If you're ready to give your Westerly-area home a new look with brand new, top-of-the-line flooring, turn to your local Carpet One. Westerly-area Carpet One stores can be counted on to supply your Rhode Island home with the top selections of flooring materials, professional installation, and flooring protection in the industry. We carry everything from natural hardwood to lavish carpet choices and everything in between.
Working with Carpet One in the Westerly area will redefine the way you shop for flooring. We are proud to offer a flooring type for every lifestyle and every price range at your Carpet One near Westerly. Our Carpet One sales professionals will help you navigate the selection process with the added help of Carpet One's SelectAFloor™ system, which aids you in choosing the best floor for your home at the best price. Whether you're looking to add contemporary style with ceramic tiling or laminate flooring that is both durable and beautiful for the high-traffic rooms of your home, rest assured that you can find what you need by shopping at Carpet One near Westerly. Plus, Carpet One offers a variety of flooring warranties to ensure that your floors perform well long after installation.
It's truly easy to find reasonably-priced, quality flooring at your Carpet One near Westerly. Rely on your Carpet One near Westerly to help you achieve your vision and renovate your floors with professional ease. Come in to your Carpet One near Westerly and let us help you start your flooring redesign journey today!


text:
Policies & Standards at Irvine Valley College
Statement on Freedom of Expression, Civility and Mutual Respect
Sidebar Menu Campus Policies
Academic Honesty & Dishonesty
Academic Policies & Standards
Academic Renewal, Probation & Dismissal
Animals/Pets on Campus
Courseload Limits
Debts Owed to the College
Digital Information
Disciplinary Action
Facebook Posting
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
Grades and Pass/No Pass Option
IVC Social Media Guidelines
Instructional & Course Material Fees
Nondiscrimination and Harassment
Smokefree IVC
Student Privacy Rights
Student Right-to-Know Disclosure
Students' Rights & Responsibilities
The Irvine Valley College community recognizes the important role of freedom of expression, civility and mutual respect in fostering a healthy and productive college environment. Therefore, the college encourages an atmosphere of professionalism and cooperation, in which each member's roles responsibilities are understood and appreciated, and in which the free expression of all opinions, beliefs and ideas is encouraged and respected. Further, the college seeks to establish the highest level of communication and transparency in the various processes of campus governance and decision making.
To achieve these goals, the college invests its resources in expressing its commitment to free expression, civility, and mutual respect in college publications, including college handbooks and manuals; in proactive education for all employees; by sponsoring projects and activities that bring people together in a spirit of hospitality, service, appreciation, and camaraderie; through regular open forums intended to foster the exchange of ideas; through maintaining open, inclusive and transparent decision-making processes, with regularly published results; and through a peer-driven process—in which all of the governance groups participate and contribute—for dispute resolution, one steeped in finding mutually agreeable solutions.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Ph.D. in Communication, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, USA, July 2008. Dissertation title: Deliberation and the Disempowered: Access, Experience and Influence.
Master of Philosophy in Communication (Graduation with honors), School of Journalism and Communication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, July 2003. Thesis title: Subaltern Public Spheres on the Internet: A Case Study of a Chinese Online Discussion Board.
Bachelor of Arts in Journalism (Graduation with honors), Department of Journalism and Communication, Nanjing University, China, July 2001.
Civic Tech
Zhang, W., Lim, G., Wang, Z., & Perrault, S. (2020, October). #CivicTech For And By Citizens: A Review And A Meta-Evaluation. In Proceedings of Annual CSCW conference Workshop Position Papers on Civic Technologies. Virtual.
Chen, Z & Zhang, W. (online first), Bracketing or Reinforcing?: Socio-economic Status, Network Power, and Online Deliberation. Telematics & Informatics.
Zhang, W., Xi, Y., & Chen, A. (online first). Why do replies appear? A multi-level event history analysis of online policy discussions. New Media & Society.
Menon, S., Zhang, W. & Perrault, S. (2020). Nudge for Deliberativeness: How Interface Features Influence Online Discourses. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference Full Papers on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Hawaii, United States.
Zhang, W. & Yang, T. (2020). The interaction between perceived procedural fairness and perceived disagreement in deliberation. Acta Politica, 55, 199–220.
Perrault, S. & Zhang, W. (2019). Effects of Moderation and Opinion Heterogeneity on Attitude towards the Online Deliberation Process. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference Full Papers on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '19), Glasgow, UK.
Zhang, W., & Soon, C (2017). The Main and Spillover Effects of Online Deliberation: Changes in opinions, informational media use and political activities. In Proceedings of CeDEM 2017, Danube University Krems, Austria.
Zhang, W. (2016). Social media and elections in Singapore: comparing 2011 and 2015. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(4), 367-384.
Zhang, W. & Sabrina, M. Anthony. (2016). Alternative tweeting: A comparison of frames in Twitter's political discourse and mainstream newspaper coverage on Singapore General Elections 2011. In M. Adria & Y. Mao (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Citizen Engagement and Public Participation in the Era of New Media. IGI Global.
Zhang, W. & Pang, N. (2016). The Internet and social media. In Lee, T., & Tan, K. (Eds.), Change in voting: Singapore's 2015 General Election. Singapore: Ethos Books.
Zhang, W. (2015). Perceived procedural fairness in deliberation: Predictors and effects. Communication Research. 42(3), 345-364.
Haciyakupoglu, G. & Zhang, W. (2015). Social media and trust during the Gezi Protests in Turkey. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 40(2), 250-266.
Zhang, W. (2015). The disenfranchised and eDeliberation: Beyond access. In Coleman, S., Przybylska, A., & Sintomer, Y. (Eds.), Deliberation and Democracy: Innovative Processes and Institutions, pp. 57-82. Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang.
Lu, X., Zhang, W., Przybylska, A, De Liddo, A., Convertino, G., Davies, T., & Klein, M. (2015). Design for Online Deliberative Processes and Technologies: Towards a Multidisciplinary Research Agenda. In Proceedings of CHI 2015 (Workshop), Seoul, South Korea.
Menon, S. & Zhang, W. (2014). A value-based design approach for online deliberation. In M. M. Skoric, P. Parycek, & M. Sachs (Eds.), In Proceedings of CeDEM Asia 2014, pp.81-96. Hong Kong, China.
Zhang, W. (2015). The silence of majority: Political talk during 2011 election time. In Tan, T. H., Mahizhnan, A., & Ang, P. H. (Eds.), Battle for hearts and minds: New media and elections in Singapore. pp.227-246. Singapore: World Scientific.
Zhang, W. & Chang, L. (2014). Perceived Speech Conditions and Disagreement of Everyday Talk: A Proceduralist Perspective of Citizen Deliberation. Communication Theory, 24(2), 124-145.
Zhang, W. (2014). 新科技对政治传播的影响 The influence of new technologies on political communication (中文 in Chinese). In J. Hong (Ed.), New trends in communication studies. pp.732-746. Beijing, China: Tsinghua University Press.
Chang, L., Jacobson, T., & Zhang, W. (2013). A Communicative Action Approach to Evaluating Citizen Support for a Government's Smoking Policies. Journal of Communication, 63(6), 1153-1174.
Zhang, W. (2013). Redefining youth activism through digital technology in Singapore. International Communication Gazette, 75(3), 253-270. (Reprinted in Youth Culture and Activism in Southeast Asia. ISEAS, 2015)
Zhang, W., Cao, X., & Trah, M. N. (2013). The structural features and the deliberative quality of online discussions. Telematics & Informatics, 30(2), 74-86.
Zhang, W. (2012). The Effects of Political News Use, Political Discussion and Authoritarian Orientation on Political Participation: Evidences from Singapore and Taiwan. Asian Journal of Communication, 22(5): 474-492.
Zhang, W. (2010). Technical capital and participatory inequality in eDeliberation: An actor-network analysis. Information, Communication & Society, 13(7), 1019-1039.
China and Internet
Zhang, W., Chen, Z., & Xi, Y. (online first). Traffic media: how algorithmic imaginations and practices change content production. Chinese Journal of Communication.
Zhang, W., & Neyazi, T. A. (2020). Communication and technology theories from the South: the cases of China and India. Annals of the International Communication Association, 44(1), 34-49.
Liang, J., Liu, X., Zhang, W. (2019) Scientists vs. Laypeople: How Genetically Modified Food is Discussed on a Chinese Q&A Website?. Public Understanding of Science, 28(8), 991-1004.
Zhang, L. & Zhang, W. (2018). The influence of monetization on the public functions of Weibo, Global Media and China, 3(3), 195-212.
Zhang, W. (2016). The Internet and New Social Formation in China: Fandom Publics in the Making. London and New York: Routledge.
Zhang, W. & Zhang, L. (2015). Fandom of foreign reality TV shows in Chinese cybersphere. In Chen, W. & Reese, S. (Eds.) Networked China: Global Dynamics of Digital Media and Civic Engagement: New Agendas in Communication, pp.197-213. London: Routledge.
Zhang, W & Chib, A. (2014). Internet studies and development discourses: The cases of China and India. Information Technology for Development, 20(4), 324-338.
Zhang, W. & Mao, C. (2013). Fan activism sustained and challenged: Participatory culture in Chinese online translation communities. Chinese Journal of Communication, 6(1), 45-61.
Zhang, W. (2012). Virtual communities as subaltern public spheres: A theoretical development and an application to the Chinese Internet. In H. Li (Ed.), Virtual community participation and motivation: Cross-disciplinary theories. Pp.143-161. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.
Zhang, W., & Wang, R. (2010). Interest-oriented versus relationship-oriented social network sites in China. First Monday, 15(8).
Zhang, W. (2006). Constructing and disseminating subaltern public discourses in China. Javnost-The Public, 13(2), 41-64.
Emerging Media Behaviors
Zhang, W. (2015). Learning variables, in-class laptop multitasking and academic performance: A path analysis. Computers & Education, 81, 82-88.
Zhang, L. & Zhang, W. (2013). Real-time Internet news browsing: Information vs. experience-related gratifications and behaviors. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(6), 2712-2721.
Zhang, W. & Zhang, L. (2012). Explicating multitasking with computers: Gratifications and situations. Computers in Human Behavior, 28 (5), 1883-1891.
Zhang, W. (2011). Multitasking with new media in large classrooms: Findings from online survey and focus groups. In S. D. Liew (Ed.), Technology in Higher Education: The State of the Art. pp.138-143. Singapore: CDTL, NUS.
Jeong, S., Zhang, W., Fishbein, M., Davis, E., Bleakley, A., Jordan, A., & Hennessy, M. (2010). Multiple media use and multitasking with media among high school and college students: A Diary method. In M.B. Hinner (Ed.), The interrelationship of business and communication. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang GmbH.
Principle Investigator (2020-2022), Civic Tech in Asia, HSS Seed Fund (Collaborative Research), National University of Singapore, S$40,000.
Co-Principle Investigator (2020-2021). Teaching for Critical Digital Literacy. Funded by International Virtual Academic Collaboration (IVAC) Program, Federal Ministry of Education and Research Germany (BMBF)/ German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), Euro 60,000 (PI is Dr Inken Heldt, Technische Universität Kaiserslautern, Germany).
Principle Investigator (2020-2021), The mediation of civic learning by digital social media: An Australian – Singapore comparison, NUS-University of Sydney Partnership Fund, S$19,888.
Principle Investigator (2019-2020), AcRF Tier 1 Grant, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, S$13,371
Co-Principle Investigator (2018-2020), Artificial Intelligence, everyday life and disinformation across Asia, HSS Seed Fund, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, S$20,000. (PI is Dr. Taberez Neyazi, CNM, NUS)
Principal Investigator (2015-2016), FASS Book Grant Scheme, S$8,250
Principal Investigator (2014-2017), Deliberative governance: Developing a digital platform, Ministry of Education, Singapore, S$430,000
Principal Investigator (2011-2012), Large Grant Writing Workshop Scheme, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, S$9800
Co-Principal Investigator (2011-2013), News Across the Great Wall: Analyzing Taiwan, Asian, and Western News Media's Web Strategies for Internet Users in China, CHIANG CHING-KUO FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL SCHOLARLY EXCHANGE, US$34,955. (PI is Dr. Iris Chyi, University of Texas-Austin).
Co-Principal Investigator (2011-2012), 2011 Singapore General Election Survey, IPS, Singapore, S$50,000 (US$40,116) (PI is Mr. Tan Tarn How, IPS, NUS)
Co-Principal Investigator (2009-2011), Citizen Participation and Legitimacy: Issues in the Evaluation of Health Policy-Making, Faculty Research Committee (FRC) Tier 1, National University of Singapore, S$62,100 (US$44,708) (PI is Dr. Leanne Chang, Baptist University of Hong Kong)
Co-Principal Investigator (2009-2011), IPS-CNM Media Use Surveys, Tote Board, Singapore, S$47,800 (US$34,388) (PI is Mr. Tan Tarn How, IPS, NUS)
Principal Investigator (2009-2011), Youth engagement and ICTs in Asia, PANeGov, IDRC, Canada, S$176,000 (US$122,000)
Principal Investigator (2008-2011), Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences Start-Up Fund, National University of Singapore, S$20,000 (US$12,935)
Principal Investigator (2008), GAPSA-Provost Award for Interdisciplinary Innovation, University of Pennsylvania, US$6,000
Swing voters in GE2020, Forum on Internet and Media Use in GE2020, hosted by IPS, NUS, virtual event open to the public, October 8th, 2020.
Fandom publics (book talk), Guangxi Arts College, September 24th, 2019
Fandom publics (book talk), School of Journalism and Communication, Nanjing Normal University, July 2nd, 2019
Online Deliberation in Asia, the International Conference on "the Search for Deliberative Democracy in Asia", Central China Normal University, Wuhan, China, May 17th to 18th, 2019
Entertaining Publics, Sun Yet-Sen University, Guangzhou, China, November 10th, 2018
Youth, ICTs, and Political Engagement in Asia: A revisit after six years, DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP IN ASIA WORKSHOP, National University of Singapore, October 12th, 2018
Fostering citizen deliberation through online platforms, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, September 19th , 2018
Online deliberation in Singapore, The Lianhezaobao Singapore-China Forum, Singapore, July 10th, 2018
Audience/Consumer/Public/Crowd in media scape?: The history and future of media and cultural studies, Sun Yet-Sen University, Guangzhou, China, October 11th, 2017
Fandom publics: Networks and new social formation in China, Sun Yet-Sen University, Guangzhou, China, April 1st, 2017
Fandom publics: Networks and new social formation in China, City University of Hong Kong, March 31st, 2017
Fandom publics: Networks and new social formation in China, University of Virginia, March 21st, 2017
Fandom publics: The Internet and new social formation in China, Chinese University of Hong Kong, January 18th, 2017
Mapping the space for online deliberation, University of Wurzburg, November 28th, 2016
Fandom publics: The Internet and new social formation in China, Leiden University, November 9th, 2016
Online deliberation in Singapore, University of Amsterdam, October 25th, 2016
Mapping the field of online deliberation, University of Warsaw, October 12th, 2016
Fandom publics: The Internet and new social formation in China, Royal Holloway University, September 20th, 2016
Online deliberation in Singapore, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore, July 29th, 2016
Online deliberation in Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore, July 27th, 2016
Mapping the field of online deliberation, Public Policy and Public Consultation: Deliberative Democracy in Asia, Singapore, May 20th – 21st, 2016
The reality of reality shows: Online fans community and intercultural communication (Keynote Speech), the Second Cross-Strait Conference on Speech Communication, Guangxi Arts University, Xiamen University and Shih Hsin University of Taiwan, Nanning, China, December 2015
Panelist on "Global Perspectives on Social Media and Sociopolitical Engagement", Global Communication Research in the 21st Century Symposium, The Penn-Wharton China Center in Beijing, June 16th, 2015
Panelist on "Networked China Bluesky workshop", the 65th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 25th, 2015.
Presenter at the Comparative Political Communication Conference, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, February 5th, 2015.
Celebrity activism on Weibo: Performance, style, and social networks (spotlight presentation), the China Internet Research Conference, Hong Kong Polytech University, Hong Kong, June 19th-21st, 2014
Fandom of foreign reality TV shows in Chinese cyber sphere, the conference on "Networked China: Global Dynamics of Digital Media and Civic Engagement", College of Communication, the University of Texas at Austin, October 17th-19th, 2013
Social media in China: A credibility crisis?, the workshop on 'China India Media Mediation', Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS, Singapore, May 17th, 2012
Political Cynicism and Political Communications in an Authoritarian Democracy, the Seminar on "The Influence of Political Cynicism and Political Efficacy on Media Use: Further findings from the IPS Survey", Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, September 14th, 2011
Change, Youth, Failure, Excellence (keynote lecture), the 22nd International Youth Forum, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and National Council of Youth Organizations in Korea, August 18th, 2011
Urban Youth, ICTs, and Civic Engagement in Asia, East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, September 13th, 2010
Youth Engagement and ICTs in Asia: A Comparative Analysis, Young Scholar Forum 2010, School of Journalism, Renming University, July 10th, 2010
Youth Engagement and ICTs in Asia: A Comparative Approach, The Joint Summer School by Chinese University of Communication, Chinese University of Hong Kong, University of Westminster and University of Pennsylvania, Chinese University of Communication, July 8th, 2010
Youth, ICTs and Political Engagement in Asia, Workshop on Potential for Mobile 2.0 in Emerging Asia, LIRNEAsia, June 22nd, 2010
Multitasking with (new) media, Communication and New Media Programme, National University of Singapore, April 14th, 2010
Communication and values on political engagement, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, December 7th, 2009
Multitasking with media: From antecedents to consequences, School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, October 21st, 2009
Pushing democracy: Prospects for media and technology, Peace, Human Rights, Good Governance: East Asian Democracies at the Crossroads, The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, September 30th, 2009
In search of collective action: Relationship-oriented vs. interest-oriented social networking sites in China, Communication and New Media Programme, National University of Singapore, April 1st, 2009
eDeliberation and the disempowered: Access, experience and influence, Communication and New Media Programme, National University of Singapore, March 2008
The Internet and disempowered groups, Department of Communication, College of Charleston, January 2008
New media behaviors: What they are and what they do, Department of Advertising, The University of Texas, Austin, November 2007
Editorial Board Membership
Annals of the International Communication Association (formerly Communication Yearbook), Associate Editor
International Communication Gazette, Associate Editor
資訊社會


Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi on Thursday announced his intention to make public the cost of the European institutions, as a row exploded over his country's budget plans.
European Commission head Jose Manuel Barroso sharply criticised Italy earlier on Thursday for publishing a letter from the EU requesting clarifications on Rome's rule-breaking budget.
Renzi, attending an EU summit in Brussels, responded with his promise to shed light on Brussels' own spending.
"We will publish data on everything that is spent by these palaces. We're going to have some fun," he said on the margins of the summit.
He added that he was surprised at Barroso's response to the publication of the EU letter, as the details had already published by the Financial Times and an Italian daily.
"The Italian budget poses no problems," he insisted.
Hours before the EU summit, the Italian finance ministry released a letter from the EU's Economic Affairs Commissioner Jyrki Katainen, marked "strictly confidential", drawing the fury of Barroso.
The president of the EU's executive said the Commission was against this "unilateral" decision by the Italian government, preferring that negotiations on its budget take place behind closed doors.
Barroso, who steps down on October 31st, said the Commission was "in consultations" with several countries over infringement of the rules and "it's better this happen in a context of trust".
French President Francois Hollande said his country had also received an EU Commission letter requiring a reply by the end of the week.
The dialogue with Brussels continues "in very good conditions", he said, stressing France's commitment to EU budgetary rules but "with the maximum flexibility".
French officials said that there was no intention to publicise the details of the "a private letter".
France's budget forecast shows a 4.3 percent GDP deficit in 2015, far above the expected three percent.
Last week, member states which use the euro currency submitted their spending plans for next year to the Commission, which won vast new powers of oversight from member states at the height of the eurozone debt crisis.
The Commission has so far refused to confirm or deny that France and Italy, along with Austria, Slovenia, Malta and Finland have all been notified that their submissions are problematic.
In Italy's case, the budget squarely misses structural reform commitments, even though it forecasts a deficit well within the EU's three percent of output ceiling.
The Commission has until Wednesday to decide whether Italy and the other countries are in "serious" breach of the rules, and the letter was the official warning that it may do so.
But admonishing France and Italy, the second and third-biggest eurozone economies, and formally demanding a change to their budget would be a huge political risk.
The fallout in France, with soaring unemployment and a stagnant economy, is especially a worry with the anti-EU far right becoming a dominant force.


Fri 6 Ladies : 18 HOLE STABLEFORD Club Comp.
Sat 7 Mens : McAlpine Cup Stroke Club Comp.
Fri 13 Ladies : MCFERRAN CUP STROKE Club Comp.
Sat 14 Mens : September Stableford Club Comp.
Fri 20 Ladies : 18 HOLE ECLECTIC Club Comp.
Sat 21 Mens : Civil Service Cup Stroke Club Comp.
Fri 27 Ladies : BATTLE OF THE BAYS Club Comp.
Sat 28 Mens : Final Stableford Club Comp.


Have you found it difficult to increase engagement and followers on Instagram. One of the easiest ways of licensing things up over on the social network is to make better use of these miracle keywords. Many businesses are failing to make the best use of the hashtag game so here are a few Instagram hashtag tips on how to use them effectively, starting now.
Users follow other users, people who they want to stay up to date with, businesses they use, and profiles filled with images they admire. Recently, Instagram added a new feature that allows users to follow hashtags as well as individual users. Each hashtag can be followed, all you need to do is find out the hashtags that your audience follow and begin using them to your advantage.
The most popular hashtags are the ones that will have the largest followers. These hashtags are usually generic, and many can be applied to your images. Finding the most popular tags is as easy as visiting third-party sites such as tagblender or top-hashtags. Don't use all of them, pick a few and start experimenting with your posts to see if you notice any sharp rises in engagement.
Experiment with location hashtags when seeking more local engagement and business. These tags can be an excellent way of connecting with your local community and raising awareness of your business. Add a few localised hashtags to your images and stories and follow them on your own feed to find what's popular with the audience.
It's okay to use a few of your maximum of 30 hashtags to inject some personality into your brand. Spare a couple of hashtags for some tongue in cheek humour. Make sure the audience will understand the humour and connect with the message it relays. These are the tags to add at the beginning of your hashtag section.
Come up with a tag that you can use in your Instagram marketing (and on other social networks). Think up a catchy tag that your audience will respond positively to and try to encourage the use of the tag with them. Use the tag on your posts but also include simple instructions for your customers in order confirmation and follow up emails to spread the word. Encourage the use of the hashtag by offering exclusive discounts, promotions or entries into a competition for people who take part.
Have you tried and tested any of these top hashtag tips for businesses? Come and share your experiences with us over on Twitter.


text:
Welcoming the Old Boys, Rugby Style
On Saturday, October 10, the HBS Rugby Football Club took the field against its senior counterpart, the HBS Alumni Rugby Football Club (Old Boys). Rarely had we seen such grizzled faces, so many grey hairs, and such antiquated knee, ankle and other protective bracing.
The first period was marked by strong rucking and the heavy Old Boys running north-south. Initially, we worried about hurting the poor old fellows, but within a few scant minutes that fear was replaced with the fear of facing large and determined HBS graduates who wanted to prove that their glory days were far from over. Do not doubt it-old man strength is real.
The Old Boys struck first with a try set up by strong forward play. Determined not to be bested at our own game, our forward pack shook off the novelty of playing against a short, stocky fellow sporting a ZZ Top-style beard and the haze of the prior evening's Harpoon Brewery festivities and got our act together. Strong forward play led to a try by Peter "Hoss" Reynolds (HLS '10), which was expertly converted in the breezy afternoon by Double B.
In the very next series we continued our aggressive forward play, and Hoss Reynolds broke through for a second try. His try was nearly stymied when Patrick Dickinson (MBA '09 B) tried to remove his shorts, ripping the entire crotch out of them, and converting them to a skirt-type clothing apparatus. Thankfully, he had his best briefs on, but this run-in destroyed the Hoss' aerodynamic form factor, and ruined his dreams of a hat trick. Again, Double B completed the conversion, sending the game to a 14-10 lead for the current side.
With both sides exhausted and the sausage sizzle on the sideline picking up steam, the current side took the ball outside to the backs for the remainder of the third period. The match was masterfully capped off and our lead widened when Andrew "Gazelle" Vinas (OF) took off down field for an 80-meter, gut-busting try. Double B's third conversion of the afternoon then made the final score 21-10.
The Old Boys had fought valiantly, but could only maintain their edge for 40 of the 60 minutes. As Gazelle said later, "It felt a little funny running around such old guys. I didn't know if I was fast, or if they were slow, and wasn't sure if it was sporting to take advantage of their decrepitness."
At the post-match festivities, we can say that songs were sung, beers were consumed, and a great time was had by all as the current side got to know their predecessors and reveled in the wonderful tradition of HBS RFC alumni weekend.
A big thank you to all of the alumni who took the time to come, play and celebrate. As always, the HBS Rugby Club is exceptionally grateful to the hospitable people of Tommy Doyle's, the deliciously creative people of the Harpoon Brewery, the intellectual people of BCG and the brave people of International Rescue.
www.replicabestsale.co.uk
tag heuer replica for sale
Previous articleVegetable Soup
Next articleFall and Winter Arts Preview


text:
Second oldest church in Germany uncovered
DPA/The Local - [email protected] • 27 Feb, 2014 Updated Thu 27 Feb 2014 16:32 CEST
Archaeologists have discovered Germany's second oldest church hidden within a cathedral in the west of the country.
In the so-called "Old Cathedral" in Mainz, which is today the evangelical Church of St John, archaeologists found the remains of another church built 1,200 years ago in the time of Charlemagne, Deacon Andreas Klodt said on Tuesday.
Only Trier on the Mosel River has an older church, with its cathedral dating back to Roman times, making the find the second oldest church in the country.
Professor Matthias Untermann from the Institute of Art History in Heidelberg said the remains of the Carolingian walls stretched from the basement to the roof.
"This is a big surprise," he said.
The Rhineland-Palatinate state curator Joachim Glatz said: "This is the only surviving Carolingian cathedral in Germany."
Usually a bishop would build a cathedral in the Middle Ages at the exact location of the previous building, getting rid of the older church.
But in Mainz the 1,000-year-old "Old Cathedral" was incorporated into the Carolingian one.
Have a look at photos of the find here
Archaeologist Ronald Knöchlein said Mainz had a Christian community in Roman times.
And according to Knöchlein two human skeletons have been found during the excavations - remains of earlier burials in the church.
The building has been used since the 19th Century as a church by the evangelical community.
During World War II, it was largely destroyed by fire after a bomb attack. Demolition was considered but was rejected. The dig is continuing.
SEE ALSO: Badger digs up medieval warrior graves
#archaeology #mainz


Updating the classic poplin shirt with an avant-garde cut, this Pinko offering is designed with an off-the-shoulder neckline, accented with fluted sleeves. In crisp, striped cotton, it boasts a classic button down silhouette with a notched collar. Leave it untucked over black denim for a sleek casual look.


text:
Home Articles posted by Diane Desierto
Why Arbitrate Business and Human Rights Disputes? Public Consultation Period Open for the Draft Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration
Published on July 12, 2019 Author: Diane Desierto
In June 2019, the Draft Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration (hereafter, "Draft BHR Arbitration Rules") was released for global online public consultation, with the consultation period set to end by 25 August 2019. Judge Bruno Simma chairs the global Drafting Team that has collaborated in developing the draft rules, since the Drafting Team started its work in January 2018 with the support of the City of the Hague. (Drafting Team Members and Working Group Members all listed here.) The final version of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration will be published on 10 December 2019. Before the release of the Draft BHR Arbitration Rules, the Working Group had produced a 2017 concept paper on business and human rights arbitration. This was followed by the creation and first meetings of the Drafting Team in January 2018; the Drafting Team's production of its Elements for Consideration in Draft Rules, Model Clauses, and Other Aspects of the Arbitral Process in time for the November 2018 Online Consultation Procedure; the April 2019 meetings of the Drafting Team and the June 2019 publication of the Summary of the Sounding Board Consultations; up to the June 2019 release of the Draft BHR Arbitration Rules.
As described in the Draft BHR Arbitration Rules:
"The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration provide a set of procedures for the arbitration of disputes related to the impact of business activities on human rights. The Hague Rules are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with modifications needed to address certain issues likely to arise in business and human rights disputes. As with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the scope of the Hague Rules is not limited by the type of claimant(s) or respondent(s) or the type of subject-matter of the dispute and extends to any disputes that the parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to resolve by arbitration under the Hague Rules. Parties could thus include business entities, individuals, labor unions and organizations, States and State entities and civil society organizations. Equally, the Hague Rules purposefully do not define the terms "business", "human rights", or "business and human rights." For the purposes of the Hague Rules, such terms should be thus understood at least as broadly as the meaning such terms have under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. However, in the vast majority of cases, no definition of these terms should be necessary at all.
Like the UNCITRAL Rules, the Hague Rules do not address the modalities by which the parties to the arbitration may consent to it nor the content of that consent, which are matters for the parties. Consent remains the cornerstone of business and human rights arbitration, as with all arbitration, and it can be established before a dispute arises, e.g. in contractual clauses, or after a dispute arises, e.g. in a submission agreement (compromis). Model Clauses may provide potential parties with options for expressing their consent to arbitration. In addition, like the UNCITRAL Rules, the Hague Rules do not address enforcement of arbitral awards made under these Rules, which are governed by national law and various treaty obligations, including in most cases the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. While these Rules have been conceived as a uniform set of rules, we acknowledge that the parties remain entitled to exercise their discretion in opting out of certain provisions that do not respond to their specific needs as arising out the dispute at issue. Certain other Model Clauses are being developed in this respect." (Emphasis added.)
I have served in the Drafting Team under Judge Simma's leadership since January 2018. My colleagues Martin Doe, Steve Ratner, and Katerina Yiannibas have helpfully crystallized elsewhere several of the main points of innovation contained in the Draft Rules, such as:
"1. provisions on facilitating settlement and mediation, and emphasizing the complementarity of arbitration to such procedures as the OECD National Contact Points system (Articles 1(6), 17(3), 42, and 51)
2. provisions to address the inequality of arms which may arise in such disputes (inter alia, Articles 5(2), 20(4), 24, 27(2), and 27(4));
3. the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the default appointing authority, given its intergovernmental nature and experience in business and human rights disputes (Article 6);
4. procedures for multiparty claims and joinder by third parties (Article 17-bis);
5. a procedure for the early dismissal of claims manifestly without merit, developed on the basis of similar procedures in the ICSID, SIAC, SCC, and HKIAC Rules (as well as the proposed new ICSID Rules) (Article 23-bis);
6. provisions making the arbitral tribunal's power over interim measures more robust, and at the same time more flexible (Article 26);
7. an emergency arbitrator mechanism elaborated on the basis of the ICC and SCC Rules (Article 26-bis);
8. specialized evidentiary procedures drawn up on the basis, inter alia, of the IBA Rules and Rules of the International Criminal Court, among others (Articles 27, 28, and 30(3));
9. measures to protect the identity of parties, counsel, and witnesses where such protections are warranted by the circumstances of the case, while ensuring due process is maintained for all parties (Articles 17(5), 28(3), and 37(5));
10. provisions on transparency and third-party participation (Articles 24-bis and 33-38);
11. tailored provisions on remedies in the business and human rights context (Article 40);
12. rules on applicable law that enhance flexibility and party autonomy (Article 41);
13. rules to protect the public interest in the case of confidential settlements (Article 42(1));
14. nuanced rules in respect of costs and deposits that encourage the tribunal to sensitive to the interests of access to justice (Articles 46-49);
15. an expedited arbitration procedure for small claims (Article 52); and
16. a Code of Conduct that reflects the highest standards for independence and impartiality in international dispute resolution (Annex)."
In this post, I do not aim to provide an authoritative commentary on the Draft Rules (which is exactly what our global online consultation procedure is for). Rather, and notwithstanding the explicit caveat drawn by the Drafting Team above on leaving the modalities and content of consent to arbitration to the parties, I instead offer my personal observations to examine the essence of main criticisms (see public comments of the Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment here as well as a few questions and comments I received at Harvard Law School in April 2019), directed against having the BHR Arbitration Rules in the first place: 1) whether companies and human rights victims would even consent to arbitration; and 2) if they do consent, whether one should view that consent with skepticism as to the authenticity of arbitration as a mode of access to justice for human rights victims. The gist of my argument is this: while the BHR Arbitration Rules will never purport to be the exclusively prescribed mechanism for human rights victims of transnational business conduct and neither does it presume to displace State-based judicial or non-judicial remedies, against the realities of a continuing limited universe of legally binding human rights recourse against the impacts of private transnational activities, we cannot afford to close off the arbitral option either. As human rights practitioners well know, no single dispute resolution mechanism for human rights disputes against transnational business is perfect, and even recent national court victories in Lungowe v. Vedanta (as spearheaded by my BHR Drafting Team colleague Richard Meeran of Leigh Day) depend on the jurisdictional openness of a State's judicial system to transnational tort claims. The question, in my view, thus has to be reframed away from "why international arbitration?", to "why not also international arbitration?".
Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Human Rights, International Economic Law, Permanent Court of Arbitration
The ESCR Revolution Continues: ILO Convention No. 190 on the Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of Work
Published on June 28, 2019 Author: Diane Desierto
On 21 June 2019, the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the landmark ILO Convention No. 190 (Convention concerning the Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of Work). The labour standards set in this Convention were negotiated over a two year period by ILO member governments, workers' representatives, and employers' organizations. The adoption of Convention No. 190 is itself revolutionary, considering that an estimated around 500 million working-age women live in countries are reported not to have any legal protections against harassment at work. The World Bank reported in 2018 that "in 59 countries, women are not legally protected from workplace sexual harassment. The lack of legal protection is observed in 70% of the economies in the Middle East and North Africa, half (50%) in East Asia and the Pacific, and one-third (33.3%) in Latin America and the Caribbean."
In this post, I examine the key landmark detailed provisions of ILO Convention No. 190, and why they present significantly higher protections than the more rudimentary and general provisions in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as well as the protections against sexual harassment indicated in the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In my view, ILO Convention No. 190 largely closes the global regulatory gap on workplace sexual harassment, not just by repeating ICESCR and CEDAW protections, but by adopting the most sweeping application of these protections (and even more substantive protections) to all the foreseeable permutations and changing employment arrangements today in the world of work. Institutionally, the adoption of ILO Convention No. 190 also formally opens the door for ILO's regular supervisory system to ensure this treaty's implementation by States ratifying ILO Convention No. 190, including special procedures under the ILO Constitution, such as the complaints procedure (Articles 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution) enabling any ILO Member State to file a complaint with the ILO if it finds that any other ILO Member State is not "securing effective observance of any Convention which both have ratified". The ILO Governing Body can refer the complaint to a Commission of Inquiry for investigation. If the respondent ILO Member State does not accept the recommendations of the Commission on Inquiry, the ILO can propose to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The expansive protections against workplace sexual harassment afforded in ILO Convention No. 190 to all persons (including women) could thus also be more strongly protected in the international legal system as well as in domestic legal systems.
In the age of MeToo and the increasing global awareness that vulnerabilities to workplace sexual harassment are highest in non-traditional work settings and arrangements where power imbalances are sharpest, ILO Convention No. 190 places human dignity at the center of the global regulatory paradigm. It will be much harder for workplace sexual harassers and those who commit violence at the workplace to escape and avoid legal responsibility anywhere in the world.
Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Human Rights, International Labour Law, International Tribunals
The Right to Development and Archaic Dichotomies in UNCITRAL ISDS Reforms
Published on May 2, 2019 Author: Diane Desierto
Editor's Note: This is the concluding post in this week's series of several posts critically examining the UNCITRAL ISDS reform process, which held its latest Working Group III meetings in New York on April 2019. On Monday we featured the introduction from UNCITRAL Academic Forum Chair Malcolm Langford and our Contributing Editor Anthea Roberts, who summarized key points of contention raised by States as to the narrower procedural reforms to ISDS as the mandate of UNCITRAL Working Group III. Posts on Tuesday (see here and here) from our Contributing Editor Anthea Roberts and her co-author Taylor St. John addressed geopolitical and ideological issues that affect ISDS reforms. On Wednesday, we featured a response post on Costs, from Susan Franck, Academic Forum Member and author of the new 2019 book, Arbitration Costs: Myths and Realities in Investment Treaty Arbitration (OUP, 2019). EJIL:Talk! Editor Diane Desierto concludes this series, with observations drawn from her own public work today in Geneva, where she is serving as Resource Expert on Institutional Compliance with the Right to Development at the 20th Intergovernmental Working Group Session on the Right to Development, organized by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
It would not have escaped our scrutiny from this week's excellent posts by Malcolm Langford, Anthea Roberts, Taylor St. John, and Susan Franck that the UNCITRAL ISDS Reform debates of States are taking place with an occluded (if not opaque) understanding of the supposed position(s) of "developing countries", or indeed, what their respective needs for reform and flexibility in UNCITRAL ISDS reforms are, as each developing country undertakes its desired reform path. As my colleagues rightly pointed out this week, one cannot approach "developing countries" with a monolithic understanding (or perceived understanding) of a regional, categorical, or group approach. The World Bank dropped the classification of "developing countries" in 2016, given the lack of agreement over the definition of this classification and the deep geographic, topographic, economic, and political diversity even within 'developing country' groupings themselves. It is thus entirely obsolete, in today's international economic system, to even keep assuming that the G77 Non-Aligned Movement of the 1970s would have any degree of settled unanimity today among them as to their respective foreign investment interests, all the more so since there are more capital-exporting States within the "Global South" that are themselves heavily investing across and within the "Global South".
On the one hand, some "developing countries" have a disproportionately outsized titanic impact on global investment, especially China, which now singularly dominates the writing of the future of the terms of global infrastructure investment through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China's leading role in global infrastructure investment was on full display at the 2nd Belt and Road Initiative International Forum in Beijing last week, attended by most world leaders, notwithstanding concerns about the new "colonization" seemingly emerging from BRI projects whose terms, as described recently in The Financial Times, are often bilaterally negotiated within an opaque "mish-mash" of debt-based infrastructure projects affecting about 62% of the world's population but which still remain non-transparent to all investment affected stakeholders. On the other hand, some 'developing countries', such as low-lying island States comprising around 37 States and around 50 million people, face raging existential issues from the climate change onslaught, and continue to face investment treaty claims as respondent host States (e.g. Mauritius has 3 pending, Cabo Verde has 1 pending, Dominican Republic has 6, Barbados has 1, Guyana has 1, Trinidad and Tobago among many others in this UNCTAD list), while the low-lying island States remain just as beholden to take an ISDS system still largely being written by other States contributing to the very phenomenon causing their impending extinction.
We do not hear much about the economic, political, structural, resource, fiscal, and negotiating power inequalities and asymmetries between and among the "Global South" of "developing countries" in the UNCITRAL ISDS reform debates. The focus has been on identifying what "developing countries" supposedly think or prefer, rather than taking each State – at whatever stage of development – as they are in evaluating the impacts of the actual distributional decisions they are making today in the ISDS reform process, and particularly whether these decisions are consistent with their commitments to the right to development (and the full range of human rights capabilities encompassed by this right). Leaving it to States to do this kind of analysis through their respective investment treaty programs, in my view, does not solve any collective action problems arising from the globalization of our ISDS system. Neither does it significantly advance peoples' right to development when we allocate ISDS reform into 'procedural' (for UNCITRAL) and 'substantive' (for States in their respective individual investment treaty programs), or characterize individualized State preferences for investment dispute decision-making in shorthand as 'the West and the Rest'. The rigor demanded of us in our responsibility to realize the right to development should be an occasion for pause in our use of, and reliance on, all these constructs and dichotomies.
Filed under: Bilateral Investment Treaties, EJIL Analysis, International Economic Law
Tags: ISDS Reforms, UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL ISDS
Comments Off on The Right to Development and Archaic Dichotomies in UNCITRAL ISDS Reforms
The Reviewability of the Security Exception in GATT Article XXI in Russia – Traffic in Transit: Implications for South China Sea Investment Disputes in GATT Article XXI-type Clauses in ASEAN Regional Investment Treaties
Published on April 9, 2019 Author: Diane Desierto
The landmark WTO Panel Report on security exceptions in GATT Article XXI came out Friday last week in Russia – Traffic in Transit. I have written extensively about necessity and national emergency clauses in the past – particularly to reject the position of the supposed wholesale unreviewability of these clauses in the Schmittian sense (on GATT Article XXI exceptions here and here, and on GATT Article XX exceptions, here and here). The significant valence to this decision, in my view, does not just lie with the Panel's reasoning (especially as to what they considered to be "objectively" determinable) and its broader implications for the current configuration of the world trading system in this era of increased Trump-driven trade wars. The greater impact of this decision's rejection of unreviewability, I submit, will be to enable arbitral tribunals to review security defenses of States anchored on international investment treaties that have purposely grafted GATT Article XXI language.
This phenomenon may be particularly acute for the regional investment treaties of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (For the detailed analysis of these clauses, see my previous published work here.) Attempts by any ASEAN nations (such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Viet Nam, in particular) to impose, in the present or in the future, certain regulatory measures against China-funded development projects or activities of Chinese firms who are increasingly expanding their footprint (from either dredging activities and the creation of artificial islands from dredged and pulverized coral reefs; to tourism; logistics, construction, as well as energy operations in the South China Sea) could, ordinarily, be justified under the GATT Article XXI-type clause of Article 17 (Security Exceptions) in the 2010 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement. With the declared reviewability of GATT Article XXI in Russia – Traffic in Transit, however, ASEAN Member States should expect that these measures could be challenged (and likely reviewed by arbitral tribunals) in investor-State dispute settlement proceedings permitted under Article 14 of the same 2010 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement. This is just one illustration of the kind of deep ripple effects that the reviewability of GATT Article XXI-type security exceptions could have across many investment treaties that have kept replicating this clause (and particularly why I have generally, in my own expert work for ASEAN, cautioned against wholesale grafting of trade norms into the regional investment treaties, without setting an explicit treaty provision either rejecting or permitting the justiciability or reviewability of these provisions). Transposing trade law so unstintingly into investment law creates its own set of unexpected consequences. Notwithstanding regime differences with world trade law, investor-State arbitral tribunals may find it hard to ignore the authoritativeness of the Russia – Traffic in Transit Panel Report's finding of reviewability of GATT Article XXI security exceptions.
This post will first give a brief summary of the Panel's reasoning on reviewability of GATT Article XXI in Russia – Traffic in Transit, anticipating some of the consequences for ongoing trade wars of the United States, the EU, and Russia that depend on the unreviewability of the security exceptions clause in GATT Article XXI. (We expect extensive commentary on this landmark decision from several quarters, and this post certainly does not intend to be the last word on the full elaboration of reasons on all issues in this case.) The remaining part of this post focuses on GATT Article XXI-type security exceptions clauses in the ASEAN regional investment treaties, and how the reviewability of these clauses could potentially impact the investment and development dimension in the South China Sea disputes.
Filed under: Bilateral Investment Treaties, EJIL Analysis, International Economic Law, WTO Dispute Settlement Body
Comments Off on The Reviewability of the Security Exception in GATT Article XXI in Russia – Traffic in Transit: Implications for South China Sea Investment Disputes in GATT Article XXI-type Clauses in ASEAN Regional Investment Treaties
SCOTUS Decision in Jam et al v. International Finance Corporation (IFC) Denies Absolute Immunity to IFC…With Caveats
Published on February 28, 2019 Author: Diane Desierto
Editor's Note: In view of this landmark SCOTUS decision yesterday, this post is a brief deviation from our ongoing Symposium for the ESIL Interest Group on Migration and Refugee Law on the UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees: The Twin Peaks?. We immediately continue with the Symposium after this post.
When it rains, it somehow pours. February 2019 ended up being such a landmark month for international law adjudication. A day after the International Court of Justice released its landmark Chagos Advisory Opinion (finely discussed by Marko Milanovic here), the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) issued its 27 February 2019 decision in Jam et al. v. International Finance Corporation, (586 U.S. ___ 2019). The decision squarely rejects the defense of absolute immunity invoked by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) through the United States' International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) of 1945, with respect to a damages suit for negligence, nuisance, trespass, and breach of contract filed in 2015 before the US District Court for the District of Columbia, by a group of farmers and fishermen in India (with assistance from the NGO EarthRights), concerning the IFC's inadequate supervision of the environmental and social action plan over its US$450 million loan to construct a coal-fired power plant in the state of Gujarat. The damages suit invokes the IFC's own internal audit through the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), admitting that the IFC did not adequately supervise the environmental and social action plan for the project.
Last week, I wrote about the evidence from Inspection Panel's body of investigation reports in about 131 cases thus far, showing ongoing gaps between the World Bank's articulated commitments to Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement, with its actual operational practices in environmental and social action compliance methods that deliberately refuse to internalize the actual international human rights, environmental, climate change, and labor obligations of States in the Bank's lending operations for development projects. In this respect, the SCOTUS decision is of landmark impact, because it opens the door for US courts to potentially determine the nature of the IFC's legal responsibilities beyond the lines of accountability internally designed at the World Bank through the independent Inspection Panel or the compliance auditing process at the CAO. Whether or not the suits will prosper on the merits, of course, is another matter altogether, noting how business and human rights litigation strategies have evolved in the United States after SCOTUS decisions in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum and Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC.
There are also caveats to the decision itself, as carefully penned by SCOTUS Chief Justice Roberts. When one goes through the Court's reasoning, the Court also signaled that "restrictive immunity hardly means unlimited exposure to suit for international organizations."
Filed under: EJIL Analysis, International Economic Law, Responsibility of International Organizations, State Immunity
Lingering Asymmetries in SDGs and Human Rights: How Accountable are International Financial Institutions in the International Accountability Network?
The recent US nomination (and thus de facto appointment) of well-known World Bank critic and US Treasury official, John Malpass, as the new World Bank President following the abrupt resignation of Jim Yong Kim (former Dartmouth College president who announced he was leaving the World Bank for opportunities in the private sector) brought a slew of criticisms (see here, here, and here) against the United States' traditional prerogatives of appointing the World Bank President, in tandem with the European Union's counterpart prerogatives in appointing the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The tradition arises from a "gentlemen's agreement" struck at Bretton Woods at the inception of the World Bank and IMF. Neither the IMF Articles of Agreement or the World Bank Group's Articles of Agreement contain any whiff of this gentlemen's agreement – but they are effectively carried out because of the United States' overwhelming voting power at the World Bank and the European Union's counterpart voting power at the IMF. In any event, contestations over power and leadership of the Bretton Woods institutions are not exactly new – they are precisely the same matters that have impelled rival geopolitical powers such as China and Russia to set up new international financial institutions (IFIs) where their influence and leadership can be more palpable, as seen from the BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Leadership contests at the IFIs – often between one hegemon and other fellow hegemons in the international system – do not, however, scrutinize the real nature of accountability of IFIs under their development mandates, as to the populations for whom such mandates were created to begin with. During his presidency at the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim was heavily criticized for soliciting private funders in Wall Street to finance the Bank, sourcing capital infusions beyond the traditional donations of governments. World Bank staff challenged him for his managerial style and the lack of strategic direction, that was alleged to be inconsistent with the Bank's actual development mandate.
Even as the IFIs continued to tout "inclusive growth" at the November 2018 G20 meetings – a goal which the World Bank defines as "growth that allows people to contribute to and benefit from economic growth" – it is quite remarkable to this day that IFIs shirk from openly embracing their own member States' human rights treaty obligations as the normative template for their development mandates, preferring to refer strictly to their internal mandates under their respective Articles of Agreement. (On this point, see the interesting 2017 article by Thomas Stubbs and Alexander Kentikelenis). It may be recalled that the UN Independent Expert for a Democratic and Equitable International Order, Mr. Alfred de Zayas, formally called on the World Bank in September 2017 to align their articles of agreement with human rights, and to ensure that development projects with Members' own international human rights commitments, all the more so because the World Bank could not afford to be a "human rights-free zone".
Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Human Rights, International Economic Law
Comments Off on Lingering Asymmetries in SDGs and Human Rights: How Accountable are International Financial Institutions in the International Accountability Network?
2018 Favourite Readings: Values, Identity, and Growth in the Global Economy
Published on December 26, 2018 Author: Diane Desierto
Editor's note: Continuing a tradition started by Isabel Feichtner a few years ago, EJIL's Review Editor, Christian J. Tams, invited members of the EJIL board to offer short reflections on their favourite books of the year 2018. In the following days we will present some selections here on EJIL:Talk! They comprise a wide range of books, from (a few) doctrinal legal texts, to (many more) historical accounts and works of fiction. Unlike in many official book prize competitions, 2018 does not necessarily stand for the year of publication; rather, board members were asked to list books they read or re-read this year, and found inspiring or enjoyable. Today we give you Diane Desierto's favourites.
Why do we have a global economy, what is it for, what comprises it, and to what ends and purposes do we regulate it? Somewhat unconsciously, my favourite books for 2018 directly or indirectly related to these questions. Throughout 2018, I relished reading (or rereading, in some of these) Hersch Lauterpacht's classic International Law and Human Rights (F.A. Praeger Press, 1950), followed by Louis Meuleman's Metagovernance for Sustainability: A Framework for Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (Routledge, 2018); David Pilling's The Growth Delusion: Wealth, Poverty, and the Well-Being of Nations (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), Mariana Mazzucato's The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy (Penguin Random House UK, 2018), and Francis Fukuyama's Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2018). These books proved illuminating this year in my ongoing thematic and granular search for answers to the above questions.
Hersch Lauterpacht's International Law and Human Rights is an apt reminder of how modern international law, at its inception, fundamentally serves the ends and aims of human rights in free and just societies. Lauterpacht makes his argument in three parts – showing in The Rights of Man and the Law of Nations that the concept of international peace is inseparable from the vindication of human dignity through human rights; elaborating human rights provisions central to the UN Charter in Human Rights under the Charter of the United Nations; and concluding with a detailed set of recommendations (recall, this was long before the development of the major human rights treaties today) for the International Bill of the Rights of Man. Read the rest of this entry…
Filed under: Announcements and Events, EJIL, EJIL Book Discussion
Comments Off on 2018 Favourite Readings: Values, Identity, and Growth in the Global Economy
Are "Transparency" Procedures and Local Community "Consultations" Enough? A Human Rights "Feedback Loop" to International Economic Law Reforms of 2018
It is nearly the end of 2018, and so many "reform" efforts are underway throughout all realms of international economic law that one is inclined to think all our good intentions must lead somewhere, eventually. There is an UNCITRAL Working Group for Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) that involves Member States, and to a different degree, academic inputs through the Academic Forum (see the blog's series of posts on these authored by Anthea Roberts, found here, here, here, here, and here). New trade agreements have been announced, such as the NAFTA renamed 2.0 version United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, recently discussed here by the Max Planck Institute's Pedro Villareal and Franz Ebert), a renegotiated Korea-US trade agreement (details here), or the forthcoming entry into force of the US-less 11-nation bloc of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on 30 December 2018 (see details here). With the United States having changed its defense and leadership of the WTO and the multilateral trading system towards a policy of not shirking from initiating open bilateral trade wars to force renegotiations – such as the temporary trade truce with China (contents here) and tariffs slapped on the EU, Canada, and other allies (see Joseph Weiler's ever prescient portents about the precarious US position here, and further discussions here, here, and here), it is not at all surprising that other States this year have been strategically realigning their economic partnerships, whether it be through deepening EU-Africa trade partnerships; Japan recently concluding a new trade pact with the EU; or more countries moving out of the Western orbit of economic influence towards China's own expansive march with debt-financed investment projects in the Belt and Road Initiative; or China and/or India leading the state of negotiations at the pending 16-member mega-regional agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), allegedly set to be finalized by early 2019. All these, apart from the uncertainties of securing any prospective UK-EU treaty, which, as of this writing is still up in the air after British PM Theresa May pulled back from forcing a catastrophic vote at the House of Commons (noting, of course, that the European Court of Justice issued a landmark ruling on 10 December 2018 declaring that the UK can voluntarily revoke Brexit).
Political expediencies and treaty negotiation pragmatisms aside, we have to wonder whether the "efficiency" of these developments will indeed result in "efficacy" or "effectiveness", and for which constituencies of the international economic system. Despite the multitude of public policy-driven reform efforts (such as expanding amicus participation, transparency guarantees, as well as public consultations in ISDS, setting out more detailed environmental and labor chapters in trade agreements, or announcing more infrastructure financing avenues for developing countries in new institutions and initiatives), what I have not seen in a year of attempted reforms is any deliberate shift towards broadening global economic governance beyond the usual voices at the negotiating table. The same political, economic, intellectual, or social elites are crafting the new rules and institutions in the international economic system, with the contours of any local community consultations actually left to be operationalized according to the political auspices and national mechanisms of individual States. To a great extent, this is understandable, since a relentless cacophony of voices might be anathema to achieving any final treaty text or clear institutional decision (e.g. the Aristotelian version of the tyranny of an extreme democracy). But to a large extent, this "business as usual" approach remains just as discomfiting as the many paeans regularly being made these days (see here, here, here, for example), towards building in some kind of consultations process for local communities that are somehow intended to depict a "more inclusive" international economic system. Is it enough that local communities are "being heard" by their respective States, or should the new rules and reforming institutions of the international economic system also start making sure that States are indeed listening?
Once communities have been "consulted", one way or another, where is the (hopefully objective and largely depoliticized) "feedback loop" that enables local communities to actually see what the State's ultimate decision-making process has been with respect to reforming international economic treaties, decisions, and institutions? That process remains shrouded in mystery – owing to the usual fictions of States claiming to need opacity during hard treaty bargaining. I make the (rather obvious, but surprisingly still ignored) argument, in this post, that States' human rights obligations to their populations make it imperative to build in a genuine "feedback loop" for any consultations or transparency procedure that may be contemplated in the continuing reform of international economic law. A feedback loop is a necessary control mechanism in the communication process that enables communicants to verify whether their respective inputs or views have been used, recycled, revised, or discarded by the decision-maker. To the best of my knowledge, this still doesn't exist in the architecture of international economic law and its limited spaces for public participation. There is "consultation" but no meaningful opportunities for communities' real-time verification of what their States have promised, traded, conceded, or otherwise bargained at the negotiating table.
It is not enough that local communities just be "heard", but we should all be properly informed of how community views translate (or not) into the State's international economic decision, so as to ensure that communities can strategically and effectively participate as fellow constituents of the international economic system. This is all the more urgent as States persist in these reforms through to the new year, when communities are, in the first place, at the frontlines of the international economic system's felt impacts on environment, health, economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights. If there is any constituency that deserves the information on how States have been making all of these reform decisions, it is our communities who have to live through the consequences of these decisions, years after all the politicians and negotiators have come and gone. With better information as to States' actual international economic decisions coming from an actual "feedback loop", communities are better empowered to choose (or reject) leaders who make these lasting decisions. The "feedback loop" is thus central to a genuine right to self-determination, in its economic and political dimensions.
Comments Off on Are "Transparency" Procedures and Local Community "Consultations" Enough? A Human Rights "Feedback Loop" to International Economic Law Reforms of 2018
Beyond "Good Neighborliness" in the ICJ 1 October 2018 Judgment in Bolivia v. Chile: Do Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligate Creating Negotiated Access for Landlocked Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean?
Published on October 4, 2018 Author: Diane Desierto
On 1 October 2018, the International Court of Justice issued its Judgment on the Merits in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), finding, by 12 votes to 3, that Chile "did not undertake a legal obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean" for Bolivia and rejecting all other submissions of Bolivia. While the Judgment minutely and carefully scrutinizes each treaty, exchange of notes, and statements of the parties for well over a century on the issue of access to the Pacific Ocean for landlocked Bolivia – and I have no difference with the Court's individual scrutiny and interpretation of each document and piece of evidence indicated in its Judgment on the Merits – it is remarkably curious that the dispute involving Bolivia's assertion of Chile's obligation to attempt good faith negotiation on access to the Pacific Ocean did not refer to nor invoke human rights or sustainable development needs as a possible basis to substantiate the urgency of cooperation necessary for both countries. As seen from the image below (source here), Bolivia's landlocked situation is a permanent feature of its territory:
Both countries are parties to the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both countries voted in favor of the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. And yet, the fundamental issue of Bolivia's massive underdevelopment (as one of the poorest countries of Latin America) for lack of any maritime access to the Pacific Ocean, in contrast to Chile's exponential economic development (remarkably succeeding in reducing poverty from 26% to 7.9%), seems to be an inherent inequality on which international legal proceedings have been silent. As reported in a World Bank study, landlocked developing countries (such as Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, among others) face higher transport costs, delays, higher consumer and food prices, less trade, such that "being landlocked is a major reason why 16 of the world's 31 landlocked developing countries are among the poorest in the world".
In today's understanding of human rights and sustainable development (and further considering that we provide for the regime of "common heritage of mankind" for all coastal and landlocked countries in regard to the marine resources in the Area), is it still an acceptable and legitimate outcome for human rights and sustainable development that landlocked countries (or Bolivia in particular, for well over a century) are denied any access whatsoever to the oceans as an inevitable result of loss of territory, peace treaties, or sheer accident of natural geography? If compensated negotiated access to the Pacific Ocean can eventually be achieved for Bolivia, does human rights and the right to sustainable development have anything to say about the degree of compensation that Chile can exact for granting such access, so as not to make it too cost-prohibitive for Bolivia to obtain such access? In this post, I briefly summarize the October 1, 2018 ICJ judgment below, and suggest some aspects of human rights and sustainable development commitments of both countries that might spur more urgency to negotiate access to the Pacific Ocean after the glacial pace of failed diplomacy for well over a century.
Filed under: American Convention on Human Rights, Economic Social Cultural Rights, EJIL Analysis, Human Rights, International Court of Justice, International Economic Law, Natural Resources
From the Indigenous Peoples' Environmental Catastrophe in the Amazon to the Investors' Dispute on Denial of Justice: The Chevron v. Ecuador August 2018 PCA Arbitral Award and the Dearth of International Environmental Remedies for Private Victims
Published on September 13, 2018 Author: Diane Desierto
The recent 30 August 2018 Chevron v. Ecuador arbitral award is yet another example of the ongoing asymmetries of protection in the much-beleaguered investor-State dispute settlement system, in which States have generously afforded protections to foreign investors to bring suits directly against States, without creating parallel avenues for affected local communities and/or indigenous peoples to initiate arbitration proceedings directly against either foreign investors or irresponsible States. Despite all our collective best efforts at ongoing reform in UNCITRAL (see updates on Working Group III's mission on ISDS Reform here), ICSID (see their latest rules amendment project here) and elsewhere, I retain serious doubts as to whether investor-State dispute settlement could ever symmetrically represent the environmental and cultural interests of indigenous peoples and local communities, as effectively as it does investors' claims to treaty protection and (significantly substantial) compensatory relief. Today, environmental plaintiffs have to navigate between an unwieldy, unpredictable, and quite disparate mix of remedies before domestic (administrative or judicial) courts or tribunals of their home States, potentially some regional courts (such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) or treaty monitoring bodies (whether those specifically created in environmental treaties or human rights treaties), other foreign courts in other countries that permit some environmental tort claims, and possibly, any cases that their home State can bring under diplomatic protection to pursue remedies against foreign nationals or the home States of these foreign nationals. And all these frequently take place in the context of abject differences of power, resources, and capacities between environmental and human rights victims as claimants against either States and/or foreign investors, vis-a-vis foreign investors as claimants or States as respondents. It's not at all hyperbolic to observe that, with respect to the international environmental system, the deck already appears heavily stacked against environmental plaintiffs at the outset.
The Chevron v. Ecuador arbitration presents a crystal example of how what was originally an environmental dispute seeking remediation for one of the worst environmental disasters in history involving oil spillage into 4,400 square kilometers of the Amazon rainforest – ultimately mutated into the investors' denial of justice claim in investor-State arbitration. At least, in my view, while the erudite tribunal in this case thoroughly set out the technical legal reasoning in its award on the precise legal issues of the investment treaty breaches alleged, the award itself more broadly demonstrates that we may well be at the point that a dedicated separate international dispute settlement system might already be necessary to properly adjudicate victims' claims in human rights and environmental disputes. (Notably, other scholars refer to this dispute to highlight the illegitimacy or alleged exces de poivre of arbitral tribunals making assessments and evaluations of the acts or decisions of domestic courts and judicial systems ipso facto – a significant heavily disputed structural matter about the current investor-State dispute settlement system, which is, however, not the law and policy observation I make here.) Some efforts looking beyond the narrow ISDS framework, among others, include projects such as the drafting of the new Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration; the tentative and non-binding 15 September 2016 policy paper of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court exploring the possibility of prosecuting environmental crimes; as well as the Permanent Court of Arbitration's suite of environmental dispute resolution procedures (interstate arbitration under environmental treaties, mixed dispute resolution under environmental instruments and contracts, specialized environmental rules for arbitration and conciliation). To date, these initiatives have not gone much further beyond their incubation.
The most difficult aspect of the Chevron v. Ecuador case is the fact that the arbitration turned on the issue of Ecuador's investment treaty breaches over what Chevron alleged were very troubling serious acts of fraud and corruption committed by lawyers and judges to produce a favorable 2011 Ecuador court judgment for the environmental plaintiffs. The fraud and corruption allegations have long since overshadowed the urgency of decades of environmental damage that have largely gone without significant and continuing remedy, alongside ongoing health problems from toxic contamination that have impacted indigenous peoples and local communities for generations. (Note: this pollution disaster originated long before I or generations of current international lawyers were even born.) The Chevron v. Ecuador arbitration succeeded in laying the blame on Ecuador since, for the tribunal, Chevron had already been released from its obligations of remediation under the 1995-1998 Settlement Agreements. Unfortunately, the arbitral award does not lay out any detailed environmental analysis to explain why contracts such as the 1995-1998 Settlement Agreements would be sufficient to release private parties from short-term, medium-term, and long-term remediation efforts to restore the ecosystem, and whether such releases were at all consistent with international public policy and Ecuador's own commitments under international law (especially international environmental treaties and customary international environmental law). Neither did the tribunal explore whether Ecuador alone had the right to conclude the Settlement Agreements on behalf of all the environmental plaintiffs and affected communities, or if Ecuador could indeed effectively and exclusively represent the environmental plaintiffs and affected communities in the investor-State arbitration considering how its government agents exercised oversight (or lack thereof) with respect to the environmental disaster. Because environmental plaintiffs, indigenous peoples, and affected communities continue to be dependent on the host State of the investment to vindicate their claims against foreign investors, the investor-State dispute settlement system simply cannot lend any of these environmental, indigenous, and local plaintiffs any real, much less effective, voice over their fight to restore the Amazon to health. While plaintiffs are mired in multiple litigations and arbitrations around the world to seek accountability from either Chevron and its affiliates or their own government in Ecuador, there is virtually no dedicated State, inter-State, regional, or public-private partnership cooperative efforts to try and achieve environmental restoration in the affected 4,400 square kilometers of the Amazon, as depicted in the map below (source here):
Filed under: EJIL Analysis, International Economic Law, International Environmental Law, Investor-State Arbitration Tribunals, Permanent Court of Arbitration
Published on June 5, 2018 Author: Diane Desierto


We have started learning about seasons and to keep it simple and exciting I planned a play dough activity with N which he thoroughly enjoyed.
I have made these printable which can be made play dough mats for unlimited fun play dough sessions.
And your Play mats are ready.
Let them explore and play on their own.This way they will try to get more innovative and creative.
Place the mats one by one and ask them what it is ?
Name all the seasons along with the characteristics.
"Summers are hot and sunny", This is sun.
"Winters are cold and we see snowfall".This is a snowman.
Like this help them identify.
The last step is to show them the mats and ask them to identify on their own.
What is this? Sun. Its sunny in summers lets make sun.
What is this ?Rainbow.What all colours do you see in rainbow? Let them recall and whatever colours they can recall let them make a rainbow with that play dough.
So far this has been the most effective way to make N learn about seasons.When we go out and its sunny he will immediately say 'Its sunny mama it is summer". And similarly cap for him means winters.
Play dough is a great way to exercise the pre writing skills.Kneading play dough strengthens the muscles and also making snakes which we made for the rainbow is an excellent holding practice.Pressing the Play dough on to make sun rays helps in concentrating.
Yet another brilliant DIY Priya! Love the concept of seasons taught so innovatively; as well as the idea of laminated sheets which can easily be reused any number of times.
Question: DO you have a laminator at home? If yes, can you recommend the brand and approx price?
Play dough is one activity which I feel has no age limit. My daughter is almost 9 years old now and still enjoys play dough. I am 38 and I join my daughter in playdough activity whenever I am stressed. It helps release negative energies. Apart from developing fine motor skills, cognitive skills etc etc, it's just pure fun.
I simply love the way to present each and every activity. This is a fun way to teach them.
We have been enjoying a lot with play doughs but I was actually out of ideas on what more to do with them. Your post has sorted my problem. Lovely and innovative as always.
This looks like so much fun. I have a hunch that my toddler would absolutely love this. I am sure we both will enjoy making these.
I am glad to have come across this post. My daughter is into play dough and she gets bored with it quickly. While I keep her occupied with many ideas, I too run out of ideas after a while. These laminated printouts are the best idea and can be reused.
Hey, this seems like so much fun for toddlers. I am sure even the mums will enjoy it as much.
Love the creativity here… A wonderful way to engage young children.. Seasons, animals, objects… All can be done this way, right?
We play a lot with play doh but I must say I never thought of this idea. This is really creative. I am gonna try it for sure.
how cute are these? We don't do playdough much yet, because I am always scared he'll try to eat it!!
My kids love to play with dough. I am sure they are going to love this idea.
Play dough is so much fun for kids. My daughter loves play dough. Never thought of such activities. Good one.
My daughter is 7 and still a big fan of play dough! She loves to make play dough doll dresses. These are some fun DIY ideas!