MeDUSA committee meetings are held fortnightly, alternating between online meetings and in person meetings at the Geelong Clinical School. Any MeDUSA member is welcome to attend, and we encourage anyone interested to join in on our meetings.
The link for online meetings is goo.gl/N1mzEl.
For all meeting dates, check out the What's On page.
If you'd like to check out the agenda for meetings or review the minutes from previous meetings, check out this google drive folder - goo.gl/un4nfi.


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Home / News / Our Blog / A welcome mat, a front door key and a stable address
A welcome mat, a front door key and a stable address
28 Mar 2018 by Louise Winterburn
Over 100 people came together in Brighton on Tuesday 27 March in an inspirational event organised by Galvanise Brighton and Hove (GalvaniseBH). As part of the European End Street Homelessness Campaign, the event was an opportunity for the community to discuss how to find a home for everyone sleeping on the streets in their city.
Brighton and Hove have the second highest number of people sleeping on the streets in England and the number is increasing. The terrible weather of the last few months has seen communities across the UK working together to provide emergency shelter for homeless people, saving many lives. In Brighton they are building on this type of direct community action and are mobilising the community to get people off the streets and into homes permanently.
At the end of 2017, over 180 people volunteered to take part in a Connections Week. Working through the night they interviewed people who were sleeping on the streets about their lives and what they needed.
The results of these interviews have been pulled together in a summary report launched at the event. It provides a stark reminder of the challenges ahead and the desperate need for GalvaniseBH and the people of Brighton and Hove to work together.
The survey found:
65% of people had been homeless for over a year
44% of those surveyed under 30 were in care as a child
51% said they had been told by a health professional that they have a mental health problem or a behavioural issue
77% of women reported being attacked while sleeping
19% of people were in paid employment but forced to sleep on the streets
When asked what they were hoping for in the future, one person said, 'A welcome mat, a front door key, a stable address'.
After hearing the results of the survey, over 100 volunteers formed into working groups to start looking at possible solutions to start making a difference as soon as possible. These included assessment centres with emergency short-term accommodation, rolling out Housing First, "Living Rent" accommodation, utilising empty homes, modular housing and community-led housing. Determined to give a voice to people with experience of homelessness, GalvaniseBH are looking for ways to meaningfully co-produce solutions and will now set up a number of Ambition and Development Groups to continue doing this.
A more detailed report is due later in the year but GalvaniseBH is determined to keep making progress on their goal to ensure no-one is sleeping rough in Brighton by 2020. Based on their work so far they are a step closer to finding homes for people that are so desperately needed.
Follow GalvaniseBH on Twitter @GalvaniseBH or search the hashtag #GalvaniseBH.
Find out more about the wider European End Street Homelessness Campaign here.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Trade Knowledge Exchange > Commentary > EU-UK: The Chips Are Down
EU-UK: The Chips Are Down
EU-UK Partnerships
Introduction – a dialogue of opposites
During the last week of February the European Union Council of Ministers formally endorsed the draft mandate which the European Commission had submitted, setting out objectives for a new long-term relationship with the United Kingdom. A few days later the UK Government published a White Paper specifying its own objectives for this negotiation, entitled The Future Relationship with the EU – The UK's Approach to Negotiations.
Both sides aim for a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). There are however wide differences as to what this "Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement" (CFTA), as the UK side terms it, should cover. The EU side would prefer something like an association agreement. Under such an agreement, there would be a large measure of regulatory convergence and an overarching framework for settlement of disputes. Inevitably the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice would be influential in settling these disputes. The EU justifies its on the grounds that the UK is not a trade partner like any other. Instead it is deeply entwined, even post-Brexit, with the rest of Europe by geographical proximity, history, and ethnicity; and the enormous volume of common legislation that grew up during the period of UK membership, in many cases through the influence of the UK.
The UK for its part appears to favour something that seems a hybrid of the disparate (and cumbersome) set of bilateral sectoral agreements which the EU has with Switzerland; and the recently-negotiated EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The latter covers both goods and services, though the additional level of actual liberalisation it yields relative to what both parties apply already on a non-discriminatory basis is limited.
Beyind that, the key point of divergence is that the EU demands that there should be a "level playing field" of regulation and economic behaviour between the UK and its nearest European neighbours, so as to avoid either side seizing an unfair advantage through reduced standards or lax competition policy. For its part, the UK flatly rejects a priori any formal mechanism that would require and alignment of its laws with those of the EU as well as any jurisdiction in the UK on the part of the European Court of Justice or any other EU institution.
The two documents nevertheless each list many areas where the EU's and the UK's objectives are essentially similar, though they may be differently expressed. There are points of apparent convergence, particularly on technical issues where both sides see reaching workable agreements is essential and there should be, scope for practical settlements. That, of course, would require both sides and especially the UK to be more open to pragmatic compromise than at present. For example, for obvious economic reasons the UK wants to retain its current intra-EU position on road transport. And both sides recognise that in addition to the proposed FTA, whatever form that takes, it will be necessary to negotiate special sectoral or topic agreements for wider issues such as fisheries, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, security, transport and energy supply.
The EU mandate recognises, implicitly, that the time window of no more than nine months for negotiating a comprehensive package of agreements during 2020 is impracticably short. (And this now takes no account of possible wholesale disruption of dealings between the UK and EU authorities resulting from the current international crisis over the Covid-19 virus.)
Under the terms of the UK Withdrawal Agreement it would be possible to extend negotiations beyond the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020 for one single period of either one or two years (but not both), provided that consensus on the need for such extension was reached by 30 June 2020. Additionally, the EU mandate now expresses willingness to go on negotiating on matters of major mutual interest after the end of the transition, although the legal basis on which this might be done is not spelt out. UK Ministers flatly rule out further extension of negotiations on any basis.
Such fundamental differences can potentially derail the negotiations and, in the worst case, bring about on 31 December the much-feared "No Deal" outcome. As from 1 January 2021 the UK and the EU would then trade together with no preferential terms between them and subject to basic World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, as is currently the case of EU trade with the United States and Australia. Indeed the White Paper states bluntly that unless "the broad outline of an agreement [is] clear" by June, and is "capable of being rapidly finalised by September", the UK will be ready to consider walking away from the negotiations.
Inescapable facts
Meanwhile it should be obvious that whether or not a FTA can be agreed between the parties, and regardless of whatever domestic regulatory standards the UK Government chooses apply after the end of the transition period, any UK business which seeks from then on to market goods or provide services in the EU Single Market will have to comply with every last requirement of applicable standards and regulations in that market.
European Union mandate – basic approach
In the early months before and after the UK Referendum in 2016 there was loose talk among leading proponents of Brexit predicting that the UK would be able to leave the EU and its common trade policy while retaining most of the advantages of membership – the so-called "cake" policy. In a sense the EU mandate takes its starting point from a position not unlike that. In setting out the EU's practical conditions for a bilateral FTA it analyses areas where the UK in its trade with the EU could retain the substance of free trade in goods and at least some Single Market principles. This would however require the two sides to observe common regulatory standards, whether through agreed joint systems or on the basis of consultation and cooperation between autonomous partners.
After recalling the context of the original Brexit negotiations and the Withdrawal Agreement, which came into force on January 31 2020, the EU mandate defines the aim of the negotiations as
"to establish a new partnership between the Union, and Euratom where relevant, and the United Kingdom that is comprehensive and covers the areas of interest outlined in the [joint] Political Declaration: trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, foreign policy, security and defence and thematic areas of cooperation. The envisaged partnership should form a coherent structure and be embedded in an overall governance framework."
As already noted, the mandate demands a "level playing field", which must protect the autonomy, institutions and financial interests of the Union and the integrity of its Single Market and customs union, including the indivisibility of the "four freedoms" (free movement of goods, services, capital and labour). The "level playing field" principle recurs throughout the text of the mandate. As regards the UK, the mandate bluntly declares that the UK as a
"non-member of the Union, that is not subject to the same obligations as a member, cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member."
Having recalled core values and rights shared between the parties, including a high level of personal data protection, the EU mandate moves on to specific areas of joint interest including terms for UK participation in EU and Euratom programmes. Its fundamental proposal is for an ambitious and balanced economic partnership based on a comprehensive FTA consistent with all the provisions of the WTO, and on the principle of sustainable development. Both parties would operate their own standards of protection for legitimate public services and such matters as public health, education, environmental protection and cultural diversity, on the basis of customs and regulatory cooperation.
Basis of a bilateral FTA
The EU mandate sets out detailed technical proposals for the FTA covering goods, and for associated customs cooperation and trade facilitation measures. There are less detailed proposals for liberalising bilateral trade and investment in services, in such areas as professional and business services, telecommunications, courier and postal services, distribution, environmental services, financial services and transport.
The mandate then turns to regulatory aspects, particularly in the field of product and health standards and measures to ensure that such regulation does not erect barriers to trade. Emphasis is laid on the UK's and the EU's common membership of the WTO and adherence to its basic standards and requirements; though the ambition of both sides should be to do better than WTO baselines wherever possible in areas such as protection of intellectual property (IP) and public procurement rules.
Priority trade topics
Other specific trade-related topics or sectors for which separate or supporting agreements should be negotiated are then listed in sequence, specifically:
Mobility of persons;
Transport (Aviation, including air safety; Road haulage; and Rail (specific issues regarding the Channel Tunnel);
Energy and raw materials (Electricity and Gas; Civil nuclear);
Fisheries (Management of and access to shared fish stocks; Sustainability);
"Level playing field" (Open and fair competition, requiring detailed provisions on Competition policy and enforcement; State-owned enterprises and subsidies; Taxation; Labour and social protection; Environmental protection and climate change.
The partnership agreement should include general exceptions, such as already exist in the WTO Agreements and the EU Treaties, permitting the parties to derogate from specific obligations in matters of particular national interest and urgency such as national security, balance of payments protection, prudential supervision and taxation.
Overarching issues of mutual concern
At this point the EU mandate moves on to tackle some of the most profound and complex policy and practical issues affecting both parties, namely:
Security, including global security, prosperity and effective multilateralism;
Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Data exchange; Operational cooperation between law enforcement authorities and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; Provisions against money laundering and terrorism financing);
Foreign policy, security and defence (Close and lasting "cooperation on external action to protect citizens from external threats, prevent conflicts, strengthen international peace and security and address the root causes of global challenges"; Alignment of policy on sanctions; UK participation, by invitation, in EU foreign missions; collaborative development of defence capabilities; Intelligence exchanges; aerospace cooperation; cooperation on international development policies).
Human rights and cooperation
The autonomy of the UK and EU partners to make and pursue their own independent policies would be preserved. However under the specific head of law enforcement and judicial cooperation the mandate takes a very strong, indeed uncompromising, line on respect for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It states that if the UK were to denounce the ECHR, or to abrogate domestic UK law that permits individuals to invoke ECHR rights before the UK courts, law enforcement cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the parties would automatically be terminated.
Under the heading of Thematic cooperation the mandate proposes ongoing dialogue and cooperation between the parties, including cooperation with Europol, on cyber security and joint action to tackle what it calls "irregular migration", i.e. unforeseen migratory and refugee flows.
The final pages cover EU proposals on institutional and administrative arrangements including the legal structure and governance of the partnership (based on a standing joint committee), as well as provision for action in the case of breaches by either side and for settlement of disputes, including recourse to independent arbitration. Provision would be made for exceptional safeguards which either side could invoke "in case of circumstances of significant economic, societal or environmental difficulties".
Repeatedly throughout the 24 closely-printed pages of the EU mandate there are references to the need for policy and regulatory cooperation, as a basis for enabling the UK to retain some degree of the EU market access and benefits which it enjoyed as a member state. Inevitably the EU side envisages such cooperation on the basis of its own regulatory structures and procedures.
The EU mandate is binding on negotiators
The terms of this mandate have been hammered out over many months of consultations within the European Commission and both informally and formally between the Commission and the 27 current member states, against the backdrop of the tortuous negotiations with the UK which led up to the Withdrawal Agreement and its associated Political Declaration. The mandate is an outline or framework – in some aspects very detailed – for the proposed partnership with the UK. While it obviously leaves room for negotiation on specific issues, it is binding on the EU's negotiators (led by Michel Barnier for the Commission) to achieve an outcome consistent with the mandate. EU negotiators do not have flexibility to strike pragmatic deals outside that framework, however politically desirable such deals might look.
Confidentiality and transparency
In the early stages of the Brexit negotiations Theresa May's government, in thrall to the right wing of the Conservative Party, made the fundamental mistake of trying to negotiate in secret an agreement whose terms could be revealed to Parliament and the public once they were done and dusted. That immediately raised suspicion on all sides as to what Ministers were up to. By contrast the EU side, representing the remaining 27 member states as well as the EU institutions, knew that with so many participants, and with the depth of political, media and civil society interest, nothing that passed across the negotiating table could be kept confidential. In any case the Treaties require the Commission to negotiate on international trade matters under supervision by representatives of the member states, to whom they must report regularly. The EU opted for transparency, reporting regularly and at all significant points what was going on, and frequently pushing the UK side onto the back foot.
UK Government White Paper on the future relationship to the EU: red lines renewed
The UK has tried not to make the same mistake in regard to the long-term negotiations. At the end of February 2020 it responded to the 24 closely-printed pages of the EU mandate with its own White Paper of comparable range and scope. The opening section, on the Overall Policy Framework, states bluntly that:
"the Government will not negotiate any arrangement in which the UK does not have control of its own laws and political life. That means that we will not agree to any obligations for our laws to be aligned with the EU's, or for the EU's institutions, including the Court of Justice, to have any jurisdiction in the UK."
Like the EU side, the UK proposes a FTA, in the form of the Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement referred to at the start of this article, based on the agreement which the EU recently negotiated with Canada, as well as on agreements with "other friendly countries". It says:
"The CFTA would be supplemented by a range of other international agreements covering, principally, fisheries, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, transport, and energy…. All these agreements should have their own appropriate and precedented [sic] governance arrangements, with no role for the Court of Justice."
In overall conception, structure and coverage the UK mandate is rather similar to the EU's. However the EU, conscious of the enormous task ahead for both parties and the short time available, expresses willingness to negotiate further after the end of the transition period if necessary. The UK as noted above demands that the "broad outline" of an agreement be clear by June 2020 and capable of being finalised by September, backing this up with the threat to walk away from negotiations and leave "No Deal" as the inevitable outcome.
UK priority trade issues for negotiation
Having thus severely limited the UK Government's room for negotiation, the White Paper turns to the Government's ambition for a CFTA, dealing in detail with matters including:
National treatment (treating imported goods the same as domestic production for tax and regulatory purposes) and market access (no tariffs or other restrictions on bilateral merchandise trade);
Rules of origin (essential in a FTA to determine what goods traded between the parties qualify for preferential treatment);
Trade remedies (action against dumping of goods at uneconomic prices and against government subsidies which distort trade);
Cooperation on standards and technical barriers to trade including sanitary and phytosanitary (animal and plant health) within the framework of established international agreements on these matters;
Customs and trade facilitation measures;
Cross-border trade in services, taking account of established WTO principles on non-discriminatory market access for service suppliers, national treatment, and presence in the market of foreign service suppliers;
Mutual investment protection;
Temporary entry and stay of UK and EU persons each other's markets for business purposes;
Avoidance of excessive regulation, together with best practice and transparency in regard to regulation which is adopted.
Interestingly this section makes no reference to public procurement, which is central to UK and EU economies, and which is governed by WTO rules to which both sides subscribe and might therefore be expected to re-endorse.
A nod towards services
The UK puts forward proposals, though with little supporting detail and in reality as no more than markers, for the treatment of various services. These include telecommunications; delivery and postal services; audio-visual services (excluded under the EU's mandate); financial services; digital; and international road transport. The little prominence afforded to financial services is surprising in the light of their crucial importance for the UK economy and the extent of public debate that has focused on the position of financial services in the post-Brexit economy.
Cooperation and good practice
The section on the proposed CFTA ends with a number of short paragraphs on trade-related topics which under the EU mandate fall under the heading of level playing field: mutual notification of government subsidies that may distort trade; competition policy and enforcement (alignment with the EU is ruled out); IP protection; good regulatory practice and regulatory cooperation; sustainable development; trade and labour; trade and environmental protection; and tax (though tax sovereignty of the partners should not be constrained "in any manner").
Broader areas of cooperation
Moving on from the CFTA, the UK White Paper sets out extensive proposals for "other" (i.e. accompanying, or parallel) agreements, also prioritised in the EU mandate, namely:
Fisheries;
Aviation (a Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement, or CATA, as well as a Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement, or BASA);
Energy (including electricity and gas trading, carbon pricing and climate change);
Mobility of labour and social security coordination;
UK participation in Union programmes including the PEACE PLUS programme in Northern Ireland;
Nuclear cooperation, to facilitate civil nuclear trade while maintaining the parties' commitments to non-proliferation;
Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including detailed provisions for data exchange and operational cooperation including between the UK and Europol, as well as between the UK and Eurojust, extradition and the transfer of prisoners between the UK and the EU;
Asylum and illegal migration; and
A Security of Information Agreement.
The UK has however stated its intention not to participate in future in the European Arrest Warrant.
The White Paper includes in its final Part 3 a postscript on "technical and other processes beyond the scope of the future relationship negotiations", including data adequacy (i.e. data protection standards); civil judicial cooperation within existing international agreements; and just four lines on equivalence between governments in financial services regulation.
While the UK proposals for a CFTA are worked out and stated in some detail, as are the accompanying proposals for a fisheries agreement, aviation, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation, many of the topics listed in the second half of the mandate are handled in a decidedly sketchy manner.
Common ground and underlying disagreements
The range and formulation of topics covered respectively in the EU mandate and the UK White Paper are unsurprisingly similar, given the common background of EU membership and the importance of these matters for both sides. All the important issues covered in the EU mandate are also covered in more or less detail in the UK White Paper, and vice-versa. The underlying approaches however are very different. The EU Commission had the easier task in drawing up its mandate, in that it was able to take a firm stance on the existing range of EU law and regulation and then search through the lists of sectors and topics to sort out areas where concessions could be made to the UK, in the interests of both sides, while maintaining the integrity of customs union and Single Market law. Generally the realisation of such concessions and cooperation would depend upon close consultation and on coordination of UK national regulation with that of the EU, with the Court of Justice of the EU in the background as the final arbiter on EU law, so that elements of ECJ jurisdiction would be bound to apply indirectly in the UK market.
The UK for its part expresses willingness at some points to consult with the EU on policy and regulatory matters, but as already noted it rejects any direct applicability of EU regulation or ECJ jurisdiction in the UK, thus apparently making impossible compromises or part-compromises of the sort at which the EU mandate hints. And because the UK is in the unprecedented position of dismantling a mature and integrated economic and legal relationship, and in the process inevitably creating new trade barriers, it still clearly has very little idea, beyond the proposals for a CFTA and on major issues for which legal and judicial cooperation is essential, of what it wants to replace existing arrangements. Hence the sketchy nature of many of the sectoral and topic proposals in the White Paper on which, by its own insistence, the UK side has to settle its policy stance and proposals and then negotiate solutions, all within little more than three months.
Uncertain outlook
The EU and UK sides agree on what the essential issues between them are, and in some cases they perceive these issues in the same way. There ought, by rational calculation, to be sufficient common grounds to find practical compromises that preserve the economic and constitutional rights and interests of both parties and contribute to the welfare of their populations. The question of whether such solutions can be made operational however collides, on the EU side, with the Union's absolute insistence on integrity of the Single Market and the indivisibility of the "four freedoms"; and on the UK side with the determination, while trading freely with EU partners, to achieve total constitutional and legal separation from the Union.
Nevertheless in a rational world it should be possible for the parties to agree on robust bilateral dispute settlement arrangements by establishing a joint system which could sidestep any question of direct EU jurisdiction in the UK
It was reported that the first round of negotiations between the parties, in the week of March 2, did not go well, with – one suspects – the parties talking past rather than to each other. Michel Barnier is reported to have spoken of grave difficulties. Such language is to be expected in the opening salvos of so tense and wide-ranging a negotiation. For any signs of positive progress we must wait for the various teams of expert subject negotiators, no doubt under intense pressure of time, to get to practical grips with the enormous task before them.
Michael Johnson was a senior official of the UK's former Department of Trade and Industry, where he worked on international commodity policy, UK bilateral commercial relations with developed country markets, and the UK's input to EU external trade policy. He is in demand as an independent consultant, and has advised governments of more than twenty developing or former Communist countries on trade policy formulation and on trade-related development projects.
Read more by Michael Johnson
Can a UK-EU free trade area preserve the benefits of the single market and the customs union in some sectors?
Services Trade in the UK: What is at Stake?
by Dr Ingo Borchert
Doing free trade agreements as if policy really matters
The "Canada model": is it a viable option?


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Wonder Woman 1984 (UHD Blu-ray) (4K)
Posted in: Disc Reviews by Gino Sassani on April 7th, 2021
2:39:1 Widescreen
Dolby: Atmos
Sci-Fi / Fantasy
"Welcome to the future. Life is good! But it can be better. And why shouldn't it be? All you need is to want it. Think about finally having everything you always wanted."
In 1917 Patty Jenkins teamed up with Israeli actress Gal Gadot to create one of the best comic book movies of all time. Wonder Woman had everything. It sported a really good lead actress surrounded by a really good supporting cast. It had a grand scope but still gave us characters at the core with wonderful chemistry and heart. We got plenty of action and huge set pieces without giving up anything in the trenches. It was easily the best superhero film of the decade and the best DC/Warner hero film since the 1978 Donner Superman movie. But the trouble here is that Jenkins already had an incredible formula going here but couldn't resist the temptation to want everything. There was a tremendously high level of expectations here, and as I've frequently opined: expectations kill. There are still a lot of the elements that made Wonder Woman so great here, but the film strays in ways that end up taking away from those great elements, and we end up with a very mediocre follow-up to a truly great film.
It's 1984, and in the 40 years since Steve Trevor (Pine) died and Diana Prince aka Wonder Woman (Gadot) has fallen into a functional funk in her life. She's a scientist at the Smithsonian, and she's adapted to the outside world quite well. But she goes through her life still feeling the sting of her loss. She's just now coming into her own as a superhero, and we get a look at her fighting crime around her. She functions quite well but surrounds herself with artifacts and mementos from the events of the first film. On the job one day she meets Barbara Minera (Wiig). She's new and a bit of a stumbling mess. The FBI has asked the Smithsonian to analyze an artifact from a heist Wonder Woman stopped at a local mall. It stumps them both, and Diana translates its inscription to reveal it was some kind of wishing device. She doesn't take that seriously and secretly makes a wish she never expects in a million years will come true. Barbara also makes a wish to be more like her confident friend Diana. Of course, both wishes are fulfilled. Steve Trevor shows up in another guy's body, and Barbara discovers she got far more than she expected when she asked to be like Diana.
We learn that the discovery of the artifact was engineered by a man named Max Lord (Pascal). He's been searching for it for a long time. He's a failed businessman and con artist who wants to be on top and is known for infomercials that promote having it all. The artifact is just what he wants. His wish is to actually become the artifact. Why limit yourself to one wish when you can have everybody's wishes? The new power allows him to have others make wishes for him and have them come true. Of course, he manipulates the wishes to stuff he wants and exacts the price that must be paid for every wish. Both Barbara and Diana learn they have paid prices for their wishes. Now Max Lord is going to use a secret government communication satellite system to get the entire world to wish with him. How can he be stopped? That's where the film kind of becomes a bad episode of Barney the Dinosaur. Everyone, including Diana, has to take back their wish. That's a bit too touchy-feely for such an action-packed superhero film.
The film's premise isn't an altogether terrible idea. Using a decade that's easily defined like the 80's offers the chance to do some creative things. The trouble is it's not terribly original right now. The X-Men have been doing historic decades for five films now, and the recent Captain Marvel took the action back to the 80's and did it also with a strong female hero, and they did it much more successfully. The 80's stuff gets pushed over the top so that instead of a nostalgic trip it becomes a Saturday Night Live skit from beginning to end. Jenkins just can't take the foot off the gas, and the film ends up looking more gimmick than solid movie. It was certainly a clever way to bring back Chris Pine and his Steve Trevor character. I'll give them that, no problem. It leads to some emotional beats that stand right up there with the original film. But it all gets diluted with the gimmicky 80's overload and the whole idea of fighting a villain by use of your wishes. The result is some powerful character moments, but an overall weaker film by a significant margin.
Gal Gadot continues to be the best part of everything that's good in this film. She doesn't let these new camp elements change her approach to the character. You can just tell she's giving her all every second she's on-screen. The film brings in some popular elements of the Wonder Woman mythology like the invisible jet and her ability to fly. These are going to stand out as great moments to fans of the character. Having comic writer Geoff Johns be a part of the script helps to maintain that comic atmosphere and deliver those wonderful splash pages and iconic moments. Kristen Wiig is a dynamic addition to the cast with a Cheetah character that has been both hero and villain in the DC comic book world. The actors share some terrific chemistry, and there's certainly room for the two of them to be paired again, most effectively on the same side next time. Pedro Pascal turns Max Lord into too much of a camp character. He's a great actor and delivers some good stuff here, but he's a bad fit, and it's a bad take on the character. You really just can't take him too seriously no matter how "powerful" he becomes. His character starts to wear on your nerves by the time it's all over.
The film has some tremendous stunts and f/x. I love that Jenkins wanted to do as much practical stuff as she could. There's a lot of wirework here, and it adds a bit more authenticity to the action scenes. There's still plenty of CG here; that can't be helped any more. But the film has a bit of an extra punch because of the time and effort to do things as much as they could in front of the camera.
One of the bright spots of the film almost didn't happen for a second time. The Amazon Games were originally going to be a part of the first film, but there just wasn't enough time both in the production budget and ultimate running time of the film. It was finally filmed for this movie, but Jenkins had to fight to keep it as the studio execs were not to keen on the idea. Fortunately it remains, and it's a really strong prologue to the movie. It also introduces us to young Lilly Aspell, who plays a young and precocious Diana. She's really a find. Her energy and passion are contagious, and you'll fall in love with this little hero rather quickly and hopelessly. I hope we see more of those moments in the future. Great job, kid.
Wonder Woman 84 is presented in its original aspect ratio of 2.39:1 and 1.90:1 all for the IMAX presentations. The changes are not distracting, and you won't even notice them. The ultra-high-definition image presentation is arrived at with an HEVC codec at an average of 50 mbps. The film was shot on 35mm and 70mm so maintains a native 4K source, and that makes a huge difference here. The 80's environments mean an extra vivid splash of color. The mall scene is just like a dish of brightly covered candies. The clothes and shop signs deliver a rainbow of colors, and they all look absolutely reference. It's like watching through a window at the mall. Colors are a bit warm and bleached in the externals which make for warmer colors against the colder sharp interiors. Details are amazing and the establishing shots are quite breathtaking. Textures really show up in the costumes and the environments. The big road warrior scenes are so sharp that the CG and wirework come through flawlessly and provide quite a punch. The HDR-enhanced contrast is working overtime, and black levels are deep, moody, and endless. The shadow definition is remarkable and shows up during some dark scenes were Cheetah and Diana fight underwater.
The Atmos track defaults to a really solid 7.1 mix. The surrounds are going to be busy throughout. A lot of the action takes place in complete 360 degree environments and immerses you solidly into the action. It's often aggressive and loud. The score doesn't have quite the same bite. I was disappointed that the Wonder Woman theme was more orchestral and didn't sport that killer electric cello it had used up until this point. I missed it and hope it returns again in the future. Subs reign throughout. The room will shake as trucks are sent flying wheels over hood. The remarkable thing in all of this is how well each of these sounds is separated enough to not only pick it all out but feel that it is placed properly along the way. There's a lot of attention to detail here, and it pays off. The dialog always cuts through, and you won't find a more balanced mix anywhere.
The Making Of Wonder Woman 1984 – Expanding The Wonder: (36:23) Plenty of behind-the-scenes footage can be found in this typical making-of feature. There's a lot of input from cast and crew, and it's a little more informative than usual and less love-fest. Highlights of the feature cover cast, set design, costumes, locations, stunts, and a beat-by-beat look at the big plot points.
Gal And Kristen – Friends Forever: (5:10) It's apparent that the two ladies got along well and became friends along the way. We get to hear them talk about the relationship, and there's plenty of examples of their playful silliness throughout the production.
Small But Mighty: (10:44) Meet Lilly who played young Diana. She's having the time of her life, and it's great to see her behind the scenes. There's some footage from her audition performance.
Scene Study: take a look at two of the action scenes a bit more closely: The Open Road (6:11) The Mall (5:03)
Gal & Kristy Having Fun: (1:12) More footage of the ladies having a blast set to a song they made up on the set.
Meet The Amazons: (21:28) Tiffany Smith hosts a virtual get-together of the women who played in the opening Amazon Games.
Black Gold Infomercial: (1:38) The entire ad from within the film.
Gag Reel: (6:26)
Wonder Woman 1984 Retro Remix: (1:40) It's a fake trailer for the film made in splashy 80's styles and set up a lot like the 70's television show.
There is no question that Patty Jenkins and company were up against a lot of barriers. The expectations from the first film make it almost impossible to meet, and sometimes that gives one extra freedom to just go for it, because chances are it's just not going to compare favorably. Then there was the pandemic that made the release schedule a nightmare, forcing the film to eventually street to weak box office and ultimately to live or die through streaming. None of that could have been foreseen or prepared for by anyone connected with the film. As the release date got pushed back, Jenkins succumbed to the temptation to "tweak" the film a little more. Haven't seen the earlier cut, so I can't say for sure if it improved or hurt the film, but I suspect it didn't improve it at all. There's no question that Jenkins has good instincts with this character, and I would certainly trust her with another go at the franchise. I hope she rolls it back and doesn't set out to compete with the first film. A film isn't better because it's bigger, faster, or stronger. It's better when the audience cares about what they see and can suspend their disbelief long enough to see a compelling story. We really do want to believe that a man … woman … can fly. You see, "Greatness isn't what you think it is."
Gino Sassani
Gino Sassani is a member of the Southeastern Film Critic's Association (SEFCA). He is a film and television critic based in Tampa, Florida. He's also the Senior Editor here at Upcomingdiscs. Gino started reviewing films in the early 1990's as a segment of his local television show Focus. He's an award-winning recording artist for Omega Records. Gino is currently working on his 8th album Merchants & Mercenaries. Gino took over Upcomingdiscs Dec 1, 2008. He works out of a home theater he calls The Reel World. Favorite films: The Godfather, The Godfather Part II, The Body Snatcher (Val Lewton film with Karloff and Lugosi, not the pod people film), Unforgiven, Gladiator, The Lion King, Jaws, Son Of Frankenstein, The Good, The Bad And The Ugly, and Monsters, Inc.
The Ten Commandments (UHD Blu-ray) (4K)	Victor and Valentino: Folk Art Foes


text:
Q: How to set default Python version in terminal on OS X 10.6.8? I just downloaded python 2.7 on my mac which runs OS X 10.6.8. The previous version of python installed was 2.6.
When I type python in the terminal it opens python version 2.6. I want it to open python 2.7
How do I make Python 2.7 open by default?

A: Because my account does not have the admin permission. I work around to set the config in ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc. Now I give a example that I assume you installed python 3.7. If you installed the other version, just change the version will be fine.

*

*~/.zshrc solution

  $ echo "alias python=/usr/local/bin/python3.7" >> ~/.zshrc
  $ source ~/.zshrc

*~/.bashrc solution

    $ echo "alias python=/usr/local/bin/python3.7" >> ~/.bashrc
    $ source ~/.bashrc

*check the result

    $ python --version
    # print result Python 3.7.1

The other solutions please refer to : https://opensource.com/article/19/5/python-3-default-mac

A: The python.org installers for Python 2.x on OS X by default modify shell profiles (for the standard shells like bash and csh) to add its framework bin directory to the front of your shell path.  Assuming you did not deselect the option during installation, there should now be the following in your .bash_profile file.
# Setting PATH for Python 2.7
# The orginal version is saved in .profile.pysave
PATH="/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/2.7/bin:${PATH}"
export PATH

But this profile is only executed by default when you launch a new terminal window; it won't apply to existing terminal sessions.  So make sure you open a new one and then try again.  If you are using a different shell, you may need to modify that shell's startup to do the equivalent.
The python.org installers for Python 3.x on OS X do not select the shell script modification option by default.  You can enable it at installation or you can later run the Update Shell  Profile.command file in the corresponding Python x.x folder in the Applications folder.  Or you can just manually edit the right profile.

A: The easier solution is to install it via MacPorts:
sudo port install python_select
port search python # Search for version you are looking for
sudo port install python27
sudo port select --set python python27

A: Add followings to your ~/.bash_profile
# Setting PATH for Python 2.7
PATH="/path/to/your/python2.7/bin:${PATH}"
export PATH

Save the file and reopen the terminal.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Q: R using special characters I have a column of strings (and NAs) in a dataset whose values look like:
"85min"  "1hr 19min"  "98min"  NA  "119min"  "105min"  NA  "1hr 30min"

I'm trying to change all of the values to numerics (in minutes), so that the values look like:
85  79  98  NA  119  105  NA  90

I tried to do it by pieces, first removing the "min," then removing the "hr," then changing "1" to "60," and then changing the middle spaces to plus signs, giving me:
"85"  "60+19"  "98"  NA  "119"  "105"  NA  "60+30"

I was hoping that by applying as.numeric, I would get the ones with "+" signs to turn into formulas, but instead they just resulted in NAs.
Is there any shorthand way of doing this kind of conversion? Many thanks in advance!

A: Yes,  you need parse and eval
strings = c("85",  "60+19",  "98",  NA,  "119",  "105",  NA,  "60+30")
sapply(parse(text=strings), eval)
[1]  85  79  98  NA 119 105  NA  90


Refil pack of 25 Cedis wipes that can be placed into your existing pocket dispenser.
Cedis wipes can be used to quickly and effectively clean and disinfect hearing instruments and earmolds. They are bactericidal, fungicidal and hepatovirucidal offering a quick and easy cleasing solution. The shrink-wrapped refil pack contains 25 wipes and can be placed into your existing pocket dispenser, meaning less waste.


Radar, the Open Door Bird Sanctuary's barred owl. Photo by Andy Seefeldt.
Stop by to enjoy snowshoeing, hiking or cross-country skiing on the sanctuary's trails (take your own equipment). The trails, about two miles long among all three, are fairly level and traverse various landscapes. Of course, you can meet some of the resident raptors during your visit, and there will be a bonfire and warm beverages.
Admission is $3 per person. For more information, visit opendoorbirdsanctuary.org.


Who can be a PADI Master Seal?
The PADI Seal Team provides a structured learning environment combined with enjoyable scuba activities. This stimulating program appeals to kids who crave adventure, seek the challenge of learning new skills and want to gain an appreciation for preserving the aquatic realm.
In this Aqua Mission you learn how to identify the aquatic animals in your local area. You'll also learn how some of these animals move or push themselves through the water. It's time to think – and act- like a fish.
Create ID Skills include identifying aquatic creatures and learning hand signals for each.
In this adventure-filled Aqua Mission, you learn what it takes to explore a sunken wreck. With the help of your instructor, you will learn safe and proper ways to look at sunken treasures.
Wreck skills include Buoyancy control, and how to measure and map and underwater wreck.
As you go through the Snap Shot Aqua Mission, you get to try underwater cameras and take pictures of your PADI Seal Team buddies. They also take pictures of you! Hang your dive pictures everywhere so your friends know you're a scuba diver!
Skills include learning to take pictures underwater.
Although you will be spending most of your time underwater as a PADI Seal, good snorkeling skills always come in handy. Here you will learn how to adjust snorkel equipment, snorkel and swim on the surface (no hands), blast and clear a snorkel, remove water from the mask, control direction while swimming.
Having the skills to find lost items underwater is important to a PADI Seal. In the Search and Recovery AquaMission, you'll learn how to search for lost items and bring them to surface.
Search & Recovery Skills include search for a lost item on the pool bottom, remove object from pool bottom using lift bag.
In this specialty AquaMission, you learn how to hover in the water like an Astronaut. You'll also play games that require you to float while catching an underwater toy. Can you make it through an underwater obstacle course? Inner Space skills include: Fin Pivots and hovering.
This is one of the best Aqua Missions yet! Whether you're diving in the pool at night or have the indoor lights off during the day, you'll find diving in the dark exciting and fun. You and your Seal Team buddies will go crazy over this dive.
In this AquaMission, you play the role of a scientist and practice how to search for and uncover the evil secrets of pollution. Knowing these skills will help you protect the environment above and below the water. Skills include underwater clean-up using search patterns.
It's always good to know where you're going. In AquaMission: Navigation Specialist, you use a compass underwater. You'll also learn to measure distance underwater.
Skills include: Underwater compass use and measuring distance by counting kick strokes.
Good divers always know what to do if a problem comes up while diving. In this fun-yet important – AquaMission, you'll learn how to help your fellow divers if they get in trouble.
Safety Skills: Pre-dive safety check, Cramp releases, self and buddy, throw a rescue line or float, surface buoyancy, self and buddy, rescue tow.
Includes PADI Seal Team crew pack with DVD.


text:
spotlight 2019: main menu
With contributions from
The Reflection Group
Choose a year
Table of Contents 2019
Reshaping governance for sustainability
Revisiting the hardware of sustainable development
Civil society reports show conflicting priorities and trade-offs in SDG implementation
Unveiling the hidden dimensions of poverty
CONSEA under threat: challenges for engagement in defense of real food and realization of rights
Democratic global governance: if it doesn't challenge power it isn't democratic
Human Rights in the 2030 Agenda: putting justice and accountability at the core of sustainable development governance
Club governance: Can the world still be run by gentlemen's agreements?
Feminist mobilization and multi-stakeholder governance structures: insights from WTO and G20 experiences
Preventing the next financial crisis while financing sustainable development: Three propositions
Sustainable development: First, do no harm
Governance of data and artificial intelligence
SDG 1 – Applying human rights standards for the governance of social protection will unleash its transformative potential
SDG 2 – Human rights risks of multi-stakeholder partnerships: the Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative
SDG 3 – Philanthrocapitalism in global health and nutrition: analysis and implications
SDG 4 – The ideological battle over SDG 4
SDG 5 – Advancing women's rights and strengthening global governance: the synergies
SDG 6 – Transforming institutional dynamics of power and governance to enable universal access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)
SDG 7 – Governing the path towards Sustainable Energy for All
SDG 8 – Reclaiming the socioeconomic transformation space for realizing SDG 8 in Africa
SDG 9 – Towards a new approach to public infrastructure provision
SDG 10 – The IMF's role in economic governance: conducive to reducing inequalities within and among countries?
SDG 11 – Tackling the challenges of global urbanization: flagship local government initiatives to meet the SDGs
SDG 12 – Initiatives to reduce the production and consumption of plastics
SDG 13 – Climate finance support to developing countries imperative for ambitious climate action
SDG 14 – Ocean governance for sustainability
SDG 15 – Cornerstones of the Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework
SDG 16 – Governing for gender equality and peace? Or perpetual violence and conflict?
SDG 17 – Can the Technology Facilitation Mechanism help deliver the SDGs in the era of rapid technological change?
Download this chapter in pdf format here.
Este capítulo en español.
By Kate Donald, CESR and Grazielle David, University of Campinas and Mahinour El-Badrawi, CESR
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays a central role in economic governance, both at the global and national levels. Although it presents itself as neutral economic arbiter, its approach is in fact deeply rooted in certain economic orthodoxies, many of which have proven incompatible with the achievement of sustainable development and the meaningful reduction of inequalities, particularly in the Global South. Drawing on the examples of Egypt and Brazil, we present concrete examples of how IMF governance – in its various forms – has led to deepening of social and economic inequalities, and threats to human rights enjoyment. This is in stark contrast to the image that the IMF is painting of itself as a champion of the SDGs.
Increasingly, the IMF is claiming a role for itself as a central player in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, and has positioned itself as an important actor on SDG 10 and tackling inequalities (economic and gender-based). However, in practice this commitment has been patchy at best, with little evidence of any meaningful policy realignment. 1 Are the IMF's actions really conducive to 'Transforming Our World', the official title of the Agenda?
SDG 10 is a particularly useful case study. It includes target 10.4 to reduce inequality through social protection, fiscal and wage policy; whereas the Fund's approaches to all three of these policy areas has been subject to robust criticism, precisely for exacerbating inequalities. 2 Indeed, despite a recent pivot towards defining income and gender inequality as 'macro-critical' issues, evidence gathered by Oxfam 3 and the Bretton Woods Project, 4 among others, suggests that the IMF's own policy recommendations and loan conditionality have in fact been – and continue to be – a major contributor to the inequality crisis. A recent academic study analyzing IMF loan conditionality from 1984 to 2014 finds that overall, "policy reforms mandated by the IMF increase income inequality in borrowing countries" and that "the IMF's recent attention to inequality neglects the multiple ways through which the organization's own policy advice has contributed to inequality in the developing world." 5 And this is not a matter of history: for example, in many countries the Fund persists in pushing austerity measures, which have taken a heavy human rights toll on the poorest and most disadvantaged groups, including women. 6 The IMF has also continued to emphasize regressive taxes like the value-added tax (VAT), rather than reining in and redistributing the incomes and wealth of the top 1 percent and multinational corporations.
Of course, SDG 10 also aims to tackle inequality between countries. There are a lot of policy areas where the IMF could be doing much more to reduce inequality between countries: preventing the 'race to the bottom' on corporate tax rates rather than advocating for cutting them, and deepening its efforts to prevent cross-border tax abuses. 7 Meanwhile, what are the IMF and its 'developed' country members doing to meet target 10.6 on enhanced representation for developing countries in decision-making in international financial institutions, on which they could have a very direct effect (for example through the upcoming quota review)?
The two main forms of governance through which the IMF exercises its power over countries' economic policy can be viewed as representing its 'soft power' and 'hard power' arms: the former via Article IV surveillance reports; and the latter via loan conditionality. This can be illustrated in the cases of Brazil and Egypt: Brazil is subject to routine IMF policy advice including Article IV surveillance over its economic and financial policies, albeit in the context of economic crisis; Egypt has an IMF loan, and is therefore subject to strict loan conditions.
Brazil – IMF providing cover for dangerously regressive economic policies 8
In 2016, the Brazilian government passed a constitutional amendment (EC 95) freezing real public spending for the next 20 years (the "Expenditure Ceiling Act"). This unprecedented measure will prevent any future elected governments without an absolute majority from determining the size of investments in human rights and sustainable development, even in the context of aging populations and increased financing needs. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights considered EC 95 "a radical measure, lacking in all nuance and compassion", 9 while the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights expressed grave concern about the impacts on poverty, inequality and discrimination. 10 Fiscal policy in Brazil had already become more regressive – and other austerity measures have been taken since the election of President Bolsonaro in 2018 - but the public spending freeze will keep these deficiencies in place for 20 years.
However, the IMF has expressed continued support for this draconian measure, 11 providing a cover of economic prudence for this nakedly political act, which has already had severe, detrimental human rights impacts. Regressions in health and education outcomes are already visible, while forecasts show that EC 95 will result in significant reductions in health and education investment over the next two decades. For example, if a similar limit had been imposed since 2003, the health budget in 2015 would have been 43 percent less. In 2017, the share of health and education spending within the federal budget already dropped 17 percent and 19 percent, respectively. 12 This is having immediate and concrete impacts: for example, in 2017, the Ministry of Health closed 314 public pharmacies, leaving only 53 in operation and 305 municipalities without access; despite the fact that more than a third of beneficiaries depended on these pharmacies for access to medicines. And for the future, a recent paper predicts an increase of 8.6 percent in the infant mortality rate by 2030 due to austerity. 13
Fiscal policy in Brazil was already ineffective at reducing inequalities, while a proposed pension reform would seriously erode the country's most redistributive policy. 14 The reform focuses on the general social pension, 15 which is the scheme that most reduces inequalities and benefits the larger and poorest part of the population. Also, the reform intends to untie the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC), the rural pension and the widow pension from the minimum wage. Women, older persons and persons with disabilities would be most affected by these changes and obliged to live on less than what is considered minimum income in Brazil. 16 Yet the IMF has promoted the reform as "much-needed", 17 ignoring likely effects on inequalities and human rights.
Austerity particularly threatens the rights of women (especially black women) in Brazil. In 2017, the government reduced funding for food security programmes – essential for low-income mothers in particular – by 55 percent. 18 Under the cover of austerity, it is also dismantling the institutions which promote gender equality, such as the Secretariat on Policies for Women, and slashing funds to women's rights programmes. For example, the number of specialized services offered to women suffering from violence has been reduced by 15 percent as a result of budget cuts – although cases of violence have been on the rise and Brazil has the world's fifth highest female homicide rate. 19 EC 95 therefore not only violates the human rights principles of non-retrogression and non-discrimination, it "endangers the lives of Brazilian women". 20
Despite this evidence, underlined repeatedly by civil society, the IMF 2018 Article IV report for Brazil doubles down on austerity, expressing concern only that it might not go far enough: "continued fiscal consolidation is of paramount importance." 21 The human and social impacts of these measures are not considered – let alone the related political consequences, in a country where an openly misogynistic, racist and authoritarian leader has just taken power and basic human and environmental rights are under threat. In contrast to SDG 10's commitments to eliminate discrimination and social exclusion, Bolsonaro's election has normalized openly discriminatory attitudes and actions, and even violence: data from "Call 180", a reporting channel for violence against women, shows that in the first two months of 2019, 17,836 notifications were received, an increase of 36.85 percent for the same period in 2018. 22
Moreover, despite IMF protestations to the contrary, there are alternatives to austerity. For example, according to the Brazilian Union of Tax Prosecutors, combating tax evasion could raise R$ 571.5 billion, almost four times the 2016 federal deficit. A reform of the personal income tax, taxing profits and dividends and adding a rate of 35 percent for very high incomes, would generate another R$ 72 billion in additional revenue, while reducing inequality by 4.31 percent. 23 And a broader tax reform redistributing the composition of the tax burden could not only enlarge fiscal space on the revenue side, but also reduce inequality. 24
Egypt – loan conditionalities exacerbating inequalities and rights deprivations
In November 2016, the executive board of the IMF approved an agreement with the government of Egypt for a US$ 12 billion loan. Intended to remedy the country's economic woes, the agreement purports to support the "government's home-grown comprehensive economic reform plan", which include cuts to public spending, shrinking the public wage bill, introducing a VAT, liberalizing the exchange rate and encouraging foreign investment. 25 The reforms have resulted in drastic cost-of-living increases, exacerbated by unprecedented spikes in inflation and currency fluctuations. Accompanied by the dismantling of the fuel subsidy system, these have had huge consequences on affordability of basic goods (including medicines and food), especially for those living in poverty. 26 Although official data on poverty have not been updated since 2015 (when the poverty rate rose to 27.8% of the population), the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) reports that an "unpublished government study estimates that poverty rates are likely to have increased in 2017 to 35 percent". 27
The IMF has classified the Egyptian reforms as successful, because of improvements in growth and employment. 28 However, experts argue that the growth experienced has not been inclusive or sustainable, but rather has been in capital-intensive industries, like tourism and the extractive industries. 29 Meanwhile, the overall fall in unemployment belies the deep inequities in how far Egyptians are able to enjoy their right to decent work, as revealed by the independent Egypt Social Progress Indicators. 30 For example, the youth unemployment rate is still over 25 percent, women's labor force participation is extremely low at 22.9 percent, and Egypt ranks 134 out of 140 countries on the 2017 Global Gender Wage Gap Index. 31 Moreover, between 2016 and 2017 wages decreased by 14 percent in real terms, and labour rights are increasingly criminalized or restricted.
Of particular relevance to SDG 10, economic inequality in Egypt is astoundingly high, and worsening. In 2017, Egypt's wealth Gini coefficient was the third highest in the world, reflecting an increase from previous years. The World Inequality Lab estimates that in 2015 the share of pre-tax national income was 19.1 percent for the richest 1 percent of the population and 48.5 percent for the richest 10 percent. 32 However, despite the IMF's professed commitment to tackling inequality, the reforms they have pushed and supported are far from redistributive.
Egypt already has one of the lowest social spending levels as a percentage of GDP compared to similar Lower Middle Income Countries. Its social spending is below half the average for the Middle East, which is 1 percent of GDP. 33 The central tax reform undertaken – at the urging of the IMF - has been the introduction of VAT (now at 14%, replacing the sales tax of 10%). Although some basic food products have been exempted, the VAT has added to the increasingly unaffordable cost of living for poor families. 34 Meanwhile, direct taxes (which are more progressive) make up only 44 percent of total tax revenue collected, and the effective corporate tax rate in Egypt is 7 percent lower than the statutory rate. Therefore, although Egypt certainly needs to improve its tax-to-GDP ratio, there are far more progressive vehicles for doing so than VAT (e.g., implementing the long-discussed capital gains tax, 35 a modernized and effective property tax, and a higher rate of income tax for the highest earners).
Although the IMF has claimed that social protection is a "cornerstone of the government's programme" and will help to cushion the blow of austerity, the Egypt Social Progress Indicators show that only 50 percent of those living under the poverty line receive support under the three main social protection programmes. Moreover, these programmes show extremely high exclusion errors, a symptom of the highly 'targeted' approach favoured by the IMF. Public health spending in Egypt is already remarkably low (even among peer lower middle income countries), at only 1.25 percent of GDP, and public expenditure on health has declined since 2015. 36 This produces severe inequities in access to health care, with households having to shoulder the large majority of health care spending from their own pockets, and women in particular facing major barriers to needed health care. It raises the question of how responsible it is for the IMF to push for further cuts to public spending, when the levels of unmet need and disparities in access to basic services are already so high.
Nevertheless, in January 2019 IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde praised the "substantial progress" of the Egyptian economic reform programme. 37 She urged the government to "press ahead" with the reforms, and a weak reference to the need for "measures to increase transparency and accountability" is the closest her statement gets to acknowledging the dire human rights situation in Egypt. She closed by "commend[ing] the patience and commitment of the Egyptian people to the reform process."
In fact, the reforms triggered significant social resistance and opposition, even before the loan agreement was reached, 38 which has only been controlled by the government's brutal crackdown on human rights defenders and other 'critics', including an economic researcher who questioned the government's economic policy. 39 These measures are of course in stark contrast to the government's human rights obligations and commitments under SDG 16. Instead of saluting the "patience" of the Egyptian people, the IMF would do better to interrogate the social impacts of its loan conditions on the Egyptian people and inequalities in the country. EIPR has assessed that of the 14 measures imposed by the IMF in Egypt from November 2017 to May 2018, eight measures have a negative impact on Egyptian people and socio-economic development more broadly. 40 Certainly, the evidence suggests that the IMF is not playing a positive role with regards to Egypt's chances of achieving SDG 10.
The larger question we should ask is: Is it really legitimate that the IMF should wield and exercise this degree of power over economic governance? It is essentially imposing a narrow, neoliberal and non-rights-compliant approach to economic policy (usually centered on 'fiscal consolidation' or austerity) across the globe; an approach which has been proven to have negative impacts on human rights, poverty eradication, and the reduction of inequality. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, recently expressed concern about the impacts that Argentina's latest agreement with the IMF was having on human rights, poverty and inequalities. 41 It raises the question: Should the IMF's advice and strictures have more weight than human rights obligations? Should the current system of global economic governance, which is dominated by the richest countries and has produced the inequality crisis that the SDGs are at least grappling with, be trusted to play a constructive role in the transformation we need?
The IMF can no longer maintain the pretense that human rights concerns are not within its purview, especially while their policies and practices have such far-reaching impacts on economic and social rights, and while they claim to be helping countries achieve the SDGs, which are explicitly underpinned by human rights law. Ultimately, what is most disappointing is that, rather than seizing a much-needed opportunity to question and realign its practices based on the SDGs, and especially the commitment to reduce inequality within and among countries, the IMF is instead using the SDGs to justify what it is already doing, no matter how incompatible this may be with equitable sustainable development. Given the IMF's profound influence over global macroeconomic governance - and therefore the enabling (or currently, disabling) environment for sustainable development - these contortions are deeply irresponsible.
Grazielle David is a PhD candidate in economic development at the University of Campinas (Unicamp) in Brazil, and advisor for the Latin American and Caribbean Fiscal Justice Network. Kate Donald is Director of the Human Rights in Economic and Social Policy programme at the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR). Mahinour El-Badrawi is the Egypt project coordinator in the Rights Claiming and Accountability programme at CESR.
1 See Donald (2019), from which parts of this chapter are adapted.
2 See e.g. Alston (2018) and Bretton Woods Project (2017).
3 See www.oxfam.org/en/research/great-expectations-imf-turning-words-action-inequality.
4 See www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Operationalising-Change.pdf.
5 Forster et al. (2019).
6 See e.g., CESR (2018) and Donald/Lusiani (2017).
7 As of April 2019, there are signs that the IMF may be moving towards a more positive position in this regard. See e.g., https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/03/08/Corporate-Taxation-in-the-Globa….
8 Much of this section - including statistics - is adapted and updated from CESR/INESC/Oxfam Brasil (2017).
9 Alston (2016).
10 IACHR (2018).
11 See e.g., www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/10/04/Brazil-Technical-Assistance-Report-Supporting-Impl… and https://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2017/10/by-fabian-bornhorst-and-teresa-curristine1-brazil-is-emerg….
12 INESC (2017a).
13 Rasella et al. (2018).
14 ANFIP/DIEESE (2017).
15 The other two schemes are the specific pension for public servants and the specific pension for the military.
16 See https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/02/20/bolsonaro-chega-ao-congresso-para-entregar-propost….
17 IMF (2018), p. 4.
18 INESC (2017b).
19 CESR/INESC/Oxfam Brasil (2017).
20 David (2018).
21 IMF (2018), press release, p. 2.
22 See https://odia.ig.com.br/rio-de-janeiro/2019/03/5625385-crimes-contra-mulheres-se-multiplicam-e-espec….
24 ANFIP/FENAFISCO/Plataforma Política Social (2018).
25 See www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/11/11/PR16501-Egypt-Executive-Board-Approves-12-billion-Extended-….
26 Corkery and El-Badrawi (2016).
27 EIPR (2018).
28 See www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/02/05/pr1933-egypt-imf-exec-board-completes-4th-review-extended-f….
30 See on this and the following indicators Egypt Social Progress Indicators (2018).
31 World Economic Forum (2017).
32 See Alvaredo/Assouad/Piketty (2018).
34 See Corkery/El-Badrawi (2016).
35 See www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-economy-tax/egypt-president-ratifies-capital-gains-tax-freeze-exte….
36 Egypt Social Progress Indicators (2018).
37 See https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/01/25/pr1918-statement-by-imf-managing-director-christine….
38 Egypt followed Article IV recommendations closely since at least 2013, in preparation for a potential loan. See e.g., https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/29/politicizing-egypts-economic-reform/.
39 See www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-arrest/author-of-critical-book-on-egypts-economy-arrested-sources-….
41 See www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23661&LangID=E.
Geneva: UNOHCHR.
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23215&LangID=E
Alston, Philip (2016): Brazil 20-year public expenditure cap will breach human rights, UN expert warns. Geneva: UNOHCHR.
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21006
Alvaredo, Facundo/Assouad, Lydia/Piketty, Thomas (2018): Measuring lnequality in the Middle East 1990-2016: The World's Most Unequal Region? World Inequality Lab, WID.\world Working Paper Series N° 2017/15.
http://wid.world/document/alvaredoassouadpiketty-middleeast-widworldwp201715/
ANFIP/DIEESE (2017): Previdência: reformar para excluir? Contribuição técnica ao debate sobre a reforma da previdência social brasileira. Brasília.
https://www.dieese.org.br/evento/2017/reformarParaExcluirCompleto.pdf
ANFIP/FENAFISCO/Plataforma Política Social (2018): Reforma Tributária Necessária: subsídios para um debate democrático. Brasília.
www.anfip.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Livro-2_COMPLETO-FINAL-SITE-1.pdf
Bretton Woods Project (2017): The IMF and Gender Equality: A Compendium of Feminist Macroeconomic Critiques. London.
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2017/09/imf-gender-equality-compendium-feminist-macroeconomic-critiques/
CESR (2018): Assessing Austerity: Monitoring the human rights impacts of fiscal consolidation. New York.
www.cesr.org/assessing-austerity-monitoring-human-rights-impacts-fiscal-consolidation
CESR/INESC/Oxfam Brazil (2017): Brazil Factsheet. Human rights in times of austerity.
www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/Brazil%20Austerity%20Factsheet%20English%20FINAL.pdf
Corkery, Allison/El-Badrawi, Mahinour (2016): Egypt's IMF deal: a huge price tag for human rights. London: Bretton Woods Project.
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2017/02/egypts-new-imf-deal-comes-huge-price-tag-human-rights/
David, Grazielle (2018): The impact of IMF-backed austerity on women's rights in Brazil. London: Bretton Woods Project.
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2018/03/impacts-imf-backed-austerity-womens-rights-brazil/
Donald, Kate (2019): Unsustainable? The IMF's approach to the Sustainable Development Goals. In: Bretton Woods Project Observer, Spring 2019, p. 5.
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/04/unsustainable-the-imfs-approach-to-the-sustainable-development-goals/
Donald, Kate/Lusiani, Nicholas (2017): The IMF, Gender Equality and Expenditure Policy.
www.cesr.org/imf-gender-equality-and-expenditure-policy
Egypt Social Progress Indicators (2018): ESPI Annual Report 2018.
www.progressegypt.org/files/espi_annual_report_2018.pdf
EIPR (2018): Eye on Debt III: The Third report on the IMF loan program for the third review period, November 2017-May 2018. Garden City.
https://eipr.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/eye_on_debt_iii.pdf
Forster, Timon et al. (2019): How structural adjustment programs affect inequality: A disaggregated analysis of IMF conditionality, 1980–2014. In: Social Science Research 80 (2019) pp 83–113.
www.tstubbs.net/uploads/4/0/5/3/40534697/forstertetal2019.pdf
IACHR (2018): Preliminary Observations of IACHR's In Loco Visit to Brazil. Rio de Janeiro.
www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2018/238OPeng.pdf
IMF (2018): Brazil. Staff report for the 2018 Article IV consultation. Washington, D.C.
www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2018/cr18253.ashx
INESC (2017a): Orcamento 2017 prova: teto de gastos achata despesas sociais e beneficia sistema financeiro. Brasília.
INESC (2017b): Utopia or dystopia? The SDGs in Brazil and the World. Brasília.
http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/2017-SR-BRAZIL-eng.pdf
Rasella, Davide et al. (2018): Child morbidity and mortality associated with alternative policy responses to the economic crisis in Brazil: A nationwide microsimulation study. PLOS Medicine 15(5): e1002570.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002570
World Economic Forum (2017): The Global Gender Gap Report 2017. Cologny/Geneva.
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf
Book traversal links for SDG 10 – The IMF's role in economic governance: conducive to reducing inequalities within and among countries?
‹ SDG 9 – Towards a new approach to public infrastructure provision
SDG 11 – Tackling the challenges of global urbanization: flagship local government initiatives to meet the SDGs ›
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9. I have 14 blazers of various colours, yet I wear black the most..
What would be your dream holiday? Somewhere with plenty to do :) Thailand, Australia, Peru.
What's your biggest fashion mistake? Hmm when I was younger I loved those cargo trousers with tassles on haha I looked like an octopus.
What piece of advice would you give your younger self? Foundation must not be worn alone.
1. What's your holy grail product?
2. what is your go to blog for beauty?
6. what's your beauty secret?
7. what's your regret clothing buy?
8. where would you like to travel if you could go anywhere?
11. what site do you look for clothes on most?


It's very difficult to type with one hand, so I'll make this brief. Pic was taken in Mub's loli dungeon. I needed to find the darkest place I could think of for this one. The noose was alredy there.
Comment on Sonic the Hedgehog's Mayhem: Deathcrush Cover.
Finally, someone who gets me.
@Vince_1990 I don't understand how being a satanist has anything to do with what happened, but alright.
Exec: 0.21828699 © 2004-2016 VGBoxArt.com. All rights reserved. Crafted in San Francisco by Reed.


We don't think he has changed his real posture. There is no way to know for sure, but it would appear probable there is some bad stuff brewing in the macro data that will be seen over the next 6 months.
We still believe Powell is the only adult in the room in Washington. No doubt he has to tread carefully with all the stupidity out there.
Stopping the Fed Fund rate rise is no surprise to us..
As you know, we said as the fourth quarter of 2018 unfolded, that we thought that would be the end of the interest rate rises because of a number of factors; Tariffs, Brexit, and Trump tax cuts, etc.
The Fed was reluctant to embrace that view for around three months, but now they are on board.
Does that mean stocks can do more than have a rebound?
For most investors the main point is to be in cash, that has been true since 1/26/18.
If you are traders the S&P today did get up into the top end of the current 2620 – 2720 trading range, in fact we tried to move early to do the final third of our shorts at 2712 but at this moment the market came up a little bit short at 2708. If it gets filled the original 2512 sell stop for 1/3 of the position will just be a little pudding on the cake if it is filled.


text:
Q: Can't create a function in bash without getting a command not found error I'm writing a bash script to edit a youtube video name and I wrote a sed function for it:
function longSed(){
         ins0=$1
         ins1=$( $ins0 | sed 's/and//g;s/ or//g;s/the//g;s/And//g;s/yet//g;s/the//g;s/so//g;s/ a//g;s/ A//g' )
         return $ins1
}

v2=longSed v1
echo "$v1 --> $v2"

But I keep receiving a command not found error on the second-to-last line no matter what I do. What am I missing here?
EDIT : This is the entire script:
#!/bin/bash

v0=$(youtube-dl --skip-download --get-title --no-warnings $1 | sed 2d )
v1=$(youtube-dl --skip-download --get-title --no-warnings $1 | sed 2d | tr -dc '[:alnum:]\n\r ' | head -c 64 )

function longSed(){
         ins0=$1
         ins1=$( $ins0 | sed 's/and//g;s/ or//g;s/the//g;s/And//g;s/yet//g;s/the//g;s/so//g;s/ a//g;s/ A//g' )
         return $ins1
}

v2=$(longSed v1)
echo "$v0 --> $v2"

I probably shouldn't be using sed for an entire wordlist like that, but I don't want a separate wordlist file.


What I wore clubbing with my house mates and friends.
The reason this post is called mix match is partly because of the patterns which have gone together very well and the fact that I fake tanned my legs and the colour defiantly doesn't match the rest of my body, but it doesn't look too bad!! I'm sporting my new boots from office, the skirt is from Primark, the shirt/vest is from a charity shop and the belt is from the Topshop sale! I was concerned that someone would spill a drink on me and all the instant tan would just run off, but I was lucky and It was still on my legs with no streaks by the end of the night!!
You're so pretty and I love your style!


text:
You Can Skip These Oscar-Nominated Movies
Nick Douglas
Jan 31, 2019, 10:30am
I just didn't want to take another look at you. (Screenshot: Warner Bros. Pictures)
You haven't seen Bohemian Rhapsody!? That's fine. The Lifehacker staff gathered our collective 2018 movie-watching experience, and named the Oscar-nominated movies that you can safely skip — including ones we ourselves did not even watch. You can actually safely skip any movie, ever, that's how entertainment works. But you can especially skip these!
I am pleased to relieve you of any compulsion you felt to see A Star Is Born. The people who tell you it's amazing are being manipulated by gauzy lighting and melodramatic music. The characters and story are thin. Bradley Cooper has about three lines and they are all inaudible. Lady Gaga can sing but you already knew that.
It's a humdrum love story that feels dated, of another time, out of touch with the complex, layered storytelling and rich characterizations of, say, Black KkKlansman or Can You Ever Forgive Me? More like A Star Is Bored and that star is me, and not you, because you're not going to see this schmaltzy flick.
- Melissa Kirsch, Editor-in-Chief
After watching BlacKkKlansman, I figured a lot of flaws — the mundane dialogue, the awkward arc, the weird motivations that drove the main characters to rookie mistakes, the bad guys who are suddenly good guys and then suddenly bad guys again — must have come out of sticking close to the real-life source material. And then I read director Boots Riley's essay on how much this story was whitewashed to make racist cops look better.
The real cops had been just as hostile toward black civil rights groups as they had toward the KKK. There wasn't really a story here worth telling. Know what's worth telling? Riley's Sorry to Bother You, probably the most culturally important movie of 2018, which has zero Oscar nominations.
- Nick Douglas, Staff Writer
Isle of Dogs is not bad. It's just not as good as hipster god/fashion icon Wes Anderson's other animal-based claymation wonderland, Fantastic Mr. Fox. Whereas Mr. Fox had all the right stars (Streep! Clooney!), Isle of Dogs is so overstuffed with Anderson's go-to players that you'll be googling who's who on your phone most of the time (oh, that's F. Murray Abraham's voice?).
Now this isn't to say that I dislike Wes Anderson movies — in fact I love them! — this just isn't his best one, and it's not even his best animated one. When all is said and done, this will be a footnote in Anderson's canon, taking a backseat to Grand Budapest Hotel, Moonrise Kingdom, and Royal Tenenbaums.
- Joel Kahn, Senior Video Producer
Green Book is a movie ostensibly about race relations that resulted in the white actor being nominated for Best Actor and the black actor being nominated for Best Supporting Actor at the Oscars. That tells you a lot about the substance of this movie, and if you watched the Golden Globes, then you know that the white director thinks racism can be "solved" if people would just talk and get to know one another a little better (he also apparently thinks it's funny to surprise people by taking his dick out on set).
That mentality has no basis in reality, but it is one Hollywood loves. In fact, it loves it so much that I'm sure we'll be treated to a similar movie in a few months — so if you miss this one, you won't really be missing anything (except a movie about race relations where the white lead thinks it's OK to say the N word in real life). Mahershala deserves more.
- Alicia Adamczyk, Personal Finance Writer
I would say skip VICE because it was very annoying to watch. The pacing and the tone were both all over the place. Sometimes I felt like I was watching an overly clever powerpoint presentation. If you're watching because you like seeing Christian Bale act, see any other Christian Bale movie. If you like seeing him and Amy Adams interact, watch American Hustle or something. I don't know. I'm not good at writing about movies.
- Claire Lower, Food & Beverage Editor
I have not seen Bohemian Rhapsody, but am comfortable saying that unless you absolutely adore Queen and are hankering for as much Queen content as possible, you don't need to see it. Our brilliant editor-in-chief Melissa pointed out recently that actual concert footage or a documentary is always more satisfying than a biopic, and this is a rule I plan to live by moving forward.
- Virginia K. Smith, Managing Editor
And now it's your turn: tell us, are we legally required to watch First Man, The Favourite, and Ralph Breaks the Internet?
dingaling @dingaling
I've seen all of these except Bohemian Rhapsody and agree wholeheartedly. Nailed it.
And yes, poor old Wes Anderson, Fantastic Mr. Fox was always going to be hard (animation) act to follow!
Joshua Chapman Guest
Yeh Spike Lee, directed BlacKkKlansman, not Boots Riley, so real good research there...
Chris Jager @Chris Jager
And then I read director Boots Riley's essay on how much this story was whitewashed to make racist cops look better.
This sentence is just listing Riley's profession - it's not saying he directed BlacKkKlansman. Also, context: why would the director trash his own movie? lol
Sylvan Nest @sylvannest
Feb 1, 2019, 10:45am
To be fair, reading through that paragraph, it does incorrectly associate Boots Riley to be the director of Blackkklansman, based on the way most other people will introduce a person into a story. Yes, he may be a director, but its in the context in which you introduce his name that forms the association. The fact that he wasn't set up as "fellow director" or "Boots Riley, director of Sorry To Bother You..." but instead was just listed as "director" with no previous mention of Spike Lee being the director of that film - it's easy to see how this was confusing to people who don't know otherwise.
Chris Jager @chrisjager
Feb 1, 2019, 2:40pm
To be fair, reading through that paragraph, it does incorrectly associate Boots Riley to be the director of Blackkklansman
I'm not arguing that the sentence is perfectly worded. But accusing the writer of not knowing who directed Blackkklansman is plainly nonsense - Riley is criticising the movie and the linked article mentions Spike Lee about ten times.
kaiminator @kaiminator
Feb 5, 2019, 7:51am
"I haven't seen this movie, and you really shouldn't either. You can trust me cuz I'm a movie reviewer journalist and I know what I'm saying."
You would really post someone's opinion about something they haven't seen? What a joke!


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