacks.
These are primary attacks that deal 1d4 points of damage plus the hill giant's Strength modifier. When the hill giant grows to Large size at 4th level, the damage die of its slams increases to 1d6. At 10th level, the damage die of its slams increases to 1d8.
Starting at at 2nd level, a hill giant becomes an accomplished rock thrower, gaining proficiency in and a +1 racial bonus on attack rolls with thrown rocks. It can hurl rocks up to two categories smaller than its size; for example, a Large hill giant can hurl Small rocks. A "rock" is any large, bulky, and relatively regularly shaped object made of any material with a hardness of at least 5. The hill giant can hurl a rock up to five range increments. Damage from a thrown rock is equal to the hill giant's base slam damage plus 1–1/2 its Strength bonus.
A hill giant's thick hide allows it to shrug off some blows. At 3rd level and every two levels thereafter, a hill giant's natural armor bonus to its AC increases by +2 (to a maximum of +9 at 9th level).
At 4th level, a hill giant grows to Large size. Its ability scores do not change, although it gains the normal benefits and penalties for being a Large creature.
The hill giant's space and reach both increase to 10 feet and it gains a –1 size modifier to attacks and armor class, a +1 special size modifier to its Combat Maneuver Bonus and Combat Maneuver Defense, a –2 penalty to Fly checks, and a –4 penalty to Stealth checks, as normal. Its slam attacks now deal 1d6 points of damage.
At 4th level, a hill giant's base land speed increases by +10 feet. Apply this bonus before modifying the hill giant's speed because of any load carried or armor worn. This bonus stacks with any other bonuses to the hill giant's land speed.
At 8th level, a hill giant gains the ability to catch Small, Medium, or Large rocks (or projectiles of similar shape). Once per round, when a hill giant that would normally be hit by a rock, it can make a Reflex save to catch it as a free action. The DC is 15 for a Small rock, 20 for a Medium one, and 25 for a Large one. (If the projectile provides a magical bonus on attack rolls, the DC increases by that amount.) The giant must be aware of the attack in order to make a rock catching attempt.


Kimmel was referring to Cassidy's vow earlier this year to only support a health care legislation if it passed a "Jimmy Kimmel test" — that a child born with a congenital heart disease like Billy Kimmel would "be able to get everything she or he would need in that first year of life," the senator said on CNN in May.
But the Graham-Cassidy Obamacare repeal bill, Kimmel argued this week, doesn't even come close to fulfilling that promise of protecting people with pre-existing conditions.
Tetralogy of Fallot with pulmonary atresia, the condition that Billy Kimmel has, is a congenital heart defect in which there is a hole in the wall between the heart's left and right chambers. Without a valve connecting the right ventricle to the lungs, not enough blood reaches the lungs.
Those born with the condition are usually diagnosed as infants or young children, according to the American Heart Association, with visible symptoms that include skin that is bluish in color. (Kimmel said a nurse happened to notice that Billy's skin appeared to have a purple tint).
How is it treated and how much does it cost?
The life-long condition typically requires multiple procedures, including open-heart surgeries to reconstruct the connection between the heart and lungs and catheterization to help enlarge arteries. Even after the children get older, they will need constant monitoring and sometimes follow-up operations as adults.
Needless to say, it is an expensive condition to treat.
According to Dr. Roger Breitbart, the chief of Boston Children's Hospital's inpatient cardiology division, open heart surgery and hospitalization can easily cost upwards of hundreds of thousands of dollars, while catheterization procedures can be multiple tens of thousand of dollars each. The total lifetime cost could easily surpass $1 million, he said.
How does someone like Billy Kimmel fare under Obamacare?
Prior to Obamacare, Billy Kimmel could have found himself branded uninsurable for life.
Insurance companies routinely turned people with pre-existing conditions away or charged them sky-high premiums if they applied for coverage on the individual market. More than a quarter of non-elderly adults have health conditions that would have made them ineligible for coverage in this market, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation.
Plus, they often limited how much they'd be willing to cover annually or over one's life. Kids like Billy Kimmel would likely blow through the cap pretty quickly.
Those with employer policies fared better, but even there, it was possible to get hit. Health care bills were one of the leading causes of bankruptcy.
The Affordable Care Act changed all that. Insurers are no longer allowed to turn people away, nor charge them more, because of pre-existing conditions. And they must offer comprehensive policies that cover a wide array of treatments and medication. Plus, insurers cannot impose annual or lifetime limits on coverage of those essential health benefits.
It would depend on where Billy Kimmel lives. The bill would allow states to set up their own rules for coverage, an idea that Republicans generally favor because they say it lets each address its unique needs. For example, one state might keep many of Obamacare's protections, while another could loosen the rules considerably.
Graham-Cassidy would not let insurers turn away those with pre-existing conditions anywhere. But states could opt to once again allow carriers to raise premiums because of people's medical histories and to sell skimpier policies that don't cover Obamacare's 10 essential health benefits.
Also, insurers would be able to cap the amount they would pay for treatment outside what their states deems an essential health benefit.
All these changes are particularly troubling for those in the individual market since employers generally offer better coverage. And they are among the reasons why multiple patient advocacy groups, including the American Heart Foundation, have come out against the bill.
The ABC late night host has made one thing clear as he has spoken about his son's diagnosis: His family is incredibly fortunate.
He has health insurance and the means to pay for his son's care. As much as he has used his son's diagnosis to draw public attention to the impact of various GOP proposals to gut Obamacare, Kimmel can at least rest easy knowing that his family can afford to pay for Billy's treatments.


Enhancing facial volume, redefining lips and smoothing out wrinkles and fine lines in order to combat signs of aging can be achieved with the help of non-surgical treatments such as Fillers. Specific types of fillers, such as Dermal Fillers, can help to plump and lift areas in the face and neck which have lost elasticity over time. As we begin to age, the skin's collagen production begins to reduce which can ultimately lead to skin around the face, neck and jawline beginning to loosen and sag. Dermal Fillers at our clinic in London can also be used in order to rejuvenate the skin on hands, and can ultimately restructure the skin in order to produce a more youthful appearance.
Here at Longevita, we pride ourselves on offering the most innovative techniques to each and every one of our patients, and provide a tailored approach in order to ensure that our patients are the ideal candidates for the treatments that we suggest. This can help to guarantee the best possible results.
Fillers are generally made from Hyaluronic Acid, which is a naturally-forming sugar which already occurs in the body to help repair any damaged tissue. As we age, the production of this sugar, and protective fatty tissue around the muscles, decreases, which can lead to a loss of elasticity. Non-surgical Filler procedures at our London clinic often take around 30-45 minutes to complete, dependent on the size of the area which is being targeted. Generally, the process is relatively pain-free meaning no anaesthesia is required. However, if you are feeling uncomfortable at all throughout the procedure, then numbing cream can be applied.
While fillers use the natural ingredient Hyaluronic Acid with the injections, there are some risks to consider, which will be discussed in detail by the surgeon prior to the treatment taking place. Some of the potential risks include asymmetry, some bruising and/or bleeding, possible scarring, lumps, skin redness or rash, and under- or overcorrection of wrinkles.
It is also important to remember that our London Filler treatments may require more than one course in order to provide optimal results.
One of the major benefits of Fillers is that they can be applied to almost any area on the face, neck, jawline and hands. The versatility of this treatment has led to an increase in demand, with patients from all over the globe seeking Filler treatments as an affordable alternative to surgical procedures.
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Public and Political: General: Defence: Correspondence and papers., 09 Jan 1937 - 23 Feb 1938
Scope and Contents Correspondents include: Sir Philip Gibbs on the inefficiency of the RAF; Sir Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt [former Vice-President of the Tank Board] (2); Sir William Beveridge [Director of London School of Economics and Political Science]; Oswald Frewen on working with German and Italian sailors, German fanaticism, Italian aid to Franco and how the policies of Neville Chamberlain [Prime Minister] encourage Germany and Italy; Leo Amery; Basil Liddell Hart; Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson...
Dates: 09 Jan 1937 - 23 Feb 1938
Public and Political: General: Personal Office correspondence, A-B, many congratulating WSC on becoming Prime Minister and praising his leadership and speeches. [please note that almost the whole file dates from 1940]., Jun 1903 - Feb 1941
Scope and Contents Correspondents include: Vyvyan Adams (4) including (2) on his attending a meeting addressed by WSC; [John] Sandeman Allen on [David Lloyd George]; [1st] Lord Alness [earlier Robert Munro]; Julian Amery [Attache HM Legation, Belgrade] on articles by WSC for publication in Yugoslavia (4); Leo Amery [Secretary of State for India and Burma, later Myanmar] sending on a 1903 letter from WSC to him on the British Army; Group Captain [Charles] Anderson on the Ministry of Aircraft Production taking...
Dates: Jun 1903 - Feb 1941
Public and Political: General: Political: Correspondence M-Q. (includes copies of wartime documents)., Feb 1941 - Dec 1946
Reference Code: GBR/0014/CHUR 2/7A-B
Scope and Contents Correspondents include: Baronessa Bettina de Malfatti on Italian royal affairs (2); 1st Lord Marchwood [earlier Frederick Penny] resigning as Honorary Treasurer of the Conservative Party; James Thomas [later 1st Lord Cilcennin] (5) and Marjorie Maxse, Vice-Chairmen of Conservative and Unionist Party; Duncan Sandys on "Maycrete" houses; "Scribe", 1st Lord Altrincham [earlier Sir Edward Grigg] (2); Anthony Bevir [Private Secretary to Prime Minister Clement Attlee], Sir Herbert Williams, and...
Dates: Feb 1941 - Dec 1946
Speeches: House of Commons: Speech notes and Hansard., 11 Feb 1943 - 27 Jul 1943
Scope and Contents Typescript speaking notes [with handwritten annotations by WSC], "Hansard" and press cuttings for WSC's speech (11 Feb 1943) on the War Situation, including the Casablanca Conference, the Battle of the Atlantic, War in the Far East, North Africa, (praising General Sir Bernard Montgomery [Commander, Eighth Army]). Published: Complete Speeches VII, pp 6742 - 55.Extract from "Hansard" on WSC's short statement (24 Mar 1943) on the Tunisian Campaign. Published: Complete Speeches VII, p...
Dates: 11 Feb 1943 - 27 Jul 1943
Speeches: House of Commons: Speech notes and source material., 18 Feb 1944 - 22 Mar 1944
Scope and Contents Speech notes for WSC's speech (22 February) on the progress of the war and the international situation including: the strength of the forces of Germany; successes in the Soviet Union and through bombing attacks on Germany; the importance of the role played by the Royal Navy and the RAF; a prediction of increased attack in 1944; events and operations in Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece; the principles of the choice of commanders for joint operations; his meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek; the Cairo...
Scope and Contents Speech notes for WSC's speech (24 May) on the foreign affairs debate entitled "The world situation" including: a meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers; the unity of empire; discontinuation of arms to Turkey; the fall of Mussolini and the position of Italy; relations with and events in Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Poland. Also includes correspondence from: Anthony Eden [later 1st Lord Avon, Foreign Secretary] (4): Count Edward Reventlow [Danish Minister at the Court of St...
Speeches: House of Commons: Speech notes and source material., 19 Jul 1944 - 08 Aug 1944
Scope and Contents Speech notes for WSC's statement (2 August) on the war situation including: successes against Germany and Japan world-wide including the Far East; decisions made at the Quebec [Canada] conference; the Normandy landings; RAF losses; the tanks supplied by the United States and praise for the Sherman and Churchill tanks; the progress of General Sir Harold Alexander [Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy]; his hopes of victory; flying bombs and the evacuation of London; improved...
Dates: 19 Jul 1944 - 08 Aug 1944
Speeches: House of Commons: Speech notes and source material., 28 Aug 1944 - 18 Oct 1944
Scope and Contents Speech notes for WSC's speech (28 September) on the war situation including: successes in France, the liberation of Paris, and landings in the South of France; fighting in Italy; a tribute to the achievements of the British and United States armies; casualty figures; the campaign in Burma [later Myanmar] and progress against Japan; the use of DDT; setbacks in China; the modernisation of the British fleet; the position of Eastern European countries; and the presidential elections in the...
Dates: 28 Aug 1944 - 18 Oct 1944
Speeches: Non House of Commons: Speech notes and source material., 09 Jan 1941 - 27 Apr 1941
Scope and Contents Speech notes for WSC's speech (9 January, Pilgrim's Society Luncheon, Savoy Hotel, London) entitled "United States co-operation" proposing a toast to Lord Halifax [earlier Edward Wood and Lord Irwin] on his appointment as British Ambassador to the United States and on the death of [11th] Lord Lothian [earlier Philip Kerr]. Published: Complete Speeches VI, pp 6327-9.BBC broadcast by WSC (9 February) entitled "Give us the tools" on the war situation including: the repulsion of the threat of...
Speeches: Non House of Commons: Speech notes and source material., 11 May 1943 - 30 Jun 1943
Scope and Contents Press cuttings of WSC's broadcast from Washington, United States (14 May) on the Home Guard in which he pays tribute to the members of the Home Guard. Also includes correspondence from Sydney Redman [Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for War]; Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore [Chairman of the Home Guard Joint Parliamentary Committee] (3); Robert Gransden; George Anderson, Principal Officer Eastern civil defence region (2); telegrams from the Ministry of Information;...
Speeches: Non House of Commons: Speech notes and source material., 07 Jul 1943 - 31 Aug 1943
Scope and Contents Broadcast by WSC (14 July) to the Polish forces on the death of General [Wladyslaw] Sikorski, former Prime Minister of Poland. Also includes correspondence from Sir Owen O'Malley, British Ambassador to Poland; Anthony Eden [later 1st Lord Avon, Foreign Secretary] and notes and copies of correspondence from Francis Brown [Assistant Private Secretary to WSC], John Peck [Assistant Private Secretary to WSC] and John Martin [Private Secretary to WSC]. Published: Complete Speeches VII, pp...
Speeches: Non House of Commons: Speech notes, newspaper cuttings and source material., 19 May 1940 - 23 Dec 1940
Scope and Contents BBC broadcast by WSC (19 May) entitled "Arm yourselves and be ye men of valour" on the war situation in France and the formation of the coalition government. Source material includes notes from Andrew Stewart. Published: Complete Speeches VI, pp 6220-23.BBC broadcast by WSC (17 June) entitled "The news from France is very bad" on the capitulation of France. Published: Complete Speeches VI, p 6231.BBC broadcast by WSC (14 July) entitled "War of the unknown warriors" on the disabling of the...
Speeches: speech notes and other material., 09 Oct 1940 - 24 Dec 1940
Scope and Contents Notes for WSC's speech (9 October, [Caxton Hall, London]) on his leadership of the Conservative Party and the retirement of Neville Chamberlain. Published: Complete Speeches VI, pp 6294-6.Notes for WSC's broadcast (21 October, BBC) to the people of France entitled "Dieu protege la France". Also includes French translation of WSC's broadcast. Published: Complete Speeches VI, pp 6296-8.Notes for WSC's speech (9 November, Mansion House [London]) entitled "A long road to tread" on the illness of...
Dates: 09 Oct 1940 - 24 Dec 1940
Speeches: speech notes and other material., 09 Jan 1941 - 27 Apr 1941
Scope and Contents Notes for WSC's speech (9 January, Pilgrim's Society Luncheon, Savoy Hotel, London) entitled "United States co-operation" proposing a toast to Lord Halifax [earlier Edward Wood and Lord Irwin] on his appointment as British Ambassador to the United States and on the death of [11th] Lord Lothian [earlier Philip Kerr]. Also includes cutting from the Times reporting WSC's speech. Published: Complete Speeches VI, pp 6327-9.Various cuttings reporting WSC's speech (17 January, Glasgow [Scotland])...
Speeches: speech notes (some by WSC as First Lord of the Admiralty) and other material., 08 Aug 1939 - 24 Jan 1940
Scope and Contents Notes for WSC's broadcast (8 August, United States [National Broadcasting Company]) entitled "A hush over Europe" on German and Italian war preparations, and [Adolf] Hitler's pivotal role. Published: Complete Speeches VI pp 6149-51.Notes for WSC's broadcast (1 October, BBC) entitled "The first month of war" on Poland, the Soviet Union, U-boat attacks, the situation in Britain, and Franco-British relations, which includes the phrase that Russia "is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an...
Dates: 08 Aug 1939 - 24 Jan 1940
Subject: Italy (nation) X
Air warfare 11
United States (nation) 11
Battle of the Atlantic (1939-1945) 5
Military equipment 5
Occupational diseases 1
Penal sanctions 1
Roads 1
Trade unions 1


CELINA - Mercer County Sheriff Jeff Grey isn't taking any chances when it comes to protecting jail personnel, especially after the recent deadly shootings of five police officers in Dallas. County commissioners this week approv . . .
CELINA - The flu vaccine will not be offered as a nasal mist during the coming 2016-2017 flu season. Julia Shaffer, Mercer County-Celina City Health Department director of nursing and communicable disease coordinator, said on W . . .


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Court holds drilling across tracts not trespass
Texas Supreme Court holds drilling across tracts not trespass
Barclay Richard Nicholson
Publication | May 31, 2017
Untitled DocumentOn May 19, 2017, the Texas Supreme Court held in a unanimous decision in Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC that an oil and gas operator does not commit trespass when, after obtaining consent from the surface estate owner of a neighboring tract, it drills into the neighboring tract's surface and through the tract's subsurface in order to access minerals in which the operator has an interest. In so holding, the Court affirmed the concept in Texas law that absent an express grant in a lease, the surface estate owner, and not the mineral estate owner, controls the subsurface earth beneath a tract.
Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC ("Anadarko") was lessee to an oil and gas lease covering the Chaparral Wildlife Management Area (the "Chaparral")—a wildlife conservation area controlled by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department—which lease granted Anadarko the right to explore, produce, and develop the mineral estate under the Chaparral. Because the Chaparral was a public area, the lease restricted the scope of drilling activities Anadarko could undertake on the Chaparral surface. To that end, the lease required that drilling sites be established at an offsite location when "prudent and feasible."
To access the minerals under the Chaparral while also complying with the Chaparral lease's restrictions, Anadarko entered into an agreement with the surface estate owners of a tract adjacent to the Chaparral ("Briscoe Ranch"), which permitted Anadarko to drill vertically into the ground beneath Briscoe Ranch, and then horizontally into the Chaparral subsurface. Lightning Oil Co. ("Lightning"), lessee of the Briscoe Ranch mineral estate, objected to Anadarko placing its drilling sites on the Ranch and drilling through Lightning's mineral estate.
Lightning sued Anadarko, alleging that Anadarko's drilling through Lightning's mineral estate was a trespass, and amounted to a tortious interference with Lightning's lease for the Briscoe Ranch mineral estate. Lightning sought a temporary restraining order and injunction to prohibit Anadarko from drilling through Lightning's mineral estate.
The lower courts hold in favor of Anadarko
The trial court in Dimmit County granted Anadarko's motion for summary judgment, disposing of Lightning's claims, and denied Lightning's motions for summary judgment.
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Briscoe Ranch surface estate owner, and not Lightning, controlled the subsurface earth beneath the Ranch, and could grant permission to Anadarko to site a well on the tract, drill into the subsurface, and directionally alter the well bore into the Chaparral subsurface. The court held that absent an express right to control the subsurface, Lightning was only entitled to "a fair chance to recover the oil and gas" in the Briscoe Ranch mineral estate. Therefore, the court held that because the Briscoe Ranch surface estate owner authorized Anadarko to drill through the subsurface earth, Anadarko was justified in undertaking that drilling, and such drilling was not a trespass.
The Texas Supreme Court affirms the lower courts
The Texas Supreme Court granted Lightning's petition for review, and affirmed the court of appeals' ruling in a unanimous decision. The Court identified the key issue as: whether Lightning's rights in the Briscoe Ranch mineral estate included the right to prohibit Anadarko's drilling activities if those activities were not intended to capture Lightning's minerals but rather to traverse the subsurface formations in which Lightning's minerals were located, in order to access Anadarko's minerals beneath the Chaparral. The Court held that neither Lightning's lease for the Briscoe Ranch mineral estate, nor Texas law, granted Lightning the right to control the subsurface beneath the Ranch.
The Court did, however, note that although it generally agreed with the court of appeals' position that a surface owner controls much of the mass that undergirds the surface estate, there is a distinction between earth surrounding hydrocarbons and earth embedded with hydrocarbons (the latter of which by definition includes some of the minerals owned by the mineral estate owner). To that end, Anadarko's drilling could constitute a trespass if that drilling "infringe[d] on [Lightning's] ability to exercise its rights" to access the minerals beneath the Ranch. The Court found that Lightning provided no evidence to show that Anadarko's drilling would interfere with its own rights. And even if Lightning had presented evidence, that evidence would have had to overcome Anadarko's evidence that the Railroad Commission of Texas's rules and oversight regarding drilling activities were sufficient to protect Lightning's rights.
The Court also recognized that by drilling through the Briscoe Ranch subsurface, Anadarko would unavoidably extract a portion of that subsurface roughly equal to the volume of the wellbore—that is, the cuttings pushed to the surface during drilling—and that extracted material would contain a small portion of Lightning's minerals. Balancing the interests of Lightning and Anadarko, and the interest of the individual operator against the interests of society and the oil and gas industry as a whole, the Court held that since off-lease drilling arrangements often provide the most efficient means of exploiting minerals, Lightning's interest in the small quantity of minerals extracted by Anadarko must cede to society's goals (embodied by Anadarko's drilling) of maximum oil and gas recovery and minimum waste.
Absent an express grant in a lease with the surface estate owner, a lessee who holds the right to recover hydrocarbons in a mineral estate has no right to control the subsurface surrounding those hydrocarbons. Thus, in some instances, an operator can obtain consent from the surface estate owner of an adjacent tract and horizontally drill through that tract's subsurface to access minerals in which the operator has rights. However, such an operator could be susceptible to a trespass claim if a mineral interest owner presents evidence showing that such drilling interferes with the owner's ability to exercise its rights to access its own minerals.
US Treasury issues final regulations to implement CFIUS' expanded jurisdiction under FIRRMA
The US Treasury released regulations that, as provided for under FIRRMA, expand the CFIUS' jurisdiction to include certain non-controlling investments in US businesses.
Publication | January 17, 2020
Supreme Court of Canada removes major obstacle to Trans Mountain pipeline expansion
Increased US sanctions on Iran
Trump signed an executive order authorizing sanctions on Iran's construction, mining, manufacturing, and textile sectors.
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Here Are Rappers You Didn't Realize Were Related
B.J. Steiner
B.J. Steiner Updated: May 21, 2022
Contributing Authors: Trent Fitzgerald
Christopher Polk, Getty Images / Baby Keem via YouTube
Rappers often talk about the importance of brotherhood and sisterhood in their lyrics. Sometimes it's not literal, but on the flip side, there are plenty of rappers you didn't know were related.
Young Thug often collaborates with Lil Baby, Lil Uzi Vert, Gunna and Lil Durk and frequently refers to them as his brothers. But Thugger is not related to any of them in real life.
"I'm ready to die by Lil Baby, Durk and Uzi, Gunna. I'm ready to die by these people. You know what I'm saying?" Thugger explained to Zane Lowe on his Apple Music 1's New Music Daily show back in April of 2021. "I always turn them [as] family. We don't look at them like rappers. We all look at each other like brothers and sisters. Bro, we really argue every day, bro."
But real-life siblings and relatives do exist in rap. Some of them have made a huge impact in the genre. West Coast G-funk pioneers Dr. Dre and Warren G are actual stepbrothers. By looking at them, you may not realize that they are related.
Another pair is Slim Jxmmi and Swae Lee of Rae Sremmurd. Their energetic personalities are so intuitive, and there's a reason why—Slim and Swae are actually brothers.
Then there's Kendrick Lamar, who has everyone repeating his "top of the morning" line from "Family Ties," his collaborative track with Baby Keem. What you may not know is that K-Dot and Keem are cousins.
And there are plenty more relatives that are putting it down for hip-hop. So check out XXL's list below of rappers that you probably didn't realize were related.—Trent Fitzgerald
See Rappers You Didn't Realize Were Related
Source: Here Are Rappers You Didn't Realize Were Related
Filed Under: 24Hrs, Audio Two, Baby Keem, Big Scarr, CL Smooth, Coi Leray, Daz Dillinger, Del The Funky Homosapien, Dr. Dre, Feature, Fijimacintosh, Galleries, Gallery, Grand Pupa, GZA, Havoc, Heavy D, Ice Cube, Juice Wrld, Juicy J, Kendrick Lamar, Lil GotIt, Lil Keed, Madeintyo, Migos, Nate Dogg, Ol Dirty Bastard, Pete Rock, Playboi Carti, Pooh Shiesty, Pras, Project Pat, Rae Sremmurd, RZA, saweetie, Slim Jxmmi, Snoop Dogg, Snoop Lion, swae lee, Tragedy Khadafi, Trippie Redd, Uno The Activist, Warren G, Wyclef Jean, Young Dolph, Zaytoven
Female Shot The Same Night As TakeOff Tells Her Story
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Jackson State Football Coach Deion Sanders Bans Players From Leaving Their Houston Hotel Rooms This Weekend After Takeoff's Death
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Kodak Black, Westside Gunn, Smino and More – New Hip-Hop Projects


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Q: How much can I improve the Nightingale Bow? I have the perks from the heavy armor side of smithing, and I currently improved my Nightingale bow to Flawless, inflicting 75 damage. I would like to improve it higher.
Everyone talks about how armor can be improved infinitely using the Alchemy-Enchant-Smithing loop (thus it's possible to have hide armor that's as strong as dragonscale). Is it also possible to improve weapons like this? I really like this bow, but it would be a tough choice if I cannot improve it higher/equivalent to a legendary daedric bow (The enchants on it are not too bad either.)

A: The infinite loop can indeed make the Nightengale Bow the strongest bow in the game. Any bow is capped for damage at a number that's essentially some huge power of two, minus one. Attempting to exceed this number, or have the game display such a number, causes a crash. If people aren't crashing the game they're not using the same loop you've read about.
The infinite loop requires four things: ingredients for restoration potions (cyrodilic spadetails, abecean longfins, salt piles), ingredients for enchanting potions, soul gems, and knowledge of the "fortify alchemy" enchantment. Fortify Smithing would also be useful for you.
For best results, have four (or as many as you can manage) +alchemy skill items as the only items on your favorites bar. Equip them. Make a fortify restoration potion. Drink the potion. Unequip the items using the favorites thing. Re-equip. Make a new restoration potion. Drink it. Repeat. Before long your potions will be 10000% plus. That's when you make the fortify enchanting potions. Use one of them to make a +smithing skill ring. Use the other to make a very high % alchemy skill ring, so you don't have to loop in the future.
If you have trouble with this loop three things help: get alchemy skill perks. You shouldn't need more than two or three. Get enchanting perks. You'll definitely want the +25% skill perk. Go fast. Remember that restoration potions multiply each other a little bit. If your alchemy skill is extremely low for your level some potion sellers might be selling higher skill fortify restoration potions than you can actually make yourself. Go buy one, if you can find it.
Because every weapon has the same theoretical maximum damage (which will display as negative because of how integers work in games, thanks to the convention of the leftmost digit in binary corresponding to positive or negative), it doesn't really matter what weapon you use. If you're using this glitch. Besides, you'll one shot anything in the game once you get your bow over 10000 damage or so, so a simple +50000% smithing enchantment ought to suffice for your weapons.
If you plan on using this loop with the double-enchanting perk to get awesome enchantments on every slot I can't stress enough how important it is to plan them out ahead of time so you don't waste a slot.

A: First off, bottom line: If you have Daedric Smithing, the max bow you can make will be about 60% stronger than the Nightingale Bow. If you have any Smithing perk, via the Alchemy-Enchanting-Smithing loop you can make that type of bow stronger than the Nightingale Bow simply because the Nightingale Bow is unaffected by Smithing perks (this is true for any Smithing value over 129; max is about 533).

Everyone talks about how armor can be improved infinitely using the Alchemy-Enchant-Smithing loop (thus it's possible to have hide armor that's as strong as dragonscale).

Armor is affected by a cap, so once you get above 567 (80% damage reduction) no amount of improvement matters. That's why weaker armors can effectively be the same as Daedric/Dragonplate/Dragonscale. Weapons have no such cap.
Using the Alchemy-Enchanting loop, you can indeed improve the Nightingale Bow drastically, however, keep in mind that it is not affected by any perks. Although the best version has the same base damage (18) as a Daedric Bow, if you're taking perks in things like Daedric Smithing, the latter will be significantly stronger.
It's impossible to predict how "strong" it will appear in your inventory because that calculation depends on factors like Archery skill level and perks.
With the loop, by the way, I've been able to create a Potion of Fortify Smithing +147% and 4 pieces of Fortify Smithing +29%. I have the Smithing perk tree filled out going the Heavy route, so I have Daedric Smithing. I then improved my Daedric Bow to where it's doing 599 damage for me (a bunch of Fortify Archery +48%, nearly full Archery perk tree). When I did the same for the Nightingale Bow, of which I have the best version, I get to 379 damage. So the max Nightingale Bow will be around 37% weaker than the max Daedric Bow.
Math
Just to think about the math for a second, I believe that gets me to
smithing = base skill * (1 + alchemy fort) * (1 + enchanting fort)
         = 100 * (1 + 1.47) * (1 + 0.29 * 4)
         = 533

Plugging that into improvement with/without the Smithing perk (Daedric Bow = Daedric Smithing, Nightingale Bow = none/without):
with    = floor((smithing - 5) / (103 / 6)) * 1.8
        = floor(30.76) * 1.8
        = 54
without = floor((smithing + 11 / 3) / (103 / 3)) * 1.8
        = floor(15.6) * 1.8
        = 27

Since the base for both is 18, that brings us to 72 for the Daedric Bow and 45 for the Nightingale Bow, or 37.5% less (and the ratio stays the same regardless of skill level/perks). Note also that the above 27 damage difference is greater than the difference between the weakest and strong base damages for bows, therefore the strongest bow will be the best bow type for which you have a Smithing perk. This should always be true if you can buff Smithing over 129 using enchanting/alchemy.
Also, FWIW, by the time you have 100 Enchanting you really should take the Extra Effect perk. That means the bow above can have the same effects as the Nightingale Bow. Not that they matter much when you're one-shotting everything.

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