When, six months ago, in the wake of violent protests against the increase in fuel prices by the government of the then Prime Minister, Jack Guy Lafontant, some businessmen and political leaders advised the president to let go of his prime minister, President Jovenel Moise was right to distrust the idea. Then, he did everything in his power to avoid this blatant manifestation of political weakness. Because in Haitian politics, you can never be sure when the first concession will be your last.
Since the July 7th events in which violent demonstrators rocked the capital and burnt down businesses, the opposition has been emboldened in its protests against Jovenel Moise. In the last three months, the rallying cries have been against corruption, the president, and his allies. Many individuals close to the president have been accused of the embezzlement of some two billions dollars from Venezuela's aid that should have been used to rebuild the country after the 2010 earthquake.
What began as a civil protest on social media was promptly transformed into a political movement from which the opposition parties have been able to mobilize all kinds of protesters against the government. The social instability this daily unrest has brought about has worsened with the obvious political distance between the president and the Prime Minister, Jean Henry Céant. Jovenel Moise has seen the departure of many individuals from his inner circle, former ministers from the government of Michel Martelly, who is now accused of corruption. The president is now a diminished political figure, with little political capital to turn around the political situation.
But the opposition, whose principal figure is Moise Jean Charles, a former presidential candidate who came third in the last presidential elections, has not been be able to capitalize on the political situation. His radical views have alienated many sectors, especially the middle-class intellectuals in the city. His last protest in which he took down the official blue and red flag to hoist the black and red one created by JeanJacques Dessalines in 1806, to symbolize his denunciation against the minority, mostly white population that controls the economy was not been well received.
In this context, besides the political chaos the confrontation between gang rivals in some of the shanty towns that surround the capital, Port-au-Prince, has been another feature of the situation. Many of these gang members are financed by politicians or other groups interested in spreading chaos. There have been reports linking some of the gang members who have perpetrated many massacres in the last two months with political operatives from the party of the president.
The reality is that, since the events that brought about the new government Haiti has become a burgeoning field for political entrepreneurs of all kinds. In a context where no one seems to have control of the situation, the next three years of the government of Jovenel Moise will be another lost opportunity to strengthen democracy in Haiti or to take bold actions that help change the dire economic and social situation that affects the vast majority of the population. The only preoccupation of the president will be surviving until his term ends, with the hope of being re-elected candidate in 2021. For the opposition, the objective is to further weaken the president and, hopefully, to get him to leave power before completing his term.
In these circumstances, where no political actors, officials and opposition, have the strength to impose their most preferred outcome, political chaos, economic despair and gang violence will be a consistent feature of the political landscape in the coming months if not years.
This entry was posted in Caribbean, Haiti and tagged Haiti on December 11, 2018 by Roody Réserve.
Article 156 of the constitution of Haiti stipulates that the prime minister runs the government and is responsible before the parliament, which can at any time decides his fate with a vote of confidence or no-confidence. This constitutional prerogative of the parliament was in full display two months ago when, on July 14th, following an interpellation by the chamber of deputies, the then prime minister, Jack Guy Lafontant, announced his resignation after it was clear that he would be voted out by a majority of legislators from his own party. This was the consequence of violent and deadly demonstrations that had rocked the capital a week before, when angry protesters took to the streets to denounce the decision of the government to increase fuel prices, following a recommendation by the International Monetary Fund.
After the events that took place on that fateful July 7th , a large group of businessmen and legislators from the ruling PHTK party decided that it was the moment to seal the fate of Lafontant. They joined the growing chorus of political opponents that had been asking for the departure of the government. The resignation of the prime minister marked the first moment since the beginning Jovenel Moïse's young presidency that the opposition had been able to score an important political point. But, this win came when many people had defected from his own party, taking advantage of the weakness of the president in the wake of the violent demonstrations to force his hand to change the primer minister. In this sense, the events that brought down the government are the result of the calculus of different actors who are trying to advance different objectives in the present context.
The preference of the president, Jovenel Moïse, would have been to maintain Jack Guy Lafontant as his prime minister. He made clear on several occasions before the events that finally forced his hand that he wanted no changes. On April 24th when he reluctantly agreed to change 27% of the cabinet, he made it clear over a period of several weeks that he was against the idea. Only after the defection of many legislators from his party did he finally accepted to swear in five new ministers.
The fact that it took the president an entire week to finally come to terms with the idea of the resignation of Lafontant after the riots of July 7th , when political actors both from his party and the opposition had signed off on the Prime Minister, shows that the president was not at all convinced that such a change was necessary.
It took Jovenel Moïse a full month to find a new prime minister. He is Jean Henry Céant, a former presidential candidate. Céant then spent exactly another month forming a new cabinet of 18 ministers, in which 33% (6 out of 18) are left over from the old government. Two months after the last wave of protests, the president was finally able to convince a majority of the legislators of his own party to approve the declaration of politics of the new government. On September 14th and 16th, the Senators and the Chamber of the Deputies approved the Cabinet and, Céant became the 21th Prime Minister since 1988 in Haiti.
But, from what we know of the negotiations between the president and the legislators from his own party, it is clear that the road to the nomination of Céant and the formation of the government was not smooth. Many legislators vented their frustration and criticisms in public when it was clear that they would not have the ability to secure their preferred outcomes. With the next legislative elections scheduled to take place at the end of next year, the majority that voted in favor of the new government has been promised a substantial amount of money for their constituency. In the coming months, if for any reason the government does not maintain its end of the bargain, it is possible that the country will experience another episode of instability in the government.
The opposition parties whose demonstrations in the street finally led to the fall of the Lafontan's government have not been able to capitalize from the instability they created. Even though the new primer minister, Céant, is from a branch of the opposition, they have not been able to secure any relevant position in the cabinet. All of the Ministers are from the ruling PHTK party or political groups around the President.
With the resignation of Lafontant, many in the opposition asked for a "cohabitation", where the opposition parties would govern alongside the President. Such a scenario would be their best second outcome, since they have not enough political strength to force out President Jovenel Moïse, as they have been trying to do since his election. But the reality is that the opposition has very little sway in this conjuncture. Its presence in both chambers of parliament is merely testimonial. In fact, recent events are more a product of internal infighting in the PHTK and the miscalculations of Prime Minister Lafontant.
The goal of the opposition in the coming months will be to maintain street demonstrations against the government. During the discussions around the formation of the new government, many cases of corruption in which the name of individuals from the PHTK were cited. The opposition parties seem poised to keep mobilizing around this issue in an attempt to discredit the president. Their ability to maintain pressure around these cases will be vital for their relevance in the near future.
This entry was posted in Haiti, Presidentialism, Presidentialism and parliamentarism, Semi-presidentialism and tagged Haiti on September 18, 2018 by Roody Réserve.
In the second year of his presidency Jovenel Moise could use this old saying, "I pray God to deliver me from my friends, so that I can defend myself from my enemies", to characterize the reality of his relationship with the members of the coalitions around the party PHTK that made possible his past electoral successes. In the absence of an opposition with enough strength to control the government, the infighting in his own camp has been in full display in the last months.
The first issue concerned the composition of the cabinet. One year after the inauguration of the presidency, many legislators from the PHTK are unhappy with the way the government is holding itself. Around March of this year, some of the leaders in the two houses of parliaments begun to ask for major changes in the government. The president stated publicly on many occasions that he thought his government was doing a good job and that he did not think it was necessary to let go of some of the ministers.
But around April 20 the political situation accelerated rapidly. A group of legislators registered a motion of interpellation against the prime minister and demanded changes in 72 hours, or the government would face a no-confidence vote. Before the ultimatum had expired, the president announced the replacement of 5 ministers. Table I shows the name of the new and old head of each Ministry.
The new Ministers, especially in the case of Brunet and Delva, respectively Ministers of Interior and Culture and Communication, are known for their close relationship with former president Martelly, whose ambitions to become president again is a growing concern among some of his detractors. But, at the same time, the changes also demonstrate the nervousness among some legislators of the PHTK about the next parliamentary elections, which are due in the second semester of 2019.
The changes to the composition of the government come in the context of an intense debate about the best way to combat the rising level of insecurity that many communities have been experiencing in the last months. The representatives of the PHTK in parliament know that it will be difficult to secure another term with the high level of insecurity that the country is facing in this moment. Hence their desire to regain some of the initiative through the changes to the Ministers of Justice and Interior. That gives them both a chance to try new approaches and, in passing, a tool to control the territory prior to the scheduled parliamentary elections of next year.
So far, the solutions introduced by the new ministers of Interior and Justice have not convinced any one. In face of the insecurity, they have prioritized a strategy of open confrontation with the gang members that has produced many victims in the communities already besieged by them. The Minister of Justice has gone so far as to jail journalists that allow gangs members to use their programs. In a letter sent to their associations, he declared that those who open their microphone to gang members will be considered as their accomplices.
At the same time, the Minister of Justice has decided to modify, through a presidential decree, the ability of the National Director of the Police to control the troops. The new decree, in a decision that clearly runs contrary to the law, obliges the head of the Police to seek the approval of the Higher Council of the Police, a political institution directed by the Primer Minister, for any changes to the rank and file of the institution. The new decision has been interpreted as an effort to politicize the operation of the institution.
Ironically, the changes in the cabinet that were designed to give the governing party more space to manoeuvre have generated more problems for the government. Even the weak and fragmented opposition has found a new reason to try to reactivate its troops against the government.
Many PHTK legislators have publicly criticised the government. Some are still unhappy about the scope of the changes in the cabinet. Others think that changes in the government should also address other pressing social problems. Many are against the idea being discussed by the government to stop subsidizing gas prices, which represent around 2% of the GDP while Health spending is just 0.8% of the GDP.
In this sense, Jovenel Moise has a real dilemma on his hands. His principal critics are now his own 'allies'. The actual fight for the control of the government might even foretell the results of the next presidential election in 2021.
This entry was posted in Caribbean, Haiti and tagged elections, Haiti on June 12, 2018 by Roody Réserve.
Since his inauguration, 8 months ago, as the constitutional President of Haiti, Jovenel Moise has had a relatively peaceful honeymoon period. The natural sense of wait-and-see that comes with a new administration and the additional "help" of tropical storms and hurricanes contributed to some months of political calm. But, since the beginning of July an apparently harmless string of protests for an increase in the minimum wage has led to many actors taking off the gloves. Now daily protests including some very violent ones have become routine in the streets in Port-au-Prince.
Jovenel Moise began his mandate as a very active president. Fulfilling the campaign pledge to act primarily in the interests of the peasants, he proposed initiatives such as the electrification of localities in the countryside or and the boosting of farm production. These actions have contributed to a relatively well regarded president in the provinces, but with less to show to the residents of the cities. With frequent visits to and many projects in rural areas, Jovenel has converted himself into an omnipresent President. In the process, he has entirely eclipsed his Primer Minister and the government. Litle is known about the government and, if it was not for some corruption scandals that have been revealed by the press, many ministers would have gone unnoticed. With full control over parliament (the president's party controls both chambers) the president operates as the de facto head of the government, negotiating directly with the legislators.
The reality of a president who operates without any check from the legislative branch is playing for now at least in his favor. For the first time since 1986, a president was able to obtain the ratification of his first choice as Prime Minister. Also, for the first time in many years, he was able to present a budget and have it approved on time. But, in an unstable political context as is usually the case in Haiti, this situation can be harmful in the long run for Jovenel Moise. If the opposition succeeds in convincing the public that the government is ineffective, then since the president is seen as the main actor of the government, the departure of the Prime Minister will not be perceived as a genuine solution to the problem. The practice of using the Prime Minister as a scapegoat to deflect political pressure from the president will be less likely.
With the violent protests that have been under way lately, the opposition has begun to test the popularity of the government. Unsurprisingly, the movement began in Port-au-Prince, in the slum cities where the president is less active. The pretext was the publication by the president of the budget for the next fiscal year. The protesters argue that the spending plans do not tackle the social conditions of the country and that they do not allocate enough resources to important areas as health care, education and judicial system. In this context, parliament also approved a scandalous increase in its allocation, a 74% increase compared to the previous fiscal exercise (102% for deputies and, the senate 55%).
There is no doubt that the budget does not address the many difficulties that the country is facing. But, it also evident that the protests can't be explain solely by the shortcomings of the budget. The protests should be read as the new opening of the political drama. After last year's elections that Jovenel and his PHTK won without appeal, the opposition needed desperately an opportunity to become relevant. The budget gives them that opportunity. How the situation evolves will depend on the capacity of the government to deactivate the mobilization of other sectors that are hoping to extract some concessions from the government and on the ability of the opposition to convince others of the inefficacy of the government.
This entry was posted in Caribbean, Haiti and tagged Haiti, president on October 10, 2017 by Roody Réserve.
On February 7 Jovenel Moise was sworn in as the 47th president of Haiti. It was the beginning of 2015 when the word came out that Michel Joseph Martelly, then president of Haiti, had chosen Jovenel Moise as the candidate of his PHTK party in the presidential election that was scheduled to take place the same year. At least two things stood out with regard to this choice. First, Martelly left out other potential candidates from his own political organization and decided without consultation to enthrone Moise. The second element was the newness of the chosen candidate. He had never participated in politics before.
Prior to his presidential candidacy, Jovenel Moise was an entrepreneur in the agroindustrial sector. He was known for his efforts to secure financial aid for his businesses and not for his political ambitions. But, in a political context where parties are weak and the president holds all the levers of power, Martelly was able to impose his protégé. Even though two elections were necessary to secure the triumph of Moise, the ex-president finally won his gamble. The question is now how will the new president govern, how will his political inexperience factor in with the structural problems he inherited and, how will he position himself in relation to his allies who are preparing the return of Michel Martelly.
Even though Jovenel Moise easily won the election in the first round, there are structural weaknesses to his presidency. First, only 15% of the electorate participated in the elections. Because the opposition was very weak, it has been was enable to use the results against the president. Despite efforts to mobilize against what they dubbed as a rigged elections, they were unable to convince the population that it was worth continuing with the protests in the street. But, any connoisseur of the Haitian situation would still point to the fact that this lack of support could be used against the president in the future.
The PHTK was founded by then president Michel Martelly. Many of the party's legislators who now control both chambers of the parliament, through alliances with other parties, are considered to be loyal partners of Martelly. During his first months in office, Moise seems to have been able to reign in these politicians. He successfully resisted pressure from his political allies and appointed a prime minister, who parliament actually confirmed, who had no relationships with the political class. In order to boost his political capital, he has embarked in a national tour, which, according to his communication team, will present solutions suitable to each locality.
Meanwhile, many crises are looming and they have the potential to disrupt the new president. Beside persistent structural economic problems, the social situation has also been tense in the first 5 months of the presidency. Members of several union organizations have mobilized, demanding a rise in their wage. So far, politicians have been kept out of the protest movement. But, knowing the structural weaknesses of the president and political system in Haiti, it could only be a matter of time before things get ugly.
This entry was posted in Caribbean, Haiti and tagged Haiti on June 12, 2017 by Roody Réserve.
On November 20 Haiti held presidential and parliamentary elections. The preliminary results indicate that the candidate of the PHTK party, Jovenel Moise, has won enough votes to secure the presidency in the first round of the elections. The party has also won, or is in a good position to control, the majority of the senate and a healthy plurality of deputies. These results represent a very important departure from the situation a few months ago.
On February 7 Michel Joseph Martelly was forced to leave power after a constellation of opponents, through massive demonstrations on the streets, successfully discredited the electoral results that placed the now winner, Jovenel Moise, in ballotage. On that occasion Moise won a mere 33% of the votes ahead of Jude Célestin, with 25% percent. At that time, the opposition took power. Jocelerme Privert, a senator from the opposition, was sworn in as interim president. Ten months later, what appeared to be an opportunity for the opposition to oust the Martelly regime has become the most important vindication of the ex-president and his party.
What went wrong for the opposition? How was Jovenel Moise finally able to win? This post analyzes briefly the political situation that led to the triumph of the Pro-Martelly camp. Two elements stands out in explaining the results: the fragmentation of the opposition and the massive investment of the economic elites in Jovenel Moise.
The designation of Privert to the interim Presidency and his subsequent decision not to honor the deal to give the office of the Prime Minister to an ally of the Martelly Camp, had a double effect on the political actors. On the one hand, the PHTK party and its allies quickly coalesced around the candidacy of Jovenel Moise. The amount of money they invested in the elections is a good indicator of their commitment. We do not have exact information about the level of spending, but all observers recognize that the PHTK heavily outspent all of their opponents. The endless resources available were in full display during the weeks after the powerful category 4 storm that ripped through Haiti on October 4 and forced the cancellation of the election previously set for October 20. All of the candidates used the emergency to manipulate the vote from the most affected regions by handing out goods to them. Yet Jovenel Moise was the one that spent most heavily. Evidence shows that his investment in the Departments most affected by the storm was rewarded. Although Moise dominated in all regions, he especially outperformed his rivals in these regions. According to the preliminary results, outside the Northern regions where the candidate has been always very strong, he performed relatively well in the South, the Nippes and Grand Anse, the regions devastated by the storm.
As regards the opponents of Jovenel Moise, the popular front they created and that successfuly forced the departure of Martelly did not endure in the face of the real possibility that they might win the elections. With Martelly ousted and delegitimized, they entirely underestimated his protégé. Instead of using the new situation to campaign, like Moise was doing all through the transition period, they spent their time trying to influence and gain control over the new government. In the end, Jovenel Moise was able to use successfully all the resources that the economic elites were putting at his disposition. These facts explain in some measure the electoral results.
But can we expect a period of political stability after the elections? The answer, again, is not a definitive yes. It will depend on the ability of the new president to navigate the complicated political, economic and social situation. On one hand, it is worth pointing out that only 21% of the electorate went to the poll. On the other, the most important candidates are already protesting the results, both on the streets and before the Electoral Council (CEP). Three out of the 9 members of the CEP did not sign the preliminary results. The evolution of the situation in the next days will tell us what kind of 2017 Haiti will face politically.
This entry was posted in Caribbean, Haiti and tagged Haiti, Jovenel Moise, Michel Joseph Martelly, presidential election on December 7, 2016 by Robert Elgie.
On 9 October 2016, for the second time in less than a year, the first round of a presidential elections will be held in Haiti. The country will experience a very difficult electoral event, which will have tremendous impact on its stability in the near feature. This post intends to assess the political conjuncture on the eve of this event. It will focus on the readiness of the new Electoral Council, the expectations of the most important actors, and the likelihood of successfully handing the presidential sash to a constitutionally elected president on February 7, 2017.
The new Electoral Council (CEP in French), which was appointed in March to organize the elections (presidential and the completion of the legislative), has so far managed not to be the main focus of the political battle. Despite some criticisms about some important organizational decisions, it is a fact that the main political news and comments are no longer concentrating on the performance of this institution.
The relative acceptance of the work of the CEP means that the political actors have been able to express their political visions more openly. A total of 27 candidates are running for the presidency, which is down form 54 in the previous electoral process. Only four of these candidates have any real possibility of being elected. Jovenel Moise, from the pro-Martelly camp, represents the right that arrived for the first time to the presidency in 2010 with the election of the former president. Maryse Narcisse and Moise Jean Charles are associated with the left. Both are basically competing in the same political space. Finally, Jude Célestin occupies a more central ideological position.
Despite the clear ideological differences between the candidates, the election is not being fought on an ideological basis. The pro- and anti-Martelly camp is the main cleavage that will define the results at the second round of the election. Since Jovenel Moise (Party PHTK) is expected to be in the second round, Moise Jean Charles, Maryse Narcisse, and Jude Célestin are basically competing to make it through to the second ballot where, eventually, they will form a coalition against the protégé of the former president.
A particularity of this political process is the relative weakness of all the actors. When Martelly was in power the opposition denounced the use of the state apparatus in favor of Jovenel Moise. But now, with the departure of the ex-president, his protégé has the press pulpit to advance his case. Even though the current interim president, Jocelerme Privert, is more inclined to favor the former opposition, its own weakness and the high number of opposition candidates (three) prevents any meaningful intervention by Privert.
The party PHTK legislators have managed to tie down Jocelerme Privert, the interim president. Even though his original mandate expired on June and should have been renewed in order to for him to serve as a fully legitimate caretaker president, they chose for political reasons not to reappoint him. In this context, while they do regular business with the government and the president, they can still raise the fact that he has not been approved by the legislators to question his legitimacy.
In this sense, as is the case with the CEP, Privert and his government have not so far been a focal point in this electoral process. His government has not intervened (or has not been able to do so in any decisive way) in favor of the candidates of the former opposition. While some decisions made by the government can be interpreted in the sense of an intervention against the candidate of the party PHTK (for example, a report produced by a branch of the government of alleged money laundering activities against Jovenel Moise has been circulated on the internet), it is not clear who would benefit from any such interventions. The three candidates that could reap the benefits of the government intervention are busier watching and tackling each other than attacking their opponent on the right.
In some respects, the political situation in Haiti is exactly where all the actors would, by default, like it to be. No one seems to have the upper hand. No sector has the ability to dominate any other. Even the International Community, which has been very influential in political events in Haiti in the last decades, now has less power to influence the actors. In order to punish the opposition for their decision to denounce the results of the last election, the US government decided not to fund the organization of this election. With this decision they also lost a certain ability to influence the decision in their preferred way.
The weakness of all the actors provides a unique opportunity for good elections. This is the first time since the departure of Duvalier in 1986 that at this stage of the electoral process no one seems to have the power and resources to dictate the outcome alone. This situation might affect the behavior of the actors and prevent them from being too aggressive. It is possible, therefore, that if this situation holds for the rest of the process these elections will not be rigged and may finally lead to a peaceful transfer of power in 2017.
This entry was posted in Caribbean, Haiti and tagged Haiti, presidential election on September 14, 2016 by Roody Réserve.
Joseph Michel Martelly's presidency ended without a successor being directly elected. The interim president, Jocelerme Privert, has not yet been able to fulfil his mandate to organize new elections. Even though political tensions have somewhat abated, the country is still not out the woods. This post offers a brief overview of the political situation since February, with a focus on the behavior and calculations of the principal actors.
On February 14 when Privert was sworn in to lead the interim government the mandate was clear: He had to complete the electoral process in 120 days. The agreement between then outgoing President Martelly and the Presidents of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies clearly stipulated that within this timeframe the interim president had to appoint a new government, reconstitute the Electoral Council (CEP in French), put in place the technical recommendations of the Independent Commision of Evaluation of the elections (CIEVE, in French), and organize the second round of the presidential and parliamentary elections.
It was clear both to Privert and to most of the political actors that it would be impossible to respect this deadline. Indeed, Privert was elected seven days after the departure of Martelly, not within the 48 hours set out in the agreement. The new CEP was installed on March 30, nearly a month after the interim President took office. The CIEVE was put in place on April 14 and handed in its recommendations more than a month later on May 29. What is more, the CIEVE recomended not the continuation of the presidential election, but its cancellation altogether.
The first 120 days of interim president Privert's office have now passed and he has been unable to fullfill the key objective of the transition: handing over the presidential sash to a newly elected president. The CEP has set the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections for October 9 and the second round for January 8, 2017. Thus, the transition will have lasted almost 365 days, instead of the 120 previously agreed. In this context, the most important question for the principal actors has revolved around what strategy to adopt given this new timetable.
So far the transition has rewarded some actors and punished others. Some are weaker than when the process began. Others are in better position today than before. Others still are looking for a way to reinter the game, after having previously been pushed out by other actors. For simplicity, I will refer to these three groups of actors as pro-Martelly camp, the International Community, and the Opposition during the Martelly government.
The International Community is the group that has lost out the most during this process. From the start, the International Community (namely the United States of America, the European Union, the OAS and the UN) assumed that they could force the opposition to the Martelly government to accept any electoral results independently of their assesment of the fairness and transparency of the process. After the first round of the parliamentary elections on August 2015, while some key actors in the opposition were denouncing widespread fraud, the International Community supported the CEP. The same situation occurred when the results of the first round of the presidential election were published. The opposition parties took to the streets to denounce the results. Meanwhile the International Community was working behind closed doors to force the result to be accepted. When the first Commision of Evaluation put in place by President Martelly recommended a thorough evaluation of the situation and measures to build confidence in the process, the representatives of International Community looked the other way. They were against the idea of interim president and, naturally, are opposed to the most recent recommendations for new presidential elections.
The representatives of the European Union have left the country to signal their opposition. The US Department of the State has made it clear that it will not support new elections financially. It goes without saying that the decision not to fund the CEP will have important repercussions for the already difficult budgetary situation of the Haitian government. But, it means also that the International Community will have less say in the political process.
The decision of the International Community to turn its back on the electoral process has meant that its protegé, the pro-Martelly camp, also has less power to impose an outcome on its adversaries. The various strategies adopted by this group are good example of how they have gauged their strength. At the beginning they were against any concessions to the opposition. Their analysis of the elections converged with that of the International Community. But, once it was clear the second round of the presidential election would not take place, they supported the interim solution agreed between Martelly and the leaders of the two houses of parliament. Their candidate for the new presidential election, Jovenel Moise, has now been chosen.
The most recent strategy of the pro-Martelly camp has been the decision not to permit a vote in the chambers on the continuation of Privert as interim president. The agreement stipulates that if elections were not held in 120 days, legislators should convene and decide what to do. The pro-Martelly group argues that this should mean the end of the Privert government. However, they do not have enough votes to force out the interim president. Consequently they have decided not to participate in parliamentary meetings. This means that since July 14, there is a president without any legitimacy, waiting to be confirmed by the Parliament.
The former opposition to the Martelly government is in a far better situation than it was before the beginning of the transition. In some measure, it has the control of the state apparatus. But it has two formidable opponents in the pro-Martelly camp and the International Community. The new situation has forced them to evolve their strategy from one of trying to derail the system to one that wants to protect the status quo. They are now more interested in keeping Privert in power than any of the other actors.
The future will show how the situation evolves in Haiti. For the moment, with a president without legitimacy, an International actor with less leverage over the key internal actors, and the pro-Martelly group being branded as corrupt, the country is almost literally on automatic pilot.
This entry was posted in Caribbean, Haiti and tagged Haiti on July 22, 2016 by Roody Réserve.
Joseph Michel Martelly finished his term as president on February 7 2016. As expected, he handed the presidential sash to the president of the National Assembly, Jocelerme Privert. 7 days later, the same Privert was sworn in as interim president for 120 days, to conclude the electoral process that Martelly has been unable to close. This post analyses the political events that have taken place since the departure of Martelly and the implications for the electoral process and political stability in Haiti in the near future.
The failure to hand the presidential sash to a constitutionally elected president on February 7, meant that the worst nightmare of Michel Martelly became true. The election of Privert by the legislators put a hold on the political ambitions of the heirs of Martelly. In practice, since February 14 the opposition forces that contested Martelly in the streets have held the political initiative. Privert has been maneuvering to sidestep the caretaker government left in place by the president.
Two days before leaving office, Martelly signed an agreement with the leaders of the assembly and the senate that would serve as a blueprint for the transition until new elections. The accord stipulates that the parliament would elect an interim president, who would establish a new electoral council, evaluate the results of the first round of the elections, and organise the remaining electoral contests on April 24. The inauguration of a newly elected president is scheduled to take place on May 14.
More than 30 days after the election of the interim president, the political process has been stalled. Privert has not been able to form a new government. He has also been unable to convince the legislators allied with the party of Martelly to vote for the chosen prime minister, Fritz Jean. The leaders of these legislators have voiced concerns about the fact that the nomination of Fritz Jean means giving absolute control to the former opposition to Martelly. In this sense, more than one month after the departure of Martelly, the political situation is still not clear in Haiti.
What should we expect from now?
The departure of Martelly on February 7 has left a clear political winner: the opposition parties that took to the streets to contest his political decisions and the elections. Since then, many of the members of these parties have official entry to the palace and the president. Street protests have mostly been silent. All actors are trying to manoeuvre the situation so as not to lose ground and have enough leverage to influence the political process when the elections are held. In this sense the actual political situation in Haiti is tense but calm with actors expecting a clash over the political process.
The forces that derailed Martelly's plan to hand over the presidency to Jovenel Moise have so far had the upper hand. An interim president was sworn in, a new electoral council (CEP), mostly containing former critics of the previous CEP, will take over the electoral process; a commission for evaluating the electoral process will be formed. We can be almost certain that the candidate of the PHTK, the party of the former president, will find it very difficult to win the upcoming elections.
But in this context many important questions remain unanswered. First it is not clear how the groups allied with Martelly will react when it becomes clear that they will lose power to influence the course of the political events in Haiti. Are they going to use the streets as their opponents did during the government of Martelly? Are they going to use the paramilitary forces that threatened to defend Martelly in his final days in office? Will each legislator try to save his own situation indivually? History shows that the structural weakness of political parties plays against any group strategy in Haiti. Influential politicians agree to particular deals to advance their own situation to the detriment of other members of their groups.
The second series of questions concerns the behaviour of the members of the opposition? Are they going to maintain their alliance in order to confront the challenges posed by the Martelly camp? So far the parties that formed the former opposition have been unified in the face of the challenges they had to overcome in order to win the battle against Martelly. Here too history has shown that unity is not a path always favoured by Haitian politicians.
Finally, as we enter the second month of the presidency of Jocelerme Privert still awaiting the formation of the new electoral council, it is almost certain that 120 days will not suffice to organize the elections. In this sense, it is probable that the parliament will need to prolong the mandate of the interim president and its government. What kind of guarantee will Privet give in order to secure the continuity of the presidency?
It will be necesarry to watch very closely the behaviour of the actors in the coming days to have clear answers to these interrogations. But what is clear is that the short-term political future of Haiti hinges upon their response. The way they interpret their interest will dictate the degree of political instability that lies ahead.
This entry was posted in Haiti, Presidentialism and parliamentarism and tagged Haiti, president on March 21, 2016 by Roody Réserve.


text:
Rick Ross 'Scared' To Feel Like He Made It
'Even with the success I have and the things I have accomplished, I still don't feel like I'm an Eric B. and Rakim yet,' Rozay tells 'RapFix Live.'
Rob Markman 08/06/2012
If things go as projected on Wednesday, Rick Ross' God Forgives, I Don'twill have earned the MC his fourth #1 album on Billboard's album chart. That could have any artist feeling like they made it to the big time, but not Rozay.
"Man I'm gonna be honest, I'm scared to feel like I made it," Ross told "RapFix Live" host Sway Calloway when he appeared on the August 1 show. "Am I wealthy? Yes... [but] there's a lot more we can do."
Hits Daily Double is predicting that the Maybach Music boss will earn the #1 spot selling anywhere between 200,000 and 220,000 copies of GFID. Tack that onto the impact Rozay has made on the game with countless hit singles, street-certified mixtapes and the artists he has ushered into the game through his MMG label. His list of accomplishments works out to be quite long. Still, there is more to do, he said.
"Even with the success I have and the things I have accomplished, I still don't feel like I'm an Eric B. and Rakim yet," the rotund rapper said, gesturing to the famed Eric B., who was sitting on his right. "As long as I keep that mindset and that inspiration still there, I can keep getting better. Thinking any other way, I think it may scare me."
On his records, Ricky has no reservations reminding fans that he is the biggest boss of them all. On "Pirates," one of the album cuts from God Forgives, Rozay goes on to compare himself to two of the most revered rappers ever. He raps, "Homicide stay on my mind, Christopher Wallace of my time/ R.I.P. to the legend, Tupac Shakur with a nine."
Outside of the booth however, Ross is far more humble. Gold and platinum plaques are nice, but Rozay insists that with this new album, he simply aims for artistic growth. "It'll just most definitely open some more eyes, go above and beyond anything my day-one supporters could imagine," he said. "That's the energy I'll be looking for, that's the response I'll be looking for."
How much further do you think Rick Ross can go in the rap game? Let us know in the comments!

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
MerchantCantos
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Doug Sosnik, Regulatory and Public Affairs
Based in Brunswick's Washington, D.C. Office, Doug is a policy and political expert who has closely advised President Bill Clinton and multiple U.S. Senators, governors, Fortune 100 corporations, foundations and universities for 35 years.
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Events and speaking engagements
Brunswick Review: The WFH Issue
Read the most recent articles from Brunswick Review.
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Brunswick Group, Tokyo
Formally opened in 2020, the global team comprises around 15 multi-lingual, Japan specialists with diverse backgrounds who provide seamless, around-the-clock advice and support for clients in intense situations.
Charis Gresser joins Brunswick in London
Brunswick expands healthcare and media relations capability.
Brunswick Group, a leading corporate advisory firm, announced today that Charis Gresser has joined as a Partner in its London office. Ms. Gresser, who has extensive experience in life sciences, is a writer who has worked for the Financial Times, Public Health England, Pearson, Oxfam and the United Nations. She will help to extend the firm's global offer in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sector, whilst also strengthening our expertise in media relations and NGO communities.
"We are delighted to welcome Charis to the Group," said Group Chief Executive Officer Susan Gilchrist. "She will enable us to continue to grow our healthcare offer globally, while also strengthening our media relations capability. Her experience working for major news outlets, health organisations and NGOs will mean that we can give our clients a completely rounded view of the market and its various stakeholders."
"Charis will strengthen our expertise in the healthcare sector, as well as using her extensive knowledge of the media and NGO communities," said UK Managing Partner Simon Sporborg. "Charis has considerable and varied experience, and will work closely with the global team to extend and deepen our advisory offers in London and internationally."
Charis Gresser
Charis Gresser comes to Brunswick from Public Health England, where she was a scientific writer. Prior to that, she was Head of Research at Meteos, providing research on value creation in the pharmaceutical sector. She worked at the Financial Times for eight years between 1997-2009, serving as a corporate reporter, a Lex columnist and a Lombard columnist. She has worked for the United Nations, Oxfam and Pearson, and began her career working as a corporate reporter at the Daily Telegraph. She holds degrees from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine at the University of London, and from Oxford University.
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Brunswick Group, the strategic advisory firm focused on critical issues, today announced that Meaghan Ramsey and Tom Burns have been appointed as Managing Partners, UK and Co-Heads of the London Office. After seven years as Managing Partner, UK and Head of the London Office, Simon Sporborg will become a Senior Partner focused on client advisory.
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text:
Q: How to present the first view controller in a view controller container Im writing a custom view controller container as per the iOS documentation on view controllers and i'm struggling on finding an elegant way to present the first view controller that also forwards the relevant display messages like viewWillAppear: automatically.
When i try transitionFromViewController:toViewController:duration:options:animations:completion: with the fromViewController: as nil i get an error. I have resorted to animating the view into the view hierarchy with a UIView animation block. This seems to break the automatic forwarding of the appearance methods and means its my responsibility to call viewWillAppear: and ViewDidAppear: at the appropriate times. Is there a more efficient way to transition the first view on to the screen that takes care of the appearance and rotation methods?
My code looks a little like this for animating in the first view controller.
self.visibleViewController = [[UIViewController alloc] init];
[self addChildViewController:self.visibleViewController];

[self.visibleViewController viewWillAppear:YES];
[self.visibleViewController.view setAlpha:0];
[self.view addSubview:self.visibleViewController.view];

[UIView animateWithDuration:0.5
                      delay:0
                    options:UIViewAnimationOptionCurveEaseOut
                 animations:^{
                     self.visibleViewController.view.alpha = 1;
                 }
                 completion:^(BOOL finished){
                     [self.visibleViewController viewDidAppear];
                     [self.visibleViewController didMoveToParentViewController:self];
                 }];

A: The answer was right there hidden in the documentation all along.
The documentation for UIViewController is
- (void)beginAppearanceTransition:(BOOL)isAppearing animated:(BOOL)animated
and the companion
- (void)endAppearanceTransition
Their documentation says never to call viewWillAppear and such from your own code. You can kick the chain off properly with these methods.

A: Are you sure the system doesn't send your child view controller the viewWillAppear/viewDidAppear/DidMoveToParentViewController messages? This bit of the Apple docs implies that it does:

In order for iOS to route events properly to child view controllers
  and the views those controllers manage, your container view controller
  must associate a child view controller with itself before adding the
  child's root view to the view hierarchy.

The way I read that, if you add a view controller as a child, then add the child's root view to your view, the system should send the appropriate messages as you add the view controller.
Try taking out your manual calls to those methods and set breakpoints in your child view controller to see if they still get called.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
namespace media {

MEDIA_EXPORT VideoCodec
VideoCodecProfileToVideoCodec(VideoCodecProfile profile);

class MEDIA_EXPORT VideoDecoderConfig {
 public:
  // Constructs an uninitialized object. Clients should call Initialize() with
  // appropriate values before using.
  VideoDecoderConfig();

  // Constructs an initialized object. It is acceptable to pass in NULL for
  // |extra_data|, otherwise the memory is copied.
  VideoDecoderConfig(VideoCodec codec,
                     VideoCodecProfile profile,
                     VideoPixelFormat format,
                     ColorSpace color_space,
                     const gfx::Size& coded_size,
                     const gfx::Rect& visible_rect,
                     const gfx::Size& natural_size,
                     const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra_data,
                     const EncryptionScheme& encryption_scheme);

  VideoDecoderConfig(const VideoDecoderConfig& other);

  ~VideoDecoderConfig();

  // Resets the internal state of this object.
  void Initialize(VideoCodec codec,
                  VideoCodecProfile profile,
                  VideoPixelFormat format,
                  ColorSpace color_space,
                  const gfx::Size& coded_size,
                  const gfx::Rect& visible_rect,
                  const gfx::Size& natural_size,
                  const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra_data,
                  const EncryptionScheme& encryption_scheme);

  // Returns true if this object has appropriate configuration values, false
  // otherwise.
  bool IsValidConfig() const;

  // Returns true if all fields in |config| match this config.
  // Note: The contents of |extra_data_| are compared not the raw pointers.
  bool Matches(const VideoDecoderConfig& config) const;

  // Returns a human-readable string describing |*this|.  For debugging & test
  // output only.
  std::string AsHumanReadableString() const;

  std::string GetHumanReadableCodecName() const;

  static std::string GetHumanReadableProfile(VideoCodecProfile profile);

  VideoCodec codec() const { return codec_; }
  VideoCodecProfile profile() const { return profile_; }

  // Video format used to determine YUV buffer sizes.
  VideoPixelFormat format() const { return format_; }

  // The default color space of the decoded frames. Decoders should output
  // frames tagged with this color space unless they find a different value in
  // the bitstream.
  ColorSpace color_space() const { return color_space_; }

  // Deprecated. TODO(wolenetz): Remove. See https://crbug.com/665539.
  // Width and height of video frame immediately post-decode. Not all pixels
  // in this region are valid.
  gfx::Size coded_size() const { return coded_size_; }

  // Region of |coded_size_| that is visible.
  gfx::Rect visible_rect() const { return visible_rect_; }

  // Final visible width and height of a video frame with aspect ratio taken
  // into account.
  gfx::Size natural_size() const { return natural_size_; }

  // Optional byte data required to initialize video decoders, such as H.264
  // AVCC data.
  void SetExtraData(const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra_data);
  const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra_data() const { return extra_data_; }

  // Whether the video stream is potentially encrypted.
  // Note that in a potentially encrypted video stream, individual buffers
  // can be encrypted or not encrypted.
  bool is_encrypted() const { return encryption_scheme_.is_encrypted(); }

  // Encryption scheme used for encrypted buffers.
  const EncryptionScheme& encryption_scheme() const {
    return encryption_scheme_;
  }

  void set_color_space_info(const gfx::ColorSpace& color_space_info);
  gfx::ColorSpace color_space_info() const;

  void set_hdr_metadata(const HDRMetadata& hdr_metadata);
  base::Optional<HDRMetadata> hdr_metadata() const;

 private:
  VideoCodec codec_;
  VideoCodecProfile profile_;

  VideoPixelFormat format_;

  // TODO(servolk): Deprecated, use color_space_info_ instead.
  ColorSpace color_space_;

  // Deprecated. TODO(wolenetz): Remove. See https://crbug.com/665539.
  gfx::Size coded_size_;

  gfx::Rect visible_rect_;
  gfx::Size natural_size_;

  std::vector<uint8_t> extra_data_;

  EncryptionScheme encryption_scheme_;

  gfx::ColorSpace color_space_info_;
  base::Optional<HDRMetadata> hdr_metadata_;

  // Not using DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN here intentionally to allow the compiler
  // generated copy constructor and assignment operator. Since the extra data is
  // typically small, the performance impact is minimal.
};

}  // namespace media

#endif  // MEDIA_BASE_VIDEO_DECODER_CONFIG_H_

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Q: Openssl runtime returns encrypted string only I am cross compiling an updated version openssl-fips and openssl for an embedded linux platform in the same manner as we have in previous versions.  It all compiles nicely, but when introduced to the embedded platform, I get a behavior I have not seen before.  No matter what command parameters I pass to it, it simply returns an encrypted string or a checksum or some random series of numbers, as follows:
openssl version
878ea738d2099bcfcad2d1c474bfc01cc80d831
I have asked this on the openssl mailing list but haven't received any responses yet. Also, I have dug all over the internet to get any kind of information on what is causing it. Is it due to incompatible fips module & openssl versions.  Or have I accidently set this to a fips only feature instead of one that can be toggled?


text:
The Carlyle Comment
enter e-mail below to be notified of updates!
A "Thank You" note sent to a Government agency today...
Sounds strange, doesn't it!
I did the unusual today.
I wrote the FCC. Yes, the Federal Communications Commission. No, not the "corporate" FCC you know, but one particular commissioner, Commissioner Ajit Pai. He has been instrumental in pushing for improvements in how AM radio stations are allowed to cover their cities of license (in our case, Ionia) and, after reading many, many comments filed in FCC Proceeding number 13-249, I felt it necessary to write. (As you know, we, and many other stations and individuals filed our comments via the FCC's public submission website.) The outcome of public comments is yet to be decided by the commission.
The letter was a thank you for his effort to assist AM stations. Much of this effort was spearheaded by the station we affectionately call our "sister 1430" WRDN in Durand, Wisconsin. They've had similar battles in bringing back a "dark" (off-air) station for their small town, serving a similar small town to our own Ionia, climbing the ladder of awareness, marketing, and acceptance.
Before writing, I needed to know how to get my message efficiently to the Commissioner. So, I called the FCC, not knowing who I would speak with or how crazy they may think my request to assure my e-mail would not go into the Commissioner's spam folder would be viewed. I was treated with the utmost courtesy by an FCC operator who took my request for how to properly reach the Commissioner, and within an hour or so, contact was made, back personally from the Commissioner's assistant, and the letter quickly exchanged, saving me sending a physical copy. It should also be noted that the very kind lady to whom I was referred told me as we worked through my request that she has been at the FCC for forty years! Can you imagine that? She's gone from sending telegrams among offices and radio & TV stations to utilizing the internet, she's seen the ability to take public comments instantly via the web, and so many developments! If only we all could have this kind of polite service in all our dealings with the government and in our dealings with what I (not-so at times) affectionately refer to as "Corporate America."
I felt it my duty to assure Commissioner Pai there are small radio stations in markets like Ionia that are successful thanks to you, our listeners, advertisers, and from the hard work of the owners. It's no secret that the "I-1430" you enjoy today is widely different from any WION you've known in the past, and it took years of faith in hard work to supply you with the services we are now proud to provide!
So today, hats-off, and a thankful note to two individuals at the FCC. One who is on the front line of communication with the public and the media, with 40 years of, no doubt, polite communications with everyone from Joe America to "big" radio or TV operator, and the other, a man who I believe has the best interest of the continued growth of stations like WION in mind as the FCC discusses all the public comments.
Some may say a thank you note of this type could be considered a request for special treatment. On the contrary. We asked for nothing except to have the letter read, and to offer WION as a small market success story. I simply felt that if I am quick to condemn big government decisions at times, I should also be quick to compliment those people who's efforts to improve business on my behalf or that of my company should be recognized.
...And, saying "thank you" to anyone who does something nice just has a calming, pleasant effect on this Monday. Or ...any day. I hope someday to introduce Commissioner Pai to you, our listeners via phone. I think you'd find him an interesting person and advocate of stations like WION.
Thank YOU for reading....Even that one felt great!
-Carlyle
Posted by Carlyle at 4:55 PM 1 comment:
A letter to the FCC about Improving AM broadcasting
Re: FCC Proceeding 13-249, AM Revitalization
With regard to the possibility of some rule changes to benefit AM stations, I'd like to comment from an AM owner's point of view. Not just any AM, but one which is the only commercial station in our county, and one we brought back from the dead in 2004 with success from hard work.
WION Radio is what some may call a "Heritage" station. Our call letters go back to 1953, when the station started at 500 watts, non-directional. I still have in our files some congratulatory telegrams, letters, and floral arrangement cards congratulating the original owners on their new station. Some of those communications come all the way from Owosso, and Hastings, Michigan. Back then, 500 watts daytime went much farther as you know. With today's interference and noise, our listenable (now 4.7kw) signal does not carry as far!
WION radio under our ownership has a proud decade-plus history. We started the station back up in 2004 from off-air. We saved the license with days to go. It had no clients, no web presence, no logo, no listeners, no accounts receivable, and no listeners. We took a chance as working owners and, today are proud of our industry-leading AM stereo analog sound and our success. Properly researched engineering allowed us to enlarge our (daytime) coverage by installing switching equipment and filing for our license to include daytime-only non-directional broadcasting. We also added an FM translator 5 years into our ownership, and in the past 3 years started independent streaming of our full-10khz wide AM stereo signal to showcase to listeners the potential quality which AM radio stations can provide. We invite you to hear WION's full analog stereo AM signal, originating from a Carver AM Stereo tuner by visiting www.i1430.com.
With all these advancements and achievements, we still operate at night under a strange and limiting factor. We have 330 watts directional power licensed on 3 towers, but by design, it points north in the shape of a light bulb, and while WION can be heard for 7 miles clearly as you head north leaving our facility, it cannot be heard on our own city of license's Main Street just a mile and a half south/southeast of the station.
We are not like many other stations. We were able to revive our station and gain support through local programming of music, news, sports, and guests in the style of 1970's full-service radio. We knew that this AM station needed not only a signal, but programming that is interesting, important, and entertaining to our listeners and at the same time, programming which served the city of Ionia and Ionia County. Our programming recipe worked, and we were paying our bills on an AM-only station long before we got the FM translator. As a matter of fact, we still have many listeners who use our AM as they travel I-96 between Lansing and Grand Rapids during daylight hours. Thus, I'd add that our FM translator helps add local listeners, but was not a "saving" factor. Proper programming, owners that care, and a combination of great engineering and educating our listeners made this station a success in our early years of our ownership, even with our nighttime limitations.
Some comments have been made to the FCC saying that AM stations owning an FM translator will "save" AM. I disagree with our history as proof. We were 5 years into our ownership before our FM was on the air, able to pay our bills, even without the FM signal. Other comments have said the parent AM turn in their license in favor of keeping only an FM translator. Again, I strongly disagree.
First of all, until such time as AM translators are protected, the risk exists of losing that translator to a fully licensed station, or of a frequency change due to factors outside the control of the AM licensee. Both these scenarios are real and would prove costly to the AM operator. Secondly, if you take the case of WION, it's true our FM translator fills in the nighttime gaps underserved by our current AM nighttime pattern, and to a degree some of our AM area by listener's choice, but our AM remains important. Our town is in a valley. our FM does not travel as well downtown, and has issues inside many of the historic buildings our clients occupy. Many (clients) still use our AM even though FM is available around our city, yet when the sun goes down, their AM signal is nearly gone. Our AM is important to us, day, and night. We've invested in it. We have probably the best sounding AM in the nation from our hard work, and we'd like to have it serve our town day and night via the airwaves, not just from FM and streaming of real AM stereo.
A review of our nighttime license and signal will show the FCC that somewhere in the past, WION was (night) licensed with no attention to it's city of license, but rather an intent of only in maintaining a 24 hour class of license. It has never properly served it's city, (Ionia) after dark. Perhaps it was a waiver, perhaps it was the ego of the original owner who wanted WION's signal to reach Greenville, MI because he hated the existence of (what is now) WGLM-AM. Either way, the problem still exists: Finding a way to give Ionia some improved degree of night service on AM 1430.
Illustrating by example that possibilities do exist to provide better night signal to our town at night, WION has observed during the time when we were building new ATU's to replace our 60 year old tower houses, and in the period of time when our FM translator was being built, that operating at greatly reduced night power for very short periods of time. (non directional via our North daytime-signal tower) provided a better, stronger, more "listenable" signal in our town which reached out only a few miles but better covered our city than our licensed 330 watts pointed north.
In each of these times, no complaints were made, filed, or noticed by the other 1430's we protect, yet in each case, our town was better covered at reduced power on a single antenna. Sad to think the possibility exists for better coverage but only by diminished RF radiation. This does, however serve as an example that not all signal solutions involve upping the power of the licensee's station, but through better use of the existing facilities.
With our situation being used as a very real example of a licensed AM which cannot serve it's own town at night, and where our particular AM 1430 is concerned, it makes sense for the FCC to look at any and all adjustments to outdated regulations which can aid in improving the service to our own town. We're not asking to compete 50 miles, 100, or even multiple states out of our coverage area, we're asking only that whatever rules prohibit us having coverage in our own towns be changed so we can provide our signal reliably day and night.
It's entirely possible that if WION was allowed, for instance, 250 watts night non-D, we'd not only cover out town nicely, but cause no measurable interference within the primary contour of any station we currently protect! It's also entirely possible that with that same reduction in our nighttime power, and the authority granted to use one antenna for coverage, the solution that helps WION better serve it's community may be achieved.
Currently, single tower power would be limited to 86 watts, and we'd have to give up our class of license to become only an "authorization." Under current rules, we'd be penalized for this by stations in Ohio (200 miles away) and Indiana (270 miles away) possibly making concurrent changes that would nullify any positive changes our single-stick 86 watts would provide. The loss of the "license" class at night also reduces the future value of the station to it's owners.
A renewed review and approach to nighttime AM rules with emphasis on proper engineering before implementation of changes on a case-by-case basis could aid many stations, WION included in our ability to serve our towns 24/7, and in the long-term viability and value of our stations.
WION has been a success because we ask of our engineers, "what can we do to improve" and, because we work hard at creating the best AM (stereo, C-Quam) sound anywhere. It's put us on the map all over the world. We hope that the FCC will help WION and other stations grow in quality of signal, coverage, and viability with positive changes in the near future.
In closing, let's hope that any future positive changes implemented by the FCC for AM broadcasters may also serve to open the door to improved receiver bandwidth standards over time, just as (AM) radio receivers added the expanded band over time after the FCC added these frequencies to the standard broadcast band.
Jim "Carlyle" Angus, Managing Member and Morning Host,
Packer Radio WION, LLC.
Licensee of WION-AM and W224BZ,
Ionia, MI 48846
Posted by Carlyle at 6:38 AM 2 comments: