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Roger Farmer's Prosperity for All
Published February 24, 2017	Arrow-Debrew-McKenzie model , J. R. Hicks , New Keynesians , Roger Farmer , Roy Radner , temporary equilibrium , Uncategorized 25 Comments
I have just read a review copy of Roger Farmer's new book Prosperity for All, which distills many of Roger's very interesting ideas into a form which, though readable, is still challenging — at least, it was for me. There is a lot that I like and agree with in Roger's book, and the fact that he is a UCLA economist, though he came to UCLA after my departure, is certainly a point in his favor. So I will begin by mentioning some of the things that I really liked about Roger's book.
What I like most is that he recognizes that beliefs are fundamental, which is almost exactly what I meant when I wrote this post ("Expectations Are Fundamental") five years ago. The point I wanted to make is that the idea that there is some fundamental existential reality that economic agents try — and, if they are rational, will — perceive is a gross and misleading oversimplification, because expectations themselves are part of reality. In a world in which expectations are fundamental, the Keynesian beauty-contest theory of expectations and stock prices (described in chapter 12 of The General Theory) is not absurd as it is widely considered to be believers in the efficient market hypothesis. The almost universal unprofitability of simple trading rules or algorithms is not inconsistent with a market process in which the causality between prices and expectations goes in both directions, in which case anticipating expectations is no less rational than anticipating future cash flows.
One of the treats of reading this book is Farmer's recollections of his time as a graduate student at Penn in the early 1980s when David Cass, Karl Shell, and Costas Azariadis were developing their theory of sunspot equilibrium in which expectations are self-fulfilling, an idea skillfully deployed by Roger to revise the basic New Keynesian model and re-orient it along a very different path from the standard New Keynesian one. I am sympathetic to that reorientation, and the main reason for that re-orientation is that Roger rejects the idea that there is a unique equilibrium to which the economy automatically reverts, albeit somewhat more slowly than if speeded along by the appropriate monetary policy, on its own. The notion that there is a unique equilibrium to which the economy automatically reverts is an assumption with no basis in theory or experience. The most that the natural-rate hypothesis can tell us is that if an economy is operating at its natural rate of unemployment, monetary expansion cannot permanently reduce the rate of unemployment below that natural rate. Eventually — once economic agents come to expect that the monetary expansion and the correspondingly higher rate of inflation will be maintained indefinitely — the unemployment rate must revert to the natural rate. But the natural-rate hypothesis does not tell us that monetary expansion cannot reduce unemployment when the actual unemployment rate exceeds the natural rate, although it is often misinterpreted as making that assertion.
In his book, Roger takes the anti-natural-rate argument a step further, asserting that the natural rate of unemployment rate is not unique. There is actually a range of unemployment rates at which the economy can permanently remain; which of those alternative natural rates the economy winds up at depends on the expectations held by the public about nominal future income. The higher expected future income, the greater consumption spending and, consequently, the greater employment. Things are a bit more complicated than I have just described them, because Roger also believes that consumption depends not on current income but on wealth. However, in the very simplified model with which Roger operates, wealth depends on expectations about future income. The more optimistic people are about their income-earning opportunities, the higher asset values; the higher asset values, the wealthier the public, and the greater consumption spending. The relationship between current income and expected future income is what Roger calls the belief function.
Thus, Roger juxtaposes a simple New Keynesian model against his own monetary model. The New Keynesian model consists of 1) an investment equals saving equilibrium condition (IS curve) describing the optimal consumption/savings decision of the representative individual as a locus of combinations of expected real interest rates and real income, based on the assumed rate of time preference of the representative individual, expected future income, and expected future inflation; 2) a Taylor rule describing how the monetary authority sets its nominal interest rate as a function of inflation and the output gap and its target (natural) nominal interest rate; 3) a short-run Phillips Curve that expresses actual inflation as a function of expected future inflation and the output gap. The three basic equations allow three endogenous variables, inflation, real income and the nominal rate of interest to be determined. The IS curve represents equilibrium combinations of real income and real interest rates; the Taylor rule determines a nominal interest rate; given the nominal rate determined by the Taylor rule, the IS curve can be redrawn to represent equilibrium combinations of real income and inflation. The intersection of the redrawn IS curve with the Phillips curve determines the inflation rate and real income.
Roger doesn't like the New Keynesian model because he rejects the notion of a unique equilibrium with a unique natural rate of unemployment, a notion that I have argued is theoretically unfounded. Roger dismisses the natural-rate hypothesis on empirical grounds, the frequent observations of persistently high rates of unemployment being inconsistent with the idea that there are economic forces causing unemployment to revert back to the natural rate. Two responses to this empirical anomaly are possible: 1) the natural rate of unemployment is unstable, so that the observed persistence of high unemployment reflect increases in the underlying but unobservable natural rate of unemployment; 2) the adverse economic shocks that produce high unemployment are persistent, with unemployment returning to a natural level only after the adverse shocks have ceased. In the absence of independent empirical tests of the hypothesis that the natural rate of unemployment has changed, or of the hypothesis that adverse shocks causing unemployment to rise above the natural rate are persistent, neither of these responses is plausible, much less persuasive.
So Roger recasts the basic New Keynesian model in a very different form. While maintaining the Taylor Rule, he rewrites the IS curve so that it describes a relationship between the nominal interest rate and the expected growth of nominal income given the assumed rate of time preference, and in place of the Phillips Curve, he substitutes his belief function, which says that the expected growth of nominal income in the next period equals the current rate of growth. The IS curve and the Taylor Rule provide two steady state equations in three variables, nominal income growth, nominal interest rate and inflation, so that the rate of inflation is left undetermined. Once the belief function specifies the expected rate of growth of nominal income, the nominal interest rate consistent with expected nominal-income growth is determined. Since the belief function tells us only that the expected nominal-income growth equals the current rate of nominal-income growth, any change in nominal-income growth persists into the next period.
At any rate, Roger's policy proposal is not to change the interest-rate rule followed by the monetary authority, but to propose a rule whereby the monetary authority influences the public's expectations of nominal-income growth. The greater expected nominal-income growth, the greater wealth, and the greater consumption expenditures. The greater consumption expenditures, the greater income and employment. Expectations are self-fulfilling. Roger therefore advocates a policy by which the government buys and sells a stock-market index fund in order to keep overall wealth at a level that will generate enough consumption expenditures to support maximum sustainable employment.
This is a quick summary of some of the main substantive arguments that Roger makes in his book, and I hope that I have not misrepresented them too badly. As I have already said, I very much sympathize with his criticism of the New Keynesian model, and I agree with nearly all of his criticisms. I also agree wholeheartedly with his emphasis on the importance of expectations and on self-fulfilling character of expectations. Nevertheless, I have to admit that I have trouble taking Roger's own monetary model and his policy proposal for stabilizing a broad index of equity prices over time seriously. And the reason I am so skeptical about Roger's model and his policy recommendation is that his model, which does after all bear at least a family resemblance to the simple New Keynesian model, strikes me as being far too simplified to be credible as a representation of a real-world economy. His model, like the New Keynesian model, is an intertemporal model with neither money nor real capital, and the idea that there is an interest rate in such model is, though theoretically defensible, not very plausible. There may be a sequence of periods in such a model in which some form of intertemporal exchange takes place, but without explicitly introducing at least one good that is carried over from period to period, the extent of intertemporal trading is limited and devoid of the arbitrage constraints inherent in a system in which real assets are held from one period to the next.
So I am very skeptical about any macroeconomic model with no market for real assets so that the interest rate interacts with asset values and expected future prices in such a way that the existing stock of durable assets is willingly held over time. The simple New Keynesian model in which there is no money and no durable assets, but simply bonds whose existence is difficult to rationalize in the absence of money or durable assets, does not strike me as a sound foundation for making macroeconomic policy. An interest rate may exist in such a model, but such a model strikes me as woefully inadequate for macroeconomic policy analysis. And although Roger has certainly offered some interesting improvements on the simple New Keynesian model, I would not be willing to rely on Roger's monetary model for the sweeping policy and institutional recommendations that he proposes, especially his proposal for stabilizing the long-run growth path of a broad index of stock prices.
This is an important point, so I will try to restate it within a wider context. Modern macroeconomics, of which Roger's model is one of the more interesting examples, flatters itself by claiming to be grounded in the secure microfoundations of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie general equilibrium model. But the great achievement of the ADM model was to show the logical possibility of an equilibrium of the independently formulated, optimizing plans of an unlimited number of economic agents producing and trading an unlimited number of commodities over an unlimited number of time periods.
To prove the mutual consistency of such a decentralized decision-making process coordinated by a system of equilibrium prices was a remarkable intellectual achievement. Modern macroeconomics deceptively trades on the prestige of this achievement in claiming to be founded on the ADM general-equilibrium model; the claim is at best misleading, because modern macroeconomics collapses the multiplicity of goods, services, and assets into a single non-durable commodity, so that the only relevant plan the agents in the modern macromodel are called upon to make is a decision about how much to spend in the current period given a shared utility function and a shared production technology for the single output. In the process, all the hard work performed by the ADM general-equilibrium model in explaining how a system of competitive prices could achieve an equilibrium of the complex independent — but interdependent — intertemporal plans of a multitude of decision-makers is effectively discarded and disregarded.
This approach to macroeconomics is not microfounded, but its opposite. The approach relies on the assumption that all but a very small set of microeconomic issues are irrelevant to macroeconomics. Now it is legitimate for macroeconomics to disregard many microeconomic issues, but the assumption that there is continuous microeconomic coordination, apart from the handful of potential imperfections on which modern macroeconomics chooses to focus is not legitimate. In particular, to collapse the entire economy into a single output, implies that all the separate markets encompassed by an actual economy are in equilibrium and that the equilibrium is maintained over time. For that equilibrium to be maintained over time, agents must formulate correct expectations of all the individual relative prices that prevail in those markets over time. The ADM model sidestepped that expectational problem by assuming that a full set of current and forward markets exists in the initial period and that all the agents participating in the economy are present and endowed with wealth enabling them to trade in the initial period. Under those rather demanding assumptions, if an equilibrium price vector covering all current and future markets is arrived at, the optimizing agents will formulate a set of mutually consistent optimal plans conditional on that vector of equilibrium prices so that all the optimal plans can and will be carried out as time happily unfolds for as long as the agents continue in their blissful existence.
However, without a complete set of current and forward markets, achieving the full equilibrium of the ADM model requires that agents formulate consistent expectations of the future prices that will be realized only over the course of time not in the initial period. Roy Radner, who extended the ADM model to accommodate the case of incomplete markets, called such a sequential equilibrium, an equilibrium of plans, prices and expectations. The sequential equilibrium described by Radner has the property that expectations are rational, but the assumption of rational expectations for all future prices over a sequence of future time periods is so unbelievably outlandish as an approximation to reality — sort of like the assumption that it could be 76 degrees fahrenheit in Washington DC in February — that to build that assumption into a macroeconomic model is an absurdity of mind-boggling proportions. But that is precisely what modern macroeconomics, in both its Real Business Cycle and New Keynesian incarnations, has done.
If instead of the sequential equilibrium of plans, prices and expectations, one tries to model an economy in which the price expectations of agents can be inconsistent, while prices adjust within any period to clear markets – the method of temporary equilibrium first described by Hicks in Value and Capital – one can begin to develop a richer conception of how a macroeconomic system can be subject to the financial disturbances, and financial crises to which modern macroeconomies are occasionally, if not routinely, vulnerable. But that would require a reorientation, if not a repudiation, of the path on which macroeconomics has been resolutely marching for nigh on forty years. In his 1984 paper "Consistent Temporary Equilibrium," published in a volume edited by J. P. Fitoussi, C. J. Bliss made a start on developing such a macroeconomic theory.
There are few economists better equipped than Roger Farmer to lead macroeconomics onto a new and more productive path. He has not done so in this book, but I am hoping that, in his next one, he will.
A Tutorial for Judy Shelton on the ABCs of Currency Manipulation
Published February 15, 2017	currency manipulation , exchange rate protection , Judy Shelton 13 Comments
Tags: Max Corden
Currency manipulation has become a favorite bugbear of critics of both monetary policy and trade policy. Some claim that countries depress their exchange rates to give their exporters an unfair advantage in foreign markets and to insulate their domestic producers from foreign competition. Others claim that using monetary policy as a way to stimulate aggregate demand is necessarily a form of currency manipulation, because monetary expansion causes the currency whose supply is being expanded to depreciate against other currencies, making monetary expansion, ipso facto, a form of currency manipulation.
As I have already explained in a number of posts (e.g., here, here, and here) a theoretically respectable case can be made for the possibility that currency manipulation can be used as a form of covert protectionism without imposing either tariffs, quotas or obviously protectionist measures to favor the producers of one country against their foreign competitors. All of this was explained by the eminent international trade theorist Max Corden over 30 years ago in a famous paper ("Exchange Rate Protection"). But to be able to make a credible case that currency manipulation is being practiced, it has to be shown that currency depreciation has been coupled with a restrictive monetary policy – either by reducing the supply of, or by increasing the demand for, base money. The charge that monetary expansion is ever a form of currency manipulation is therefore suspect on its face, and those who make accusations that countries are engaging in currency manipulation rarely bother to support the charge with evidence that currency deprection is being coupled with a restrictive monetary policy.
So it was no surprise to see in Tuesday's Wall Street Journal that monetary-policy entrepreneur Dr. Judy Shelton has written another one of her screeds promoting the gold standard, in which, showing no awareness of the necessary conditions for currency manipulation, she assures us that a) currency manipulation is a real problem and b) that restoring the gold standard would solve it.
Certainly the rules regarding international exchange-rate arrangements are not working. Monetary integrity was the key to making Bretton Woods institutions work when they were created after World War II to prevent future breakdowns in world order due to trade. The international monetary system, devised in 1944, was based on fixed exchange rates linked to a gold-convertible dollar.
No such system exists today. And no real leader can aspire to champion both the logic and the morality of free trade without confronting the practice that undermines both: currency manipulation.
Ahem, pray tell, which rules relating to exchange-rate arrangements does Dr. Shelton believe are not working? She doesn't cite any. And, what, on earth does "monetary integrity" even mean, and what does that high-minded, but totally amorphous, concept have to do with the rules of exchange-rate arrangements that aren't working?
Dr. Shelton mentions "monetary integrity" in the context of the Bretton Woods system, a system based — well, sort of — on fixed exchange rates, forgetting – or choosing not — to acknowledge that, under the Bretton Woods system, exchange rates were also unilaterally adjustable by participating countries. Not only were they adjustable, but currency devaluations were implemented on numerous occasions as a strategy for export promotion, the most notorious example being Britain's 30% devaluation of sterling in 1949, just five years after the Bretton Woods agreement had been signed. Indeed, many other countries, including West Germany, Italy, and Japan, also had chronically undervalued currencies under the Bretton Woods system, as did France after it rejoined the gold standard in 1926 at a devalued rate deliberately chosen to ensure that its export industries would enjoy a competitive advantage.
The key point to keep in mind is that for a country to gain a competitive advantage by lowering its exchange rate, it has to prevent the automatic tendency of international price arbitrage and corresponding flows of money to eliminate competitive advantages arising from movements in exchange rates. If a depreciated exchange rate gives rise to an export surplus, a corresponding inflow of foreign funds to finance the export surplus will eventually either drive the exchange rate back toward its old level, thereby reducing or eliminating the initial depreciation, or, if the lower rate is maintained, the cash inflow will accumulate in reserve holdings of the central bank. Unless the central bank is willing to accept a continuing accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves, the increased domestic demand and monetary expansion associated with the export surplus will lead to a corresponding rise in domestic prices, wages and incomes, thereby reducing or eliminating the competitive advantage created by the depressed exchange rate. Thus, unless the central bank is willing to accumulate foreign-exchange reserves without limit, or can create an increased demand by private banks and the public to hold additional cash, thereby creating a chronic excess demand for money that can be satisfied only by a continuing export surplus, a permanently reduced foreign-exchange rate creates only a transitory competitive advantage.
I don't say that currency manipulation is not possible. It is not only possible, but we know that currency manipulation has been practiced. But currency manipulation can occur under a fixed-exchange rate regime as well as under flexible exchange-rate regimes, as demonstrated by the conduct of the Bank of France from 1926 to 1935 while it was operating under a gold standard. And the most egregious recent example of currency manipulation was undertaken by the Chinese central bank when it effectively pegged the yuan to the dollar at a fixed rate. Keeping its exchange rate fixed against the dollar was precisely the offense that the currency-manipulation police accused the Chinese of committing.
When governments manipulate exchange rates to affect currency markets, they undermine the honest efforts of countries that wish to compete fairly in the global marketplace. Supply and demand are distorted by artificial prices conveyed through contrived exchange rates. Businesses fail as legitimately earned profits become currency losses.
It is no wonder that appeals to free trade prompt cynicism among those who realize the game is rigged against them. Opposing the Trans-Pacific Partnership in June 2015, Rep. Debbie Dingell (D., Mich.) explained: "We can compete with anybody in the world. We build the best product. But we can't compete with the Bank of Japan or the Japanese government."
In other words, central banks provide useful cover for currency manipulation. Japan's answer to the charge that it manipulates its currency for trade purposes is that movements in the exchange rate are driven by monetary policy aimed at domestic inflation and employment objectives. But there's no denying that one of the primary "arrows" of Japan's economic strategy under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, starting in late 2012, was to use radical quantitative easing to boost the "competitiveness" of Japan's exports. Over the next three years, the yen fell against the U.S. dollar by some 40%.
That sounds horrible, but Dr. Shelton conveniently forgets – or declines – to acknowledge that in September 2012, the yen had reached its post-war high against the dollar. Moreover, between September 2012 and September 2015, the trade weighted US dollar index in terms of major currencies rose by almost 25%, so most of the depreciation of the yen against the dollar reflected dollar appreciation rather than yen depreciation.
Now as I pointed out in a post in 2013 about Japan, there really were reasons to suspect that the Japanese were engaging in currency manipulation even though Japan's rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves that began in 2009 came to a halt in 2012 before the Bank of Japan launched its quantitative easing program. I have not kept up on what policies the Bank of Japan has been following, so I am not going to venture an opinion about whether Japan is or is not a currency manipulator. But the evidence that Dr. Shelton is providing to support her charge is simply useless and irrelevant.
Last April, U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew cautioned Japan against using currency depreciation to gain a trade advantage and he placed the country on a the"monitoring list" of potential currency manipulators. But in response, Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso threatened to raise the bar, saying he was "prepared to undertake intervention" in the foreign-exchange market.
Obviously, the US government responds to pressures from domestic interests harmed by Japanese competition. Whether such back and forth between the American Treasury Secretary and his Japanese counterpart signifies anything beyond routine grandstanding I am not in a position to say.
China has long been intervening directly in the foreign-exchange market to manipulate the value of its currency. The People's Bank of China announces a daily midpoint for the acceptable exchange rate between the yuan and the dollar, and then does not allow its currency to move more than 2% from the target price. When the value of the yuan starts to edge higher than the desired exchange rate, China's government buys dollars to push it back down. When the yuan starts to drift lower than the desired rate, it sells off dollar reserves to buy back its own currency.
China's government has reserves that amount to nearly $3 trillion. According to Mr. Lew, the U.S. should mute its criticism because China has spent nearly $1 trillion to cushion the yuan's fall over the last 2½ years or so. In a veiled reproach to Mr. Trump's intention to label China a currency manipulator, Mr. Lew said it was "analytically dangerous" to equate China's current intervention policies with its earlier efforts to devalue its currency for purposes of gaining a trade advantage. China, he noted, would only be open to criticism that is "intellectually sound."
Whether China is propping up exchange rates or holding them down, manipulation is manipulation and should not be overlooked. To be intellectually consistent, one must acknowledge that the distortions induced by government intervention in the foreign-exchange market affect both trade and capital flows. A country that props up the value of its currency against the dollar may have strategic goals for investing in U.S. assets.
Far from being intellectually consistent, Dr. Shelton is rushing headlong into intellectual incoherence. She has latched on to the mantra of "currency manipulation," and she will not let go. How does Dr. Shelton imagine that the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods era, for which she so fervently pines, were maintained?
I have no idea what she might be thinking, but the answer is that they were maintained by intervention into currency markets to keep exchange rates from deviating by more than a minimal amount from their target rates. So precisely the behavior that, under the Bretton Woods system, she extols wholeheartedly, she condemns mindlessly when now undertaken by the Chinese.
Again, my point is not that the Chinese have not engaged in exchange-rate protection in the past. I have actually suggested in earlier posts to which I have hyperlinked above that the Chinese have engaged in that practice. But that no longer appears to be the case, and Dr. Shelton is clearly unable to provide any evidence that the Chinese are still engaging in that practice.
[T]he . . . first step [to take] to address this issue [is] by questioning why there aren't adequate rules in place to keep countries from manipulating their exchange rates.
The next step is to establish a universal set of rules based on monetary sovereignty and discipline that would allow nations to voluntarily participate in a trade agreement that did not permit them to undermine true competition by manipulating exchange rates.
I have actually just offered such a rule in case Dr. Shelton is interested. But I have little hope and no expectation that she is or will be.
The Incoherence and Bad Faith of Antonin Scalia's Originalism — Updated
Published February 7, 2017	Uncategorized 7 Comments
UPDATE: I just realized that yesterday I mistakenly published a rough draft of this post instead of the version that I had intended to publish. I apologize for that unforced error.
My previous post about judge-made law was inspired by a comment by Scott Sumner on the post before that about Judge Gorsuch. Well, another commenter, gofx, who commented on the post about judge-made law, has inspired this post. Let's see how long we can keep this recursive equilibrium going. Here's what gofx had to say:
David, I think your original post criticizing Gorsuch for a "monumental denial of reality" is confusing a normative statement and a positive statement. Textualists, like Scalia and others try to balance the effects common law, statutory, and executive (administrative) law. Yes, English common law is one of the bases of American law. But even the supreme court placed limits on federal judges creating common law with respect to certain areas of state law (Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins). So while common law remains important, judges are no longer the King's agents attempting to standardize decisions and principles across the realm. Along came democracy, legislatures and executive-branch regulations. There is still plenty of scope for common law, but there is more and more "prescribed" laws and rules.
I agree that there is a problem here with confusing "normative" and "positive" statements about the law and the role of judges in making – or not making – law. But I don't think that the confusion is mine. This is an important point, which will come up again below. But first, let me quote further from gofx's comment:
Here is Scalia in "Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws:"
But though I have no quarrel with the common law and its process, I do question whether the attitude of the common-law judge – the mind-set that asks, "What is the most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any impediments to the achievement of that result be evaded?"– is appropriate for most of the work that I do, and much of the work that state judges do. We live in an age of legislation, and most new law is statutory law. As one legal historian has put it, in modern times "the main business of government, and therefore of law, [is] legislative and executive …. Even private law, so-called, [has been] turning statutory. The lion's share of the norms and rules that actually govern[} the country [come) out of Congress and the legislatures. . . . The rules of the countless administrative agencies [are] themselves an important, even crucial, source of law." This is particularly true in the federal courts, where, with a qualification so small it does not bear• mentioning, there is no such thing as common law."
I am grateful for the reference to this essay based on two lectures given by Scalia in 2010, which I have now read for the first time. The first thing to note about the lecture is that despite his disclaimer about having "no quarrel with the common law and its process," Scalia adopts an almost uniformly derogatory and disdainful attitude toward the common law and especially toward common-law judges; the disdain, bordering on contempt, is palpable. Here are some examples aside from the one gofx kindly provided:
As I have described, this system of making law by judicial opinion, and making law by distinguishing earlier cases, is what every American law student, what every newborn American lawyer, first sees when he opens his eyes. And the impression remains with him for life. His image of the great judge — the Holmes, the Cardozo — is the man (or woman) who has the intelligence to know what is the best rule of law to govern the case at hand, and then the skill to perform the broken-field running through earlier cases that leaves him free to impose that rule — distinguishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches his goal: good law. That image of the great judge remains with the former law student when he himself becomes a judge, and thus the common-law tradition is passed on and on.
[T]he subject of statutory interpretation deserves study and attention in its own right, as the principal business of lawyers and judges. It will not do to treat the enterprise as simply an inconvenient modern add-on to the judges' primary role of common-law lawmaking. Indeed, attacking the enterprise with the Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for incompetence and usurpation.
But the Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers' intent and objective meaning; but rather that between original meaning (whether derived from Framers' intent or not) and current meaning. The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of what is called the "living Constitution," a body of law that (unlike normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society. And it is the judges who determine those needs and "find" that changing law. Seems familiar, doesn't it? Yes, it is the common law returned, but infinitely more powerful than what the old common law ever pretended to be, for now it trumps even the statutes of democratic legislatures.
If you go into a constitutional law class, or study a constitutional-law casebook, or read a brief filed in a constitutional-law case, you will rarely find the discussion addressed to the text of the constitutional provision that is at issue, or to the question of what was the originally understood or even the originally intended meaning of that text. Judges simply ask themselves (as a good common-law judge would) what ought the result to be, and then proceed to the task of distinguishing (or, if necessary, overruling) any prior Supreme Court cases that stand in the way. Should there be (to take one of the less controversial examples) a constitutional right to die? If so, there is. Should there be a constitutional right to reclaim a biological child put out for adoption by the other parent? Again, if so, there is. If it is good, it is so. Never mind the text that we are supposedly construing; we will smuggle these in, if all else fails, under the Due Process Clause (which, as I have described, is textually incapable of containing them). Moreover, what the Constitution meant yesterday it does not necessarily mean today. As our opinions say in the context of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence (the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause), its meaning changes to reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
This is preeminently a common-law way of making law, and not the way of construing a democratically adopted text. . . . The Constitution, however, even though a democratically adopted text, we formally treat like the common law. What, it is fair to ask, is our justification for doing so?
The apparent reason for Scalia's disdain for common-law judging is basically that judges, rather than deferring to the popular will expressed through legislation, presume to think that they can somehow figure out what the right, or best, decision is rather than mechanically follow the text of a statute enacted by a democratic legislature. Scalia hates judges who think for themselves, because, by thinking for themselves, they betray an insufferable elitisim instead of dutifully deferring to democratically elected legislators through whom the popular will is faithfully expressed. For Scalia it is the only the popular will that matters, the rights and interests of the litigants appearing before the judge being of little consequence compared to upholding the statutory text, the authoritative articulation of the popular will. Moreover, even if the statutes don't achieve the right result, the people can at least read the statutes and regulations and know what the law says and how it will be enforced. And how can the people ever know what those high and mighty judges will decide to do next? And we all know — do we not? — the countless hours of their spare time spent in libraries and on-line by the unwashed masses poring over the latest additions to US Code and the Federal Register. Just think how all those long hours devoted to reading the US Code and the Federal Register would be wasted if those arrogant judges could simply ignore the plain meaning of the statutes and regulations and were allowed to use their own judgment in deciding cases.
I will forego, at least for now, indulging my desire to comment on Scalia's critique of common-law judging. I want to focus instead on the positive case that Scalia makes for his textualist theory of statutory interpretation. To do so, let me quote liberally from Richard Posner's withering 2012 review of Scalia's treatise (co-authored by Bryan Garner), Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, which exposes the both the incoherence and the bad faith of Scalia's textualist arguments. The entire review is worthy of careful study, but I will pick out a few paragraphs that highlight Scalia's tortured relationship with and attitude toward the common law.
Judges like to say that all they do when they interpret a constitutional or statutory provision is apply, to the facts of the particular case, law that has been given to them. They do not make law: that is the job of legislators, and for the authors and ratifiers of constitutions. They are not Apollo; they are his oracle. They are passive interpreters. Their role is semantic.
The passive view of the judicial role is aggressively defended in a new book by Justice Antonin Scalia and the legal lexicographer Bryan Garner (Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 2012). They advocate what is best described as textual originalism, because they want judges to "look for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it has borne from its inception, and reject judicial speculation about both the drafters' extra-textually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading's anticipated consequences." This austere interpretive method leads to a heavy emphasis on dictionary meanings, in disregard of a wise warning issued by Judge Frank Easterbrook, who though himself a self-declared textualist advises that "the choice among meanings [of words in statutes] must have a footing more solid than a dictionary—which is a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures." Scalia and Garner reject (before they later accept) Easterbrook's warning. Does an ordinance that says that "no person may bring a vehicle into the park" apply to an ambulance that enters the park to save a person's life? For Scalia and Garner, the answer is yes. After all, an ambulance is a vehicle—any dictionary will tell you that. If the authors of the ordinance wanted to make an exception for ambulances, they should have said so. And perverse results are a small price to pay for the objectivity that textual originalism offers (new dictionaries for new texts, old dictionaries for old ones). But Scalia and Garner later retreat in the ambulance case, and their retreat is consistent with a pattern of equivocation exhibited throughout their book. . . .
Another interpretive principle that Scalia and Garner approve is the presumption against the implied repeal of state statutes by federal statutes. They base this "on an assumption of what Congress, in our federal system, would or should normally desire." What Congress would desire? What Congress should desire? Is this textualism, too?
And remember the ambulance case? Having said that the conclusion that an ambulance was forbidden to enter the park even to save a person's life was entailed by textual originalism and therefore correct, Scalia and Garner remark several hundred pages later that the entry of the ambulance is not prohibited after all, owing to the "common-law defense of necessity," which they allow to override statutory text. Yet just four pages later they say that except in "select fields such as admiralty law, [federal courts] have no significant common-law powers." And still elsewhere, tacking back again, they refer approvingly to an opinion by Justice Kennedy (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.), which states that "the Sherman Act's use of 'restraint of trade' invokes the common law itself … not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890." In other words, "restraint of trade" had a specific meaning (and it did: it meant "restraints on alienation") in 1890 that judges are free to alter in conformity with modern economics—a form of "dynamic" interpretation that should be anathema to Scalia and Garner. A few pages later they say that "federal courts do not possess the lawmaking power of common-law courts," ignoring not only the antitrust and ambulance cases but also the fact that most of the concepts deployed in federal criminal law—such as mens rea (intent), conspiracy, attempt, self-defense, and necessity—are common law concepts left undefined in criminal statutes.
Scalia and Garner indicate their agreement with a number of old cases that hold that an heir who murders his parents or others from whom he expects to inherit is not disqualified from inheriting despite the common law maxim that no person shall be permitted to profit from his wrongful act. (Notice how common law floats in and out of their analysis, unpredictably.) They say that these cases are "textually correct" though awful, and are happy to note that they have been overruled by statute. Yet just before registering their approval they had applauded the rule that allows the deadlines in statutes of limitations to be "tolled" (delayed) "because of unforeseen events that make compliance impossible." The tolling rule is not statutory. It is a judicial graft on statutes that do not mention tolling. Scalia and Garner do not explain why that is permissible, but a judicial graft disqualifying a murdering heir is not.
Scalia and Garner defend the canon of construction that counsels judges to avoid interpreting a statute in a way that will render it unconstitutional, declaring that this canon is good "judicial policy." Judicial policy is the antithesis of textual originalism. They note that "many established principles of interpretation are less plausibly based on a reasonable assessment of meaning than on grounds of policy adopted by the courts"—and they applaud those principles, too. They approve the principle that statutes dealing with the same subject should "if possible be interpreted harmoniously," a principle they deem "based upon a realistic assessment of what the legislature ought to have meant," which in turn derives from the "sound principles…that the body of the law should make sense, and…that it is the responsibility of the courts, within the permissible meanings of the text, to make it so" (emphasis added). In other words, judges should be realistic, should impose right reason on legislators, should in short clean up after the legislators.
I would just note in passing that Posner shows that the confusion between normative and positive which gofx in the comment above ascribed to me is obviously running rampant, if not amok, throughout Scalia's treatise. But Posner's evisceration of Scalia's bad faith does not go far enough, because the bad faith extends beyond Scalia's willingness to invoke (or smuggle in) common-law principles to cover up the gaps in his textualism. Scalia's whole originalist doctrine that the text of the Constitution should be interpreted according to the original meaning of the text of the Constitution relies on the premise that the judicial interpretations of the Constitution had always been governed by the original meaning that had been universally attributed to the Constitutional text. It was only much later, say, in the middle of the twentieth century, on or about May 17, 1954, that the interpretation of the Constitution was perverted by the reprehensible judges and their academic handmaidens who invented the notion of a living constitution that adjusts to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Let me quote once more from Posner's review:
Scalia and Garner contend that textual originalism was the dominant American method of judicial interpretation until the middle of the twentieth century. The only evidence they provide, however, consists of quotations from judges and jurists, such as William Blackstone, John Marshall, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote before 1950. Yet none of those illuminati, while respectful of statutory and constitutional text, as any responsible lawyer would be, was a textual originalist. All were, famously, "loose constructionists."
Scalia and Garner call Blackstone "a thoroughgoing originalist." They say that "Blackstone made it very clear that original meaning governed." Yet they quote in support the famous statement in his Commentaries on the Laws of England that "the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law" (emphasis mine, except that the first "signs" is emphasized in the original). Blackstone adds that "the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it."
Just so! But, once again, Posner goes too easy on Scalia, because Scalia's whole premise in his essay on common law courts, to which gofx pointed me, is that the modern theories of Constitutional interpretation so abhorent to Scalia are basically extensions, albeit extreme extensions, of common-law judging in which the judge tries to find the best possible outcome for the case he that he is deciding, unconstrained by any statutory or Constitutional text. It is the lack of subordination by common-law judges to any authoritative legal text with a fixed meaning that they are bound to accept that is the ultimate heresy of which all common-law judges, in Scalia's eyes, stand convicted. But when the US Constitution was ratified all the judges in America and Britain were common-law judges. And Blackstone's magisterial Commentaries on the Laws of England was a four-volume paean to the common law of England. So, under Scalia's own originalist doctrine, the meaning of the judiciary in the US Constitution, written by the Framers under Blackstone's thrall, was the kind of judging practiced by common-law judges. The judges who interpreted the Constitution for almost two centuries after the Constitution was ratified were common-law judges and they were interpreting the Constitution using the very interpretative methods of common-law judges that Scalia so violently condemns.
Scalia has literally hoisted himself by his own originalist petard. Couldn't have happened to a finer fellow.
Yes, Judges Do Make Law
Published February 5, 2017	Neil Gorsuch , Ronald Dworkin , Scott Sumner , Uncategorized 14 Comments
Scott Sumner has just written an interesting comment to my previous post in which I criticized a remark made by Judge Gorsuch upon being nominated to fill the vacant seat on the Supreme Court — so interesting, in fact, that I think it is worth responding to him in a separate post.
First, here is the remark made by Judge Gorsuch to which I took exception.
I respect, too, the fact that in our legal order, it is for Congress and not the courts to write new laws. It is the role of judges to apply, not alter, the work of the people's representatives. A judge who likes every outcome he reaches is very likely a bad judge . . . stretching for results he prefers rather than those the law demands.
I criticized Judge Gorsuch for denying what to me is the obvious fact that judges do make law. They make law, because the incremental effect of each individual decision results in a legal order that is different from the legislation that has been enacted by legislatures. Each decision creates a precedent that must be considered by other judges as they apply and construe the sum total of legislatively enacted statutes in light of, and informed by, the precedents of judges and the legal principles that have guided judges those precedents. Law-making by judges under a common law system — even a common law system in which judges are bound to acknowledge the authority of statutory law — is inevitable for many reasons, one but not the only reason being that statutes will sooner or later have to be applied in circumstances were not foreseen by that legislators who enacted those statutes.
To take an example of Constitutional law off the top of my head: is it an unreasonable search for the police to search the cell phone of someone they have arrested without first getting a search warrant? That's what the Supreme Court had to decide two years ago in Riley v. California. The answer to that question could not be determined by reading the text of the Fourth Amendment which talks about the people being secure in their "persons, houses, papers, or effects" or doing a historical analysis of what the original understanding of the terms "search" and "seizure" and "papers and effects" was when the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was enacted. Earlier courts had to decide whether government eavesdropping on phone calls violated the Fourth Amendment. And other courts have had to decide whether collecting meta data about phone calls is a violation. Answers to those legal questions can't be found by reading the relevant legal text.
Here's part of the New York Times story about the Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. Califronia.
In a sweeping victory for privacy rights in the digital age, the Supreme Court on Wednesday unanimously ruled that the police need warrants to search the cellphones of people they arrest.
While the decision will offer protection to the 12 million people arrested every year, many for minor crimes, its impact will most likely be much broader. The ruling almost certainly also applies to searches of tablet and laptop computers, and its reasoning may apply to searches of homes and businesses and of information held by third parties like phone companies.
"This is a bold opinion," said Orin S. Kerr, a law professor at George Washington University. "It is the first computer-search case, and it says we are in a new digital age. You can't apply the old rules anymore."
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for the court, was keenly alert to the central role that cellphones play in contemporary life. They are, he said, "such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy."
But he added that old principles required that their contents be protected from routine searches. One of the driving forces behind the American Revolution, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, was revulsion against "general warrants," which "allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity."
"The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand," the chief justice also wrote, "does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the founders fought."
Now for Scott's comment:
I don't see how Gorsuch's view conflicts with your view. It seems like Gorsuch is saying something like "Judges should not legislate, they should interpret the laws." And you are saying "the laws are complicated." Both can be true!
Well, in a sense, maybe, because what judges do is technically not legislation. But they do make law; their opinions determine for the rest of us what we may legally do and what we may not legally do and what rights to expect will be respected and what rights will not be respected. Judges can even change the plain meaning of a statute in order to uphold a more basic, if unwritten, principle of justice, which,under, the plain meaning of Judge Gorsuch's remark ("It is the role of judges to apply, not alter, the work of the people's representatives") would have to be regarded as an abuse of judicial discretion. The absurdity of what I take to be Gorsuch's position is beautifully illustrated by the case of Riggs v. Palmer which the late — and truly great — Ronald Dworkin discussed in his magnificent article "Is Law a System of Rules?" aka "The Model of Rules." Here is the one paragraph in which Dworkin uses the Riggs case to show that judges apply not just specific legal rules (e.g., statutory rules), but also deeper principles that govern how those rules should be applied.
My immediate purpose, however, is to distinguish principles in the generic sense from rules, and I shall start by collecting some examples of the former. The examples I offer are chosen haphazardly; almost any case in a law school casebook would provide examples that would serve as well. In 1889, a New York court, in the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer, had to decide whether an heir named in the will of his grandfather could inherit under that will, even though he had murdered his grandfather to do so. The court began its reasoning with this admission: "It is quite true that statues regulating the making, proof and effect of wills, and the devolution of property, if literally construed [my emphasis], and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer." But the court continued to note that "all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime." The murderer did not receive his inheritance.
QED. In this case the Common law overruled the statute, and justice prevailed over injustice. Game, set, match to the judge!
Judge Gorsuch on "the Role of Judges" in our Legal System
Published February 2, 2017	Korematsu v. United States , Neil Gorsuch 4 Comments
Tags: Federalist Society, Marbury v. Madison
Neil Gorsuch, nominated this week to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court left by the demise of Antonin Scalia, is in many respects an impressive Judge on the tenth circuit Court of Appeals, receiving accolades and encomiums not only from his ideological allies but also from legal experts and scholars on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. Besides a J.D. from Harvard, Gorsuch has a Ph.D. in law from Oxford, having written his doctoral dissertation on assisted suicide and euthanasia, a work subsequently published by Princeton University Press. A scholarly judge, known for well-crafted and lucid opinions, he is likely, if confirmed, to leave a lasting mark on the Supreme Court and on American jurisprudence.
So I was really disappointed, though not really surprised, to find out that Judge Gorsuch, at his public introduction at the White House on Tuesday evening, felt compelled to indulge in an abject ritual obeisance to the prevailing right-wing populist legal ideology, delivering the following willfully ignorant, ahistorical, misrepresentation of the role of judges in our Anglo/American, common law legal system.
How someone trained in the law both at Harvard and Oxford could so flagrantly mischaracterize what it is that judges do – a mischacterization of the same ilk as John Roberts's infamous comparison, as a nominee for Chief Justice testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, of judges to baseball umpires calling balls and strikes – when the entire Anglo-American legal system and the whole of its jurisprudence rests on the foundation of the common law, a law made in its entirety by judges deciding cases according to their understanding of the principles of justice and their understanding of how earlier judges had decided similar cases in similar situations, a law that evolved slowly as an organic, living tradition over countless generations and many centuries, is simply beyond my comprehension.
With all due respect to Judge Gorsuch's impressive legal scholarship, I consider his statement to be a monumental denial of reality, orders of magnitude beyond denying climate change or even evolution. It is a denial of the obvious on the level of a Ph.D. mathematician denying that two plus two equals four. But so ferocious and so intransigent are the demands of current right-wing populist legal ideology that failure to deny obvious historical reality would be regarded as an unpardonable sin and a damnable heresy, more than ample grounds for being rejected to fill a coveted seat on the Supreme Court.
I can almost hear the howls of protest emanating from the Federalist Society, which, in its mission statement, solemnly asserts "that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to state what the law is, not what it should be." But what exactly is the meaning of "the law" in that ever-so emphatic pronouncement?
"The law" could mean a specific statute, ordinance, enactment, provision, article, or rule, which, if duly enacted by an appropriate law-making body, has "the force of law." Or alternatively, "the law" could mean the entire body of law under which a rule of law is said to be in effect. Whether a specific statute, ordinance, enactment, provision, article, or rule exists is a purely factual question, and, for the most part, not a controversial one. When a question of law becomes controversial, it is rarely because people have forgotten the existence of a relevant statute, ordinance, or rule, of whose existence they must be reminded by a judge with a superior memory. Rather the question of law arises, because it is not clear which one of a number of alternative, potentially applicable rules should govern the outcome of the case at hand. And that question of law can rarely be answered – certainly not satisfactorily answered – simply by reminding the litigants that the law says such and such and so and so.
The real challenge confronting the judge – especially an appellate judge – is to determine which of the alternative, potentially applicable rules should determine the outcome of the case. And to answer that question, a judge can't just look up what the law says, the judge has to consider how the entire legal system, including not just the explicit rules, but all the relevant previous judicial decisions and all the principles embodied in those decisions, comports with the decision that must be rendered. The judge deciding the case has to figure out how to make a ruling that best fits in with all those previous decisions and all their underlying principles. It is that best decision which is what "the law," considered as an overall system, requires. But if that is what a judge is trying to do, it is simply nonsense – as in absurd and incoherent – to assert that the judge is stating "what the law is, not what it should be."
To be sure, judges sometimes have to make decisions with which they are personally uncomfortable, judges never being possessed of unlimited discretion to rule as they please. But judging means a weighing of arguments and of conflicting values to arrive at the best possible decision under the circumstances — the decision most consistent with the entire system of law, not just particular statutes, enactments or decisions.
For example, Korematsu v. United States has never formally been overruled or vacated by the US Supreme Court. Under the absurd doctrine of the Federalist Society, that abominable decision, no less than the admirable Marbury v. Madison, is "law." But under any defensible understanding of what the US legal system actually entails, Korematsu is not law, even though it has, regrettably, not yet been formally expunged from precedents of the Supreme Court. One would hope that Judge Gorsuch will be given an opportunity to opine on the legal status of Korematsu and perhaps other legal abominations which are still available to be invoked as precedent, when he testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee.


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GOP Rep. Kevin Brady: 'Pro-Life Issues Are the Family I Wake Up to Every Day'
GOP Rep. Kevin Brady: 'Pro-Life Issues Are the Family I Wake Up to Every Day'
In an exclusive interview, the Texas congressman opened up about his personal faith, about key political issues — and about his heartfelt beliefs
By LifeZette Staff
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Rep. Kevin Brady (R-Texas) shared his thoughts about faith, family — and policies that aren't mere policies for him but are a big part of leading a faithful Christian life for the lawmaker.
"When I first came to Congress, I was very worried about my faith because that's the town that just eats families up. So if you want to protect your family, you've gotta fight for it," Brady told Reverent Media's CEO Clay Vaughan during an exclusive interview this month.
"And so, I've been blessed," said the congressman, who represents the 8th Congressional District in Texas.
"My faith has actually grown in Congress. My relationship with Jesus Christ has skyrocketed in Congress, because I've surrounded myself with men and women, Christians, who believe as I do, men who hold ourselves — each other — accountable, who keep our faith and our family ahead of politics and of Earth, as we know that's not where we are of."
"And as a result, with my Bible study and because of our relationships, because of my faith leaders' breakfast that we hold regularly, I really feel that strength, that prayer of inspiration," he said. "I've just been really blessed."
"And I think, too, people would be surprised to know how many members of Congress, and those in the White House — who, as I do — spend a great deal of each day keeping that faith in front of what we do."
Brady addressed key pro-life issues in this country right now.
"We have a huge battle on pro-life issues. In the past, we've always fought for the innocent unborn. Now, we're actually fighting for the innocent born," said Brady. "These new state laws that allow a baby that's born from a botched abortion actually to get no medical attention, to die there — it's just seems beyond anything we ever thought we'd have to fight."
"Whether you are strongly pro-life, as I am, or pro-choice, certainly we can agree that that baby deserves the same medical attention as everyone else."
Despite that brutal and tragic reality of infanticide in some places, he noted that he is "really proud" of what's happening "in the states where we are fighting for the innocent born, against all of this, and movements like 40 Days for Life — that prayer, that loving, that fasting — that has changed thousands of lives."
Related: Pro-Life Movement Must Stop Today's Insane Wave of Infanticide, Says CEO of 40 Days for Life
Overall, "my view is we are winning this battle for pro-life, for the innocent unborn. But it is a fight every day," he indicated — and people of faith clearly must stay engaged and committed to that fight.
Brady added an important addendum: "Pro-life isn't a position for me. It's my family," said Brady. "My wife and I had no luck getting pregnant. But the Lord blessed us with two boys — two adopted boys — because two women, in two very difficult situations, chose life."
"And they created a family where none existed. And so, the pro-life policies are the family I wake up to each day," he said.
Brady also shared his thoughts on what this next year might bring as the country gears up for another presidential election during a highly fraught and divided time in the culture.
"I don't know that we've ever seen an election where the stakes for the country are any higher than this," said Brady.
He noted that attacks on President Donald Trump started virtually from the moment the president was elected in November 2016.
There are people in this country who "have never accepted his presidency … And now we have the impeachment [hearings], and we know what this is about," said Brady. "It's about taking him down by any means necessary. It's about overturning the will of 60 million Americans."
"It's wrong," he said in no uncertain terms. "We need to stand with the president. We need to stand with values and faith and security as a country — and our freedoms."
"That's what we're fighting for."
Be sure to click on the video link in this article (up above) to see our full exclusive interview with Rep. Kevin Brady.
And share your thoughts.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Posts Tagged 'les deux salons'
Les Deux Salons
I made two food-based resolutions for 2011:
Stop eating out so much.
Eat steak tartare.
The first of those isn't going so well but I applied myself to the second much more whole-heartedly. Various candidates were proposed – the third floor of Smith's of Smithfields, Le Pont De La Tour and The Canton Arms – but eventually I settled on Les Deux Salons. This was for three reasons: its pedigree, its decor and its bouillabaisse. Les Deux Salons is from the same people as Wild Honey and Arbutus, both restaurants on my ever increasing list, and it certainly looks the part of a French bistro: chrome, leather banquettes and aproned staff. Hard to believe that not too long ago it was a Pitcher & Piano. The presence of fish soup becomes important when one's dining partner is a pescatarian and strangely refuses to show any interest in raw meat. Luckily Les Deux Salons have a plat du jour and Friday is bouillabaisse night.
So, steak tartare. N looked slightly askance at its arrival but I was relieved to see it was already prepared so all I had to do was add a few cornichons to my plate and break the yolk perched on top. In terms of taste, I had no idea what to expect but it was something like picnic lunch rolled into one. And it rolled together wonderfully; the sharpness of the capers against the depth of the steak against the creaminess of the egg. By the by, I asked the internet why my yolk was such a beautiful dark orange and the internet said because the chicken that produced the egg had AIDS. Thanks, internet.
N had salt cod brandade with fried squid and parsley cromesqui (a cromesqui is a mini-croquette traditionally made with caul fat, although hopefully not in this instance). It was a prettily presented and well-balanced dish, the squid set off by the richer flavour of its ink, the brandade mixing together everything good in the world: "I could guzzle this but I am going savour it." Admirable restraint. When N cut into the cromesqui, it exploded with bright green parsley sauce as vivid as gloss paint but, alas, its contribution to the plate was solely visual. She followed this (as I'd hoped) with the bouillabaisse.
This was presented in its constituent parts: a pot of stock, a pan of fish and vegetable, bread, aioli and rouille. To say the stock was fishy is a ludicrous understatement. I instinctively cringed away from it; N ladled it into her bowl, remarking of the lovely pouring action of said ladle. She said she couldn't possibly have eaten the stock on its own as a soup, it was so amazingly dark and bitter that it had to be tempered by the fish, leek and fennel but these elements managed to hold their own within the potent broth. Despite having had bouillabaisse in Marseilles, N felt like she was having the real deal for the first time: "I feel like a proper French."
My main of ox cheeks was not as successful as my starter. Whilst the meat was well cooked, I wanted it to be more unctuous and the flavour more toothsome. The accompanying salsify was as blandly tuberous as a yam and the watercress and bone marrow salad had a head-clearingly sharp greenness but no evidence of marrow. Perhaps this was lost to the dark, sticky liquor at the bottom of the pan which, whilst delicious, didn't leave any available surface to try and keep the components of the meal seperated. Sides were excellent though. Daulphinois was the Platonic ideal of a gratin and braised endive with orange and juniper almost made me believe that that particular vegetable wasn't put on Earth as a practical joke.
Puddings were a disappointment (I always say this). I virtually forced the rum baba on N on the grounds she is a rum loving woman. Unfortunately, it was rather stodgy and the flavours too disparate. And I only had myself to blame for ordering something called "floating islands with pink pralines". This was, in fact, one island; a pink mousse that tasted somewhere between Flump and a Barrat's Nougat Bar. It floated on a sea of creme anglais which was probably the best bit, the mousse itself being altogether too bizarre and insubstantial.
£60 a head including service (three staff, three styles, all excellent), fizzy water (natch), a glass of Innes & Gunn (the sweetness of the beer going perfectly with the sharpness of the tartare) and a glass of Welcombe Hills (a light, extremely floral white from – believe it or not – Warwickshire). Beforehand we had a couple of drinks at 5th View, the bar at the top of the huge Waterstone's on Piccadilly. It very nearly does everything right but manages to just fall short across the board.
Tagged with 5th view, les deux salons


1998 Zhai, Xiaoming, Day, Howard W., Hacker, Bradley R., and You, Zhendong. Paleozoic Metamorphism in the Qinling Orogen, Tongbai Mountains, Central China. Geology, v. 26, p. 371 -374.
1999 Schiffman, P and Day, Howard W. Petrological methods for the study of very low grade metabasites in Frey, M and Robinson, D. (editors), Very Low Grade Metamorphism, Blackwell Scientific.
2000 Mayfield, Jason D. and Day, Howard W. Ultramafic Rocks in the Feather River Belt, Northern Sierra Nevada, California, in Brooks, E.R. and Dida, L.T., editors, Field Guide to the Geology and Tectonics of the Northern Sierra Nevada. California Department of Conservation, Division of Mines and Gelogy, Special Publication 122, pp. 1-15.
2001 Fagan, T.J., Day, Howard W., and Hacker, B.R. Timing of arc construction and metamorphism in the Slate Creek Complex, northern Sierra Nevada, California. Geological Society of America Bulletin, v. 113, p. 1105-1118.
2002 Springer, R. K. and Day, Howard W. Hydrothermal amphibole in sub-greenschist facies mafic rocks, western Sierra Nevada, California. Schweizerische Mineralogische und Petrographische Mitteilungen, v. 82, p. 341-354.
2004 Day, Howard W., and Bickford, M. E.. Geochronologic and isotopic constraints on the tectonic setting of the Jurassic Smartville and Slate Creek Complexes, northern Sierra Nevada, California. Geological Society of America Bulletin, v. 116, no.11/12, p. 1515-1528.
2005 Day, Howard W. and Springer, R. K. First appearance of actinolite in the prehnite-pumpellyite facies, Sierra Nevada, California. Canadian Mineralogist, v. 43, pt 1, p. 89-104.
2005 Pan, X., Day, Howard W., Wang, W., Beckett, L. A. and Schenker, M. B. Residential proximity to naturally occurring asbestos and mesothelioma risk in California. American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, v. 172(8), p.1019-1025.
2007 Day, H. W. and Mulcahy, S. R. Excess silica in omphacite and the formation of free silica in eclogite. Journal of Metamorphic Geology, v. 25, p. 37 - 50.
1972 Day, Howard W. Geometrical analysis of phase equilibria in Ternary systems of six phases. American Journal of Science. 272:711-734.
1980 Day, Howard W. and H. Kumin. Thermodynamic analysis of the aluminum silicate triple point. American Journal of Science. 280:265-287.
1980 Day, Howard W. and V.M. Brown. Evolution of perthite composition and microstructure during progressive metamorphism of hypersolvus granite, Rhode Island, U.S.A. Contributions to Mineralogy and Petrology. 72:353-365.
1982 Day, Howard W. and Philip M. Fenn. Estimating the P-T-XH2O conditions during crystallization of low calcium granites. Journal of Geology 90:485-507.
1985 Day, H.W., J.V. Chernosky, and H.J. Kumin. Equilibria in the system MgO-SiO2-H2O: A thermodynamic analysis. American Mineralogist, 70: 237-248.
1985 Day, Howard W., Moores, E.M. and Tuminas, A.C. Structure and tectonics of the Northern Sierra Nevada. Geological Society of American Bulletin, 96:436-450.
1987 Day, Howard W. Controls on the apparent thermal and baric structure of metamorphic belts. Journal of Geology, 95, 807-824.
1987 Beard, James S. and Day, H.W. The Smartville intrusive complex, northern Sierra Nevada, California: The core of a rifted volcanic arc. Geological Society of America Bulletin, 99, 779-791.
1989 Day, Howard W. and Chamberlain, C.P. Implications of thermal and baric structure for controls on metamorphism: northern New England, U.S.A., in Daly,J.S., Cliff, R.A. and Yardley,B.W.D.(eds) Evolution of Metamorphic Belts. Geological Society (London) Special Publication 43, 215-222.
1989 Edelman, S. H., Day, H. W., Moores, E. M., Zigan, S.M., Murphy, T.P., and Hacker, B.R., Structure across a Mesozoic Ocean-Continent suture zone in the northern Sierra Nevada, California. Geological Society of America Special Paper 224, 55 p.
1989 Patrick, B. E. and Day, H. W., Controls on the first appearance of jadeitic pyroxene, northern Diablo range, California. Journal of Metamorphic Geology, 7, 629-639.
1991 Giaramita, Mario J. and Day, Howard W. Buffering in the assemblage staurolite - aluminum silicate - biotite - garnet- chlorite. Journal of Metamorphic Geology, 9, 363-378.
1992 Springer, R.K. and Day, Howard W. and Beiersdorfer, R. E. Prehnite-Pumpellyite to Greenschist Facies transition, northern Sierra Nevada, California. Journal of Metmorphic Geology, 10, 147-170.
1995 Beiersdorfer, R. E. and Day, Howard W. Paragenesis of Pumpellyite in Low-Grade Mafic Rocks, in Schiffman, P. and Day, H. W., eds., Low -Grade Metamorphism of Mafic Rocks. Boulder, Colorado,Geological Society of America Special Paper 296, 5-28.
1995 Br�cker, Michael and Day, Howard W. Low-grade Blueschist Metamorphism in Metagraywackes, Eastern Franciscan Belt, Northern California. Journal of Metamorphic Geology, 13, 61-78.
1997 Fagan, T. J. and Day, Howard W. Formation of amphibole after clinopyroxene by dehydration reactions: Implications for pseudomorphic replacement and mass fluxes. Geology, v. 25, p 395-398.


FISHERS, Ind. -- Think you can you construct a boat out of cardboard sturdy and water resistant enough to transport at least two people 200 yards? Then you should consider entering the City of Fisher's first-ever Cardboard Regatta.
The race is happening Saturday, Aug. 4 at The Indianapolis Sailing Club on Geist Reservoir. Registration is free and ends July 20th.
There's a lengthy list of rules and regulations about the race and how boats are to be constructed, which can be found on the city's website. Violations will result in point deductions and time penalties. Teams of at least two and up to four people will construct their own boats using only cardboard, with exception of the sail, which is mandatory. To propel, teams can use a combination of sailing and paddling. But no paddling with arms or legs will be permitted. Participants must bring their own life jackets.
In addition to the race, boats will be judged based on best original design, best construction, best decorated, best team effort, and people's choice. There's also an award for Most Spectacular Sinking.


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Apr. 28
New Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, at Your Fingertips
by Tara Klamrowski
Gone are the days of Google searching to see the latest Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decisions. Instead of searching for decisions, some new, some outdated, Docket Alarm makes it easy to view every new decision published by the PTAB in one place.
Docket Alarm's dedicated PTAB orders and decisions page is organized by decision type, and includes categories like final written decision, petition institution, motion to terminate, motion for supplemental information, and more.
For example, to view all recent PTAB Motions for Joinder, simply select the category. Each decision features a summary, highlighted issue tags, and links to the related proceeding and the underlying order itself. The summaries make it easy to quickly skim the list to find the most relevant developments.
Docket Alarm's PTAB orders and decisions page is continuously updated, so you know you are always viewing the latest information coming out of the PTAB.
New PTAB decisions and orders can be sent to your inbox with Docket Alarm's email alerts. Click "Get Email Alerts!" to select the frequency at which you wish to receive updates: from once a day to continuously throughout the day. Each email alert contains a summary of the update, along with a PDF attachment of the decision or order. This eliminates the need to log in to keep up with the latest PTAB news.
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Taylor Swift Capitalizes on Trademark Applications to Protect Her Brand
Taylor Swift has been raising eyebrows recently, but not for the reasons you may think. This time, instead of the 25-year-old pop star's love life being the topic of discussion, it's her recent legal activity. Swift & Co has filed more than 37 federal trademark applications in the past six months, setting off a firestorm of speculation.
Swift's applications seek protection for phrases like "this sick beat," "Party like it's 1989," and "nice to meet you, where you been?" Many of these phrases are actually lyrics from her immensely popular songs. Additionally, instead of filing one trademark application for multiple classes of goods for each mark, Swift has filed separate trademark applications for each class. The result is over 16 filed trademark applications for each phrase, with each application seeking protection for a different good or service. It may seem like overkill, but there is actually a clever (albeit expensive) strategy behind the parsed filings. If Swift was to run into problems with clearance for any one class, the other applications for the same mark will not be affected. Conversely, if all classes were claimed in one application and there was a clearance issue, the entire application process for each class would be stalled.
Below are some examples of the different classes of goods and services Swift has filed applications for.
"THIS SICK BEAT" "NICE TO MEET YOU, WHERE YOU BEEN?" "PARTY LIKE IT'S 1989"
Musical Instruments Entertainment Services
Paper Products Hair Accessories
Utensils and Containers
While some may be surprised at Swift's aggressive protection strategy, it's not uncommon for a big time celebrity to capitalize on registered trademarks. Swift has a major world tour on the horizon with a tremendous merchandising opportunity. This flurry of trademark applications could be a preventative measure to protect her brand from unauthorized use by vendors while she is promoting her music worldwide, or it could indicate a potential launch of a new line of products produced by Swift in anticipation of her tour.
Either way, there is a lot of money in the Taylor Swift brand— her net worth is currently at $200 million.
This is not the first time Swift has been in the spotlight for trademark issues. In 2014, she was sued by online clothing retailer Blue Sphere, Inc., over her use of the phrase "Lucky13". Blue Sphere also did business under the name "Lucky13", accusing Swift of infringing on their trademark by marketing her own line of goods bearing the name. The case is still ongoing.
Docket Alarm can help you keep up with Taylor's legal activity. Click here to view legal actions involving Swift. To receive updates, you can hit the "get new lawsuit alerts" button to keep tabs on Taylor.
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Apr. 3
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Working with professional business cooperation and high quality manufacturer in many different countries, took us several years with experience in research and development to help you explore the fascinating world of all microscope application from micro reach nano-scale.
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Slot machine Keks (Gingerbread) - hilarious online slot with a simple interface and easy operation. It is very popular on the Web only as a Slavic subjects. Here the player can feel like a real hero of the tale about the bun, which is so loved by all the children. Children's orientation does not affect the possibility of winning! Here, you can earn good money! In addition, online casino three ACE offers visitors slot Keks in paid and free mode! You can see his own profit without investment!
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conventional hydraulic and pneumatic cylinders used in materials handling applications.
Even as little as a degree or two of off-centre loading can spell doom for the rods, seals or bores of common types of actuators used for lifting and placing objects or providing constant loads on conveying belts or materials webs.
Bent rods, scored bores or damaged seals can lead to downtime on such essential apparatus in industries as diverse as bulk materials handling, manufacturing, minerals processing and packaging, say the suppliers of a simpler, robust alternative: Airstroke actuators from Firestone.
Firestone's sole Australian industrial distributor, Air Springs Supply Pty Ltd, says these tough, flexible wall bellows contain no internal moving parts to break or bend, cause internal scoring or require lubrication.
Because an air spring has a flexible, compliant bellows wall, instead of seals or guides, the bellows follows the path of least resistance.
This means users don't have to worry about side loads caused by misalignment, says James Maslin, Industrial Manager, Air Springs Supply.
Unlike a conventional cylinder (which extends a rod, or plunger, to provide actuation), Airstrokes themselves inflate to provide actuation force.
Using standard factory compressed air at 7 bar (100 psi) – or other compatible gases and liquids such as nitrogen and water-glycol solutions – Airstrokes inflate like enormously robust tubular balloons, extending to deliver actuating forces between 40-40,000kg (88- 88,185lb) per unit.
The range is being progressively expanded by Air Springs Supply to encompass models from palm-sized mini-actuators (ideal for conveyors) to triple-convoluted types almost a metre across.
Airstrokes can also cycle rapidly – the lack of seals also means lack of friction – which makes them ideal for conveying or stamping tasks.
Alternatively, they can be inflated slowly and with great precision, such as when they have been used to lift giant mining shovels and heavy industrial plant for maintenance.
They are very suitable for uses where a constant force needs to be applied to a moving object, like a web or belt.
damage equipment. Because Airstroke actuators have no sliding seal, there is no breakaway friction, as there is with conventional cylinders.
Airstrokes also possess the unique capability of stroking through an arc without a clevis. Angular motion of up to 27º is possible, along with the design advantage of generally less complex linkages.
Airstroke sizes are available from about 31mm diameter (2.2in) to 940mm (37in). These offer compact starting heights of 30.48mm (1.2in) and 139.7mm (5.5in) respectively (with the tiny plastic moulded Airomatic polyactuator – a different design - having a starting height of just 16mm, 0.6in).
The smaller sizes provide a wide range of forces required for conveyor and processing operations, while the largest sizes allow force up to 40,000kg (88,185lbs) each using only 7 bar (100psi) air pressure.


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CEO of General Electric Says Company Will be Splitting Into Three
The CEO of General Electric has announced a major change to the company's future that could affect workers in the Capital Region.
On Tuesday, Lary Culp Junior said GE will be splitting into three companies and those units will focus on aviation, healthcare, and energy. Right now, the Schenectady campus serves as the home of both GE Renewable Energy and GE Power which will be merged into GE Digital starting in 2024. GE also has a global research lab in Niskayuna and GE Healthcare has a digital X-ray assembly plant in North Greenbush. There's no word if any jobs are going to be cut when the company splits.


Contains 22 British species of mostly widespread ¹ beetles associated with fungi, they are rarely found away from fungi or bark containing the mycelia. Several have a very restricted range e.g. Cis dentatus Mellie and Cis jacquemarti Mellie from the Scottish highlands, but generally one should expect a dozen or so species from the Watford area. During the warmer months adults are obvious and usually occur in numbers where found. Berlese extractions from winter fungi usually contain at least some Ciidae; Octotemnus glabriculus (Gyllenhal) and our only non native Cis bilamellatus would seem to turn up, usually in numbers, in just about every such sample from around Watford. Most species seem to show a range of host preferences (Alexander) but it must be said that, especially during summer, they seem to get rather adventitious and may turn up in any (fungoid) situation. This is very much a family to get the feel of, although they appear to be small, drab and nondescript insects when first encountered they become, with a little experience, distinctive enough (with a lens) in the field to get excited about possible new discoveries.
1.2-3mm. Dull brown or black beetles, elongate and very convex, somewhat cylindrical. Antennae 8-10 segmented ² , coupled with general habitus, a good diagnostic character, short with a loose 3 segmented club. Without a scape, some small species of Scolytinae might be mistaken for Ciids but they always have a distinctive scape. Inserted under a raised margin about the front of the head. Head distinctly visible from above (Bostrychidae), often sexually dimorphic with horns, lamellae or teeth in male Cis spp. Pronotum quadrate to (slightly) elongate, often strongly bordered and sometimes adorned anteriorly in male (as head), front angles round but the side margins may end abruptly anteriorly giving the appearance of a tooth. Elytra entire (Monotomidae), randomly punctured, smooth or rugose, glabrous or with scale-like pubescence, in Rhopalodontus perforatus (Gyllenhal) with long outstanding pubescence. Legs short, tarsi 4-4-4, 1-3 very short and sometimes difficult to appreciate (Bostrychidae).
The only complete key in English is given Joy's handbook but this can only give, in most cases, an indication when it comes to Cis (15 spp.) and Orthocis (2 spp.). Beyond this (as before, German permitting) Vol. 7 of Die Kafer Mitteleuropas should be consulted. Ideally with this group, access to a reference collection is needed.
For the latest nomenclature see the Coleopterist website or the superb article on the subject by Orledge and Booth ³.
² Coupled with the general habitus, a good diagnostic character.
³ An annotated list of British and Irish Ciidae. Coleopterst April 2006. Orledge, G.M and Booth, R.C.
There is now a key in english to the Ciidae written by Mark Telfer, it can be found at markgtelfer.co.uk.


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AAC&U-Cengage Inclusion Scholarship Winner
Claudia Schrader
President, Kingsborough Community College
President Claudia Schrader joined the Kingsborough Community in the fall of 2018. Under her leadership, Kingsborough Community College applied for the Achieving the Dream Race and Equity Leadership Academy and the AAC&U Institute on Truth, Racial Healing & Transformation. Through these initiatives, she has empowered a cross-functional team of faculty and staff to engage in a reflective process of implicit bias and to identify key areas where we can make equitable change. She has secured funding, championed, and promoted these ongoing efforts, been an integral participant in the dialogues, and created structures whereby faculty and staff feel empowered to exercise their own agency.
In previous equity and inclusion reports, Kingsborough students had expressed repeatedly that they did not feel like they were listened to or acknowledged. President Schrader listened and brought her energetic and empathetic "Welcome Wagon" into the areas of New York City that were most neglected." She went to students where they were to let them know they were wanted, heard, and a part of our college community, perhaps the first president in the college's history to visit these more remote, underdeveloped parts of New York City. The effort was such a success she was later joined by another City University of New York President as well as the Chancellor. Her persistence was spreading and shining the light on students who had previously been marginalized.