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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

by

David Hume

PAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS

It has been remarked, my HERMIPPUS, that though the ancient philosophers
conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this method
of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom
succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and
regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical
inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic
manner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point
at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce
the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in
conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer
desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a
freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of Author and
Reader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the
image of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the
natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and
preserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much
time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely
think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order,
brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them.

There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly
adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method
of composition.

Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of
dispute, but at the same time so important that it cannot be too often
inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the
novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where
the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the
variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may
appear neither tedious nor redundant.

Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so OBSCURE and
UNCERTAIN, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard
to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into
the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to
differ, where no one can reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments,
even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and if the
subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner,
into company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human
life, study and society.

Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of
NATURAL RELIGION. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a
God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most
refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and
arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all
our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of
society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent
from our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and
important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of
that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence?
These have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning
these human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these
are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry
with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and
contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate
researches.

This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of
the summer season with CLEANTHES, and was present at those conversations
of his with PHILO and DEMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect
account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must,
of necessity, enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and
display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so
delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast
in their characters still further raised your expectations; while you
opposed the accurate philosophical turn of CLEANTHES to the careless
scepticism of PHILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the
rigid inflexible orthodoxy of DEMEA. My youth rendered me a mere auditor
of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of
life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection
of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any
considerable part of them in the recital.

PART 1

After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in CLEANTHES's library,
DEMEA paid CLEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of
my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his
friendships. The father of PAMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend:
The son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son,
were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every
useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am
persuaded, in prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate
to you a maxim, which I have observed with regard to my own children,
that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I
follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That
students of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then ethics, next
physics, last of all the nature of the gods." [Chrysippus apud Plut: de
repug: Stoicorum] This science of natural theology, according to him,
being the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest
judgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other
sciences, can safely be entrusted with it.

Are you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of
religion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether
those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course
of their education? It is only as a science, replied DEMEA, subjected to
human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural
Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care; and
by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I
imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the
principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I
still remark the uncertainty of each part; the eternal disputations of
men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous
conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the
principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper
submission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening
to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from
that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the
most established doctrines and opinions.

Your precaution, says PHILO, of seasoning your children's minds early
with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite
in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your
plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very
principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and
self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive
to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are
unacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless
disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for
philosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great
points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little
into study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in
doctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult
for human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences,
profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But CLEANTHES will, I hope,
agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest
remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane
liberty. Let DEMEA's principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become
thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of
human reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless
contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the
errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable
difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the
contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and
effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all
kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any
certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full
light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can
retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any
regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote
from common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a
stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when
these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain
circumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we
decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from
eternity to eternity?

While PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the
countenance both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES. That of DEMEA seemed to imply an
unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in CLEANTHES's
features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some
raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of PHILO.

You propose then, PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to erect religious faith on
philosophical scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be
expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these
theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority.
Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we
shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see,
whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really
doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according
to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more
fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think,
fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics.
If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world
with their doubts, cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they
are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to
the state, to philosophy, or to religion.

In reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in
a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions
and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and
opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism,
or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press
in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy
dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be
able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And
for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in
which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently
with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be
more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in
reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the
same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their
schools, and which they ought to have confined to them.

In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the
STOICS and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them
seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform
sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every
disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a
sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of
honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not
prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by
its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this
sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a
philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to
such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most
calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support
this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be
recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him
unawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian.

I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied
PHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind
cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even
when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition;
and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in
common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient
schools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and
constancy which seem astonishing to present times.

    Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy.
    Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm
    Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite
    Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast
    With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel.

In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical
considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will
not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects;
but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in
his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either
never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments
more favourable to human reason.

To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of
scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men;
and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the
absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his
speculations further than this necessity constrains him, and
philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a
certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself
after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common
life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from
our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general
principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we
acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our
principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call
philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the
same kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially
different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater
stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its
exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding.

But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the
surrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two
eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the
creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of
spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing
without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable,
infinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest
tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got
quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our
speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make
appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen
our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the
suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning
that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have
not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon
objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of
all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are
like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem
suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against
the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We
know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in
such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is
peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are
entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them.

All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view,
it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never
retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the
sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to
counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the
senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose
this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined
scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose
and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The
mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense
or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism.

But I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all
speculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at
variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of
common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it,
notwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some
of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of
certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who
pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of
the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays
of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And
what would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to
the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth,
should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these
subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow
and fallacious reason of mankind?

There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well
observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do
not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which
requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of
scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that
those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not
only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the
most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to
them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor
attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and
philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature.
They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and
their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence
which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most
abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by
philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the
heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of
bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the
parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are
obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart,
and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which
occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and
political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and
religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the
general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any
particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a
plain proof of prejudice and passion?

Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our
ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion,
full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the
difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I
have not capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it:
I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance,
refutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the
received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour.

I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated
writer [L'Arte de penser], who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of
philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm
(I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers.
But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement,
I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse
nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural
recreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions.

In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common
life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all,
if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and
evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies
entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of
mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any
pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to
entertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system
contains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our
natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even
monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to
it. And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive
knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to
the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most
obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has
such easy access and admission into the mind of man?

And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a
pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the
union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first
establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all
religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses,
against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry.
All the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and
thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout
Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or
rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith, were
sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural
reason. A celebrated prelate [Monsr. Huet] too, of the Romish communion,
a man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of
Christianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils
of the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM. LOCKE seems to have been the
first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but
a species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and
that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in
morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the
principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and
other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and
first reformers, still further propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr.
LOCKE: And it is now in a manner avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning
and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it
is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter
principle, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain
the former.

Don't you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on
this head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an
Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious
remark too, said PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another passage,
where, having mentioned DAVID's fool, who said in his heart there is no
God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a
double share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts
there is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips, and
are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such
people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be
very formidable.

But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear
communicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the
religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us.
It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the
whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which
followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived,
that Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the
presumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that
human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty
influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those
suggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most
determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present,
when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more
open commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular
principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have
changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of
STOICS, PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and
ACADEMICS. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to
lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another;
whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in
giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their
favourite principle, and established tenet.

It is very natural, said CLEANTHES, for men to embrace those principles,
by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have
any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient.
And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of
principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they
tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the
cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations.

PART 2

I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me,
than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the
whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were
maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and
Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental
principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a
question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am
persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so
certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but
the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human
understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The
essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his
existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular
which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and
blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence;
and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite
perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it
entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep
cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating
through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his
existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees
and attributes.

But lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my
philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very
great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation
of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological
subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated
for piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus
expresses himself [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. "One ought not
so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively
what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being
infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as
we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed
with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that
that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine
that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our
spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind.
We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of
matter without being material.... he comprehends also the perfections of
created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit:
That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without
restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal."

After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have
produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear
ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your
doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the
question can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the
Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and
self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of
this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him
every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth,
deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to
wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all
perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we
comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his
perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human
creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to
him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other
language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of
him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond
to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these
qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and
comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of
disputation in the schools.

In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse
to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in order to come at
this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We
have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not
conclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a
pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound
piety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the
adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being.

Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing
himself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious declamations of
PHILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the
world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be
nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of
lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond
what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various
machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other
with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever
contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all
nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of
human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence.
Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer,
by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the
Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed
of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which
he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument
alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity
to human mind and intelligence.

I shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the
beginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the
similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums
by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the
Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which
have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all
sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and
probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity:
But surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists,
which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning.

What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that
all religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that
they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that
inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the
earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and
when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without
hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases
gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence
is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least,
from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the
evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is
confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the
circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it
takes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and
fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that
it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much
weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our
experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily
followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments,
to have been mistaken.

If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty,
that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that
species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species
of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a
resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a
similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The
dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is
a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how
that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.

It would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be
deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity
amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole
adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a
resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and
arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that
human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and
infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and
this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the
dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name
only of presumption or conjecture?

Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders
of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect
evidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the
adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these
extravagant opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them?
or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by
such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS?

You seem not to apprehend, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in
his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his
tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most
with you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of
the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to
escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you
can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I
may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of
CLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and
I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain
no further scruples with regard to it.

Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he
would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine
what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one
state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he
clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction,
every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he
assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects
the others which are equally possible.

Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really
is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any
one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might
set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety
of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being
all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory
account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can
point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.

Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is,
indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement,
or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design;
but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that
principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source
or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and
there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements,
from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite
arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal
mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The
equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by
experience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference
between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or
form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone,
and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the
ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy,
arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house.
Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of
order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar
causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a
machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.

I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance,
which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must
conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound
Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall
endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of
the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided
he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.

When CLEANTHES had assented, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the
following manner.

That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on
experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the
supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar
effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But
observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners
proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the
cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying
their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of
circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new
experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no
moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age,
disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars
may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the
objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect
with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that
which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of
philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate
march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are
incapable of all discernment or consideration.

But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have
been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to
the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their
similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes?
Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other
animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the
universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred
others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by
which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on
other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred
from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all
comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we
learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a
leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction
concerning the vegetation of a tree?

But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature
upon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin
of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so
weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is
found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little
agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it
the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does
indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully
to guard against so natural an illusion.

So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can
afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will
not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be
very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude,
that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence,
reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has
so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can
we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a
universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to
this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action,
with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all
things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the
rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable
sophism.

But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling
the human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its
activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in
this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted,
arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which
is in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and
arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and
nourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution
that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to
the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature,
we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number
of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every
change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles
would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the
formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend
to determine.

A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very
imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively
concerning the origin of the whole?

Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this
time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without
human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally
attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art.
But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former?
Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe?
Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another
situation vastly different from the former?

And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of
SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by HIERO,
What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and
after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing
in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had
answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this
subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out
sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many
other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even
contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from
its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the
sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been
observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence
of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an
argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the
objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without
parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will
any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must
arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have
experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we
had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely,
that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance...

PHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and
earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience
in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest,
said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of
popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that
the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the
question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is
found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a
species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe
from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the
motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise
all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged
against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you
have seen to move? Have...

Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon
another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus
another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the
revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same
theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the
sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn,
and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and
resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs
of the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you
have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.

In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is
now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part
even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous
in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a
matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who
had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn
their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and
convincing. But if we peruse GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the
system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the
sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that
there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between
elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the
illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had
established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible,
unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to
the former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity
in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness
when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid,
the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and
moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c.
After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men
plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and
that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same
arguments and phenomena from one to the other.

In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own
condemnation, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you
are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show
any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of
a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles
the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under
your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the
phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation?
If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory.

PART 3

How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of
ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not
aware, PHILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first
disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial
matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and
supported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but
that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the
similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this
similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form;
what more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes, and to
ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention?
Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse
cavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted
in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather
than by serious argument and philosophy.

Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds,
much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach:
Suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all
nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect:
Suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and
meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent
Being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment
concerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it
to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections
(if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism,
may also be produced against this inference.

Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on
experience: that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence
infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to
conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this
extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all
languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no
reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a
rational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some
accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or
intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I
hope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in
the one case than in the other.

But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I
shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or
impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable
language, common to every individual of human race; and that books are
natural productions, which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with
animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions
of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a
natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own
species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in
the finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organised body,
the propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is an easier supposition than that
of any plant or animal.

Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by
natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite
beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original
cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it
reasons and discourses; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its
views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect,
sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every
consideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that
all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first
formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded
not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that
degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be
abashed at so glaring an absurdity.

But if there be any difference, PHILO, between this supposed case and the
real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The
anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the
perusal of LIVY or TACITUS; and any objection which you start in the
former case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene
as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the
supposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, PHILO,
without ambiguity or evasion; assert either that a rational volume is no
proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works
of nature.

Let me here observe too, continued CLEANTHES, that this religious
argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected
by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and
undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either
affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable
sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to
adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent,
wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot,
without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural
Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse,
obstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye;
survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling,
if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a
force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in
favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon
up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support
Infidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the
correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole
course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that
the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and
millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the
universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible
meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree,
therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such
natural and such convincing arguments?

Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules,
and which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition
to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established
masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend,
contradictory to the principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible
influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular
nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a
coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable
proof of design and intention.

It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their
due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian; not because they are
obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question
with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal?
From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents?
A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are
lost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to
trace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but
stupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive
disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: You
can compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors
proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too
luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a
profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections.

Here I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little embarrassed and
confounded: But while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for
him, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse, and saved his countenance.

Your instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn from books and language, being
familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is
there not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not
render us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and
have some adequate idea of his nature and attributes? When I read a
volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him,
in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and
conception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while
employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can
make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect,
but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains a great and
inexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning.

The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout of
all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS,
expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed
to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in
acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain
mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties.
These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be
acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and
comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the
grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the
whole universe.

All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love,
friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain
reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for
preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in
such circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to transfer such
sentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them;
and the phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a
theory. All our ideas, derived from the senses, are confessedly false and
illusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme
intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of
the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding,
we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect
similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the
manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or
suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain,
fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these
circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such
a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason.
At least if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still
to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to
acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally
incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us
to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable
sublimity of the Divine attributes.

PART 4

It seems strange to me, said CLEANTHES, that you, DEMEA, who are so
sincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious,
incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously
that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The
Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which
we can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not
just, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what
there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any
meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain
the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or
Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and
unintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting
the production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know
of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific
intelligible cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed,
if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to
bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you
shall please to require of them.

Who could imagine, replied DEMEA, that CLEANTHES, the calm philosophical
CLEANTHES, would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname
to them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have
recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he
not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that
Anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous
consequences, as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In
reality, CLEANTHES, consider what it is you assert when you represent the
Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of
man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas;
united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each
other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse,
arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved
entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement.
New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which
continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest
variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with
that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe
to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and
future: His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual
operation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every
instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no
diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or
diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be,
without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in
one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that
this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or
idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any
different judgement or idea.

I can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect
simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have
explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the
consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word,
Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity
possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we
never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible
with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and
sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly
simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason,
no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at
all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as
well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without
composition.

Pray consider, said PHILO, whom you are at present inveighing against.
You are honouring with the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox
divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last
be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist
in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be
asserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the
argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of
mankind?

But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I
shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences
of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that
there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the
Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the
same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which
he intends to execute.

It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether
we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged
to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had
assigned as satisfactory and conclusive.

If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries a priori) be
not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect,
this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world,
or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world,
or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require
a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion
a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are
entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is
not common to both of them.

Again, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some sentence,
even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she
perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two
kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and
to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have
specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a
vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from
these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes,
than thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons after the
same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor
indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different
periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of
weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these
particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious
machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and
operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not
more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more
curious adjustment of springs and principles.

How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that
Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system
of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material?
Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal
world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further;
why go so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy
ourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what
satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the
story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more
applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon
a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so
on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the
present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its
order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we
arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step
beyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour which it
is impossible ever to satisfy.

To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme
Being, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really
to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain
know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material
world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one
opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so?

We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves,
and without any known cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger
experience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of
generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause
exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular
systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in
madness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that
order is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause
in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of
objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make
leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our
inquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction
can ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the
narrow bounds of human understanding.

It was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause
of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or
occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its
nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been
discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of
ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really
said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed
that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it
is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being;
can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it
is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why
a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the
order of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent
creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to
say, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all
originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only
more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the
one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater
conformity to vulgar prejudices.

You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES:
You seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life,
if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I
cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question
which may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly
submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to
be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles
into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable as
these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement
of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and
intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest
language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join
in the same testimony: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the
praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general
harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me,
what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns
not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go
further, who are wiser or more enterprising.

I pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I
should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am
sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same
answer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the
beginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can
absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any
advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge,
must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed
very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though
these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally
inexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a
particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be
accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of
itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a
material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any
more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former.

PART 5

But to show you still more inconveniences, continued PHILO, in your
Anthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of your principles. Like
effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this,
you say too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that
the liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which
are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either
side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less
conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you to
reject its consequences.

All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur
and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments
for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to
your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections,
by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects
of human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even
following the old system of the world, could exclaim,

    Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
    Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
    Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes
    Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces?
    Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto?

If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural,
as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN:

"Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam
tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae
molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti
muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti
aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?"

If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater
must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely
enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more
unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience
of the narrow productions of human design and invention.

The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature,
are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The
further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer
the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from
any object of human experience and observation.

And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?...
These surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new
instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected
on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said PHILO. I
know of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted
PHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES.

Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the
consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim
to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause
ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it
falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we,
upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being?
You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity
to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at
the same time weaken all proofs of his existence.

Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to
the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from
every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many
inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a
perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only
seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace
infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these
difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new
instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must
acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited
views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any
considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real
systems. Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that
poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank
among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other
production?

But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain
uncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed
to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of
the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and
beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a
stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a
long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections,
deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many
worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere
this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made;
and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in
the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the
truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great
number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may
be imagined?

And what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from
your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men
join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a
commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and
framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human
affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit
the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and
knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to
you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such
foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing
and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we
may suppose several degrees more perfect!

To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true
philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one
deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every
attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be
needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity
existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes
are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings,
by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy?
Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the
opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight
equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an
aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if
the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen
conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more
probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and
capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the
language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all
analogy, and even comprehension.

But further, CLEANTHES: men are mortal, and renew their species by
generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great
sexes of male and female, says MILTON, animate the world. Why must this
circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous
and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought
back upon us.

And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity
or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.?
EPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human
figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument,
which is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to
you, solid and philosophical.

In a word, CLEANTHES, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps
to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from
something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one
single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his
theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for
aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior
standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who
afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work
only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to
his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some
superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures,
from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You
justly give signs of horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions; but
these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES's
suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are
supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think
that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect,
preferable to none at all.

These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried CLEANTHES: they strike me,
however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in
which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I
see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get
rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every
turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and
this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion.

PART 6

It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said DEMEA, which can be erected on
so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one
deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our
existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or
alive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or
worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all
the purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless:
and even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty,
according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory.

To render it still more unsatisfactory, said PHILO, there occurs to me
another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the
method of reasoning so much insisted on by CLEANTHES. That like effects
arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all
religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less
certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where
several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will
also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we
conclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us.
Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we
conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In
short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no
scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity.

Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge,
it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body, and seems
actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual
circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in
every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived
throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its
proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the
whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the
SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.

You have too much learning, CLEANTHES, to be at all surprised at this
opinion, which, you know, was maintained by almost all the Theists of
antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For
though, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as
if they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather
their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organisation
renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the
universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art
and contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety,
be extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour
of the ancient than the modern theory.

There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which
recommended it to the ancient theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all
their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than
mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their
senses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single
instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they
felt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in
both, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but
seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to
suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of
them, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable
from them.

Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, CLEANTHES, on
which you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any
considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to
systematical prejudices, to find any more difficulty in supposing an
animal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes,
possessed of order and organisation, than in supposing a similar order to
belong to mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always
to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely
neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which
you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you
assert, that our limited experience is an unequal standard, by which to
judge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own
hypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it,
and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.

This theory, I own, replied CLEANTHES, has never before occurred to me,
though a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an
examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You
are very scrupulous, indeed, said PHILO: were I to examine any system of
yours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in
starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur
to you, you will oblige us by proposing it.

Why then, replied CLEANTHES, it seems to me, that, though the world does,
in many circumstances, resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also
defective in many circumstances the most material: no organs of sense; no
seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In
short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an
animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the
soul of the world.

But, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the
world; and that is a principle, which, I think, can be refuted by the
strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this
purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those,
who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their
inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations
derived from the nature of human society, which is in continual
revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches
and poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited
experience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be
expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger
of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and
had these convulsions continued a little longer, or been a little more
violent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a
few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the
Popes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the
appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been
utterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous,
would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the GREEK language
and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of
CONSTANTINOPLE. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the
mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily
imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later
origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the
eternity of the world, seems a little precarious.

But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. LUCULLUS was
the first that brought cherry-trees from ASIA to EUROPE; though that tree
thrives so well in many EUROPEAN climates, that it grows in the woods
without any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no
EUROPEAN had ever passed into ASIA, and thought of transplanting so
delicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once
transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires
may rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and
knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain
in the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by
the revolutions of human society.

It is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into FRANCE,
though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is
not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were
known in AMERICA. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole
eternity, there never arose a COLUMBUS, who might open the communication
between EUROPE and that continent? We may as well imagine, that all men
would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to
think of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the
youth, or rather infancy, of the world; as being founded on the operation
of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society
is governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the
elements will ever destroy all the EUROPEAN animals and vegetables which
are now to be found in the Western world.

And what argument have you against such convulsions? replied PHILO.
Strong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole
earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely
covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from
matter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and
great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The
incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate
some such general transformations; though, at the same time, it is
observable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever
had experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor
can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the
parts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of
reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to
defend any particular system of this nature, which I never willingly
should do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an
eternal inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with
great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all
difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely
complete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or
later have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have
been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order
somewhere, in thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which
of these we give the preference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis,
sceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady,
inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us,
we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no
idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly
see that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article,
ever to admit of any other disposition.

Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which
maintained, as we learn from HESIOD, that this globe was governed by
30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature: you would
naturally object, CLEANTHES, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis;
and that it is as easy to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous,
but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the
same inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of
deities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses within
himself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these
systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on
your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any
advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your
principles.

PART 7

But here, continued PHILO, in examining the ancient system of the soul of
the world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just,
must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first
inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a
greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of
human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the
former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be
ascribed to generation or vegetation, than to reason or design. Your
conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and
defective.

Pray open up this argument a little further, said DEMEA, for I do not
rightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed
it.

Our friend CLEANTHES, replied PHILO, as you have heard, asserts, that
since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the
existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The
world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its
cause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the
operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very
small part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the
rule by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he
measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual
standard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm,
that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human
invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the
world, and which, therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the
universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables.
The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a
watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable,
resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation
or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be
something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation.

But how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any
thing similar to vegetation or generation?

Very easily, replied PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into
the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great
vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself
certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos,
vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world;
and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star
to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every
where surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new
system.

Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should
suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal:
and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without
any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so...

I understand you, says DEMEA: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions are
these! What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the
slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal
sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? Objects,
which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for
each other?

Right, cries PHILO: This is the topic on which I have all along insisted.
I have still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of
cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in
extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the
whole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what
rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule
than the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant
or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a
stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine,
which arises from reason and design?

But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? said DEMEA.
Can you explain their operations, and anatomise that fine internal
structure on which they depend?

As much, at least, replied PHILO, as CLEANTHES can explain the operations
of reason, or anatomise that internal structure on which it depends. But
without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer,
that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you
conclude a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation,
reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects
are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one of these
principles, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a
standard to the whole of nature.

In reality, DEMEA, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the
views are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our
conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects.
In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles,
reason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar to each
other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other
principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of
the universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to
system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of
these four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie
open to our conjecture,) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the
origin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to
confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds
operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a
partiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal
fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or
vegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, indeterminate word, Nature, to
which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more
inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from
experience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation,
are totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to
experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation, from a seed shed
by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or
contrivance, according to the sense in which CLEANTHES understands it.

But methinks, said DEMEA, if the world had a vegetative quality, and
could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power
would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For
whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can
order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it
bestows?

You need only look around you, replied PHILO, to satisfy yourself with
regard to this question. A tree bestows order and organisation on that
tree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the
same manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this
kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise
from reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and
vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor
can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, a priori,
both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and
that it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong
to matter.

But further, DEMEA; this objection which you urge can never be made use
of by CLEANTHES, without renouncing a defence which he has already made
against one of my objections. When I inquired concerning the cause of
that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing;
he told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could
never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. "We must
stop somewhere", says he; "nor is it ever within the reach of human
capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any
objects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are supported
by experience and observation." Now, that vegetation and generation, as
well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is
undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to
the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And
when CLEANTHES asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or
generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his
great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on
both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to
stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience,
generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the
latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter.

Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I,
resembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from
generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small
appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says CLEANTHES, resembles
a machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The
steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he
pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or
reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may,
with better authority, use the same freedom to push further his
hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle
of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the
utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in
innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of
generation, and never to arise from any other principle.

HESIOD, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this
analogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an
animal birth, and copulation. PLATO too, so far as he is intelligible,
seems to have adopted some such notion in his TIMAEUS.

The BRAHMINS assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who
spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates
afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and
resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which
appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible
animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the
whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our
globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is
very possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and
irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all
things to design and intelligence, as explained by CLEANTHES. Why an
orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain,
it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason.

I must confess, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, that of all men living, the
task which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits
you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So
great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to
acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such
out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I
clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but
you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution
so ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense
and reason are entirely against you; and that such whimsies as you have
delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us.

PART 8

What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied PHILO, is
entirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects adapted to the
narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination,
which carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound
judgement, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd
and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred
contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and
invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort
of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems
of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth, though it
is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be
the true system.

For instance, what if I should revive the old EPICUREAN hypothesis? This
is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that
has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it
might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead
of supposing matter infinite, as EPICURUS did, let us suppose it finite.
A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions:
and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or
position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, therefore,
with all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and
destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds
and limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite,
in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination.

But this supposes, said DEMEA, that matter can acquire motion, without
any voluntary agent or first mover.

And where is the difficulty, replied PHILO, of that supposition? Every
event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and
every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion,
in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity,
begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose
always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis;
and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in
matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind
and intelligence.

Besides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all
eternity, and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld
in the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, as much is
gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is
certain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as
far as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at
present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest.

And this very consideration too, continued PHILO, which we have stumbled
on in the course of the argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony,
that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an
order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual
agitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in
the forms which it produces? There certainly is such an economy; for this
is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of
matter, therefore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce
this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once
established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But
wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in
perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its
situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and
contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must
have a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself
must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element
in which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its
waste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A
defect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter of
which it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular
motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular
form. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great
quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is
entirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its
first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcass of one
languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues;
till finite, though innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms,
whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a
continued succession of matter.

Suppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were
thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that
this first position must, in all probability, be the most confused and
most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of
human contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an
adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the
actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever
in disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or
activity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still
continues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a
second, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the
first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No
particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The
original force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual
restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and
instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment,
it is instantly hurried away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force
which actuates every part of matter.

Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of
chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so
as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed
inherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance,
amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find to
be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually
changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains,
in appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather
be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and
may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which
is in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject a little, and we shall
find, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability
in the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts,
affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty.

It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals
or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain
know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do
we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment
ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? It happens
indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some
regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it
were not so, could the world subsist? Must it not dissolve as well as the
animal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but
finite succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order?

It is well, replied CLEANTHES, you told us, that this hypothesis was
suggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure
to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections
to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess
those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence: some new order or
economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at last some
order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But
according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and
advantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, are not
absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might
have been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep,
and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction
and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the
sandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved?
If no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful
direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been
immediately extinguished? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very
frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one
of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design,
which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe.

At least, you may safely infer, said PHILO, that the foregoing hypothesis
is so far incomplete and imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow.
But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this
nature? Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be
liable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to
our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature? Your
theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though
you have run into Anthropomorphism, the better to preserve a conformity
to common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances
which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are
ectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: You reverse
this order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we
have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that
matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence
upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its
own body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an
universal law of nature: But your theory implies a contradiction to this
experience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to
collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought
that is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal);
these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each
other, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be
received from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on
account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which
we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted.

All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and
insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he
carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities,
and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole,
prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no
system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this
plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard
to any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable
resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence,
among Theologians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who
remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no
fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged
to defend?

PART 9

But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said DEMEA,
had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori,
which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all
doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of
the Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with
certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is
finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say,
prove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very
difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from
contemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the
plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute.
Whereas the argument a priori ...

You seem to reason, DEMEA, interposed CLEANTHES, as if those advantages
and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its
solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what
argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards,
from itself, better than from its useful consequences, endeavour to
determine what value we ought to put upon it.

The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one.
Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being
absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of
its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we
must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate
cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that
is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may
be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and
effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and
efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal
chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any
thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much
as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is
still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from
eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there
be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is
equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having
existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which
constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something
to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular
possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed
to be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that
can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a
necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in
himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express
contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a
Deity.

I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the
starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of
this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded,
and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety
and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it.

I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in
pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any
arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies
a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a
contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as
non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a
contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is
demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am
willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.

It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this
necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting,
that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be
as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But
it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the
same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to
conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor
can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain
always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always
conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary
existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is
consistent.

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily
existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We
dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught
we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known,
would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that
twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the
material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument
is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the
world. "Any particle of matter," it is said[]Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived
to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an
annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems
a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends
equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that
the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes
to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which
can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes
unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not
belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they
can never be proved incompatible with it.

Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems
absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing,
that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a
priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by
that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is
the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the
uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct
countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is
performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on
the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each
individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think
it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of
the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause
of the parts.

Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse
me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot
forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by
arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some
lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any
of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are
products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is
a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser
product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may
be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful
algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and
demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these
numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the
universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can
furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the
order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into
the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was
absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So
dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present
question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite
to the religious hypothesis!

But dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining
ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation,
that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except
to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to
abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the
understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary
to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to
subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good
sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in
such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly
where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive
their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning.

PART 10

It is my opinion, I own, replied DEMEA, that each man feels, in a manner,
the truth of religion within his own breast, and, from a consciousness of
his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek
protection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So
anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is
still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward,
and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those
unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and
oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst
the innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of
atonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly
agitated and tormented?

I am indeed persuaded, said PHILO, that the best, and indeed the only
method of bringing every one to a due sense of religion, is by just
representations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose
a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of
reasoning and argument. For is it necessary to prove what every one feels
within himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible,
more intimately and sensibly.

The people, indeed, replied DEMEA, are sufficiently convinced of this
great and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man;
the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of
pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial
in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their
own immediate feeling and experience?

In this point, said PHILO, the learned are perfectly agreed with the
vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery
has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and
melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a
system, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in
images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole inspired
tribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things
would suit the feeling and observation of each individual.

As to authorities, replied DEMEA, you need not seek them. Look round this
library of CLEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of
particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to
treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers,
from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other,
extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is
entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can
recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it.

There you must excuse me, said PHILO: LEIBNIZ has denied it; and is
perhaps the first [That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King and some
few others before Leibniz; though by none of so great a fame as that
German philosopher] who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion;
at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system.

And by being the first, replied DEMEA, might he not have been sensible of
his error? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to
make discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man hope by a
simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear
down the united testimony of mankind, founded on sense and consciousness?

And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all
other animals? The whole earth, believe me, PHILO, is cursed and
polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures.
Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear,
anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into
life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent:
Weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is
at last finished in agony and horror.

Observe too, says PHILO, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to
embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the
weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in
their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without
relaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, which either are
bred on the body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their stings in
him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment
them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every
animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and
destruction.

Man alone, said DEMEA, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule.
For by combination in society, he can easily master lions, tigers, and
bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey
upon him.

On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried PHILO, that the uniform and
equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. Man, it is true, can, by
combination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the
whole animal creation: but does he not immediately raise up to himself
imaginary enemies, the demons of his fancy, who haunt him with
superstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life? His pleasure,
as he imagines, becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give
them umbrage and offence: his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials
to anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill,
presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the
wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the anxious
breast of wretched mortals.

Besides, consider, DEMEA: This very society, by which we surmount those
wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to
us? What woe and misery does it not occasion? Man is the greatest enemy
of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition,
war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each
other; and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed,
were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their
separation.

But though these external insults, said DEMEA, from animals, from men,
from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of
woes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within
ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many
lie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic
enumeration of the great poet.

    Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs,
    Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy,
    And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,
    Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence.
    Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: despair
    Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch.
    And over them triumphant death his dart
    Shook: but delay'd to strike, though oft invok'd
    With vows, as their chief good and final hope.

The disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not
perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage,
disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed
through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have
scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred
by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those
few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach
contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make
a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and
any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often
the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to
render life ineligible.

Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as
a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded
with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a
fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny,
famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him
a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an
opera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only showing him a
diversity of distress and sorrow.

There is no evading such striking instances, said PHILO, but by
apologies, which still further aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I
ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?...
They have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from
their discontented, repining, anxious disposition...And can there
possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a
wretched temper?

But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist,
why do they remain in life?...

    Not satisfied with life, afraid of death.

This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not
bribed to the continuance of our existence.

It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits
indulge, and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of
mankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is it
any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of
life? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more
alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what
judgement must we form in general of human life?

Let men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They
are willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No! reply I: an anxious
languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their
activity and ambition.

I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied
CLEANTHES: but I confess I feel little or nothing of it in myself, and
hope that it is not so common as you represent it.

If you feel not human misery yourself, cried DEMEA, I congratulate you on
so happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not
been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let
us attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, CHARLES V, when, tired
with human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the
hands of his son. In the last harangue which he made on that memorable
occasion, he publicly avowed, that the greatest prosperities which he had
ever enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might
truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment. But did
the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater
happiness? If we may credit his son's account, his repentance commenced
the very day of his resignation.

CICERO's fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and
renown; yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar
letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably to
his own experience, he introduces CATO, the great, the fortunate CATO,
protesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would
reject the present.

Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over
again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next
twenty, they say, will be better:

    And from the dregs of life, hope to receive
    What the first sprightly running could not give.

Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it
reconciles even contradictions), that they complain at once of the
shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow.

And is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these
reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still
persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of
the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the
same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is
infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other
animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom
is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But
the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it
is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human
knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than
these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the
benevolence and mercy of men?

EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil,
but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

You ascribe, CLEANTHES (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to
Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice
and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The preservation
alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for
her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any
care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No
resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure
or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some
want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this
nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance.

Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives
satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and
propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand,
arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the
injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth,
laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no
further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains
of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself,
in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were
pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by
deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible.

And have you at last, said CLEANTHES smiling, betrayed your intentions,
PHILO? Your long agreement with DEMEA did indeed a little surprise me;
but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against
me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of
your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the
present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an
end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural
attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and
uncertain?

You take umbrage very easily, replied DEMEA, at opinions the most
innocent, and the most generally received, even amongst the religious and
devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a
topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged
with no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and
preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have
they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may
attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this
life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena,
therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of
existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of
things, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace with
adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the
mazes and intricacies of his providence.

No! replied CLEANTHES, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be
admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence
can any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can any
hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one
hypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air; and the utmost
we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the
bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms,
establish its reality.

The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I
willingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of
man. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views mostly
fictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is
more common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And
for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a
hundred enjoyments.

Admitting your position, replied PHILO, which yet is extremely doubtful,
you must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent than
pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is
often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid
enjoyments; and how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several
in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever
able to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue
for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate,
the nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly
degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how
often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it
becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted,
courage languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our
misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole
cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still
greater horror and consternation.

But not to insist upon these topics, continued PHILO, though most
obvious, certain, and important; I must use the freedom to admonish you,
CLEANTHES, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue,
and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential
articles of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a
just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human
life, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our
present pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to be eligible and
desirable! But this is contrary to every one's feeling and experience: It
is contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No
decisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it
possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all
the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: And thus, by
your resting the whole system of religion on a point, which, from its
very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that
system is equally uncertain.

But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never
possibly can prove, that animal, or at least human happiness, in this
life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing: For this is not, by
any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and
infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by
chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the
Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention?
But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so
short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects
exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and
falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along
insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn
and indignation.

But I will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment, for I
deny that you can ever force me in it. I will allow, that pain or misery
in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even
in your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these
concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must
prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present
mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful
undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being
finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where
they are also so jarring and discordant!

Here, CLEANTHES, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph.
Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of
intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical
subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its
parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes
strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what
I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then
imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But
there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from
which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes,
or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and
infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is
your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical
subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience.

PART 11

I scruple not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect
the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all
theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and
that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better
served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate
expressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise,
and holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing
beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the
affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all
human analogy, as seems your intention, DEMEA, I am afraid we abandon all
religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration.
If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to
reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes;
much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the
Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a
satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and
every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then
be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to,
in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated
by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the
present. You, PHILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and
reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without
interruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our
attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form.

My sentiments, replied PHILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and
therefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with
regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a
very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted
with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very
good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his
conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find
it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these
attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could
be so full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life.
Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still
assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent
Being; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would
never retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument;
since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness
and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those
phenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing,
which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not
antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent, and
powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of
things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason
for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of
his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference
concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that
inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more
you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render
him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the
reach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him
merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition
or conjecture.

Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment
convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages,
stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise,
confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you
would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination.
The architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that
if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What
he says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the
other parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences.
But still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had
skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole,
and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have
remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your
own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the
impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in
the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn
the architect.

In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and
as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a
limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and
benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary.
And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be,
allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a
Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The
consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures,
especially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may
perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be
foundations for any inference.

There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest
part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures; and it is not
impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable.
We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with
regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however
wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may
not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep
ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and
not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is
supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the
case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on
which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree
necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the
utmost license of imagination.

The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or
economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are
employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the
great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various
degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All
animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by
any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness;
instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they
might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their
subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least
they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly
possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is
any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can
be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it;
and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce
that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses.
Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any
appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the
most certain truth?

But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the
second circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws;
and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if
everything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature
would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the
conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this
inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill,
wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any
preparation, or long progress of causes and effects?

Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the
world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us
appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our
expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite
number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a
great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the
prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner,
depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret
springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all
these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy,
without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes
were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good
princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and
authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few
such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the
face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of
nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things,
where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small
touches given to CALIGULA's brain in his infancy, might have converted
him into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying
CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored
liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know,
be good reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they
are unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons
exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine
attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that
conclusion.

If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if
animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but
some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various
concurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very
rare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to
mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are
distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs
and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation,
that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any
single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every
animal has the requisite endowments; but these endowments are bestowed
with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must
entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is
a proportional abatement in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness
are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either
imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving
wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity,
is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily
advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging,
without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill
and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation
of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has
afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly
sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have
bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure
the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate
concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so
surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path,
by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some
reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor
would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an
economy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is
supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason,
as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his
dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power
extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed
these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder
is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock
will enable him to finish.

In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man
should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force
of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or
rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I
am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his
soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and
labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent
to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an
equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by
habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any
allay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment.
Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from
idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their
frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of
land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of
every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully
reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best
regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable
of any, Nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow
it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for
his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so
contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can
oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at
least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of
a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our
demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If
we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement, of a
more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and
friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the
order of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of
being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our
state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I
dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of
wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our
foe or refuses its assistance ... we should also have our own temper to
struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone
fence against these multiplied evils.

The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the
universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles
of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are
few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and
whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the
whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without
affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it
must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful,
are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in
which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every
occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine,
that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker;
so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with
which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours
along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how
oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious?
Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth:
but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite
to all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due
proportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the
body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts
perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all
the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do
they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society?
There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently
becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with
the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The
irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is
often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery.

On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the
greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable
of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil
never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed
with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity
requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so
accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium;
there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at
present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that
these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have
been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too
presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest
in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I
mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable
reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be
sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown
manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this
goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the
phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are
so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have
been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on
such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances,
notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes
as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a
conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the
phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from
these phenomena.

Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated
and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety
and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living
existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive
to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How
contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but
the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle,
and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her
maimed and abortive children!

Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the
difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has
more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible
account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But
if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement
of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of
the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an
opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures:
but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of
principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true
conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely
indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above
ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light
above heavy.

There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the
universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have
perfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and
malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can
never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and
steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth,
therefore, seems by far the most probable.

What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little
or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude
of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence
resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater
cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since
moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral
good than natural evil above natural good.

But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which
is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so
long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much
puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a
cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every
effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry
on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who
is the ultimate cause of all things...

Hold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I
joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible
nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who
would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you
running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and
betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly,
then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself?

And are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me,
DEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at
both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious
reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of
ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute
incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery,
and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to
be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of
stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused;
and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition,
than such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and
melancholy of mankind. But at present...

Blame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend
gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly
it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was
vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are
incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract
this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that
there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this
life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was
thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have
recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men
have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is
necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as
will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the
same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with
regard to Scepticism.

Thus PHILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure
of established opinions. But I could observe that DEMEA did not at all
relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after,
on some pretence or other, to leave the company.

PART 12

After DEMEA's departure, CLEANTHES and PHILO continued the conversation
in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said CLEANTHES, will
have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are
in company; and to tell truth, PHILO, I should rather wish to reason with
either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit
of controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries
you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so
sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that
occasion.

I must confess, replied PHILO, that I am less cautious on the subject of
Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never,
on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and
because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common
sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, CLEANTHES,
with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that
notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular
arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind,
or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers
himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of
nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most
careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in
absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in
vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the
contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and,
from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new
organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its
use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the
maxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most
proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it,
lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is
observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost
lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their
authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess
that intention.

It is with pleasure I hear GALEN reason concerning the structure of the
human body. The anatomy of a man, says he [De formatione foetus], discovers
above 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find,
that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different
circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper
figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and
lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves,
veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several
views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he
calculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of
each, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these
simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments,
vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body;
how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and
intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The further we advance
in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry
still, at a distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine
internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the
fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every
different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact
propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each
species. And if the infidelity of GALEN, even when these natural sciences
were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to
what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have
attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence!

Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare),
I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself
immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger
proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature?
What indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of
things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could
mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which
demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions;
and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now,
according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for
undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature
admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very
numerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human
imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their
cogency!

I shall further add, said CLEANTHES, to what you have so well urged, that
one great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only
system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and
yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and
experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of
human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many
instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike
all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation.
Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by
establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It
is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote
and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgement, which is
here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of
mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained
against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the
religious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the
force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and
perseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported
by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early
education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.

So little, replied PHILO, do I esteem this suspense of judgement in the
present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters
somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is
usually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the
productions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good
reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that
their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also
considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional
difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much
higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have
ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly
ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account
of these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence,
notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed
between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy?
No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves
from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this
inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an
analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme
cause a GOD or DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call
him but MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a
considerable resemblance?

All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound
so much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that
the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from
the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the
strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a
species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of
human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any
precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or
precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any
quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether HANNIBAL
be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of
beauty CLEOPATRA possessed, what epithet of praise LIVY or THUCYDIDES is
entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The
disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or
vice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into
each other's meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not,
like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which
may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning
Theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps,
if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the
slightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is
a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the
human and the divine mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he
assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify
the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature
which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I
assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I
ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the
parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all
the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether
the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure
of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy
to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily
acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still further
in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle
which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears
not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of
nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought.
However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both
these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows,
that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The
Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote
analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter
into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor
consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I
should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the
Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the
Supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal
creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all
the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every
position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if
you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure
yourselves of your animosity.

And here I must also acknowledge, CLEANTHES, that as the works of Nature
have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance,
than to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer,
that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to
those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the
consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more
defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme
Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs
most from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of
rectitude and perfection.

It seems evident that the dispute between the Skeptics and Dogmatists
is entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and
assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; and such
disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise
determination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are
difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that
these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely
insolvable. No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity,
notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and
reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently
assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between
these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit,
caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist,
for like reasons, on the necessity.

These, CLEANTHES, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these
sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in
proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar
superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing
such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And
you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion
to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both.

My inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion,
however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine
of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that
we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary
rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how
much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal?

How happens it then, said PHILO, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to
society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious
consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions,
subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal
consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If
the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we
are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend
it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those
in which it is never regarded or heard of.

The reason of this observation, replied CLEANTHES, is obvious. The proper
office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanise their
conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as
its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and
justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these
other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate
principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has
become only a cover to faction and ambition.

And so will all religion, said PHILO, except the philosophical and
rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The
inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and
punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite
and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the
attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which
we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are
declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they
always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed
it is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence
of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their
religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their
speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so
powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to
subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is
certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and
benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views
suggested by theological theories and systems. A man's natural
inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the
mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas
religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and
bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether
habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the
philosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least
impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end,
prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be
repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation.

Another advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and
ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious
principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is
almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account
for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy
themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their
religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools
ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and
philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to
theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a
great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon
several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they
be cheated and deceived by him?

We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and
reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the
restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are
utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be
pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations
to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous
observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not
run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances
of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that
atrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of
declaiming in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a
sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be
laid upon it.

But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in
direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the
raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous
distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most
pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the
natural motives of justice and humanity.

Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar
motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must
be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot
satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task.
Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the
heart, at the time, feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is
by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant
principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest
zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being
inconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual
character.

The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined;
but where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be
forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the
cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it.

The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal
salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a
narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it
easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.

Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on
general conduct; nor is their operation favourable to morality, in the
instances where they predominate.

Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that
both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very
narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his
fasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular
religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail.
The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches,
will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the
guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of
life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set
apart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and
who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then,
that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to
popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it,
and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society?
Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with
inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he
must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every
consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his
own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the
wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of
them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect;
otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions,
persecutions, and civil commotions.

True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must
treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I
any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a
species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that
principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of
being always confined to very few persons.

Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question
whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the
solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and
the reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief
restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but
little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and
religion; and a Quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same
footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that POLYBIUS
[Lib. vi. cap. 54.] ascribes the infamy of GREEK faith to the prevalency of
the EPICUREAN philosophy: but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a
reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we
cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to
mention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean
philosophy; and EURIPIDES [Iphigenia in Tauride], in a passage which I
shall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against
his nation, with regard to this circumstance.

Take care, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, take care: push not matters too far:
allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration
for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great
comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of
adverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for
human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents
us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who
created us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable
desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will
transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those
desires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a
Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we
can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection.

These appearances, said PHILO, are most engaging and alluring; and with
regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it
happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater
part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of
religion commonly prevail above its comforts.

It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as
when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof,
that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?

But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied CLEANTHES.
Sometimes, said PHILO: but it is natural to imagine, that they will form
a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and
melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the
contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to
predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the
most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the
flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely
superior in number to the elect.

I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which
represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render
it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine
models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies
between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking
to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond
it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of CERBERUS and
FURIES; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone.

It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these
passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them
forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a
cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or
entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and
thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to
do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge
himself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he
has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his
thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or
circumstances, which may restore his good humour, and raising cheerful
prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and
triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the
primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always
predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.

Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by
exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of
superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so
happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to
support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and
uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery.
No wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind,
and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is
seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it
is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that
gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.

It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon
account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk
hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both
an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the
Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a
restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that,
since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in
particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior.

To know God, says SENECA, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed
absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low
condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation,
presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which
superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the
condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who
exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that
Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly
mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the
votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit
his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or
rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine
perfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and
indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally
rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or
endeavour to suspend, all judgement with regard to such sublime and such
extraordinary subjects.

If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain,
resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least
undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe
probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this
proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular
explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can
be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect
as it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and
cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other
qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most
inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain,
philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and
believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the
objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will
naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from
its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no
solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and
magnificent a question. But believe me, CLEANTHES, the most natural
sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a
longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate,
at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more
particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature,
attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person,
seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will
fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty
Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by
the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this
adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of
letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound,
believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to
the attention of PAMPHILUS: And I hope CLEANTHES will forgive me for
interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil.

CLEANTHES and PHILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as
nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of
that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I
cannot but think, that PHILO's principles are more probable than DEMEA's;
but that those of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth.

End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by
David Hume

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