What would Dream Land be without dreams? A nightmare! The Dream Spring, source of all dreams, has dried up, taking with it all the blissful dreams of Dream Land. It's up to Kirby, the bombastic blimp, to return happy naps to the inhabitants of Dream Land! Kirby's appetite for adventure is as big as ever as he eats his way through a feast of all new enemies! In this adventure, he can also steal the abilities of bad guys as he scarfs down! With this new power, Kirby can perform twenty new tricks that will help him make his way through the nightmare infested Dream Land!.


text:
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Action, Advocacy, Alaska, Roadless
Action Alert: Speak Up for the Tongass and the Roadless Rule
The U.S. Forest Service has proposed to exempt the Tongass from the Roadless Rule, which would open a vital carbon sink to logging and mining. The deadline for public comment is December 17.
The Tongass is the largest national forest in the United States—17 million acres of temperate rainforest that stretches down the panhandle in Southeast Alaska. Home to old growth trees and tons of wildlife, including whales, salmon, bears, and bald eagles, the Tongass also holds tremendous value for carbon sequestration and climate change mitigation. The U.S. Forest Service estimates the Tongass stores 10 to 12 percent of the total carbon captured by America's national forests.
Right now, the U.S. Forest Service has proposed exempting the entire Tongass National Forest from the Roadless Rule. Why does this matter? The Roadless Rule is an important tool that protects wild landscapes on U.S. Forest Service lands. The proposal would open the world's largest remaining temperate rainforest—a critical resource in the fight against climate change—to logging. For reasons of conservation, recreation, and climate action, we can't let this happen.
November 26, 2019 /by Julie Brown
https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Tongass-NF_Credit-Howie-Garber.jpg 994 1500 Julie Brown https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/WWA_Logo_OrangeBlue-300x89.png Julie Brown2019-11-26 17:26:402019-11-26 17:32:49Action Alert: Speak Up for the Tongass and the Roadless Rule
Advocacy, Grassroots, Plumas
Watch: Visions of the Lost Sierra
Check out this beautiful film by one of our grassroots groups, Friends of Plumas Wilderness. "Visions of the Lost Sierra" is about the Wild & Scenic Middle Fork Feather River. The Middle Fork was one of the first eight rivers in the country protected by Congress through the National Wild & Scenic Rivers Act in 1968.
Without the National Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, the Middle Fork would've been dammed long ago—but the Act only protects a half-mile wide corridor along the river. That means adjacent wild lands and rivers in the Lost Sierra remain threatened by illegal roads, dumping, marijuana grows, and dredging, all of which could pollute the primary water source for 27 million Californians. Also, there's an increased pressure to build more dams in California, jeopardizing our region's untamed, free-flowing rivers.
The documentary is an interesting look at the original work done by local wild river advocates in the 60s and addresses why we need to continue to push for more protections.
It's a short film but if you don't have 14 minutes to watch it, please take a minute to fill out the petition to expand wilderness designations in our region to permanently protect our public lands and free-flowing rivers.
Sign the petition here.
For more about the Plumas National Forest, read up on the latest developments with Winter Travel Planning.
November 13, 2019 /by Winter Wildlands
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Why It's So Hard to Get to the Mountains
It's the paradox of winter. Snow-covered mountains promise an escape from the modern world—until the entire modern world seemingly attempts an escape at the exact same time as you. Traffic congestion and crowded parking lots have always been a part of the skiing experience. But if you think last winter had more traffic and more parking issues than ever before, you're not alone.
"The parking and traffic has always been bad. But last year was really bad—like really bad," says Chris Adams, president of the board of Wasatch Backcountry Alliance.
If there's one thing that every backcountry skier needs to be clear about as they head into winter, it's the parking situation at their local trailhead.
How Bad Is It Really?
Utah is a special place, where 1.2 million people live in the Salt Lake City metro area at the foot of the Cottonwood Canyons. Last winter, it snowed a lot. Which means that everyone who had a season pass intended to use it, especially on powder days during the weekends. The Ikon Pass brought more people to the area. Then, factor in avalanche control, which shuts down those icy roads for a block of time. And traffic piles up. Adams says the worst days had two to three hours of traffic just to go up the canyon, with another two to three hours of traffic to get back out.
"There's just nowhere to go," Adams says. "On the way up and on the way down, it can just be forever."
Traffic and parking have become the number one topic of conversation at the Wasatch Backcountry Alliance. A similar fever pitch is happening all over the West. Exhibit A: Interstate 70 in Colorado. In Wyoming, a survey conducted by the Teton Backcountry Alliance identified parking on Teton Pass as a "serious concern." In Tahoe, ski traffic on one particularly nightmarish weekend last January was so clogged up, way beyond capacity, with a huge storm rolling in, that California Highway Patrol begged people on Facebook to "please stop coming up here."
While the vast majority of this traffic is headed to the ski resorts, those of us going to the backcountry aren't immune. As Adams points out, a lot of the best backcountry skiing is at the top of the Cottonwood Canyons—beyond the ski resorts. Once you get to the trailhead, best of luck finding a spot to park. Adams sees a lot of people heading out early to beat traffic for dawn patrol. But that can be problematic if snow safety professionals, especially in Utah, are trying to blast for avalanches at early hours in the morning. All this added together is why traffic and parking have become lightning-rod issues that are motivating many backcountry skiers to action. Attend a grassroots meeting for a local backcountry alliance anywhere and chances are you'll hear the board talking about plowing at trailheads, carpooling, or the latest updates from the state department of transportation. The same goes for us, on the national level. When we talk to land managers about winter travel planning, parking and access are absolutely a huge part of the conversation.
We've Got a Problem. So What's the Solution?
There's nothing like traffic and a lack of parking to get skiers fired up and organized. The good news is that progress is being made, thanks to on-the-ground efforts from our grassroots partners across the country.
The genesis of the Tahoe Backcountry Alliance can be pin-pointed to the moment when policy makers attempted to shut down parking to a very popular backcountry zone on Tahoe's West Shore. By organizing local backcountry skiers, the Alliance was able to communicate to land managers the importance of keeping those parking areas open and plowed. And they've kept plugging away at the issue. Starting this winter, Tahoe Backcountry Alliance is launching a micro transit pilot program over three of the busiest Saturdays in the winter, offering a free shuttle from the transit center in Tahoe City to one of the most popular backcountry ski destinations in the Basin.
The informal San Francisco Backcountry Skiers Facebook group has exploded in the last couple of years. "It was literally started as a way to get Bob Shattuck a ride to the mountains," says Andy Rathbun, a professional geologist who organizes the group's monthly happy hour gathering in the Castro district. "And now we have 2500 people."
In Wyoming, local skiers responded to the Teton Backcountry Alliance survey with a lot of opinions and ideas. Some suggested that parking on Teton Pass should be closed altogether—so you really have to earn your turns. More cited ideas included a permit system and a free shuttle. This conversation is just getting started, though, and we're working closely with the Teton Backcountry Alliance to support them along the way. (Come join us for the Teton Sheep and Skier Social on November 15th!)
But one of the biggest ski traffic experiments of all is in Utah. Starting this season, Solitude Ski Area is charging for parking, impacting backcountry access in Big Cottonwood Canyon. UDOT is increasing bus frequency, with improvements to routes and more stops. And even though Alta Ski Resort doesn't want you to park in their spots in their special-use permit at the top of Little Cottonwood Canyon, the Forest Service confirmed that backcountry skiers (and anyone else) can park in those spots. Thankfully, Wasatch Backcountry Alliance has a close eye on the parking situation, and they're talking to ski resorts, land managers, UDOT, the Utah Avalanche Center, and many more stakeholders, to make sure the backcountry skiing community is represented in these decisions.
These aren't be-all solutions. But they're a start. If you've got an idea, or want to make some good things happen, please get involved. Chances are there's a grassroots group near you, and they're working on the issues most important to your local ski community. Here's one more piece of advice for the road: Take the bus.
November 6, 2019 /by Julie Brown
https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/IMG_2621.jpg 1500 1500 Julie Brown https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/WWA_Logo_OrangeBlue-300x89.png Julie Brown2019-11-06 10:39:282019-11-06 10:41:49Why It's So Hard to Get to the Mountains
Advocacy, Backcountry Film Festival, Events
Wild Weekend Recap: Grassroots Advocacy Meets Film Festival Meets Snowball
Winter Wildlands Alliance just wrapped up a weekend full of events: the world premiere of the 15th Annual Backcountry Film Festival, the Snowball fundraiser for SnowSchool, and the three-day Grassroots Advocacy Conference. In Boise, Idaho, the "Wild Weekend" was a chance to showcase all that happens in the Winter Wildlands Alliance office. But it was also an opportunity to connect people with each other, to share knowledge and experience, and to inspire.
October 31, 2019 /by Julie Brown
https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/IMG_9304.jpg 1000 1500 Julie Brown https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/WWA_Logo_OrangeBlue-300x89.png Julie Brown2019-10-31 13:55:112019-11-26 13:01:38Wild Weekend Recap: Grassroots Advocacy Meets Film Festival Meets Snowball
Advocacy, Grassroots
What We're Talking About at the 8th Biennial Grassroots Advocacy Conference
This week, we are hosting our 8th Biennial Grassroots Advocacy Conference in Boise, Idaho, and we couldn't be more excited. It's an opportunity to learn and to share alongside people who are passionate about public lands, recreation, the great outdoors, wild places.
This year's theme is "Growing Equity on Public Lands." We don't have all the answers. But we want to ask questions. We want to learn. We want to hear about diverse experiences and perspectives. We want to absorb relevant information. We want to get everyone in the same room to have meaningful dialogue, to rumble with the hard things, so we can all take steps to make a positive impact. (And after all these deep conversations, you bet we'll be kicking back and having fun at the World Premiere of the Backcountry Film Festival on Friday night. Come Saturday, we're dressing up early for Halloween and doing the ski boot jig on the dance floor at Snowball.)
Here's a look at some of the conversations that we'll be having with a solid lineup of speakers who are joining us from across the country. They are community organizers, government employees, nonprofit workers, journalists, policy directors, professors, lawyers, scientists, tourism officials, and more. They are also skiers, paddlers, climbers, mountain bikers, hikers, mountain guides, fly fishers, among others.
Keynote by James Edward Mills
When: 6:30pm on Thursday, October 24, at the Basque Center
A journalist whose work specializes in stories about outdoor recreation, environmental conservation, and sustainable living, James Edward Mills will start the conference with a keynote talk about "Growing Equity on Public Lands."
There Is Room for Everyone—How to Embrace Diversity
When: 9am on Friday, October 25
Let's keep the conversation going. Panelists include Jolie Varela, Justin Forrest Parks, Theresa Simsiman. Varela is a citizen of the Nüümü and Yokut Nations. She is the founder of Indigenous Women Hike. Forrest Parks is a climber, mountaineer, outdoor enthusiast and community advocate. He is the co-founder of Sending in Color and a coalition member at Diversify Outdoors. Simsiman is the California Stewardship Director for American Whitewater.
Planning the Future of Public Lands
When: 10am on Friday, October 25
This isn't speculation. We will hear from people on-the-ground experience. Panelists include Alison Flint, the director of litigation and agency policy at The Wilderness Society; Francisco Valenzuela, a retired professional with the U.S. Forest Service who co-authored "Recreation Equity: Is the Forest Service serving its diverse publics?"; and Hilary Eisen, policy director at Winter Wildlands Alliance.
Messaging the Sacred
This is all about the bigger picture. Panelists include Charles Wolf Drimal of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition; Darren Parry, chairman of the Northwestern Band of the Shoshone Nation; Midy Aponte, senior vice president of Spitfire Communications, where she works with foundations like World Resources Institute, Ford Foundation, and the Environmental Defense Fund; and Laura Yale, a Colorado-based filmmaker who has produced award-winning documentaries like Jumbo Wild and Treeline.
Wolverines and Winter Recreation
When: 1pm on Friday, October 25
Outdoor recreation has a big impact on wildlife. This presentation will look specifically at wolverines and winter recreation, led by Winter Wildlands Alliance Policy Director Hilary Eisen, who recently tracked wolverines in Mongolia. Eisen will be joined by Dr. Kimberly Heinemeyer, a scientist who studies the ecology of mid-sized carnivores in the Rocky Mountains.
Experiential Education: Passing the Knowledge
Winter Wildlands Alliance Director of SnowSchool Kerry McClay will be leading this workshop, with Salome Mwangi, who works with the Idaho Office for Refugees.
How Do We Pay For It? New Strategies for Funding Public Lands
When: 9am on Saturday, October 26
A really good question, with insight from people who follow the money. Panelists include John Gardner, who is the senior director for budget and appropriations at National Parks Conservation Association; Louis Geltman, policy director at Outdoor Alliance; and Susan James, an avid pursuer of outdoor adventure with an unexpected career in public land management, most recently with the Sawtooth National Recreation Area.
The Outdoor Economy: Is It Ruining the Outdoors?
When: 10am on Saturday, October 26
We can all agree that outdoor recreation is good thing, except when it runs smack into big issues like over-tourism, sustainability, and a lack of affordable housing. Our panelists approach this issue from every vantage: Lucy Kay, CEO of the Breckenridge Tourism Office; Danna Stroud, executive director of Travel Paso and formerly with the Sierra Nevada Conservancy; Todd Walton, executive director of Winter Wildlands Alliance with a career in PR in the outdoor industry; and Yoon Kim, founder of Outdoor Media Summit and Blogs for Brands.
E-Recreation: A Brave New World?
E-bikes are no longer a fringe sport. They are shifting recreation on public lands. To help us understand what this means, and the stakes at hand, our panelists include Todd Keller, director of government affairs for the International Mountain Bicycling Association; Brad Brooks, acting senior director of agency policy and planning for The Wilderness Society; John Wentworth, member of the Town Council at Mammoth Lakes and chairman and CEO of the Mammoth Lakes Trails and Public Access Foundation.
Climate Science Into Action: What Can We Do?
When: 1pm on Saturday, October 26
Empowering the audience with knowledge and opportunities for action, snow scientist and glaciologist Hans-Peter Marshall will be presenting with Kerry McClay, director of SnowSchool. The Marshall and McClay have sparked a partnership between NASA and Winter Wildlands Alliance, empowering kids to help scientists measure and monitor the snowpack.
Collaboration: Three Case Studies
This is how things get done. Panelists include Erik Murdock, policy director at the Access Fund; Mike Fiebig, river protection director for the Southwest U.S. at American Rivers; and Tony Ferlisi, executive director of Mountain Bike the Tetons.
https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/BSI.jpg 1125 1500 Julie Brown https://winterwildlands.org/wwa/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/WWA_Logo_OrangeBlue-300x89.png Julie Brown2019-10-21 15:08:282019-10-21 15:25:15What We're Talking About at the 8th Biennial Grassroots Advocacy Conference
2019 Grassroots Advocacy Conference
info@winterwildlands.org
Boise ID 83702
Winter Wildlands Alliance /

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable, Robert Wood, 2008
• Feb. 9, 2016 • Locations: United States of America • Topics: Sentencing, Wrongful Conviction, Wrongful Imprisonment
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This text is machine-read, and may contain errors. Check the original document to verify accuracy.
By Robert W. Wood
Robert W. Wood practices law with Wood & Porter,
in San Francisco (http://www.woodporter.com), and
is the author of Taxation of Damage Awards and Settlement Payments (3d Ed. Tax Institute 2005 with 2008
update), available at http://www.taxinstitute.com.
This discussion is not intended as legal advice, and
cannot be relied on for any purpose without the
services of a qualified professional.
Copyright 2008 Robert W. Wood.
News stories about prisoners released from custody
following the discovery of exculpating evidence have
been cropping up with increasing frequency. As CSI fans
will attest, one path that can lead to this result involves
DNA evidence, a relatively recent scientific phenomenon.1 A more disturbing path involves the discovery of
prosecutorial misconduct.2 Still another involves evidence or witnesses that somehow escaped everyone's
attention.
However the evidence comes about, we cannot help
but notice an uptick in these stories. Given the generally
litigious nature of our society (and the corollary theory
that for every wrong there is a right), it is hardly
surprising that the number and size of settlements from
claims for wrongful conviction and imprisonment have
blossomed.3
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php
(statistics show that 145 of the 208 postconviction DNA exonerations have been since 2000).
See http://www.innocenceproject.org (profiles of exonerated individuals whose conviction was partially or completely
overturned based on prosecutorial misconduct: Billy Wardell,
Marvin Anderson, and Jeff Deskovic); Edwin M. Borchard, A
Long Legacy of Error, excerpted from Convicting the Innocent:
Errors in Criminal Justice (New Haven, Yale University Press,
1932) (discussing the inherent flaw in our prosecutorial system
in which a conviction is regarded as a personal victory for the
prosecutor).
See Martinez v. Brink's, Inc., No. CL0103469AH (S.D. Fla. Oct.
2, 2003) (the plaintiff won an $8.26 million verdict for malicious
prosecution after spending six months in pretrial detention);
Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001, at 24 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 18, 2002) (approving an award of $3,925,976, including $3,537,000 to compensate for three years of incarceration).
TAX NOTES, April 21, 2008
As such, it seems inevitable that the income tax affects
of these increasingly large recoveries will bubble to the
surface. When someone who has been in jail is vindicated
and released, and receives money from the state, county,
or federal government on account of their unlawful
incarceration, is that recovery taxable? It would seem
there would be a clear answer.
After all, despite the increase in volume, this is not a
new phenomenon. Although large recoveries may represent a recent trend, recoveries for wrongful imprisonment have occurred for generations.4 Before embarking
on a tour of the pertinent federal income tax law, the
paucity of tax authority on these issues, and the reasons
I believe these recoveries should be tax free, we should
review the types of causes of action that may be brought.
I. Types of Recoveries
Claims for false imprisonment may be brought in
myriad guises. However, all of the legal bases of suing for
unlawful incarceration have more similarities than differences. Someone who has claims for a wrongful incarceration may seek to recover in one or more ways.
A wrongfully convicted individual can attempt to
recover under several common-law tort theories, including false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and
abuse of process.5 This individual could also bring an
action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violation of his
constitutional rights. A section 1983 action allows a
lawsuit for damages against any official acting under
color of state law who deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.6 Some individuals seek to have a private
bill enacted by their state legislature entitling them to
compensation for wrongful incarceration.
Finally, state statutes may expressly allow claims for
false imprisonment. In fact, 22 states, the District of
Columbia, and even the federal government have enacted compensation statutes through which an individual can seek redress for false imprisonment. The
sections that follow briefly review each of these avenues
of recovery. These sections are not intended as an authoritative legal discussion, but only as an overview to
set the stage for an examination of the tax authorities.
A. Common Law
The common-law tort of false imprisonment requires
an individual to prove that he was knowingly and
intentionally confined, against his will and without his
consent, and that the confinement was not privileged.7 A
See Borchard, supra note 2.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts section 35 (1965), section 653
(1977), section 682 (1977).
42 U.S.C. 1983 (1996).
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 35 (1965).
(C) Tax Analysts 2008. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
Are False Imprisonment
Recoveries Taxable?
TAX PRACTICE
Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 10, 118, 121-132 (1965).
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 653 (1977).
28 U.S.C. 2680(h) (2000).
Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 118, 121-132 (1965).
immunity is waived, the wrongfully convicted individual
will often have to turn elsewhere for compensation.15
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.16 The statute was amended in 1996 as
part of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996.
Before the 1871 enactment of section 1983, states and
those acting with state imprimatur were not liable for
violations of the U.S. Constitution. Section 1983 allows an
action against any person, acting under color of any
statute, for a violation of an individual's constitutional
rights.17
Section 1983 provides a statutory framework by which
a wrongfully convicted individual can seek compensation from police officers, prosecutors, and municipalities
for violating his constitutional rights. The underlying
purposes of section 1983 are to compensate victims for
past abuses and to serve as a deterrent against future
constitutional abuses.18
A section 1983 action can be based on the notion that
a lawsuit for damages against an official, acting under
color of state law, is proper when the official deprives the
individual of a constitutional right.19 A typical claim
would assert violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on illegal search and seizure, or a violation of the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law.20
For example, in one case, the police withheld exculpatory information from the prosecutor and encouraged
witnesses to pick the defendant out of a police lineup,
contributing to a guilty verdict. After spending 15 years
in prison, the wrongfully convicted individual was found
innocent and pardoned by the governor. The individual
then brought a successful action under section 1983 for a
violation of his due process rights.21
One problem with the viability of many section 1983
claims is that the individual must prove a constitutional
violation. Furthermore, even assuming that this initial
burden is met, the individual must contend with the
probable cause barrier. In the case of a police officer, if the
officer had probable cause (a very low standard), he is
generally immune from prosecution.22
An alternative (although still within the rubric of
section 1983) is to bring an action against the prosecutor
for violating the individual's Fifth Amendment right to
liberty.23 Such an action against the prosecutor will likely
fail, as prosecutors have absolute immunity from suits
arising out of their prosecutorial duties.24 The origin of
See Adele Bernhard, ''When Justice Fails: Indemnification
for Unjust Conviction,'' 6 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 73, 86-92
See generally 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1996).
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-131 (1988).
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Newcome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001), aff'd,
319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 543 (2003).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-429 (1976).
false imprisonment claim can be brought against any
individual, not merely against the state. For example, a
bank robber may be guilty of false imprisonment for
taking a bank's customers and employees hostage, physically preventing their escape.
Of course, we are not concerned here with the actions
of civilians, but rather with government action leading to
false imprisonment. Suits against the government and
against government officials have their own problems.
The most difficult obstacle for an exonerated person in
bringing such a claim is proving that the actor was not
''privileged'' to arrest or imprison the individual.8
At common law, an action for confinement resulting
from an arrest under valid process was brought as a
claim for either malicious prosecution or abuse of process. Malicious prosecution is related to, but distinct from,
false imprisonment. To prove malicious prosecution, a
wrongfully convicted person must generally show that:
• a prosecutor initiated a proceeding against him;
• the proceeding terminated in favor of the wrongfully convicted person;
• the prosecutor initiated the case without probable
cause;
• the primary purpose of the prosecution involved
malice (or something other than bringing the individual to justice); and
• damage resulted from the prosecution.
Thus, to recover for malicious prosecution, an exonerated individual would need to show that the prosecutor
brought criminal charges without probable cause, resulting in the plaintiff's wrongful conviction and incarceration, as evidenced by his later exoneration.9
Abuse of process is another common-law tort. It is
related to (but distinct from) malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment. To prove abuse of process, an individual must show that the legal process was used ''primarily'' to accomplish a purpose for which it was not
designed.10 An abuse of process claim does not focus on
the procurement of process or the wrongful initiation of
proceedings. Rather, the claim focuses on the use of the
process for an improper purpose.11
To recover under any one of these tort theories, the
claimant must prove all of the elements of the offense,
and must overcome any obstacles to recovery, such as a
privilege defense. Precisely who can be sued is a delicate
matter. Notably, sovereign immunity generally insulates
the government from intentional tort claims.12
Likewise, prosecutors and judges have absolute immunity for acts in their official capacities, regardless of
their motives or intent to wrongfully convict the individual.13 Finally, police officers are generally immune
from liability for an arrest, provided it was made within
the scope of their authority.14 For this reason, unless
C. State Legislative Remedies
Although it has not occurred frequently, some individuals (particularly those who have received good press
coverage of their plight) may turn to their state legislature to seek redress for false imprisonment. The victim
may be able to influence the state legislature to pass a
private bill to award compensation directly from the state
treasury.26 This avenue has a couple of major limitations.
The first is that many courts have viewed a private
compensatory bill as potentially violating the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the 14th Amendment states that a
legislature cannot pass a bill for the benefit of one person
without passing legislation for all similarly situated
people.27 The second stumbling block is the reality that
not all wrongful conviction cases garner significant — or
even favorable — press.
Moreover, few exonerated individuals have the resources necessary to influence the state legislative bodies
to act on their behalf. For these reasons, a private bill is a
remedy available for very few cases.
D. State Compensation Statutes
State compensation statutes are another avenue for a
wrongfully convicted individual to seek compensation
for years spent behind bars. Twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia have enacted general compensation
statutes, allowing an individual to pursue a claim against
the state for wrongful conviction. These statutes all
provide some type of compensation for wrongful imprisonment, but they vary greatly in their requirements, as
well as in their compensation levels.
Some of the state statutes require an official pardon
from the governor before an individual can file a claim.28
Some states only allow a recovery if the conviction was
for a felony.29 Almost half of the statutes preclude a
recovery when the individual entered a guilty plea. The
idea of disqualifying an individual who has pleaded
guilty appears to be that compensation should be unavailable to an individual who played a part in his own
conviction.30 Of course, some defendants are coerced into
confessing, or face such bleak circumstances that a plea
bargain (and confession) may be the only way to avoid
the death penalty or a life sentence.
The states also vary in the amount and measure of
compensation. For example, California's maximum payout is $100 per day of incarceration, whereas Wisconsin
allows a recovery of only $5,000 per year, up to a
maximum of $25,000.31 Some states, notably including
New York, have no ceiling on the allowable recovery.32
Other states, such as Tennessee, have a $1 million maximum.33 Another variation is Montana, which does not
provide for any monetary compensation. Instead, Montana provides only educational aid to those exonerated
by postconviction DNA evidence.34
The states vary not only in the maximum amount of
their payout, but also in the means used to measure the
amount of compensation. New Jersey and Virginia base
the compensation amount on a measurement of the
exoneree's earning capacity. In New Jersey, the individual
is entitled to twice his yearly income in the year before
incarceration, or $20,000, whichever is greater. Virginia's
compensation statute varies slightly, in that the compensation is based not on the individual's prior earning, but
rather on the per capita income of the Virginia population.35
There are also states that include lost wages as a
component of the total compensation amount. In these
states, lost wages do not make up the majority of the
compensation and are not used as the measure from
which to pay out compensation. In Iowa, Ohio, and
Texas, lost wages are paid in addition to the compensation otherwise provided by the statute.
E. Federal Compensation Statute
An individual may also choose to sue under the
federal compensation statute for unjust conviction and
imprisonment.36 This statute was originally enacted in
1948.37 To succeed, the plaintiff must prove that:
• his conviction has been reversed or set aside on the
ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which
he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he
See, e.g., An Act Compensating James C. Tillman for His
Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration, Connecticut H.B. 6673,
Special Act No. 07-5 (May 21, 2007), available at http://
www.cga.ct.gov/ 2007/ACT/SA/2007SA-00005-R00HB-06673SA.htm.
Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution
and Other Dispatches From the Wrongly Convicted (Doubleday,
See Cal. Penal Code section 4900; 505 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
505/8(C); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 14, section 8241(4); Md. Code
Ann. State Fin. & Proc. section 10-501(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. section
148-82.
See Ala. Code section 29-2-156; Cal. Penal Code section
4900; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 258D, section 1(C)(ii); Mo. Ann.
Stat. section 650.055(9)(I); Mont. Code Ann. section 53-1-214(1);
N.C. Gen. Stat. section 148-82; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section
2743.48(A); Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 51, section 154(B)(1); Va. Code
Ann. section 8.01-195.10(B).
See Cal. Penal Code section 4903; D.C. Code section
2-422(2) (2001); Iowa Code Ann. section 663A.1(b) (West 1998);
N.J. Stat. Ann. section 52.4C-3(C) (West 2001); N.Y. Cr. Cl. Act
section 8-b(5)(d) (McKinney 1989); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section
2743.48(A)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 51,
section 154(B)(2)(b) (West Supp. 2006); Va. Code Ann. section
8.01-195.10(B) (Supp. 2006); W. Va. Code Ann. section 14-213a(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/
National-View1.php (gives state by state breakdown of the
compensation statutes, their requirements, and their payouts).
28 U.S.C. section 1495 (2000); 28 U.S.C.A. section 2513
(West Supp. 2006).
that immunity is the concern that ''harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies . . . and the possibility that he would
shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.''25
• he did not commit any of the acts charged . . . and he
did not, by misconduct or neglect, cause or bring
about his own prosecution.38
If adequate proof is established, the individual can
recover $50,000 for each year of incarceration, or $100,000
for each year of incarceration spent on death row.39
The Innocence Protection Act of 2004 was enacted as a
part of the Justice for All Act of 2004 (JFAA).40 Signed into
law by President Bush on October 30, 2004, the JFAA was
designed to provide additional victim's rights, additional
funds and protocol for DNA testing, postconviction testing to prove innocence, and additional compensation for
persons wrongfully convicted.41 The JFAA increased
compensation to wrongfully convicted persons under the
federal wrongful conviction statute from $5,000 to
$50,000 per year ($100,000 in the case of a year spent on
death row).42 The JFAA also expressed Congress's belief
that states should provide compensation to any person
wrongfully convicted and sentenced to death.43
II. Ancillary Claims
As this brief review of the types of causes of action
arising out of false imprisonment makes clear, there is
significant variety in those claims. Nevertheless, there is
an overwhelming level of consistency in the pertinent
fact patterns and in what must be proven. There are more
similarities than differences.
Moreover, regardless of the precise manner and forum
in which those claims are pursued, there is another
virtual constant. Often, there are ancillary claims expressly or implicitly made in the context of that litigation.44
For example, in addition to false imprisonment, the
plaintiff may have a claim for poor medical care during
the plaintiff's time in prison, which may constitute medical malpractice under prevailing standards. Other ancillary claims may involve loss of consortium by spouses
and loved ones, rape claims against government employees and institutions (for which the state may bear
some responsibility), battery, invasion of privacy, and so
on. Many of these ancillary claims are indisputably tort
claims (such as medical malpractice), and under tradi-
Justice for All Act of 2004, P.L. 108-405, section 431-432, 118
Stat. 2260, 2260-2261 (2004).
Although I use the term ''litigation'' here, some disputes of
this nature are resolved far more amicably, with the state
seemingly recognizing, long before any lawsuit is filed, that it
made a mistake and that it should pay for that mistake. See, e.g.,
Azrael Sky, ''Man Receives $5 Million for Rape He Didn't
Commit,'' available at http://www.associatedcontent.com/
article/248548/man_receives_5_milli on_for_rape_he.html.
tional federal income tax principles, they should presumably yield a tax-free recovery to the injured party.45
Moreover, if one family member is seriously injured in
an accident, another family member may have a loss of
consortium claim against the tortfeasor. Traditionally, a
loss of consortium claim is regarded as physical, and so is
tax free to the spouse (or other family member), based on
the assumption that the injury giving rise to the loss of
consortium is also tax free.46 Such loss of consortium
claims have a kind of piggyback status, deriving their
tax-free character from the underlying tort claim involving the injured party that gave rise to the loss of
consortium.47
It is difficult to address all such ancillary causes of
action within the more standard model of a false imprisonment claim. Generally speaking, however, these ancillary causes of action will make the case for a tax-free
recovery to the falsely imprisoned individual much better.
Example: Gideon is sent to prison for five years for
a crime he did not commit. While in prison, he
receives medical care that is grossly inadequate and
causes him permanent physical injuries. If Gideon
later recovers for these various harms, there is a
better case for his recovery being fully excludable
from his income than if he had the same fact pattern
but without the medical malpractice.
One likely reason there is little discussion of the tax
treatment of wrongful imprisonment recoveries is the
frequent interaction between the underlying false imprisonment claim and the all-too-frequent ancillary claims.
Sometimes the ancillary claims may rise to a primacy of
seriousness (such as medical malpractice in the prison
hospital), in which the causes of action for such ancillary
claims are quite meritorious in their own right. In those
cases, neither taxpayers nor the IRS may be focusing too
clearly on precisely how the wrongful imprisonment
recovery, by itself, should be taxed.
In any event, because of both the variation in these
ancillary claims and the extent to which they cloud (and
frankly make easier) the underlying question whether
false imprisonment claims by themselves should give rise
to damage awards that are fully excludable from the
exonerated individual's income, I focus here not on any
of the ancillary claims, but simply on false imprisonment
itself.
See generally section 104(a)(2); Commissioner v. Schleier, 515
U.S. 323, 115 S. Ct. 2159, Doc 95-5972, 95 TNT 116-8 (1995).
Id.; Francisco v. United States, 54 F. Supp.2d 427, 435, Doc
1999-20985, 1999 TNT 128-8 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd, Francisco v.
United States, 267 F.3d 303, Doc 2001-27013, 2001 TNT 208-8 (3d
Cir. 2001).
LTR 200121031, Doc 2001-15011, 2001 TNT 103-10.
was found not guilty of such offense . . . or that he
has been pardoned upon the stated ground of
innocence and unjust conviction; and
III. Tax Authorities
The Internal Revenue Code has provided an exclusion
for personal injury damages for more than 80 years.48
Most states follow suit. For the bulk of this long history,
the exclusion from income applied to any damages
received (by judgment or settlement) for personal injuries
or personal sickness. That meant emotional distress damages were also excludable from income.
In 1996, however, the statute was amended to narrow
the exclusion to cover only damages for personal physical
injuries and physical sickness.49 This simple but farreaching statutory change was made primarily in response to what both Congress and the IRS viewed as
abuses by lawyers and their plaintiff clients in employment lawsuits.50 Although many employees sue for discrimination or wrongful termination, and a portion of
damages received for such claims is almost invariably for
lost wages, some plaintiffs and their counsel became
aggressive in seeking to allocate the bulk of their recoveries from such claims to ''emotional distress.'' The 1996
amendment to section 104 was expressly designed to
stem that tide and to make emotional distress recoveries
taxable.
Surprisingly, the IRS has failed to update its regulations since 1996, and has provided no official guidance on
the meaning of the term ''physical.''51 Private letter
rulings suggest that the IRS believes not only that there
must be a physical striking of the plaintiff, but that the
plaintiff must also experience observable bodily harm
(broken bones, bruising, and so on).52 The legislative
history to the 1996 amendment to section 104 indicates
Congress's view that mere symptoms of emotional distress do not result in excludable awards. Thus, headaches, stomachaches, and insomnia, commonly
Section 104(a)(2) originates from the Revenue Act of 1918,
ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, section 213(b)(6). See H.R. Rep. No. 767 65th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918) (1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 86, 92). Major
revisions of the Internal Revenue Code in 1939 and 1954 altered
the wording only slightly and made no substantive changes to
the provision. Section 22(b)(5) (1939); section 104(a)(2) (1954). In
1982, Congress amended section 104(a)(2) to exclude deferred
payments explicitly by adding the language that ''periodic
payments as personal injury damages are excludable from gross
income of the recipient.'' S. Rep. No. 97-646, at 4 (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580, 4583.
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, P.L. 104-188,
section 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (1996); H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
104-737, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (1996).
See Robert W. Wood, ''Tax Treatment of Settlements and
Judgments: Post-1996 Act Section 104 Cases: Where Are We
Eight Years Later?'' Tax Notes, Oct. 4, 2004, p. 68, Doc 2004-18582,
2004 TNT 189-27. See also Wood, ''Recent Damage Awards
Decisions,'' Tax Notes, Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1129, Doc 2005-18117, 2005
TNT 169-15.
1. Schleier test. The U.S. Supreme Court in Commissioner
v. Schleier56 established a two-part test for determining
whether a payment is excludable from income under
section 104. The test came before the 1996 amendments to
section 104, but the case continues to be relied on, now
with the ''physical'' modifier. The first prong of this test
requires a taxpayer to establish that damages were received through a tort or tortlike action.57 The second
prong requires a taxpayer to establish that the damages
received were ''on account of'' personal (physical) injury.58
Despite this seemingly simple test, the courts have
struggled to apply it. Most of the case law has been
decidedly antitaxpayer, giving an unduly narrow focus
to section 104. The cases are legion in which taxpayers
fail to carry their burden of proving a recovery to be
excludable under the Schleier standard. For example, in
Reid v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held a tort recovery
for wrongful discharge not to be excludable because it
was not received ''on account of'' personal physical
injuries or physical sickness.59
Reid, a cashier at a Florida Chevron station, alleged he
was injured lifting a bucket of ice and filed for workers'
compensation benefits. When his claim was denied and
he was fired, he sued Chevron for wrongful discharge.
The case settled for $5,000.
Reid excluded the settlement from his income, and the
matter ended up in Tax Court. Noting that the settlement
agreement failed to allocate any portion of the recovery
to personal physical injuries or physical sickness, the
court held for the IRS. Even if there was an ancillary
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-737, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 301
See Vincent v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-95, Doc 20059343, 2005 TNT 85-6. See also Wood, ''Ulcers and the Physical
Injury/Physical Sickness Exclusion,'' Tax Notes, June 20, 2005, p.
1529, Doc 2005-13042, 2005 TNT 115-33.
See, e.g., LTR 200121031, supra note 47, in which the IRS
ruled that an asbestos claim resulting from inhalation of fibers
was excludable (despite the lack of physical touching).
515 U.S. 323, 336-337 (1995).
T.C. Summ. Op. 2002-55, Doc 2002-12459, 2002 TNT 100-12.
A. Section 104 Authorities
experienced by those in stressful situations, are not
sufficiently ''physical'' to give rise to an exclusion from
income.53
Unfortunately, there is little authority from which to
divine the line between mere symptoms of emotional
distress on one hand, and physical injuries or physical
sickness on the other. Is a stroke a mere headache? Are
bleeding ulcers mere stomachaches?54
Perhaps more significantly, is the IRS correct that there
must be a striking for an exclusion to be available? I
believe the answer must be no, and that some physical
consequences must be viewed as serious enough to
constitute physical injury or physical sickness, and thus
to give rise to an exclusion from income, despite the
absence of a physical battery.55 Yet the issue remains
controversial.
Private letter rulings are not technically authority, and can
be used only by the taxpayer to whom they are issued.
However, practitioners routinely read them and rely on them as
indications of the position of the IRS National Office. Moreover,
even the U.S. Supreme Court has cited letter rulings. See Rowan
Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
See supra note 52.
Prasil v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-100, Doc 2003-9085,
2003 TNT 69-39.
See Wood, ''Ulcers and the Physical Injury/Physical Sickness Exclusion,'' supra note 54. See also Wood, ''Physical Sickness
and the Section 104 Exclusion,'' Tax Notes, Jan. 3, 2005, p. 121,
Doc 2004-24100, 2005 TNT 2-41.
T.C. Memo. 2005-95, Doc 2005-9343, 2005 TNT 85-6.
nately for the taxpayer, this was a case that had settled
after a jury verdict, and the Tax Court reviewed the jury
verdict. Finding no mention whatsoever that the jury had
considered the ulcers, the Tax Court found the entire
recovery to be taxable.
Proving a physical sickness may sometimes be easy,
but proving its cause often will not be. Moreover, when
the sickness itself is mental, the courts have thus far not
addressed the excludability of recoveries attributable to
that sickness.65
In at least one letter ruling involving a serious physical
sickness (cancer) that led to the person's death, the IRS
did not expressly comment whether this was ''physical
sickness,'' presumably because it was so obvious that it
was.66 The ruling involved a widow whose husband died
from cancer after being exposed to asbestos. The ruling
concludes that the widow's recovery for wrongful death
and her recovery for loss of consortium were both
excludable under section 104. The IRS does note that
there was a direct causal link between the deceased's
inhalation of asbestos and the widow's claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium.
This letter ruling involving cancer from asbestos may
be an obvious case. Yet it illustrates what is at the root of
many of the Tax Court cases that seem to ignore physical
sickness and even many physical injuries: the problems
of proof. As in many of the cases I've noted, the taxpayer
is unable to show much of anything in the way of
medical documentation.
Even when the plaintiff has medical documentation,
plaintiffs often fail to show a causal connection between
the defendant's conduct and the sickness or injury. Of
course, in some cases, as in Vincent, there is even a failure
to show that the malady was attributed to the defendant
and argued as part of the case. Given such failings, it is
hardly surprising that most of the authority interpreting
section 104, particularly in the post-1996 era, has found
that this exclusion does not apply.
Given the express purpose of the 1996 tightening of
section 104 (to prevent abuses that Congress thought
were occurring in allocations of damages in employment
lawsuits), one should expect that result. Thus, in Tritz v.
Commissioner,67 the Tax Court found settlement payments
for a termination of employment to be fully taxable. The
settlement payment was made under a reduction in force
of many employees, and the taxpayer signed a release
that provided for wage treatment for the entire severance
payment. The taxpayer argued that because he had been
treated for carpal tunnel syndrome, a portion of the
settlement had to be attributed to that, and therefore was
nontaxable.
Predictably, the Tax Court concluded that the entire
severance payment was properly treated as severance, as
See Tamberella v. Commissioner, 139 Fed. Appx. 319, 322, Doc
2005-15534, 2005 TNT 140-11 (2d Cir. 2005). (''We expressly do
not decide whether a serious mental illness, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, constitutes a 'physical' injury or sickness
within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. [section] 104(a)(2).'')
cause of action based on tort or tort-type rights, the
settlement agreement did not ascribe any amount to
personal physical injuries or physical sickness.
Nevertheless, the IRS has recognized that when there
is physical touching and resulting physical injuries, recoveries (such as for sexual harassment) can be excluded.
In what is generally regarded as a seminal private letter
ruling,60 the IRS bifurcated a sexual harassment recovery
into damages for the period leading up to a physical
battery (what the IRS called the First Pain Incident), and
damages thereafter.61 The physical battery and its consequences became a threshold beyond which all damages
were tax free.
LTR 200041022 clearly indicates that in the IRS's view,
when there is a battery that causes visible harm, all
damages flowing therefrom (including emotional distress) are excludable. In the real world, however, there is
often no clear event from which both physical and
nonphysical damages flow. The IRS's desire for bright
lines has probably caused it to virtually ignore the
''physical sickness'' wing of section 104. Nevertheless, the
statute is clear that physical sickness recoveries are fully
excludable, and physical sickness is not generally triggered by a battery.
There is often simply too little proof from which such
a watershed can be observed. For example, in Prasil, the
Tax Court found a sexual harassment settlement fully
taxable.62 The court dismissed Prasil's uncorroborated
testimony that the harassment caused or exacerbated
various illnesses. Proving that express tax language in
settlement agreements does matter, the court noted that
the settlement documents failed to allocate any portion of
the payment to physical injury or physical sickness.
2. Physical 'sickness' recoveries. One whole wing of the
section 104 exclusion has rarely been explicated.63 The
statute excludes damages for physical injuries or physical
sickness. That physical sickness has almost never been
discussed in rulings, in the tax literature, or in case law is
disturbing. In our common experience, most physical
sickness does not arise from a battery. Thus, physical
touching should arguably be irrelevant.
A few authorities expressly touch on the physical
sickness wing of section 104. In Vincent v. Commissioner,64
the plaintiff claimed her employer's conduct exacerbated
her ulcers. She claimed that supported the exclusion of 50
percent of her settlement, which she attributed to her
ulcers and emotional distress arising therefrom. Unfortu-
3. Cases on constitutional rights. Although much of our
learning about the current scope of section 104 comes
from employment litigation, there has been some litigation over the tax treatment of recoveries for violations of
constitutional rights. Moreover, several courts have held
compensatory payments in this circumstance to be excludable from income.
For example, in Bent v. Commissioner,68 the taxpayer
was a schoolteacher whose contract was not renewed
after he publicly criticized the school administration. The
plaintiff had a reputation for outspokenness, and at a
teachers' meeting, made several highly critical remarks
about a school administrator. Shortly thereafter, he received an evaluation by the same administrator concluding that he would not be employed the following year.
When Bent's contract was not renewed, he sued for
breach of contract and violation of his right to freedom of
speech, suing under section 1983. The court rejected all
claims except that for free speech. However, before the
court reached a decision on damages, the taxpayer and
the defendant settled.
In the subsequent tax dispute, the Tax Court determined that claims for constitutional rights violations
under section 1983 are tort-type claims. Accordingly, the
Tax Court held the recovery to be excludable because the
free speech violation was the only claim on which the
school board was liable. The IRS appealed to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, but the appellate court affirmed.
Bent stands for the view that personal injuries include
mental pain and suffering, and not simply physical
trauma. Of course, this view was disapproved by statute
for recoveries after August 20, 1996, which may make
Bent and other constitutional violation cases irrelevant
after 1996. At the very least, they must be read with the
current gloss of required physical (sickness or injury)
However, there is an interesting point regarding the
calculation of damages in Bent. Although the settlement
amount in Bent was calculated by reference to the plaintiff's wages, the court did not treat this fact as significant.
The reference to wages did not make this settlement
wages. Wages were a measuring device for determining
the tort damages.
4. Sex Abuse Ruling. Up until now, arguably the most
important IRS statement on how the IRS views section
104 came in LTR 200041022, which is now often simply
dubbed ''the bruise ruling,'' among tax aficionados.69
Broadly stated, this letter ruling indicates that for an
exclusion to be available under section 104, one must
show evidence of physical injuries we can see. Bruises or
broken bones would certainly qualify, but how much less
would qualify is unclear. This ruling also makes crystal
87 T.C. 236 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67, 88-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) para. 9101, 61 AFTR2d (P-H) para. 88-301 (3d Cir. 1987).
See discussion accompanying notes 60-62 above.
clear the watershed nature of those physical manifestations. Once one crosses the threshold of physicality, all
damages flowing from the physical event, including
emotional distress damages, also become excludable.
Recently, there are signs the IRS is ameliorating its
rigid need to see demonstrable physical harm to recognize exclusions under section 104. In ILM 200809001,70
the IRS determined that a settlement with an institution
for sex abuse that occurred many years previously was
fully excludable under section 104. The IRS reached this
conclusion despite the taxpayer's failure to be able to
demonstrate any signs of physical injury. While any other
tax result on such a recovery would be indefensible, this
is nevertheless an important stride in section 104 interpretation that should not go unnoticed.71
The IRS does not do away with its demonstrable
physical injury talisman. Instead, the IRS says that in this
case, given what occurred, it is reasonable to presume that
the injuries were physical in nature. That is a momentous
step in the right direction. The IRS does not say that one
is not required to have observable bodily harm in some
situations, but rather that one need not demonstrate it. To
me, the reasoning goes something like this: Some things
are inherently and incontrovertibly physical, whether or
not they leave lasting outward scars. Sex abuse surely fits
this category, as does rape or other sexual assault. I think
wrongful imprisonment does too.
If one can criticize the recent ILM (which I'm certainly
not doing, since I think it is a hugely important ruling) it
would be only in potentially creating ambiguity about
the importance of the plaintiff being a minor at the time
of the abuse, and an adult when the case settled. The
ruling does not emphasize this, and surely the rationale
for not needing to prove observable bodily harm in some
cases does not rest on the minority of the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, one cannot help but wonder whether the
IRS is implicitly restricting its view to such circumstances, or perhaps to more general circumstances in
which the failure to be able to show observable bodily
harm is somehow especially excusable.72 Regardless, ILM
200809001 shows that in at least some cases, proof of
physical harm is not required.
B. Evaluating False Imprisonment
In an archetypal false imprisonment case, how do the
tax authorities suggest that a recovery should be taxed? If
one is deprived of one's personal liberty, if one is
confined unlawfully behind bars, is that not by its very
nature physical? The answer must surely be yes. It is
difficult to see how it could be otherwise. Perhaps one
might review civil rights law and find cases in which
bona fide deprivations of civil rights might not in all
senses be physical. However, wouldn't being confined in
a jail cell (unlawfully) always be physical?
Doc 2008-4372, 2008 TNT 42-21. Interestingly, this legal
memorandum was written by the IRS's Michael Montemurro,
who also authored the bruise ruling.
See Wood, ''IRS Allows Damages Exclusion Without Proof
of Physical Harm,'' Tax Notes, Mar. 31, 2008, p. 1388, Doc
2008-5734, 2008 TNT 13-31.
it had clearly been intended by the employer. Those
cases, however understandable they are, arguably trivialize the section 104 exclusion.
See New York State Court of Claims Act, section 8-B.
See Cal. Penal Code section 4900-4906; Iowa Code Ann.
section 663A.1 (West 1998); Wis. Stat. section 775.05 (2006).
See IRS Publication 525, Taxable and Nontaxable Income.
O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, Doc 96-31894, 96 TNT
240-1 (1996); Francisco v. Commissioner, 267 F. 3d 393, 315, Doc
2001-27013, 2001 TNT 208-8 (3d Cir. 2001); Commissioner v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329 (1995); Ervin v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-134, Doc 2002-13101, 2002 TNT 105-5; Rev. Rul.
85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14.
See Wood, ''New Law Radically Changes Tax Rules in
Employment Litigation,'' Tax Notes, Aug. 19, 1996, p. 1045, Doc
96-23171, 96 TNT 176-75.
between wages, on one hand, and nonwage damages, on
the other. For that reason, perhaps it was inevitable that
the IRS and Congress would eventually act to narrow the
section 104 exclusion. In the false imprisonment context,
there is (quite obviously) no dichotomy between payments for loss of liberty and payments of wages.
Plainly, there is no employment relationship between
the prisoner and the state.78 It is also odd to think of
emotional distress damages here. The IRS could perhaps
argue that a recovery for false imprisonment represents a
payment for emotional distress, and as such, is taxable.
To do so, however, it would seem that the IRS would
have to contend that the emotional distress was not
caused by the physical confinement. This seems counterintuitive, if not downright impossible.
In any event, recall that the legislative history to the
1996 amendment to section 104 makes eminently clear
that the section 104 exclusion applies to damages for
emotional distress triggered by (or emanating from)
physical injuries or physical sickness.79 It is hard to
imagine that a false imprisonment plaintiff would not
have emotional distress. It is equally hard to imagine that
the emotional distress will not be unequivocally caused
by his confinement.
C. False Imprisonment Authorities
Despite the lack of authorities on the tax treatment of
false imprisonment recoveries, there is some history on
unlawful imprisonment recoveries and the tax issues
they raise. Helpful analogies can be found in the tax
treatment of payments made to: survivors of Nazi persecution; U.S. prisoners of war during World War II and the
Korean War; and Japanese-Americans placed in internment camps. In the case of interned Japanese-Americans,
Congress enacted legislation to clarify the tax treatment
of those payments. In the other cases, the IRS issued
revenue rulings providing exclusions from income tax for
the payments.
The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 provided compensation
for Japanese-Americans who were relocated and placed
in internment camps, as well as those wrongfully convicted under Executive Order Number 9066 (the order
providing for their relocation and internment).80 This law
established a fund for compensating those individuals.
For tax purposes, those amounts were considered damages for ''human suffering'' and were expressly excluded
I ignore here the possibility that the prisoner may perform
menial tasks for menial pay, such as Michael Vick's reported 12
cents per hour kitchen job. See Holtzclaw, ''Michael Vick's New
Salary: 12 cents an Hour,'' New York Daily News, April 7, 2008; see
also http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-now-vick.a7,0,6509
.story. Any such ''employment'' should not invoke the dichotomy between wages and tort payments. Plus, if a prisoner's
recovery were taxable, it would presumably not mean his
attorney fees would be deductible under the above-the-line
deduction for legal fees in employment cases now provided by
See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, P.L. 104-188,
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, P.L. 100-383, section 101-109, 102
Stat. 903, 903-911 (1988).
In determining whether damages or settlement payments paid on account of wrongful conviction should
qualify under section 104 (as paid on account of personal
physical injuries or personal physical sickness), the statutory scheme under which the exonerated person recovers
is clearly relevant. Some state statutes limit recoveries to
circumstances in which there has been an actual imprisonment (as opposed to merely a wrongful conviction in
which the person remains free on bail or is otherwise not
incarcerated).73
If one accepts the notion that incarceration is itself
physical, such restrictions in the underlying statute
would seem to help rather than hurt the case for excludability under section 104. Moreover, if one accepts the
notion that the wrongful incarceration is itself physical, it
should not matter whether the state statutory scheme (or
any other basis of recovery) includes damages for loss of
income, emotional distress, and so on.
Consider an automobile accident case in which there is
physical injury. Plainly, the tools that may be used to help
measure damages (loss of income, pain and suffering,
and so on) do not make the recovery for injuries in the
accident taxable. In other words, despite the origin of the
claim test that governs the tax treatment of litigation
recoveries, wage loss is not income if it is awarded
because of physical injuries or physical sickness.
There are suggestions that in calculating the damages
to which a plaintiff in a false imprisonment case should
be entitled, the number of days, months, or years in
confinement serve as a kind of litmus test for the amount
of appropriate damages.74 This does not make the payment wages. Wage loss is often used as a measure of
damages in auto accident (and other tort) cases, but this
does not make the damage payments taxable.75 If the
amounts paid to compensate the individual are tax free
under section 104(a)(2), the amounts paid for wages lost
as a result of the injury are tax free as well.76
There is another way in which unlawful imprisonment should be evaluated in the context of existing
section 104 authority. Before the 1996 statutory change to
section 104, it became common practice in resolving
employment cases to denominate some portion of the
damages as ''emotional distress damages.'' The goal, of
course, was to achieve tax-free treatment for those damages.77
In almost every employment case (whether employment discrimination, sexual harassment, wrongful termination, and so on), there was a natural dichotomy
Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20.
Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213.
See Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-12 IRB 747, Doc 2007-4230, 2007
TNT 34-15, obsoleting these and other revenue rulings. Although the IRS does not publish reasons for an obsolescence, I
understand from IRS personnel who were involved in this
obsolescence that the IRS considered the rulings no longer valid
in light of the 1996 changes to section 104.
imprisonment is by its very nature physical, the fact that
these are pre-1996 revenue rulings does not matter.
D. The General Welfare Exception
Exclusions from income are narrowly construed and
generally have been limited to those specified in the
code.87 There is, however, a little-known administrative
exception to gross income that could conceivably apply
to false imprisonment recoveries.88 To be clear, this is
entirely independent from the section 104 exclusion, and
one might argue them in the alternative.
Under the general welfare exception (GWE), some
government payments do not constitute gross income to
the recipients. Under the GWE, the IRS has ruled that
payments made under legislatively provided social benefit programs for promotion of the general welfare are
excludable from gross income.89 In determining whether
the GWE applies to payments, the IRS requires the
payments to be:
• made from a governmental general welfare fund;
• for the promotion of the general welfare (that is, on
the basis of need rather than to all residents); and
• not made as payment for services.90
The IRS has applied the GWE to a handful of disparate
government payments. Perhaps the most classic example
of the GWE's application is a government payment to
victims of a natural disaster.91 The IRS has applied the
GWE doctrine to government payments ranging from
housing to education to adoption, and even crime victim
restitution.92 Thus, it is not farfetched to suggest that the
GWE could apply to government payments for wrongful
imprisonment. Many such payments could arguably
satisfy the GWE requirements.
This may particularly be the case when the payment is
made under a state or federal compensation statute.
However, any payment from the government in this
context, even one prompted by a lawsuit for false imprisonment, could arguably qualify. After all, the GWE is
intended to exempt from taxation amounts the government pays for the general welfare. Plainly, that is what
payments to victims of false imprisonment do.
IV. Conclusion
Perhaps victims of false imprisonment may be no
more numerous today than they were 100 years ago. Yet
O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996); Commissioner v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
See Wood and Richard C. Morris, ''The General Welfare
Exception to Gross Income,'' Tax Notes, Oct. 10, 2005, p. 203, Doc
2005-20172, 2005 TNT 191-34.
See ITA 200021036, Doc 2000-14946, 2000 TNT 104-74; LTR
200451022, Doc 2004-23902, 2004 TNT 244-53 (Dec. 17, 2004).
See ITA 200021036.
Many disaster payments have now also been statutorily
exempted from income under recently enacted section 139. Rev.
Rul. 2003-12, 2003-3 IRB 283, Doc 2002-27748, 2002 TNT 245-6,
acknowledges that the GWE doctrine overlaps the application
of section 139, so both can apply.
See Rev. Rul. 76-373, 1976-2 C.B. 16; Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1
C.B. 20; Rev. Rul. 76-395, 1976-2 C.B. 16; Rev. Rul. 75-271, 1975-2
C.B. 23; LTR 200409033, Doc 2004-3963, 2004 TNT 40-26; Rev.
Rul. 74-153, 1974-1 C.B. 20; Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18.
from income.81 Moreover, the payments were also not
considered resources for purposes of determining Social
Security eligibility.
Similarly, Rev. Rul. 56-46282 dealt with payments by
the U.S. government to U.S. citizens who were captured
and held by the enemy during the Korean War. This
ruling cited Rev. Rul. 55-132,83 which provided a tax
exemption for payments made to U.S. citizens who were
prisoners of war during World War II. In both rulings,
these payments were treated as compensation for the loss
of personal rights during imprisonment and were excluded from income for federal income tax purposes.
Rev. Rul. 58-37084 and Rev. Rul. 56-51885 provided
tax-free treatment for payments by Germany or Austria
for persecution by the Nazis. Rev. Rul. 58-370 states that
the payments represent reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights, and as such, are not
includable in income. Similarly, Rev. Rul. 56-518 states
that the payments were made on account of persecution,
resulting in damage to life, body, health, liberty, or to
professional or economic advancement. Thus, they were
excluded from income for tax purposes.
Being incarcerated has dramatic effects on one's ability
to work and earn a living. Yet, plainly, the consequences
of incarceration are more of a measuring tool, much the
way wage loss is used as a measuring tool for damages in
auto accidents and other more traditional personal physical injury cases. That a wrongfully incarcerated person
experiences wage loss does not ascribe the character of
wages to a payment for unlawful incarceration.
Indeed, in all of those historic cases, the individual
was not being compensated for a loss of wages or some
other economic claim. Instead, like wrongfully convicted
individuals, the IRS recognized that those persons were
being compensated for the loss of the simple pleasures of
life we may take for granted. These revenue rulings
reflect the prevailing view that the ability to take a breath
of fresh air, to sleep in one's own bed, to attend a family
gathering, is not taxable.
Unfortunately, of course, those authorities predate the
1996 changes to section 104, imposing the ''physical''
requirement. How big an impact that timing should have
is not clear. Yet all of the aforementioned revenue rulings
were ''obsoleted'' by Rev. Rul. 2007-14, issued on March
19, 2007.86 That is disturbing.
After all, despite the lack of IRS guidance since 1996,
the legislative history to the 1996 act makes clear that all
emotional distress damages that flow from physical
injuries or physical sickness are still excludable from
income. Thus, if one believes, as I do, that wrongful
Whatever triggers the payment, it is appropriate to ask
what federal income tax consequences face the victim.
Like the tax treatment of victims of clergy sex abuse, this
may be the type of tax question we're afraid to ask. Not
only should this be a tax question we want to ask, but it
should be one we embrace with open arms, seeking tax
certainty that helps to bring finality to a painful incident
for all parties. Unfortunately, we do not yet have crystal
clear answers to this tax conundrum.
Yet I believe there is no question that these recoveries
should be tax free, either under section 104 or under the
GWE. It should not take congressional action to do it,
although clarifying legislation would be appropriate. I
believe being wrongfully incarcerated is manifestly
physical, and that a payment for same must therefore be
excludable from income.
It is especially easy to reach this conclusion when the
victim has ancillary claims, such as medical malpractice,
battery, and so on. At least with such ancillary claims,
there is existing federal income tax authority speaking
more clearly to the excludability of the recoveries from
income. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, there will
be ancillary claims. They may vary in type and severity,
but they inevitably add to the physicality of it all, as if
being locked up by itself was not palpably physical
But to return to my initial assumption, even taking the
somewhat unrealistic fact pattern in which there are no
ancillary claims — that is, even when there are no such
separate tort causes of action — the point seems clear. It
is difficult to think of a decent argument based on the
existing tax authorities, or for that matter, based on social
or tax policy, for taxing these recoveries.
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and practitioners. To be considered for publication,
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they are certainly more easily identified today. Not only
that, but society has clearly recognized that they deserve
compensation. The compensation may come via a state or
federal statute, legislative edict, or an old-fashioned
lawsuit.
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text:
Tom Engelhardt created and runs the Tomdispatch.com website, a project of The Nation Institute, where he is a fellow. He is also consulting editor for Metropolitan Books and the co-founder of its American Empire Project series. He is the author of The American Way of War: How Bush's Wars Became Obama's, The End of Victory Culture (University of Massachusetts Press), which has just been thoroughly updated in a newly issued edition that deals with victory culture's crash-and-burn sequel in Iraq and a novel, The Last Days of Publishing, about a world he inhabited for thirty years. His latest book, coauthored with Nick Turse, is Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050. Each spring he is a Teaching Fellow at the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley.
Tomdispatch.com began in November 2001 as Tom Engelhardt's unnamed e-list of commentary and collected articles from the world press. In December 2002, it gained its name, became a project of The Nation Institute, and went online as "a regular antidote to the mainstream media." It now posts Tom Engelhardt's regular commentaries and the original work of authors ranging from Rebecca Solnit and Mike Davis to Chalmers Johnson, Michael Klare, and Elizabeth de la Vega. Nick Turse (who also writes for the site) is its part-time associate editor and research director.
Tomdispatch is intended to introduce readers to voices and perspectives from elsewhere (even when the elsewhere is here). Its mission is to connect some of the global dots regularly left unconnected by the mainstream media and to offer a clearer sense of how this imperial globe of ours actually works. It also has regular interviews with thinkers and doers Engelhardt admires. These are now collected in Mission Unaccomplished: Tomdispatch Interviews with American Iconoclasts and Dissenters (Nation Books, October, 2006).
PoliticsJanuary 8, 2021
America After The Donald
It's going to be quite a task in a world that needs so much else just to demine the American system after he leaves the White House.
WorldDecember 4, 2020
The American Empire Is Falling Apart
The US is now an empire in decline, regardless of whether Donald Trump, Joe Biden, or Mitch McConnell runs the show.
Election 2020November 12, 2020
We'll Be Living In Trump's America Long After He's Gone
Trumpism has split America in two in a way that hasn't been imaginable since the Civil War.
PoliticsNovember 2, 2020
We've Been on Trump's Road for a Long Time
Trump is only a symptom of what's been ailing America since the 1970s. Even if he loses the election, we'll still be living in his country.
The stakes are higher now than ever. Get The Nation in your inbox.
PoliticsOctober 6, 2020
Trump Is Getting Away With Much More Than Murder
Trump boasted in 2016 that he could get away with murder. In the 4 years since, his administration has been responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths.
Election 2020September 23, 2020
A Vote for Trump Is a Vote for Climate Apocalypse
It's not complicated—four more years of Trump will consign us to a hell on Earth of a sort still only faintly imaginable today.
WorldSeptember 10, 2020
The US Is a Failed State
In less than four years, Donald Trump has exacerbated nearly every issue plaguing this country, from income inequality to global warming.
InequalityAugust 12, 2020
The Grim World Our Grandchildren Will Inherit
At 76, I knew our world was headed for a dark place decades ago. Did I ever think it would be this bad? Not a chance.
US Wars and Military ActionJuly 17, 2020
Donald Trump Is Living Proof of Osama bin Laden's Success
The US's militarized and nationalist response to 9/11 has accelerated the decline of the American empire.
WorldJune 19, 2020
The End of the American Century
Marked by disease, endless wars, and a dying planet, the American empire is finally reaching its decline.
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text:
Q: C-Programming: What happens if I increment an Arraypointer while passing it as an argument Will this work?
I expect
foo(myArraypointer + 10);

be the same as
foo( &(myArraypointer[10]));

will this be treated as same for most compilers? Is this considered good or bad practice and why? What could go wrong?

A: For any pointer or array a and index i, the expression a[i] is equal to *(a + i). That means that &a[i] is equal to &*(a + i), where the last can be shortened to a + i.

A: They are exactly the same as required by the C standard. Note that the compiler must not evaluate the array index before taking its address: i.e. the expression is well defined even if the array elements are not initialised.
I prefer the first one though. It's clearer and is friendlier to C++ code which might have overloaded the address of operator for your type. And the non-initialised point I've already made is really one for the pub quiz.

A: Both of them are same as in the first one foo(myArraypointer + 10); it access myArraypointer which is the base address of variable and +10 will increment the address to 10th position from base address.
Incrementing or decrementing address of a pointer depends upon the data type of the pointer Variable. i.e. if pointer is character type it'll increment/decrements by 1.
If myArraypointer points to a character whose address is 1000, then increment by one will point to the location 1001 but if myArraypointer points to an integer whose address is 1000, then increment by one will point to the location 1002(1000 + 2). Like this for float also.


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text:
Q: WMI query to find lack of drive letter for Group Policy I'm building a group policy to apply to a subset of users within my organization. This subset of users have no Home Directory set on their Active Directory object, whereas other users have an I:\ drive assigned.
I need to find a WMI query which will allow the User Configuration GPO to apply to a user with no I:\ drive.
I can easily find the inverse of that:
Select * From Win32_LogicalDisk Where DeviceID = 'I:'

But if I make this WHERE DeviceID <> 'I:\', it returns C:, D: and other mapped drives.
I thought about querying the user profile with something like this:
select RoamingPath from Win32_UserProfile where RoamingPath <> '\\*'

however that returns many results for system accounts and local administrator profiles, rather than the logged on user.
I've read that it is possible to query AD directly, but the command below gives me an "Invalid Class" error and I don't know if it would apply to the logged in user:
select * from ds_user where ADSIPath = LDAP://OU=CA,DC=global,DC=opus AND DS_homeDirectory='*'

I think ideally this would be solved by using Win32_LogicalDisk to count the total number of drives, a second query to get a count of I:\ drives (either 1 or 0), and then subtract the second result from the first. If the result is = the first query, I have my set of users. So far no luck on finding syntax to do this within a GPO wmi filter though.

A: I have determined that do accomplish this exactly as I've defined in my question is not really possible.
The two best options I have come across are:

*

*Inverted WMI Filters - Create an environment variable per user/PC which produces a result based on required logic. Then use a regular WMI query to filter on that environment variable.

*Scheduled PowerShell query - as Yanick suggested in the comments, create a PowerShell query which filters users based on required logic (i.e. homeDrive attribute being empty) and then add these user accounts into a group, which can then be used for Security Filtering on the GPO. This PowerShell is then scheduled on a LAN server to run repeatedly.

I've chosen option #2 in my environment.


text:
Tag Archive: River of No Return
Cowardly Lion, Casablanca props highlight Turner Classic Movies auction in November
Filed under: Backstage Pass, Con Culture, Fantasy Realms, Movies, Retro Fix, Sci-Fi Café — Leave a comment
It's the second time TCM and auction house Bonhams have teamed up to offer screen-used and production-made costumes, props, and other relics from the Golden Age of Hollywood. A November auction, TCM Presents: There's No Place Like Hollywood, will feature a large private collection of rare items from Casablanca, including the piano featured prominently in the film where Sam plays "As Time Goes By." A lesser seen piano from another scene in the film sold in 2012 for more than $600,000.
One lot features a mannequin display with costume components worn by Bert Lahr as the Cowardly Lion in The Wizard of Oz, said to have been used in several scenes in the film. Many of the costumes and props appear to be the same lots that have been featured in other auctions in the last few years, including various dresses from the Debbie Reynolds collection of items offered by auction house Profiles in History.
Costumes from several classic films are on the auction block, including a Clark Gable jacket from Gone With the Wind, Marilyn Monroe's saloon gown from River of No Return, Jimmy Stewart's Charles Lindbergh flight suit from The Spirit of St. Louis, Faye Dunaway's dress from The Towering Inferno, a Jane Russell costume from The Outlaw, and a John Wayne Union Army coat from Rio Lobo and The Undefeated. Sci-fi and fantasy fans aren't forgotten in the TCM auction, as there will be costumes worn by Charlton Heston and Roddy McDowall in Planet of the Apes, a background crewmember astronaut jumpsuit from Close Encounters of the Third Kind, a test dress for Judy Garland as Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz, and a Saruman staff and Aragorn sword from The Lord of the Rings films, both from Sir Christopher Lee's personal collection.
Tags: Alfred Hitchcock, Auctions, Bert Lahr, Bonhams, Casablanca, Christopher Lee, Close Encounters of the Third Kind, Gone with the Wind, Humphrey Bogart, Lord of the Rings, Marilyn Monroe auction, Planet of the Apes, Rio Lobo, River of No Return, Roddy McDowall, TCM network, TCM Presents: There's No Place Like Hollywood auction, The Spirit of St Louis, The Towering Inferno, The Undefeated, The Wizard of Oz, Turner Classic Movies


text:
Home » SFF Reviews » The Swarm: A longwinded build-up to an alien invasion
The Swarm: A longwinded build-up to an alien invasion
The Swarm by Orson Scott Card & Aaron Johnston
Orson Scott Card's ENDERVERSE has grown to sixteen novels and counting, along with several novellas and short stories, since he published Ender's Game in 1985 (or if you want to go back even further, since the original "Ender's Game" short story was published in Analog magazine in 1977). Andrew Wiggin, or Ender, is the main character in only a few of these works; others focus on his brother Peter Wiggin, Ender's protégé Bean, and other new or secondary characters from Ender's Game. Which brings us to Mazer Rackham, the half-Māori war hero who plays a brief but pivotal role in Ender's Game.
In 2012, Card, along with co-author Aaron Johnston, began writing prequels to the original ENDER series, beginning with Earth Unaware, set almost a century before Ender's Game. Mazer Rackham is a key character in this series, but shares the stage with many others, particularly Victor Delgado, a space-born mechanic; Bingwen, a brilliant young Chinese boy training as a soldier to fight the alien Formics; and Lem Jukes, immensely wealthy son and heir of the first Hegemon.
I mention this background because, although The Swarm (2016) is designated as the first volume in the SECOND FORMIC WAR trilogy, readers should really consider it the fourth book in the prequel novels about the original Formic attacks on Earth. It's possible to start your prequel reading with The Swarm, but the events and characters are so closely connected to the FIRST FORMIC WAR trilogy (Earth Unaware, Earth Afire and Earth Awakens) that I really can't recommend beginning with The Swarm.
After barely beating off the Formics who invaded Earth in the First Formic War, the people of Earth have reorganized themselves politically and militarily, knowing that a larger invasion of Formics is inevitable. Lem Jukes' father Ukko has become the Hegemon, a type of prime minister over the entire planet, and he's been joined by a Polemarch, chief over the new International Fleet, and a Strategos, in charge of the defense of our solar system. As Victor and his shipmates discover a second invasion of Formics gearing up, hidden among the asteroids in our solar system, Mazer battles his superior officer's greed and corruption that have resulted in punitive court-martial proceedings against Mazer. Meanwhile, Bingwen and other Chinese orphan boys are being whipped into soldiers by the merciless and driven Captain Li, who knows that their small size may make them invaluable warriors if humans need to battle Formics in their underground tunnels.
The plot of The Swarm is complex, jumping between these and other characters' points of view. One of the more fascinating, and appalling, characters is Khalid, a murderous Somalian space pirate, whose brief subplot makes for compelling reading. (There will certainly be more to come from Khalid.) There's also Wila, a young Thai biochemist who takes a lot of heat for her Buddhist-inspired empathy toward the Hive Queen of the Formics, but whose scientific and philosophical insights may lead to key breakthroughs in defending against them. Overall it's a typical Card cast of characters: incredibly bright, precocious children; idealistic fighters for freedom; and the corrupt, self-centered people who stand in their way.
The theme of deadly alien threat, counter-balanced with the grave problems caused by human selfishness and greed, plays out throughout The Swarm. For my money, Card and Johnston are taking much too long to spin out this tale, when you consider not just the 500+ pages in this novel but all of the other books you need to read to get the entire story. But all in all, it's a well-told tale if you like SF space operas and you're a fan of Orson Scott Card's ENDERVERSE books. If you haven't already read Ender's Game, I strongly recommend that you start there, then read my favorite book in the entire series, Speaker for the Dead, and then decide from there if you want to get deeper into the ENDERVERSE. The SECOND FORMIC WAR series continues with The Hive, just published in June 2019.
Published in 2016. Orson Scott Card and Aaron Johnston return to their Ender's Game prequel series with this first volume of an all-new trilogy about the Second Formic War in The Swarm. The first invasion of Earth was beaten back by a coalition of corporate and international military forces, and the Chinese army. China has been devastated by the Formic's initial efforts to eradicate Earth life forms and prepare the ground for their own settlement. The Scouring of China struck fear into the other nations of the planet; that fear blossomed into drastic action when scientists determined that the single ship that wreaked such damage was merely a scout ship. There is a mothership out beyond the Solar System's Kuiper Belt, and it's heading into the system, unstoppable by any weapons that Earth can muster. Earth has been reorganized for defense. There is now a Hegemon, a planetary official responsible for keeping all the formerly warring nations in line. There's a Polemarch, responsible for organizing all the military forces of the planet into the new International Fleet. But there is an enemy within, an enemy as old as human warfare: ambition and politics. Greed and self-interest. Will Bingwen, Mazer Rackam, Victor Delgado and Lem Juke be able to divert those very human enemies in time to create a weapon that can effectively defend humanity in the inexorable Second Formic War?
August 22nd, 2019. Tadiana Jones´s rating: 3.5 | Orson Scott Card | SFF Reviews | no comments |


text:
Hidra may refer to:

Places
Hidra, Tunisia, a municipality in the Kasserine Governorate, Tunisia
Hidra, Vest-Agder, a former municipality in Vest-Agder county, Norway
Hidra (island), an island in Flekkefjord municipality in Agder county, Norway
Hidra Church, a church in Flekkefjord municipality in Agder county, Norway

Scientific Devices
Hybrid Illinois Device for Research and Applications, HIDRA, a toroidal fusion device at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

See also
Hitra (disambiguation)
Hydra (disambiguation)

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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Pieces falling into place for Seattle's expansion franchise bid
The Hockey Night in Canada panel go over all the news and rumours around the league, including what Max Pacioretty would be worth on the trade market.
Sonny Sachdeva | @sachdevasonny December 30, 2017, 10:41 PM
Sonny Sachdeva @sachdevasonny December 30, 2017, 10:41 PM
The NHL's potential expansion into Seattle continues to slowly creep forward and, by February, could reach the stage of gauging the city's interest in housing another professional franchise.
After seeing its $600-million arena plans approved by the Seattle City Council in early December, soon followed by notification from the NHL that the league will consider expanding into the Emerald City, the Oak View Group is now moving into the next phase of its expansion bid.
The first item on the agenda: putting together the operational side of the organization.
"Everything is starting to take shape," Sportsnet's Chris Johnston said on Hockey Night in Canada's Headlines segment Saturday. "[Oak View Group CEO] Tim Leiweke says he's closing in on hiring an executive team. This will be people to get the business operations up and going."
Likely leading the list of tasks on the schedule for that soon-to-be-assembled business team is putting together a season-ticket drive to see how interested the Seattle public is in having an NHL franchise in their city.
Those answers could come in just a few months.
"[Leiweke's] got an ad firm, a campaign, a website, and after he gets NHL approval, they will soon roll out plans for their ticket launch," Johnston said. "They hope to have that live by February."
While the process is moving forward there's much to be decided before Seattle's bid can be considered a sure thing. One aspect that can't be overlooked is the hefty price tag attached — $650 million, according to Sportsnet's Elliotte Friedman, considerably higher than the $500 million paid to launch the Golden Knights in Vegas.
The ownership group is targeting the 2020-21 season as Seattle's inaugural campaign, according to Friedman.
SEA: looking at 2020-21. Have asked to file application to expand. League has agreed and will allow a season-ticket drive. But Bettman says this is not guarantee of a team
— Elliotte Friedman (@FriedgeHNIC) December 7, 2017
An early-2018 ticket drive should make clear to the league and the rest of the hockey community just how viable Seattle is as an NHL city. It took Vegas only two days to make their case, as the city checked off half of their 10,000-ticket goal in the first day and a half of their own campaign. In Winnipeg, only seven minutes were needed to sell out all 13,000 available tickets, leaving no questions regarding the Canadian city's ability to reclaim the Jets.
Should all go according to the Oak View Group's plan, it will only be a matter of months before Seattle can prove its own interest.
Bettman: NHL expansion process open to Seattle
Andrew Bottomley
Seattle approves $600M renovation plan for KeyArena
Quick Shifts: Should Maple Leafs trade for Jake McCabe?


J. "Val" Edmondson, 74, died March 7, 1997, at Niobrara County Hospital in Lusk. Services were March 12 at Redwood Memorial Estates. Memorials are to Niobrara Senior Center.
He was born June 4, 1922, in Lusk to Mabel F. and William W. Edmondson. He married Gloria M. Castillo Dec. 24, 1961, in Denver. They lived in Casper for two years and then moved to Salt Lake City, Utah. He was raised in Lusk and graduated from Niobrara County High School. He retired from Hill AFB after 25 years of service. He enjoyed fishing, hunting and camping.
Survivors include his wife; sons William V. Edmondson of Dickinson, Texas and James C. Edmondson of Salt Lake City; daughter Carol Ann Peterson of Fort Collins, Colo.; stepson Robert J. Castillo of Salt Lake City; 10 grandchildren; and two great-grandchildren.


Tony Farrar-Hockley was arguably Britain's best-known soldier in the post-war era. Winning the MC, DSO and Bar he served in WW2 Greece, and Korea where he survived captivity and torture by the Chinese. His career culminated as a senior NATO commander. A military historian as well as a serving General, this biography by another General does Farrar-Hockley's full life and career more than justice.
This is the biography of the most distinguished field commander of modern times, who turned to scholarship and writing at an early stage of his career and pursued both professional military life and historical study in parallel. In later life he also took to broadcasting and commentating. Half his military life was spent abroad on operations and his career spanned the period from the Second World War, in which he served as a platoon and company commander, winning the MC in Greece and being mentioned in despatches, and then the campaign in Palestine. He fought in the Korean War, during which he was at the Imjin River – where he won his first DSO – and then spent three years as a prisoner of the Chinese during which he made six escape attempts, was beaten, starved and tortured. He then served in Cyprus, at Suez and in the intervention in Jordan. He commanded 3 Para in the Radfan, where he won his second DSO. He then served in Borneo and was later the first Commander Land Forces in Northern Ireland. He ended his military career as Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Northern Region. Understanding Farrar-Hockley the soldier is impossible without also understanding Farrar-Hockley the scholar; the reverse is also true. He was never a stranger to controversy – Margaret Thatcher valued his candid advice because, as she said to him, 'you tell me things I didn't know'; and he never walked away from a fight in his life. He was a man of redoubtable character and huge achievements, an inspirational leader and commander in peace and war, at every level.