During 1979 through 1981, plaintiff-respondents purchased units in seven Connecticut limited partnerships, with the expectation of realizing federal income tax benefits. Among other things, petitioner, a New Jersey law firm, aided in organizing the partnerships and prepared opinion letters addressing the tax consequences of investing. The partnerships failed, and, subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the claimed tax benefits. In 1986 and 1987, plaintiff-respondents filed complaints in the Federal District Court for the District of Oregon, alleging that they were induced to invest in the partnerships by misrepresentations in offering memoranda prepared by petitioner and others, in violation of, inter alia, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and asserting that they became aware of the alleged misrepresentations only in 1985. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the complaints were not timely filed, ruling that the claims were governed by Oregon's 2-year limitations period for fraud claims, the most analogous forum state statute; that plaintiff-respondents had been on notice of the possibility of fraud as early as 1982; and that there were no grounds sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals also selected Oregon's limitations period, but reversed, finding that there were unresolved factual issues as to when plaintiff-respondents should have discovered the alleged fraud.
895 F.2d 1416, 1417, and 1418, reversed.
of a 1-year period after discovery combined with a 3-year period of repose. Moreover, in adopting the 1934 Act, Congress also amended the 1933 Act, adopting the same structure for each of its causes of action. Neither the 5-year period contained in the 1934 Act's insider trading provision, which was added in 1988, nor state law fraud provides a closer analogy to § 10(b). Pp. 501 U. S. 358-362.
2. The limitations period is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. The 1-year period begins after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, making tolling unnecessary, and the 3-year limit is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling. P. 501 U. S. 363.
3. As there is no dispute that the earliest of plaintiff-respondents complaints was filed more than three years after petitioner's alleged misrepresentations, plaintiff-respondents' claims were untimely. P. 501 U. S. 364.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B, II-C, III, and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-A, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 501 U. S. 364. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined, post, p. 501 U. S. 366. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined, post, p. 501 U. S. 369. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 501 U. S. 374.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-A.
In this litigation, we must determine which statute of limitations is applicable to a private suit brought pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and to Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1990), promulgated thereunder.
The controversy arises from the sale of seven Connecticut limited partnerships formed for the purpose of purchasing and leasing computer hardware and software. Petitioner Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow is a West Orange, N.J., law firm that aided in organizing the partnerships and that provided additional legal services, including the preparation of opinion letters addressing the tax consequences of investing in the partnerships. The several plaintiff-respondents purchased units in one or more of the partnerships during the years 1979 through 1981 with the expectation of realizing federal income tax benefits therefrom.
The partnerships failed, due in part to the technological obsolescence of their wares. In late 1982 and early 1983, plaintiff-respondents received notice that the United States Internal Revenue Service was investigating the partnerships. The IRS subsequently disallowed the claimed tax benefits because of overvaluation of partnership assets and lack of profit motive.
of offering memoranda for the partnerships. The complaints alleged that plaintiff-respondents were induced to invest in the partnerships by misrepresentations in the offering memoranda, in violation of, among other things, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. The claimed misrepresentations were said to include assurances that the investments would entitle the purchasers to substantial tax benefits; that the leasing of the hardware and software packages would generate a profit; that the software was readily marketable; and that certain equipment appraisals were accurate and reasonable. Plaintiff-respondents asserted that they became aware of the alleged misrepresentations only in 1985, following the disallowance by the IRS of the tax benefits claimed.
After consolidating the actions for discovery and pretrial proceedings, the District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the complaints were not timely filed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22A. Following precedent of its controlling court, see, e.g., Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641 (CA9 1980), the District Court ruled that the securities claims were governed by the state statute of limitations for the most analogous forum state cause of action. The court determined this to be Oregon's 2-year limitations period for fraud claims, Ore.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1) (1989). The court found that reports to plaintiff-respondents detailing the declining financial status of each partnership and allegations of misconduct made known to the general partners put plaintiff-respondents on "inquiry notice" of the possibility of fraud as early as October, 1982. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43A. The court also ruled that the distribution of certain fiscal reports and the installation of a general partner previously associated with the defendants did not constitute fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Applying the Oregon statute to the facts underlying plaintiff-respondents' claims, the District Court determined that each complaint was time-barred.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the cases. See, e.g., Retz v. Leasing Consultants Associates, 895 F.2d 1418 (1990) (judgment order). In its unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals found that unresolved factual issues as to when plaintiff-respondents discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud precluded summary judgment. Then, as did the District Court, it selected the 2-year Oregon limitations period. In so doing, it implicitly rejected petitioner's argument that a federal limitations period should apply to Rule 10b-5 claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8A. In view of the divergence of opinion among the Circuits regarding the proper limitations period for Rule 10b-5 claims, [Footnote 1] we granted certiorari to address this important issue. 498 U.S. 894 (1990).
"Congress's most recent views on the accommodation of competing interests, provides the closest federal analogy, and promises to yield the best practical and policy results in Rule 10b-5 litigation."
Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae 8. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that a uniform federal period is indicated, but we hold that the express causes of action contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide the source.
It is the usual rule that, when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, a court "borrows" or "absorbs" the local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 471 U. S. 266-267 (1985); Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 383 U. S. 704 (1966); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 155 U. S. 617 (1895). This practice, derived from the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, has enjoyed sufficient longevity that we may assume that, in enacting remedial legislation, Congress ordinarily "intends by its silence that we borrow state law." Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 483 U. S. 147 (1987).
of a state limitations period would frustrate the policies embraced by the federal enactment, this Court has looked to federal law for a suitable period. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 (1983); Agency Holding Corp., supra; McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221, 357 U. S. 224 (1958). These departures from the state borrowing doctrine have been motivated by this Court's conclusion that it would be "inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 161.
"only 'when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.'"
Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U. S. 319, 488 U. S. 324 (1989), quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 172.
Predictably, this determination is a delicate one. Recognizing, however, that a period must be selected, [Footnote 3] our cases do provide some guidance as to whether state or federal borrowing is appropriate and as to the period best suited to the cause of action under consideration. From these cases, we are able to distill a hierarchical inquiry for ascertaining the appropriate limitations period for a federal cause of action where Congress has not set the time within which such an action must be brought.
First, the court must determine whether a uniform statute of limitations is to be selected. Where a federal cause of action tends in practice to "encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics," Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 471 U. S. 273, such that a single state limitations period may not be consistently applied within a jurisdiction, we have concluded that the federal interests in predictability and judicial economy counsel the adoption of one source, or class of sources, for borrowing purposes. Id. at 471 U. S. 273-275. This conclusion ultimately may result in the selection of a single federal provision, see Agency Holding Corp., supra, or of a single variety of state actions. See Wilson v. Garcia (characterizing all actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as analogous to a state law personal injury action).
"The multistate nature of [the federal cause of action at issue] indicates the desirability of a uniform federal statute of limitations. With the possibility of multiple state limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger of forum shopping and, at the very least, would 'virtually guarante[e] . . . complex and expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward matter.'' Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 483 U. S. 154, quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 392 (1985)."
vary depending upon the federal cause of action and the available state and federal analogues, such factors as commonality of purpose and similarity of elements will be relevant.
of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 404 U. S. 13, n. 9 (1971), we have made no pretense that it was Congress' design to provide the remedy afforded. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 196 ("[T]here is no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy") (footnotes omitted). It is therefore no surprise that the provision contains no statute of limitations.
In a case such as this, we are faced with the awkward task of discerning the limitations period that Congress intended courts to apply to a cause of action it really never knew existed. Fortunately, however, the drafters of § 10(b) have provided guidance.
We conclude that where, as here, the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of action with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations period. We can imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would have balanced the policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck by the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 171; United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 451 U. S. 69-70 (1981) (opinion concurring in judgment). When the statute of origin contains comparable express remedial provisions, the inquiry usually should be at an end. Only where no analogous counterpart is available should a court then proceed to apply state borrowing principles.
"a federal statute of limitations actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here -- a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the suggested state law parallels."
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges."
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195, citing S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934).
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to bring an action to enforce a requirement of this chapter or the availability of any cause of action implied from a provision of this chapter."
the 1934 Act with express limitations periods. The language of § 20A makes clear that the 100th Congress sought to alter the remedies available in insider trading cases, and only in insider trading cases. There is no inconsistency.
Finally, the Commission contends that the adoption of a 3-year period of repose would frustrate the policies underlying § 10(b). The inclusion, however, of the 1- and 3-year structure in the broad range of express securities actions contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts suggests a congressional determination that a 3-year period is sufficient. See Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates, 918 F.2d 349, 363 (CA2 1990).
Thus, we agree with every Court of Appeals that has been called upon to apply a federal statute of limitations to a § 10(b) claim that the express causes of action contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide a more appropriate statute of limitations than does § 20A. See Ceres Partners, supra; Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (CA7 1990), cert. pending, No. 90-526; In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (CA3), cert. denied sub nom. Vitiello v. I. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
"where the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party."
Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 88 U. S. 348 (1875); see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 327 U. S. 396-397 (1946). Notwithstanding this venerable principle, it is evident that the equitable tolling doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the 1- and 3-year structure.
The 1-year period, by its terms, begins after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, making tolling unnecessary. The 3-year limit is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling. One commentator explains: "[T]he inclusion of the three-year period can have no significance in this context other than to impose an outside limit." Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U.Colo.L.Rev. 235, 288 (1989). See also ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions 645, 655 (1986) (advancing "the inescapable conclusion that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply in actions under the securities laws"). Because the purpose of the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutoff, we hold that tolling principles do not apply to that period.
See, e.g., Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (CA9 1990) (applying state limitations period governing common law fraud); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (CA10 1990) (same); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (CA4 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981) (applying state blue sky limitations period); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 225, 551 F.2d 411 (1977) (same); In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (CA3), cert. denied sub nom. Vitiello v. I. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U.S. 849 (1988) (establishing uniform federal period); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (CA7 1990), cert. pending, No. 90-526 (same).
Although not identical in language, all these relate to one year after discovery and to three years after violation.
On rare occasions, this Court has found it to be Congress' intent that no time limitation be imposed upon a federal cause of action. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355 (1977). No party in the present litigation argues that this was Congress' purpose in enacting § 10(b), and we agree that there is no evidence of such intent.
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1990).
Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), sets a 2-year, rather than a 3-year, period of repose. Because that provision requires the disgorgement of unlawful profits and differs in focus from § 10(b) and from the other express causes of action, we do not find § 16(b) to be an appropriate source from which to borrow a limitations period here.
"No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation."
"No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued."
"No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 771(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 771(1) of this title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under section 77k or 771(1) of this title more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 771(2) of this title more than three years after the sale."
JUSTICE KENNEDY would borrow the 1-year limitations period contained in the 1934 Act, but not the accompanying period of repose. In our view, the 1- and 3-year scheme represents an indivisible determination by Congress as to the appropriate cutoff point for claims under the statute. It would disserve that legislative determination to sever the two periods. Moreover, we find no support in our cases for the practice of borrowing only a portion of an express statute of limitations. Indeed, such a practice comes close to the type of judicial policymaking that our borrowing doctrine was intended to avoid.
The Commission notes, correctly, that the various 1- and 3-year periods contained in the 1934 and 1933 Acts differ slightly in terminology. To the extent that these distinctions in the future might prove significant, we select as the governing standard for an action under § 10(b) the language of § 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).
"amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to causes of action accruing on or after the date [December 1, 1990,] of the enactment of this Act."
This new statute obviously has no application in the present litigation.
Although I accept the stare decisis effect of decisions we have made with respect to the statutes of limitations applicable to particular federal causes of action, I continue to disagree with the methodology the Court has very recently adopted for purposes of making those decisions. In my view, absent a congressionally created limitations period state periods govern, or, if they are inconsistent with the purposes of the federal Act, no limitations period exists. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 483 U. S. 157-170 (1987) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), see also Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U. S. 319, 488 U. S. 334 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).
The present case presents a distinctive difficulty because it involves one of those so-called "implied" causes of action that, for several decades, this Court was prone to discover in -- or, more accurately, create in reliance upon -- federal legislation. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U. S. 174, 484 U. S. 190 (1988) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common law courts, but not for federal tribunals. See id. at 484 U. S. 191-192; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 441 U. S. 730-749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). We have done so, however, and thus the question arises what statute of limitations applies to such a suit. Congress has not had the opportunity (since it did not itself create the cause of action) to consider whether it is content with the state limitations or would prefer to craft its own rule. That lack of opportunity is particularly apparent in the present case, since Congress did create special limitations periods for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 causes of actions that it actually enacted. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78i(e), 78r(c); see also § 77m.
"[w]e can imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would have balanced the policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck by the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections."
Ante at 501 U. S. 359.
I join the judgment of the Court, and all except Part II-A of the Court's opinion.
In my opinion, the Court has undertaken a lawmaking task that should properly be performed by Congress. Starting from the premise that the federal cause of action for violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), was created out of whole cloth by the Judiciary, it concludes that the Judiciary must also have the authority to fashion the time limitations applicable to such an action. A page from the history of § 10(b) litigation will explain why both the premise and the conclusion are flawed.
this presumption to a federal statute enacted for the benefit of investors in securities that are traded in interstate commerce.
nonpolicymaking role of the judge. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971); In re Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1551 (Seitz J., dissenting).
The Court's rejection of the traditional rule of applying a state limitations period when the federal statute is silent is not justified by this Court's prior cases. Despite the majority's recognition of the traditional rule, ante at 501 U. S. 355, it effectively repudiates it by holding that "[o]nly where no analogous counterpart [within the statute] is available should a court then proceed to apply state borrowing principles." Ante at 501 U. S. 359. The Court's principal justification for this departure is that it took similar action in DelCostello, supra. I registered my dissent in that case for reasons similar to those I express today. In that case, there was nothing in the statute to lead me to believe that Congress intended to depart from our settled practice of looking to analogous state limitations. Id. at 462 U. S. 171-173. Likewise, in this case, I can find nothing in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that leads me to believe that Congress intended us to depart from our traditional rule and overrule four decades of established law.
The other case on which the Court primarily relies, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143 (1987), is distinguishable from this case. Agency Holding did not involve a change in a rule of law that had been settled for 40 years. Furthermore, in that case, the Court found an explicit intent to pattern the RICO private remedy after the Clayton Act's private antitrust remedy. The remedy in the Clayton Act was subject to a 4-year statute of limitations, and the Court reasonably inferred that Congress wanted the same limitations period to apply to both statutes. The Court has not found a similar intent to pattern § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 after those sections subject to a 1- and 3-year limitation. See ante at 501 U. S. 360-361.
justification for making a change in what was well settled law during the years between 1946 and 1988 governing the timeliness of action impliedly authorized by a federal statute. This Court has recognized that a rule of statutory construction that has been consistently applied for several decades acquires a clarity that "is simply beyond peradventure." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 459 U. S. 380 (1983). I believe that the Court should continue to observe that principle in this case. The Court's occasional departure from that principle does not justify today's refusal to comply with the Rules of Decision Act. See, e.g., Shearson/ American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 482 U. S. 268 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
"A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law. . . . This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium."
241 U.S. at 241 U. S. 39-40.
Federal judges have "borrowed" state statutes of limitations because they were directed to do so by the Congress of the United States under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 1652. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 172-173 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 483 U. S. 157-165 (1987) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).
Congress is perfectly capable of making these decisions. When confronted with the same need for uniformity in treble damages litigation under the antitrust laws in 1955, it enacted § 5 of the Clayton Act to provide a 4-year period of limitations. See 69 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C. § 15b.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, dissenting.
I agree that predictability and judicial economy counsel the adoption of a uniform federal statute of limitations for actions brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE KENNEDY, however, I believe we should adopt the "1 year from discovery rule," but not the 3-year period of repose. I write separately only to express my disagreement with the Court's decision in 501 U. S. In holding that respondent's suit is time-barred under a limitations period that did not exist before today, the Court departs drastically from our established practice and inflicts an injustice on the respondents. The Court declines to explain its unprecedented decision, or even to acknowledge its unusual character.
back more than 30 years. [Footnote 3/1] See ante at 501 U. S. 353. The case proceeded in the District Court and the Court of Appeals for almost four years. During that time, the law never changed; the governing limitations period remained the analogous state statute of limitations. [Footnote 3/2] Notwithstanding respondents' entirely proper reliance on this limitations period, the Court now holds that their suit must be dismissed as untimely because respondents did not comply with a federal limitations period announced for the first time today -- 4 1/2 years after the suit was filed. Quite simply, the Court shuts the courthouse door on respondents because they were unable to predict the future.
One might get the impression from the Court's matter-of-fact handling of the retroactivity issue that this is our standard practice. 501 U. S. after all, only two sentences: the first sentence sets out the 1- and 3-year rule; the second states that respondents' complaint is untimely for failure to comply with the rule. Surely, one might think, if the Court were doing anything out of the ordinary, it would comment on the fact.
Apparently not. This Court has, on several occasions, announced new statutes of limitations. Until today, however, the Court had never applied a new limitations period retroactively to the very case in which it announced the new rule, so as to bar an action that was timely under binding Circuit precedent. Our practice has been instead to evaluate the case at hand by the old limitations period, reserving the new rule for application in future cases.
A prime example is Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971). The issue in that case was whether state or federal law governed the timeliness of an action brought under a particular federal statute. At the time the lawsuit was initiated, the rule was that federal law governed. This Court changed the rule, holding that the timeliness of an action should be governed by state law. The Court declined to apply the state statute of limitations in that case, however, because the action had been filed long before the new rule was announced. The Court recognized, sensibly, that its decision overruled a long line of Court of Appeals' decisions on which the respondent had properly relied, id. at 404 U. S. 107; that retroactive application would be inconsistent with the purpose of using state statutes of limitations, id. at 404 U. S. 107-108; and that it would be highly inequitable to pretend that the respondent had "slept on his rights'" when, in reality, he had complied fully with the law as it existed, and could not have foreseen that the law would change. Id. at 404 U. S. 108.
We followed precisely the same course several years later in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U. S. 604 (1987). We declined to apply a decision specifying the applicable statute of limitations retroactively because doing so would bar a suit that, under controlling Circuit precedent, had been filed in a timely manner. We relied expressly on the analysis of Chevron Oil, holding that a decision identifying a new limitations period should be applied only prospectively where it overrules clearly established Circuit precedent, where retroactive application would be inconsistent with the purpose of the underlying statute, and where doing so would be "manifestly inequitable." Saint Francis College, supra, at 481 U. S. 608-609.
right to be heard in court. See Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55, 185 U. S. 62 (1902); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 281 U. S. 681-682 (1930). Not surprisingly, then, the Court's decision in Chevron Oil and Saint Francis College not to apply new limitations periods retroactively generated no disagreement among Members of the Court: the opinion in Chevron Oil was joined by all but one Justice, who did not reach the retroactivity question; Saint Francis College was unanimous.
"When considering the retroactive applicability of decisions newly defining statutes of limitations, the Court has focused on the action taken in reliance on the old limitation period -- usually, the filing of an action. Where a litigant filed a claim that would have been timely under the prior limitation period, the Court has held that the new statute of limitation would not bar his suit."
Id. at 496 U. S. 193-194.
"most inequitable to [hold] that [a] plaintiff ha[s] "slept on his rights'" during a period in which neither he nor the defendant could have known the time limitation that applied to the case."
American Trucking, supra at 496 U. S. 220 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), quoting Chevron Oil, supra at 404 U. S. 108.
After American Trucking, the continued vitality of Chevron Oil with respect to statutes of limitations is -- or should be -- irrefutable; nothing in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, post, p. 501 U. S. 529, alters this fact. The present case is indistinguishable from Chevron Oil, and retroactive application should therefore be denied. All three Chevron Oil factors are met. First, in adopting a federal statute of limitations, the Court overrules clearly established Circuit precedent; the Court admits as much. Ante at 501 U. S. 353. Second, the Court explains that "the federal interes[t] in predictability" demands a uniform standard. Ante at 501 U. S. 357. I agree, but surely predictability cannot favor applying retroactively a limitations period that the respondent could not possibly have foreseen. Third, the inequitable results are obvious. After spending 4 1/2 years in court and tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees, respondents' suit is dismissed for failure to comply with a limitations period that did not exist until today.
Earlier this Term, the Court observed that "the doctrine of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our legal system." California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 500 U. S. 579 (1991). If that is so, it is difficult to understand the Court's decision today to apply retroactively a brand new statute of limitations. 501 U. S. without discussing the relevant cases or even acknowledging the issue, declines to follow the precedent established in Chevron Oil, Saint Francis College, and American Trucking, not to mention Wilson and Brinkerhoff-Faris.
the Court, for reasons unknown and unexplained, chooses to ignore the issue, thereby visiting unprecedented unfairness on respondents.
Even if I agreed with the limitations period adopted by the Court, I would dissent from 501 U. S. Our prior cases dictate that the federal statute of limitations announced today should not be applied retroactively. I would remand so that the lower courts may determine in the first instance the timeliness of respondents' lawsuit.
See Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641, 644 (1980); Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383, 1387 (1976); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Investments, Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 914-916 (1971); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (1970); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 214 (1962); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 634-635 (1953).
See Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 839 F.2d 1369, 1369-1370 (CA9 1988); Volk v. D. A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1411-1412 (CA9 1987); Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 733 (CA9 1985); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308-1309 (CA9 1982).
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, dissenting.
I am in full agreement with the Court's determination that, under our precedents, a uniform federal statute of limitations is appropriate for private actions brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that we should adopt as a limitations period the "1 year from discovery" rule Congress employed in various provisions of the 1934 Act. I must note my disagreement, however, with the Court's simultaneous adoption of the 3-year period of repose Congress also employed in a number of the 1934 Act's provisions. This absolute time bar on private § 10(b) suits conflicts with traditional limitations periods for fraud-based actions, frustrates the usefulness of § 10(b) in protecting defrauded investors, and imposes severe practical limitations on a federal implied cause of action that has become an essential component of the protection the law gives to investors who have been injured by unlawful practices.
"when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."
Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151, 462 U. S. 172 (1983); see Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U. S. 319, 488 U. S. 324 (1989). Applying this principle, the Court looks first to the express private rights of action in the 1934 Act itself to find what it believes are the appropriate limitations periods to apply here. One cannot fault the Court's mode of analysis; given that § 10(b) actions are implied under the 1934 Act, it makes sense for us to look to the limitations periods Congress established under the Act. See DelCostello, supra at 462 U. S. 171; United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 451 U. S. 68, n. 4 (1981). That does not relieve us, however, of our obligation to reject a limitations rule that would "frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies." Reed, 488 U.S. at 488 U. S. 327. When determining the appropriate statute of limitations to apply, we must give careful consideration to the policies underlying a federal statute and to the practical difficulties aggrieved parties may have in establishing a violation. Ibid.; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 471 U. S. 268 (1985).
This is not a case where the Court identifies a specific statute and follows each of its terms. As the Court is careful to note, the 1934 Act does not provide a single limitations period for all private actions brought under its express provisions. Rather, the Act makes three separate and distinct references to statutes of limitations. The Court rejects outright one of these references, a 2-year statute of repose for actions brought under § 16 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), and purports to follow the other two. §§ 78i(e), 78r(c). The latter two references employ 1-year, 3-year schemes similar to one the Court establishes here, but each has its own unique wording. The Court does not identify any reasons for finding one to be controlling, so it is unnecessary to engage in close grammatical construction to separate the 1-year discovery period from the 3-year statute of repose.
of action implied under § 10(b). The limitations statutes to which the Court refers apply to strict liability violations or, in the case of § 78i(e), to a rarely used remedy under § 9 of the 1934 Act. See L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 920 (2d ed.1988). Neither relates to a cause of action of the scope and coverage of an implied action under § 10(b). Nor does either rest on the common law fraud model underlying most § 10(b) actions.
Section 10(b) provides investors with significant protections from fraudulent practices in the securities markets. Intended as a comprehensive antifraud provision operating even when more specific laws have no application, § 10(b) makes it unlawful to employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in violation of the Securities and Exchange Commission's rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. Although Congress gave the Commission the primary role in enforcing this section, private § 10(b) suits constitute "an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements," Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 485 U. S. 231 (1988), and are "a necessary supplement to Commission action.'" Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U. S. 299, 472 U. S. 310 (1985) (quoting J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 377 U. S. 432 (1964)). We have made it clear that rules facilitating § 10(b) litigation "suppor[t] the congressional policy embodied in the 1934 Act" of combating all forms of securities fraud. Basic, supra at 485 U. S. 245.
market"), damages caused by the wrongdoing, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U. S. 647, 478 U. S. 663 (1986), and scienter on the part of the defendant, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976). Given the complexity of modern securities markets, these facts may be difficult to prove.
The real burden on most investors, however, is the initial matter of discovering whether a violation of the securities laws occurred at all. This is particularly the case for victims of the classic fraud-like case that often arises under § 10(b). "[C]oncealment is inherent in most securities fraud cases." American Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus.Lawyer 645, 654 (1985). The most extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within the time allowed for bringing an express cause of action under the 1934 Act. Ponzi schemes, for example, can maintain the illusion of a profit-making enterprise for years, and sophisticated investors may not be able to discover the fraud until long after its perpetration. Id. at 656. Indeed, in Ernst & Ernst, the alleged fraudulent scheme had gone undetected for over 25 years before it was revealed in a stockbroker's suicide note. 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 189.
Litigation, 24 New England L.Rev. 537, 549-550 (1989). Only a small minority of States constrain fraud actions with absolute periods of repose, and those that do typically permit actions to be brought within at least five years. See, e.g., Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e) (1991) (5-year period of repose); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.120(11) (Michie 1990) (10-year period of repose); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(5) (1986) (10-year period of repose). Congress itself has recognized the importance of granting victims of fraud a reasonable time to discover the facts underlying the fraud and to prepare a case against its perpetrators. See, e.g., Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(2) (action may be brought within three years from discovery of violation); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(4) (action may be brought within five years of the violation). The Court, however, does not.
327 U. S. 392 (1946). A 3-year absolute bar on § 10(b) actions simply tips the scale too far in favor of wrongdoers.
The Court's decision today forecloses any means of recovery for a defrauded investor whose only mistake was not discovering a concealed fraud within an unforgiving period of repose. As fraud in the securities markets remains a serious national concern, Congress may decide that the rule announced by the Court today should be corrected. But even if prompt congressional action is taken, it will not avail defrauded investors caught by the Court's new and unforgiving rule, here applied on a retroactive basis to a pending action.
With respect, I dissent, and would remand with instructions that a § 10(b) action may be brought at any time within one year after an investor discovered or should have discovered a violation. In any event, I would permit the litigants in this case to rely upon settled Ninth Circuit precedent as setting the applicable limitations period in this case, and join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion in full.


This is your chance to win £50 worth of vouchers and more… and for just a few seconds of your valuable #freefrom time you would be doing me a huge favour. Read on to find out how you can reward all the hard work of a humble freefrom blogger (that's me!) for a lot of hard work raising awareness and blogging about all things freefrom, allergy and anaphylaxis.
You could help What Allergy make history and become The Best Freefrom Blog 2015.
And like I said, not only will you get a lovely warm feeling for having voted for you bestest most favouritest freefrom blogger (me again!), there are also some GREAT prizes to be had.
The Foods You Can Free-From Awards™ are chosen by popular vote* via the free from food community. It doesn't matter who you are, you can place your vote and help to decide which brands deserve to be the WINNERS. This year we're expecting thousands of you to take part and cast your votes. Each person only has one vote so get involved and make it count. By getting involved and casting your vote, you'll also have a chance to WIN a range of fantastic free from prizes. Each person that votes can** be entered into a free prize draw to win one of three prizes.
A £50 food shopping gift voucher for the supermarket of your choice.
free-from food hamper with goodies worth up to £50.
VOTING is now open and ends on the 25th of October 2015.
*Only one vote can be placed per person.
**Voters can opt out of being entered for the competition.
I won this award last year. Can I defend my coveted #bestfreefromblogger title? Can I win this for a second year running?
Please don't assume that just because this is such an awesome blog that I won't need your help… I'm up against some pretty brilliant fellow bloggers. I would vote for some of them if I wasn't so competitive myself. The line up of FreeFrom bloggers is pretty impressive this year so the competition is going to tough.
I'm going to the awards ceremony this year too to present one of the other awards so it would the icing on the #totallyfreefrom cake to win again.
And if you love freefrom food and actually do eat it yourself, you can also vote for your favourite #freefrom pasta, cake, biscuit, food on the go, restaurant etc. to name just a few.
It's just an honour to even get shortlisted so every company here has been vetted and analysed by the Foods You Can panel of judges.


First song during the opening credits as Charlie is riding his motorcycle around Rhode Island.
Charlie and Layla have a picnic by the beach.
Charlie and Layla get married at the church and drive to their new house near the ocean.
Finneran asks Charlie at the barbecue party why his kids are dark.
Layla makes out with Shonté before they drive away from Charlie's house, leaving the kids behind. Montage of Charlie spending time with the kids.
Jim Nabors in Gomer Plye is singing this song on TV before Charlie changes the channel to HBO.
Plays in the brother's room as Jamal helps Shonté Jr. with his homework.
Charlie is waiting in line at the checkout center at the grocery store when a woman asks Charlie if she could cut in front of him.
Charlie turns into Hank. (0:46) Hank watches a man throw a cigarette on the ground. (1:14) Hank stares down at a man for making of fun of him. (1:29) Hank fights Dickie in the train.
Hank goes around town, punishing everyone that has tormented and mocked Charlie.
Dickie tells Gerke at the country club about Irene.
Charlie drives on the highway with Irene when he comes across a cow on the road. (1:45) Hank proposes to Irene, plays into the end credits.
Irene knocks out Lt. Gerke as Hank beats Gerke up.
Tango music that plays when Hank twitches his eyebrows.
Hank quotes this song after telling Irene his name.
Jamal hacks into the Pentagon's file and reads Vince Fosters file. Colonel Partington knocks on the door.
Charlie and Irene leave the hospital after getting beat up because of Hank's behavior. Contiunes playing on the car radio as Charlie tells Irene to call in the Rhode Island State Troopers.
Hank and Irene dispose of the car in the lake.
Hank and Irene arrive at a carnival. Hank steals an ice cream from a little girl.
Charlie wakes up in the car with Irene and notices that his face is different.
Charlie and Irene chase after the train.
A young boy is staring at Charlie while making slurping noises which triggers Hank to confront the kid.
Hank tells Irene about Layla and starts crying.
Charlie drives to a gas station where he finds a man parked at a handicapped spot which triggers Hank to vandalize the car. Continues as they are traveling on the highway.
Charlie enters Irene's room in the motel and tells her about Whitey's confession.
Charlie returns back to the room with the cokes.
Charlie sings this song as he pours the champagne on the glass.
Whitey finds a note left by Charlie and Irene on his car window telling him that it is too dangerous for him. Whitey goes to a gun store and purchases guns and ammo.
Charlie and Irene kiss at the train station.
Charlie and Hank fight each other.
Hank steals a car as he drives back to Rhode Island.
The triplets drop the ladder from the helicopter for Charlie and Irene to climb.


Add your community to Slack directories Finally, you can publicize your community by adding it to the directories of open Slack groups. To get yours on this Medium list , tweet at its creator , Angela Cois.... 2/11/2017�� This article was co-authored by our trained team of editors and researchers who validated it for accuracy and comprehensiveness. wikiHow's Content Management Team carefully monitors the work from our editorial staff to ensure that each article meets our high standards.
Slack Integration. Slack is a popular tool that lets you chat with your team. If you use Slack, you�ll be excited to learn that our new integration will make Slack even more useful by allowing your team members to start a screen share directly from within Slack by simply starting a message with "/leap". how to add a pattern to photoshop cs6 The Asana for Slack integration is different than the previous Asana app and we will be deprecating the older version in due course. We will import any configurations you had set up from the old app to the new Asana for Slack app.
6/12/2018�� You can join a channel on Slack by going into your channel settings and selecting any default channels available to you. If you're a team administrator, you can also edit which channels will be available for team members to join. how to add contacts to ipad from iphone By clicking edit/add you can manually adjust what channels your new team members will automatically join at first opening Slack. But more about channels later. For now, hit that Invite button after you�ve input the correct email addresses and names.
Add your community to Slack directories Finally, you can publicize your community by adding it to the directories of open Slack groups. To get yours on this Medium list , tweet at its creator , Angela Cois.
The Asana for Slack integration is different than the previous Asana app and we will be deprecating the older version in due course. We will import any configurations you had set up from the old app to the new Asana for Slack app.
To start adding new messages, click on your name in the top left corner and select "Customize Slack" from the dropdown menu. Click on the third tab from the left labeled "Loading Messages," add a message in the text box, and hit "Add Message."
15/06/2015�� The Ultimate Guide to Using Slack for Team Communication 06/15/2015 05:01 pm ET Updated Dec 06, 2017 The foundation of every relationship is built on trust and communication.


text:
Q: Error messages in Javascript So, I have two questions in my HTML code. After submitting the button, my code should display whether question # 1 and # 2 is correct right after the specified number. But the "msg" just prints on question # 1. How do I make the "msg" prints on both number? Any help would be greatly appreciated. Thankies!

    <form action="#" onsubmit="return checkAnswers(this)" name="myForm">

QUESTIONS

Question No. 1.)
 What is the world's number 1 shampoo?

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="yes" id="q"/>A. Hi

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"  id="q"/>B. Hello

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"  id="q"/>C. Ahh

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"  id="q" />D. Kitkat

Question No. 2.)
 What is the world's number 1 shampoo?

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no" id="q"/>A. Hi

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="yes"  id="q"/>B. Hello

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"  id="q"/>C. Ahh

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"  id="q" />D. Kitkat

    <input type="submit" name='submit' value="Submit">

</form>

A: See this fiddle!
I changed your id="msg" to name="msg", look at the javascript below to see why! (And because it's not a good idea to have multiple element with the same id)
I removed id="q" because we can already get all radio without it !

<form action="#" onsubmit="return checkAnswers()" name="myForm">

QUESTIONS

Question No. 1.)
 What is the world's number 1 shampoo?

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="yes"/>A. Hi

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"/>B. Hello

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"/>C. Ahh

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"/>D. Kitkat

Question No. 2.)
 What is the world's number 1 shampoo?

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"/>A. Hi

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="yes"/>B. Hello

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"/>C. Ahh

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"/>D. Kitkat

    <input type="submit" name='submit' value="Submit">

</form>

This is your js, We create a list of unique radio name, then check their value and show the result:
function checkAnswers() {
    var retval;

    //This gets all radio !
    var listRadio = document.querySelectorAll('input[type="radio"]');

    //We need to loop only each group, not every radio
    //This array will hold all the unique names !
    var listNameRadioGroup = new Array();

    //We loop all radio, when the name is not in the array, we add it
    for (var i = 0; i < listRadio.length; i++) {
        if (listNameRadioGroup.indexOf(listRadio[i].name) === -1)
            listNameRadioGroup.push(listRadio[i].name);
    }

    //Then we only need to loop this new array to test each group
    for (i = 0; i < listNameRadioGroup.length; i++) {

        //We can access the value of the radio with .value on the element
        //listNameRadioGroup[i] will return the current name to test
        if (document.myForm[listNameRadioGroup[i]].value == "yes") {
            retval = true;
            //because msg is now a name, we can use getElementsByName and they will be in order !
            //So we set the value to correct
            document.getElementsByName("msg")[i].innerHTML = "Correct Answer!";
        }
        else {
            retval = false;
            document.getElementsByName("msg")[i].innerHTML = "Wrong Answer!";
        }

    }

    return retval;

}

A: // i've edited your code a little and here it is. In your code, if you have choose the correct answer, and you change it, the "msg" doesn't change. it remains as "Correct answer!"    even though it is a wrong answer. But thanks for your help!

<form name="myForm" onsubmit="return checkAnswers()">

QUESTIONS

Question No. 1.)
What is the world's number 1 shampoo?

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="yes"  />A. Hi

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no" />B. Hello

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"  />C. Ahh

    <input name="one" type="radio" value="no"  />D. Kitkat

Question No. 2.)
What is the world's number 1 shampoo?

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"  />A. Hi

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="yes"  />B. Hello

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"  />C. Ahh

    <input name="two" type="radio" value="no"  />D. Kitkat

    <input type="button" name='submit' value="Submit"  />
</form>

A: In normal time you not put two time the same id but...your javascript/jquery need to look like that:
function checkAnswers(){
    var retval = false;
    for(i=0;i<document.myForm.q.length;i++){
        if(document.myForm.q[i].value == "yes" && document.myForm.q[i].checked == true){
            retval = true;
        }
       if(retval== true){
            $("span[id=msg]")[i].innerHTML="Correct Answer!";
        }
        else if(retval == false){
            $("span[id=msg]")[i].innerHTML="Wrong Answer!";
        }
    }
}

Because you need to loop all the msg span in your html and point at them.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
TMD Treatments
Orthodontic Treatments
Dental Sleep Medicine
Unsure of Treatment
BHC Patients
Sleep Apnea May Be Worsened By Tongue Fat
diet fat Mingus obstructive orthotic Sleep apnea tongue
3 Reasons Why Chewing Gum Can Help With Oral Health
First Dental Checkup for Infants
Why Smoking Is So Bad for Teeth
Obesity Linked to Tooth Decay?
Binge Eating and Oral Health
If you have obstructive sleep apnea, you might have been told by your doctor that losing weight will help clear up the dangerous sleep disorder. Obstructive sleep apnea is the most common type of sleep apnea. In fact, the sleep disorder as a whole affects an estimated 22 million Americans, with 80 percent of those cases considered obstructive or severe obstructive sleep apnea.
Obstructive sleep apnea occurs when the airway becomes obstructed during sleep as the affected person is lying flat. Obstructive sleep apnea causes snoring and, more troubling, breathing difficulties that cause the affected person to stop and restart breathing throughout the night. This in turn causes many dangerous co-morbid conditions, such as low oxygen saturation, depression, high blood pressure and can even worsen the severity of other conditions like diabetes and cancer.
Doctors have long known that losing weight can help curb the severity of and possibly even eliminate obstructive sleep apnea, but they never knew exactly why. But now a new study by the Perelman School of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania has figured out a cause, and it might take you by surprise.
Dr. Kelley Mingus is a dentist who treats sleep apnea in his Bend, Oregon, practice. He says that, while surprising, the results of the study make sense.
"The University of Pennsylvania study found that obstructive sleep apnea has a lot to do with body fat in the tongue," he said.
The larger the tongue, the more obstruction to the airway - and the greater the incentive to lose excess body weight, Mingus said.
"I'm sure some people don't think about excess body fat in their tongue," he said. "But it does occur, and it's an important thing to think about when you suffer from sleep apnea."
Mingus says getting on a healthy diet and adding a regular exercise routine are the best ways to lose weight, but patients should be treating their obstructive sleep apnea in the meantime.
"Don't think that just because you're on a diet you can just ignore your sleep apnea and hope it goes away," Mingus said. "You are still at risk for doing your body a lot of harm."
For patients with sleep apnea, Mingus recommends using a sleep orthotic like the ones prescribed in his clinic. He says they are safe, effective and eliminate the need for those scary-looking, uncomfortable CPAP masks.
"Sleep orthotic therapy has been found to be more effective than CPAP because people actually use their orthotics. Only about 30 to 40 percent of people utilize their CPAP machine as prescribed, which means it's not doing anything to help you," Mingus said.
   ✉
© 2021 Bend Headache Center.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


HANDCRAFTED JAPANESE BUTTER KNIFE WITH SOLID BRASS HANDLE AND SILVER-PLATED MOUTH PIECE. DESIGNED BY OJI MASANORI.
THE SURFACE IS IHADA-FINISHED, A CRUDE CASTING SURFACE THAT GETS BETTER WITH AGE. THE BRASS GRADUALLY CHANGES ITS COLOR OVER THE COURSE OF YEARS DUE TO OXIDIZATION AND BECOMES RICHER AND SUBTLER. ALL OF OUR IHADA CUTLERY IS PACKAGED INDIVIDUALLY IN A PAPER BOX.


Isnt it funny how one thing can lead to another? Last year I interviewed a delightful chartered accountant not two words you often see together, I"know. Tim Lerwill is also a writer of childrens fiction books. He grew up on a farm in North Devon and has published two books under the Farmer Tim Stories brand. Anyway, Tim asked me if I ever worked outside the region, and I admit to being a little tentative, as travelling anywhere north of Taunton nowadays fills me with dread!
He wanted someone to facilitate the West of England Society of Chartered Accountants awards ceremony in Bristol at which Lord Lamont was speaking. Turns out that apart from encouraging those present to donate to the chosen charity, The Princes Trust, all I had to do was hold the evening together. So it was with relish that I embarked upon bullying the number-crunchers to part with their money. Must have done something right because last week I received a lovely letter on behalf of the president of The Princes Trust, HRH The Prince of Wales, and a red lapel badge adorned with the Royal fleur de lys welcoming me as an Ambassador! So all that and a fascinating tete-a-tete with Lord Lamont over coffee.
Phil Hammond is the sort of doctor we should all have sensitive, informed, communicative and very funny. Still a practising GP, he is also a writer, broadcaster and possibly the only comedian to have appeared at a public inquiry. He was touring recently with Dr Phils Rude Health Show, and I couldnt help but laugh when he told me how during his training he had to stitch a deep cut on top of a patients head and ended up stitching his rubber glove to his head... resulting in the man looking like a demented cockerel!
In my days in regional television, I was a bit of a have-a-go girl. I have cleaned the windows of the Plymouth Civic Centre hanging over the side in a cradle, Ive gone headfirst from a smoke tower over the shoulder of a burly fireman, dived with sea lions off the Isles of Scilly, parascended between the legs of an Austrian I hadnt even been introduced to, and in latter years white-water rafted in Zimbabwe. The only thing I have ever hated and would never do again (apart, that is, from the window cleaning), is the white-water rafting. The instruction was minimal, as was the instructors English. I had to sit in the back with two non-swimmers who were terrified particularly as the next raft was full of gung-ho Aussies whose raison detre was to capsize us!
At last I have found another pretty have-a-go broadcaster who hated it too. Frank Gardner, the BBC award-winning security correspondent who had always been an adventure-loving soul before his disabling accident, still skis and dives. He too hated white-water rafting. Frank did capsize, came up under the boat, put his hand over the edge and trapped it the guide yanked him up and all was well until he noticed a row of people on the shoreline laughing, which is when he realised his trunks were around his ankles. As he put it: An undignified way to do the Zambezi!
Im not usually this careless, but a few months ago I found an uncashed cheque for 30 in one of my files from a utilities company. Only problem was it was dated 2005. So I rang and asked if they be good enough to honor it? Oh yes, said a very helpful lady. If you would like to send us a cheque for 13.60 to cover the costs.


text:
Le cose cambiano è il quarto album dei Delta V, e ultimo album di studio pubblicato con Ricordi BMG. La parte vocale è di nuovo affidata a Gi Kalweit, che già aveva cantato nel disco precedente, mentre Carlo oltre alla musica si occupa anche della scrittura dei testi. A Flavio il ruolo di produttore artistico dell'album.

Tracce
 La costruzione di un errore
 Prendila così
 Il senso falsato di un mondo migliore
 Mani chiuse
 In picchiata
 L'alba ogni mattina
 Frammenti
 Via da qui
 Se mi senti
 Moto d'insoddisfazione personale
 Due giorni
 -
 La costruzione moonbase rmx
 In picchiata (Home Sweet Home) + Comunicazione interrotta

Singoli
 Prendila così
 Via da qui

Crediti
 Testi e musica di Bertotti tranne:
 La costruzione di un errore (Bertotti-Gurian-Ferri)
 Prendila così (Mogol-Battisti)
 Mani chiuse (Bertotti-Ferri)
 Due giorni (Bertotti-Gurian-Lenzi)
 Gi Kalweit: voce
 Carlo Bertotti: chitarra acustica, tastiere, Fender Rhodes, programmazione, voce
 Flavio Ferri: programmazione, theremin, synth
 Cesarone: basso
 Carlo Bosco: pianoforte
 Mao Granata: batteria
 Marco Trentacoste: chitarra
 Enrico Ferraresi: batteria
 Fefo Forconi: chitarra
 Alice Ricciardi: cori
 Jara Grieco: cori
 Riccardo Tonco: cori

Recensioni

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Swiss Voters Reject So-Called "Responsible Business Initiative"
Swiss voters rejected a ballot question called the Responsible Business Initiative that would have instituted legal liabilities and allowed torts against domestic companies that are accused of international human rights abuses and climate damage. If this had passed, environmentalists and other left-wing groups would have had a field day in terms of litigating Switzerland into outright socialism by destroying Swiss companies via the legal system. Thankfully it was shot down.
Swiss firms narrowly avoid 'Responsible Business' liability as vote divides nation
By Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, November 29, 2020
ZURICH (Reuters) – Swiss firms narrowly avoided facing greater liability for human rights and environmental abuses on Sunday after a national vote rejected the proposal due to regional differences despite it winning majority popular support.
In a divisive referendum, 50.7% of Swiss voters supported proposals by the Responsible Business Initiative (RBI) to extend liability over international human rights abuses and environmental harm caused by major Swiss companies and the firms they control abroad.
But the initiative failed to win support in a majority of cantons, a necessary condition for a public initiative to be enacted in Switzerland, paving the way for a milder government counter-proposal to come into force.
It is the first time in over 60 years a Swiss vote has failed on regional grounds after winning popular support.
"The Federal Council is pleased with the result, but is also aware that many who have fought for years for the initiative are disappointed today," Justice Minister Karin Keller-Sutter said at a press conference.
She said the enactment of new government measures meant supporters would not leave the campaign with empty hands. "The Federal Council is convinced that this is a good way to achieve the common and undisputed goal of better protecting human rights and the environment."
The government proposal will require firms to step up and publicly report checks on their overseas operations and supply chains, hitherto voluntary measures, but stops short of extending liability to Swiss courts.
PHOTO CREDIT: Ballots and other documents mailed to Swiss voters in Berne for elections and referendums. By Sandstein – Own work by uploader. Use of any copyrighted content is de minimis., CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5128691
November 29, 2020 gjihadpoliticslaw, lawsuit, politics, pollution, sustainability, Switzerland
Previous Post "Climate is now subservient to the master of #COVID"
Next Post "COVID Passport" In Development Nearly Complete
Population Control Isn't the Answer to Climate Change. Capitalism Is.


text:
Q: Updating a Sketchup Model by changing an underlying sketchup model I have a SketchUp model which I have created by importing three other model files. I want to update one of the three underlying model files. If I edit the model and physically import again, I have to spend the time to physically positioning the model again. Is there way to change the underlying model and the higher level model gets updated automatically?

A: Not sure if this is a programming question or user question, but if it's programming question then you can use DefinitionList#load to load the new SKP file, then use ComponentInstance#definition= to replace the instances for the definition you want to replace.
http://ruby.sketchup.com/Sketchup/DefinitionList.html#load-instance_method
http://ruby.sketchup.com/Sketchup/ComponentInstance.html#definition=-instance_method
If this is a user question, then I'd recommend you ask in the Superuser site (https://superuser.com/) or the SketchUp forums: https://forums.sketchup.com/

A: You don't need to do this programmatically - you can do it within Sketchup itself.

*

*Save a component in file aComponent.skp

*Import the component into your working file, perhaps workingFile.skp

To UPDATE the component (similar to an XREF in Autocad)
Whenever you make changes to the aComponent.skp file, all you need to do is go into your workingFile.skp and find the component you loaded (I made one called weirdThing here) in the OUTLINER, not the Component window.

*

*Right click on the component's name in the OUTLINER.

*Choose "Reload..."

*Sketchup asks you for the file to update it with. Choose aComponent.skp -- or any other file with a component definition of the same name inside it!
NOTE: This doesn't work if you right click on the name in the Component List (see image below).

A: While SketchUp doesn't link models and you can't automate changes from one model to another (without a plugin anyway), there is a way to replace a component with a different one.  Are you comfortable using the Ruby console?  If so, do the following (note that this assumes your objects are components!):

*

*Select the old component instance, the one you want to replace.

*Open the Ruby console (Window -> Ruby Console).

*Type the following (you must have the old instance selected):
old = Sketchup.active_model.selection.first
and hit enter.

*Import your new object (unless you already have) and place it somewhere in the scene (somewhere it's not in the way and you can find it easily).

*Select the new component instance, your new object that you just imported

*Type the following in the Ruby console (you must have the new instance selected):
new = Sketchup.active_model.selection.first
and hit enter.

*Now, to replace the old component with the new component, type the following in the Ruby console:
old.definition = new.definition
and hit enter.
That should replace the old component with your new one.  You can now delete the object you imported earlier.  It would probably be a good idea to purge your model too.
Note the replacement uses the old instance's coordinate axis location.  As long as these are the same model, just with some edits, you shouldn't have any trouble.


text:
CCP Virus-Hit Cruise Liner Leaves Japan After Month-Long Quarantine
June 1, 2020World
A crew member waves on the balcony of Italian cruise ship Costa Atlantica, which has crew members confirmed with cases of the CCP virus infection, in Nagasaki, southern Japan, on April 26, 2020. (Kyodo/via Reuters/File Photo)
TOKYO—The Costa Atlantica cruise ship, which docked in southern Japan with over 100 crew members testing positive for COVID-19, has left the country and is en route to the Philippines, local government officials said on June 1.
The ship departed Nagasaki on Sunday over a month after it became the second CCP (Chinese Communist Party) virus-stricken cruise ship to dock in Japan. Lax control on the movement of crew whilst docked highlighted Japan's patchy response to the pandemic.
The 86,000 tonne Costa Atlantica docked for maintenance in late April carrying no passengers and 623 crew, most of whom were eventually quarantined inside the ship after 149 tested positive.
An aerial view shows Italian cruise ship Costa Atlantica, which has crew members confirmed with cases of the CCP virus infection, in Nagasaki, Japan, on April 26, 2020. (Kyodo via Reuters/File Photo)
Six remain hospitalized in a non-life-threatening condition, Nagasaki prefecture officials said.
The remainder have been confirmed negative and have left Nagasaki, with 126 aboard the ship bound for Manila, Nagasaki prefecture official Kenjo Ura told Reuters.
Nagasaki Prefecture Governor Hodo Nakamura on Sunday told reporters the outbreak revealed the "need for a system to grasp the health condition of crew members" when cruise ships enter Japan, including smooth information exchange with foreign cruise companies.
Costa Cruises, operator of Costa Atlantica, did not have an immediate comment when contacted by Reuters.
The crew's ordeal with the CCP virus may be over, but financial struggles are expected because of a decline in the number of voyages, said a family member of one of the crew members.
Rosan Ogayon, daughter of Caferino Ogayon, a chef on the ship, said her father would fly home to Manila soon. He has fought off the CCP virus and been confirmed negative, but is out of work until the cruise company resumes sailing.
"Because of the pandemic, my father can't work for the meantime, so that means he can't earn money for us," the Manila-based college-student told Reuters.
By Ju-min Park
NTD staff contributed to this report.


Can Post-Traumatic Stress (PTSD) Affect Driving?
The human brain is capable of keeping us alive through intense, extreme situations. From car wrecks and domestic abuse, to stalking and shoot-outs, we can survive horrible things. However, just like physical trauma, mental and emotional trauma leaves wounds in the psyche. Sometimes they heal over, and you'd never even know. Other times, though, the trauma leaves deep, painful scars. When those scars interfere with your daily life, the condition is called post-traumatic stress disorder.
Isn't PTSD Just For Soldiers?
When people think of post-traumatic stress disorder, they tend to think of returning combat veterans. Whether it's pop culture depictions like what we saw in Rambo: First Blood, or nightly news stories about the numbers of soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who are dealing with this condition, it's something we think of as exclusive to warriors. Sometimes we admit that it may be common in police officers, as well. However, being in a war zone is just one instance where the constant tension, stress, and regular infusions of adrenaline can leave lasting effects on someone's mind.
Because everyone reacts to trauma differently, it's impossible to say what will, and what won't, leave someone suffering from PTSD. For example, someone involved in a mass shooting might be able to put the incident behind them, once they've had some time to recover and recuperate. Other people, though, may never be able to go to the place where the incident happened, or even other places like it, without being triggered. Nightmares, flashbacks, severe anxiety, and intrusive thoughts regarding the trauma can all make leading a normal life extremely difficult.
Can Post Traumatic Stress (PTSD) Affect Driving?
Post-traumatic stress disorder takes many forms, and no two sufferers show the same symptoms, or react the exact same way to the same stimuli. For example, one person who drove a convoy through a war zone might have no negative reactions to traffic when behind the wheel, but someone who was involved in a collision that resulted in the loss of a loved one might feel extreme distress whenever a truck sounds its horn.
If someone suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, they have to plan their entire lives around it. And, in some cases, they need to inform the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
According to the Houston Chronicle, there are many states, such as Texas, Virginia, Florida, and Ohio which ask applicants if they suffer from any conditions, or take any forms of medication, that might interfere with them being able to drive safely. This is far from a universal requirement, though, and in many states where there is an attempt to classify some applicants as "mentally unwell" there have been legal challenges on the grounds that the questions are archaic and unnecessary.
Getting behind the wheel is always a risk. Whether you're driving down to the corner store to pick up some snacks, or you're on a cross-country road trip, there is always a chance that circumstances will pitch a fast ball at your head. As a driver, you need to know whether you're going to be able to react to that.
Having PTSD doesn't mean you can't drive, or even that you're an unsafe driver. However, if your condition is triggered by driving, or you're more likely to suffer from serious symptoms when you drive, then it's important to know that, and to gauge the risk appropriately. Suffering from this condition doesn't prevent you from having a driver's license, owning a car, or getting out on the highway. But you need to take responsibility, and avoid that sort of situation, if you know there's a high risk of incident when you drive.


text:
6-year-old Guadalupe girl found safe after family member's boyfriend kidnapped her: MCSO
By FOX 10 Staff
6-year-old Guadalupe girl safe after being kidnapped
Luna Nunez was reportedly taken by the boyfriend of a family member, who was taken into custody by deputies on I-8 near Gila Bend.
GILA BEND, Ariz. (AP) - A freeway was closed in the southern Arizona desert for about an hour Saturday as authorities negotiated with a man suspected of kidnapping a 6-year-old girl.
Interstate 8 east of Gila Bend was closed until the suspect was taken into custody without incident, said Sgt. Calbert Gillett, a Maricopa County Sheriff's Office spokesman, on March 12.
The child from that incident was identified as 6-year-old Luna Nunez, who had been reported missing that same morning from a home in Guadalupe.
Nunez had been put to bed at 10 p.m. the night before, but family did not notice her disappearance until 6:30 a.m. the next morning. Deputies searched for hours on the ground and in the air to find her.
The person who kidnapped her is reportedly the boyfriend of a family member.
"At this time, this case is being investigated as a kidnapping. Detectives are investigating and this is all the information available for release at this time," Gillett said.
The suspect has not been identified.
Luna Nunez
More Arizona headlines
Police shooting under investigation in west Phoenix
Arizona man arrested, accused of murder following Phoenix apartment shooting
Man, woman found shot to death in Mesa; suspect arrested
Multiple stolen vehicles, drugs seized in Wittmann; 3 suspects arrested


presentationsManager HD is a Apple Keynote e Microsoft Powerpoint file reader (.key, .ppt, .pptx).
The software does not need an internet connection: each presentation is stored in the mobile device (using the technology "iTunes File Sharing" or "Open In") and can be read by the software itself.
The file will be automatically stored in the presentationsManager documents archive.
- Using an app installed on Your device such as Safari, Mail, dropbox, etc… tap a presentation file (or a presentation file attached to an email or a presentation file web link), press on "Open In" button and choose "presentationsManager HD" from the list.
With "presentationsManager HD" you will always have and everywhere all your presentations!


Leland A, Cross, a 70-year resident of Loyalton, died peacefully in his home on Dec. 11. He was an accomplished artist/sign painter, a loving husband, caring father, grandfather and an active community member.
Leland moved from Vermont to the Sierra Valley in the 1950s where he met the love of his life, Phyllis, and married after a three-week courtship. They were married for 68 years when Phyllis passed away in January of this year. Leland and Phyllis had four children: daughter, Pam Whitley and husband, Marty; son, Greg Cross and wife, Karen; daughter, Pattie Williams; daughter, Penny Gamble and husband, Mark; as well as 11 grandchildren and 19 great-grandchildren.
Leland was born and raised in Wilmington, Vermont, which cultured his great love for sharp cheddar cheese and a warm slice of apple pie. He had a secret salad dressing recipe that tantalized the taste buds. He attended Ag School and helped his folks on their farm along with his brother Myron, and sisters Ada, Jane and Linda. Linda is his only surviving sibling. He shared many happy memories of the years he spent in Vermont hunting, fishing and serving in the National Guard.
Leland took great pride in his activity in the 20-30 Club, Loyalton Fire Dept. and the Rotary Club. He earned the nickname in Rotary of "Dead Eye" due to a bet he made with some friends that he could shoot a squirrel; he missed. He illustrated the Rotary paper and drew many caricatures of club presidents and district leaders. He often donated paintings to club events and various community fundraisers in the Sierra Valley and beyond. He had a heart for the valley and the town he made his home.
Leland will be sorely missed by his family and the friends in the valley he so dearly loved.
An open house celebration of Leland's life will be held at the Sierra Brooks Lodge 510, Longhorn Drive, Loyalton on Saturday, Jan. 12, from 1 to 3 p.m.
In lieu of flowers please send memorial gifts to the Loyalton Fire Department or the Loyalton Rotary Scholarship Fund in his honor.


Extra large number of people vacations all around the society for various causes; a visit for professional several reasons and some for exclusively holidaying.
USA not strictly offers tons of most most coveted take flight destinations of usually the world but there are a plenty of regions in the new of America even you can experience without spending a nightmare lot of dollars. To talk about unquestionably the gorgeous beaches all through this part with regards to the globe, and then there are few striking ones for constructive. taxi app of clients visits this venue from various nooks to cherish excellent time they have the opportunity to spend here among some blissful environmentally friendly surroundings accompanied basically some enthralling regarding art and adventure.
Laguna Beach could be worldrenowned for its sunsets and scenic coastline that can also cast a beauty charm upon some viewers' mind. Therefore , the number holiday here is best growing with effort. If you are one of those about to come to doing this stunning place then chances have started gathering steam in terms pointing to gathering different great information, necessary head in hand as well as dead here. Once in order to zeroed on hotels or resorts you wish to stay in here, choosing the right transport that usually tend to becomes the associated with constrain for an journey can end up being bit tricky.
While looking finest kind of cabs in this purpose or while take into account a taxi within Laguna Beach, you will be thankful to know any now you possess copious options to decide on among numerous pickup truck's cab and cab help providing companies. Taxicab companies in Laguna Beach provide truck transportation services, supply passengers between multiple locations of an individuals choice within and don't limits for each fare normally dependant on the distance gone. Those who have already opted for providers know that Laguna Beach taxi yields are extremely reasonable.


"So far it's great. I hope to need many more orders!"
"Awesome, easy to use and will be back! Hopefully my next order there will be more colors available to chose from."
"Great shopping, look forward to doing more business."
"unable to use amazon pay- I kept getting errors, had to refresh the page several times in order to just put in my credit card info after removing amazon pay option. it was a nightmare to start off :( looking forward to the hats, and possibly having better luck in the future with the website."
"Great I found the blank Baseball Hats. Been looking for a while."
"It was fast and easy experience"
"Easy and hopefully fast shipping"
"My grade level is buying these for our students as a gift. As teachers, we truly appreciate the great prices and great quality."
"I am so glad you guys have all the hats that I need."
"Easy to navigate the website with tons of color choices. Shipping is a little steep but the prices can't be beat so it balances out. I have ordered from them several times I always get what is pictured/described."
"Hoping I get them quickly"


Many academics see tremendous value in engaging groups outside the University in their research, but face challenges trying to make that a reality.
Two University of Minnesota researchers cleared these hurdles with support from the University's Clinical and Translational Science Institute (CTSI), generating findings that would influence local and national health policy.
"Our CTSI-supported research project didn't just inform public policy; it led directly to the creation of new legislation," says Rebecca Shlafer, PhD, MPH, an Assistant Professor with the Medical School's Department of Pediatrics, referring to a bill that helps care for pregnant, incarcerated women and their babies.
Dr. Shlafer has engaged a wide range of CTSI offerings, from its career development programs for junior investigators to its grants stimulating community-engaged research. This ultimately advanced her career and her research alike.
Our CTSI-supported research project didn't just inform public policy; it led directly to the creation of new legislation.
Dr. Shlafer's road to policy change began in 2011, when she teamed up with Everyday Miracles' Erica Gerrity, MSW, to apply for – and ultimately receive – a $23,770 CTSI grant that supports collaborations between University researchers and community entities such as nonprofits, physicians, and clinics.
At the time, the local nonprofit Everyday Miracles had just begun providing doula support to pregnant prison inmates. The grant marked Dr. Shlafer and Gerrity's first formal collaboration.
The team used the funds to continue implementing the program and evaluate how the doulas – nonmedical companions who assist women before, during, and after childbirth – impacted health outcomes, collecting evidence that would ultimately drive policy change.
In addition to making an impact in the legislative world, CTSI support gave a big boost to Dr. Shlafer's burgeoning career as a researcher.
CTSI grantee Dr. Katy Kozhimannil conducts research to inform the development, implementation, and evaluation of health policy that impacts reproductive-age women and their families.
Another University researcher – School of Public Health Professor Katy Kozhimannil, PhD – had been partnering with Everyday Miracles on another endeavor for years, but they lacked the funding to realize their shared vision.
The same CTSI Community Health Collaborative Grants program gave Dr. Kozhimannil and collaborators Mary Williams, LPN, and Debby Prudhomme the support they needed to evaluate the effectiveness of a new Minnesota Medicaid policy that gives beneficiaries access to doula services, and would later influence policymakers nationwide.
"CTSI support formalized our University-community partnership, which was critical to our ability to make a nationwide impact with our work," says Dr. Kozhimannil.
One of the doulas trained through Dr. Kozhimannil and team's program supports a new mother during her labor and delivery.
CTSI support formalized our University-community partnership, which was critical to our ability to make a nationwide impact with our work.
Grants for both Drs. Kozhimannil and Shlafer were provided through CTSI's Office of Community Engagement to Advance Research and Community Health (CEARCH), which provides an infrastructure so University-community research teams can work together to address health issues in ways that are truly relevant to the community.
Shortly after receiving a community-engaged research grant from CTSI, Dr. Shlafer sought to grow her capabilities as an investigator, and joined a CTSI career development program.
Programs are designed to advance the research careers of junior investigators and the clinical and translational science workforce, and are part of CTSI's broader Research Education, Training, and Career Development function (CTSI-Ed).
When Dr. Shlafer joined the Pre-K Career Development Program, she had just made the jump from post-doc to Assistant Professor. She was eager to hit the ground running and quickly become an independent researcher, meaning that she would be able to secure enough grant funding to support her salary and research endeavors, and establish a national reputation in her field.
To help researchers reach this point, CTSI's faculty career development programs provide its scholars with a top-notch team of mentors, between $50,000-78,000 in research funds, protected time for research, and comprehensive career development support, including progress reviews, training on essential research skills, and ongoing guidance from CTSI team members even after scholars "graduate" from the program.
"Dr. Shlafer has accomplished a tremendous amount during her short time as a faculty member, due to her extraordinary talent and dedication as well as the continuous support of CTSI," says Joseph Neglia, MD, MPH, Head of the Medical School's Department of Pediatrics. "By partnering with CTSI, we can give our junior investigators the momentum they need to lift their careers off the ground and conduct research that can help people live healthier lives."
Dr. Shlafer's research capabilities grew so much in the Pre-K Program that she applied for and was accepted into CTSI's more advanced KL2 Scholars Program. In addition to the perks Dr. Shlafer received through the Pre-K Program, the next-level program would also offer $100,000 in salary support annually and the assurance that 75 percent of her time would be protected exclusively for research pursuits.
Having protected time through CTSI's KL2 program allowed me to continue growing my research program at a pivotal point in my career.
Scholar seminars and other training activities are held jointly with University scholars from other K award programs, including the Building Interdisciplinary Research Careers in Women's Health (BIRCWH) K12, which supported Dr. Kozhimannil's career development from 2011-2014.
Dr. Kozhimannil credits her peers and mentees from the joint career development programs with driving some of the biggest enhancements to her research through their feedback and new perspectives.
For example, Dr. Kozhimannil first developed a research partnership with Rachel Hardeman – a racial equity expert who would later become a collaborator, mentee, and School of Public Health Assistant Professor – through CTSI's community of scholars.
Dr. Shlafer with her mentor Michael Resnick, PhD, MA.
Because Dr. Shlafer received support from multiple CTSI programs, she was able to incrementally build upon her research projects and continue collecting evidence that would support policy change efforts.
"CTSI's programs are designed to work together to empower investigators to improve human health through their research," says Bruce Blazar, MD, Director of CTSI. "When researchers take advantage of CTSI's wide range of offerings, they have the potential to advance their careers and their research alike."
One of the many mom-baby pairs who benefits from the prison doula program led by Dr. Rebecca Shlafer, Erica Gerrity, and team.
When Dr. Shlafer evaluated the doula program for her first CTSI grant, women shared concerns about being unable to eat enough during their pregnancies, and not knowing what they should be eating in the first place. This would become the focus of her Pre-K project.
Her KL2 research project built upon that and asked the broader question of how many pregnant women and parents were going through the criminal justice system, a number unknown to the Minnesota Department of Corrections. It would also provide financial support for her program partner, so they could continue implementing the prison doula program and evaluating its effectiveness.
Conversations with inmates and corrections officers clued Dr. Shlafer, Gerrity, and their team in on the startling fact that nothing was being done to systematically address the needs of pregnant inmates. For example, many jails weren't providing pregnancy tests or offering the community standard for prenatal care.
Efforts shifted to policy change, with Dr. Shlafer and Gerrity teaming up to help craft the legislation, testifying, working with advocates to find legislative sponsors, and educating legislators. They shined a light on the conditions for pregnant women, the needs uncovered through research and programming, and how legislation could fill those gaps.
Dr. Shlafer shares her perspective at one of CTSI's seminars for K scholars, which Dr. Kozhimannil also attended. Seminars cover a wide range of topics, such as conflict fluency, communication skills, and management strategies.
Along the way, Dr. Shlafer drew from the skills she learned as a CTSI scholar, such as how to communicate effectively, engage with the media, write winning grant proposals, and build a national reputation.
Efforts snowballed, and led to Minnesota's passage of the most comprehensive law in the country pertaining to the care and treatment of incarcerated pregnant women.
I never expected my research to drive legislative change at such an early stage in my career, but CTSI's support made that possible.
Thanks to this legislation, Minnesota is viewed as a national leader on the issue. Dr. Shlafer and team have received calls from legislative aides from multiple states, conducted trainings with other Departments of Corrections, and created resources ranging from a Pregnancy Resource Guide for Incarcerated Mothers to a webinar about how to create a prison doula program.
Dr. Shlafer continues to team up with Erica Gerrity, a collaboration first formalized by the CTSI grant that has since developed into an ongoing, sustainable partnership. "We collaborate on pretty much everything together," says Dr. Shlafer.
Moving forward, they're working with the Alabama Department of Corrections to pursue collaborative grant opportunities that would enable them to examine the doula model's implications through a multi-site intervention trial.
Dr. Kozhimannil and partners – Debby Prudhomme of Everyday Miracles and Clara Sharp of Ahavah Birth Works – meet Lieutenant Governor Tina Smith at the Department of Human Services.
Like Dr. Shlafer, Dr. Kozhimannil's work has shaped public policy around doula care. A manuscript she wrote while participating in CTSI career development programming would influence a 2013 Minnesota law that made Minnesota the second state in the nation to allow Medicaid coverage for doula services.
While a promising development, the actual implementation would prove to be more challenging due to issues surrounding reimbursements, licensing guidelines, consumer outreach, and other details about how the policy itself was structured.
That's where CTSI's community-engaged research grant came in. Support allowed Dr. Kozhimannil and team to evaluate the law's first year of implementation, and broadly share findings in Minnesota and around the country.
In addition, the team used CTSI funds to train 12 women from diverse backgrounds to become doulas, helping to create opportunities for women who otherwise couldn't afford it and expand the capacity of doulas of color in the Twin Cities.
Dr. Kozhimannil and team used part of their CTSI grant to train 12 women from diverse backgrounds to become doulas.
Because CTSI began supporting the project just as the law was going into effect, Dr. Kozhimannil and team could truly investigate the implementation process, identify barriers and challenges, and make recommendations to policymakers and community members to more fully realize the law's potential.
Findings from this study as well as related work about the benefits of providing Medicaid coverage – namely, improved birth outcomes and reduced costs – were widely shared in mainstream media and academic journals alike.
For example, Drs. Kozhimannil and Hardeman co-authored a blog post in Health Affairs – the online arm of the largest health policy journal in the country – that became one of the blog's most-read posts in 2015.
Their work has been cited in other states' efforts to propose similar legislation for Medicaid coverage of doula services, and such legislation has now been introduced in New Jersey. In addition, Dr. Kozhimannil and team have received inquiries from legislators, state program administrators, advocacy organizations, and doula groups in many states.
Thanks to CTSI, we've been able to build momentum for our research to improve access to doula care for women across the country.
Today, Dr. Kozhimannil continues to collaborate with Dr. Hardeman – a former CTSI Translational Research Development Program scholar – and community-based doula groups. Together with midwife Rebecca Polston of Roots Community Birth Center, Drs. Kozhimannil and Hardeman have recently been selected to participate in Interdisciplinary Research Leaders, a new national Robert Wood Johnson Foundation program, administered by the School of Public Health. Their project will document the content and outcomes of culturally competent pregnancy and childbirth care to improve racial equity in maternal and child health.