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Союзницька війна (), або Марсійська війна (), через активну участь у ній племен марсів, 91—87 рр. до н. е. — повстання італійських союзників Риму: самнітів, марсів і більшості італійських народів центральної та південної Італії. Основні бойові дії відбувалися в 90—89 до н. е.

Війна розпочалася, коли Рим відмовився поширити права римського громадянства на союзників, як пропонував трибун Марк Лівій Друз. Союзники були добре організовані і озброєні, створили політичну «Італійську федерацію» зі столицями в Центральній Італії, в містах Корфіній та Бовіанум, де перебували владні органи, так що спочатку римляни не могли одержати над ними верх за допомогою сили. На чолі союзу стояла Рада п'ятисот, союзники навіть карбували власну монету із зображенням бика, що долає римську вовчицю.

Згодом, щоб запобігти розростання повстання, римляни запропонували права громадянства всім, хто ще не взявся за зброю, і навіть тим, хто припинить боротьбу. Нарешті, коли повстання було жорстоко придушене, що вимагало напруження всіх сил Риму та участі найкращих полководців, у тому числі Марія і Сулли, громадянство було дано всім, хто протягом 60 днів виявить бажання його отримати. Таким чином, переможені домоглися від переможців виконання своїх вимог, завдяки чому була ліквідована небезпека відновлення війни.

Передумови

Формально Союзницька війна не була громадянською війною, оскільки  вона відбувалася між громадянами Риму та союзниками Риму, які не мали римського громадянства. Італіки служили в римській армії, але не мали рівних прав, не могли отримати свою частку завойованого, в тому числі й землю. В той же час, основна частина ділянок «народної землі», ager publicus, знаходилась на території різних племен. Становище італіків нагадувало становище плебеїв трьома століттями раніше.

Розвиток подій

В 91 році до н.е. плебейський трибун Марк Лівій Друз Молодший вніс законопроєкт: надати італійським союзникам права римського громадянства. Сенат категорично відмовив, а самого Марка Лівія було вбито в Римі. Вбивство стало сигналом для початку союзницької війни. Особливо були невдоволенні жителі італійських міст і громад. Не маючи в розпорядженні прав римського громадянства, італіки були не лише безправні і принижені в політичному, але і серйозно ущемлені у своєму економічному стані, і передусім в аграрному питанні: вони навіть не могли і мріяти про отримання хоч би в майбутньому земельних ділянок в якості повноправних громадян. У італіків не було легальних шляхів у відстоюванні своїх інтересів, і вони взялися за зброю. Це була справжня громадянська війна. У кінці 91 р. до н. е. почалася так звана Союзницька війна (91—88 рр. до н. е.) — одна із найкровопролитніших воєн в усій римській історії. Це була війна і в той самий час повстання, де тісно переплелися військові, політичні і соціальні вимоги, що надало їй особливе озлоблення.

Спочатку італіки хотіли під час одного з латинських свят принести в жертву на Альбанській горі двох консулів 91 року – Луція Марція Філіпа і Секта Юлія Цезаря. План зірвався, і тоді італіки почали готуватися до відкритого наступу. Безумовно, приховати такі масштабні приготування таємно не вийшло. Почалося повстання у 91 р. випадково. Коли претор Гай Сервілій прийшов у місто Аскула і почав народу погрожувати вони обізлилися і вбили його і його легата у театрі і пізніше усіх римлян у місті, оскільки італіки дізналися про підготовку повстання. Почали це повстання марси, тому інша назва – Марсійська. Пізніше до них приєднались інші. Повсталі виставили армію в 100 тис. чоловік, причому вона мала таку ж високу військову виучку і організацію, що і власне римська, оскільки італіки здавна служили в римській армії в якості допоміжних частин.

Римський сенат прислав в різні міста послів для вияснення: чого хочуть італіки?
Перед повстанням італіки спробували ще раз домовитись з Римом. Переговори нічого не дали. Дуже важливим для союзників було створення власне політичної організації. Нею стала федерація усіх італійських громад і міст з центром в місті Корфіній. Федерація дістала характерну назву «Італія». Вони вибрали Раду п'ятсот і почали карбувати свою власну срібну монету «Італія». Її символом, свого роду гербом, стало символічне зображення бика, який їсть римську вовчицю.

Політична організація італіків скопіювала римські порядки. Так само, як і в Римі, обиралися сенат з 500 членів, 2 консули і 12 преторів, інші магістрати. Очевидно, існувало і народне зібрання. Повсталі італіки сформували два військові угрупування: північне – марси, пелінги, вести на чолі з марсом Помпедієм Сілоном і південну – самніти, лукани й інші на чолі з самнітом Папієм Мутілом.

Варто зазначити, що Рим мав деякі переваги:
 Володів старою централізованою державною організацією, а Італія була сильно децентралізована.
 Італіки вели партизанську війну, а римські війська розбивали їх поодинці.
 Територія повстання рідко була суцільною.

Ополчення італіків швидко перебільшило 200 тисяч чоловік, тоді як чисельність всієї римської армії не досягала і 130 тисяч. Складність повстання полягала в тому, що далеко не всі італіки приєдналися до повстання. Етруски і умбри зберегли вірність Риму. Латинські колонії також підтримали Рим і вони були розкидані по всій Італії. Римське військо почало зосереджуватися навколо Рима, адже ніхто не знав, з якого боку і в якій кількості будуть нападати італіки.

Жахливі сторони війни полягали в тому, що «ворог» і «свої» були всюди. Жертвами відразу стали тисячі і десятки тисяч людей.
Вже в 91 році римляни пішли на перші поступки: дарували права римського громадянства племенам, які не брали участі у війні, тобто етрускам й умбрам.

Деякі плем'я завагалися, але марси, самніти і піцени продовжували боротися. Римляни пішли на нову поступку – надали права громадянства всім італікам, якщо вони протягом 60 днів складуть зброю, і дарували права латинського громадянства жителям Цизальпійської Галлії. Вже після цих рішень Сулла винищив більше 50 тисяч італіків, і взяв декілька міст, в тому числі нову столицю італіків – Бовіан.

Спираючись на численну і добре організовану армію, а також на свою політичну організацію, італіки досягли в 90 р. до н. е. великих успіхів. Римська армія, яка повинна була розділитися, щоб вести бойові дії проти двох повстанських фронтів і ряду італійських фортець, терпіла неодноразові поразки. Особливо чутливими були поразки легіонів консула Луція Юлія Цезаря і консула Рутілія Лупа в області еквів, здача сильної фортеці Езернія в Північній Самнії. У інших місцях римські загони насилу утримували основні фортеці. Успіхи італіків сприяли розширенню масштабів повстання: на їх сторону стали переходити міста, що зберігали спочатку вірність Риму, наприклад грецькі міста Кампанії — Нола, Салерн, Помпея, Венафр. Почалися коливання в Етрурії і Умбрії.

У 89 р. почались кризові події а в 88 р. більшість повстанців були перебиті. Перший рік дуже невдалий для Риму. Поразки і консула Публія Рутилія Лупа. Це визвало погіршення настрою серед умбрських і етруських общин і смуту у самому Римі. Кількість повсталих і кількість римських військ була приблизно однаковою, тому це погрожувало затягтись на довгий час. Римляни опинилися в скрутному становищі. У цих умовах римський сенат вжив рішучі заходи. Була проведена додаткова мобілізація, в легіони були включені навіть вільновідпущеники. На чолі окремих армій були поставлені кращі полководці. Разом з військовими заходами найважливішу роль в переломі ходу військових дій зіграли заходи політичні.

Наприкінці 90-х років консул Луцій Юлій Цезар прийняв закон Юлія Цезаря (lex Julia), про те що права громадянства надавались усім італікам, що залишалися вірними Риму, що зупинило розповсюдження повстання далі.

89 рік став менш вдалим для італіків, які зазнали декілька поразок від Сулли, хоча продовжували хоробро битися. На початку 89 р. прийняли ще один важливіший закон Плавція — Папірія (89 р. до н. е.), за яким усі жителі союзних громад, що подали в 2-місячний термін заяву, отримували римське громадянство. Ці закони внесли розлад в ряди італіків. Від союзників стали відходити багато міст, їх військові сили почали танути.
У другий рік війни (89 р. до н. е.) римлянам вдалося нанести італікам ряд поразок. Консул Страбон на початку 89 р. до н. е. розбив п'ятнадцятитисячний загін марсів та піценів, що просувався до Етрурії з метою підняти повстання і там у бою Страбон знищив половину загону італіків, решта ж була вимушена відступати посеред зими через гірську місцевість, у наслідок чого значна їх частина загинула від холоду і нестачі провізії . Після цього він провів низку битв, у яких розбив марсів, марруцинів і вестинів . Завершив же він свою кампанію взяттям в облогу Аускула. Оскільки це місто було добре укріпленим і мало вигідне для оборони розташування , очевидно, що облога була тривалою і у певний момент обложені здійснили спробу масштабного прориву, коли їм на допомогу підійшов Відацилій, один із керівників італіків, що походив із цього міста . Страбон розбив військо Відацилія у відкритому бою, після чого останній здійснив самогубство . По смерті свого вождя місто опиралося недовго і, зрештою, Помпей Страбон ним оволодів . За перемогу під Аускулом і взяття самого міста, Помпей Страбон 25 грудня 89 р. до н. е. справив тріумф . У Етрурії був знищений загін марсів у 15 тис. осіб. Одна з основних баз північного угрупування — місто Аскул було узяте римськими військами. Лягла столиця повстанської федерації місто Корфіній. Були приведені до покірності кампанські міста.

На початку 88 р. до н. е. вдалося розгромити останні фортеці супротивника, місто Нолу в Кампанії, місто Езернію та ін.
Важка Союзницька війна була закінчена. Римський сенат розумів крайню небезпеку таких воєн для самого існування Риму. Тому, щоб назавжди викоренити найбільш глибокі причини таких воєн, сенат надав усім італікам (за деякими виключеннями) права римського громадянства, але приписали їх лише до вісьмох (або до десятьох)  новим трибам, а не до всіх 35, що не давало їм практично ніякого соціально-політичного впливу. Тобто переможці були вимушені задовольнити вимоги переможених.

Наслідки

Перемога Риму була історично необхідною. Заможна частина італіків злилася з римлянами. Проте повного культурно-правового урівняння Риму та решти Італії так і не сталося. Дві області – Луканія і Самній – взагалі не отримали в той час права голосу через свій опір під час війни. Найголовнішим було те, що Рим втратив своє виняткове положення в Італії і став primus inter pares – перший серед рівних. Майже всі общини Італії перетворилися на римські муніципії.

Особлива жорстокість Союзницької війни, розорення безлічі міст, загибель великої кількості людей різко погіршили економічний стан як Італії, так і усієї Римської держави. На цьому тлі знову загострюються соціально-політичні протиріччя в римському суспільстві. На початку 80-х років до н. е. Рим стикається також і з серйозними зовнішньополітичними ускладненнями, зокрема розпочинається протистояння із Понтійським царством.

Джерела

 Союзницька війна: її причини, хід та наслідки
 Дж.(Андрій КОВАЛЬ Київ ПОМПЕЙ СТРАБОН: НЕНАВИСНИЙ ГЕРОЙ СОЮЗНИЦЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ)
 Союзническая война 91-88 до н.э. Андрей Буровский. «Древний Рим. 1000-летняя биография»
 Соціально-політична боротьба в Римській республіці в період II—I ст. до н. е. Історія Давнього Риму
 Дж Древний Рим. 100-летняя биография. Андрей Буровский.
 Аппиан, «Гражданские войны», I, 38-53

Примітки

Війни Стародавнього Риму
Громадянські війни в Стародавньому Римі
Війни I століття до н. е.

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text:
Video Game Development with Scrum
How to Prepare a Project Communications Management Plan
People Analytics For Dummies Cheat Sheet
Scrum and Your Customers: The Most Crucial Stakeholders
Scrum in Action in Customer Service
Scrum For Dummies
By Mark C. Layton
Many technology companies are already using scrum to great success. For example, the hugely popular and complex area of software development can utilize scrum to great success. You find four basic reasons:
Flexibility: With scrum, you start with the basic features and grow the game into more complexity. This happens organically and therefore you're always developing what's most important next.
Finding the fun: Developers can add the fun in small, iterative doses. Those features that add the most value in terms of fun (a critical element of any game) get added first.
Cost savings: Most games fail to break even financially. Scrum's cost-saving nature is a company saver. Even if funding is cut halfway through (assuming that the minimum playtime is met), you still have the most important 50 percent of the features fully functioning and, if not yet marketable, at the very least reusable.
Regular and frequent feedback in at least two forms:
Daily from the product owner
At each sprint review from the stakeholders (such as publisher and marketing)
Gaming is all about keeping the customer happy and engaged. Feedback within scrum is incorporated quickly, so the end result is actually what the user wants.
Development stages of video game development
For games, the technical development generally follows three stages, as shown for the general flow of game development.
The historic flow of video game development.
Development follows three stages:
Pre-production: This is where artists, directors, and engineers come together to "find the fun." It's a prototyping and proof of concept phase to determine whether the game is a good, fun idea before they enter it into production and more money is spent.
Especially with mobile games, engineers can prototype without any art very quickly. But with any games, teams can validate the idea of the game, define it, develop concept art, ensure funding, and assemble a development team.
Production: The proof of concept gets developed by directors, artists, and engineers.
Post-production: Professional testers hit the "finished" product, beta testers follow, and sales, marketing, and support begin.
As this process implies, publishers typically engage with studios under traditional waterfall contracts and structures, paying the studio only at certain long-term milestones. This often implies that the publisher goes for long periods of time without seeing progress.
Under a scrum model, the game development process looks more like what is shown here. Here you can clearly see the ongoing testing necessary for QA. After each task, whether it be concept art, storyboarding, writing, or prototyping, the task is tested and either moved on or further developed.
The game development process with scrum.
With scrum, publishers identify and kill the nonfun stuff more quickly and have greater control over quality, because they participate regularly in sprint reviews and pay studios incrementally, in line with the delivery of working game increments.
Short sprints keep a flow of outbound content that attracts and retains consumers. Scrum gets something playable more quickly to such stakeholders as publishers and focus groups. This allows developers to quickly emphasize the fun factor and eliminate sooner the gameplay elements that aren't entertaining. This can also save wasted art creation costs.
Marketing and video game development
Games have traditionally been sold as retail products. However, as they become increasingly popular, online and digital distribution is shifting the emphasis from retail to digital delivery. A huge need exists to constantly and quickly update and add, and then push out content to a game. It is the difference between surviving or not. The barrier to entry continues to lower as basic game-making tools become easier to use and less expensive than ever, and Apple and Google are convenient and inexpensive platforms to sell through (it only costs about $100 to set up a developer account through which you can release game apps). Speed to market is critical.
Game sales are overwhelmingly seasonal, with over 50 percent of the industry's revenue coming from the Christmas season alone. This is a major contributing factor to the crunch time that many teams regularly face, because the holiday season imposes a hard deadline.
Scrum's priority-driven product backlog ensures that the highest-priority "fun" will be delivered with minimized crunch time. This not only makes management happy but also helps reduce employee burnout.
Art in game development
Art is a significant portion of the development work required. Console and PC games require a lot of art and animation assets, adding up to 40 percent or more of the overall cost of a game title. Technical or gameplay issues late in production are costly.
Art, being the most costly, is tempting to outsource overseas more and more. However, trouble with time zones and communications almost always leads to delays, rework, and dissatisfaction in finished product quality.
Scrum allows artists and developers to work on the same team, rather than as silos, with the same goals in sight and real-time communication on what will work and what will not.
Timeboxed delivery (sprints) of art assets keeps everyone on schedule with deadlines that they set as a team and a steady flow of deliverables to market, keeping waste to a minimum.
To optimize collaboration, teams should be onshore and in-house (colocated). Onshore and colocated teams actually keep delay and rework costs down.
Many times, larger game titles require larger development teams than nine people: for instance, 15 or more developers, 10 or more artists, and 30 or more on the QA team.
Wooga, a social game developer, releases a new version of its game on Facebook on the same day of each week, every week. The developers take the weekend to refresh their minds before hitting the next sprint again on Monday. The one-week sprint, although rigorous, forces them to be disciplined in their work and avoid delays due to dependencies with other teams. Although they release on the same day each week, they'll still release earlier if a feature is ready. Development team members regularly submit new ideas, and those ideas often get prioritized and developed in the next sprint, which adds to team morale and ownership in the product.
Because gaming technology is changing so rapidly, to perform well and succeed in the gaming sphere, nimbleness and speed are paramount.
Ideally, games can't "ship" with fewer than 10–12 hours of playtime for a single-player game. So while this may be the release goal, after every sprint, publishers can review the working software and provide invaluable feedback.
The definition of "done" may differ between pre-production and production. Be sure to clarify both up front. For instance, a pre-production sprint's definition of done may include different types and levels of documentation and artwork standards than a production sprint.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Analysen Positionen Essays
Download "Analysen Positionen Essays"
Caroline Edwards
1 Analysen Positionen Essays Dr. Günter Seufert born in 1955, is Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs / Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin. Prior to this he worked as a freelance journalist and author, taught at the University of Cyprus (Nicosia), and was acting director of the Istanbul branch of the Institute of the German Oriental Society (DMG). His main research focus lies on Turkey and the Cyprus conflict. Contact The text is a revised version of the author s contribution to the symposium of the Scientific Board of the Southeast Europe Association (SOG) on the topic Farewell to democracy, farewell to Europe? Turkey after the attempted coup in July 2016, which was held in Berlin on 9 February The text was completed in June Turkey s Shift to Executive Presidentialism: How to Save EU-Turkish Relations Summary The most recent report of the European Commission on Turkey from 17 April 2018 points out that, for the time given, there is no room for the opening of new EU negotiation chapters. After 13 years of protracted bargaining, mutual crimination, backtracking of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey as well as a serious loss of prestige and leverage on the side of the EU, relations between Ankara and Brussels are at an all-time low. Undermining the separation of powers and the independency of the judiciary, Turkey s shift to executive presidentialism may well push both sides further apart. However, the EU still matters for Turkey economically and the EU depends on Turkey in the realm of security policy where highly sensitive issues are at stake such as migration, the fight against terrorism and Turkey s membership in NATO. To secure a working relationship, both Turkey and the EU have to shoulder responsibility for the failing accession process. Turkey needs to fix a number of arrangements of its presidential system most detrimental to democracy. For its part, the EU has to create a new framework for relations of its members with Ankara. A framework is needed that is both attractive for Turkey in terms of economy and challenging regarding the rule of law. 6 SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Günter Seufert
2 Günter Seufert Turkey s Shift to Executive Presidentialism: How to Save EU-Turkish Relations The most recent report of the European Commission on Turkey of 17 April points out that, for the time given, there is no room for the opening of new negotiation chapters. Turkey's backsliding in all areas pertaining to the Political Criteria of Copenhagen has undermined the political and legal basis of membership negotiations. In Germany, but also in other EU member states with large-scale migration from Turkey, influential political circles had silently hoped for an end of Turkey's EU membership process mostly due to concerns regarding new migratory flows. Today, however, there is no mood of relief, quite the reverse. In recent years, the earlier relationship between Turkey and Europe in which the EU had intended to use its leverage on Turkey to modernise the country economically and to transform it politically has given way to a state of interdependency in which Turkey sometimes was able to put more pressure on Europe than vice versa. One example highlighting this is the refugee crisis that Europe was able to manage at least temporarily only with the help of Turkey, and Brussels ensuing hopes for Turkey's future cooperation. 2 Another matter of concern in the EU are the so-called European foreign fighters that are about to retreat from Syria into Turkey, probably on their way to Europe. To stave off terrorist threat to their own populations, Berlin, Paris, and Brussels rely on information from Turkish intelligence. 3 Ankara's rapprochement to Moscow forms a third issue that disquiets not only the US but also NATO-members all over Europe. Doubts whether Turkey remains a reliable military partner haunt the sleep of many in Europe. 4 What went wrong? What can both sides do to avoid further escalation or a complete breakdown of mutual relations? 1 C.f Marc Pierini, EU-Turkey relations, confined to core priorities, Carnegie , 4 Rayk Hähnlein et al., Die Türkei verlässt die NATO (German), in: Lars Borzus (Ed.), Während wir planten, Berlin 2018, p SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Analysen 7
3 First, Turkey and its European partners should stop putting the blame for the derailed membership process completely on the other side. Both sides should reconsider the extraordinary difficulties of Turkey s EU accession process and take responsibility for their own fatal failures. Second, Turkey should be aware of the risk it shoulders in terms of its relations with the European Union in case of a one-to-one implementation of its amended new constitution into law and political practice. Third, the European Union should work for an additional framework concerning the Union's relations with Turkey to ensure cooperation with Turkey beyond the stalled membership process and to avoid that every single member state deals with Turkey on a bilateral level. Reading Turkey's membership process beyond the established blame game Three groups of reasons contributed to the failure of EU-enlargement concerning Turkey, a country of vital interest to Europe's well-being and security: First, the changing geopolitical context after the End of the Cold War; second, developments in Turkey's domestic arena; and third, the EU's incapacity to align EU-member states to a joint and coherent policy towards the country. The change of geopolitical context due to the end of the Cold War During the Cold War, Turkey's role in the security considerations of the West had shaped Turkey's relationship with Europe. The pivotal state at NATO s south-eastern flank was to be economically developed and politically stabilized. Additionally, NATO wanted to minimize frictional losses caused by Turkey's rivalry with Greece. Turkey itself perceived Moscow its primary security concern since the Soviet Union demanded a say in the ruling of the Turkish straits and glanced at regions in the north east of Anatolia. In these days, Ankara's alignment with the West in strategic terms made up for Turkey's 'European character' that unlike today nobody questioned with reference to historical, religious or geographical considerations. Alongside Greece and Germany, Turkey had been one of the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan. It was a founding member of the OECD's forerunner OEEC as well as the Council of Europe. Already in 1956 prior to Germany Turkey entered NATO. Turkey's at the time unequivocal political, economic and cultural orientation towards the West undoubtedly added to the country s image as part of the West. Thus, Walter Hallstein, the first President of the EEC-Commission, stated his desire to have Turkey one day as a member of the Union on equal footing. 5 Things drastically changed with the demise of the USSR. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact seemingly reduced Turkey's significance for Europe in terms of security and, at the same time, allowed the EU to develop its vision of eastern enlargement with the concomitant change of priorities. Feeling no longer challenged by the USSR, 5 Frank R. Pfetsch, Gehört die Türkei zu Europa?, Tuerkei%20zu%20Europa.doc. 8 SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Günter Seufert
4 European societies experienced the so-called 'democratisation of foreign policy' that as far as Turkey was concerned resulted in a stronger impact of culturalist prejudices and ensuing discourses on foreign policy making. Turkey, too, saw an expansion of political freedoms that led to the strengthening of religious-conservative forces. Additionally, Turkey's foreign policy leeway widened drastically, allowing for engagement in hitherto inaccessible regions. Thus in the 1990s and 2000s when Turkey for the first time came close to EU candidacy and membership negotiations Europe's primary motif for enlargement towards Turkey was weakened and, simultaneously, Turkey, for the first time, became able to ponder alternative directions for economical cultural and political development. Domestic developments in Turkey: political transformation stalled When the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal in 1987 for the first time applied for full membership in the EU, Turkey still struggled with the political and economic devastations caused by the coup d'état of 1980 and the ensuing military rule that lasted until Economic policies remained stuck between the protection of loss-making state enterprises and efforts of privatization. Large parts of the Turkish population doubted both the generals' and the civilians' capabilities to develop the country. Thus, Özal's application appeared to have been driven by economic considerations and with a view to the EU's financial contribution to neighbouring Greece. The 1990s witnessed a further erosion of the political centre in Turkey, the taking office of the first Islamist Prime Minister (Necmettin Erbakan), an escalation in the fight with the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK), and repeated interventions of the military into politics. It is against this background, that the AKP in 2002 came out as the sole winner of legislative elections and singlehandedly formed the new government. A fragile balance of power emerged that triggered unforeseen political dynamics. The governing party that rested on a solid religious-conservative electorate, for the first time, was able to challenge the vested power of the secular elite, that was as authoritarian as westernizing, including the high judiciary, large parts of the press and as the decisive force the military. This state-elite tirelessly questioned the political legitimacy of the ruling party whose leadership has its roots in Islamist circles. Nothing depicts the situation better than the fact that the AKP in 2007 only at a hair's breadth escaped its being outlawed by the constitutional court, although the AKP enjoyed absolute majority in the parliament those days. In such a political setting, the EU's demands toward democratic reform could only work to the advantage of the conservative forces and to the disadvantage of the state elite, particularly the military that lacked democratic legitimacy. This was the main reason why the AKP oriented itself towards Europe disregarding the fact that its electorate represented those clusters of Turkey's society with the greatest distance to the overall secular European life style and political culture. The pious opted for democracy because they needed it and a window of opportunity opened for deep-grounded political SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Analysen 9
5 transformation of Turkey's state and society. When the AKP, in 2004, defined itself as a movement for Conservative Democracy, 6 the door was open for a silent revolution in Turkey. In the meantime, the AKP has won four legislative and three local elections, three constitutional referenda and one race for president of state. In the eyes of its electorate, the underlying conflict between the pious people and the secular and alienated elite is still valid. However, gone has the time of democratic reform and orientation towards Europe. In the domestic arena the AKP lost interest in further democratisation exactly at that moment it had brought down the bastions of elite rule, and the military, the high judiciary and the secular press ceased to be political actors to reckon with. In terms of foreign policy, the so-called Arab Spring played in the hands of those who projected Turkey as the new pivotal state in the Middle East. Ankara expected the overturn of authoritarian secular and militarist rule in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria and the coming to power of moderate Muslim movements that would accept Turkey as a natural leader of the Middle East. Thus, both domestic and international dynamics weakened the interest of the Turkish government in Europe and in the EU. EU-member states render Turkey's membership process a plaything of their 'national interests' and domestic policies In Europe, several issues exerted a negative impact on Turkey's EU accession process and pushed the question of Ankara's fulfilment of accession criteria on the backstage: The sheer size of Turkey in demographic terms, the unresolved Cyprus Question and the ascribed cultural remoteness of Turkey s overall Muslim population. The presence of large Turkish migrant communities all over Europe made Turkish accession the subject of heated domestic debates in some member-states and other member-states used Turkey s quest for membership to selfishly pursue their own 'national agendas'. For the latter, the policy of Greece may serve as an example. Athens became an EU member in 1981, and, in the 1990s, it used its status to spoil the development of a common European strategy to bring Turkey closer to the Union with the aim to put pressure on Turkey due to conflicts in the Aegean. 7 At the EU Summit of 2013 in Thessaloniki, Greece threatened to block the eastern enlargement in case Cyprus would not enter the list of candidates for future membership. Brussels gave in, thus opening the way for Nicosia to block single-handedly a number of negotiation chapters for Turkey in 2009 as a response to Turkey's policy in the Cyprus question. However, already two years earlier, in 2007, the newly elected French President Nicolas Zarkozy in open violation of the European Council's decision had unilaterally blocked five negotiation chapters to prevent Turkey s membership. Probably France would not have been able to get away with this would the German government not 6 Yalçin Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi, AKP, Ankara 2003, xmlui/handle/11543/ Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States, Washington D.C. 2000, p. 195 ff. 10 SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Günter Seufert
6 have tacitly given its blessing to the move. Turkey, thus, was the first candidate that faced the so-called 'nationalisation of the EU's enlargement policy, an euphemistic term for the Union's growing inability to enforce commonly taken decisions on it member states. Due to these reasons European policy deplorably failed to impart new impetus to Turkey's EU accession process particularly at the moment, when dynamics towards Europe in Turkey itself slowed down. Probably, the EU wasted the final opportunity to breath new live into Turkey accession process in 2016 when in the course of the refugee crisis Turkey's then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu demanded the opening of new chapters in return for Turkey's cooperation. Again, it was Cyprus that blocked the move and probably again other member-states behind the scene supported Nicosia. Meanwhile, public opinion in Europe had turned even more negative towards Turkey due to the country's authoritarian trajectory. Thus, many political actors have to share responsibility for the derailment of Turkey's EU membership adventure. Additionally, geopolitical conditions changed and moods among the populations here and there were not supportive to say the least. Therefore, it does not make sense to heap the blame exclusively on one or the other side. If you are serious about the significance of the relationship adopt a new language! In case leaders in Europe and in Turkey should decide for renewed cooperation, they, first have to acknowledge a shared responsibility for the state of affairs in the relationship. They, second, will have to desist from entering again in vicious circles of mutual accusations and in ascribing bad intentions towards the other side. They, third, should seriously consider a change of language in the same direction also when speaking to domestic audiences. They, fourth, should publicly acknowledge that with derailing the membership process, both, Turkey and the EU have missed a great opportunity and that it is time for damage limitation. Without such a change in language currently applied and approaches currently pursued even strong awareness of shared interests and well-designed new frameworks of cooperation will not ensure productive cooperation. The risk of further escalation in EU-Turkey relationship due to Turkey s shift to executive presidentialism In 1993, the European Council on its Summit in Copenhagen defined the political criteria a candidate country must meet for accession to the Union as follows: Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 8 Even prior to the already mentioned most recent SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Analysen 11
7 report of the European Commission on Turkey, central stakeholders in Europe arrived at the conclusion that the domestic situation in Turkey is no longer matching its criteria. Already in November 2016, the European Parliament called on the Commission and the member states of the European Union... to initiate a temporary freeze of the ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey, because... repressive measures under the state of emergency are disproportionate and in breach of basic rights and freedoms of democratic values upon which the European Union is founded In April 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided to reopen the monitoring procedure of Turkey until serious concerns about the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law are addressed in a satisfactory manner. 10 In January 2018, the French President Emmanuel Macron said in a joint press conference with Turkey's President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan: As far as the relationship [of Turkey] with the European Union is concerned, it is clear that recent developments and choices do not allow any progression of the process we [Turkey and the EU] are engaged. 11 In March 2018, the three parties that form the new German government agreed on the following formula to define their common approach to Turkey: Turkey is an important partner for Germany whom we have manifold relations with and a neighbour of the EU. Therefore, we have strong interest in good relations. There is backsliding for quite some time in regard to democracy, rule of law and human rights. This is the reason why we are not intending to close chapters of the accession negotiations or to open new ones. 12 In April 2018, the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) expressed its deepest concerns about the announcement on 18 April 2018, of the holding of early presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey on 24 June 2018, because... an adverse context will impede the conduct of genuinely democratic elections. 13 Currently, the government and the ruling party in Turkey push for amendment acts to harmonize the law with the newly amended constitution. Adopting the law in that direction may well drive the final nail in the coffin of Turkey s EU membership perspectives. On request of PACE's Monitoring Committee, the Council of Europe's constitutional law experts from the so-called Venice Commission scrutinized the 9 C.f. DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=DE BBC, , The press conference took place immediately after the meeting of the two leaders and shortly after Turkey had ordered 25 passenger airplanes from the French-German Airbus Company. 12 Koalitionsvertrag für die 19. Legislaturperiode, koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf?file= SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Günter Seufert
8 constitutional amendment already in March They warned... that by removing necessary checks and balances, the amendment would not follow the model of a democratic presidential system based on the separation of powers, and instead would risk degeneration into an authoritarian presidential system. 14 How justified are these concerns? The political context of Turkey s constitutional amendment and the rhetoric that accompanied its implementation Despite quite a variety of democratising amendments some of them made in the 2000s in response to expectations of the European Union the Turkish constitution until today bears many authoritarian traces. These traces originate from the constitution of 1982 that the forces of the 1980 military coup imposed on the country. This original version of the present constitution defined the whole populace as ethnically Turkish, privileged the Sunni version of Islam against other confessions and beliefs and at the same time obliged the whole citizenry to a strictly secular lifestyle. In doing so, the 1980 constitution seriously limited the political leeway, particularly for Muslim conservatives but also for lingual and religious minorities. At the same time, the constitution yielded legitimacy to extra-parliamentary veto players, in the first line the military and the high judiciary. Thus, in the 1990s and more so in the 2000s, a wide range of political actors valued the Turkish constitution of 1980 as one of the major obstacles for further democratisation and demanded a fundamental change. In preparing the populace for the most recent amendment, the AKP government heavily capitalised on that sentiment. However, with the most recent amendment, the government did not change the authoritarian character of the constitution. 15 The AKP, instead, only replaced the alleged secular character of the Turkish nation used for decades to limit and to sanction conservative political activity with an equally fantasized pious character of the whole nation and in doing so, again paved the way for an authoritarian policy. The key arguments the government put forward in defending the necessity for the shift to a presidential system exemplify this very strategy, starting with the designation of the envisaged system. The Turkish president is not striving for a presidential system as such, but for a Turkish type -presidential system. 16 He substantiates the need for change by saying that up until today the Turks had to live under exported constitutions, designed accordingly to equally exported logics. Now it is time to turn to the native and home-grown values of the nation. In need is a constitution that puts the nation in the centre and rests on our ancient and autochthonous governance tradition. Thus, the government again constructs a Osman Can, The basic priorities of the constitutional order remain untouched (Turkish), Karar, , 16 For this and the following see the speech of R. T. Erdoğan published in the newspaper Hürriyet, , under the title Turkish type constitutional order: the nation is ready (Turkish), SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Analysen 13
9 culturally homogeneous nation. This nation resists exported, i.e. secular, values. It longs for rule according to Turkey's ancient governance tradition and, thus, traces its roots back to the ancestors from imperial Ottoman times. United in autochthonous values, this nation knows no inner conflicts, and there is no need for the separation of powers. According to the Turkish President, the constitutions so far in place rested on the idea of conflict between the powers. The spirit of the new constitution, he said, will not be conflict, but harmony and balance, and the powers will not strive to harm but to complement each other, and all current problems will be solved. 17 The provisions of the amendment very much mirror these intentions. The abolition of the cabinet and the concentration of the executive power in one person The president of state is taking over the competences and responsibilities of the prime minister and the cabinet. Both latter institutions cease to exit. The president appoints his own deputy, the ministers, the undersecretaries and leading bureaucrats. 18 Far reaching decisions such as the declaration of the state of emergency, the exceptional convocation of the parliament as well as the issuing of decree-laws and administrative decrees, decisions that prior to the amendments rested with the collective deliberation of the cabinet, are now in the exclusive competence of the president of state. 19 Reduced rights and competences of the parliament The amendment drastically reduces the power of the parliament to control the executive. The government does not rely on a parliamentary vote of confidence, ministers are not obliged to answer personally parliamentarians' investigative quests, and there are no sanctions for ministers who refuse to deliver parliament even written reply. Parliament's budget rights also turn into blunt weapons. When the parliament refuses to approve the new budget, the government continues its work, using the adopted budget of the previous year. 20 Impeachment of the president in case of criminal offence requires extraordinary large majorities in parliament. It needs three fifths of the deputies to trigger criminal investigation, and two thirds of the deputies have to back the instigation of the court procedure. 21 In order to dismiss the president, the parliament has to dissolve itself which it can do only with a majority of two thirds of its members. On the other hand, the president may dissolve the parliament whenever he sees fit. The parliament faces serious challenges also regarding its core capacity, legislation. Prior to the amendment, the parliament overturned presidential vetoes of laws adopted by the parliament with 17 Ibid. 18 Christian Rumpf, Die geplante Verfassungsänderung, Stuttgart, , p Union of Turkish Bar Associations, Comparison of the changing articles of the old and the new constitution (Turkish), 20 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, amended (Turkish), anayasa/anayasa_2017.pdf, Article Ibid, Article 105.I. 14 SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Günter Seufert
10 the bare majority of the quorum. The new provisions ask for the absolute majority of seats. 22 However, for the parliament s legislative monopoly, the newly introduced power of the president to issue decree-laws appears to be even more fateful. Although the amendment explicitly limits the scope of decree-laws to areas not already designed by ordinary laws, this limitation does not apply in the state of emergency. 23 Most recent moves on the side of the Turkish government unequivocally displayed a tendency of the executive to use this provision to make large inroads into the legislative monopoly of the parliament. The constitution limits the scope of decree-laws issued under the state of emergency to matters related to the threats that caused the declaration of the state of emergency. However, the government, in August 2017, did not respect this limitation. It circumvented parliament by changing a number of ordinary laws with no relation to the causes that triggered the declaration of the state of emergency by ways of decree-law, thus clearly violating constitutional rules. 24 Blurring the division between the executive and the legislative If one looks for the particular 'Turkish type' 25 of Turkey's new presidential system, two issues meet the eye: First, the president of state is not obliged to leave his party and to resign from party posts. 26 As a result, the president who has collected all powers of the executive in his person acts also as the head of the party that enjoys absolute majority in parliament. This leads to a serious blurring of the divide between the executive and the legislative powers as the person that single-handedly runs the executive due to his authority over the hegemonic party also determines the conduct of the parliament. The second crucial regulation in this context stipulates that the elections for parliament and presidency will take place at the same date. 27 Thus, the campaigns for both elections happen in the same political setting and atmosphere and under the very same political front lines and slogans. This design, in all probability, will further reproduce the already alarming polarisation of Turkey's polity. The executive will uphold its decisive influence on parliament and the blurring of the divide between the powers will continue. Enhanced impact of the executive on the judiciary The combination of, first, the concentration of all executive powers in one person, and second, the merger of interest between the hegemonic party and the president (due to the latter's continuing party membership and even leadership) is also likely to severely undermine the independency of the judiciary. This is the case because the president of 22 Ibid, Article 89, including footnote Ibid, Article 104 and Decree-Law 694 of Etyen Mahçupyan, A presidential parliamentary system (Turkish), Karar, , 26 Union of Turkish Bar Associations, Comparison of the changing articles of the old and the new constitution (Turkish), Article Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, amended (Turkish), anayasa/anayasa_2017.pdf, Article 116. SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Analysen 15
11 state and the party that holds the simple majority of parliament are in the position to staff the most central juridical institutions. The president of state appoints twelve out of 15 members of the Constitutional Court and the parliament elects the remaining judges and may do this with simple majority! 28 Thus, the president and the ruling party may appoint all members of the court. 29 The very same picture occurs when it comes to the staffing of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors that is responsible for the appointment of juridical personal at the courts. Including the Minister of Justice and its undersecretary, the president appoints five of its 13 members. The parliament elects the remaining seven members, and again is able to do this with simple majority. 30 Thus, president and hegemonic party exclusively decide the staffing of main juridical institutions. If you are serious about the significance of the relationship consider steps to re-introduce checks and balances The rhetoric adopted by Turkey s ruling party of today to justify the need for a presidential system draws the picture of an absolute contradiction between the values of the Muslim conservative nation on the one hand and all those who do not fit into this culturalist designation of the sovereign. This does not bode well for political opponents and for the rights of religious, ethnical and sexual minorities. The capacities of parliament to control the executive and to protect its monopoly of legislation are severely limited and the separation of powers is put into question. Government and hegemonic party are able to staff main juridical institutions. The constitutional amendment thus undermines the very foundations of democracy and the stability of institutions in Turkey. In order to avoid further escalation in its relationship with the European Union, the Turkish government and the ruling party should consider the re-establishment of checks and balances. In this vein, the government should end the state of emergency. It should not issue new decree-laws and respect the legislative monopoly of the parliament. It should secure the independency of the judiciary by stipulating the need for a two third majority in parliament for the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court as well as to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. The government should hand back to parliament its budgetary rights, and the discretion of the president to dissolve the parliament should be limited and bound to legal conditions, unequivocally formulated. A new framework for Turkey's relations with the European Union Today, practically, Turkey and the EU are on equal footing. They maintain manifold relations that create strong interdependency and function to mutual benefit. The flip side of the coin is that both sides can also harm each other seriously. In fact, if tensions escalate, both sides have much to lose. The EU member states may experience unbridgeable gaps in their capability to prevent terrorist activities. The European Union 28 Ibid, Article Ibid, Article Ibid, Article SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Günter Seufert
12 may fail to prevent uncontrolled and therefore unmanageable immigration with severe consequences for the EU members Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. Given its today similar fragile relations with the United States, Turkey in case of simultaneously escalating tensions with Europe may even turn its back to NATO and thus rock transatlantic power-balances. Such scenarios, naturally, would come with a cost for Turkey. Ankara risks the drain of its main source of direct foreign investment. At stake is also its privileged access to its primary export market. Turkey's industry will miss incentives for technical improvement, and Turkey's holiday destinations will lose again tourists from Europe. Neither Ankara nor Brussels are likely to risk a total break. At the same time, however, the current framework of relations Turkey's EU membership process today appears to be more of a spoiler than a facilitator for cooperation. For both parties tend to use the membership process as a bargaining chip, forgetting that due to the factual stalling of the process this currency is out of value. So neither will Turkey manage to force its way into the Union only because Brussels depends on Turkey's cooperation in the abovementioned fields. The very character of the accession process does not allow for this as accession remains to be dependent on the fulfilment of criteria. At the same time, recent experience shows that the EU has lost the leverage on Turkey that it enjoyed in times when the accession process worked. Whenever one of the both sides, today, refers to the accession process, it only causes anger as well as raising tensions. Existing frameworks for cooperation Beyond accession negotiations, Turkey-EU relations rest on the following pillars: In 1964, Ankara entered into an Association Agreement with the EU that already foresaw future full membership. 31 In 1970, both sides signed an additional protocol that pointed to the gradual establishment of a customs union. The actual Customs Union between Turkey and the EU entered into force in 1995, designed as a temporary agreement that will become superfluous with later membership. With the stalemate of the EU accession process looming, since 2013 and more so since 2015, both sides have concentrated on high level dialogues to enable necessary cooperation. A High Level Political Dialogue deals with foreign policy and cooperation in the field of mutual security. Both sides discuss Turkey's demand for visa-free travel to the Schengen countries in the format of a Visa Liberalisation Dialogue. Regular meetings additionally take place in the High Level Economic Dialogue as well as in the High Level Energy Dialogue. In 2015, the parties made mutual political statements to frame their cooperation for handling the refugee crisis. Turkey's need for a new framework for the relationship with the EU However, the above-mentioned agreements and dialogue formats have not been able to prevent the deterioration of Turkey's relation with the European Union. None of the 31 This and the following according to the website of the Turkish EU Ministry, SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Analysen 17
13 dialogue formats has yielded substantial results. Even the Association Agreement and the Customs Union have contributed their share to political strife. Turkey and the EU need a new format for cooperation. Turkey, first, needs a new base for its economic relations with the EU to guarantee its long-term access to the common market independent of the fate of the accession process. Only a framework that works beyond everyday political strife and that does not relate directly to Turkey's political transformation will help to attract future long-term investment. Turkey, second, needs a new base for its economic relations with the EU to overcome the flaws of the existing Customs Union. Thought as a temporary arrangement it does not grant Turkey any say in European trade policy but forces Turkey to bear the costs of new Free Trade Agreements the EU is conducting with third countries. Moreover, the existing Customs Union applies only to industrial products excluding services and agriculture. It lacks effective arbitration mechanisms, a flaw that becomes more relevant by the day. Turkey, third, needs a new base for its economic relations with the EU as an incentive to re-establish the rule of law a step that is in Turkey's own economic interest. Disregarding wide-spread criticism towards Europe in Turkey, there is no other point of reference for legal standards, for economic norms and universal values than the EU. The EU's need for a new framework concerning the relationship with Turkey A new institutional framework for its relationship with Turkey is also central to the interests of the European Union. Given the huge divergence of single EU member states towards Turkey, only the institutionalisation of relations with Turkey may serve as platform for a joint European policy. For there is no single all-over European interest towards Turkey that would invite the EU member states to arrive at a common European policy towards the country that alone may exert impact on Ankara. Given their interests in Turkey, one may discern three different groups of EU member states: A first group is made up of countries with huge labour migration (not only but also) from Turkey, namely Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Austria and France. The governments of these states often face an interested public, active and sometimes even agitated when it comes to Turkey and its EU membership bid. Fears of further migration but also wide spread concerns of well-informed circles regarding democracy and the respect for human rights trigger the debates. These countries, at the same time, appear to be the most prominent destinations for refugee influx. Additionally, these countries are the most concerned about returning foreign fighters. Their governments depend the most on Turkey and at the same time face a very Turkey-critical public opinion. The southern EU member states form a second group of countries, made up by Italy, Portugal and Spain. They look at Turkey primarily as economic partner. They do not share at least not to a similar degree neither the concerns of the first group of countries nor their political restraints. A third group consists of Central and East 18 SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Günter Seufert
14 European states. In some of them 32 the state of democracy and rule of law are matters of concern and there is no particular criticism towards Turkey. They see Turkey only as crucial NATO partner one must avoid driving into the arms of Russia. In most recent years, Berlin, Den Haag and Vienna have come to realise how difficult it is to organize support inside the European Union when quarrelling with Turkey. A common EUframework, thus, is the most effective way to avoid ineffective bilateral strife with Ankara. If you are serious about the significance of the relationship remain silent on the EU accession process, modernise and deepen the Customs Union, ease visa requirements Given the divergence of the EU member states' interests in Turkey, to remain silent on the accession process, comes as the only way for the EU to maintain the semblance of common EU policy and to the save the face. Agreement on alternative options like the formal suspension or the restart of the accession procession is not really a possibility. Thus, there is no need to burn the bridges and to further complicate the climate for cooperation. To modernise the Customs Union serves Turkey's most pressing interest in upholding friendly relations with the EU. The Turkish government hopes the deepening of the Customs Union will double the current trade volume from 146 to 300 Billion USD per annum. 33 This is a strong incentive for Turkey in order to cooperate in the above-mentioned areas where Ankara exerts leverage on the EU and/or on single EU member states. At the same time, the present Customs Union has not worked to the detriment of the EU as far as trade balances are concerned. Additionally, the start of negotiation on the Customs Union will put considerable pressure on the Turkish side in terms of rule of law, transparency, fair competition rules and worker's rights. More than anything else, the positive economic effects of the existing Customs Union turned Turkey's industrial entrepreneurs into supporters of Ankara s EU membership. They know that only enhanced trade with Europe helps Turkey to escape the middle-income trap by grading up its technological capacities and strengthening its competitiveness. Additionally, to agree on re-negotiations of the Customs Union today seems to be the only option the EU member states could jointly arrive. A move to ease visa requirements between Turkey and the EU will face strong opposition from various governments in Europe, most likely particularly from those, who point the most to human rights, the rule of law and ethical standards. However, no other step is of more relevance to Turkey's pro-european audience. And no other step contributes stronger to a more positive image of the EU in Turkey and thus secures that Turkey's European option will continue to exist. 32 But also in some countries of the other two groups. 33 (Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım), We can manage to modernise the Customs Union (Turkish), news-website Diken, , SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 03/2018 Analysen 19
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The jacket is by my London tailor, Timothy Everest—nothing like tea and bespoke clothing in Spitafields at Tim's studio! The shirt is Thom Browne. I have so many Thom Browne shirts – they fit me perfectly. The tie and handkerchief are Charvet and I found them in Paris at their store there. The grey pants are by Ron Herman.
I like to always be a bit over-dressed for everything so I like bow ties as you can hit a black tie benefit and a nightclub on the Lower East Side and feel great in both places.
This look is so me that it took about 30 seconds to put together. I am a very fast dresser.
A 10. The jacket is perfection thanks to Timothy Everest who really is a 10 in my book when it comes to bespoke clothing.
The Thom Browne shirt has little white dots everywhere that you can only see close-up. I love that subtle detail.
This is the type of outfit I pretty much wear every day.
I love the bespoke jacket and since I helped "design" it with my mastermind tailor Timothy Everest, it seems like I was part of the whole process and I know I will never see anyone in the same jacket ever.
Love my husband !!!! so chic !!!!!