Fashion Week (or month, really!) has come to an end, but there were so many inspiring new trends that I spotted both at runway shows and on the streets. I'm sharing the Top 10 Trends from New York and Paris Fashion Week so you can get a jump start on the latest styles and be ahead of the fashion curve.
Don't be afraid to wear a little color this year. 80's inspired neon, and hot pink in particular, were very popular during fashion week.
I really love how much maroon I am seeing on the runway, it is such a beautiful color for fall. Take a risk and go for something maroon where you would normally choose black.
Don't be afraid to add a little bit of shimmer with your makeup. A lot of runway shows featured sparkling face glitter as part of their beauty looks, and I recommend trying this at any music festival you attend this summer.
This trend is a perfect combination of style and comfort. A blanket coat is so chic and will keep you warm and cozy in cooler months.


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Bhubaneswar: Youth who was burnt to death on Acharya Vihar flyover identified
Bhubaneswar: The identity of the youth who was burnt to death on Acharya Vihar flyover near Maharaja cinema hall in Odisha capital last night has been established.
The deceased was identified as Ambika Prasan Pati of Jagatsinghpur.
According to reports, he was working as a marketing executive and residing at a rented house in Kesura. He had yesterday gone to Chandrasekharpur in the city to attend a wedding function.
Pati was burnt alive with his motorcycle under mysterious circumstances. As per eyewitnesses, they saw the youth lying on the two-wheeler in a burning state at around midnight. Though they tried to rescue him, the victim had already died with around 70 percent burn injuries.
On being informed, Saheed Nagar police rushed to the spot, recovered the charred body for post-mortem and initiated an investigation into the incident.
Cops were examining the footage of nearby CCTV cameras to find out the circumstances under which the incident took place. It is being suspected that it was a pre-planned murder.
Yashwant Sinha files nomination for Presidential poll
Moosewala's ghost rises to defeat AAP in Punjab CM Bhagwant Mann's Lok Sabha bastion

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Rhode Island's CollegeBound 529 savings program is managed by Ascensus College Savings with Invesco Advisors, Inc. as investment manager. The plan is sold through brokers (unit classes A and C) and registered investment advisors (unit class I). Rhode Island residents purchasing through advisors can use lower-cost classes RA and RZ. The program features a menu of age-based and static portfolio options utilizing Invesco funds. Accounts can be linked to the Upromise rewards service. To find a financial advisor in your area, use the Directory of Financial Professionals.
Inception1998, substantially changed in 2016.
Accepts contributions until all account balances in Rhode Island's 529 plan for the same beneficiary reach $395,000.
$20 annually for accounts with less than $25,000, waived for Rhode Island residents, and for accounts in the automatic contribution plan.
0.17% (includes 0.02% state administrative fee), plus distribution/servicing fee of 0.25% (Class A), 1.00% (Class and C), or 0.00% (Class I). None for Class RA.
Ranges from 0.39% to 0.50% in the age-based and target-risk portfolios (portfolio weighted average), and from 0.16% to 0.90% in the individual-fund portfolios.
Children born to or adopted by Rhode Island families are eligible for a $100 "CollegeBoundbaby" grant to be used for Qualified Expenses if the request is received by the Treasurer within one (1) year of their birth or adoption.
Contributions to the Rhode Island 529 plan of up to $500 per year by an individual, and up to $1,000 per year by married taxpayers filing jointly are deductible in computing Rhode Island taxable income, with an unlimited carry forward of excess contributions. Rollovers from another 529 plan are not deductible. Contribution deadline is December 31.
The principal portion of rollovers and nonqualified withdrawals from this plan within two taxable years of the contribution are included in Rhode Island taxable income to the extent of prior Rhode Island tax deductions.
Qualified distributions from Rhode Island and non-Rhode Island 529 plans are exempt.
Rhode Island follows federal tax-free treatment except that, in the two taxable years following the year of deduction, outbound rollovers are subject to the recapture of prior state tax deductions.


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Wide Angle Gallery
Available as Prints and Gift Items
Choose from 840 pictures in our Wide Angle collection for your Wall Art or Photo Gift. All professionally made for Quick Shipping.
Saint-Malo Brittany France
Fine Art Storehouse
The Richtersveld is located in South Africas northern Namaqualand
Cooks Bay, Moorea, Society Islands, French Polynesia, South Pacific, Pacific
WorldInPrint
Plaza de San Francisco and Church and Convent of San Francisco at night, Old City of Quito
Overwater bungalows at Le Meridien Tahiti Hotel, Pape'ete, Tahiti, French Polynesia
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View over Botafogo towards the Sugarloaf Mountain at dawn, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Europe, England, Lancashire, Blackpool, Central Pier Blackpool
Sprinkenhof office building built in 1927-1943 in brick expressionist style
Oceania, New Zealand, Aotearoa, South Island, Wanaka, Lake Wanaka, Tree in water
Overwater bungalows of Sofitel Hotel, Moorea, Society Islands, French Polynesia (PR)
Opunohu Bay, Mo'orea, Society Islands, French Polynesia
Europe, United Kingdom, England, Lancashire, Manchester, John Rylands Library
Saint-Malo is a walled port city in Brittany in northwestern France on the English Channel. It is a sub-prefecture of the Ille-et-Vilaine.Traditionally with an independent streak, Saint-Malo was in the past notorious for piracy. Today it is a major tourist destination, with many ancient, attractive buildings
United States of America, Arizona, Grand Canyon, Toroweap Overlook
Spiral staircase inside Ballinhaus ( MeAAŸberghof) office building built in 1924
Cityscape from Vista Chinesa at sunrise, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
View over Botafogo towards the Sugarloaf Mountain, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Europe, England, London, Westminster Central Hall
United States of America, Arizona
Europe, United Kingom, England, Oxfordshire, Oxford, Radcliffe Camera
USA, New York City, Manhattan, Brooklyn Bridge and Downtown Manhattan
View over the old town of Salzburg, UNESCO World Heritage Site, Salzburg, Salzburger Land
Aerial photo of Grand Canyon from Papillon Helicopter, Grand Canyon National Park
UK, London, St. Pauls Cathedral
London Posters and Prints
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Aerial photo of Grand Canyon from Papillon Helicopter, Grand Canyon National Park, UNESCO World Heritage Site, Arizona, United States of America, North America
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The Tea Party is Like a Bratty Teenager — And the GOP Needs to Send It Packing
By Alex Rausch
Adolescents. We all know the foul-mouthed, uncooperative, often stubborn creatures who self-assuredly boast about their desire not to mirror their parents and their plans to change the world with bold new ideas. Frustrated with the nature of the parent-child relationship, eventually these angsty teens leave the nest voluntarily, or are pushed out by their parents.
It's time for the GOP to pack the Tea Party a bag, give it a loving embrace, maybe some spending money, and drop it off at the bus station to start its own life as a relevant, separate political party. There are three top reasons Republicans need to send the Tea Party on it's own way.
1. The 'my way or the highway' attitude
Like most angry and rebellious youths, the Tea Party seems to believe that it is inherently right in whatever it believes. Much like a teen who's been given the keys to his first car, the Tea Party sees its electoral victories as a "mandate of the people" which it uses as a vehicle to take the country anywhere it damn well pleases, simultaneously ignoring the facts that huge swaths of Americans don't want to go the same direction (a paltry 24% of the population support the Tea Party), think it's being reckless and, are ticked off at its use of the vehicle to do stupid things – like forcing a government shutdown because it's unhappy about not getting its way.
2. Taking unnecessary risks
CNN's Candy Crowley was rather surprised to hear Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) say, "Destroying the entire planet is really the best and only way to stop Obamacare." Instead of allowing this not-so-amusing display of hyperbole to stand alone, he elaborated, saying, "Obamacare is like a parasite that needs a host to feed on. If you want to kill the parasite you kill the host, and in this case that means killing this planet. As long as there's a planet Earth, the nightmare of Obamacare could always come screaming back to life."
Really, senator? At last check, the prescription for a tapeworm wasn't suicide. His childish suggestion demonstrates two things about the Tea Partiers. First, they will take any risk to achieve their ends, even to the detriment to every American. Second, they have a strong commitment and will, things they need to make it as a party apart from the GOP.
3. The need to find its own place in the world (of politics)
55% of non-Tea Party Republicans view the Tea Party as a separate and independent entity according to the Pew Research Center. 52% of those in the Tea Party consider themselves separate and independent, though this figure is actually down by 15% from last year.
The Tea Party is disruptive, and as with all adolescents, that is a part of its nature, but it's tearing the GOP apart as Republicans try to define themselves in the minds of the voting public and as Republican leaders try, and often fail, to make meaningful legislation that is both moderate and appealing to Tea Party members. If the Tea Party believes that its desires as more important than those of the GOP and doesn't even consider itself a part of the party, the gridlock will continue and we will probably see more political brinksmanship in the future.
Plus, Americans could use a viable major third party player in government to make for an institution that is more focused on coalition building than partisan division. The Tea Party already has national recognition and respect (depending on whom you ask) and it has big donors behind it; these factors mean it's far more likely to be viable than most third party groups come election season. The Tea Party deserves the chance to survive on its own without the direct backing of the GOP – this would be the real test of the movement and its political ideals.
Some current GOP members would split from the party, but with its radically conservative wing gone, Republicans would have a much easier time recruiting new members. This would mean more political candidates of higher quality, more decision-making power for Americans, the chance for moderates to have a voice again, and much more interesting elections.
Everybody grows up eventually, and this is just the natural next step for the GOP and the Tea Party.


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Daily Buzz: Integrate Planning Into Your Schedule
Planning and adapting for the future is an ongoing process—that's why you need to incorporate it into your daily schedule. Also: three phrases that sell membership.
By Jeff Hsin Feb 11, 2019
Evaluating and updating your processes can help improve and grow your association—but it's not something that has to wait for every three to five years. "There's nothing wrong with that, it's just limited, a snapshot in time in a world that is changing fast," says Laurence Pagnoni in a post on the Bloomerang blog.
Instead of waiting, Pagnoni says leaders should incorporate planning into their daily schedules. For example, if your team solidifies its annual email or mail schedule in the beginning of each year, have you applied what you learned in 2018 to update and leverage it for this year's calendar? Let data lead, and use findings to continually update your practices to ensure that you're making the most of your—and members'—time.
"Yes, do have times designated for planning, but also integrate planning processes into your daily work when that makes sense," he says. "Planning is not an episode, it's ongoing."
Phrases That Sell Membership
How can you tap into the power of psychology to better "sell" your organization's membership? Try incorporating some of these words and phrases: https://t.co/HkHBSUreNz #assnchat
— MemberClicks (@MemberClicks) February 11, 2019
Whether you think of membership as a product for sale or not, it is—and the words you choose to market it matter. Callie Walker from the MemberClicks blog recommends the following phrases to convert potential members into full-fledged devotees:
"Join [numbers] others…" "What this shows is that other people are taking advantage of your organization's membership," Walker says. "Plus, by listing your organization's size, it gives your organization credibility—and that plays a big role in the sales process as well."
"Save [XYZ]." Whether it's time, money, or resources, we all want to save something. Include concrete numbers, such as specific dollar amounts, to really paint the picture of benefits for potential members.
"… at your fingertips." "The phrase 'at your fingertips' is appealing because it implies ease," Walker says. "Whenever you need something, it's available."
Other Links of Note
What are you learning at work? People who are conscious of their learning will be more successful in today's workforce, says Jeff Cobb on Mission to Learn.
Step up your association's culture authentically with these tips from CMSWire.
Looking for interactive video inspiration? The HubSpot blog outlines seven of the most creative examples.
(Warchi/iStock/Getty Images Plus)
By Jeff Hsin


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A great winter playlist
1. Breathe Me – Sia http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSH7fblcGWM
2.Rush of Blood To The Head- Coldplay http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoyyr1SFPCY
3. All I Need- Radiohead http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iY4APDrl66s
4.Play Dead- Bjork http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNoo_rNZQ84
5. Only If For A Night- Florence and The Machine http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkJK2KVFsi0
6. Love Like A Sunset Part II- Phoenix http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6vKp1PPL5k
7. Army Of Me- Bjork http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyEJxzQM24Q
8.Graveyard- Feist http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVfEK4zZ33A
9. Asleep- Emily Browning http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHs6ZhEel3g
10. Give Up The Ghost- Radiohead http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Akdxrqt9r5Y
11. A Commotion- Feist http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmT9oLN-158
12. Marching Bands of Manhattan- Death Cab For Cutie http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Se4NBz5N_SA
Enjoy! 🙂
Tags:Bjork, commotion, death cab for cutie, http www youtube, marching bands of manhattan, rush of blood to the head
I wished a customer at work to have a happy holiday yesterday, and he just looked at me and said, "I'll have a Merry Christmas thanks!" And I was like, "well, I don't always know who I should say it to, so Merry Christmas sir." But it didn't end there, and that's what inspires me to write this particular entry. He says, "This is a Christian country. I don't care what Obama says about it!" First point of contention is in the offense taken at my wishing of a happy holiday, I wasn't using it to replace Christmas the way others do, and anyone who knows me would know I was referencing Christmas as the holiday in question. But I often use holiday in the loose all encompassing sense as well. I love holidays, especially one's I view as an outsider. Learning is great at any age, and every new or unknown experience just makes life better. Okay, on to my second point, this country has heavy populations of Christians but the nation is not itself held under one religious stance. So even if it were a Christian country, the sheer number of sects would not make it a country of one faith. There is seperation of church and state, and freedom of religion. And the most basic Christian tenets, if followed correctly express that people can be free to follow whatever they choose, with this thing that the bible even mentions, it's called free will. Also, Christmas in this country is a very secular holiday, and many who celebrate, do not do so for religious purposes, nor do some even know the story of the nativity that dictates the religious celebration of it. A lot of secular things surrounding a United Statesian Christmas are actually antithetical to anyone's disillusion that this is a Christian country. Think about it. Fueling the big business monster is not in the Christmas spirit. And lastly, I am having a hard time fathoming where Obama fits into that man's reasoning. It's strange.
Anyways, hope everyone had or is still having great holidays with an overabundance of love and happiness!
I know it's a bit early but here's the new countdown!
I only call it a countdown because it's a numbered list, but it's in no particular order, and mainly exists as my way of sharing good music with the masses.
1.Crazy Love= Gregory Douglass I saw him play at my school a number of years back, and absolutely adore this song. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fS4-BZ95jkE
2.What The Water Gave Me= Florence and The Machine http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6I4KvITlPE
3.Never Let Me Go= Florence and The Machine http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Xg6g7Akgjo
4. Fort Hood= Mike Doughty The opening track off his album, Golden Delicious! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buHmaVwSjHk
5.Isabella= Dia Frampton http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWAGUaWlo_w Just found her album on Spotify. It's pretty interesting!
6.Carroll Street Station= Kaiser Cartel http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ORCienAuIc Saw these guys at The Starving Artist a couple years ago now, and drank beer with them. They're pretty amazing, and I hope to met them again someday.
7. Quiet Little Voices= We Were Promised Jetpacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5ZhBAylbN4
8. Forces of Victory= Gogol Bordello This song always helps keep me inspired. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xM80O4zTogQ
9. Rumor Has It= Adele http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ti3t7MAwaaM
10. The Bad In Each Other= Feist http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h28s3In1HSs
11. All This and Heaven Too= Florence and The Machine http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0FRPg9DS-oA
12. Home= Edward Sharpe and the Magnetic Zeros http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHEOF_rcND8&ob=av2n I almost forgot that this song existed but am glad it does. It makes me smile and always reminds me why I'm glad to have been an Indie kid. "Home is whenever I'm with you." It's such a simple sentiment, yet it's perfect. Who doesn't want something like that?
Well, I hope you enjoy this as much as I enjoy making it. Cheers and may you have a glorious Christmas, Hannukah, Kwanzaa or whatever the hell you celebrate. 🙂 -Craig
Christmas Countdowns!!
1. Little Drummer Boy/ Peace on Earth= Bing Crosby and David Bowie This is one of my all time favorite holiday tunes, featuring two amazing voices! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiXjbI3kRus
2. Rudolph= Gene Autry http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6OC7Y4n3xs
3. Christmas At Sea= Sting http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJoW2iigvk0
4. Soul Cake= Sting http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWDi8nJfGPA
5. Snow Miser/Heat Miser http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3e1SQmt9WtQ
6.Merry Christmas Baby= Bruce Springsteen http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wi9kvO2zL2E
7. Carol Of The Bells= Trans-Siberian Orchestra So so Epic! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vNcGlM8O3I
8. Linus and Lucy= Vince Guaraldi I know it's not really a Christmas tune, but the fact that it is featured in A Charlie Brown Christmas is enough for me. And it dredges up so many good memories of the Peanuts gang. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AwEJZG0vN1w
9.The Chipmunk Song http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hAUWyp0qzs
10. Oh Holy Night!= Josh Groban's version 😀 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIFH0TUWcBA
11. The Most Wonderful Time of The Year= Gonzo and Rizzo http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DB3kEOsgMAU
12. Sleigh Ride= Los Straitjackets http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l63kaxL_UVo
This is merely a sampling of some great holiday tunes and is by no means a list of the only good tunes out there. And to be fair, it isn't necessarily a list of my absolute favorites. But it is a fun playlist nonetheless. Merry Merry!! 😀
The bad guy in the new Zelda game looks like Lady Gaga!
some of my favorite things about Christmastime!
1. Pretty Lights
2.Cocoa and stuff
3.Making Cookies
4. Old fat dudes bringing presents down chimneys
5.Snow forts
6.The smell of Winter- It can't really be explained but it's there.
7.Giving gifts to people
8.The Muppet Christmas Carol
9.Remembering what Christmas is all about
10.Having Christmas off
11.Sweaters
I got into wondering as I ate my subway sandwich last night, why the sandwiches are called subs. The last thing on my mind as I am eating a sub is a submarine. Although the first thing on my mind, were I on a submarine would probably be a sandwich. I'm quite certain I would be a nervous mess, if I found myself on a submarine, and what better way to ease my anxiety, than by eating a delicious sandwich? None! I got to musing on the hilarious scenario of the submarine being named after a sandwich, and not the other way around. But that doesn't work either, unless the first sandwich was eaten underwater. Chances also are that the earliest sandwich breads more closely resembled the oblong loaves on which we eat subs, as opposed to the square bread we all know and love. But I leave you with this thought: Wouldn't it be awesome to find out that a long ago submariner with an epic moustache invented the sandwich? I will hold the memory of Captain James H. Sandwich close to my heart, as long as I am alive to eat sandwiches.
It's hard to believe that it's been two years since my grandfather died. He was one of the biggest inspirations on my life, and I have a lot to thank him for. Although we seemed very different, I could talk to him better than I could talk to anyone else. We both loved stories, questions, and nature. Seeing the world as limited to only the limitless nature of my mind, is much in part influenced by him. Give out love and respect even when you don't expect it back. Without him, I wouldn't take any stock in religion or spirituality, and I will never have a reason not to be thankful for that. And I think whether or not he believed in my lifestyle choices or what have you, I know that he would have been proud of me, and in his memory, I know I can stay faithful to the idea that I can do just about anything as long as I apply myself to it. Craig
Birthday Musings
25! Oh what a year, a silver anniversary. A time to laugh, a time to cheer. Not quite young, but still not very old. A time to end, but a time to start. Punch that clock and take life by the hand, it's time to love yourself again. Today is the harvest of dreams. A bounty of time laid out on the table before you, don't waste it and risk being deemed a fool, bring your heart back to school. All the doors are open, and the windows too. No results are found in moping, just get out there and start doing!!!
Return of Countdowniness!!!
Two years since I started this blog, and I realize just how much I have neglected it this year. It's been a weird year, and not in the way I am used to, what with car crashes and weird relationships and whatever else happens. But back to the good weirdness, and more of it. The return to the countdown, will begin with the most lovely sort of weirdness that only Muppets can bring. Go see the new movie it's great!
1.The Rainbow Connection=Weezer featuring Hayley Williams (originally by Kermit the Frog) Can't find a link for the cover, so feel free to look it up on spotify or whatever you use. It's great. So here's the original for your pleasure: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBLOodQ9vAQ
2.Man Or Muppet= Gary and Walter (from the new movie, The Muppets) This song was also written by Mr. Bret Mckenzie from Flight of The Conchords! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m5iN0QNT6Uk
3.What The Water Gave Me= Florence and The Machine As should be expected of Florence Welch and her amazing machine, is another lushly layered ethereal journey into a musical landscape that is nearly unrivaled. Amazing!!! Check out her new disc, Ceremonials, when you get the chance! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6I4KvITlPE
4.27 Jennifers= Mike Doughty One of my favorite songs by him, it's catchy, has great lyrics, and is song by Mike Doughty, and that in itself is enough for me. I kind of want to write a story based on it. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nN_5kkYR6k
5.Sunburn=Muse Haven't listened in a while, but it was the first song that came up on my ipod during my walk today. And it's also the first track off the first album by one of my favorite bands! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9SZaOJEWXU&ob=av2e
6.Animal= Ellie Goulding Such an amazing woman, I hope her career takes her to great heights! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjMMGxgEisk
7. Raise Your Weapon= Deadmau5 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnwfTHpnGLY&ob=av2e
8. Britney Spears=Toxic Just because. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOZuxwVk7TU
9. Only If For A Night=Florence and the Machine Another track from Ceremonials, I just can't get enough of this album! 🙂 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkJK2KVFsi0
10. Use Me= Bill Withers I heard a band cover this one tonight at Fritz's in Keene, and remembered how much I love it, so here it is on my new countdown! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ROGOHNSEBs
11.Watching The Wheels= John Lennon In honor of Thursday being the 31st anniversary of his death, and ironically enough my 25th anniversary of life, I just had to give John a place on my countdown. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qp9dc9im3-M&feature=results_video&playnext=1&list=PL6C759C0FBCE854ED
12. The Doors= People are Strange My birthday is also Jim Morrison's birthday, so I felt the need to put this here for that reason! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3CHi_9sxj0
Enjoy! 🙂 As we head into 2012 my new countdown will always feature at least 12 songs from now on!


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A member of the Virginia Trial Lawyers? There's an infinite want to enhance the financial local weather inside our communities all through northern Virginia. As all the time, we shared how necessary it's for producers to teach younger individuals about agriculture in our communities. In the end, two folks in a special county caught measles because of the defiance of the quarantine orders, spreading the illness to a brand new area. This sample declares that a downturn is imminent, attributable to imbalances within the marketplaces that feed massive law firms. Now, one would assume that the legislation protects everybody. Take coronary heart, you aren't the just one whose declare has been turned down, as a result of it occurs to almost ninety % of the shoppers. Wadhawa says, "Ideas are a dime a dozen. You do not know what to count on and you do not know the results which are to comply with. This may be harmful for the abused companion, as you could know when you've got skilled failed couples therapy for home abuse. Home abuse survivors worldwide ask this query, time and again. Survivors have been simply starting to really feel empowered and accepted after current media consideration and political and communal statements calling consideration to their suffering.
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In no way hire a new lawyer who else contacts you after a person have been recently in a accident.


Let's go ahead and admit it. Rockers, writers, and scenesters outside Fort Worth may think our city is pretty cool for one reason. We have Dreamy Life Records, and they don't.
The lovechild of two local labels, Dreamy Soundz and Lo-Life Recordings, is pumping out quality product as feverishly as if the fate of the universe hung in the balance. Of the label's last few releases, at least three of them –– Jake Paleschic's Again, at Last, Andy Pickett's It Happens Every Night, and Vincent Neil Emerson's East Texas Blues –– have appeared in one form or another on more than a couple lists of 2015's best. Where are the soundz coming from? Cloudland Recording Studio, the recently opened Eastside retreat of producer extraordinaire and fringe-inspired muso Britt Robisheaux (Ronald Shannon Jackson, Drug Mountain, The Theater Fire). Where are the soundz going? Soon, across the globe (hopefully), but even sooner, a lot of them will come to life onstage at 1912 Club (1912 Hemphill St., 817-921-0411).
The recently launched Near Southside venue is about to host two exceptional Dreamy and Life-y shows. The first is Saturday, when two of the four bands slated to play will celebrate the release of debut albums, both recorded at Cloudland and both put out by Dreamy Life. Released jointly with Moon Sounds Records, Mercury Rocket's Mindbenders calls to mind Can, Amon Düül II, and My Bloody Valentine. The Dallas trio's bombastic, shimmering, tinny guitars, thunderous drums, and distant, heroin-dazed vocals combine into sprightly, poppy shapes. The other album is Chinese Folk Songs by another Dallas trio. Professor Fuzz 63 is a little quieter, a little groovier, and a little more Velvet Underground-inspired than their fellow Dallas labelmates but no less fascinated by '60s psychedelia. Dallas' Kallohonka and Fort Worth's The Fibs will open the show.
The other Dreamy Life-tastic 1912 gig you'd do well to check out is Saturday, Jan. 9. It's another double-record release gig. Bulls' eponymous debut album staggers into Jesus Lizard/Tomahawk territory: tortured vocals, loud and clanging guitars, and mercurial beats. What the Fort Worth trio does really well is dynamism. On a track like "Pisss," the simple staccato riff beneath the repetitive vocal melody could have quickly become predictable, but Bulls execute enough changes to keep you intrigued until all three minutes and 10 seconds have passed. A deliciously complex yet uncomplicated tack for such obvious primitivists.
Bulls will be joined at 1912 by the tribute to proto-punk greatness that is Stoogeaphilia, Austin's Crack Pipes, and the other band celebrating a new release, Tame … Tame and Quiet. Blazing that bubbly arpeggiated trail followed by Cleanup and Two Knights, locally, and nationally by Maps & Atlases, TT&Q's core of frontman Aaron Bartz and fellow lead guitarist Darren Miller pulled back from performing a few years ago but, evidently, not from writing. Though the new release, Peach Hills, might make you think otherwise. Gone are Bartz and Miller's trademark quickly calling-and-responding fretwork over bashed drums. In their place: catchy little folk-flavored ditties. Two to be exact. The rest of the EP consists of found footage, including the mellifluous voice of possibly a '50s-era hypnotist and the soothing sounds of waves crashing against the shore. Avant-garde? Postmodern? Silly? There's no telling, but since Bartz and Miller –– and the other guys in the band, drummer Jason McMullen and bassist Jeff Williams –– are so badass, we owe them the benefit of the doubt. "Avant-garde," it is.
Oh, and all of these records –– and more –– will be available at Dreamy Life Records and Music (Fairmount Community Library, 1310 Allen Ave., 817-733-5463). That's right. Dreamy Life Records owns a retail store, too.
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issue139series 1Sep/Oct 2006
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Alessandra Tanesini, Peter Hallward, Jon Beasley-Murray, Bob Cannon and Philip DerbyshireRP 139 (Sep/Oct 2006)
Critique of loveWendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2005. x + 159 pp., £35.95 hb., £14.95 pb., 0 691 12360 8 hb., 0 691 12361 6 pb.
At the beginning of a new millennium this is a book full of melancholy. Written between 1998 and 2005, it includes pieces on the end of liberal democracy, the darkness of current times, the mourning of the revolution within feminism and the impossibility of women's studies as an intellectually rigorous programme. The book is not organized around a single theme or thesis. Several of the essays draw conclusions and make recommendations that are mutually incompatible, perhaps a natural consequence of the fact that the pieces have been written for different audiences over several years. Nevertheless, there are reiterated topics. One is the possibility of critique and the future of political and critical theory; another is the revolutionary impulse in feminism; a third is a concern with some very specific issues such as patriotism or the importance of silence as a weapon of resistance.
On the first of these, Brown claims that ʻcritical theory in dark times is a singular practice of amor fati'. Invoking the work of Walter Benjamin and Friedrich Nietzsche, Brown is keen to emphasize critique as a break from the age's self-conception. Yet critique's untimeliness is understood as the fruit of historical thinking. Thus, critical theory is not utopian, quite the contrary. Although critique breaks with the times by taking as its object the limited range of possibilities and choices which are visible from the age's perspective on itself, nevertheless it is bound to affirm this time as its time. Thus, critique is amor fati because it is ʻa practice of affirming the text it contexts'. Brown characterizes our dark times as the times of two powers whose currency is fear: empire and terrorism. Although she does not elaborate, these remarks indicate Brown's approval for Hardt and Negri's account of our current situation as one best understood in terms of the notion of a global empire. They also clearly date this claim as belonging to the post-9/11 era.
This dual role of critique as both affirming and contesting the current age seems to be lacking in the other essays in this collection. Instead, some use critique to affirm and others to contest. Hence the article on neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy is focused exclusively on contestation. In this piece, Brown rehearses what I take to be well-known arguments about neoliberalism as a form of governmentality: neoliberal structures and powers re-shape all spheres of social life so as to be governed exclusively by instrumental considerations of costs and benefits. Brown also argues that liberal democracy cannot survive in the context of neoliberal political governmentality. The realization that liberal democracy is coming to an end has, for Brown, put the Left in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, the Left never loved liberal democracy, preferring different democratic models. On the other, the Left is compelled to defend liberalism against its neoliberal antagonist.
In this essay Brown enjoins the Left not to give in to a melancholic attachment to liberal democracy. In her view, if the Left defends liberal democracy and civil liberties in liberal terms, it loses its own vision. The Left might wish to mourn the demise of liberal democracy, but it should not try to keep this form of democracy alive. Instead, Brown suggests that ʻwhat remains for the Left … is to challenge emerging neoliberal governmentality in Euro-Atlantic states with an alternative vision of the good.'
Brown's suggestion is unsatisfactory for two reasons.
First, given Brown's analysis of the current situation in several essays in this collection, it is extremely unclear how or even whether such an alternative can be developed and take hold. After all, in another essay Brown boldly claims that the project of ʻrevolution is unquestionably finished'. Second, Brown's description of this vision is extremely sketchy. She writes that ʻa left vision of justice would focus on practices and institutions of popular power'; that it would treat rights merely as safeguards for the individual ʻagainst radical democratic enthusiasms'; that it would take a ʻlong view' of ʻthe importance of both meaningful activity and hospitable dwellings to human flourishing'. This description is too brief to permit a serious assessment of the vision it hints at. It is nevertheless surprising to hear Brown use the vocabulary of human flourishing and of conceptions of the good. This is not the kind of vocabulary that is much in evidence elsewhere in this book with a single, but telling, exception. When discussing the idea that revolution is now both dangerous and anachronistic, Brown remarks that ʻall visions of the Good now appear to consort with fundamentalism'. Unless the capitalization is intended to bear an enormous weight, this remark stands in considerable tension with Brown's positive proposal for an alternative vision of the Left.
Both the remark about the death of revolution and that about the connection between fundamentalism and visions of the good appear in an illuminating essay on the relation of feminism to revolutionary impulses. I return to the main themes in this piece below, but here I want to note another tension with the opening manifesto about the role of critique in our times. There Brown warns us against utopian impulses; she urges us to realize that ʻuntimely critique that seeks to speak to our time is launched not from outside time, or indifferently to the times'. And yet elsewhere she enjoins us to recuperate a utopian imaginary. This imaginary would not be a mechanism of escape from the felt impossibility of social transformation. Instead, despite being stripped of the illusions of redeeming the past and being realized in the future, it would contribute to the making of social transformation. Perhaps Brown is deploying two different notions of utopia in these contexts. It is hard to say. But, like the previous invocation of an alternative vision of the good, this call for utopian thinking sits rather uneasily with Brown's views about the nature and role of critique.
Utopia or contestation does not figure prominently in an essay on political love of one's country and political loyalty for one's community. This piece, clearly written in the shadow of 9/11, attempts to dispel the equation of dissent with disloyalty which has become problematically prevalent in the North American context. Brown sets up her argument by means of two telling caveats. First, she claims not to be providing a universal account of the relationship between citizenship, loyalty and critique. Instead, she ʻexplores these relations as they are configured by a time of crisis and by a liberal democratic state response to that crisis'. Second, she ʻconsiders the relation of love, loyalty, and critique within a political order, the existence and basic legitimacy of which is not called into question'. She does not mean to suggest that within these constraints it is impossible to argue for a radical transformation of one's own collectivity, but acknowledges that hers is ʻa distinctly nonrevolutionary formulation of the problematic of dissent'.
ʻFair enough', one may be tempted to say, ʻeven radical democrats are allowed to be strategic in their thinking'. And yet this is an odd approach for someone with Brown's convictions. Odd, first, because the whole point of critique is to put into question the assumptions behind the polity's understanding of itself. Odd, also, because she has stated elsewhere that the Left's defence of liberal democracy by liberal means is tantamount to political suicide. It is unclear, then, why she engages in the kind of strategic action which she appears to believe is utterly misguided.
Brown's discussion of political love and dissent begins with an exploration of Socrates' loyalty to Athens, and of Freud's account of group psychology. She uses these figures to argue that loyalty and love are necessary to bind a collectivity together. But this love is always directed toward an idealization. The conservative patriot idealizes the current state of things or the polity's past. The radical critic, whose dissent is a form of love for her community, identifies with ʻa utopian version of one's polity'. Brown develops these considerations into a proposal about how internal critics of US foreign policy might wish to frame their interventions. She suggests that they might be ʻtendered as an act of love'. Critique, she continues, ʻmight then inhabit the dignified and authoritative voice of belonging, rather than the moral screech of exclusion. It might also be proffered in the voice of love and desire (for a better nation) rather than the voice of rage, shame, or denunciation.' I find these suggestions deeply problematic. The critic, by declaring her love for her people, and identifying only with an ideal version of her community, frees herself of any responsibility for its actual shortcomings. She takes her community to be answerable to her dissent, but she does not take herself as answerable for her community's behaviour. And yet, it would seem that this is precisely what is required by Western critics. What is required is an acknowledgement of our own responsibility for the shameful behaviour of our own countries.
In lieu of a conclusion, I wish to discuss briefly the last two pieces that make up this collection. They are courageous and thought-provoking reflections on what has gone wrong with feminism. In ʻFeminism Unbound' Brown reflects on the fact that historically there has been a deep connection between anticapitalist revolutionary impulses and feminism. What was immensely liberating in feminism was the promise ʻthat we could become new women and men, that we could literally take in hand the conditions that produce gender and then produce it differently'. This promise has waned with the realization that capitalism per se does not require gender or gender subordination. It has tendencies to increase such subordination as well as to attenuate it. The promise has disappeared with poststructuralist acknowledgements of ʻthe impossibility of seizing the conditions of making gender as well as the impossibility of escaping gender'. Thus, the question for Brown is what is left of feminism now that its revolutionary impulse is dead. This is a question she does not answer in this collection but it is certainly worthy of consideration.
Impossibility looms large in the last essay of this collection also, where Brown suggests that degree programmes in Women's Studies lack intellectual coherence, and have become a negative conservative force in academia. Most of Brown's penetrating observations about what has gone wrong with Women's Studies apply to issues that are specific to the North American academic context she discusses. But her conclusion deserves careful consideration. In her view, the political mission of Women's Studies is incompatible with its institutionalization as a degree programme in universities. Perhaps she is right. But the observation should not simply lead us to reflect on the shortcomings of such programmes, as Brown does, but also to entertain the possibility that something might be wrong with academia as such.
Alessandra tanesini
RetreatmentIan James, The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2006. 296 pp., £34.95 hb., £19.95 pb., 0 8047 5269 9 hb., 0 8047 5270 2 pb.
By the end of the 1970s, Jean-Luc Nancy had already acquired a reputation as a brilliant deconstructive critic of classical philosophical texts. His books included an anti-foundationalist reading of Kant and a critique of Descartes, which argued that the criteria of clarity and distinction could apply only to thinking what was thought rather than to the process of thinking thinking per se. Following closely in Derrida's footsteps and working with his Strasbourg colleague Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy included among his other early targets the German Romantics and Lacan. In the 1980s Nancy began to exceed the genres of criticism or commentary, as he started to develop a systematic account of existence after the end of essence, and of meaning after the end of any original or ultimate ʻMeaning'. Over the past fifteen years or so Nancy has refined and extended this account to cover a vast range of topics, including politics, community, freedom, literature, art, technology, ethics and Christianity.
The fundamental move that informs Nancy's approach to all these topics is a straightforwardly Heideggerian distinction between beings and being, or between what any presentable entity happens to be and its active being or ʻpresenting' as such. On the one hand there is the presented and thus describable entity or thing; on the other hand there is the process of its coming into presence, its being ʻborn to presence', which cannot itself be presented or described but only ʻsensed' in its very withdrawal from all possible presentation. That is to say, there is whatever is disclosed, and there is the pure event or Ereignis of its disclosing as such. Nancy develops an elaborate series of variations on this theme, distinguishing between what is given and its giving, between what happens and its happening, between what is created and its creating, between what is meant and its meaning, between what is embodied and its embodying, between what is touched and its touching, and so on. In line with Heidegger's critique of presence-at-hand (and, more to the point, in line with Derrida's famous critique of Heidegger as himself compromised by the thematics of presence and proximity) he relentlessly tracks down any attempt to confuse one set of terms with the other. A presenting or ʻpresencing' makes present but is not itself presentable. A presenting comes to presence but has no presence; it is radically ʻfinite' in the sense that it can never (unlike Hegel's metaphysical infinite) complete, ground or encompass itself.
Nothing can be presented of a presenting as such, and, in particular, no presenting can present itself. This is the basic argument that emerges from most of Nancy's work, and that continues to inform both its critical and affirmative priorities. Negatively, it lies behind his critique of myth, conventional theology, communitarianism, philosophies of the subject, and so on, as so many deluded efforts to enable a presenting to present (and thus define, authorize, ground, establish) itself. Affirmatively, it has allowed him to develop perhaps the most sophisticated and congenial post-Heideggerian ontology of his generation. Since a presenting cannot present itself but only its lack of coincidence with itself, so then this account of finite or incomplete being is also an ontology of being conceived as being-with that which is other than itself; Mitsein can thus be acknowledged as the most basic existential dimension of being as such. Since presentings only present together, since they are only in common, Heidegger's fateful distinction between the exceptional and the everyday, between the proper and the improper, between enowning and disowning, between eigentlich and uneigentlich, drops out of the picture, along with its disastrous political implications. Since the common world or shared space of presentings presents all that can be presented, without nostalgia for any original or self-sufficient presence, Heidegger's reactionary critique of technology and modernity can likewise be abandoned as apparently extrinsic to his own essential ontological concerns.
In his Fragmentary Demand, Ian James provides a thorough and illuminating overview of Nancy's general project. As his title implies, James adopts the motif of fragmentation and plurality as the organizing principle for his book: because it acknowledges no presentable unity or foundation, James presents Nancy's work as a series of shifting meditations on an incongruent plurality of topics. A first chapter considers Nancy's long-standing critique of the subject (the modern paradigm of a presenting that seeks to present itself). Further chapters then work through his conceptions of space, body, community and art as dimensions of being without essence, dimensions of an existential sharing or being-together in a disparately and elusively everyday world. In line with Nancy's own methodological orientation, James presents these topics ʻless as thematic unities and more as a series of singular openings. Each motif is construed as an instance of opening onto, or of exposure to, the sense of Nancy's philosophy, in which philosophy itself is articulated as a series of exposures to the limit of sense.'
As an introductory overview to a major contemporary thinker, James's book is exemplary: the exposition is economical and clear, and combines useful contextual background with sustained sequences of detailed exegesis. James has a real knack for the concise presentation of complex ideas, and draws to good effect on Nancy's own tendency to work closely with and through other thinkers' work. The chapter on subjectivity includes fairly involved discussions of Kant's first critique and Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, prefaced by an admirably compressed summary of Derrida's ʻStructure, Sign and Play'. Later chapters include equally detailed readings of Husserl and the phenomenological conception of space, Merleau-Ponty on embodiment, and Hegel on aesthetics, supplemented by pertinent comparisons with several of Nancy's contemporaries (Henry, Lacoue-Labarthe, Derrida again; Stiegler is a rare omission). James pays particular attention to Nancy's post-phenomenological account of the body and the interface between meaning, touching and writing, arguing that the particular ʻstrength of Nancy's thought lies in its emphasis on the materiality of sense and of embodied being-in-the-world as finite spatial existence'.
To my mind James makes about as good a case for Nancy's position as can be made, and it's hardly an exaggeration to say that this book may tell you just about everything you might want to know about Nancy's work. Nevertheless, unless you're already inclined to accept its broadly Heideggerian orientation, it may not make you want to know a great deal more about it. James repeatedly addresses the question as to how far Nancy, in the end, is ʻmerely' a Heideggerian philosopher, arguing that his insistence on the primacy of Mitsein and of sharing or being in common, his affirmation of the banal and of the ʻinauthentic', his acknowledgement of technology and the originary ʻimpropriety' of body, and so on, all suffice to distance him from the neo-romantic pathos of aletheia and Ereignis. It might be more accurate to say that Nancy has extended the same basic logic of Ereignis, the same essential difference between a disclosing and the disclosed, to many of those dimensions of experience that Heidegger himself was inclined to abandon as unworthy of thought (many of these dimensions, I should say, though certainly not all: it remains hard to see how this ontology might ground viable accounts of science and mathematics, for instance). Nancy is the thinker who, working on the unquestioned assumption that Heidegger's questions should continue to set the contemporary philosophical agenda, has gone to the greatest lengths to distance this agenda from Heidegger's own most grievous mistakes.
The two most obvious problems that beset this agenda, however, persist more or less unchanged. In the first place, for all James's emphasis on the open, fragmentary and non-totalizable plurality of Nancy's concerns, it's hard to avoid a powerful sense of monotony, closure and ennui. The same basic problematic returns again and again in Nancy's rapidly expanding oeuvre, and James's own account does not preserve enough critical distance from his subject to escape a version of this same monotony himself. When he turns to art in his final chapter, for instance, he observes that ʻart, in Nancy's thought, exists in, or as, a relation to the world, a relation to shared finite existence, and more specifically to that movement of sense which is, or opens up, world-hood itself in all its singular plurality.' Anyone who has read the previous four chapters will be thoroughly familiar with every word in such a sentence – but isn't this just another way of saying that according to this approach art simply is the world? Art is the world in so far as the world is nothing other than its coming into presence – that is, in so far as the world is itself a synonym for the movement of ʻsense', or finitude, or freedom, or community, or being-with, and so on. All these terms operate as little more than variations on the same essential exploration of existence without essence, contributions to one and the same thinking of being which only is in its withdrawing from whatever has or will have been. It is far from clear, moreover, how on this basis we might think of art as any sort of ʻrelation' to the world at all.
In the second place, then, for all Nancy's emphasis on the relational orientation of his ontology, since there can be no relation between a presenting and the presented, between that something is and what it is, his whole account of relationality remains radically abstract, a simple consequence of this ontology's ʻfinite' (or non-self-coincident) orientation. His account of the world as an open spacing or sharing precludes any consequential consideration of the relation between how the world is and what the world has been. Nancy encourages us to engage in the world without reference to any ʻpre-given realities' and without aligning ourselves with any discernible project, struggle or community. Countering the objections raised by Nancy Fraser and others, James claims that Nancy's call for a ʻwithdrawal from politics and the concomitant "retreating of the political" is a deeply engaged gesture that does not intervene or make prescriptive/normative judgements about the present, but that demands that the present be thought.'
Let the present be thought, by all means. Rather than help us to think the historical urgency of the present, however, Nancy's great achievement may instead have been to develop new ways of rereading one of the most profoundly compromised thinkers of our recent past. A reformed Heideggerianism promises little critical purchase on the contemporary moment. Suspension of intervention or of prescriptive demands, the dismissal of pre-given realities, an indifference to inherited or cumulative forms of injustice and exploitation, together with an emphasis on fragmentation and deferral, on the undecidable and the indeterminate, and so on – this is precisely the way our present has long preferred to think of itself. It may well be that the suspension of prescriptive judgement has for some time now served above all to allow (what Nancy continues to call) ʻthe West' to come up with ways of avoiding thinking many of the things that the world itself might otherwise encourage us to think.
Peter hallward
Face-offLars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen eds, Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and Lack, University of Manchester Press, Manchester, 2005. 288 pp., £55.00 hb., 0 7190 7044
9. ^ Darrow Schecter, Beyond Hegemony: Towards a New Philosophy of Political Legitimacy, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005. 240 pp., £55.00 hb., 0 7190 6088 5.
In a quirk of sloppy copy-editing, one of the contributions to Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen's Radical Democracy bears the running header ʻFor an Agnostic Public Sphere' instead of the essay's actual title, which is ʻFor an Agonistic Public Sphere.' But this confusion between agnosticism and agonism is perhaps symptomatic of the problems afflicting the very concept of radical democracy. For though its proponents repeatedly invoke notions of political combat and engagement, they all too easily slip into quiescent indecision. Put it this way: it is far from clear what is ʻradical' about radical democracy behind the rhetorical display of terms such as agonism, antagonism, pluralism, heterogeneity, and the like.
Is radical democracy a specific form of democracy, comparable to but different from (say) its Athenian, liberal, or neoliberal variants? And if so, is it a democracy still to come, to be fought for as a perhaps utopian horizon of democratic thought and struggle? Or is it, by contrast, a form of democracy in which some groups (new social movements, say) currently engage, in other words a counter-democratic actuality that has emerged since the end of the Cold War and the bad old days of class politics? On the other hand, could radical democracy be found less either in the future or the present, but in a return to the founding moment of the so-called ʻdemocratic revolutions'? Is radical democracy then the rediscovery of a radicalism once inherent to democracy but now lost? In slightly different words, is radical democracy simply another name for what Simon Critchley here terms ʻtrue' democracy? Or finally, is democracy always radical? Is radical democracy really a tautology, in that democracy properly understood and described, even as it is played out currently in the real world, is necessarily in some way radical?All these possibilities crop up at one point or another in this collection, and often enough several contradictory positions are argued or assumed in more or less the same breath by the same author. To his credit, Ernesto Laclau at least confronts the fact that there are, as he puts it, a ʻplurality of ways of radicalisation'. In his version of this plurality, these are: first, the universalization of democratic ideals leading to ʻthe internal democratisation of liberal institutions'; second, ʻthe constitution of the "people"' as a ʻdemocratic subjectivity'; and third, a ʻradical pluralism' as a range of demands from diverse constituencies insist on being heard within the political arena. So radical democracy can be liberal; it can be populist; and it can also be what for want of a better word we could call postmodern. But in themselves neither liberalism nor populism nor indeed postmodernism are necessarily radical – often quite the reverse in terms of, say, their relations to capitalism, minorities, or the prospect of revolutionary change. So, albeit without wanting to lose the notion that these three possibilities are in fact radical in some way, Laclau concludes by arguing that what is truly radical is precisely their mutual incompatibility: ʻThe undecidable character of this interaction [between liberalism, populism, and postmodernism], the impossibility of conceptually mastering the contingent forms in which it crystallizes, is exactly what we call radical democracy.' Yet surely this is simply making a virtue out of incoherence. What is more, the normative problem remains: for Laclau these incompatible democratic impulses necessarily intertwine in any politics; politics is therefore always incoherent; while the social is always political because it is always incomplete, in that it is defined by a constitutive lack. Once again, ʻradical democracy' comes to be a tautology.
Tønder and Thomassen frame their collection as a kind of face-off between (as their subtitle suggests) theories of lack and theories of abundance – or more strictly, ʻthe ontological imaginary of abundance and the ontological imaginary of lack'. Essentially this means that the Lacanians confront the Deleuzeans in this version of a political philosophy World Cup. But the Lacanian team are almost without exception made up of players affiliated in some way with Laclau; there are no Žižekians, for instance, and Žižek himself gets rather a bad rap, not least from Critchley, who somewhat cattily suggests ʻOne might say, like Slavoj Žižek, pretty much anything you like, as there are so many contradictions in what he has said about politics over the years'. And on the other hand, the Deleuzeans are stymied by the fact that the chosen field of play is radical democracy, a concept so close to the heart of Laclau (and, perhaps even more so, his collaborator Chantal Mouffe) yet so alien to Deleuze. Paul Patton, for instance, purports to get around this significant obstacle only by means of a series of non sequiturs that rely mostly on what Deleuze did not say about radical (or indeed any other form of) democracy. Hence Patton's contribution is studded with rhetorical questions such as ʻdoes this neglect of political reason in Deleuze's thought justify the charge that he provides an aesthetics or ethics but not properly a theory of politics?' Or, in discussing Deleuze and Guattari's critique of Rorty in What is Philosophy?, Patton's argument is based, it seems, on the assumption that Deleuze may have chatted to his friends from time to time:
He is clearly opposed to the idea that the exchange of opinions is a means to create concepts, but not necessarily opposed to the pleasures of conversation as such. Moreover, nothing follows … about the exchange of opinions or the need for consensus in the political sphere.
Nothing follows; how true.
So we have a rather forced opposition between lack and abundance framed as a debate on the common terrain of radical democracy. Many contributors are keen to problematize the distinction between the two philosophies allegedly in contention: Tønder and Thomassen themselves admit that ʻthe distinction between abundance and lack may itself be contestable'; while Nathan Widder convincingly argues that the point is more that a Deleuzean politics has little interest in the failures or otherwise ʻof any identity or identification' and so in the pseudo-politics of hegemony. But on the whole the issue of radical democracy, and the desirability of either radicalism or democracy, remains unaddressed. If, after all, ʻantagonism is and remains constitutive' in liberal democracy, as Yannis Stavrakakis argues, then surely celebrating this fact would be better described as conservatism? Moreover, though there are many nods towards internationalism, few contributors think beyond the notion of a territorially defined demos upon which democracy traditionally rests, and almost without exception all see the state as an immutable feature of political and social organization. For all the excitable proclamations of hope in a radical future, the prevailing sentiment is that summarized by Critchley: ʻfor good or for ill, let us say for ill, we are stuck with the state, just as we are stuck with capitalism'. In this context radicalism seems to be mostly a matter of trying to get people to be a little nicer to each other, and democracy to depend (in line with some of New Labour's flirtations) on faith groups and the like: ʻlocal meetings, internet campaigns, church organization, film portrayals, celebrity testimonials' and so on in William Connolly's words; the revivalist atmosphere of a ʻRev. Battle' whipping his flock into ʻa guttural "love jam" incantation with Corinthians: "LOVE … LOVE … LOVE"' in Romand Coles's account. Perhaps even worse, Jon Simons turns to what is surely now the thoroughly discredited cultural populism of cultural studies and its praise for ʻconsumer agency'.
Still, there are some bright spots here and there.
Despite the many kneejerk dismissals of Negri's concept of the multitude (and disparaging Negri and Hardt is clearly as fashionable now as adulating them was some five years or so ago), in fact Critchley's version of the political subject as a ʻformless mass' is more multitudinous than he would like to admit, however much he wants to relegate such subjectivity to an ʻempty space'; for to say that ʻthe people are missing' (as Deleuze has it) is not to say that they are some kind of non-entity. And fashioning a more expansive conceptualization of subjectivity and agency is also Jane Bennett's project: drawing on Bruno Latour she offers an ʻenchanted materialism' that posits ʻmultiple sites of agency' in the human and non-human alike; it would certainly be good to cultivate the ʻslight surprise of action' that she takes from Latour rather than the reiterated certainties of hegemony theory otherwise offered by Radical Democracy.
Darrow Schecter, by contrast, has so little time for either hegemony or hegemony theory that he hardly stops to define what he means by the term that appears in his title, Beyond Hegemony. He suggests, however, that hegemony is a ʻfabricated consensus'. It is society's purported reconciliation either (in its liberal variant) by ʻtransforming the horizontal contract between private trading partners in economic exchange into a vertical contract between citizens and the state' or (in its post-liberal, socialist or social democratic variants) on the basis of legitimacy's trumping legality by positing particular subjects as the bearers of the general will. But in the end, he argues, these two variants are much the same: the problem with those who criticize liberalism, be they partisans of state socialism or civil society democratization, is that they neither go far enough beyond liberalism, nor do they really understand it in the first place. They merely substitute an overt legitimating subject (the proletariat or new social movements, say) for the covert (white, male, property-owning) subject that anchors the traditional liberal ideal. So encore un effort, Schecter tells us, if we are really to leave behind liberalism or its hegemonic compromises. Yet abandoning liberalism means also returning to its first impulses, before it became corrupted by its hegemonic pretensions.
For Schecter wants to rescue liberalism from its own disrepute. Rather than remaining content with the familiar observation that liberal universalism is built on particular premises, he argues for a return to the Kantian priority of legality over legitimacy. And so rather than tempering abstract legality with popular demands for legitimacy (this being, as he sees it, the long history of Western democracies passing through universal suffrage and the welfare state), he seeks instead to establish a legitimate legality, which would retain the virtues of universality and objectivity, without being in hock to the subjective needs of an ever wider cast of particularities. The position he stakes out is, then, what he terms a ʻcritical', ʻradical', or even ʻmaterialist' idealism that also, inter alia, promises to reconcile humanity with both outer nature, or the system of needs, and inner nature, or the system of the passions. This reconciliation will be instantiated by means of consumer councils and workers' cooperatives, which will further ensure that ʻknowing becomes aesthetic and pleasurable rather than instrumental and strategic', leaving instrumental reason behind as an odd relic of a by-then-vanquished age of hegemony.Schecter's critique of purported post-liberalism, as simply a warmed-over liberalism that conserves the worst rather than the best of what it claims to supersede, is a useful antidote to theories of radical democracy. His analysis of liberalism's paradoxes, while not always novel, is also sharp and to the point. However, he might have considered more the possibility that we are already living in a post-hegemonic age. Bush, Blair, and Co. hardly stir themselves much to fabricate consensus these days – indeed, Blair's main argument for the war in Iraq is now that precisely the unpopularity of his policies is a guarantee that he is not merely bowing to the court of legitimate public opinion. Moreover, is not Schecter's dream of a ʻconstant exchange of information between producers … and consumers' not already with us albeit in the form of questionnaires, focus groups, and the information derived from loyalty cards on the one hand, and advertising and the ideologies of business transparency on the other? We are already beyond hegemony, and whatever else radicalism might be, surely it does not involve rescuing liberalism, whether in its purer, idealist, form or in its corrupt, democratizing, incarnations.
Jon Beasley-Murray
Oi – come back!
Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis, eds, Human Dignity: Social Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism, Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington VT, 2005. 197 pp., £50.00 hb., 0 7546 4468 5.
This book brings together a group of like-minded thinkers to explore the theme of human dignity in opposition to capitalism. In many respects this represents a continuation of the Open Marxism series edited by Bonefeld and Psychopedis with Richard Gunn, but with a stronger theme running throughout. These essays are not works of Marxist political economy. They are less concerned with the inner workings of capitalism than its moral costs. Indeed, one could describe it as a kind of Manichaean Marxism, which counterposes the ʻhumanitarian' values of equality, dignity and autonomy to the alienation, inversion and perversion of these values by an autonomous economic system.
The primary moral assumption underlying this critical enterprise is that human beings comprise selfconstituting agents in their own right. In this respect they adopt a Kantian account of ʻMan' (as the editors unfortunately translate the term Mensch), grounded in the categorical distinction between: (1) objects, which possess no dignity and should be treated as a mere means to an end, and (2) humans, which possess intrinsic worth and comprise ends in themselves. In support of this normative stance Bonefeld and Psychopedis declare in the title essay, ʻHuman Dignity: Social Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism', that ʻDignity cannot be sold, quantified or conferred. Dignity is a general human value that belongs to each concrete individual. It is an indivisible human value.' This contrasts with a Hegelian–Habermasian approach, which regards autonomy as a historically ʻmodern' phenomenon that agents intersubjectively confer upon one another. In contrast the authors operate with a naturalistic conception of autonomy, which comprises the moral basis of human dignity. This, however, raises two important questions: (1) to what extent does this comprise a valid interpretation of Marx's critique of capitalism, and (2) to what extent does it comprise a valid critique of capitalism. I want to examine each in turn.
The strongest aspect of this collection is its interpretation of Marx. This maintains that the basic structure of Marx's critical enterprise remained unchanged from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts onwards. This rests upon a ʻhumanistic' core, which capitalism is condemned for inverting and perverting. In his essay ʻAspects of Marx's Concept of Critique', Hans-George Baukhaus argues that Marx's ʻanthropological' critique combines the materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach with the activism of German idealism. In this respect, the notion of fetishism Marx develops in Capital represents a continuation of Feuerbach's critique of religion, with the difference that the inversion of subject and object that defines religion is grounded in the inverted (perverted) world of capitalism. According to Baukhaus,
Marx defines all economic ʻforms' or ʻcategories' as ʻperverted' forms (verrückte Formen). Marx deploys the phrase ʻverrückte' (perverted) forms in its double senses, on the one hand, puzzling, mystical essence, and, on the other hand, as a sphere ʻoutside Man', displaced and transposed.
Similarly, Helmut Reichhelt concludes his essay ʻSocial Reality as Appearance' by stating that ʻHuman sensuous practice subsists through its supersensible existence in the autonomization of society as both the object and subject of its perverted (verrückte) social practice.
Psychopedis argues in ʻSocial Critique and the Logic of Revolution' that, for Marx, revolution comprises ʻa kind of re-establishment of the sensual essence of the species through the overcoming of its alienated capitalist form of existence'. Michael A. Lebowitz continues this theme in his short contribution ʻBeyond the Muck of Ages', arguing that the task of Marxism is to make workers aware that they create the system which rules over them. In contrast, in ʻThe Untimely Timeliness of Rosa Luxemburg' Joseph Fracchia departs from this theme in his account of the contemporary significance of Luxemburg's analysis of class struggle. He criticizes Lukács (a little unfairly in my opinion) for treating workers as hopelessly mired in reification, arguing that Luxemburg was right to begin from the everyday experience of the working class. To this end, Fracchia emphasizes the role of struggle ʻfrom below' in constructing a ʻworkers' public sphere'. That said, his account of the latter does not address the theme of human dignity or alternative conceptions of the ʻpublic sphere' such as Habermas's.
Sergio Tischer's ʻTime of Reification and Time of Insubordination' returns to the book's main theme and applies it to the question of time. This takes the form of arguing that ʻthe revolutionary struggle for human emancipation, for human dignity, has to produce a real alternative to capitalist time'. To this end, he champions a version of Benjamin's ʻmessianic temporality', which aims to restore the ʻsocial autonomy of Man over his conditions'. This means rejecting the notion of progress, because it thinks the future as a prolongation of the present, in favour of redeeming the past in the present. Tischer calls for a restorative revolution grounded in the ʻlost unity' of society. In ʻNationalism and Anti-Semitism in Anti-Globalization Perspective', Bonefeld argues that anti-Semitism comprises ʻa senseless barbaric rejection of capitalism that makes anti-capitalism useful for capitalism'. By effectively identifying Jews with the highest level of capital fetishism – the valorization of value without passing through production – Hitler skilfully translated anticapitalism into anti-Semitism. Bonefeld then warns against mounting a similar critique against the abstract monetary forms of capitalism as somehow independent from and parasitical upon productive capitalism. The danger here is that the anti-globalization movement will support national (industrial) capital over global (financial) capital. To guard against this he argues that the fetish form is intrinsic to capital, just as exploitation is intrinsic to productive accumulation. It follows that the only solution to the rule of capital is democratic self-determination by associated producers, on the understanding that the self-constituting status of capitalism is merely an ʻobjective delusion', which masks the role of human subjects in its production. Bonefeld concludes by citing Marx: ʻEvery emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man (Menschen) himself.' The final essay in the collection is a short summary of Holloway's much discussed plea to ʻStop Making Capitalism'. It also promotes a ʻrecuperative' conception of revolution, which returns humanity to its essence, understood as a modality of creative self-determination upon which capitalism is parasitical.
While there is much to recommend this interpretation of Marx, there is unfortunately little attempt to engage with alternative interpretations of Marx's critical enterprise. This is a major omission. In the absence of debate with rival interpretations, the authors fail to establish the validity of their approach. This is particularly true of their account of fetishism. Rethinking fetishism in moral terms has much to recommend it. But this also goes against Marx's self-understanding of his critical enterprise, which eschewed moral in favour of scientific categories. This is symptomatic of a tension in Marx's writings between a scientific and a moral critique of capitalism. Unfortunately, there is insufficient discussion of this tension, or how it might be resolved. Emphasizing the dependence of Marx's critique of capitalism on moral categories is a good start. But merely exchanging a moral for an epistemological objectivism is insufficient to overcome this tension. A moral critique of capitalism grounded in an essentialist conception of humanity raises a number of problems that the authors fail to address. I want to consider three.
First, there is the question of where the ʻtrue' subject of self-constitution resides. Given that capitalism dominates the social landscape, the capacity of human beings to constitute themselves through labour only appears in an alienated guise. As Lebowitz notes: ʻHaving sold their power to the capitalist, the social productivity of workers necessarily takes the form of the social productivity of capital.' This then renders the true source, substance and subject of capital invisible – hence the Rubin School's claim that value-producing labour takes an ʻabstract' form under capitalism. But as there is no phenomenological basis for this claim why should we believe it? At best ʻabstract labour' comprises a hidden placeholder for a normative critique of capitalism.
Second, there is the related question of how capitalism can be both self-constituting and constituted by human labour. The authors stress – and this is the strongest aspect of their analysis – that capitalism comprises a self-constituting, self-valorizing, selfpositing system in its own right. And it is this that renders capitalism unjust, invalid and immoral. But they also argue that the autonomy of capitalism is merely an ʻobjective delusion', a mere ʻmystification' of the true state of affairs, whereby human beings constitute themselves in an alien guise. In which case, capitalism is not a self-constituting system after all. It only appears to be. In reality capitalism comprises an alienated act of self-creation on humanity's part, even though the subject of this act is ʻburied' under the system. And yet the appearance of self-constitution on the system's part is also real – hence the ʻobjectivity' of the putative illusion in question. Herein resides the paradox. This suggests we have reached the limits of an epistemological critique of capitalism – namely, that which counterposes the true, real and factual to the false, illusionary and fictional – while failing to advance a fully normative critique that would counterpose the just, valid and ethical to the unjust, invalid and unethical). If we are to overcome this paradox, we need to rethink the normative ground of the critique of capitalism in social and historical terms, rather than the naturalistic and transhistorical terms preferred by the authors. Only Fracchia addresses the role played by working-class struggle in creating an alternative to capitalism. But, as noted above, he does not engage with the naturalistic conception of human dignity that his colleagues find so compelling.
Third, there is the related question of the normative status of self-constitution. Rather than viewing selfconstitution as a social practice whereby agents arrive at valid moral rules, the authors view self-constitution as a natural capacity we exercise whether we realize it or not. Given that capitalism usurps this capacity by assuming a self-constituting guise, it follows that it is not only immoral but also illusory. This relieves the authors of the need to establish the validity of their normative standpoint. Having discovered – through a process they do not explain – the essence of humanity, they then claim the authority to speak on its behalf. Anyone that disagrees with them is, by definition, not only guilty of ʻanti-humanism' but also the victim of ʻfalse consciousness'. In this way the modern right of agents to constitute intersubjectively their own norms is transformed into an essential capacity from which an objective account of morality is deduced. Needless to say, this represents a perversion of the modern norm of autonomy. Rather than allowing agents to determine their own moral identities, in line with the modern norm of self-constitution, the authors treat the latter as a natural state of affairs from which they deduce an objective morality. This authorizes them to impose their morality upon everyone else, in the name of what's good for humanity. Indeed, it transforms this ʻgood' into a universal moral obligation that we all have an objective duty to redeem. To ignore this categorical imperative is to collude in the dehumanization of humanity. Needless to say, from a modern perspective, such an account of morality appears authoritarian. As Charles Taylor has noted, ʻany theory based on an antecedent notion of the good as prescribed by nature – is profoundly repugnant. It does not exalt the freedom of the subject as one ought, but rather preempts it.' Having placed Marx's critique of capitalism on a moral foundation, the authors follow Marx in placing morality on a naturalistic one. Like Marx, they can afford to denounce modern norms as ʻbourgeois' because they have privileged access to an objective set of moral principles, which are neither conferred upon nor alienable from humanity. But this not only gives their critical strategy an authoritarian character, it also gives it a conservative one. Rather than aiming to free human beings from the impediments of capitalism, to create their own moral identities, the authors call for the ʻrestoration' of ʻMan to himself', on the grounds that the moral essence of humanity not only pre-dates capitalism but is also usurped by it. The drive to overcome capitalism is then grounded in the moral imperative to bring our alienated social existence back into correspondence with our pre-constituted essence. From this perspective, revolution reverses the ʻinversion' of capitalism and restores the natural order of things upon which capitalism is secretly parasitic. In short, rather than grounding the critique of capitalism in the struggle of social agents to constitute their own moral identities democratically, the authors ground it in a pre-constituted moral identity to which they have privileged access, having parted the veil of fetishism to discover the true subject of self-constitution at work. Human dignity is ʻrestored', but only at the cost of reducing human beings to mere means for the realization of objective moral ends of which they are the unconscious bearers.
Bob cannon
The new holy familySlavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner and Kenneth Reinhard, The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005. 240 pp., £30.50 hb., £12.00 pb., 0 226 70738 5 hb., 0 226 70739 3 pb.
Carl Schmitt's notion of ʻpolitical theology', the idea that central concepts of political thought are secular versions of theological concepts, has been the object of much recent critical work. If the positive critique inspired by such work seeks to eliminate the theological in some properly secular re-foundation of the political, a more malign deconstructive ʻtarrying with the theological' – as in the essays here – travels in the opposite direction, attempting to refashion the political around a revivified theology, seeing a Derridian unavoidability as the occasion for positive affirmation.
All three essays depart from the notion of the neighbour in Freud's work. For the Freud of the Project for a Scientific Psychology, the neighbour is the first ʻother' the subject encounters, the locus of satisfaction and resistance to satisfaction. This split is famously emphasized in Lacan's Ethics seminar, where the neighbour is the place of the obdurate and obscene Thing, that which lurks in the other and threatens the subject. For the later Freud of Civilization and Its Discontents, the neighbour is the object of the impossible injunction ʻlove thy neighbour as thyself' – the ethical imperative tout court – and also the other which is both object of domination and menace of subjugation. The neighbour is thus an essentially transitional site, where the political and ethical emerge and overlap.
Ken Reinhard pursues the notion of the neighbour onto other terrain. He sees a secularized avatar of the theological notion of the neighbour in Adorno's reflections on Kierkegaard's idea of the ʻdead neighbour' which maps the impossibility of neighbour–neighbour relations under capital, and Arendt's account of the vanished neighbour of totalitarian society, the mark of the impossibility of the political under the fusion of the social in dictatorship – although it is difficult to see what is theological about this latter, and what constitutes the passage to secularity. More problematically, he sees ʻa political theology of the neighbour' as a positive programme, something that would be a supplement to the ʻpolitical theology of the sovereign'. This is opaque. What it seems to mean is that where Schmittian sovereignty lies in the power to decide what constitutes the exception, and thus what lies within and outside the law, Reinhard is looking for a space of contiguity not organized by the logic of inside and outside, nor by the structure of totality and exception that generates it. Rather than abandon the contaminated notion of sovereignty, he identifies it with Freud's primal father and then develop Lacan's readings of the neighbour as object of traumatic encounter, together with his later account of sexuation, to set this identity against another logic. This is the logic of the neighbour, which as well as being the source of anxiety and threat occupies the space of the feminine within Lacan's account of sexuation. The neighbour is the site of the non-totalized set of instances, which can only be counted one by one ad infinitum: the set that has no signifier and no common denominator. Ontologically, then, the neighbour eludes the logic of totality and confirming exception – the set of masculine subjects according to Lacan – and obeys the logic of Badiou's generic set; that is, it allows for the possibility of the union of entirely disparate sets joining together in unnatural union. The neighbour is the name of the place where love passes into politics, where the rule of ʻequality and sameness gives way to the singularity and difference of love'. Reinhard's move is thus to generate from Lacan and Badiou an account of the site of the neighbour as the place of a non-sovereign politics. Now, the use of psychoanalysis to limn the space of an alternative political subjectivity is hardly new. What is difficult to understand here is the status of sovereignty after such a discovery, and more crucially the name of God, which suddenly emerges within the final Borromean knot at the end of Reinhard's article. Here an unanalysed God is a necessary moment, triangulating neighbour and self, jouissance and love, politics and psychoanalysis. Theology with a vengeance.
Santner's essay is explicitly devoted to a ʻpostsecular thinking' and, as in his recent book The Psychotheology of Everyday Life, recasts the work of Benjamin and Freud within the language of Rozensweig and, now, via Badiou, St Paul. The central concern here is ethical self-relation and the emergence of a ʻproper' subject out of the repetitions of creaturely existence. This is accomplished through the miracle – a notion that derives in part from Benjamin's idea of the recognizability of possibility within history, but mostly from Rozensweig, where it signifies a traumatic event that has a paradoxical structural effect: the miracle shifts the personality to the self. Santner identifies the personality with Freud's drive-destined individual (the individual of repetition) and the self with Badiou's post-evental subject. The individual prior to the event is already engaged in interpretation of an essential lack (Santner borrows from Laplanche here) but the effort of remaining faithful to the event involves an ethical consistency: drive-destiny becomes metaethical self, personality becomes subject. Crucially, the miracle becomes the site of the break with superegoic attachment, with the social and the sovereign: the miracle breaks with ʻmere life' and Schmitt's political theology of sovereignty – ʻbut using the resources of theology'.
Rozensweig thus becomes a reinscription of St Paul as understood in Badiou. Badiou's idea of death as an evental site where new possibilities can emerge is the point at which resurrection can occur, or, in Rozensweig's terms, where the metaethical self can emerge. The possibility of the new is not guaranteed: something must happen. This transformation of drive-destiny is achieved by way of grace or love, and such love must be understood not as oblatory or sacrificial, but as the infinite dissemination of the capacity for loving the neighbour. Paul of course reduces all commandments to ʻLove thy neighbour as thyself' and Badiou glosses this as directed towards the most thing-like element of the other – his drive-destiny. Santner follows Agamben in criticizing Badiou for his universalism, and uses Agamben's account of Paul to argue for a subterranean influence of Paul on Benjamin, but also to argue that it is only now that Paul is legible.
And what positively does Santner take from Agamben's Paul? That Paul's notion of the law allows for a cut into the latter's fantasmatic underside which can, if only momentarily, free us from drive-destiny and repetition, and thus shift us from a fantasy of exception to a proper and exposed relation to the neighbour, who only becomes visible in such a shift. The opening to the neighbour as a consequence of the miracle of grace is inscribed in a law that is not the law of prohibition and enjoyment but of love.
Exposure to the neighbour is the starting point of Žižek's contribution, which I shall deal with in less detail, in part because as ever the components of the text crop up elsewhere – most notably in the new ʻbook' The Parallax View – and between the digressions of the essay, it is not clear how really different his account of the neighbour is from the views outlined above and elsewhere.
Criticizing Butler by way of an attack on ʻpostmodern' concerns with not being vulnerable, with not being exposed to ethical violence, Žižek outlines the Lacanian typology of the other: the imaginary other of competition and recognition; the symbolic big Other of language and institutions and the real other, the impossible thing at the heart of human existence – ours and the neighbour's. This typology is deployed in a critique of Levinas, which essentially separates the ʻgentrified' other of the face from the abyssal horror of the real other: the encounter with the face, the seeming opening to infinite responsibility, is in fact the avoidance of the encounter with the real other of the neighbour. Again engaging with Agamben, Žižek uses the figure of the Muselmann (from the Nazi extermination camps) to draw the limit of Levinas's other, who here is faceless, who cannot say ʻHere I am' and thus is the zero-level of the neighbour. This faceless other is just the monstrous ʻThing', and Levinas's face then itself becomes monstrous, inhuman, excessive. The ʻLaw' is there to keep this monstrosity at a distance, not to gentrify it. Against Levinas, then, love is a moment of cutting into an indifferent multitude, privileging the other against all others. (Oddly, this is Freud's exact legitimation of the impossibility of ʻloving my neighbour as myself', though Žižek doesn't mention it). Justice is the memory of all those others, the Third in Žižek's terms. We suspend the hold of the face of the other, and choose the Third, which is always already there behind our responsibility to the other, in fact its condition of possibility. ʻThe face is the ultimate ethical lure.' Here Žižek defends the Jewish law as that which eliminates the lure of the neighbour to produce him as pure subject. Thus love of the neighbour is the obverse of the law, just as love and law coincide – only differing in the point from which they are viewed. Žižek's Hegelian parallax (how does he do so much with so little?) blithely identifies Christian and Jewish deities and magically eludes once besetting contradictions: his tarrying with God looks facile and deeply disingenuous.
Such wholesale restitution of theological motifs is daunting and depressing. The notions of miracle and grace, groundless moments of conversion, turn back to the Augustinian notion of predestination, only now devoid of determination. Some are elected to subjecthood, but the elect are consequences of contingency. The deity is pure indeterminacy, yet determinant. Love and law are mobilized just at the moment where the theory of the subject voids the ground of a coherent politics or ethics, reduced as in Reinhard's case to a decisionism without decision. The form of the neighbour shifts from that of the imaginary other, the semblable of liberalism, to be replaced by a notion of the real other revealed by love and law, and held in check by God. Pace Žižek, politics is made into ethics again by a curious, revived vanguardism of the spirit, bizarrely in tutelage to a resurrected deity. This does not seem to be a useful direction to follow.
Philip derbyshire
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We all know that Wi-Fi is a fantastic way to connect employees and customers to the network without tying them down to a specific location. What you may not know is how to capture location data and put it to use for your business. This is typically called locationing.
More than just a hot trend, locationing is a powerful way to leverage your existing Wi-Fi infrastructure to capture context, spot trends, and generate value for your customers and your company.
Now that you've read that blog, you know how impactful Wi-Fi analytics can be for your business. By freeing data that already exists in your Wi-Fi network, you can make powerful business decisions based on the real-time location of customers and employees.
As valuable as these insights are, Wi-Fi analytics do have some inherent limitations. When discussing locationing, two of the key metrics are latency and precision. Based on the way that mobile devices and mobile operating systems use Wi-Fi, the best precision we can get using Wi-Fi only is about 5 meters to 10 meters and the best latency is in the range of 15 seconds to 2 minutes. This is more than adequate for providing business intelligence but falls short of the requirements for micro-locationing.
I've got a couple more articles in the queue over on the Aruba blog, and am working on a 6-part series all about cybersecurity infrastructure technologies for the SolarWinds blog – so keep an eye out!


Making a living as a freelance writer is not an impossible dream. Through websites, businesses and clients, writers can find the work that they need to earn a living. Some of the most consistent sources of income are through websites. While some sites are known as content mills, others offer real-world clients and payment protections.
Do They Side With the Author?
The first thing that writers should look for in a site is if the site supports its authors. Having an article tossed out because of quality is acceptable, but some sites will deny payment for any article that the client does not like. To find the best sites, authors should look for a website that works to support authors and prevent abuse.
Every day, new sites pop up online that promise prompt payments and high earnings. In reality, few of these websites pan out. Before choosing a site, writers should look through some reviews. Other writers will detail their experience with payments. For the site to be worthwhile, payments should be made bi-weekly and on a timely basis. Before getting started, the author should also figure out exactly what the pay rate will be.
Keyword stuffing a 200-word article takes time and is extremely annoying to do. Few writers actually want to make a living writing spam articles for the web. Before picking a writing site, individuals should check out the variety and quality of the projects. Unless they want to get burned out, they need to find a site that offers a refreshing array of topics.
Every person who has ever wanted a freelance career has searched through online classified ads. Instead of competing against everyone else, writers should find a site that has a limited number of authors. This lowers the level of competition and ensures that the writer will have work available.
Many writing sites get their clients by marketing directly to a business. Instead of getting paid a fraction of what the site makes, the writer can go directly to the source. Using e-mails, in-person contact and marketing advertisements, they can offer their writing services directly to a business. This will generally allow them to make more money and offers a heightened level of stability. Having an in-person relationship with the client can also help the writer to clarify any project requirements or specific style guidelines that are required.


This article looks at trends in inflation since 1947 as measured by the RPI. Much of the data that underpins this analysis has previously been published but it has not, until now, been available electronically.
The article starts by considering trends in the composition of households' expenditure, as shown by the weights used to construct the RPI, and examines how this is reflected in the range of representative items used to construct the RPI. It then looks at trends in inflation, and finishes with a comparison of how average prices of selected products have changed over the years.


Java File Manager is a Commander-like file manager also known as an Orthodox file manager.
Java File Manager is a Commander-like file manager also known as an Orthodox file manager. JFM is written in Java, and supports filesystem plugins to be written for it. By offering a simple and straight-forward API, new plugins can be written very easily, extending the application.
Java File Manager is a completely free software. You can free download and use it as long as you like.
Frame edit is a drawing plug-in for iMovie. It lets you edit every single frame of your video clip, and then directly integrates the changes into your clip -- all from within iMovie.
HSL is an iMovie plug-in that allows direct color control via the hue-saturation-lightness model (as opposed to the more intuitive red-green-blue color model many people are familiar with).