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Justia Regulation Tracker Department Of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration Arnold E. Feldman, M.D.; Decision and Order, 39614-39618 [2017-17640]
Arnold E. Feldman, M.D.; Decision and Order, 39614-39618 [2017-17640]
Download as PDF 39614 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 160 / Monday, August 21, 2017 / Notices personal identifying information in your comment, please be aware that your entire comment—including your personal identifying information—may be made publicly available at any time. While you may ask us in your comment to withhold your personal identifying information from public review, we cannot guarantee that we will be able to do so. John Mahoney, Senior Policy Advisor, Federal Geographic Data Committee. [FR Doc. 2017–17561 Filed 8–18–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4338–11–P DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Drug Enforcement Administration [Docket No. 13–39] Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc.; Order On August 14, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the Agency's motion to dissolve the stay of my Order of September 8, 2015, revoking DEA Certificate of Registration No. RD0277409 issued to Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc. See Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc., v. Drug Enforcement Administration, No. 15– 1335 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) (Order). Accordingly, I order that DEA Certificate of Registration No. RD0277409 issued to Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I further order that any application of Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc., to renew or modify this registration, be, and it hereby is, denied. This Order is effective at 12:01 a.m. on August 16, 2017. Dated: August 15, 2017. Chuck Rosenberg, Acting Administrator. [FR Doc. 2017–17638 Filed 8–18–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410–09–P DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Drug Enforcement Administration asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES [Docket No. 17–17] Arnold E. Feldman, M.D.; Decision and Order On January 24, 2017, the Assistant Administrator, Diversion Control Division, issued an Order to Show Cause to Arnold E. Feldman, M.D. (Respondent), of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificate of VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:37 Aug 18, 2017 Jkt 241001 Registration No. BF4179203, and the denial of his application for a registration, on the ground that he ''do[es] not have authority to handle controlled substances in the State of Louisiana, the [S]tate in which [he is] registered . . . and [is] applying'' for registration. Show Cause Order, at 1. As to the jurisdictional basis for the proceeding, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent is ''registered . . . as a data-waived/100 practitioner in [s]chedules II–V pursuant to [Registration No.] BF4179203 with a registered address at 505 East Airport [Blvd.], Baton Rouge, Louisiana,'' and that this registration does not expire until ''September 30, 2018.'' Id. The Order also alleged that ''[o]n July 31, 2013, [Respondent] applied for a separate . . . [r]egistration as a practitioner in [s]chedules II–V with a registered address of 505 East Airport [Blvd.], Baton Rouge, Louisiana.'' Id. As to the substantive ground for the proceeding, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent's ''[a]uthority to prescribe and administer controlled substances in the State of Louisiana was suspended effective October 19, 2016.'' Id. at 2. The Order then asserted that as a consequence of Respondent's ''lack of authority to handle controlled substances in the State of Louisiana,'' Respondent's registration is subject to revocation and his application must be denied. Id. The Show Cause Order notified Respondent of his right to request a hearing on the allegation or to submit a written statement while waiving his right to a hearing and the procedure for electing either option. Id. (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). In addition, the Order notified Respondent of his right to submit a corrective action plan pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C). Id. at 2–3. On February 23, 2017, Respondent requested a hearing on the allegation. Letter from Respondent to Hearing Clerk, Office of Administrative Law Judges (Feb. 23, 2017). The same day, the matter was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Charles Wm. Dorman (hereinafter, ALJ), who issued an order (also on Feb. 23) directing the Government to file evidence supporting the allegation by March 10, 2017 at 2 p.m., as well any motion for summary disposition. Briefing Schedule For Lack Of State Authority Allegations, at 1. The ALJ's order also provided that if the Government moved for summary disposition, Respondent's opposition was due by March 24, 2017 at 2 p.m. Id. The next day, Respondent emailed the ALJ's law clerk seeking a continuance in order to engage counsel. Email from Respondent to ALJ's law clerk (Feb. 24, PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 2017). Respondent explained that he was seeking the continuance because ''I have court cases pending in multiple jurisdictions including a Mar 16 hearing, a Mar 20 hearing in Mississippi and appeals in Louisiana and Mississippi and California.'' Id. Respondent subsequently sought '' 'a continuance of at least 120 days' due to constant court appearances in Louisiana, Mississippi, and California.'' Order Denying The Respondent's Request For Continuance, at 1 (Feb. 27, 2017). Noting that his Briefing Schedule order ''provided the Respondent [with] a date to respond, if the government files such a motion,'' the ALJ reasoned that ''[b]ecause the government ha[d] not filed a motion for summary disposition . . . Respondent's request . . . is premature.'' Id. On March 2, 2017, the Government filed its Motion for Summary Disposition. As support for its motion, the Government provided: (1) A copy of Respondent's registration; (2) his July 30, 2013 application for registration as a hospital/clinic; (3) the Decision and Order of the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners (Aug. 15, 2016) which ordered the suspension of his medical license for a period of two years to begin 30 days from the date of the Order, and a subsequent Order of the Board (Sept. 13, 2016), which extended the commencement of the suspension until October 14, 2016; (4) a copy of a judgment issued by the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans which stayed the Board's Order from October 14, 2016 through October 19, 2016 and further ordered the Board to ''show cause'' as to ''why the stay should not continue''; and (5) a Declaration of a Diversion Investigator as to various matters, including that the Board's Order had gone into effect on October 19, 2016. Mot. for Summ. Disp., at Appendix A–E. On March 10, 2017, counsel for Respondent entered a notice of appearance. On March 23, 2017, Respondent filed his Reply to the Government's Motion. Therein, ''Respondent acknowledge[d] that his license to practice medicine in . . . Louisiana has been suspended in accordance with the . . . Board of Medical Examiners' Order.'' Resp. Reply, at 1. Respondent contended, however, ''that there are material questions of fact and law that require resolution in a plenary, evidentiary proceeding.'' According to Respondent, these issues were that he possesses ''an active and unrestricted'' license to practice medicine in Alabama and ''a full and unrestricted Alabama Controlled E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1 asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 160 / Monday, August 21, 2017 / Notices Substance Certificate.'' Id. at 2. Respondent argued that ''none of the cases cited by the Government'' address the situation ''where a physician has lost authority to practice in one state, while retaining unrestricted authority in another.'' Id. at 3. He also argued that the Agency's longstanding rule that a practitioner must possess authority under the laws of the State in which he engages in professional practice ''is based on the indiscriminate intermingling of'' 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824, ''each of which deals with different aspects of the control and enforcement authority to dispense controlled substances.'' Id. at 3. He further contended that while section 823 mandates that the Attorney General register the applicant if he ''is authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices,'' ''[t]he term 'practitioner' does not appear in'' section 824 and the latter provision ''does not speak to a physician's authorization to practice or dispense under the laws of the state in which the registrant practices.'' Id. at 4. In Respondent's view, section 824 authorizes revocation ''only if the registrant is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the dispensing of controlled substances . . . under state law.'' Id. at 4–5. He also maintained that ''[t]he fact that Congress employed the term 'practitioner' in'' section 823(f) but not in section 824 ''is a clear indication that it did not intend to authorize revocation or suspension of a [registration] where a registrant has continued to maintain authority to practice and dispense under the laws of any state.'' Id.; see also id. at 5 & n.16 (''Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'') (quoting Keene Corp. v United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (other citation omitted)). Finally, Respondent contended that ''[t]he Government's indiscriminate intermingling of [sections 823 and 824], and its misinterpretation of 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) amount to a violation of [his] constitutional right to travel.'' Id. at 6. He explained that ''[t]heoretically, [he] should be able to pack up and remove himself and his practice from Louisiana to . . . Alabama, where he is authorized to practice medicine and dispense controlled substances. But[] his constitutional right to do so is impaired by the Government's misinterpretation of its authority to revoke'' his registration. Id. VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:37 Aug 18, 2017 Jkt 241001 On April 3, 2017, the ALJ granted the Government's Motion. The ALJ found that ''Respondent conceded in his Reply that his Louisiana medical license is currently suspended'' and that ''it is undisputed that . . . Respondent lacks state authorization to handle controlled substances in Louisiana, where [he is] registered, and where [he] has applied for an additional'' registration. R.D. 6. Because Respondent is registered in Louisiana, the ALJ found it irrelevant that Respondent holds a license to practice medicine in Alabama. Id. at 4. The ALJ noted that ''both the CSA's 'definition of the term ''practitioner'' and the registration provision applicable to practitioners make clear that a practitioner must be currently authorized to dispense controlled substances by the State in which he practices in order to obtain and maintain a registration,' '' and that Agency's interpretation has been upheld by the Fourth Circuit. Id. (quoting Rezik A. Saqer, 81 FR 22122, 22125 (2016) and citing Hooper v. Holder, 481 Fed. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012)). The ALJ further reasoned that ''Respondent's analysis is counter to the way the DEA has interpreted the CSA for nearly forty years.'' Id. at 5 (citing Saqer, 81 FR at 22126 (citing Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR 27616 (1978))). The ALJ also rejected Respondent's contention that the Agency's interpretation impairs his constitutional right to travel. Id. at 5–6. The ALJ noted that under DEA regulations, '' '[a] separate registration is required for each principal place of business.' '' Id. at 5 (quoting 21 CFR 1301.12(a)). The ALJ also noted that in 2006, the Agency issued a final rule which ''clarif[ied] that a practitioner must obtain a separate DEA registration for each state in which he or she practices'' and that '' '[j]ust as a license to practice medicine in one State does not authorize a practitioner to practice in any other State, a DEA registration based on a particular State's license cannot authorize dispensing controlled substances in another State.' '' Id. at 6 (quoting Clarification of Registration Requirements for Individual Practitioners, 71 FR 69478, 69479 (2006) and citing Joe W. Morgan, 78 FR 61961, 61965 n.13 (2013)). The ALJ thus explained that ''Respondent is able to pack up and remove himself and his practice from Louisiana to Alabama—he just cannot dispense or prescribe controlled substances there unless he first obtains a separate DEA registration for his Alabama location in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.12(a).'' Id. The ALJ thus recommended that I revoke PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 39615 Respondent's registration and deny any pending applications. Id. at 7. Respondent filed Exceptions to the ALJ's Recommended Decision. On May 1, 2017, the ALJ forwarded the record to me for Final Agency Action. Having considered the record and Respondent's Exceptions, I reject Respondent's various contentions and adopt the ALJ's Recommended Decision. I will therefore also adopt the ALJ's recommendation that I revoke Respondent's registration and deny his application. I make the following findings. Findings of Fact Respondent is the holder of DEA Certificate of Registration No. BF4179203, pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense controlled substances in schedules II through V as a practitioner, at the registered address of: ''The Pain Treatment CTR of B.R.,'' 505 E. Airport Blvd., Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Mot. for Summ. Disp., Appendix A. Under this registration, Respondent also holds an identification number (XF4179203), id., pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense or prescribe schedule III through V ''narcotic controlled substances which have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration . . . specifically for use in maintenance or detoxification treatment'' to up to 100 patients. 21 CFR 1301.28(a). Respondent's registration (and identification number) do not expire until September 30, 2018. Mot. for Summ. Disp., Appendix A. On July 30, 2013, Respondent submitted an application to register an entity known as ''First Choice Surgery Center of BA'' as a Hospital/Clinic, at the same address as above. Id. Appendix B. This application remains pending before the Agency. Respondent also holds a medical license issued by the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners. However, on August 15, 2016, the Board suspended his medical license for a period of two years; this Order became effective on or about October 19, 2016.1 See Mot. for Summ. Disp., Appendices B & E; Resp.'s reply, at 1. Accordingly, I find that Respondent 1 While ''[t]he suspension was to commence after [30] days,'' the Board, following flooding in the Baton Rouge area, extended the effective date of the suspension until October 14, 2016. Mot., Appendix C, at 1. On October 12, 2016, the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans stayed enforcement of the Board's Order through October 19, 2016, and directed the Board to show cause on October 19, 2016 as to ''why the stay should not continue.'' Mot., Appendix D, at 1. However, it is undisputed that the court lifted the stay and that the Board's Order has gone into effect. Mot., Appendix E, at 2 (DI Declaration); see also Resp.'s Reply at 1. E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1 39616 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 160 / Monday, August 21, 2017 / Notices asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES currently lacks authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the State of Louisiana. Discussion Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), ''upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license . . . suspended [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a practitioner, DEA has long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the State in which a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 Fed. Appx. 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR 27616 (1978). Respondent acknowledges that the Agency's precedents ''do indeed reveal a consistent [and in his view] uncritical repetition of th[is] claim, to an extent . . . that the proposition has come to attain near sacrosanct status.'' Exceptions, at 2. As he did before the ALJ, he contends that the Agency's rule ''is based on the indiscriminate intermingling of'' the registration requirements of section 823 and the suspension/revocation authority of section 824. Id. at 3. He again argues that because ''the term 'practitioner' is employed solely in 21 U.S.C. 823'' and ''does not appear in section 824'' this ''is a clear indication that [Congress] did not intend to authorize an automatic, summary revocation . . . where a registrant has continued to maintain authority to practice and dispense under the laws of any state.'' Id. at 4. Respondent is mistaken. As the Agency has repeatedly noted, the Agency's rule actually derives from the text of section 802(21), which defines the term ''practitioner,'' and section 823(f). Notably, in section 802(21), Congress defined ''the term 'practitioner' [to] mean[ ] a . . . physician . . . or other person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to distribute, dispense, [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). The text of this provision makes clear that a physician is not a practitioner within the meaning of the CSA if he is not ''licensed, registered or otherwise VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:37 Aug 18, 2017 Jkt 241001 permitted, by the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to dispense [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice.'' Id. To the same effect, Congress, in setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, directed that ''[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f). Thus, based on these provisions, the Agency held nearly forty years ago that ''[s]tate authorization to dispense or otherwise handle controlled substances is a prerequisite to the issuance and maintenance of a Federal controlled substances registration.'' Blanton, 43 FR at 27617 (revoking physician's registration based on one-year suspension of his state license) (emphasis added). As the ALJ recognized, the CSA also provides that ''[a] separate registration shall be required at each principal place of business or professional practice where the applicant . . . dispenses controlled substances.'' 21 U.S.C. 822(e).2 Based on this provision, the Agency has further explained that, because the issuance of a registration is dependent on a practitioner having authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of a particular state, a registration issued for a location in one state cannot authorize the practitioner to engage in controlled substance dispensing in another state. See Clarification of Registration Requirements for Individual Practitioners, 71 FR 69478 (2006); 21 CFR 1301.12(a) & (b)(3). See also United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 140–41 (1975) (''Registration of physicians and other practitioners is mandatory if the applicant is authorized to dispense drugs . . . under the law of the State in which he practices. [21 U.S.C. ] Sec. 823(f). In the case of a physician, this scheme contemplates that he is authorized by the State to practice medicine and to dispense drugs in connection with his professional practice.'').3 2 See also 21 U.S.C. 822(b) (''Persons registered by the Attorney General . . . to . . . dispense controlled substances . . . are authorized to possess . . . or dispense such substances . . . to the extent authorized by their registration and in conformity with the other provisions of this subchapter.''). 3 While the CSA was amended in 1984 to provide the Agency with authority to deny a practitioner's registration on public interest grounds, the requirement that a practitioner be ''authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the States in which he practices,'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f), was unaltered by this legislation. PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Notably, while Respondent holds a medical license in Alabama, his registration authorizes him to dispense controlled substances only in the State of Louisiana. Moreover, the Show Cause Order proposes only the revocation of this registration4 and the denial of his application for an additional registration in Louisiana. Because Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the Act, and Respondent is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of Louisiana, the State in which he is registered and has applied for an additional registration, revocation of his registration and denial of his application are the appropriate sanctions. See, e.g., Hooper, 76 FR at 71371–72; Sheran Arden Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988); Blanton, 43 FR at 27616. As noted above, Respondent contends that Congress' use of the word ''registrant'' rather the word ''practitioner'' in section 824 is a clear indication that it did not intend to authorize an automatic, summary revocation . . . where a registrant has continued to maintain authority to practice and dispense under the laws of any state.'' Exceptions, at 4. A practitioner is, however, a particular category of registrant and thus falls within section 824(a). Given the provisions of section 802(21) and 823(f), it is not clear why Congress needed to use the word ''practitioner'' in section 824(a) to authorize the Agency to effectuate the policy expressed by sections 802(21) and 823(f). Moreover, Respondent ignores that there is a good reason for why Congress used different language in sections 823(f) and 824(a) to describe the class of persons who are subject to each provision, and this reason provides no support for Respondent's contention. Section 823(f) is specifically applicable to those applicants seeking registration as a practitioner, which is just one of eight different categories of registration under the CSA. See generally 21 U.S.C. 823. By contrast, section 824(a), which authorizes the imposition of sanctions against a registrant based on any one of five findings, is applicable to all categories of registrants under the CSA, including Respondent. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, 4 There is no evidence in the record as to whether Respondent holds a DEA registration in Alabama. Nor does this matter, because the Government proposes only the revocation of his Louisiana registration and the denial of his application for a second registration in that State. E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 160 / Monday, August 21, 2017 / Notices asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES 76 FR 71371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied Hooper v. Holder, 481 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2012). As explained above, the Agency's rule that revocation is warranted whenever a practitioner is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which he engages in professional practice is derived from the specific provisions of the Act which define the term ''practitioner'' and set forth the registration requirements which are specifically applicable to practitioners.5 Hooper, 76 FR at 71371– 72. Indeed, were I to adopt Respondent's view, he would be allowed to maintain his registration even though his lack of state authority bars him from obtaining a registration in Louisiana in the first place. 21 U.S.C. 823(f). Moreover, under DEA regulations, a practitioner's registration is good for a period of three years, after which a practitioner must submit a renewal application. Yet that renewal application remains subject to section 823(f), which requires that ''the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' Respondent's view leads to the illogical result that a practitioner would need to hold state authority to obtain his initial registration and any subsequent renewal of the registration, but would not need to hold state authority during the intervening period between the granting of his initial application and the granting of his renewal application. I reject Respondent's contention and adhere to the Agency's longstanding and consistent interpretation of the Act, which has been affirmed by two courts of appeals. See Hooper v. Holder, 481 Fed. Appx. at 828; Maynard v. DEA, 117 Fed. Appx. 941, 945 (5th Cir. 2004). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Hooper, in rejecting the practitioner's contention that the agency's revocation of his registration ignored the discretion 5 Section 824(a)(3) grants authority applicable to all categories of DEA registrants (and not only practitioners) as well as each of the enumerated findings. As explained in Hooper, this general grant of authority in imposing a sanction must be reconciled with the CSA's specific provisions which mandate that a practitioner hold authority under state law in order to obtain and maintain a DEA registration. 76 FR, at 71371–72 (quoting Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) (''A specific provision controls over one of more general application.'') and Bloate v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 1354 (2010) (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc., v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (''General language of a statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.'')). VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:37 Aug 18, 2017 Jkt 241001 granted by section 824 and read the suspension option out of the statute: We find Hooper's contention unconvincing. Section 824(a) does state that the [Agency] may ''suspend or revoke'' a registration, but the statute provides for this sanction in five different circumstances, only one of which is loss of a State license. Because § 823(f) and § 802(21) make clear that a practitioner's registration is dependent upon the practitioner having state authority to dispense controlled substances, the [Agency's] decision to construe § 824(a)(3) as mandating revocation upon suspension of a state license is not an unreasonable interpretation of the CSA. The [Agency's] decision does not ''read[] the suspension option'' out of the statute, because that option may still be available for the other circumstances enumerated in § 824(a). 481 Fed. Appx., at 828. See also Maynard, 117 Fed. Appx. at 945 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding revocation of DEA registration after Texas DPS summarily suspended practitioner's controlled substance registration, noting that the Agency ''has construed the CSA to require revocation when a registrant no longer possesses valid state authority to handle controlled substances''; ''We agree with [the] argument that it may have been arbitrary and capricious had the DEA failed to revoke [the physician's] registration under the circumstances.''). Respondent makes an additional argument beyond that made in Hooper. He contends that ''[it] is noteworthy that [section] 824(a) . . . employs the word 'may' in authorizing the Attorney General to revoke or suspend a registration, when among other factors, the registrant is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the dispensing of controlled substances.'' Exceptions, at 5. In Respondent's view, ''under [section] 824(a), the loss of state authority is only one of several factors that may result in suspension or revocation of a practitioner's DEA registration.'' Id. He thus maintains that ''[t]he correct interpretation is that [section] 802(21) and [section] 823(f) require state authority in order for the Administrator to grant an application for registration, but [section] 824(a)(3) only renders a loss of state authority a discretionary factor in determining whether to suspend or revoke an existing registration.'' Id. Respondent thus contends that Agency's ''practice of deciding these cases on summary disposition without providing [him with] the opportunity to present other evidence supporting continued registration not only violates the plain language of the [CSA] . . . it also denies [him] the due process rights to which he is entitled under the'' Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 6. PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 39617 Respondent cites no authority for his contention that the various grounds set forth in section 824(a) pursuant to which the Agency is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration are merely ''discretionary factors'' in the same manner as are the public interest factors of section 823. Indeed, his argument is refuted by the texts of section 823(f) and 824(a) and the history of the CSA. Notably, section 823(f) instructs that ''[i]n determining the public interest, the following factors shall be considered'' and then lists the five factors. 21 U.S.C. 823(f). By contrast, section 824(a) makes no reference to ''factors.'' Rather, the provision begins with the word ''Grounds'' and then states that ''[a] registration pursuant to section 823 of this title . . . may be suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that'' one of the five different grounds apply to the registrant.6 Id. § 824(a). Had Congress intended that the various findings set forth in section 824(a) be treated as ''discretionary factors,'' it would have done so by using language similar to that it used in section 823(f). See Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (''We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.''). Rather, the findings enumerated in section 824(a) are grants of authority, each of which provides an independent and adequate ground to impose a sanction on a registrant. See Alfred S. Santucci, 67 FR 68688 (2002) (''Loss of state authority is an independent ground to revoke a practitioner's registration under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3).''); VI Pharmacy, Rushdi Z. Salem, 69 FR 5584, 5585 (2004) (''Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1), falsification of a DEA application constitutes independent grounds to revoke a registration.''); 6 As noted above, Respondent invokes the canon of statutory construction that ''[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion''; he argues that it is significant that while Congress used the word ''practitioner'' in section 823, it used the word ''registrant'' in section 824(a). Exceptions, at 4 (quoting Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 208 (other citation omitted)). Contrary to Respondent's contention, the correct comparison is between the language of section 823(f), which states that ''[i]n determining the public interest, the following factors shall be considered,'' and the language of section 824(a), which authorizes the Agency to suspend or revoke a registration upon making one of the five enumerated ''finding[s].'' E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1 39618 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 160 / Monday, August 21, 2017 / Notices Lazaro Guerra, 68 FR 15226, 15227 (2003) (''mandatory exclusion from participation in the Medicare program pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a) . . . is an independent ground for revoking a DEA registration'' (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5)). See also Richard B. Lynch, Jr., 50 FR 7844, 7845 (1985) (Agency made findings under section 824(a) (1), 824(a)(2), and 824(a)(3); ''The Administrator concludes that there are three independent statutory grounds for denial of the subject application.''). The Agency's interpretation is buttressed by the CSA's legislative history. As originally enacted, the CSA granted the Attorney General authority to suspend or revoke a registration: upon a finding that the registrant— asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES (1) has materially falsified any application filed pursuant to or required by this title [the CSA] or title III [the Controlled Substance Import Export Act (CSIEA), 21 U.S.C. 951– 971]; (2) has been convicted of a felony under [the CSA or CSIEA] or any other law of the United States, or of any State, relating to any substance defined in this title as a controlled substance; or (3) has had his state license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied by competent state authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances. Pub. L. 91–513, § 304, 84 Stat. 1255 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 824(a)).7 Describing this provision, the House Report explained that ''[s]ubsection (a) of this section empowers the Attorney General to revoke or suspend any registration issued under this title if it is found that the holder has falsified his application, lost his State license, or has been convicted of a felony violation relating to any controlled substance.'' H. Rep. No. 91–1444 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4608–09. Absent from this statement is any discussion that in determining the sanction, the Attorney General was required to consider not only whether a registrant had lost his state authority, but also whether he had also materially falsified his application or had been convicted of a felony related to a controlled substance. Moreover, while in 1984, Congress amended the CSA by granting the Attorney General authority to deny an application for a practitioner's registration and to revoke an existing registration on public interest grounds, it did so to increase the Agency's 7 Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.C. 330, 339 (1979) (''Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise[.]) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 739–40 (1978)). VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:00 Aug 18, 2017 Jkt 241001 authority to respond to the ''[i]mproper diversion of controlled substances by practitioners,'' which Congress explained ''is one of the most serious aspects of the drug abuse problem.'' H. Rep. No. 98–1030, at 266 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3448. The House Report explained that ''effective Federal actions against practitioners has been severely inhibited by the limited authority in current law to deny or revoke practitioner registrations'' and that ''the current limited grounds for revoking or denying a practitioner's registration have been cited as contributing to the problem of diversion of dangerous drugs.'' Id. Finding that ''the overly limited bases in current law for denial or revocation of a practitioner's registration do not operate in the public interest,'' Congress amended section 823(f) ''to expand the authority of the Attorney General to deny a practitioner's registration application'' based upon a finding ''that registration would be 'inconsistent with the public interest.''' Id. (emphasis added). While Congress also amended section ''824(a) to add to the current bases for denial, revocation, or suspension of registration a finding that registration would be inconsistent with the public interest on the grounds specified in [section] 823, which will include consideration of the new factors added by'' the amendment, id. at 266–67, Congress did not otherwise alter the text of section 824(a), which makes clear that the various paragraphs of this provision are findings, each of which provides an independent and adequate ground to support agency action against a registration, and not discretionary factors to be considered by the Agency. Indeed, Respondent points to nothing in the language of section 824 or the CSA's legislative history to support his position, which would fundamentally alter the scope of the Agency's authority under section 824. Nor is there any merit to Respondent's contention that denying him ''the opportunity to present other evidence supporting [his] continued registration'' denies him due process. Exceptions, at 6. As explained above, in a proceeding brought against a practitioner under section 824(a)(3), the only fact that is material is whether the practitioner is currently authorized to dispense controlled substances under laws of the state in which he practices and is registered. Because ''other evidence supporting [his] continued registration'' is not material to the outcome of this proceeding, and Respondent was provided with the opportunity to put forward evidence disputing the only PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 material fact at issue, I reject his contention that the use of summary disposition denied him due process. See Rezik A. Saqer, 81 FR 22122, 22124 (2016) (citing cases). I therefore reject each of Respondent's Exceptions. Based on the ALJ's finding that Respondent is not currently authorized to dispense controlled substances in Louisiana, the State in which he holds the DEA registration at issue in this proceeding and seeks an additional registration, I will adopt the ALJ's recommended order that I revoke his registration and deny his application. Order Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of Registration No. BF4179203 issued to Arnold E. Feldman, M.D., as well as DATA Identification No. XF4179203, be, and they hereby are, revoked. I further order that the Application of Arnold E. Feldman, M.D., for a registration as a Hospital/Clinic, as well any application to renew the above the registration or for any other registration in the State of Louisiana, be, and it hereby is, denied. This ORDER is effective immediately.8 Dated: August 14, 2017. Chuck Rosenberg, Acting Administrator. [FR Doc. 2017–17640 Filed 8–18–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410–09–P DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Notice of Lodging Proposed Consent Decree In accordance with Departmental Policy, 28 CFR 50.7, notice is hereby given that a proposed Consent Decree in United States v. Duarte Nursery, Inc. and John Duarte, Civil Action Number 2:13–cv–02095–KJM–DB, was lodged with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento District, on August 15, 2017. This proposed Consent Decree concerns an answer and counterclaim filed by the United States on May 7, 2014, against Duarte Nursery, Inc. and 8 Based on the Board's findings with respect to the sixth charge of the Administrative Complaint, which found that he violated state law by prescribing, dispensing, or administering legally controlled substances or any dependency-inducing medication without legitimate medical justification thereof or in other than a legal or legitimate manner,'' I find that the public interest necessitates that this Order be effective immediately. Mot. for Summ. Disp., Appendix C, at 13, 15; see also 21 CFR 1316.67. E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 160 (Monday, August 21, 2017)]
[Docket No. 17-17]
Arnold E. Feldman, M.D.; Decision and Order
On January 24, 2017, the Assistant Administrator, Diversion Control
Division, issued an Order to Show Cause to Arnold E. Feldman, M.D.
(Respondent), of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The Show Cause Order proposed
the revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration No.
BF4179203, and the denial of his application for a registration, on the
ground that he ``do[es] not have authority to handle controlled
substances in the State of Louisiana, the [S]tate in which [he is]
registered . . . and [is] applying'' for registration. Show Cause
Order, at 1.
As to the jurisdictional basis for the proceeding, the Show Cause
Order alleged that Respondent is ``registered . . . as a data-waived/
100 practitioner in [s]chedules II-V pursuant to [Registration No.]
BF4179203 with a registered address at 505 East Airport [Blvd.], Baton
Rouge, Louisiana,'' and that this registration does not expire until
``September 30, 2018.'' Id. The Order also alleged that ``[o]n July 31,
2013, [Respondent] applied for a separate . . . [r]egistration as a
practitioner in [s]chedules II-V with a registered address of 505 East
Airport [Blvd.], Baton Rouge, Louisiana.'' Id.
As to the substantive ground for the proceeding, the Show Cause
Order alleged that Respondent's ``[a]uthority to prescribe and
administer controlled substances in the State of Louisiana was
suspended effective October 19, 2016.'' Id. at 2. The Order then
asserted that as a consequence of Respondent's ``lack of authority to
handle controlled substances in the State of Louisiana,'' Respondent's
registration is subject to revocation and his application must be
denied. Id.
The Show Cause Order notified Respondent of his right to request a
hearing on the allegation or to submit a written statement while
waiving his right to a hearing and the procedure for electing either
option. Id. (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). In addition, the Order notified
Respondent of his right to submit a corrective action plan pursuant to
21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C). Id. at 2-3.
On February 23, 2017, Respondent requested a hearing on the
allegation. Letter from Respondent to Hearing Clerk, Office of
Administrative Law Judges (Feb. 23, 2017). The same day, the matter was
assigned to Administrative Law Judge Charles Wm. Dorman (hereinafter,
ALJ), who issued an order (also on Feb. 23) directing the Government to
file evidence supporting the allegation by March 10, 2017 at 2 p.m., as
well any motion for summary disposition. Briefing Schedule For Lack Of
State Authority Allegations, at 1. The ALJ's order also provided that
if the Government moved for summary disposition, Respondent's
opposition was due by March 24, 2017 at 2 p.m. Id.
The next day, Respondent emailed the ALJ's law clerk seeking a
continuance in order to engage counsel. Email from Respondent to ALJ's
law clerk (Feb. 24, 2017). Respondent explained that he was seeking the
continuance because ``I have court cases pending in multiple
jurisdictions including a Mar 16 hearing, a Mar 20 hearing in
Mississippi and appeals in Louisiana and Mississippi and California.''
Id. Respondent subsequently sought `` `a continuance of at least 120
days' due to constant court appearances in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
California.'' Order Denying The Respondent's Request For Continuance,
at 1 (Feb. 27, 2017). Noting that his Briefing Schedule order
``provided the Respondent [with] a date to respond, if the government
files such a motion,'' the ALJ reasoned that ``[b]ecause the government
ha[d] not filed a motion for summary disposition . . . Respondent's
request . . . is premature.'' Id.
On March 2, 2017, the Government filed its Motion for Summary
Disposition. As support for its motion, the Government provided: (1) A
copy of Respondent's registration; (2) his July 30, 2013 application
for registration as a hospital/clinic; (3) the Decision and Order of
the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners (Aug. 15, 2016) which
ordered the suspension of his medical license for a period of two years
to begin 30 days from the date of the Order, and a subsequent Order of
the Board (Sept. 13, 2016), which extended the commencement of the
suspension until October 14, 2016; (4) a copy of a judgment issued by
the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans which stayed the
Board's Order from October 14, 2016 through October 19, 2016 and
further ordered the Board to ``show cause'' as to ``why the stay should
not continue''; and (5) a Declaration of a Diversion Investigator as to
various matters, including that the Board's Order had gone into effect
on October 19, 2016. Mot. for Summ. Disp., at Appendix A-E.
On March 10, 2017, counsel for Respondent entered a notice of
appearance. On March 23, 2017, Respondent filed his Reply to the
Government's Motion.
Therein, ``Respondent acknowledge[d] that his license to practice
medicine in . . . Louisiana has been suspended in accordance with the .
. . Board of Medical Examiners' Order.'' Resp. Reply, at 1. Respondent
contended, however, ``that there are material questions of fact and law
that require resolution in a plenary, evidentiary proceeding.''
According to Respondent, these issues were that he possesses ``an
active and unrestricted'' license to practice medicine in Alabama and
``a full and unrestricted Alabama Controlled
Substance Certificate.'' Id. at 2. Respondent argued that ``none of the
cases cited by the Government'' address the situation ``where a
physician has lost authority to practice in one state, while retaining
unrestricted authority in another.'' Id. at 3. He also argued that the
Agency's longstanding rule that a practitioner must possess authority
under the laws of the State in which he engages in professional
practice ``is based on the indiscriminate intermingling of'' 21 U.S.C.
823 and 824, ``each of which deals with different aspects of the
control and enforcement authority to dispense controlled substances.''
Id. at 3. He further contended that while section 823 mandates that the
Attorney General register the applicant if he ``is authorized to
dispense controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices,'' ``[t]he term `practitioner' does not appear in'' section
824 and the latter provision ``does not speak to a physician's
authorization to practice or dispense under the laws of the state in
which the registrant practices.'' Id. at 4.
In Respondent's view, section 824 authorizes revocation ``only if
the registrant is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the
dispensing of controlled substances . . . under state law.'' Id. at 4-
5. He also maintained that ``[t]he fact that Congress employed the term
`practitioner' in'' section 823(f) but not in section 824 ``is a clear
indication that it did not intend to authorize revocation or suspension
of a [registration] where a registrant has continued to maintain
authority to practice and dispense under the laws of any state.'' Id.;
see also id. at 5 & n.16 (``Where Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'') (quoting Keene Corp. v United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (other citation omitted)).
Finally, Respondent contended that ``[t]he Government's
indiscriminate intermingling of [sections 823 and 824], and its
misinterpretation of 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) amount to a violation of [his]
constitutional right to travel.'' Id. at 6. He explained that
``[t]heoretically, [he] should be able to pack up and remove himself
and his practice from Louisiana to . . . Alabama, where he is
authorized to practice medicine and dispense controlled substances.
But[] his constitutional right to do so is impaired by the Government's
misinterpretation of its authority to revoke'' his registration. Id.
On April 3, 2017, the ALJ granted the Government's Motion. The ALJ
found that ``Respondent conceded in his Reply that his Louisiana
medical license is currently suspended'' and that ``it is undisputed
that . . . Respondent lacks state authorization to handle controlled
substances in Louisiana, where [he is] registered, and where [he] has
applied for an additional'' registration. R.D. 6. Because Respondent is
registered in Louisiana, the ALJ found it irrelevant that Respondent
holds a license to practice medicine in Alabama. Id. at 4. The ALJ
noted that ``both the CSA's `definition of the term ``practitioner''
and the registration provision applicable to practitioners make clear
that a practitioner must be currently authorized to dispense controlled
substances by the State in which he practices in order to obtain and
maintain a registration,' '' and that Agency's interpretation has been
upheld by the Fourth Circuit. Id. (quoting Rezik A. Saqer, 81 FR 22122,
22125 (2016) and citing Hooper v. Holder, 481 Fed. App'x 826 (4th Cir.
2012)). The ALJ further reasoned that ``Respondent's analysis is
counter to the way the DEA has interpreted the CSA for nearly forty
years.'' Id. at 5 (citing Saqer, 81 FR at 22126 (citing Frederick Marsh
Blanton, 43 FR 27616 (1978))).
The ALJ also rejected Respondent's contention that the Agency's
interpretation impairs his constitutional right to travel. Id. at 5-6.
The ALJ noted that under DEA regulations, `` `[a] separate registration
is required for each principal place of business.' '' Id. at 5 (quoting
21 CFR 1301.12(a)). The ALJ also noted that in 2006, the Agency issued
a final rule which ``clarif[ied] that a practitioner must obtain a
separate DEA registration for each state in which he or she practices''
and that `` `[j]ust as a license to practice medicine in one State does
not authorize a practitioner to practice in any other State, a DEA
registration based on a particular State's license cannot authorize
dispensing controlled substances in another State.' '' Id. at 6
(quoting Clarification of Registration Requirements for Individual
Practitioners, 71 FR 69478, 69479 (2006) and citing Joe W. Morgan, 78
FR 61961, 61965 n.13 (2013)). The ALJ thus explained that ``Respondent
is able to pack up and remove himself and his practice from Louisiana
to Alabama--he just cannot dispense or prescribe controlled substances
there unless he first obtains a separate DEA registration for his
Alabama location in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.12(a).'' Id. The ALJ
thus recommended that I revoke Respondent's registration and deny any
pending applications. Id. at 7.
Respondent filed Exceptions to the ALJ's Recommended Decision. On
May 1, 2017, the ALJ forwarded the record to me for Final Agency
Having considered the record and Respondent's Exceptions, I reject
Respondent's various contentions and adopt the ALJ's Recommended
Decision. I will therefore also adopt the ALJ's recommendation that I
revoke Respondent's registration and deny his application. I make the
following findings.
Respondent is the holder of DEA Certificate of Registration No.
BF4179203, pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense controlled
substances in schedules II through V as a practitioner, at the
registered address of: ``The Pain Treatment CTR of B.R.,'' 505 E.
Airport Blvd., Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Mot. for Summ. Disp., Appendix
A. Under this registration, Respondent also holds an identification
number (XF4179203), id., pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense
or prescribe schedule III through V ``narcotic controlled substances
which have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration . . .
specifically for use in maintenance or detoxification treatment'' to up
to 100 patients. 21 CFR 1301.28(a). Respondent's registration (and
identification number) do not expire until September 30, 2018. Mot. for
Summ. Disp., Appendix A.
On July 30, 2013, Respondent submitted an application to register
an entity known as ``First Choice Surgery Center of BA'' as a Hospital/
Clinic, at the same address as above. Id. Appendix B. This application
remains pending before the Agency.
Respondent also holds a medical license issued by the Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners. However, on August 15, 2016, the
Board suspended his medical license for a period of two years; this
Order became effective on or about October 19, 2016.\1\ See Mot. for
Summ. Disp., Appendices B & E; Resp.'s reply, at 1. Accordingly, I find
that Respondent
currently lacks authority to dispense controlled substances under the
laws of the State of Louisiana.
\1\ While ``[t]he suspension was to commence after [30] days,''
the Board, following flooding in the Baton Rouge area, extended the
effective date of the suspension until October 14, 2016. Mot.,
Appendix C, at 1. On October 12, 2016, the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans stayed enforcement of the Board's Order
through October 19, 2016, and directed the Board to show cause on
October 19, 2016 as to ``why the stay should not continue.'' Mot.,
Appendix D, at 1. However, it is undisputed that the court lifted
the stay and that the Board's Order has gone into effect. Mot.,
Appendix E, at 2 (DI Declaration); see also Resp.'s Reply at 1.
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), ``upon a finding that the registrant .
. . has had his State license . . . suspended [or] revoked . . . by
competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to
engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect
to a practitioner, DEA has long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the State in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
See, e.g., James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied,
481 Fed. Appx. 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR
27616 (1978).
Respondent acknowledges that the Agency's precedents ``do indeed
reveal a consistent [and in his view] uncritical repetition of th[is]
claim, to an extent . . . that the proposition has come to attain near
sacrosanct status.'' Exceptions, at 2. As he did before the ALJ, he
contends that the Agency's rule ``is based on the indiscriminate
intermingling of'' the registration requirements of section 823 and the
suspension/revocation authority of section 824. Id. at 3. He again
argues that because ``the term `practitioner' is employed solely in 21
U.S.C. 823'' and ``does not appear in section 824'' this ``is a clear
indication that [Congress] did not intend to authorize an automatic,
summary revocation . . . where a registrant has continued to maintain
authority to practice and dispense under the laws of any state.'' Id.
at 4.
Respondent is mistaken. As the Agency has repeatedly noted, the
Agency's rule actually derives from the text of section 802(21), which
defines the term ``practitioner,'' and section 823(f). Notably, in
section 802(21), Congress defined ``the term `practitioner' [to] mean[
] a . . . physician . . . or other person licensed, registered or
otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices .
. . to distribute, dispense, [or] administer . . . a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21).
The text of this provision makes clear that a physician is not a
practitioner within the meaning of the CSA if he is not ``licensed,
registered or otherwise permitted, by the jurisdiction in which he
practices . . . to dispense [or] administer . . . a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice.'' Id.
To the same effect, Congress, in setting the requirements for
obtaining a practitioner's registration, directed that ``[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is
authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f). Thus, based on
these provisions, the Agency held nearly forty years ago that ``[s]tate
authorization to dispense or otherwise handle controlled substances is
a prerequisite to the issuance and maintenance of a Federal controlled
substances registration.'' Blanton, 43 FR at 27617 (revoking
physician's registration based on one-year suspension of his state
license) (emphasis added).
As the ALJ recognized, the CSA also provides that ``[a] separate
registration shall be required at each principal place of business or
professional practice where the applicant . . . dispenses controlled
substances.'' 21 U.S.C. 822(e).\2\ Based on this provision, the Agency
has further explained that, because the issuance of a registration is
dependent on a practitioner having authority to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of a particular state, a registration issued
for a location in one state cannot authorize the practitioner to engage
in controlled substance dispensing in another state. See Clarification
of Registration Requirements for Individual Practitioners, 71 FR 69478
(2006); 21 CFR 1301.12(a) & (b)(3). See also United States v. Moore,
423 U.S. 122, 140-41 (1975) (``Registration of physicians and other
practitioners is mandatory if the applicant is authorized to dispense
drugs . . . under the law of the State in which he practices. [21
U.S.C. ] Sec. 823(f). In the case of a physician, this scheme
contemplates that he is authorized by the State to practice medicine
and to dispense drugs in connection with his professional
practice.'').\3\
\2\ See also 21 U.S.C. 822(b) (``Persons registered by the
Attorney General . . . to . . . dispense controlled substances . . .
are authorized to possess . . . or dispense such substances . . . to
the extent authorized by their registration and in conformity with
the other provisions of this subchapter.'').
\3\ While the CSA was amended in 1984 to provide the Agency with
authority to deny a practitioner's registration on public interest
grounds, the requirement that a practitioner be ``authorized to
dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the States in
which he practices,'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f), was unaltered by this
Notably, while Respondent holds a medical license in Alabama, his
registration authorizes him to dispense controlled substances only in
the State of Louisiana. Moreover, the Show Cause Order proposes only
the revocation of this registration\4\ and the denial of his
application for an additional registration in Louisiana. Because
Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state
authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the Act, and
Respondent is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances
under the laws of Louisiana, the State in which he is registered and
has applied for an additional registration, revocation of his
registration and denial of his application are the appropriate
sanctions. See, e.g., Hooper, 76 FR at 71371-72; Sheran Arden Yeates,
71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988); Blanton, 43 FR at
\4\ There is no evidence in the record as to whether Respondent
holds a DEA registration in Alabama. Nor does this matter, because
the Government proposes only the revocation of his Louisiana
registration and the denial of his application for a second
registration in that State.
As noted above, Respondent contends that Congress' use of the word
``registrant'' rather the word ``practitioner'' in section 824 is a
clear indication that it did not intend to authorize an automatic,
authority to practice and dispense under the laws of any state.''
Exceptions, at 4. A practitioner is, however, a particular category of
registrant and thus falls within section 824(a). Given the provisions
of section 802(21) and 823(f), it is not clear why Congress needed to
use the word ``practitioner'' in section 824(a) to authorize the Agency
to effectuate the policy expressed by sections 802(21) and 823(f).
Moreover, Respondent ignores that there is a good reason for why
Congress used different language in sections 823(f) and 824(a) to
describe the class of persons who are subject to each provision, and
this reason provides no support for Respondent's contention.
Section 823(f) is specifically applicable to those applicants
seeking registration as a practitioner, which is just one of eight
different categories of registration under the CSA. See generally 21
U.S.C. 823. By contrast, section 824(a), which authorizes the
imposition of sanctions against a registrant based on any one of five
findings, is applicable to all categories of registrants under the CSA,
including Respondent. See, e.g., James L. Hooper,
76 FR 71371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied Hooper v. Holder, 481 Fed.
Appx. 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2012).
As explained above, the Agency's rule that revocation is warranted
whenever a practitioner is no longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in which he engages in
professional practice is derived from the specific provisions of the
Act which define the term ``practitioner'' and set forth the
registration requirements which are specifically applicable to
practitioners.\5\ Hooper, 76 FR at 71371-72. Indeed, were I to adopt
Respondent's view, he would be allowed to maintain his registration
even though his lack of state authority bars him from obtaining a
registration in Louisiana in the first place. 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
\5\ Section 824(a)(3) grants authority applicable to all
categories of DEA registrants (and not only practitioners) as well
as each of the enumerated findings. As explained in Hooper, this
general grant of authority in imposing a sanction must be reconciled
with the CSA's specific provisions which mandate that a practitioner
hold authority under state law in order to obtain and maintain a DEA
registration. 76 FR, at 71371-72 (quoting Gozlon-Peretz v. United
States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) (``A specific provision controls
over one of more general application.'') and Bloate v. United
States, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 1354 (2010) (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons,
Inc., v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (``General language of a
statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not
be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part
of the same enactment.'')).
Moreover, under DEA regulations, a practitioner's registration is
good for a period of three years, after which a practitioner must
submit a renewal application. Yet that renewal application remains
subject to section 823(f), which requires that ``the applicant is
the State in which he practices.'' Respondent's view leads to the
illogical result that a practitioner would need to hold state authority
to obtain his initial registration and any subsequent renewal of the
registration, but would not need to hold state authority during the
intervening period between the granting of his initial application and
the granting of his renewal application.
I reject Respondent's contention and adhere to the Agency's
longstanding and consistent interpretation of the Act, which has been
affirmed by two courts of appeals. See Hooper v. Holder, 481 Fed. Appx.
at 828; Maynard v. DEA, 117 Fed. Appx. 941, 945 (5th Cir. 2004). As the
Fourth Circuit explained in Hooper, in rejecting the practitioner's
contention that the agency's revocation of his registration ignored the
discretion granted by section 824 and read the suspension option out of
the statute:
We find Hooper's contention unconvincing. Section 824(a) does
state that the [Agency] may ``suspend or revoke'' a registration,
but the statute provides for this sanction in five different
circumstances, only one of which is loss of a State license. Because
Sec.  823(f) and Sec.  802(21) make clear that a practitioner's
registration is dependent upon the practitioner having state
authority to dispense controlled substances, the [Agency's] decision
to construe Sec.  824(a)(3) as mandating revocation upon suspension
of a state license is not an unreasonable interpretation of the CSA.
The [Agency's] decision does not ``read[] the suspension option''
out of the statute, because that option may still be available for
the other circumstances enumerated in Sec.  824(a).
481 Fed. Appx., at 828. See also Maynard, 117 Fed. Appx. at 945 (5th
Cir. 2004) (upholding revocation of DEA registration after Texas DPS
summarily suspended practitioner's controlled substance registration,
noting that the Agency ``has construed the CSA to require revocation
when a registrant no longer possesses valid state authority to handle
controlled substances''; ``We agree with [the] argument that it may
have been arbitrary and capricious had the DEA failed to revoke [the
physician's] registration under the circumstances.'').
Respondent makes an additional argument beyond that made in Hooper.
He contends that ``[it] is noteworthy that [section] 824(a) . . .
employs the word `may' in authorizing the Attorney General to revoke or
suspend a registration, when among other factors, the registrant is no
longer authorized by State law to engage in the dispensing of
controlled substances.'' Exceptions, at 5. In Respondent's view,
``under [section] 824(a), the loss of state authority is only one of
several factors that may result in suspension or revocation of a
practitioner's DEA registration.'' Id. He thus maintains that ``[t]he
correct interpretation is that [section] 802(21) and [section] 823(f)
require state authority in order for the Administrator to grant an
application for registration, but [section] 824(a)(3) only renders a
loss of state authority a discretionary factor in determining whether
to suspend or revoke an existing registration.'' Id. Respondent thus
contends that Agency's ``practice of deciding these cases on summary
disposition without providing [him with] the opportunity to present
other evidence supporting continued registration not only violates the
plain language of the [CSA] . . . it also denies [him] the due process
rights to which he is entitled under the'' Administrative Procedure
Act. Id. at 6.
Respondent cites no authority for his contention that the various
grounds set forth in section 824(a) pursuant to which the Agency is
authorized to suspend or revoke a registration are merely
``discretionary factors'' in the same manner as are the public interest
factors of section 823. Indeed, his argument is refuted by the texts of
section 823(f) and 824(a) and the history of the CSA.
Notably, section 823(f) instructs that ``[i]n determining the
public interest, the following factors shall be considered'' and then
lists the five factors. 21 U.S.C. 823(f). By contrast, section 824(a)
makes no reference to ``factors.'' Rather, the provision begins with
the word ``Grounds'' and then states that ``[a] registration pursuant
to section 823 of this title . . . may be suspended or revoked by the
Attorney General upon a finding that'' one of the five different
grounds apply to the registrant.\6\ Id. Sec.  824(a).
\6\ As noted above, Respondent invokes the canon of statutory
construction that ``[w]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is
the disparate inclusion or exclusion''; he argues that it is
significant that while Congress used the word ``practitioner'' in
section 823, it used the word ``registrant'' in section 824(a).
Exceptions, at 4 (quoting Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 208 (other
citation omitted)). Contrary to Respondent's contention, the correct
comparison is between the language of section 823(f), which states
that ``[i]n determining the public interest, the following factors
shall be considered,'' and the language of section 824(a), which
authorizes the Agency to suspend or revoke a registration upon
making one of the five enumerated ``finding[s].''
Had Congress intended that the various findings set forth in
section 824(a) be treated as ``discretionary factors,'' it would have
done so by using language similar to that it used in section 823(f).
See Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (``We do not lightly assume
that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it
nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when
Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to
make such a requirement manifest.'').
Rather, the findings enumerated in section 824(a) are grants of
authority, each of which provides an independent and adequate ground to
impose a sanction on a registrant. See Alfred S. Santucci, 67 FR 68688
(2002) (``Loss of state authority is an independent ground to revoke a
practitioner's registration under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3).''); VI Pharmacy,
Rushdi Z. Salem, 69 FR 5584, 5585 (2004) (``Pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(1), falsification of a DEA application constitutes independent
grounds to revoke a registration.'');
Lazaro Guerra, 68 FR 15226, 15227 (2003) (``mandatory exclusion from
participation in the Medicare program pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a)
. . . is an independent ground for revoking a DEA registration''
(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5)). See also Richard B. Lynch, Jr., 50 FR
7844, 7845 (1985) (Agency made findings under section 824(a) (1),
824(a)(2), and 824(a)(3); ``The Administrator concludes that there are
three independent statutory grounds for denial of the subject
application.'').
The Agency's interpretation is buttressed by the CSA's legislative
history. As originally enacted, the CSA granted the Attorney General
authority to suspend or revoke a registration:
upon a finding that the registrant--
(1) has materially falsified any application filed pursuant to
or required by this title [the CSA] or title III [the Controlled
Substance Import Export Act (CSIEA), 21 U.S.C. 951-971];
(2) has been convicted of a felony under [the CSA or CSIEA] or
any other law of the United States, or of any State, relating to any
substance defined in this title as a controlled substance; or
(3) has had his state license or registration suspended,
revoked, or denied by competent state authority and is no longer
authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of
controlled substances.
Pub. L. 91-513, Sec.  304, 84 Stat. 1255 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
824(a)).\7\
\7\ Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.C. 330, 339 (1979)
(``Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by
a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context
dictates otherwise[.]) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 739-40 (1978)).
Describing this provision, the House Report explained that
``[s]ubsection (a) of this section empowers the Attorney General to
revoke or suspend any registration issued under this title if it is
found that the holder has falsified his application, lost his State
license, or has been convicted of a felony violation relating to any
controlled substance.'' H. Rep. No. 91-1444 (1970), as reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4608-09. Absent from this statement is any
discussion that in determining the sanction, the Attorney General was
required to consider not only whether a registrant had lost his state
authority, but also whether he had also materially falsified his
application or had been convicted of a felony related to a controlled
Moreover, while in 1984, Congress amended the CSA by granting the
Attorney General authority to deny an application for a practitioner's
registration and to revoke an existing registration on public interest
grounds, it did so to increase the Agency's authority to respond to the
``[i]mproper diversion of controlled substances by practitioners,''
which Congress explained ``is one of the most serious aspects of the
drug abuse problem.'' H. Rep. No. 98-1030, at 266 (1984), as reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3448. The House Report explained that
``effective Federal actions against practitioners has been severely
inhibited by the limited authority in current law to deny or revoke
practitioner registrations'' and that ``the current limited grounds for
revoking or denying a practitioner's registration have been cited as
contributing to the problem of diversion of dangerous drugs.'' Id.
Finding that ``the overly limited bases in current law for denial or
revocation of a practitioner's registration do not operate in the
public interest,'' Congress amended section 823(f) ``to expand the
authority of the Attorney General to deny a practitioner's registration
application'' based upon a finding ``that registration would be
`inconsistent with the public interest.''' Id. (emphasis added).
While Congress also amended section ``824(a) to add to the current
bases for denial, revocation, or suspension of registration a finding
that registration would be inconsistent with the public interest on the
grounds specified in [section] 823, which will include consideration of
the new factors added by'' the amendment, id. at 266-67, Congress did
not otherwise alter the text of section 824(a), which makes clear that
the various paragraphs of this provision are findings, each of which
provides an independent and adequate ground to support agency action
against a registration, and not discretionary factors to be considered
by the Agency. Indeed, Respondent points to nothing in the language of
section 824 or the CSA's legislative history to support his position,
which would fundamentally alter the scope of the Agency's authority
under section 824.
Nor is there any merit to Respondent's contention that denying him
``the opportunity to present other evidence supporting [his] continued
registration'' denies him due process. Exceptions, at 6. As explained
above, in a proceeding brought against a practitioner under section
824(a)(3), the only fact that is material is whether the practitioner
is currently authorized to dispense controlled substances under laws of
the state in which he practices and is registered. Because ``other
evidence supporting [his] continued registration'' is not material to
the outcome of this proceeding, and Respondent was provided with the
opportunity to put forward evidence disputing the only material fact at
issue, I reject his contention that the use of summary disposition
denied him due process. See Rezik A. Saqer, 81 FR 22122, 22124 (2016)
(citing cases).
I therefore reject each of Respondent's Exceptions. Based on the
ALJ's finding that Respondent is not currently authorized to dispense
controlled substances in Louisiana, the State in which he holds the DEA
registration at issue in this proceeding and seeks an additional
registration, I will adopt the ALJ's recommended order that I revoke
his registration and deny his application.
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of Registration No.
BF4179203 issued to Arnold E. Feldman, M.D., as well as DATA
Identification No. XF4179203, be, and they hereby are, revoked. I
further order that the Application of Arnold E. Feldman, M.D., for a
registration as a Hospital/Clinic, as well any application to renew the
above the registration or for any other registration in the State of
Louisiana, be, and it hereby is, denied. This ORDER is effective
immediately.\8\
\8\ Based on the Board's findings with respect to the sixth
charge of the Administrative Complaint, which found that he violated
state law by prescribing, dispensing, or administering legally
controlled substances or any dependency-inducing medication without
legitimate medical justification thereof or in other than a legal or
legitimate manner,'' I find that the public interest necessitates
that this Order be effective immediately. Mot. for Summ. Disp.,
Appendix C, at 13, 15; see also 21 CFR 1316.67.
Dated: August 14, 2017.
Chuck Rosenberg,
Acting Administrator.


text:
Sam Smith Gets Surprised By Fifth Harmony on 'Carpool Karaoke': 'The Woman In Me Is On Fire'
Bianca Gracie
Sam Smith is the latest star to ride in the passenger seat with James Corden on last night's Carpool Karaoke. The two British buddies cruised through the streets as they belted out some of the singer's biggest tunes and busted out a ton of laughs.
The pair sung everything from "Money On My Mind," "Lay Me Down," and "I'm Not The Only One" to Smith's most recent singles "Too Good At Goodbyes" and "Pray." But the best part comes when Fifth Harmony (his favorite girl group at the moment) surprises him in the car! "I feel free, I feel alive. I feel the woman in me is on fire. 'Work From Home' I listen to every time before I go out. I think it's my wedding song. I want to walk down to it in heels," Smith tells Corden before the ladies pop up.
"I want a funeral for my single self before my wedding. I'm in a coffin, and there's a PowerPoint presentation about my single life..." Smith says as he hilariously breaks down his future weeding plans. "And then I raise from the coffin, and then everyone takes off their black clothes and they're wearing white. And then the wedding begins." Then of course 5H jump right in the car to sing "Work From Home" after Corden makes a sneaky phone call. Smith reaction? PRICELESS!
Sam Smith's sophomore album The Thrill of It All arrives this Friday, Nov. 3. But until then, take it back to his 2014 interview with Fuse where he recalls hugging Sting and breaks down the concept behind his hit debut album, In The Lonely Hour:
More Pop
The Governors Ball Music Festival 2019 Lineup: SZA, Nas, Charli XCX and More! + Spotify Playlist
The Governors Ball Music Festival
20 Songs That Remind Us Of The 2000's
MAJOR. Gives Everyday Relationship Advice
From Soundcheck to Stage with blackbear at Chicago's House of Blues
Artist Alec Benjamin Gives Everyday Advice
Galantis And MAX Give Everyday Advice at Lollapalooza 2018
© 2018 fuse, LLC. All rights reserved.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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text:
Congressman Mark Siljander From Believer toTraitor: A Congresman's Crooked Journey
This was the scene on November 2007 as Congressman Mark Siljander made his tour to promote his new book "A Deadly Misunderstanding: A Congressman's Quest to Bridge the Muslim-Christian Divide". As it turned out Congressman Siljander's idea for bridging that divide involved helping Al Queda terrorists raise money and he now faces an indictment for it.
"Toting his new book--A Deadly Misunderstanding: A Congressman's Quest to Bridge the Muslim-Christian Divide, Congressman Mark Siljander explained how, according to his studies, the two religions aren't so different after all.
Jerry Dillon, who organized the event, told UTW that the ideas espoused by Siljander are needed to combat the ignorance and Islamophobia he said certain "redneck Oklahoma leaders" recently displayed in "rejecting the gift of the Quran,"
Siljander explained that his "spiritual journey" began 15 years ago at the National Prayer Breakfast, when he was a Republican congressman from Michigan. The self-deprecating former lawmaker recounted, "I was trained as an evangelical Christian; I was a poster boy for Jerry Falwell."
As such, Siljander was incensed when the Quran was read at the Breakfast, prompting him to fire-off an angry letter to the emcee, demanding, "How can you read the book of the devil at a prayer breakfast?"
It was also during this period that he met Nassim Matar, a Lebanese-born, Washington, D.C.-based real estate broker. To further explore what "cultural misunderstandings" he had regarding Christianity and its relationship to Islam, Siljander began to study... Siljander said he also began to study the Quran for the first time.
After days of discussions with Sudan's President Omar al Bashir, Siljander said the ruler introduced him to his religious and political advisors, who then invited him and his delegation to speak at the Khartoum Shari'a Law School."
Of course once in Sudan, Siljander called for lifting those mean sanctions on Bashir's brutal government, which had massacred hundreds of thousands, Christians and non-Christians.
"I believe there is a desire to find middle ground," Siljander told WORLD concerning the purpose of his visit to Darfur. "Did the Sudan government arm the janjaweed? Absolutely. No question they did horrific things. But now they realize it got away from them and they have announced that they aim to disarm the janjaweed. If they say they are willing to disarm them and protect workers, then let's come to some agreement."
Both Siljander and Beasley told WORLD they believe lifting U.S. sanctions would "incentivize" Khartoum to resolve the Darfur crisis and to increase economic development in a way that will benefit more Sudanese. "In the past we promised to remove sanctions but we then didn't. Our credibility is important here, too," said Siljander."
Interestingly enough Nassim Matar, whom Siljander cites as his influence in convincing him that Islam was just great, along with Siljander, was one of the few signatories in praise of a Fatwa issued by the Fiqh Council of North America condemning terrorism. This Fatwa is ironic considering the deep involvement of Fiqh council members in terrorism.
Back in 2005 Steve Emmerson described the Fiqh Fatwa as a lie
"the fatwa is bogus. Nowhere does it condemn the Islamic extremism ideology that has spawned Islamic terrorism. It does not renounce nor even acknowledge the existence of an Islamic jihadist culture that has permeated mosques and young Muslims around the world. It does not renounce Jihad let alone admit that it has been used to justify Islamic terrorist acts. It does not condemn by name any Islamic group or leader. In short, it is a fake fatwa designed merely to deceive the American public into believing that these groups are moderate. In fact, officials of both organizations have been directly linked to and associated with Islamic terrorist groups and Islamic extremist organizations. One of them is an unindicted co-conspirator in a current terrorist case; another previous member was a financier to Al-Qaeda.
Another past trustee of the Fiqh Council, Abdurrahman Alamoudi, is serving a 23-year prison sentence for illegal financial dealings with Libya and immigration fraud, has admitted to his part in a plot to assassinate the Saudi Crown Prince, and has vocally announced his support for the terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah. Additionally Alamoudi was just named by Treasury as having been a financier for Al Qaeda."
Suddenly Siljander's Al Queda ties stop being so surprising and it's likely that Nassim Matar was actually Siljander's link to figures in the Islamic pro-terrorist community. Nassim Matar is the Director of Bridges to Common Ground, which published the Thanksgiving Declaration that Siljander signed, which urges Americans to respect the beliefs of the Prophet Mohammed. The website also contains a lecture by Mark Siljander, which I will shortly cite, as well as links to the Islamic Society of North America, A Saudi funded organization which controls virtually all the mosques in America and Canada and promotes Wahhabism
"According to terrorism expert Steven Emerson, ISNA "is a radical group hiding under a false veneer of moderation"; "convenes annual conferences where Islamist militants have been given a platform to incite violence and promote hatred" (for instance, al Qaeda supporter and PLO official Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi was invited to speak at an ISNA conference); has held fundraisers for terrorists (after Hamas leader Mousa Marzook was arrested and eventually deported in 1997, ISNA raised money for his defense); has condemned the U.S. government's post-9/11 seizure of Hamas' and Palestinian Islamic Jihad's financial assets; and publishes a bi-monthly magazine, Islamic Horizons, that "often champions militant Islamist doctrine."
The Bridges website or as the organization is called "International Peace Organization" though the only NGO by that name appears to be based out of Pakistan, has the following in its mission statement;
"People of good will on both sides of the Divide need to come together on "common ground" found in the Qur'an and the original Aramaic Injil."
But what is there beneath the surface narrative of an intolerant man becoming tolerant, there is an extensive hidden narrative. What really drove a man who supposedly viewed the Koran as the Book of Satan into a willing tool for the genocidal regime of Omar al Bashir, who was responsible for the torture, rape and murder of hundreds of thousands of Christians?
The answer is likely that it was the same things that drove some prominent Americans to become Soviet apologists, money. The Former Congressman was also the President of Global Strategies Inc, a worldwide multiservice firm that handled imports, exports and a whole lot more.
At some point in time Congressman Siljander transformed himself into a willing prostitute for the Jihad, touring the world in order to build up his business. There are some interesting details to Global Strategies Inc. For starters the bookkeeping and accounting at Global Strategies Inc is handled by one Allison Siljandir, possibly his daughter but likely a family member. And a company that needs a family member to handle the books is often seriously dirty and has things to hide.
Now let's take a look at what else Global Strategies Inc handles. Under Immigration, Siljander's company offers services such as
Strategize immigration categories for workers in; agricultural, high tech, nursing, corporate executives, etc.
Assist prominent individuals in securing visas
Yes one would imagine that terrorists might be interested in such services. There's also an extensive charity section, including a focus on areas of conflict, read Jihadi areas. Under Public Relations, GSI boasts of having advised lobbying teams from Liberia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Benin and Bangladesh. There is also the following cryptic reference;
"Aided a former First Lady (non US) regarding personal financial troubles"
Under Government Services, it only gets creepier.
Document production of driver licenses, passports, national ID's, marriage and death certificates
Advised organizations with technical and political problems related to the US government
Any terrorist group would consider the above two a major bonanza. Meanwhile Mark Siljander was wandering around the Middle East boasting of his ties to the brutal regime of Al Bashir. Here are key excerpts from his Oxford lecture available on his website.
"Permit me to take you back to a hot night in August 2006. I had the opportunity to meet with the President of Sudan, His Excellency al-Bashir, a person I have courted friendship with over the last nine years. He is a man mostly recently known for saying "No" to a UN Force in Darfur...
The Sheik was flabbergasted. He said, "Do you mean to tell me that the statement of faith that makes us Muslims is both in the Torah and Gospel, and that it also contains a perfect definition of the 'Religion of Islam'?"
"It seems so, Your Excellency," I replied.
"Do these same witnesses to the One God also believe in the last days and the prophets of Allah?" The Sheikh wondered.
I told him many if not most (Christians) not only accept the "witness" and the prophets and last days, but moreover would additionally believe in a broad sense, in the other four Pillars of Islam: 1) Salat, regular prayer; 2) Zakah, giving to the poor; 3) Siym, fasting; 4) Hajj, pilgrimage to the Holy Land.
I will never forget his look as he declared, "This is revolutionary."
The question arises whom Islam considers as "infidels." The militants argue that non-Muslims are infidels and therefore, worthy of death. Kafers (infidels) are those who do not accept the Shahadah.
Think of it, if those who follow Torah and Gospels would witness and believe in their hearts that God is one, could they be removed from the list of who are considered as "infidels"? This new common ground can help undercut the radical's message of hate and their view of the glory of martyrdom through killing of infidels."
Or of course it can pave the way for describing Jews and Christians not as Infidels but as Reverts, heretics against Islam. While infidels may not necessarily be killed under Islam for no reason, heresy against Islam is itself justification for murder.
Now former Congressman Mark Siljander may have thought he was rather cleverly proving that Christians, Muslims and Jews believe the same thing, when he was actually making the case that the beliefs were similar enough to be considered a heresy... or he may have known exactly what he was doing, which was creating another theological basis for terrorism. And back in the West, the practical upshot of his argument is essentially a call to Islam.
Siljander becomes more explicit on this point as his Oxford lecture continues;
"This is one of the most painful misunderstandings among Christians. Polls indicate that the vast majority of Christians universally feel that Allah is not the same God as the God of the Hebrews, or Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Ishmael.
Many noted US Christian preachers have reinforced this idea by stating that "The God of Islam is not the same God." Televangelist Benny Hinn also commented, "This is not a war between Arabs and Jews. It's a war between God and the devil."
I recall speaking to an assembly of seminary students in Lancaster Bible College in PA a few years ago. When questioned, their view, rightly or wrongly, was unanimous that Allah was a false god and in fact, derived from a Moon-god of ancient East.
The Apostle Paul faced similar challenges with the Greek pagans as described in Acts 17. Paul used an idol to reflect the true God. While "some mocked…many followed and surrendered" to God. The point being, that the origins of a name do not always reflect on the later application."
Here Siljander compares himself to Paul preaching a new gospel that fuses Christianity and Judaism into Islam. But his real gospel was likely much more bottom line, an ex-congressman with business interests in the third world who found another profitable venue, promoting and aiding the Jihad. But he is only the tip of a much larger iceberg.
William T. Thornton, pastor said...
His equation of the religion of mohammed with belief in the God of Israel is not at all accurate.There is no similarity at all. The God of Israel is a living God and certainly not blood thirsty.
It is amazing to me how people can talk themselves into just about anything.
I updated my little blog tonight and was going to have a few words about the on going problems with Islam but decided to stick with things that would not ruin my digestion.
I continue to learn from your blog Sultan Knish and am glad to have it as a resource.
Keli Ata said...
It's a wonderful expose! The Islamic Assembly of North America also at one time funneled money to the Nation of Islam in the US to build mosques and promote Wahabi sect of Islam in the US.
It sounds as though the congressman in his efforts to bridge the gap between Muslims and Christians wanted to do so with a practice of lets unite in disdain for a common enemy--Israel and Jews.


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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


We started drone.horse back in May 2015 after a spark of drone-related chatter on the meh.com forum. Since that time we've had a fun time discussing around 350 drone related topics. But, activity has slowed considerably and it's time to shut things down.
Our plan is to migrate all content (forum topics, comments, replies, likes, etc) back to meh.com where the content will remain searchable and discussions can continue. After data migration we'll forward the drone.horse domain over to the forum at meh.com.
It's been a fun experiment. See you over at meh.com.
Darn! I keep hoping my Mavic will show as "Shipped" so I could post…but I guess I can do that at meh.
@fultonmartin I certainly want to hear about your experience with it. I've been thinking about if I should upgrade my Phantom 3 with something more portable.
@shawn I'll certainly keep everyone here informed as to its status–but there's plenty of detail on YouTube that should help you decide.
I have appreciated the opportunity to participate here, but I agree, it seems to have run its course.
It's been my pleasure and honor to make the acquaintance of many fine people who share my enthusiasm for the hobby. I prefer to think of you all as friends!
And I never use emojis.
But your logic is sound. I don't come here like I used to, nor do I really fly like I used to.
Thanks for the fun, and thank you for planning to move the content rather than have it evaporate on us.
That's sad to hear, but yes, I haven't used this forum as much as when I got the P1. I met alot of good people on this board (@ruottaurmind and everyone else on this thread).
I'm not one of you real drone crazies yet, but it's nice to see a company putting the effort in to preserve the community of one of its subsections, rather than relying on the wayback machine to do it for them with very little warning.


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text:
Brandie McPherson has been the Director of Investor Relations for the Kansas Chamber since May of 2011. Brandie has been instrumental in ensuring the Kansas Chamber has a strong, member driven foundation. She takes pride in collaborating with her colleagues at the Kansas Chamber in contributing towards it being the most influential business advocacy organization in the State.
Prior to her tenure at the Chamber, she worked for the KU Endowment in fundraising and development.
Brandie earned her Bachelor of Arts degree from Washburn University. She went on to earn a Master of Science degree from the School of Education at Drake University. In her studies she specialized in non-profit business management and has served in leadership positions at the National Multiple Sclerosis Society and the YWCA. In addition, she proudly served eight years in the United States Air Force Air National Guard 190th Refueling Wing in Topeka, Kansas. Her specialty was as a Supply Technician where she supported refueling missions around the U.S. and abroad.
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