Debtor's bankruptcy schedules indicated she had $1,500 in a checking account and no cash on hand. The Kentucky Medicare Fraud Unit subsequently searched her home and seized $270,000 in cash. Debtor was indicted for fraudulently claiming Social Security benefits, bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering. Debtor's mother, Newton, who allegedly lived with Debtor, deposited $51,000 in cash into their joint bank account, then transferred $50,000 to retain a law firm as Debtor's criminal counsel. Debtor was convicted. The chapter 7 trustee initiated an adversary proceeding to pursue the attorney fee. The bankruptcy court held that the fee was not subject to turnover, acknowledging: "Trustee offered substantial evidence that the Debtor was the source of the $50,000," which may have been estate property before its transfer, but that the trustee's "claim to estate property is no greater than the debtor's claim." The court held that because the trustee never sought to avoid that transfer under 11 U.S.C. 549, it was not estate property. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Trustee did not meet her burden of establishing that the attorney fee is property of the estate; fraudulently transferred property only becomes estate property upon avoidance of the transfer. The trustee did not establish that the fee was property of the estate under the Rules of Professional Responsibility.
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 17b0001p.06 BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ In re: SHERYL BRUNER, Debtor. __________________________________________ > PHAEDRA SPRADLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL JOHN KHOURI; KHOURI LAW FIRM, Defendants-Appellees. No. 15-8031 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington. No. 13-51267—Tracey N. Wise, Judge. Argued: May 26, 2016 Decided and Filed: January 4, 2017 Before: DELK, HUMPHREY, and OPPERMAN, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Richard Boydston, BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Yelena Bakman, KOURI LAW FIRM, Irvine, California, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard Boydston, BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Yelena Bakman, KOURI LAW FIRM, Irvine, California, for Appellees. _________________ OPINION _________________ GUY R. HUMPHREY, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. In this appeal, Phaedra Spradlin, Chapter 7 Trustee, appeals the bankruptcy court's order and decision denying the 1 No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 2 Trustee's request for turnover of funds paid to the debtor's criminal attorney and his firm postpetition from a joint bank account that the debtor shared with her mother. The bankruptcy court held that, assuming the funds belonged to the debtor, once the funds were transferred to the attorney, they no longer belonged to the debtor, and turnover was not an appropriate remedy since the fees were no longer property of the estate. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Panel affirms the bankruptcy court's decision and order. ISSUES ON APPEAL 1. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in its determination that the Trustee did not meet her burden in proving that the Attorney Fee paid to the Defendants was property of the chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and thus subject to turnover under § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. 2. Whether the bankruptcy court was required to consider whether the payment to the Defendants could be avoided under § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. 3. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by finding that previous testimony proffered into evidence by the Trustee was inadmissible hearsay. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit ("Panel") has jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky has authorized appeals to the Panel, and no party has timely filed to have this appeal heard by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(6), (c)(1). A final order of the bankruptcy court may be appealed as of right. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). For the purpose of an appeal, a final order is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Midland Asphalt Corp. v. U.S., 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S. Ct. 1494, 1497 (1989) (citation omitted). Whether property is part of the bankruptcy estate is a question of law. Kitchen v. Boyd (In re Newpower), 233 F.3d 922, 927 (6th Cir. 2000). The bankruptcy court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Corzin v. Fordu (In re Fordu), 209 B.R. 854, 857 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997). "Under a de novo standard of review, the reviewing court decides an issue independently of, and without deference to, the trial court's determination." Menninger v. Accredited Home Lenders No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 3 (In re Morgeson), 371 B.R. 798, 800 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Essentially, the reviewing court decides the issue "as if it had not been heard before." Mktg. & Creative Solutions, Inc. v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co. (In re Mktg. & Creative Solutions, Inc.), 338 B.R. 300, 302 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). "No deference is given to the trial court's conclusions of law." Id. (citation omitted). FACTS On May 16, 2013 Sheryl A. Bruner ("Debtor") filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Debtor's schedules indicated she had $1,500 in a checking account and no cash on hand. On December 5, 2013 the Kentucky Attorney General's Medicare Fraud Unit executed a search warrant of the Debtor's home. The search resulted in the seizure of $270,000 in cash stored in an unlocked safe. As a result of the discovery of the concealed cash, the Chapter 13 trustee moved to convert the case to chapter 7. The court granted that motion on December 27, 2013 and Phaedra Spradlin ("Trustee") was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee. On January 9, 2014 the Debtor was indicted for fraudulently claiming Social Security benefits, bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering. On January 16, 2014 the Debtor's mother, Mary Jane Newton ("Newton"), deposited $51,000 in cash into a joint bank account she held with the Debtor. Immediately after depositing the money, Newton transferred $50,000 to the Appellee Khouri Law Firm to retain the firm as the Debtor's criminal counsel. ("Attorney Fee") (Khouri and his law firm shall be referred to as "Defendants"). The Defendants represented the Debtor in her criminal trial in which she was convicted of all counts in March of 2014. Her conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on July 30, 2015. On February 11, 2014 the Trustee filed a bare bones complaint, initiating an adversary proceeding to pursue the Attorney Fee. Complaint by Trustee for Turnover, ECF No. 1. 1 ("Complaint"). The Complaint alleged that the Attorney Fee was property of the chapter 7 estate and that the Trustee was entitled to take possession of the fee pursuant to, inter alia, § 541 of the 1 The record in this appeal is found in the electronic docket of Spradlin v. Khouri (In re Bruner), Adv. No. 14-05009 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.). Citations to the electronic docket will identify the document by name, date, and the ECF number for the docket entry. No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 4 Bankruptcy Code. Other than the title to the Complaint being "Complaint By Trustee For Turnover," the three-page complaint did not mention that the Trustee was pursuing the Attorney Fee under § 542, nor the theory under which the funds transferred to the Defendants remained property of the estate. The Defendants answered the Trustee's Complaint by denying all substantive allegations and asserting 21 affirmative defenses. Before answering the Complaint, the Defendants moved for summary judgment. 2 Specifically, the Defendants argued that '"The Trustee has failed to tie the $50,000 retainer in any way, shape, or form to the bankruptcy estate.'" Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, Jan. 30, 2015, ECF No. 75 (quoting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment). The bankruptcy court found that: It is undisputed that the immediate source of Defendants' retainer to represent the Debtor in her pending criminal action was a $50,000 wire transfer from the Debtor's mother, Mary Jane Newton, which in turn came from a cash deposit made into a joint account of the Debtor and Ms. Newton the day before the transfer. Id. at 1, 2. The bankruptcy court went on to find that: the Trustee had presented evidence to the effect that the Debtor and her mother, Newton, lived together; that all of Newton's cash was seized by police a month before the wire transfer; and that following the seizure of cash from the Debtor and Newton's home, the Debtor withdrew over $130,000 of cash from various bank accounts. Id. at 2. Based upon these findings, the bankruptcy court determined that there was a "genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Debtor's funds were the source of the cash deposit made by Newton and subsequent wire transfer" and denied the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. On February 4, 2015 the bankruptcy court entered the Second Amended Order for Trial, setting the trial date as well as deadlines for trial briefs and stipulations. ECF No. 78. The parties submitted their first Joint Stipulation of Fact on March 17, 2015, stipulating that: 1. Plaintiff is the Chapter 7 trustee in the chapter 7 case of Sheryl Ann Bruner (the "Debtor"). 2 Only the Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment is included in the record. References made to the motion and responses to the motion for summary judgment are from the Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment. No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 5 2. Defendant Michael J. Khouri is the counsel for the Debtor as defendant in Criminal Action No. 5:14-CR-5-KKC in the United States District Court for the district styled United States of American, plaintiff v. Sheryl Bruner, defendant (the "Criminal Case"). 3. The federal criminal proceeding was commenced with an indictment on January 9, 2014, two weeks after the Debtor's bankruptcy case was converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. The Debtor was arrested on January 10, 2014. After a federal court detention hearing held January 15 and 16, 2014 the Debtor was incarcerated and has remained continuously in federal custody since then. 4. Debtor was found guilty in the Criminal Case on March 13, 2014. Judgment was entered and sentencing was imposed on August 7, 2014. 5. The Debtor, through defendants, is currently pursuing an appeal of the judgment in the Criminal Case in the Court of Appeals in the Sixth Circuit (the "Appeal"). 6. Defendants contend that all of the Deposit were funds owned by Mary Jane Newton and were thus not property of the bankruptcy estate. 7. Plaintiff contends the Deposit was entirely of funds owned by the Debtor. 8. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is unable to meet her burden of proof and that all of Plaintiff's evidence is circumstantial. ECF No. 82. The parties also filed their trial briefs the same day. Plaintiff's Trial Brief, ECF No. 83 and Defendants' Trial Brief, ECF No. 85. ("Trustee's Trial Brief," and "Defendants' Trial Brief"). The Trustee's Trial Brief stated that "there is only one issue" to be determined at trial, "who owned the $51,000 deposited January 16, 2014 into the joint Fifth Third Bank checking account out of which $50,000 was wired that day to Defendants." Trustee's Trial Brief at 3. In their trial brief, the Defendants also only identified a single issue: "whether the fee paid to Defendants to represent the Debtor in her criminal proceeding is part of the Debtor's estate." Defendant's Trial Brief at 2 (emphasis added). The parties filed the Amended Supplemental Joint Stipulation of Fact a week before trial. July 21, 2015, ECF No. 117. In the Amended Supplemental Joint Stipulations of Fact, the parties stipulated that: "1. The $50,000 used to pay the $50,000 Fee was deposited into the Fifth Third No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 6 Account on January 16, 2014 (the "Deposit"). 2. The Deposit was made in cash." Id.3 The Defendants filed an additional trial brief in which they alternated between arguing that the only issue before the court was the "ownership of the cash used to make the deposit" that was wired to the Defendants and "whether the fee paid to Defendants to represent the Debtor in her criminal proceeding is part of the Debtor's estate." Defendants' Pre-Trial Opening Brief at 1, 2, July, 24, 2015, ECF No. 122 (emphasis added). At the trial of the adversary proceeding the Trustee called nine witnesses. The Trustee also sought to introduce a transcript of Newton's testimony from the Debtor's criminal trial to support the proposition that the December 5, 2013 search of the Debtor's home resulted in the seizure of all of the mother's money in the house. The bankruptcy court denied admission of the transcript testimony, finding that it did not meet the former testimony exception to the rule against hearsay. Following the trial, the bankruptcy court issued a decision determining that the Attorney Fee was not subject to turnover, stating that: The Trustee's "claim to estate property is no greater than the debtor's claim." Here, the Debtor has no claim to Defendants' fee. The Trustee offered substantial evidence that the Debtor was the source of the $50,000 transferred to Defendants, and that the $50,000 may have been estate property before its transfer. The Trustee did not, however, avoid that transfer; thus, no evidence the Trustee adduced could prove that the now transferred $50,000 fee is estate property. Memorandum Opinion at 9, Aug. 10, 2015, ECF No. 136. (internal citations omitted). The Trustee timely appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. 3 The Amended Supplemental Joint Stipulation of Fact amended the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts which was also designated by the Defendants. The Supplemental Stipulation of facts contained an additional stipulated fact—"3. Plaintiff has no evidence related to the ownership of the Deposit."— that was included in the stipulation due to a mistaken approval of the stipulation by the Trustee. July 21, 2015, ECF No. 116. No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 7 DISCUSSION I. The Trustee Did Not Meet Her Burden of Establishing that the Attorney Fee Is Property of the Estate, and therefore, the Bankruptcy Court Must Be Affirmed Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code requires parties to turn over to a trustee property in their possession "that the trustee may use, sell or lease under section 363 of this title…" 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). Section 363 provides that a trustee "may use, sell or lease…property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). The bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case…." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 462 U.S. 198, 203, 103 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 (1983); In re Bailey, 380 B.R. 486 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008). Since this case was converted from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7 case, § 348 defines property of the converted estate as "property of the estate . . . as of the date of filing of the petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the date of conversion." 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A).4 The Trustee, as the party seeking turnover, bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Attorney Fee was property of the estate. Bailey v. Suhar (In re Bailey), 380 B.R. 486, 490 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Chalmers (In re Wheeler), 252 B.R. 420, 425 (W.D. Mich. 2000)). To prevail in such an action, the Trustee needed to prove that the property in question: (1) is or was in the possession, custody or control of an entity during the pendency of the case; (2) …may be used by the trustee in accordance with § 363 or exempted by the debtor under § 522; and (3) …has more than inconsequential value or benefit to the estate. 4 The Trustee argues that the purpose of § 348(f) is to limit trustees' ability to bring into the chapter 7 estate wages and equity earned by the debtor while still in chapter 13. Case law and legislative history indeed support this view. See Harris v. Viegelahn, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1837 (2015) ("Absent a bad-faith conversion, § 348(f) limits a converted Chapter 7 estate to property belonging to the debtor 'as of the date' the original Chapter 13 petition was filed. Postpetition wages, by definition, do not fit that bill."); H.R. Rep. No. 103-834, at 42–43, 1994 WL 545773, at *H10770–71. However, the bankruptcy court's decision did not require, or make, a determination of whether the Trustee met any of the requirements of § 348. Instead, the court held that even "[a]ssuming that the funds were property of the estate under § 348, they ceased to be property of the estate upon their wire transfer to Defendants in January 2014." Memorandum Opinion at 7. Since the Panel is affirming the bankruptcy court on the basis that the Trustee failed to meet her burden of proof to establish that the Attorney Fee was property of the bankruptcy estate, the Panel need not consider the Trustee's argument that § 348 would not apply. No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 8 Id. at 490. In this case there has been no dispute that elements 1 and 3 were present. The disputed issue was the second element–whether the Attorney Fee could be used by the Trustee or exempted by the Debtor. The bankruptcy court determined that this element was not present because the Trustee could not use the funds until the wire transfer of those funds was avoided under § 549 of the Code and the funds were brought back into the estate. The Debtor's chapter 13 petition was filed on May 16, 2013 and the case was converted to chapter 7 on December 27, 2013. The parties stipulated that the Attorney Fee originated from $50,000 in cash deposited by Newton into the joint checking account shared with the Debtor and was wired to the Defendants on the same day, January 16, 2014. The bankruptcy court noted that "[t]he Trustee offered substantial evidence that the debtor was the source of the $50,000" transferred to the defendants. Memorandum Opinion at 9. However, the bankruptcy court determined that once the cash deposited into the mother's account had been wired to the Defendants, the "Debtor has no claim to Defendants' fee." Id. The Trustee makes two arguments on appeal as to why the bankruptcy court erred in determining that the Attorney Fee was no longer property of the estate. The first is a theory that a trustee may pursue post-petition fraudulent conveyances without first avoiding the transfer under § 549, and the second is that under the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, the estate retained an equitable interest in the Attorney Fee until it was earned. The Panel will consider these two theories in turn. A. Fraudulently Transferred Property Only Becomes Property of the Estate on Avoidance of the Transfer The Trustee first argues that under NLRB v. Martin Arsham Sewing Co. the Attorney Fee paid to the Defendants is property of the bankruptcy estate and thus subject to turnover. 873 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1989), modified on reh'g, 882 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1989). In Martin Arsham, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") sought to recover a debtor corporation's back pay obligation from an officer of the corporation on the theory that the officer received a fraudulent transfer of assets of the bankrupt company. The court held that the NLRB was precluded from attacking the transfer from the corporation to the officer as fraudulent because that transfer was not avoided in the corporation's bankruptcy for the benefit of all of the corporation's creditors. In No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 9 dicta, the court suggested that the fraudulently transferred funds were property of the estate while in the possession of the officer. Id. at 887, 88. In a further effort to consolidate all the debtor's assets and distribute them equally between creditors, the Bankruptcy Code contains provisions empowering the court or the trustee in bankruptcy to recover property belatedly, unlawfully, or fraudulently transferred by the debtor in an effort to place it outside the reach of creditors. Any effort to recover this property is essentially an action to recover property that belongs to the debtor. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983). For example, the section 544 "strong arm" provision of the Code allows the trustee to "step into the shoes" of a creditor in order to nullify transfers voidable under state fraudulent conveyance acts for the benefit of all creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1982). Any property recovered is returned to the estate to be divided pro rata. In re Johnson, 28 B.R. 292, 297 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). The Supreme Court has stated that the definition of property of the estate includes "any property made available to the estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2313, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983). Thus, property fraudulently conveyed and recoverable under Bankruptcy Code provisions remains property of the estate and, if recovered, should be subject to equitable distribution under the Code. Id. at 887 (emphasis added). Martin Arsham has been cited extensively for the proposition that because the claims for fraudulently transferred funds are property of the estate, creditors are barred from bringing fraudulent conveyance actions against third parties which could be brought by the trustee. See e.g. Moyer v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp. (In re Feringa), 376 B.R. 614, 625 n.10 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007) (finding that Martin Arsham was limited to transfers that could be avoided as fraudulent conveyances and not as preferential transfers). However, the Trustee's argument that MortgageAmerica and Martin Arsham allow trustees to pursue post-petition conveyances through a turnover proceeding without first avoiding the transfers under § 549 appears to be novel. No published opinion in the Sixth Circuit has cited Martin Arsham either in support of or to refute this argument. Besides its apparent novelty, this argument is erroneous because it would apply the dicta in Martin Arsham to allow trustees to use § 542's turnover provision to supplant the remedy provided by § 549 to recover unauthorized post-petition transfers and, in the process, allow trustees to by-pass the time limitations provided by § 549(d) merely by alleging the property was No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 10 fraudulently transferred post-petition. Such use of § 542 to supplant the avoidance remedies provided by §§ 547, 548, and 549 and by-pass the limitations periods governing those provisions frequently has been held to be improper. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Meadows (In re Meadows), 396 B.R. 485 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (finding that post-dated checks cashed postpetition ceased to be property of the estate upon negotiation and must be brought back into the estate under § 549). See also Rosen v. Dahan (In re Hoang), 469 B.R. 606, 620 (D. Md. 2012); and Smith v. Mark Twain Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 278, 293 (8th Cir. 1986) (post-petition transfer claim untimely under § 549 time limitation could not be recovered under § 542). It has also been held that recovery under § 542 is limited to assets that are "undisputedly property of the estate." Liquidating Tr. of the Amcast Unsecured Creditor Liquidating Trust v. Baker (In re Amcast Industrial Corp.), 365 B.R. 91, 122 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); Wagner v. Pruett (In re Vaughan Co.), 477 B.R. 206, 212 n.2 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). It is not until the transfer is avoided under § 549(a) that the property becomes property of the estate. Westphal v. Norwest Bank (In re Missouri River Sand & Gravel, Inc.), 88 B.R. 1006, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. 1988); Hoang, 469 B.R. at 619 ("Section 542(a) should not be interpreted or used in a manner that overlaps or conflicts with Section 549.") (citations omitted). Further, the dicta in Martin Arsham and MortgageAmerica upon which the Trustee relies has come under a great deal of criticism both within the Sixth Circuit and beyond. See FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1992) ("If property that has been fraudulently transferred is included in the § 541(a)(1) definition of property of the estate, then § 541(a)(3) is rendered meaningless with respect to property recovered pursuant to fraudulent transfer actions.") (citations omitted); In re Cincom iOutsource, Inc., 398 B.R. 223, 234 n.10 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) ("The MortgageAmerica holding ... has been recently criticized and called into question by several courts and commentators."); Feringa, 376 B.R. at 625 n.10 ("[i]t is difficult to read Section 541(a)(1) so broadly as to include potential recoveries of fraudulent conveyances, especially in light of subparagraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) of that same section."). For these reasons, the Panel rejects the Trustee's argument based on the dicta of Martin Arsham. No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 11 B. The Trustee did not Meet Her Burden to Prove that the Attorney Fee Remained Property of the Estate under Applicable Rules of Professional Responsibility The Trustee argued in her appellate Reply Brief that in determining that the fee paid to the Defendants was no longer property of the estate, the bankruptcy court failed to consider the fact that the money wired to the Defendants was an attorney fee and under the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct5 the Debtor would still have a claim to this fee and thus her interest in those funds remained property of the estate after being wired to the Defendants. Reviewing this determination de novo, the Panel affirms the bankruptcy court on this issue. In Meadows, a debtor received a pay-day loan and in exchange gave the creditor a postdated check to be used as payment towards the loan. 396 B.R. at 488. The debtor subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection and the creditor, without notice of the bankruptcy, presented the check for payment. Id. at 489. This BAP held that the post-petition presentment of the check constituted a transfer of the debtor's property interest in the underlying funds, and that those funds were no longer property of the estate unless the transfer was avoided under § 549. Id. at 498. Key to this analysis was the court's determination that the negotiation of the check resulted in a complete divestment of the debtor's interest in the accompanying funds under state law. Id. at 492. The Meadows court went on to distinguish In re Sharon. Id. at 493 (citing TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999)). In Sharon this BAP held that refusing to turnover possession of the debtor's repossessed car after demand and adequate protection was tendered was an exercise of control over property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay. Id. at 681. Though the car was in the possession of the creditor, the court ruled that under state law the title of a repossessed car does not transfer until the debtor's right to redemption is foreclosed at auction. Id. at 682. Since the debtor retained ownership of the car in the creditor's possession, it remained property of the estate and refusal to turn over the car to the estate was a violation of the automatic stay. Id. 5 Since the Trustee has presented this issue as an issue under Kentucky law, specifically the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, the Panel's analysis of this issue will focus on those rules. However, during oral argument the Defendants argued that their conduct was also governed by California and Texas law since members of the Khouri Law Firm were licensed to practice law in California and Texas. The outcome, however, is not altered by which state's rules of conduct for lawyers is applied. No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 12 In this case, under Sharon and Meadows, the Attorney Fee would remain property of the estate to the extent that state law dictated that the Debtor retained an interest in it at the time the Defendants took possession of it. Given this, to what extent could the Debtor's interest in the Attorney Fee be alienated from the estate once it was in the Defendants' possession? There is a current circuit split on the issue of whether the bankruptcy estate may recover from a debtor or transferee under § 542 if the debtor or transferee was in possession of property of the estate at some point during the pendency of the case, but no longer is in possession of that property at the time that the turnover adversary proceeding or motion is filed. Compare Beaman v. Vandeventer Black, LLP (In re Shearin), 224 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000) (law firm, having possessed funds belonging to the debtor during the pendency of his bankruptcy case, must turn over profits, or their equivalent value, to the trustee, notwithstanding that the law firm no longer possessed the funds at the time the turnover proceeding was filed);6 with Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that section 542 may not be used to recover property of the estate from a third party if that property is no longer in the possession of the third party at the time the § 542 motion or adversary proceeding is filed). See also Richard E. Mikels & Ella Shenhav, Is Possession a Requirement for Turnover?, 32 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 34 (2013). This BAP has adopted the majority approach, finding that § 542(a) may be used to recover property of the estate, or its value, that was in the possession of the debtor or third party during the pendency of the case from the debtor or third party even if that party is no longer in possession of the property. See Bailey v. Suhar (In re Bailey), 380 B.R. 486 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008); and In re Gardner, No. 14-33734 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1097 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2015). No other circuit has adopted the Eighth Circuit's more restrictive rule. 6 Besides the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit and Tenth Circuit BAP also support this view. See Boyer v. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. (In re USA Diversified Prods., Inc.), 100 F.3d 53, 56 (7th Cir. 1996) (Section 542 "requires the delivery of the property or the value of the property. Otherwise, upon receiving a demand from the trustee, the possessor of property of the debtor could thwart the demand simply by transferring the property to someone else. That is not what the statute says ... and can't be what it means."); Shapiro v. Henson, 739 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that property of the estate in the possession of the debtor or a third party can be recovered through § 542 as long as the property was in the possession of the debtor or third party at any time during the case); Jubber v. Ruiz (In re Ruiz), 455 B.R. 745, 752 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011) ("This Court reaffirms…that current possession of estate property is not a required element for turnover pursuant to § 542(a)."). No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 13 Under the majority approach, to the extent that the Debtor retained an interest in the Attorney Fee under applicable state law at the time it was wired to the Defendants, it remained property of the estate and could be recovered by the Trustee through use of § 542, even if it was subsequently earned and the transfer was made complete. Although § 542(c) of the Code provides an exception to turnover liability, the Meadows court found that "§ 542(c) only protects the [transferor] who in good faith honored the check and paid with funds from the Debtor's account; it does not protect the transferee…." Meadows, 396 B.R. at 496 (citing Franklin v. Kwik Cash of Martin (In re Franklin), 254 B.R. 718, 721–22 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 549.03). By earning the fee, the Defendants would be completing the transfer from the Debtor to themselves by extinguishing the Debtor's equitable interest in the fee. Thus, the Defendants would only be acting as a transferee in this transaction, and so under the Meadows analysis, they would not receive the protection of § 542(c). Taking these decisions together, under Meadows, when a post-petition transfer completely divests a debtor's interest in property, that property is not subject to turnover under § 542, but that transfer may still be avoided under § 549. However, under Sharon, if only possession of property of the estate has been transferred, the estate retains whatever state law interest that the debtor had in that property. And under Bailey, § 542 may be used to recover property of the estate subsequently transferred by a custodian to the extent that it was in the transferor's possession at some time during the pendency of the case. Since the Attorney Fee was wired to the Defendants post-petition, § 542 was available to compel the turnover of whatever interest the Debtor retained in the Attorney Fee at the time of the wire transfer. Thus, the final question to be answered is what interest in the Attorney Fee did the Debtor retain at the time of the wire transfer? The Trustee did not argue that the Attorney Fee remained property of the estate under the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct until she filed her appellate Reply Brief. The Defendants did not request the Panel for a sur-reply to address the issue, so the argumentation on this subject was limited to the oral argument and the Reply Brief. Because of this, the parties did not develop the law or facts on several important questions regarding the Attorney Fee. In re Bruner No. 15-8031 Page 14 However, the Panel need not determine such issues because it was the Trustee's burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Attorney Fee was property of the estate. The only evidence presented to the bankruptcy court going to the fact that the Debtor retained an interest in the Attorney Fee was the fact that the property in question was legal fees; therefore, the Trustee failed to carry her burden. Rule 3.130(1.5) of the Kentucky Supreme Court covers fees charged by attorneys. Comment 4 to Rule 3.130(1.5) clarifies that an attorney's terms of payment for fees "may require advance payment of a fee, but [the attorney] is obliged to return any unearned portion" under Rule 3.130(1.16(d)). Rule 3.130(1.16(d)) states that "[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as…refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred." So, to the extent that, at the time of transfer to the Defendants, the Attorney Fee was a prepayment for legal services, the Debtor retained a right to refund of fees not yet earned by the Defendants. However, the Trustee did not present evidence sufficient to determine to what extent the Attorney Fee wired to the Defendants might have been the prepayment of unearned legal fees, as opposed to an "earned upon receipt" attorney fee. Moreover, Rule 3.130(1.5(f)) of the Kentucky Supreme Court provides that "[a] fee may be designated as a non-refundable retainer." If the Attorney Fee was designated as such a fee, then the entire Attorney Fee could have been earned upon receipt by the Defendants, and thus the Debtor would have no right to a refund of the fees for the Trustee to pursue under § 542. Moreover, the laws of California and Texas also allow for similar non-refundable, or "true retainers." See Rule 3-700(D) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct ("A member whose employment has terminated shall: …(2) Promptly refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned. This provision is not applicable to a true retainer fee which is paid solely for the purpose of ensuring the availability of the member for the matter."); Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 431, 49 Tex. B.J. 1084 (1986) available at http://www.legalethicstexas.com/Ethics-Resources/Opinions/Opinion-431 ("A retainer fee is a payment to compensate an attorney for his commitment to provide certain services and forego other employment opportunities. Non-refundable retainers are not inherently unethical, but must be utilized with caution."). No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 15 In order for the Trustee to prove that the Attorney Fee remained property of the estate, and, therefore, that the Trustee could use that property, the Trustee would have needed to produce evidence of the type of retainer agreement that existed between the Debtor and the Defendants, and the extent to which the Debtor retained an interest in those fees at the time of the wire transfer. However, the Trustee offered no evidence to this effect at trial.7 Because the Trustee submitted no evidence as to the nature of the agreement between the Defendants and the Debtor as to the Attorney Fee, or the extent to which the fees had been earned at the time of the wire transfer to the Defendants, the Panel finds that the Trustee did not meet her burden to show that the Attorney Fee remained property of the estate. II. The Bankruptcy Court was not required to Consider Avoidance of the Payment of the Attorney Fee under § 549 Since It Was Not Pled in the Complaint The Trustee also made an abbreviated argument that the bankruptcy court was obliged to consider avoiding the transfer to the Defendants under § 549, even though there was no claim for avoidance under § 549 in the Complaint. The Panel rejects this argument. The Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court made its decision under § 549 of the Code, and that the court "never requested briefing on the subject on which it based its judgment," and so "[i]n equity, because sua sponte judgment was made on arguments not presented, the Bankruptcy Court should have considered the entire record." Reply Brief at 4. The bankruptcy court held that "'Section 542(a) . . . allow[s] the trustee to obtain possession of property only where the debtor otherwise had a right to possess the property.' The Trustee's 'claim to estate property is no greater than the debtor's claim.' Here, the Debtor has no claim to Defendants' fee." Memorandum Opinion at 8–9 (citations omitted). Contrary to the Trustee's argument, the bankruptcy court based its opinion on the requirements of § 542. The only extent to which the bankruptcy court's opinion was based on § 549 was to illustrate an alternative avenue the Trustee could have pursued. 7 When asked at oral argument before the Panel whether the Trustee had sought the Defendants' retainer agreement, counsel for the Trustee acknowledged that the Trustee had not specifically pursued it. In re Bruner No. 15-8031 Page 16 Moreover, the Trustee offers neither statute nor case law to support her claim that the bankruptcy court should have considered avoiding the payment of the Attorney Fee under § 549. To the contrary, there was no basis for the bankruptcy court to determine whether the payment of the Attorney Fee should have been avoided under § 549 if that relief was not sought in the adversary complaint. Before trial, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7015 allows parties to amend pleadings as a matter of course within 21 days of service, or beyond 21 days with the written consent of the opposing party or through leave of the court. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015(a). Rule 7015 also gives parties the opportunity to amend pleadings during or after trial. A party may amend its pleadings if an opposing party objects to evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings, while at trial. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015(b)(1). A party may also amend its pleading if an issue not raised by the pleadings is raised and litigated at trial by the consent of the parties. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015(b)(2). In this case, the Trustee made no effort to amend her complaint until after the trial and after the bankruptcy court issued its Memorandum Opinion. Further, the issue of avoidance under § 549 was not raised at trial. Therefore, none of the options for amending the Trustee's Complaint under Rule 7015 are available to the Trustee. The only claim litigated by the parties under the pleadings was turnover under § 542, and there was no legal basis for the bankruptcy court to consider whether she should avoid the payment of the Attorney Fee under § 549 as an unauthorized post-petition transfer. III. Ownership of the Attorney Fee was at Issue Before the Bankruptcy Court The Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court erred by deciding that title to the Attorney Fee had transferred to the Defendants. The Trustee reasoned that the focus of the adversary trial was to determine whether the Attorney Fee paid to the Defendants was paid from property of the estate, and that no arguments were made or evidence presented that title to the Attorney Fee had passed to the Defendants. The Panel is not persuaded by this argument; the ownership of the Attorney Fee was at issue in the trial and it was the Trustee's burden to prove that the Attorney Fee was property of the estate. At the oral argument before the Panel, the Trustee began by quoting the Defendants' closing arguments at the trial. "There is a single issue in this case, and the issue is who owned the cash that was deposited…into Mary Newton's account on January 16, 2014 and almost No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 17 immediately transferred to Defendants…." Transcript Regarding Hearing Held 07/28/2015 at 123, Sept. 24, 2015, ECF No. 146. However, the statement of issues in the Defendants' Trial Brief was broader: "whether the fee paid to Defendants to represent the Debtor in her criminal proceeding is part of the Debtor's estate." Defendants Trial Brief at 2. This statement of issue placed the question of whether the Attorney Fee held by the Defendants was property of the estate under § 541 as an issue to be determined at trial, contrary to the argument of the Trustee and the Defendants' statement in their closing arguments. Though the parties stipulated that the Attorney Fee was paid from the cash deposited into Newton's account on the day of the wire transfer, there was no stipulation that if the cash was found to be property of the estate, that it would remain property of the estate after the wire transfer to the Defendants. While the Trustee's argument identified only a narrow issue in dispute, the issue identified by the Defendants was broader, and indeed, more accurately encompassed the issue that needed to be resolved by the bankruptcy court. At any rate, the bankruptcy court did not prevent the Trustee from arguing or introducing evidence that the Attorney Fee remained property of the estate post-transfer. While the parties presented subtly different issues to be determined at trial, ultimately, it is the requirements of § 542 that dictate the issues to be resolved by the bankruptcy court. As discussed in Section A, under § 542, the moving party has the burden to show that the property to be turned over is property of the estate. The Trustee's argument that the Defendants neither argued, nor presented evidence at trial that the Attorney Fee was the Defendants' property reverses this burden. Though the Trustee made conclusory statements that the Attorney Fee remained property of the estate, she offered the bankruptcy court no legal theory as to why the funds remained property of the estate despite being in the Defendants' possession. More importantly, the only evidence offered that the Attorney Fee was property of the estate while in the Defendants' hands was that the funds paid to the Defendants were to cover legal fees. However, evidence that the wired funds constituted an attorney fee was insufficient to establish the nature of the Debtor's or Trustee's interest in those funds in the hands of the Defendants without evidence of the nature of the fee arrangement between the Debtor and the Defendants. Without evidence as to the nature of No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 18 the fee arrangement between the Debtor and Defendants, the Trustee failed to establish that the Trustee could use the funds in question, i.e. that the Debtor or Trustee retained an interest in those funds, a necessary element of a turnover claim. Without establishing each and every element of the Trustee's claim, judgment was appropriately rendered against the Trustee. See Wilkie v. Brooks, 515 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1975) (Judgment for trustee on a preference claim was reversed when trustee did not prove an essential element of his cause of action.). IV. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining That Newton's Testimony Was Inadmissible Hearsay The final issue is whether the court erred in refusing to admit Newton's testimony from the criminal proceeding under the former testimony exception to the rule against hearsay. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kerley, 784 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2015). Under this standard, a bankruptcy court's decision will only be disturbed if it "relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard." Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund, 340 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Panel holds that the court did not abuse its discretion. Hearsay is a statement, made outside the current trial or hearing, that a party offers as proof of the matter asserted in that statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801. Hearsay evidence is not admissible; however, the rules of evidence provide exceptions to this rule. Fed. R. Evid. 802. Federal Rule of Evidence 804 allows certain types of hearsay evidence when the person that made the statement is unavailable to testify in the current trial or hearing. The Trustee asserts that the transcript of Newton's testimony should have been admitted into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), the exception for former testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) allows testimony "given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during the current proceeding or a different one" so long as it "is now offered against a party who had—or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had—an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination." The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of "predecessor in interest" is generous and practical. A "previous party having like motive to develop the testimony about the same material fact is, in the final analysis, a predecessor in interest to the present party." Clay v. Johns- No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 19 Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1295 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978)). A party has no right to introduce former testimony under Rule 804 without showing a similar motive to develop the testimony. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992). "Because 'similar motive' does not mean 'identical motive,' the similarmotive inquiry, in my view, is inherently a factual inquiry, depending in part on the similarity of the underlying issues and on the context of the…questioning." Id. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Though the bankruptcy court noted that the Trustee argued that Newton was unavailable to testify at trial, the Memorandum Opinion made no findings as to whether this was the case. There was no dispute that Newton's testimony was made at the Debtor's prior criminal trial. The bankruptcy court based its decision on the "predecessor in interest" element and sustained the Defendants' objection to the use of the prior testimony of Newton at the adversary trial. The bankruptcy court explained its decision more thoroughly in the Memorandum Opinion: The Trustee argued that Defendant Khouri was the predecessor in interest of the Trustee, because both Defendant Khouri (at the criminal trial) and the Trustee (in this matter) had similar motives to elicit from Ms. Newton testimony that there was no cash left in her house after the search. This argument fails because the Trustee sought to offer Ms. Newton's testimony against the Defendants. For the hearsay exception to apply, it is Defendants, not the Trustee, whose predecessor in interest must have had a similar motive to develop Ms. Newton's testimony at the criminal trial. The Trustee's predecessor is irrelevant. Memorandum Opinion at 3–4. At trial, the Trustee argued that the Defendants were the predecessor in interest to the Trustee in the criminal case. However, the bankruptcy court correctly noted that this is irrelevant because Newton's criminal trial testimony was being offered against the Defendants, not against the Trustee, and so it was the Defendants' predecessor in interest that was at issue. Memorandum Opinion at 4. The bankruptcy court went further and considered, though not argued by the Trustee, whether the Defendants could have been a predecessor in interest to themselves. At the adversary No. 15-8031 In re Bruner Page 20 trial, the Defendants argued that their motive was to develop testimony on behalf of their client not on behalf of themselves, and so they would have no motive to develop testimony to exonerate themselves at the adversary trial. The bankruptcy court's Memorandum Opinion found that the Defendants' motives in the criminal case "were the precise opposite of their motives in this proceeding." Id. On appeal, the Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court based its opinion on the fact the Defendants were the counsel in the criminal trial, but not a party. This is true only in part. In its decision, the bankruptcy court made the factual determination that "even if Defendants were 'parties' in the criminal case within the meaning of Rule 804, their motives in the criminal case were the precise opposite of their motives in this proceeding." Memorandum Opinion at 4. Thus, the bankruptcy court's decision was made independently of whether the Defendants were parties to the Debtor's criminal case. The bankruptcy court was correct in its finding that Newton's testimony was offered against the Defendants and the court applied the correct law by holding that the "Trustee's predecessor is irrelevant." Because the bankruptcy court did not rely upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly apply the governing law, or use an erroneous legal standard, the Panel affirms the bankruptcy court's determination. CONCLUSION It was the Trustee's burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the money in question was property of the estate, but she introduced no evidence to establish that the Debtor retained an equitable right to or interest in the Attorney Fee. Though the bankruptcy court failed to do an analysis under the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct as to the nature of the fee arrangement between the Debtor and the Defendants, such an analysis could not be done without evidence regarding that arrangement. In having the burden to establish the Trustee's or Debtor's interest in the funds in the hands of the Defendants, it was the Trustee's burden to introduce evidence as to the nature of that fee arrangement. Having failed to introduce any such evidence, the Trustee failed to meet her burden of proof to establish the elements necessary to obtain a turnover order. For the reasons stated herein, the bankruptcy court's order is AFFIRMED.


text:
Richard Jordan: The Cats movie may have bombed but it was an ambitious attempt to film the musical
OpinionJan 9, 2020by Richard Jordan
Richard Jordan is an award-winning UK and international theatre producer. He has been a regular contributor to The Stage since 2005. Read R...
Richard Jordan is an award-winning UK and international theatre producer. He has been a regular contributor to The Stage since 2005. Read Richard's latest column for The Stage every Thursday.
Sunset Boulevard in Concert – at Home
Long Reviewsby Tim Bano
Lloyd Webber: Commercial theatre won't survive unless government steps up
Exclusive: Phantom has not closed for good – Really Useful Group
Newsby Matthew Hemley
Andrew Lloyd Webber is leading from the front in the fight to save theatre
Opinionby Alistair Smith

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
package org.wso2.das4is.integration.common.clients;

import org.apache.axis2.AxisFault;
import org.apache.commons.logging.Log;
import org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory;
import org.wso2.carbon.analytics.stream.persistence.stub.EventStreamPersistenceAdminServiceStub;
import org.wso2.carbon.analytics.stream.persistence.stub.dto.AnalyticsTable;

public class EventStreamPersistenceClient {

    private static final Log log = LogFactory.getLog(EventStreamPersistenceClient.class);
    private static final String serviceName = "EventStreamPersistenceAdminService";
    private final EventStreamPersistenceAdminServiceStub persistenceAdminServiceStub;

    public EventStreamPersistenceClient(String backEndUrl, String sessionCookie) throws AxisFault {
        String endPoint = backEndUrl + serviceName;
        try {
            persistenceAdminServiceStub = new EventStreamPersistenceAdminServiceStub(endPoint);
            AuthenticateStubUtil.authenticateStub(sessionCookie, persistenceAdminServiceStub);
        } catch (AxisFault axisFault) {
            log.error("MessageConsoleStub Initialization fail " + axisFault.getMessage());
            throw new AxisFault("MessageConsoleStub Initialization fail " + axisFault.getMessage());
        }
    }

    public EventStreamPersistenceClient(String backEndUrl, String userName, String password) throws AxisFault {
        String endPoint = backEndUrl + serviceName;
        try {
            persistenceAdminServiceStub = new EventStreamPersistenceAdminServiceStub(endPoint);
            AuthenticateStubUtil.authenticateStub(userName, password, persistenceAdminServiceStub);
        } catch (AxisFault axisFault) {
            log.error("MessageConsoleStub Initialization fail " + axisFault.getMessage());
            throw new AxisFault("MessageConsoleStub Initialization fail " + axisFault.getMessage());
        }
    }

    public boolean isBackendServicePresent() throws Exception {
        return persistenceAdminServiceStub.isBackendServicePresent();
    }

    public void addAnalyticsTable(AnalyticsTable analyticsTable) throws Exception {
        persistenceAdminServiceStub.addAnalyticsTable(analyticsTable);
    }

    public AnalyticsTable getAnalyticsTable(String streamName, String version) throws Exception {
        return persistenceAdminServiceStub.getAnalyticsTable(streamName, version);
    }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Back to Llandovery College
Old Llandoverian Society Producing notable men and women for over 170 years
For over 170 years Llandovery College is proud to have produced notable men and women who have gone on to make their mark in the world. With an outstanding rugby heritage the College has over 50 former pupils having notched up close to 550 caps for Wales – a record that eclipses that of any other Welsh School in the history of the game.
Sam A Simon
Rod Richards
DTR (David) Davies
Huw Miles
Sir David John K.C.M.G
Bill Baldon
Reverend Roger Thomas
Dillwyn Thomas
Lowell Williams Roberts
A record of Old Llandoverians who have recently passed away
Sam A Simon(OLl 1948 - 1954). A former Trustee of Llandovery College.
Rod Richards(OLl 1958 - 1964). Broadcaster and politician in both Westminster and the Welsh Assembly following his time at Llandovery College.
DTR (David) Davies(OLl 1958 - 1964). David was the son of the late vicar of Kenfig with Pyle and lived after his marriage in Bridgend.
David Lloyd (OLl 1962 - 1969). David worked in the family business in London before retiring to Llanelli. Brother to William (OLl 1960 - 1968).
Huw Miles(1964 -1969)
Dillwyn Thomas - (41-43)
Lowell Williams Roberts(O.Ll 1939-1944)Lowell passed away in late January at the age of 92. He had been a veterinary surgeon practicing in Aberdare but more recently lived in Penarth.
01550 723000 mail@llandoverycollege.com
Llandovery College
Queensway, Llandovery, Carmarthenshire, SA20 0EE United Kingdom
© 2021 Llandovery College. All Rights Reserved
Llandovery College is the trading name of Coleg Llanymddyfri (Cymru) Company registration number: 08133485


text:
Although much of the 2020 school year was spent learning at home, students, especially those in secondary schools still face the question of what comes next? For many, their unwavering dreams of pursuing an art education was as strong as ever evident by the turnout of this year's Malaysia Top 10 Outstanding Young Artists Awards despite the ongoing pandemic situation. On competition day, participants began queuing up early in the morning and the crowd did not stop as more and more hopefuls came forth to put their art skills to the test and walk away with a coveted scholarship. For many, this was the golden ticket to kickstart their creative journey.
The nationwide secondary school art competition organized by The One Academy that spanned over the months of September to October has come to a close on 28th November 2020 with the winners' announcement and prize-giving ceremony held online. Despite the pandemic that hit this year, The One Academy continues its effort to bring the 23rd edition of this annual competition that serves as a platform for many young artists to showcase their talents and pursue their dreams.
The competition received more than 2,000 entries from participants from over 300 schools nationwide. The students were undeterred by the restriction circumstances and continued with their participation, a display of their passion for art and determination. Traditionally, the MT10 competition collaborates with Pixar Animation Studios as seen in all its previous editions. However, this year was an exception as the launch of the partnering movie with Pixar was postponed.
The competition adopted the apt theme of "A Rainbow After a Storm", a metaphor to describe that moments of hardship will gradually pass. Participants were asked to use their wildest imagination to portray the visual of a new world or life transformation after surviving the tough times. The coveted Gold Award trophy and The One Academy scholarship worth RM80,000 as well as RM2,000 cash prize was won by Phoebe Su Yuin Zhen from Sarawak. Following that, Silver Award winner Wong Shu Hou from Perak and Bronze Award winner Chee Ying Xuan from Sabah won scholarships worth RM60,000 and RM40,000 respectively as well as cash prize of RM500 each.
The seven other Young Artists Awards winners each received RM25,000 worth of scholarship, RM500 cash prize and certificates of excellence. They are Tsai Xing En and Kiu Ngin Wen from Sarawak, Pang Emma Evelyn from Sabah, Low Chong Xian from Perak, Wong Wei Jie from Penang, Marcus Tan Guang Zhi from Selangor and Lim Xiao Ying from Johor.
In an effort to recognise and appreciate the passion of art educators, the Distinguished Art Educator Awards was awarded to the art teachers who helped nurture the Top 10 Outstanding Young Artists winners. Gold Award winner's teacher Lee Yen Yen, Silver Award winner's teacher Ng Chew Hsia and Bronze Award winner's teacher Chung Yen Mee followed by five other Young Artists Award winner's teachers Wong Ing San, Ethan Lo, Mohamad Masebak Bin Zaini, Lim Lee Ling and Ng Chee Ying were given certificates as a token of appreciation for their unwavering dedication. Two of the Young Artists Award recipients were self-taught.
We congratulate all the winners of this year's competition and wish them all them all the best in their future undertakings. For those who did not make it this time, fret not! We will see you next year for another shot at becoming one of Malaysia's Top 10 Outstanding Young Artists!


Does anyone know what show that was?
Pig Food, Townsville, CD Launch at the Riverway Arts Centre, April 24, 2008.
Actually the last part of this video is from the song "Tsietsi".
(Find more videos via the Videos category).
You are currently browsing the The Middle East blog archives for August, 2009.


Noticed higher energy or water bills this summer?
You may have if you've been cranking the AC or watering your garden more to combat the extreme heat. And, you're right to take action. 2016 is on pace to be the hottest year on record.
Instead of reacting, though, approach the dry spells and heat proactively. Pick drought-tolerant trees–especially if your state is currently in severe drought. Remember though, wait until fall to plant new trees!
What states are currently experiencing drought?
As of early August, the U.S. Drought Monitor found more than 20 percent of each state below is experiencing severe, extreme or exceptional drought.
What are the best drought-tolerant or drought-resistant trees for my zone?
Set yourself up for success by picking trees in your planting zone that will also tolerate drought.
Note: Trees with an asterisk are drought-tolerant only when established.
Learn more about caring and watering trees in drought here.


Any behavior that is aimed to control and subjugate another person through the use of fear, humiliation, verbal and physical assaults is abuse. Constant criticism, making snide remarks, verbal threats and manipulating another person's decisions in the disguise of offering advice all are emotional abuse. Research proves such behavior systematically erodes the victim's self concept, self esteem, self confidence and self worth thus emtional abuse is regarded as the most destructive of all types of abuse.
Refusal to acknowledge how you feel such as, when you confront the abuser they may say "I do not know what you are talking about," "I never said that," "I was just joking," etc. Refusal to listen to your view point ("You mean I should not meet my parents/friends" etc. even when you did not say that) or ignoring your concerns ("you are just exaggerating there is enough money in the account "etc.), feelings and treating you like an extension of themselves (making decisions without consulting you eg. "I told them she'll do it," "You have to do it because I gave a word" etc) is denying. We are a couple so we should think and feel alike. Refusal to talk or listen to you, withholding affection as punishment is also part of denying. Giving silent treatment to the abused on her/his refusal to abide by abuser's wishes/commands.
Minimizing is a form of denial. The abuser accepts that the said event occurred but denies how the abused feels. For example, "you are being too sensitive," "you are too touchy about particular topic," "you misunderstood me my English/Hindi/X language is not so good" etc. thus implying recipient's emotions and perceptions are faulty or inconsequential.
I am married 10 months now. Inter religious love marriage. I am a Christian and he was a Hindu (converted to Christian during marriage.) when we had to decide how to marry, he asked whether I can convert. I said no. I had faith in my religion and he is not like that. So he said he will convert (mostly out of compulsion I guess). His family is very much orthodox. This is the basic reason I wanted a Christian marriage because I felt they will not let us live in peace if we had done a hindu marriage or had done a register marriage. His family did not accept us. In the opposite my family had no objection.
His parents did not attend our marriage.
Before marriage I took him for granted for months (10 months or so – this happened just before marriage). I regret it till today, I did not do it on purpose. I realized that after marriage and I will never repeat it. During those when I took him for granted, he had a difficult relationship with his family main because of our marriage. Altogether it had left a bitter feeling in him. But during all these he loved me so much and was very patient.
Our relationship is very much abusive from both ends. Myself and he.
About my family: I am from middle upper class family. Initially my mother and father used to cook and the rest is done by servant. Later, We had servant at home for everything – to cook, clean, wash etc. we have a room for each person and we spend most of our time in our private room. We come out of our rooms only to take food from the table. My mother and father had a very strained relationship. (I do not know if it left any impression on me.). My mother entirely took care of my family. She is the strongest person I have ever seen. (Nowadays I feel she is quite manipulative too.). I have an elder brother. He is a very broad minded person. I admire him a lot. My dad is a hypocrite. He is nice outside to others but not to my mother. He went into deep debt and went away from home in the name of business. My mother had to face (still facing) all the problems he had caused. He is a money minded person.
About his family: He is from a lower middle class family. Mother, father, 2 elder sisters and him. His family is very much orthodox. They see good time, bad time for everything (husband told me). Love marriage is very much new to his family.
Our relationship: he is 9 years elder to me (now I am 23 and he is 32). He is my house owner's son's classmate. I met when I was in fifth standard. I had a crush on him even since that time. We didn't speak much though. During college, we fell in love and came to know he too liked me a lot since my fifth standard. In the second year of my college(engineering), I stopped talking to him abruptly. I felt I was doing wrong. I regret it. That is one of the worst things I have done on my life.
Later , during my third year of my college, I started speaking to him, he asked why did I do so, I gave reasons like, my mom was strict, she found out etc..etc.. then again we started talking. (not as a lover though, I do not know what I was doing! He asked how should we proceed, I said lets be friends.) One day I went to meet him. I got caught at home.(I told I am going to my friend's house and my mom had called to find out I was not there.. they don't doubt me unnecessarily, I think since I was talking to him over phone they would have found something is fishy.) . my mom did not talk to me for one whole day and the next day she asked what have you decided about marrying him. Till that moment, I did not feel like marrying him (though I liked him a lot, he is very kind, soft, sweet, etc. I thought since he is much older he might want to marry at the earliest which I was not willing.) But when my mom asked so, I wanted to marry because I did not want to miss this nice person in my life.
He loved me like hell. I do not know how to describe it. He loved me a lot. Shared everything with me. I too liked him. Was addicted to him in a way. Later I started taking him for granted without my conscious knowledge. But he stayed with me.
As I thought, he wanted to marry early as he was nearing 30. We got married 10 months ago. I am working in my own school (my parents run a school) just for the sake of earning. I want to be independent always.
I realized I was taking him for granted when he started giving silent treatment (before marriage). I used to repeated call him when he hangs up on me on a call and yell at him. He used to sms me all the time and I did not care to reply(not intentionally, I do not know why I did so). One day, he stopped sms-ing and I asked him, he said, he did not feel like it. When we used to go out, I always chose hotel or coffee shop over going to park. Later after I realized, I wanted to park to spend time with him, but he wanted to go to hotel instead.
Post marriage: we live in a separate rent house. He is working in night shift and I am in day shift and we hardly get time to see each other during weekdays. Quarrels, yelling(me at him) and silent treatment(him at me) all the time. He is a person who understands things when we sit together and talk nut yelling character has changed him I guess. 10 months passed, we have spent more time in yelling and silence than being together. Nowadays if we spend one day without argument it is a big deal.
I am using harsh words always. He, then gets up and leaves the room. Then, he will not talk to me, eat at home, and attend my calls even in an emergency. I cry a lot. I am a person who use harsh words in an anger and later a smile can cool me down.
During the initial months of our marriage, we used to go to his house during weekends, just 5 min from my house, he always wants me to wear chudidhar or sari. Since I work in school I wear every day, so I wish to wear western clothes during weekends. But that does not happen. And he insists I keep bindi when I visit his house or any function in his house. I do not like it. I like keeping bindi but now they are forcing on me, I totally hate it. As soon as we enter his house, his mother or his sister comes with bindi and says, please keep bindi. Nobody here is allowed without keeping it. I feel irritated. I wear it when they give it and remove it immediately once I move out. Every time we plan to go to his house, this happens. I hate going there for the same reason.
Nowadays we don't go there mainly because, once in an argument about moving in together with his parents, he said, "I can only decide one of the two. One: we move in with them. Two: we don't move in with them and therefore there is no necessity to visit them often. So from now on I am not going to visit them at all." I kept quiet. After that we didn't go there much may be once or twice. That's all.
Another problem 1: I'm not very organized at house work and this gets him irritated to the core. He helps in everything in our house work. He can sweep, mop, clean vessels, cut vegetables etc etc. I want to be very much organized in everything but I am not able to do it. I am always late to work.(since it is my own school I take advantage of that.) I am not punctual in anything. I want to keep the house as organized as possible. I do it for two days and later it's gone. my house is messed up all again. I feel lazy.
He is very much irritated because he grew in a house where his mother did everything. He will clean the house, sweep, mop and again I mess it up. Not on purpose though.
Another problem 2: His father has two flats. One is under construction. So his father and mother are living in the other flat which is single bedroom flat. Now, he is having of plans of moving together with his family after the flat is constructed but I'm not for it. If I go there, I will have no identity and I know he will never stand up for me in any situation. We have a lot of arguments on it. I tell him I will come there only if he is willing to stand up for me. One minute, he says he will, next time he says, he is not sure whether he can stand up for me. Though I want to go there just for the sake of him, I'm terribly scared.
I feel I am a drama queen. Attention seeker. Manipulative. Feeling guilty all the time.
1.	Yesterday, My brother had a baby few days back and we went to see them at hospital. His in-laws were also present there.(my brother did a register marriage. He married a hindu. Both families accepted.). my husband loves babies. So I went near the infant, he was standing next to the room entrance itself. I tell him, come here, come here, you can have the baby in your hand. After so much hesitation, he came near me and took the infant. Back home, we were just talking casually, he says he did not like it when I called him near me because all were ladies next to the bed there and gents were sitting (are supposed to seat) only near the entrance. The in-laws might feel bad because they are hindu, they will follow all this. I was thinking what the hell!
I said, so you are bothered only about the in-laws who might get hurt and you do not think about me. he said, yes, you are right. Iam wrong totally and he got up and left the room and is giving me silent treatment. I cry.
2.	He gets angry if I don't cook and gives silent treatment and he will not eat at home.
3.	Once we were just chatting in the hall in the afternoon. As we were talking, he said,"I am looking at the clock(digital clock) often just to remind you that you have switched it off in the morning, but you are not noticing me." (we have two clocks in the hall, I use digital clock for exercise and getting ready to work). I was totally shocked. I was thinking, that means he was not at all involved in the chatting we had. I was happy that we were spending time chatting. I was deeply hurt. I went quiet.
I am not remembering many things now, but every time it is just a small thing over which we end up yelling followed by silent treatment.
I want to make this relationship work. I'm sure he too wants the same. i am browsing your blog for answers. they are helping a lot. i understood yelling is emotional abuse only after reading it here. i feel bad that i'm doing it. i carry the guilt everyday. Advice me on how to stop the emotional abuse. many times i wonder if this relationship is going to work ever! i do not know. hope it works.
Welcome back to GGTS, a safe space.
You are just repeating yourself if you want DG's personal attention you should understand her time costs. She has clearly mentioned in numeroud posts any one on one response will be a nominally charged service.
Please respect her time and opinion.
thank you DG. you response is very much valuable to me. i am looking for personal response. i feel there is too much damage done in our relationship and now i am very scared whether we can restore it back. i would like to take up a paid service. how do i do?
Its natural to have inbuilt defence mechanisms. When i am afraid and when i do not like what the other person is doing, we can automatically become withdrawn emotionally and may not respond well to the other person. How to proceed in such a case – you cannot confront a person because you do not know how they twist or think about it.
If someone is doing something you don't like just ask and tell guess talking is taught to children early in life but nobody teaches how to talk effectively in a relationship. DG is still learning.
Next time please be direct in asking DG she doesn't respond well to hypothetical and abstract questions.
Emotional abuse is huge in India – even bigger than cricket!
It is sad how it is passed down through the generations. It is endemic to one side of my family, and I am sad to say has creeped into my own nuclear family.
How can this inter-generational chain of emotional abuse in Indian society ever stop?
I am glad there are blogs like this addressing this topic. Awareness is the first step.
Yes, this cycle of intergenerational abuse can STOP. Say it out loud THIS STOPS WITH ME. I WILL NOT BE PART OF THIS GAME HERE AFTER.
Here are some resources. Please refer the comments and the books mentioned.
The lines you have quoted are the ones that keep doing the rounds all the time. I must say , I find it absolutely brilliant that you used these lines to highlight the ways emotional abuse is disguised in.
Great job! and I wish your message reaches more people.
How familiar it all sounds.
Voted for you. Tweeted this post, I think such posts should be read by all.
I enjoy browsing your blog, I usually learn something interesting facts.
Thank you. Please share this message of hope with others.
Khamoshi todo, bahan. You are not alone. Many of us are sailing in the same boat. This is a safe space where we can together find solutions to our everyday problems. Desi Girl has created a page "For Khamoshi" just devoted to your questions. She could not come up with a proper title. Please suggest one and let her know if the information is helpful to you and your firends.
Please google any quiz about 'are you being emotinally abused'. Also look online for a book called Power and Control- why charming men make dangerous lovers.
My daughter has just been rescued from an abusive marriage within weeks of the wedding.
Every girl must be educated from a very young age to recognise signs of abusive men.
Glad to know your daughter is safe. GGTS was started With the purpose of sharing information and breaking isolation .


offers more by camping beyond the sight of roads and habitation.
Wild camping – What is it?
the chance to take in sunrise or sunset like never before.
when you can camp freely.
and back out again, so you'll need to take a careful look at your kit.
and trim your kit bit by bit over time.
notice that less is definitely more when it comes to paying for weight.
groundsheet the trade off for the extra weight.
to cook in the porch with enough height to sit up in comfort.
anywhere" with tiny footprints you can fit on a ledge or behind a wall.
down to around half a kilo.
third of your time in your sleeping bag, so selection is important.
their synthetic counterparts – so long as you don't get them damp.
-5C though at double the weight.
400 at a miserly 670gm.
the torso and only carry 219gm.
few grams more than the Coleman.
and one which should be followed whether in Scotland, England or Wales.
– do not bury used toilet paper.
Wild camping is fun, and a great way of experiencing nature first hand.
elements and a short walk in.


A method for creating a relational database schema is provided. The method comprises accessing a reference ontology comprising a first number of concepts and a second number of properties, selecting a first set of concepts from the reference ontology, determining a first set of properties from said second number of properties, associated with the selected first set of concepts, determining a second set of concepts associated with the determined first set of properties, and generating a relational database schema comprising a number of tables, of which at least one table pertains to a concept of said second set of concepts. Further, a module for creating a relational database schema is provided.


text:
<!DOCTYPE html>

    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <title>Hout</title>
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">

    <link href={{ url_for('static', filename='../static/Flat-UI-master/bootstrap/css/bootstrap.css' )}} rel="stylesheet">
    <link href={{ url_for('static', filename='../static/Flat-UI-master/css/flat-ui.css' )}} rel="stylesheet">
    <link href={{ url_for('static', filename='../static/Flat-UI-master/images/favicon.ico' )}} rel="shortcut icon">

list_page

              <colgroup>
                  <col class="span6" />
                  <col class="span3" />
                  <col class="span3" />
              </colgroup>

                  id
                  name
                  time

              {% for m in events%}

                  {{ m.id }}
                  {{ m.name }}
                  {{ m.time }}

              {% endfor %}


Al Qaida's Iraqi branch is behind a number of deadly attacks in Syria, according to a Friday McClatchy report.
US officials reportedly told the newspaper that American intelligence information has revealed that the radical Sunni group is using the 11-month uprising against Syrian President Bashar Assad and his resulting bloody crackdown as an opportunity to expand its activities and influence abroad.
The officials confided that it was Osama bin Laden's successor, Ayman al Zawahiri, who gave the orders for two bombings in Damascus outside intelligence agency compounds on December 23 and January 6, and for a suicide attack in Aleppo on Friday that killed at least 28 people.


text:
Q: How to delete a OpenLdap Object in C#? I am using C# to manipulate openldap objects, now I can use System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry class to implement most of the methods (adding & modifying objects) expect for deleting an object. I am using the DirectoryEntry.DeleteTree method to delete an object now but I get an error:"treeDelete control value not absent". Does the method only work with AD? or I have to use DeleteRequest and LdapConnection classes in System.DirectoryServices.Protocols to delete an object?
I am wondering if there is a way and prefer to use DirectoryEntry to delete an object.
Thanks so much.

A: Have come out the solution now, and it's quite simple, just like this:
            var de = GetAgentEntry();
            var pa = de.Parent;
            pa.Children.Remove(de);
            pa.CommitChanges();

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
namespace Evelyn.Server.Host
{
    using Evelyn.Core.WriteModel;
    using Evelyn.Management.Api.Rest;
    using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Builder;
    using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting;
    using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
    using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
    using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;

    public class Startup
    {
        public Startup(IConfiguration configuration)
        {
            Configuration = configuration;
        }

        public IConfiguration Configuration { get; }

        // This method gets called by the runtime. Use this method to add services to the container.
        // For more information on how to configure your application, visit https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=398940
        public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services)
        {
            services.AddMvc().SetCompatibilityVersion(CompatibilityVersion.Version_2_2);
            services.AddCors();

            services.AddEvelynApi(api =>
            {
                api.WithWriteModel(wm =>
                {
                    // Use a simple in-memory event store...
                    ////wm.WithEventStore.InMemory(es =>
                    ////{
                    ////    es.WithEventPublisher.SynchronouslyInProcess();
                    ////});

                    // ...or,  use Greg Young's EventStore
                    wm.WithEventStore.UsingEventStoreDotOrg(es =>
                    {
                        es.ConnectionFactory = new EventStoreConnectionFactory("tcp://eventstore:1113");
                        es.WithEventPublisher.RunningInBackgroundService(p =>
                        {
                            p.PublishEvents.SynchronouslyInProcess();
                        });
                    });
                });

                api.WithReadModel(rm =>
                {
                    rm.WithReadStrategy.ReadFromCache(c => c.InMemoryCache());
                });
            });
        }

        // This method gets called by the runtime. Use this method to configure the HTTP request pipeline.
        public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app, IHostingEnvironment env, IStartUpCommands startUpCommands)
        {
            if (env.IsDevelopment())
            {
                app.UseDeveloperExceptionPage();
            }

            app.UseCors(builder => builder
                .AllowAnyOrigin()
                .AllowAnyMethod()
                .AllowAnyHeader());

            app.UseMvc();

            app.UseEvelynApi(startUpCommands);

            app.UseSwagger();
            app.UseSwaggerUI(c =>
            {
                c.SwaggerEndpoint("/swagger/management-api/swagger.json", "Evelyn Management API");
                c.SwaggerEndpoint("/swagger/client-api/swagger.json", "Evelyn Client API");
            });
        }
    }
}


I tried to make the probe several times but it failed again and again. It usually turns out that the probe after hydrolysis is very very short (maybe around 50nt). I did not check the RNA before hydrolysis except last time. However, I saw a band (though very weak) last time, but it still produce very very short probe after hydrolysis.I use Sp6 polymerase to synthesize RNA, and the original how to say may i speak english in french 22/07/2012 · Instructions for making an audio test probe, a handy device for troubleshooting an amplifier when you don't have an oscilloscope. This probe has an isolating capacitor, so it is safe and easy to use.
How can one make a good RNA probe for in situ hybridization?
21/05/2018 · Rinse the probe with deionized water between solutions. Clean the probe with the spray bottle. Make sure to rinse the entire area that was submerged so it does not contaminate future solutions.
RF Output Sample. The probe has two secondary windings. One 50 turn winding feeding a fifty ohm load provides an RF current sample of one volt per amp that is similar to that of the expensive commercial models that are described above.
Seamoro, If you already know the sequence of the gene sequence and have decided what plasmid to use, then you can design a pair of primers that (1) allows you to amplify the gene by PCR and, (2) later on, allows you to clone onto the plasmid of your interest.


BREAKING NEWS…… I am going back to work and joining the #1 NEWS TEAM in Columbia, South Carolina WIS TV!!
AND….gearing up for a special Mother's Day….I'm opening up about my struggle to start a family….the heartbreak of losing a child…and the REAL REASON I decided to take a break from TV. It's ALL in the May/ June issue of Columbia Living Magazine.


text:
Store / Party Games / Secret Hitler
Secret Hitler
SKU: 711746875073 Category: Party Games Tag: Base Game
Secret Hitler is a social deduction game for 5-10 people about finding and stopping the Secret Hitler.
Players are secretly divided into two teams: the liberals, who have a majority, and the fascists, who are hidden to everyone but each other. If the liberals can learn to trust each other, they have enough votes to control the elections and save the day. But the fascists will say whatever it takes to get elected, advance their agenda, and win the game.
The standard edition is identical to the edition of Secret Hitler that shipped to Kickstarter backers in 2016, including foil inlays on the boards and wooden placards for the Chancellor and President.
1 review for Secret Hitler
Anonymous (verified owner) – January 1, 2022
It was a hit at games night. 15 year olds through 15 year olds all playing with passion. Its double entertaining for the parents to watch them!


MIAMI — The Coast Guard Cutter Thetis supported disaster response efforts Wednesday in Les Cayes, Haiti.
Cutter Thetis crewmembers assisted the Royal Netherlands Navy HNLMS Holland crew, Dutch Marines and Red Cross members to load supplies for the World Food Program at the Haitian Coast Guard station in Les Cayes.
Cutter Thetis crewmembers and embarked Coast Guard Air Station Houston MH-65 Dolphin helicopter crew also assisted Jean Marie Wagnac, Haitian Coast Guard Commandant, to visit troops and assess damage to the Haitian Coast Guard station in Les Cayes for the first time since the passage of Hurricane Matthew.
The Coast Guard continues to patrol the waters in the Mona and Windward Passage in close cooperation and coordination with foreign partners. The Coast Guard and its partner agencies urge migrants not to take to the sea or take part in any illegal migration endeavors. The sea is dangerous and unforgiving for overloaded and poorly made vessels which are often the means used on these types of illegal voyages. Storms can quickly form over the Caribbean and adverse weather effects generated by a tropical storm or hurricane can cover an area hundreds of miles wide.
"The Coast Guard and its partners continue to patrol the Caribbean and Florida Straits to enforce U.S. immigration law and stop unsafe voyages before they end in tragedy," said Capt. Mark Gordon, chief of enforcement for the Coast Guard 7th District.


Women's Mountain Backpacking Light Down Jacket designed for for women hiking in the mountains for several days in cold weather.
Do you need a warm and lightweight padded jacket that is breathable? This padded jacket with fine technical wadding guarantees effective thermal insulation.
Stretch inserts under the arms providing plenty of comfort.
2 zipper hand pockets to secure personal items.
All our padded jackets have been laboratory tested on thermal mannequins in 3 mph winds, reproducing a hike involving a moderate level of exertion. This allows you to make the best choice by comparing the degree of thermal insulation on a scale of 1 to 5.
Store on a hanger in a clean, dry place.
Machine wash at 86°F (close the main zip when washing). Do not tumble dry. Do not dry clean Do not iron.


text:
Q: Installed SSD in Mac Mini to split as bootcamp drive, now I can't format the original drive I just bought a Mac Mini.  Before I even booted it up I installed a 256 GB SSD along side the stock 1 GB hard drive, and reinstalled Mac OS and Windows 8 on the new drive using bootcamp.  Everything is working fine, but I'd like to reformat the stock drive as one big NTFS partition so I can use it as shared storage between the OSes.
When I view the drives in Apple's Disk Utility, it shows the following partitions:
256 GB SSD:

*

*SSD - Mac OS Extended (Journaled) (A silly name for my new Mac OS partition)

*Bootcamp - NTFS (A silly name for my Windows 8 partition)

1TB Apple HDD

*

*Macintosh HD - Mac OS Extended (Journaled) (The original Mac OS install from the factory)

When I view the drives in Windows Disk Manager, it shows the following partitions:
Disk 0 (1TB hard drive)

*

*200 MB Healthy (EFI System Partition)

*930 GB HFS Healthy (Primary Partition)

*620 MB Healthy (Primary Partition)

Disk 1 (256 GB SSD)

*

*200 MB Healthy (GPT Protective Partition)

*(E:) 118 GB HFS Healthy (Primary Partition)

*620 MB Healthy (Primary Partition)

*BOOTCAMP (C:) 119 GB NTFS Healthy (System, Boot, Page File, Active,
Crash Dump, Primary Parition)

When I try to erase the 1 TB drive in Apple's Disk Utility, it gives me an error saying "Disk Erase failed with the error: Couldn't unmount disk".  Is my old drive still holding something important, like a master boot record or whatever the modern equivalent to that is?  Should I use Windows to try to erase the 1 TB drive?  I'm pretty confident I'm booting into the copy of Mac OS on the new SSD, because the bootcamp startup screen shows the OS partition on the old drive as well, and I'm selecting the new one.  The EFI partition on the old drive seems suspicious to me, is bootcamp using this or something?

A: Disconnect the second drive. Then boot up. If all is good. Just reformat the second drive and delete the partitions.

A: I wasn't able to solve this problem without reformatting my disks.  What I ended up doing was downloading a freeware utility that I copied to a bootable USB jump drive that let me do a bit-wise erase on my drives.  I then started from scratch, partitioned my SSD and made sure my OSes were installed only on that drive.  Not the easiest solution, as erasing the drives took multiple hours for each drive, but I got the results I was looking for in the end.


text:
Iraq-Bush Revisited
THE ARTICLE BELOW IS AN UPDATED VERSION OF THE ONE SENT OUT ON 28 OCTOBER, FOR THE BENEFIT OF PAPERS THAT DID NOT USE THE ORIGINAL AFTER LAST WEEK'S BOMBINGS IN BAGHDAD.
The Iraqi Quagmire and the US Election
Sixteen US soldiers killed by the Iraqi resistance in September, thirty-three killed in October — and eighteen killed in the first two days of November. More and more American casualties in the north of Iraq around Mosul, an area that was relatively free of anti-US attacks until last month. And as the situation in Iraq spins out of control, the disarray in the occupying forces grows more acute.
"Certainly these attacks seem to have been the operations of foreign fighters," said Brigadier-General Mark Hertling, deputy commander of the 1st Armored Division, after four suicide bombs in one day in Baghdad left dozens dead and hundreds injured. Not at all, said Major-General Raymond Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division: "My initial feeling is, this is former regime loyalists doing this with maybe minor coordination with a few people that might not be from Iraq originally."
Meanwhile, back in Washington, US President George W. Bush explains why Iraqis and/or foreign fighters are resisting the US occupation of Iraq in terms that any child could understand: "[They] can't stand the thought of a free society. They hate freedom. They love terror. They love to try to create fear and chaos." Trouble is, grown-ups find this sort of explanation…well, childish. Does Mr Bush really believe that people (weird Muslim people) go around thinking to themselves: "I hate freedom. I love terror"?
It's a mess that's going from bad to worse — and yet, we are constantly told, it would be even worse if the United States pulled out of Iraq now. All the American and British pundits say so, even the relatively sensible ones like John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org: "The problem at the moment is that if they turn the country over to the Iraqi Governing Council…some guy with a moustache is going to come in and shoot them and say he's in charge."
The message is clear. Whatever we may have thought about the idea of invading Iraq in the first place, we must now support the US occupation for two or three or five years or however long it takes, because the only alternative is the return of Saddam Hussein or somebody very like him.
But is that really true? Imagine that George W. Bush and his chief political strategist Karl Rove called in some independent advisers – not the current policy-makers, who are shackled to the commitments and strategies they advocated in the past, but genuine outsiders — and asked them how to manage policy and perceptions in the twelve months left until next year's presidential election. It's a safe bet that they would identify the Iraq quagmire as the biggest obstacle to Mr Bush's re-election.
If they were worth their salt, they would then recommend that he pull US forces out of Iraq now: announce that America's mission in Iraq has been accomplished with the destruction of the Baathist regime, and ask United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to take over the task of building a civil society and a decent government in the country. 'Declare a victory and leave,' as they used to say in the Vietnam era.
The United Nations would still need troops to maintain order in Iraq, of course, but large numbers of blue-helmeted soldiers from other countries — mostly Muslim countries that have no direct border with Iraq, like Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Algeria — would almost certainly become available if US troops were all pulled out. It is suspicion about US motives and unwillingness to work under US command that currently keeps those countries away.
Would that stop all the bombs and ambushes? Probably not, but it would eliminate the mistrust of American motives among ordinary Iraqis that currently gives the resistance fighters a friendly and supportive environment to operate it. It would get US troops out of the firing line. And it would NOT necessarily end with some 'guy in a moustache' walking in and taking over.
To argue that this is the only alternative to a continued American occupation reveals a deep contempt for the aspirations and abilities of Iraqis. The Iraqi Governing Council, purged of obvious Pentagon carpet-baggers like Ahmed Chalabi, would represent most of the more powerful groups in Iraqi society. If it got real power and credibility under a UN administration, it might well succeed in holding free national elections within six months or so. Iraqis are not fools, and most want to see their country reach a safe, democratic harbour.
So why doesn't the Bush administration grasp this lifeline? Perhaps because it would require the wholesale replacement of all the powerful people in the administration who advocated the Iraq adventure in the first place, and probably also the cancellation of all the lucrative contracts and oil concessions that Mr Bush's business cronies and campaign contributors think are coming their way. That may be more than he can handle — but what else can he be thinking might come along to ease his path to a second term in November, 2004?
Another terrorist attack on American soil would be more likely to drive panicked voters back into Mr Bush's arms than to turn them against his administration, and al-Qaeda will certainly provide that if it possibly can, for its leaders understand that Mr Bush is their best recruiting agent. If the terrorists can't get it together, then what Mr Bush needs is another short, victorious war against an alleged 'terrorist state' next spring or summer to distract the voters' attention from the mess in Iraq. Syria would do just fine.
To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 3 and 5. ("Meanwhile…terror";and "The message…him")