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Wardak No-Man's-Land, 2009
From No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes, by Anand Gopal (Henry Holt, 2014), Kindle pp. 235-236:
The summer of 2009 saw an increase in infighting among Wardak's Taliban, and growing tensions with their co-insurgent allies in Hekmatyar's faction. At the same time, because the Taliban leadership paid units a "bonus" for outstanding attacks, the number of fake assaults, staged for video, surged. Akbar Gul played the game as well as anyone, but as the days went on he slid into despair. He hated those men in Quetta, he hated the ISI, and, most of all, he hated Ghulam Ali and his success. But he kept it all to himself. It was a dangerous new world, and you couldn't trust anyone, even your own allies.
Countrywide, his movement was losing steam. The Taliban were now responsible for more civilian deaths than were the Americans. In some communities, roadside bombs, assassinations, and summary executions had come to take their place alongside Guantanamo and the door-kicking night raids of US troops in the pantheon of fears that kept villagers awake at night. Meanwhile, the insurgency was spreading from marginalized, cut-off communities into those that had fared better in the post-2001 years, whether it was welcome there or not.
In Chak, many of the commanders Akbar Gul knew had been killed in night raids, leaving Ghulam Ali's crew and a smattering of independents, most younger than he, with no memories of the old Taliban days. It became increasingly difficult to defend their actions—which included, in one case, beheading a schoolteacher—to the village elders. He turned inward, planning operations on his own, without other commanders, and keeping away from Pakistan. Then, one day, he received a surprising phone call. It was the government's new chief of police for Chak, an old war buddy from his Hizb-i-Islami days. They had ended up on opposite sides through chance more than anything else. The man spoke of a government program that invited fighters to switch sides in return for money and a guaranteed job. Akbar Gul listened and wondered where such a program had been years earlier, when he would have given anything for a normal life. But things were different now, more complicated. He realized that it had been a long while since the Taliban meant anything to him. But he couldn't imagine himself openly joining forces with the government either. In fact, he knew that friends who'd gone down that route were languishing in a dangerous political no-man's-land: Karzai's government had not fulfilled its promises, and for the Taliban they were now marked men.
"What are you fighting for? The Americans are going to leave anyway," the police chief said. "We are building Afghanistan." The Taliban, he added, were terrorists, enemies of the country, stooges of Pakistan.
Akbar Gul was unmoved. "There are no good men among the living, and no bad ones among the dead," he replied, reiterating one of his favorite Pashtun proverbs. This war had left no group, Afghan or foreign, with clean hands. You had to be careful to survive. Today, the government said the Taliban were terrorists—but what about tomorrow? Would the Taliban be venerated, as the mujahedeen were now venerated? Would the Americans change their allegiances, as it seemed they had done after the 1980s, and brand the Karzai government as their enemy? It was too much for Akbar Gul to grapple with just then. He knew only that to trust the categories put forth by the Americans or the government was to go down the road to ruin.
He told the police chief that he wasn't interested. He said he was satisfied with his life as it was, thanked him for his call, and hung up.
The next morning, with new presidential elections looming, with American patrols crawling here and there, with Taliban groups erecting their usual checkpoints to hunt for spies and possible kidnap targets, he hopped on his motorcycle, headed for the low hills behind the village, and began another day of [resistance] work.
Posted by Joel at 9/30/2021 06:39:00 AM No comments:
Labels: Afghanistan, economics, migration, military, nationalism, Pakistan, religion, U.S., war
Using U.S. Troops to Settle Afghan Feuds
As winter settled across Uruzgan and people marked the first full year since the Taliban's downfall, tit-for-tat killings and feuds over access to the Americans continued. But a new political order was slowly, undeniably crystallizing, unwittingly enforced by American forces.
Away from the Pashtun south, the story was different. In the northern province of Balkh, for example, two warlords—Rashid Dostum and Muhammad Atta—jockeyed for control, leading to multiple small-scale skirmishes. The possibility of open warfare seemed all too real, but things never came to a head. Instead, United Nations negotiators were able to preserve the peace, as Atta accepted a governorship and Dostum a post in Kabul. I asked Eckart Schiewek, then a political advisor with the UN mission to Afghanistan, why the outcome was so different, why the southern pattern of killings had never taken hold. "There were no American troops," he replied, pointing out that almost the entire US military presence was concentrated in the Pashtun south and east near the Pakistani border. "You couldn't call on soldiers to settle your feuds."
Anthropologist Noah Coburn found a similar dynamic in his study of Istaliff, a district near Kabul similar in size to Khas Uruzgan but with no regular US troop presence. "International military forces," he wrote, had "little interest in involving themselves in local politics" in Istaliff. Because none of the various Afghan factions competing for power enjoyed privileged access to foreign troops, no group could outmuscle the other, and no one "seriously considered trying to establish hegemonic control over town politics." The result was a tenuous, fragile stability—but stability nonetheless. No communities were severed from state access, nor were there cycles of bloody revenge. And, to this day in Istaliff, there is no anti-American insurgency.
In southern Afghanistan, the mix of American boots on the ground and strongmen itching to outflank their rivals prevented such détentes. Day by day, marginalized southern communities from one valley to the next were slipping out of the government's orbit. The Americans were beginning to wear out their welcome—and it was only going to get worse.
Labels: Afghanistan, economics, military, nationalism, religion, U.N., U.S., war
Flexible Loyalties in Afghanistan
Within a month of its military collapse, the Taliban movement had ceased to exist. When religious clerics in Pakistan launched a fund-raising campaign to get the Taliban back on their feet and waging "jihad" against the Americans, it was roundly rejected by the Talib leadership. "We want to tell people the Taliban system is no more," Agha Jan Mutassim, finance minister of the fallen regime and Mullah Omar's confidant, told reporters. "They should not give any donations in the name of the Taliban." He added: "If a stable Islamic government is established in Afghanistan, we don't intend to launch any action against it."
Khalid Pashtoon, spokesman for the new Kandahar government, declared: "Ministers of the Taliban and senior Taliban are coming one by one and surrendering and joining with us." The list included the Taliban ministers of defense, justice, interior, vice and virtue, information, health, commerce, industry, and finance—in effect, the entire Taliban cabinet; key military commanders and important governors; diplomats; and top officials who had worked with Mullah Omar. The avalanche of surrenders knew no bounds of ideology: leaders of the notorious whip-wielding religious police were among the earliest to defect. A group of former Taliban officials even announced that they were forming a political party to participate in future democratic elections. "We are giving advice to Hamid Karzai," said their leader. "We support him."
By surrendering, the Taliban were following the pattern that had marked Afghan politics for much of the previous two decades. After the Soviet withdrawal, many Afghan Communists had rebranded themselves as Islamists and joined the mujahedeen. During the civil war, factions shifted loyalties based on nothing more than bald pragmatism. Upon the Taliban's entry onto the scene, warlords across the Pashtun belt had either retired, fled, or joined them. Now it was the Taliban's turn, and as one member of the movement after another submitted to the authority of the Karzai administration, there emerged the possibility of a truly inclusive political order.
Labels: Afghanistan, democracy, military, nationalism, religion, U.S., war
Early Origins of the Taliban in Kandahar
From No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes, by Anand Gopal (Henry Holt, 2014), Kindle pp. 79-80:
Most writing on the Taliban assumes that they originated in extremist Pakistani madrassas in the 1980s. In fact, the group's origins lie much deeper in the Afghan past. Visiting Paktika in 2010, I came upon a small hilltop village where locals had gathered around a silent, downcast man. Nearby, a young herder paced back and forth, watching him intently, and, off to a side, tribal graybeards stood conferring. One of them approached, pushing his way through the scrum, and announced a verdict: for killing Rahim Gul's cow, Moheb Jan was to pay him two sheep and twenty days' worth of labor. Afterward, I sat down with the elder, who explained that each transgression in his community carried a fixed fine. Break someone's nose in a fight, and you gave him a chicken. Break a bone, and you surrendered a sheep or goat. Murder, depending on the circumstances, could cost you a piece of land, your house, or even one of your women, who would go to the victim's family in marriage.
This was how the hillspeople had learned to live with each other in a world without a state or police or judicial system. Each tribe had its own set of intricate rules, decided by elders elected by the clan's entire male population. The elders derived their status from experience and the respect traditionally accorded to the aged. No man, however, outranked another in rights, and it was rare for one family to possess significantly more than any other. For men, at least, a deep egalitarian ethos ran through the tribal system.
For a long time, most of the Pashtun belt had functioned this way. Eventually, however, when some tribes moved down from the mountains into agricultural settlements, certain enterprising individuals developed ties with distant state authorities, and soon hierarchies sprang up. In eighteenth-century Kandahar, for example, the Safavid Empire of Persia had established suzerainty, incorporating tribal figures of their liking into their military or using them as intermediaries in dealing with the native population. The egalitarian system of the mountains slowly gave way to one dominated by tribal strongmen, and decisions were increasingly made not through traditional tribal law but on the whims and biases of a small clique of notables. It was not long before Kandahari tribes were the most thoroughly hierarchical in the country.
As a consequence, a different form of justice grew in popularity as an alternative to the tribal system: religious law, or sharia. Like tribal law, religious law expressed itself in a detailed set of punishments and restitutions for particular crimes. Its main practitioners were mullahs, who led Friday sermons and could adjudicate disputes. To become a mullah, you studied for up to twelve years in a madrassa, where you learned the intricacies of Islamic law, along with history, philosophy, and logic. In Pashto, such students were called taliban. Because a mullah was guaranteed employment for life, this was a course of study particularly well suited to those from the humblest backgrounds. It was in greater Kandahar, where tribal structures were the weakest, that the taliban were most fully integrated into social life.
Labels: Afghanistan, democracy, economics, education, Iran, nationalism, Pakistan, religion
Afghanistan Civil War, 1992-1996
All around him, families were crumbling. There seemed to be no rhyme or reason to it—it didn't matter what you thought, whether you supported the mujahedeen or the Communists. The only households surviving unscathed, he knew, were the neighborhood's few Uzbek families, members of the same ethnic group as Gelam Jam.
He wasn't interested in this war, but the war seemed interested in him. There were no more innocents, no more neutrals, only sides already chosen for him. The choice was clear: pick a side, or end up like his brothers. It would have been unthinkable before the war, but now he felt he could trust only his fellow Pashtuns. They had borne the brunt of Gelam Jam in his neighborhood, it seemed. At first, they had hidden their ethnicity, speaking only Farsi in public, but soon they were getting plucked from their vehicles to have their pronunciation checked—and if their speech sounded Pashtun, they were often killed on the spot. This was a war against people who spoke like him, who looked like him, and if that's what the enemy had decided, then he'd play by their rules. So one morning he went to a camp of Hizb-i-Islami, a Pashtun-heavy militia, and sought out an acquaintance. "I want to do jihad," he announced. The man broke into a broad smile. "Welcome," he said.
Thousands of young men, many of them now orphans and widowers, flocked to the various factions feuding for power in the civil war. There were no heroes; each group proved as responsible for the bloodshed as the next. Broadly, the factions were organized along ethnic lines—not so much due to ethnic nationalism but because in the face of perpetual instability, with a weak or absent state, you allied with those you knew and trusted. In fact, it was often unclear what ideological differences, if any, divided the men fighting each other on Kabul's streets. Still, the struggle for power and survival was imbued with meaning: more than simply a battle of wills, for many the war was "jihad."
The West responded to the civil war by simply ignoring it, and after the 2001 invasion the years from 1992 to 1996 were all but stricken from the standard narrative. It was dangerous history, the truths buried within it too uncomfortable and messy. If the mujahedeen had been no better than the Taliban or al-Qaeda, any attempt to bring the principal actors of that period to account could only lead to the highest echelons of Hamid Karzai's government, and, by extension, to American policy over the previous thirty years.
Yet it isn't difficult to uncover this history, for every Kabuli has a story to tell. Deadly roadblocks, disappeared neighbors, and decaying bodies were woven into the fabric of daily life, like going shopping or saying your prayers. Every day brought fresh destruction; any date picked out of the calendar is the anniversary of some grisly toll.
Labels: Afghanistan, Europe, language, military, nationalism, religion, U.S., USSR, war
Afghanistan's Year Zero: 1979
As with Mullah Cable and Jan Muhammad, I was interested in Heela's experience in the new American-backed order. But to start her story with the US invasion would be like "watching a movie from the middle," as she put it. In truth, Afghanistan's real Year Zero was 1979, the year of the Soviet invasion, and nothing—not the Taliban, or the American invasion, or the trajectory of Heela's life—makes much sense without first coming to terms with the Russian occupation and its aftermath.
In the veritable Afghan prehistory of peace and anonymity, the era before the Soviets, there lies a world lost and yet to be recovered. In 1972, the year that Heela was born to a family of journalists and professionals, Kabul was a quaint, relaxed mountain town. An important stop on the "hippie trail"—a well-trodden route for Western stoners and flower children often heading to India—the town had reinvented itself in a few short generations. A wave of progressive reforms had rippled through Afghanistan in the 1950s, resulting in a government decree that veiling was optional for women. In 1964, they were granted the franchise. Photographs from the era show besuited men accompanied by women in short skirts and beehive hairdos; there are movie theaters, broad paved roads, and tree-lined sidewalks.
Out in the heavily tribal Pashtun countryside, however, conservatism still reigned and women lived cloistered in their homes. The state was largely absent, and civil society nonexistent; politics worked through kinship and patronage, leaving clan leaders and landlords to run their own fiefdoms. If you managed to make it out to Kabul and attend university, you came away with a tantalizing taste of what your country could become, and a stark, unremitting sense of the inadequacies of the world you'd left behind. As with so many other developing nations of that era, this disjuncture spawned a crisis of modernity, and the disillusioned urban intelligentsia struggled to articulate a response. Two rival currents emerged: one embracing Communism, which looked to the Soviet Union and third-world liberation movements, and the other, Islamism, which took inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood and related trends in the Arab world.
For many years these were merely undercurrents, but they rushed to the surface in the late 1970s.
Labels: Afghanistan, democracy, education, migration, military, nationalism, religion, U.S., USSR, war
Negative Human Development in Resource States
From The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth, by Tom Burgis (PublicAffairs, 2016), Kindle pp. 211-212:
In 1970, the year the Olympic movement expelled South Africa, the government passed legislation formally stripping blacks of their citizenship and restricting them to destitute "homelands," and the authorities appointed a barbaric new commanding officer at Robben Island prison to watch over Mandela and his fellow inmates, South Africa produced some 62 percent of the gold mined worldwide. From the early 1970s to 1993 gold, diamonds, and other minerals accounted for between half and two-thirds of South Africa's exports annually.
South Africa's gold and diamonds provided the financial means for apartheid to exist. In that sense white rule was an extreme manifestation of the resource state: the harnessing of a national endowment of mineral wealth to ensure the power and prosperity of the few while the rest are cast into penury and impotence. None of Africa's resource states today come close to the level of orchestrated subjugation of the majority that the apartheid regime achieved. Neither do they employ apartheid's racial creed, even if ethnicity has combined poisonously with the struggle to capture resource rent in Nigeria, Angola, Guinea, and elsewhere. But as their rulers, in concert with the multinational corporations of the resource industry, horde the fruits of their nations' oil and minerals, Africa's resource states have come to bear a troubling resemblance to the divisions of apartheid.
While the children of eastern Congo, northern Nigeria, Guinea, and Niger waste away, the beneficiaries of the looting machine grow fat. Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize–winning Indian economist who has examined with great insight why mass starvation occurs, writes, "The sense of distance between the ruler and the ruled—between 'us' and 'them'—is a crucial feature of famines." That same reasoning could be applied to the provision of other basic needs, including clean water and schooling. And rarely is the distance Sen describes as wide as in Africa's resource states.
Many of Africa's resource states experienced very high rates of economic growth during the commodity boom of the past decade. The usual measure of average incomes—GDP per head—has risen. But on closer examination such is the concentration of wealth in the hands of the ruling class that that growth has predominantly benefited those who were already rich and powerful, rendering the increase in GDP per head misleading. A more revealing picture comes from a different calculation. Each year the United Nations ranks all the countries for which it can gather sufficient data (186 in 2012) by their level of human development, things like rates of infant mortality and years of schooling. It also ranks them by GDP per head. If you subtract a country's rank on the human development index from its rank on the GDP per head index, you get an indication of the extent to which economic growth is actually bettering the lot of the average person in that country. In countries that score zero—as Congo, Rwanda, Russia, and Portugal did in 2012—living standards are roughly where you might expect them to be, given that country's GDP per head. People in countries with positive scores enjoy disproportionately pleasant living conditions relative to income—Cuba, Georgia, and Samoa top the table with scores of 44, 37, and 28, respectively. A negative score indicates a failure to turn national income into longer lives, better health, and more years of education for the population at large. Of the ten countries that come out worst, five are African resource states: Angola (–35), Gabon (–40), South Africa (–42), Botswana (–55), and Equatorial Guinea.
Equatorial Guinea's score (–97), comfortably the worst in the world, is all the more remarkable because its GDP per head is close to $30,000 a year, not far below the level of Spain or New Zealand and seventy times that of Congo.
Labels: Africa, Angola, Congo, democracy, economics, energy, Equatorial Guinea, industry, labor, nationalism, Nigeria, South Africa
"Survival of the Fattest" in Rentier States
A governor of one of Nigeria's thirty-six states is effectively president of his own fiefdom. He has immunity from prosecution and controls the state security budget. The chairman of each of the 774 local governments is answerable to the state governor. To win a presidential primary a candidate needs two-thirds of the states to back him. That backing is in the gift of the governors. The Governors' Forum is perhaps the most potent gathering in the land. Only about half of Nigeria's oil revenues are allocated to the federal government. A fifth goes to the local governments. The governors control the quarter of oil revenues that goes to the states.
Oil-producing states receive an additional 13 percent share of Nigeria's oil income before it is divided between the tiers of government. The state houses of the Niger Delta are powerful pistons of the looting machine. When he agreed to meet me in late 2010, Timipre Sylva had succeeded Goodluck Jonathan as governor of Bayelsa, one of the Delta's three main states. I had hoped to interview him at Gloryland, the gubernatorial palace set well apart from the shacks that house his constituents. Instead, I was summoned to the penthouse suite of a five-star hotel in Lagos, where Sylva was staying with his entourage during a visit to the commercial capital.
A tall and intelligent man, Sylva was under pressure. Politics in the Niger Delta is unremittingly volatile. Gunmen drift between the militias of MEND, crime gangs, and squads of political thugs that freelance for competing aspirants to power. As Sylva's rivals sought to force him from office, loyalists were exchanging tit-for-tat attacks with his enemies. Relations with Jonathan, recently elevated to the presidential palace by Yar'Adua's death, had soured. Little wonder, I suggested, that others coveted his job: his immediate predecessor had found himself president and the one before had siphoned off so much cash that he, like Joshua Dariye and James Ibori, the former governors of Plateau and Delta States, had snapped up enough assets abroad to earn the attention of the British police.
Sylva accepted that there had been widespread corruption among the governors. But he was, he pleaded, just a cog in a patronage system not of his making. "If a chief walks into my office, he expects me to take care of his problems because that is what the military used to do," Sylva said. "That's what he's used to. If I don't, I've got a very big political enemy."
So you have to "settle" them, I suggested, using the Nigerian term for the dispensing of cash.
"Yes. And you will read that as corruption. But me, I probably will read that as political survival, because I have to survive before I become incorruptible."
"And you use public funds to do that?" I asked.
"What does he expect me to do? I don't have that kind of money; the kind of money he's expecting. Even if I have it privately, I won't do that with it. And he's coming to me because I'm governor. If, for example, the big chief comes, and he has to go for a medical check, it shouldn't be my problem. But it is. If a very big traditional ruler dies somewhere, and they want to do an elaborate burial ceremony, they come to me. I have to do it."
Me, I probably will read that as political survival. To justify corruption, Sylva reached for the same word—"survival"—that Mahmoud Thiam had chosen when he explained why pariah states are willing to deal with the likes of Sam Pa and the Queensway Group. Said Djinnit, the UN's man in west Africa, called the competition to control political power in the resource states "a struggle for survival at the highest level." Paul Collier talks about the law of "the survival of the fattest" in rentier states.
Labels: Africa, China, democracy, disease, economics, energy, military, Nigeria, U.N.
How Multinationals Dodge Taxes
Two-thirds of trade happens within multinational corporations. To a large extent those companies decide where to pay taxes on which portions of their earnings. That leaves ample scope to avoid paying taxes anywhere or to pay taxes at a rate far below what purely domestic companies pay.
Imagine a multinational company making rubber chickens, called Fowl Play Incorporated. Fowl Play's headquarters and most of its customers are in the United States. A subsidiary, Fowl Play Cameroon, runs a rubber plantation in Cameroon. The rubber is shipped to a factory in China, owned by another subsidiary, Fowl Play China, where it is made into rubber chickens and packaged. The rubber chickens are shipped to Fowl Play's parent company in the United States, which sells them to mainly US customers.
Fowl Play could simply pay taxes in each location based on an honest assessment of the proportion of its income that accrues there. But it has a duty to its shareholders to maximize returns, and its executives want the bonuses that come from turning big profits, so its accountants are instructed to minimize the effective tax rate Fowl Play pays by booking more revenues in places with low tax rates and fewer revenues in places with high tax rates. If, for example, Fowl Play wanted to reduce its tax liability in Cameroon and the United States by shifting profits to China, where it has been granted a tax holiday to build its factory, it would undervalue the price at which the rubber is sold from the Cameroonian subsidiary to the Chinese one, then overvalue the price at which the Chinese subsidiary sells the finished rubber chickens to the parent company in the United States. All this happens within one company and bears scant relation to the actual costs involved. The result is that the group's overall effective tax rate is much lower than it would have been had it apportioned profits fairly. Many such tax maneuvers are perfectly legal. When it is done ethically "transfer pricing," as the technique in this example is known, uses the same prices when selling goods and services within one company as when selling between companies at market rates. But the ruses to fiddle transfer pricing are legion. A mining company might tweak the value of machinery it ships in from abroad, or an oil company might charge a subsidiary a fortune to use the parent's corporate logo.
Suppose Fowl Play gets even cannier. It creates another subsidiary, this time in the British Virgin Islands, one of the tax havens where the rate of corporation tax is zero. Fowl Play BVI extends a loan to the Cameroonian subsidiary at an astronomical interest rate. The Cameroonian subsidiary's profits are canceled out by the interest payments on the loan, which accrue, untaxed, to Fowl Play BVI. And all the while Fowl Play and the rubber chicken industry's lobbyists can loudly warn Cameroon, China, and the United States that, should they try to raise taxes or clamp down on fiddling, the company could move its business, and the attendant jobs, elsewhere. (The BVI company is only a piece of paper and doesn't employ anyone, but then there is no need to threaten the British Virgin Islands—its tax rate could not be lower.)
Labels: Africa, Cameroon, Caribbean, China, economics, Europe, industry, U.S.
New African Infrastructure for Whom?
It is too simplistic to see China's quest for African resources as a Manichean struggle for nature's treasure between East and West. There is competition, but there is also cooperation in the business of resource extraction. And for all its increased attractiveness to rival investors from overseas, much of Africa remains locked at the foot of the global economy.
Ibrahim Iddi Ango, the industrialist who headed Niger's chamber of commerce, told me that Niger's rulers had sold the country short in their negotiations with the Chinese. "They need strategic resources. You must say, 'You are interested in that? These are the conditions. First, you must use local labor. Second, all the needs you have—for example, the transit—you must use at a minimum 50 percent local operators.' But when they came the government said none of this. The state took a percentage of the businesses and let the Chinese do what they want." A brief window of opportunity to use China's desire for African minerals to insist on securing for Niger the skills and infrastructure that might help to salve the resource curse by broadening the economy was closing. "To diversify, it's central," Iddi Ango said—and with good reason. Niger is among the African states most acutely dependent on a handful of raw commodity exports, their economic fortunes yoked to the whims of far-off consumers. On the African Development Bank's index, where a higher score indicates a more diversified economy, relatively wealthy countries not shackled to the resource trade such as Mauritius and Morocco score 22 and 41, respectively. The average for the whole of Africa, including more prosperous North Africa, is 4.8. The most oil-dependent states, Angola and Chad, record the lowest scores, 1.1. Niger does only marginally better, with a score of 2.4.
"But if you let China do what it wants—as many African countries have—they pay for the oil or the resources and use Chinese labor, Chinese trucks. It's a big problem," Iddi Ango said. "They are coming because the resources are here. This moment will not be repeated. We can't miss it. When the uranium or the oil is finished, they will leave."
The fall of Tandja demonstrated the limits of China's readiness to get involved in domestic politics to protect African allies. But Xia Huang, the Chinese ambassador in Niamey, encapsulated how China's readiness to spend and build allowed Beijing to gain a foothold sufficiently strong that its interests could withstand a coup against an ally. "Today there is a bridge between the two sides of the River Niger," he told me. "But there is also a bridge that links China and Niger."
Yet the true value of China's offer to guide Africa on a path to economic diversification and industrialization—the road that led the rich world to prosperity—rests on whether its construction spree is geared primarily toward cultivating the rulers who govern access to resources or toward broadening the opportunities of the population at large. Neither railways that simply connect Chinese-owned mines to Chinese-built ports for the export of commodities nor vanity projects of great cost but little economic usefulness will lift resource states' inhabitants from their poverty. Martyn Davies, the chief executive of a South African consultancy called Frontier Advisory who has worked as an adviser on Chinese deals in Africa, told me, "When you have a commodity-driven economy, where a lot of people are excluded, it's a silo economy. It's very difficult to build infrastructure that supports inclusive growth. Is Chinese-financed infrastructure going to provide diversification? Which comes first?" He added, "African governments should never assume that responsibility for the development of our continent has been outsourced to Beijing."
Beijing appears to be undercutting its side of the deal. Chinese goods like the counterfeit textiles flooding into northern Nigeria drown out hopes for industrialization, regardless of how many roads and railways Chinese companies lay. Lamido Sanusi, governor of Nigeria's central bank from 2009 to 2014, put it well: "So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India to secure raw materials and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new form of imperialism."
Labels: Africa, China, economics, industry, labor, Niger
Nigeria's Smuggled Economy
From The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth, by Tom Burgis (PublicAffairs, 2016), Kindle pp. 61-62, 65:
Weapons and unwilling human traffic cross Nigeria's northern border covertly. But the flow of counterfeit Chinese-made textiles has grown so voluminous that it would be impossible to keep it secret even if secrecy were required to ensure its safe passage. All the same, most of the shipments go through under cover of darkness. Those who control the trade engage in highly organized "settling," or bribing, of the border officials, smoothing the textiles' transit.
The Nigerian stretch is just the final leg of a 6,200-mile journey. It begins in Chinese factories, churning out imitations of the textiles that Nigerians previously produced for themselves, with their signature prime colors and waxiness to the touch. By the boatload they arrive in west Africa's ports, chiefly Cotonou, Benin's biggest city, a tiny country beside Nigeria that has, like Montenegro in Europe or Paraguay in South America, become a state whose major economic activity is the trans-shipment of contraband. At the ports the counterfeit consignments are loaded onto trucks and either driven straight over the land border between Benin and western Nigeria or up through Niger and round to the border post with its taciturn chief. The trade is estimated to be worth about $2 billion a year, equivalent to about a fifth of all annual recorded imports of textiles, clothing, fabric, and yarn into the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.
Smuggling is a long-established profession here. Before colonial cartographers imposed the frontier, today's smuggling routes were the byways of legitimate commerce. The border marks a delineation of what used to be British and French territory in west Africa, but no natural division of language or ethnicity exists. People on both sides speak Hausa, a tongue in which the word for smuggling, sumoga, strikes a less pejorative note than its English equivalent. The textile smuggling bosses are the oligarchs of the northern borderlands. For those in their pay, they can be generous benefactors.
The cheaper price of smuggled garments relative to locally produced ones was good news, superficially at least, for the traders' hard-pressed customers but less so for the employees of Nigeria's textile industry. "It is a pitiable situation," said Hillary, apparently oblivious to his and his colleagues' role in their compatriots' downfall. "All the [textile factories] we have here have shut down. The workers are now on the streets."
In the mid-1980s Nigeria had 175 textile mills. Over the quarter-century that followed, all but 25 shut down. Many of those that have struggled on do so only at a fraction of their capacity. Of the 350,000 people the industry employed in its heyday, making it comfortably Nigeria's most important manufacturing sector, all but 25,000 have lost their jobs. Imports comprise 85 percent of the market, despite the fact that importing textiles is illegal. The World Bank has estimated that textiles smuggled into Nigeria through Benin are worth $2.2 billion a year, compared with local Nigerian production that has shriveled to $40 million annually. A team of experts working for the United Nations concluded in 2009, "The Nigerian textile industry is on the verge of a total collapse." Given the power crisis, the near-impassable state of Nigeria's roads, and the deluge of counterfeit clothes, it is a wonder that the industry kept going as long as it did.
Labels: China, economics, industry, migration, military, Nigeria
Congo's Tantalum Wealth
From The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth, by Tom Burgis (PublicAffairs, 2016), Kindle p. 30:
The Congolese are consistently rated as the planet's poorest people, significantly worse off than other destitute Africans. In the decade from 2000, the Congolese were the only nationality whose gross domestic product per capita, a rough measure of average incomes, was less than a dollar a day.
Tantalum's extremely high melting point and conductivity mean that electronic components made from it can be much smaller than those made from other metals. It is because tantalum capacitors can be small that the designers of electronic gadgets have been able to make them ever more compact and, over the past couple of decades, ubiquitous.
Congo is not the only repository of tantalum-bearing ores. Campaigners and reporters perennially declare that eastern Congo holds 80 percent of known stocks, but the figure is without foundation. Based on what sketchy data there are, Michael Nest, the author of a study of coltan, calculates that Congo and surrounding countries have about 10 percent of known reserves of tantalum-bearing ores. The real figures might be much higher, given that reserves elsewhere have been much more comprehensively assessed. Nonetheless, Congo still ranks as the second-most important producer of tantalum ores, after Australia, accounting for what Nest estimates to be 20 percent of annual supplies. Depending on the vagaries of supply chains, if you have a PlayStation or a pacemaker, an iPod, a laptop, or a mobile phone, there is roughly a one-in-five chance that a tiny piece of eastern Congo is pulsing within it.
The insatiable demand for consumer electronics has exacted a terrible price. The coltan trade has helped fund local militias and foreign armies that have terrorized eastern Congo for two decades, turning what should be a paradise into a crucible of war.
Labels: Australia, Congo, economics, industry, labor, military, war
Africa's Resource Curse
From The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth, by Tom Burgis (PublicAffairs, 2016), Kindle pp. 4-6:
The sheer number of people living in what are some of the planet's richest states, as measured by natural resources, is staggering. According to the World Bank, the proportion of the population in extreme poverty, calculated as those living on $1.25 a day and adjusted for what that wretched sum will buy in each country, is 68 percent in Nigeria and 43 percent in Angola, respectively Africa's first and second biggest oil and gas producers. In Zambia and Congo, whose shared border bisects Africa's copper-belt, the extreme poverty rate is 75 percent and 88 percent, respectively. By way of comparison, 33 percent of Indians live in extreme poverty, 12 percent of Chinese, 0.7 percent of Mexicans, and 0.1 percent of Poles.
The phenomenon that economists call the "resource curse" does not, of course, offer a universal explanation for the existence of war or hunger, in Africa or anywhere else: corruption and ethnic violence have also befallen African countries where the resource industries are a relatively insignificant part of the economy, such as Kenya. Nor is every resource-rich country doomed: just look at Norway. But more often than not, some unpleasant things happen in countries where the extractive industries, as the oil and mining businesses are known, dominate the economy. The rest of the economy becomes distorted, as dollars pour in to buy resources. The revenue that governments receive from their nations' resources is unearned: states simply license foreign companies to pump crude or dig up ores. This kind of income is called "economic rent" and does not make for good management. It creates a pot of money at the disposal of those who control the state. At extreme levels the contract between rulers and the ruled breaks down because the ruling class does not need to tax the people to fund the government—so it has no need of their consent.
Unbeholden to the people, a resource-fueled regime tends to spend the national income on things that benefit its own interests: education spending falls as military budgets swell. The resource industry is hardwired for corruption. Kleptocracy, or government by theft, thrives. Once in power, there is little incentive to depart. An economy based on a central pot of resource revenue is a recipe for "big man" politics. The world's four longest-serving rulers—Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Paul Biya of Cameroon—each preside over an African state rich in oil or minerals. Between them they have ruled for 136 years.
From Russia's oil-fired oligarchs to the conquistadores who plundered Latin America's silver and gold centuries ago, resource rents concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the few. They engender what Said Djinnit, an Algerian politician who, as the UN's top official in west Africa, has served as a mediator in a succession of coups, calls "a struggle for survival at the highest level." Survival means capturing that pot of rent. Often it means others must die.
The resource curse is not unique to Africa, but it is at its most virulent on the continent that is at once the world's poorest and, arguably, its richest.
Africa accounts for 13 percent of the world's population and just 2 percent of its cumulative gross domestic product, but it is the repository of 15 percent of the planet's crude oil reserves, 40 percent of its gold, and 80 percent of its platinum—and that is probably an underestimate, given that the continent has been less thoroughly prospected than others. The richest diamond mines are in Africa, as are significant deposits of uranium, copper, iron ore, bauxite (the ore used to make aluminum), and practically every other fruit of volcanic geology. By one calculation Africa holds about a third of the world's hydrocarbon and mineral resources.
Outsiders often think of Africa as a great drain of philanthropy, a continent that guzzles aid to no avail and contributes little to the global economy in return. But look more closely at the resource industry, and the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world looks rather different. In 2010 fuel and mineral exports from Africa were worth $333 billion, more than seven times the value of the aid that went in the opposite direction (and that is before you factor in the vast sums spirited out of the continent through corruption and tax fiddles). Yet the disparity between life in the places where those resources are found and the places where they are consumed gives an indication of where the benefits of the oil and mining trade accrue—and why most Africans still barely scrape by. For every woman who dies in childbirth in France, a hundred die in the desert nation of Niger, a prime source of the uranium that fuels France's nuclear-powered economy. The average Finn or South Korean can expect to live to eighty, nurtured by economies among whose most valuable companies are, respectively, Nokia and Samsung, the world's top two mobile phone manufacturers. By contrast, if you happen to be born in the Democratic Republic of Congo, home to some of the planet's richest deposits of the minerals that are crucial to the manufacture of mobile phone batteries, you'll be lucky to make it past fifty.
Labels: Africa, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, democracy, economics, education, energy, Equatorial Guinea, industry, labor, migration, Zimbabwe
Political Economy of the Roadblock
From The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth, by Tom Burgis (PublicAffairs, 2016), Kindle pp. 44-45:
Our two-jeep convoy slowed as it approached a roadblock deep in the tropical forests of one of eastern Congo's national parks. Manning the roadblock were soldiers from the Congolese army, theoretically the institution that should safeguard the state's monopoly on the use of force but, in practice, chiefly just another predator on civilians. As my Congolese companions negotiated nervously with the soldiers, I stepped away to take advantage of a break in a very long drive and relieve myself, only to sense someone rushing toward me. Hurriedly zipping up my fly, I turned to see a fast-approaching soldier brandishing his AK47. With a voice that signified a grave transgression, he declared, "It is forbidden to piss in the park." Human urine, the soldier asserted, posed a threat to eastern Congo's gorillas. I thought it best not to retort that the poor creatures had been poached close to extinction by, among others, the army nor that the park attracted far more militiamen than gorilla-watching tourists.
My crime, it transpired, carried a financial penalty. My companions took the soldier aside, and the matter was settled. Perhaps they talked him down, using the presence of a foreign journalist as leverage. Perhaps they slipped him a few dollars. As we drove away it occurred to me that we had witnessed the Congolese state in microcosm. The soldier was following the example set by Kabila, Katumba, Mwangachuchu, and Nkunda: capture a piece of territory, be it a remote intersection of potholed road, a vast copper concession, or the presidency itself; protect your claim with a gun, a threat, a semblance of law, or a shibboleth; and extract rent from it. The political economy of the roadblock has taken hold. The more the state crumbles, the greater the need for each individual to make ends meet however they can; the greater the looting, the more the authority of the state withers.
While we were visiting my historian brother during his sabbatical in Cameroon, we hired a driver to take us into the Southern Region. As we approached Lolodorf (a name dating back to German Kamerun), I stepped out of the car to take a photo of the sign. As I got back in the car, a policeman, who had been sitting in his car in the shade across the road, came over to tell us it was forbidden to take photos of road signs. After we politely asked why, he began to find fault with the windshield documentation required for the hired car. He went back and forth to his car several times, supposedly checking with his superiors, while we quietly waited to see how much of a bribe it would take to get free of him. He asked for all our IDs, and we gave him anything except our passports. After perhaps 20 minutes of quiet back and forth, we were able to pay him a "fine" equivalent to about US$10, enough for him to buy more beer for his afternoon in the shade.
Labels: Cameroon, Congo, democracy, economy, labor, migration, military
Collapse of Lebanon's Second Republic
From Beirut 2020: Diary of the Collapse, by Charif Majdalani (Other Press, 2021), Kindle pp. xii-xiv (preface to the English-language edition, which provides very helpful context for the diary entries, which I will refrain from excerpting):
But the main issue was that the war chiefs–turned–political leaders seized control of the government and public sector, in concert with the generals of the Syrian occupying forces, and together they developed a system of governance that was entirely based on clientelistic mafia practices. They took advantage of the huge public works program for the reconstruction of the country, and of the bountiful financial manna this generated, to shamelessly enrich themselves and to entrench corruption as a system of government and a way of life, with the culpable consent of a powerful caste of arrogant bankers. Nevertheless, this was the beginning of thirty years of renewed opulence, euphoria, creativity, and vitality, when the population shamefully closed their eyes to the actions of this noxious political class.
In 2005, the Sunni prime minister Rafic Hariri, the only politician who was not a former war chief and who showed himself to be extremely hostile to the Syrian control of the country, was assassinated by the Syrians with the help of Hezbollah. This sparked a huge insurrection, which forced the Syrians to withdraw. Those previously banished (Michel Aoun) or who were political prisoners (Samir Geagea) returned. But former allies of Syria, such as Berri, Jumblatt, and the Hezbollah chiefs, managed to stay in power. New alliances sprang up between them and those who had returned, which led to the persistence of the same clientelism and corruption in political practices as under the occupation. This finally brought about the collapse of the country in 2020—a disaster which the present diary documents from day to day.
Despite this tormented history, Lebanon really had been, and perhaps could still be, a laboratory for some important political and social experiments. The first of these experiments is the management of multiculturalism and religious coexistence, which have endured despite violent convulsions, and lead every day to new forms of acculturation and cultural diversity. This small country has also been the laboratory where the processes of transforming family, clan, and community affiliation into a sense of citizenship are repeated on a daily basis. In other words, it is like a small-scale reenactment under a bell jar of the very genesis of any democracy.
Unfortunately these experiments have been slow to be reflected in political practice. They have suffered from being subverted or misappropriated by the ruling class, whose poor governance, corruption, and clientelization of the citizenry on the basis of community affiliation might also serve as a test case. The crisis in Lebanon in 2020 showed the dangers resulting from hyperliberal economic policies and the absence of any regulatory authority or control over the country's social or economic life, which have turned political leaders into mafia bosses in their dealings with the nation's citizens. The Lebanese people were forced to endure this hyperliberalism and the transformation of the public sector into a mafialike structure. They were obliged, day in and day out, to invent original forms of social and civic regulation and transaction, in the absence of any higher authority doing so. For several decades, they thought that this might also serve as a model, before they understood that a world where the banks and the super-wealthy seek to manage the life of ordinary citizens by depriving them of any official recourse to government was a complete disaster on all levels—be it social, economic, urban, or ecological. In this way as well, Lebanon's recent history and collapse might serve as a forewarning and alarm bell for the entire planet.
Labels: democracy, economics, Lebanon, migration, military, nationalism, religion, Syria
Lebanon's Civil War and Its Aftermath
From Beirut 2020: Diary of the Collapse, by Charif Majdalani (Other Press, 2021), Kindle pp. x-xii (preface to the English-language edition, which provides very helpful context for the diary entries, which I will refrain from excerpting):
All this explains why the tensions between the large religious groups remained very strong, in particular because the constitution created in 1945 implicitly gave more power to the roles reserved for Christians than to those accorded to Muslims. The Muslims demanded reforms, but the Christians, fearing for their status and survival and continuing to believe that Lebanon was created for them, refused. Moreover, the Christians held great fears at the prospect of the rise in power and militarization of the Palestinian organizations that had sprung from the refugee communities in Lebanon in 1948, and that started demanding to play a role in internal Lebanese politics in 1969 and 1970. The strategy of these organizations consisted in giving their support to Lebanese Muslims. Faced with this coalition of Islamic-Palestinian interests, the Lebanese Christians took fright and armed themselves in turn, leading inevitably to the Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990.
This was indeed a civil war, in that most of the fighting was between the Lebanese people themselves, but it was also very much a foreign war, because the Palestinians, Syrians, and Israelis were also involved. In 1982 the Palestinian militias were forced out of Lebanon by the Israeli invasion. But the Israelis had to evacuate the invaded Lebanese territories and confine themselves to the southern border regions adjacent to Israel. This opened Lebanon's doors to the Syrians, who allied themselves with the Lebanese Muslims and Druzes, and with war chiefs such as the Druze Walid Jumblatt or the Shiite Nabih Berri, as well as with the Shiite Hezbollah organization, which was engaged in a war with Israel in the regions it still occupied. For their part, the Christians resisted the Syrians for years, under the command of men such as Bashir Gemayel and Samir Geagea. In 1989, the reckless and unruly Christian general Michel Aoun took it into his head to unite the Christian ranks, and threw himself into devastating wars against his rivals on the same side, notably Samir Geagea, which led to the collapse of the Christian camp in 1990 and to the entire country falling to Syrian control.
This marked the end of the civil war and the start of what is called the second Lebanese republic, which is divided into two eras. In the first, from 1990 to 2005, Syria dominated the country and its ruling class. The Muslim or Druze war chiefs, Jumblatt, Berri, along with the Hezbollah leaders, but also the less powerful Christian leaders who had pledged allegiance to the Syrians, all took over the controls. The other Christian leaders, such as Geagea and Aoun, found themselves respectively either in prison or in exile. The allocation of posts along religious lines was reinstated during this period, but with a notable difference: the dominant positions were given to Muslims and no longer to Christians.
Labels: democracy, Israel, Lebanon, migration, military, nationalism, religion, Syria, war
Foundations of Lebanon's Exceptionalism
From Beirut 2020: Diary of the Collapse, by Charif Majdalani (Other Press, 2021), Kindle pp. viii-x (preface to the English-language edition, which provides very helpful context for the diary entries, which I will refrain from excerpting):
This peculiar identity could undoubtedly be considered as the source of all the conflicts to come, but it also proved to be Lebanon's defining characteristic for many years: a nation straddling the great cultures of the East and the West, a crossroads, a herald of coexistence, openness, cultural exchange and integration. For the thirty years from 1945 to 1975, despite a few minor jolts, Lebanon also figured as something of an exception among its neighbors. It was the only country in the region not to fall prey to a nationalist military dictatorship, like Egypt under Nasser and Iraq or Syria under the Baath parties. It was the only democracy of the Arab world, and one of very few in what was then called the third world. It also developed a liberal economy which has endured to this day, within a region entirely dominated by so-called socialist models—models which, in Nasser's Egypt and in Syria and Iraq, led to disastrous nationalizations, to the disappearance of their middle classes and the impoverishment of their populations. Lebanon thus lived for thirty years in unbelievable opulence and enjoyed exceptional cultural and economic vitality.
It now seems clear that it was precisely because of the diversity of its population and the complexity of its human institutions that Lebanon avoided dictatorship and the so-called socialist models that beset the rest of the Arab world between 1950 and 1975. Religious affiliation, which in Lebanon is more cultural than strictly faith-based, underpinned all political relationships and balances. This was made manifest in the strangest political system imaginable, called "confessionalism." All government posts were allocated approximately equally between religious communities. Every single employment position in the public sector, from the highest level in a ministry to its lowest echelons, was reserved for one or another community, depending on its presumed importance. The president of the republic had to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and so on. This political system prevented any single community or individual from controlling the government, and averted any possibility of hegemony or coups.
All this nevertheless created something like an oligarchic system, where the political leaders were systematically elected from the most important family clans within the large religious groups. They ruled the country collegially, on the basis of elections where the focus was always on the interests of the various religious communities, rather than on political issues. And yet the social classes that divided society were strongly intercultural. A real middle class had arisen from both Muslim and Christian communities, in the face of wealthy upper classes that also recruited from various groups, just as the working classes had members from both sides of the religious divide. However, social identity and affiliation never produced true class consciousness, but were always dominated by a very strong sense of religious, cultural, and community affiliation.
Labels: democracy, economics, Lebanon, Middle East, military, nationalism, religion
Lebanon Before Independence
From Beirut 2020: Diary of the Collapse, by Charif Majdalani (Other Press, 2021), Kindle pp. vi-viii (preface to the English-language edition, which provides very helpful context for the diary entries, which I will refrain from excerpting):
For centuries, the religious mosaic and cultural diversity thus introduced into the lands that would become Lebanon were more or less well managed by the central powers of the empires on which Lebanon and its neighbors depended. Of course, there were clashes and conflicts, but everything remained under the slightly manipulative control of the dominant powers, and notably, from the sixteenth to the beginning of the twentieth centuries, of the Ottoman Empire.
When that empire collapsed in 1918, victorious France and Great Britain divided up the Middle East. It was France that secured the mandate over Lebanon, thus fulfilling the wishes of part of its Christian population, which sought to place itself under French protection and to avoid British rule. It should be noted that the Christians had long felt closely connected to France. Many had adopted the French language and culture well before the period of the Mandate, and had dreamed of the French taking control of the country to rid them of the Ottoman occupation. This privileged relationship between the Christians of Lebanon and the French also explains why the Lebanese never felt any hostility toward France. In the Lebanese worldview, France was never seen as an occupying power, but rather as an ally. Only the highly ideological left-wing discourse of the 1970s attempted to represent France as a colonial power, which it never really was in Lebanon, despite some instances of very transient irregularities. In fact it was with the assistance of the Christians, and on their advice, that the French determined the current borders of Lebanon in 1920: they adjoined a long band of coastline and the interior plain of Beqaa to the original Lebanon Mountains, along with the northernmost part of Galilee in the south. The overriding aim was to unite as many regions as possible where the inhabitants were Christian. The Maronites, the Eastern-rite Catholics and Greek Orthodox communities actively worked toward the creation of the new nation in its present form, and considered it to have been founded for them alone, even though part of its population was Muslim or Druze. During a relatively soft Mandate that barely lasted twenty-five years, the French successfully managed the antagonisms between the various communities. But when Lebanon acquired independence in 1945, the foundations for discord were already laid, notably regarding the definition of the country's identity. The Christians still felt closely connected to the West, the Muslims for their part felt they belonged more to the Arab world. Nevertheless, the two communities both demanded and obtained independence together, then found a way of avoiding conflict by decreeing that the new Lebanon was not a Western country, but nor did it belong to the Arab world. This was the famous affirmation of national identity by a double negative.
Labels: Britain, France, language, Lebanon, Middle East, nationalism, religion, Turkey


Fannie Sellins (1872–1919) lived during the Gilded Age of American Industrialization, when the Carnegies and Morgans wore jewels while their laborers wore rags. Fannie dreamed that America could achieve its ideals of equality and justice for all, and she sacrificed her life to help that dream come true. Fannie became a union activist, helping to create St. Louis, Missouri, Local 67 of the United Garment Workers of America. She traveled the nation and eventually gave her life, calling for fair wages and decent working and living conditions for workers in both the garment and mining industries. Her accomplishments live on today. This book includes an index, glossary, a timeline of unions in the United States, and endnotes.
After serving as president of her local union, Fannie traveled to different cities giving talks about working conditions. In the early 1900s, these were often treacherous-- buildings in poor condition, workers riddled with disease, and dangerous jobs performed by very young children. The union not only worked to get these conditions improved, but took up collections to help families affected by them. Strikes were common and often brutal. At one of these, in Black Valley, Pennsylvania, shots were fired into a crowd, and Fannie was killed. The police inquiry absolved the officer, and even commended the force for keeping the peace!
The formatting of this book is excellent-- while I'm not usually a fan of larger books (this is about 10" x 10"), this size allows plenty of photographs and a lot of space around the text. While it may seem silly, this is a HUGE selling point. Readers are often reluctant to pick up books filled with dense blocks of text and few pictures. The buttons and cogs at the bottom of the sepia toned pages also make this a more reader-friendly book, and that will go a long way to entice children to read about this important historical figure.
I loved this author's Pure Grit, but felt that it was too long and involved for most of my readers. Fannie Never Flinched struck an excellent balance between easy-to-read format and amount of information. It's a great starting point for National History Day projects (especially in 2016-17, with the theme being Taking a Stand!), and will intrigue and encourage readers to investigate the other sources listed in the bibliography.


New to this site. Looking for invite to high quality music site. Am 62 years old and have been an audiophile since I was 16 years old when I bot a used 8 track player and hooked it up in my bedroom and used a car battery to power it. Next, I bot the awesome JBL Jubals speakers. Since then, I have owned Mark Levinson, Krell, Theta, B&W (now my favorite speakers) and many others.
I hope you will consider me for the invite to LossslessClub.
Last edited by redwood355; 10-26-2018 at 04:28 AM.


text:
Francisco Eduardo Pérez Valarezo, más conocido como El Che Pérez, fue el hincha número uno del equipo del Club Sport Emelec, nació en Machala el 13 de octubre de 1935.

Biografía
El Che Pérez fue el primer hincha de un equipo de futbol ecuatoriano en crear una barra organizada, al fundar la Barra Azul en un 9 de octubre de 1969. Posteriormente el nombre cambiaría a la "Barra del Che Pérez".

A diferencia de otras barra futbolísticas, La barra del Che Pérez acudía a presenciar los eventos de otras disciplinas deportivas del Club, como: beisbol, natación o básquet.

Falleció debido a un paro cardiaco a la edad de 66 años, fue velado en el estadio Capwell y sepultado en una sección espacial del cementerio llamado El Astillero.

Referencias

Hinchadas de fútbol
Hombres
Hincha del Club Sport Emelec

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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Perilous times for Ahmadi Pakistanis
The PTI government is more interested in political manoeuvring, appeasing its allied religious supporters to reclaim seats in the upcoming by-elections, rather than protecting the rights of its citizens
Imran Ahsan Mirza
The Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan is passing through a perilous period of attention and scorn. There is a relentless campaign by religious extremists, who are bent on harassing and targeting Ahmadis. This is not a new phenomenon for the Ahmadiyya Community, however, in the recent past this drive has intensified many fold.
I am pleased that this newspaper, Daily Times, has covered many such incidents and commendably spoken on the travesty of justice meted out to Ahmadis. On the other hand, a competing Urdu newspaper recently published a paid advertisement by the Ahmadiyya Community, which later, due to sheer bigotry and pressure by religious extreme elements; published an apology for printing it. The advertisement was a customary September 6, Martyrs Day remembrance commemorating the recipients of Nishan-e-Haider, besides various Ahmadi soldiers of the past. The advertisement was clearly a mark of respect. Moreover it was an attempt to show the integration and contributions of Ahmadis, in the past who sacrificed their lives for the cause and defence of Pakistan. The retraction by the Urdu paper is extremely demoralising adding to the destructive mindset prevalent in society.
There is a line from a couplet of Mir Taqi Mir's Ghazal: "Every corner of the desert becomes green because of my wailing". Contextually; it plainly means my misery causes happiness. The hatred propagated against Ahmadis causing misery, does satisfy many.
During the first few weeks of the PTI government, it took some effort to take stock of the financial and economic situation of the country. While setting various teams to address the core issues, it was pleasing to note that a renowned economist and academic of Pakistani origin; Dr Atif Rehman Mian of Princeton University, was included in the Economic Advisory Council (EAC).
Dr Mian's work focuses on the connections between finance and the macro-economy, a desired policy area for Pakistan. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified Dr Mian as one of the 25 young economists, who it expects will shape the world's thinking about the global economy in the future; a great acclaim.
However, in his native country; Dr Mian's Ahmadi faith became a bizarre and yet understandable issue perpetuated by numerous religious parties, including members of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf(PTI). Initially the Information Minister Mr Fawad Chaudhry admirably defended his selection and with seemingly clear conviction snubbed the religious bigotry. But this was short lived. Dr Mian was asked on the first day of the EAC meeting to relinquish his membership. This was another highly dispiriting and disheartening decision, with deeper consequences which may not be apparent to the government as of now.
It is appalling that our current leadership and the religious clergy misinform the public about Ahmadis. Moreover, existing legal frameworks don't even permit the community to provide a rebuttal to such allegations, which subsequently incites hatred on a daily basis. Scholars of Pakistani history are well versed with the contributions of the Ahmadiyya community, towards the establishment of this nation. Moreover, Ahmadis have excelled in the fields of science, technology, public service, medicine etc.
Ahmadis have been on the receiving end of violence for long enough, and are witness to its deep and profound impact. Such behaviour is not a part of the State of Madinah rather it has parallels with Nazi Germany. This is not just an Ahmadi issue and we must realise that ordinary Pakistanis will also witness that violence is detrimental for them
Amongst them was a renowned Ahmadi with economics expertise; Mirza Muzaffar Ahmad, better known as; M. M. Ahmad. He was pivotal in negotiating the finances for both Mangla and Tarbela Dams. He ran one of the most successful five-year plans in Pakistani history. He was a key player in establishing US-China bilateral relations, by introducing Henry Kissinger to the Chinese leadership. He has made immense contributions to economic policy; the impact of which resonates in the global economy till today.
The removal of Dr Atif Mian, sets a prejudicial and harmful precedence where removing an Ahmadi from a government institution, due to his beliefs was made an example of before the nation. Religious intolerance was given a new platform, by letting prejudice serve as a legitimate reason for the termination of employment. This has many repercussions for both the nation and the beleaguered Ahmadiyya community of Pakistan.
The PTI government inadvertently or perhaps deliberately abandoned safeguarding the rights of Ahmadis; who as citizens of the nation, are guaranteed safeguards against discrimination in accordance to Article 27 of the constitution. This will lead to increased vigilante behaviour by countless intolerant sections of society and numerous extremist elements spreading across the country.
This may result in more murders, destruction of Ahmadi properties, businesses and worship places. Recent history is replete with such incidents; such action will only add fuel to this fire of hatred. I assume that the PTI government is more interested in political manoeuvring, appeasing its allied religious supporters to reclaim seats in the upcoming by-elections, rather than protecting the rights of its citizens. Nevertheless, it is regretful.
The government has also given unchecked space to the anarchist religious elements of society, which propagate regressive, ignorant and downright violent philosophies in the name of Islam. The retraction of Dr Mian's name will lead to more assertive conduct and control by religious parties and the extremist religious elements within PTI. This will lead to continued divisions and discord in Pakistan which is, as we know, a country of 220 million people with nearly 30 distinct languages and dozens of religious denominations and faiths.
Religious denominations in majority will continue to encroach upon the rights of smaller denominations. This competition is bound to result in violence, especially when the government seems to have relinquished its responsibility of enforcing fairness among its citizens.
Ahmadis have been on the receiving end of violence for long enough, and are witness to its deep and profound impact. I can only suggest with sincere intentions that we must move away from such dangerous inclinations of religious hate and intolerance. Such behaviour is not a part of the State of Madinah rather it has parallels with the Nazi Germany. This is not just an Ahmadi issue and we must realise that ordinary Pakistanis will also witness that violence is detrimental for them.
I do not despair for my fellow Ahmadis, as I know well that through our community's spirit we will re-emerge as more resilient. Ahmadis are almost 100 percent literate in Pakistan, where overall literacy is barely 30 percent. Ahmadis have always put extraordinary emphasis on higher education over the past decades. Ahmadi youth, will find their way despite persecution and hatred. Educated youth, who are well guided, are bound to excel in their pursuit of learning, even though they are limited in positively contributing to the nation's progress in the current atmosphere.
The narrative of rooting out corruption was a misguided priority, as we are finding out. It is almost impossible to recover the stolen money; the only thing possible is stopping further corruption by apprehending corrupt politicians. The PTI leadership should return to its more idealistic policy of prioritising fairness, equality and justice. It is our Prime Minister's responsibility to show leadership and re-educate the masses who, have been otherwise taught only hatred.
Ahmadis will always remain loyal and committed to Pakistan's progress. Dr Mian has also shown this sentiment in his statements after leaving the membership of the EAC. It is the government's responsibility to tackle religious extremism head on, and transform this miserable and vile atmosphere to a more conducive one.
Despite the abysmal character shown by many politicians and their followers in the past few days, the solidarity that other Pakistanis showed with Dr Atif Mian was heart-warming. They displayed a strong conscience, humanity and magnanimity of character; which the current leadership unfortunately lacks.
The American Civil rights activist Dr Martin Luther King Jr. once said, "Darkness cannot drive out darkness: only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate: only love can do that". Let us seek this love, for the sake of Pakistan. I hope and pray, for the success of the Economic Council too. I have no doubt it can fulfil its mandate, and ultimately materialise a progressive Pakistan, despite the removal of an eminent economist. Long live Pakistan.
The writer holds the degree in engineering from NED University. He can be reached at @imranahsanmirza

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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To qualify for the contract buyout program, a customer must order and install a qualifying Triple Play promotion or limited Double Play promotion (offers not available in all areas). Offer available to qualifying customers only, who have no outstanding obligations to Charter. Check amount will be determined by the early termination fee on the final bill from the previous provider, not to exceed $500.
As equipment improved, all twelve channels could be utilized, except where a local VHF television station broadcast. Local broadcast channels were not usable for signals deemed to be priority, but technology allowed low-priority signals to be placed on such channels by synchronizing their blanking intervals. Similarly, a local VHF station could not be carried on its broadcast channel as the signals would arrive at the TV set slightly separated in time, causing "ghosting".[citation needed]
Some cable TV providers require you to commit to a long-term contract while others don't. The length and terms of your contract will vary by the provider you choose and your location. Typically, you can expect the contract length to range from 1 to 3 years. For instance, DIRECTV's contracts are two years long, while Xfinity's range from one to two years depending on the plan that you choose. On the other hand, Spectrum will never make you sign a contract.
Some people make the assumption that cable or satellite TV limits you to watching live programming from your television set at home. However, most of the nation's largest TV providers offer SO much more than that. Seriously, the perks are endless. Let's say you're Drew. Drew watches all sorts of different networks: sports, reality TV, sitcoms, HBO, you name it. He also hates dealing with commercials. Every Friday Drew has a movie night with friends and family, so he wants lots of on demand options. He travels often and likes to watch TV on his tablet in the hotel room while he's away. Sometimes he misses his favorite premieres while he's on the road. So what can a TV package do for Drew?
I am now paying a total of $184/month to Spectrum for my 3 in1 package! I am a 67 year old woman. I really need to lower my expenses for all three services. This is the best most detailed article I have found. But I still don't know where to begin. I need is to know what steps to take. Is it possible to talk to you so you can walk me through. Thank you.
The best cable TV company will make it easy to find your favorites for a fair price. We took 2017's 50 most-watched channels and tallied them against providers packages to see which were offering the best plans for the best value. Popular channels like the Food Network hold more value and relevance for most viewers than channels that tally up in your package count, like the Gem Shopping Network or C-SPAN 4. But if you know your TV habits are a little more niche, keep track of the channels you frequent most and then compare the provider packages to see which offers the best price for minimal excess.
YouTube is another option for online viewing that can take the place of your cable or satellite package. The popular web channel shares many movies and TV show episodes for legal viewing. YouTube won't offer an abundant selection of quality movies and TV show episodes. Still, there are some available, and it's free with your Internet access package.
You forgot Playstation Vue. It's way better than Sling (Sling's app is terrible), has full function cloud DVR and OnDemand access, and has access to local Comcast SportsNet channels (DirecTV Now doesn't in Philly). I've been using Vue for 6 months and I did a trial of DirectTV Now and Sling. DirecTV probably has the best app (Amazon Fire), but Vue has the best content if you're a sports fan. Sling is a distant 3rd, worst app and worst performance.
TV providers advertise low prices to entice new customers. These promotional rates will usually increase at the end of your initial contract and jump to the regular monthly price. However, some providers will increase rates in the middle of your contract. Most companies have rate information on their websites, but you should also confirm any rate increases with a sales representative.
Many plans include fees in addition to the monthly price of your TV package that are either one-time or recurring. Some, like installation and equipment fees, are pretty standard, while others like broadcast or HD fees might be more uncommon. Always check with a sales representative or review the fine print so you know exactly what you're paying for.
TV executives have also spent billion of dollars acquiring sports rights, which has driven up the price of TV service—and almost no one has bid more aggressively for sports than Disney CEO Robert Iger. Disney, owner of ESPN, is on the hook for $45 billion in sports rights in the coming years. To cover those fixed costs, ESPN charges TV operators about $8 per month per subscriber, making it the most expensive channel and an easy target for critics.
Consumers nowadays often have multiple cords tying them to a service provider. According to Comcast, nearly 70% of its residential customers in its most recent quarter received at least two Xfinity products because of the bundle discounts. Pricing will continue to be an issue for the industry going forward as new entrants such as Apple mull whether to jump into the market.
Just because you subscribe to cable or satellite doesn't mean you have to use the provided set-top box. In an effort to become part of the cord-cutting landscape, many of the major cable and satellite providers, who double as internet service providers, let users subscribe and then access all programing via apps rather than the cable box or even the tuner in the TV.
Many customers may opt for the "cord-cutting" route and purchase streaming subscriptions directly from networks that have shows they like. Many users lean toward this service because it's cheaper and they can trim the fat by removing all the unnecessary programming they don't watch and pay for the ones they do. While this might seem like a good idea on paper, for just a few extra dollars a month, you don't have to limit yourself to just one network, or one free episode on these streaming services. Access all of your favorite shows and networks in a single place with providers like DIRECTV and Spectrum.
Most cable companies will send a representative to your home to install the TV, phone, and internet equipment. Usually the service provider will set up an installation date shortly after you order the package. The setup should take no longer than an hour. After the setup, the representative will give you a brief overview of how to use the equipment, which is usually straightforward. If you have any technical problems after the representative leaves, call the support line for additional instructions.
We're not talking about those adjustable rabbit ears of the 1950s, but a modern antenna that sits atop your roof or behind a picture in your living room—wherever you get the strongest signal—to deliver live TV (but not streaming videos) without cable. "One of the best cable TV alternatives is the tried-and-true antenna," says Chris Brantner, known as Mr. Cable Cutter from the website Cut Cable Today. "Most people don't realize just how many free TV stations they can get with a quality antenna." According to Brantner, chances are good that you're in range of dozens of great over-the-air (OTA) broadcast channels, including NBC, ABC, CBS, CW, FOX, PBS, ION, and other regional stations. "Many of the most popular TV shows, local sports games, and local news come on OTA TV in crystal-clear high definition," he adds. "And get this: The broadcasts you can pick up with an HD antenna are higher quality than what cable provides, because their broadcasts are compressed!" Did we mention that these channels are totally free? Remember these money-saving tips that don't actually pay off in the long run.
IMPORTANT: If you regularly watch sports on a Regional Sports Network, such as Fox Sports, Altitude, SportsNet, Pac-12, Big 10 or Mid Atlantic Sports Network, and you don't want to give up that programming (largely MLB, NBA, NHL, MLS and College Sports), you should think twice about cutting the cord. Trying to duplicate that content in its entirety from streaming services will end up costing you as much as your current pay-TV service.
Coaxial cables are capable of bi-directional carriage of signals as well as the transmission of large amounts of data. Cable television signals use only a portion of the bandwidth available over coaxial lines. This leaves plenty of space available for other digital services such as cable internet, cable telephony and wireless services, using both unlicensed and licensed spectrum. Broadband internet access is achieved over coaxial cable by using cable modems to convert the network data into a type of digital signal that can be transferred over coaxial cable. One problem with some cable systems is the older amplifiers placed along the cable routes are unidirectional thus in order to allow for uploading of data the customer would need to use an analog telephone modem to provide for the upstream connection. This limited the upstream speed to 31.2k and prevented the always-on convenience broadband internet typically provides. Many large cable systems have upgraded or are upgrading their equipment to allow for bi-directional signals, thus allowing for greater upload speed and always-on convenience, though these upgrades are expensive.
Roku ($29.99 - $99.99): One of the pioneers in the concept of cheaply and simply turning any TV into a streaming portal, Roku offers a wide range of products, from simple sticks to bigger (yet still compact) boxes. Because it's been around so long, Roku has agreements with pretty much every major and minor streaming video service, and it is even integrated into some smart TV models. The company has also been giving its customers more power to control the sound of what they're watching, with features like "night mode" (which mutes explosions and amplifies whispers) and "private listening" (which allows viewers to watch a show or movie on their TVs but listen to it through headphones).
During the 1990s, the pressure to accommodate the growing array of offerings resulted in digital transmission that made more efficient use of the VHF signal capacity; fibre optics was common to carry signals into areas near the home, where coax could carry higher frequencies over the short remaining distance. Although for a time in the 1980s and 1990s, television receivers and VCRs were equipped to receive the mid-band and super-band channels. Due to the fact that the descrambling circuitry was for a time present in these tuners, depriving the cable operator of much of their revenue, such cable-ready tuners are rarely used now - requiring a return to the set-top boxes used from the 1970s onward.
If you stream, you should abandon the notion of channels. Many channels do have apps, but not all, and some require a cable log in. Streaming services are more like hubs, or video stores, where you can find thousands of titles, including some popular shows. But if you're thinking about a cheaper way to maintain your present viewing habits, forget about it. What you're getting is far superior, ad free content for a fraction of the price.
A "cable channel" (sometimes known as a "cable network") is a television network available via cable television. When available through satellite television, including direct broadcast satellite providers such as DirecTV, Dish Network and Sky, as well as via IPTV providers such as Verizon FIOS and AT&T U-verse is referred to as a "satellite channel". Alternative terms include "non-broadcast channel" or "programming service", the latter being mainly used in legal contexts. Examples of cable/satellite channels/cable networks available in many countries are HBO, Cinemax, MTV, Cartoon Network, AXN, E!, Fox Life, Discovery Channel, Canal+, Eurosport, Fox Sports, Disney Channel, Nickelodeon, CNN International, ESPN, GMA Pinoy TV and The Filipino Channel.
The Amazon Fire TV specs are enough to allow for playing over 300 console and PC Games. If you are a gamer and want to stream games, then this is the one to get. The Fire is rooted in the Amazon Prime service and if you don't plan on using Amazon Instant Video then the Fire TV may not be for you. You get 1 month of Amazon Prime free if you want to give the service a try.
Triple Play packages give you access to all of Spectrum's services. You'll not only have the greatest selection of HD channels on the market but also fast enough internet speeds for the whole family and unlimited calling to boot. Enjoy these services from home, or enjoy them on the go with help from Spectrum's Wi-Fi hotspot network and the Spectrum TV app.
For the base price, you get on-demand stuff from almost all of the networks (but not The CW) and even get them live in some markets. There are lots of basic cable stations (minus Viacom-owned stations like SyFy and Comedy Central). Each new tier of service adds more channels, going up to $44.99 to add some sports programming, and $54.99 for 90 channels, ending with $74.99—that Ultra package has those 90 channels plus paid cable services HBO and Showtime (but no Starz) for a little less than adding them separately.
When you start adding Paks ($10–$16 per Pak per month) on top of your base service charge, your monthly price starts to go up pretty quickly. It's nice to start so low, but don't expect to get out at the advertised price. Also, keep in mind, most Paks are limited to the Contour TV package, so if you're looking for more options, you'll be starting at a higher base price.
By the time you factor in functionality, premium channels, etc., most of these cord cutting options fall short in their ability to even keep up with what Comcast can provide a household. People paying over $200 for cable are also paying for their voice lines as well as their high speed internet, which, mind you, is required to even sustain these cord cutting offerings.
The problem with Netflix is that the catalog of (non-original) films and TV shows is constantly in flux as the studio and networks play games, look for better terms, or set up exclusives on other services. We can't guarantee an entire series or movie will be there forever. But original programming makes Netflix a destination, giving it not only market share, but mind share, the likes of which only HBO can rival.
We think it's worth the upgrade to the Hopper though, because along with all the other awesome Hopper features, DISH has integrated Amazon Alexa voice commands into its DVR experience. No longer must you sift through the couch-cushion chasms to find your lost remote. You can simply tell Alexa to turn on This Is Us and cry your eyes out with the rest of us.
One of the first and most important factors that you need to consider before selecting a cable internet provider is speed. We all need access to a faster and reliable high-speed internet service at an affordable price. If you are a heavy internet user or if there are multiple internet users at your home, then it is best to look for a plan with at least 50MBps speed or above.
Perhaps no one deserves more credit for threatening the old TV business model than Netflix Chief Executive Officer Reed Hastings. As the driving force behind the world's largest streaming video service, with about 130 million subscribers, he's taught consumers to expect an abundance of old and new shows and movies, without the irritation of commercial interruptions, for just $8 a month.
While we recognize that Hulu is evolving as a service, at this time we don't feel that it provides much added value to TV antenna users. For cord cutters who for some reason cannot use a TV antenna or don't have access to one, Hulu, at either $8 or $12 per month depending on whether you want a lot of TV commercials in your content or just a few (you can't skip them), Hulu would be a great service to have.
In order to receive any promotional rate, you will be required to authorize and agree that Cable ONE may obtain a consumer report about you in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act from a consumer reporting agency in order to verify your eligibility to receive this and other offers as well as determining deposits and install fees required, if any.
Believe it or not, you can still have all this for less than the price of cable. Even after subscribing to HBO Now, Netflix, Hulu, CBS All Access, and Sling TV, you'll still be more than $200 ahead. Don't care for Girls or Game of Thrones? You can replace the HBO option and subscribe to Showtime through Hulu and save another $72. Or you can drop Sling TV for Showtime and save an extra $108.
It could be true that choosing one of these options won't get you all of shows you could get with cable. However, if you truly want to get rid of cable, knowing what some of the options are can help you choose the BEST one. Then you can make the decision of whether or not it is worth it to spend the additional money to get the extra one or two channels through cable OR sacrifice one or two shows to save a BUNCH of money. It just depends your priorities.
Last year, the company's VP of customer service, Tom Karinshak, detailed some steps Comcast is making to overhaul its customer service, including; expanding digital care teams, a callback feature that allows you to schedule a time for Comcast to call you (rather than wait on hold), and an ETA feature that messages customers on the arrival status of service technicians (for installation and troubleshooting).
If you want—or need—to see a significant number of your local teams' games, I'm going to stop right here. This is one area where streaming services can't yet fully deliver. Local games are generally exclusive to regional sports networks, and you'll still need cable for that. There's also the issue of some online services being a little more unstable than die-hard fans might like. Dish's Sling TV failed for many customers during this weekend's NCAA Final Four action, leading the company to issue an apology.
I couldn't tell you for sure since I don't watch many of those shows, but you may want to double check before moving forward. The more obscure the channel or show – probably the harder it is to find. I do know one friend downloaded a plugin for the playon software that allows you to search and find just about any show you might want, so that might be something to look into.
This evolved into today's many cable-only broadcasts of diverse programming, including cable-only produced television movies and miniseries. Cable specialty channels, starting with channels oriented to show movies and large sporting or performance events, diversified further, and "narrowcasting" became common. By the late 1980s, cable-only signals outnumbered broadcast signals on cable systems, some of which by this time had expanded beyond 35 channels. By the mid-1980s in Canada, cable operators were allowed by the regulators to enter into distribution contracts with cable networks on their own.
This streaming service so happens to be more current and up to date than Netflix. The drawback about this is that the latest movies and TV shows (from both broadcast and cable) often come with an extra price tag. Regardless, its HBO library is to die for. Episodes of shows you wouldn't find anywhere else like The Sopranos, Six Feet Under, The Wire, Oz, and Band of Brothers are available for free with your subscription, and you won't find them anywhere else. It's HBO content covers up for the lack of its attention-grabbing originals. There are no adds, and the subscription fee is 99$ a year, but if you do the math you'll realize that it's less than 9$ a month.
For the technically competent, I'd recommend setting up a Home Theater PC. A $70 AMD A6-5400K should handle all of your HTPC needs. If you'd like to game as well, consider a more expensive A8 or A10. Of course, you need to couple this with a case, PSU, motherboard, RAM, HDD, wireless 802.11n adapter, wireless keyboard/mouse, and OS. Most people who go this route aren't starting from scratch, but if you are, it's a significantly more expensive option than a set top box.


So much beauty in one place!
Thumbs Up - I'm Getting Married!!!
With Elizabeth Britton, Nathan's sister and best friend growing up.
With Kelsie Steele, my long-time friend and kindred spirit of 11 years!
With Rhonda Kwong, my Chinese sister!
With Tara Craig, my other long-time friend, kindred spirit, and former ministry partner!
So excited to be sharing the day with these special girls!
The handsome James Loo joins the party!
He was a great Bible-bearer!
Blessed to be his daughter.
After three months of hard work, we made it, Mom!
My mom and dear friend.
Oh Katrina, your dress is beautiful! Did you make it?
I'm so enjoying seeing all of these pictures from your wedding!
Did you buy it or make it?
Looking forward to part 4!
Katrina, you are one the biggest encouragements for me. Praise the Lord from the bottom of the heart for you.


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