A national media project that invites people from all walks of life to write and speak aloud brief essays describing the core values that guide their lives.
This I Believe is a national media project that invites people from all walks of life to write and speak aloud brief essays describing the core values that guide their lives. The series creates a unique space in the media today: a space for truth without accusation, patriotism without political spin, and faith beyond religious dogma.
Acclaimed writer Amy Tan believes in ghosts and the messages of joy, love and peace they bring her.
Luis Urrea believes he is a better writer and better person when he's open to the world around him.
Tired of chasing personal prosperity, Eve Birch now believes in an American dream of shared success.
By dancing around the world, Internet video star Matt Harding believes he's helping to unite people.
Environmental activist and White House advisor Van Jones believes in making his late father proud.
Retired Army Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré believes hard work can build character and promote freedom.
Even though we tend to focus on our differences, Sheri White believes there is much that unites us.
From her village in Nepal, Chameli Waiba believes letters and words have the power to changes lives.
Kendra Jones, an English teacher in Alabama, believes in toughness, steeliness and even meanness.
As a doctor and patient, Alicia Conill has learned that listening is an important part of healing.
Texas student Alaa El-Saad believes in wearing a hijab, a religious head covering for Muslim women.
Seven-year old Tarak McLain of Texas shares the 30 things he believes. Number one: life is good.
Jim Haynes believes in bringing people together—even total strangers—over Sunday dinner in his home.
Farmer Gina Parosa believes in setting good boundaries, and being flexible enough to change them.
Environmental activist Majora Carter believes in making the old neighborhood a better place to live.
Paul Farmer believes heath care is a human right-and he's devoted his life to making that a reality.


Explore our Black Grenson Shoes collection at Northern Threads, Shop for luxury men's footwear with a contemporary twist. Their boots come in a range of leathers or suede, providing a classic addition to any outfit. You might want to check out our selection of Clarks Originals, which share similar qualities with this collection.
Orders over £75 will receive free delivery and we are also offering new customers 10% discount off the total of their first order. If you have any queries about our current offers, please visit our FAQ page or fill our enquiry form today.
Here at Northern Threads we are confident that you will find everything you're looking for on our site, however if you do require further assistance, feel free to call on 0191 454 7358 to discuss our Black Grenson Shoes in more detail.


text:
Berlin Wall 30
Dynamics of Air
Bicultural Urbanite
Sustainably Chic
Kino In Oz
Urban Subcultures
Berlinale Bloggers 2019
International Coproduction Fund
Translation Program
Women at the Berlinale Disappointingly few female directors
After all, the International Jury has a strong presence of women | © Berlinale
Only two of the 21 competition entries of the Berlinale are from female directors. This stands in contrast to the political ambition of the festival.
The 66th Berlinale 2016 started with disappointingly few competition entries from female directors – only two of the 21 submissions. The jury consists of four women and three men. As we have all been well aware since the 2015 Oscars at the latest, Meryl Streep – who heads the panel of judges – is a committed feminist. Meryl Streep appears optimistic: "I am very committed to equality and inclusion of people of all genders, races, ethnicities, religions. There should be inclusion, and this jury is evidence that at least women are included and impact dominates this jury. So I think that the Berlinale is ahead of the game."
Exklusion Of Women Not An Issue
I am unable to share her conclusion that the festival is ahead of the game in terms of gender parity, however. At the opening press conference, Dieter Kosslick stressed the following point: "In my opinion it is not only cinema but culture in general that have a responsibility in our society." This promising statement was followed by references to politically mismanaged countries.
As was the case in the debate about the events that took place at Cologne's main train station on New Year's Eve 2015, no further mention was made of gender discrimination at the local level, culture and policy in far-off countries being criticized instead. The exclusion of women from the film and culture industry: simply not an issue. That one of Europe's major film festivals is screening less than two percent female contributions in the most influential section does not appear to be important enough for this self-declared "political festival". That said, compared to the film festival in Cannes, France's largest film festival, the Berlinale is in fact very progressive given that Cannes showed 22 films by 22 men in last year's competition.
Of 62.5 million euros in film funding, six million went to female directors
A spontaneous protest reaction such as that which changed France's leading comic industry event – the Angoulême festival – appears unthinkable at the present time in the film industry. At least ten of the 30 illustrators refused their nominations in 2015 in favour of entries by female illustrators. The film sector's political responsibility seems to be more concerned with preserving particular role models and power distribution criteria, one of the latter being money.
Of the 62.5 million euros in funding which the German Federal Film Fund made available for cinema films in 2013, just short of six million went to female directors and somewhat more than 56.5 million to male directors.
Yet women push themselves to their limits and thus succeed in realizing their visions even on smaller budgets. This is reflected at the Berlinale, where women account for a total of 24 percent of the entries. Women directed 112 of the 434 submissions in total. I am now keen to find out how many women I will find in front of the camera in my list of films, and will start this afternoon with Maher Abi Samra's film Makhdoumin, a Norwegian-Lebanese co-production with United Arab Emirate participation.
Translation: Chris Cave
Copyright: Goethe-Institut Norwegen

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Whether it is the turquoise jewellery worn by the Navajo Indians or the opulence and grandeur of pieces made by master craftsman in Italy, each has very distinct stories to tell.
My handcrafted pieces are purposely designed with this in mind. I love a piece to look handmade, be unique, organic and not too measured or perfect. Whilst I design within a theme I look to lose myself in a moment of passion in my studios in Brisbane and Noosa where I can disappear for days. It is why I keep my studio and design separate from the Stone And Metal Gallery as they are two halves of a whole.
I opened up the gallery for these stories to come to life and named it Stone And Metal to highlight the rawness of the jewellery, the stone and the metal, bringing it back to the earth and reminding us of its beauty. There is so much talent in Australia that I wanted to have a place where real artists could shine alongside talented craftsman from around the globe and share their vision of adornment.
Every quarter we have a complete refresh of the gallery so Stone And Metal is always evolving to create a treasure trove of wonder for our customers to come and view incredible jewels. Even the gallery itself has been designed with this in mind. The slab of green onyx in the counter from Pakistan, the polished concrete floors and stainless steel fittings against the backdrop of the refined chandeliers – earthy and raw. I wanted our customers to feel the experience when they came inside, create a connection with their piece and weave that into their own story. As we always say, although our shelves are filled with precious pieces we are not a museum, we are a dress up shop. So come in and play and you might just unearth your treasure.
Read more about Samantha Anderson and the Stone and Metal Gallery here.


text:
Economic Recovery Has Not Reduced Pension Debt for Many States
Disparity grows between well-funded and financially strained pension systems
By: Greg Mennis & David Draine Topics: Fiscal & Economic Policy, Retirement & U.S. State Policy Projects: Public Sector Retirement Systems Read time:
Every state pension system experienced investment losses during the 2007-09 Great Recession, but not every state has rebounded equally in the recovery, new research by The Pew Charitable Trusts shows. In fact, the disparity between well-funded public pension systems and those that are fiscally strained has never been greater.
For example, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin had, on average, 97 percent of the assets needed to fully fund their pension liabilities in 2007 and remained at 95 percent funded or higher in 2017. Conversely, the three states with the lowest funded ratios—Illinois, Kentucky, and New Jersey—saw a drop from 69 percent funded, on average, in 2007, to 36 percent funded in 2017.
Ultimately, policy choices drive differences in state pension funding levels. Well-funded states successfully coped with the adverse effects of the recession by consistently making their actuarially determined contributions in good times and bad. These states also follow risk management policies that automatically increase contributions or lower benefits in response to market downturns. As a result, their retirement systems were nearly fully funded or had surplus funding in 2017, without facing sharp increases in taxpayer contributions.
Conversely, growing pension debt leads to higher costs, so states with poorly funded plans have had to substantially increase their employer contributions to try to pay it down. The three best performing states—South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin—had consistently low employer pension contribution rates over the past decade, averaging 8 percent of payroll in 2017. But the bottom three, Illinois, Kentucky, and New Jersey, had much more volatile employer contribution rates, averaging more than 31 percent of payroll by 2017. That's a 22- percentage point increase in average contribution rates for the three states since 2007, reducing resources available for other important public priorities.
Across the country, we see this same pattern of disparity in fiscal health with most state retirement systems reporting declining funded ratios. Just eight states were at least 90 percent funded in 2017, while 20 states were less than two-thirds funded. And although all states suffered declines in reported funded status over the five years between 2007 and 2012, states that were at least 90 percent funded by 2017 had seen their funding levels increase in the years following 2012. On the other hand, states that were less than two-thirds funded in 2017 reported further declines in financial position from 2013 to 2017 despite strong investment performance over that period.
The overall poor financial position of state pensions raises concerns about how some states would fare in a future recession. Well-funded state pension plans provide a roadmap for how states can sustainably fund retirement benefits without breaking the bank or their promises to state workers. Wisconsin, Tennessee, and South Dakota successfully weathered the recession for two reasons: They consistently made full actuarial contributions in good financial times and in bad, and they followed sound risk management policies that allowed them to navigate the volatility from investment and other risks.
Greg Mennis is a director and David Draine is a senior officer with The Pew Charitable Trusts' public sector retirement systems project.
Greg Mennis Director
Public Sector Retirement Systems
David Draine Senior Officer
Sarah Jones Officer, Communications 202.540.6568
Fiscal & Economic Policy Retirement U.S. State Policy
Greg Mennis David Draine
January 9, 2020 In National Parks Aging Roads Pose Growing Challenge for Managers
FDA Should Require Recall of Unsafe Tuna to Protect Consumers


text:
"Be Informed" theme for series of port meetings
Local News 13 Nov, 2019 Follow News
With the port referendum drawing closer, the government has organised a series of eight big public meetings for disseminating information and answering voters' questions about the proposed new cruise berthing facility, the first of which took place at Mary Miller Hall on 12 November.
Many points of concern were addressed as the evening unfolded, first with detailed presentations and later with a series of questions which attendees were invited to write down on pieces of paper before being read out to the panelists Premier, Hon Alden McLaughlin, Deputy Premier Hon. Moses Kirkconnell, and Michael Bayley representing the Verdant Isle Consortium.
MLA for Prospect Austin Harris spoke first of all: "I stood against this in 2017 but information changed my mind," he explained. "it is your right to challenge and question. Ask as many questions as you feel satisfy you," he said.
Premier Alden McLaughlin explained that the purpose of these meetings was to try to provide as much information as possible for voters in the run-up to the referendum on 19 December, while cautioning against letting strong feelings about the port divide the community. "This debate has taken on an ugly tone and we should all remember that we are all Caymanians or residents here who have strong feelings for this place…but we can disagree…without spewing hate at people who might have a different point of view," he said. "All of us campaigned on a platform for the need for cruise berthing so we believe we have a mandate…The referendum has been triggered and the Government supports that process. I hope what we have over the next few weeks we have a proper campaign on both sides."
Hon. Moses Kirkconnell explained that, while the government had taken significant steps to improve the airport facilities thereby attracting more stayover tourists, the peak time for these tourists was winter, whereas the peak for cruise ship tourists was the summer: "business is 365 days a year, so we looked at peaks and valleys, and how the valleys could raise up," he said. Mr. Kirkconnell also explained that because of the improvements to the airport, the constraints of the government's budget meant there could be no government funding for a much-needed enhancement to the port's cargo facilities, and that the new plan would solve that issue, because it would address growing cargo handling capabilities in the same deal with the consortium, as part of the "Design, build and finance," model.
Michael Bayley of Verdant Isle outlined some of the facts of the project: "there will be no financial risk to the Cayman Islands Government," he said, because the developers would be taking all the risk, and reimbursed through an arrivals fee. "At the end of the 25 years that asset (valued at 450 million dollars) becomes the property of Cayman, he said. "Control of the port remains with the people of the Cayman Islands through the Port Authority of the Cayman Islands."
A strong theme throughout the presentations was that the key players had taken concerns relating to environmental degradation very seriously, and had changed the initial plan by reducing the project's "footprint," (in this case meaning the undersea area covered) by 30 percent and also by the use of concrete pillars under the walkway, which would allow for the free movement of sea currents and marine life. There had also been a change of plan from hydraulic dredging which would cause a high degree of turbidity, to mechanical dredging which it was claimed, would keep turbidity to a minimum. An expert in coral replanting, Dr. Vaughn, had been engaged and he would help oversee the project to not only move corals away from the danger area, but plant many thousands of micro-corals, using a pioneering technique he had developed. During the question and answer session, one of the questions, addressed to Mr. Bayley, was: "what will happen if we do not build a pier?" to which Mr. Bayley replied that the super-large ships such as those of the Oasis class would not be able to come to Cayman.
Another question was: "How many jobs will be lost by not tendering?" to which Mr. Bayley replied that the cruise ship companies would work with the tenders to produce a "Soft landing," and that tendering would not be completely eliminated. There is also the opportunity to convert their business into other types of business, he explained.


text:
Biden Is Failing on His Campaign Promise to End Private Immigration Detention
Posted by Jennifer Ibañez Whitlock | Feb 9, 2022
For those who believed President Biden's pledge to end prolonged detention and the use of for-profit prisons, his first year in office has been deeply disappointing. Instead of shrinking the immigration detention system, President Biden has expanded it. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) data showed a 20-year low in the detention population at the beginning of President Biden's term with around 14,000 people in custody. Currently, there are approximately 22,000 people in detention. This increase transpired even with regular expulsion flights to places like Haiti and Guatemala during his first year, using a public health order known as "Title 42."
Shockingly, ICE is also undermining the President's Exec. Order No. 14006, which banned the renewal of contracts with end dates for privately operated Department of Justice (DOJ) prisons. With the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center, ICE reinitiated a contract for this private facility shortly after DOJ terminated their own contract and now has an additional 1,875 beds at its disposal. ICE is also planning to add 1,800 "beds" to the Folkston ICE Processing Center in Georgia and there are rumors of other private DOJ jails in consideration for immigration detention. AILA and other partners are calling for the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security to conduct a review and bring to light how ICE's maneuverings to trade out criminal detainees for immigrant detainees.
Immigration detention is deadly, even without the presence of COVID-19. However, the fact is that those in detention have been at heightened risk because of COVID-19 throughout the pandemic and now the highly transmissible Omicron variant has rapidly spread throughout the United States. While the number of ICE custody deaths in 2021 decreased compared to the reported deaths in 2020, it does not change the fact that people in detention are at the mercy of ICE and its inadequate medical system. While awaiting an interview with an asylum officer, Pablo Sanchez-Gotopo, a 40-year-old Venezuelan man died in October of last year from acute respiratory failure, including COVID-19. It was also reported that he had other serious health conditions, including acute kidney failure, anemia, and HIV/AIDS. Given the severity of his health conditions, presence of family in the U.S. and the fact that he was seeking protection in the U.S., under ICE's own enforcement guidance, he should have been considered eligible for release from custody where he would have been far safer. Instead, he spent his last day gasping for breath like so many other victims of this terrible virus.
Immigrants in detention never stood a chance against COVID-19. As the rest of the world stocked up on masks, personal protective equipment, and isolated at home, people detained by ICE were sometimes left exposed without basic protections. When they spoke out against the poor conditions, some facility personnel subjected them to violence and abusive treatment. A federal court ordered ICE to identify medically vulnerable people in its custody who could die from COVID-19 related complications and consider them for release. Gallingly, the Biden administration appealed the federal court decision.
The Biden Administration needs to act now to protect immigrant lives. Take for example, the most recent inspection reports from the Aurora ICE Processing Center in Aurora, CO. The report shows the number of sick call requests climbed higher each month from 260 in January to 475 at the end of September. Last year, the Aurora facility was under scrutiny for its poor handling of the pandemic but the administration did little to correct the problem. In fact, since the discovery of the Omicron variant in November, there has been no update to ICE's nationwide COVID-19 policy. President Biden has the tools to fix this situation. DHS has broad authority to screen and release individuals in its custody. Under the new DHS enforcement guidance, ICE officers should review each person's case, weighing all positive and negative factors, to determine if release would be appropriate.
Congress should use its power to control Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s purse strings and restrict ICE's funding to maintain or increase its detention capacity. A February 2021 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that in most recent contracts, ICE "has not documented its need for new space or followed other portions of its own process for obtaining it." Instead, ICE has been busy signing contracts with minimum guarantees to line the pockets of private corporations and localities looking for revenue. With no significant changes to speak of under this administration, it is up to Congress to put up some guardrails. To date, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have released DHS appropriations bills that would reduce fiscal year 2021 funding but still authorize ICE to detain 28,500 immigrants on any given day, amounting to a continuation of costly and inhumane detention policies under the Biden administration.
Last year, President Biden told a protestor at a Georgia rally to give him "5 days" in response to a demand to end detention. It has been over a year since he took office. We cannot wait another day.
PreviousMy Moment – When Immigration Law Became My Path, Part 3
NextU.S. Asylum Laws and the People of Haiti
Jennifer Ibañez Whitlock
Jennifer Ibañez Whitlock has spent her professional career working in immigration law and policy; currently she serves as policy counsel for AILA focused on immigration enforcement and humanitarian processes. Previously, she worked with the Immigration Justice Campaign, a joint project of AILA and the American Immigration Council, where she oversaw a pro bono program for detained immigrants. Before transitioning to non-profit work, she was in private practice, focused on family-based immigration, humanitarian relief, and deportation defense.


Goodstart Early Learning Child Care centre Chelsea Heights is a purpose built centre located amid retail outlets, close to local schools and transport – making it a convenient daily drop-off and pick-up point.
We have three rooms, ranging in age from six weeks to five years. Our centre provides individualised programs for Nursery, Toddler, Prekinder and Kindergarten / Preschool.
Our Storypark platform, as well as regular family events and emailed newsletters, enable us to stay in close contact with parents and families, ensuring open and clear communication. This also means we can tailor each program to the child's individual needs, interests and strengths – as well as the strong level of cultural diversity in our centre.
Outside, we have age appropriate play spaces and equipment, all geared to enhance the children's awareness of their surrounds and the greater environment, as well as their understanding of the importance of sustainability. With a decked-in sandpit, rockery, bridges, dry creek bed, swings, mud kitchen, vege patch, our pet chickens and an outdoor classroom area, we have plenty to keep busy learners entertained.
Our centre provides five meals throughout the day including breakfast, morning tea, lunch, afternoon tea, and late snack. These healthy meals are all prepared at the centre by our qualified cook.
Each room has qualified early childhood staff working with the children to encourage and develop all areas of learning. Your child will be introduced to a wide variety of learning experiences both indoors and outdoors in a safe, supervised and fun environment.
I'm Ineke and I am the Centre Director at Goodstart Early Learning Child Care Centre Chelsea Heights.
I have been in the Early childhood education and Care sector for 18 years and throughout my career I have gained experience across all age groups and in a variety of roles.
I have been directing Goodstart Chelsea Heights for the past 10 years and enjoy all aspects of my work.
I currently hold my Diploma of community services as well as first aid, child protection and food handling certificates.
Here at Goodstart Chelsea Heights we believe "it takes a village to raise a child" and we consider our centre and team an important part of that village, with years of experience and excellent qualifications, this is a team of dedicated and committed professionals that will work closely with every child and family to support them along their early learning journey.
"My daughter goes in the toddler room at the centre and she loves it, the director is always smiling and happy and she always accommodates the requests we have. The staff are read more lovely and she always has paintings and art activities and even cooking things that she brings home, it's a fantastic place and we all love going there."
"A huge thank you to everyone at GS Chelsea Heights for helping our son on his way. Because of your caring, nurturing environment, from nursery to kinder, he is a thriving read more little boy with an appetite for learning. We will miss you all! "
"After a terrible experience at another Child Care Centre, meeting Inneke and the team at Chelsea Heights was a dream come true!! Everything was explained and so thorough. My read more daughter was able to attend a few orientations, a few with me present, and some watching nervously from the window. By the time she started I felt confident (so did my daughter!) and happy. My daughter has been there for over a year and has since moved rooms and I really feel that they care for my child. There are always familiar faces upon arrival, and seem to know exactly what she needs if she is feeling a bit unsettled. I would and have recommended this centre to friends - and to strangers I meet with kids!!!! We have been so happy and my daughter loves 'play group'. "
"My 3year old son is always so excited to go to daycare the staff are so friendly and my son is learning so much from socialisation to pronunciation. The staff keep the day read more interesting for wonderful stories to bring home as well as a huge smile from all the fun he has in a day"
"My 3 year old daughter has been with Goodstart Chelsea Heights since she was 11 months old. Being a first time mum, freaking out about returning to work and leaving my child read more with strangers, I booked appointments with lots of local child care centres. I met with Goodstart last and they were the absolute front runners! Ineke - the centre director - was so personable, friendly and bubbly. She explained everything so clearly and reassured me that I could be confident in her centre. The staff at the centre are well presented, the rooms are clean, and the children are happy! My daughter has moved up through the rooms at the guidance of the centre staff from nursery, to toddlers and now to pre kinder. Every staff member is friendly, open, encouraging and happy to help/offer advice. I have recommended Goodstart Chelsea Heights to my mummy friends and will continue to do so."
"Thank you to the incredible staff at Goodstart Chelsea Heights for all their care, teaching and friendship they have given our daughter overt the last three years. The caring read more environment, brilliant learning environment and the beautiful staff have enabled our daughter to thrive over this time and we are so grateful. Thank you Ineke and your amazing team!"
"The staff are excellent, they genuinely care about every child and know every child's unique needs and personality"
At Goodstart Chelsea Heights, you and your child can enjoy the best of both worlds. Our early learning centre offers a Government-funded kindergarten program and long day care under the one roof. Our kindergarten teachers are University qualified and provide a play-based learning program that will support your child in learning the skills for school and life.


Absa's new strategy reflects our African identity. We are firmly committed to playing a shaping role in society.
The Absa group embarked on a journey to become a fundamentally different, disruptive and digitally led bank; making some critical choices that shape the business and brand strategies. One of the key decisions is for the business to become an active force for good in society. With that, our new purpose and strategy, at the heart of which is growth, will be driven through three strategic priorities and three enablers, one of which is playing a shaping role in society.
Why do we turn to nonprofits, NGOs and governments to solve society's biggest problems? Michael Porter admits he's biased, as a business school professor, but he wants you to hear his case for letting business try to solve massive problems like climate change and access to water.
Government and businesses should develop shared value to address socio-economic challenges. Building shared value is an important quality for accelerating social and economic change, especially in times of economic difficulty - by Mzukisi Qobo.
Business is driven by profit, but Shift Social Development CEO Tiekie Barnard believes in the importance of profit with purpose. In this Q&A, she explains the meaning of Shared Value and how companies can use this business strategy to find where the biggest growth opportunities lie.
It is now critical for any business to demonstrate that it has a purpose before and beyond profit, and that it seeks to improve the lives of its customers. Failure to have such a purpose, to be clear about it and to ensure it directs everything you do, will lose customers, employees and ultimately business value. This requires transparency and authentically communicating purpose to the consumer in a tangible, trustworthy way.
"...the concept of Shared Value sets itself apart from frameworks like philanthropy and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The key distinguishing feature of Shared Value is that it aims to address social and environmental problems through company's core business, rather than as a separate side project. Sustainability and human rights are not add-ons or compliance tasks but part of a corporate strategy. It's the old business case argument on steroids.
From Oxfam's perspective, the motivation behind Shared Value, to better align core business and social impact, is an ambition we agree with. For too long, we have struggled to move attention to social issues out of niche sustainability departments and onto the agenda of corporate executives. Nevertheless, the discussion at the Shared Value Summit left me with more questions than answers."
A company cannot succeed in a society that is failing. These words, spoken by Sanda Ojiambo, head of corporate responsibility at Safaricom, crystallise the core message of the inaugural Africa Shared Value Summit.
Taking place in Johannesburg this week, the summit brings together business, the government and academia to explore best practice in the field of shared value — a concept dubbed by Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter in the Harvard Business Review.
Issues of shared value are increasingly topical across much of South Africa, and are especially relevant within the local film sector, where there is a progressively more urgent need for greater alignment behind what "giving back" actually looks like. The nuances in this space are important, especially as we transition from local content in terms of its value as an art, towards where there is a more mature balance in terms of its sustainable commercial value.
Today's highly competitive, globalized, world requires organizations and businesses to think differently about how they are going to stay in business. They can no longer afford to focus on profits alone as other factors, such as social and environmental sustainability, are becoming more present – both in real terms as well as from a regulatory perspective. The hyper-connectedness of our modern world also means that customers now have more information about businesses than ever, as well as a greater number of choices, meaning that businesses that fail to understand all of what their customers are looking for will be substituted quickly.
Organizations must therefore think about ways to build sustainable business that incorporates more than just short term thinking on profits.
John Elkington, executive chair of Volans and the nearest sustainability has to a founding father, took Porter deftly to task for his lack of subtlety. Paul Polman, Unilever CEO and sustainability's leading light ever since he told short-term speculators to sell their shares in his company, was also unconvinced.
I was delighted to participate in the recent Shared Value Leadership Summithosted by FSG, a non-profit consultancy founded by Mark Kramer. Together Professor Michael Porter and Kramer wrote Creating Shared Value, published in the Harvard Business Review in 2011.
However, I left Cambridge, Massachusetts somewhat unsettled about some aspects of the way Porter seems to see the sustainability agenda.
The key to business sustainability is changing how we think about competition and partnership. The business landscape is beginning to shift away from the traditional competition model, especially in Africa, to a form of capitalism that is more open to collaboration. When it comes to making a positive impact on the world, of course, there is immense power in joining forces to create collective impact at a scale far beyond what any one company could achieve alone.
One of the three pillars of the Shared Value business model is Enabling Local Cluster Development, which the Shared Value Initiative defines as "Improving the available skills, supplier base, and supporting institutions in the communities where a company operates to boost productivity, innovation, and growth". In a nutshell, this is the development of and investment in the Shared Value ecosystem. In order to implement Shared Value successfully throughout the value chain, a business must work with the communities in which it operates, the non-government organisations that have the knowledge and experience to guide purpose-driven policy implementation, and the government entities responsible for regulation and maintaining the infrastructure essential to normal business operations.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become one of the standard practices of business. It has seen many incarnations over the years, and continues to keep evolving even today.
But for every corporate leader that believes it is an important part of any company's business strategy, there is an equal number of dissenting voices that say it is nothing more than a corporate obligation forced on them by, either, legislation or public pressure.
Africa is rising and fast becoming a lucrative commercial market with enormous investment potential. Despite recent slumps in commodity price exports, the growing relative political stability, improved economic governance and a more predictable business environment for investors means there is a growing optimism about the continent's future, as the performance of economies of countries such as Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Rwanda and Mozambique keeps hopes of a growth explosion alive.
America's biggest bank, Wells Fargo, has been fined $185m after disclosures that 5 300 employees had secretly opened 2m accounts for customers who didn't ask for them. Wells reacted by firing those who did the deeds (average 377 each). Critics believe it is the CEO and his top team who should have been bulleted because staff were incentivised to act dishonestly by an excessively aggressive sales policy.
You have to wonder when companies like Wells Fargo will realise old style capitalism is dead. Since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, progressive companies have been adopting business guru Michael Porter's "Shared Value" business model – where customers, society at large and the business all benefit.
Africa's developmental challenges can only truly be met through the mainstreaming of public–private partnerships (PPPs) that drive the creation of a shared value in the pursuit of profits and the development of infrastructure, it was held at the EY Strategic Growth Forum Africa 2014.
The central premise behind creating shared value, EY CEO Ajen Sita explained, was that the competitiveness of a company and the health of the communities and economies around it were mutually dependent.


World-renowned composer and conductor Dr. René Clausen has served as conductor of The Concordia Choir since 1986. He is the artistic director of the Emmy Award-winning Concordia Christmas Concerts, which are frequently featured by PBS stations throughout the nation.
Clausen is a renowned composer and arranger, having written dozens of commissioned compositions for famed performances, including "MEMORIAL" and "Crying for a Dream" for the American Choral Directors Association. He is also a frequent guest conductor, composer and lecturer. Clausen has conducted such works as Mozart's "Requiem," Beethoven's "9th Symphony," Brahms' "Requiem" and several of his own works including "Gloria" – in three movements – performed at Carnegie Hall in New York.
His compositions and arrangements are published by E.C. Schirmer, Roger Dean Publishing Company, Shawnee Press in the Mark Foster Catalog, Santa Barbara Music Publishing, Hal Leonard, Walton and Augsburg Fortress.
"Life and Breath: Choral Works by René Clausen" is a 13-track recording by the Kansas City Chorale. This CD of compositions by Clausen won two Grammy Awards in 2013, including Best Choral Performance.
Clausen was commissioned by Concordia College to compose a major work to observe the 500th anniversary of the Reformation titled "The Passion of Jesus Christ," which premiered at Orchestra Hall, Minneapolis, in April 2017.
Clausen graduated in 1974 from St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn., and received Master of Music Performance and Doctor of Musical Arts degrees from the University of Illinois, Urbana.
Prior to his appointment as conductor of The Concordia Choir, Clausen was director of choral activities at West Texas State University, Canyon, and assistant professor of choral music at Wichita (Kan.) State University. He also served as senior editor of Mark Foster Music Company and as interim conductor of the National Lutheran Choir of Minneapolis.
In 1996, Clausen was named the Paul J. and Eleanor Christiansen Chair in Choral Music at Concordia. In 2016, the Reuel and Alma Wije Distinguished Professorship Award was conferred upon Clausen.
In 2017, Clausen was honored by his alma mater with the St. Olaf Alumni Achievement Award.
In 2018, he received the Weston H. Noble Award for Lifetime Achievement from the North Central American Choral Directors Association.


text:
// Package install installs the certificates API group, making it available as
// an option to all of the API encoding/decoding machinery.
package install

import (
	"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apimachinery/announced"
	"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apimachinery/registered"
	"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/runtime"
	"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/sets"
	"k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/api"
	"k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/apis/certificates"
	"k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/apis/certificates/v1beta1"
)

func init() {
	Install(api.GroupFactoryRegistry, api.Registry, api.Scheme)
}

// Install registers the API group and adds types to a scheme
func Install(groupFactoryRegistry announced.APIGroupFactoryRegistry, registry *registered.APIRegistrationManager, scheme *runtime.Scheme) {
	if err := announced.NewGroupMetaFactory(
		&announced.GroupMetaFactoryArgs{
			GroupName:                  certificates.GroupName,
			VersionPreferenceOrder:     []string{v1beta1.SchemeGroupVersion.Version},
			ImportPrefix:               "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/apis/certificates",
			RootScopedKinds:            sets.NewString("CertificateSigningRequest"),
			AddInternalObjectsToScheme: certificates.AddToScheme,
		},
		announced.VersionToSchemeFunc{
			v1beta1.SchemeGroupVersion.Version: v1beta1.AddToScheme,
		},
	).Announce(groupFactoryRegistry).RegisterAndEnable(registry, scheme); err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


this website is a total scam,ghdshopzone are in no way associated with or authorized by the official ghd company.so,be warned,do not use this website!!!!!
this web site is rubbish no answer from anyone don't us this site as i have paid but no goods bank are now getting involved.
Questions? Get answers from the Ghdshopzone staff and other customers.


This SCA judgment concerning utterances comprising intimidation suggests that senior managers who require employees to 'plead' to allegations [charges] at a 'hearing' before any evidence is produced could be found to have acted unfairly if not unlawfully and could even nullify the reason for dismissal itself by allowing employees to provide self-incriminating evidence when only a right to be heard is required.
Conduct or utterances comprising intimidation must induce actual fear or inducing such fear would reasonably be the consequence thereof.
(387/2017; 386/2017)  ZASCA 100 (20 June 2018). Split decision – see summary.
1 The appeal in Moyo and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others is dismissed, with all parties to pay their own costs.
2 The appeal in Sonti and Another v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
'(i) It is declared that s 1(2) of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 is unconstitutional and invalid.
(ii) The order of invalidity is retrospective only to the extent that it affects pending trials or appeals and does not extend to any convictions where the right of appeal has been exhausted.
(iii) The matter is referred to the Constitutional Court in terms of s 172(2)(a) of the Constitution.
Constitutional law – constitutionality of s 1(2) of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 – s 1(2) presumes that accused's actions or utterances are without lawful reason if such reason not advanced prior to close of prosecution case – whether presumption reverses the onus of proof or is merely evidential – s 35 of Constitution – right to a fair trial, to be presumed innocent and to remain silent.
Majority – presumption evidential – places pressure on the accused to disclose content of defence prematurely – infringes the right to a fair trial and the right to remain silent – no justification for limitation of rights in terms of s 36 of Constitution – section 1(2) unconstitutional and invalid.
Minority – presumption reverses onus of proof requiring the accused to prove the existence of a lawful reason for their acts or utterances – accused can be convicted even though no proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt – infringes the right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain silent – no justification for limitation of rights – section 1(2) unconstitutional and invalid.
Constitutionality of s 1(1)(b) of Intimidation Act – whether infringes right of freedom of expression as contained in s 16(1) of Constitution – section capable of being interpreted in conformity with Constitution.
Section 1(1)(b) to be construed as relating only to conduct that is intimidatory in character – section requires mens rea – conduct or utterances constituting intimidation must induce actual fear in target or inducing such fear would reasonably be the consequence of such conduct or utterances – mere anxiety, nervousness or apprehension not constituting fear within the meaning of the section – conduct that is lawful in terms of the Constitution or statute not unlawful – lawful expression in terms of s 16(1) of Constitution not falling within the section and not constituting intimidation.
Minority – section impermissibly wide – contravenes s 16(1) of Constitution – no justification for limitation of rights – section 1(1)(b) unconstitutional and invalid.
 These two appeals, which were heard together in accordance with a practice directive of the President of this court, concern the constitutional validity of ss 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 (the Act). The appeals are against the judgment of Khumalo J, sitting in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the court a quo) who simultaneously heard, and thereafter dismissed, the appellants' applications for declaratory orders of invalidity and unconstitutionality of ss 1(1)(b) and 1(2) respectively.
The court a quo found that s 1(1)(b) of the Act does not infringe the right to freedom of expression, and that the provision only criminalises expressive acts which are reasonably construed to be threats of violence. With regard to s 1(2) of the Act, the court a quo accepted that this provision infringed the right to be presumed innocent, the right to remain silent and the right against self incrimination.
However, it found that these infringements were justified on two bases.
First, it was not possible for the State to disprove the existence of a lawful reason as required by s 1(1)(a) of the Act.
Secondly, the reverse onus created by s 1(2) served the purpose of combating intimidation, the incidence of which, the court a quo found, was 'rife' in the country. Both appeals are with leave of the court a quo.
 The first appellants in each of these appeals are respectively General Alfred Moyo (Mr Moyo) and Nokulunga Primrose Sonti (Ms Sonti). Mr Moyo is currently facing a charge of contravention of s 1(1)(b) in the Germiston Regional Court. Ms Sonti is charged in the Rustenburg Regional Court with contraventions of both s 1(1)(a)(ii) and s 1(1)(b)(i) of the Act. Neither has yet pleaded to the charges and their trials are still pending, having been adjourned pending the outcome of these proceedings.
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R40 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.
 In the first appeal, Mr Moyo, together with the second appellant (the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, CALS), challenges the constitutionality of s 1(1)(b) of the Act, on the ground that its provisions violate the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed in s 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). They contend that the section criminalises any speech or conduct which creates a subjective state of fear in any person regardless of whether the conduct or speech in question is intended to create fear. An offence is also committed, so they contend, where no fear is in fact created and only speech or conduct which reasonably apprehended might have created fear is established.
 The appellants aver that s 1(1)(b) is overbroad as it criminalises many forms of expression which fall within the protection of s 16(1) of the Constitution. The appellants further submit that the breadth of the interference with s 16(1) of the Constitution created by s 1(1)(b) of the Act, cannot be justified in terms of the limitation clause in s 36 of the Constitution and consequently falls to be declared unconstitutional and invalid.
 The fourth respondent (the Minister), opposes the appeal on the basis that Mr Moyo's utterances and conduct, which form the basis of the charge against him, properly construed constitutes incitement of imminent violence which falls within the unprotected categories of expressions provided for in s 16(2) of the Constitution. The Minister also contends that s 1(1)(b) of the Act does not criminalise speech or conduct which creates a subjective state of fear in the addressee, but criminalises speech or conduct which if reasonably construed the natural and probable consequences thereof would be that a person perceiving the conduct fears for his or her own safety or that of another. The Minister further submits that s 1(1)(b) postulates the determination, on objective grounds, whether the utterances could be perceived to constitute a threat to the addressee or any other person affected thereby.
 In the second appeal, Ms Sonti, together with the second appellant, Socio Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI), challenges the constitutionality of s 1(2) of the Act on the basis that the section creates a reverse onus in all proceedings brought under s 1(1)(a) of the Act. They contend that the effect of the reverse onus is that an accused person must prove on a balance of probabilities, that he or she had a lawful reason to issue the threat criminalised under s 1(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, unless the accused makes a statement 'clearly indicating the existence' of a lawful reason before the prosecution closes its case. If no such statement is made, the threat is presumed to have been unlawful. The appellants therefore contend that s 1(2) of the Act breaches the fair trial rights entrenched in s 35(3)(h) and (j) of the Constitution, namely the rights to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to be compelled to give self incriminating evidence. The appellants contend further that the effect of s 1(2) is that an accused person must sacrifice the rights to be silent and against self incrimination if he or she is to be given the benefit of the presumption of innocence. If, on the other hand, the accused wishes to exercise his or her right to silence and protection from self incrimination, the accused will attract an onus and will not be presumed to be innocent.
 Ms Sonti also avers that s 1(2) constitutes an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression, enshrined in s 16 of the Constitution, in that it presumes any threat and therefore any expression which falls within s 1(1)(a)(ii) to be unlawful, unless a statement setting out a lawful reason for it is made in advance. She then contends that s 16 of the Constitution requires all expressions it protects to be presumed to be innocent and lawful unless the state can prove beyond reasonable doubt that they constitute a crime.
 The Minister opposes this appeal on the basis that the provisions of s 1(2) of the Act properly construed, do not create a reverse onus requiring the accused person to prove an element of the crime on a balance of probabilities. The presumption created by this section, so the Minister submits, merely imposes an evidentiary burden on the accused. In the alternative, and if it were found that the provisions of s 1(2) violate the right to freedom of expression or the right to a fair trial, both rights are not absolute and may be limited in terms of s 36 of the Constitution, which the Minister submits, is the case in this matter.
 I now turn to consider the merits of each appeal separately. Before doing so however, I need to dispose of a point in limine raised by the Minister. The point raised is this: The applications for orders declaring the relevant provisions of the Act unconstitutional arise from the pending criminal trials in the regional court of the first appellant in each appeal. Accordingly, it was submitted that both appellants should first go through their trials and then raise the constitutional validity of ss 1(1)(b) and 1(2) on appeal, if necessary. The Minister submitted that it was undesirable that the appellants should require this court to decide the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, without the benefit of the criminal trials' findings on a number of issues which could have a bearing on the question whether the relevant provisions should be declared unconstitutional.
(c) why the referral was made at that juncture, before considering the appeal on non-constitutional grounds.
The Minister submits that this court is placed at a disadvantage for it is required to deal with difficult questions of law, constitutional or otherwise, and has to perform the balancing exercise demanded by s 36(1) of the Constitution virtually as a court of first instance, in circumstances where the constitutional issues raised might not be decisive of the cases.
The Minister concludes that the regional courts, before which Mr Moyo and Ms Sonti are to stand trial, are better placed than this court to evaluate the effect of the alleged overbreadth of s 1(1)(b), and of the so-called reverse onus of s 1(2) of the Act on the essential fairness of a criminal trial.
 Although it must be accepted that the ordinary procedure would be to challenge the constitutionality of ss 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Act at the trial or in post conviction proceedings, it must be noted that both Mr Moyo and Ms Sonti have been charged in the regional courts. Regional courts lack jurisdiction to strike down unconstitutional statutes. Indeed, the regional courts would be bound to decide the matter on the basis that ss 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Act are constitutionally valid in terms of s 110(2) of the Magistrates Courts Act 32 of 1944. This would mean that both Mr Moyo and Ms Sonti would have to run the risk of conviction and imprisonment under the Act, before having an opportunity to raise the constitutional validity of the provisions they claim are unconstitutional.
 I am also of the view that it is in the public interest to finally determine the constitutional validity of ss 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Act. An important consideration in this regard is that the high court judgment created a precedent that is binding on lower courts. If the judgment is wrong, it is in the public interest that it should not stand.
 In light of what I have stated above, I find that the point in limine raised by the Minister, must fail.
 I need to point out that although the aforesaid point in limine was squarely an issue before the court a quo, there is no mention thereof whatsoever in the judgment under appeal. The omission of so important an issue in the judgment, which had the potential to be decisive of the matter, is particularly concerning.
The first appeal: The constitutional validity of section 1(1)(b) of the Act.
 The criminal charge of intimidation in terms of s 1(1)(b) of the Act, which has been preferred against Mr Moyo (there is an alternative charge of assault which has no bearing in this matter), arose under the following circumstances. Mr Moyo is the chairperson of a community based organisation known as the Makause Community Development Forum (MCDF) in the Makause informal settlement. According to him, the MCDF has had a difficult relationship with the local branch of the African National Congress (ANC), which always challenged the right of the MCDF to conduct any organising or other work of a social or political nature in the settlement. He states that as a result of tensions between the two organisations, the ANC laid various spurious allegations and complaints against MCDF members, which resulted in their arrest and detention. However, no convictions have resulted from any of these arrests.
Mr Moyo denies that he did or said anything with the intention of intimidating the complainants. In his view, the charges that have been preferred against him are simply a ploy to frustrate the MCDF's legitimate rights to protest and criticise what they see as biased policing practices sanctioned by the complainants.
 I need to point out at this stage that whether or not Mr Moyo uttered the words or conducted himself in the manner alleged or with the intention of intimidating the complainants, is an issue that must be determined by the trial court. Furthermore, such issue will not form the basis upon which the constitutionality of the provisions of s 1(1)(b) of the Act should be decided.
 I deem it prudent at this point to consider the context in which the Act was adopted, together with its legislative history, as this will be helpful in determining the purpose and meaning of the provision.
 Section 1(1)(b) was imported into the Act by the Internal Security and Intimidation Amendment Act 138 of 1991 (the Internal Security Amendment Act). Although the one purpose of the Internal Security Amendment Act was to reduce the length of time a person could be detained without trial by the apartheid state, and to ease some of the more draconian aspects of the internal security legislation in force at the time, that Act also significantly broadened the statutory offence of intimidation. The reason for doing so was to reverse a series of prior decisions of the high court that had narrowed the range of conduct and speech that could count as intimidation. These decisions included S v Mohapi en Andere 1984 (1) SA 270 (O), in which it was held that a general threat directed at the inhabitants of an area as a whole, cannot constitute intimidation; S v Kekana (an unreported decision of the Witwatersrand Local Division under case number A444/88), in which it was held that a mere threat that is not intended to induce particular conduct in another person is not intimidation; and S v Malevu (an unreported decision of the Witwatersrand Local Division under case number A635/87), in which it was held that a striker did not intimidate three non-strikers who he had told would encounter problems and would be hurt if they continued to work. This was because it was not established beyond a reasonable doubt that these utterances conveyed anything more than a warning.
 Clearly, the purpose of the Internal Security Amendment Act was to widen the statutory offence of intimidation to include speech and conduct which, under apartheid, was considered harmful, but would certainly be considered innocuous today. This is confirmed by the explanatory memorandum to the Internal Security and Intimidation Amendment Bill which sets out the objects of the bill as to render certain intimidatory conduct which does not fall within the scope of the Act, punishable.
 Even at the time it was passed, the breadth of s 1(1)(b) was controversial in that it was not limited to serious threats of unlawful conduct. Members of the House of Assembly, at the second reading of the Intimidation Bill, raised consumer boycotts as legitimate forms of political action criminalised by s 1(1)(b). Mr A S K Pitman MP highlighted during the debate that it should not be a criminal offence to embark on a consumer boycott.
(b) acts or conducts himself or herself in such a manner or utters or publishes such words that it might reasonably be expected that the natural and probable consequences thereof would be that a person perceiving the act, conduct, utterance or publication fears for his or her own safety or the safety of his or her property or the security of his or her livelihood, or the safety, property or livelihoods of others (even if no fear is actually created).
 Clearly, the text of s 1(1)(b) does not require that fear be caused intentionally or negligently. Although our courts read a penal statute, where possible, as requiring some sort of fault on the part of the person to be charged, the text of s 1(1)(b) leaves no room for such an exercise. If an expressive act results in someone feeling fearful or might reasonably have that result, then there is an offence under the section.
 The court a quo interpreted the section as only criminalising the creation of reasonable fear. In this regard, the court sought to rely, inexplicably, in my view, on the decision in Setlogelo v Setlogelo, which with respect is inapplicable to the circumstances or situation dealt with herein. The court a quo held that the court must decide, on the facts presented to it, whether there is any basis for the entertainment of a reasonable apprehension by the person threatened.
 In my view this is erroneous as the text of the section precludes such an interpretation. The section clearly creates an offence where a person 'acts or conducts himself or herself in such a manner or utters or publishes such words that it has or they have the effect, or that it might be reasonably expected that the natural and probable consequences thereof would be that a person perceiving the act, conduct, utterance or publication' would be placed in fear. Furthermore, the use of the word 'or' is clearly intended to distinguish between two situations: one in which fear is created, whether reasonably or not, and another in which reasonable fear might be created, regardless of whether it was in fact created. An offence is committed in both situations.
 The second interpretative error adopted by the court a quo was to characterise s 1(1)(b) as being directed only at threats of violence. In this regard the learned judge observed that the Act is one of the pre-democracy pieces of legislation remaining in our statute books with the aim of fighting violence in all its forms. But this is wholly untenable because s 1(1)(b) of the Act criminalises a much wider range of expressive acts than mere threats of violence. One need only consider the provision in its immediate statutory context to see this. Threats of violence are explicitly criminalised in s 1(1)(a) of the Act and, if s 1(1)(b) were meant only to criminalise threats of violence, then clearly it would be superfluous. On the plain meaning of s 1(1)(b) it includes acts or conduct not relating to violence.
 The plain text of the section places emphasis on how the person being threatened feels or might reasonably feel, not on what the expressive act actually means or was intended to achieve. To illustrate the scope of s 1(1)(b) of the Act, it bears emphasising what Mr Moyo is not charged with. It is not alleged that any harm of a specific nature actually resulted from anything which Mr Moyo said or did; that the fear said to have been induced by his utterances or conduct had any specific focus; or importantly, that he intended at any stage to induce fear in the police officers and to intimidate them.
 The fundamental problem with s 1(1)(b) of the Act is that it obliterates the distinction between 'true threats' and 'political hyperbole' as it covers both categories of expression, and a lot more. A true threat is a threat of unlawful violence made by a person who intends to carry that threat out and has the means to do so. On the other hand, political hyperbole is (often emotionally charged) rhetoric with no serious intent to harm, or capacity to cause harm and can include anything from popular struggle songs to trite political slogans. Thus even advocating a consumer boycott, as I have mentioned earlier, or campaigning to remove a politician from office would constitute criminal acts if they are demonstrated to have actually or reasonably placed someone in fear for the security of the livelihood of any person.
 For all these reasons, the interpretation the court a quo placed on s 1(1)(b) of the Act is untenable. Textually the section creates significant inroads into the right of freedom of expression. I say so because s 1(1)(b) debars people from speaking their minds lest they place another in a subjective state of fear or might reasonably do so. However, unless hate speech, incitement of imminent violence or propaganda for war as proscribed in s 16(2) of the Constitution are involved, no one is entitled to be insulated from opinions and ideas that they do not like, even if those ideas are expressed in ways that place them in fear.
Indeed, in present day South Africa many will be afraid of the political and social possibilities that are advocated for daily in high stakes debates that characterise a transforming society with a violent, racist past. Obviously this may place many South Africans in a condition of subjective or 'reasonable' fear. But that does not entitle them to expect the State to lock up those whose chosen forms of expression placed them in a subjective state of fear or might reasonably (but not in fact) have placed them in fear.
'A court should not be hasty to conclude that because language is angry in tone or conveys hostility it is therefore to be characterised as hate speech, even if it has overtones of race or ethnicity'.
The court recognised however, that in guaranteeing freedom of speech, the Constitution also places limits upon its exercise. Thus where it goes beyond a passionate expression of feelings and views and becomes the advocacy of hatred based on race or ethnicity and constitutes incitement to cause harm, it oversteps those limits and loses its constitutional protection.
 The aforesaid position holds true in the United States. In Watts v United States the Supreme Court held that only 'true threats' fall outside a person's first amendment protection against interference with free speech. The defendant, at a public rally at which he was expressing his opposition to the military draft, said, 'if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J'. He was convicted of violating a federal statute that prohibited 'any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United of States'. The Supreme Court reversed that finding. Interpreting the statute 'with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind' it found that the defendant had not made a 'true threat', but had indulged in mere 'political hyperbole'. Clearly, although the utterances in Watts may have placed reasonable people in fear, they were still protected under the first amendment of the US Constitution. The point is that the conduct of Mr Watts could have constituted a crime under s 1(1)(b) of the Act.
 The real problem with s 1(1)(b) is, in any event, its overbreadth, which could not be cured by the court a quo's attempt to read it down. As I have demonstrated above, it in fact matters little whether s 1(1)(b) of the Act only applies to the creation of reasonable fears. Even if it could be read that way, which in my view it definitely cannot, its prohibitions would still not confine it to violent threats. This section plainly limits the right to freedom of expression guaranteed in s 16 of the Constitution.
Can the limitation of the right of freedom of expression be justified?
 As it has been shown that s 1(1)(b) of the Act limits s 16(1) of the Constitution, the next enquiry is to determine whether the limitation can be justified under s 36 of the Constitution. If the limitation cannot be justified, then s 1(1)(b) of the Act will be rendered unconstitutional.
 It is trite that once a constitutional infringement is established, as has happened in this matter, then it is for the party relying on the legislation to establish the justification, and not for the party challenging it to show that it was not justified. The evaluation of the justification of a limitation under s 36 of the Constitution involves a process described in S v Makwanyane & another as the 'weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality … which calls for the balancing of different interests'. The relevant considerations in the balancing process include those that are listed in s 36(1) of the Constitution. Although s 36(1) does not expressly mention the importance of the right infringed in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, it is a factor that must of necessity be taken into account in any proportionality evaluation.
'Ours is a constitutional democracy that is designed to ensure that the voiceless are heard, and that even those of us who would, given a choice, have preferred not to entertain the views of the marginalised or the powerless minority, listen.' (Footnote omitted).
 In Khumalo & others v Holomisa the Constitutional Court explained that the right to freedom of expression is 'integral to a democratic society for many reasons', including the reason that the right is constitutive of the dignity and autonomy of human beings and because, without it, the ability of citizens to make responsible political decisions and to participate effectively in public life would be stifled.
 One of the purposes of the right to freedom of expression is to foster tolerance of competing political views and the manner in which they are expressed. In a democracy such as ours, we have to tolerate people who have different views, and we have to accept that those views might be expressed in ways we do not like. Significantly, in his answering affidavit, the Minister correctly accepted that it is 'undeniable' that freedom of expression is 'indispensable . . . [to] a State such as South Africa' and that it is a right of 'core importance for the democratic dispensation'.
 With regard to the question of the importance of the purpose of the limitation, I have taken into consideration the legislative history of s 1(1)(b) of the Act. What clearly emerges from such history is that the offence of intimidation is a product of apartheid era legislation that was designed to control dissent against an unjust system. It then becomes clear that its purpose has been rendered constitutionally offensive in modern day South Africa.
 The contention that s 1(1)(b) of the Act promotes 'inter-communal peace and harmony' is, in my view, a classic analogue of the justifications given in non democratic regimes for stifling political dissent. There can be no debate over the fact that democracy thrives on the expression of disagreement. Of course, some limitations on the right to freedom of expression are necessary. But there can be no justification for the imposition of limitations on the right to freedom of expression simply to pacify the expression of disagreement, or to create a comfortable, placid political atmosphere.
 I accordingly find that s 1(1)(b) of the Act constitutes one of the last and most insidious of the apartheid regime's efforts to curtail freedom of expression and political action that was aimed at bringing that abominable regime to an end. It has no place in a free, open and democratic South Africa which respects, protects, promotes and fulfils the right to freedom of expression and falls to be struck from our statute books.
 The nature and extent of the limitation contained in s 1(1)(b) of the Act can be devastating on any person caught on its wrong side. It carries a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment and the option of a fine of R40 000 which is prohibitively expensive for an indigent person charged with the manner of expression that the Act criminalises. For these reasons, I find that s 1(1)(b) of the Act is clearly egregious, both in its nature and its extent.
 The aspect of the relation between the limitation and its purpose raises two questions. The first is whether there is a rational connection between the limitation and its purpose. The second is whether the limitation is proportional to the purpose it serves.
 Although the court a quo found that the purpose of s 1(1)(b) of the Act was to combat violence and threats of violence, this was erroneous. In truth, its scope extends beyond threats of violence. As I have demonstrated, expressive acts that merely 'have the effect' of creating fear or might reasonably have that effect, are criminalised. There is accordingly no rational connection between the text of s 1(1)(b) and the protection of the individual from violent threats.
(c) Public violence, which is the unlawful and intentional commission, by a number of people acting in concert, of acts of sufficiently serious dimensions which are intended to violently disturb the peace or security or invade the rights of others.
 In light of what I have stated above, s 1(1)(b) of the Act is not a justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression. It is inconsistent with the Constitution and must be declared unconstitutional.
 I have found that s 1(1)(b) is inconsistent with the Constitution and that it must accordingly be declared invalid in accordance with s 172(1)(a) of the Constitution. In terms of the doctrine of objective constitutional invalidity, s 1(1)(b) will become invalid from the date upon which the Constitution came into operation.
 In light of the fact that the purpose of s 1(1)(b) of the Act has been unlawful since at least the commencement of the Constitution, and that there are several criminal offences that can effectively curb criminal conduct involving threats, I come to the conclusion that there is no reason to suspend the declaration of invalidity.
 I am also of the view that the order of invalidity should apply retrospectively. The effect thereof will be adequately managed by the fact that any person previously convicted of contravening s 1(1)(b) of the Act may have his or her conviction set aside on appeal or review application.
Second appeal: constitutional validity of section 1(2) of the Act.
 The challenge by Ms Sonti against the constitutionality of s 1(2) of the Act arose in the following instances. Ms Sonti is a Member of Parliament. At the time she was charged, she was the leader of a community based organisation known as 'Sikhala Sonke', which provides support for the victims of the Marikana massacre.
 The charge laid against Ms Sonti concerns telephone calls and text messages she is alleged to have directed to Ms Nobuhle Zimela (the complainant) on 17 and 18 December 2012 near Marikana. The complainant alleges that these telephone calls and text messages contained threats to kill the complainant and burn her house down with the intention of compelling her to withdraw criminal complaints she had made against a certain Mr Anele Zonke. Ms Sonti denies all the allegations made against her.
 Ms Sonti applied for an order declaring s 1(2) of the Act unconstitutional because it unjustifiably infringes her right to freedom of expression and her fair trial rights namely, to remain silent, to be presumed innocent and not to be compelled to make self-incriminating admissions, which are entrenched in ss 35(3)(h) and (j) of the Constitution.
 In light of my finding in Mr Moyo's appeal that s 1(1)(b) of the Act violates the right to freedom of expression, I do not deem it necessary to deal with that aspect in this appeal. I will accordingly confine myself to the issue of the alleged infringement of Ms Sonti's fair trial rights.
 Ms Sonti's attack on s 1(2) of the Act is that the section creates a reverse onus in proceedings brought under s 1(1)(a) of the Act. She avers that the effect of the reverse onus created by this section is that an accused person must prove on a balance of probabilities, that he or she had a lawful reason to issue the threat criminalised under s 1(1)(a)(ii), unless he or she makes a statement 'clearly indicating the existence' of a lawful reason before the prosecution closes its case. If no such statement is made, the threat is presumed to have been unlawful.
 Ms Sonti therefore submits that s 1(2) of the Act is unconstitutional as it breaches the right to silence, the right not to be compelled to make self-incriminating admissions, and the right to be presumed innocent. Furthermore, under its terms, an accused person must sacrifice the right to silence and against self-incrimination if he or she is to be given the benefit of the presumption of innocence. If on the other hand, the accused wishes to exercise his or her rights to silence and protection from self incrimination, the accused will attract a true onus and will not be presumed innocent.
 The court a quo accepted that s 1(2) of the Act infringes the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to incriminate oneself. However, it held that these infringements were justified on two bases. Firstly, that it is not possible for the State to disprove the existence of a lawful reason for making a threat as defined in s 1(1)(a) of the Act; and secondly, that the reverse onus serves the purpose of combating intimidation the incidence of which, the court a quo found, is 'rife' in South Africa.
 The Minister contended that the provisions of s 1(2) of the Act do not require an accused person to prove or disprove on a balance of probabilities, any element of the crime as contended for by the appellants. The Minister contended further that the provisions mainly require the accused to make a statement indicating the lawful reason for his or her conduct and that he or she does not have to convince the court as to the lawfulness of such statement. This means that no proof on a balance of probabilities of the lawfulness of the statement is required, except in the event that the accused elects not to put lawfulness in dispute by not making a statement indicating the existence of a lawful reason – for example, self-defence or necessity or whatever such reason may be – and doing so before the close of the prosecution's case. The Minister states that once the statement is placed before the court, the prosecution will still bear the onus of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that all the elements of a crime exist and have been proven before any conviction could follow. In other words, no possibility exists, so the Minister contended, for the conviction of the accused despite a reasonable doubt.
 In my view, the Minister's understanding of the provisions of s 1(2) is untenable. Textually, s 1(2) casts on the accused person the legal burden of proving a 'lawful reason' for conduct criminalised by s 1(1)(a), unless he or she makes a statement disclosing the 'lawful reason' upon which they intend to rely, before the closing of the State's case. Therefore, an accused person that invokes the right to remain silent and the right not to be compelled to self-incriminate, will bear the onus of proving a lawful reason for the conduct in question. In such a case it may very well happen that at the conclusion of the trial the court is unable to find that the accused had shown lawful reason on a balance of probabilities, but may entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether the conduct was justified by lawful reason.
This will result in a conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Also, an accused person cannot offer a lawful reason for the conduct in question, without admitting that conduct. It follows that in order to avoid the reverse onus the accused will have to abandon the right to remain silent and the right not to be compelled to self incriminate himself or herself by admitting the conduct that the prosecution has to prove, thus relieving the prosecution of the duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In both respects there is a clear breach of the fundamental right to be presumed innocent.
 The court a quo correctly accepted this and correctly rejected the Minister's contention that s 1(2) of the Act places a mere 'evidentiary burden' on an accused to indicate that he or she has some lawful basis for conduct proved against him or her. It correctly found that this is at odds with the plain text of the section, which states that 'the onus of proving the existence of a lawful reason' is placed on the accused.
 Section 1(2) clearly creates a full onus on the accused, in the event that he or she chooses to remain silent before the State's case is closed. However, it bears mentioning that even the creation of an 'evidentiary burden' that allows for conviction despite reasonable doubt is nonetheless unconstitutional. It thus matters not whether s 1(2) creates what is classified as a 'full onus' or 'an evidentiary burden'. What is important, rather, is whether the final effect of s 1(2) of the Act is to displace the presumption of innocence. Therefore, whatever label one chooses to apply to s 1(2) of the Act that is indeed its final effect.
 As I have said, the court a quo accepted, correctly, that there was an infringement of fair trial rights. However, it characterised the infringement of rights as slight, because threats criminalised under s 1(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, in respect of which the reverse onus operates, will always be inherently unlawful. The court a quo erred in this respect.
 In addition, in a trial, if at the close of the case for the prosecution the court is of the view that there is no possibility of a conviction unless an accused incriminates himself or herself in a witness box, then, pursuant to s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the accused is constitutionally entitled to be discharged. This is because the accused is presumed innocent, and the requirement that the State prove its allegations beyond reasonable doubt means that he or she is entitled to be acquitted and discharged. The presumption of innocence is, accordingly sacrosanct and underpins the fairness of a trial.
 As I have said, s 1(2) of the Act creates the real risk of a conviction despite the presence of a reasonable doubt. At a trial the evidence for the prosecution may tell one tale and evidence for the defence may tell another. If the State succeeds in proving two elements of the offence namely, conduct that constitutes a threat intended to compel an act or an omission from another, and a court finds it impossible to determine the existence or otherwise of a lawful reason, then the court will necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of the said element. Yet s 1(2) of the Act will demand a conviction, unless the accused admits the conduct upfront, and relies on a 'lawful reason to justify it'.
'[t]he accused need only respond once. The Crown must present its evidence at an open trial. The accused is entitled to test and to attack it. If it does not reach a certain standard, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. If it does reach that standard, then and only then is the accused required to respond to or stand convicted.' (My emphasis).
 Where, as in this case, an accused person denies the charge in its entirety, remaining silent while the State lays out its evidence will normally be an important way of protecting him or her against unfair self-incrimination. It will also enable the accused to provide a full, consistent explanation for all the facts proved against him or her, to the extent that he or she is able to do so.
 It is plain from above that s 1(2) of the Act infringes the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence.
 I have found that s 1(2) of the Act limits the fair trial rights in s 35(3)(h) and (j) of the Constitution. The next stage of the enquiry is whether or not s 1(2) of the Act can be justified under s 36 of the Constitution.
 In paras 37 to 39 I dealt in a fair amount of detail with the applicable principles in the evaluation of the limitation of rights in terms of s 36 of the Constitution. Those principles are also applicable to Ms Sonti's appeal. I do not deem it necessary to repeat them.
 The Minister submitted that intimidation by its nature is a threat of unlawful action, implying physical harm on others. He then averred that the Act acknowledges and gives recognition to an enshrined right in s 12(1) of the Constitution, which gives to everyone the right to freedom and security of the person. Accordingly s 1(2) of the Act viewed in the context of the protection of the rights enshrined in s 12(1) of the Constitution, acknowledges that the existence of the lawfulness of the reasons of the utterance would ordinarily be within the exclusive knowledge of the utterers of the words, and that it would be unreasonable to expect the State to lead in anticipation evidence on the existence of lawful reasons to utter such intimidatory words or threats.
 The nature and importance of the rights to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to be compelled to make self-incriminating admissions, cannot be over emphasised. They lie at the core of our constitutional order and protect the individual against the State's over-reach and constitute essential preconditions for the development of individual freedom and the realisation of the self. Accordingly, any limitation of these rights must require compelling justification which in this matter is, in my view, lacking.
 The Minister's reliance on the decision of the majority in Prince v President, Cape Law Society is misplaced. In that case the Constitutional Court was faced with the question of the constitutional validity of the prohibition on the use or possession of cannabis when its use or possession is inspired by religion. The crux of the majority judgment was that the legitimate government's purpose of the legislation in preventing harmful drug use outweighed the impact on Mr Prince's right to freedom of religion. In my view, the nature of the right in that case, can hardly be compared to the type of rights we are dealing with here, which lie at the very core of our constitutional order.
 The Minister's contention that s 1(2) of the Act is justified by the difficulty of the prosecution proving the absence of lawful reason, is untenable. In truth, this burden is slight. Proof of conduct that falls within the provisions of s 1(1)(a) – ie assault, causing injury or damage, a threat to kill, assault, injure or cause damage with intent to compel or induce action or inaction – will almost always constitute prima facie proof of unlawfulness. The prima facie case will become conclusive in the absence of evidence by the accused that raises a reasonable doubt as to the lawfulness of the conduct. It follows that there is no real need for a reverse onus.
'[T]hat an obligation to prove an element of an offence which falls peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused makes it more difficult for the prosecution to secure a conviction. The question is whether it makes it so difficult as to justify the infringement of the accused's right to be presumed innocent on the grounds of necessity … Discharging the burden of proof is a function which the criminal justice system requires the prosecution to perform in the normal course with regard to many common law and statutory offences. It was not claimed that if all the circumstances surrounding the false representation are fully and properly investigated and presented in evidence the prosecution cannot obtain the conviction to which it might be entitled.' (Footnote omitted).
 The court a quo's finding that s 1(2) was justified because intimidation was 'rife' in South Africa falls to be rejected. The court a quo heard no evidence in that regard and it was not entitled to draw that inference. In any event, the court a quo's approach flies in the face of the warning by the Constitutional Court that '(o)ne must be careful to ensure that the alarming level of crime is not used to justify extensive and inappropriate invasions of individual rights'. The mere assertion, without more, that 'intimidation is rife' was accordingly not enough to justify the invasion of the rights embodied in s 1(2) of the Act.
 The nature and extent of the limitation embodied in s 1(2) in the form of a reverse onus, is undoubtedly egregious. It has the potential, where an accused person exercises his or her rights under s 35(h) of the Constitution, to create the possibility of his or her conviction where his or her guilt is reasonably in doubt.
 It has not been demonstrated that there is a rational connection between s 1(2) of the Act, and the purpose proffered for it, namely relieving the prosecution of an impossible burden. I have already found that the burden is not impossible and can be discharged by leading evidence of the context in which the alleged threat was made. Furthermore, this will, in my view, be a less restrictive means to achieve the section's aforesaid purpose.
(b) The situation of people convicted of contravening s 1(1)(a) of the Act and who would not have been convicted but for the reverse onus in s 1(2), can be dealt with in terms of the ordinary appeals processes.
 In the light of the reasons set out above I would have upheld both appeals and made an order declaring both impugned sections unconstitutional and invalid and referring them to the Constitutional Court in terms of s 172(2)(a) of the Constitution.