A look at four homes on the market from less than $500,000 to more than $1 million.
Read: How risky is it to skip the home inspection?
Read: Trivia quiz: How well do you know Greater Boston?
At some point, Warren expects higher interest rates to start tempering price increases. Unfortunately, that doesn't really translate to relief for those home buyers who rely on a mortgage — in other words, most of us. Instead, a house of the same price will cost even more per month.
Kayakers paddle down the Charles River in Needham.
Patrons carry fried seafood dinners outside of the Clam Box restaurant in Ipswich.
Jon Gorey is a regular contributor to the Globe Magazine. Send comments to magazine@globe.com. Get the best of the magazine's award-winning stories and features right in your e-mail inbox every Sunday. Sign up here.


text:
Die Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño war eine politische Partei in Puerto Rico, die zwischen 1971 und 1993 aktiv war.

Geschichte

Die Partei war an der achten Vollversammlung der Bewegung für Unabhängigkeit (Movimiento Pro Independencia MPI) am 28. November 1971 gegründet worden. Der wichtigste Führer der Partei war Juan Mari Brás. Der Senator kandidierte im Jahre 1976 als Gouverneur gemeinsam mit Carlos Gallisá bei den Wahlen 1980. Die Partei forderte eine vollständige Unabhängigkeit für Puerto Rico und eine sozialistische Regierung für das Land. Bei der Wahl 1980 erreichte die Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno knapp 5 % der abgegebenen Stimmen.

Einzelnachweise

Historische sozialistische Partei
Politik (Puerto Rico)
Geschichte Puerto Ricos
Partei (Vereinigte Staaten)
Gegründet 1971
Aufgelöst 1993
Organisation (Puerto Rico)

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
LexRoll.com Home
Ninth Circuit Opinions
UNITED STATES v. HENRY, 984 F.3d 1343 (2021)
LexRoll.com > LexRoll.com > Ninth Circuit Opinions > UNITED STATES v. HENRY, 984 F.3d 1343 (2021)
Gary Lamar HENRY, AKA G-Thing, AKA G., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-50080.United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted November 12, 2020 Pasadena, California.Filed January 6, 2021.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Robert H. Whaley, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00862-RHW-1.
Benjamin L. Coleman (argued), Coleman & Balogh LLP, San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
David R. Friedman (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal Appeals Section; Nicole T. Hanna, United States Attorney; L. Ashley Aull, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: MORGAN CHRISTEN and PAUL J. WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and LEE H. ROSENTHAL,[*] Chief District Judge.
The panel affirmed convictions for one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 371; five counts of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); two counts of bank robbery under § 2113(a); and three counts of brandishing a firearm during the bank robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
The panel held that the defendant did not waive his Speedy Trial Act claim, that the district court made sufficient findings to support its three ends-of-justice continuances under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), and that the delays were not unreasonable.
The panel held that the defendant did not waive his claims under United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017), that the district court misapplied Pinkerton liability to the § 924(c) counts, and that Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. (2014), requires revisiting Pinkerton liability.
Because the defendant's convictions are valid under either a Pinkerton or aiding-and-abetting theory, the panel did not need to decide which theory the jury used to convict. The panel held that Honeycutt, which addressed joint and several liability under 21 U.S.C. § 853, does not apply principles of conspiracy and thus does not require this court to vacate the defendant's § 924(c)'s convictions. The panel also held that Davis, under which crimes of violence for § 924(c) are limited to those that have violence as an element under § 924(c)(3)(A), does not conflict with or undermine the cases upholding § 924(c) convictions based on Pinkerton liability.
The panel reviewed for plain error the defendant's argument that his § 924(c) convictions should be vacated because the jury instructions and verdict form for the predicate § 2113(d) convictions only required the jury to find a conspiracy to commit generic bank robbery and did not require the jury to find the knowing use of a gun. Noting that Rosemond did not alter Ninth Circuit precedents on accomplice liability, the panel declined the defendant's request to revisit the mens rea required for Pinkerton liability in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Rosemond that "knowledge"—not just reasonable foreseeability—is required for aiding-and-abetting liability for § 924(c) charges. The panel held that the district court's instructions on aiding-and-abetting liability were not plainly erroneous, and that the defendant's conviction on either a Pinkerton or an aiding-and-abetting theory was amply supported.
The panel held that the defendant preserved the claim that the indictment failed to allege the necessary elements of armed bank robbery under § 2113(d). Noting that the word "assault" used in the indictment denotes intentionality, the panel wrote that the indictment charged the required mens rea. The panel wrote that the failure to include the "use of a weapon" element in the verdict form for armed robbery was incorrect, but that there is not a basis for reversal, because the district court correctly instructed the jury on the use of a dangerous weapon.
ROSENTHAL, Chief District Judge:
This appeal raises three issues: continuances that allegedly violated the Speedy Trial Act; § 924(c) convictions after United States v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019); and an allegedly defective indictment and verdict form. Gary Henry appeals his bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and derivative firearms convictions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.
In 2017, Gary Henry was indicted with three codefendants for a 2016 series of bank robberies in Los Angeles and Bakersfield, California. Henry was charged with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), and brandishing a firearm during the armed bank robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The indictment alleged that Henry would remain outside the banks while some of his codefendants went inside. The armed bank robbery counts alleged that "[i]n committing said offense, defendants HENRY and [his
codefendants] assaulted and put in jeopardy the life of an employee of [the bank], and others, by using a dangerous weapon and device." Some of the armed bank robbery counts specified that a firearm was used.
Henry was arrested and detained and made his first appearance on May 1, 2017, starting the Speedy Trial Act clock. The district court set a trial date of June 27, 2017. On June 6, 2017, the government and two codefendants, Orlando Soto-Forcey and Edgar Santos, jointly sought a continuance to December 2017, citing the need for more time to prepare and their lawyers' conflicting trial settings through the summer and early fall. Henry opposed the continuance. At a June 12, 2017 status conference, the district court stated that it would grant the continuance over Henry's objection because Santos had just made his first appearance in what was "a complicated conspiracy and bank robbery case." The next day, the district court entered a written order finding that the continuance served the "ends of justice."
In October 2017, the government and all codefendants sought a second continuance, to March 2018. Henry objected but the stipulation provided by the government and Henry's codefendants included Henry's counsel's statement that he too needed the additional time to prepare to defend Henry at trial. The district court issued a written order granting the continuance and finding that: "(i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; (iii) failure to grant the continuance would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence."
In January 2018, the government and all Henry's codefendants sought a third continuance, to May 2018. Although Henry again objected, the stipulation provided by the government and Henry's codefendants included Henry's counsel's statement that he had trials scheduled for January and March, and that he too needed the additional time "to confer with [Henry], conduct and complete an independent investigation of the case, conduct and complete additional legal research including for potential pre-trial motions, review the discovery and potential evidence in the case, and prepare for trial in the event that a pretrial resolution does not occur." The district court granted the continuance, finding that it served the ends of justice. The district court noted Henry's objection, but also pointed out that Henry's counsel had represented that a "failure to grant the continuance would deny him reasonable time necessary for effective preparation," and that he needed more time because he was "scheduled to begin multiple trials, including a trial set for the same date." (Docket No. 14 at 104-05).
Henry's three codefendants pleaded guilty in February, March, and April 2018. On April 30, 2018, Henry filed a motion to dismiss based on violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. Henry argued that he had objected to each continuance and that "[t]he Government could have, and should have, brought defendant HENRY to trial within the time period mandated by § 3161(d)(2)." (Docket No. 26 at 319). The district court denied the motion, finding that Henry had not "state[d] or present[ed] any actual issue with the continuances or any contention that the continuances were invalid [under the Speedy Trial Act]." The district court found the delay excludable under the Speedy Trial Act.
At Henry's six-day trial in May 2018, Santos testified that Henry was the leader of the robbery crew. A jailhouse informant also testified against him and stated that Henry provided guns for robberies.
The parties submitted joint proposed jury instructions and a joint proposed verdict form. The judge read the instructions to the jury before closing arguments. The instruction on armed bank robbery included the requirement that the government prove that "[t]he defendant or a co-conspirator… intentionally made a display of force that reasonably caused a victim to fear bodily harm by using a dangerous weapon or device," and that "[a] weapon or device is dangerous if it is something that creates a greater apprehension in the victim and increases the likelihood that police or bystanders would react using deadly force." The instructions explained that "the evidence would not support that the defendant possessed a firearm himself, brandished a firearm, carried it, or used it" during the robberies, but stated that Henry could be convicted under either an aiding-and-abetting or a Pinkerton theory of liability, setting out the elements for both.
The verdict form sections on the armed bank robbery counts did not refer to a firearm. The verdict form asked the jury whether it found Henry guilty of armed bank robbery, meaning one including "a display of force that reasonably caused the victim to fear bodily injury." The verdict form sections for the § 924(c) counts did ask the jury whether Henry "or a co-conspirator knowingly possess[ed] a firearm in furtherance of … [or] use[d] or carr[ied] a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged," and if the firearm "was brandished."
The jury sent two notes during deliberations. One note asked whether the jury had to find both Pinkerton and aiding-and-abetting liability to convict Henry on the substantive counts. The district court responded that the instructions for Pinkerton and aiding-and-abetting liability referred to "separate legal principles" and that the jury could base its verdict "on either instruction, alone, or both." The second jury note asked if a finding of guilt on the conspiracy charge would necessarily extend to the armed bank robbery and firearms counts. The court responded that it would not, and while the jury "must decide the other Counts separately," conspiracy was "a means by which [the] defendant may be found guilty of the offenses charged in the other Counts."
Henry was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 371; five counts of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); two counts of bank robbery under § 2113(a); and three counts of brandishing a firearm during the bank robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The sentence totaled 387 months: 60 months for conspiracy; concurrent terms of 135 months for each of the bank robbery counts; and a consecutive term of 84 months for each of the three § 924(c) counts.
On appeal, Henry argues that: (1) the indictment should be dismissed because the district court made inadequate findings and did not dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h); (2) the § 924(c) convictions should be vacated because the district court improperly applied Pinkerton liability to those counts; and (3) the armed bank robbery counts and the derivative § 924(c) counts should be vacated for structural error because the armed bank robbery counts failed to allege the required mens rea.
The court reviews the denial of the motion to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act
grounds de novo and reviews findings of fact for clear error. United States v. King, 483 F.3d 969, 972 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). "A district court's finding of an ends of justice exception will be reversed only if there is clear error." United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Henry's Pinkerton claim based on intervening law is reviewed de novo and his forfeited Pinkerton claims are reviewed for plain error. See United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2019) (claims based on intervening law); United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997) (forfeited claims). The sufficiency of the indictment is reviewed de novo. United States v. Omer, 395 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Speedy Trial Act requires a trial within 70 days of the defendant's initial appearance or indictment. Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010). Section 3161(h) sets out delays that are excluded from the 70-day calculation. Id. Delays not in one of the enumerated categories may be excluded to serve the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
The district court must make certain findings to exclude time from the Speedy Trial clock based on the ends of justice:
No such period of delay … shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
"Excludability under [§ 3161(h)(7)(A)] is not automatic; the period of delay must be `reasonable.'" United States v. Hall, 181 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326-27, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986)). This court "gauge[s] the reasonableness of delay on a case by case basis, given the fact-bound nature of the inquiry." United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Messer, 197 F.3d 330, 337 (9th Cir. 1999)). "[C]ourts look particularly to whether the delay was necessary to achieve its purpose and to whether there was any actual prejudice suffered by the appellant." Hall, 181 F.3d at 1062 (quotation omitted). Other relevant considerations include whether the length of the delay "was so egregious as to call into question its reasonableness" and "whether the defendant was free on bond during the delay." Messer, 197 F.3d at 338. Delay is prejudicial when its purpose is to secure the cooperation of codefendants. Hall, 181 F.3d at 1063.
"[W]hen a defendant expressly asserts his speedy trial right before the trial court, he preserves that right even if his actions contradict his lawyer's behavior." United States v. Tanh Huu Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hall, 181 F.3d 1057). The district court must consider a pretrial motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act when it is "not frivolous, defense counsel is proceeding in good faith, and the facts supporting the motions are set forth." United States v. Alvarez-Perez, 629 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010).
Henry asserts Speedy Trial Act violations because (1) the district court failed to make adequate findings when it granted the continuances under § 3161(h)(7)(A); and (2) the delays were unreasonable. The government responds that Henry failed to preserve these errors because he did not
raise specific violations of the Speedy Trial Act before the district court and because his own counsel twice made the same request for more time as the codefendants. Henry replies that he properly asserted violations of the Speedy Trial Act before trial, his counsel did not "join" in the continuances, and both Henry and his counsel objected to the first continuance, which alone violated the Speedy Trial Act. The government argues in the alternative that the district court did not err in granting any or all of the three continuances.
Henry did not waive his Speedy Trial Act claim. Both Henry and his counsel objected to the first continuance, which totaled 161 days. The second and third continuances present a closer question, but Henry also preserved his objection to those continuances, despite his counsel's inconsistent request for more time to prepare. In Lam, the Ninth Circuit found that trial delays were attributable to the defendant when the attorney had "repeatedly stipulated in open court" to the need for more time, and when the defendant did not move to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. Lam, 251 F.3d at 857, 858 n.9. Although Henry's counsel stated that he needed the additional time provided by the second and third continuances, Henry maintained his objection, and his counsel did not join in the motions for the continuances or the stipulated facts. Henry moved to dismiss the indictment after the third continuance and before trial. While Henry's motion did not provide detailed facts, he reiterated his objections and asserted that "[t]he Government could have, and should have, brought defendant Henry to trial within the time period mandated by § 3161(d)(2)." This court has found that, in keeping with Congress's intent "to place a fair share of responsibility for ensuring that cases are tried in a timely fashion on the district court and government counsel," district courts should consider Speedy Trial Act motions as long as the defendant raises "his belief that the STA ha[s] been violated," even when a motion is made orally or on the eve of trial. Alvarez-Perez, 629 F.3d at 1061 (alteration in original) (citation and quotation omitted). Henry's assertion of his rights and pretrial motion to dismiss for Speedy Trial Act violations preserved the issue for appeal.
"[T]he district court must satisfy two requirements whenever it grants an ends of justice continuance: (1) the continuance must be specifically limited in time; and (2) it must be justified [on the record] with reference to the facts as of the time the delay is ordered." United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). Section 3161(h)(7)(B) lists the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, the complexity of the case, and the lack of opportunity for counsel to complete adequate trial preparations using due diligence as factors a judge must consider in determining whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B). Section 3161(h)(7), which provides for ends-of-justice continuances, "demands on-the-record findings and specifies in some detail certain factors that a judge must consider in making those findings." Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006). If the district court does not make the required findings, the delay resulting from the ends-of-justice continuance is counted against the Speedy Trial clock. Id. at 508, 126 S.Ct. 1976.
Henry argues that the district court did not make the required findings because it did not hold hearings before
granting the second and third continuances and it failed to identify the reasons specifically applicable to Henry to delay the trial. Section 3161(h)(7) requires the district court to provide reasons "either orally or in writing." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)A). The statute does not require the court to hold a live hearing on a motion for continuance. The issue is whether the district court made sufficient findings to support each of the three ends-of-justice continuances that it granted.
The district court held a hearing on the first continuance. The court stated, on the record, several reasons for moving the original trial date. It was the first appearance for one of Henry's codefendants, who would not have time to prepare for the trial, then set only a few weeks away. The court asked counsel for the newly appearing codefendant if he could be ready for the trial when set, and he stated that he could not. Henry did not move to sever his trial from that of his codefendants. The court addressed Henry's objection directly, granting the continuance over the objection because the trial was of "a complicated conspiracy and bank robbery case." The district court issued an order incorporating by reference the codefendants' and the government's written stipulation setting out the reasons justifying the continuance, finding that: "(i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and (iii) failure to grant the continuance would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence."
In October 2017, the government and Henry's codefendants sought a second continuance, to March 2018. Henry objected, but the joint written stipulation provided by the government and Henry's codefendants included Henry's counsel's statement that he needed the additional time to prepare to defend Henry at trial. The district court issued a written order granting the continuance. The order incorporated the joint stipulation by reference and stated that the facts in the stipulation supported a continuance. The court found that "(i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; (iii) failure to grant the continuance would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence."
On January 19, 2018, the government and Henry's codefendants sought a third continuance, supported by a joint written stipulation, to May 2018. While Henry objected, the joint stipulation included Henry's counsel's statement that he had trials scheduled for January and March, and that he too needed the additional time "to confer with [Henry], conduct and complete an independent investigation of the case, conduct and complete additional legal research including for potential pre-trial motions, review the discovery and potential evidence in the case, and prepare for trial in the event that a pretrial resolution does not occur." The district judge incorporated the stipulation by reference and granted the continuance, finding that it served the ends of justice. The court noted Henry's objection, but also noted that Henry's counsel had stated that "failure to grant the continuance would deny him reasonable time necessary for effective preparation," and that Henry's counsel was "scheduled to begin multiple trials, including
a trial set for the same date" as Henry's. (Docket No. 14 at 104-05).
In each instance, the district court made findings on the record based on detailed stipulated facts provided in writing by the government and Henry's codefendants. Although not joined by Henry, the stipulations included statements by Henry's counsel. The government and the codefendants stipulated that conflicting trial dates and the need for more time to prepare for trial required the additional delay. The district court made adequate fact findings to justify each of the three ends-of-justice continuances. See United States v. McCarns, 900 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 926, 202 L.Ed.2d 653 (2019) ("A district court's discussion of the statutory factors is adequate to support a continuance that serves the ends of justice when it is clear that the district court considered the factors in § 3161(h)([7])(B) and determined that the continuance was merited based on the applicable factor or factors" (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)); United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1157 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) ("District courts may fulfill their Speedy Trial Act responsibilities by adopting stipulated factual findings which establish valid bases for Speedy Trial Act continuances.").
Henry argues that the delays were unreasonable. "[A]n exclusion from the Speedy Trial clock for one defendant applies to all codefendants. The attribution of delay to a codefendant, however, is limited by a reasonableness requirement." Messer, 197 F.3d at 336 (internal citation omitted). Reasonableness is assessed on a case-by-case basis according to a totality-of-the-circumstances test. See Messer, 197 F.3d at 338 (in determining whether a delay was unreasonable, courts consider the length of the delay and whether the defendant was in pretrial detention).
The three continuances totaled 315 days, or approximately ten and a half months. This delay of close to a year is "presumptively prejudicial." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) ("Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay presumptively prejudicial at least as it approaches one year." (quotation omitted)). But the Ninth Circuit has upheld similar continuances in complex cases, even when, as here, the defendant is in pretrial detention. See Lam, 251 F.3d at 856 (a delay of fourteen and a half months was reasonable in a complex case). In addition to the fact of the detention itself, a jailhouse informant ultimately testified against Henry at trial, and his codefendant Santos pleaded guilty and also testified against him at trial.
In Hall, the court found a delay of 293 days between arraignment and trial was unreasonable because, among other issues, "an underlying aim [of the continuances] was to eliminate the need for a joint trial by achieving a plea agreement" with the cooperating co-defendant. 181 F.3d at 1063 (emphasis in original). But in Lewis, a subsequent case, this court found no error when there was no evidence that the primary purpose of the continuance was to secure the testimony of a codefendant, and when only one of multiple codefendants testified against the objecting defendant. Lewis, 611 F.3d at 1178.
This case is closer to Lewis. There is no evidence that the primary purpose of the continuances was to secure Santos's testimony or to secure the testimony of a jailhouse informant. Instead, each continuance was supported by detailed information about the complexity of the case and the need for additional time to prepare a defense,
particularly because the defense lawyers had a number of conflicting trial commitments. It was reasonable to allow the codefendants and Henry's counsel additional time to adequately prepare to try this complex bank robbery and conspiracy case. Considering all the circumstances, "the addition of [the codefendant's] testimony, although prejudicial, did not make the delay unreasonable." Id.
The district court's denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment is affirmed.
Henry argues that United States v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) and Honeycutt v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 198 L.Ed.2d 73 (2017) prohibit using § 2113(d) convictions based on a Pinkerton theory of liability as predicates for § 924(c) convictions. He also argues that Pinkerton liability is inapplicable to the armed bank robbery and § 924(c) counts because the jury was instructed on conspiracy to commit generic bank robbery, not armed, bank robbery, and because the government failed to show the required mens rea. Finally, Henry argues that the court should reevaluate Pinkerton liability in light of the holding in Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014), that aiding-and-abetting liability for § 924(c) charges requires proof of the defendant's advance knowledge that a firearm would be present.
Again, an initial issue is whether Henry preserved these claims for appeal. The government asserts waiver because Henry did not raise the claims before the district court and because he submitted and approved jury instructions that included Pinkerton liability. Henry asserts that because his claims are based on intervening Supreme Court authority, de novo review is appropriate.
Henry relies on an intervening Supreme Court case, Davis, to support his argument that Pinkerton liability is inapplicable to his § 924(c) convictions. "The Government suffers no prejudice because of [Henry]'s failure to raise the issue to the district court—at the time, under then-current law, the answer would have been obvious and in the Government's favor." McAdory, 935 F.3d at 842.
Henry has not waived his claim that the district court misapplied Pinkerton liability to the § 924(c) counts under Honeycutt, or that Rosemond requires revisiting Pinkerton liability. "[W]aiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant forfeited, as opposed to waived, his right to appeal an erroneous jury instruction that his attorney submitted at trial when there was no evidence that the attorney knew the correct instruction. United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Depue, 912 F.3d at 1233 ("Under Perez, a failure to object or an uninformed representation to the court is not alone sufficient evidence of waiver. Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant was aware of the right he was relinquishing and relinquished it anyway."). The record does not reflect that Henry's trial counsel was aware of, or intentionally relinquished, the claim that Pinkerton liability did not apply to the § 924(c) counts because the object of the conspiracy was generic rather than armed bank robbery. Because Henry forfeited,
rather than waived, these issues, we review the district court's decision for plain error. The court reviews Henry's argument that Pinkerton liability is inapplicable to his § 924(c) convictions de novo.
Henry argues, based on the two notes from the jury during deliberations, that his convictions were based on a Pinkerton rather than on an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability. We need not decide which liability theory the jury used to convict, because Henry's convictions are valid under either.
Pinkerton extends liability to a conspirator for a coconspirator's substantive offenses "when they are reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946)). We have consistently held that Pinkerton liability applies to § 924(c) counts. See, e.g., United States v. Luong, 627 F.3d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Winslow, 962 F.2d 845, 853 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). Henry argues that two recent Supreme Court cases require a different result.
In Honeycutt, the Supreme Court held that joint and several liability under 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires forfeiture by defendants convicted of certain drug crimes, did not extend to defendants who never obtained tainted property as a result of the crime. 137 S. Ct. at 1632. The Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that the text of § 853 was based on background principles of conspiracy liability, and instead based its analysis on the in rem nature of forfeiture. Id. at 1634-35. The Court explained that "§ 853 maintains traditional in rem forfeiture's focus on tainted property unless one of the preconditions [for forfeiting substituted property] exists." Id. at 1635. The forfeiture provision did not apply when the individual in question did not reap the profits of the crime. Id. Honeycutt overturned a forfeiture judgment against a coconspirator who did not receive the proceeds from selling materials used to produce methamphetamine. Id. at 1630. The Court did not review or vacate the defendant's underlying conviction for drug conspiracy. See id. at 1635. Honeycutt does not apply principles of conspiracy liability and does not require this court to vacate Henry's § 924(c) convictions.
Relying on Davis, Henry also argues that his § 924(c) convictions are invalid because to convict him under § 2113(d), the jury likely found him guilty under a Pinkerton theory, which did not require the jury to find that Henry himself intentionally used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force. Davis invalidated the § 924(c) residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B), as unconstitutionally vague, because that provision extended § 924(c)'s long prison sentences to certain offenses treated as "crimes of violence," while "provid[ing] no reliable way to determine which offenses qualify as crimes of violence." Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2324. Davis vacated a conviction based on a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery only under the residual clause. Id. at 2336.
Under Davis, predicate crimes of violence for § 924(c) charges are limited to those that have violence as an element under § 924(c)(3)(A). Henry's argument fails because armed bank robbery, his predicate offense, does have violence as an element. See Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 61, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001) (armed bank robbery is a crime
of violence in federal court); United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (concluding that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause). Defendants found guilty of armed bank robbery under either a Pinkerton or aiding-and-abetting theory are treated as if they committed the offense as principals. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (whoever "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [the] commission" of an offense against the United States is "punishable as a principal"); Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2008) ("there is no material distinction between an aider and abettor and principals in any jurisdiction of the United States including … federal courts"); Allen, 425 F.3d at 1234 ("The Pinkerton rule holds a conspirator criminally liable for the substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when they are reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." (quotation omitted)).
This court has repeatedly upheld § 924(c) convictions based on accomplice liability. See, e.g., United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1214-18 (9th Cir. 2014); Allen, 425 F.3d at 1234; United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989). We have continued to affirm convictions that may have been based on a Pinkerton theory in unpublished decisions after Davis. See, e.g., United States v. Sleugh, 827 F. App'x 645, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jordan, 821 F. App'x 792, 793 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Khamnivong, 779 F. App'x 482, 483 (9th Cir. 2019). Since Davis, the First, Third, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery—the conviction that was vacated in Davis when based on the residual clause—is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). See United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733, 742 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). Davis does not conflict with or undermine the cases upholding § 924(c) convictions based on Pinkerton liability.
Henry also argues that his § 924(c) convictions should be vacated because the jury instructions and verdict form for the predicate § 2113(d) convictions only required the jury to find a conspiracy to commit generic bank robbery. Henry argues that because the jury did not have to find the knowing use of a gun for the § 2113(d) convictions, the § 924(c) convictions cannot stand.
Henry's argument is unpersuasive. We have sustained convictions based on Pinkerton liability when the government has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that: "(1) the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the offense fell within the scope of the unlawful project; and (3) the offense could reasonably have been foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement." United States v. Fonseca-Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Henry urges the court to revisit the mens rea required for Pinkerton liability in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Rosemond that "knowledge"—not just reasonable foreseeability—is required for aiding-and-abetting liability for § 924(c) charges. See 572 U.S. at 67, 134 S.Ct. 1240. Rosemond did not alter Ninth Circuit precedents on accomplice liability. United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1040 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The instructions [in Rosemond] are perfectly consonant with our line of cases" on aiding-and-abetting liability). Rosemond raises some question about whether advance knowledge should be required
for Pinkerton liability as well as for aiding-and-abetting liability, but it does not hold that. The facts of this case, and our plain error review, provide a poor vehicle to take that step.
The district court instructions on aiding-and-abetting liability were not plainly erroneous.[1] At trial, Henry's friend, part of the bank robbery crew, testified that Henry and another codefendant got in an argument in April 2016 because Henry knew that this codefendant had brandished a gun during a recent robbery. The friend testified that, after this argument, Henry continued to send this codefendant to rob banks, and that this codefendant insisted on using a gun to commit the robberies. The jailhouse informant testified that Henry provided guns for the robberies and decided that using guns in the robberies was "a good idea." The record shows that Henry "chose[], with full knowledge, to participate in the illegal scheme." Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 79, 134 S.Ct. 1240. Use of a firearm was within the scope of the coconspirators' unlawful scheme, and Henry had advance knowledge that his codefendant would use the gun. Henry's conviction on either a Pinkerton or an aiding-and-abetting theory was amply supported.
Henry's convictions made him liable for armed bank robbery as a principal. Armed bank robbery is a crime-of-violence predicate for § 924(c)(3)(A). Henry's § 924(c) convictions are valid.
Henry argues that the armed bank robbery counts failed to allege mens rea, requiring reversal of those convictions and of the derivative § 924(c) convictions. Henry also argues that the verdict form was flawed because the definition of "armed bank robbery" did not include the use of a weapon. Instead, the verdict form defined armed bank robbery as robbery with "a display of force that reasonably caused the victim to fear bodily injury."
To support the armed bank robbery counts, the indictment alleged that "[i]n committing said offense, defendants HENRY and [his codefendants] assaulted and put in jeopardy the life of an employee of [the bank], and others, by using a dangerous weapon and device." Some of the armed bank robbery counts specified that a firearm was used. Henry's trial counsel moved to exclude an aiding-and-abetting theory from the jury instructions and verdict form on those counts, arguing that they did not allege that Henry "had the specific intent to facilitate the assault and plac[e] in jeopardy the life of an employee." The district court rejected the argument, finding that aiding and abetting was a theory of liability, not a substantive offense, and that the government had sufficiently alleged the elements of armed bank robbery. Henry reasserts the argument here.
The government contends that Henry has waived this argument on appeal because he moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege the specific intent necessary for aiding-and-abetting liability for the bank robbery counts. The pretrial motion did not raise the absence of allegations
of specific intent for bank robbery itself.
"[I]t is claims that are deemed waived or forfeited, not arguments." United States v. Walton, 881 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004)). In the district court, Henry argued that the indictment did not support aiding-and-abetting liability because the bank robbery counts did not allege that Henry "had the specific intent to facilitate the assault and plac[e] in jeopardy the life of an employee." Henry preserved the claim that the indictment failed to allege the necessary elements for appeal even though he now advances a variation on his original argument. We review Henry's argument de novo. United States v. Studhorse, 883 F.3d 1198, 1203 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 127, 202 L.Ed.2d 78 (2018) (a variation of an argument based on a claim raised before the trial court is reviewed de novo).
The armed bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), requires more than "mere possession" of a weapon. United States v. Odom, 329 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). While "not necessarily determining that § 2113(d) contains a mens rea requirement," this court has held that the statute requires that "the robber knowingly made one or more victims at the scene of the robbery aware that he had a gun, real or not." United States v. McDuffy, 890 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 845, 202 L.Ed.2d 612 (2019) (emphasis in original) (quoting Odom, 329 F.3d at 1035). "Implied, necessary elements, not present in the statutory language, must be included in an indictment." United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1380 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The issue is whether the armed robbery counts allege the required mens rea for armed bank robbery. Henry relies on Du Bo to argue that these counts fail to allege knowing or intentional use of a weapon. In Du Bo, the court found that an indictment alleging that the defendant "unlawfully" affected commerce through the "wrongful" use of force was fatally flawed because it did not allege the "knowingly or willingly" mens rea required for a Hobbs Act conviction. 186 F.3d at 1179.
A defendant acts knowingly when "the defendant is aware of the act and does not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident." Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions (Ninth Circuit Jury Instructions Comm. 2010) (brackets and alternate wording omitted). Unlike the word "unlawfully" in the Du Bo indictment, the word "assault" used in Henry's indictment denotes intentionality. See United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (the two types of common-law assault are "a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the person of another" or a threat to inflict injury causing a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm, sometimes called "intent-to-frighten"). The indictment charges the required mens rea.
Before trial, Henry's counsel and the government submitted joint proposed jury instructions. At the final pretrial conference, the district court noted that "[t]he jury instructions seem to be agreed. Unless someone raises an issue about them, I will give them as — as presented." (Docket No. 26 at 7). The parties then made minor changes to the verdict form, but the relevant language remained the same.
Henry now challenges the armed bank robbery counts in the verdict form, which asked the jury to decide if "the robbery [was] an armed robbery, meaning, defendant aided and abetted or a co-conspirator intentionally made a display of force that reasonably caused the victim to fear bodily injury." (Docket No. 14 at 3, 5-7, 9). Henry argues that these questions on the verdict form, which do not include the "use of a weapon" element for the armed bank robbery counts, are plainly erroneous, requiring reversal of the convictions.
The district judge correctly instructed the jury on the use of a dangerous weapon for counts 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9. Henry's argument does not present a basis for reversal.
The failure to include the "use of a weapon" element in a verdict form for armed robbery was incorrect. But the jury instructions, which Henry agreed to, were correct. The district judge's jury instruction stated that armed robbery required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "[t]he defendant or a co-conspirator… intentionally made a display of force that reasonably caused a victim to fear bodily harm by using a dangerous weapon or device." (Docket No. 14 at 47). The judge instructed the jury that "[a] weapon or device is dangerous if it is something that creates a greater apprehension in the victim and increases the likelihood that police or bystanders would react using deadly force." (Docket No. 14 at 47-48).
Henry's convictions are AFFIRMED.
[*] The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
[1] The judge instructed the jury that, for aiding and abetting liability, "[i]t is not enough that the defendant merely associated with the person committing the crime or unknowingly or unintentionally did things that were helpful to that person or was present at the scene of the crime. The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the knowledge and intention of helping that person commit the crime charged." (Docket No. 14 at 51).
YOUNG v. UNITED STATES, No. 20-71740 (01/18/2022)
SMITH v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., No. 21-35149 (01/18/2022)
UNITED STATES v. GRIMALDO, 984 F.3d 876 (2021)
Copyright © 2016-2017 LexRoll.com, Inc.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Board cuts budget, extends executive director term
by Terri Lackey
The 2017-2020 Women of the ELCA executive board adopted a revised 2018 budget that increased funds for programming and eliminated two staff positions. The board also offered Linda Post Bushkofsky her fifth four-year term as executive director.
In an October 19-21, 2017, meeting in Chicago, the board, in executive session, adopted a revised budget of $3,120,231.
Viviane Thomas-Breitfeld, left, talks with Lisa Plorin
The 2018 budget allows for a full-time staff of 11, a reduction of two; sets aside adequate funds for the 2020 triennial convention (one-third of the total cost); adds $35,705 to a program budget, making it $67,705; and allows for salary adjustments and raises. It also funds a vacant director for justice position.
Program areas of the churchwide organization include discipleship, stewardship, intergenerational, justice, and accompanying resources.
In her report to the executive board, Bushkofsky said, "It's an exciting, heady time to be Women of the ELCA. We're coming off a very successful triennial convention and gathering."
She said the triennial gathering had higher than expected registration numbers (about 3,300), with more than 500 already signed up to attend the Eleventh Triennial Gathering 2020 in Phoenix, Ariz. The result of better-than-expected registration numbers at the gathering, Bushkofsky said, resulted in "the first time in a long time that income has exceeded our expenses."
However, she said, the final budget numbers from the triennial gathering have not yet been tallied.
"There is much to celebrate, but we have the capacity to do so much more," she said. "As we move into year 31, we can sit back and congratulate ourselves for what has been. Or we can challenge ourselves to live into the fullness of our foremothers' visions of this organization as a radical change agent in the church."
Angela Bell, l-r, Liz Burgess, Tina Bigelow
Revenues and expenses
With Thankofferings and Regular Offerings down, Bushkofsky said the organization must look at additional ways to raise money.
"I think the time has come that we have to be more strategic and intentional about how to grow," she said.
Regular offerings are those collected in congregational units that benefit the unit, the synodical organization and the churchwide organization. Thankofferings are gifts made to churchwide, in appreciation for all that God has done, historically collected in October or November.
At the end of September, with the new budget year beginning February 1, 2018, revenue is at $1,275,085 ($1,222,014 below fiscal year projections), according to Executive Board Treasurer Anna Sarver. Expenses at $1,778,374 were at 57% of the budget ($3,093,318) with four months left in the fiscal year.
Freddie Jordan, secretary, Becky Shurson, vice president
Other board actions
The board elected three members to serve on the executive committee. They are Elizabeth (Liz) Burgess of Augusta, Maine, Joy Michalicek of Duluth, Minn., and Karen Voris of Anchorage, Alaska. They join the four officers to comprise the executive committee. The officers are Lisa Plorin, president, Upham, N.D.; Becky Shurson, vice president, Eugene, Ore.; Freddie Jordan, secretary, Columbus, Ohio; and Anna Sarver, treasurer, Greensburg, Penn. (See the list of all board members here.)
The board also
–voted to extend the executive committee term from one year to three, allowing the at-large members to serve the entire triennium.
–voted to remain committed to anti-racism training, allowing for no fewer than two hours training in its April 2018 meeting with additional reading and study beforehand.
–approved a request from the Virginia Synodical Women's (SWO) organization to reduce the size of its board from eight members to six.
–approved requests the Southwestern Pennsylvania SWO to reduce the size of its board from nine to seven, and the Florida-Bahamas SWO to reduce the size of its board from eight to six provided they make consistent the language in their constitutions and advise the board of those revisions.
–denied a resolution forwarded from the Tenth Triennial Convention (2017) that would allow two members of one congregational unit to serve on a synodical women's board.
–heard a report about a proposed partnership with Equal Exchange, a fair-trade non-profit organization, that could include workshops, training and trips.
–heard reports from the president, treasurer, executive director, staff and advisors.
In her report, newly elected Executive Board President Lisa Plorin said, "I'm really looking forward to the next three years with each of you. It will be a journey—some of it will be fun, some of it not so much. We won't always agree on everything, but please know, you were elected to this position because you are a bold woman. Your voice matters."
The next board meeting is April 20-21, 2018.
Terri Lackey is director for communication for Women of the ELCA.
Feature photo: Becky Shurson, vice president, l-r, Lisa Plorin, president, Anna Sarver, treasurer, and Laura Krueger, parliamentarian, consult. Photos by Elizabeth McBride
Jane Harrison says:
Appreciate reading the update from the meeting.
Lori Lashman says:
Thank you all for your hard work. I am proud to be a part of such a wonderful group of women.
Carol Swa says:
Good to get this news. I will look forward to future hi-lights and work to get this information out to the synod.
Nancy Johnson from NSWO says:
Thanks for the information and the work of the Executive Board. I know that are some hard decisions to make. Thanks to all for serving.
Dinah L Halopka-Ryson, SWTX SWO says:
Tough decisions and good decisions-signs of an effective board! Thank you for all your hard work!
Raeann Purcell says:
We are fortunate that the staff are such good stewards of our offerings. Thanks to the staff and board for you service
dlnv says:
Thank the board and staff for their faithful work for our organization. I am certain much thought and prayer went in to the staff changes and other adjustments that needed to be made.
Nadine Robinson says:
could you please share the racial justice readings with the local synodical units? Thank you.
Jan Zook says:
Lisa is from Upham ND not NC as your article states.
Terri Lackey says:
Of course! Editorial mistake. Thank you!
Lorie Garcia says:
Thank you for your work and for your continued commitment to anti-racism and justice issues. This news should invigorate those of us at the synodical and unit level to share the work we can do as a larger body. Communicating this message is key to increasing support.


As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. . . . . In addition, a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice . . . . [A]ll lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. . . . .
In order to meet this ethical responsibility, and in a time in which conversations about race and racism are often very triggering and end at impasses, this CLE will entirely focus on specific suggestions and tools to support lawyers' ability to have constructive conversations about race and racism with our colleagues and clients.


text:
Q: parallel access to vectors I want to search a vector of strings list for strings that begin with a certain character c  and put the strings that I found in a second list outputList. This should happen on multiple threads.
I thought I just split the list to different threads and make the outputList a vector of string vectors, so that each thread has its own "outputList" and after every thread filled its own outputlist, I just flatten the vector of string vectors. However if I execute the binary it segfaults, except the words that are found are all in the last part of the list and therefore in the last vector of the outputList
loop that calls the threads:
    for (unsigned int nrThread = 0; nrThread < nrCpu; nrThread++)
    {
        outputList.push_back(std::vector<std::string>());
        int begin = std::accumulate(partSize, partSize + nrThread, 0);
        threadVector.emplace_back(searchList, list, c, begin, partSize[nrThread], &outputList[nrThread]);
    }

this function should run on different threads:
void searchList(std::vector<std::string> v, char c, unsigned int partBeginn, unsigned int partSize, std::vector<std::string> *outputList)
{
    std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = v.begin() + partBeginn;
    while (it != v.begin() + partBeginn + partSize)
    {
        if (it->at(0) == c)
        {
            outputList->push_back(*it);
        }
        it++;
    }
}

my assumption is that somehow the address &outputList[nrThread] of one subvector changes if an element is put in another subvector.
Any help to clarify this or tips are greatly appreciated.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Late check-in procedure If your arrival is early in the day and you prefer immediate access to your room, we recommend reserving for the prior night to guarantee immediate access. Similarly, for late departures, reserving an additional night will guarantee access until you leave the Hotel. If you choose not to reserve, we will be glad to store your bags and offer you breakfast.
Nearest international airport, approximate driving time and distance.
To make this trip as comfortable as possible, GLK PREMIER Regency Suites and Spa offers its guests Mercedes van cars with additional fee and takes the most picturesque road along the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus to the hotel or back to the airport (based on traffic conditions) in addition to being more relaxing especially after a long air journey, road in distance, is shorter than the highway. For the fee and details contact with the hotel.
Nearby attractions (including a brief description if necessary) with approximate distances (not walking/driving time).
Please note that this is a secure reservation enquiry only and one of our hotel representative will contact you within 24 hours to confirm. For the fastest service on any questions regarding your reservation, please contact with our reservation department at below listed hotel contacts.
Redemption Period: 12.01am PST, March 31, 2019 to 11:59pm PST, December 31, 2020.
Travel Period: The travel dates must be between April 1, 2019 and December 31, 2020 (inclusive).
3. The coupon code entitles you to 15% off the price of the relevant travel reservation. The maximum savings discount differs to reservation dates.


It doesn't take long to go through the pages and add alt tags and proper descriptions, titles, and captions to your images, and it is well worth the effort. Royalty Free Image Websites Below are a few of the sites that offer images with royalty free options.
Adding the "alt tag" image tag to all your website images.
For optimal website SEO (Search Engine Optimisation), we recommend that you add Image ALT tags to as many photos as possible. An ALT tag or Alternative tag provides descriptive information about an image.
9/09/2014 · Alt tags have nothing to do with metadata. They are what the name implies - additional HTML code. Your programmer will have to insert it, you can merely provide the text he will use.
Hello Regio, This can be done via the Shopify theme itself. If you edit the template for products, you'll notice an alt tag at one point. Just switch image.alt to product.title and this will be injected for alt= instead of what is manually configured via the admin.


Leading the Way: Darby's Ranger Noel Dye by A.H. Durshimer III. Merriam Press Military Biography Series.
This is the story of Raymond Noel Dye, one of the youngest members of the Ranger battalions of World War II. Many imminent politicians, statesmen, authors and historians have told their stories of that pivotal moment in the history of the world far better and in far richer detail than I could ever hope to do. The same can be said of a multitude of soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen. I will not retell the story of the war, but instead strive to tell the story of a very small and personal part of that war, the part that concerned one of the youngest privates in one of the Army's newest units. This is Noel's story, and those early Rangers, who blazed a trail of glory for others to follow. They are heroes every one.


The findings by international experts have brought understanding about water to the next level. In this doco, acclaimed researchers such as Dr Emoto Masaru show that water has got memory, is sensitive to energy fields and emotional expression.
This doco features Perl Laperla, Doctor of Medicine and Immunology, conducting a blood test of a patient, explaining on a screen what the blood cells configuration mean about the patients health and pending illnesses, and showing how structurised (ionized) water can change cellular health in a very short amount of time. "Its utterly amazing!"
Attached you will find a collage of some images and a narrative from a video clip of the documentary.
We also attach a link to watch the doco on line ........ see attached below.


During this opening session, which brings together discussion and projection, we will explore the work conducted at the Cinemateca Portugesa laboratory with a masterclass conducted in Mire by two of its technicians, and we will see films, from the beginnings of cinema to the present day, which are all examples of the creative possibilities opened up by the access of filmmakers to the copying machinery.
To open this session, Quatres Vues Photographiques Animees du Cinématographe Lumière. In the early days of cinema, the Cinématographe Lumière was both a camera, a printer and a projector. The copying function is inherent to the "original" machinery of the cinema. Although today's camera, printer and projector have become separate, these devices still work on the same principles.


text:
"""
Sample config for production
"""

# import everything from common and then overwrite necessary
from common import *

# Turn debug OFF on production
DEBUG = True

# templates with debug OFF
TEMPLATES = [
    {
        'BACKEND': 'django.template.backends.django.DjangoTemplates',
        'DIRS': [],
        'APP_DIRS': True,
        'OPTIONS': {
            'context_processors': [
                'django.template.context_processors.request',
                'django.contrib.auth.context_processors.auth',
                'django.contrib.messages.context_processors.messages',
            ],
        },
    },
]

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


Manchester United are the latest club to join the race for Ajax midfielder Frenkie de Jong, according to The Sun.
The Netherlands international, aged 21, has been strongly linked with Barcelona and Tottenham Hotspur in recent months.
Dutch giants Ajax were unwilling to part company with De Jong during the last transfer window, but they face a fresh challenge to keep hold of him in the next two transfer windows.
United reportedly sent scouts to watch the youngster in action for the Netherlands in their Nations League clash with world champions France earlier this month.
Red Devils boss Jose Mourinho is said to be a big admirer of the former Willem II starlet after being alerted to the rave reviews he was getting from scouts at other clubs.
Mourinho is apparently impressed with De Jong's abilities and the option of dropping him into defence.
Having taken a closer at their target, United are ready to launch a January bid.


Couple of days back i heard this really amazing lecture about marketing software by Seth Godin. This is a must watch if you are a software developer looking to jump into entrepreneurship domain.
Saw Harry Potter And Half blood Prince yesterday and i must say i was disappointed.May be the people who have not read the books will like it but for a book crazy fan like me it was a disappointment.Every one knew that movie wasn't going to be as good as book but this one was a very poor effort.
From the cave scene till the ending the book keeps you in tight grip but in the movie those scene which are essence of half blood prince happen in like 10-15 min which is a shame.
The ending of Order of Phoenix in movie was much better but this one was disappointing.If you remove the books then movie was good watch still not epic movie.Certainly not the best movie in series.
Well i have finally joined twitter. Aleem is like crazy about twitter so also decided to give it a go.Now if u think Facebook was gr8 for sharing ur thoughts and day to day activities then twitter goes a step further by giving u an opportunity to virtually broadcast urself onto the world(Forcefully).
And like every Other thing it has its pros and cons.Like i was immediately informed when Aleem reached his Dubai and then his home.
Problem i am facing is that i dun have a decent set to use twitter.If anyone has any good suggestion for a good set in range of 15k Rs(150-200$) please do suggest.
You can find me on twitter by searching abdul_azeem.


You about to hear-to hear-to hear-to hear-to hear-to hear-to hear"
How it all, how it all, got started, got started, ah yeah!"
How it all got started"
Back when-back when-back when-back when"
How it all, how it all, got started, got started"
(How it, how it all got started) ah yeah!
How it all got started, got started"
Back when (back when), back when-back when-back when"
Back when, (back when) back when"
This nostalgic ode produced by No I.D. is a history lesson that mainly serves as a look back at Nas' roots in Queens. It also expands to touch on the history of the Hip-Hop industry, how attitudes and people have changed and to give advice on achieving success.


text:
Q: three.js black/White screen before moving mouse I decided to use a 3D WebGL viewer to put on my website, but i have a small issue.
Everything work fine, I can move my object and see it, but when I load the page, the screen is black before I move the mouse while clicking.
So it's not an issue for me, but for people visiting my website : they can't guess they should move my object, and enjoy the viewer, and they could think it's a bug.
here is my webpage :
http://urlz.fr/1SQj
I thought about a solution, but I'm not able (not yet !!) to do this :

*

*when the script is load, just rotate the object until the user click on the item (I think, as the object is moving, the black screen will disapear immediatly, because it does when I move the mouse).

What do you think about ?
Thank you very much,
ngt78

A: You are only calling the render function from the controls listener and the window resize listener.
If you only want to render when the controls are changed, you could remove the animate function altogether and call render instead of animate at the start of your script.
If you want to render every frame, call your render function from your animate function. You could probably get rid of the controls listener then.


text:
Sky News debuts 'glass box' studio in new broadcasting center
Sky News ushered in a major change Monday with the launch of its flagship home in Osterley, a suburb to the west of London.
The move radically revamps Sky's on-air look with a clean and minimal studio from Jago Design, leaving behind the network's former newsroom space which has been on-air since 2005.
Dubbed the "glass box," Studio 21 is located in the atrium of Sky Central, a mixed-use office building that includes some of Sky News operations. This unique placement provides a windowed vantage into the office complex, which also includes a minimal and green design.
Studio 21, or the "glass box" during its initial broadcast.
Inside the studio, multiple ceiling-mounted robotic cameras are present, allowing a variety of shots and jibs to create a flowing presentation.
Three of the four walls feature large, unobstructed glass panels, with a LED screen on the fourth. Light wood flooring and minimal coloration connect the space to the larger building, with backlit panels around the desk and video wall.
The sets desk uses a square shape to allow for multiple presenters and guests, also changing height for different newscasts.
A large ticker wraps around the outside of the box, which is synced to the on-air ticker. Additional cameras are located in the atrium for additional angles.
Sky News Studio 21
View a gallery of this project…
The studio debuted during the 11 a.m. hour with presenters Jayne Secker and Colin Brazier at the helm.
glass box, jago design, simon jago, sky, Sky Central, Sky News
Broadcast Design, Broadcast Facility Design, Heroes, International Set Design, News Set Design, Set Design, TV News Set Design


Fresh water pearl mussels aren't something you'd normally think about when you enter a forest. But most of the world's remaining populations of fresh water pearl mussels live in rivers and streams in partially or wholly forested catchments. This means sustainable forest management has a pivotal role to play in conserving this globally threatened population.
The FES North Highland Forest District has the largest concentration of extant pearl mussel rivers in both Scotland and the UK, and the Environment Team has led efforts to conserve pearl mussel populations.
Work has been developed and implemented to aid the protection and recovery of this species. This started with a series of targeted surveys to find out where the pearl mussels were living and numbers. The results then helped inform forest management plans, including how to harvest a 30ha site of trees which blocked light from the water and provided large quantities of needles and cone litter directly into the water, which in turn blocked water space and nutrients available. 20 dams were carefully installed across the forest ditches and once harvesting began, surveyors monitored the effects and where necessary, installed additional dams. The dams dramatically reduced the amount of needles and cones in the water and hopefully enriched the nutrients in the water. This approach to forest management is considered to be best practice for all forested pearl mussel catchments. Felling and extraction were carried out by harvester and forwarder machines, with contractors being made aware of the sensitivity of the watercourse and their responsibilities when working in the area.
Neil McInnes, Environment Manager, said: "Protecting or improving the quality of aquatic habitat is fundamental to the conservation of this critically endangered species. Along with work to stop illegal pearl fishing, reducing the amount of silt entering watercourses is key to the species survival in one of its last global strongholds - the North West Highlands of Scotland. The methods for protecting the rivers, burns and lochs that are home to these animals are relatively straightforward and so by increasing understanding of what we need to do amongst machine operators and foresters we can combine really effective conservation action with everyday forestry operations.
The District's work to aid the species has received recognition by two organisations. It recently won the Neil Findlay Trophy from the Royal Scottish Forestry Society as well as scoping 'highly commended' runner up place by the Chartered Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management in its annual awards for work contributing to knowledge sharing in ecology.


A classic guitar band of the eighties. Born at the end of the Punk era, with a feel for Velvet Undergroundon The Dream Syndicate instantly became the saviours of alternative rock before tha term was commonly used.
With The Days Of Wine and Roses they climbed to a highpoint in the critics eyes, and is still today considered a classic outside of die hard Steve Wynn fans circles.
The Medicine Show took a different direction that the raw punkish debut, and some critiques turned their fingers down. It was/is however on of the most lived albums among fans.
After The Medicine Show there was change in line up. Out went Kendra Smith and Karl Precoda and in came Mark Walton and Paul B. Cutler.
The bass player in the original lineup of The Dream Syndicate. She also was part of The Suspects, the first recording band Steve was in. Kendra left The Dream Syndicate in 1983, before the recording the their second album. She joined Opal for several albums, and has released breathtaking solo albums also.
Mark Walton replaced Kendra Smith as the bas palyer in The Dream Syndicate in 1983, and stayed in the band until the split up in 1989. He later toured with Steve Wynn several times, and joined the critically acclaimed Continental Drifters.
Paul B. Cutler became the second amazing lead guitarist in The Dream Syndicate as Karl Precoda left the band after the 1984 live tour. He had a history from 45 Grave and had engineered/produced a bunch of fine albums, including the first Dream Syndicate EP.
Along with Steve Wynn Dennis Duck was the only continous member of The Dream Syndicate. When The Dream Syndicate formed, Dennis was the most famous of the group, having released an album with Human Hands. He played drums with Steve Wynn on a tour in the late 90's, and the complete recordings of Human Hands, were also released in the late 90's.


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Chris has an excellent post up about the Clinton campaign's dwelling on how pledged delegates aren't locked into a particular candidate. I'd just add one thing: The person responsible for this procedural quirk is none other than Harold Ickes, the wily Clinton operative currently overseeing her delegate-whipping effort.
Pledged delegates actually were bound to their candidate through the 1980 campaign. That was the year Ickes' boss, Ted Kennedy, entered the Democratic convention needing hundreds of pledged delegates to abandon Jimmy Carter, who'd already clinched the nomination, in order to have a shot at it himself. Ickes' strategy was to first engineer the procedural change that would allow delegates to switch their allegiances, then to pick off said delegates. It was a tall order, and Ickes obviously came up short. But, from what I'm told was a kind of consolation to the Kennedy forces, the rule was changed before the next presidential cycle, which is where we are today.
Why am I recounting this bit of history? Two reasons: 1.) Because I can--it was just lying around in my notes. And 2.) because, while I 90-percent agree with Chris and Josh Marshall that the Clintons' goal here is to create a "fog of nonsense" (terrific term, by the way), I think Ickes himself is just crazy enough to want to target Obama's pledged delegates, the same way he pursued Carter's in 1980, and against much, much longer odds. If nothing else, Ickes probably figures he can extract some concessions the way he did back then.


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HomeSheitels and Garments: A Mormon and a Jew Discuss the Dreaded 'MRS' Degree
Sheitels and Garments: A Mormon and a Jew Discuss the Dreaded 'MRS' Degree
by Brianne McDonald and Rachel Benaim
Lior Zaltzman
Sheitels and Garments is a series of letters between Brianne McDonald, a Mormon writer, and Rachel Delia Benaim, a Jewish freelance journalist. They discuss topics pertaining to women, religion, and modernity of both faiths in the 21st century. Sheitels refers to the wigs that married Orthodox women are wear after they're married. Garments refers to the undergarments bestowed upon Mormons after they undergo Endowment, a religious ceremony usually correlated with marriage.
Failing to Get My MRS
By Rachel Delia Benaim
Dear Brianne,
I'm not really sure where to begin. You're from Arizona and I'm from South Florida. You are a mother, and I can barely remember how to make cereal and milk (which one goes first!?). You're a Mormon and I'm a Jew. And yet, after having spoken to you over the past few weeks, I see that we really do have a lot in common: our desire to empower women of faith, our love of language, and our constant hunger to learn. I guess the best place to start is a space in which we share an experience.
As I think I mentioned, I failed Yeshiva University's Stern College for Women. Sure, I graduated with Greek honors and was Editor in Chief of the student newspaper The Observer, but that's not what I mean. I failed to attain the degree that stereotypical Stern culture holds in the highest esteemed: the MRS degree. I was close, don't get me wrong. There were a few hopefuls here and there. There was even almost a wedding involved, but I couldn't seal the deal.
Until I finished college, I was everything that a well brought up Orthodox girl should be: I went to all of the correct schools and summer programs, wore the right kind of clothing, and only hung out with other members of the Tribe. Yet here I am, a nice Jewish girl with a useless degree in English Literature with no husband to win me a place in my Jewish community. Shame, really. But this isn't a story of an unmarried Jewish girl. It's not even a story of Yeshiva University's marriage culture. This is the beginning of a story of how MRS culture helped create an unlikely friendship between the two of us: a Mormon and an Orthodox Jew.
Both Mormon and Jewish communities generally isolate themselves against a larger world that rarely understands the nuances and practices of their faiths. I mean seriously, have you seen the amount of quirky articles written about both of our rituals and beliefs!?
It's no secret that Orthodox Jews and Mormons share many social practices. From women's modest clothing to insular communal life, the two houses of Israel share more than the Old Testament and a fear of God. Women going to college for MRS degrees is just one of the many overlapping cultural norms.
During our first chat, you told me about what it was like being married with a daughter during college. Your situation, in a way, reminded me of some of my friends at Stern College who had gotten married during our first year at university and had kids within 18 months.
Personally, I had a different college experience. I failed to get my MRS degree. During my second year of college, I met a guy who was smart enough and cute enough. We dated for a while, and then we broke up. Then we dated again and broke up again. This pattern continued on and off through graduation. In retrospect, I think a large part of why he and I kept getting back together was because of societal pressures, namely, the need for a spouse. Sure, we enjoyed spending time together, but not enough to work through the hard stuff.
After graduation, most of our friends were engaged or married. During my senior year in college alone, I was invited to 47 weddings, and attended 39 of them. To the outsider that may seem crazy, but so is the life of a Stern girl. For the record, I got really good at getting ready for weddings in under ten minutes. Once, I even got ready in an airport bathroom in Chicago. (The key, for the record, is having a go-to hairstyle and makeup palette.)
Anyway, that might be why he panicked- or maybe I panicked, who remembers anymore. Either way, the week after graduation, we got back together- again- and within a month we were discussing engagement. Phew, I must have thought subconsciously, college wasn't a total waste. I got my MRS degree.
For a variety of reasons, the engagement didn't last more than a few weeks. In my pain of having lost what I believed to have been my first love, I also felt tremendous shame. It wasn't until later, until I started looking critically at how my community subconsciously treats women, that I realized the source of that shame.
In Orthodox Judaism, even many modern circles, there are certain cultural stigmas around unmarried women (let alone ones with broken engagements - we came so close to attaining the ideal and then ruined our chance!). Though these stigmas are cultural, they come from Jewish texts. For example, even the three mitzvoth, Biblical commandments, specifically for women — family purity, Shabbat candles, and baking challah — are reserved for married women, some argue. Perhaps that is why, even in a time where women are encouraged to go to college and pursue careers, there is still an emphasis on also getting an MRS degree at university.
So, Bri, I guess what I'm trying to ask is how do Mormon social expectations affect women's college experiences in your community? Is women's education valued in and of itself or is it a means unto an end (i.e. marriage)? Are there stigmas around single women?
Beyond the Pre-approved MRS Degree
By Brianne McDonald
My understanding of Judaism, up until very recently, was centered on a few stereotypical things: their near decimation during WWII; kosher isles in the grocery store; men with black hats and those curly bits of hair (what do those symbolize and how do they get them so perfectly curled?!); and the entirely racist sentiment that they're penny pinchers.
That's pretty much it. I'd never given much thought to how their women lived or how they might struggle with some of the things I struggled with growing up. My religion felt very much isolated. A world unto its own.
MRS degrees, for instance (I didn't even know there was a name for this! Mind blown!) wasn't what I considered to be a common modern concept. Despite what popular culture might believe, Mormons encourage their women to pursue a higher education. What remains unspoken, but nevertheless true, is that this is more a means to find a suitably educated husband to support you and less about finding a job after graduation. The fact that Mormons believe a woman's place is in the home is no secret, but it was one that rubbed me the wrong way from a young age. I don't think I actively considered the effect my upbringing had on my choice of major (History) until long after the fact. History wasn't the sort of degree a person pursued to make money or launch a lucrative career. I had only the vaguest sense of what I might do after college, which basically amounted to: pursue my Masters; possibly work at a museum; write books. But really, in the back of my mind, I knew I was going to accept my diploma, tuck it away, and likely never put it to use. Maybe I'd frame it and use it as a dining tray. Ha.
As you mentioned, I was married in college. I also had a small child to care for and sometimes I felt like college was merely a means to distract me and placate me rather than uplift me. I think this is certainly how my ex-husband viewed the endeavor, with a sort of indulgent belittlement.
Older and wiser, I now wish I'd pursed something different.
I chose History because it was easy and it was safe, and also because it was one of the pre-approved MRS degrees. There would be no long nights for me, hunched over a computer or workbench as I worked my way up in an Engineering field, because my husband worked and I belonged at home. There would be no devoted hours toward exploring the complex world of computer programing (I think it would be amazing to be involved in video game development, but that's the geek in me) or, closer to my heart, no scrambling to have my writing published. A small but insistent voice told me I would never be good at those things and that I would never succeed. Looking back, I think the source of that voice is pretty obvious.
I was far more school oriented than my husband. My grades had always been better and my motivation to pursue education much higher. Another little voice in my heart whispered early on that if I were to step out into the workforce, there was a good chance I could make more money, that we could live easier and better lives. A voice that grew louder and louder as my ex-husband lost job after job and settled into something very close to mediocrity. As much as I enjoyed my time at home with my daughter (because I absolutely did) it was incredibly frustrating to watch my life deteriorate, seemingly beyond my control.
I struggled deeply with the guilt of these feelings. Teetering on the edge of everything I had ever known. My place was with my daughter, at home, caring for her needs; facts which had been drilled into me since birth. It's an ideology I still struggle to come to terms even now, years later.
All I know is that I draw a great deal of personal happiness and satisfaction both from my current career in the government (as well as my humble dalliances in writing) and in caring for my daughter. But there is a sense, quiet but aggressive, that to pursue one to is to scorn the other. It sets me apart in many ways in the Mormon culture and it pushes me back, it keeps me just a little bit outside. Activities are often set during the work day, Callings (each member of the church is given a specific task; child care; teaching young adults; planning events, etc.) that demand a great deal of time and effort during the week…I think you get the idea.
These feelings are merely magnified by the fact that I am, in fact, divorced and, up until recently (I remarried in November of last year), I was a single mother. These are two claims very few Mormon women can make and are easily what defines me through a religious lens.
As to there being a stigma around single women…absolutely. I have a close friend who is now in her early thirties, unmarried, and struggling deeply with remaining in her faith because, after a woman reaches a certain age, so few things are designed around husbandless and childless women (as I've already discussed). They have what they call 'Singles Wards,' which is really the Mormon equivalent to a mix and mingle, but in a town as small as mine there aren't enough unmarried people to facilitate one so they have the occasional get-together. It really boils down to another form of isolation though; a constant reminder that you haven't settled into what is easily one of the most important parts of Mormonism — marriage and the family.
For me, personally, I find it incredibly comforting to know and connect with women who maybe struggle with a similar pressure and a similar sense of insecurity. I guess the point is that it's always nice to know you're not alone.
Since we're talking about faith, what are Jewish beliefs concerning alcohol?
Mormons have a pretty strict diet and consumption rules but I'm thinking we've got that in common, too. (How you guys manage to live without bacon is quite honestly amazing.)
Sincerely, Brianne
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Using a concept mapping application, create a concept map on DNA. The concept map should include terms and concepts related to DNA, its discovery, how it controls the cell, how it makes copies of itself, enzymes and proteins related to DNA.
The concept map will be submitted as a digital file emailed to your instructor (or submitted via flash drive).
The assignment is rather large and will take some time to complete. Be prepared to spend time outside class to complete this project.
Collaboration is possible with any of these programs if this assignment is to be completed as a group project.