text:
0.15.1 / 2013-06-26
==================

 * add try/catch around parseLinks

0.15.0 / 2013-06-25
==================

 * make `Response#toError()` have a more meaningful `message`

0.14.9 / 2013-06-15
==================

 * add debug()s to the node client
 * add .abort() method to node client

0.14.8 / 2013-06-13
==================

 * set .agent = false always
 * remove X-Requested-With. Closes #189

0.14.7 / 2013-06-06
==================

 * fix unzip error handling

0.14.6 / 2013-05-23
==================

 * fix HEAD unzip bug

0.14.5 / 2013-05-23
==================

 * add flag to ensure the callback is __never__ invoked twice

0.14.4 / 2013-05-22
==================

 * add superagent.js build output
 * update qs
 * update emitter-component
 * revert "add browser field to support browserify" see GH-221

0.14.3 / 2013-05-18
==================

 * add browser field to support browserify

0.14.2/ 2013-05-07
==================

  * add host object check to fix serialization of File/Blobs etc as json

0.14.1 / 2013-04-09
==================

  * update qs

0.14.0 / 2013-04-02
==================

  * add client-side basic auth
  * fix retaining of .set() header field case

0.13.0 / 2013-03-13
==================

  * add progress events to client
  * add simple example
  * add res.headers as alias of res.header for browser client
  * add res.get(field) to node/client

0.12.4 / 2013-02-11
==================

  * fix get content-type even if can't get other headers in firefox. fixes #181

0.12.3 / 2013-02-11
==================

  * add quick "progress" event support

0.12.2 / 2013-02-04
==================

  * add test to check if response acts as a readable stream
  * add ReadableStream in the Response prototype.
  * add test to assert correct redirection when the host changes in the location header.
  * add default Accept-Encoding. Closes #155
  * fix req.pipe() return value of original stream for node parity. Closes #171
  * remove the host header when cleaning headers to properly follow the redirection.

0.12.1 / 2013-01-10
==================

  * add x-domain error handling

0.12.0 / 2013-01-04
==================

  * add header persistence on redirects

0.11.0 / 2013-01-02
==================

  * add .error Error object. Closes #156
  * add forcing of res.text removal for FF HEAD responses. Closes #162
  * add reduce component usage. Closes #90
  * move better-assert dep to development deps

0.10.0 / 2012-11-14
==================

  * add req.timeout(ms) support for the client

0.9.10 / 2012-11-14
==================

  * fix client-side .query(str) support

0.9.9 / 2012-11-14
==================

  * add .parse(fn) support
  * fix socket hangup with dates in querystring. Closes #146
  * fix socket hangup "error" event when a callback of arity 2 is provided

0.9.8 / 2012-11-03
==================

  * add emission of error from `Request#callback()`
  * add a better fix for nodes weird socket hang up error
  * add PUT/POST/PATCH data support to client short-hand functions
  * add .license property to component.json
  * change client portion to build using component(1)
  * fix GET body support [guille]

0.9.7 / 2012-10-19
==================

  * fix `.buffer()` `res.text` when no parser matches

0.9.6 / 2012-10-17
==================

  * change: use `this` when `window` is undefined
  * update to new component spec [juliangruber]
  * fix emission of "data" events for compressed responses without encoding. Closes #125

0.9.5 / 2012-10-01
==================

  * add field name to .attach()
  * add text "parser"
  * refactor isObject()
  * remove wtf isFunction() helper

0.9.4 / 2012-09-20
==================

  * fix `Buffer` responses [TooTallNate]
  * fix `res.type` when a "type" param is present [TooTallNate]

0.9.3 / 2012-09-18
==================

  * remove __GET__ `.send()` == `.query()` special-case (__API__ change !!!)

0.9.2 / 2012-09-17
==================

  * add `.aborted` prop
  * add `.abort()`. Closes #115

0.9.1 / 2012-09-07
==================

  * add `.forbidden` response property
  * add component.json
  * change emitter-component to 0.0.5
  * fix client-side tests

0.9.0 / 2012-08-28
==================

  * add `.timeout(ms)`. Closes #17

0.8.2 / 2012-08-28
==================

  * fix pathname relative redirects. Closes #112

0.8.1 / 2012-08-21
==================

  * fix redirects when schema is specified

0.8.0 / 2012-08-19
==================

  * add `res.buffered` flag
  * add buffering of text/*, json and forms only by default. Closes #61
  * add `.buffer(false)` cancellation
  * add cookie jar support [hunterloftis]
  * add agent functionality [hunterloftis]

0.7.0 / 2012-08-03
==================

  * allow `query()` to be called after the internal `req` has been created [tootallnate]

0.6.0 / 2012-07-17
==================

  * add `res.send('foo=bar')` default of "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"

0.5.1 / 2012-07-16
==================

  * add "methods" dep
  * add `.end()` arity check to node callbacks
  * fix unzip support due to weird node internals

0.5.0 / 2012-06-16
==================

  * Added "Link" response header field parsing, exposing `res.links`

0.4.3 / 2012-06-15
==================

  * Added 303, 305 and 307 as redirect status codes [slaskis]
  * Fixed passing an object as the url

0.4.2 / 2012-06-02
==================

  * Added component support
  * Fixed redirect data

0.4.1 / 2012-04-13
==================

  * Added HTTP PATCH support
  * Fixed: GET / HEAD when following redirects. Closes #86
  * Fixed Content-Length detection for multibyte chars

0.4.0 / 2012-03-04
==================

  * Added `.head()` method [browser]. Closes #78
  * Added `make test-cov` support
  * Added multipart request support. Closes #11
  * Added all methods that node supports. Closes #71
  * Added "response" event providing a Response object. Closes #28
  * Added `.query(obj)`. Closes #59
  * Added `res.type` (browser). Closes #54
  * Changed: default `res.body` and `res.files` to {}
  * Fixed: port existing query-string fix (browser). Closes #57

0.3.0 / 2012-01-24
==================

  * Added deflate/gzip support [guillermo]
  * Added `res.type` (Content-Type void of params)
  * Added `res.statusCode` to mirror node
  * Added `res.headers` to mirror node
  * Changed: parsers take callbacks
  * Fixed optional schema support. Closes #49

0.2.0 / 2012-01-05
==================

  * Added url auth support
  * Added `.auth(username, password)`
  * Added basic auth support [node]. Closes #41
  * Added `make test-docs`
  * Added guillermo's EventEmitter. Closes #16
  * Removed `Request#data()` for SS, renamed to `send()`
  * Removed `Request#data()` from client, renamed to `send()`
  * Fixed array support. [browser]
  * Fixed array support. Closes #35 [node]
  * Fixed `EventEmitter#emit()`

0.1.3 / 2011-10-25
==================

  * Added error to callback
  * Bumped node dep for 0.5.x

0.1.2 / 2011-09-24
==================

  * Added markdown documentation
  * Added `request(url[, fn])` support to the client
  * Added `qs` dependency to package.json
  * Added options for `Request#pipe()`
  * Added support for `request(url, callback)`
  * Added `request(url)` as shortcut for `request.get(url)`
  * Added `Request#pipe(stream)`
  * Added inherit from `Stream`
  * Added multipart support
  * Added ssl support (node)
  * Removed Content-Length field from client
  * Fixed buffering, `setEncoding()` to utf8 [reported by stagas]
  * Fixed "end" event when piping

0.1.1 / 2011-08-20
==================

  * Added `res.redirect` flag (node)
  * Added redirect support (node)
  * Added `Request#redirects(n)` (node)
  * Added `.set(object)` header field support
  * Fixed `Content-Length` support

0.1.0 / 2011-08-09
==================

  * Added support for multiple calls to `.data()`
  * Added support for `.get(uri, obj)`
  * Added GET `.data()` querystring support
  * Added IE{6,7,8} support [alexyoung]

0.0.1 / 2011-08-05
==================

  * Initial commit


text:
By Disarray on September 23, 2012 • ( Leave a comment )
Filmmakers Spotlight: Interview with Director Ella Hatamian of "The Epiphany"
We recently caught up with Armenian Director Ella Hatamian to discuss her film, The Ephiphany, which is currently being screened at Sunset Gower Studios as part of NewFilmmakers Los Angeles. Learn about Hatamian's project, her learnings and influences.
Name/Position: Ella Hatamian/Director
Film: The Epiphany
Tell us a little bit about your project and how long you've been working on it.
The Epiphany was my undergraduate thesis film at NYU. I had the idea two summers ago when I was on vacation with my family, I thought it would be fun to make a movie with them. Most of my films take place around a social event – over a short, specific period of time. Armenian Christmas was only a couple months away so I decided that would be the central setting of the film. I wrote the script in September and shot the film in January and it took me way too long to edit.
Is there anyone you'd like to thank for helping out with this film?
Everyone who made the production possible – my family, my producers, my crew, all the friends (and strangers) who donated on Kickstarter, my teachers Susan Seidelman and Nick Tanis.
How does it feel to have your film part of the NewFilmmakers Screening at Sunset Gower Studios?
Awesome. I've never seen it on the big screen. My favorite part of making a movie is watching an audience watch the film – it's completely nerve-wracking but I live for it. I'm excited to be a part of such a well-curated showcase.
Enthusiasm. It's not easy to cultivate so I'm always inspired by people who maintain enthusiasm for what they do.
Who are your influences and who do you admire?
Blake Edwards, Woody Allen, Rainer Fassbinder, and Sidney Lumet are some of the most influential storytellers in my book. Tennessee Williams and William Saroyan are my favorite playwrights. I admire Busby Berkeley for his commitment to spectacle, and Albert Einstein for his ability to articulate some of the most intricate and complex ideas to the point of understanding; for me, achieving clarity is the greatest challenge of filmmaking. I admire my parents for always having faith and confidence in my pursuits (that have never been the kind ensure steady income or dental benefits). I mean, I admire all the people who take me seriously…
What lessons have you learned from the industry so far?
That it's changing. There's been a revolution in everything from medium to distribution and filmmakers don't have to be at the mercy of a studio to tell a story. I've learned to take advantage of that.
If you could collaborate with anybody, who would it be?
Peter Sellers.
I feel silly answering this question because I'm only 23, have always had a roof over my head, food in my stomach, an incredible education, family, and friends. One time I had an ulcer, but I took medicine and it went away. Another time I broke my arm, but that got better too. I never had a "tough" experience – only incidents I dramatized for college applications.
Stand up straight.
What advice would you give to new filmmakers starting out in the industry?
Know what you like and what you don't – taste is everything.
Where can we expect to see you next?
I'd like to act some more but auditions are too nerve-wracking for me and my nerves have no patience for any more wracking than I'm already subjected them to so I guess I'll write myself a role. I'll direct a feature soon, I plan on it being a comedy because I like to make people laugh. I only say "plan" because one time I made a dramatic film called "Going Out" and ironically, it won an award for "Best Comedy" so you never know… Or maybe you do. But I sure don't.
For more information, visit: http://www.newfilmmakersla.com/
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Categories: Interview, news
Filmmaker Spotlight: Interview with Director Rene Rhi of "Bordando La Frontera"
Filmmakers Spotlight: Director Alexis Morante of "Matador on the Road"

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Older Cherubs enjoy a fascinating range of activities with wonderful, purpose-made materials they can choose from.
The Preschool Room is a vibrant home to all indoor messy play learning activities.
The Craft Room is decorated by the children themselves and children grow seedlings, learn about the properties and uses of water, sand, clay, paint, wood working, cooking!
The computer is used for photo editing and using programmes to support current projects.
The Montessori room provides an oasis of calm, with an impressive selection of Montessori activities, books, puzzles and music to suit every interest and ability.


Some of our precious Omaha babies!
Children's Square U.S.A. hosted a ribbon cutting Wednesday at its office for integrated health services.
Omaha, Nebraska, our 1st paw prints………….
Omaha, NE will always be special to us; it is where we began in loving memory of our beloved Founder, Jennie. Through our 25th year our Omaha, NE Members continue to visit many facilities that we originally visited! We take pride in knowing we are making a difference in many lives just by sharing our four footed angels.
Unending caring and compassion can be found throughout Paws For Friendship Incorporated.
Younkers Fund Raising in Omaha, NE.
Dude visiting with a friend!
Thanks to everyone for sharing their little angels!


text:
Platanos self-organized structure for refugee reception at Skala Sykamnias/Lesvos about accreditation hunt on the NE Aegean islands
Nieuws, gepost door: nn op 20/01/2016 01:07:46
Wanneer: 20/01/2016 - 20:38
As people of solidarity who have been operating for three months at the
Platanos self-organized structure for refugee reception at Skala
Sykamnias, and prompted by the arrival in the last few days of an
accreditation hunt on the NE Aegean islands, we want to avoid any
misunderstandings by making our position towards this game of
impressions clear.
The structure of Platanos is an endeavour based on the principles of
self-organization, solidarity and dignity.
We describe ourselves as self-organized because no political party,
business or organization is standing behind us; all decisions and
actions arise from open public assemblies and the responsibility of
their implementation is shared equally. Mistakes are corrected
collectively and every success is shared collectively. There are no
leaders, only coordinators that are appointed by the assembly and
alternated periodically. Above all the responsibility of the presence of
everyone here is a clear, conscious, individual choice, not dictated by
a governmental organisation or any other plan.
We act in Solidarity because we are here to give active support to
refugees and migrants arriving from the opposite shore; recognising the
injustice that pushed them to this choice and not to draw surplus
humanitarian value from the pain of "these poor people" or exert
politics on their backs, or worse, on their dead bodies.
We make the conscious choice of grassroots solidarity and networking in
contrast with both the current dictates of a society that demands
philanthropic consumers and inhumane workers, and with the ruling class
and the suffering it causes.
We act in dignity because we choose to stand beside them in a human, not
humanitarian way. We recognise the other's existence when our eyes meet
and the need to treat them with the dignity they deserve, acknowledging
the causes that led them to this point and promising not to stop
fighting against those causes.
We are against the easy humanitarian approach that averts its gaze from
the real cause of the problem and in complacency hides behind phoney
charities and "good deeds" that numb your conscience.
These are the principles through which it is made clear that our action
so far, and as long as our forces allow us to continue, will remain
without guardians and be uncompromising against the dictates of the
killer states and their executive bodies – in or out of uniform.
It is therefore natural that any scheme for our legitimisation through
associations, organizations and any other legal entities leaves us
completely indifferent, since this condition is already achieved in
everyone's conscience.
It has been achieved through the selfless support that we receive from
thousands of people around the world, demonstrated through their
participation and endorsement, and through the recognition of the
struggle that has been withstood all these months and its dissemination.
At the same time the state remains completely indifferent to providing
assistance to these people while wasting thousands of resources to shift
the responsibilities of its absence to those who rushed to replace it.
Self-organization is an act that fits neither in the system's
registries, nor of course in the narrow framework of politicians that
access everything through statutes. It is a continuous experiment which
through its development and dissemination searches for the realisation
of a free, consciously defined society; to each according to his needs,
from everyone according to their capabilities.
Solidarity is not an accreditable product nor a theoretical discussion,
but an act that is recognisable through its support and continuation.
Dignity is not negotiated in the halls of the courts and ruling
institutions, but is determined through the daily struggle against
injustice that these same institutions impose.
These are the principles of Platanos, and with these we will continue to
move on, as long as the structure remains alive.
Self-organized Structure Platanos, Skala Sykamnias, 2016
https://www.facebook.com/solidarityplatanos/posts/1108435912530141
Plaats een aanvulling Begin discussie
Re: Platanos self-organized structure for refugee reception at Skala Sykamnias/Lesvos about accreditation hunt on the NE Aegean islands
do, 21/01/2016 - 16:57
geplaatst door: nn
Hands off the solidarity people: Lesvos, Chios, https://www.indymedia.nl/node/31503 .
ma, 25/01/2016 - 01:18
Inmiddels zijn er mensen gearresteerd vanwege hun steun aan de vluchtelingen: http://libcom.org/forums/news/lesvos-chios-volunteers-helping-refugees-a...
wo, 03/02/2016 - 23:38
Greek Police raid the house of a group of international refugee-supporters - cooking goes on, https://www.indymedia.nl/node/31776 .


text:
First published Tue May 14, 2002; substantive revision Wed Nov 12, 2008
The concept of desert is deeply entrenched in everyday morality. We say that effort deserves success, wrongdoing deserves punishment, innocent suffering deserves sympathy or compensation, virtue deserves happiness, and so on. We think that the getting of what's deserved is just, and that failure to receive what's deserved is unjust. We also believe it's good that a person gets what she deserves, and bad that she doesn't—even if she deserves something bad, like punishment. We assume, too, that it's wrong to treat people better or worse than they deserve, and right to treat them according to their deserts. In these and other ways, the notion of desert pervades our ethical lives.
In spite of its ubiquity, or perhaps because of it, the notion of desert is not especially well understood. This isn't surprising, since there are many difficult questions surrounding desert. For instance, what are the ingredients (as it were) of desert? What sorts of thing can be deserving? What are the grounds or bases for desert? How do bases for desert manage to make a thing that has them deserving? What connections does desert have to other moral-normative concepts, such as justice and goodness? This article sketches some possible answers to these and subsidiary questions about desert.
1. Ingredients of Desert
2. Subjects of Desert
3. Desert Bases
4. How Desert Bases Work
5. Desert's Relationship to Some Other Concepts
1. The Ingredients of Desert
Consider some ordinary desert claims:
Hans deserves praise in virtue of his efforts.
Because of her outstanding scholarly contributions, Nkechi deserves promotion to full professor.
Financial compensation is what the innocent victims of September 11 deserve.
These desert claims have several things in common: each involves a deserving subject (Hans, Nkechi, innocent victims), a deserved object (praise, promotion, compensation) and a desert basis (effort, contribution, innocent suffering). This suggests that desert itself is a three-place relation that holds among a subject, an object, and a basis. Of course, sometimes the desert claims we utter do not explicitly refer to all three of these ingredients. For example, one might say that Hans deserves praise (without specifying the basis of his desert), or that Nkechi is deserving (without specifying what she deserves). But unless one can fill these claims out further—say, by explaining why one thinks that Hans deserves praise, or what it is one thinks that Nkechi deserves—then the concept of desert is being misused.
It might be thought that desert involves more than three ingredients—more, that is, than a basis, object, and subject. This thought might be due to reflection on desert claims like these:
In virtue of his efforts, Hans deserves praise from his teacher.
Because of her scholarly contributions, Nkechi deserves from the University the position of full professor.
Financial compensation from groups that sponsor terrorism is what the victims of September 11 deserve.
These desert claims specify a "source" from which the subject deserves the object. Hans deserves praise not from just anyone, but from his teacher. Nkechi deserves promotion not just by any institution, but by her university. The victims of September 11 deserve compensation not from just any group, but from those who harbor terrorists. Thus, it might be supposed that desert has four ingredients: a basis, a subject, an object, and its source (Kleinig 1971).
There are two reasons to resist adding this fourth ingredient to desert. One is that some legitimate cases of desert involve either no object-source, or an object-source so general that specifying it would be otiose. For example, you might deserve some good fortune after a long streak of undeserved bad luck, even though the good luck you now deserve is not deserved from any particular source. Or, in virtue of being a person, you might deserve respect—but from whom? Well, everyone! A second reason for not allowing an independent fourth ingredient (the object-source) into desert is that in fact it is already contained in one of the undisputed ingredients—namely, the desert object itself. For example, the object of Hans's desert is not simply praise, but praise from his teacher; the object of Nkechi's desert is not simply promotion, but promotion by her university; and so on. In these cases, the desert object includes a specific source. In other cases, the desert object will not involve a specific source—as when you deserve good luck from no particular source, or respect from everyone.
The most uncontroversial bearers of desert are human beings. Humans are thought to deserve, or be capable of deserving, many things: punishment, reward, apologies, compensation, admiration, contempt, wages, grades, prizes, and so on. But is desert limited to human beings? Can non-human animals, for example, be deserving too?
A conservative view is that only humans can be deserving, and that any attribution of desert to non-humans is either incoherent, false, or translatable into some claim of "human" desert, or perhaps into a claim that does not mention desert at all. So, for example, suppose someone says "The dog deserves a treat." On the conservative view, this claim could be incoherent, since dogs (it is claimed) neither deserve nor fail to deserve anything. The concept of desert simply does not apply to them. Or it could be coherent but false: the dog does not deserve a treat, since dogs cannot literally deserve anything. Or it could be coherent and even true, provided that it's translatable without change of meaning into some other claim, e.g., "You deserve the satisfaction of giving your dog a treat," or "Giving the dog a treat will reinforce its good behavior."
This view seems a bit too conservative. First, it flies in the face of the way we ordinarily apply the concept of desert. Indeed, if ordinary language is any guide, then just about anything can be literally deserving. For in addition to making desert claims about humans, we also say, for example, that the pet deserves our love, the Olympic Peninsula our respect, the proposal our support, the nation our loyalty, the painting our admiration. (It's possible that some of these claims are translatable in ways that would be consistent with the conservative view, but it's not obvious that all of them are. The burden of proof—and of translation!—is on the conservatives.) Second, what makes a human being capable of desert probably is not the biological fact that she is a human being—that is, a member of the species Homo sapiens. It might instead be the fact that she is capable of reason or self-reflection, or that she is capable of experiencing pain and pleasure. If so, then since there are non-human creatures (e.g., dogs) who can either reason or experience pain and pleasure, then at least some non-human creatures are subjects of desert too.
Unfortunately, this isn't saying very much. For one thing, it's not clear how having the ability to reason or experience pleasure or pain would make a creature capable of being deserving. Furthermore, it's not obvious that possession of one or more of those abilities is even necessary for being a subject of desert. Dead people, who don't have those abilities, are sometimes thought to deserve various things, such as a decent burial. Likewise, inanimate objects—such as the Grand Canyon or Big Ben—are also said to deserve certain things, such as preservation or protection.
Clearly, the question of what is necessary or sufficient for being a subject of desert is a difficult one. Is there any way to answer it? One possibility suggests itself: first, draw up a list of the possible bases of desert; then look around and see what sorts of things can have them. The result would be at least a partial catalogue of the sorts of things that can be deserving. In order to do this, of course, we would need a list of possible desert bases. What would that list look like? What are the bases for desert?
3. Bases for Desert
Suppose we are asked to draw up a list of the bases for desert—that is, a catalogue of the sorts of things such that having any of them would make a subject deserving. What would go on the list, and how would each entry be justified? We might agree that effort, for example, is a basis for deserving reward or success, but we might be less sure about whether need, for instance, is a basis for deserving medical care, or whether moral worth is a basis for deserving happiness. In order to settle such doubts and arrive at a justifiable catalogue, some general and defensible principles for identifying desert bases seem necessary.
There is agreement that the basis of a thing's desert must in some important sense be a fact "about" that thing (Feinberg 1970). So, for example, the fact that 3 is a prime number, or that a particular star is two billion years old, is not a basis for your deserving anything. In order for a fact to be a basis of your desert, it must be a fact about you—for example, that you have worked hard, innocently suffered, are a person, and so on. So the basis of a thing's desert must be a fact about that thing. Is there anything more that can be said?
Many writers have claimed that another necessary condition on something's being a desert base is that the deserving subject is responsible for it (see Cupit 1996a and Feldman 1995b, 1996 for references and discussion). A standard version of this condition can be stated as follows:
(DR) A deserves x in virtue of y only if A is responsible for y.
DR is plausible at first glance, and there are many cases that seem to support it. If, for instance, a professor discovers that his student isn't responsible for the high-quality paper she submitted (because she stole it from the Internet), then she can't deserve a good grade for it. Or consider the fact that criminal action deserves punishment, but not if the agent was insane at the time of the action. Presumably, the justification for this is that an insane agent is not responsible for his or her actions, and no one deserves punishment for actions for which he or she isn't responsible.
DR plays a central role in contemporary discussions about desert. It occurs, for instance, in a much-discussed argument for the conclusion that no one deserves anything. (This argument is suggested by some passages in Rawls 1971, though it's not clear that Rawls himself means to endorse the following versions of it. See Miller 1976 for discussion.) The argument goes something like this: all the actions we perform and attributes we possess—in short, all would-be bases for desert—are determined by factors for which we are not responsible, such as our genetic makeup, early training, and environment. But if no one is responsible for his or her possession of any would-be basis for desert, then these are not bases for desert at all (DR). Therefore, no one deserves anything. On another version of this argument, it involves an extra premise: if A deserves x in virtue of y, then A must also deserve y (Nozick 1974 and Zaitchik 1977 add this premise to the argument, and both reject it). So, for example, Rostropovich deserves praise for his musical talent only if he deserves to have that talent. But does he? This is where DR comes in. For if DR is true, then Rostropovich can deserve his musical talent only if he's responsible for it—which he isn't, since he was born with it. Thus, he can't deserve praise for it. Likewise, it's argued, for any alleged desert base: no one could deserve to have any so-called desert base, since no one is responsible for having such things. Thus, once again, no one deserves anything.
DR appears elsewhere in theorizing about desert. A good example is found in the literature on desert of wages. Much of this literature centers on the question of whether the wage a worker deserves depends on the effort exerted (regardless of actual productivity), or on productivity (regardless of effort). Sometimes the following argument is proposed: wages are deserved either for effort or productivity; people are responsible only for their efforts, not for the success or productivity of those efforts; DR is true; thus, it's the worker's effort, not productivity, that determines the deserved wage. (For more discussion of this argument, see Lamont 1994, McLeod 1996, and Sadurski 1985.)
In spite of DRs intuitive appeal and wide acceptance, it has not gone unchallenged. To some, it seems obvious that we can be deserving in virtue of things for which we are not responsible (Cupit 1996a, Feldman 1995b, 1996). Consider a person who innocently suffers a brutal mugging. The victim is not responsible for the attack, but deserves compensation anyway. Or consider a person who innocently suffers an excruciating disease that is very expensive to treat. She is not responsible for contracting this disease, yet she might deserve medical care and sympathy. Or consider the fact that you are a person. No one is responsible for this, yet in virtue of being a person you deserve a modicum of respect. These examples suggest that if there is a connection between desert and responsibility, it's more complicated than the one posited by DR. (For more discussion of the connection, see Section 5.4 below, as well as Cupit 1996a,b and Smilansky 1996a, b.)
Another attempt to place conditions on desert bases does so by attempting to link them with certain emotions or attitudes (Miller 1976). A version of this view begins by calling attention to the class of attitudes that we take up toward people in virtue of various qualities they possess or actions they perform. Those attitudes include admiration, gratitude, disgust, resentment, and so on. These have been called the "appraising attitudes". The idea here is that the bases for appraising attitudes are, or at least coincide with, the bases for desert. Put another way:
(DAA) x is a desert base if and only if x is the basis of an appraising attitude.
If correct, DAA would provide a useful principle for determining what the desert bases are. For example, it's sometimes held that need is a basis for desert (say, of medical care). Yet need doesn't seem to be the basis of any appraising attitude. We don't respect or resent people, admire or detest them, because of their needs. Thus, if DAA is true, then need isn't a basis for desert. On the other hand, it seems that exerting effort (for example) is a basis for admiring a person. If DAA is true, it follows that effort is a basis for desert.
However, there may be a problem with DAA. To see it, consider the distinction between something's actually being admired or resented, on the one hand, and that thing's being appropriately admired or resented on the other. For example, many admired Hitler even though it would have been appropriate to detest him. And many resented Martin Luther King, Jr., even though it would have been appropriate to admire him. This allows us to ask: is DAA the thesis that x is a basis for desert if and only if x happens to be the object of an appraising attitude? Or is it instead the view that x is a basis for desert if and only if x is an appropriate basis for an appraising attitude? If the former, then DAA reduces to an implausible form of relativism about desert bases. (Desert bases would be properties whose presence we just happened to admire or detest, even if we admired nasty properties and detested noble ones.) If the latter, then DAA is in danger of being vacuous. For what else could make x an "appropriate" basis for an appraising attitude, except for the fact that those who have x deserve to be the object of that attitude?
Still another way of attempting to determine the bases for desert proceeds in two stages (Feinberg 1970). First, draw up a list of all the sorts of treatment that can be deserved: prizes, rewards, punishments, grades, compensation, and so on. Second, for each form of treatment, attempt to specify the basis or bases for which it is deserved. There are two potential problems with this approach. First, just as it is difficult to draw up a catalogue of bases for desert, it is hard to draw up a list of forms of deservable treatment. Second, this way of proceeding might reinforce the assumption that for every sort of deservable treatment, there is a desert base or set of desert bases unique to it. This assumption may be correct, but another possibility is that there is a single set of desert bases, and possession of any or all of them can influence the extent to which one deserves any given form of deservable treatment. If this latter view of the relationship between desert bases and deserved treatment is correct, then attempting to match deserved treatments to their bases might not be the best way to determine the bases of desert (McLeod 1996).
Yet another method for determining desert bases follows directly from an "institutional" theory of desert (Cummisky 1987, Arnold 1987). On that sort of theory, the bases for desert are determined by the rules or purposes of social institutions. For example, if the purpose of the 'institution' of Olympic gymnastics is to award the gold medal to the gymnast who receives the highest number of points from the judges, then the gymnast who achieves that score deserves the gold medal. If a theory of this sort is correct, then discovering the bases for desert will be as easy (or as difficult) as discovering the rules or purposes of social institutions. A possible source of trouble for this view, however, is that desert bases do not seem to be entirely determined by the rules or purposes of social institutions. Otherwise morally repugnant rules such as racist restrictions on voting eligibility, sexist restrictions on employee benefits, and so on, could not be fairly criticized on the grounds that race, gender, and so on are not legitimate grounds for deserving the loss of such benefits. But such criticism certainly seems warranted. This has persuaded some writers that there are "pre-institutional" facts about the bases for desert, and that social rules and purposes can be evaluated in terms of them (Feinberg 1970, McLeod 1999).
How do desert bases work? In particular, how does possession of a basis for desert manage to make its possessor deserving? The difficulty of this question can be brought out by imagining a person who has, for example, exerted quite a lot of effort toward achieving some end. Effort is widely thought to be a basis for desert, so let's suppose that it is. Would this mean that the person who exerted effort now deserves to achieve his end? One reason to doubt this is that his end might have been an evil one—for example, the bombing of a building full of innocent people. Surely he can't deserve that this horrible end be realized, no matter how hard he works for it. So maybe we should add that effort is a basis for desert only if it's directed toward a morally unobjectionable end. If correct, this would explain why the terrorist can't deserve that his efforts succeed. After all, those efforts are directed toward the morally objectionable end of murdering innocent people.
However, it's probably a mistake to conclude that exerting effort toward a morally unobjectionable end is sufficient for deserving the end itself. This is because there might be other factors at work that could weigh against one's deserving it, even if the end itself is morally okay. For example, suppose you've worked hard toward getting an A on your term paper. You spent hours in the library doing research, you composed several drafts, you went hours without sleep, and so on. Your end is morally okay, since there's nothing wrong with trying (in these ways!) to get an A. Even so, it's still possible that, in spite of your tremendous efforts, your paper is terrible. In that case, you probably don't deserve an A.
The general phenomenon emerging here is that, at least in many cases, possession of any particular basis for desert is not going to be sufficient for being deserving. You might work hard toward an end, but what if the end itself is wrong? Or the end is okay, and your effort intense, but what if the product of your effort is of very low quality? Even if the product of your effort is of high quality, you still might not be deserving, since other factors could count against you. Until all these of factors are taken into consideration and weighed against each other, it's impossible to render a verdict of desert.
This sort of phenomenon is not unprecedented. In fact it comes up often in philosophical ethics, most notably in theorizing about moral rightness and wrongness. There, it's standard to distinguish prima facie moral rightness from all-things-considered moral rightness (Ross 1930). To illustrate this distinction, imagine that you've made a solemn promise to help your friend. In virtue of this, it would be morally right, in some sense, for you to keep your promise. However, the rightness here is merely prima facie, for it might not be all-things-considered morally right for you to help your friend. This is because your promise might, for example, have been to help your friend by murdering his enemy (who, let's suppose, is an innocent person). In that case, you almost certainly have an all-things-considered obligation to break your promise. Still, the fact that you made a solemn promise to perform a certain action does seem to count toward the action's being right. For in other circumstances, a solemn promise to do something could generate an all-things-considered obligation to do it. It just so happens that, in this case, the prima facie rightness that the act would inherit in virtue of being a promise-keeping is outweighed by the prima facie wrongness of committing murder. Thus, on this way of thinking, the all-things-considered rightness or wrongness of any action is determined by all the respects in which the action would be prima facie right, when weighed against all the respects in which it would be prima facie wrong.
It might be that desert bases work in a similar way. That is, there might be a distinction between prima facie desert and all-things-considered desert. Possession of any given desert base makes one prima facie deserving, but it might not make one all-things-considered deserving. For example, you might have exerted intense effort toward achieving some end. If, as is usually held, effort is a basis for deserving success, then you prima facie deserve success in virtue of your effort. However, you might not be all-things-considered deserving of success. Perhaps this is because your effort was directed toward an evil end. In such a case, the prima facie desert of success that you gained in virtue of exerting effort is outweighed by the prima facie desert of failure and punishment that you acquired in virtue of plotting an evil end. If these are all the desert bases in play, then you all-things-considered deserve failure and punishment, not success.
The obvious drawback to thinking of desert bases as functioning in this way is that the method, if any, for determining the weight or importance of desert bases in particular cases is pretty mysterious. How, for instance, are we to weigh effort against productivity in the context of deserving a wage, or moral worth against need in the context of deserving medical care, or a person's humanity against his criminal behavior in the context of deserving punishment? Until we have some principled way of weighing prima facie desert bases against each other, the distinction between prima facie and all-things-considered desert might serve only to describe, rather than solve, the problem of how desert bases work.
An alternative approach would involve abandoning the distinction between prima facie and all-things-considered desert, and working toward a catalogue of more "finely-grained" desert bases. The idea here is that if the desert bases are specified in enough detail, then the relationship between having them and being deserving would be simple: possession of a desert base would be sufficient for being deserving. On this sort of view, effort itself, for example, is not a basis for desert, nor is effort-directed-toward-a-morally-unobjectionable-end, since neither one seems sufficient for being deserving (say, of an A on a paper). Instead, possession of a much more complicated desert base—viz., effort-directed-toward-a-morally-unobjectionable-end-that-is-not-also-a-grade-on-a-paper-etc.—is sufficient for desert.
This kind of view has the advantage of positing a simple relationship between possessing a desert base and being deserving. That relationship is this: possession of the desert base entails being deserving. However, this simplicity is purchased at the cost of making the desert bases themselves hopelessly complicated. The prior view, by contrast, makes desert bases very simple (e.g., 'effort', 'productivity', 'moral worth'), but the price for this simplicity is a complicated and admittedly mysterious relationship between possessing desert bases and being deserving.
Fully grasping a concept involves understanding its relationships to other concepts. Thus, in order to fully grasp the concept of desert, it's important to see what connections it has to other concepts. Desert probably bears interesting connections to a large number of concepts, but this concluding section focuses only on four: justice, intrinsic value, entitlement, and responsibility.
5.1 Justice
There are many theories of justice (and, some would say, many sorts of justice—distributive, retributive, social, etc.—for there to be theories about). Some of these theories are egalitarian, since they state that some sort of equality is most central to justice. Other theories of justice are libertarian, because of the supreme importance that they place on liberty or freedom. But an ancient idea is that justice involves the getting of what's deserved—even if this results in inequalities, and even if distribution according to desert involves or requires some loss of liberty. On an old-fashioned version of this view, for instance, justice obtains entirely to the extent that the morally virtuous are happy, and the morally wicked suffer. If happiness were somehow to be distributed according to moral goodness in this way, the result would be inequality with respect to happiness, since the more virtuous would be happier than the less virtuous. There would also be a loss of liberty or freedom for the morally wicked, since they would be punished or otherwise made to suffer. But these inequalities and losses of freedom wouldn't detract from the justice of the world; instead, they would be required by justice itself.
However, contemporary theorists don't agree about the relationship between justice and desert. Some seem willing to accept that justice is entirely a matter of getting what's deserved (Feldman 1992, 1995a, 1995c). A more moderate position is that getting what's deserved is part, but only a part, of justice (Feinberg 1974, Lucas 1980, Slote 1973). Another possible component of justice is fairness, which has to do with the way one's treatment compares to the treatment received by others. Suppose, for example, that every student in the class deserves a C, but one of them is arbitrarily given an A and the rest are given Cs. Some will say, quite plausibly, that although these other students are given the grades they deserve, they are treated unjustly because they are treated unfairly. If this is correct, then justice cannot consist simply in getting what's deserved. Other factors, such as fairness, might be relevant to justice as well (Feinberg 1974). Another such factor might be consent. For suppose a person has worked hard to earn money, for example, and thereby comes to deserve it. Even so, there is no injustice if the person freely consents to giving this money away (Slote 1973).
Some theorists have gone so far as to argue that desert has nothing at all to do with justice. This view contradicts commonsense morality, but the arguments for holding it have been influential. One such argument is that the concept of desert, rather than providing a basis for the explanation of justice, is in fact conceptually parasitic on the notion of justice. On this way of seeing things, to deserve something is to be entitled to it according to rules that are just. The justice of these rules is then explained not in terms of how well or regularly they result in deserved distributions, which would be circular, but rather by some criterion (such as agreement on those rules by rational parties) that has nothing to do with desert (Rawls 1971, Scanlon 1984). The motivation behind a view like this might be that a more robust notion of desert would involve metaphysical mysteries, such as freedom or responsibility (Scheffler 1995). Or perhaps the motivation is simply the pragmatic one that any system designed to distribute goods and evils according to individual deserts would be hopelessly impractical (Rawls 1971). For how could we determine each individual's moral worth, level of effort, productivity, and so on, and then distribute benefits and burdens accordingly?
There is another argument for thinking that desert is irrelevant to justice—or, more precisely, that distribution according to 'desert' would actually involve injustice. This argument relies on the intuition that just distributions cannot be based on factors over which the recipients have no control. The distribution of economic and political benefits according to race or gender, for instance, seems unjust since neither one's race nor gender is within one's control. But what if the alleged bases for desert—effort, moral worth, productivity, being a person, and so on—are also beyond or largely outside of one's control, and due instead to factors such as such as genetic endowment and early training? It would seem to follow that distributions based on these factors, these "desert bases", are unjust (Rawls 1971).
5.2 Intrinsic value
The intrinsic value of a thing is the value it has simply in virtue of what it is, rather than the value it has in virtue of what it leads to, signifies, entails, purchases, and so on. (For reasons that can't be discussed here, the concept of intrinsic value is of central importance in philosophical ethics.) The branch of ethics concerned with intrinsic value is known as axiology. A helpful assumption often made in axiology is that intrinsic value is had not just by anything at all, but rather by states of affairs or propositions. And one of the central questions in axiology is this: what elements can contribute to the intrinsic value of a state of affairs?
Some have argued that one such element involves desert (Feldman 1992, 1995c, Kagan 1999; Hurka 2001). To see why, consider two states of affairs: (i) that Smith is happy, and (ii) that Jones is unhappy. What is the intrinsic value of these states of affairs? One might suppose that (i) is intrinsically good, since happiness seems a likely constituent of intrinsically good states of affairs, and that (ii) is intrinsically bad, since unhappiness seems a likely ingredient of intrinsically bad states of affairs. So far, so good. However, it might be that happiness and unhappiness are not the only contributors to the intrinsic values of states of affairs. Another such factor might be the "fit" between the happiness or unhappiness received, on the one hand, and the happiness or unhappiness deserved, on the other. For suppose that Smith and Jones are morally despicable people, and that therefore their happiness is undeserved. In that case, it seems wrong to say that (i) is intrinsically good and (ii) intrinsically bad. On the contrary, a more plausible view is that (i) is intrinsically bad and (ii) intrinsically good! In any case, an intuitively appealing position is that a state of affairs in which a person who deserves unhappiness but receives happiness is intrinsically bad, and a state of affairs in which a person who deserves unhappiness and gets it is not intrinsically bad, and quite possibly intrinsically good. If this is correct, then the fit between desert and receipt within a state of affairs is at least one determinant of its intrinsic value.
That said, the quality of fit between desert and receipt is almost surely not the only determinant of intrinsic value (Persson 1996). Compare, for instance, two possible worlds (here thought of as extremely large states of affairs). One world contains a million sinners, all of whom suffer the horrible punishment that they deserve. Another world contains a million saints, all of whom enjoy the bliss that they deserve. These are rather different worlds, but in one respect they are the same: the quality of fit between desert and receipt in the sinners' world is equal to that of the saints' world. This is because the fit in each world is perfect: each person in each world receives precisely what he or she deserves, and the worlds have the same population. However, it seems absurd to say that these worlds have the same intrinsic value. On the contrary, the sinners' world seems intrinsically much worse than the saints'. If so, then the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is not exhausted by the quality of fit between desert and receipt.
5.3 Entitlement
We often speak of being entitled to something, like a vacation, a grade, an inheritance, or an apology. Notice, however, that in many of these cases we could just as easily have said that we deserve these things. Thus, the terms 'entitled to' and 'deserve' are often used interchangeably. This raises the question of desert's relationship to entitlement. Are they one and the same, or are they different? And if they are distinct notions, then what connection, if any, does desert bear to entitlement?
First, though, what exactly is entitlement? Reflecting on a few cases can bring out the sense of 'entitlement' of interest here. Suppose, then, that the rules of a certain corporation state that its employees shall receive two weeks of paid vacation after one year of full-time employment. Now suppose that an employee of the company has worked full-time for one year. This employee is now entitled to two weeks of paid vacation. Or, to take another example, suppose the rules of a certain board game specify that a player who rolls "snake eyes" must lose a turn. If a player now rolls snake eyes, then that player is "entitled" to lose a turn. (Admittedly, we don't usually think of penalties as objects of entitlement, but, in the sense of 'entitlement' that concerns us, they can be.) Suppose, as a final example, that the accepted rules of etiquette state that the hostess of an upcoming dinner party shall receive RSVPs from her invited guests, even if she fails to request the favor of a response. In that case, the hostess is entitled to a response from all her invitees. These cases have several things in common. First, there is a conventional rule that specifies that a person shall receive a certain treatment in virtue of possessing an "entitlement base" (that is, a particular attribute or performance of a certain action). Second, there is a person who falls under the rule and who has the entitlement base. Third, this person thereby comes to be entitled to the treatment in question. These are paradigmatic cases of entitlement.
Clearly, entitlement thus understood is structurally similar to desert. For entitlement, like desert, is a three-place relation among an entitled subject, a basis of entitlement, and an object of entitlement. Also, as noted above, many objects of entitlement—vacations, punishment, replies to invitations—are also objects of desert. Furthermore, failure to treat in accordance with entitlement, like failure to treat in accordance with desert, can be an injustice. These considerations might lead some to conclude that there is a profound relationship between entitlement and desert.
Some might want to say that the relationship between desert and entitlement is extremely intimate. Indeed, the "institutional" theories of desert mentioned in Section 3 are precisely those that identify desert with some sort of entitlement. However, this proposed connection (identity) is a bit too intimate, for there are cases in which a person is entitled to something but doesn't deserve it, and also cases in which what's deserved isn't something to which the person is entitled. For instance, the rules that govern the state lottery might entitle the winning ticket holder to one hundred million dollars, even if the lucky winner doesn't deserve so much money. Or, it might be that everyone in the United States deserves free or affordable access to basic health care, even though there are no rules that entitle us to it. These cases suggest that if there is an interesting relationship between desert and entitlement, it isn't identity.
At least some authors have claimed that although entitlement is not identical to desert, it is nevertheless a basis for desert (Feldman 1992, 1995a; McLeod 1999). On their view, being entitled to something is a basis for deserving it. Perhaps the main motivation for this position springs from combining the conviction that justice is simply the getting of what's deserved with the apparent fact that failing to treat in accordance with entitlement can involve injustice. If this combination of views is correct, it would seem to follow that being entitled to something must be a basis for deserving it. But this view also suffers from serious problems. One is its implication that evil or morally repugnant rules are capable of generating desert. Suppose, for example, that Nazi laws entitled officers of the SS to property confiscated from Jews. Even so, it hardly seems correct to say that, in virtue of this, the Nazi officers came to deserve (even prima facie) the stolen property. Another problem with the view that entitlement is a basis for desert is that it seems to violate the requirement that a desert basis must be a fact about the deserving subject. Unlike the property of being morally virtuous or being lazy, the property of being entitled by the rules to x is a highly extrinsic property of an individual, and thus cannot count as a basis for desert.
A third proposed connection between desert and entitlement is found in Cupit (1996b). Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that the orchestra has just pulled off an electrifying performance of Dvorak's Ninth Symphony. The musicians deserve the audience's admiration, and there are rules for how it can be expressed. If, as in this case, their admiration is immense, then the rules call for a standing ovation. Put another way, there is a rule that entitles the musicians to a standing ovation from the audience. Thus, if the audience fails to give the orchestra a standing ovation, the message is conveyed that the musicians don't deserve it. In other words, if the audience fails to give the players that to which they are entitled, then it fails to give them what they deserve. In this way, a link seems to be forged between desert and entitlement: the rules that generate entitlement also help to shape the meanings of the actions that fall under those rules; those actions are meant to express what the recipient deserves; therefore, failure to treat in accordance with entitlement can result in failure to treat in accordance with desert.
5.4 Responsibility
Much of the relevant literature presupposes or explicitly considers some conception of the relationship, if any, that desert bears to the concept of responsibility. As noted in Section 3, some authors (e.g., Rawls 1971, Rachels 1978, Pojman 1997) claim that desert always presupposes responsibility. On their view, one cannot deserve anything in virtue of an action or attribute for which one isn't responsible. Feldman (1995a), Cupit (1996a, b), and others challenge this claim by pointing to properties that seem to be bases for desert but that do not presuppose responsibility. Innocent suffering, being a person, being beautiful, being a member of an endangered species - all of these properties are plausibly regarded as bases for desert of various forms of treatment, such as compensation, respect, admiration, protection, and so on, in spite of the fact that one need not be responsible for possessing them. Thus, it seems that if there is a desert-responsibility connection, it's not as simple as some have thought.
There are ways in which proponents of the view that desert always involves responsibility might deal these apparent counterexamples. One is to distinguish "moral" from "nonmoral" desert—moral desert presupposes responsibility, while nonmoral desert does not—and to relegate nonmoral desert to the philosophical scrap heap. But this maneuver seems both ad hoc and implausible: ad hoc because what motivates the distinction is simply a desire to save the alleged desert-responsibility connection; implausible because treatment (or failure to treat) in accordance with innocent suffering, being a person, being beautiful, etc., doesn't really seem to be nonmoral. On the contrary, failure to treat in accordance with a thing's possession of one or more of those properties would be unfitting or wrong, while treatment in accordance with one or more of them would be fitting or right. A similar objection applies to treating desert as a species of "merit". On this view, merit is based on possession of any quality that is an appropriate basis for treatment, whether the meriting subject is responsible for the quality or not, while desert is a species of merit that requires responsibility for the merit basis (Pojman 1997). This too is ad hoc, since ordinary language doesn't support a sharp merit-desert distinction. It also contradicts the actual practice of competent speakers who readily speak of desert in cases where the subject isn't responsible for the basis.
This isn't to say that desert and responsibility are not connected in any way. In fact, there are cases where desert does require responsibility (perhaps the most obvious is punishment). Thus, rather than focus on simple versions of a desert-responsibility connection, theorists of desert should distinguish those cases in which desert involves responsibility from those in which it does not, and articulate general principles that explain the difference.
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––– and McLeod, Owen, eds., 1999, What Do We Deserve? New York: Oxford University Press
Primoratz, Igor, 1989, Justifying Legal Punishment, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International
Rachels, James, 1978, 'What People Deserve,' in Justice and Economic Distribution, Arthur, John and Shaw, William, eds., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall: 167-196
Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Rescher, Nicholas, 1966, Distributive Justice, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Richards, Norvin, 1986, 'Luck and Desert,' Mind 95: 198-209
Ross, W. D., 1930, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Sadurski, Wojceich, 1985, Giving Desert its Due, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing
Sandel, Michael, 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Scanlon, Thomas, 1988, 'The Significance of Choice,' in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII, McMurrin, Sterling, ed., Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press: 149-216
Scheffler, Samuel, 1992, 'Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 21: 299-323
Schmidtz, David, 2006, The Elements of Justice, New York: Cambridge University Press
Sher, George, 1987, Desert, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Slote, Michael, 1973, 'Desert, Consent, and Justice,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 2: 323-347
Smilansky, Saul, 1996a, 'Responsibility and Desert: Defending The Connection,' Mind 105: 157-163
–––, 1996b, 'The Connection between Responsibility and Desert: The Crucial Distinction,' Mind 105: 485-486
–––, 2006, 'Control, Desert, and the Difference Between Distributive and Retributive Justice' Philosophical Studies 131: 511-524
Sterba, James, 1974, 'Justice as Desert,' Social Theory and Practice 3: 101-116
–––, 1976, 'Justice and the Concept of Desert,' The Personalist 57: 188-97
Sverdlik, Steven, 1983a, 'The Logic of Desert,' Journal of Value Inquiry 17: 317-324
–––, 1983b, 'The Nature of Desert,' Southern Journal of Philosophy 21: 585-594
Vallentyne, Peter, 1995, 'Taking Justice Too Seriously,' Utilitas 7: 207-216
Waller, Bruce, 1987, 'Just and Nonjust Deserts,' The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25: 229-238
–––, 1989, 'Uneven Starts and Just Deserts,' Analysis 49: 209-213
Wicclair, Mark, 1986, 'Preferential Treatment and Desert,' Social Theory and Practice 12: 287-308
Young, Robert, 1992, 'Egalitarianism and Personal Desert,' Ethics 102: 319-341
Zaitchik, Alan, 1977, 'On Deserving to Deserve,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 370-88
justice: distributive | luck: justice and bad luck | moral responsibility | repugnant conclusion, the | value: intrinsic vs. extrinsic
Owen McLeod <mcleodo@mail.lafayette.edu>


text:
Guy Basquet, né le  à Layrac et mort le  à Agen, est un joueur français de rugby à XV. Il a joué troisième ligne centre ou aile gauche au SU Agen.

Biographie

Guy Basquet fut tout d'abord basketteur, puis joue rapidement en catégorie juniors au Racing club de France, et se retrouve à Agen dès la Seconde Guerre mondiale (à compter de 1940), ville où il poursuit toute sa carrière de joueur jusqu'en 1953. Lors de la finale du championnat en 1947, il subit une expulsion temporaire durant toute la seconde moitié de la première période, alors que le règlement ne le permettait plus depuis deux décennies déjà. Il joue à Agen aux côtés d'Albert Ferrasse, puis seconde longtemps ce dernier à la tête de la Fédération française (FFR) et de leur club. Le cinquantenaire du club de St-Cyprien (Dordogne) sera fêté avec des rencontres internationales. Le SCAC renforcé par des joueurs de renom du Périgord ou de l'Agenais tels que Guy et Albert Ferrasse affrontera les Anglais du London Scottish, puis les Italiens de l'AS Roma Il est en effet vice-président de la Fédération de 1968 à 1991, date de l'arrivée de Bernard Lapasset à la tête de la FFR, et l'ultime président du Comité de sélection à partir de 1980 en succédant à Élie Pebeyre. Il fut aussi président des Barbarians français, et du SU Agen à partir de 1985 jusqu'à l'arrivée de Daniel Dubroca.

Ses propos ont été recueillis dans l'ouvrage de Roger Driès, Un missionnaire du rugby au cœur de tous les défis (éditions CMCP) en 2001. Il est le grand-père du demi de mêlée Jérôme Fillol.

Palmarès
 Championnat de France de première division :
 Champion (1) : 1945
 Vice-champion (2) : 1943 et 1947
 Coupe de France :
 Vainqueur (2) : 1943 et 1945

Statistiques en équipe nationale
 33 sélections en équipe de France A de 1945 à 1952 (dont 24 capitanats de 1948 à 1952), faisant ainsi partie de la  sélection vainqueur à Swansea en 1948, et à Twinckenham en 1951
 24 points (8 essais)
 Coupe d'Europe FIRA de rugby à XV 1952
  tournée en Argentine en 1949 (et directeur de la tournée en Nouvelle-Zélande en 1961)

Distinction

Notes et références

Annexes

Bibliographie

Liens externes

Joueur international français de rugby à XV
Joueur du SU Agen
Troisième ligne centre (rugby à XV)
Troisième ligne aile (rugby à XV)
Dirigeant français de rugby à XV
Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur
Naissance à Layrac (Lot-et-Garonne)
Naissance en juillet 1921
Décès en février 2006
Décès à 84 ans
Décès à Agen

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
5 reel video slot | New Game release | Return |
Slot supplier Play'n GO continue their landmark year with another new release today, the 5-reel video slot Wild Rails.
The game is a milestone for the company as it represents their first horizontal reel slot, where the symbols travel across the reels rather than down them as is the standard for almost all slot games.
The game speaks to the reputation Play'n GO have built as a company that puts a focus on aiming to innovate their games with new ideas, and try new things, to keep players entertained; a focus that has led them extremely far in the modern gaming industry.
The game received a hugely positive reception last week when Play'n GO gave an exclusive preview at an invite-only event hosted to kick off the WGES conference in Barcelona.
The unfamiliarity of the game's design is tempered by the game's visually striking design and the smoothness of its gameplay, with special attention having been paid to the mechanics of the reel's movement and speed.
The look and feel of the game are reminiscent of classic films like Murder on the Orient Express, calling back to a time where travelling by train the most exciting and adventurous way to travel, a notion still held today.
The game is another feather in the cap of the slot specialists, who have been experiencing one of their most successful years in the business, further cementing their position as a leading supplier in regulated markets.
CEO Johan Törnqvist spoke about the excitement of still being able to do something new as a leading company:
"As a company, we love trying out new concepts and ideas. We're currently on track for our most successful year ever, and it is innovative games, like Wild Rails, that are going to continue that track and lead us into the future!"
Wild Rails is out to play online now.
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Next week, you'll probably be huddled on blankets at the Starlight Bowl, waiting for our annual viewing of fireworks to begin. It will be a grand affair, a fitting topper to a day of barbecues, star-spangled dinnerware and the occasional nod to the historical significance of July 4, 1776.
There will be a few attending Burbank's Fourth of July festivities who will have a slightly different perspective on the revelry. You will likely hear them after the first "dud" firework sending its booming reverberation through the chests of all gathered.
A few kids will decide right then that fireworks are not for them. They may ask to go home, or at least wait out the remainder of the entertainment in the safe, steel enclosure of the family sedan.
They may do so with the measured, rational response of youth: They will scream their brains out.
Growing up, I knew this fear. It's a form of pyrophobia or arsonphobia, and it usually hits young children or pets. In most cases, it's considered an irrational fear, although a gripping desire to avoid burning things seems pretty rational to me.
It's not uncommon in kids. Susan Park, a Burbank-based family psychologist, said the fear can be linked to hypersensitivity to loud noises or bright lights.
For those who have these specific fears without other sensitivities, Park said parents should have their children draw pictures of fireworks and focus on their positive aspects. Then they might try watching videos and gradually turning up the sound.
Usually it's the loud noise that turns children off, so Park suggests making children focus on the colors or the people that are around if you're going to a big event like the extravaganza at the Starlight Bowl. The night will feature performances by the Burbank Philharmonic and Stone Soul leading up to the light show.
That advice probably would have helped me 20-odd years ago. Instead, I made a tradition of hiding in the car, or under it.
One year I was coaxed out to the blanket at the local park where my whole town went to view the fire-consumed sky. As the local orchestra's "1812 Overture" came to its crescendo, a wind crept over the pit and across the pond. Thousands of families welcomed the nice breeze sweeping the pond. A shiver ran over me, and not from the wind.
Shots went up. The whimsy commenced. The wind grew.
I can't speak to every child's fireworks phobia, but I was less concerned with the noise and more concerned with Newton's Law: what goes up inevitably comes down.
The fireworks slowly drifted over the crowd. With each new explosion came a looming face in color and sparkle, haughtily lording over the crowd like the ants we were.
A hissing grew from above. The lights now extinguished, a dark mass came hurtling toward us trailing a thin thread of smoke. With an unceremonious plop the expired firework landed 2 feet from my blanket.
The scream was choked somewhere down my throat. My defenses kicked in, and I responded to the threat with an offensive tactic: meet missile with missile. I brought my hand out from a potato chip bag and hurled the sour-cream-and-onion ammunition at the charred offender.
I expected the chip to become engulfed in hellfire, fueled with the passion of a thousand terrors. Instead it bounced weakly off into the grass. A neighbor gave a mildly annoyed look, thinking the projectile was meant for him.
No one else seemed to notice the spent firework was there. I noticed something else was missing. In the nonchalance of the huddled masses I discovered there is joy in the Fourth, in the beautiful dance of fire and light unbound from the earth that marks our collective freedom from tyranny and fear.
Trial by fire and whatnot.
BRYAN MAHONEY is a recent transplant from the East Coast. When he's not cowering from fireworks, he can be reached at 818NewGuy@gmail.com and on Twitter @818NewGuy.


text:
Illinois Medical District Hosts Job, Resource And Health Fair Thursday
The fair will run 10 a.m.-4 p.m at the Illinois Medical District headquarters, 2100 W. Harrison St.
Mauricio Peña
7:00 AM CDT on Aug 18, 2021
Rush University Medical Center in the Illinois Medical District.
Rush Production Group
MEDICAL DISTRICT — The Illinois Medical District will host a job, resource and health fair Thursday.
The community fair, hosted in partnership with Ald. Walter Burnett Jr. (27th), runs 10 a.m.-4 p.m at the Illinois Medical District headquarters, 2100 W. Harrison St.
Attendees seeking employment are encouraged to bring extra copies of their resume and a valid photo ID. Attendees will be required to wear a mask indoors, regardless of vaccination status.
Rush University Medical Center, Superior Air-Ground Ambulance Services and Communities Empowered Through Construction are among some of the employers who will be on hand at the job fair.
"The Illinois Medical District is proud to support Chicagoans in their pandemic recovery," Kate Schellinger, interim executive director of the Illinois Medical District, said in a statement. "Bringing the community together for the benefit of all has been part of the District's core mission from the start."
Other employers and resources at the fair:
Carnivale Chicago
Carole Robertson Center for Learning
Chicago Center for Arts and Technology
Chicago Children's Advocacy Center
The Chicago Lighthouse
Children of Peace School
Chicago Urban League
Erie Family Health Centers
Ferrara Candy Co.
Grow Greater Englewood
Illinois Action for Children
The Illinois Secretary of State's Office will be at the event to help with on-site license plate renewal stickers and other services.
The event also will include a live DJ, activities for kids, snacks, a giveaway and a raffle.
Cook County Health will administer COVID-19 vaccinations at the event.
Pilsen, Little Village and West Loop reporter mauricio@blockclubchi.org
Illinois Medical District
Kate Schellinger
Walter Burnett Jr.


text:
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NOTICE: This web page has been archived for historical purposes. Its content is no longer maintained, so information may be out of date and links may not work properly. For current Healthy Water features, please see the Newsroom, Features, & Observances page.
Drinking Water Week is May 4-10
This year marks the 100th anniversary of one of the most significant public health advances in US history—the disinfection of drinking water. Since 1908, much of America's drinking water has been disinfected to protect us from waterborne infectious diseases.
The United States is fortunate to have one of the safest public drinking water supplies in the world. In 2000, the United States alone used 408 billion gallons of water per day (1)! This is the equivalent of approximately 1400 gallons of water per day for every man, woman, and child. This amount is enough to fill 14 standard-size bathtubs and includes both direct water use (drinking, bathing, flushing the toilet, etc.) and indirect water use (watering the lawn, washing the car, growing crops, manufacturing, etc.). (2)
May 4–10, 2008 is National Drinking Water Week.* Each year, the American Water Works Association and an alliance of organizations, including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), sponsor this awareness week to highlight the importance of tap water and the need to reinvest in water infrastructure (3).
Listen to a CDC podcast on Safe Drinking Water ( 2 minutes 54 seconds).
Water's Many Roles
Clean drinking water is one of the world's most precious resources.
Water plays a critical role in the success of a society, including public health protection, fire protection, and economic support. Access to safe water can lower morbidity and mortality rates. Healthier populations lead to increased productivity, thereby facilitating economic growth. Water's importance in day-to-day business operations as a primary ingredient in many products further leads to economic growth and the provision of jobs. No matter which way you look at it, water plays a vital role in our daily lives.
History of Disinfection
During the past century, many improvements in the health and prosperity of the U.S. population can be attributed to improvements in water quality. In 1908, researchers Chick and Watson developed what would later be known as Chick's Law. Chick's Law describes the length of time and concentration of disinfectant needed to kill microorganisms in water (4). Through her research, Chick determined that as contact time between microorganisms and disinfectant increases, the number of microorganisms in water decreases, thereby showing that a disinfectant can be effective in killing potentially harmful microorganisms in water. This monumental discovery quickly paved the way for researchers and scientists to promote
widespread disinfection of drinking water.
Disinfection of Water - Public Health Protection for 100 Years!
Incidence of Typhoid Fever, 1920-1960. Image Credit: Robert Tauxe.
American drinking water supplies are among the safest in the world. The disinfection of water has played a critical role in improving drinking water quality in the United States. With Chick and Watson's discovery of the effectiveness of water disinfection, efforts began to disinfect public drinking water supplies around the country. In 1908, Jersey City, New Jersey was the first city in the United States to begin routine disinfection of community drinking water (5). Over the next decade, thousands of cities and towns across the United States followed suit in routinely disinfecting their drinking water. The incidence of waterborne diseases, such as cholera and typhoid, dropped dramatically, leading to a decrease in overall morbidity and mortality from waterborne illness in the American population. In 1900, the incidence of typhoid fever in the United States was approximately 100 per 100,000 population. By 1920, it had decreased to 33.8 per 100,000 population (6). In 2006, it had decreased to 0.1 per 100,000 population (only 353 cases) and approximately 75% of these cases occurred among persons returning from international travel (7, 8). This decrease in illness can in part be credited to the implementation of drinking water disinfection in community water systems, one of the great public health achievements of the 20th century (9).
For more information on the history of drinking water disinfection and its 100th anniversary, visit www.americanchemistry.com/100years .
Today's Disinfection
Even today, sources of drinking water are still subject to contamination and require appropriate treatment to remove disease-causing contaminants. Contamination of drinking water supplies can occur in the source water as well as in the distribution system after water treatment has already occurred. There are many sources of water contamination, including naturally occurring chemicals and minerals (e.g., arsenic, radon, uranium), local land use practices (fertilizers, pesticides, concentrated feeding operations), manufacturing processes, sewer overflow, and malfunctioning wastewater treatment systems (e.g., septic systems). In the United States, an estimated 4 million to 33 million cases of gastrointestinal illness associated with public drinking water systems occur annually (10, 11). However, these estimates are imprecise and do not include illness in the estimated 45 million people served by small or individual water systems (12) or illness other than gastrointestinal illness.
Public drinking water systems use various methods of water treatment to provide safe drinking water for their communities. Today, the most common steps in water treatment used by community water systems (mainly surface water treatment) include flocculation, sedimentation, filtration and disinfection (see Water Treatment Process, US Environmental Protection Agency). A variety of technologies can be used in each of these steps. For example, sand, gravel, activated charcoal, and membranes can be used for filtration. Chlorine, ozone, and ultraviolet radiation can be used as disinfectants (5). Today, chlorination still remains the most commonly used method for disinfecting drinking water. Many municipal systems that chemically disinfect drinking water use some form of chlorine, either alone or in combination with other methods (13). Chlorine has certain attributes that make it the disinfectant of choice for many public systems, including its ability to kill many different microorganisms and its persistence in water distribution systems resulting in residual protection against microbial regrowth (14). Water may be treated differently in different communities depending on the quality of the water that enters the treatment plant. Typically, surface water requires more treatment and filtration than groundwater because lakes, rivers, and streams contain more pollution and are more likely to be contaminated than groundwater.
The presence of contaminants in water can lead to adverse health effects, including gastrointestinal illness, reproductive problems, and neurological disorders. Chlorine, in addition to killing or inactivating pathogens in water, can react with natural organic matter to produce potentially harmful byproducts. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates drinking water quality in public water systems and sets maximum concentration levels for these chlorine byproducts, in addition to many other water chemicals and pollutants. More information about these rules can be found on EPA's National Primary Drinking Water Regulations Web page. Every water utility is required to provide Consumer Confidence Reports (CCR) to their customers each year. These reports provide information on local drinking water quality, including the water's source, the levels of contaminants found in the water, and the steps customers can take to protect their drinking water.
To find more information about public drinking water quality in general and about your local drinking water CCR, visit:
• CDC — Healthy Drinking Water
• EPA — Consumer Confidence Reports (CCR)
• EPA — What Contaminants May Be Found in Drinking Water?
• EPA — Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water
For those people who do not use community public water systems and who instead use private groundwater wells, more information can be found at:
• CDC — Private Well Owners
• EPA — Private Drinking Water Well
A Global Need
A family in rural Madagascar using the Safe Water System - including a bottle of Sûr'Eau solution and a safe container. Photo Credit: Daniele Lantagne.
Worldwide, 1.1 billion people do not have access to an improved water supply, and 2.6 billion people – half of the developing world – lack access to adequate sanitation. That's almost 40% of the world's population! (15, 16) Basic sanitation is described as having access to facilities for the safe disposal of human waste (feces and urine), as well as having the ability to maintain hygienic conditions, through services such as garbage collection, industrial/hazardous waste management, and wastewater treatment and disposal (17). In order to meet the United Nations' Millennium Development Goal [PDF - 21 pages] to halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to improved drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015, an estimated 1.1 billion people will need to gain access to an improved water supply and 1.6 billion people will need to gain access to basic sanitation (accounting for expected population growth). Even if this Millennium Development Goal is reached by 2015, it will still leave 790 million people (11% of the world's population) without access to an improved water supply and 1.8 billion people (25% of the world's population) without access to adequate sanitation (18, 19).
In much of the world, community water systems do not exist. In areas where access to safe water, appropriate wastewater management, and adequate sewerage systems are not feasible, certain programs, such as CDC's Safe Water System, can empower people to improve and protect the quality of their drinking water through simple, inexpensive technologies to treat and safely store water in their homes. The intervention consists of three steps:
• Point-of-use treatment of contaminated water;
• Safe water storage; and
• Behavior change techniques.
More information on household water treatment is available from the World Health Organization (WHO) at Household Water Treatment and Safe Storage.* For smaller community-based organizations, technical information on household water treatment and safe water storage programs can be found online at Safe Water for the Community: A Guide for Establishing a Community-Based Safe Water System Program [PDF - 62 pages]* or in hard-copy with a CD by sending an email to safewater@cdc.gov (20).
In other parts of the world where community water systems do exist, some communities struggle to effectively adapt their water and sanitation systems to the community's changing needs. CDC's Global Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Program is a community-based, integrative approach to improving health and quality of life that incorporates many aspects of a sanitation plan, including:
1. Assessing, monitoring, and managing community water systems from source to tap to ensure the delivery of safe drinking water;
2. Researching the health impacts of sanitation improvements; and
3. Improving the sustainability of community water and sanitation systems.
Programs, such as CDC's Global Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene program, empower communities to take part in their own water safety plan, helping them to build skills for maintaining and sustaining improved water and sanitation programs (21).
Looking into the Future
After 100 years, disinfection remains a cornerstone of modern water treatment. New challenges, such as chemical contamination of water sources, aging water distribution system infrastructure, and increasing water reuse, will require us to remain vigilant in protecting all aspects of our water supply. Scientific breakthroughs and improvements in water safety regulations will ensure that communities continue to receive safe drinking water.
For More Information on Healthy Drinking Water and CDC's Efforts in This Area
Healthy Drinking Water
Water-Related Environmental Public Health
Index of Water-Related Topics
Community Water Fluoridation
Water PLUS / Agua y MAS
Safe Water System
Surveillance for Waterborne Disease and Outbreaks Associated with Drinking Water and Water not Intended for Drinking – United States, 2003-2004. (also see Appendix and Glossary)
1. US Geological Survey. Estimated use of water in the United States in 2000.
2. Water Systems Council. Wellcare information for you about water conservation [PDF - 4 pages].*
3. American Water Works Association. Only tap water delivers: drinking water week 2007.
4. Haas CN. Disinfection. In American Water Works Association, Water quality & treatment: a handbook of community water supplies. 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1999. p 14.22-14.30.
5. US Environmental Protection Agency. The history of drinking water treatment [PDF - 4 pages].
6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Achievements in public health, 1900–1999: safer and healthier foods. [PDF - 28 pages] MMWR 1999; 48(40): 905.
7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Summary of notifiable diseases- United States, 2006. [PDF - 100 pages] MMWR 2008; 55(53): 17.
8. US Census Bureau. Annual estimates of the population for the United States, regions, and states and for Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2007 (NST-EST2007-01).
9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Achievements in public health, 1900-1999: changes in the public health system. MMWR 1999; 48(50):1141-1147.
10. Colford JM, Roy SL, Beach MJ, Hightower A, Shaw SE, Wade TJ. A review of household drinking water intervention trials and an approach to the estimation of endemic waterborne gastroenteritis in the United States. Journal of Water and Health 2006; 4 (Suppl 2):71--88.
11. Messner M, Shaw S, Regli S, Rotert K, Blank V, Soller J. An approach for developing a national estimate of waterborne disease due to drinking water and a national estimate model application. J Water Health 2006; 4 (Suppl 2):201-240.
12. US Environmental Protection Agency. Private drinking water wells.
13. White GC. Handbook of chlorination and alternative disinfectants. 4th ed. New York: Wiley-Interscience Publication; 1999. p. 333.
14. Water Quality & Health Council. The history of chlorine.*
15. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. International year of sanitation: sanitation is vital for human health*.
16. US Census Bureau. International programs center: population clocks.
17. World Health Organization. Sanitation.*
18. The United Nations. Millennium Development Goals report 2007 [PDF - 21 pages].*
19. Joint Monitoring Programme. Millennium Development Goals assessment report 2006.* [PDF - 47 pages]
20. Lantagne DS, Gallo W. Safe water for the community: a guide for establishing a community-based safe water system program. CDC 2008; Edition 1.
21. CDC. Water Plus / Agua y Mas.
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The early 2000's were a great time for guitar driven indie rock, bands like The White Stripes, The Strokes, and Yeah Yeah Yeahs were dominating the airwaves with infectious singles that we still hear pretty often today. Glasgow, Scotland's Franz Ferdinand were right there among them with hits like "Take Me Out" and "Do You Want To?" but they found their biggest success at home in the UK. Every few years though, Franz Ferdinand make a trip stateside to play for their US fans. This year they're back again and have brought a new album with them. Always Ascending, their 5th studio album was released in February is availible now. On Tuesday night, the group played to a well filled House of Blues right next door to the Red Sox vs Yankees game at Fenway Park. Check out some scenes from the show below.