Respondent union, representing the plumbing and mechanical trades in Dallas, was a party to a multiemployer collective bargaining agreement with a mechanical contractors association. The agreement contained a "most favored nation" clause, by which the union agreed that, if it granted a more favorable contract to any other employer, it would extend the same terms to all association members. Respondent picketed petitioner, a general building contractor which subcontracted all plumbing and mechanical work and had no employees respondent wished to represent, to secure a contract whereby petitioner agreed to subcontract such work only to firms that had a current contract with respondent. Petitioner signed under protest and, claiming that the agreement violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws, brought suit against respondent seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. By the time this case went to trial, respondent had secured identical agreements from other general contractors and was selectively picketing those who resisted. The District Court held (1) that the subcontracting agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws because it was authorized by the first proviso in § 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which exempts jobsite contracting agreements in the construction industry from the statutory ban on secondary agreements requiring employers to cease doing business with other persons, and (2) that federal labor legislation preempted the State's antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
recognized in Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676, because it imposed direct restraints on competition among subcontractors that would not have resulted from the elimination of competition based on differences in wages and working conditions. Pp. 421 U. S. 621-626.
(a) The agreement indiscriminately excluded nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market, even if their competitive advantages were derived from efficient operating methods, rather than substandard wages and working conditions. P. 421 U. S. 623.
(b) The "most-favored nation" clause in the multiemployer bargaining agreement, by insuring that no union subcontractor would have a competitive advantage on any matters covered by the agreement, gave respondent's agreements with petitioner and other general contractors the effect of creating a sheltered market for union subcontractors in that portion of the subcontracting market controlled by signatory general contractors. Pp. 421 U. S. 623-624.
(c) Since the agreement did not simply prohibit subcontracting to any nonunion firm, but to any firm that did not have a contract with respondent, it gave the union complete control over subcontract work offered by general contractors that had signed the agreement and empowered the union to exclude certain subcontractors from that portion of the market by refusing to deal with them. Pp. 421 U. S. 624-625.
2. The first proviso to § 8(e) of the NLRA does not shelter the challenged agreement from the federal antitrust laws, since that proviso was not intended to authorize subcontracting agreements that are neither within the context of a collective bargaining relationship nor limited to any particular jobsite. Here respondent, which has never sought to represent petitioner's employees or bargain with petitioner on their behalf, makes no claim to be protecting those employees from working with nonunion men; the agreement was not limited to any particular jobsite; and respondent concededly sought the agreement solely as a means of pressuring Dallas mechanical subcontractors to recognize it as their employees' representative. Pp. 421 U. S. 626-633.
3. There is no indication that Congress in the Taft-Hartley amendments or later meant to make NLRA remedies for "hot cargo" agreements exclusive, thus precluding liability for such agreements under the antitrust acts. Pp. 421 U. S. 633-634.
would risk substantial conflict with policies central to federal labor law. Pp. 421 U. S. 635-637.
5. Whether the subcontracting agreement violated the Sherman Act, an issue not fully briefed or argued in this Court, must be decided on remand. P. 421 U. S. 637.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 421 U. S. 638. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 421 U. S. 638.
parties to the union's current collective bargaining agreement. The union disclaimed any interest in representing the general contractors' employees. In this case, the picketing succeeded, and petitioner seeks to annul the resulting agreement as an illegal restraint on competition under federal and state law. The union claims immunity from federal antitrust statutes, and argues that federal labor regulation preempts state law.
Local 100 is the bargaining representative for workers in the plumbing and mechanical trades in Dallas. When this litigation began, it was party to a multiemployer bargaining agreement with the Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas, a group of about 75 mechanical contractors. That contract contained a "most favored nation" clause by which the union agreed that, if it granted a more favorable contract to any other employer, it would extend the same terms to all members of the Association.
"WHEREAS, the contractor and the union are engaged in the construction industry, and "
"WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agreement applying in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8(e) of the Labor-Management Relations Act;"
"WHEREAS, it is understood that, by this agreement, the contractor does not grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bargaining representative of any employees of the signatory contractor; and"
"WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limitation provided herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor does not perform with his own employees, but uniformly subcontracts to other firms;"
agreement violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, and was therefore invalid. Connell sought a declaration to this effect and an injunction against any further efforts to force it to sign such an agreement.
The District Court held that the subcontracting agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws because it was authorized by the construction industry proviso to § 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as added, 73 Stat. 543, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). The court also held that federal labor legislation preempted the State's antitrust laws. 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (ND Tex.1971). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 483 F.2d 1154 (1973), with one judge dissenting. It held that Local 100's goal of organizing nonunion subcontractors was a legitimate union interest, and that its efforts toward that goal were therefore exempt from federal antitrust laws. On the second issue, it held that state law was preempted under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959). We granted certiorari on Connell's petition. 416 U.S. 981 (1974). We reverse on the question of federal antitrust immunity and affirm the ruling on state law preemption.
that labor unions are not combinations.or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and exempt specific union activities, including secondary picketing and boycotts, from the operation of the antitrust laws. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941). They do not exempt concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties. Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 381 U. S. 662 (1965). The Court has recognized, however, that a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676 (1965).
party agree to restrain competition in a business market. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797, 325 U. S. 806-811 (1945); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws -- A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 252 (1955); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 659 (1965).
In this case, Local 100 used direct restraints on the business market to support its organizing campaign. The agreements with Connell and other general contractors indiscriminately excluded nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market, even if their competitive advantages were not derived from substandard wages and working conditions, but rather from more efficient operating methods. Curtailment of competition based on efficiency is neither a goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary effect of the elimination of competition among workers. Moreover, competition based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws strive to protect.
stood to benefit from any extension of Local 100's organization, but the method Local 100 chose also had the effect of sheltering them from outside competition in that portion of the market covered by subcontracting agreements between general contractors and Local 100. In that portion of the market, the restriction on subcontracting would eliminate competition on all subjects covered by the multiemployer agreement, even on subjects unrelated to wages, hours, and working conditions.
it could refuse to sign collective bargaining agreements with marginal firms. Cf. Mine Workers v. Pennington, supra. Or, since Local 100 has a well defined geographical jurisdiction, it could exclude "traveling" subcontractors by refusing to deal with them. Local 100 thus might be able to create a geographical enclave for local contractors, similar to the closed market in Allen Bradley, supra.
This record contains no evidence that the union's goal was anything other than organizing as many subcontractors as possible. [Footnote 2] This goal was legal, even though a successful organizing campaign ultimately would reduce the competition that unionized employers face from nonunion firms. But the methods the union chose are not immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal. Here Local 100, by agreement with several contractors, made nonunion subcontractors ineligible to compete for a portion of the available work. This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws.
might be entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful collective bargaining agreement. Cf. Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 664-665; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 689-690 (opinion of WHITE, J.); id. at 381 U. S. 709-713, 381 U. S. 732-733 (opinion of Goldberg, J.). In this case, Local 100 had no interest in representing Connell's employees. The federal policy favoring collective bargaining therefore can offer no shelter for the union's coercive action against Connell or its campaign to exclude nonunion firms from the subcontracting market.
Local 100 nonetheless contends that the kind of agreement it obtained from Connell is explicitly allowed by the construction industry proviso to § 8(e), and that antitrust policy therefore must defer to the NLRA. The majority in the Court of Appeals declined to decide this issue, holding that it was subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the NLRB. 483 F.2d at 1174. This Court has held, however, that the federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws. [Footnote 3] We conclude that § 8(e) does not allow this type of agreement.
"It is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 143 U. S. 459."
National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 386 U. S. 619 (1967).
"a measure designed to allow agreements pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construction site because of the close community of interests there, but to ban secondary objective agreements concerning non-jobsite work, in which respect the construction industry is no different from any other."
"[T]he purpose of the section 8(e) proviso was to alleviate the frictions that may arise when union men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same construction site."
District Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 640 (CA3 1964).
would be free to enlist any general contractor to bring economic pressure on nonunion subcontractors, as long as the agreement recited that it only covered work to be performed on some jobsite somewhere. The proviso's jobsite restriction then would serve only to prohibit agreements relating to subcontractors that deliver their work complete to the jobsite.
We therefore hold that this agreement, which is outside the context of a collective bargaining relationship and not restricted to a particular jobsite, but which nonetheless obligates Connell to subcontract work only to firms that have a contract with Local 100, may be the basis of a federal antitrust suit because it has a potential for restraining competition in the business market in ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.
regulate union activities in aid of organization must also be preempted because it creates a substantial risk of conflict with policies central to federal labor law.
In this area, the accommodation between federal labor and antitrust policy is delicate. Congress and this Court have carefully tailored the antitrust statutes to avoid conflict with the labor policy favoring lawful employee organization, not only by delineating exemptions from antitrust coverage, but also by adjusting the scope of the antitrust remedies themselves. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1940). State antitrust laws generally have not been subjected to this process of accommodation. If they take account of labor goals at all, they may represent a totally different balance between labor and antitrust policies. [Footnote 18] Permitting state antitrust law to operate in this field could frustrate the basic federal policies favoring employee organization and allowing elimination of competition among wage earners, and interfere with the detailed system Congress has created for regulating organizational techniques.
Because employee organization is central to federal labor policy and regulation of organizational procedures is comprehensive, federal law does not admit the use of state antitrust law to regulate union activity that is closely related to organizational goals. Of course, other agreements between unions and nonlabor parties may yet be subject to state antitrust laws. See Teamsters v. Oliver, supra, at 358 U. S. 295-297. The governing factor is the risk of conflict with the NLRA or with federal labor policy.
"No. The agreement says that no one will be given a more favorable agreement. I couldn't, if I desired, as an agent, sign an agreement other than the ones in existence between the local contractors and the Local 100."
"Q. I see. So that's -- in other words, once you sign that contract with the Mechanical Contractors' Association, that sets the only type of agreement which your Union can enter into with any other mechanical contractors; is that correct, sir?"
There was no evidence that Local 100's organizing campaign was connected with any agreement with members of the multiemployer bargaining unit, and the only evidence of agreement among those subcontractors was the "most favored nation" clause in the collective bargaining agreement. In fact, Connell has not argued the case on a theory of conspiracy between the union and unionized subcontractors. It has simply relied on the multiemployer agreement as a factor enhancing the restraint of trade implicit in the subcontracting agreement it signed.
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676, 381 U. S. 684-688 (1965) (opinion of WHITE, J.); id. at 381 U. S. 710 n. 18 (opinion of Goldberg, J.); Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 386 U. S. 176-188 (1967); Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962).
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b)[(4)(B)] of this section the terms 'any employer,' 'any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce,' and 'any person' when used in relation to the terms 'any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,' 'any other employer,' or 'any other person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception."
See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 39-40 (1959).
105 Cong.Rec. 17327 (1959) (remarks by Sen. Kennedy); id. at 17381 (remarks by Sens. Javits and Goldwater); id. at 15539 (memorandum by Reps. Thompson and Udall); id. at 16590 (memorandum by Sen. Kennedy and Rep. Thompson). These debates are reproduced in 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, pp. 1377, 1385, 1576, 1708 (1959) (hereinafter Leg.Hist. of LMRDA).
105 Cong.Rec. 17899 (1959) (remarks by Sen. Kennedy); id. at 18134 (remarks by Rep. Thompson); 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1432, 1721.
President Eisenhower's message to Congress recommending labor reform legislation urged amendment of the secondary boycott provisions to permit secondary activity "under certain circumstances, against secondary employers engaged in work at a common construction site with the primary employer." S.Doc. No. 10, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1959) (emphasis added). Various bills introduced in both Houses included such provisions, see 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1912-1915, but neither the bill that passed the Senate nor the one that passed the House contained a Denver Building Trades provision. The Conference Committee proposed to include such an amendment to § 8(b)(4)(b) in the Conference agreement, along with a closely linked construction industry exemption from § 8(e). 105 Cong.Rec. 17333 (1959) (proposed Senate resolution), 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1383. But a parliamentary obstacle killed the § 8(b)(4)(B) amendment, and only the § 8(e) proviso survived. See 105 Cong.Rec. 17728-17729, 17901-17903, 2 Leg.Hist of LMRDA 1397-1398, 1434-1436. References to the proviso suggest that the Committee may have intended the § 8(e) proviso simply to preserve the status quo under Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93 (1958), pending action on the Denver Building Trades problem in the following session. See H.R.Rep. No. 1147, supra, n 5, at 39-40; 105 Cong.Rec. 17900 (1959) (report of Sen. Kennedy on Conference agreement), 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1433. Although Senator Kennedy introduced a bill to amend § 8(b)(4), S. 2643, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), it was never reported out of committee.
See 105 Cong.Rec. 17881 (1959) (remarks by Sen. Morse); id. at 15541 (memorandum by Reps. Thompson and Udall); id. at 15551-15552 (memorandum by Sen. Elliott); id. at 15852 (remarks by Rep. Goodell); see also id. at 20004-20005 (post-legislative remarks by Rep. Kearns); 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1425, 1577, 1588, 1684, and 1861.
105 Cong.Rec. 6428-6429 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater); id. at 6648-6649 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 6664-6665 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater); id. at 14348 (memorandum of Rep. Griffin); 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1079, 1175-1176, 1191-1192, 1523.
H.R.Rep. No. 1147, supra, n 5, at 42; 105 Cong.Rec. 10104 (1959) (memorandum of Sen. Goldwater); id. at 18128 (remarks by Rep. Barden); 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1289, 1715. The NLRB has taken this view. Operating Engineers Local 54, 142 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1963), enforced, 331 F.2d 99 (CA3), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 889 (1964).
As noted above, supra at 421 U. S. 628-630, the garment industry proviso reflects different considerations. The text of the proviso and the treatment in congressional debates and reports suggest that Congress intended to authorize garment workers' unions to continue using subcontracting agreements as an organizational weapon. See Danielson v. Joint Board, 494 F.2d 1230 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J.).
Connell also has argued that the subcontracting agreement was subject to antitrust sanctions because the construction industry proviso authorizes only voluntary agreements. The foundation of this argument is a contention that § 8(b)(4)(b) forbids picketing to secure an otherwise lawful "hot cargo" agreement in the construction industry. Because we hold that the agreement in this case is outside the § 8(e) proviso, it is unnecessary to consider this alternative contention.
See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (House Managers' statement), 65-67 (1947); 93 Cong.Rec. 4757, 4770, 4834-4874 (1947) (debates over Sen. Ball's proposal for antitrust sanctions and Sen. Taft's compromise proposal for actual damages, which became § 303 of the NLRA).
The dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART argues that § 303 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of § 8(e), thereby precluding recourse to antitrust remedies. For that proposition, the dissenting opinion relies upon "considerable evidence in the legislative materials." Post at 421 U. S. 650. In our view, these materials are unpersuasive. In the first place, Congress did not amend § 303 expressly to provide a remedy for violations of § 8(e). See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, §§ 704(d), (e), 73 Stat. 544-545. The House, in 1959, did reject proposals by Representatives Hiestand, Alger, and Hoffman to repeal labor's antitrust immunity. Post at 421 U. S. 650-654. Those proposals, however, were much broader than the issue in this case. The Hiestand-Alger proposal would have repealed antitrust immunity for any action in concert by two or more labor organizations. The Hoffman proposal apparently intended to repeal labor's antitrust immunity entirely. That the Congress rejected these extravagant proposals hardly furnishes proof that it intended to extend labor's antitrust immunity to include agreements with nonlabor parties, or that it thought antitrust liability under the existing statutes would be inconsistent with the NLRA. The bill introduced by Senator McClellan two years later provides even less support for that proposition. Like most bills introduced in Congress, it never reached a vote.
In most cases, a decision that state law is preempted leaves the parties with recourse only to the federal labor law, as enforced by the NLRB. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274 (1971); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959). But in cases like this one, where there is an independent federal remedy that is consistent with the NLRA, the parties may have a choice of federal remedies. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 386 U. S. 176-18 (1967); Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962).
"Nothing herein shall be construed to repeal, affect or diminish the force and effect of any statute now existing on the subject of trusts, conspiracies against trade, pools and monopolies."
The Texas antitrust statutes prohibit, among other specified agreements, trusts, and monopolies, any combination of two or more persons to restrict "the free pursuit of a lawful business." Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code §§ 15.02-15.04 (1968).
In addition to seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement with Local 100 violated the antitrust laws, Connell sought a permanent injunction against further picketing to coerce execution of the contract in litigation. Connell obtained a temporary restraining order against the picketing on January 21, 1971, and thereafter executed the contract -- under protest -- with Local 100 on March 28, 1971. So far as the record in this case reveals, there has been no further picketing at Connell's construction sites. Accordingly, there is no occasion for us to consider whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbids such an injunction where the specific agreement sought by the union is illegal, or to determine whether, within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, there was a "labor dispute" between these parties. If the Norris-LaGuardia Act were applicable to this picketing, injunctive relief would not be available under the antitrust laws. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941). If the agreement in question is held on remand to be invalid under federal antitrust laws, we cannot anticipate that Local 100 will resume picketing to obtain or enforce an illegal agreement.
While I join the opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, I write to emphasize what is, for me, the determinative feature of the case. Throughout this litigation, Connell has maintained only that Local 100 coerced it into signing the subcontracting agreement. With the complaint so drawn, I have no difficulty in concluding that the union's conduct is regulated solely by the labor laws. The question of antitrust immunity would be far different, however, if it were alleged that Local 100 had conspired with mechanical subcontractors to force nonunion subcontractors from the market by entering into exclusionary agreements with general contractors like Connell. An arrangement of that character was condemned in Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797 (1945), which held that Congress did not intend "to immunize labor unions who aid and abet manufacturers and traders in violating the Sherman Act," id. at 325 U. S. 810. Were such a conspiracy alleged, the multiemployer bargaining agreement between Local 100 and the mechanical subcontractors would unquestionably be relevant. See Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 381 U. S. 673 (1965) (concurring opinion); Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676, 381 U. S. 737 (1965) (dissenting opinion). But since Connell has never alleged or attempted to show any conspiracy between Local 100 and the subcontractors, I agree that Connell's remedies, if any, are provided exclusively by the labor laws.
engaged in peaceful picketing to induce the petitioner Connell Construction Co., a general contractor in the building and construction industry, to agree to subcontract plumbing and mechanical work at the construction site only to firms that had signed a collective bargaining agreement with Local 100. None of Connell's own employees were members of Local 100, and the subcontracting agreement contained the union's express disavowal of any intent to organize or represent them. The picketing at Connell's construction site was therefore secondary activity, subject to detailed and comprehensive regulation pursuant to § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as added, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), and § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 158, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187. Similarly, the subcontracting agreement under which Connell agreed to cease doing business with nonunion mechanical contractors is governed by the provisions of § 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). The relevant legislative history unmistakably demonstrates that, in regulating secondary activity and "hot cargo" agreements in 1947 and 1959, Congress selected with great care the sanctions to be imposed if proscribed union activity should occur. In so doing, Congress rejected efforts to give private parties injured by union activity such as that engaged in by Local 100 the right to seek relief under federal antitrust laws. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment before us.
the Labor Management Relations Act (the Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, in 1947, union economic pressure directed against a neutral, secondary employer was not subject to sanctions under either federal labor law or antitrust law, at least in the absence of proof that the union was coercing the secondary employer in furtherance of a conspiracy with a nonlabor group. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219; Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797.
"Congress abolished, for purposes of labor immunity, the distinction between primary activity between the 'immediate disputants' and secondary activity in which the employer disputants and the members of the union do not stand 'in the proximate relation of employer and employee. . . .'"
National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 386 U. S. 623.
In Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U. S. 821, for example, the Court found that union conduct in forcing a freight carrier out of business was protected activity beyond the reach of the federal antitrust laws even though it involved secondary pressure that culminated in the union's compelling the carrier's principal patron to break its contract with the carrier and to discharge the carrier from further service. "That which Congress has recognized as lawful," the Court noted, "this Court has no constitutional power to declare unlawful, by arguing that Congress has accorded too much power to labor organizations." Id. at 325 U. S. 825 n. 1.
"a union to induce employees to strike against or to refuse to handle goods for their employer when an object is to force him or another person to cease doing business with some third party."
Carpenters' Union v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93, 357 U. S. 98. [Footnote 2/2] In condemning "specific union conduct directed to specific objectives," ibid., however, Congress deliberately chose not to subject unions engaging in prohibited secondary activity to the sanctions of the antitrust laws.
Section 12(a)(3) of the Hartley bill, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., as initially passed by the House, defined "unlawful concerted activities" to include an "illegal boycott." 1 NLRB Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 205 (hereinafter Leg.Hist. of LMRA). Section 12(c) provided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should have no "application in any action or proceeding in a court of the United States involving any activity defined in this section as unlawful."
"Illegal boycotts take many forms. . . . Sometimes they are direct restraints of trade, designed to compel people against whom they are engaged in to place their business with some other than those they are dealing with at the time. . . . Under [§ 12], these practices are called by their correct name, 'unlawful concerted activities.' It is provided that any person injured in his person, property, or business by an unlawful concerted activity affecting commerce may sue the person or persons responsible for the injury in any district court having jurisdiction of the parties and recover damages. The bill makes inapplicable in such suits the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which heretofore has protected parties to industrial strife from the consequences of their lawlessness, no matter how violent their disputes became. Persons who engage in unlawful concerted activities are subject to losing their rights and privileges under the act."
H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 24, 44, 1 Leg.Hist. of LMRA 315, 335.
The Senate, however, refused to adopt the House's removal of antitrust immunity for prohibited secondary activity, choosing instead to make the remedies available under federal labor law exclusive. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare approved S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., which provided that proscribed secondary conduct would be an unfair labor practice and could be enjoined on application of the National Labor Relations Board. No private remedy for an injured employer was authorized in the bill approved by the Committee. See S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8, 22, 1 Leg.Hist. of LMRA 413-414, 428.
"An amendment reinserting in the bill a section making secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes unlawful and providing for direct suits in the courts by any injured party. . . ."
"The amendment proposes that [the injured party] be entitled to file a suit for damages and obtain a temporary injunction while that suit is being heard. . . ."
"The amendment, furthermore, removes the protection of the Clayton Act from monopoly agreements to fix prices, allocate customers, restrict production, distribution, or competition, or impose restrictions or conditions on the purchase, sale, or use of material, machines, or equipment. While the existence of the union should not be a combination in restraint of trade, we see no reason why unions should not be subject in this field to the same restriction as are competing employers."
S.Rep. No. 105, supra at 54-55, 1 Leg.Hist. of LMRA 460-461.
the part of labor unions, sometimes acting on their own, sometimes in conspiracy with employers."
Although stating that he personally agreed with the changes proposed by Senator Ball, Senator Taft argued for defeat of the Ball amendment, explaining that resistance to providing a private injunctive remedy in cases of secondary boycotts was so strong that an attempt to eliminate the labor exemption from the antitrust laws would lead to the defeat of any effort to provide for a private damages remedy for injured parties. Senator Taft proposed as a substitute that private parties be given only the right to sue for actual damages. 93 Cong.Rec. 4843-4844, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRA 1365. The Ball amendment was thereafter defeated, 93 Cong.Rec. 4847, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRA 1369-1370, and Senator Taft introduced his proposal "to restore to people who lose something because of boycotts and jurisdictional strikes the money which they have lost." 93 Cong.Rec. 4858, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRA 1370-1371.
In response to Senator Morse's claim that the proposal would impose virtually unlimited liability on unions, Senator Taft made plain that he was not advocating the use of antitrust sanctions against prohibited secondary activity.
and attorneys' fees. In this case, we simply provide for the amount of the actual damages."
93 Cong.Rec. 4872-4873, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRA 1398; see Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, 377 U. S. 260 n. 16. Senator Taft's proposal for a private damages remedy under federal labor law as adopted by the Senate. 93 Cong.Rec. 4874-4875, 2 Leg Hist. of LMRA 1399-1400.
secondary activity by labor unions, see Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93; and those practices which it did outlaw were to be remedied only by seeking relief from the Board or by pursuing the newly created, exclusive federal damages remedy provided by § 303. Teamsters v. Morton, supra.
time, Congress expanded the scope of the § 303 damages remedy to allow recovery of the actual damages sustained as a result of a union's engaging in secondary activity to force an employer to sign an agreement in violation of § 8(e). [Footnote 2/6] In short, Congress has provided an employer like Connell with a fully effective private damages remedy for the allegedly unlawful union conduct involved in this case.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence in the legislative materials indicating that, in expanding the scope of § 303 to include a remedy for secondary pressure designed to force an employer to sign an illegal "hot cargo" clause and in restricting the remedies for violation of § 8(e) itself to those available from the Board, Congress in 1959 made the same deliberate choice to exclude antitrust remedies as was made by the 1947 Congress.
"would solve many of the problems attending unbridled union power as it exists and operates in this country. My proposal is in the nature of antitrust legislation, applied to labor unions."
"restrictive trade practices such as price-fixing, restrictions on use of new processes and technological improvements, exclusion of products for the market, and so forth. . . . This bill deals directly with [this aspect] of union monopoly power."
by a union to induce an employer or a group of employers to comply with a union demand which would result in restrictive trade practices would be unlawful and an employer faced with such a demand could seek legal remedies to restrain the union from enforcing its demand. The consequent denial to unions of the right to fix prices or impose other artificial market limitations would not in any way interfere with normal and legitimate union functions or with their proper collective bargaining powers. They would merely be placed on an equal footing with all other groups in society as was the case during the fifty years prior to the Hutcheson decision."
105 Cong.Rec. 12137, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1508.
"[e]nter into any arrangement -- voluntary or coerced -- with any employer, groups of employers, or other unions which cause product boycotts, price-fixing, or other types of restrictive trade practices."
105 Cong.Rec. 15533, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1569.
"[It] serves to point out that the substitute [the Landrum-Griffin bill] is a minimum bill. It might be well at this point to mention some provisions that are not in it."
"There is no antitrust law provision in this bill."
"This is truly a minimum bill that a responsible Congress should pass. I believe I speak for the gentleman from Georgia [MR. LANDRUM], as well as myself when I say that, if amendments are offered on the floor to add antitrust provisions or others that have been mentioned, I, for one, will oppose them. The gentleman from Georgia and I have tried to balance delicately the provisions which we believe should be in a bill at this time and which a majority of this body could support."
"does not go far enough, that it needs more teeth, and that more teeth are going to come in the form of legislation to bring labor union activities under the antitrust laws."
105 Cong.Rec. 15858, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1690 (remarks of Rep. Alger); see 105 Cong.Rec. 15859-15860, 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1691-1692 (adoption of the Landrum amendment to H.R. 8342, substituting in lieu of the text thereof the text of H.R. 8400 as amended).
Indeed, two years after enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act, Senator McClellan, whose committee hearings into abuses caused by concentrated labor power had played a major role in generating support for the 1959 labor reform legislation, together with five other Senators, introduced a bill to provide antitrust sanctions for illegal "hot cargo" agreements in the transportation industry, despite the fact that such agreements were already expressly prohibited by § 8(e). [Footnote 2/12] As it had in 1947 and 1959, however, Congress in 1961 rejected this effort to subject illegal union secondary conduct to the sanctions of the antitrust laws.
intended to subject such activity only to regulation under the National Labor Relations Act and § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The judicial imposition of "independent federal remedies" not intended by Congress, no less than the application of state law to union conduct that is either protected or prohibited by federal labor law, [Footnote 2/13] threatens "to upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy." Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 260. See Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 98-100; National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 619-620. Accordingly, the judgment before us should be affirmed.
Before 1932, this Court had held that secondary strikes and boycotts were not exempt from the coverage of the antitrust laws. E.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U. S. 37. Duplex and its progeny were overruled by Congress with passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70. See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91, 311 U. S. 100-103; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 312 U. S. 229-231, 312 U. S. 235-237.
"to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person. . . ."
"shall not be applicable in respect of violations of subsection (a) [defining prohibited secondary conduct], or in respect of any contract, combination, or conspiracy, in restraint of commerce, to which a labor organization is a party, if one of the purposes of such contract, combination, or conspiracy is to fix prices, allocate customers, restrict production, distribution, or competition, or impose restrictions or conditions upon the purchase, sale or use of any material, machines, or equipment."
"(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is -- "
"(1) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person;"
"(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason o[f] any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit."
"(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self employed person to join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section. . . ."
"(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title."
"(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason o[f] any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit."
Indeed, Connell's original state court complaint was filed before Connell had signed any agreement with Local 100. See ante at 421 U. S. 620. At that point, it was apparent that the primary reason for the lawsuit was Connell's request for an injunction to stop the union's picketing.
If, contrary to the Court's conclusion, see ante at 421 U. S. 626-633, Congress intended what it said in the proviso to § 8(e), then the subcontracting agreement is valid and, under the view of the Board and those Courts of Appeals that have considered the question, Local 100's picketing to obtain the agreement would also be lawful. See, e.g., Orange Belt District Council of Painters v. NLRB, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 236, 328 F.2d 534, 537; Construction Laborers v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (CA9); Northeastern Indiana Bldg. Trades Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854, enforcement denied on other grounds, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 352 F.2d 696. Connell would therefore have neither a remedy under § 303 nor one with the Board.
It would seem necessarily to follow that conduct specifically authorized by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act could not, by itself, be the basis for federal antitrust liability unless the Court intends to return to the era when the judiciary frustrated congressional design by determining for itself "what public policy in regard to the industrial struggle demands." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 254 U. S. 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219. In my view, however, even if Local 100's conduct was unlawful, Connell may not seek to invoke the sanctions of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to decide in this case whether the subcontracting agreement entered into by Connell and Local 100 is within the ambit of the construction industry proviso to § 8(e), and, if it is, whether it was permissible for Local 100 to utilize peaceful picketing to induce Connell to sign the agreement.
If Connell and Local 100 had entered into a purely voluntary "hot cargo" agreement in violation of § 8(e), an injured nonunion mechanical subcontractor would have no § 303 remedy, because the union would not have engaged in any § 8(b)(4) unfair labor practice. The subcontractor, however, would still be able to seek the full range of Board remedies available for a § 8(e) unfair labor practice. Moreover, if Connell had truly agreed to limit its subcontracting without any coercion whatsoever on the part of Local 100, the affected subcontractor might well have a valid antitrust claim on the ground that Local 100 and Connell were engaged in the type of conspiracy aimed at third parties with which this Court dealt in Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797. At the very least, an antitrust suit by an injured subcontractor under circumstances in which Congress had failed to provide any form of private remedy for damage resulting from an illegal "hot cargo" agreement would present a very different question from the one before us -- a question which it is not now necessary to answer. Cf. Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676, 381 U. S. 708 n. 9 (opinion of Goldberg, J.).
On the other hand, the signatory of a purely voluntary agreement that violates § 8(e) is fully protected from any damage that might result from the illegal "hot cargo" agreement by his ability simply to ignore the contract provision that violates § 8(e). If the union should attempt to enforce the illicit "hot cargo" clause through any form of coercion, the employer may then bring a § 303 damages suit or may file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B). Since § 8(e) provides that any prohibited agreement is "unenforceable and void," any union effort to invoke legal processes to compel the neutral employer to comply with his purely voluntary agreement would obviously be unavailing.
The legislative proceedings leading to the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 519, began in January, 1959, when Senator John Kennedy introduced S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. In March, 1959, Senator Kennedy introduced S. 1555, incorporating 46 amendments to S. 505 made by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. S. 1555, with various additional amendments, was approved by the Senate on April 25, 1959, and sent to the House, where it was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor. On July 30, 1959, the House Committee favorably reported H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. One week earlier H.R. 8400 and H.R. 8401, identical bills, were introduced in the House by Representatives Landrum and Griffin, respectively. The House voted on August 13, 1959, to substitute the text of H.R. 8400 for the text of the House Committee bill, and the Landrum-Griffin bill was then inserted by the House in S. 1555 in lieu of its provisions. The Conference made several substantive changes in the Landrum-Griffin bill, which was then passed by both the House and Senate and approved by the President. See generally 1 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA vii-xi.
"[W]e should act today with full knowledge that passage of the Landrum-Griffin bill will not solve every problem. The heart of the problem, the very heart, is the sheer power in the hands of labor union leaders due to their above-the-law status with respect to our anti-monopoly laws."
105 Cong.Rec. 18132; 2 Leg.Hist. of LMRDA 1719.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, every contract, agreement, or understanding, express or implied, between any labor organization and any employer engaged in the transportation of persons or property, whereby such employer undertakes to cease, or to refrain from, purchasing, using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products or services of any producer, processor, distributor, supplier, handler, or manufacturer which are distributed in trade or commerce in any territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or between any such territory and another, or between any such territory or territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, or to cease doing business with any other person shall be unlawful."
I fully agree with the Court's conclusion, ante at 421 U. S. 635-637, that federal labor law preempts the state law that Connell sought to apply to Local 100's secondary activity in this case.


For the last 50 years, except for one case, the so-called 1968 Federal Anti-Riot Act lay dormant and forgotten, but now the Justice Department has revived this constitutional monster, awakening it because of media outrage over the Charlottesville turmoil. Its revival represents the greatest current threat to our First Amendment rights.
Last October, teams of FBI agents swooped down on eight young men for allegedly intending to incite a riot and for conspiring to riot. The men are accused of violating 18 U.S.C. §2101 and 18 U.S.C. §2102, the Federal Anti-Riot Act of 1968.
The act was Congress's heavy-handed response to the anti-war, civil rights, and counterculture disturbances of the late 1960s, particularly the riots in Washington, D.C. that followed the assassination of civil rights activist Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. A pall of smoke still hung over Washington, D.C. and troops circled the Capitol when the act was enacted on April 11. The act was specifically designed to battle social dissent and was based on the idea that sinister groups of "outside agitators" were riling up students and blacks. It was first used to prosecute the Chicago Eight, the leaders of the protests at the 1968 Democratic convention.
The head of one of the world's oldest elite foreign policy institutions in London is calling for the world's pro-globalist think tanks to unite like never before, lest their neoliberal world order dissolve in the rising populist tide.
Voter fraud and corruption is a very real problem, even in so-called "advanced democracies," such as the United States. For example, changes made in 2016 to AB1921, a California state law dealing with collecting and submitting voter ballots, may have exacerbated the problem in the Golden State, at least according to some political experts.
Prior to 2016, California election laws stated that voters wishing to vote by mail had to either mail their ballot in or have a family or household member submit the ballot on their behalf at their local polling place. The changes made to AB1921 and signed into law in 2016 by Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown updated the law to allow anyone to return mail ballots on behalf of other voters. Called "ballot harvesting," the updates allowed third parties—really anyone—to collect ballots from voters and submit them to election officials with little oversight.
Are Americans more politically polarized than at any time in recent history? According to the work of the Pew Research Center, the answer is yes. While polarization statistics have hit an apex during and because of the Trump presidency, the trend is not brand new. A fuller divide began growing during both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies.
Political polarization is measured by the approval gap—the presidential approval rating difference between supporters of both parties. The Trump gap numbers are at an all-time high: Republicans overwhelmingly approve of the job he has done in office, while Democrats give him historically low approval numbers. The gap is, therefore, wider than it has been in modern polling history, which began in the 1950s.
The failure of the coordinated efforts of the West, its Arab allies, and Israel to redraw the map of the Middle East by forcing regime change in Syria has exposed Israel's declining power across the region.
Russia's intervention in the Syrian war on the side of Syria's government turned the tide against ISIS, al Qaeda, and the al-Nusra Front who received arms, intelligence, and training from the West and its allies, especially Britain, France, Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. It also placed a spotlight on a regime change policy that had all the hallmarks of a neoconservative agenda that risked helping Israel find an excuse to go to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon and provoke a major confrontation with Iran that would drag in Western powers.
It is the first time in my lifetime that opening up the morning newspaper is something like an adventure. Last week I learned that the Donald Trump White House had considered a military intervention in Venezuela to remove the admittedly dystopic and despotic government of President Nicolas Maduro. For those who are not following developments in the Southern Hemisphere closely, the Venezuelan "Bolivarian" government is an odd mixture of South American old-style communism based on an aggressive populism that promotes class warfare. Political demonstrations over the past year protesting the deteriorating economy and the threat to what remains of the country's democracy have been suppressed by violence initiated by heavily armed police in which dozens died. The National Assembly, which is controlled by the political opposition, is being ignored by Maduro, who is ruling by decree. Since he controls the security apparatus there is no one to tell him what he cannot do.
Venezuelans, sitting on huge oil reserves, are starving, unemployed, plagued by hyperinflation not seen since post-World War I Germany, and fleeing the country in the hundreds of thousands. Credit both internationally and domestically has vanished and foreign companies that had set up shop in the country, which refuses to allow them any longer to repatriate their profits, have fled, meaning that consumer goods once readily available have disappeared from the shelves.
Is the radical Israeli government helping the Saudis build nuclear weapons? According to a new reportin the online news and commentary website "Middle East Monitor," an Israeli writer is blowing the whistle on a secret deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia to sell detailed information on how to build a nuke.
Dor-on claims that the Saudi push to go nuclear stems from concerns that Iran is building its own arsenal, despite the fact that objective nuclear scientists along with U.S. intelligence agencies contend Iran abandoned its nuclear weapon program back in the early 2000s. Also, the Saudis believe that President Donald Trump's closeness to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu means the U.S. will not move to block the deal.
The much-ballyhooed "caravan" of Central Americans, which recently arrived at the Mexico-California border in several buses seeking asylum, looks to be nothing more than a publicity stunt that has been artificially inflated in size and scope for purposes of political agitation.
The retired naval engineer and videographer has been watching the caravan for over a month now from the U.S. border in southern California.


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Renee Kinman, M.D., Ph.D., is board certified in Pediatrics and Pediatric Endocrinology.
She earned her medical degree at Case Western University. She completed a residency in Internal Medicine and Pediatrics at University Hospitals of Cleveland/Rainbow Babies and Children's Hospital. Her fellowship in Pediatric Endocrinology was also completed at Rainbow Babies and Children's Hospital.
Renee Kinman, M.D., Ph.D., is currently an Associate Program Director for the University of California, San Francisco, Fresno Pediatric Residency Program. She is also an Associate Clinical Professor for University of California, San Francisco. She has extensive experience instructing at other institutions including University of Southern California School of Medicine and West Los Angeles Community College.
She has received many awards and honors including the Children's Hospital Central California Champion in the Community Award and the Resident Teaching Award from UCSF Fresno. She is currently enrolled in a Master's in Education program at California State University Fresno (Curriculum Design & Instruction option).
In her free time, Renee Kinman, M.D., Ph.D., enjoys figure skating and is working on completing her gold medal in ice dance.
University of Southern California; Physiology and Biophysics Ph.D.
University of California, San Diego; Chemistry B.A.


text:
We deserve a voice on our public lands!
by Larissa Liebmann
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Public lands are required to be managed by the federal government to benefit the United States public as a whole, ideally in a way that protects those lands and makes them available to be used, experienced, and enjoyed by everyone. However, under the energy dominance agenda of the Trump administration, changes in federal policy have led to the aggressive leasing of public lands for fossil fuel extraction.
It is not in the public's best interest to lease our public lands to fossil fuel companies. Stand up for public lands by voicing your support for the "Restoring Community Input and Public Protections in Oil and Gas Leasing Act of 2019" (H.R. 3225). This bill is an important first step towards stopping the aggressive sell-off of our lands to fossil fuel companies, improving protections for national parks, and restoring opportunities for public input.
While the federal government has leased some public lands for extraction in the past, the Trump administration has vastly increased the lands being put on the auction block for fossil fuel leasing—12.8 million acres of public lands were offered for oil and gas leasing by the Trump administration in 2018, triple the average offered by Obama. Additionally, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has changed leasing policies in order to expedite and expand leasing to fossil fuel companies and make it much more difficult for the public to have a say in leasing decisions. For example, BLM recently reduced the time to protest a lease sale by two-thirds (from 30 to 10 days), and always announces lease sales on Fridays, practically leaving the public only five business days to become aware of a proposed sale and to prepare and file a protest. These changes have predictably resulted in decreased public lands available for public use and enjoyment, water quantity and quality impacts from fossil fuel extraction, and increased greenhouse gas emissions.
The "Restoring Community Input and Public Protections in Oil and Gas Leasing Act of 2019" (H.R. 3225) would reverse some of these changes and implement common-sense processes to make the leasing process more transparent and fair. It would provide greater opportunities for the public to weigh in on lease sales and plans, limit the number of lease sales that can be held per year, and require the government to consider the impacts to nearby national parks. It also would require the federal government to make sure that the leases are sold at competitive prices that actually bring in revenue to taxpayers.
While the provisions in this act are far from the sweeping changes required to combat climate change, reversing the administration's expansion of leasing would be a vast improvement to the current process. This act is an important first step in making sure public lands are not freely handed out for fossil fuel profits.
Please join us in stopping this administration's reckless and aggressive leasing of public lands for fossil fuel interests. Contact your Representative today and tell them that you support H.R. 3225.
Here is a script you can use for a phone call:
My name is _____ and live in zip code_______. I am calling because I am concerned about the mismanagement of our public lands. Under the current administration, our public lands are being recklessly and aggressively put on the auction block for fossil fuel profits. The current process locks out the public and does not even make sure that the leases are being sold at a competitive price. H.R. 3225, called the "Restoring Community Input and Public Protections in Oil and Gas Leasing Act of 2019" would make common-sense changes to the leasing process to make it more transparent, restore the public's ability to provide input, and make sure the leases are generating revenue. I am asking you to support this bill.
Feature image: North Fork Valley, Colorado. Targeted for new oil and gas leasing.
Dive Into Democracy
Prior Appropriation and Water in the West
Insure Our Future Campaign Targets Liberty Mutual, Top Fossil Fuel Insurer
About Waterkeeper
United as one powerful force, Waterkeeper Alliance fights for every community's right to drinkable, fishable, swimmable water. For more information please visit waterkeeper.org

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Xiao long bao has invaded Manila, even long before stalwart Din Tai Fung made it to our shores. Combine this tradition-turned-trend with something incredibly Filipino, that incites the same reaction—bulalo. Its clear soup is the perfect antithesis to the fatty, viscous marrow burrowed in the giant bone that sits in the middle of a bowl, and cures many an ailment with its satisfying quality. Imagine the broth with nuggets of marrow hidden behind a translucent dumpling; this cross-cultural hybrid could become as classic as its origins.
In a large bowl, mix the ground beef, bone marrow, and corn kernels.
Salt a deep pot of boiling water. Add the cabbage and pechay, blanch for around a minute. Remove the vegetables from the liquid and submerge in icy water until completely cool.
Finely mince the vegetables and squeeze out all excess water.
Combine the vegetables and the rest of the ingredients into the meat mixture. Refrigerate for at least one hour.
Fold in the cubes of gelatinized stock. Set aside in the fridge.
Mix the flour and salt in a bowl, create a well in the center.
Combine the hot water and vegetable oil. Slowly pour the liquid into the center of the flour.
Push and knead the dough until it is smooth and pliable, around 7–10 minutes.
Cover with plastic wrap and allow the dough to rest for at least an hour.
Roll the dough into a log that is an inch in diameter; divide the dough into 3/4 inch pieces. Cover with a damp towel to keep the dough from drying.
Roughly quarter the carrot and onion. Toss the vegetables with the oil and beef bones. Spread on a tray and bake at 185°C for around 1.5 hours, or until the ingredients have browned.
Put the browned ingredients in a pot and add 1.5 liters of water. Bring to boil, skimming off impurities that rise to the top. Lower to a simmer and continue to cook it without a lid for at least 2 hours.
Bloom the gelatin sheets in ice water until rehydrated and softened, around 12 minutes.
Strain the broth and mix in the bloomed gelatin, calamansi, and fish sauce. Season to taste.
Cool completely in the fridge until the broth has set. Cut into 1cm cubes. Fold into the filling.
Push down on a piece of dough with the heel of your palm. Using a thin rolling pin, roll from the center moving outwards while rotating the dough in order to achieve a circle.
Put a half inch ball of filling into the dough. Using your thumb and index finger, pleat the edges in a circular motion until the top has sealed.
Carefully arrange them in a steamer lined with either parchment paper dotted with holes, or a piece of clean cheesecloth. Steam for 8-10 minutes. Serve Immediately.
thanks for this! ehm… what's the equivalent for 3 'sheets of gelatin'?
Hi! Gelatin sheets come in individual leaves that you can count. We prefer using sheets for this particular recipe because it melts at a low temperature. Agar-agar ("gulaman") has a much higher melting point. The resulting broth might not be smooth.
Note: You can get gelatin sheets at Santis or Japanese grocery stores.
Thanks, Sweetcraft in Mandaluyong also has the sheets.


text:
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA MEDIA CONFERENCE
Will Muschamp
WILL MUSCHAMP: Real pleased with how recruiting went. I think any time you get to this day, it's a culmination of a lot of hard work and effort by our staff. I think our staff did an outstanding job. You've got to improve your program where you know you need to improve your program.
Of the 23 players that joined our program today, 14 are line‑of‑scrimmage players, mid skill and big skill guys. We saw very easily in our season this year, we struggled on both lines of scrimmage, consistently being able to run the ball and stop the run. I certainly feel like we've addressed our most pressing need, was on both lines of scrimmage, developed play makers and depth on both lines of scrimmage.
So I'm really excited about the guys we've got in that group, and also eight skill guys which includes a quarterback. We'd like to sign a quarterback every year. I think that's important. A kicker in Austin Hardin, a guy that came in and did an outstanding job for us, and we're real pleased about him coming from Marist. We'll know about this class in two or three years.
I'll say the same thing this year as I did last year. Football is a developmental game, develop the players. Really excited about Jeff Dillman and Jesse Ackerman and our strength staff, our coaching staff, but the job that they do in getting our players in here and doing a nice job with them, and we'll know a lot more about this class in two or three years at the end of the day.
So this is a developmental game. So we'll be able to address that. It's not about winning in February. Okay? It's about winning in the fall and developing your football team and addressing your needs, and I think we've done that.
Six mid‑year signees, Willie Bailey's on campus, Jessamen Dunker, D.J. Humphries, Damien Jacobs, Antonio Morrison, and Latroy Pittman are all guys that are in the program right now.
Of course, we've been going as a staff really the last month, so we haven't spent a whole lot of time with any of those guys, but good that they were able to graduate and get enrolled at the University here, and certainly we'll help their progress as far as going into spring practice.
We pleased with our staff. Outstanding job and appreciate all the support from our administration and the people that touch our program as far as the recruiting process, because it takes a team effort to get this thing done and certainly not any one person gets it done. It takes a whole team effort. So real pleased, and I'll go ahead and open it up for any questions.
Q. Can you talk about the work you guys did in North Carolina?
WILL MUSCHAMP: I think D.J. Durkin, first of all, is kind of our area recruiter for that area, and I think he knows now that he does a really nice job recruiting, period. But it was a full team effort. You look at Bryant Young, Dan Quinn, Tavaris Robinson, myself, defensive side of the ball, we're really‑‑ we hone in on the guys we want and the guys we feel like can come and make a difference in our program, and we go after those guys.
So we were able to ‑‑ you look at Jon Bullard, Rhaheim Ledbetter, D.J. Humphries. Alex McCalister is a guy that came to our camp, broad jumped over ten feet, close to a 40‑inch vertical leap, a guy that's 6'6", 220 pounds, and his best football is ahead of him. That's a very, very explosive athlete and a guy that hasn't played a whole lot of football. So real pleased with the job we were able to do with those players.
Q. And I guess the news today was kind of flipping Fowler. How big was that coming on late?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, again, you recruit through this process, and sometimes when you get there to signing day, you're leaving it up to a young man and his family to make a decision, and I think Dante had a good fit here at Florida as far as his position was concerned, his opportunity was concerned, and we're excited to add another good pass rusher to our program.
Q. Can you talk a little bit about the quarterback situation? Was it Coach Pease that wanted to add a quarterback or was it‑‑
WILL MUSCHAMP: It was, but we had made the decision. We had recruited a quarterback through the year, and when he had committed to another school, we had made the decision we were going to recruit another quarterback at the end of November. And of course Charlie left for Kansas the 1st of December.
I do think that position is different than every other position as far as identifying the critical factors, number one, but having a good feel for that quarterback coach, coordinator position, to have kind of a guy that he wanted to recruit. And so when we tired‑‑ I held off on all of that. Obviously evaluated the tape and got everything ready, and the moment we hired Brent, he and I sat down and talked about what we needed to do at that position, and pinpointed Skylar from the beginning.
Q. Would you talk about Brent Pease and how he came in here and it just seems like that he was an instant fit and was an instant success on the recruiting?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Brent does an outstanding job. He's a really good football coach. He's a guy that knows what he wants within our philosophy of what we want to do offensively. We've identified those things. We have an outstanding recruiting staff and he certainly has blended in well.
Q. Also, would you talk about‑‑ you pinpointed the defensive line in particular that you wanted to get stronger there. Would you talk about some of the recruits that you got on the defensive line that you're excited about.
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, I'm excited about all of them, but I think all of those guys certainly can come in and contribute in some form or fashion. Obviously we talked about Jon Bullard earlier. He's a guy that's 6'5", 285‑pound guy that can really run. Went and watched him play basketball last week and he gets up and down the court very well.
Bryan Cox is a guy that's kind of come in and was sort of was an outside linebacker and moved to Fort Lauderdale this past year and played for St.Thomas and played both inside and outside, but is a guy that's got great length as far as his arms are concerned. He's a very tough kid. I really like his toughness and what he brings to the program.
We obviously have addressed Dante. We needed to address our pass rush. I think we've addressed that. And a guy that certainly can get on the edge. He's got natural pass rush ability, knows where to put his hips in the rush.
Jafar Mann's is a guy that's an inside player. We needed to add more girth inside and more depth inside, and he certainly is a guy that played on both sides of the ball at Stevenson, but excited about him.
Alex McCalister is more of an outside‑backer type, a guy that, again, he came to camp, really impressed us, and that's when we really liked what we saw with him. He's a guy that I think has got a tremendous upside as a player. He's been a basketball player most of his life and a guy that we really liked in camp.
Of course Dante Phillips has been a guy that's been committed to us for a long time, but you're talking about a 6'7", 295‑pound guy that can move. He's got great feet and change of direction and strike and punch and power. So we're really pleased obviously with him.
And then Quinteze Williams is a guy is 6'5", about 290 pounds. Probably about 270. He will be 290 very soon. But he's got a great frame and is an outstanding athlete and comes from a great program there, Sandy Creek right outside of Atlanta.
Again, very pleased with this class as far as those guys are concerned, and if you watched in our league this year, the two dominant teams were very good on both lines of scrimmage.
Q. When you recruit, how much do you use your depth chart and say, Hey, we had some depth issues and talent issues last year, you can come right in and help us out.
WILL MUSCHAMP: You know, I really think the way it is in recruiting nowadays, there's not a whole lot of secrets, and I think people do‑‑ obviously, I think every kid and their family or whoever is close to them, narrow down the recruiting process of maybe the schools they're looking at. And as they kind of narrow that down, they probably pay a lot of attention to the depth chart.
You know, we don't really address the depth chart a whole lot. I get very concerned when a player asks me about the depth chart more than about once. If they don't want to compete, they don't need to come here. They're going to compete.
We don't make any promises. We promise an opportunity and that's it, an opportunity to come here and if you're the best at your position, you'll play. If you're the best in your position, you'll start. I don't really care where you're from or what grade you are. We owe that to the University of Florida.
You know, we don't really talk in terms of that a whole lot, but I do think kids are obviously pretty aware of it in a situation where they look at it. I think it's good for a young man to ask and say, Who do you have at the position. I think that's important. But when they ask about the 15th time, you start wondering. It's not changing, they're all still here.
Q. You got D.J. and Jessamen on the offensive line. Can you talk about what those two guys bring and how much it helps that they're already question.
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, there's no question. When they're able to go through spring, especially knowing my philosophy as far as playing early, the further your position moves to the ball, the harder it is. So them being able to go through 15 days of spring practice is going to be huge.
But they're just both two very good, big athletes, move very well, great feet, change of direction, very flexible, can bend, both powerful guys. So real excited about both players.
Q. You also got two pretty good tight ends. Can you talk about each of those guys and maybe what reassurance they might have needed after Charlie left that the system would remain the same and fit what they were doing.
WILL MUSCHAMP: I think from the standpoint of when we recruit, it's a philosophy of offense, defense and special teams of who we are, it's not a person. So I think they understood that. But I think they complement each other very well.
Colin is 6'5", 265‑pound guy that can stretch the field. He can do a lot of things for you at the point of attack.
Kent Taylor's a guy that can stretch the field, match‑up issue, is a guy that can really go and get the football. Outstanding athlete, outstanding baseball player.
So both guys are guys we're really excited about.
Q. Is Matt Jones sort of the prototype of what you're looking for in the back now, and does he kind of face maybe more pressure than some of the other freshmen that come in and play right away and contribute at a position that's kind of shaky?
WILL MUSCHAMP: No, I feel good about the position, but in that situation, the only pressure that they're going to have is what they put on themselves, and if they work hard and come in here in shape and they accept the responsibility of being a University of Florida football player and learn what to do and how to do it, they'll be fine.
Q. Can you just talk about him and what you liked from him?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Toughness. Toughness. At the end of the day, it's toughness. He runs behind his pads and he's one of those guys in the fourth quarter you get tired of tackling. That's what we need. We need more of those guys who are able to run up in there when it's 4th and 1 and know that you're going to move the pile by turning around and handing it to somebody. That's something that I didn't always feel as comfortable with this year.
Q. I know you don't want to talk about guys that didn't sign here, but are you a little disappointed that you weren't able to add as many playmakers on the outside of the offense as you had hoped?
WILL MUSCHAMP: No, we'll be fine, no.
Q. This is your second class, but it's the first year where you had a whole year to recruit kids and get to know them and build relationships for a whole year as opposed to just a couple weeks last year. Talk about what that's going to do for your program, being able to bring in guys that, you know, that fit what you want. They only know your beat. They're going to come in and kind of be the foundation for your program.
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, again, I've never looked at it as being somebody's players. At the end of the day they're University of Florida's players, so I don't view it that way, and it's our job to fit them into what we can do to make them successful and put them in situations they can be successful.
But there's no question from a recruiting standpoint, there is a trust factor, and when you build relationships with people, and that's really what recruiting is, you're just building relationships with people and you're presenting a great product in the University of Florida, a great school, great opportunity, great tradition, and I think a lot of young men see that.
Q. How important is it getting closer to that 85‑man limit after the problems with numbers that you had this past season?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Oh, there's no question.
Q. And how many scholarships are still available?
WILL MUSCHAMP: We just have a couple. We're right at it.
Q. And then as far as D.J. Humphries, his weight, what's a good weight? What's a good expectation as far as getting good weight put on him for next fall?
WILL MUSCHAMP: I sort of always‑‑ when I was younger in this profession, I used to always look at a guy, well, he needs to weigh this, he needs to weigh that. Really what I want to do now is evaluate each player with our staff, with Jeff Dillman and come to on optimum weight what a person should be because it's hard to really say until you see him perform, until you see him move around and you see their endurance levels and their stamina and all those sort of things that are important to really put a weight on somebody and say you need to weigh this.
Well, some guys may carry it better, some may not carry it as well. I think I always want to see a guy move around before we really want to put a number on what they need to weigh.
Q. Is the list that you put out today the complete class, and if not, how many guys are you still recruiting?
WILL MUSCHAMP: That's the complete class we have at this point, and I can't comment on anything.
Q. And looking at Jessamen Dunker, he would look like he's as big or bigger than any of the linemen you already have on the roster. Is he already big enough to play on the line in the SEC, and what do you like about him other than that?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, certainly from a size standpoint, yes. But I mean, again, J.D. is a guy that's played football for two years, so his best football is going to be ahead of him. He's going to improve leaps and bounds from spring to fall. How much he will play and how much he will contribute will depend on spring practice and how he develops through the summer, through our off‑season program to spring practice, to the summer and then into the fall. But as far as his size is concerned, sure, certainly he can help us.
But again, the developmental part of that and being a good football player and an offensive lineman on top of it, that will all be determined in time.
Q. Some schools are starting to offer four‑year scholarships. Did you do any of those? Are you still on the year‑to‑year scholarship basis?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Right, we're on the four‑year.
Q. You're on the four‑year now?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Right.
Q. So they're not year‑to‑year?
Q. And the Tampa‑St.Pete area you got quite a few players from there, you had some on the roster already. Can you talk about that area, and is that one you feel like you have a pretty good stronghold on?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, again, I think each year you look at for whatever reason some areas are stronger than others, and that was an area this year that had a lot of good football players, and we were very fortunate. Derek Lewis, DJ Durkin, Brian White all have part of that southwest Florida area, and they all did an outstanding job.
Q. Whether you believe in rankings or not, you guys have a top five, whatever it is. Seven teams on your schedule had top 25 classes. That doesn't include Auburn and Alabama. Can you just talk about how tough it is to stay there, to be able to compete with‑‑ when you know that everybody else is going to have great classes, too?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, I think when you're in the southeast, everybody asks me the difference, when you come from Texas to Florida as far as recruiting is concerned, and the thing that I would say is you really look at from the standpoint of Gainesville and then you branch out from Gainesville and you look within a driving distance area, there's some outstanding universities and programs that are well within a driving distance area. When you're in Austin, Texas, obviously Texas A&M, three hours east. You've got to look for Norman, eight hours north, and then to the east past A&M, LSU.
So my point being, really at the end of the day, if you had one factor that would determine in a young man's decision, it's probably playing close to home because they want their family and friends to be able to see them play, if you had to poll all kids, not to say it's true with every kid. So when you start talking about going and recruiting in different areas, obviously there's a lot more opportunities and choices for a young man as opposed to just maybe one choice.
So you also understand in the southeast when you go look at the SEC, every year in the NFL draft and you look at the number of SEC players taken and they're all‑‑ most of them are from the southeast where football is pretty much paramount to what we're trying to do.
Again, I think that there's a lot of really good players out there. I worry about the ones we sign, not the ones anybody else signs. I've got to worry about them one time out of the year, so it's about our job to get them on campus and coach them and develop them, and I feel comfortable where we're headed with that.
Q. You said you won't to be able to know about this class, how you'll judge them for a few more years. What will be the ultimate determination of whether or not this was a good class?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, I think obviously winning games, winning championships. I mean, they're going to determine the class as they come in. This past year we red shirted four guys. Does that mean it was a successful class? No, it wasn't; we went 7 and 6. So did they contribute? Did some of those guys have outstanding individual performances? Will some of them continue to progress and maybe play two years from now? Certainly. So I think individually it's a different way you look at it as opposed to a team aspect.
Q. And five more recruits on the defensive side of the ball versus offense. Is that just the way it played out, or did you feel there was more of a need to get some more defensive guys this year?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, again, I thought we really struggled up front with our depth on the defensive line. We had to cross‑train guys at multiple positions because we didn't have enough guys to be able to play one position all the time without really losing some depth‑‑ I mean, losing some talent level as far as subbing some guys out, so we really needed to address that.
Really on the offensive line we got everybody back, we had David Young and that's it, so we added two offensive linemen. Certainly that will be a little bit more of a focus next year.
Q. And then Latroy Pittman, he was the first guy committed, stayed on through the coaching change. What do you like about him? What do you think that says about him on and off the field?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, Latroy wants to be a Gator, so that's what it tells you, number one. But a really good athlete and a guy that can possibly help us on either side of the ball. Was an outstanding safety at North Marion and also a playmaker at the wide receiver position, so he's a guy that we're really kind of still determining where he'll start.
Q. The four‑year deal, is that new this year, the first time you've ever offered everybody four, and why is that important for families and kids and for you guys?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well at the end of the day it's really not a whole lot different from a single‑year contract. Instead of bringing them in in the spring and letting them sign that they have another year, I don't know that anybody tells them that they don't have four years on their deal when they sign a scholarship, so really at the end of the day it's not a whole lot different.
Q. So if a guy didn't work out, you could still cancel the scholarship?
WILL MUSCHAMP: You can't cancel him for athletic ability. I mean, I don't know anybody that does that. For medical reasons obviously, and obviously for discipline and felony type of issues, but none of that other ‑‑ it doesn't matter if you're on a four‑year or a one‑year. That's going to be the same issue.
Q. Last year you had Marcus Roberson and Pop Saunders contribute early. Do you see anybody in this class making that same type of impact?
WILL MUSCHAMP: We'll find out in August. I mean, that's hard to sit there and stand up here and tell you. We don't make any promises to any of them. We promise them all opportunity. If they come in there and they play well, and our guys know it, and they know who the good players are, and you identified two last year certainly in camp, Pop going through last spring, our players on this football team knew they were good football players and they were going to contribute for us.
Q. Clarifying your answer to Mark, did you offer four‑year scholarships last year, or is that new this year?
WILL MUSCHAMP: No, that's new this year. Let me clarify this: It's not really a whole lot of different. It's just what it says in the scholarship, which most all schools probably are doing. But at the end of the day, instead of having a guy come in in the spring and sign a scholarship that says he's being renewed, you can't take a guy off scholarship for athletic reasons. You can't say you're not good enough. That doesn't happen. Now, if a guy goes and hurts his back and he can't play football anymore, then obviously he still has a scholarship but he can't play. Or if a guy comes to you and says he doesn't want to play at your institution anymore and he wants to transfer, then obviously he's not on scholarship.
There's not a whole big deal that all of a sudden it becomes a four‑year deal. Really when you sign a young man, most situations that I've been a part of, it was kind of agreed upon it was a four‑year deal and a five‑year if he was red‑shirted and all that kind of good stuff.
Q. Have you given some of the guys you're bringing in, do you anticipate there's going to be any position changes, and who might some of them be, if there are?
WILL MUSCHAMP: You know, again, I think that will all determine where they can help our football team, and certainly I don't ever want to ask a guy to play a position that he doesn't want to play. At the end of the day, they all want to get on the field.
Q. I'm talking about guys that you currently got because you're bringing in guys that may be fortifying positions‑‑
WILL MUSCHAMP: We're in discussions right now with guys that we may look at at some different spots in the spring, but we're going to do that regardless. We've got to find out what they can do and where they'll fit and help our football team. We're still in discussions. We haven't made any concrete decisions.
Q. The receiver from Tallahassee, I'm not sure how to pronounce his name, Raphael?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Andrades.
Q. Can you talk about him and where that developed?
WILL MUSCHAMP: We had him in camp. We've recruited we're him all along and a guy that we liked. He did a great job in camp. He's a guy that had a bunch of offers. We had been recruiting him all along. That's why you have a deep board; when you get in a situation you want to go in and take a guy, you take the guy, and we're really excited.
Q. Fowler was a guy who went on the record saying, I grew up a Florida State fan, hated Florida. Is it easier to harder to recruit those kind of kids when they say I'm a certain fan of one school? When you come in and give them information, are they finding it out for the first time? What's that process like?
WILL MUSCHAMP: I don't know. You go and recruit the players and you find out pretty quickly, number one, who their childhood team was, but at the end of the day, it's a business decision. You've got to‑‑ they've got to look at the situation, where they feel comfortable, coaching staff, their opportunity. All of those situations come into it, and some can separate that and others can't.
Q. Is it amusing when you walk in their house and there's Florida State stuff or other team stuff all over the place?
WILL MUSCHAMP: They didn't have any Florida State stuff up. Have you been in their house? (Laughter.)
Q. What's your plans for spring practice? Is that going to be open, closed, or what are we doing there?
WILL MUSCHAMP: I mean, I was planning on opening it, but Brent wants it to be closed.
Q. So who wins out on that one?
WILL MUSCHAMP: (Laughing) No, I'll be honest with you, I haven't even discussed that. We've been trying to finish this up, and we haven't even discussed it. I was kidding.
Q. In terms of numbers, you had mentioned last year that you would reevaluate Neiron Ball in January and February. Have you had a chance to do that yet?
WILL MUSCHAMP: Well, I'm not, our medical staff is.
Q. Have they had a chance to do that?
WILL MUSCHAMP: No, they're going to do that in March, and they certainly feel like he's on schedule. That's all I know to this point, and he looks great, but that's something that will be totally up to our medical staff.


To increase mainframe processor capacity and speed, IBM turned to vertical polarization. Learn how to take advantage of it through a feature called HiperDispatch.
Its strategies include instruction pipelining, hyper-threading and processor cache. These new techniques sometimes make mainframe performance variable, if not erratic, depending on what's going on in the system. One way to get top performance out of a mainframe is to optimize processor vertical polarization.
Recent mainframe processor models depend heavily on cache to feed the instruction pipeline. IBM's latest mainframe processor, z13, comes with four levels of cache with varying sizes and distance from the central processor (CP). Each core has Level 1 (L1) and L2 caches. L3 cache is shared with every core on the chip, while L4 may be accessed by any processor in the drawer. Data must be in L1 cache for the processor to use it.
Mainframes are known for running disparate workloads at high rates of efficiency. This means a lot of context switching between the hardware states of, say, an online transaction and a batch job grinding away at a large file.
For example, as a production logical partition (LPAR) runs, it builds its cache working set, which leads to better performance as the mainframe processor spends less time retrieving data from memory or lower cache. Then, at some point, the production LPAR loses control of the CP to a test system. The development LPAR goes through the same process of gathering its favorite data into cache, gaining efficiency only to give control back to the production system. On fully loaded processors, this thrashing leads to slower performance and higher CPU consumption.
To remedy the situation, a mainframe can exploit the idea of vertical polarization, which aims to keep LPARs on the same physical processor and to spend less time loading and purging cache. To increase vertical polarization, IBM introduced a feature called HiperDispatch, along with a couple of ways to measure it.
When HiperDispatch is enabled, the operating system dispatcher collaborates with the mainframe hypervisor, Processor Resource/System Manager (PR/SM). The two work together to ensure any LPAR runs consistently on the same group of physical processors, thus preserving cache contents, minimizing cache misses and increasing processing efficiency.
The first measurement of cache efficiency is relative nest intensity (RNI). IBM has a complicated formula for RNI that differs for each mainframe processor model, based on the time it takes to fetch data from the varying levels of cache and memory. A lower RNI indicates efficient cache usage, which means the CPU spends less time waiting for instructions and data.
The second measurement is clocks per instruction (CPI). This metric counts the number of clock cycles it takes to execute an instruction. The further the processor reaches into cache or memory, the more cycles an instruction will take -- the lower the CPI, the better. It's also an object lesson for how the same program with the same data can consume different amounts of CPU based on competition for cache.
Vertical Low (VL) -- Physical processors with no requirements that will be parked until needed.
In general, PR/SM assigns vertical polarity based on an LPAR's weight and number of logical and physical processors. LPAR weight defines a partition's relative importance and CPU share when a processor becomes busy.
When HiperDispatch is enabled, determine the number of CPs an LPAR can use by dividing the individual LPAR weight by the total LPAR weight times the number of physical processors. In practice, with z/OS and PR/SM collaborating, each z/OS would do its best to dispatch work on its one VH processor. If the VH CP becomes too busy, it might send work to the medium high processor.
Since PR/SM understands the underlying cache structure for the processor, it assigns CPs to an LPAR on the same or nearby chips to shorten the time needed to retrieve data. Given PR/SM's complex and opaque decision making, a systems programmer's best bet is to download IBM's LPAR Design Tool. This tool, in the form of a complex Excel spreadsheet, allows users to plan their LPAR configurations to optimize their hardware.
What other tips do you have to boost mainframe processor capacity and speed?