Ahmed Ali: Can you provide an overview of your activities in the IoT market?
David Smith: We play in the industrial IoT world; both in the licensed and the unlicensed space. We have been serving the carriers' 2G and 3G networks which are becoming less relevant in the United States but are still relevant in Europe. We also have 4G LTE products including LTE CAT-M1 and narrowband IoT (NB-IoT). Our products can either be in the form of separate boxes that connect to other network nodes or they can be embedded within the customer's devices. These products are fully certified for carrier networks. In fact, our LTE Cat-M1 devices were the first to be approved by AT&T in the United States.
On the unlicensed side, we support LoRa. After a careful evaluation of all the low power wide area network (LPWAN) technologies, we decided that LoRa is the most promising one. It is the only open standard that addresses the different market segments we target which are private, public and enterprise networks.
AA: What is the difference between private and enterprise networks?
DS: We define enterprise networks as the middle section between the small and geographically concentrated private networks and the public wide-area cellular networks like AT&T and Verizon. An example of a private network would be a farm that is served by a single gateway and where data is consumed locally. An example of an enterprise network would be a network of a thousand gas stations distributed across the region with each station having its own gateway to monitor local operations and report back to a single location for central management and control.
AA: The fragmented LPWAN space was a concern for some players as they were not sure which technology to adopt. Do you think this is still the case?
DS: Companies will be deploying and providing multiple technologies. What we see from real customer deployments, is that it is almost always a combination of technologies for a given solution. For example, LoRa endpoints will be connected to a gateway that has a cellular backhaul in addition to Bluetooth or Wi-Fi for local configuration or higher speed transmission. Carriers will probably broaden their technology base with LoRa gateways and cellular NB-IoT small cells so they can support different applications.
AA: You support many industries including manufacturing, agriculture, medical and energy. How do you see the adoption of the licensed and unlicensed technologies across all these verticals?
DS: Agriculture and manufacturing locations, in many cases, are at the edge of the cellular coverage. As a consequence of that, I think such verticals will be predominantly covered by unlicensed LPWAN technologies. In addition, big manufacturing companies would not want their operational data to leave their facilities.
The medical space is still a battleground. Cellular small cells are needed to provide indoor consumer services. However, data privacy concerns make a compelling case against cellular as medical enterprises might also want to keep their data local.
Smart cities and smart grid applications are areas where the cellular network would have a stronger play.
AA: Security is still a major concern for many companies. So, what is your approach to security?
DS: On the licensed side, we are fully compliant with what the carriers want. We are onboard with technologies like embedded universal integrated circuit cards (eUICC) which are slowly being adopted by carriers.
On the LoRa side, there are several layers of security that we build into our products. For the hardware, we have a secure element that is made by Gemalto and it is similar to a SIM in providing security functions including key generation, encryption and decryption. On our roadmap, we are adding more security features like secure booting and trusted execution environment. We operate as part of the LoRa Alliance. We are an active member and I am on both its strategy and the technical committees. The Alliance released LoRaWAN 1.1 which has been evaluated by major security firms such as Deloitte and Giesecke & Devrient. It has concluded that LoRaWAN benefits from world-class security that could be better than that of cellular networks.
AA: Your solution covers different IoT technologies and that means it is important to have a wide range of partners. What is your strategy for selecting and expanding your partner ecosystem?
DS: Part of our strategy involves the LoRa Alliance which is rapidly growing, approaching 600 members including big companies like Cisco and Comcast and start-ups of different flavours. We collaborate with public network operators to provide network equipment and help them understand the LoRa technology. Moreover, we support device manufacturers in integrating our endpoint modules. Also, we helped to start the certification committee which supports devices and networks interoperability. We are an agnostic company and we work with everybody across the board even with our competitors which is interesting.
AA: Finally, what is on your roadmap for 2018?
DS: We break our roadmap down into three sections; the endpoints, the gateways and the cloud platforms. For cloud platforms, all I can say that in 2018, we will be addressing the needs of the enterprise in a strong way. So, look for a big announcement from MultiTech in this space. For gateways, we are diversifying our products in different areas. First, we are releasing a series of geolocation gateways and we will continue to develop their accuracy to bring it closer to global positioning system (GPS) accuracy. Second, we are improving the capacity, the security, and the ease of deployment of our regular gateways. For endpoints, we see them moving away from being general purpose to being more tightly integrated with the specific functionalities of the devices. We are working with partners to add a range of capabilities in areas like security and positioning. For example, our partner; Combain provides indoor location services based on a mix of technologies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. We are collaborating with them to add LoRa to the mix.


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Raw Recap, 10/10/2016 – The Road to HIAC
• Raw Digitals
• Captures (Full) – Coming Soon
Seth Rollins vs. Chris Jericho – Main Event (WWE YouTube)
Match Video – Full (Dailymotion)
Seth Rollins def. Chris Jericho (Keeps one on one match vs. Kevin Owens at HIAC)
Last night, SmackDown LIVE's pay-per-view No Mercy put on a show-stealing Triple Threat Match for the WWE World Championship. Raw, it appears, will not be able to mount one of its own at WWE Hell in a Cell, since Chris Jericho failed to defeat Seth Rollins and win his way into a WWE Universal Championship that will now be contested inside the Cell itself. That's got to sting for Raw Commissioner Stephanie McMahon's competitive instincts, but it's also got to sting for Jericho, who would have been a very real threat to his "best friend" Kevin Owens' title had he been able to win the match.
One Superstar who isn't upset? Seth Rollins, who gets to keep KO one-on-one and receives a momentum boost in the process. The victory was made even sweeter by the fact that The Architect had to battle back from the beating Jericho put on his recently injured ribs. Even a behind-the-ref superkick from a ringside Owens wasn't enough to keep "The Man" down, as Rollins took out KO with a suicide dive and felled Jericho with an inside-cradle reversal of the Walls of Jericho. Owens didn't wait to put a beating on Rollins after the match, but Jericho was quick to both save KO from a Pedigree and, ultimately, take one of his own while Owens, again, did nothing to stop it.
Published by Ash on October 11th, 2016
Filed in Digital Photos, Gallery Additions, Monday Night Raw, Results and Photos, Screen Captures

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Louisville vs. Long Beach State Preview
By Mike Rutherford@CardChronicle Nov 28, 2011, 4:46pm EST
Share All sharing options for: Louisville vs. Long Beach State Preview
LOUISVILLE CARDINALS (5-0) vs. LONG BEACH STATE 49ERS (3-2)
Game Time: 7:02 p.m.
Site: KFC Yum! Center: Louisville, Ky.
Television: ESPNU
Announcers: Justin Kutcher, play-by-play; Bob Valvano, analyst.
Officials: Ed Corbett, Paul Faia, Sean Corbin
All-Time Series: First meeting
Favorite: Louisville by 11
Probable Starting Lineups
ABOUT LONG BEACH STATE
Predicted Conference Finish: First
Returning Starters: 5
Season To Date:
BEAT Idaho (69-61)
BEAT Pittsburgh (86-76)
LOST to San Diego State (77-73, OT)
BEAT Boise State (72-62)
LOST to Montana (73-71)
Quickie Preview:
Known before the season for playing the toughest non-conference schedule in the country, Long Beach State caught the country's collective eye with its 86-76 win at then-No. 9 Pittsburgh on Nov. 16. It was the 49ers first win over a ranked team since 1994. In addition to Pitt and Louisville, LBSU faces three other ranked non-conference opponents this season in No. 1 North Carolina (Dec. 10), No. 12 Xavier (Dec. 22), and No. 14 Kansas (Dec. 6).
Four seniors and a junior are among the five returning starters from a LBSU team that posted a 22-12 record last season and won the Big West regular season. Reigning Big West Player of the Year Casper Ware is one of the best guards in the country, at any level. The senior leads the 49ers in scoring at 18.8 ppg and assists at 4.0 apg. He rarely makes poor decisions with the ball in his hands, which is a huge asset for The Beach against Louisville's pressure.
Senior forward T.J. Robinson in Long Beach State's all-time leading rebounder (919 career rebounds) and is eighth in career scoring. He's currently averaging a double-double at 14.4 points and 11.6 rebounds. Senior two guard Larry Anderson is the team's second-leading scorer (14.6 ppg) and a capable three-point shooter. He's been a double figure scorer in each of his four seasons at LBSU.
Despite starting four seniors, head coach Dan Monson has blamed both of his team's losses on a lack a lack of maturity and understanding of what it takes to win on the road. In each instance, the 49ers squandered a double-digit lead and made crucial mistakes down the stretch. Part of The Beach's late-game struggled might also have to do with all the traveling the team has done already. The 49ers played at Montana on Saturday and will tip-off inside the Yum Center tonight just a little over 48 hours after that game ended.
Don't be surprised if Louisville falls behind by a fairly healthy margin early on and then has to string together a second-half rally. These guys have already shown they're fully capable of getting up for the big game.
Relevant Video:
Louisville will not win this game tonight without a better offensive performance than they've given over the past three contests. LBSU is the most talented team the Cards have faced this season, and they're even more capable of springing the upset tonight than Ohio was on Friday. Don't be surprised if U of L trails for more minutes than they lead tonight.
Card Chronicle Prediction: Louisville 77, Long Beach State 72


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An upgrade of Inverell's Byron Street will commence next week as part of the third stage of the Town Centre Renewal Plan. Mayor Paul Harmon said the works will focus on the section of Byron Street between Vivian and Lawrence Streets will commence later this week. "These works will adjoin the previous stage, which transformed Byron Street between Coles and Best and Less and ensure Byron Street has a fresh look to attract visitors and shoppers to our CBD". Cr Harmon explained the 14-week works program will be fast tracked to minimise any adverse impacts on trading for local businesses. "Council is aware that these works will have an impact on retailers and residents and for that reason, we are committing to 12-hour workdays during construction to ensure we complete the work in the shortest period possible". Cr Harmon said nine of the existing trees will be retained, while ten London Plane trees will be removed. He said a further eleven new trees will be planted during the course of the project. "The initial six weeks of the project will focus on the northern side of Byron Street between Vivian and Lawrence Street. "This means there will be no vehicle access or parking available on the ANZ Bank side of the street; however, there will be access for traffic and parallel parking on the side in front of the IGA Plaza". While there will be temporary changes to traffic flow in Byron Street, footpath access will remain open at all times. "Short term, we will have some temporary alteration to parking while the project is in progress, including parallel parking on the Australian Hotel side of the street". Council requests road users to exercise care and consideration when travelling through the works site. This time last year the project focused on the stretch of Byron Street between Campbell Street and Otho Street and there were temporary changes to traffic conditions.
/images/transform/v1/crop/frm/DGrXNFBDsLGR33GNb27qNq/37e3e9ce-b17e-46ad-b55b-218eb9ea0c58.png/r1208_92_2108_600_w1200_h678_fmax.jpg
January 13 2021 - 12:04AM
Inverell's Byron Street rejuvenation continues
Further details regarding the Byron Street renewal works are available on Council's Town Centre Renewal Plan webpage.
An upgrade of Inverell's Byron Street will commence next week as part of the third stage of the Town Centre Renewal Plan.
Mayor Paul Harmon said the works will focus on the section of Byron Street between Vivian and Lawrence Streets will commence later this week.
"These works will adjoin the previous stage, which transformed Byron Street between Coles and Best and Less and ensure Byron Street has a fresh look to attract visitors and shoppers to our CBD".
Cr Harmon explained the 14-week works program will be fast tracked to minimise any adverse impacts on trading for local businesses.
"Council is aware that these works will have an impact on retailers and residents and for that reason, we are committing to 12-hour workdays during construction to ensure we complete the work in the shortest period possible".
Cr Harmon said nine of the existing trees will be retained, while ten London Plane trees will be removed.
He said a further eleven new trees will be planted during the course of the project.
"The initial six weeks of the project will focus on the northern side of Byron Street between Vivian and Lawrence Street.
"This means there will be no vehicle access or parking available on the ANZ Bank side of the street; however, there will be access for traffic and parallel parking on the side in front of the IGA Plaza".
While there will be temporary changes to traffic flow in Byron Street, footpath access will remain open at all times.
"Short term, we will have some temporary alteration to parking while the project is in progress, including parallel parking on the Australian Hotel side of the street".
Council requests road users to exercise care and consideration when travelling through the works site.
This time last year the project focused on the stretch of Byron Street between Campbell Street and Otho Street and there were temporary changes to traffic conditions.


The truth was that comprehending the Blue Lotus Domain wasn't much at all.
When a heroic young elite comprehended the third level Concept of Fire Laws to the peak, and also had great potential and a great destiny upon them, anyone could successfully form the Blue Lotus Domain. As long as they didn't perish on their road, their future achievements wouldn't be low. Thus, the Blue Lotus Domain was considered a type of phenomenon that symbolized someone with the life of an Emperor.
But as things stood, there were countless geniuses within the Ancient Phoenix Clan that had comprehended the Blue Lotus Domain. With a hundred billion clansmen, the base number was simply too great!
The Ruby Sovereign had guarded Fire Spirit Star for many years now and it was difficult to measure how many geniuses had comprehended the Blue Lotus Domain. But, no one had managed to comprehend the Blue Lotus Domain in such a way that left the Ruby Sovereign so surprised!
When Lin Ming first arrived at Fire Spirit Star, the Ruby Sovereign could see that Lin Ming had just traced upon the threshold of the Concept of Creation – he was far from reaching large success. It was inferior to a normal genius disciple, much less those like Yan Littlemoon or Huo Yanguang.
In ordinary circumstances, one had to slowly accumulate understandings for years or even decades to comprehend each level of the Fire Law. Lin Ming's perception was extremely high. With the support of Fire Spirit Star's atmosphere, it would already be good if he could comprehend the Blue Lotus Domain in a year and a half. But now, in his first trip into the Hells of Flame, he had undergone a single period of sudden enlightenment to walk the same distance that should have taken him a year and a half!
How could the Ruby Sovereign not be stupefied by this!
Moreover, the quality of the Blue Lotus Domain that Lin Ming condensed was at the peak of all peaks!
The Ruby Sovereign had impeccable judgement. He had seen countless talents form the Blue Lotus Domain over the years, but there were very few that could compare to Lin Ming's degree.
The Ruby Sovereign thought out loud. A state of sudden enlightenment could only be found through a stroke of fate. A single period of sudden enlightenment that lasted for one or two quarter hours of time was the same as a long period of seclusion. But even so, for Lin Ming to produce such an impeccable Blue Lotus Domain after a single period of sudden enlightenment, the Ruby Sovereign thought this was simply incredulous.
As the Ruby Sovereign was wrapped up in his imagination, he saw that Lin Ming's scorched skin, and even the parts where the oil was baked out of his body, began to peel away, revealing new and tender skin beneath. Some places were severely burned with even the meridians and flesh scorched black, but a blue-green energy wrapped around those wounds. The flesh underneath slowly wriggled, glowing with vitality as it regenerated at a speed visible to the eye.
This was the most important aspect of the Blue Lotus Domain – healing. Especially with the Heretical God Sprout supporting him, the healing effect of the Blue Lotus Domain was even better! At this time, within Lin Ming's dantian, the blue lotus-shaped leaf on the Heretical God Sprout began to glow with a misty light. The speed at which his wounds regenerated was actually faster than the healing from the Gate of Healing!
If the Blue Lotus Domain and the Gate of Healing combined together, the effects could be imagined!
Moreover, the Blue Lotus Domain could heal more than just Lin Ming's own injuries – it had a healing effect on anyone within the range of the domain. As long as Lin Ming desired it, he could expend some of his true essence to shroud others in his Blue Lotus Domain, saving them from injury and harm.
"His restorative ability is too extraordinary. However, that should also be because there is the Gate of Healing added on that such an effect is produced. This boy's Blue Lotus Domain can likely even compare with Yan Littlemoon's! And Yan Littlemoon has already begun to touch upon the fourth level Concept of Fire. In this Fire Spirit Star's smelting trial, she should be able to comprehend the fourth level of the Fire Concepts. If Lin Ming wants to catch up to her, he'll have to work hard for it." The Ruby Sovereign thought out loud.
And at this time, Yan Littlemoon had already penetrated 23,000 miles deep into the Hells of Flame!
In fact, this wasn't Yan Littlemoon's limit. The only problem was that if she passed down to the deepest depths she could, she would only be able to stay at that limit for an incense stick of time before she would be forced back. If she stayed at the 23,000 mile area, she would be able to reluctantly absorb the fire origin energy here and comprehend the Fire Laws. In other words, this was the depth limit at which she could reasonably train.
Within the third level, the fire origin energy was no longer lifeless, but had a mind of its own.
Endless fire origin energy turned into vicious beasts and saint beasts that charged towards Yan Littlemoon. But at this time, Yan Littlemoon was similar to a descended goddess. Her entire body was wrapped in flaming golden light. This flaming golden light was similar to the golden light that appeared between Lin Ming's eyebrows when he burnt the blood of the Ancient Phoenix.
But when Lin Ming burnt the blood of the Ancient Phoenix, only a wisp of golden light shot out. As for Yan Littlemoon, her entire body was shining in radiant glory!
When the beasts formed by fire origin energy met this golden light, they immediately melted away, turning into pure energy that was absorbed by Yan Littlemoon.
Compared to Lin Ming, Yan Littlemoon may not have entered the state of sudden enlightenment, but the speed at which she absorbed fire origin energy was a rate Lin Ming could not hold a candle to! The perfect Ancient Phoenix bloodline was well known for its strength; how could it be empty talk?
If Lin Ming wanted to reach Yan Littlemoon's speed of absorption, he would have to use the Heretical God Sprout. But, the fire origin energy that the Heretical God Sprout absorbed wasn't his own.
In the 8000 Mile Black Swamp's Nine Heavens Thunder Dominion, The Heretical God Sprout had even absorbed the heavenly retribution divine thunder left behind by Empyrean Thunder Punishment. Afterwards when Lin Ming fought Yang Yun in the final battle, he has used that divine thunder to break through Yang Yun's master move and cause him to suffer deep losses. It had a miraculous effect on the battle. However, this heavenly retribution divine thunder was in the end not part of Lin Ming's own strength. Once he used it up it was impossible to use again.
Thus, the Heretical God Sprout was only a cultivation method in the end. No matter how powerful it was, it could only play a supporting role. It was impossible for him to rely on a single set of cultivation methods to comprehend the source Laws of the universe.
Time passed minute by minute, second by second. Yan Littlemoon training at the 23,000 mile distance was still extremely difficult for her. She quickly reached her limit as fragrant sweat dripped down her body.
This training state continued for two incense sticks of time. Then, with an explosive shattering sound, Yan Littlemoon's protective true essence broke apart. Wild and turbulent fire energy crazily impacted towards her.
However, Yan Littlemoon did not need the Ruby Sovereign to rescue her. An invisible layer of energy emitted from the surface of her body, shielding her from the fire origin energy.
This was Yan Littlemoon's top grade saint artifact vestment. This vestment was also a peak top grade saint artifact; its value was no worse than the Phoenix Blood Spear. With this vestment on, any non-Ninefall Divine Sea master could forget about breaking through this defense. Even if Yan Littlemoon stood still and allowed others to freely strike her, they wouldn't be able to harm a single hair on her body, until both Yan Littlemoon and the top grade vestment's energy was depleted!
Those with a perfect Ancient Phoenix bloodline had a monstrous compatibility with Fire Laws. If others took several years to comprehend the Fire Laws, it would only take Yan Littlemoon several months, if not less. Not just that, but Yan Littlemoon's perception was also exceedingly high. With these two conditions combined together, Chu Redcloud really couldn't imagine how anyone could surpass her in training speed. Moreover, Yan Littlemoon's starting point was higher than the others' to begin with. While most disciples were diligently training in the second level, Yan Littlemoon had already penetrated 23,000 miles deep into the Hells of Flame. If she didn't care about training, she could even reach a depth of 25,000 miles!
"Aunty, in another month I should be able to reach the 26,000 mile depth. After that is the 29,000 mile depth and then after that is the fourth level!
Yan Littlemoon blithely said. Even so, Chu Redcloud was all smiles as she listened.
"Haha, you little girl, you still want to trick me with your flattery? Breaking through to the late Divine Lord realm isn't a problem, but reaching the peak late Divine Lord realm is extremely difficult. As for breaking past the Divine Lord realm, the chances of that are too faint for someone like me. There are countless Divine Lord realm powerhouses that cannot pass that moat. Compared to that mountain, even the ninth stage of Life Destruction seems weak.
"Of course I know that. Humph, you also shouldn't forget that I am younger than he is! The reason my cultivation is one stage of Life Destruction higher than his is all because of my diligent and torturous training. If I reached the seventh stage of Life Destruction two years faster than him, then I can reach the Divine Sea realm three years ahead of him. Then, when I reach Divine Transformation or the Divine Lord realm, my lead against him will become greater and greater! I do not believe that with my perfect Ancient Phoenix bloodline my cultivation speed will be lower than his!
Yan Littlemoon pursed her lips. She acknowledged Lin Ming's talent in combat, but in terms of cultivation speed, there was no way for Lin Ming to defeat her.
"Rewards? What rewards?" As Yan Littlemoon heard the word 'rewards', she suddenly perked up.
"What! That's too cheap!" Yan Littlemoon already had a perfect Ancient Phoenix bloodline. Why would she still care about a single drop of phoenix plume blood now?


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My week working in the UK with The King's Fund and NHS colleagues convinced me that the case for change in the NHS is unquestionable. The challenges now are to create system-wide engagement that includes patients and local populations, and ensure that there is sustained capability for change. But how can the system meet these challenges? Building capable and sustainable primary care capacity, as we did in Canterbury, may be the answer.
Looking at the experiences of Pegasus Health, a clinically led, management-enabled primary care network of general practices in Canterbury, gives some hints to how a solution can be achieved. Pegasus Health supports more than 350 GPs in 100 practices within the Christchurch and Canterbury area to deliver care for 420,000 enrolled patients. The organisation has an annual operational turnover of £30 million, mostly from providing an extensive range of health service contracts funded by the District Health Board, and employs 342 staff. Pegasus also owns and operates the 24-hour (non-enrolling) after-hours surgery, which employs medical officers and nursing staff and where GPs contribute shifts as part of their after-hours obligations.
Pegasus Health is governed by a board of ten directors, comprising six GPs, one nurse and three independent directors. A clinical board with representatives from different primary care clinical groups acts in an advisory capacity to the board. The clinical board is complemented by a community board made up of representatives from Maori, Pacific, culturally and linguistically diverse advisory groups and other community members. In addition, there are 11 clinical leaders, primarily GPs, who provide support and clinical leadership for the activities and initiatives of the organisation.
Building on a base of co-operation around out-of-hours care in the late 1980s, Pegasus has developed capacity and capability for system change that is available to the whole health system. At its heart is the Small Group Education programme which is based on the 'most ethical use of finite resources' and recognises that general practice teams often work with 'islands of evidence in seas of uncertainty'. More than 90 per cent of GPs in the Pegasus Health network are engaged with the programme. The programme was extended to practice nurses in the late 1990s and to community pharmacists in 2010. This means that six times a year, more than 700 primary care clinicians receive the latest information on relevant topics and debate them in peer-led small-group settings.
As well as educational opportunities, Pegasus Health provides GP teams across the network with IT support, population health strategies, primary mental health teams and much more. Consequently, GP teams don't have to build that capability and capacity themselves and can get on with the work of providing high-quality clinical care to their patients.
Pegasus Health also works with GP teams to prepare them for the challenges ahead and is currently working with them at scale to shift their models of care and the experience they can give their patients onto a more sustainable footing. Nurses and social workers within the primary care team work with people with long-term conditions to set up care plans and proactively manage their conditions. Early indications are that all the aspirations of care closer to home and reduction of reliance on hospital-based services are being met, and there has been a 50 per cent reduction in emergency department attendances for people with long-term conditions from these model practices.
Through the Canterbury Clinical Network primary care teams have been able to engage successfully with their secondary care and community colleagues to design population pathways, and these are now showing some really significant system results. The Network acts as a facilitator and co-ordinator for innovation, which might otherwise be stifled by organisational barriers and professional hierarchies.
So, what does this mean for the NHS?
Well, unless you have a well-supported, engaged and relevant primary care community you will not be able to shift the whole system into a sustainable future. While recognising that primary and community care are only parts of the system that patients and communities come into contact with, as Barbara Starfield, the American paediatrician and advocate for primary care, contended continuity, comprehensiveness, co-ordination and accessibility are hallmarks of a functional primary care system that will ensure a sustainable platform for good patient outcomes.
I'd like to end with the following reflections and challenges for those leading change in the NHS.
Find a place where you can engage across the system and ensure you involve patients and focus on patient care.
Focusing on not wasting people's time can become a great motivator for designing new and effective models.
Focusing on good care and the best possible patient experience will deliver efficient and sustainable systems. This takes time and patience is required while new practices and programmes bed in.
It is about building momentum, which ultimately leads to system fitness and it is system fitness that will allow us to adapt to the challenges that the future will throw at us.
Vince Barry, Chief Executive Officer, Pegasus Health, New Zealand discusses Pegasus Health's role in implementing transformational changes to primary and community services and developing integrated working across primary and secondary care.


Kai Qin Chan, a doctoral candidate at Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands found that even water tastes sweeter when you're in love.
However, not every emotion heightens the senses. Jealousy did not bring out bitter or sour tastes, despite predictions it may.
Kai Qin Chan found these results by letting students rate the taste of a sweet-and-sour gummy or bittersweet chocolates after writing about a romantic experience, a jealous experience or a neutral topic. He found that students who wrote about a romantic experience rated the both the candies and chocolates sweeter than those who wrote about a negative jealous experience or a neutral one.
And once again, even writing about love made water taste sweeter- a substance that really has no taste at all.
The Huffington Post reports, "the finding is important for two reasons, Chan said. First of all, the fact that even water tastes sweeter when people think about love reveals that the emotion isn't acting on the taste receptors on the tongue, making them more sensitive to sugar. There's no sugar in the water, after all. Instead, the effect must arise from the brain's processing of the taste information.
What an interesting finding! Wow, love definitely turns your entire world around.


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Delphine Nguyen
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Do You Require Lender Information?
Questions / Where Are You Looking?
BY Delphine Nguyen
© Copyright 2021 Delphine Nguyen. All Rights Reserved.


If you're planning on going to a physical college, then you've got to spend some time contemplating the college campuses. What do you want from them? How much do you really care about the place where you're going to be studying?
If you're not sure whether or not to go to a physical college or to use online college courses, then you've still got to ask yourself the same questions. Would you miss having an actual campus to walk around on? Would you rather not have to deal with the complications of a physical campus?
For students just getting started in their thinking about college, here are some key questions you should be asking yourself about college campuses.
1. City, suburb, or rural area: do I care?
Colleges exist all around the country and the world, and you can find one wherever you want. So where do you want to find one? If the campus was in the middle of the city, would you be happy? What if it was in the middle of a pristine, totally empty wilderness? Think about whether you want to be in a city, a suburb, a rural area, or anything in between…or even if you care at all.
2. What facilities do I need?
If your campus doesn't have a gym, are you going to be unhappy? If your campus doesn't have a pool, are you going to go mad for lack of a place to swim? Especially when, depending upon where you are, you can find facilities of nearly any nature you want at a very high caliber, off campus. So what do you need to have on campus, and how good do those facilities need to be, for you to be content attending school there?
3. Do the amenities and extras matter?
Lots of campuses bear with them bonuses that don't necessarily scream utility or importance. Natural areas through which you can hike, for instance, or underground tunnels between buildings to allow for easy traveling. Think about whether those things are just nice touches, or there's anything that you actually care about that doesn't directly relate to your lifestyle.
4. What's the Goldilocks size?
Do you want to be on an enormous college campus, spread out over a vast stretch of territory? Or do you want to be on a nice, close knit campus where you can easily walk to any other building in 10 minutes? How many people are you interested in having on campus? Those're all questions about the size of the school, and it's important to figure out the size that's just right for you.
5. Through rain or sleet or snow…?
If you're going to a physical campus, then you're going to have to deal with all those other pesky qualities of physical reality like, y'know, the weather. Consider this one heavily, because if you go to a college campus for your education, you're probably going to be there for a substantial portion of the year, and you're going to be dealing with the weather as it changes throughout the seasons. Can you deal with massive piles of snow? Or sweltering terrible heat? Humidity? Terrible rainstorms? The weather you'd be most comfortable with might play a huge factor in determining the region of the country that you're going to look at for college.
6. Can I stand to look at these buildings?
It may seem trivial, really, but keep in mind that if you're going to apply for a traditional on-campus 4 year college program, then you're going to be looking at the same structures for the next 4 years. Do you find the architecture on campus ugly as sin? Or do you find the buildings to be beautifully constructed marvels of building-art? It can make a huge difference to your overall satisfaction with your life on campus.
7. How the heck can I get around?
This one goes part and parcel with the size of the campus and the nature of the extras. How are you going to actually navigate the campus? Just walking? Do you have to drive? Are you going to need to bike? How you get around is going to determine the day in, day out activity of your life on campus, so it's important to keep in mind. If you need a car and you can't afford it or the insurance, then that campus might not be the best choice. If biking everywhere doesn't interest you, then maybe you should stay away from campuses where that's going to be the key way to navigate paths and sidewalks.
8. Am I going to do stuff here?
One of the primary advantages of physically being on campus is that you can actually take advantage of activities that happen in and around the campus. When your college brings a speaker on campus, you can just pop on down to the auditorium and listen in. When there's a cool concert in the college pavilion, it's just a hop skip and a jump away to enjoy some good music. But if you're never going to take advantage of any of these on campus activities, then you've really got to ask yourself if it's worth it to go to a college campus that has them, or to go to a college campus at all.
9. How are the dorms?
It's possible that you might attend a physical college campus while commuting, but there's a pretty decent likelihood that you're going to actually be on campus, living in a dormitory. So it's incredibly important that you take a look at the dorms, and decide what's important to you. Do they need to have air conditioning? Do they need to have nice bathrooms? What about the rooms, what do they have to have for you to be content? Think carefully about this one: you're going to be living in these places! And if you're not happy with the on campus dorms, make sure you consider whether or not you can live off campus.


Dark-haired, languid, gentlemanly, long-chinned English actor, born John Christopher Howland, who played character roles in German and Italian films after becoming a TV and radio personality, 'Mr Pumpernickel'. Originally a gunner in the British army, Howland stayed in Germany after the war. Following radio success, he began to add quirky cameos in films to his CV: Ball der Nationen (1954), Jamboree! (1957), Gauner-Serenade (1960), Musik aus Studio B (1961), The White Spider (1963), Apache Gold (1963), Fanny Hill (1964), Yellow Devil (1964), Wild Kurdistan (1965), Agent 505: Death Trap Beirut (1966), Castle of the Doomed (1967), then much on TV until Wer Spinnt denn da, Herr Doktor? (1982), Farssmann oder Zu Fuss in die Sackgasse (1991) and Neues vom Wixxer (2007), his last. Four times married.


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Home » Podcast » AT THE BRINK » Did Ukraine Make a Mistake by Giving Up Nuclear Weapons?
Did Ukraine Make a Mistake by Giving Up Nuclear Weapons?
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A special episode of AT THE BRINK
In the 90s, Ukraine made the decision to dismantle the thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons left on its territory. Nearly 3 decades later, Russia has invaded Ukraine using its own nuclear arsenal to bully other nations from interceding. In this special episode of AT THE BRINK, we explore whether Ukrainian denuclearization was a fateful mistake and if a nuclear Ukraine could have prevented the Russian invasion.
Transcript Expand
Lisa Perry:
I'm Lisa Perry, and you're listening to At the Brink, a podcast about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the stories of those fighting to protect us. Today, we're bringing you a special episode of At the Brink. The At the Brink team has been hard at work putting together an amazing second season of the podcast, which we'll be releasing later this spring.
But unless you've been hiding under a rock, you've probably heard about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Now, if you're a fan of our show, you know that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the nineties, the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to a process to dismantle the Soviet nuclear weapons left on their territory.
If you haven't listened to Episode Three, where we outline how that history unfolded, I highly recommend checking it out for further context for today's episode.
In that episode, we portray the denuclearization of these nations as a positive. In fact, we titled the show: Loose Nukes, a Nuclear Success Story. But with the invasion of Ukraine by the world's leading nuclear power, some people have been looking back at that history, and wondering if Ukraine made a mistake in giving up those weapons.
In this special follow-up episode of At the Brink, we ask three experts on Ukrainian nuclear history to explore this question: should Ukraine have held on to its nuclear arsenal?
Our first expert is former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. Secretary Carter was instrumental in negotiating the Budapest Memorandum, which was the political agreement made with Ukraine, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia, to give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for financial compensation and security assurances. He was also a central figure in implementing the cooperative threat reduction program which was the US program created to help dismantle former Soviet nuclear warheads and delivery systems, as well as decommission silos and retrain nuclear scientists and missileers.
Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with us today, Secretary Carter. As one of the first people to recognize the problem of so-called loose nukes on former Soviet territory, you've been involved in this issue from the very beginning. With the recent war in Ukraine, a lot of people have been questioning whether Ukraine should have retained this nuclear arsenal that you helped them to dismantle, with the idea that a nuclear armed Ukraine could have prevented a Russian invasion. What's your perspective on this hypothetical?
Ash Carter:
While that's an understandable question, there's a fallacy there, which comes from replaying history and just changing one variable. In other words, they are imagining that the entire 25 years between then and now would have gone just like it did now, they'd have had 25 years of statehood and 25 years of the general support of the West, and nuclear weapons. But that is not what was on the table for them back then.
For starters, Russia was not going to permit Ukraine to, independently of it, be a nuclear power. Second, neither the United States, nor any other Western countries at the time, wanted more nuclear proliferation. Because nuclear proliferation brings its own dangers, which are worse. That is, the dangers of what we called loose nukes there, which means either getting loose to all kinds of governments that could be unstable, and also loose in the sense of possibly losing control of them. So those were the reasons why we, the west and Russia at the time would not have allowed that to happen. So there is no alternative history in which Ukraine is the way it is now, a westernized society that has enjoyed 25 years of peace and independence, and has nuclear weapons; that was not going to happen.
Now that doesn't make Ukraine's plight something that we don't care about or shouldn't care about, because at the time that I worked with them to help them to get rid of nuclear weapons, which I think was in the interest of this country, but also really the world, I also worked along with then Secretary of Defense Perry, who was my boss, to bring the Ukrainian military more generally up to snuff, not to embed it in NATO, because we thought that was going too far. And in fact, I wanted NATO to go more slowly than it did actually. I'm not saying that would have made Vladimir Putin now any less reckless than he is. But he, it would have given him fewer excuses.
But anyway, we thought that a independent country, not aligned with either East nor West, difficult as that is, but hopefully aligned with both, with its own military, but not armed with nuclear weapons, was the best way for an independent Ukraine to be born. And I still believe that's true, despite what's going on right now.
And one last thing I'll say is that neither I nor Bill Perry believe that what is happening now in Ukraine could never happen. On the contrary, we thought it could happen. We referred to it in a book we wrote in the late 1990s as the Weimar Russia syndrome. In other words, like in Weimar Germany, when Germans came to feel aggrieved about the aftermath of World War I and a vicious politician took advantage of that grievance, and I'm speaking of Adolf Hitler now, and start a war. We were afraid that in the analogous case, if we overplayed the Western hand and humiliated Russia, or did things that it would interpret as threatening, even though we didn't mean them to be threatening, like NATO enlargement, that we could end up with a Weimar syndrome in Russia. And at least in some parts of today's Russia, we have precisely that syndrome. So Bill and I knew that this was possible, but that was not a reason in our mind, not to denuclearize Ukraine. On the contrary, it was a reason to, because if you saw that coming, possibly down the road, you don't want nuclear weapons mixed up in
You were a central figure in the negotiations that would lead to the Budapest memorandum. Is there anything in that agreement that we should be revisiting today, given the current situation.
Well, we certainly should remember, even though it's just a piece of paper, and I'm sure that's what Vladimir Putin would say—in it, Russia promised not to do exactly what it's doing right now. Now, you know, promises not to wage war are the first casualties of almost every war. So it's not surprising that that's true now, but the point was that it was the deal with Ukraine then that the Western countries would welcome the independence of Ukraine rather than insisting that Ukraine remained a part of Russia, if it surrendered its nuclear weapons, and Russia would agree to that also under the same conditions. So that's what we all agreed back there in Budapest. And that was the right deal for the time, and it bought us a quarter century of peace and also a quarter century without nuclear proliferation. But nothing's forever.
And so we have the war we have, and that's a completely different situation in which so far as, as this very moment is we're talking, seems to be headed for a very large cataclysmic war.
On the other hand, the West is I think conducting itself quite well in terms of unity, and willingness to make Putin pay a price. I don't think sanctions and that kind of thing were ever going to deter him if he was determined to do it. That's not really the point, deterrence isn't the point. The point of what is being done now by the Western countries is, in the long run by showing punishment to make sure that nothing like this happens again, and nobody else gets an idea that this is an easy ride for somebody who's going to attack their neighbor.
Next I spoke with Dr. Maria Rost Rublee. Dr. Rublee is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Monash University, specializing in nuclear politics. She is also the award-winning author of the book: "Non-proliferation Norms. Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint."
In 2015, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Dr. Rublee published a journal article where she explored the technical, political and strategic obstacles that challenged the notion that Ukraine could have maintained a nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
I wanted to start with the technical issues. What sorts of things were standing in their way to maintain these weapons and make them their own?
Maria Rublee:
Ukraine had multiple technical inadequacies that would have prevented them or made it very hard for them to, first of all, use the weapons that they had, the Soviet nuclear weapons that were on their soil, you know, and they inherited a third of the Soviet arsenal, they were suddenly the third largest nuclear weapons state in the world. So it might seem appealing to Ukrainians and now today, if only we had those to keep Putin out, but could Ukraine even had used them?
And then if they could have figured out a way to use them, could they have maintained and modernized them, because it's one thing to have nuclear weapons, you have to be able to deliver them somewhere. And so in all three of these assumptions there are lots of problems. The first about, could Ukraine have used them? That's one that they probably could have overcome this technical difficulty because they didn't have command codes, but most experts agree that they could have found a way to rewrite the launch codes and alter targeted guidance so they could gain operational control of the weapons, but the other two assumptions are much more problematic.
There were also a number of economic concerns that Ukraine was facing at the time coming out of the Cold War out of the Soviet Union. What sorts of problems were [economic concerns posing to the capability to maintain these weapons and be able to gain that operational control?
Most people, they don't understand the complexities here because maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons would have taken large very expensive investments over time, not just in personnel, because you need people trained in this, which Ukraine didn't have, but in terms of the facilities needed.
You have to remember at the same time Ukraine was a brand-new country. And, you know, they had a lot of investment needs, you know, a lot of things they needed to do for their human population. So the, the president at the time, who was against Ukraine keeping them, he basically said Ukraine shouldn't have to sell or pawn all of its property just to have nuclear weapons.
He estimated that having a fully operational nuclear arsenal would take at least 10 years and would cost about $200 billion. In comparison, as we look back over those same 10 years, public spending on education and health was about 60 billion. And so, we would have wiped out all Ukrainian spending on education and health, and that would have only covered a third of what was needed to modernize and maintain the weapons and delivery vehicles.
Beyond the launch codes and the economic concerns, were there other technical issues to retain nuclear weapons at that time?
Yes, absolutely. For them to be able to build up, you need a uranium enrichment plant, you need a plutonium ore processing plant, you need a nuclear test sites. Ukraine didn't have any of these. And in addition to that, maintaining delivery vehicles would have been really difficult. A lot of the ICBMs, the Intercontinental ballistic missiles that were part and parcel of what Ukraine inherited, they were due to reach the end of their service life within 10 years, and they just didn't have the capacity to maintain them.
In particular, one of the types of missiles they had, they were actually, decaying and really going to be no longer usable within about five years. So, the idea that Ukraine is suddenly going to have uranium enrichment plant, plutonium re- processing plant; they're going to be able to suddenly have the ICBM factory where they can maintain current weapons and build new ones—it just boggles the mind. Like this is not going to be possible within 10 years, and even if you thought, okay, Ukraine could have put all the money into doing that, is Russia going to sit idly by over the 10 years in which this has to take place, not to mention the US.
Which leads me directly into my next question is the political ramifications. Now, obviously this is speculative, but you've studied how this would have been received politically by Russia and the West. So tell us a little bit about what you imagined in this piece of how Russia might have reacted to Ukraine trying to retain its nuclear capabilities.
We have no way of knowing exactly how it would have happened, but we can imagine given the weight of the evidence that, in particular, Russia would not have tolerated Ukraine keeping its nuclear weapons. First of all, they said that tolerating a nuclear Ukraine would have violated their obligations to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, because as part of those obligations, they promised not to transfer weapons to another state.
More importantly than that, Ukraine would have accrued the military and diplomatic leverage of being the third largest nuclear weapon state, and given the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and the huge loss of prestige, Russia wouldn't have been able to bear that.
There were some people within Ukraine saying, we need to keep these. There's arguments about how serious that was, did they actually want to keep them, or were they just trying to get more money from the West? To use them as negotiating leverage to get a payout, essentially to help their country with their infrastructure needs.
And at one point the Russians threatened to permanently halt all gas to Kiev, unless all nuclear weapons were returned. These threats were made and they actually did shut off gas a number of times. And if Ukraine had said, we are keeping them, I think that Moscow would have come through with those threats.
Do you believe that Russia would have been deterred from taking action against Ukraine, if Ukraine did have a functional nuclear deterrent?
There is no way Russia would have sat off by the side and given them a five-year pass. I just don't think that would have happened. If it had happened, well, what about the US and Europe? Because they certainly wouldn't have sat idly by, and in fact, in those early years Ukraine received an enormous amount of foreign aid from both Europe and the US. Without that foreign aid, they wouldn't have been able to do these types of things. And there's no way that foreign aid would have been forthcoming if Ukraine had insisted on keeping the weapons.
We shouldn't be asking if Ukraine of today had nuclear weapons, would Russia being invading them right now? That shows a deep ignorance of what would have been required. Instead, the question should be what would have happened to Ukraine, if it insisted on keeping those weapons, what would have happened to its diplomatic status? What would have happened to public education? You know, Ukraine improved dramatically in terms of, public education, public health, and a number of these developmental measures. That wouldn't have happened. Some experts have argued and I would agree with this that they may have even devolved into an unstable rogue state in its attempt to maintain and modernize these weapons and delivery systems.
And frankly, we can't say for sure, but Russia likely would have invaded. I mean, all the signals that we can see from the time is that the invasion of Ukraine would have happened much sooner.
Given the recent interest in this question, Dr. Rublee has made her journal article free to access for the time being. To read her piece: "Fantasy counterfactual, a nuclear armed Ukraine", go to the show notes page for this episode on our website, www.atthebrink.org.
Finally, we spoke with Dr. Mariana Budjeryn, in order to get a better understanding of the Ukrainian perspective on denuclearization. Dr. Budjeryn is a research associate with the Project on Managing The Atom at the Belfer center with a focus on post-Soviet nuclear history.
Hailing from the city of Lviv in Western Ukraine, Dr. Budjeryn is also the author of the forthcoming book, "Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine." I spoke with Mariana about what Ukrainians wanted to do with their inherited nuclear arsenal and how they feel about the decision today.
Just a little helpful background information for this conversation. In addition to the Budapest memorandum in 1994, Ukraine also became a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. The NPT is a landmark 1970 UN treaty, which classifies states parties into two categories: nuclear weapon states, and non-nuclear weapons states. Under the treaty, the original five sanctioned nuclear weapons states of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom committed to pursuing general and complete disarmament. While the non-nuclear weapon states agreed to forgo ever developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.
In your book, you explore the Ukrainian journey to nuclear disarmament, which was definitely not a straight line. In AT THE BRINK, we've explored that disarmament perspective more from the American side of things. And I'm really interested to hear from both your Ukrainian perspective and also the research you've done professionally. What were some of the key reasons why Ukraine decided to denuclearize?
Mariana Budjeryn:
What is often forgotten today and current discourse is that Ukraine started its path to independent statehood with an intention to become a nuclear free state. So already in July, 1990, that's still a year and a half, a full year and a half before the Soviet Union collapses in December, 1991, Ukraine parliament adopts the declaration of state sovereignty in which it pledges to become, in the future, a nuclear free state. This was completely unilateral, there was no pressure, there was no kind of corrosion or persuasion by the outside parties. This came very genuinely from the Ukrainian political realm at that point.
And the reason for that was two-fold. One was Chernoybl. There was a pervasive anti-nuclear sentiment, that was also an anti-Soviet, anti-institutional, because those institutions were held responsible for the causes of this terrible accident, but also for the mis-handling of the aftermath, right. For the coverups, for you know, for all sorts of institutional dysfunction. And there was a pervasive anti-nuclear feeling. There was even an attempt to close Ukraine's nuclear power plants at that point.
The second reason for this renunciation was an understanding that Soviet command and control. Military command and control, especially of these strategic nuclear weapons, was so centralized, it was so closely tied into Moscow, bypassing republican leadership, that Ukraine's independence would be impossible if you do not sever those military ties. So for Ukraine to declare itself as a neutral state and a non-nuclear state, it was actually quite revolutionary at the time, because that meant disentangling something that was part and parcel of the Soviet union and of Soviet military industrial complex. Now history sort of had its own plans. The Soviet Union collapsed in a rather rapid and unexpected manner throughout the Fall of 1991. And those weapons with those command and control ties to Moscow, were left on now sovereign territory of Ukraine, but also in Belarus and Kazakhstan.
So the question then became not, should Ukraine really keep these weapons or not—I think it's a modern day simplified version of the story—but rather, how does the question of succession to this nuclear inheritance, how does that get resolved?
And Ukrainian leaders then took a more nuanced stance more as a matter of recognition that Russia is not the sole successor to all of the Soviet inheritance. That Russia was, was one amongst equals, at least in the international legal sense, right? That there shouldn't be this conflation of the Soviet Union and Russia. And that was a tough bargain, because of course an international sort of global order was, was sorted in the way that there were five permanent members of the UN security council, right? Only one successor from the Soviet side could succeed the Soviet Union that regard. And the same turned out to be true for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the NPT, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only five states could be recognized internationally as quote unquote, legitimate nuclear possessors.
So there was kind of this tension. On the one hand, it was rather logical and beyond dispute that Russia should succeed the Soviet Union in relation to the NPT. But on the other hand, Ukraine, but also Belarus and Kazakhstan said, listen, we were also part of this Soviet nuclear program. We contributed our resources. We contributed our scientists. We did not proliferate in violation of any international norm, or launch some clandestine programs. This was part of our legacy, just as much as it is part of Russia's legacy. So these were these questions that had to be addressed and sorted.
There were several narratives across the Ukrainian political spectrum that this inheritance should be somehow held onto and reworked to actually provide Ukraine with a nuclear deterrent. That narrative, the deterrence narrative, was extremely marginal in Ukrainian political debates. Most of the leaders said, listen, it is something we've rightfully inherited from the Soviet collapse. We do not want to be a nuclear weapons state. We do not want to be a nuclear possessor. But we feel entitled to compensation.
And one part of the compensation is for the fissile material, for the actual highly enriched uranium, plutonium, contained in these warheads that we are giving up. And the other part is security guarantees. That process of negotiations for that renunciation of this nuclear inheritance yielded the so-called Budapest Memorandum.
So from your research, the interest around a Ukrainian nuclear arsenal is a more recent evolution. One that perhaps employs are rather hazy hindsight perspective, and doesn't actually reflect what the Ukrainian people at the time were interested in doing with the weapons they inherited.
That's generally correct. So, in about 1993, the support for retaining nuclear arms in Ukraine, I think it peaked at about 30 or so percent, a little bit higher in Western parts of the country, but generally there was really no overwhelming support for nuclear arms.
After 2014, that support peaked at almost 50%. Since then it kind of petered out again, but after the Russian annexation of Crimea and then the war in the Donbass in 2014, there have been a couple of motions on the part of Ukraine's political leaders to withdraw from the NPT and revisit as Ukrainians, like to say, Ukrainian nuclear status. What does that exactly mean? That leaves a leave as much room for interpretation, whether that's launching a nuclear weapons program in earnest, or just somehow hedging this claim of that Ukraine has an entitlement to a nuclear program that remains obscure. But I have to say that these kinds of official motions, or the statements from leaders or officials, they have remained really quite marginal for the same reasons that they have been in the past 30 years ago when Ukraine was deliberating these choices.
And one is, more so in the early nineties then today, was resources, right. What Ukraine inherited back in that day was a shard of nuclear armaments that were designed by a different country for different strategic purpose. What was left by mid-1992 was intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads that had ranges of over 10,000 kilometers. Even if you could seize command and control and you can re target them, which allegedly, would have been a bit risky, but not beyond the capabilities of Ukrainian industry and science at the time, so even if you could do that, where would you target them as a deterrent? Vladivostok? You know, they would not have fashioned a credible deterrent, so a lot would have to be still done.
And if the nuclear element were to be included, not just sort of strategic missiles, conventionally armed, but with nuclear warheads that the entire nuclear fuel cycle basically would have had to be built. That was something Ukraine did not have. So there are huge gaps Again, not beyond the reaches of scientists and engineers in Ukraine, but the resources, right. You would have to relocate those resources from other areas. And in the early nineties, those resources were scarce. And so they are today.
And the other reason why Ukraine would not in earnest reconsider this, and why back in the nineties, it made the choices that it did, is essentially for the kind of country Ukraine wanted to become. It did not want to be a North Korea of Eastern Europe. It wanted to join the international community on good terms. Back in the early nineties, there was sort of, you know, the evil empire fell apart, and there was this aspiring democracy. I think a bit rosy eyed and a bit naive as to what the world was like out there. They wanted to be on a good side of, of history, wanted to join the international community on good terms.
And at that point, joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state was part of that. It was part of constructing yourself into the kind of state that Ukraine really wanted to be and did not want to defy the international consensus on non-proliferation it wanted to be part of it.
If you could elaborate a bit more on what the economic situation was for Ukraine at the time, was there even a real world in which Ukraine could have retained these nuclear weapons and been able to do what was needed, both for security and retrofitting and upkeep and maintenance of these weapons?
The economic situation was really dire. In 93, 94, inflation reached tens of thousands of a percent. It was one of the highest inflation rates worldwide. Ukraine did not even have a permanent currency. It had these coupons so-called that were sort of placeholders until Ukraine could stabilize its currency enough to introduce the hryvnia, what we know now as Ukraine national currency. That was introduced only in 1996.
So , clearly Ukraine was in a very, very tough position. Is there a real world in which Ukraine could have held on to nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons, probably not. The actual nuclear warheads, it could have potentially kept a couple of warheads just to see if they could reverse engineer them a more stable economic situation. But it could certainly not have afforded to retain these intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear armed.
So in the end, the United States, the policy was all strategic arms, including delivery vehicles, have to go. And in that sense, the Nunn-Lugar program that paid for the dismantlement of missiles of silos of bombers, that went a really long way because Ukraine would not have wanted to find itself in the situation, with this decaying infrastructure that's not usable, would have to be covered from the Ukrainian budget. So in the end it was a good deal and it was a right thing that Ukraine did, And I think that needs to be recognized that it was not giving up nuclear weapons for nothing. That Ukraine did receive technical assistance, that it did receive compensation for the fissile material that was contained in the warheads. Kind of indirect recognition that those were Ukrainian warheads to give away, right? But there needs to be a recognition in Ukraine that it was a lot more complicated, that it was not ready to go nuclear deterrent that was just turned over for nothing.
I think perhaps the West, post-2014, could have done a bit of a better job of framing the military assistance that was very earnestly given to Ukraine in the Budapest Memorandum. For some reason, the document was sidelined. And there was one meeting of the Memorandum signatories on March 5th, 2014. Russia didn't show up, sort of just ignored the meeting. There was a statement that was produced that condemned Russian actions, and that was sort of it. So not much was being made of that part of the deal, which was again, not insignificant.
It's not a legally binding treaty, it's not a guaranteed, but it is an important political document, signed by the heads of state, that is now part and parcel of the international non-proliferation regime. But you know, these guarantees slash assurances were negotiated by Ukrainian diplomats. And from my standpoint as a historian, it was a big win. It was a big achievement and for a country that had very little leverage at the time, negotiating with two nuclear states that were coordinated, to see Ukraine the nuclear free state.
In our show, we've detailed quite a bit about the US perspective on denuclearizing the former Soviet states. If you could talk a little bit about the Russian perspective at the time, would Russia have tolerated a situation in which Ukraine maintained some nuclear weapons or kept some nuclear warheads? How do you think that would have played out potentially?
The Russian perspective of the time was a bit inconsistent. On the one hand Russia was very sensitive to any claims that those were Ukrainian weapons to give up. It maintained that those were Russian weapons, simply trapped on Ukrainian territory, very much like, US stations its weapons in Turkey or in Germany, and so forth. So on the one hand, they kind of denied any claims Ukraine would have to these weapons. On the other hand, they were really legitimately worried.
Whether Russia would have invaded, which is a claim that's often made at that time, it's hard to assess. There was, you know, a CIA assessment of that possibility that I read amongst their archival documents. And they concluded that, at least at that point in the early nineties, any kind of large scale military operation between Ukraine and Russia was, was probably not a realistic option.
So even though Russia would have not liked one bit, the fact that Ukraine would have meddled somehow with these nuclear weapons, I doubt personally that the kind of, you know, large scale response would have been forthcoming. That is not to say Russians would have not had other means to sabotage or subvert that kind of program. I mean, those were still very interconnected systems at the time, the Russian military, the Ukrainian military, you wouldn't even call it penetration, right, there was no kind of division then as it is now. So I think Russia back at that time would have made efforts to sabotage the program for sure.
Do you, as a non-proliferation expert have concerns about how the current incursion by Russia is going to influence the narrative around nuclear proliferation and potentially incite more pressure towards nuclear development, not just in Ukraine, but in other nations around the world?
I'm very much concerned about that, and even before the current invasion, after 2014, I think, that's one of the salient consequences of the breach of the Budapest Memorandum simply because it is still part and parcel of the broader nonproliferation regime. And nuclear states, they have a special responsibility. There's an honest responsibility for international peace and security and for not abusing this privileged status that the international community had agreed voluntarily to bestow upon them, in an essentially discriminatory treaty. Some are allowed to have nuclear weapons, and some don't. So there are a set of bargains that are designed exactly to ameliorate this inequality, and we've already seen, with the emergence of the Ban Treaty, that there is this kind of this international pushback. There's an insurrection as it were to say, nuclear states, you are not standing up to your part of the bargain.
So the credibility of the NPT regime is already shaky right? From, from a different side. And suddenly we see one of the recognized nuclear states, not only sort of rest on its nuclear laurels, but actively use and abuse this nuclear status, this nuclear power that they have to invade another country.
I mean, we've heard threats, nuclear threats, coming out of Kremlin, very explicit references that Russia is a nuclear power. So, you know, the West, don't get involved. This kind of blatant abuse of this nuclear status that has been recognized, conditionally, is very, very damaging to the international non-proliferation community. And I think it's going to become that much harder to dissuade other potential proliferators to either relinquish the nuclear weapons—I mean, think about North Korea or Iran—it's just that much harder to, to make credible promises that their security will not suffer as a result of nuclear, nuclear disarmament and nuclear renunciation.
Mariana, thank you so much for talking with us today, and all the best to your family and everyone in Ukraine during this really difficult time.
You can check out Mariana Budjeryn's book, "Inheriting the Bomb, The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine," coming to bookstores soon.
That's it for today's special episode, make sure you subscribe to the show so that you get notifications. When we come out with our second season about the brain this spring, where we'll be exploring the dark legacy of nuclear weapons testing in the United States and hear from some of the people who've been paying the price for our nuclear policies for decades.
Thank you again to Secretary Ash Carter, Dr. Maria Rost Ruble, and Dr. Mariana Budjeryn for their insight and expertise. To find out more about their work or to read up on the disarmament of Ukraine, go to the show notes page on our website, WWW.ATTHEBRINK.ORG.
I'm Lisa Perry. Thanks for listening
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
25th U.S. Secretary of Defense; 31st U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense; Director, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Maria Rost Rublee
Associate professor of international relations at Monash University, with expertise in nuclear politics. Author, "Fantasy Counterfactual: A Nuclear Armed Ukraine"
Twitter: @mariarostrublee
Mariana Budjeryn
Researcher on the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. Native of Lviv, Ukraine. Author, "Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine"
Twitter: @mbudjeryn
Tagged Ash Carter, Bill Perry, denuclearization, Maria Rost Rublee, Mariana Budjeryn, Russia, Soviet Union, Ukraine
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