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My 2nd Yale PhD Dissertation Paper: Hart's Fatal Mistake in The Concept of Law and How to Fix It
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Here is my 2nd Yale PhD Dissertation Paper: Hart's Fatal Mistake in The Concept of Law and How to Fix It:
Hart's Fatal Mistake in The Concept of Law and How to Fix It
In The Concept of Law, HLA Hart crafts a theory of legal systems as the union of primary, duty-imposing social rules of obligation and secondary, power-conferring social rules of authority. The social group whose legal system it is confers authority upon the public officials of the legal system to promulgate, change, and adjudicate the primary, duty-imposing social rules of obligation. It is the citizenry who confers authority upon the public officials of a legal system. If the public officials purport to make law beyond the constraints of what the social group accepts as valid, then the public officials have failed to make valid law.
Hart then makes a fatal error, undermining his entire legal theory, an error, which Ronald Dworkin famously recognized and exploited to great effect in Law's Empire. Hart alienates the citizenry from their own legal system. Hart does this to save the obligatory character of law. Hart believes that this obligatory character only manifests in situations wherein everyone in the social group accepts the social rule, and he believes that this will only occur when the social rule is a matter of great importance to the social group, such that no one would wish anyone in the social group to unilaterally deviate therefrom. This is a point upon which Hart receives much pushback, because he has to make a seemingly arbitrary distinction between social rules that are important enough to be real social rules, and social rules that are lesser, or not real, social rules, such as rules of etiquette.
Hart recognizes that it would never be the case that all members of a social group, the citizenry, would accept the social rules comprising their legal system. So, he strips the citizenry, the general public, of their legal system. He alienates them from their own social rules. For Hart, it is enough that the citizenry not mutiny against the public officials. He makes the body of public officials the social group whose legal system it is. He thinks that, by so doing, he is able to argue that all of the public officials of the legal system would accept the social rules comprising the legal system. But, this would mean that the public officials confer authority upon themselves and constrain themselves, according to what they will and will not accept as valid. And, still, as Dworkin so astutely pointed out, no body of public officials accepts their social rules en masse, as a monolithic entity, devoid of unilateral deviation or disagreement or dissent.
I believe there is a way to fix Hart's fatal mistake, and craft a legal theory that returns a social group's legal system to the citizenry, whose legal system it is. The solution is to apply a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions to Hart's legal system as the union of primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation and secondary, power-conferring social conventions of authority. According to this account of social conventions (rules in Hart's parlance), what it is to be a social convention is to be a union of a primary, duty-imposing social convention of obligation and a secondary, power-conferring social convention of authority. All social coordination requires authority.
By recognizing that all social rules/conventions are these unions of a primary social convention of obligation and a secondary social convention of authority, Hart's necessary connection between obligatory character and unanimity of acceptance is severed. Social conventions are step public social goods, for which the public officials (authorities) are freeriding defectors, and the moment at which the social convention arises, the social group rests upon an equilibrium point. All members of the social group, save the authorities, are parties to the social convention. No one would wish anyone party to the social convention to unilaterally deviate, because the social convention (step public social good) would collapse. Therefore, there is something closely akin to an obligation for all social group members party to the social convention to continue to conform thereto. But, the authorities (freeriding defectors) are not party to the social convention, and they fare far better by continuing to defect. The fact of their not being party to the social convention also makes it the case that they are free to move the social group to alternate social conventions, by exercising their authority. It is in this way that we can allow for the social conventions of a legal system to arise, evolve, devolve, and, eventually collapse. Likewise, dissent and disagreement and legal advocacy become part and parcel of a legal system. Social conventions wax and wane over time, as do legal systems. The citizenry is a major player in its own legal system once again, conferring power upon public officials, constraining their authority, and pressuring the evolution and devolution of their legal systems.
A Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions as the Basis for Hart's Legal System in The Concept of Law
This Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions defines a social convention as a Hartian system of social conventions. This system of social conventions includes a primary, duty-imposing social convention of obligation (or quasi obligation) and a secondary power-conferring social convention of authority. This is HLA Hart's legal system from The Concept of Law, but modified. For Hart, legal rules are legal rules, because they are part of a system of social rules; however, Hart was actually giving an account of social conventions. As Gerald Postema elucidates in "Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law," Hart misspeaks, or, rather, speaks imprecisely, when he refers to what are actually social conventions as social rules. The social conventions that comprise this system of social conventions are Lewisian social conventions, in that this is David Lewis' game theoretic, rational choice-based account of social conventions from his seminal work, Convention, but modified.
Why modified? Both Lewis and Hart were trying to capture what they construed as an essential feature of social conventions, their obligatory character. But, both Lewis and Hart appreciated that they had only an individual, instrumental (means-ends) rationality with which to work. This led both men to devise accounts of social conventions that are Lewisian social conventions, in that there is a single rational thing to do, which is what everyone else in one's social group is doing. If there is a single rational thing to do, then you have something approaching an obligation or quasi-obligation to do that one rational thing. Both Lewis and Hart demand unanimity in preference for, expectation of, and actual conformity, in order to generate obligatoriness.
But, Lewisian social conventions only arise in situations wherein everyone in a population is particularly motivated to align their beliefs and expectations with one another. No unilateral deviation may be tolerated, because everyone fares far worse, if even a single social group member fails to conform. This means that Lewisian social conventions are severely constrained. They must pop into and out of existence, and they cannot evolve or devolve, nor do they allow for dissent or disagreement or pluralism. This is because of the risk dominance of the status quo position. No one party to a Lewisian social convention is going to jump to an alternate social convention, unless she is certain that her entire social group will jump with her. But, we have pre-theoretical intuitions that our social conventions wax and wane over time, arising in a population, evolving and devolving, and, eventually, collapsing. We have pre-theoretical intuitions that people disagree about what the law is and should be.
There are 3 steps to modifying Lewis' and Hart's accounts of social conventions to allow for evolution and devolution, disagreement and dissent, and pluralism. Step 1 is to acknowledge Margaret Gilbert's insight that social conventions are social group constituting in "Social Convention Revisited." A population that has a social convention is a social group for that reason alone, if for no other. Step 2 is to acknowledge the role that practical authority plays. Practical authority solves the problem of the risk dominance of the status quo position, because a practical authority makes known how everyone in a social group will behave. The account of authority employed is that of legal philosopher Joseph Raz in The Authority of Law, but slightly modified. To have authority over someone is to have the power or capacity to alter their protected reasons, and a protected reason is a first order reason to do something and a second order reason not to consider any alternate actions (any alternate Lewisian social conventions, other than the one made salient by the practical authority). A last important point is that authority is always assumed, then conferred, but the risk-tolerant, foresighted persons required to assume such authority may be few and far between. Social coordination problems often go unsolved. This phenomenon has been studied empirically in "The unrealized value of centralization for coordination," by Eva Ranehill, Frédéric Schneider, and Roberto Weber.
Step 3 is acknowledging that social institutions/conventions are step public social goods, as described in Hugh Ward's "Three Men in a Boat, Two Must Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame." This is so, because, as Brian Skyrms points out in The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, a social convention (Skryms is speaking to a social contract) is best thought of as a stag hunt scenario, rather than a prisoner's dilemma. A stag hunt scenario includes a social convention, because you have incentive to play your part in the stag hunt, as long as others play theirs. The moment that the social good that is the constitution of the social group itself is generated, the social group resides upon an equilibrium point. This is because the practical authority is a free riding defector, a member of the social group, but not party to the social convention. Fortunately, Lewis allowed for negligible deviation in Convention. At the equilibrium point, no one party to the social convention has any incentive to deviate, because the social group would collapse back to the status quo. And, the practical authority/freeriding defector has no incentive to conform to the social convention, because they fare far better by freeriding. Thus, everyone who is party to the social convention has something approaching obligation to continue conforming, but we have severed the necessary connection between unanimity of conformity and obligatoriness.
We can now have sub social groups with sub social institutions/conventions that wax and wane over time. We can have disagreement and dissent and pluralism. The cooperative game theoretic concepts of the Core and the Shapley Value define when a sub social institution/convention becomes the social institution/convention of the entire social group. A social institution becomes a legal institution when the authority that is conferred by the social group or sub social group is conferred upon public officials qua public officials.
This is the game theoretic, rational choice-based formal definition of a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions:
First, the formal definition of the primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation (or quasi-obligation):
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among members of P,
a minimum threshold level of or more members of P conforms to R;
a minimum threshold level of or more members of P expects a minimum threshold level of or more members of P to conform to R;
almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding R and R';
a minimum threshold level of or more members of P prefers to conform to R, on condition that a minimum threshold level of or more members of P conforms to R;
a minimum threshold level of or more members of P would prefer to conform to R', on condition that a minimum threshold level of or more members of P conforms to R',
where R' is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R' and to R.
This also translates into the following formal definition for the secondary, power-conferring social conventions of authority:
The identification of a practical authority to make salient the solution to a primary duty imposing coordination problem of obligation, R, by members of a population P when they are agents in a primary duty imposing coordination problem of obligation is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, when such practical authority, R, is assumed, then:
almost everyone conforms to R;
almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R;
almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions;
almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on condition that almost everyone conform to R;
almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to R', on condition that almost everyone conform to R',
where R' is some possible identification of a practical authority (or none) by members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R' and to R.
The simultaneous existence of these two social conventions, one primary and duty-imposing, the other secondary and power-conferring, in union, is the formal definition of a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of a Social Convention.
Hart's Fatal Mistake in The Concept of Law and the Hart/Dworkin Debate
As mentioned above, Hart demands unanimity in acceptance of the primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation or quasi-obligation, in order to establish the obligatory character of law. Hart demands that these social conventions are Lewisian social conventions, in that he requires unanimity in preference for, expectation of, and actual conformity to these Lewisian social conventions. No unilateral deviation may be tolerated. There is a single rational thing to do, which is what everyone else in your social group is doing, conforming to a Lewisian social convention.
Hart recognizes that it could never be the case that the entire social group, including both the general public/citizenry and the public officials, would all accept and use the same body of primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation or quasi-obligation. So, Hart makes it the case that the social group whose legal system it is includes only the public officials of the legal system. Hart alienates the general public/citizenry from their own legal system.
Hart recognizes that it must be the case that, generally speaking, the majority of the general public complies with the legal system of their public officials, but Hart allows that this could be the case merely if it is a habit of the general public to do so, or if it is a calculating move on the part of the members of the general public, to avoid sanction or to better themselves personally. Hart merely requires that the general public/citizenry not mutiny against the legal system of their public officials. Hart does not require that the general public takes the internal point of view towards the primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation or quasi-obligation of the legal system of their public officials. This brings up a whole slew of issues, which I address further below.
But, the point remains that Hart requires unanimity amongst the public officials. Hart requires that the entire body of public officials, whose legal system it is, takes the internal point of view towards their body of primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation or quasi-obligation. Hart refers to this body of primary, duty-imposing social conventions that is the foundation of the legal system of the public officials as the Rule of Recognition. Hart requires that the body of public officials has a social practice, a social practice which they regard as obligatory, to accept and use their body of primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation. The scope of the practice of the body of public officials defines the scope of the obligatory character of the primary, duty-imposing social conventions of the body of public officials, of the Rule of Recognition. The Rule of Recognition is the foundation of the legal system for Hart. It is the ultimate criterion of legal validity.
Of course, Dworkin exploits this fact, the fact that Hart requires the entire body of public officials to unanimously accept and use the Rule of Recognition, to great effect, as Scott Shapiro points out in Legality. Dworkin describes this criticism as the issue of theoretical disagreement. If there exist disagreements amongst public officials regarding what the law is or requires, regarding the content of the Rule of Recognition, and, of course, as Dworkin points out, such disagreements do exist, then whatever the disagreement is about, whichever purported legal rule/convention, is immediately disqualified as being a valid legal rule/convention in the legal system of the public officials. It is the fact of acceptance and use, of there being a social practice, that makes it the case that a particular social rule/convention is a valid legal rule/convention of the legal system of the public officials. If there is no fact of acceptance and use, then whichever social rule/convention is not a valid legal rule/convention. There is no space for theoretical disagreement about what the law is or requires, about the content of the Rule of Recognition, under Hart's account of a legal system.
How to Fix Hart's Fatal Mistake in The Concept of Law
I concur with Dworkin that this is a very serious problem for Hart, but, of course, I think the solution remains a positivist solution. I argue that we must re-enfranchise the general public/citizenry by employing a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions as the basis for Hart's legal system in The Concept of Law. The Rule of Recognition is a body of primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation or quasi-obligation, but it does not belong to the public officials of the legal system; it belongs to the social group (the general public/citizenry) whose legal system it is.
The Rules of Change (including Promulgation and Adjudication) are secondary, power-conferring social rules/conventions of authority. The public officials do not have obligations to interpret or apply or amend or promulgate the valid legal rules/conventions of the legal system in which they operate; the public officials have had authority conferred upon them by the general public/citizenry, by the social group whose legal system it is. The scope of the legal authority of the public officials is constrained by the body of primary, duty-imposing social rules/conventions of obligation that the general public accepts and uses. This is the Rule of Recognition. But, if the public officials act outside of the scope of their legal authority, they have not violated an obligation; they have simply failed to make law.
The general public is very much an important player with respect to its own legal system. The general public confers legal authority upon the public officials of its legal system. The primary social conventions/rules that the general public accepts and uses, or that they would accept and use, define the scope of the legal authority of the public officials of the general public's legal system. These are the alternate primary Lewisian social conventions, from which the public officials may choose to promulgate, change, and adjudicate. Gerald Postema makes a similar point in "Coordination and Convention at the Foundation of Law," where he explicates his notion of a second order coordination problem between public officials and the general public/citizenry. Public officials are constrained by what the general public does and will accept, and this is necessary to capture both the obligatory character of law, and the fact that legal systems arise out of social practices.
Hart says that a social group has a legal system when they make rules about their rules, secondary rules about how to promulgate, adjudicate, and change their primary social rules. But, I would say, a social group has a legal system when they confer authority upon a body of public officials (which may sometimes include individual citizens) to promulgate, adjudicate, and change their primary social conventions. Individual citizens sometimes have this authority conferred upon them when they establish business contracts and enter into marriages, etc.
The legal rules/conventions of the legal system are social conventions in the sense of being a union of a primary, duty-imposing social convention of obligation and a secondary, power-conferring social convention of authority. This is why they are step public social goods. Social coordination always requires authority. A secondary, power-conferring social convention of authority arises out of necessity, to solve a coordination problem, when the practical, and in this case, legal, authority makes salient (promulgates, changes, or adjudicates) one or another alternate primary, duty-imposing social convention of obligation. The obligatory character of the secondary, power-conferring social convention (obligatory for the social group whose legal system it is, not for the public officials upon whom authority is conferred) piggy backs on the obligatory character of the primary, duty-imposing social convention.
And, as explained above, these legal rules/conventions, these step public social goods, can evolve and devolve, but it remains the case that there is a single rational thing to do, for those party to the primary social rule/convention, which is to conform to the primary social rule/convention. If this is the case, then they possess an obligatory or quasi-obligatory character, because there is a single rational thing to do, which is to continue to generate the step public social good. And, it makes sense that the body of public officials (the authority) would not have an obligation to comply with the primary, duty-imposing social rules/conventions as public officials, because they are the freeriding defectors. And, it is the very fact that the public officials (the authority) comprise a body of freeriding defectors that the obligatory character of the law is generated, because the entire social group resides at an equilibrium point, an equilibrium point at which no one, neither the general public (the body of cooperators who generate the step public social good) nor the public officials/authorities (the body of freeriding defectors) have any incentive to do otherwise.
The fact that the social conventions (rules) of a legal system can evolve and devolve over time while possessing an obligatory character makes space for difference, dissent, theoretical disagreement, and pluralism. We have severed Hart's necessary connection between unanimity of acceptance and obligatory character. We have pre-theoretical intuitions that our legal systems do evolve and devolve over time, waxing and waning via legal advocacy and as the general public/citizenry makes demands of their public officials. And, our legal systems sometimes collapse, just as our social conventions do.
So, we have an answer, a positivist answer to Dworkin's criticism with respect to theoretical disagreement. Also, we have re-enfranchised the general public. We have made it the case that the general public has something closely akin to obligation (or as close as we can get) to comply with the law, albeit an obligation based upon the fact that there is but a single rational thing to do, based upon an individual instrumental rationality (there are no normative facts, merely social facts). But, it is the general public who confers legal authority upon public officials, and the public officials are constrained by what the general public does and will accept. The public officials are answerable to the general public/the citizenry. A non-ideal legal theory is a legal system with legitimate authority, authority which may be stripped by the citizenry. A non-ideal legal theory is a legal system of, by, and for the People.
Law, i.e., legal authority, serves the function of helping social groups solve coordination problems, as well as move from a less optimal social convention to a more optimal social convention. A practical authority is a legal authority when her social group or sub social group has conferred authority upon her as a public official qua public official. Customary law also involves authority, which may be legal authority, but for a sub social group. A sub social group may confer authority upon public officials qua public officials, but only with respect to their sub social group's legal institutions/conventions. These would not be legal institutions for the entire social group, but they could become so. Hart made another mistake that has not been so widely recognized. This is the mistake to think that a social group can possess a body of primary, duty-imposing social rules (conventions) of obligation without authority. Customary law demands authority as much as Hart's legal system does, and this could also be legal authority, but it need not be. Social coordination always requires authority.
What is the Nature of Legal Authority?
But, is it not the case that secondary, power-conferring social conventions are coordination problems themselves? So, it might seem that we get ourselves into trouble at this point, if it is never the case that we merely coordinate without an authority, then how can we coordinate upon identifying an authority upon whom to confer legal authority? Authority is assumed. It is the fact that authority is assumed that makes it salient. And, there is no need to coordinate upon an authority, because the authority is assumed. It is subsequently conferred, and this conferral of authority is obligatory or quasi-obligatory. Because there is a single rational thing to do, and because it is necessary to confer authority, in order to do this one rational thing, there is something closely akin to an obligation to confer authority.
Recent empirical work bears out the assertion that authority is always assumed. For an authority to arise in a social group requires for there to exist at least one risk-tolerant foresighted person, someone who is able to recognize the long-term benefits of assuming authority and bear the costs associated with communicating the salience of one or another primary, duty-imposing social convention of obligation. Authority is always assumed and then conferred. So, there is always a risk involved. In Frederic Schneider et al.'s "The unrealized value of centralization for coordination," they demonstrate that it is very difficult for social groups to coordinate to confer authority upon someone. This rarely happens. It is only when such authority is assumed that a social group is able to confer authority upon the assumed authority. We would expect to see that authority has to be assumed, in order to be conferred. And, given the hypothesis that assuming authority requires a certain level of risk tolerance, as well as a certain level of foresight, we should not expect to see authority being assumed ubiquitously.
I adopt Joseph Raz's concept of authority, albeit modified. Raz asserts that to have authority over persons is to have the ability to alter their protected reasons. A protected reason is a first order reason to do something, as well as a second order reason to exclude from consideration all of one's first order reasons to do otherwise. This aligns beautifully with a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of social conventions as the basis of Hart's legal system in The Concept of Law. Hart's legal system is the union of primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation and secondary, power-conferring social conventions of authority. Salience is a protected reason. The legal authority makes salient the one or another primary social convention. Salience is a first order reason to conform to the primary social convention being made salient, as well as a second order reason to exclude all of one's first order reasons to do otherwise, i.e., to conform to any alternate primary social conventions.
Raz makes a distinction between being an authority and having authority, but I make no such distinction. I do make a distinction between being an authority and being a public official of a legal institution, i.e., being a legal authority. Legal authority is conferred upon a public official of a legal system when it is conferred upon a public official qua public official. Legal authority could be conferred by either a sub social group or the entire social group.
For Raz, this concept of authority does away with the so-called paradoxes of authority, i.e., that to submit to authority is irrational, because rational, and moral, authority requires autonomy, understood as consideration of all of one's first order reasons to act. On Raz's concept of authority, there exists a second order reason to exclude consideration of one's first order reasons to do otherwise, other than as the first order component of one's protected reason to act indicates. Of course, above, I argue that it is not only rational, but obligatory, or, at least, quasi-obligatory, to confer authority, in order to solve coordination problems.
The Problem with Hart's View of Legal Authority
I argue that the Rule of Recognition, the ultimate criterion of validity of the legal rules/conventions of a legal system, is the body of primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation of the social group whose legal system it is, the primary social conventions that the social group whose legal system it is do or would accept. The general public/citizenry confers authority upon the public officials of the legal system to make, change, and adjudicate their primary social conventions, and the public officials are constrained by what the general public does and will accept. The general public confers legal authority upon the public officials of their legal system, to help the social group solve coordination problems and move from less optimal to more optimal primary social conventions.
It may very well be the case that a social group's primary social conventions are standards of conventional morality; it may very well be the case that a public official has the legal authority to make salient this or that primary social convention, because it is conventionally morally superior. What is dispositive is the fact that the social group accepts and uses the primary social conventions that they do accept and use. What is paramount is the fact that the social group confers legal authority on their public officials/legal authorities. These are social facts.
This account of social conventions and legal systems renders me an inclusive legal positivist. An inclusive legal positivist argues that it's the case that the Rule of Recognition, the ultimate criterion of validity of the legal rules/conventions of a legal system, could include primary social conventions that are standards of conventional morality. I once argued for exclusive legal positivism in a trivial sense, because I believed that the Rule of Recognition was only a secondary, power-conferring social convention of authority. If the Rule of Recognition were a secondary, power-conferring social convention of authority, then it necessarily could not include a primary social convention that is a standard of conventional morality. An exclusive legal positivist argues for a necessary separation between law and morality, while an inclusive legal positivist allows for the social fact that the Rule of Recognition can include primary social conventions that are standards of conventional morality and the social group can confer legal authority upon public officials to choose, promulgate, change, make salient, and adjudicate the primary social convention that is morally conventionally superior.
Hart's concept of legal authority in The Concept of Law is confused. Initially, Hart argues for an account of legal systems that is very much in line with the account described above, based on a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions. But, then, he chooses to alienate the general public from their own legal system, in order to capture the obligatory character of law. He chooses to make it the case that the Rule of Recognition is a body of primary, duty-imposing social conventions/rules of obligation that govern the behavior of the public officials alone. Hart still seems to think that these primary social conventions/rules give rise to secondary, power-conferring social conventions/rules of authority. But, this is very confusing. It would seem that public officials confer legal authority upon themselves. However, in order for it to be the case that the Rule of Recognition is their Rule of Recognition, in the sense that the fact that the public officials accept and use the Rule of Recognition constitutes the public officials as a social group, it would seem to be the case that the public officials must exist as public officials, qua public officials, prior to it being the case that they confer legal authority upon themselves to make, change, and adjudicate their own primary social conventions/rules of obligation. It simply isn't clear on Hart's account how either legal authority or public officials arise. Hart's account of legal authority and public officials devolves into a chicken and egg argument. And, this is because he alienates the general public/citizenry from their own legal system.
What About Legitimacy?
It does seem to be the case that I am arguing that legal authority is always conferred by the social group whose legal system it is; therefore, am I not saying that a legal system is always legitimate, if it exists? In a sense, I am saying this. This may be somewhat controversial, but I am arguing that legal authority is always conferred. If it were not conferred, then the legal authority would not exist. The legal authority would not have the power to change the protected reasons of the social group members. However, I am making space for a sub social group having been hijacked. I make space for them having been coerced via propaganda. I argue that this must happen, in order to build both social and legal institutions. And to say that a legal system is legitimate in this sense is not to say that it is moral. It remains the case that the quasi-obligation, because there is a single rational thing to do, which is to continue contributing to the generation of the step public social good, is a matter of an individual instrumental rationality. But, in a sense, if one continues to perpetuate the step public social good that is the State, which entails conferring authority upon the small group of public officials/legal authorities/freeriding defectors, because it is in one's own interest to do so, then one is complicit. It is more optimal that the State exists, that certain social institutions and legal institutions exist, despite the fact that they are, by their very nature, oppressive and coercive, than it is for the legal and social institutions and the State to collapse back to the state of nature. Future work will further develop this concept of legitimacy. There is a sense in which a legal system is legitimate if it exists. And, I make room for difference, dissent, and pluralism. I make room for social and legal activism. But, there remains a sense in which all social change entails coercive propaganda. However, the legal authority of public officials is constrained by what the general public does and will accept.
I also make room for the pool of freeriding defectors to include those persons who are not part of the legal authority; they have not conferred authority, and they do not contribute to the generation of the step public social good. These persons do not take the internal point of view towards the primary, duty-imposing social conventions/rules of the social group. They are persons who are a part of the social group; they are freeriding defectors who benefit from the generation of a legal system for their social group, but they may only recognize their social group's laws, in order to avoid sanction, or to take advantage of those who do comply with their social group's laws. These persons are typically characterized as criminals, but I will address this as a misnomer below.
When Does a Social Institution for a Sub Social Group Become a Social Institution for the Entire Social Group?
In order to define the point at which a social institution/convention of a sub social group becomes a social institution/convention for the entire social group, I make use of concepts from cooperative game theory, namely the Shapley Value and the Core. The Core is a distribution of payoffs amongst the members of a social group (or a sub social group) formed into coalitions, such that no one would prefer to do otherwise by joining a different coalition. If it is the case that some sub set of members of the social group would do better by joining some other coalition, then this sub set of members is said to block the existing coalition (or set of coalitions). Being inside the Core is a measure of stability. A set of coalitions with whatever distribution of payoffs is said to be stable, if it's in the Core, because no one will disrupt the current arrangement by forming an alternate coalition. The Shapley Value is a measure of fairness. The Shapley Value is the payoff that each member of the social group, given the current arrangement of coalitions, should receive. The Shapley Value is the average of the marginal contributions for each possible ordering for the current arrangement of coalitions for each member of the social group. The idea is that you should receive a payoff that reflects your contribution to the total payoff of the social group.
I argue that as soon as a subset of a social group has developed a sub social convention, as in a sub step public social good, then this sub social group has established a mini customary legal system. This is the case, because they have established a system of the union of a primary, duty-imposing social convention of obligation and a secondary, power-conferring social convention of authority. They have conferred authority upon someone(s), and, by doing so, they have created a step public social good that they have a quasi-obligation to continue to generate. If this step public social good, which is the creation of the sub social group itself, is in the Core, which it is by definition, then this is a social institution/convention, but only for the sub social group, for those who have conferred such social authority. It is not a social institution for the entire social group. I make a distinction between customary law and a full-fledged legal system. A customary law institution is a social institution, but not a full-fledged legal institution. A legal institution is a social institution for either a sub social group or the entire social group for which the conferred authority has been conferred upon public officials qua their status as public officials.
The authorities could have their own social convention, a tertiary social convention, to establish a distribution of the costs of communicating salience. And, finally, the social institution is a social institution for the entire social group, including freeriding defectors who are not authorities, when the set of coalitions that comprise the step public social good are in the Core for the entire social group. So, legal institutions are social institutions that are in the Core for either a sub social group or the entire social group, for which the conferred legal authority remains in the hands of a small subset of the social group qua their explicit status as public officials. I will also delve further into the idea of using the Shapley Value to define a legitimate legal or social institution, as opposed to an illegitimate legal or social institution.
Are Criminals Criminals? Or, Are They Freeriding Defectors (But Not Authorities)?
Our notion of criminal punishment is called into question with this account of a legal system. The freeriding defectors, including those who have not and are not legal authorities/public officials, serve an important purpose. They ensure the stability of the step public social good that is the legal institution, including the State itself. I argue that the State does not in fact punish so called criminals as a retributive statement on behalf of the citizenry, and the State does not in fact punish so called criminals with the aim of specific deterrence. The State does not in fact want so called criminals to stop being freeriding defectors. The State punishes so called criminals as propaganda, undermining propaganda. The State needs for the social group members that are the pool of cooperators to know that there exists a large subset of the social group who are freeriding defectors, so that the cooperators will continue to comply with the law, so that the legal system and the State do not collapse back to the state of nature. This is what the State is actually doing when it punishes so called criminals. So, you could make the argument that the purpose of punishment is general deterrence. But, a purpose of maintaining the status quo is a better characterization. Additionally, I would like to address how the State's policy of mass incarceration arises and how the over populated prison system is itself a system of undermining propaganda and oppressive coercion, not just of those imprisoned, which it is, of course, but also of those who number themselves amongst the group of cooperators who are generating the State and its legal system through their compliance. And, of course, it is amongst this pool of so-called criminals that social change and activism is possible. So, of course, they are a threat to the existing State/legal system. It is possible for social activism to arise within the pool of cooperators as well, but this is more likely to take place amongst the so-called criminals.
Hart's fatal mistake in The Concept of Law was to alienate the general public/citizenry from their own legal system. He did this to capture the obligatory character of law, or, at least, something closely akin thereto, i.e., the quasi-obligation that exists when there is a single rational thing to do, which is to conform to the Lewisian social convention to which your entire social group is conforming. Hart chose to alienate the social group whose legal system it is from their own legal system, because he knew he could never have the unanimity in acceptance that his account of a legal system demanded. But, in so doing, he dealt a fatal blow to his legal theory. Unanimity of preference for, expectation of, and actual conformity can no more be expected of the body of public officials of a legal system than it can be expected of the general public/citizenry. And, he created an untenable chicken and egg dilemma, because the public officials of Hart's legal system now confer authority upon and constrain themselves. It's not even clear how they arise in the first place. Moreover, Hart's legal system cannot evolve or devolve over time, and leaves no room for dissent or disagreement or pluralism.
The solution is to apply a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions to Hart's account of a legal system in The Concept of Law. A legal institution is a social institution/convention; it is a step public social good. Just as Hart's legal system in The Concept of Law is a union of a primary, duty-imposing social convention/rule of obligation and a secondary, power-conferring social convention/rule of authority, so is a social convention itself, according to the Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions, for which a formal game-theoretic, rational choice-based definition has been given above.
All social coordination requires authority. A practical authority overcomes the risk dominance of the status quo position in a situation that gives rise to a Lewisian social convention, because the practical authority makes known how all social group members will behave. And, because the practical authority is a freeriding defector, the moment that the social convention that is the social group itself is generated, the social group sits upon an equilibrium point. No one who is party to the social convention has any incentive to stop cooperating to generate the step public social good, because the social institution/convention would collapse. Therefore, there is a quasi-obligation to do the one rational thing, which is to continue to conform to the social convention. In this way, we are able to sever Hart's necessary connection between unanimity in acceptance and obligatory character. Thus, we can have sub social groups with sub social institutions/conventions (step public social goods) that wax and wane over time. And, we can accommodate difference, dissent, and pluralism. And, most importantly, we can re-enfranchise the general public/citizenry, and give back the legal system to the social group whose legal system it is. The general public is a major player in their own legal system again, conferring legal authority upon the public officials of their legal system, and constraining the boundaries of their public officials' legal authority, which is the Rule of Recognition, the ultimate criterion of validity of a legal system, the body of primary social conventions the social group whose legal system it is do and will accept and use.
Future work will include a complete account of how sub social groups evolve and devolve, as well as a precise account of when a social institution of a sub social group becomes a social institution of the entire social group. Additionally, I will delve deeper into the process of how an authority arises and what happens when there is more than one assumption of authority to solve a particular coordination problem. I will also complete an agent based computational model and simulations in Matlab of how social institutions, including legal institutions, arise in a population, evolve, devolve, and, eventually, collapse. I will also complete an empirical social psychological study on the nature of authority, the nature of legitimacy, and the nature of the relationship between the two.
Dworkin, Ronald, 1986b, Law's Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gilbert, Margaret, 1989. On Social Facts, New York: Routledge.
Gilbert, Margaret, 2008. "Social Convention Revisited," Topoi, 27: 5–16.
Hart, H.L.A., 2012, The Concept of Law, 3rd edition (first edition 1961), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lewis, David, 1969. Convention, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Pacheco, J., Santos, F., Souza, M., & Skyrms, B. (2009) Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag hunt dilemmas. Proc. R. Soc. B. 276, 315-321. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.1126)
Postema, Gerald, 1982. "Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, 11(1), 165-203.
Ranehill, Eva, Schneider, Frédéric, & Weber, Roberto, "The unrealized value of centralization for coordination" (unpublished manuscript dated January 1, 2017 received from authors).
Raz, Joseph, 1979, The Authority of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Raz, Joseph, 1990, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shapiro, Scott, 2011, Legality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Skyrms, Brian, 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skyrms, Brian, 2010. Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Communication, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ward, Hugh, 1990, "Three Men in a Boat, Two Must Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 34, Issue 3, pp. 371 – 400.
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Agates are a microcrystalline variety of quartz known as chalcedony. They are distinguished from other varieties of quartz by color bands that are often concentric. Lake Superior agates formed about one billion years ago when silica-rich fluids filled in hollow cavities (vesicles) of molten rock (lava) created during volcanic activity. The concentration of iron and the amount of oxidation determine the color within or between an agate's bands.


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chmod -R 777 web/assets

mkdir web/uploads
mkdir web/uploads/default
mkdir web/uploads/event
mkdir web/uploads/people
mkdir web/uploads/project
mkdir web/uploads/paper
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chmod -R 777 web/uploads

# Newer version yii issue
ln -s bower-asset vendor/bower

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


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North Carolina > Elections And Election Laws > Nomination of Candidates (§ § 163-104 through 163-127.6) Article 10. Primary Elections (§ § 163-104 through 163-121)
§ 163-123. Declaration of intent and petitions for write-in candidates in partisan elections.
Section mandates procedure for the handling of candidate declarations and qualifying a write-in candidate.
(a) Procedure for Qualifying as a Write-In Candidate.–Any qualified voter who seeks to have write-in votes for him counted in a general election shall file a declaration of intent in accordance with subsection (b) of this section and petition(s) in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.
(b) Declaration of Intent.–The applicant for write-in candidacy shall file his declaration of intent at the same time and with the same board of elections as his petition, as set out in subsection (c) of this section. The declaration shall contain:
(1) Applicant's name,
(2) Applicant's residential address,
(3) Declaration of applicant's intent to be a write-in candidate,
(4) Title of the office sought,
(5) Date of the election,
(6) Date of the declaration,
(7) Applicant's signature.
(c) Petitions for Write-in Candidacy.–An applicant for write-in candidacy shall:
(1) If the office is a statewide office, file written petitions with the State Board of Elections supporting his candidacy for a specified office. These petitions shall be filed on or before noon on the 90th day before the general election. They shall be signed by 500 qualified voters of the State. No later than 5:00 p.m. on the fifteenth day preceding the date the petitions are due to be filed with the State Board of Elections, each petition shall be presented to the board of elections of the county in which the signatures were obtained. A petition presented to a county board of elections shall contain only names of voters registered in that county. Provided the petitions are timely submitted, the chairman of the county board of elections shall examine the names on the petition and place a check mark by the name of each signer who is qualified and registered to vote in his county. The chairman of the county board shall attach to the petition his signed certificate. On his certificate the chairman shall state that the signatures on the petition have been checked against the registration records and shall indicate the number of signers who are qualified and registered to vote in his county and eligible to vote for that office. The chairman shall return each petition, together with the certificate required in this section, to the person who presented it to him for checking. The chairman of the county board shall complete the verification within two weeks from the date the petition is presented.
(2) If the office is a district office under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Elections under G.S. 163-182.4(b), file written petitions with the State Board of Elections supporting that applicant's candidacy for a specified office. These petitions must be filed with the State Board of Elections on or before noon on the 90th day before the general election and must be signed by 250 qualified voters. Before being filed with the State Board of Elections, each petition shall be presented to the board of elections of the county in which the signatures were obtained. A petition presented to a county board of elections shall contain only names of voters registered in that county who are eligible to vote for that office. The chairman of the county board shall examine the names on the petition and the procedure for certification shall be the same as specified in subdivision (1).
(3) If the office is a county office, or is a school administrative unit office elected on a partisan basis, or is a legislative district consisting of a single county or a portion of a county, file written petitions with the county board of elections supporting his candidacy for a specified office. A petition presented to a county board of elections shall contain only names of voters registered in that county. These petitions must be filed on or before noon on the 90th day before the general election and must be signed by 100 qualified voters who are eligible to vote for the office, unless fewer than 5,000 persons are eligible to vote for the office as shown by the most recent records of the appropriate board of elections. If fewer than 5,000 persons are eligible to vote for the office, an applicant's petition must be signed by not less than one percent (1%) of those registered voters. Before being filed with the county board of elections, each petition shall be presented to the county board of elections for examination. The chairman of the county board of elections shall examine the names on the petition and the procedure for certification shall be the same as specified in subdivision (1).
(d) Form of Petition.–Petitions requesting the qualification of a write-in candidate in a general election shall contain on the heading of each page of the petition in bold print or in capital letters the words:
"THE UNDERSIGNED REGISTERED VOTERS IN ………. COUNTY HEREBY PETITION ON BEHALF OF ………. AS A WRITE-IN CANDIDATE IN THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION. THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY PETITION THAT SUBJECT CANDIDATE BE PLACED ON THE LIST OF QUALIFIED WRITE-IN CANDIDATES WHOSE VOTES ARE TO BE COUNTED AND RECORDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH G.S. 163-123."
(e) Defeated Primary Candidate.–No person whose name appeared on the ballot in a primary election preliminary to the general election shall be eligible to have votes counted for him as a write-in candidate for the same office in that year.
(f) Counting and Recording of Votes.–If a qualified voter has complied with the provisions of subsections (a), (b), and (c) and is not excluded by subsection (e), the board of elections with which petition has been filed shall count votes for him according to the procedures set out in G.S. 163-182.1, and the appropriate board of elections shall record those votes on the official abstract. Write-in votes for names other than those of qualified write-in candidates shall not be counted for any purpose and shall not be recorded on the abstract.
(g) When any person files a petition with a board of elections under this section, the board of elections shall, immediately upon receipt of the petition, inspect the registration records of the county and cancel the petition of any person who does not meet the constitutional or statutory qualifications for the office, including residency.
The board shall give notice of cancellation to any person whose petition has been cancelled under this subsection by mail or by having the notice served on that person by the sheriff. A person whose petition has been cancelled or another candidate for the same office affected by a substantiation under this subsection may request a hearing on the issue of constitutional or statutory qualifications for the office. If the person requests a hearing, the hearing shall be conducted in accordance with Article 11B of this Chapter.
(h) Municipal Elections Excluded.–This section does not apply to municipal elections conducted under Subchapter IX of this Chapter.
(1987, c. 393, ss. 1; 2; 1989, c. 92, s. 1; 1999-424, s. 5(c); 2001-319, s. 9(a); 2001-398, s. 7; 2001-403, s. 12; 2002-158, s. 13; 2004-127, s. 7; 2006-155, s. 4; 2007-391, s. 8(b); 2008-187, s. 33(a); 2017-3, s. 11; 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-146, s. 3.1(a), (b).)
Candidate Qualification
7. Definition for Office
Definition [Office]
(4) Office. – The elected office for which the candidate has filed or petitioned.
(2006-155, s. 1; 2006-259, s. 48(a); 2017-6, s. 3.)
8. Definition for election
9. Definition for Abstract
Definition [Abstract]
"Abstract" means a document signed by the members of the board of elections showing the votes for each candidate and ballot proposal on the official ballot in the election. The abstract shall show a total number of votes for each candidate in each precinct and a total for each candidate in the county. It shall also show the number of votes for each candidate among the absentee official ballots, among the provisional official ballots, and in any other category of official ballots that is not otherwise reported.
11. Definition for candidate
Definition [candidate]
The term "candidate" means any individual who, with respect to a public office listed in G.S. 163A-1411(80), has taken positive action for the purpose of bringing about that individual's nomination, retention, or election to public office. Examples of positive action include any of the following:
a. Filing a notice of candidacy, filing a notice to be retained, or a petition requesting to be a candidate.
b. Being certified as a nominee of a political party for a vacancy.
c. Otherwise qualifying as a candidate in a manner authorized by law.
d. Making a public announcement of a definite intent to run for public office in a particular election.
e. Receiving funds or making payments or giving the consent for anyone else to receive funds or transfer anything of value for the purpose of bringing about that individual's nomination or election to office. Transferring anything of value includes incurring an obligation to transfer anything of value. Status as a candidate for the purpose of this Article continues if the individual is receiving contributions to repay loans or cover a deficit or is making expenditures to satisfy obligations from an election already held. Special definitions of "candidate" and "candidate campaign committee" that apply only in Part 2 of this Article are set forth in G.S. 163A-1475.
"Candidate" means any individual who, with respect to a public office listed in G.S. 163A-1411(80), has filed a notice of candidacy, notice of retention, or a petition requesting to be a candidate, or has been certified as a nominee of a political party for a vacancy, or has otherwise qualified as a candidate in a manner authorized by law, or has filed a statement of organization under G.S. 163A-1412 and is required to file periodic financial disclosure statements under G.S. 163A-1418.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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2010: Five news stories that made you happy
We've reached that time of year. You know, the time when news organizations start putting together their lists—top flicks of the year, the most-talked about news stories of the year, controversial newsmakers of the year and more.
Astrid Van Den Broek Updated December 18, 2010
We've reached that time of year. You know, the time when news organizations start putting together their lists—top flicks of the year, the most-talked about news stories of the year, controversial newsmakers of the year and more. So, I thought I'd use today's post to recap five stories from 2010 that very likely made you smile. Or feel warm inside. Or just made you feel good. Starting with…
1. The Chilean Miners: What a happy end to what could have been a devastating tragedy. After being buried alive when a mine caved in, we thought the story of the 33 Chilean miners would not end well. But this one had an astounding end when a rescue device was designed to break through the solid rock and bring each miner up one by one in a shoulder-width tight tube. We watched into the night, flicked on the TV the next morning to find that Luis Urzua, the last miner, was being brought up safely. The top feel-good story, hands down.
2. Allen and Violet Large: After winning $11.2 million in a lottery in November, this Truro, NS couple in their seventies decide to donate the entire chunk of change to charity, noting that what they never had, they'd never miss. Their donations reached organizations such as the local fire department, churches, the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, hospitals and of course families who needed help, say reports.
3. First gold on home soil: In February, Canada hosted the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics in hopes of "owning the podium." While that didn't quite happen, what did happen was that Alexandre Bilodeau, a 23-year-old moguls skier from Montreal won Canada's first gold at a Canadian-hosted Olympics, causing national pride to spill out into the streets of Vancouver.
4. William finally asks Kate: Don't deny the hype—in November, the social networks were all, er, a twitter gushing over Prince William and Kate Middleton's engagement that finally happened after a looong courtship. Add to the fact that the Prince gave Kate the engagement ring that belonged to his mother, the late Princess Diana who died in a tragic car accident in 1997, and we were swooning. Finally we've all got a royal wedding to look forward to.
5. Angela James and Cammi Granato: This seems like one of those stories like Halle Berry being the first African-American woman to win an Academy Award in Oscar in 2002—when you find out, you wonder, why hasn't this happened yet? So it was with Angela James and Cammi Granato who in November became the first women inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame. A proud moment for women, whether you play hockey or not.
FILED UNDER: Halle Berry Princess Diana


Relive the glorious and interesting history of Thailand. Learn how it all started and understand their beliefs. The lifestyle the people led here in the ancient times and the diverse cultures with unified goals. Siam Niramit is the proud presenter of this show which has crushed many world records. You will be amazed to see that this show plays on the highest stage in the world!!!
● Siam Niramit is renowned across the world for its largest production.
● Extravagant Show with hundreds of performer and uncountable costumes.
● Famous for its special effects and it uses world's most advanced technology.
● Introduce yourself to the history of Thailand when it was referred as Siam.
● Sets of this show will leave you speechless.
Benefit from pick-up at your hotel and transfer to a performance of "Siam Niramit" for the start of a captivating evening of food and art in Bangkok. Dine on the unique flavors of Thai cuisine from a buffet menu du jour of classics and contemporary creations.
Then, journey through the myths and legends of Thailand's rich history as you experience one of the grandest stage productions in Asia. Marvel as countless actors recreate the story of Thailand's culture and traditions in 3 separate acts.
Be dazzled by live animals, aerial acrobatics, pyrotechnics and state-of-the-art technical effects that take you back in time, through joyous festivals and beyond the imagination. Then, relax on the journey back to your hotel at the end of your thrilling evening.
● 17:30 Hrs: Get ready to explore the culture & history of Thailand at Siam Niramit show. Our driver will pick you up from the hotel (centrally located)and will drive you to the venue( 30 min).
● 8:00 Hrs: Upon reaching the venue. Take a tour of the Ancient Thai Village and see the different rural lifestyles across the Four Regions of Thailand in bygone times.
● 18:30 Hrs: Treat yourself with Thai and International delicacies at the Buffet Dinner.
● 20:00-22:00Hrs: Now is the time to sit back and relax as the most awaited show is about to begin. The show is in three parts . In Act 1 - Journey Back to History, In Act 2 -we visit the three realms central to traditional Thai beliefs... Fiery Hell, Mystical Himapaan and Blissful Heave . In Act 3- Thai culture is full of a wide variety of merit-making festivals, which combine religious ceremony with colourful and joyful celebration, which you will enjoy in.
● 22:30 hrs: After the show take a cozy ride back to your hotel.


Adblock Plus 2.9 introduced very significant changes to the data storage. The unfortunate side-effect was that Adblock Plus was broken for Thunderbird users as well as users on pre-release SeaMonkey versions, and nobody noticed before the release. After we discovered a problem with our original fix, as of Adblock Plus 2.9.0.4251-beta development build things should work correctly on all platforms. This being a rather non-trivial change, your feedback is appreciated. If no other issues pop up we plan to release Adblock Plus 2.9.1 next Tuesday, June 6.


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Soledad police investigating fatal shooting
Updated: 11:50 AM PDT Apr 19, 2021
Josh Copitch
Soledad Police
SOURCE: Soledad Police
Soledad police are investigating a fatal shooting that took place over the weekend. According to investigators, police responded to reports of gunshots on Tiburon Place, near Metz Road, at 12:30 a.m. on Saturday. Officers first on scene found a person inside a parked car with a gunshot wound to to the head. The victim, identified as a 35-year-old man, was taken to a nearby trauma unit where he later died from his injuries. Anyone with information is asked to call Officer Brian Solis at 831-223-2176, the Soledad Police Department 831-223-5120 or 831-755-5111.
SOLEDAD, Calif. —
Soledad police are investigating a fatal shooting that took place over the weekend.
According to investigators, police responded to reports of gunshots on Tiburon Place, near Metz Road, at 12:30 a.m. on Saturday. Officers first on scene found a person inside a parked car with a gunshot wound to to the head.
The victim, identified as a 35-year-old man, was taken to a nearby trauma unit where he later died from his injuries.
Anyone with information is asked to call Officer Brian Solis at 831-223-2176, the Soledad Police Department 831-223-5120 or 831-755-5111.


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POLITICO Davos Playbook
The touchstone each morning for significant conversations and newsworthy events for the global political, business and media community that comes together at Davos #WEF2020.
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POLITICO Davos Playbook: No Trumps — China's chance — The other Swiss army
By Florian Eder and	Ryan Heath
Good morning and welcome to POLITICO's Davos Playbook, our guide through this week in the Swiss Alps. We are Ryan Heath and Florian Eder, and we've teamed up to make this little extra goodie possible for you each day this week.
Whether you are a participant at the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting or want a daily peek into what's driving the day in the meeting rooms, panels and power parties, this is the place to find out. If you enjoy reading this, please share it with your colleagues and friends.
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Get in touch: [email protected], [email protected] and follow us on Twitter: @florianeder … @PoliticoRyan
DAVOS INSIGHT: The global elite is here to lick its wounds after a political year that shook its most sacred belief: that the globalization it has driven and benefited most from can't be unwound.
But this is what president-elect Donald Trump promised and what, in part, the British voted for in their June 2016 referendum to leave the EU. Discontent with the establishment is now an election-winning issue, the World Economic Forum warned recently. Its 2017 Global Risk Report says stronger global economic growth is needed to counter "increasing national sentiment."
Populism and the anger that fuels it will be the elephant in many rooms at this year's forum, which officially runs from Tuesday to Friday. Reuters' Noah Barkin describes the public face of Davos delegates as a mere "veneer of optimism."
Watch out for panel debates that seek to take the prevailing winds head on, such as "Squeezed and Angry: How to fix the middle-class crisis," with IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde.
The elites got 2016 wrong, failing to foresee the dramatic changes that came. But their proposed solutions are the same as ever, offering little beyond anodyne calls for growth to quell the anger of the masses.
INEQUALITY ON THE RISE: Economic inequality is increasing across the globe, including in rich Western countries, according to a report released Monday by the World Economic Forum. It also said median per capita income has fallen among people in the world's richest nations by 2.4 percent and that growth in those nations has slowed to a crawl.
THE RESPONSIBLE ELITE: While participants ponder whether the masses are coming for them with pitchforks, they will still take comfort at being among high-minded friends for the 47th consecutive year in Europe's highest city, Davos, 1,560 meters above sea level in the Graubünden Alps. The official WEF theme is "Responsive and Responsible Leadership," and the call to arms is for a "new model of leadership championing collaboration, growth, reformed capitalism and preparedness for the Fourth Industrial Revolution."
More than 3,000 politicians, business leaders, activists and central bankers are expected in town. It's a record-high number with star attractions, but also some noticeable no-shows.
The political superstars include British Prime Minister Theresa May, Chinese President Xi Jinping and outgoing U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, who will give a speech on foreign policy. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, however, said nein this year.
The demographics of Davos: The split is two-thirds Western, and one-third from the rest of world; two-thirds business and government, and one-third from other sectors. More than half of the 400 sessions on the program will address the issues of social inclusion and human development. And the agenda has been brought forward by one day, compared to previous years. The change will allow participants to make Trump's January 20 inauguration in Washington, but future years will also follow the 2017 schedule, so no, this isn't an example of the "Trump effect." Quartz has a nice visualization here, showing where participants are from.
Business is booming for Davos landlords: Not surprisingly, visitors to the WEF can expect to pay around five times the usual mid-season price for apartments and hotel rooms. Private landlords typically apply a strict Saturday-to-Saturday rental period — meaning the casual WEF visitor pays for a week, even if they only stay two nights. The staff that make the official forum and its fringe events happen aren't spared either: They pay for two weeks if they can't leave immediately after the last session.
2 AMERICAS, ONLY 1 IN DAVOS: The 2017 WEF will have a distinctly Obama-Clinton flavor among the American contingent. Secretary of State John Kerry and Biden will appear, as will James Stavridis, the former NATO supreme allied commander Europe. Facebook's Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg, who was named last week as a likely treasury secretary had Hillary Clinton won in November, is a frequent Davos attendee. And Hewlett Packard Enterprise CEO Meg Whitman, a Republican who backed Clinton, is one of the forum's co-chairs this year.
On the Trump side, "No one will be attending," Trump spokeswoman Hope Hicks said in a statement. The only Trump-related figure will be Anthony Scaramucci, founder of SkyBridge Capital and another Davos regular.
CHINA FILLS TRUMP VACUUM: President Xi Jinping will deliver the WEF opening speech Tuesday morning, the centerpiece of his four-day European tour. He won't be visiting London, Berlin or Brussels — only Switzerland. First stop Sunday was Zürich, where he was received by Swiss President Doris Leuthard. His last stop will be Geneva. Swiss magazine L'Hebdo reports Xi is intrigued by how the Swiss educational model boosts the country's strong reputation for innovation.
China's message: The "globalization bullet train" is broken, says Chinese state media organ Xinhua. This year's Davos "may be the start of China's new role as a leader in promoting globalization and a speedy recovery of the global economy," as Western countries turn to "isolationist self-centeredness," commentator Sun Ding wrote for China's official Xinhua news service. IHS Markit chief economist Nariman Behravesh told AFP: "In Davos, Xi will likely articulate China's vision for the world economic and political order."
Did you know? Switzerland is one of two European countries with which China has concluded a trade agreement. The other one is Iceland.
THOUGHT BUBBLE — A 10-POINT GUIDE TO LEADERSHIP IN THE AGE OF POPULISM: Alberto Alemanno — a Jean Monnet Professor of Law at HEC Paris, WEF participant and Playbook reader — writes: "In a representative democracy, the mission of leaders should be to temper citizens' input and emotional responses rather than to foster the violence of the majority. In other words, the relationship between representatives and represented must be ongoing and should entail judgement on both sides."
SO DAVOS! Ned Tozun, co-founder and CEO of the off-grid solar company, d.light, is in Davos with the message that the Fourth Industrial Revolution ought to include everyone, including the 30 percent of the world's population who lack energy essentials. The firm says 65 million people living at the bottom of the "energy access ladder" have benefited from d.light's portable solar lantern and home systems, financed through no-interest pay-as-you-go finance.
INTRODUCING … 'PROGRESSIVE PROTECTIONISM': Colin Hines, author of the book "Progressive Protectionism: Taking Back Control," lays out some food for thought for Davos types on the Guardian Economics blog. Hines explains his idea "aims to nurture and rebuild local economies in a way that permanently reduces the amount of international trade in goods, money and services and enables nation states to control the level of migration that their citizens desire."
1 DAVOS, 2 ARMIES: The Swiss army gets most of the attention in Davos, with thousands of armed forces protecting the streets, airspace and the Congress Center itself. But there's another army here too, the Guardian writes: "Hundreds of chambermaids, doormen and cocktail waiters have been flown to Davos to cater to every whim of world leaders, business executives and the super rich." While there are some ridiculous people with ridiculous demands in Davos, there are also thousands of congress goers and hangers-on sprawled on studio couches, fold-away beds and in youth hostels.
#MYDAVOSROOM … Don't just take Playbook's word for it: See the photos of the bedrooms in POLITICO's apartment, here and here. In fact, why don't you help us present a fuller picture of life away from the champagne flutes …
Send us a photo of your accommodation in Davos. Post it on Twitter, Facebook or Instagram with #mydavosroom, or email it to [email protected], [email protected]. We'll feature the good, the bad and the very ugly throughout the week.
DON'T FORGET! You will need an adaptor to plug in your electrical appliance, phone, laptop, in Switzerland. If you or your team can't arrange it before arrival, the Co-op supermarket in Davos sells a range of adaptors.
DAVOS SKIING TIPS: For all those yet to arrive in Davos, including the many who will travel today from the DLD tech conference in Munich, Playbook tested the slopes Sunday. Here are our top five tips for smooth day (or stolen hour) skiing:
— Take cash. Many restaurants and bars on the mountaintops won't accept credit cards.
— There is a Davos Klosters ski app. In addition to resort maps, there is a GPS tracker that will help the resort owners find you if you're in trouble and which measures everything from your speed to distance traveled.
— Our favorite slopes: The long runs from Parsenn down to Klosters and Davos, respectively.
— If you are skiing on a budget, the lift passes are 10 to 20 percent cheaper online.
SUBSCRIBE to the POLITICO newsletter family: Brussels Playbook … Morning Exchange … Morgen Europa … Brexit Files … Brussels Influence … D.C. Playbook … All our POLITICO Pro policy morning newsletters.
More from ... Florian Eder and	Ryan Heath


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View alumni that have participated in East Dubuque High School Drama. If you participated in Drama while at East Dubuque HS, register now and add your name to the list with a message to your old friends.
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55 Famous Leadership Quotes for Inspiration
Collection of 55 famous leadership quotes and sayings for you to get inspired.
"A leader is one who knows the way, goes the way, and shows the way."-John Maxwell
"Before you are a leader, success is all about growing yourself. When you become a leader, success is all about growing others."-Jack Welch
"He who has great power should use it lightly."-Seneca
"Education is the mother of leadership."-Wendell Willkie
"To command is to serve, nothing more and nothing less."-Andre Malraux
"A great leader's courage to fulfill his vision comes from passion, not position."-John Maxwell
"Leadership is not about titles, positions or flowcharts. It is about one life influencing another."-John C. Maxwell
"Not the cry, but the flight of a wild duck, leads the flock to fly and follow."-Chinese Proverb
"Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power."-Abraham Lincoln
"The real leader has no need to lead–he is content to point the way."-Henry Miller
"He who has learned how to obey will know how to command."-Solon
"The task of the leader is to get his people from where they are to where they have not been."-Henry Kissinger
"Without leadership, command is a hollow experience, a vacuum often filled with mistrust and arrogance."-Eric Shinseki
"Management is doing things right; leadership is doing the right things."-Peter Ferdinand Drucker
"People ask the difference between a leader and a boss. The leader leads, and the boss drives."-Theodore Roosevelt
"The ear of the leader must ring with the voices of the people."-Woodrow Wilson
"I suppose leadership at one time meant muscles; but today it means getting along with people."-Indira Gandhi
"To handle yourself, use your head; to handle others, use your heart."-Eleanor Roosevelt
"Keep your fears to yourself, but share your courage with others."-Robert Louis Stevenson
"He who cannot be a good follower cannot be a good leader."-Aristotle
"As we look ahead into the next century, leaders will be those who empower others."-Bill Gates
"A leader is a dealer in hope."-Napoleon Bonaparte
"If you think you are leading and turn around to see no one following, then you are just taking a walk."-Benjamin Hooks
"If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, you are a leader."-John Quincy Adams
"Do not follow where the path may lead. Go instead where there is no path and leave a trail."-Ralph Waldo Emerson
"A good objective of leadership is to help those who are doing poorly to do well and to help those who are doing well to do even better."-Jim Rohn
"When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the reason in increasingly large circles around your own desk."-Gen. Bruce Clarke
Leadership is not a position or a title, It is action and example.
"Great leadership usually starts with a willing heart, a positive attitude, and a desire to make a difference."-Mac Anderson
"Leaders do not avoid, repress, or deny conflict, but rather see it as an opportunity."-Warren Bennis
"Leadership is about magnetic communication. Leaders have a way of communicating that draws people toward the vision and the horizon."-Doug Firebaugh
"A real leader faces the music, even when he doesn't like the tune."
"Remember the difference between a boss and a leader; a boss says "Go!"-a leader says "Let's go!"-E.M. Kelly
"If I have seen farther than others, it is because I was standing on the shoulder of giants."-Isaac Newton
"The price of greatness is responsibility."-Winston Churchill
"The very essence of leadership is that you have to have vision. You can't blow an uncertain trumpet."-Theodore M. Hesburgh
"Nobody is more powerful as we make them out to be." Alice Walker
"Be with a leader when he is right, stay with him when he is still right, but, leave him when he is wrong."-Abraham Lincoln
"Leaders aren't born, they are made. And they are made just like anything else, through hard work. And that's the price we'll have to pay to achieve that goal, or any goal."- Vince Lombardi
"The greatest leader is not necessarily the one who does the greatest things. He is the one that gets the people to do the greatest things."- Ronald Reagan
"A boss creates fear, a leader confidence. A boss fixes blame, a leader corrects mistakes. A boss knows all, a leader asks questions. A boss makes work drudgery, a leader makes it interesting. A boss is interested in himself or herself, a leader is interested in the group."- Russell H. Ewing
"An army of deer would be more formidable commanded by a lion, than an army of lions commanded by a stag." -Viking Proverb
"No man will make a great leader who wants to do it all himself, or to get all the credit for doing it."-Andrew Carnegie
"There are three essentials to leadership: humility, clarity and courage."-Chan Master Fuchan Yuan
"Don't follow the crowd. Let the crowd follow you." – Margaret Thatcher
"A good leader is as good as half an army."-German Proverb
"Good leadership consists of showing average people how to do the work of superior people."-John Davison Rockefeller
"Don't tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and let them surprise you with their results."-George Smith Patton, Jr.
"Love and respect do not automatically accompany a position of leadership. They must be earned."
"There go my people. I must find out where they are going so I can lead them."
"Leadership cannot really be taught. It can only be learned."
"Courage is not the absence of fear. It is going forward with the face of fear."-Abraham Lincoln
"Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other." –John Kennedy
"No guts, no story." Chris Brady
"A leader…is like a shepherd. He stays behind the flock, letting the most nimble go out ahead, whereupon the others follow, not realizing that all along they are being directed from behind."-Nelson Mandela
45 Inspiring Quotes About Teamwork
20 Amazing APJ Abdul Kalam Quotes on Dreams
50 Inspirational Quotes To Face Life and Struggles
27 Inspiring Quotations On Health
21 Short Positive Quotes and Sayings for Happy Lif...
21 Swami Vivekananda quotes on Youth
41 Quotes about Being Thankful for Life
50 Keep Smiling Quotes to Put a Smile on Your Face
35 Motivating Quotes for Students to Help Studying
Top 10 Quotes about Dreams by APJ Abdul Kalam
36 Great Quotes about Music


Babywearing Learn & Play meetups are a free resource for our community and we invite everyone to learn, share knowledge, make friends, and try out carriers in our lending library. Membership is optional and at $30/year, you're not only supporting your favorite nonprofit, it also comes with some awesome member benefits!
BRING HOME AND TRY ALL THE CARRIERS…WITHOUT BUYING ALL THE CARRIERS!
Members have exclusive access to our lending library of over 200 carriers for a year. We have five meetups a month where rentals are allowed! You could (emphasis on could) rent carriers 60 times during the year, for $0.50 each time. If you only rent 12 times, it's $2.50 each rental. AND what kind of carrier are you going to find for $30 that will last you all year, allow you to exchange it at will, and it changes with the season and your child's needs? Nope. None. Take a look at our lending library! There are so many options and we're adding new carriers all the time.
We also occasionally offer special member discounts on carriers and for events, member giveaways, and more!
Your membership fee stays with our local group to support education and outreach in our local community as well as funding exciting new carriers to add to our lending library. We are a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization and your membership is a donation. THANK YOU for your support! You may be able to deduct membership fees or dues you pay to a qualified organization.
You can join Triangle Babywearers in person at our monthly Babywearing Learn & Play meetups, see our events calendar. If you have questions about membership or babywearing in general, send us an email! Thank you for supporting Triangle Babywearers and our mission to make babywearing a universally accepted practice.
By providing payment for my Triangle Babywearers membership I am agreeing to the terms of the Membership and Lending Library Agreement. You can pay the membership/trial fee in advance or pay via cash, check, credit/debit card, or through PayPal at any Babywearing Learn & Play meetup.


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Cheap flights from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County (VPS) to Inverness (INV)
Home Europe United Kingdom Scotland Inverness Cheap flights from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness
Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County (VPS) to Inverness (INV)
Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness 2021 flight deals
Cheap flights to Inverness from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County found for this year
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Useful info, stats and facts about Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness flights.
From Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness
Are flight prices decreasing from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness due to COVID-19 (coronavirus)?
At this time, Cheapflights has noticed price decreases for many domestic flights due to COVID-19. Travel is not necessarily recommended at this time, and flights may be prone to cancellation: please check with local authorities in both Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County and Inverness for travel alerts, and be sure to review the airline's cancellation policy and travel advisories before booking. For more information, please view our post on what to know about COVID-19 (coronavirus) and travel.
Can I find flights from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness for under $700 on Cheapflights?
Yes, there are multiple flights from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness for under $700. The cheapest flight booked recently is on Multiple Airlines for just $677, but on average you can expect to pay $1,596.
Are there nonstop flights from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness for under $700 on Cheapflights?
There are no nonstop flights from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness, but Cheapflights can provide you with all the information you need to find the fastest route with the fewest stops.
Does it rain more in Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County or Inverness?
In Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County, there will be greater rainfall in Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County compared to Inverness over the next 13 days.
Is Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County weather warmer or cooler than Inverness?
With an average temperature of 90 °F, peak weather can be found in July. As a traveler, expect to see changes in flight prices during that period. The temperatures in Inverness are colder than in Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County.
Flights to Inverness from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County
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Miami to Edinburgh from $573 pp
Fort Lauderdale to Edinburgh from $711 pp
Jacksonville to Edinburgh from $713 pp
West Palm Beach to Edinburgh from $829 pp
Gainesville to Edinburgh from $954 pp
Melbourne to Edinburgh from $1,104 pp
Destination information for Inverness
Things to know before you go. Useful info for your trip from Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County to Inverness
$1 = £0.74
Average temperature for January in Inverness
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Eglin Air Force Base/Okaloosa County (VPS)
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Inverness (INV)
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LMC gets charged up for electric vehicles
PG&E construction workers create space for the new charging stations in Lot A.
Spencer Batute, @BatuteSpencer
Electric vehicles are not just the future — they are the near future. Construction of 18 new electric vehicle charging stations in Parking Lot A is expected to be completed by the beginning of September, with the stations becoming operable around October.
The construction in the parking lot, which started at the end of July, is expected to finish some time in the beginning of September. However, the stations will not actually be operable until October, as some PG&E system upgrades have still not been made and require coordination with the surrounding community.
Once the stations are online, people with a parking permit will be able to use them by paying a fee via the ChargePoint app or a ChargePoint card.
Users will be charged $0.42/kWh during the first four hours of use. After 4 hours, users will be charged an hourly rate of $4. "However, this (rate) will be continually monitored and reviewed by the district," said Tracy L. Marcial, Energy & Sustainability Manager at the District Office.
The chargers use Level 2 circuitry — the most common type among public electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS). The 240 Volt, 40 Amp stations yield about 25 miles of Range Per Hour (RPH), and can be used by any electric vehicle (EV) with the exception of Teslas, which require a certain adapter to use them.
One station will be compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act, and one will be van-accessible. Prior to this project, there were no EVCS on campus.
However, the addition of the EVCS displaced normal parking spaces. "13 Faculty spots were removed along with a few metered spots and now we're trying to figure out where those are going to go," said LMC President Bob Kratochvil.
Owners of EVs often have to take extra planning steps so as to stay charged up. John Barnaby, an RN student, often has to leave school early to let his Tesla charge long enough for his wife to use it.
The addition of EVCS on campus "would be awesome," Barnaby said.
Planning for the project began in late 2017 when LMC was approved for a grant from the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) that partially paid for the construction of the EVCS, which were beginning to be required as part of the bond program and by building codes. Simultaneously, LMC applied for PG&E's newly founded EV Charge program, which provides the design and construction of the electrical infrastructure for the EVCS up to the point of connection of the stations.
As a "disadvantaged community" that falls in the top 25% of communities in PG&E's service area that are disproportionately burdened by multiple sources of pollution, LMC also qualified for a different subset of the program which paid for the EVCS themselves with a small participation fee.
The project is projected to cost LMC less than $30,000 to install the infrastructure and EVCS. PG&E is providing funding for approximately $190,000 in infrastructure and EVCS. In other words, LMC is paying $30,000, to get a project valued at about $220,000.
Much of the funding from PG&E and the BAAQMD is in order to meet California's clean energy goals, based on the California Energy Commission.
"Since the transportation industry in CA accounts for 40% of the greenhouse gases in California, achieving these goals will have a huge impact," said Marcial.
Spencer Batute, Staff Writer
LMC's Interim President has been chosen
Police Report adds more details to controversial situation
LMC strikes deal with food trucks
Honors Program hosts bake sale
LMC donates food to students at the student union
LMC's Rotaract Club makes major donation
LMC gives back for the holidays
Campus life: Joining clubs and organizations
Keeping up with the Kinesiology and Athletics Complex
LMC reacts to the situation
Jose Luis Montes
Wow! 42 cents a KWh is pretty steep. If you look at it closely that's almost $3 for 25 miles of range , 12 cents per mile sort of defeats the purpose of owning a EV for a lower cost of milage when comparing to an I.C.E. Looking at the market near by the City of Pittsburg charges $1 an hour , Pittsburg school district charges $1.5 an hour, Sonic's burger and the Somerville Mall offer Free charging.. If we want to look at a standard rate let's look at Tesla , they charge 28cents a KWh. LMC, why are the rates so high ??? Isnt the state of California subsidizing some some of the cost allocated to EV chargers?
https://lmcexperience.com/news/campus/2019/09/05/17346/#comment-262141


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Q: Are there more than $\beth_1$ non-homeomorphic topological subspaces of $\Bbb R$? I've been asked by a younger student about a certain claim he had on a classification of topological subsets of $\Bbb R$. The overall idea was a bit fuzzy, but in hindsight it revolved around taking the $\sigma$-algebra generated by six (Borel) subsets + translations. I successfully (and, I hope, instructively) argumented against it. However, this led me to the question:

Could I just cut it short and fancy with a cardinality argument? Specifically, if $\sim$ is the homeomorphism equivalence on $\mathcal P(\Bbb R)$, is $\operatorname{card}\left(\mathcal P(\Bbb R)/\sim\right)>\beth_1$ ?

Intuitively, I'd say yes, because, "come on, there are $\beth_2$ nasty non-Borel sets". And, "at chit-chat level, homeomorphisms $(a,b)\to(c,d)$ are monotone functions". However, this is neither a proof nor a sufficient reason for my question to even be decidable in ZFC.
In fact, on the topic I found this weaker fact: "closed subsets up to homeomorphism are exactly $\beth_1$".
Thank you for links and/or answers.

A: Every subset of $\mathbb{R}$ has a countable dense subset.  If $X\subseteq\mathbb{R}$ and $A\subseteq X$ is a countable dense subset, a homeomorphism from $X$ to another subset $Y\subseteq\mathbb{R}$ is determined by its restriction to $A$.  So there is an injection from the set of homeomorphisms from $X$ to other subsets of $\mathbb{R}$ to the set of functions from $A$ to $\mathbb{R}$. There are only $\beth_1$ functions from $A$ to $\mathbb{R}$ since $A$ is countable.
So each subset of $\mathbb{R}$ can be homeomorphic to at most $\beth_1$ other subsets of $\mathbb{R}$.  Since there are $\beth_2>\beth_1$ different subsets of $\mathbb{R}$, there must be $\beth_2$ different homeomorphism classes of subsets of $\mathbb{R}$.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


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Ridgefield Daily Voice serves Ridgefield, CT
Trumbull-Monroe
serves Easton, Monroe, Redding & Trumbull
serves Norwalk & Rowayton
serves Weston & Westport
serves Brewster, Carmel-Kent, Cold Spring, Mahopac, Patterson & Putnam Valley
Breaking News: Two Killed After Wrong-Way Head-On Crash, CT State Police Say
Ridgefield High School Ranks Among 'Most Challenging' In The Nation
by Alissa Smith and Vanessa Inzitari
Ridgefield High School was ranked by The Washington Post as one of the most challenging high schools in the nation. Photo Credit: Alissa Smith
More Articles Schools
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These Fairfield County Students Named Regeneron Semifinalists
RIDGEFIELD, Conn. – Ridgefield High School is considered one of the most challenging in the country, according to The Washington Post's "Most Challenging High Schools" of 2013 listing.
Out of more than 2,000 public and private high schools nationwide, Ridgefield was listed at No. 703. In the Northeast region, Ridgefield ranked No. 88 out of 264 schools.
Of the 18 Connecticut high schools that made the list, Ridgefield was ranked as the eighth most challenging. It is preceded by Greenwich High School at No. 6 and Weston High School at No. 7. Staples High followed at No. 9, Wilton High School at No. 10, Fairfield Warde at No. 12 and New Canaan at No. 14.
The rankings are based on each school's index score. These scores are determined by the number of college-level tests given at a school each year and divided by the number of seniors who graduated that same year, the Post explains.
Nationwide, American Indian Public Charter in Oakland, Calif., was rated as the No. 1 most challenging school. In the state, Connecticut IB Academy in East Hartford ranked at No. 1.
To see the full list of schools that made the cut, click here.
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COVID-19: Here's When Americans Can Order Free At-Home Tests
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