text:
Note: You will find lots of scanning errors. But, the essence of the handbook is here
Cl. 7 N.Y. 476 (1852); Muser v. Robertson, 17 F. 500
(1883). -
•2. Bliss, A Treatise Upon the Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure, c. XIII, Rules Governing the Statement, ~ 174—215 (3d ed. by Johnson, St. Paul, 1894).
53. N.Y.Laws 1848, c. 379, effective on July 1.
RELATION OF PLEADING TO OTHER SYSTEMS
fact, express statutory provisions aside, it may be said that if a Lawyer, in a Complaint under the Code, frames his Allegations of Fact in a manner to meet with the requirements of Stating a Cause of Action or Defense at Common Law, he need have no fear of being thrown out of Court on Demurrer because of some Formal or Substantive Defect in his Pleadings.63 Indeed, the prophetic words of Professor Thomas M. Cooley seem as true today as when originaijy written, when, in referring to the relation of the New to the Older System, he declared:
"The works of Common Law Pleading have not been superseded by the New Codes which have been introduced. . . . A
-careful study of these works is the very best preparation for the Pleader, as well where a Code is in force as where the old Common-Law Forms are still adhered to. Any expectation which may have existed that the Code was to banish technicality, and substitute such simplicity that any man of common un~erstanding was to be competent, without legal training, to present his case in due Form
-of Law, has not been realized. After a trial of the Code System for many years, its friends must confess that there is something more than Form in the Old System of Pleading, and that the Lawyer who has learned to state his case in a logical manner after the Rules laid down by Stephen and Gould, is better prepared to draw a Pleading that will stand the test on Demurrer than the man who, without that training, undertakes to tell his story to the Court as he might tell it to a neighbor, but who, never having accustomed himself to a strict and logical presentation of the precise Facts which constitute the Legal Cause of Action or the Legal Defense, is in danger of stating so much or so little, or
-of presenting the Facts so inaccurately, as to leave his rights in doubt on his own showing. Let the Common-Law Rules be mastered, and
the work under the Codes will prove easy and simple, and it will speedily be seen that no time has been lost or labor wasted, in coming to the New Practice by the Old Road." 04
Relation to the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
TOWARD the close of the Nineteenth Century, the American Bar Association concluded that Legislative Control of Practice was highly inefficient and that the Federal Conformity Act had produced no Real Conformity between State and Federal Practice. In this situation the Association placed its influence behind a bill in Congress which provided for turning the Federal Rule-Making Power over to the Supreme Court of the United States. After much agitation and much backing and filling, by the Act of June 19, i934,~ Congress gave the Supreme Court power "to prescribe, by General Rules, for the District Courts of the United States and for the Courts of the District of Columbia, the Forms of Process, Writs, Pleadings, and Motions, and the Practice and Procedure in Civil Actions at Law."°6 The Rules as formuJated under this Act did not modify in any way the substantive rights of litigants. The Act further provided that the Court might "unite the General Rules prescribed by it for Cases in Equity with those in Actions at Law so as to secure One Form of Civil Action and Procedure for both." 67 The right of Trial by Jury as at Common Law and decl?.red by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution was preserved.
From the nature and character of the provisions of the Act of 1934, and the Rules of Civil Procedure as promulgated thereunder by the Supreme Court in 1938, it is clear that
04. Shipman, Code Pleading: The Aid of the Earlier Systems, 7 Yale Li. 197, 200 (1898), Quoting Professor Cooley.
65. C. 851, fi 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C.A. fl 723b,
723e.
66. *1, 48 Stat 1064, 28 U.S.O.A. { 723b.
Il. *2, 48 Stat 1064,28 V.S.C.A. { 723e.
43. Shlpman, Code Pleading: The Aid of the Earlier
Systems, 7 Yale Li. 197, 205 (1898).
BASIS OF MODERN REMEDIAL LAW
in scope and content they were patterned after the provisions of our various State Codes and Practice Acts, which, as previously indicated, were founded on the fundamental principles of Common-Law Procedure. There are, however, two thief differences. First, under the New System in the Federal Courts and as adopted in Several States, the control of Pleading and Practice by Rule of Court gives a flexibility in the application of the Procedural Law and in its adaptation to any need for change growing out of new or unforeseen conditions, as opposed to the Older System of Code Pleading, which more or less placed procedure in a legislative strait-jacket, leaving little room for development to meet changing social conditions. Second, under the Codes, attempts to simplify and reduce the number of provisions regulating Pleading did not meet with success. For example, the New York Civil Practice Act contained some 1578 Sections, Supplemented by 301 Rules of Civil Practice. In 1938, when a comparison was made between the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the New York Code, it appeared that it took only 86 Federal Rules to cover substantially the area occupied by 1100 of the 1578 sections of the Civil Practice Act and 133 of the 301 New York Rules of Civil Practice. And finally, it may be added that the spirit and tendency of the New System of Procedure as represented by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and as regulated by the Judges, is in the direction of the Common Law, as is evidenced, to give but a single example, by the provision that all Actions must be instituted through a Clerk of a Court and by Authority of a Court, as at Common Law, as opposed to the Code Method of Commencing an Action by an Individual or an Attorney serving a Summons and Complaint upon the defendant.
TIlE STATUS OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING UNDER TIlE CODES
Acts and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But even after a Century of Development under the Codes we still find that Common-Law Pleading survives in fact or in theory. On the basis of the degree of Common-Law Pleading which still prevails, the states fall into five groups:
The Common-Law States;
The Quasi Common-Law States;
The Code States;
The Rules of Court States;
Civil Law States,
IN the early part of the Nineteenth Century the influence of Bentham began to be felt in America. By the New York Constitution of 1846, the Court of Chancery was abolished,~ and a New Court having General Jurisdiction over Law and Equity was created and the Legislature was directed to provide for the appointment of Three Commissioners "to revise, reform, simplify, and abridge" the Practice and Pleadings of the Courts of Record of the State.'9 In response to this direction, in the following year the State Legislature instructed the Commissioners "to provide for the abolition of the present Forms of Actions and Pleadings in cases at Common Law; for a Uniform Course of Proceeding in all Cases whether of Legal or Equitable Cognizance, and for the abandonment of all Latin and other foreign tongues, so far as the same shall by them be deemed practicable, and of any Form and Proceeding not necessary to ascertain or preserve the Rights of the Parties." ~0 Under the directing genius of David Dudley Field, the Commission formulated and reported a Code which was passed on April 12, 1848, and became operative on July 1, 1848, as the Code of Procedure,~1 which has served as the source of most of our Modern Procedural Reform. The greatest single achievement of the Code, according to Professor Pomeroy, was the sub-
68. Art xiv, § S.
6L Art. vi, 24.
fl- N.Y.Laws 1847, e. 50, § 5.
71. N.Y.Laws 1848, C. 370.
6. In theory at least Common-Law Pleading
was abolished by our Modern Codes, Practice
STATUS UNDER THE CODES
stitution of One Form of Action in place of the Eleven Common-Law Forms of Action~2 In addition, Separate Courts of Law and Equity were established, in favor of what was hoped would turn out to be a Blended System of Procedure, operating under a Formless Action to be known as a Civil Action, which was in the nature of an Action on the Case. The Code also provided the Pleadings should state the Facts in plain and concise language,'3 and that the more liberal provisions of Equity Procedure should govern Joinder of Parties, and provided for the rendition of Judgments against one or more Parties according to the particular interest of the Parties involved.
Within a quarter of a century after the adoption of the New York Code of Procedure in 1848, the Code was adopted in twenty-four States, and, according to Clark," some Form of Code Procedure was, in 1947, then in force in twenty-nine states, two territories, the District of Columbia, and in the Federal Courts. So, even at this late date, it still remains true that the Movement for Reform, which took definite shape In 1848, has been only partially effective. Prior to the adoption of the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the States were roughly lined up in Four Groups, being classified as CommonLaw, Quasi.Common-Law, Code and Civil Law States. After 1938, there may be added another Group, the Rules of Court States. Perhaps a brief word concerning each type of Jurisdiction may be helpful.
i'he Common-Law States
BY the phrase "Common-Law States," is meant those States in which the Pleading is
19. Code Remedies, ~. i, Abolition of the Distinctions Between Actions at Law and Suits In Equity, and of all the Common Law Forms of Action, 10, 15 (4th ed. by Bogle, Boston, 1904).
13. Carried into New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, Rule 3014 (1968).
'71- Ilandbook of the Law of code Pleading, c. I, 5 5, 25 (2d ed., St. Paul, 1947).
primarily according to the Common-Law Rules, as Unwritten Law or in the Form of Statutory Enactment of the Common Law. Characteristic of the Procedure of the States which fall into this Group is the retention of the Forms of Actions and the Rules of Common-Law Pleading under a Court System that still calls for Separate Actions at Law and Suits in Equity. Even so, the Practice in these Separate Courts has from time to time been modified by Local Practice Acts.
The Quasi Common-Law States
IN these States the Formal Distinction between Law and Equity has been continued at least in theory, although in practice it has been weakened by Statutes abolishing the distinctions between Trespass and Trespass on the Case, or combining the Forms of Actions in the two divisions of Tort arid Contract. Usually in Jurisdictions of tins character Equitable Defenses are permitted in Law Actions.
The Code States
IN the Code States, originally largely patterned 'after the New York Code of Procedure, the Systems of Pleading and Practice are Statutory, but based on a combination of the better features of the Common-Law and Equity Procedural Systems. The same Rules apply to both Law and Equity Cases. But it should be remembered that there is a far greater similarity in the essential principles of Pleading at Common Law, in Equity, and under the Reformed Code of Procedure than is generally realized. The Essential Elements of Causes of Action which must be Pleaded are not changed by the Codes. And the Rules as to the manner of making Allegations of the respective contentions of the Parties still have much in common.
Rules of Court States
THESE states are distinguished front the Code States, whose Pleading and Practice is generaily, if not entirely, Re~u1ated by the Legislature, in that their Procedure is Reg
Ch. I
ulated by Rules of Court, usually framed by or under the authority of the Court of Highest Jurisdiction-.---the Supreme Court. The advantage of Regulating Procedure by Rule of Court as opposed to Legislative Enactment is that of greater flexibility in making changes as the social need therefor arises, without the necessity of each time referring the matter to a Legislative Body, which may be dilatory in taking action, and is oftentimes influenced by political considerations. Since the promulgation of the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a number of states have adopted the substance of the New Rules in revising their procedure.
Civil Law States
In this group the Systems of Pleading were originally based upon the Civil as opposed to the Common Law. Louisiana is a remaining State which began with a Civil Law background, from which it has never fully escaped.
ASIDE from the fact that after the lapse of over a Century, almost a third of the Several States of the United States were yet to accept the Reform represented by the adoption of a Code of Civil Procedure, how have the codes been received? The object was to blend Law and Equity into a Uniform Mode of Procedure. This was to be accomplished by abolition of the Forms of Action and the Distinction between Law and Equity. A single Form of Action in the nature of an Action on the Case was to be substituted in place of the Common-Law Forms of Actions and Suits in Equity. In some Codes there were also provisions liberalizing the law controlling Joinder of Parties and Joinder of Causes of Action, but unfortunately many of the early Codes omitted the latter type of provision.
In some States, notably New York, the Reforms under the Code of Procedure, met with
a cold reception.75 Thus in Reubens v. Joel,'° Selden, ~., in referring to the possibility of abolishing the distinctions between Law and Equity, declared: "By what process can these two Modes of Relief be made indentical? It is possible to abolish one or the other, or both, but it certainly is not possible to abolish the distinction between them.
Another leading distinction between Common-Law Actions and Suits in Equity consists in their different Modes of Trial. The former are to be tried by a Jury, the latter by the Court. Can the Legislature abolish this distinction? They might, but for the restraints of the Constitution, abolish either kind of Trial, or reclassify the classes to which they apply; but they cannot make Trial by Jury and Trial by the Court the same thing." r~
What such an attitude has meant in practical terms is that a large part of the Century following the adoption of the First Codes has been spent by the Judges in reading back into the Code, provision by provision, the Rules of the Common Law.
According to Clark,75 the objections of the Courts which have taken an unfriendly attiTa chief Justice Winslow of Wisconsin, said: "The
cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant code received from the New York Judges Is matter of history. They had been bred under the Common-Law Rules of Pleading and taught to regard that System as the perfection of logic, and they viewed with suspicion a system which was heralded as so simple that every man would be able to draw his own Pleadings. They proceeded by construction to import into the Code Rules and distinctions from the Common-Law System to such an extent that in a few years they had practically so changed it that it could hardly be recognized by its creators." MeArthur v. Moffet, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (1910).
to. is N.Y. 488, 493,494 (1&6).
It See, Gou]et v. Asseler, 22 N.Y. 225, 78 Am.Dec. 186 (1860); Caddell V. Allen, 99 N.C. 542, 548, 6 SE. 399, 402 (1888). CL Warren v. flail, 170 N.e. 406, 87 S. E. 126 (1915).
78- Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading, e.
2, The Code Action, 1 15, p. 88 (St. Paul 1947). -
MODERN PROCEDURE UNDER CODES, ETC.
tude toward the Code Reforms, are five in number:
(1) The necessity of forming clear and exact issues, both for the Trial and also to support the Judgment and thus make the Plea of Res Judicata thereafter available to the Parties.
(2) Inherent differences as to Jurisdiction and Venue, referring to the fact that Certain Actions must be brought in Certain Courts or at Certain Places.
(3) Inherent differences as to the application of Certain Statutes, such as Statutes of Limitations which were drawn along the lines of the old Procedural Divisions.
(4) Inherent differences in Manner or Amount of Relief to be granted, referring to the Specific Relief of Equity as distinguished from the Money Damages ordinarily given at Law; or to a possible Variance in the Amount of Money Damages recoverable, depending on the Form of Action chosen; or to Particular Remedies granted only in Certain Forms of Actions, such as Execution on the defendant's body.
(5) Inherent differences in Manner of 'Trial and of Appellate Review, referring to the Constitutional Right of Trial by Jury in "Law Cases" and to the different Methods of Appellate Review in "Law" and "Equity" cases.
Ail these problems have, with a more liberal point of view on the part of the Judges, been satisfactorily solved in other Code States, according to Judge Clark, and it was his belief that in time the Courts in New York would come around to the same view. But the very existence of the objections enumerated by Judge Clark ninety-nine years after the adoption of the New York Code of Procedure in 1848, plus the fact that numerous States are still without the Circle of Reform, is some slight indication of the tenacity of the Common Law. And when you add to this the fact that the great bulk of the decisions under the Codes
have necessarily been made against the background of the Common Law, it becomes clear why many distinguished Judges cling to the thesis that the inherent and fundamental difference between Actions at Law and Suits in Equity cannot be ignored—a view which has found the support, at least, of one distinguished teacher,79 who stated, in referring to the Abolition of the Forms, that they "are not archaic, accidental, artificial or arbitrary, but in the nature of things reasonable, if not indeed in their essence necessary." ~°
MODERN PROCEDURE UNDER CODES,
PRACTICE ACTS AND RULES OF
COURT—MERELY ANOTHER STEP IN
THE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
OF THE COMMON LAW
7. Viewed in its proper Historical Perspective, any unbiased and well-informed Student of Legal History, Generally, and of Legal Procedure, Specifically, must observe that each new advance in our System of Procedure was and is but another Evolutionary Step in the Development of the Common Law, and must acknowledge the fact that Common-Law Pleading, after the passage of some Seven or Eight Centuries, still survives as the basis of our Modern Legal Procedural Systems as they exist in both the State and Federal Courts.
HAVE the developments which have taken place since 1848, under the various Codes of Civil Procedure, and the Practice Acts of the Several States, together with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, been Revolutionary in Character, wiping out the Ancient Landmarks of the Common Law and the procedural experience of the Anglo-Saxon race, extending over a period of over eight hundred years, or rather, have they been merely gradual steps in the Evolutionary Development of Common-Law Pleading and Practice?
In the first, or Flexible Stage, of the Development of the Common Law, Original Writs
79. Keigwln. Cases In Common Law PleadIng, 259 (2d ed. Rochester, N. 1. 1934).
80. See Note, Law and Equity In New York—Still Unmerged, 55 Yale Li. 826 (1946).
issued out of Chancery in great profusion, creating New Rights and New Law. It was during this period that the Ancient Proprietary and Possessory Real Actions developed in great number.
Alter the Provisions o Oxford in 1258, the power of the Clerks in Chancery was restricted, the Real and Mixed Actions became so highly technical, difficult to manage and
lengthy in process, that they became inflexible and in consequence the Common Law lost some of its inherent power of expansion. During this period of inflexibility, an effort to restore the Authority of the Clerks in Chancery was made so that they might again Create New Rights by Issuing New Writs under Chapter 24 of the Statute of Westminster II (1285). But the effort was too little and came too late, so that the Residuary Power of the King's Council, operating through Chancery, was invoked to supplement the Common Law, not necessarily because of the Defects in the Common Law, but rather for reasons of State Policy.
As a result of the Statute perhaps, but more as a result of the growing social, economic and mercantile needs of England, the Modern Personal Common-Law Actions, which to some extent ran parallel to the Ancient Proprietary and Possessory Actions, and which were gradually emerging into greater prominence with the decline of these actions, were substituted in lieu of the old Real Actions which had predominated during the early Developmental Period of the Common Law. In the course of time, these Modem Forms of Action, latest in point of growth, in the Third State of Development, were abolished in favor of a Single, Formless, Form of Action, under which remedies could be provided for the violation of private rights of most any character.
With this in mind, let us swiftly glance back over the territory covered, and with almost a thousand years perspective in mind, view the Present Status of Common-Law
Pleading and Practice as it stands in the light of Modem Reforms.
From the Reign of Edward I (1272-4307) to 1848, a Period of five hundred and seventy-six years elapsed, during which Period, in both England and the United States, Legal Procedure was governed by the Common Law. When, in England, the Modern Common-Law Actions were substituted in the place of the Old Real Actions, as is later observed,8' it was assumed that such an occurrence was merely a Normal Evolutionary Development of the Common Law, based upon the change in the English social structure from One of a Feudal to One of a Commercial or Industrial Character. This change became official or was Procedurally recognized by the Real Property Limitations Act of 1833,~~ which abolished the Real and Mixed Actions.
When, therefore, in 1848, the New York Code of Procedure attempted to obliterate the distinctions between Law and Equity, to abolish the Common-Law Actions and to substitute in lieu thereof the Modem Single Formless Form of Action, the World was witnessing, not a Revolutionary Reform which swept the Common-Law System from its Ancient Moorings, but merely a Third Step in the Evolutionary Development of Common-Law Procedure, like that which took place in the Roman System.
Between 1848 and 1947, according to Clark,83 only twenty-eight out of the forty-
eight States followed New York in establishing Code Systems of Procedure. And in those States which did follow New York's example, the intervening one hundred years have been spent largely in reading back into
Si. No specific date on whieb this occurred may be assIgned but the process was completed by the Real Property Limitations Act of 1833. 3 & 4 Wm. iv, c. 27, * 36 (1833).
fl. 3&4Wm.IV,c.27,~S6(1833).
83. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading, cI, * 8, 25 (Zd ed. St. Paul, 1947).
Sec. 7 MODERN PROCEDURE UNDER CODES, ETC. 29
the various Code provisions the Appropriate inent of the Common Law, and to acknowlRule of the Common Law, edge the stubborn fact that Common-Law
By the Supreme Court of Judicature Act Pleading and Practice, despite the passage of of 1873,81 now largely replaced by the Su- almost Seven Centuries, still survives as the preme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) basis of our Modern Legal Procedural SysAct of 1925,85 England followed New York tems, both State and Federal.87
in the abolition of the Common-Law Actions
87. In Grobart v. Society For Establishing ttseflul
in favor of a Single Form of Action.86 Yet Manufactures, 2 NJ. 136, 65 A.2d 833, 839 (1949), in no one suggested that this Development in referring to the present statue of Common-Law England was anything other than an Evolu- Pleading, Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt declared:
"The Pleadings in the case at Bar are lengthy, but the
tionary Change in the Common Law, albeit same principles are applicable to them as to the
long overdue, simplest case. The flexibility and seeming Infor
Finally, in 1938, came the long awaited inality of Pleadings under the New Rules should
not deceive one into believing that the essentials of
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sound Pleading at Law or in Equity have been sought to and did place the Regulation of abandoned. Quite the contrary; the objective of
Pleading and Practice in the Federal Courts reaching an issue of law or of fact in two or at the
most three simple Pleadings has been attained, hut
and in the District of Columbia in the hands not at the sacriftce of stating the elements of a of the Supreme Court of the United States, Claim or of a Defense. They remain the same as as opposed to Congress. Some States, at Common Law as a matter to Substantive Law
as well as of Good Pleading."
in whole or partially have emulated the Fed-
And William Wirt Blume, a distinguished nuthority
eral Courts in Regulating Procedure by Rule ~ Ic,ti~ Ancient and Modern Procedure, after a
of Court as opposed to Legislative Fiat, long and thorough survey of Reform Movements in
both England and America, in an article, Theory of
So, whether we stand in the Period of the pleading: A Survey Including the Federal Rules,
Common Law when the Real Actions were 47 Micb.L.Rev. 297, 339—340 (1949), in summarizing
gradually being replaced by the Modern the Common-Law principles of Pleading still in ef
fect, declared:
Common-Law Actions; whether we start .1 A Jud~ent of a Court of Record is a conclusion with the abolition of the Common-Law drawn from premises appearing on the face of the Forms of Action by the New York Code of Jg'~t Record.
"2. A Judgment Record contains Statements of Claim
Procedure in 1848, In favor of the Single, and Defense, Verdicts, and Findings of Fact, but
Formless Form of Action, in the nature of not Evidence introduced at Trial,
an Action of Trespass on the Case, or wheth- "8. In rendering Judgment on a Claim or Defense er we look at the situation today in the light the Court must determine the legal sufficiency of
the Claim or Defense.
of our most recent Procedural Reform under "4. In determining the legal sufficiency of a Claim
the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,— or Defense the Court looks only to the pleadings viewed in its proper Historical Perspective, which form a part of the Record.
"5. For the Court to be able to determine the legal
any unbiased and well-informed Student of sufficiency of a Claim or Defense it must be legally
Legal History GeneraJly, and of Legal Proce- complete.
dure, Specifically, will be forced to admit "6~ A. question of legal sufficiency may be raised be
fore Judgment by Demurrer or Motion, or after
that Each New change in Our System of Judgment by Writ of Error.
Procedure, by Way of Reform, has been but "T, If before Trial a Claim or Defense is found to
another Evolutionary Step in the Develop- be legally Insufficient Judgment Is for opposite pafle
be legally insufficient Judgment is for opposite party
'4. 36 & 37 VIe., c. 66 (1878). •~8, If before Trial & Claim or Defense is found to
be legally sufficient Judgment Is for pleader unless
l~ 15 & 16 Gee. V, c. 49(1923). opposite party Is allowed to raise an issue of fact
SI. See article by Hepburn, In the Hope of a New "9. If after trial a Claim or Defense is found to be Birth of One Form of Action. Pan II, The Statutory legally Insufficient judgment Is for opposite party One Form of ActIon, 13 Va.L.Itev. 09, 78—80 (1920). even though Verdict Is for the pleader.
30 BASIS OF MODERN REMEDIAL LAW Cit 1
"10 If after trial a Claim or Defense Is found to be "16. For the Record to be true, matters proved may legally sufficient Judgment is for pleader If the not 'vary' from matters pleaded.
facts pleaded are found to be true. "17. Having pleaded one material matter, a party
"11. In determining the truth of a legally sufficient may not surprise his opponent by proving a difterclaim or defense the court looks only to the plead- ent matter.
ings and Verdict or Findings.
"18. To prcvcnt surprise at the trial the plaintiff
"12. Material facts pleaded by one party and not de- must Plead Items of Special Damage.
nied by the other party are deemed to be true.
"13. Material facts pleaded by one party and denied "19. To prevent surprise at the b-Ial the plaintiff may by the other party are deemed true or false in ac- be required to furnish a Bill of Particulars. cordance with the Verdict or Findings. "20. To prevent surprise and future relltlgntion a
"14. Pleadings serve as a Record of matters admit- Claim or Defense should be identified by details ted by failure to deny, and of matters found by a such as time and place.
General Verdict. "Except to the extent that parties are permitted to "15. The Record of a Court of Record, which In- form new issues by evidence introduced at the trial,
chides the pleadings, is an indisputable Itecord of the above principles are as valid today as they were matters adjudicated, at Common Law."
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON-LAW
FORMS OF ACTION'
8. Origin of the Common-Law Forms of Action.
9. Classification of the Common-Law Actions.
10. The Ancient Real Actions First in Order of Development.
11. The Modern Real Actions.
12. The Modern Personal Actions.
13. The Effect of the Development of the Forms of Action.
MOST authorities 2 who have undertaken to discuss the Development of the Forms of
1. Ia general, on the Forms of Action, Ancient and Modern, as developed at Common Law, see:
Treatises: Booth, Real Actions (1st Am. ed., New York 1808); Palgrave, The Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons (London 1827—1834); 1 Roscoc, Law of Actions Relating to Real Property (Philadelphia 1840); Jackson, Real Actions (Boston 1828); Browne, Actions at Law (Law Library, Philadelphia 184-1) Chitty, On Pleading, €. II, 67—101, Of the Forms of Action (3d Am. ed., Philadelphia 1849); Bigelow, History of Procedure in England, c. IX (Boston 1880); Waite, Actions and Defences (Albany, 1877—1879); 1 Thorpe, Anglo-saxon Laws, 181—3 (London, 1840); Prentice, Actions at Law (2d ed. London 1880); 2 Polloek and Maitland, History of English Law, Bk. II, C. IX, Procedure, 556— 571 (Cambridge 1895); Alderson, A Practical Treatise upon the Law of Judicial Writs and Process In Civil and Criminal Cases (New York 1895); Stephen, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions (3d Am. ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1892); Warren, Law Studies, Pleadings in Particular Actions, Appendix (New York 1896); 3 Street~ Foundations of Legal Liability (Northport 1906); Gould, A Treatise on the Priaciples of Pleading, Pt. I, Forms of Actions, 1—67 (4th ed. by Will, Albany 1909); Ames, Lectures on Legai History, cc. IV— XIV (Cambridge 1913); Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, c. II, The Common Law ActIons, 13—54, In Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History (Oxford 1914); Scott, Fundamental Procedure in Actions at Law (New York 1922); Shipman, Handbook on Common Law Pleading, ~. II, The Deve1opment of the Forms of Action, if 27—34 (3d ed. by Ballantine, St Paul 1923); 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law, c 7, Chancery, 194—263 (London, 1903); Morgan, The Study of the Law, c. V, 56—83, Forms of Action (Chicago 1926); Klnnane, Anglo-American Law, a. XX, The Common
Action as they existed at Common Law have usually begun by attempting to give some
Law Actions and Remedies, §~ 210—215 (Indianapolis 1932); Keig~vin, Cases in Common-Law Pleading, Introductory, 10—32 (Rochester 1934); Benson & Fryer, Readings on the Study of Law and the Anglo-Americaa Legal System, e- VIII, § 3, The Writ Systems (Washington, 0. C. 1931); Lawler & Lawler, A Short Introduction to the Law of Real Property, e. III, The Real Actions, §~ 218—225 (Chicago 1940); Plueknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, The Forms of Action, Bk. II, Pt. I, c. 1, 336—357 (4th ed., London 1948); Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge 1948); Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law (London 1949).
Articles: Maitland, The History of the Register of
Original Writs, 3 Uarvt.Rev. 97, 167, 212 (1889);
Wilson, "Writs v, Rights", 18 MichtRev. 255
(1920); Holland, Writ and Bills, S Cambridge L.J.
15 (1942); Schulz, Writ 'Praecipe Quod Reddat"
and Its Continental Models, 54 Jurid.Rev~ 1 (1942):
Mclntire, The History and Use of Writs: A List of
Selected Books and PeriodIcals, 37 L.Lib.J. 14 (1944). On the early Prerogative Writs in the Common Law
see article by Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in Eng11th Law, 32 Yale L.J. 523 (1923); Humphreys, Formedon en Remainder at Common Law, 7 Camb.L.J. 238 (1941).
Comments: The Writ in Legal History, 164 L.T. 333
(1927); Some Legal History and Its Bearing on the
Forms of Massachusetts WrIts, 20 Mass.L.Q. 37
(1935); Form of the Original Writ in West Virginia,
42 W.Ve.L,Q. 273 (1936).
2. See, for example, Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law, Lecture I, 1—4 (Cambridge 1948), where he begins by pointing out that the choice of a Form of Action Is a choice between the different Methods of Procedure adapted to different kinds of cases. This observation is doubtless true, but It
Kottler & Reppy Com.Law Pldp. HB—i
definition thereof. It has always seemed that this was to put the cart before the hone, that no understandable effort to define what is meant by the phrase "Forms of Action" could be made except as against a somewhat detailed survey of the History of the Common-Law Forms of Action, both Ancient and Modern. To present a definition to the student at a time when he has no apperceptive background or conception of how the Forms of Action developed, would appear to be an almost fruitless effort. In any event, it is respectfully submitted that the viewpoint of one who is seeking an understanding of the Forms of Action should be one of realization that the "Common-Law Scheme of Actions was not framed; it grew." ~
ORIGIN OF THE COMMON-LAW FORMS OF ACTION
& The Common-Law Forms of Action had their Origin In the Action and Inter-action which took place between the Chancellor and
the Three Royal Courts, King's Bench, Exchequer and Ctmmon Pleas, whereby individual litigants applied to the Chancery for Original Writs authorizing one of the three Courts to try a Specific ActIon. The Multiplication of this Process first produced the Ancient Real, Mixed and Personal Common-Law Actions, which later were superseded by the Modern Common-Law Actions.
HOW, then, did the Formulary System of the Common Law develop the Ancient and Modem Common-Law Forms of Action? And why is a knowledge of what was meant by the phrase "Forms of Action" essential to one who seeks to understand the Law?
comes at a time when the beginning student is not qualified to fully comprehend its meaning. See, also, Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law, e. 1, Introductory, ft 7, 8 (St. Paul 1905); Stephen, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading ia Civil Actions, c. x, or the Proceedings In an Action from Its Commencement to Its TerminatIon, 39 (3d Am, ed.
by Tyler, Washiniton, P. 0. 1592).
~ a Street, Poundations of Legal Liability, a. IV, Classification of Actions In the Common-Law System, 37 (Northport, 1906).
The answer to these inquiries can only be discovered and understood against the background of the Norman Conquest and the statesmanship of William the Conqueror, who operating through the King's Council or Curia Regis, the King's writ, the King's Inquest and the doctrine of the King's peace, did three things which left an indelible imprint upon English Legal History, In the first place, he organized the System of Feudal Tenure under which, in legal theory at least, land was held in some form under the King, which explained why the King's Courts were always keenly interested in any litigation, public or private, which affected land. In the second place, he issued in 1072 what is now known as the Ordinance of William the Conqueror,4 which separated the Ecclesiastical and Common-Law Courts. This development not only exercised a profound influence upon the Procedural and Substantive Law of Descent and Distribution, Wills and Testaments and Probate and Administration, but by reason of the fact that it left Jurisdiction over Freehold Estates in the Common-Law Courts, it was largely responsible for the subsequent necessity of classifying the Common-Law Actions as Real, Mixed and Personal. In the third place, he established Law and Order through the creation of a Centralized System of justice, as an incident of which the Common-Law Forms of Action were developed.
The agencies by or through which these things were done were, in the beginning, the King's private property, and they were not at first National Institutions, nor were they a part of the Regular Machinery of Administration. The Nation was governed by the
4. See Reppy, The Ordinance of William the Conqueror (1072)'—Its Implications in the Modem Law
of Succession (New York 1954), whIch originally appeared as a contribution to the Symposium on the Law of Wills and Administration of Estates In honor of the distInguished authority on that subject, Dean Alvin Evans of the University of Kentucky Law School, 42 Ky.IJ. 523 (1954).
ORIGIN OF FORMS OF ACTION
Customary Local Law, which was Administered in the Local Hundred, Shire and County Courts. There the best Brand of Justice was not always available. Perceiving this condition William, in the process of political reorganization of the whole country, began creating a System of Royal, Superior Courts, to which those not satisfied with the Local Courts, might repair. And it was through the operation of these New Courts under William the Conqueror [1066—1087], Henry I [1100—1135], Henry's grandson, Henry It 1154—1189], and Edward I [1272—1307], that the Centralization of Justice was achievedA
The Courts in Which, the Forms of Action Developed
An action could be instituted in each of the Three Superior Royal Courts, King's Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas, each presided over by four Judges. Jurisdiction was distributed as follows; The Court of King's Bench exercised control over Crimes, Torts Akin to Crimes, and Other Business Pertaining to the Crown, Matters of Revenue Excepted; the Court of Exchequer handled cases relating to taxation and Revenue; while the Court of Common Pleas dealt with Ordinary Civil Suits between subject and subject, known as communia placita. In the Three-cornered Struggle for Jurisdiction,
6- 'For most matters affecting the mass of the nation the Ancient System of Customary Law arid ~ cal Courts was continued in effect. Modification was for the most part not sudden or revolutionary, but the result of a long process of growth. Speaking very generally, it may be said that there was a time of political reorganization under William the Con~uoror (1006—lOST) and his son Henry I (1100— 1135), of legal Innovation and creation under Henry's able grandson Henry II (1154—11S9), of rapid legal growth during the long reign of Henry Ili (1216—1272), and of legal consolidation and eonstt-uction under hdward I, the "English Justinian" (1272—]307J. The account which follows will be materially aided by keeping in mind the names of these kings and the dates of their reigns." Bownina, Handbook of Elementary Law, c. 10, 80, 152 (St. l.'aul 1029).
King's Bench, by resort to a Fictitious Allegation of Trespass wider which control of the defendant could be secured by an arrest, expanded its Jurisdiction at the expense of the other Two Courts in a manner so as to include all Personal Actions. By a similar process of usurpation the Court of Exchequer also came to exercise Jurisdiction over Personal actions, but the Jurisdiction of neither Court extended to the cognizance of Real and Mixed Actions. In the meantime the Court of Common Pleas continued to exercise its Original Jurisdiction, which included the authority to entertain All Actions between the subjects of the King, Real, Mixed, or Personal, such as the Ancient Proprietary Writs of Right, the Possessory Assizes, Writs of Entry and Writs of Entry and Forcible Detainer, or such Modern Actions as Account, Covenant, Debt and Detinue, then in existence, and in time, over those Personal Actions of later vintage,
In King's Bench and Common Pleas an Action could be commenced either by an Original Writ or by Bill; in Exchequer, by Bill only. The Former Method of Commencing an Action, according to Stephen, "is the regular and ancient one, and the latter is in the nature of an exception to it. The proceeding by Original Writ consequently claims first notice." ~
The Original Writ
(I) The Historical Rack graund.—When the Conqueror first took over in England, in the process of establishing Law and Order, he followed the Norman system of having his Secretary, the Chancellor, write out and dispatch various Administrative Orders concerned with the execution of the business of the Crown. The King summoned his Army by Writ, instructed his Ambassadors by Writ, and it was under an order or orders of this
C. Stephen, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading In Civil Actions, c. I, Of the Proceedings in an Ac' tion from Its Commencement to Its Termination, 40 (3d Am. ed by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1802).
character that the facts were gathered for the Domesday Book.7 As the Authority of the King was more frequently exercised, it gradually and naturally fell into regular Administrative Channels, and there was a distinct tendency to develop standards or Common Forms for handling the King's business. When, therefore, in pursuance of the Conqueror's announced policy of non-interference with the Local Courts, an effort was made to aid the Administration of Justice by creating a System of Royal Courts to which Litigants, who Failed to Secure Justice in the Local Courts, might repair, it was only normal and natural that the existing System of Administrative Controls should be applied to the conduct of the King's business in the Courts. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that as each of the Superior Common Law Courts split off from the Curia Regis or King's Council, its activities were strictly limited to only those cases which were delegated to it by means of an Administrative Order, which, when applied to Judicial Affairs, became a Judicial Administrative Order, now familiarly known as an Original Writ (breve originale). Under Henry It (1154—1189), the use of such Writs, which had been occasional and extraordinary, perhaps a royal favor, became usual and regular.
(U) The Depends~we of Right upon Bernedy.—In the beginning these Judicial Orders, representing the King, were issued only occasionally, perhaps in aid of some great tenant of the King. But later, when it became necessary or desirable to expand the activities of the King's Courts, all that needed to be done was to expand and develop New Forms of what were, in the beginning, merely thought of as new routines in the Process of Judicial Administration. In Glanvill's
'. For a group of comprehensive essays, see Maitland, Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays In the Early History of England (Cambridge 1901)
time [1178—1189] ,~ the tendency of the Royal Courts, King's Bench, Exchequer and Common Pleas, to enlarge their Jurisdictions was not great. In Bracton's day [1245—1267] however, the period of growth was definitely under way, and the Procedural Mechanism by which this was to be rcalized was to be through the Invention of New Forms of Actions, to be, as he suggested, as numerous as there were Causes of Actions, under which the King was to Administer a System of Law as broad in its scope and variety as the Roman Law. The Common-Law theory that wherever there is a wrong there is a Remedy 9 was in effect given expression even at this early date when it was declared that there ought to be a remedy for every wrong; if some new wrong be perpetrated then a New Writ may be invented to meet it.
The Forms of Action, therefore, constitute
a vivid illustration of the dependence of
right upon remedy. The question of whether
a man could bring this or that Action, such
8. During the latter part of the Reign of Henry II (1154—1189), the first systematic treatise of English Law appeared. The exact date of Its appearance is not known, but it is generally thought to have been somewhere around 1187—1180. And it has been attributed to Banulf de Gianviil, Henry's great Chief Justielar. According to 1 Pollock and Maitland, flistory of English Law, Bk. I, c. v, 143 (Cambridge 1893), the author may have been his nephew, Hubert Walter, who may have written under Glanvill's direction. In any event, he produced the first authoritative story of the Development of Procedural and Substantive Common Law, as evolved by the
Lawyers and Judges, under the reforming energy of Henry II, Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History, c. I, 43 (New York 1915), in commenting on this book, declared: "We look back from it to a law book written in the reign of Henry I (1100—1135), [the Leges Henrici Primci, written about 1115J, and we can hardly believe that only some seventy years divide the two. The one can, at this moment, be read and understood by anyone who knows a little of Medieval Latin and a little of English Law; the other will always be dark to the most Learned Scholars. The gulf between them looks like that between Logic and Caprice. between Reason and Unreason."
0. 1 Bacon, Abridgment of the Law, "Actions in General", B. 28, 29 (Dublin, 1786).
as Trespass, Trover, Assumpsit, and so on, was a question of Substantive Right and of Liability. In theory, as has been suggested, there ought to be a remedy for every wrong (ubi jus, ibi renwdium), yet the Right of Action at Common Law was dependent upon whether the litigants' facts fell within the scope of a limited and arbitrary list of Writs. There were at any given moment of development—a development which stretched over Centuries—only the same number of Rights of Action as there were Forms of Action. These Forms of Action, Ancient and Modern, persisted in actual use in English Procedure for Six Centuries, from the time of Henry TI [1154—1189] and Edward I [1272—1307], until the Judicature Acts '° in the Nineteenth Century. And these Forms were issued, and from time to time, found their way into and were permanently recorded in the Chancery in a book known as the Register of Writs"
10. 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (ISiS); as & ~a Viet. c. 77 (1875).
(Regisirurn Brevium) , which was first printed and published in the Reign of Henry VIII [1509—1547]. This book thus became an authoritative source I or the purpose of determining, at any given moment in English Legal History, what Forms of Writs were then available to litigants. A variation, however, from the transcript of the Form as it appeared in the Register, was not conclusive against the propriety of the Form, if it appeared correct from other sufficient authority adduced.
Thus, the King's Court was even then in the throes of developing a Formulary System through which it was ultimately destined to establish a Broad, General, National Jurisdiction and approximate the Common-Law ideal of affording a litigant a remedy for every wrong. This type of activity applied mostly to Civil Pleas or Common Pleas, whereas Pleas to the Crown, criminal for most part, depended upon a System of Procedure controlled by the Local Authorities. These Civil Pleas originally were Pleas dealing with the land, as under the Feudal System the crown was concerned with maintaining strict control over the land, as a result of which the Common Law Regulating the Land was ultimately to be converted into the Common Law of the Land. While in general these disputes might also have been handled by the Local Courts, where the Feudal Court was either weak, partial or actually corrupt, a Writ might issue from the King, through the Chancellor, ordering the Feudal Lord to do immediate Justice or appear in the King's Court on a certain day and explain why not. In the beginning such intervention was largely administrative in character, and such threats, for the purpose of setting the Local Lord's Judicial Machinery in motion, were not without both Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman precedent.
were wide differences. 2 Pol)ock and Maitland, History of English Law, Bk. II, c. IX, rrocedure, § 1, 562, 568 (Cambridge 1S95).
11. In general, on the subject of Writs, see Maitland, The History of Original Writs, 3 Hat-v.L.ilev. 97 (1889), reprinted in 2 Maitland, Collected Papers, 110 (Edited by H. A. Fisher, Cambridge 1911).
The purpose of the Register of Writs was to provide the Clerics in Chancery with an authoritative collection of Forms for all the existing Writs. It also served as a guide to Lawyers as to what Writs were available in the Chancellor's omce. Maitiand, in his article on The History of the Original Writs, 3 Ilarv.LRev. 97, 107 (1889), reprinted in 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, e. 36, 549 (Boston 1908), declared that the Register grew and expanded over a period of some Three Centuries, during which time its 51cc constantly increased. Long after the period of its greatest development had passed it appeared in print for the first time in what is known as A Collection of Rastell's Entries, first published in 1596. 4 Reel-es, History of English Law, e. XXX, Henry VIII, 566 (Am. ed. by Finlasen, Philadelphia 1880). For some Two Centuries thereafter this book and others based upon it were among the commonplace books used by the Practicing Lawyers. Such books took the Form of Commentaries by Judges and text-writers upon the character and use of the Writs available in the Begister. These Writs, if the variations in each one were noted, reached Into the hundreds; if, however, we omit the variations, the number may be estimated at thirty or forty between which there
CIt 2
(III) The Creation of the First Origina' Writ and Its Three Purpose&—However this may be, if for a moment we retrace our steps, there must have been a time, immediately after the First Superior Common-Law Court was differentiated from the King's Council, when the first litigant petitioned the Chancellor for Relief, let us say, based upon a claim that his title or possession to certain property was in jeopardy. Where title or a proprietary interest was involved, the Remedy required was some Form of the Writ of Right, but where a mere possessory interest was in question the Remedy consisted of a Possessory Writ, which later was followed by the Writ of Trespass (quare ckiuaum fregit) and the Writ of Ejeetment. Now, for the first time, the Chancellor was confronted with the problem of just how he would delegate to the then single existing Court the required Authority of the King which was essential f or the Court to function or to hear the Complaint contained in the Petition to the Chancellor. At this point the Chancellor, faced with the Concrete problem of framing a Judicial Order for the first time, doubtless looked over the Forms of some of his Non-Judicial Administrative Orders, observed that they usually began with greetings from the King and were directed to the individual whose action was sought. Adopting such Nonjudicial Order as a pattern, but phrasing it in Judicial Language, and directing it to the Sheriff of the County where the Cause of Action arose, or to the defendant, he thus created the First Original
Writ, the Beginning and Foundation of the
Suit, the exact date of which is buried in the mists of history.
After the first Original Writ of Trespass quare clausum Ire git (Trespass to Land), as referred to above, had been issued several times to cover that Specific Factual Situation, it gradually acquired a Fixed Form and
a Fixed Theory of Liability. If, however, the petitioner appeared in Chancery with a Complaint that his cattle had been taken
and carried away, the First Writ did not fit the Factual Situation, hence the Chancellor or his Clerks had to Frame a New Writ to cover a Trespass to personal property. Looking over the Form of the Writ of Trespass quare c7ausun'~ fregit, the Chancellor doubtless discovered that by changing the description of the property involved from realty to personally, he could accomplish the desired end of authorizing the proper Court to try the case. Thus was created the Writ of Trespass to Personalty (Trespass tie bonis asportatis) - And so with another slight variation in the language of the Two Preceding Writs, he was able to bring forth the Writ of Trespass for Assault and Battery. Pursuing the same thought, if the Complaint was that the defendant had failed to pay the plaintiff a sum certain due and owing, a Writ of Debt was framed; if the Complaint was that the defendant had breached the terms of a Sealed Contract, a Writ of Covenant was the plaintiff's only remedy. And so on, until by a similar process, the whole gamut of human activity was in a manner covered, and there developed in the Common Law a great multieiplicity of Types of Actions, as almost all types of injury, whether involving Breach of a Contract, Injury to Person or Injury to Property, occurred under slightly different combinations of Facts or Events, making with each variation a New Writ, the issuance of which created a New Right.
An Original Writ, according to Blackstone, was a mandatory letter on parchment, issuing out of Chancery, under the Great Seal, in the King's name, directed to the Sheriff of the County where the injury was alleged to have occurred, containing a Summary Statement of the Cause of Action, and requiring the defendant to satisfy the claim, or upon the defendant's failure to do so, then to Summon him to appear in the designated Superior Common-Law Court on the day named in the Writ, It was a kind of Judicial ~xecutive Order to show cause why he had not redressed the wrong complained of. In
Sec. S
some cases it omitted the former alternative, and required the Sheriff simply to enforce an Appearance. Examples of the Form of such a Writ, in one of the Ancient Real Actions and in one of the Modern Personal Actions, the relationship of which will be developed later, appear below:
FORM OF TIlE WRIT OF PEAECIPE IN CAPITE'5
EDWARD THE FIRST, King of England, To the Sheriff of County,
COMMAND William Johnson that justly and without delay he render to Arthur Brown one messuage with the appurtenances in Trumpington which he claims to be his right and inheritance, and to hold of us in chief and whereof he complains that the aforesaid William Johnson unjustly deforceth him. And unless he will do this, and (if) the aforesaid Arthur Brown shall give you security to prosecute his claim, then summon by good summoners the aforesaid William Johnson that he be before our justices at Westminster, on ______ to show wherefore he hath not done it. And have there the summoners and this writ.
WITNESS, ourself at Westminster,
FITZ-HERBERT, Natura Brevium, (English ed. 1794)-
FORM OF ORIGINAL WRiT IN DEBT EDWARD THE FIRST, King of England,
To the Sheriff of County,
COMMAND William Johnson, late~ of County, that justly and without delay
he render là Arthur Brown the sum of £10
12. Pitz-Hcrbert, Natura Brevium (Dublin 1553)- The translation of the Writ of Praecipe In Capite as bet out above wa~ taken from the English edition.
Maitlanci, The Forms of Action at Common Law 82, it 2 (Cambridge 1945).
of good and lawful money of Great Britain, which he owes to and unjustly detains from him, as it is said; and unless he shall do so, and if the said Arthur Brown shall make you secure of prosecuting his claim, then summon, by good summoners, the said William Johnson that he be before us on the _______ day of _______ wheresoever we shall be in England, (or, in Common Pleas before our Justices at Westminster, on ), to shew wherefore he bath not done it, and have there the names of the summoners, and this writ.
WITNESS, ourseif at Westminster,
TIDD'S APPENDIX, 20, as set out in Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law, Appendix, 365 (St. Paul 1905).
In other words, the Writs were not transformed into Actions until, in pursuance of the authority granted therein, the defendant Appeared in Court. At that time the plaintiff, elaborating upon the Charge Stated in the Original Writ, filed his Declaration stating for the first time his Cause of Action, in the course of which he not only repeated the Charge in the Original Writ, but expanded it into a full-fledged Statement of his Cause of Action. The issuance of each New Writ with each new variation in the Combination of Facts or Events presented amounted, thes~efore, to the creation of a New Cause or Right of Action.'3
At this point, therefore, it should be observed, that the Original Writ as finally
l~ It was this very practice, as we shall see, which led the Barons in 1258 to draw up what are now known as the Provisions of Oxford, which bad a restrictive effect upon the practice of the Clerks in Chancery in issuing New Writs. It was this restriction upon the Clerks which ultimately led to the Enactment of the Statute of Westminster 11 (1285), 13 Edw. I, c. 24, 1 Pickering's Statutes at Lar-ge 196, under which the Clerks were authorized to issue New Writs in all cases similar to but not Identical with Trespasses, provided they fell within the scope of some existing Writ; otherwise the mutter was to be referred to Parliament
developed, served three distinct and material purposes:
(1) It authorized a specific Superior Common-Law Court to acquire control over the specific individuals involved in the controversy, or to put the matter in more technical phraseology, it gave the Court Jurisdiction over the Parties to the Action.
(2) it authorized the same Court to assume control over the controversy, or to put the matter in more technical language, it gave the court Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter of the Action and served as the Institution of the Action.
(3) It determined the Character of the Action to be tried, for if the plaintiff sued out of Chancery an Original Writ in Debt, he could not declare in Account, Covenant, or any other Form of Action but Debt. The Character of the Writ definitely defined and limited the Character of the Action.
In short, except in the case of the Practice of Proceeding by Bill, no Action could be begun in any Superior Court without the express sanction of an Original Writ, the general effect of which was to confer Jurisdiction on the Specific Court in which it directed the defendant to Appear. This suing out of an Original Writ, the first step in the Commencement of an Action was, as we have seen, taken by the plaintiff, to whom it was available as a matter of course, upon the payment of a fee 14 to the King, the size of the fee being in proportion to the amount demanded by way of Damages in the action. The cost of these fees, therefore, became a continuing and ever-increasing source of the King's revenue, and constitutes one explanation of the Crown's unfailing interest in the Administration of Justice. The net effect
Xl. For the fines payable on Original Writs, see Tidd, Practice of the Court of King's Bench in Personal Actions 97 (1st Am. S., Philadelphia 1801), and for a full explanation of the subject of Pines, consult Bellon, Practice In the Courts of King's Bench, Introduction, xl-xliv (London 1798).
of all this was to make the King "the fountain of justice," and his Writ the Foundation of the Jurisdiction of the Court.'5
(IV) The Relation of the Charge in the Original Writ to the Charge in the Declaration —In considering the Early Developmental Stages of the Writ System, it is well to keep in mind three things:
The first is the significance of the Writ Process as a device f or "making a pathway for the Jurisdiction of the King's Court." '~
The second is that the Earlier Writs of course (Writs "dc cursu"), which existed long prior to the time when the Actions of Trespass on the Case came into being and operation, 'were not," as Bigelow observes,'7 "created by a stroke of the pen, or imported into perfect form from Normandy," but though of Continental origin, "they were gradually developed on English soil, out of rough and even shapeless material." If this fact be well understood, it will clearly appear that the Common-Law Forms of Action antecedent to and therefore necessarily not founded upon the Statute of Westminster II (1285), did not arise out of the Writ; that originally it was "entirely foreign to any purpose of the Writ to set forth tha Formal Language of an Action." 18
This brings us to the third thing which must be kept in mind, to wit, the relation of the Charge in the Original Writ to the Charge in the Declaration, at the Various Stages in the Development of the Writ Process. In the beginning apparently there was no connection between the Original Writ and the Declaration. According to Bigelow, as pointed out above, originally it was not the Function of the Original Writ to set
15. Philadelphia, B. & \V. It. Co. v. Ootta, 4 Boyce (Del.) 38, 85 A. 721 (1013); Parsons v. BilL, 15 App. D.C. 532 (1900).
16. Bigelow, History of Procedure in England, c. IV, The Writ Froceas, 147 (Boston 1580).
forth the Charge contained therein in the technical form or language of a full-fledged Cause of Action; it was required to include a definite statement of the subject matter or Cause of Action, as the defendant was entitled to be apprised of the plaintiff's demand, in order that he might prepare himself to meet it intelligently. And when the summons was thus accomplished by virtue of the authority of the Writ, the actual service was made by the "good summoners" ref erred to in the Forms of the Old Writs, and their knowledge of the Cause of Action necessarily must have been obtained from the Original Writ. It has been suggested that the oldest Common Law Forms of Action are a direct lineal descendent of the (3cr-manic formulae of Pre-Norman and Norman England; and that the Writ, which is of ancient origin, and the Count, which has a long record reaching back to the Anglo-Saxon time of Alfred, were originally two separate forces operating independently of each other, but which, nevertheless, were gradually converging, until by the time of Glanvill (1178—1189) they were approaching a point of contact, which however, was not completed until the next, or Thirteenth Century. Once this convergence was completed, it is clear that in time the Writ came to control both the Form of the Action as well as the Statement of the Cause of Action contained therein.
(V) Necessity of Selecting the Correct Form of Writ.—When the plaintiff petitioned the Chancellor for an Original Writ, he was under great pressure to select the right Writ for the facts of his case. He chose at his own persona! peril. If he selected a Form of Writ which did not fit his case, however just his grievance might be, he could not succeed. Thus, if he sued out a Writ of Debt and his Complaint was that he had been evicted from Blackacre, for which he should have sought a Writ of Ejeetment, the case would be dismissed, If he sued out a Writ
of Replevin for a wrongful taking of Personal Property, he could not recover in Special Assumpsit for Breach of a Contract. In each instance where he selected the Wrong Form of Writ, his only recourse would be to retrace his steps and start over, selecting a Writ appropriate to the character of his Complaint. Referring to this characteristic of the Common-Law Forms of Action, Pal-lock and Maitland compared the System to an Armory, declaring: "It contains every species of medieval weapon from a two handed sword to the poinard. The man who has a quarrel with his neighbor comes hither to choose his weapon. The choice is large; but he must remember that he will not be able to change weapons in the middle of the combat and also that every weapon has its proper use and may be put to none other. If he selects a sword, he must observe the rules of sword-play; he must not try to use his cross-bow as a mace.""
'9. 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Bk. II, c. IX, Procedure, ~ 1, 559 (Cambridge 1895).
And Professor Hepburn, in his work, The Historical Development of Code Pleading c. Ii,
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Burundi Gender
The activities of the 16-day campaign of activism against violence to women have ended in Kayanza and Bururi provinces
KAYANZA/ BURURI December 14th (ABP) – Ceremonies relating to the 16-day campaign of activism against violence to women ended on Friday, December 10 in Kayanza and Bururi provinces.
In Kayanza province (north), the ceremonies took place in Matongo commune and were honored with the presence of various administrative authorities of the province, a check on the site by ABP has revealed.
The communal administrator of Matongo, Mrs. Alice Nsabiyumva, said that cases of sexual violence are often committed against young girls in that commune. In turn, the provincial representative of the women's forum, Mrs. Théodosie Karikurubu, specified that during the year 2020, 887 women were victims of violence of different forms while the men victims amounted to around 171. She added that once apprehended, the perpetrators of GBV are brought to justice and that the judiciary convicts them as soon as possible.
On that occasion, Mrs. Karikurubu asked to avoid any form of amicable settlement between the perpetrator and the victim of GBV, but rather to denounce the perpetrators and entrust the victims of GBV to the various healthcare centers.
The governor of the province, Mr. Rémy Cishahayo, also affirmed that cases of gender-based violence are a reality. He deplores the fact that some women civil servants do not have the right to manage their wage. Mr. Cishahayo also lambasted the attitude of some women who underestimate their husbands under the pretext of being rich. To all those two categories, he asked to pull themselves together and to live in symbiosis especially in the management of the family patrimony. The provincial governor thanked the judiciary for the step taken in terms of sentencing the perpetrators of GBV and asked them to continue in the same vein to avoid the complaints of the victims of GBV. He recommended to women and girls not to hide the violence committed and their perpetrators, and to team up in associations or cooperatives in order to self-develop, stressing that it is vulnerable women and girls who are often victims of GBV.
In Bururi province, the closure of those activities was an opportunity to put together the observations made in the area of GBV. In general, the situation has improved compared to previous years thanks to the combined efforts of all actors, said the chief of staff in the office of the governor, Mr. Juvent Ndayikeza. He asked the communal administrators who are new in their functions to invest themselves effectively to take another step. Mr. Ndayikeza said that the most frequent violence in that province was linked to the mismanagement of family assets where all family assets are managed only by men. Those cases of violence are located in hard-to-reach milieus.
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The appellant sought information on 19 points regarding teachers working in DPS, Nalco Nagar, Angul.
Both parties are present and heard. The appellant filed an RTI application on 23.09.2013 seeking the above information. PIO vide reply dated 11.10.2013 informed the appellant that DPS, Nalco Nagar, Angul is an independent educational institute and is managed by Delhi Public School Society Delhi and no records of the school are maintained by NALCO. The FAA vide order dated 19.12.2013 upheld the stand of the PIO. Not satisfied with the response of the public authority, appellant filed the present appeal before the Commission. The appellant stated that she had sought information about the teachers employed in DPS, Nalco Nagar, Angul but the PIO malafidely denied the information stating that information sought is not available with NALCO. The respondent stated that the DPS Nalco Nagar is run by Delhi Public School Society and there is a agreement between NALCO and DPS Society in which the NALCO provides the infrastructure to the school and the DPS society runs the school as per their rules and guidelines. On queries by the Commission as to whether in their agreement, there is any clause by which they can access the information from the DPS, Nalco Nagar, Angul, further, do they have any administrative control over the said school and whether they have any right to interfere in the recruitment of the teachers in the school, admission etc. The respondent requested 10 days time to answer the queries of the Commission through their written submission.
The appellant requested to impose penalty on the PIO for malafide denial of information and compensation to her for mental agony suffered by her to get the information.
Considering the request of the respondent, the Commission directs the respondent to submit their written submission demonstrating in detail as to whether in their agreement, there is any clause by which they can access the information from the DPS, Nalco Nagar, Angul, further, do they have any administrative control over the said school and whether they have any right to interfere in the recruitment of the teachers in the school, admission etc. along with the copy of the agreement between NALCO & DPS Society positively by 30th of July 2015.
a) as per the MoU signed between the NALCO and Delhi Public School Society, Mathura Road, New Delhi, the power to establish, maintain and manage the said school vested in the School Managements wherein the representative of NALCO management are members. The DPS society manages the day to day functioning of the school. The School Management Committee is only responsible for overall supervision of the functioning of the School. Further, the information/data regarding the school is not maintained by NALCO management and is maintained by the DPS society.
b) The information sought by the information seeker in the original RTI application dated 23/09/2013 are from 1984 onwards. As per Chapter-I, Clause-2(f) of Right to Information Act, "information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force,. As per aforesaid definition, the information seeker can only seek documents as stated above and the public authority is not supposed to give any clarification or reason. Further, as per the DOPT guidelines dated 16th September 2011, quote "But where the information sought is not a part of the record of a public authority, and where such information is not required to be maintained under any law or rules or regulations of the public authority, the act does not cast an obligation upon the public authority, to collect or collate such non available information and then furnish it to an applicant" unquote.
That the powers to establish maintain and manage the said school shall vest the School Management Committee, consisting of nine members. Five to be nominated by the Chairman, Delhi Public School Society and four to the nominated by General Manager (Smelter) NALCO.
That the salaries of the staff employed for Delhi Public School, NALCO NAGAR shall be on the same pattern as in Delhi Pubic School at Delhi. Specific jobs of responsibilities shall be provided for different categories of members of staff. However, a detailed scheme including allowances and other emoluments shall be prepared and implemented as soon as possible after approval by the school management committee.
That the NALCO shall also provide (initially to DPS quarters in NALCO NAGAR at its own cost for the exclusive occupation and use of teachers and other staff members of Delhi Public School, NALCO NAGAR.
That the employees of DPS will be treated at par with NALCO employees so far as (medical) consumer cooperative, club and alike facilities are concerned.
That save as otherwise provided in this agreement all rights and liabilities in respect of DPS, NALCO Nagar shall vest in the Board of Governors of DPS Society, Delhi and school management committee, NALCO NAGAR.
That NALCO shall meet the revenue deficit of DPS NALCO NAGAR for the first five years commencing from 1983-84 on actual basis, subject to an ultimate ceiling limit on the subsidy per child to Rs.75/- in the subsequent years, though in the initial years the amount of subsidy per child will be higher. Since NALCO shall be subsiding tuition fees and meeting the capital expenditure and the revenue deficit, NALCO shall have the right to fix the tuition fees and other charges from time to time for the children of NALCO employees and non NALCO employees. After completion of the 5 years period, if NALCO wants to continue to subsidise the fee for the wards of its own employees, the difference between the fee charges by DPS, Ranipur and DPS, NALCO NAGAR will be borne by NALCO.
That the School Accounts will be audited yearly by the Auditors as appointed by School Governing body / School Management Committee.
That it shall also be lawful for DPS, NALCO NAGAR to raise funds by way of loans, donations and voluntary contributions and the Governing Body of the School, NALCO NAGAR shall use the same in the manner decided by it for the betterment of and in the interest of the school, provided that no endowment fund shall be created and all funds at the credit of the school, shall, in the event of termination of this agreement pursuant to this belong to and vest in NALCO absolutely.
That if any of the parties hereto, at any time wish to terminate this agreement, it shall do so on giving at least six months prior notice in writing to the other party of such an intension, provided that such termination shall be effective only at the close of the academic session, provided further that in the event of such termination, the services of the staff employed by the school shall, subject to any agreement to the contrary between the two parties hereto be terminated in accordance with the terms of their appointment in the DPS, NALCO NAGAR.
The Commission vide order dated 20th July, 2015 directed the PIO to submit their stand with respect to access of information from DPS but the submission is silent on this point. The submission is based upon the premise that information is not held by them and that is why they are not in a position to provide information to the appellant. They have neither denied this fact nor made any submission against the same. On a bare reading of the MoU signed between the NALCO and Delhi Public School Society, the Commission finds that the respondent is represented in School Management Committee, as 4 members are nominated by General Manager, NALCO and the MoU itself says that a detailed scheme including allowances and other emoluments shall be prepared and implemented as soon as possible after approval by the School Management Committee. NALCO provides the quarters for use of teachers and other staffs of DPS, Nalco Nagar and NALCO also has power to terminate the agreement. NALCO also treats DPS employees at par with NALCO employees so far as (medical) consumer cooperative, club and alike facilities are concerned. In view of the above facts, the Commission concludes that the information can be accessed by the NALCO from DPS, NALCO Nagar.
The Commission directs the respondent to provide the information on point no. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 12, 14, 15, 17 and 18 of the RTI application dated 23.09.2013 to the appellant after accessing from DPS, Nalco Nagar within 4 weeks of receipt of this order under intimation to the Commission. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.


WHITTIER – The cost of dog licenses, library video rentals and many other fees for building and planning and other services are going up.
The increases – approved unanimously Tuesday by the Whittier City Council – are expected to raise more than $800,000 annually, although that number might be on the high side, said City Controller Rod Hill.
All of the increases will go into effect July 1.
The goal is 100 percent cost recovery, Whittier Councilman Owen Newcomer said.
"For several years we have been moving our fees to match our expenses," Newcomer said.
The increases range from doubling the video and DVD rental fee to $1 to tripling the price of a dog license for an altered pet to $36. The dog license price for seniors will go from $7 to $18.
Licenses for an unaltered pet will increase from $30 to $60.
The price for dog licenses is increasing because Los Angeles County Animal Control is raising its fee, Hill said.
City librarian Paymaneh Maghsoudi said she doesn't believe the increased price for video rentals will discourage its patrons from renting them.
"It's still cheaper than any video store," Maghsoudi said.
Not all of the fees are going up.
Some, such as the price of photocopies, actually are going down. A copy of an 11-by-17 page will decrease from 20 to 15 cents.
The city also has some new fees. It now will charge a business license application fee. New ones will cost $10 and renewals will be $7. Both are on top of the cost of the actual license.
In addition, the city will charge $163 for a permit to use an inflatable bounce house at a city park.
The city currently doesn't allow them, said Jim Kurkowski, director of parks.
"These are fees to make sure they're set up right and don't damage the turf," Kurkowski said.
Councilwoman Cathy Warner hesitated to raise the fees, but did so anyway.
And yet as the economy gets worse, so does the general fund, City Manager Steve Helvey said.
Warner also noted that only one person spoke about the fees – Julia Emerson of Southern California Gas Co. – and that was more about fee structure, not the cost.
Councilman Greg Nordbak said it's never a good time to raise fees.
"If we don't do it now, we'll never get back to where we need to be," Nordbak said.
The fee increases are something the council has been doing annually since 2003 when it had its first cost study.


Going into his senior year, Jason Knoblich makes his debut as a reporter for The Miter. Completely new to journalism, Jason hopes to sharpen his journalistic skills and improve on his writing ability. To gain some background on Jason and understand who he is, it's critical to know of his love for sports. He's played sports all his life, and at Bishop Blanchet High School, he was able to play football and basketball for his first two years until deciding to pursue his running career. He's now been running cross country for two years and going into this year's track season he'll have been running for four years. Besides running Jason enjoys spending his spare time watching the Bishop Blanchet football team and spending time with friends.


So first I would like to pose a question: In that same topic some people claimed that hair follicles never die, and always remain in the scalp, even when a man has gone nw7. is this claim true(scientific proof)?
if so, why not take out the immune battered, balled, hair follicles from someone with a nw7, and graft them onto immunodeficient mice. then let all the bad influence of the human immune system wear off, and graft them back into the original person. Sure after some time they would be attacked again, maybe a week maybe a year who knows? but no matter for how much time, this could be the best option humans have today bringing back all of their hair follicles.
Can you post any studies, experiments, sites, etc.
From my understanding when a bald spot on your head stays bald i.e shiny for atleast 2-3 yrs then the follicle is pretty much history. However, I do not think there is scientific evidence to back this notion up. And this is why the topic of reviving dormant follicles with some docs.
» when a man has gone nw7. is this claim true(scientific proof)?
We're speculating past what has been really tested I suspect.
Either way the "grow it on the back of a mouse" solution is impractical so I doubt it's been studied much. It might even work to some extent, but there's no way in hell that it's any less expensive/risky than existing meds & transplant methods.
The original follicles are there. They don't leave. The body doesn't eat them. They just don't operate to produce hair anymore once MPB has really shut them down. It's as if the follicle has gone into the "resting" stage of the cycle and never comes back out of it.
In a few years the "dead" follicles develop some fibrosis (scarring), which seems to be the end of any chance of improvement from the existing MPB meds the vast majority of the time.
» We're speculating past what has been really tested I suspect.
» meds & transplant methods.
» of the cycle and never comes back out of it.
» MPB meds the vast majority of the time.
impractical? It sounds more practical to me then using a med that lowers your libido levels, gives you sexual problems and can lead to depression.
And at least as practical as taking follicles out of one part of the head, and transplanting them on another one.
Besides, humanity is looking for a way to retrieve all of a males hair back. And if grafting follicles on a mouse is the solution, then believe me my friend, there will be people willing to .
» » We're speculating past what has been really tested I suspect.
» » meds & transplant methods.
» » of the cycle and never comes back out of it.
» » MPB meds the vast majority of the time.
» » emerging hair shaft easily shoves the fibrosis aside and grows normally.
» your libido levels, gives you sexual problems and can lead to depression.
» and transplanting them on another one.
» my friend, there will be people willing to .
If we assume the average human head has 100,000 hairs and an nw7 loses 60% of them (both likely conservative estimates), that is 60,000 hairs to take off the head and put on mice.
If we assume the follicles could simply be FUEd off the head (which would probably be one hell of an accomplishment since you can't even see them) a conservative estimate of existing hair transplant cost for that procedure would be $4.00ish a hair.
Add the additional cost per hair of implanting them on immunodeficient mice, retrieving them off the mice, cleaning, and reimplanting and I could see it easily reaching $10+ dollars per hair.
So by all around conservative estimates you are looking at $600,000.00+ dollars to get all your hair back.
… it ain't worth it.
What happens is that over time, the MPB follicles (which become vellus hairs in size and are still there on your head, look very close in very good light…those used to be your hairs) become "vellus" like and stay in the rest phase much longer than normal. But something else happens. As Haroldo once pointed out on another forum, a type of molecule under the follicle called CD200 becomes lost. CD200 is a cell-type that apparently tells the immune system to NOT ATTACK THE FOLLICLES. So when you lose these, the immune system still attacks the follicles even if you are taking a DHT inhibitor. Thats why so little hair grows back in the front when people get on finasteride, but finasteride does so much better with apes like macaques. The immunological component.
Its not really practical to transplant the vellus hairs to mice, after they have lost the cd200 molecule, and put them back on your head…they'd just get small again.
The best solution to baldness in the remote future is either Aderans or Follica's approaches. Aderans would probably be better than Follicas because the hairs created should be brand new donor-area-like hairs. We dont know how good the Follica hairs will be against hormone. Hopefully some genes will be able to be topically blocked during the follica process and the new hairs created will be donor like. If they could find the exact gene on chromosome 20 that influences baldness, and the ectodysplasin gene, and block them both during the "hair-making" phase up there…we might be in the clear.
Dr. Hideo Uno noted that in stumptailed Macaques (an ape), pattern baldness doesn't have an immuno or inflammatory component like it does in men. This is why minoxidil and finasteride work so much better on them than us.
Here's a patent to treat hair loss via CD200. Too complicated for me to understand. Maybe somebody can translate this to English.
though good portion of them probably are, some can easily get rejected by your immune system completely. The follicle shrinks to such a small size at the end point that your body can easily eject it out. in fact i have seen this happen to me in front. i saw very very very tiny small hair (i mean like 2mm long, and at the end of the hair i could see transparent bulb (white cell stuff that your immune system wraps stuff with, and inside of it i could see what looked to me like very tiny follicle (rly microscopic almost).
and no its not like if you pull your hair out with the white stuff attached to it. thats not what im talking about.
Assuming that MPB actually represents an immune attack at all, which I don't think is really confirmed. And assuming that it would continue going that far.
What I understand is effectively that hairs don't die but stop growing at normal size and lose their color.
Mice transplanting is not a solution cause if you had the hairs implanted back onto your head you would be getting mice´s cells (with their virus, bacteries, etc). Not a good thing.
It is an experiment to show that hairs don't die but I think that's all.
A doctor should try to implant those vellus haris from the scalp to a leg, chest or the most appropriate place (maybe on the back on the head) and see what happens.
That could be a sort of HM.
Anyone in contact with pioneer doctors to tell them to try this?
This is one of the first articles i read which explained that men with MPB have the same amount of Follicles as men who don't have MPB. It's 8yrs old but still a good read if your interested.
» but still a good read if your interested.
Dr. Peter Proctor (check out his site folks) has quite a bit of information on the pathiogenesis of baldness and why cyclosporin might be the most effective regrowth agent we have. You dont really "lose" your hairs, Ive read this in several places, they just get so small that its hard to even see them with the naked eye.
» hard to even see them with the naked eye.
Has anyone ever done a study on hairloss in people who are suffering from diseases of immunity (AIDS, etc.)?
What they are saying (in red) is that when you put hairs in a CD200 NEGATIVE hhost, and transfer T-cells from a mouse that previously had skin without CD200, the immunity would kill the follicles. Well, CD200 is lost in advanced cases of AGA. The hairs probably stay in telogen to protect themsleves from a never-ending immno attack.
BTW----Did anybody else see that bit on "why hair greys"? They have found that hairs grey because the body ends up bathing the melanocytes in hydrogen peroxide for whatever reason. It causes them to become non-active, and they dont pigment the hairs anymore. Facsinating stuff.
I dont have time to google hairloss and AIDS, but I think that I remember some of those strong AIDS drugs have hairloss side effects.


text:
Congress fields namesakes to queer poll pitch for Jaganmohan Reddy
The Congress is learnt to have fielded YSR Congress Party president Jaganmohan Reddy's six namesakes as dummy candidates for the byelection to the Kadapa Lok Sabha seat.
A Srinivasa Rao
Jaganmohan Reddy.
In an obvious attempt to hit YSR Congress Party president YS Jaganmohan Reddy below the belt, the Congress has fielded six namesakes as dummy candidates for the byelection to the Kadapa Lok Sabha seat.
As many as six candidates with the name "Jaganmohan Reddy" filed their nominations as independents on Saturday, a day after the former Kadapa MP filed his papers.
The candidates - Gopireddy Jaganmohan Reddy, Boothuru Jaganmohan Reddy, P Jaganmohan Reddy, Kotapadu Jaganmohan Reddy, Konda Jaganmohan Reddy and Avula Jaganmohan Reddy - are all said to be close followers of the state health minister and the Congress's choice for Kadapa, DL Ravindra Reddy.
As many as three women candidates who are namesakes of Jagan's mother Y Vijayalakshmi also filed their nominations as independents on Saturday for the Pulivendula assembly by-election.
Vijayalakshmi is contesting on behalf of the YSR Congress Party from the constituency.
A few more "Jaganmohan Reddys" and "Vijayalakshmis" were expected to file the nominations.
As the Election Commission is yet to accord the YSR Congress recognition as a political party, Jaganmohan Reddy as well as Vijayalakshmi are being treated as independent candidates. Both will contest the polls on different election symbols.
Taking advantage of this, the Congress appears to have fielded their namesakes as independents in both Kadapa and Pulivendula with a view to confuse voters. "Since all the candidates with same name are listed together in the electronic voting machines, it would cause a lot of confusion for those who want to vote for Jaganmohan Reddy. It is clearly a Congress conspiracy to defeat him by hook or by crook, or at least reduce the margin of his victory," pro-Jagan MLA Adinarayana Reddy alleged.
According to the Jagan camp, the YSR Congress president has deputed as many as 100 strong campaigners to each block exclusively to popularise the election symbol to be allotted to the party. They would make door-to-door visits and educate voters about the symbol, so that they do not get confused on the day of polling.
Both Jagan and Vijayalakshmi have applied for ""cot" or "candle" as their election symbol, which they would be allotted after the last date for withdrawal of nominations on April 20.
Meanwhile, Jagan's declaration that he held assets worth Rs 365 crore, besides the Rs 41.33 crore in the name of his wife Bharati, has given the Congress fresh ammunition.
Pradesh Congress Committee spokesman N Tulasi Reddy described the electoral battle in Kadapa as a war between Kuber (the lord of wealth) and Kuchela (a symbol of abject poverty).
"The people are ready to teach this looter a fitting lesson in the election," he said.
All in a name
The Congress has fielded six namesakes as dummy candidates for the Kadapa Lok Sabha seat by-polls
All of them are said to be close followers of Congress's choice for Kadapa, state health minister DL Ravindra Reddy.
Three women candidates, namesakes of Jagan's mother Y Vijayalakshmi, have also filed nominations as independents for the Pulivendula assembly by-poll.


text:
What is the Golden Buzzer on Britain's Got Talent?
Lucky acts gets a pass to the live shows, but how?
By Helen Daly
Friday, 24th April 2020 at 2:57 pm
Back in the old days of Britain's Got Talent there was no such thing as a golden buzzer. If you got through your audition you would enjoy a rush of excitement, but there'd still be a nervous wait to see if you made it to the live semi-finals. After all, there's not space for every successful audition to make it to a studio performance.
Then in 2014 the all-important Golden Buzzer was introduced. This meant that every year, five lucky acts would be showered in golden confetti, safe in the knowledge they would be definitely be appearing on live TV for the semi-finals.
But how do the BGT judges use the golden buzzer? And why all the tears?!
Here's everything you need to know about the exciting feature on Britain's Got Talent.
Who are the 2020 Golden Buzzers?
The latest series of Britain's Got Talent has created five more Golden Buzzer acts, thrilled to jump straight through to the semi-finals (even though we're not quite sure when they are going to happen yet!).
David Walliams made his choice in the first week after a hugely emotional performance from Sign Along With Us.
Everyone was already in tears, but David ramped up the emotion by pressing his Golden Buzzer for the talented act.
In week two of the auditions, Ant and Dec rushed on to stage to press their golden buzzer for Jon Courtenay.
The Chorley comedian won over hearts with a song about his life, as he sang and played the piano.
In week three, Simon Cowell hit the golden buzzer for 12-year-old singer Faith Ifil from Swindon, who wowed the audience and judges with her rendition of Proud Mary.
Amanda Holden pressed her golden buzzer in week four, for mother and daughter singing duo Honey and Sammy.
The pair won Amanda over with their close bond and their rendition of the Freya Ridings song Lost Without You.
Alesha Dixon was the final judge to press her Golden Buzzer on Britain's Got Talent 2020.
Nabil Abdulrashid was the lucky recipient, after the Croydon comedian impressed the former Mis-Teeq singer.
What is the Golden Buzzer?
A key part of Britain's Got Talent is the ability for judges to buzz off an act they have had enough of, or don't like. It was a much-loved feature when the show began, with BGT buzzers even available to buy as toys!
The noise of the big red X is fearful and no act wants to hear it. If nothing else, it's so loud that it often makes people jump out of their skin – not great if your act is balancing knives or fire-eating!
But right in the middle of the judges' panel is a magical Golden Buzzer.
All of the judges, as well as presenters Ant and Dec, have the power to press the big button, which has amazing results.
Aside from the dramatic rise in music and confetti bursts, the act on the right end of the Golden Buzzer gets a fast pass to the live shows.
While they don't get a guaranteed spot in the final, they will definitely perform live for millions in the semi-final, in a bid to get the public vote.
This essentially means the act skips the judges' shortlisting which takes place after the audition stage.
Britain's Got Talent introduced the Golden Buzzer in 2014 and it has remained a favourite part of the show ever since, not least because the judges tend to pick an act they connect with personally, and it all gets very emotional. The judges will usually go on stage to hug and congratulate their act, and will back them during their semi-final.
Who has been a Golden Buzzer act before?
So far, there have been 35 acts who have enjoyed that all-important Golden Buzzer moment, plus five acts from the BGT: The Champions series who bagged the title too.
Helpfully, we've ranked all of the Golden Buzzer acts so you don't have to, so click here for a big blast from the past…
Britain's Got Talent airs its final 2020 audition show on Saturday 30th May at 7pm. The live shows are expected on our screens later this year.
If you're looking for more to watch, check out our TV Guide.
All-singing, all-dancing BGT act 100 Voices of Gospel will give you tingles
Which BGT acts are in the running to be the public's Wildcard?
All about Britain's Got Talent
Every BGT Golden Buzzer Act ranked
BGT semi-final 3: meet the 9 acts performing