For the current debate on a devolved English legislature, see Devolved English parliament.
In 1066, William of Normandy introduced what, in later centuries, became referred to as a feudal system, by which he sought the advice of a council of tenants-in-chief (a person who held land) and ecclesiastics before making laws. In 1215, the tenants-in-chief secured Magna Carta from King John, which established that the king may not levy or collect any taxes (except the feudal taxes to which they were hitherto accustomed), save with the consent of his royal council, which gradually developed into a parliament.
Over the centuries, the English Parliament progressively limited the power of the English monarchy which arguably culminated in the English Civil War and the trial and execution of Charles I in 1649. After the restoration of the monarchy under Charles II, and the subsequent Glorious Revolution of 1688, the supremacy of Parliament was a settled principle and all future English and later British sovereigns were restricted to the role of constitutional monarchs with limited executive authority. The Act of Union 1707 merged the English Parliament with the Parliament of Scotland to form the Parliament of Great Britain. When the Parliament of Ireland was abolished in 1801, its former members were merged into what was now called the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
Under a monarchical system of government, monarchs usually must consult and seek a measure of acceptance for their policies if they are to enjoy the broad cooperation of their subjects. Early kings of England had no standing army or police, and so depended on the support of powerful subjects. The monarchy had agents in every part of the country. However, under the feudal system that evolved in England after the Norman Conquest of 1066, the laws of the Crown could not have been upheld without the support of the nobility and the clergy. The former had economic and military power bases of their own through major ownership of land and the feudal obligations of their tenants (some of whom held lands on condition of military service). The Church was virtually a law unto itself in this period as it had its own system of religious law courts.
In order to seek consultation and consent from the nobility and the senior clergy on major decisions, post-Norman Conquest English monarchs called Great Councils. A typical Great Council would consist of archbishops, bishops, abbots, barons and earls, the pillars of the feudal system. When this system of consultation and consent broke down, it often became impossible for government to function effectively. The most prominent instances of this before the reign of Henry III are the disagreements between Thomas Becket and Henry II and between King John and the barons. Becket, who served as Archbishop of Canterbury between 1162 and 1170, was murdered after a long running dispute with Henry II over the jurisdiction of the Church. John, who was king from 1199 to 1216, aroused such hostility from many leading noblemen that they forced him to agree to Magna Carta in 1215. John's refusal to adhere to this charter led to civil war (see First Barons' War).
The Great Council evolved into the Parliament of England. The term (French parlement or Latin parlamentum) came into use during the early 13th century, when it shifted from the more general meaning of "an occasion for speaking." It first appears in official documents in the 1230s. As a result of the work by historians G. O. Sayles and H. G. Richardson, it is widely believed that the early parliaments had a judicial as well as a legislative function.
During the 13th and 14th centuries, the kings increasingly called Knights of the Shire to meet when the monarch saw it as necessary. A notable example of this was in 1254 when sheriffs of counties were instructed to send Knights of the Shire to parliament to advise the king on finance.
Initially, parliaments were mostly summoned when the king needed to raise money through taxes. After Magna Carta, this became a convention. This was due in no small part to the fact that King John died in 1216 and was succeeded by his young son Henry III. Leading peers and clergy governed on Henry's behalf until he came of age, giving them a taste for power that they would prove unwilling to relinquish. Among other things, they made sure that Magna Carta would be reaffirmed by the young king.
Once the reign of John ended and Henry III took full control of the government, leading peers became increasingly concerned with his style of government, specifically his unwillingness to consult them on decisions he took, and his seeming patronisation of his foreign relatives over his native subjects. Henry's support of a disastrous papal invasion of Sicily was the last straw. In 1258, seven leading barons forced Henry to swear to uphold the Provisions of Oxford, superseded, the following year, by the Provisions of Westminster. This effectively abolished the absolutist Anglo-Norman monarchy, giving power to a council of fifteen barons, and providing for a thrice-yearly meeting of parliament to monitor their performance. Parliament assembled six times between June 1258 and April 1262, most notably at Oxford in 1258.
The French-born nobleman Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, emerged as the leader of this characteristically English rebellion. In the years that followed, those supporting Montfort and those supporting the king grew more hostile to each other. Henry obtained a papal bull in 1263 exempting him from his oath and both sides began to raise armies. At the Battle of Lewes on 14 May 1264, Henry was defeated and taken prisoner by Montfort's army. However, many of the peers who had initially supported Montfort began to suspect that he had gone too far with his reforming zeal. His support amongst the nobility rapidly declined. So in 1264, Montfort summoned the first parliament in English history without any prior royal authorisation. The archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and barons were summoned, as were two knights from each shire and two burgesses from each borough. Knights had been summoned to previous councils, but the representation of the boroughs was unprecedented. This was purely a move to consolidate Montfort's position as the legitimate governor of the kingdom, since he had captured Henry and his son Prince Edward (later Edward I) at the Battle of Lewes.
A parliament consisting of representatives of the realm was the logical way for Montfort to establish his authority. In calling this parliament, in a bid to gain popular support, he summoned knights and burgesses from the emerging landed gentry class, thus turning to his advantage the fact that most of the nobility had abandoned his movement. This parliament was summoned on 14 December 1264. It first met on 20 January 1265 in Westminster Hall and was dissolved on 15 February 1265. It is not certain who actually attended this parliament. Nonetheless, Montfort's scheme was formally adopted by Edward I in the so-called "Model Parliament" of 1295. The attendance at parliament of knights and burgesses historically became known as the summoning of "the Commons", a term derived from the Norman French word "commune", literally translated as the "community of the realm".
After Edward's escape from captivity, Montfort was defeated and killed at the Battle of Evesham in 1265. Henry's authority was restored and the Provisions of Oxford were forgotten, but this was nonetheless a turning point in the history of the Parliament of England. Although he was not obliged by statute to do so, Henry summoned the Commons to parliament three times between September 1268 and April 1270. However, this was not a significant turning point in the history of parliamentary democracy. Subsequently, very little is known about how representatives were selected because, at this time, being sent to parliament was not a prestigious undertaking. But Montfort's decision to summon knights of the shires and burgesses to his parliament did mark the irreversible emergence of the landed gentry as a force in politics. From then on, monarchs could not ignore them, which explains Henry's decision to summon the Commons to several of his post-1265 parliaments.
During the reign of the Tudor monarchs the modern structure of the English Parliament began to be created. The Tudor monarchy was powerful, and there were often periods of several years when parliament did not sit at all. However the Tudor monarchs were astute enough to realise that they needed parliament to legitimise many of their decisions, mostly out of a need to raise money through taxation legitimately without causing discontent. Thus they consolidated the state of affairs whereby monarchs would call and close parliament as and when they needed it.
It was in this period that the Palace of Westminster was established as the seat of the English Parliament. In 1548, the House of Commons was granted a regular meeting place by the Crown, St Stephen's Chapel. This had been a royal chapel. It was made into a debating chamber after Henry VIII became the last monarch to use the Palace of Westminster as a place of residence and after the suppression of the college there. This room became the home of the House of Commons until it was destroyed by fire in 1834, although the interior was altered several times up until then. The structure of this room was pivotal in the development of the Parliament of England. While most modern legislatures sit in a circular chamber, the benches of the British Houses of Parliament are laid out in the form of choir stalls in a chapel, simply because this is the part of the original room that the members of the House of Commons used when they were granted use of St Stephen's Chapel. This structure took on a new significance with the emergence of political parties in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, as the tradition began whereby the members of the governing party would sit on the benches to the right of the Speaker and the opposition members on the benches to the left. It is said that the Speaker's chair was placed in front of the chapel's altar. As Members came and went they observed the custom of bowing to the altar and continued to do so, even when it had been taken away, thus then bowing to the Chair, as is still the custom today.
Battles between Crown and Parliament would continue throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, but parliament was no longer subservient to the English monarchy. This change was symbolised in the execution of Charles I in January 1649. It is somewhat ironic that this event was not instigated by the elected representatives of the realm. In Pride's Purge of December 1648, the New Model Army (which by then had emerged as the leading force in the parliamentary alliance) purged Parliament of members that did not support them. The remaining "Rump Parliament", as it was later referred to by critics, enacted legislation to put the king on trial for treason. This trial, the outcome of which was a foregone conclusion, led to the execution of the king and the start of an 11-year republic. The House of Lords was abolished and the purged House of Commons governed England until April 1653, when army chief Oliver Cromwell dissolved it after disagreements over religious policy and how to carry out elections to parliament. Cromwell later convened a parliament of religious radicals in 1653, commonly known as Barebone's Parliament, followed by the unicameral First Protectorate Parliament that sat from September 1654 to January 1655 and the Second Protectorate Parliament that sat in two sessions between 1656 and 1658, the first session was unicameral and the second session was bicameral.
The revolutionary events that occurred between 1620 and 1689 all took place in the name of parliament. The new status of parliament as the central governmental organ of the English state was consolidated during the events surrounding the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660. After the death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658, his son Richard Cromwell succeeded him as Lord Protector, summoning the Third Protectorate Parliament in the process. When this parliament was dissolved under pressure from the army in April 1659, the Rump Parliament was recalled at the insistence of the surviving army grandees. This in turn was dissolved in a coup led by army general John Lambert, leading to the formation of the Committee of Safety, dominated by Lambert and his supporters. When the breakaway forces of George Monck invaded England from Scotland where they had been stationed—without Lambert's supporters putting up a fight—Monck temporarily recalled the Rump Parliament and reversed Pride's Purge by recalling the entirety of the Long Parliament. They then voted to dissolve themselves and call new elections, which were arguably the most democratic for 20 years although the franchise was still very small. This led to the calling of the Convention Parliament which was dominated by royalists. This parliament voted to reinstate the monarchy and the House of Lords. Charles II returned to England as king in May 1660. The Anglo-Scottish parliamentary union that Cromwell had established was dissolved in 1661 when the Scottish Parliament resumed its separate meeting place in Edinburgh.
After the Treaty of Union in 1707, Acts of Parliament passed in the Parliament of England and the Parliament of Scotland created a new Kingdom of Great Britain and dissolved both parliaments, replacing them with a new Parliament of Great Britain based in the former home of the English parliament. The Parliament of Great Britain later became the Parliament of the United Kingdom in 1801 when the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was formed through the Act of Union 1800.
The Constitution of the United Kingdom has evolved over a long period of time beginning in the predecessor states to the United Kingdom and continuing to the present day. The relative stability of the British polity over centuries, progressing without a revolution or regime change that lasted, has obviated the need to write a constitution from first principles, in contrast to many other countries. What Britain has instead is an accumulation of various statutes, judicial precedents, convention, treaties and other sources which collectively can be referred to as the British Constitution. It is thus more accurate to describe Britain's constitution as an 'uncodified' constitution, rather than an 'unwritten' one.
The House of Commons of England was the lower house of the Parliament of England from its development in the 14th century to the union of England and Scotland in 1707, when it was replaced by the House of Commons of Great Britain. In 1801, with the union of Great Britain and Ireland, that house was in turn replaced by the House of Commons of the United Kingdom.
The Statute of York was a 1322 Act of the Parliament of England that repealed the Ordinances of 1311 and prevented any similar provisions from being established. Academics argue over the actual impact of the bill, but general consensus is that it made the idea that the House of Commons should be consulted on all matters of general interest. The Statute is seen as "the end of a period of revolutionary experiments in English government", with no Ordinances ever attempted again.


1.7 How To Download IURDP Mumbai Result 2019?
IURDP Mumbai Result 2019 will be announced by the Integrated Urban and Rural Development Programs (IURDP) authority very shortly. Candidates who are seeking for the IURDP Result 2019, they can read this article in order to know the complete information. Through this post, we had provided all the necessary details about this IURDP Mumbai Clerk, Computer Operator Result 2019 and given the related links at the below. Exam participants should enter Hall Ticket Number, Date of Birth details to view the IURDP Mumbai Result 2019 from www.iurdp.org. The IURDP Mumbai Result 2019 is an important aspect for the candidates who had applied for the District Manager, Taluka Manager, Computer Operator, Clerk posts. Based on the IURDP Result, applicants will be selected by the IURDP recruitment team. Further details about IURDP Mumbai Clerk, Computer Operator Exam Cut Off Marks, and Merit List details mentioned in the below section.
Mostly the IURDP officials will declare the IURDP Mumbai Result 2019 in the month of March 2019. By checking the www.iurdp.org Computer Operator, Clerk Exam Result 2019, candidates come to know whether they selected for the next selection round or not. In earlier, the IURDP released a recruitment notification for 550 District Manager, Taluka Manager, Computer Operator, Clerk posts. A huge number of candidates applied. In order to select the best and talented one from the applicants, the higher authority decided to conduct the Written Test & Interview. Competitors who will perform well in both rounds, they will get a job for the applied post.
Candidates are advised to don't waste your valuable time for searching the IURDP Mumbai Result 2019 at various websites. because through this article we had furnished all important information about the IURDP Clerk, Computer Operator Result 2019 in a detailed manner. So all the competitors should read this complete article and capture all important details. Moreover, in the below section, we had provided a few steps regarding how to check the IURDP Mumbai Result 2019 from the official site. Therefore aspirants should follow those steps and come to know the Result Status quickly. For more updates keep following Sarkari Naukri on a daily basis.
IURDP Clerk, Computer Operator Cut Off Marks 2019 information is provided in this section. Candidates who will secure more than the cut off marks in the written test, they will promote to the next selection level. The cutoff score will be prepared by the authority by analyzing the few factors. The IURDP Clerk, Computer Operator Cut Off Marks 2019 not same for every candidate. It should differ based on the candidate's category. Competitors who will satisfy the cut off marks, they will be shortlisted for the next levels. Candidates can check and download the IURDP Clerk, Computer Operator Cut Off Marks 2019 from the official site at www.iurdp.org.
The IURDP Clerk, Computer Operator Merit List 2019 will be available in the form of PDF at the official site. The IURDP Clerk, Computer Operator Merit List 2019 contains details name and hall ticket numbers of the candidates who secure the best marks in the written examination. The Toppers List will be uploaded along with IURDP Mumbai Result 2019. As per the Merit List, the candidates will be called for the next selection round. Aspirants can also check the official website to know more information about the Result and Merit List.
How To Download IURDP Mumbai Result 2019?
Initially candidates log in to the official website of IURDP at www.iurdp.org.
Find the IURDP Mumbai Result 2019 link in all notification section.
Enter all required details in necessary fields and press on submit button.
As per given info, the Result will display.


Home > Spine Injuries > Health Feed > Tips > Ways To Keep Your Spine Happy!
Ways To Keep Your Spine Happy!
The spinal cord is indispensable to your body. It supports your head, keeps your posture erect, and helps you walk. Ailments of the spine are extremely painful to remedy and throw a lot of your other organs in trouble as well. Therefore, it follows that you should take the best care of your spine possible.
• Do your exercises properly: there are umpteen ways you can work out and get results that are harmful to your spine. You may easily lift something too heavy for your constitution, or the angle at which the object is placed may be too high for all your muscles to coordinate and work properly. Be aware, and avoid these mistakes. If you feel like the object is too heavy, refrain from lifting it. Even when lifting, make it such that the muscles of your lower body have to do the maximum work.
• Move on: Physical movement is the first commandment of having your spine fit and in a peak condition. This movement can be trivial and every day, like daily walks in the park or going to walk your pet. However, a sustained movement like that is very important, combined with stretching or aerobic exercises.
• Work smart: There are several ways you can avoid injuring your spine at the workplace. You should choose a chair that is adjusted according to your height and supports your lower back well. Your feet should be able to reach the floor properly and well. You should also avoid unhealthy conveniences like holding your phone between your ear and shoulders to keep your hands free.
• Go for daily checks: You should keep daily tabs on what is happening to your spine. Go for daily checks, and immediately check with your doctor if you experience symptoms like back pain without any evident disease, or if discomfort persists even after medication.
The spine is integral to the proper functioning of your whole body, and shouldn't be ignored even for a day. There are exercises you can do to keep it in good shape, and those that you can avoid. There are also triggers after which you should check with your doctor as well. Here's wishing you good spinal health.
The spine is an integral part!
Spinal Cord Injury - Tips To Help You Recover!


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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


A private one on one (2.5 hr. session) $85–$95 (per couple) single image. Includes supplies.
We are currently working to complete a great catalogue of images for you to choose from. Check back often for updates. We're artists, so we can create custom images for your private parties as well - just give us a call 210-660-3838. Custom images ($50 non-refundable deposit for custom painting applied to final payment).
All paintings are 16 x 20 unless otherwise noted.
Red Remembrance with Erica. Double Panel couples painting.
Praise Dance Double Panel (16 x 20 each) couples painting.


Please join us for an exciting Earth and Space event!
4th and 5th graders will have the opportunity to explore and have fun with many aspects of earth and space.
Learn about constellations and conditions on the moon with two hands-on, interactive experiences!


Sewitch MJ, Abrahamowicz M, Barkun A, Bitton A, Wild GE, Cohen A, et al. Patient nonadherence to medication in inflammatory bowel disease. The American journal of gastroenterology. 2003;98(7):1535-44.
Kane S, Huo D, Aikens J, Hanauer S. Medication nonadherence and the outcomes of patients with quiescent ulcerative colitis. The American journal of medicine. 2003;114(1):39-43.
Hawthorne A, Rubin G, Ghosh S. medication non‐adherence in ulcerative colitis–strategies to improve adherence with mesalazine and other maintenance therapies. Alimentary pharmacology & therapeutics. 2008;27(12):1157-66.
Higgins PD, Rubin D, Kaulback K, Schoenfield P, Kane S. Systematic review: impact of non‐adherence to 5‐aminosalicylic acid products on the frequency and cost of ulcerative colitis flares. Alimentary pharmacology & therapeutics. 2009;29(3):247-57.
Kane SV, Cohen RD, Aikens JE, Hanauer SB. Prevalence of nonadherence with maintenance mesalamine in quiescent ulcerative colitis. The American journal of gastroenterology. 2001;96(10):2929-33.
Kane SV, Sumner M, Solomon D, Jenkins M. Twelve-month persistency with oral 5-aminosalicylic acid therapy for ulcerative colitis: results from a large pharmacy prescriptions database. Digestive diseases and sciences. 2011;56(12):3463-70.
Ingerski LM, Baldassano RN, Denson LA, Hommel KA. Barriers to oral medication adherence for adolescents with inflammatory bowel disease. Journal of pediatric psychology. 2009;35(6):683-91.
Kane S. Systematic review: adherence issues in the treatment of ulcerative colitis. Alimentary pharmacology & therapeutics. 2006;23(5):577-85.
Kane SV, Hanauer SB. Medication adherence is associated with improved outcomes in patients with quiescent ulcerative colitis (UC). Gastroenterology. 2000;118(4):A886.
Trindade AJ, Ehrlich A, Kornbluth A, Ullman TA. Are your patients taking their medicine? Validation of a new adherence scale in patients with inflammatory bowel disease and comparison with physician perception of adherence. Inflammatory bowel diseases. 2011;17(2):599-604.
Bermejo F, Román AL-S, Algaba A, Guerra I, Valer P, García-Garzón S, et al. Factors that modify therapy adherence in patients with inflammatory bowel disease☆. Journal of Crohn's and Colitis. 2010;4(4):422-6.
Greenley RN, Kunz JH, Biank V, Martinez A, Miranda A, Noe J, et al. Identifying youth nonadherence in clinical settings: data-based recommendations for children and adolescents with inflammatory bowel disease. Inflammatory bowel diseases. 2011;18(7):1254-9.
Sartor RB. Mechanisms of disease: pathogenesis of Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis. Nature clinical practice Gastroenterology & hepatology. 2006;3(7):390-407.
Tiao DK, Chan W, Jeganathan J, Chan JT, Perry J, Selinger CP, et al. Inflammatory Bowel Disease Pharmacist Adherence Counseling Improves Medication Adherence in Crohn's Disease and Ulcerative Colitis. Inflammatory bowel diseases. 2017;23(8):1257-61.
Bhatt J, Patil S, Joshi A, Abraham P, Desai D. Self-reported treatment adherence in inflammatory bowel disease in Indian patients. Indian Journal of Gastroenterology. 2009;28(4):143-6.
Chan W, Chen A, Tiao D, Selinger C, Leong R. Medication adherence in inflammatory bowel disease. Intestinal research. 2017;15(4):434-45.
Robinson A. Improving adherence to medication in patients with inflammatory bowel disease. Alimentary pharmacology & therapeutics. 2008;27(s1):9-14.
San Roman AL, Bermejo F, Carrera E, Pérez-Abad M, Boixeda D. Adherence to treatment in inflammatory bowel disease. Rev Esp Enferm Dig. 2005;97(4):249-57.
Lennard-Jones J. Classification of inflammatory bowel disease. Scandinavian Journal of Gastroenterology. 1989;24(sup170):2-6.
Krousel-Wood M, Islam T, Webber LS, Re R, Morisky DE, Muntner P. New medication adherence scale versus pharmacy fill rates in hypertensive seniors. The American journal of managed care. 2009;15(1):59.
Kane SV, Robinson A. understanding adherence to medication in ulcerative colitis–innovative thinking and evolving concepts. Alimentary pharmacology & therapeutics. 2010;32(9):1051-8.
Sewitch MJ, Abrahamowicz M, Bitton A, Daly D, Wild GE, Cohen A, et al. Psychological distress, social support, and disease activity in patients with inflammatory bowel disease. The American journal of gastroenterology. 2001;96(5):1470-9.
Shale M, Riley S. Studies of compliance with delayed‐release mesalazine therapy in patients with inflammatory bowel disease. Alimentary pharmacology & therapeutics. 2003;18(2):191-8.
Červený P, Bortlík M, Kuběna A, Vlček J, Lakatos PL, Lukáš M. Nonadherence in inflammatory bowel disease: results of factor analysis. Inflammatory bowel diseases. 2007;13(10):1244-9.
Kim SB, Kim KO, Jang BI, Kim ES, Cho KB, Park KS, et al. Patients' beliefs and attitudes about their treatment for inflammatory bowel disease in Korea. Journal of gastroenterology and hepatology. 2016;31(3):575-80.
San Román AL, Bermejo F, Carrera E, Pérez-Abad M, Boixeda D. Adherence to treatment in inflammatory bowel disease. Rev Esp Enferm Dig. 2005;97(4):249-57.
Bucci C, Zingone F, Tammaro S, Iovino P, Santonicola A, Ciacci C. Factors predicting the adherence to the therapy of Italian IBD patients. Gastroenterology research and practice. 2017;2017.
Ghadir MR, Bagheri M, Vahedi H, Daryani NE, Malekzadeh R, Hormati A, et al. Nonadherence to Medication in Inflammatory Bowel Disease: Rate and Reasons. Middle East journal of digestive diseases. 2016;8(2):116.
Burgess SW, Sly PD, Morawska A, Devadason SG. Assessing adherence and factors associated with adherence in young children with asthma. Respirology. 2008;13(4):559-63.
Marhefka SL, Koenig LJ, Allison S, Bachanas P, Bulterys M, Bettica L, et al. Family experiences with pediatric antiretroviral therapy: responsibilities, barriers, and strategies for remembering medications. AIDS Patient Care and STDs. 2008;22(8):637-47.
Zelikovsky N, Schast AP. Eliciting accurate reports of adherence in a clinical interview: development of the Medical Adherence Measure. Pediatric Nursing. 2008;34(2).


Designer Tuula Wilén tells: In the design Kylä, I wanted to create an impression of a village where the reflections of lights on windows invigorate the scene at dusk. The shapes of houses were inspired by my numerous travels and the different construction styles were smoothly brought together on the same street. The tiles of the sidewalks harmonize the diversity of the houses, and who knows, this village might even be the cozy neighborhood of the city.
Mika Sahikallio got inspiration to Nimikko pattern from Jokipiin Pellava logo. J-letters create a beautiful honeycomb pattern.
Marjat line by Henna Mantere is depicting berries in Finnish nature: this is Mansikka (strawberry).
Marja line by Henna Mantere depicts berries in the Finnish nature: Mansikka dish towel.
The Finnish forest is beautiful and full of life. The soothing inner echo of the forest calms the mind and makes it lighter. The forest is a wonderful hideaway, where the elk lives.
No matter how magnificent the crown-headed king is, it is better not to meet him in the wild.
Inspiration to this pattern is drawn from waving water, which ever-changing surface one can gaze endlessly.
This design was born inspired by the old fisherman's huts. Roof shingles with patina created by sun and time repeat in the pattern.
Classic pattern in new colour!
Bath rug made of linen terry is an absorbent small mat for the sauna dressing room floor.
The gentle waves of the grain field whisper and shine in the sun. They charm the viewer and lead him into their Kingdom. In the design Irina Ylänne illustrates the dance of the grain in wind rhythms by showing the dignity of the grain and tradition.
Designer Paola Suhonen tells: Indian Summer has typical American hippie and desert imagery. I'd just moved from New York to Los Angeles where the hippie movement is still alive and kicking. My own style, too, has always had a tuch of the hippie girl. The collection was dedicated to that girl. Other sources of inspiration were childhood Indian games and the seemingly endless, hot Indian summers, when everything sinks in a yellowish haze, asphalt is steaming hot and forests are intensely green groves for adventures.
Linen terry is also ideal for washing, skin peeling and dry massage. The gently rough surface of linen cherishes even a sensitive skin and complexion.
We wanted Graniitti Throw to be very light but still warm and airy. The roughness of linen and softness of wool relate directly to Jokipii`s history. Graniitti was named after the bedrock of Finnish nature, granite. This product is of high-quality, warm and luxurious. Manufactured from start to finish in Jokipii, Finland. Enjoy your Graniitti Throw!


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Leadership Intelligence Bulletin
CORPORATE CULTURE IS NOT THE HR DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY
AVERT DANGER BY KEEPING UP WITH WORKPLACE SAFETY TRENDS
BUILDING A WORLD WHERE EVERYBODY WORKS LESS FOR MORE MONEY
STEINHOFF - THE DROWNED FROG
HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS SHAPING ASSISTANCE SERVICES
WHAT LEAN MANAGEMENT CAN DO FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES
EDUCATION TRANSFORMS WOMEN INTO INSPIRATIONAL LEADERS
OBESITY: INHERITING A GLOBAL PHENOMENON
SABPP ANALYSIS OF THE MARIKANA MASSACRE: WHERE DID IT ALL GO WRONG?
Findings of the Farlam Commission Report – how Lonmin Employment Relations Management practice compared to the SABPP HR Management Standard on ERM.
Tags: marikana analysis, sabpp, socio economics, south africa
The SA Board for People Practices (SABPP) is recognised by SAQA as a professional body for the Human Resources (HR) profession and is also the ETQA for HR learning provision. The HR profession is about supporting economic and social growth through good workplace people practices.
In 2013, the SABPP adopted an HR Management System Model and Standard to provide the framework of good practice for the profession[1]. One of the elements of the Standard is Employment Relations Management (ERM). In addition, the South African HR Competency
See Appendix 1 for the full Model.
Model (appendix 2) provides a solid foundation for sound HR competence in dealing with socio-economic issues, in particular applying the competencies "Duty to society" and "Citizenship for the future."
This paper uses the findings of the Farlam Marikana Commission of Enquiry to evaluate, in a desk top study, to what extent the decisions and actions of Lonmin as an employer are congruent with the ERM Standard. The purpose of the paper is to provide a case study for the HR profession so that lessons learned can be absorbed and implemented widely within the profession. No interviews or further follow ups were conducted with Lonmin and therefore reasons for decisions and actions are not investigated nor commented on. We believe that the Farlam Commission conducted a very thorough investigation, and subjected the evidence to legal tests, therefore its report provides a very sound basis from which to draw relevant facts.
The SABPP ERM Standard
The ERM element of the National HR Standard defines ERM as:
The management of individual and collective relationships in an organisation through the implementation of good practices that enable the achievement of organisational objectives compliant with the legislative framework and appropriate to socio-economic conditions.
The objectives that an organisation should achieve in order to meet the Standard are:
To create a climate of trust, cooperation and stability within an organisation.
To achieve a harmonious and productive working environment which enables the organisation to compete effectively in its market place.
To provide a framework for conflict resolution.
To provide a framework for collective bargaining where relevant
To ensure capacity building and compliance to relevant labour legislation, codes of good practice (ILO and Department of Labour) and international standards.
Implementation of the Standard should follow the systemic approach shown below the article.
The main findings of the Commission
The main findings of the Commission, as they relate to Lonmin, are that:
"Lonmin PLc did not use its best endeavours to resolve the disputes that arose between itself and the members of its work force who participated in the unprotected strike and between the strikers and those workers who did not participate in the strike. It also did not respond appropriately to the threat and outbreak of violence.
The Commission says this because it is of the view that Lonmin should in the special situation created by Impala's action in unilaterally raising the wages of its Rock Drill Operators (RDOs) have negotiated with its RDOs and not initially sheltered behind the two year agreement and thereafter insisted it would only negotiate with NUM in which it knew the RDOs had no confidence.
Lonmin also failed to employ sufficient safeguards and measures to ensure the safety of its employees. In this regard it failed to provide its security staff with the armoured vehicles they needed for their protection despite being requested to do so. It also insisted that its employees who were not striking come to work despite the fact that it knew that it was not in a position to protect them from attacks by strikers.
"Lonmin's reckless actions in urging employees to come to work in circumstances where they were aware of the potential dangers to them and in the full knowledge that they could not protect them, falls to be condemned in the strongest terms. Lonmin must, in the Commission's view, bear a measure of responsibility for the injuries and deaths of its employees and those of its sub-contractors." (The Commission recommended that these matters be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions, North West, for further investigation and to determine whether there is a basis for prosecution.)
Finally, it created an environment conducive to the creation of tension, labour unrest and disunity among its employees by failing to comply with the housing obligations undertaken by its two subsidiaries in the Social and Labour Plans on the strength of which it obtained new order mining rights."
Note that, in addition to severe findings against the SA Police Service, there are also findings against AMCU and NUM, both of whom failed to exercise effective control over their members in ensuring that their conduct was lawful and did not endanger the lives of other persons; and against the individual strikers who promoted a situation of conflict and confrontation which gave rise to deaths and injuries and endangered the lives of other non-striking workers.
This paper, however, confines itself to the evidence in relation to Lonmin' employment relations management practices.
The time line of events
The Commission's report established a time line of events and we extract from that the aspects relevant to ERM practice.
Background – the housing situation
2004 – Lonmin (Western and Eastern Platinum mines jointly) submitted and had approved a Social and Labour Plan (SLP) in terms of which they committed to phasing out all existing single sex hostel accommodation, converting hostels into bachelor or family units and building an additional 5500 houses for their migrant employees to replace the hostels. This was to be completed by September 2011.
2009 – Lonmin, in its close out report of the 5 year term of the SLP, reported an unachieved financial commitment of R665m on house construction. This was a shortfall of 41 hostel conversions out of 70 and a shortfall of 3197 houses against the target of 3300. This was attributed by the company to the impact of the global economy on the price of platinum.
2010 – Lonmin's Sustainable Development Report repeated the housing commitments of the SLP and recognised the principal risk of possible withdrawal of mining licences if the SLP is not delivered. (As at 2012, there were about 23 000 employees in lower grades, of whom the majority were migrant workers. 5883 of these, including local workers, were in decent housing, making 25%. The Commission noted that if the promised houses had been delivered, 54% would have been in decent housing and the remaining 45% would have seen tangible progress. Instead of which, the company had done nothing for over a decade and had pushed 7 out of every 8 hostel residents into the informal settlements.)
Background – the Impala strike and settlement
October 2011 - At Impala Platinum mine, close to the Lonmin shafts, NUM and management concluded a 2 year collective agreement on wages and conditions of employment.
2 December 2011 – Lonmin and NUM concluded a 2 year wage agreement, in terms of which RDOs, as well as other workers, would receive an increase of 9 – 10%.
18 December 2011 – Implats management unilaterally increased wages by a further 18% for "miners", thereby undermining their own arguments in the October negotiations that they had no more money for further increases. These "miners" were mostly NUM members and the decision caused discontent against the union amongst both those who received increases and those who did not.
January 2012 – the RDOs at Implats went on an unprotected strike outside NUM structures to attempt to force management to further increase their wages. This strike was very violent. Implats dismissed its workforce in February, but later reinstated most of the workers, after reaching an agreement in April 2012 which involved increases of different amounts to the entire workforce which brought an end to the strike. In terms of this agreement, RDOs received a grade promotion which meant a 52.7% increase in guaranteed pay to R9 991.
Lonmin's attempt to align with the Impala settlement
June 2012 – RDOs at Lonmin's Karee mine elected 2 representatives who approached the senior manager at the mine with a request for a basic net salary of R12 500. They said they did not want to involve any of the trade unions as their demand did not involve the entire workforce. The manager recommended to Lonmin management that the company engage with both the NUM and AMCU to reach agreement on allowances to bring the RDOs pay up to that of Implats. (Since 2011, AMCU had been in the majority at Karee mine, while NUM continued to be the large majority at both Eastern and Western Platinum.) Lonmin management, however, decided unilaterally to pay small additional monthly allowances. Management did not discuss this even with NUM.
The unprotected strike and subsequent violence
End July 2012 - Mr Mokwena, EVP for Human Capital and Exernal Affairs, telephoned Mr Mathunjwa of AMCU and informed him that there were rumours that there was going to be a march by employees of Lonmin to bring a memorandum to management in respect of wage demands. Mr Mathunjwa told him that he should hold a meeting with all unions. Mr Mokwena said he would speak to the General Secretary of NUM and would revert to Mr Mathunjwa, which he did not do.
9 August – the RDOs at a large but peaceful meeting decided not to accept these allowances, not to go to work next day and to march to the company's offices to demand the R12 500. The meeting decided not to involve any union because they came from different units and were members of different unions, but also because they did not trust NUM to take up their demands and AMCU lacked recognition by the company. They elected a representative committee representing all three sections.
9 August – Mr Mokwena was informed about this meeting and heard "strong rumours" (Commission's report's italics) that the workers were possibly intending to embark on a "wild cat strike" from the next day. He therefore drafted and issued a communique reminding employees that no demands outside of existing collective bargaining structures would be tolerated. The communique also warned workers that the work stoppage would constitute unprotected industrial action, that any gathering would be in breach of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, that the SAPS would be called in and that management would not hesitate to dismiss workers who participated.
9 August – NUM held a mass meeting at Lonmin speaking against participation in strike action and telling members that they could not raise the demands for R12 500 because of the two year wage agreement (which union officials later conceded was incorrect). NUM would assist members who experienced difficulties in going to work.
10 August – Lonmin workers began gathering at 6am. At 7am Lonmin managers, including the Senior Manager of ER (Mr Kwadi) held a meeting to review the situation. It was noted that workers had not reported for work. It was also noted that that AMCU had not aligned itself to the demand and NUM had distanced itself from the demand. At 8am workers began to march and management requested police assistance. Mr Mokwena phoned Mr Mathunjwa to tell him that employees were going to present a memorandum, to be received by SAPS. Mr Mathunjwa advised Mr Mokwena to emphasise to employees that receipt of such memorandum by the police should not be construed as constituting a precedent and that its contents would have to be dealt with by the structures within the company. (He then wrote a letter to the company confirming this.) The managers phoned the Executive Manager for Human Capital at Western Platinum (Mr Kgotle), who informed them that management would not speak to a faceless crowd when there were recognised and established structures in place whereby demands could be put to management. It had just been decided by a management meeting that they would not accept a memorandum from the marchers because Lonmin would not bargain outside its established bargaining structures. Lonmin served papers in the Labour Court for an interdict.
As the march progressed, Lonmin security, accompanied by the SAPS commander, approached the crowd and asked them what they wanted. 6 of the workers came forward and spoke for the marchers. Lonmin security informed them of the management decision and requested the crowd to put their demands in writing. The crowd responded that they were illiterate and could not do so. The security officials then reported back to management.
At this stage, Mr Kgotle issued a communique informing workers that their conduct amounted to serious misconduct and instructing them to report for duty. Failure to comply would lead to termination of employment. This communique was conveyed to the crowd by the security officials, and then the workers' representatives addressed the crowd.
At this stage, the mood of the crowd changed significantly and levels of aggression began to increase rapidly, and the security officials noted this and found it very unusual and disturbing. The security officials also noted that there were between 4 and 6 individuals who appeared to be able to influence the crowd. It would appear that the report back by the representatives displeased the crowd, as, when asked by the crowd what the employer said they were supposed to do next, they reported that "the employer said we can do what we want". The crowd then dispersed, after agreeing to gather again next morning to wait for a further response from management.
Management held a debriefing later that day, with SAPS in attendance. The meeting agreed on a communique which gave notice of intended disciplinary action against the marchers and thanked all employees who had reported for duty. It is not stated in the report how this communique was distributed to workers.
Later that evening, acts of intimidation started and security at one stage fired rubber bullets. In response, NUM officials used their vehicle to take members to work. Groups of strikers were at this stage observed to be carrying traditional weapons. Some of the intimidation seemed to have been demonstrating inter-union rivalry. NUM members, meanwhile accumulated weapons at their offices. According to a Lonmin security official, there was a strategy session to discuss the aggression and disturbing behaviour, but no notes were kept of this meeting. Apparently also they expected workers to attack Lonmin property and intimidate workers, but not to attack NUM offices. They apparently did not know that NUM offices at Impala had been attacked at some previous stage.
11 August – the intimidation incidents were discussed at an 8am management briefing. Mr Kwadi warned that the actions of NUM would lead to faction fights between the unions. The security officials subsequently warned NUM officials and advised them to vacate their offices.
The strikers' march and other incidents on this day were marked by high levels of aggression against NUM, apparently fuelled by information that AMCU members had been shot by NUM members, and the strikers were seen to be armed with assegais. A fight took place at the NUM offices and NUM members fired shots at the crowd.
Security observations and intelligence found that the workers were bringing a sangoma and planning how to retaliate against NUM.
In the afternoon, management met with NUM to attempt to defuse the situation and also decided to meet with AMCU. Cooperation with SAPS was felt to be inadequate and Mr Kgotle was asked to resolve this. There is nothing in the report about a meeting between management and AMCU. From this point onwards, it is apparent the management and SAPS dealt with the situation in terms of inter-union rivalry.
12 August – At 7.40 am a radio broadcast instructed employees to go back to work. A Lonmin Exco member, in his evidence, agreed that management was well aware of the dangers facing employees coming to work and he agreed that to encourage them to come to work was reckless as Lonmin was unable to adequately protect them. The strike continued. Lonmin security failed to warn security personnel on the ground that the situation was very dangerous and in an escalation of violence, three security officials were killed by strikers.
It appears, from AMCU evidence, that there was a meeting between management and 'leaders of other organisations'. AMCU had been invited by text message but did not respond.
13 August – the strike continued and violence continued, with 5 deaths including 2 policemen. SAPS accordingly escalated their presence and activity. Mr Kwadi phoned Mr Mathunjwa stating that there was violence at the mine and something had to be done to stop it, and asking Mr Mathunjwa to intervene.
At a meeting between SAPS and management, management stated that the strikers were not known to them, they were 'faceless'. Management also stated that the genesis of the problem was rivalry between AMCU and NUM. A separate discussion between the senior SAPS commander and Mr Kgotle conveyed allegations to Mr Kgotle that management at Impala were colluding with AMCU and she alleged that from a political point of view there was a feeling that the mining industry wanted to replace NUM with another face and that was why these things were erupting. At an earlier meeting between the SAPS National Commissioner and Mr Kgotle, the National Commissioner had apparently told Mr Kgotle that if management gave the strikers leeway they could be seen as supporting them.
14 August – a SAPS negotiator engaged with the strikers, and five of the crowd came forward to talk to him. They told the negotiator that the strike was about wages and demanded to speak to management. The gathering at that moment was about the killing of their members by NUM on 10 August. The workers later requested the negotiators to withdraw until next day at 9am to allow the workers to discuss the process they wished to follow. This request was conveyed to management and the negotiators were told to agree to this.
While this was happening, SAPS was meeting with Mr Mokwena and the security manager. This meeting was recorded, although management initially did not hand this in to the Commission. In initial statements, no-one at the meeting, including Mr Mokwena, mentioned the meeting. At this meeting, Mr Mokwena said that Lonmin's priority was getting people arrested. He said it was very clear that AMCU was behind the strike and that AMCU had made media statements that they had presented the wage demand to management. He later, in cross examination, withdrew both these statements. On the tape, he also referred to a tape recording on which AMCU had said that Lonmin would remain ungovernable. He later said that he had never heard this recording, and that Mr Kwadi, who apparently had the tape, was unwilling to hand it over. At this meeting, Mr Mokwena also said that Lonmin would not start to talk to the strikers outside organised bargaining structures. The senior SAPS official said that the workers felt they were in control because the employer was not telling them anything and not calling them to work. She encouraged Mr Mokwena to communicate with the strikers and issue an ultimatum for them to come to work. She said it did not matter if the workers were angered because the police were here and would manage the situation. Mr Mokwena agreed to prepare a communique which would be delivered by helicopter. Other political considerations concerning a possible intervention by Julius Malema were introduced into this discussion also, and these discussions were strongly criticized in the report. The meeting concluded on the basis that the next day would be 'D' day, when the strikers either voluntarily laid down their arms and left the koppie or were forced to do so as a result of police action.
15 August - In the event, the 15th was not 'D' day, because the police commanders realised that they could not act while negotiations were proceeding, and because of a radio programme in the early morning involving both unions and Mr Mokwena at which the two unions agreed to go and talk to the workers and urge them to go back to work, while Mr Mokwena said that Lonmin wanted to "use the structures of the unions to discuss any grievances or concerns in the most civilized manner without pangas and without guns. We can do it now, we can do it as soon as possible." The two union presidents went to the mine and were briefed by SAPS that SAPS intelligence revealed that some of the strikers belonged to AMCU and others belonged to NUM.
Mr Mokwena was not prepared to go and address the crowd as the company's stance was that they would only negotiate in a controlled environment and only within established bargaining structures. He set out the company's position to be conveyed to the strikers as "We are willing to engage our employees within the structures that are known. In a very safe environment where there are no weapons. Not on the mountain. So we are willing to meet our employees through their structures, through their leaders to discuss any issue. Not when they are armed. Not when they are actually outside Lonmin property. So when the workers are back, disarmed, tomorrow, tonight, through their leaders we will meet them. That is our position. So we are not against meeting, discussing issues with employees through their right structures. We are prepared to do that." It is not clear from the report through what channels this message was to be conveyed.
The NUM president was not able to speak to the crowd but the AMCU president did get a hearing, after one of his officials had expressed inflammatory remarks. Mr Mathunjwa told the strikers that he had asked the employer to give them a guarantee that if the strikers went back to work it would talk to their union, namely the structures the strikers had chosen so that they could get what they wanted. He further advised the strikers that they should go back to work so that if the negotiations broke down they could approach the CCMA for arbitration so that any subsequent strike in which they might engage would be protected. According to him, the strikers thanked him and told him they understood the message from the employer but as it was getting dark he must come back in the morning and see how they would go back to work.
Mr Mathunjwa debriefed with SAPS and said he did not have a specific answer as to what would happen next day but added that he believed the next day would be day of joy for everyone. NUM debriefed with SAPS and asked them to disarm the strikers on the mountain, which SAPS refused to do as it would lead to bloodshed.
Mr Mathunjwa requested [presumably through Mr Kwadi, the senior ER Manager] a meeting with management for 8am the following day so that he could hear from management that 'if the workers happened to agree to return back to work, where are they supposed to report.' Management agreed to this request.
16 August – Mr Mathunjwa arrived for the meeting late, at 8.20. He met Mr Kwadi in the foyer and reminded him that they had spoken the previous night and that he wanted to know the response of management. He also said that he would go and speak to the workers on condition that the company gave some sort of guarantee that the company would negotiate with AMCU as part of a central forum to deal with the issue of RDOs across Marikana operations. Mr Kwadi responded that he had to consult with management, and he went off, then returned and reported that management was no longer prepared to engage with the strikers as they had the two year collective agreement in place. Consequently they were not prepared to commit themselves with workers. Mr Mathunjwa felt betrayed, as management had reneged on the commitment made the previous day. Mr Mokwena then came and gave him his cellphone as the police commander wished to speak to him urgently to go and speak to the strikers at 9am as promised.
He arrived to speak to the strikers at 12 noon. The strikers again told him they wanted the employer to come and address them. He therefore telephoned Mr Kwadi, who told him that management was not prepared to meet with him. He then tried to phone another executive manager (Mr Seedat) who told him he would try his best but he was not in control.
From this point, the police implemented their tactical plan, which resulted in the massacre.
The Commission's report ends at this point.
Lonmin then closed the mine for a period of mourning, and called for workers to return to work on 20th August. The company disassociated the violence from the industrial dispute.
The strike continued until 19 September, with various ultimatums being issued to the strikers before a settlement was reached between the company and both NUM and AMCU whereby RDOs were promoted a pay grade, received a drilling allowance and a small increase, totalling an increase of between 11% and 22%. The settlement excluded all contract workers (about 9 000). Talks which led to the settlement were preceded by a peace accord and facilitated by the Department of Labour and the president of the SA Council of Churches.
Neighbouring platinum producers closed mines and experienced unprotected strikes for the rest of the year.
Strike handling procedures
The report notes that detailed minutes of briefing meetings should have been kept, in terms of the company Procedure. The evidence of the log books shows that minutes were neither detailed nor accurate.
The governance of policies and procedures appears to be poor, as policies were accepted as binding by officials despite not having been properly authorized. (The Commission report notes that the Lonmin Counter Industrial Action Procedure, which was considered binding by Lonmin security officials, was testified by Mr Mokwena not to be, in fact, a fully authorized company policy.
The critical importance of accurate and complete incident log books was not emphasized and controlled by management.
SABPP analysis
Lonmin, as conceded by management after the Marikana massacre in its 2012 Annual Report, would not easily build a relationship of trust with its employees as long as they were forced to live in squalid conditions on its doorstep. In evidence at the Commission, Mr Seedat conceded that the company had known about the critical housing problem for years. Lonmin, over the period 2004 to 2009, converted 41 hostels, thereby displacing its former inhabitants, without building replacement housing for them. Over the same period, the proportion of the migrant labour component of the workforce did not change. The impression is given that workers were not seen as people but as a commodity.
Management did not adequately match the investment in employee housing to the cycles of platinum prices. The argument that the global economic situation accounted for the failure to build houses over the period 2004 to 2009 is not supported by the more than doubling of the Rand platinum price over that period. (See Appendix 3) Management misrepresented their legal obligations and achievement against those in its Social and Labour Plan report of 2009, reducing the target for housing to 3 show houses and awarding itself a 100% rating for achievement of the target. This is highly undermining of trust and respect with their workforce and other stakeholders.
Management appeared to fail to understand the legal stature of the SLP and that the company could not simply unilaterally review its obligations, which were legally binding.
Management had not thoroughly debriefed themselves about the Implats situation and had not prepared contingency plans for when wage demands were raised by RDOs. The Implats precedent was a significant one – employers should negotiate reasonable wages subject to affordability, but once the Agreement is signed it must be enforced. It would appear that the Implats job evaluation system was not properly or fairly applied - changing the job grading is either an easy way out or workers were incorrectly graded all along.
Management took a poor decision in refusing to involve the unions as recommended by their mine manager. This is significant – one has to engage all stakeholders when an issue like this arises. The problem here was that the structures did not seem to work for the RDOs – the group that initiated the strike and who had previously tried to talk to management. It was a worker issue – reminiscent of the 1973 Natal strikes.
Having refused to involve the unions, management then acted arbitrarily and awarded a unilateral, small allowance, and told the workers that management would not deal with the matter outside the established structures. Management did not even involve NUM as the majority union. This therefore missed an opportunity, as recognition of an actor's power leads to de-escalation of conflict – management's actions would inevitably lead to an increase in the conflict – the union has to demonstrate its power.
Management did not act on rumours of a march and wage demands by convening, as suggested by AMCU, a meeting of all the unions. Mr Mokwena even neglected to follow up with Mr Mathunjwa as promised, thereby undermining any relationship.
Management did not take advantage of the opportunity presented by a peaceful march to listen to their employees and ask the marchers to elect representatives to present the memorandum and to agree the way forward. It is true that one should not deal with a mob but workers should have been asked to elect representatives to meet with management.
Instead, management, speaking through security officials, cut off all avenues for communication and took a hard line, and in the process set up security officials as 'the enemy'. Representatives did in fact emerge and could have been met with. As soon as management took a hard line, the levels of aggression escalated rapidly. Taking a confrontational approach guarantees a strike and probably violence to go with it. This sort of approach should only be taken in the last instance when all attempts at conciliation have failed and you are in a strong bargaining position. It was very confrontational in the circumstances to issue ultimatums and threaten dismissals – lessons of the 1980's were ignored. Dismissals change the nature of the conflict unless the employer is in a very strong position, (Lonmin wasn't) and usually lead to violence – example BTR Sarmcol Strike in the 1980's. A better strategy would have been to isolate the strikers and then just wait. (The Commission notes that the first 'game changer' was the decision by the strikers on 10 August to enforce their strike by violence and intimidation – this is just after management had taken this hard line.)
Management's decision to speak only through the security officials did not take advantage of an opportunity for a known face of management to speak to the representatives and also to ensure that management's feedback was correctly conveyed to the crowd. At a late stage, management also refused to speak directly to the strikers and allowed Mr Mathunjwa to convey messages on their behalf (even while refusing to allow AMCU into bargaining structures). At various times, the police were also conveying messages from management. Inconsistency in leadership is a major flaw.
It appears that at no stage was one senior company representative designated to deal with communication to the strikers and the unions. A strike action plan should have determined who did what during the strike, including who was responsible for communication. Various HR, ER and other managers appear in the narrative at various points, leaving it unclear as to who was in charge. This exacerbated the communication problems with the strikers, who kept asking for 'the employer' to come and speak to them.
Management's attitude to AMCU appears to have been inconsistent, sometimes refusing to allow AMCU 'a seat at the table' and at other times begging Mr Mathunjwa to intervene to stop the violence and inviting him to meetings. Recognition of an actor's power leads to a decrease in power deployment – a basic principle of working with power relations.
Management did not sufficiently evaluate the risk of violence to workers who reported for work and thus issued ultimatums which posed a severe risk to workers should they comply. Management also appears to have condoned, if not encouraged, NUM officials to encourage and enable their members to go to work despite threats of violence against them. Management did not close the mine to protect non-striking workers and to enable security to be concentrated on protecting essential service workers. It seems that at this stage they were believing their own propaganda – that the conflict was rooted in inter-union rivalry. It is not management's role to take sides in inter-union conflict – rather focus on winning the hearts and minds of the workforce – a strategy which works.
As the report notes, Lonmin did not use the intelligence available, did not properly formulate plans for dealing with the strikers, did not ensure that there were adequate security resources at its disposal and did not properly brief security staff. This all points to the lack of a proper strike contingency plan.
Management decided to characterize the strike and the violence as inter-union rivalry rather than as a wage demand and rejection by workers of union representation. It is apparent that Mr Mokwena reached this conclusion with insufficient evidence. Mr Mokwena also behaved unprofessionally in making statements which he later had to withdraw as being incorrect.
Management did not behave consistently and keep promises made on 15th August, when management publicly committed themselves, through Mr Mokwena, to meet with union structures once the strikes were back at work, but yet on 16th August, management refused to meet on the grounds that the 2 year agreement was in place. This constitutes a breach of trust.
There is no mention in the evidence that management in general, and the two ER/HC executives in particular, showed concern that the strikers were employees who should be treated as employees. The stance seemed to have been that they were 'faceless' and deserved no consideration.
Management did not have an effective strike contingency plan.
The Commission found that Lonmin did not collude with SAPS in a toxic manner and confirmed that the involvement of the police when acts of violence against people and property are occurring during a strike is entirely appropriate.
The company's internal investigation after the event identified the following contributory factors:
a. Inadequate intelligence network;
b. Lack of consideration of risk associated with supplier and contractor equipment services
c. Ineffective contingency plan for this type of situation;
d. Absence of a system to ensure that training requirements are managed so that employees and contractors are competent to meet the risks applicable to their responsibilities;
e. Lack of awareness by employees to provide correct information about incidents;
f. Lack of management commitment to safeguard employees from industrial action related violence.
21. Management's role in and reaction to the events, demonstrated a lack of leadership behaviour which lives the stated values of Lonmin, which are:
a. " Zero harm – we are committed to zero harm to people and the environment
b. Integrity, honesty and trust – we are committed, ethical people who do what we say we will do.
c. Transparency – open honest communication and free sharing of information.
d. Respect for each other, embracing our diversity enriched by openness, sharing, trust, teamwork and involvement.
e. High performance – stretching our individual and team capabilities to achieve innovative and superior outcomes.
Employee self-worth – to enhance the quality of life for our employees and their families and promote self-esteem."
From an SABPP point of view this tragedy could have happened to a lot of South African businesses where there is very poor HR management and a lack of values-based leadership. Management and ERM training is too often only done to get BBB-EE points or so as to claim skills development levies instead of with the aim of creating a business climate whereby employees are treated consistently, fairly and with respect. Employers too often look for short cuts – trying to train complex subjects such as ERM in too short a time, with the result that such training creates conscious incompetence and supervisors shy away from their responsibilities because they see these as too difficult and complicated. Ultimately this leads to militancy and industrial unrest.
The tragic events at Marikana hold many lessons for employers and HR/ER practitioners. The objectives of the SABPP ERM Standard show the way forward.
To provide a framework for collective bargaining where relevant.
As described by veteran ER specialist Adrian du Plessis in August 2012, the roots of mine violence lie deep in the structure of large, hierarchical, labour-intensive operations in cyclical industries and which traditionally rely on migrant labour. When rival unions emerge, these tensions are worsened. To deal with these issues, systemic interventions at various levels are needed, including a deep understanding of the dynamics involved; fundamental reforms designed together with social partners; aligning ER systems to the changing character of employment, work and reward; and the establishment of an integrative stakeholder structure.
The Farlam Commission dealt more concretely with events within a short time frame of August 2012. Some of the main lessons to be learned from the way this particular industrial dispute was managed include:
Management must at all times give honest information about its financial circumstances and ensure that employees understand the information;
Commitments made in any plan or agreement must be adhered to or stakeholders must be involved in any proposed changes to those commitments;
Information on any change in the employment relations climate, which may occur from many different causes, should be gathered and carefully evaluated. New stakeholders should be involved sooner rather than later in a dispute.
External circumstances can impact on internal employment relations processes, therefore the employer must continually scan and evaluate the external environment;
Paying attention to the conditions under which employees live and giving them a stake, means that they are less likely to pay attention to radical elements from inside or outside;
When collective bargaining structures are in place, employers may not take unilateral action on wages or conditions of employment;
Employers should not take sides in inter-union disputes, even where one union is recognised and the other is not;
Employers should ensure that there is a fully developed strike contingency plan including the nomination of a credible management representative that can present a consistent face, known to workers, and who is seen as being able to take decisions;
Although the current climate of violence in strikes is to be deplored, employers must recognise it and ensure that non-striking workers are protected and not placed in danger.
Footnote: In an interview in August 2015 for the GIBS Acumen publication, the CEO of Lonmin since August 2013, Ben Magara, told how he spent his first 100 days on the job just listening to employees anywhere and everywhere. He has also started a leadership change whereby managers have re-assumed their people management responsibilities. "It all starts with people and it all starts with conversations. This may sound obvious but these can be very painful and very trying if battle lines have already been drawn. And, frankly, miners would prefer to view spreadsheets and operate machinery than deal with what have been traditionally viewed as soft issues. This, after all, is why we abdicated our responsibility to engage with our employees to the unions in the first place – and the legacy of that practice continues to haunt us… Managers and supervisors are now driving direct engagements with employees, and the early wins from unleashing the Lonmin human potential are pleasing."
16 August 2017 (updating the version of September 2015)
This Commentary was prepared by Marius Meyer, CEO of the SABPP and Dr Penny Abbott, Head of Research of the SABPP. Thanks to Bruno Bruniquel of Bruniquel Associates, and Dr Angela du Plessis for reviewing and commenting on the paper. SABPP would also like to acknowledge the excellent work done by the Farlam Commission in investigating the Marikana massacre and for producing such a comprehensive report. The SABPP analysis serves as a guide for HR Managers and Line Managers, as well as Employment Relations Academics and students.
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If you could only have one, which one would you get???? I know jumbo is better for every day but it's SO big!!!! The large (maybe medium?) is better for nights. I can only afford one bag...which one should I go with? I need an every day bag as well as something that I could dress up for a night out. Which one would you recommend?????
the jumbo is nice but too large for night life.
i'd go with the large.
large! the jumbo is so bulky looking!
For me the jumbo didn't right on my frame, but it is a cool looking bag. The large is good for both day and night.
I like the large best for a dinner to evening look. Most of the classic flaps I have are large. If you want to wear the large during the day you can do that too, but it will only fit the necessities. The only reason I got the navy in the jumbo is because I wanted a funkier look for the navy color and the jumbo defnitely does that for it. Good luck choosing!
Ladies, for the 2.55 is the large size same as medium size, I know it's a silly question but I read it somewhere in this forum before..
haha, I'm struggling with this same question: large or jumbo. Jumbo doesn't look as good as the large on me but I know I'd use it more during the day. Decisions decisions!!
Large would be my choice. Jumbo is toooooo big.
Jumbo but only for the daytime.
Correct me if I am wrong, the difference between the two is about 2inches in length?
I tried on both and felt that the jumbo was significantly bigger, maybe 2 inches in length and width?


text:
import unittest
from AddressBook import AddressBook
from AddressBookHandler import AddressBookHandler

class AddressBookTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self.obj = AddressBookHandler()

    def test_address_book_object(self):
        assert not AddressBook("Umair", "Bhatti", "GHQ", "marry@smart.com", "5001676", "Human") == None

    def test_add_group(self):
        self.obj.add_group('Human')

    def test_add_person(self):
        self.obj.add_person("Jawad", "Aslam", "PDK", "jawad@hafiz.com", "5519726", "Human")
        assert self.obj.count_persons() > 0

        self.obj.add_person("Umair", "Bhatti", "GHQ", "marry@smart.com", "5001676", "Human")
        assert self.obj.count_persons() == 2

    def test_get_address_book(self):
        assert type(self.obj.get_address_book()) == list

    def test_ptrint_short_info(self):
        allPersons = self.obj.get_address_book()
        if len(allPersons) > 0:
            self.obj.print_short_info(allPersons[0])

    def test_get_persons_in_group(self):
        allGroups = self.obj.get_all_groups()
        if len(allGroups) > 0:
            self.obj.get_persons_in_group(self.obj.get_all_groups()[0])
        else:
            self.obj.get_persons_in_group("Default")

    def test_print_person_info(self):
        allPersons = self.obj.get_address_book()
        if len(allPersons) > 0:
            self.obj.print_person_info(allPersons[0])

    def test_get_group_info_of_person(self):
        allPersons = self.obj.get_address_book()
        if len(allPersons) > 0:
            self.obj.get_group_info_of_person(allPersons[0].fname)

    def test_get_person_info_by_name(self):
        allPersons = self.obj.get_address_book()
        if len(allPersons) > 0:
            self.obj.get_person_info_by_name(allPersons[0].fname)

    def test_get_person_info_by_email(self):
        allPersons = self.obj.get_address_book()
        if len(allPersons) > 0:
            self.obj.get_person_info_by_name(allPersons[0].email)

    def tearDown(self):
        self.obj = None

if __name__ == '__main__':
    unittest.main()


text:
Winchester – jednostka osadnicza w Stanach Zjednoczonych, w stanie Wisconsin, w hrabstwie Winnebago.

CDP w stanie Wisconsin

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


If there is a difference between our Personal Savings Products – General Terms and Conditions; and the Personal Savings Products – Specific Terms and Conditions for your product, the Specific Terms and Conditions will prevail.
"We", "us", "our" means OakNorth Bank plc, a company registered in England and Wales under company number 08595042 and whose registered office is at 57 Broadwick Street, London, W1F 9QS.
OakNorth Bank plc is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority (Financial Services Register No. 629564). Registered in England No. 08595042.
1.1 You must be at least 18 years of age to open an account(s) with us.
1.2 We are obliged to confirm the true identity of all applicants. If we cannot confirm your true identity, we may refuse your application to open an account and refuse to accept a deposit from you without giving a reason.
1.3 If you are an individual, you have the right to nominate an authorised third party to help with the administration of your account(s). If you do this, we will need to confirm the true identity of the third party, as well.
1.4 The currency of the account will be the Pound sterling and deposit(s) will only be accepted if they are in this currency.
1.5 The minimum deposit required to open your account is £1,000.
1.6 The maximum deposit you may pay into any one account is £250,000. The maximum amount that you will be allowed to hold on deposit with us across multiple accounts is £250,000.
1.7 You may not overdraw or borrow on your account.
1.8 If your application to open an account is approved, there will be a maximum period of 14 calendar days to fund your account from the date of approval. If the account is not funded within 14 days, it will be closed.
1.9 If you are required to send us further information, you will have 10 calendar days in which to do so.
1.10 Details of our current interest rates are available online. You can also refer to your deposit statement or contact us to find out more.
1.11 If the account holder dies, the personal representatives of the deceased must notify us in writing and provide us with a copy of the death certificate and other documents to close the account. The account will remain open and continue to accrue interest until it is closed.
1.12 It is a condition of this agreement that you will not: (a) act abusively, offensively or violently towards our staff; (b) become bankrupt; (c) act dishonestly with us; (d) use your account for a dishonest or unlawful purpose; or (e) act in a way that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of fraud. If you do any of these things, we will regard that as a serious breach of the agreement between us; and we may close your account immediately. We may also close your account immediately, if we reasonably consider that (a) it would be unlawful for us to keep; or (b) we would breach our regulatory obligations if we kept, your account open.
1.13 If you breach these conditions in a significant way, or you breach them repeatedly, we may also close your account by giving you 14 days written notice of our intention to do so.
2.1 We will only accept cheques and funds transferred from a UK bank account that is both in your name, and the nominated bank account specified in your application to open the account..
2.2 Deposits funded by online transfer will be credited to your account, and interest will begin accruing on the business day on which we receive your funds.
2.3 Deposits funded by cheque will normally be credited to your account not more than 2 business days after the business day we receive your cheque and interest will begin accruing on the business day we credit your account.
3.1 If a payment is fraudulently or mistakenly paid into your account, it may be removed from your account later.
3.2 Under the Payments Services Directive, if an unauthorised or incorrectly executed payment transaction occurs, you are entitled to rectification, provided you notify us without undue delay on becoming aware of the transaction. There will usually be undue delay if you fail to notify us within 30 calendar days of receiving a statement of account showing the relevant transaction. Failure to notify us within 13 months of the transaction will always amount to undue delay.
3.3 If you fail to notify us in accordance with condition 3.2 or if you act fraudulently in relation to your account you will be liable for all losses. If you act without reasonable care and losses are caused, you may also be liable for them.
3.4 You must contact us using the details on our 'get in touch' page as soon as you realise there has been an unauthorised or incorrectly executed payment transaction.
4.1 You must take all reasonable security precautions to prevent misuse of your account and any customer security details (including account details, security codes or secure personal information) which allow you to gain access to your account. Failure to take reasonable security precautions may result in access to your account or additional services being blocked. Reasonable security precautions include not disclosing your security details to anyone (except when confirming, registering or resetting your security details with us); not disclosing or writing down your security details in any way that can be understood by someone else; not choosing security details which are easy to guess; and ensuring your security details are kept private at all times.
4.2 You must also tell us as soon as possible of a change of name, address or other contact details so that any correspondence does not get into the wrong hands.
4.3 If your security details are lost or stolen or you think someone knows them or has used or tried to use them, you must contact us immediately by calling us on 0330 380 1181.
4.4 We will ask you to co-operate with us by providing information or other assistance in connection with the loss or misuse of your security details. We may also give the police information about you or your account which we consider relevant to assist with any investigation of criminal activity. In some instances, we may ask you to contact the police in connection with suspicious or criminal activity on your account. You agree to give us, the police and other investigative and law enforcement agencies, your reasonable co-operation, if asked to do so.
5.1 If your security details are used with your permission by someone else, or because you acted fraudulently or failed to take reasonable security precautions (see condition 4), or if you deliberately or with gross negligence failed to inform us of the loss, theft, misuse or suspected misuse of any of your personal security details, you may be liable for all losses.
5.2 You will not be responsible for any losses for abuse of your secure personal information after you have informed us in the manner set out in condition 4 of their loss, theft, misuse or suspected misuse.
5.3 If you have any reason to think we have made an error you must tell us as soon as possible. If we make an error in administering your account we will tell you and put it right, restoring the account to the state it would have been had the error not taken place. In resolving any error, you agree that we may make the necessary correcting entry(ies) to your account without having to seek your prior approval.
6.1 A statement will be issued to you annually.
6.2 You agree to check your statement and tell us as soon as possible if you think there has been a mistake. If you do this, we will investigate. If we need more information to carry out our investigations, we will tell you, and you agree to take reasonable steps to give us what we need. When we have completed our investigations, we will tell you what we found, and what action we are proposing to take.
6.3 We can make available to you any further information which we hold in relation to any transaction on your account and this can be requested by contacting us.
6.4 Our current Tariff of Charges is available online and you may request a copy at any time. You may also incur charges for non-standard services provided on your account. We may change our Tariff of Charges in a proportionate manner in order to reflect changes in reasonable overheads and costs. If you have any further questions, or would like further information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
6.5 We will give you at least 2 months' notice prior to increasing the charges contained within the Tariff. If you are not prepared to accept the changes, you must tell us within the notice period. If you do that, you will be entitled to close your account, without having to pay a charge to do so. If you do not tell us, within the notice period, that you are not prepared to accept the changes, you will be deemed to have accepted them when the notice period expires.
7.1 You must notify us immediately of any change in your name, your home address, your email address or your telephone number.
7.2 If you ask us to accept instructions by email (and signed attachment in whatever format) or telephone or in writing then, in consideration of us agreeing to accept instructions in this way, you agree to indemnify us from and against all actions, proceedings, claims and demands which may be brought against us and all losses, costs, charges, damages and expenses which we may incur or for which we may become liable because we acted on an instruction from you or an authorised signatory (notwithstanding that any such instruction may not have been duly authorised by you). You will also reimburse us fully for legal fees and all other collection costs and expenses incurred in the enforcement of this indemnity.
8.1 To make these conditions easier to understand or fairer to you.
8.2 To correct non-material mistakes, ambiguities, inaccuracies or omissions where it is reasonable to do so or as a result of customer feedback.
8.3 To make improvements to the services we provide which are of benefit to you.
8.4 To reflect changes in security design or technology at no increased cost to you..
8.5 To respond to changes in the law, codes of practice, industry-wide fraud prevention practices, court or ombudsman decisions or new regulatory requirements or practice.
8.6 To take account of any change in our ownership or to reflect a reorganisation of our business as a result of it being acquired or merging with another bank or organisation, to make sure that our customers and the customers of the other organisation are treated in a similar way if they have a similar product.
8.7 If we reasonably believe the change is necessary in the interests of our customers and OakNorth.
9.1 If false or inaccurate information is provided and fraud is identified or suspected, details may be passed to fraud prevention agencies. Law enforcement agencies may access and use this information.
9.2 We and other organisations may also access and use this information to prevent fraud and money laundering, for example when checking deposit applications.
9.3 We and other organisations may access and use, from other countries, the information recorded by fraud prevention agencies.
9.4 If you would like contact details for the credit reference and fraud prevention agencies we use, please contact us.
11.1 We may monitor or record calls, emails, text messages or other communications in accordance with applicable laws. Such recording or monitoring may take place for business purposes such as quality control and training, prevention of unauthorised use of our telecommunication systems and website, ensuring effective systems operation, prevention or detection of crime, and protection of your personal data.
12.1 It is our aim to ensure a complete service at all times, but we will not be responsible when failure is caused by unforeseeable circumstances beyond our control.
12.2 OakNorth Bank plc is covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). The Scheme will pay compensation of up to £85,000 (the current Scheme Limit) to eligible depositors if we cannot meet our financial obligations to them.
12.3.2 We reasonably believe such person is capable of performing our responsibilities.
12.4 You may not transfer any of your rights or responsibilities under this agreement to any person.
12.5 If we believe that you or your organisation has tax obligations in other countries, we may disclose information about you or your organisation directly to those tax authorities or to HM Revenue & Customs, which may share the information with the other tax authorities.
12.6 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). If you are a US person (US passport or US Born or US Registered address or US Taxpayer) we may be obliged to provide any required details about you and your account with us. We will inform you by telephone or email if this is the case.
13.1 If for any reason you need to contact us, this can be done by email, by phone or by writing to us. Please refer to our website for our contact details.
14.1 Please visit our website for details of our complaints procedure. If you would like to contact us to discuss or make a complaint, please call, email or write to our Customer Services Team using the contact details on our website.
14.2 We always endeavour to reply to complaints within two or three days. If for some reason we have not been able to resolve your complaint within eight weeks, or you are not satisfied with the resolution, you may be entitled to refer your complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service. The Financial Ombudsman Service will not usually accept or consider a complaint (a) until we have issued our final response; or (b) more than six months after we have issued our final response to your complaint.
15.1 We are committed to protecting your information. Please refer to the OakNorth Privacy Notice on our website which describes what information we collect about you and how your information will be used. The Privacy Notice (which can be found here) is to be read in conjunction with these Terms and Conditions.
16.1 These Terms and Conditions shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English law. Without prejudice to section 14, the parties hereby submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts in respect of any dispute or matter arising out of or connected with these Terms and Conditions.
17.1 These Terms and Conditions are available only in English and all communications from us will be in English.
17.2 We will only accept communications and instructions from customers in English.
1.1 We will only accept one deposit from you in relation to a single account, although you may be able to open more than one account at a time (subject to clause 1.6 relating to the maximum aggregate balance that you may deposit with us).
1.2 The account is for a fixed period of time commencing on the day the account is funded. We will confirm this date by sending an email to the email address nominated by you. The email will include the account number, amount invested, interest rate applied and the maturity date for the account.
1.3 You cannot close or make withdrawals during the term of your account unless it falls within the specified criteria set out in the Specific Terms and Conditions for Fixed Term Deposit Products, section 5.
1.4 If you fund your account using a cheque, and the cheque does not clear, your account will be deactivated and we may ask you for an alternate means of payment.
2.2 If we do not receive your instructions before your account maturity date, the total amount including interest will be automatically transferred to the nominated account that was provided on application. If the nominated account is no longer active or closed and the funds are returned to us, we will attempt to contact you to source new bank account details to transfer the funds to.
2.3 Your account will mature on a business day. If the maturity date falls on a non-business day (weekends and bank holidays) the date of maturity will be the next business day and interest will continue to accrue for the additional day or days.
3.1 The interest rate for your account will be fixed by the Bank when your account is approved. (Unless the law requires us to do something else), we will pay you credit interest without deduction of tax. You are responsible for paying any tax which may be due.
3.2 We will calculate interest on the minimum daily balance in your account. Interest will be calculated from the day we receive cleared funds into your account.
3.3 We will pay interest to your account on maturity.
3.4 Fixed Term deposit customers will get a statement on maturity.
5.1 You cannot close your account at any time between the date your account is funded and the date when the product matures, unless there are exceptional circumstances.
1.3 Interest will be calculated on the minimum daily balance, and applied monthly.
5.1 We will send you an account closure statement when you close your Easy Access account.
3.1 Withdrawal from your Notice account to your nominated account can be triggered online or through telephone requests.
3.2 The minimum withdrawal amount is £1,000, or the balance amount if the account balance is less than £1,000. If you make a withdrawal and the balance falls to £0, and remains at £0 6 months, your account will be closed.
3.3 The maximum withdrawal amount is £250,000..
3.4 If your withdrawal request is received on a business day, the money will be sent back to your nominated account on the following business day. If it is received on a non-business day such as a Saturday, Sunday or a Bank holiday, the money will be sent back to your nominated account within the 2 business days following. You can also trigger withdrawal requests over the phone.
5.1 We will send you an account closure statement when you close your Notice account.


Must All Inventions Be Patented?
Must all innovation/inventions be patented? – Defensive Publication Patents have always been the means of protecting your inventions against unwarranted use. Patenting your invention prevents a person from using your invention without your permission.


We buy hundreds of vehicles every week, to resell and to dismantle or scrap.
The quote details will then be automatically e-mailed to you. Just print a copy of the quote & bring it with you when you deliver your car or have it handy when we collect you car.
Please note: The price we quote for a vehicle is on the basis that it is complete and delivered to us. If parts have been removed or we have to collect it, we may reduce the price.