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Effect of Power-Frequency Magnetic Fields on Genome-Scale Gene expression on s....
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RADIATION RESEARCH 160, 25–37 (2003) 03-7587/03 $5.0 q 2003 by Radiation Research Society. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
Effect of Power-Frequency Magnetic Fields on Genome-Scale Gene Expression in Saccharomyces cerevisiae
Satoshi Nakasono,a,b,1 Craig Laramee,b Hiroshi Saikia and Kenneth J. McLeodb a Bio-Science Department, Abiko Research Laboratory, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, 1646 Abiko, Abiko-City, Chiba 270- 1194, Japan; and b Program in Biomedical Engineering, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York 11794
Nakasono, S., Laramee, C., Saiki, H. and McLeod, K. J.
Effect of Power-Frequency Magnetic Fields on Genome-Scale Gene Expression in Saccharomyces cerevisiae. Radiat. Res. 160, 25–37 (2003).
To estimate the effect of 50 Hz magnetic-field exposure on genome-wide gene expression, the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae was used as a model for eukaryotes. 2D PAGE (about 1,0 spots) for protein and cDNA microarray (about 5,900 genes) analysis for mRNA were performed. The cells were exposed to 50 Hz vertical magnetic fields at 10, 150 or 300 mT r.m.s. for 24 h. As positive controls, the cells were exposed to aerobic conditions, heat (408C) or minimal medium. The 2D PAGE and microarray analyses for the positive controls showed high-confidence differential expression of many genes including those for known or unknown proteins and mRNAs. For magnetic-field exposure, no high-confidence changes in expression were observed for proteins or genes that were related to heat-shock response, DNA repair, respiration, protein synthesis and the cell cycle. Principal component analysis showed no statistically significant difference in principal components, with only insignificant differences between the magnetic-field intensities studied. In contrast, the principal components for the positive controls were significantly different. The results indicate that a 50 Hz magnetic field below 300 mT did not act as a general stress factor like heat shock or DNA damage, as had been reported previously by others. This study failed to find a plausible differential gene expression that would point to a possible mechanism of an effect of magnetic fields. The findings provide no evidence that the magnetic-field exposure alters the fundamental mechanism of translation and transcription in eukaryotic cells. q 2003 by Radiation Research Society
Public concern regarding the health effects of power-frequency electric and magnetic fields (EMFs) has been increasing since an epidemiological study in 1979 reported
1 Address for correspondence: Bio-Science Department, Abiko Research Laboratory, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, 1646 Abiko, Abiko-City, Chiba 270-1194, Japan; e-mail: nakasono@ criepi.denken.or.jp.
an increased cancer risk in children living near power lines (1). Since then, many studies have been conducted in an effort to explain the findings, and some recent research suggests that weak power-frequency fields (50/60 Hz) may exert biological effects. The NIEHS working group report (2) of the EMF Research and Public Information Dissemination Program stated that extremely low-frequency (ELF) EMFs may be carcinogenic to humans. However, a mechanism for the carcinogenic or biological effects of EMFs has not been forthcoming, and most laboratory results are in disagreement with this conclusion (2–6).
Several investigators have reported observations of an effect of weak magnetic fields (below 1 mT) on gene expression in bacteria (7) and on heat-shock proteins (HSPs) in yeast (8) and mammalian cells (9, 10). Additional reports suggest that the pattern of synthesis is similar to the response to general environmental stress (1). This type of response with induction of HSPs is widely reported in bacteria, yeast and human cells. In contrast, other reports indicate no such response in bacteria (12) and human cell lines (13). Some reports suggest that these discrepancies could arise from differences in exposure systems, differences in cell karyotypes between the research groups (2, 5), or a misunderstanding of experimental noise (12).
McCann and her colleagues reviewed the literature on the genotoxic potential of EMFs in 1993 and again in 1998 (3, 4). Most of the reports reviewed showed that ELF EMFs ranging from 0.15–5 mT were not genotoxic. Nevertheless, some reports were positive. An exposure to a 50 Hz, 400 mT magnetic field increased the mutation frequency in MeWo cells (14), and a 60 Hz, 0.1–0.5 mT magnetic field inhibited DNA repair in rat brain cells (15, 16) in a reaction that could be blocked by free radical scavengers, suggesting involvement of oxygen radicals.
The general stress response (elevated temperature, toxins, heavy metals, free radicals, etc.) is found in all bacteria, plant and animal cells, and it is remarkably conserved throughout evolution. The mechanism of the stress response has been widely investigated in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, whose genome has recently been fully sequenced and which provides a useful model system for studies of eukaryotes. Recently databases for yeast have
26 NAKASONO ET AL.
FIG. 1. Comparison of 2D image of yeast total protein between control and positive controls. 7: increased level of protein synthesis compared to control gel. N: decreased level of protein synthesis. The change in synthesis levels was estimated by visual observation. Protein; 1002125 mg. Control conditions: for 24 h at 258C, YPD medium. Aerobic conditions: for 12 h at 258C with 1 liter air/min, YPD medium. Heat shock: at 508C for 1 h, YPD medium. Minimal medium: for 24 h at 258C, minimal medium. Three independent experiments (control and exposure) were done for each condition. The difference in the protein profiles was estimated visually in the same experimental set. The gel images shown are typical gels for each condition.
27POWER-FREQUENCY MAGNETIC FIELDS AND GENE EXPRESSION IN YEAST
FIG. 2. Comparison of 2D images of yeast total protein in control and magnetic-field-exposed cells. The changes in synthesis levels were observed visually. Protein: 100–125 mg. Control conditions: for 24 h at 258C, YPD medium. Magnetic-field exposure: 50 Hz, 10 mT, sinusoidal, vertical, for 24ha t2 58C, YPD medium.
been constructed: The SWISS-2DPAGE database2 for protein and the YPD (17), MIPS3 and Stanford Genomic Resources4 databases for mRNA.
Genome-scale screening methods such as 2D PAGE and cDNA microarray analyses are powerful methods for identifying global responses to various environmental perturbations, such as heat shock (18), different carbon sources (19, 20), UV radiation (21), mutagens (2), osmotic shock, radicals (20) and EMFs (18). Protein 2D PAGE provides a protein profile that is related to the cell and reflects differences in protein function. This method can identify a large number of proteins (about one-sixth of the total proteins in yeast). cDNA microarray provides an mRNA synthesis profile that reflects the cellular response to environmental changes rather than the cell type. Thus functional analysis is easier, since all of the genes on the array have already been characterized. Thus using both 2D PAGE and cDNA microarrays should be one of the most powerful approaches for identifying both the effect(s) and mechanism(s) of environmental perturbation.
If the magnetic-field exposure causes differential gene expression that is related to an unknown or known process in eukaryotic cells, such as the heat-shock response, DNA repair, respiration, protein synthesis and the cell cycle, a response in yeast also should be found after exposure to a
2 SWISS-2DPAGE (http://expasy.hcuge.ch/ch2d/ch2d-top.html). 3 Munich Information Centre for Protein Sequences (MIPS, http:// mips.gsf.de/proj/yeast/). 4 Stanford Genomic Resources (http://genome-w.stanford.edu/).
high-intensity magnetic field using genome-scale gene expression analysis. The aim of this study is to clarify the existence of an effect of high-intensity (up to 300 mT) 50 Hz magnetic fields on genome-wide gene expression in yeast by analyses using 2D PAGE and cDNA microarrays (containing over 95% of the total expected genes). The magnetic-field intensities in this study are at least several hundred times higher than the intensities found in homes or intensities in occupational settings, and these are at least tens of thousands of times higher than the intensity that caused the health effects reported in some epidemiological studies (1), but they will provide a reference point for further studies.
Yeast Strain, Culture Vessels and Growth Conditions
The yeast S. cerevisiae (IAM 4206) was obtained from the IAM Culture Collection (The University of Tokyo, Japan). The cells were precultured at 25.0 6 0.28C at 160 rpm for 12 h in 5 ml of YPD medium. The medium was made from 10 g of yeast extract, 20 g of peptone, and 20 g of dextrose in 1 liter of deionized water. For 10 mT magnetic-fieldexposed cultures and positive controls (aerobic, heat shock, minimal medium), 50 ml of the preculture was inoculated into 300 ml of medium (final cell density about 104 cells/ml) in an annular-shaped culture vessel (external diameter 20 cm, internal diameter 15 cm) (12). For 150 mT and 300 mT magnetic fields, 17 ml of preculture was inoculated into 100 ml of YPD medium (final cell density about 104 cells/ml) in an annularshaped culture vessel (external diameter 9.5 cm, internal diameter 6.0 cm). The control cells in each experiment were cultured at the same time in an identical culture vessel in the sham-exposure system. The conditions
TABLE 1 Comparison of Changes in Expression between Proteins and mRNAs
ORF Gene name
Protein name on
2D gel Process Function Aerobic
Protein mRNA ratio CL
YJR121W YPL106C YFL039C YAL005C
YLL024C
ATP2 SSE1 ACT1 SSA1
SSA2
ATPB HS78 ACT HS71
ATP synthesis calmodulin signaling cytoskeleton ER and mitochondrial translocation
ER and mitochondrial translocation
F1F0-ATPase complex, F1 beta subunit HSP70 family actin cytosolic HSP70 cytosolic HSP70
YPR035W YBR221C YDR050C YFR053C YGL253W
GLN1 PDB1 TPI1 HXK1 HXK2 glutamine biosynthesis glycolysis glycolysis glycolysis glycolysis glutamine synthetase pyruvate dehydrogenase triosephosphate isomerase hexokinase I hexokinase I
— YGR192C YHR174W YJL052W YKL152C YLR044C
TDH3 ENO2 TDH1 GPM1 PDC1
G3P3 ENO2 G3P1 PMG1 DCP1 glycolysis glycolysis glycolysis glycolysis glycolysis glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase 3 enolase I glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase 1 phosphoglycerate mutase pyruvate decarboxylase
— A (UP) YLL026W
YLR355C
YCL018W YIL051C
YDR226W
HSP104 ILV5
LEU2 MMD1
ADK1
Effect of Power-Frequency Magnetic Fields on Genome-Scale Gene expression on s. cerevisiae
Effect of Power-Frequency...


Sometimes we Okies look upon our neighbors to the south with a resentful eye. For pro-life Oklahomans, though, our eyes in the weeks ahead ought to be on Texas, but with all prayer, hope and friendship.
You see, two major battlefronts in the fight for life come down to what is happening in Texas.
According to Americans United for Life President, Charmaine Yoest, the Supreme Court's consideration of Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, which stems from a law regulating abortion clinics in Texas, could affect all states who have passed laws regulating abortion.
The law in question simply requires abortion clinics have the same standards as normal medical clinics and that doctors have hospital admitting privileges no more than 30 miles away.
Oklahoma has passed various common-sense laws regulating abortion like this, 16 laws in fact since 1998 alone. The fate of some of these laws, as well as Texas and other states, could rest in the decision of the nine Supreme Court justices.
The highest Court in the land has been unreliable at its best moments and downright disastrous at its worst, when it comes to the lives of the unborn. Let's pray the hearings in March and ruling this summer go to protect life and women's health.
Not far from the city related to the Supreme Court case, a Grand Jury investigation is taking place that could determine the future of those who exposed Planned Parenthood, the nation's largest abortion provider.
To be specific, "David Daleiden, the director of the Center for Medical Progress (CMP), has been indicted on a felony charge of tampering with a governmental record and a misdemeanor count related to purchasing human organs. Another CMP employee, Sandra Merritt, was indicted on a charge of tampering with a governmental record." We now know that the CMP are being accused of using fake driver's licenses to do their undercover work.
We must let the legal system do its work in this case and let details emerge, but we must note the irony that PP is off the hook, even though there is evidence they are harvesting and trafficking tissue and organs from aborted babies, while the people trying to expose this heinous, grizzly practice are on trial.
Some people praise David Daleiden for taking on the abortion Goliath, Planned Parenthood. Others in the pro-choice movement want to see him arrested or at least silenced.
What we ought to do is pray that hearts would be changed, and this nation would no longer tolerate—let alone fund through tax dollars—the immoral practices of Planned Parenthood.
The weeks and months ahead will be very telling in the epic struggle for life in America, and the fate of millions of unborn children may rest in the Lone Star State. And so we pray and say, God bless Texas.


CORVALLIS SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY. CORVALLIS SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. OREGON ex rel. STATE LAND BOARD.
This litigation involves a dispute between the State of Oregon and an Oregon corporation over the ownership of two portions of land underlying the Willamette River, which is navigable but not an interstate boundary. The first portion has been within the riverbed since Oregon's admission into the Union, while the second portion is in an area that was not part of the riverbed at the time of Oregon's admission but later became part of the riverbed because of changes in the river's course. In an ejectment action brought by Oregon against the corporation, which had been digging in the disputed part of the riverbed for 40 to 50 years without a lease from the State, the trial court awarded the first portion to the State on the ground that it had acquired sovereign title thereto upon admission into the Union and had not conveyed it, but with respect to the second portion found that avulsion, rather than accretion, had caused the changes in the river channel and that therefore the title to the land remained in the corporation, its original owner before it became riverbed. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, taking the view that it was bound to apply federal common law to the resolution of the dispute by Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S.Ct. 517, 38 L.Ed.2d 526, and accordingly holding that the trial court's award of the second portion to the corporation was correct either under the theory of avulsion or under an exception to the accretion rule, and that preservation of the State's interest in navigation, fishing, and other related goals did not require that it acquire ownership of the new riverbed. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, with certain modifications dealing only with a factual question regarding the length of the second portion. Held: The disputed ownership of the riverbed lands should be decided solely as a matter of Oregon law and not by federal common law, since application of federal common law is required neither by the equal-footing doctrine nor by any other principle of federal law. If the lands at issue did pass under the equal-footing doctrine, state title is not subject to defeasance and state law governs subsequent dispositions. A similar result obtains in the case of riparian lands which did not pass under that doctrine; state law governs issues relating to such property, like other real property, unless some other principle of federal law requires a different result. Bonelli Cattle Co., supra, was wrong in treating the equal-footing doctrine as a source of federal common law after the doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in question in that case in the State of Arizona as of the time of its admission into the Union, and accordingly that case's application of federal common law to cases such as the instant one is overruled. Pp. 368-382.
272 Or. 545, 536 P.2d 517; 272 Or. 550, 538 P.2d 70, vacated and remanded.
Robert Mix, Corvallis, Or., for Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.
Russell Iungerich, Los Angeles, Cal., for the State of Cal. as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
Peter S. Herman, Salem, Or., for Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd.
This lawsuit began when the State of Oregon sued Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., an Oregon corporation, to settle the ownership of certain lands underlying the Willamette River. The Willamette is a navigable river, and this land is located near Corvallis, Oregon. The river is not an interstate boundary.
Corvallis Sand had been digging in the disputed part of the riverbed for 40 to 50 years without a lease from the State. The State brought an ejectment action against Corvallis Sand, seeking to recover 11 separate parcels of riverbed, as well as damages for the use of the parcels. The State's complaint alleged that by virtue of its sovereignty it was the owner in fee simple of the disputed portions of the riverbed, and that it was entitled to immediate possession and damages. Corvallis Sand denied the State's ownership of the bed.
Each party was partially successful in the Oregon courts,1 and we granted cross petitions for certiorari. 423 U.S. 1048, 46 L.Ed.2d 636. Those courts understandably felt that our recent decision in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S.Ct. 517, 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), required that they ascertain and apply principles of federal common law to the controversy. Twenty-six States have joined in three amicus briefs urging that we reconsider Bonelli, supra, because of what they assert is its significant departure from long-established precedent in this Court.
* The nature of the litigation and the contentions of the parties may be briefly stated. Title to two distinct portions of land has been at issue throughout. The first of these portions has apparently been within the bed of the Willamette River since Oregon's admission into the Union.
The other portion of the land underlies the river in an area known as Fischer Cut, which was not a part of the riverbed at the time Oregon was admitted to the Union. The trial court found that prior to a flood which occurred in November 1909, the Willamette flowed around a peninsula-like formation known as Fischer Island, but that by 1890 a clearly discernible overflow channel across the neck of the peninsula had developed. Before 1909 this channel carried the flow of the river only at its intermediate or high stages, and the main channel of the river continued to flow around Fischer Island. But in November 1909, a major flood, in the words of the Oregon trial court, "suddenly and with great force and violence converted Fischer Cut into the main channel of the river."
The trial court, sitting without a jury, awarded all parcels in dispute, except for the Fischer Cut lands, to the State. That court found that the State had acquired sovereign title to those lands upon admission into the Union, and that it had not conveyed that title. The State was also awarded damages to recompense it for Corvallis Sand's use of the lands.
With respect to the Fischer Cut lands, the trial court found that avulsion, rather than accretion, had caused the change in the channel of the river, and therefore the title to the lands remained in Corvallis Sand, the original owner of the land before it became riverbed.
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. That court felt bound, under Bonelli, to apply federal common law to the resolution of this property dispute. In so doing, the court found that the trial court's award of Fischer Cut to Corvallis Sand was correct either under the theory of avulsion, or under the so-called exception to the accretion rule, announced in Commissioners v. United States, 270 F. 110 (CA8 1920).2 The court, finding that preservation of the State's interest in navigation, fishing, and other related goals did not require that it acquire ownership of the new bed, rejected the argument that the State's sovereign title to a riverbed follows the course of the river as it moves.
The dispute in Bonelli was over the ownership of the former bed of the Colorado River, a bed which the river had abandoned because of a federal rechanneling project. The Bonelli land was not part of the actual riverbed, however, either at the time Arizona was admitted to the Union, or at the time of suit. Before Arizona had been admitted as a State, Bonelli's predecessor in title had received a United States patent to the land. Over a period of years the Colorado River had migrated gradually eastward, eroding its east bank and depositing alluvion on its west bank in the process. In the course of this movement of the river the Bonelli land, which had at the time of patent been on the east bank, was submerged, and, until the rechanneling project, most of it was under water. After the completion of the rechanneling project the bed of the Colorado River was substantially narrowed, and the Bonelli land re-emerged.
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that Arizona owned the title to the beds of navigable rivers within its borders, and that Arizona therefore acquired title to the Bonelli land when it became part of the riverbed as a result of the eastward migration of the Colorado. That court went on to hold that under state law the re-emergence of the land was an avulsive change, which did not divest the State of its title to the exposed land. This Court granted certiorari and reversed the Supreme Court of Arizona.
We held that federal common law should govern in deciding whether a State retained title to lands which had re-emerged from the bed of a navigable stream, relying in part on Borax, Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 56 S.Ct. 23, 80 L.Ed. 9 (1935). That case held that the extent and validity of a federal grant was a question to be resolved by federal law, and in Bonelli we decided that the nature of the title conferred by the equal-footing doctrine set forth in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845), should likewise be governed by federal common law. Under the equal-footing doctrine "the new States since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction . . . as the original States possess within their respective borders." Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436, 18 L.Ed. 756 (1867). Pollard's Lessee held that under the equal-footing doctrine new States, upon their admission to the Union, acquire title to the lands underlying navigable waters within their boundaries.
We went on to discuss the nature of the sovereign's interest in the riverbed, which we found to lie in the protection of navigation, fisheries, and similar purposes. We held that under federal common law, as we construed it in that case, Arizona's sovereign interest in the re-emerged land was not sufficient to enable it to retain title. We found the principle governing title to lands which have been formed by accretion, rather than that which governs title where there has been an avulsive change in the channel of the river, to be applicable. We chose the former because it would both ensure the riparian owner access to the water's edge and prevent the State from receiving a windfall. We therefore decided that Bonelli, as riparian owner, was entitled to the land in question.
Our analysis today leads us to conclude that our decision to apply federal common law in Bonelli was incorrect. We first summarize the basis for this conclusion, and then elaborate in greater detail in Parts III and IV, infra.
The title to the land underlying the Colorado River at the time Arizona was admitted to the Union vested in the State as of that date under the rule of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra. Although federal law may fix the initial boundary line between fast lands and the riverbeds at the time of a State's admission to the Union, the State's title to the riverbed vests absolutely as of the time of its admission and is not subject to later defeasance by operation of any doctrine of federal common law. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 10 L.Ed. 264 (1839); Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57, 21 L.Ed. 798 (1873).
Bonelli's thesis that the equal-footing doctrine would require the effect of a movement of the river upon title to the riverbed to be resolved under federal common law was in error. Once the equal-footing doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in Arizona as of the time of its admission to the Union, the force of that doctrine was spent; it did not operate after that date to determine what effect on titles the movement of the river might have. Our error, as we now see it, was to view the equal-footing doctrine enunciated in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan as a basis upon which federal common law could supersede state law in the determination of land titles. Precisely the contrary is true; in Pollard's Lessee itself the equal-footing doctrine resulted in the State's acquisition of title notwithstanding the efforts of the Federal Government to dispose of the lands in question in another way.
The equal-footing doctrine did not, therefore, provide a basis for federal law to supersede the State's application of its own law in deciding title to the Bonelli land, and state law should have been applied unless there were present some other principle of federal law requiring state law to be displaced. The only other basis4 for a colorable claim of federal right in Bonelli was that the Bonelli land had originally been patented to its predecessor by the United States, just as had most other land in the Western States. But that land had long been in private ownership and, hence, under the great weight of precedent from this Court, subject to the general body of state property law. Wilcox v. Jackson, supra, 13 Pet., at 517, 10 L.Ed. 264. Since the application of federal common law is required neither by the equal-footing doctrine nor by any other claim of federal right, we now believe that title to the Bonelli land should have been governed by Arizona law, and that the disputed ownership of the lands in the bed of the Willamette River in this case should be decided solely as a matter of Oregon law.
"(T)hat if (the jury) believed the premises sued for were below usual high water-mark, at the time Alabama was admitted into the union, then the act of Congress, and the patent in pursuance thereof, could give the plaintiffs no title, whether the waters had receded by the labour of man only, or by alluvion . . ." 3 How., at 220.
"First, The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, The new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states. Thirdly, The right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy . . . ." Id., at 230.
In so holding, the Court established the absolute title of the States to the beds of navigable waters, a title which neither a provision in the Act admitting the State to the Union5 nor a grant from Congress to a third party was capable of defeating.
"The new states admitted into the Union since the adoption of the constitution have the same rights as the original states in the tide waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective jurisdictions. The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below (the) high-water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws of the several states, subject to the rights granted to the United States by the constitution."
At the time of our decision in Bonelli, this line of authority stood side by side with, and was wholly consistent with, other cases requiring the application of federal law to questions of land titles or boundaries. Where Mexico had patented tidal lands to a private owner before ceding to the United States the territory which ultimately became the State of California, California did not succeed to the ownership of such lands upon her admission to the Union. Knight v. United Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161, 12 S.Ct. 258, 35 L.Ed. 974 (1891). If a navigable stream is an interstate boundary, this Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction over suits between States, has necessarily developed a body of federal common law to determine the effect of a change in the bed of the stream on the boundary. See, e. g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 12 S.Ct. 396, 36 L.Ed. 186 (1892); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 38 S.Ct. 301, 62 L.Ed. 638 (1918). Congress possesses by virtue of its commerce power a "navigational servitude" with respect to navigable waters.
"All navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various states and individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of navigation created in favor of the federal government by the constitution." Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-272, 17 S.Ct. 578, 579, 41 L.Ed. 996 (1897).
In Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 56 S.Ct. 23, 80 L.Ed. 9 (1935), this Court also found a basis to apply federal law, but its rationale does not dictate a different result in this case. In Borax, the city of Los Angeles brought suit to quiet title in certain land in Los Angeles Harbor. Los Angeles claimed the land under a grant from the State of California, whereas Borax, Ltd., claimed the land as a successor in interest to a federal patentee. The federal patent had purported to convey a specified quantity of land, 18.88 acres, according to a survey by the General Land Office. This Court recognized that if the patent purported to convey lands which were part of the tidelands, the patent would be invalid to that extent since the Federal Government has no power to convey lands which are rightfully the State's under the equal-footing doctrine. Id., at 17-19, 56 S.Ct., at 26-27. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand for a new trial to allow the city to attempt to prove that some portion of the lands described in the federal patent was in fact tideland.
"We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land which had once been the property of the United States has passed, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever, according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United States." Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., at 517, 10 L.Ed. 264. (Emphasis added.) The contrary approach would result in a perverse application of the equal-footing doctrine. An original State would be free to choose its own legal principles to resolve property disputes relating to land under its riverbeds; a subsequently admitted State would be constrained by the equal-footing doctrine to apply the federal common-law rule, which may result in property law determinations antithetical to the desires of that State. See, Bonelli, 414 U.S., at 332-333, 94 S.Ct., at 529 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
A similar result obtains in the case of riparian lands which did not pass under the equal footing doctrine. This Court has consistently held that state law governs issues relating to this property, like other real property, unless some other principle of federal law requires a different result.
Under our federal system, property ownership is not governed by a general federal law, but rather by the laws of the several States. "The great body of law in this country which controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private parties, is found in the statutes and decisions of the state." Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155, 64 S.Ct. 474, 480, 88 L.Ed. 635 (1944). This is particularly true with respect to real property, for even when federal common law was in its heyday under the teachings of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842), an exception was carved out for the local law of real property. Id., at 18. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591, 93 S.Ct. 2389, 2396, 37 L.Ed.2d 187 (1973).
"Whether, as rules of property, it would now be safe to change these doctrines (arising out of the confusion of the original classification of nontidal waters as nonnavigable) where they have been applied, as before remarked, is for the several States themselves to determine. If they choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for others to raise objections. In our view of the subject the correct principles were laid down in Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 10 L.Ed. 997; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565, and Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 id. 471, 13 L.Ed. 220. These cases related to tide-water, it is true; but they enunciate principles which are equally applicable to all navigable waters." Id., at 338.
"(W)hatever incidents or rights attach to the ownership of property conveyed by the government will be determined by the states, subject to the condition that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the grants, or the use and enjoyment of the property, by the grantee."
"As this land in controversy is not the land described in the letters patent or the (A)cts of Congress, but, as is stated in the petition, is formed by accretions or gradual deposits from the river, whether such land belongs to the plaintiff is, under the cases just cited, a matter of local or state law, and not one arising under the laws of the United States." Id., at 343, 26 S.Ct., at 481.
Upon full reconsideration of our decision in Bonelli, we conclude that it was wrong in treating the equal-footing doctrine as a source of federal common law after that doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in the State of Arizona as of the time of its admission to the Union. We also think there was no other basis in that case, nor is there any in this case, to support the application of federal common law to override state real property law. There are obviously institutional considerations which we must face in deciding whether for that reason to overrule Bonelli or to adhere to it, and those considerations cut both ways. Substantive rules governing the law of real property are peculiarly subject to the principle of stare decisis. See United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S. 472, 44 S.Ct. 621, 68 L.Ed. 1110 (1924).
Here, however, we are not dealing with substantive property law as such, but rather with an issue substantially related to the constitutional sovereignty of the States. In cases such as this, considerations of stare decisis play a less important role than they do in cases involving substantive property law. Cf. The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 470, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849) (Taney, C. J., dissenting); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-411, 52 S.Ct. 443, 446-449, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944). Even if we were to focus on the effect of our decision upon rules of substantive property law, our concern for unsettling titles would lead us to overrule Bonelli, rather than to retain it. See Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 3 Wall. 332, 334, 18 L.Ed. 42 (1866). Since one system of resolution of property disputes has been adhered to from 1845 until 1973, and the other only for the past three years, a return to the former would more closely conform to the expectations of property owners than would adherence to the latter. We are also persuaded that, in large part because of the positions taken in the briefs presented to the Court in Bonelli, the Bonelli decision was not a deliberate repudiation of all the cases which had gone before. We there proceeded on the view, which we now think to have been mistaken, that Borax, supra, should be read so expansively as to in effect overrule subsilentio the line of cases following Pollard's Lessee.
For all of these reasons, we have now decided that Bonelli's application of federal common law to cases such as this must be overruled.
The judgment under review is vacated, and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of Oregon for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I would not overrule Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S.Ct. 517, 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), and would therefore affirm the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE joins, dissenting.
The Court today overrules a three-year-old decision, Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S.Ct. 517, 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), in which seven of the eight participating Justices joined. In addition, as the Court is certain to announce when the occasion arises, today's holding also overrules Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 88 S.Ct. 438, 19 L.Ed.2d 530 (1967), a nine-year-old decision also joined by all but one of the participating Justices.1 It is surprising, to say the least, to find these nearly unanimous recent decisions swept away in the name of stare decisis. See ante, at 381-382.
The public, especially holders of riparian or littoral property whose titles derive from the United States, deserve some explanation for the Court's change of course. Yet today's majority does not contend either that circumstances have changed since 1973 or that experience has shown Hughes and Bonelli to be unworkable. Nor does the majority attempt to explain why a result it finds so clearly commanded by our earlier cases was almost unanimously rejected by this Court twice in the last decade. We are left, then, with a mystery.
I respectfully suggest that the solution to this puzzle is not hard to find. In contrast to the Bonelli and Hughes Courts, the Court today decides a question the parties did not present,2 brief,3 or argue.4 By so doing, the Court rules without the benefit of "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions". Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The lack of illumination has caused the Court to choose the wrong path.
* The question the Court elects to decide in this case is whether a grant of riparian5 land by the Federal Government is to be interpreted according to federal or state law. The Court holds that federal law governs only the determination of the initial boundaries of the grant; all other questions are to be determined under state law. This conclusion depends on an unjustifiably limited interpretation of the meaning of a riparian grant.
It is undisputed that "the quality of being riparian" is perhaps "the land's 'most valuable feature' and is part and parcel of the ownership of the land itself." Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S., at 326, 94 S.Ct., at 526 quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S., at 293, 88 S.Ct., at 440. Cf. New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717, 9 L.Ed. 573 (1836). In the natural course, however, a riparian boundary tends to move, a fact reflected in the common-law doctrines of accretion, avulsion, erosion, and reliction. Prior to today's ruling, federal grantees of riparian land, and holders under them, correctly understood that their titles incorporated boundaries whose precise location would depend on the movements of the water and on the federal common law.
"The question is well settled at common law, that the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water, which changes its course gradually by alluvial formations, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss, by the same means which may add to his territory: and as he is without remedy for his loss, in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain." Ibid. (emphasis added).
"The rule, everywhere admitted, that where the land encroaches upon the water by gradual and imperceptible degrees, the accretion or alluvion belongs to the owner of the land, is equally applicable to lands bounding on tide waters or on fresh waters, and to the king or the state as to private persons, and is independent of the law governing the title in the soil covered by the water." Id., at 35, 14 S.Ct., at 561 (emphasis added).
Thus, the right to such additions7 was part of the title which passed with the federal grant, cf. 3 American Law of Property § 15.27, p. 859 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952), and was protected by federal law. By holding that state law now governs the impact of changes in the course of the bordering water on a federal riparian grant, the Court denies that "a question which concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States" is "necessarily a federal question." Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22, 56 S.Ct. 23, 29, 80 L.Ed. 9 (1935). As far as federal law is concerned, a federal riparian grant is now understood to have incorporated a fixed rather than ambulatory boundary. Ante, at 376. The rule of New Orleans v. United States, supra, and County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra, is discarded along with Bonelli and Hughes.
"We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land which had once been the property of the United States has passed, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever, according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United States." Id., at 517 (emphasis added).
The italicized language, on which the majority opinion makes no comment, explains why state law cannot control this case. Denial of the riparian holder's federal common-law rights to a changing boundary is not "consistent with the admission that the title . . . vested according to the laws of the United States."
In Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 11 S.Ct. 210, 34 L.Ed. 819 (1891),9 the Court held that it would construe federal grants of lands bordering navigable but nontidal waters as reaching only to the edge of the stream. As it did in Wilcox, the Court in Packer noted that state law governs property once it has passed from the hands of the Federal Government. But the Packer Court, like its predecessor, also noted that the influence of state law is "subject to the condition that (state) rules do not impair the efficacy of the (federal) grants, or the use and enjoyment of the property, by the grantee." 137 U.S., at 669, 11 S.Ct., at 212. Today's holding, which allows States to divest federally granted lands of their valuable quality of being riparian simply by refusing to recognize the titleholders' common-law rights, obviously removes this fundamental limitation on state power.
The Court also attempts to draw support from cases which affirm the proposition that the riparian title passed by a federal grant conveys title only to the water's edge, not to the middle of the stream. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 24 L.Ed. 224 (1877),10 was a controversy over the ownership of land created when the city of Keokuk filled in land below the ordinary high-water mark. The plaintiff claimed title to the new land by virtue of his asserted ownership of the adjacent upland. The Court noted that "(i)t is generally conceded that the riparian title attaches to subsequent accretions to the land effected by the gradual and imperceptible operation of natural causes." Id., at 337. Whether the same rule applied to land created out of the bed of the river, however, the Court considered a question of state law. The reason for this as the Court explained, is that the riparian rights granted by the Federal Government extended only to the water's edge; if the States wish to grant the riparian owner rights beyond that point, they may do so at their own discretion. See id., at 338. The Court transforms this conclusion that the States may, if they wish, enlarge the title granted by the Federal Government into support for the proposition that the States may also restrict that title. The transformation is impressive, but it is not logical.
The issue before the Court in Shively v. Bowlby, supra, was the title to land below the high-water mark of the Columbia River in Oregon. Shively claimed under a prestatehood grant from the United States, while Bowlby based his title on a subsequent grant from the State of Oregon. The Court held for Bowlby, finding that although Congress could have granted Shively title to the land he claimed,11 it had not done so, nor had the State. 152 U.S., at 48-57, 14 S.Ct., at 566-569.
"The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below (the) high-water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws of the several states, subject to the rights granted to the United States by the constitution." Id., at 57-58, 14 S.Ct., at 569.
Thus, the cases refute the majority's contention that the results in Hughes and Bonelli sharply departed from prior law. Today's holding cannot, therefore, be based on interpretation of the meaning of the pre-statehood riparian grants under which Corvallis Sand & Gravel holds title, since the right to an ambulatory boundary was assumed to be part of the rights of a riparian grantee at the time the grants were made. Moreover, the cases also demonstrate that there is no constitutional basis for today's holding. The only constitutional question discussed in the majority opinion is the law governing the States' title to land beneath navigable waters, and the rights of the riparian holder are independent of that law.
Since today's ruling cannot be a matter either of constitutional law or of interpretation of the meaning of federal grants, it must be a choice-of-law decision. In deciding whether to formulate and apply a federal common-law rule, "normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises must first be specifically shown." Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 86 S.Ct. 1301, 1304, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966). See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 756-832 (2d ed. 1973). In order to assure an informed presentation of federal policies and interests when faced with a choice between federal and state law, this Court in the past has invited the Solicitor General to file a brief amicus curiae expressing the views of the United States.14 See, e. g., Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 810, 86 S.Ct. 80, 15 L.Ed.2d 59 (1965); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 372 U.S. 905, 83 S.Ct. 721, 9 L.Ed.2d 715 (1963). We followed this practice in both Bonelli, 409 U.S. 1022, 93 S.Ct. 461, 34 L.Ed.2d 313 (1972), and Hughes, 385 U.S. 807, 87 S.Ct. 82, 17 L.Ed.2d 50 (1966), and the Solicitor General participated as an amicus in both cases.
Today's majority has made no similar effort to inform itself about the impact of its ruling on the Federal Government. Indeed, the majority opinion does not even consider that issue, although it is normally central to a choice-of-law decision. As the opinion and result show, the only views the Court has received are those of the amici States, whose interests here are hostile to those of the United States.
I cannot, of course, know what the Solicitor General would have said had the Court indicated that it was considering a choice-of-law question and invited him to present the views of the Government. In both Bonelli and Hughes, however, the submissions for the United States as amicus curiae strongly urged the Court to hold that federal rather than state law governed the case. In Bonelli, the Government noted that its quiet enjoyment of the more than 200 miles of Colorado River shoreline it owned in Arizona had been threatened by some interpretations of the state court's decision. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 1-2, filed Sept. 20, 1973, in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, O.T. 1973, No. 72-397. The Government urged that the state-court opinion be given a narrow interpretation and affirmed as consistent with the applicable federal law. Id., at 3-5.
"The decision is of broad consequence. It trenches on a significant element of title to realty acquired from the United States in the past and it materially curtails the nature of the title that the United States may convey in the future. . . . Equally important, it affects the powers of the United States with respect to more than 200 miles of Washington's coastline owned today by the federal government. Moreover, the principle of a fixed tideland boundary may readily be brought to bear on the property of the United States and its patentees in other coastal States. . . . Nor is there any apparent reason why, in Washington or elsewhere, the principle should be limited to tidelands; it can be applied with consistency of logic to the shifting banks of rivers and lakes owned by a State. . . . An inducement for the adoption and expansion of this principle is not lacking, since it tends inevitably to bring land into State ownership, and the sale of land thus acquired has been recognized as an attractive source of State revenue. . . .
"To be sure, the court below stated that it did not 'question the federal government's right over its own property'. . . . (But) the court below failed to recognize that 'the federal government's right over its own property' embraces the right effectively to dispose of such property." Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae 3-5 in Hughes v. Washington, O.T. 1967, No. 15.
"restrains the government from disposing of the full measure of its title in connection with any program or policy which it may wish to pursue in the future. In sum, we do not believe that it can be said here, as it could in Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, (86 S.Ct. 1301, 16 L.Ed.2d 369) that there is 'no significant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest.' " Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae 6 in Hughes v. Washington, supra.
Today's decision necessarily has an even greater impact on federal interests, since it casts doubt on the Government's continued ownership "of the full measure of its title."
One final word. Stare decisis should be more than a fine-sounding phrase. This is especially true for us, because "unless we respect the . . . decisions of this Court, we can hardly expect that others will do so." Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629, 634, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 1910, 1913, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Accordingly, "(a) substantial departure from precedent can only be justified . . . in the light of experience with the application of the rule to be abandoned or in the light of an altered historic environment." Id., at 634-635, 94 S.Ct., at 1913. Such admonitions are even more salient where land titles are concerned. Yet the majority has advanced neither experience nor changed circumstances to justify its interment of a 7-1 decision of this Court issued barely three years ago.
I am convinced that if the Court had considered the cases on which it relies in the light of an adversary presentation and had invited the Government to explain its interest in the application of federal law, the result today would be different. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The case was brought and tried in the Circuit Court of Benton County, Ore. Both parties appealed from the judgment rendered by that court to the Oregon Court of Appeals. Subsequent to that judgment, our decision in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S.Ct. 517, 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), had come down and the Court of Appeals employed the reasoning of Bonelli in deciding the appeal. Both parties then sought review in the Supreme Court of Oregon, which granted discretionary review limited to the factual question of the length of a channel known as Fischer Cut, modified the Court of Appeals' decision in this respect, and, without discussion, affirmed the decision "(i)n all other respects." Because of this procedural history we shall, as a matter of convenience, refer in the course of this opinion to rulings and findings of the "Oregon courts."
" '(The accretion rule) is applicable to and governs cases where the boundary line, the thread of the stream, by the slow and gradual processes of erosion and accretion creeps across the intervening space between its old and its new location. To this rule, however, there is a well-established and rational exception. It is that, where a river changes its main channel, not by excavating, passing over, and then filling the intervening place between its old and its new main channel, but by flowing around this intervening land, which never becomes in the meantime its main channel, and the change from the old to the new main channel is wrought during many years by the gradual or occasional increase from year to year of the proportion of the waters of the river passing over the course which eventually becomes the new main channel, and the decrease from year to year of the proportion of its waters passing through the old main channel until the greater part of its waters flow through the new main channel, the boundary line between the estates remains in the old channel subject to such changes in that channel as are wrought by erosion or accretion while the water in it remains a running stream. . . .' " 18 Or.App. 524, 539-540, 526 P.2d 469, 477 (1974).
The dissenting opinion is correct in stating that neither party in its brief requested that Bonelli be overruled. That question was elaborately briefed by amici, however, and counsel were questioned about it during oral argument. Counsel for amici urged that Bonelli be overruled. Counsel for the State agreed that a re-examination of Bonelli would be appropriate, and that upon such re-examination issues such as those in this case should be left to state law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34.
"Since the Act does not extend to the States any interest beyond those afforded by the equal-footing doctrine, the State can no more base its claim to lands unnecessary to a navigational purpose on the Submerged Lands Act than on that doctrine." Id., at 324-325, 94 S.Ct., at 525.
The compact entered into when Alabama was admitted to the Union contained the following language: " '(A)ll navigable waters within the said state, shall for ever remain public highways, free to the citizens of said state, and of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor, imposed by the said state.' . . ." 3 How., at 229. The Court found that this language merely enunciated Congress' right to regulate commerce upon the navigable waters, similarly reserved to it with respect to the original States, and thus the language did not detract from the State's absolute title in the bed. Id., at 229-230.
"The rule deals with waters that lap both the lands of the State and the boundaries of the international sea. This relationship, at this particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital interest of the Nation in its own boundaries to allow it to be governed by any law but the 'supreme Law of the Land.' " 389 U.S., at 293, 88 S.Ct., at 440.
We are fortified in our conclusion that Bonelli's equal-footing analysis was unsound by the fact that its author has likewise rejected it. The dissenting opinion of our Brother Marshall, post, at 382, would sustain the result reached in Bonelli but on a ground explicitly avoided in the Bonelli opinion. The "mystery" or "puzzle" to which our Brother refers, post, at 384, turns out to be nonexistent; in rejecting Bonelli's equal-footing analysis, we are simply refusing to be more Roman than the Romans. The dissent's own abandonment of Bonelli's ratio decidendi is anything but a ringing endorsement of the rule of stare decisis.
We think that the insistence of our dissenting Brethren that "federal common law" should be applied to a determination of title in this case, albeit not for the same reason expounded in Bonelli, misapprehends the meaning and significance of the term "common law" as it is used in several of our old cases.
" 'the body of those principles and rules of action relating to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming and enforcing such usages and customs; and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law of England.' " Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102, 21 S.Ct. 561, 564, 45 L.Ed. 765 (1901) (citing Black's Law Dictionary).
It is in this descriptive sense that the term is used in the two principal quotations relied upon in the dissenting opinion, New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717, 9 L.Ed. 573 (1836), and County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 68, 23 L.Ed. 59 (1874). In the passage from New Orleans, the Court, simply summarized the accepted British common-law doctrine of accretion. In Lovingston, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois which had rested upon the proper rule of common law, without any indication that this rule was not the law of Illinois. In light of the treatment of the subject in such later cases as Barney v. Keokuk, Packer v. Bird, Shively v. Bowlby, and Joy v. St. Louis, all discussed in the text, no "rule" requiring the application of "federal common law" to questions of riparian ownership may be deduced from New Orleans and Lovingston. See post, at 387-388.
Although the Court rejects the reasoning on which Hughes is based, it refrains from formally overruling Hughes on the ground that that case was not relied on in Bonelli and not cited by the Oregon courts below. Ante, at 377 n. 6. In Bonelli, the Solicitor General urged the Court to find federal law controlling because riparian lands patented by the United States were involved and, under Hughes, federal common law therefore controlled the riparian rights of the landowner. Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae 3-4, filed Jan. 2, 1973; and Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae 2-3, filed Sept. 20, 1973, in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, O.T. 1973, No. 72-397. The petitioner took the same position. Brief for Petitioners 31-34 in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra. The Bonelli Court did not reach this contention noting that there was some doubt that the land in question was riparian at the time of the federal patent. 414 U.S., at 321 n. 11, 94 S.Ct., at 523. In its eagerness to do away with Bonelli's result as well as its approach, however, today's opinion explicitly concludes that had Bonelli relied on the theory advocated by the petitioner there and the Solicitor General, it would now be rejected. Ante, at 371-372, 378-381.
Nevertheless, the majority suggests that Hughes might still control ocean-front property. Ante, at 377 n. 6. It is difficult to take seriously the suggestion that the national interest in international relations justifies applying a different rule to oceanfront land grants than to other grants by the Federal Government. It is clear that the States have complete title to the lands below the line of mean high tide. See Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 56 S.Ct. 23, 80 L.Ed. 9 (1935); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(2), 1311. These lands, of course, are the only place where the waters " 'lap both the lands of the State and the boundaries of the international sea.' " Ante, at 377 n. 6, quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S., at 293, 88 S.Ct., at 440. There are no international relations implications in the ownership of land above the line of mean high tide. See Note, The Federal Rule of Accretion and California Coastal Protection, 48 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1457, 1472 (1975).
The cross-petitions for certiorari did not raise the question whether federal law governed the outcome; they were concerned only with whether the Oregon courts properly interpreted the governing federal common law.
"In a typical situation of a navigable river flowing through two channels, where the smaller of the two channels after 20 years of erosive flooding 'suddenly' becomes the main channel, and the other channel eventually becomes unusable, does federal law deprive the public of title to the beds of both channels?"
"1. Does plaintiff, State of Oregon, have sufficient ownership to maintain statutory ejectment to recover possession of the bed of a navigable fresh water stream where its claim of ownership is based on sovereignty rather than grant and where there is no allegation pleaded and no proof that the public rights of navigation, fishery and related uses are being impaired or interfered with by defendant Corvallis Sand and Gravel Company?
"2. Does plaintiff, State of Oregon, have sufficient ownership to maintain statutory ejectment to recover damages for the removal of sand and gravel from the bed of a navigable fresh water stream where its claim of ownership is based on sovereignty rather than grant and where there is no pleaded allegation or proof that the public rights of navigation, fishery and related uses are being impaired or interfered with by the defendant Corvallis Sand and Gravel Company?"
The parties' briefs faithfully mirrored their perceptions of the issues as presented in the petitions for certiorari. Thus, in No. 75-567, the State argued that the public interest requires recognition that the sovereign title in a riverbed is "full and complete" and that protecting that title requires that federal common law apply avulsion principles against a State only in very rare cases. Alternatively, the State argued that if classic avulsion principles applied, it still should receive title to the contested land. Corvallis Sand & Gravel responded by challenging the State's right to ownership of the riverbed under common law and by maintaining that the factfindings of the lower courts were both correct and not subject to review in this Court. In No. 76-577, the parties disputed Corvallis' contention that the State's title is limited to protection of navigation, fishery, and related uses and cannot be the basis for an ejectment action when those uses are not affected. Both parties assumed that federal common law governed the case.
Counsel for the State of California, representing the amici States, argued that Bonelli should be overruled. Neither party addressed that issue except in response to questions from the Court. In response to those questions, counsel for both parties stated that federal common law should govern this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 28, 33.
For convenience, I will use "riparian" in place of "riparian or littoral" for the remainder of this opinion.
Cited ante, at 375, 379-380.
In Bonelli, the question was ownership of relicted land, which is land exposed by the subsidence of the water. The law of reliction is identical to the law of accretion. 3 American Law of Property § 15.26 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). In the present case, the State claims title to land by virtue of the doctrine of erosion, the converse of accretion. Corvallis Sand & Gravel resists by arguing that the change in the river's course was not gradual, as erosion and accretion require, but sudden. A sudden, or avulsive, change does not effect a shift in boundaries. These doctrines form a coherent system. It would make no sense to hold that the federal doctrine of accretion must be applied to the benefit of a federal riparian grantee but that the federal doctrine of avulsion need not be applied.
Cited ante, at 371, 372, 377.
Cited ante, at 374, 379.
The language in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845), on which the majority heavily relies to prove that Congress had no such power, see ante, at 372-374, was dismissed as dictum by the Shively Court. See 152 U.S., at 28, 14 S.Ct., at 28.
The majority also quotes the Shively Court's statement that federal grants " 'leave the question of the use of the shores by the owners of uplands to the sovereign control of each State.' " Ante, at 379, quoting 152 U.S., at 58, 14 S.Ct. at 569. It is clear from the context that by "shores" the Shively Court meant the land below the high-water mark. The State, as owner of that land, controls it. The Court did not suggest that the State was free to diminish the title of the upland owner by denying his right to an ambulatory boundary if the "shores" recede or the uplands grow.
The majority's assertion that the rule of New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 9 L.Ed. 573 (1836), and County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 23 L.Ed. 59 (1874), is merely a description of the English common law, ante, at 380-381, n. 8, is belied by the Shively Court's affirmation of the independence of the riparian holder's rights from the law governing the lands beneath the water. The majority chooses not to discuss this aspect of Shively.
Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 342, 343, 26 S.Ct. 478, 481, 50 L.Ed. 776 (1906), cited ante, at 377, does contain language which supports the conclusions reached by the majority. That case, however, did not involve lands in which a grantee of the United States held or claimed title. The land in that case was granted by Spain. Congress confirmed the grant, but by so doing it added nothing to the title conferred by Spain. See Joy v. St. Louis, 122 F. 524 (ED Mo.1903), aff'd, 201 U.S. 332, 26 S.Ct. 478, 50 L.Ed. 776 (1906); United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830, 833 (CA9 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817, 82 S.Ct. 828, 7 L.Ed.2d 783 (1962).
When the papers before the Court indicate that a choice-of-law question will be presented, the Solicitor General sometimes prepares an amicus brief on his own motion. See, e. g., Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae and Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Free v. Bland, O.T. 1961, No. 205. In the present case, of course, the Solicitor General had no notice from the petitions for certiorari that the issue decided today would be raised. See n. 2, supra.


text:
London to Hyeres by train
1,047 kilometres
Travelling from London to Hyeres by train
Fast trains from London to Hyeres take around 7 hours and 54 minutes, covering a distance of approximately 1,047 kilometres. There are frequent services on the rail route between London and Hyeres.
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Journeys between London and Hyeres usually involve one change of train.
We usually find around 12 departures on the route from London to Hyeres every weekday that leave enough time to change trains without waiting around for longer than necessary.
2. How long is the train journey from London to Hyeres?
The London to Hyeres train travel time is normally about 7 hours and 54 minutes, whatever time you make the journey.
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On weekdays the earliest train to Hyeres is usually scheduled to depart London around 05:40 and the last train is around 16:31. At weekends the first train of the day leaves London around 06:18, and the last at 17:31.
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Visit Highclere Castle, the real Downton Abbey, by train
Uncover the real story behind the hit TV show Downton Abbey with a visit to Highclere Castle, in Hampshire, by train.
Autumn hikes from European cities
With the seasonal change, make the most of beautiful breathing spaces on the doorsteps of many European cities.

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–Brandon, a computer technician in Silicon Valley and member PBPC Park Boulevard Presbyterian, Oakland, California, who gave superb leadership in the high school outreaches.
–Ashlie, a college freshman at Lake Washington Institute of Technology in Seattle and member at Redmond Assembly of God, served in the children's and youth ministry/outreach.
–Fiona, a college freshmen from Florida who completed a year at the Torchbearer's Bible School in Ersekë, Albania, teamed up with others to lead a terrific children's ministry.
–Glen, a businessman and house church leader from Asheville, NC., assisted with youth activities; prayer, healing, and prophetic ministry.
–George, an Interim/Transitional pastor from the Seattle, Washington area, preached in Sunday worship; and provided direction for leadership development in the local church. He joined his wife, Margie, in leading a "Healthy Marriage" seminar for couples.
–Margie, who with her husband has been leading teams to Albania for 19 years, gave administrative direction and leadership to the children's and women's ministries.
–Dave Pierson, Executive Director for Alongside Ministry, joined American and Albanian leadership for youth ministry, preaching, morning Bible teaching, prayer and healing ministries.
Our joy was that during the past two weeks many Albanians came to faith in Christ, sought to be Jesus' disciples and received personal/spiritual healing.


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CFP: Sexology and Development: Exploring the Global History of the Sexual Sciences
October 5-6, 2018, Barcelona, Spain
This international conference seeks to investigate the global history of the sexual sciences by focusing on the concept of development. Key questions might include, but are not limited to:
How are concepts of development deployed in sexual science?
How is development understood, for instance, as a quality or trajectory of nations, races, social groups and communities?
How is development equally a concept mapped on to individuals?
How do related sciences further these concepts and ways of thinking about human sexuality? How, for example, do hormonal theories of sexual development intersect with other theories and ideas about development in the sexual sciences?
How are the links between individual and cultural or racial development imagined?
How is sexual scientific knowledge positioned in relation to the development of the human sciences and related processes of knowledge production?
How do global developments of sexual science relate to regional specificities?
Scholarship on the history of sexual science or sexology has witnessed a growing interest in the global and transnational dimensions of scientific understandings of sex.[1] Scholars have begun to explore the variety of forms of scientific thinking about sex that emerged at different times in multiple locations across the globe. Exchange across linguistic, national and cultural boundaries played a central role in shaping scientific debates about sex. Attempts to make sense of sexual behaviours, identities and attitudes associated with cultures, societies and nations that were constructed as 'foreign', 'distant', 'exotic', 'uncivilised' or 'primitive' were integral in shaping sexual scientific knowledges. Moreover, debates about the contours, boundaries and authority of sexual science were fundamentally influenced by the tendency to think comparatively, to look outward and to situate scientific knowledge within wider global and transnational networks.
This conference seeks to approach the global history of sexual science by focusing on the multivalent concept of development. Hierarchies of cultural and racial development were central in shaping the global self-positioning, circulation and reception of sexual scientific knowledge, and models of development used to understand the nature and significance of human sexual behaviour. At the same time, development is a concept at stake in the articulation of what made sexual science special and authoritative. Some sexual scientists presented their work as 'modern' and 'new', insisting that it constituted a radical break with the past, yet modern sexual science was also frequently seen to emerge out of older forms of knowledge. Magnus Hirschfeld's suggestion that his own research on sex was in some sense related to ancient Indian sexual knowledges offers one example of this attempt to create histories of the development of sexual science that cut across established cultural and national boundaries. The tendency to classify forms of knowledge as more or less 'developed', 'progressive' or 'advanced' played a constitutive role in these debates about the authority as well as the contours and histories of sexual scientific thinking.
Development was also a key concept in sexual science for understanding the individual. Explorations of how and why the sexed body, sexual desire and gender identity developed over the individual life course were the subject of vibrant debate in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth century, creating dialogue between thinkers that might be classified as sexologists, endocrinologists, eugenicists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, evolutionary theorists, embryologists, zoologists, anthropologists, educators, reformers and others. For some, being able to trace, guide and intervene in the process of individual development promised to create a stronger, fitter, more civilised and more competitive nation or race that could defend its place within a global context. The sexual scientific interest in technologies such as hormones, birth control and hypnosis was equally driven by a desire to influence for the better the development and health of the individual and, by extension, the cultural group, nation or race. Controversial late nineteenth-century theories around recapitulation, which suggested that individual development (ontogeny) repeats the development of the species (phylogeny), led to the search for correspondences between individual and cultural as well as racial development. Henceforth, figures that were central to sexual scientific knowledge – including the child, the homosexual or the neurotic – were linked to groups of people perceived as 'primitive', 'backward' or 'savage', creating complex connections between scientific attempts to understand individual development and sexual, racial and cultural difference. In these, and other ways, understandings of individual sexual development that emerged at this time were fundamentally shaped by cross-cultural comparison and related ideologies of culture, race and empire.
For scholars working on the history of sexual science today, exploring these and other issues around the global construction of sexual science offers an important opportunity to reconsider existing historical accounts of the development of sexual science itself. For instance, examining the formation of sexual scientific knowledge through a global lens, it might be necessary to reconsider the widely rehearsed argument that sexual science emerges in the second half of the nineteenth century. Looking at sexual science from a global perspective might also mean tracing the different theoretical trajectories and practical developments in different part of the world, and looking at different spheres of influence, regional affinities and national competitions. More broadly, the conference invites speakers to reflect on the ways in which methodologies drawn from global and transnational studies can challenge and enrich existing histories of sexual science. In so doing, the conference wishes to open up debate about the development of scholarship on sexual science or sexology in the present: what is at stake in the growing embrace of the global and transnational as a lens through which scholars are approaching the history of sexual science or sexology?
This conference is interdisciplinary in scope and we explicitly invite papers from speakers across disciplines. In fact, we hope that the intellectual framing of this conference will allow for new dialogue to emerge between scholars interested in thinking historically about the issues, questions, concepts, disciplines and fields of knowledge mentioned above. We also welcome abstracts that explore aspects of the link between global history, sexual science and development that we have not yet addressed.
The conference is part of Chiara Beccalossi's Sexology, Hormones and Medical Experiments in the Latin Atlantic World project at the University of Lincoln as well as Kate Fisher's and Jana Funke's jointly directed Rethinking Sexology project at the University of Exeter. Both projects are funded by the Wellcome Trust.
The conference is hosted by the Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona (CCCB) in Spain. Conference speakers are invited to the launch of Beccalossi's Transitional States video art exhibition on the evening of 4th October 2018. The conference itself will take place on 5th and 6th October 2018.
Abstracts of proposals and a short bionote (300 words) should be sent to: CBeccalossi@lincoln.ac.uk and J.Funke@exeter.ac.uk
Abstracts should be 300 words in length, sent as an email attachment, and include your name, organisation, and contact address. They should also include the title of the proposed paper.
The deadline for the submission of proposals is 6th April 2018. Proposers will be informed whether their paper has been accepted by 4th May 2018.
Deadline: April 6, 2018
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Impact of the Epidemic Threat on Changes in the Civil Aviation Security System due to SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic
Adrian K. Siadkowski, Piotr Uchronski
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to diagnose the impact of the epidemic threat on air transport as illustrated by the case of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic, and to forecast possible changes in the civil aviation protection system. Design/Methodology/Approach: An analysis of the evolution of the world's passenger traffic since 1945 in the context of changes in the world's civil aviation security system shows that the two major events of the 9/11 attack and the SARS epidemic have brought a decrease in the number of passengers carried. While the 9/11 attack entailed deep changes in the security system, the SARS epidemic has not resulted in deployment of additional safety measures. The purpose of the methodology employed, based on a system analysis, a trend analysis and passenger surveys, was to forecast changes in the civil aviation security system. Findings: Empirical studies show that the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has been unprecedented in terms of a decrease in passenger numbers, so an analysis of the already deployed ad hoc changes as well as efforts to deploy additional security measures demonstrates the permanent character of those changes in the system of safeguarding civil aviation against epidemic threats. This conclusion is confirmed also by air passenger surveys. Practical Implications: The study has practical implications for the direction of changes in the civil aviation protection system in response to the epidemic threats and implementation of additional safeguards. Originality/value: The 9/11 terrorist attack brought changes in the global civil aviation security system. On the other hand, no lessons were learnt from the previous SARS epidemic and no additional safeguards were implemented against the epidemic threat. Interpretation of the study findings has allowed the authors to conclude that changes in the aviation system are made with respect to incurred events, and therefore an analysis of trends can be utilised in pro-active safety and security measures in the civil aviation.
Adrian K. Siadkowski, Piotr Uchronski (2021). Impact of the Epidemic Threat on Changes in the Civil Aviation Security System due to SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic, European Research Studies Journal Volume XXIV Special Issue 4, 849-864


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Mrs. Sim teaches 6th grade for Branson School Online. Read on to learn more about this talented BSO teacher.
Pets: A turtle, named Teddy, that I have had for 27 years!!
Hobbies: I love being outside. In the winter that means skiing. In the summer I like hiking, swimming, and camping.
What do you love about teaching? I love that I can help a student who had a bad experience in the past realize that they have to potential to do anything and change their mind about what they were previously told.
What do you love about teaching with Branson? I love that I can help students who struggled in a traditional school realize that learning can be fun again.
Favorite season? I love Fall because I think that pumpkins smell great! I don't like to eat it, but I love the smell of pumpkin pie.
Favorite place you have traveled to? I loved when I lived in South Korea for 2 years. I got to learn and experience a new culture every day. It was awesome!!
Anything else you'd like to share: I am trying to learn to speak Korean! I have a 9 month old son who keeps me very busy. I come from a huge family and already have 9 nieces and nephews.
Each month our BSO counselors publish a newsletter that provides important information for our high school students. Please click on the link below to view last month's Counselor's Corner.
Let's celebrate by sharing why we love learning online! Reply to this post and/or post on Facebook or Twitter, and tell the world why you love Branson School Online!
Make sure to include #BransonSchoolOnline and #OnlineLearningDay in your posts!
On Thursday, Sept 15, join us on Twitter for a National Online Learning Day Twitter party!
Only participants during the #Twitterparty are eligible to win (1-3 PM Central Standard Time on 9/15/16).
US residents only. No purchase necessary. Each contestant agrees to a complete release of Twitter and National Day Calendar. You also Acknowledge that the promotion is in no way sponsored, endorsed or administered by, or associated with, Twitter. Entrants agree their name will be posted if they are selected as a winner. Sponsoring company handles prize administration.


Our transparent process is designed to help you realize your vision while also providing you with a high-touch, superior service that is unmatched in Fairfield & Westchester Counties. With over 40 years of combined experience in the construction industry, our team of talented designers and remodeling professionals is with you every step of the way, taking care of all of the details of your project, from design to completion.
At Simply Baths & Kitchens, we strive to bring the most discerning homeowners a truly tailored remodeling experience: offering customized design, creative space planning, high-quality, curated products, personalized showroom service and proactive project management.


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Clinton on Women Uncomfortable With Biden Touching Them: 'Get Over It'
Former first lady, secretary of state, and presidential contender Hillary Clinton dismissed women and girls who have expressed how uncomfortable they became when touched by former vice president and current presidential hopeful Joe Biden.
Clinton, 71, was with her daughter Chelsea Clinton, 39, promoting the new book they wrote together.
"For goodness' sake, I'm sorry, I have to jump in because I've heard a little bit about that," Clinton told People magazine. "I mean, I don't think that the Twitterverse is the American electorate, but there are lots of vocal voices that say all kinds of things."
She said Biden, 76, "is a thoroughly decent human being who has served our country honorably and well for decades."
"You could take any person who sticks their little head above the parapet and says, 'I'm going to run for president,' and find something that … a little annoying habit or other kind of behavior that people are going to pick apart and disagree with," she continued.
Biden for years has come under scrutiny for his physical contact that includes repeatedly touching women and girls he comes into contact with, although some women, like Stephanie Carter, have defended him.
Ashton Carter (R) makes remarks after he was sworn in as Secretary of Defense as his wife Stephanie (2nd L) Vice President Joe Biden (L) listen in the Roosevelt Room of the White House in Washington on Feb. 17, 2015. (Alex Wong/Getty Images)
On the other side, former Nevada lieutenant governor candidate Lucy Flores wrote an essay in March describing a 2014 interaction with Biden, who attended a political event to endorse Flores.
She said Biden came up behind her and put his hands on her shoulders before leaning in and inhaling her hair.
"I was mortified," she wrote. "I thought to myself … 'What in the actual [expletive]? Why is the vice-president of the United States smelling my hair?'"
She was embarrassed and shocked, she wrote, and even more so when he kissed the back of her head, leaving her temporarily paralyzed.
"He made me feel uneasy, gross, and confused. The vice-president of the United States of America had just touched me in an intimate way reserved for close friends, family, or romantic partners—and I felt powerless to do anything about it," Flores wrote.
Biden released a statement saying he'd never acted inappropriately.
"In my many years on the campaign trail and in public life, I have offered countless handshakes, hugs, expressions of affection, support and comfort," Biden said. "And not once—never—did I believe I acted inappropriately. If it is suggested I did so, I will listen respectfully. But it was never my intention. I may not recall these moments the same way, and I may be surprised at what I hear."
Biden said in a Twitter video he would change his behavior, citing changing social norms, but soon after touched a 10-year-old while at a campaign event.
Soon after, several other women, including 43-year-old Amy Lappos, said Biden touched them inappropriately.
Lappos said Biden grabbed her during a 2009 fundraiser.
"It wasn't sexual, but he did grab me by the head," Lappos said. "He put his hand around my neck and pulled me in to rub noses with me. When he was pulling me in, I thought he was going to kiss me on the mouth."
In a Facebook post, she blasted people who think the "grossness of men invading women's boundaries to sniff and touch is debatable."
Follow Zachary on Twitter: @zackstieber
Frank Sturgill is a Citizen Journalist for C-VINE News Network. A former Police Officer, Frank"s hobbies include Old School Motorcycles, Computers, and Ham Radio.
Amy LapposBidenChelsea ClintonLucy Flores
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We are trying to get more fish into our eating plan here at the house.
I've had some Tilapia in the freezer and decided that I needed to find a good recipe to try out.
Headed over to Recipezzar.com, typed in what I was looking for (fish, spicy), sifted through various recipes until I discovered this recipe.
The recipe is super easy to follow and is excellent!
The whole family enjoyed the fish, it was flaky, flavorful and had just the right amount of spice without being too overboard.
Place fillets in milk and soak for 30 -60 minutes in refrigerator.
Meanwhile combine the 1/2 cup flour with the creole seasoning (Emeril's Essence works well). Mix well.
When ready, remove fish one at a time and coat with flour mixture, shaking off loose excess before cooking.
Heat non stick pan on medium heat with 1 TBS of oil until rim of pan is hot to touch.
Cook fillet(s) until they flake easily, roughly about 3 minutes per side.
Sprinkle with desired salt once on plate and enjoy.
Per Serving: 68 Calories; 3g Fat (33.5% calories from fat); 1g Protein; 10g Carbohydrate; 1g Dietary Fiber; 0mg Cholesterol; 215mg Sodium. Exchanges: 1/2 Grain(Starch); 0 Lean Meat; 1/2 Fat; 0 Other Carbohydrates.


The Giraffe - Animals that stand out in a crowd.
Marriage - A relationship that cannot stand alone.
Health - Strength to stand the test of time.
Humanism - Perversion that will not stand before God.
Just the Facts Darwin, Just the Facts!
The Bible - The Book that stands alone.


Currently Hive on MR3 calls a Tez runtime to execute Hive queries and relies on MR3 for the rest such as scheduling DAGs, creating containers, messaging, authenticating and authorizing users, and so on. For end users, Hive on MR3 is similar to Hive on Tez except for several configuration keys specific to MR3. Thus one can quickly migrate from Hive on Tez to Hive on MR3 without much difficulty.
All the three versions of Hive run on MR3 with Tez 0.9.1 runtime.
In comparison with Hive on Tez, Hive on MR3 generally runs faster for sequential queries by virtue of the simple architectural design of MR3. In particular, it makes a much better utilization of computing resources and thus yields a higher throughput for concurrent queries because MR3 allows concurrent DAGs in the same ApplicationMaster to share containers.