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WW2 in Color History Forum > Other Wars > Other Wars > Falklands/Malvinas War > General Belgrano sinking.
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1000ydstare
I know it is 6 years late but you couldn't make it up.
This has got to be ambulance chasing really reaching now!!!!
Any way what are your thoughts on the sinking of the General Belgrano. Was it a war crime or a legitimate attack?
In case you may not have figured my opinion out, it is brutally simplistic.
Argentina and Britain were at war, she was a warship, she was a target whether in the exclusion zone, in the south atlantic, tied up in home port or even in another nations waters. As were, obviously, any British warships at the time. Likewise any Argentine ship in the exclusion zone was at risk. This was why it was set up.
It wasn't a ring or a "fighting zone" it was an area the British set up to ensure no forign vessels were caught up inthe scrap, and any Argentine ship in it would be classed as hostile and could be engaged.
The families and their (probably handsomely paid lawyer) are, I believe, under a misconception that the exclusion zone was indeed a ring. Where ships would not be engaged if they were outside of it. I also believe the families were manipulated by people in Argentina who were trying to force the then government into taking action on the matter, as the then government had announced that they basically agreed that the engagement was a legimate action.
A bit bonk, but think of it as a boxing fight, the Argies think they are bound by boxing rules the Brits use WWF rules!!!!
A warship in a war, is a target whereever it is.
Found this little doozy too.
The Malvinas islands, located off the coast of Argentina, had been occupied by Britain since 1833. At the beginning of 1982 the military junta tried to restore dwindling popular support by issuing statements reasserting Argentina's historical right to the islands. By April, as Argentine troops arrived on the island, intense negotiations between Britain and Argentina were under way, led by President Belaunde Terry of Peru, when Thatcher ordered the attack on the Belgrano and effectively launched her cowardly war against a small oppressed nation.
Ok maybe oppressed, but small?
Man of Stoat
Wow, that's perhaps the craziest revisionist claptrap I've ever read! :shock:
1000ydstare, I do not and cannot agree with you.
The United Kingdom NEVER called to the Exclusion zone as you are explaining. That could be your view or a british writer, journalist or political, adopting the most appropiate position to Great Britain.
On April the 12nd, the Thatcher's government offialized made official the creation of an maritime exclusion zone, which was hardened as total exclusion zone on April the 28th...
"Her Majesty's Government declare that since April the 30th, will be stablished a Total Exclusion Zone, with a range of 200 miles. That Exclusion zone will be applied not only to the Argentine aircrafts and ships; Any millitary or civilian aircraft or ship that support the illegal occupation inside that zone will be considered as hostile and would be exposed to be attacked".
So, that declaration explain very well the Exclusion Zone. Does it says in some place that is "a declaration to defend another flag's ships"? I must answer a huge NO.
Besides, before April the 28th Argentina and the United Kingdom stayed in a extremely tension state, but not at war. If they were at war, the Royal Marines captured on April the 2nd had been released, as well as the Argentine Marines in the Georgias islands.
As Argentina and the United Kingdom weren't at a real war, the most logical posture would be that the United Kingdom was warning to Argentina to not transport any provisions from the Continent to the archipelago.
But never, I repeat, NEVER from April the 2nd to May the 2nd, the British government talked about the waters from the outside of that Exclusion Zone. As the United Kingdom wasn't interested in that zones.
As the United Kingdom only talked about the Exclusion Zone, and never said a word from the outsides of it, the most logical, I repeat, is that Any Argentine ship, millitary or civilian, could stay on that waters.
The cruiser was the leader of the "Task Force 79" from the <Sea Fleet>, which was formed by the cruiser, two destroyers and a tanker ship.
Where the "General Belgrano" was? That May the 2nd, the "General Belgrano" wasn't advancing. It was out from the Exclusion Zone, at 380 km or 236 miles from the archipelago, 36 miles out the Exclusion Zone. That is not a little or/and confusing distance.
Not only it wasn't advancing, it was "showing pope" to the Exclusion Zone, as a signal that the cruiser was not advancing to it, and was not interested in advancing to it.
http://sistecom.webcindario.com/mapa1.gif
position where the cruiser was attacked
However, the nuclear submarine HMS "Conqueror" launched three torpedoes MK.8 agaisnt the cruiser. Two of them reached their objective, and another crashed itself against one of the destroyers, but didn't exploded. In the attack, more than 270 sailors, including two civilians, died immediately. Another 50 died as shipwrecked sailors, on their saving rafts.
The submarine of the Royal Navy had been chasing the cruiser and his* Task Force by weeks, since they left the Ushuaia port.
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/10/11/thumb/t006dh11.jpg
The sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano
http://www.naval-history.net/FpHMSConqueror.jpg
Nuclear submarine HMS "Conqueror"
The United Kingdom' Government said that the Belgrano was attacked for being a serious threat to the Royal Navy. Let's see...
When the Belgrano was attacked, was at 200 miles from the nearest british ship (taking as Argentina hadn't the possibility of know that a nuclear submarine was at two miles from the cruiser). The cruiser hadn't got a real ASW (Anti-Submarine War) systems, and It hadn't got an appropiate ASW weapon, as an helicopter or torpedoes.
The Belgrano's most powerful weapons were tweenty three cannons from different calibres, without a guide system. Six of those cannons had the maximum range, from 12 miles.
The only smart weapons that the cruiser had were the SAM (Surface-Air Missile) system Sea Cat, a not so great system, with a range of 3 miles. It hadn't any surface-surface missile, as the MM-38 Exocet
Besides, the Belgrano was an ancient ship, with several problems in his systems and power plants.
Could be an ancient ship with that kind of weapons, with that kind of systems, a "real serious thread" to the Royal Navy? Certainly NO.
If the Belgrano had been at 40 miles from the heart of the British Task Force, advancing to it, I could understand the sinking, but... Was a really necessity the fact of attack and sink a ship which was too far from the Task Force, static, by the time "repelling" the possibility of enter in action, without a real capability of make harms to the Royal Navy?
http://www.redargentina.com/malvinas/belgranoA.jpg
Argentine Cruiser ARA "General Belgrano"
Although it was a really huge vessel, with the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo the symbols of the Argentine Navy, it wasn't an important strategic objective.
The murmurs about that the objective of the british attack was in order to lock the negociations of an offer made by the Peruvian President (an offer that could benefit a lot to Argentina) is true. If Argentina would accepted it, the United Kingdom could had been in real problems. So the United Kingdom needed to do something to make enrage to the Argentine government and people. So, Argentina wouldn't want to negociate. How the United Kingdom could do that? killing their proud vessel, their "loved elderly people", their "grandfather". And they got it. As a lot of people say: Was easier to Britain stay in the archipelago by war than by a talk.
That murmur is really heavy here in Argentina, and I consider it a lot when I have to talk about the Belgrano's sinking.
If the murmur is false, and the United Kingdom wanted to attack a real, serious thread to their Royal Navy, the United Kingdom should attacked to the three A-69 Corvettes ("Drummond","Grandville","Guerrico"), that were fast ships, with a really low radar signal, armed with smart weapons, as SAMs and the, by the time, deadly Exocet missiles. The Royal Navy should attack them if they wanted to sink the real thread to them.
http://www.histarmar.com.ar/Armada%20Argentina/ArmadaHoy/Fotos/CorbetaGrandville.jpg
A-69 class corvette, ARA ""
http://www.telpin.com.ar/InternetEducativa/EscuelasPolimodal/Tecnica/n63.jpg
OUR CRUISER, FOREVER WITH US...
*: I said HIS because in spanish the ships are "male or female", depending what kind of ship is, examples M for male, F for female:
-Aircraft Carrier - M
-Cruiser - M
-Battleship - M
-Destroyer - M
-Tanker - M
-Submarine - M
-Frigate - F
-Corvette - F
-Patrol Boat - F
PD bis: 1000 What is your name? Calling you by a number sounds a little strange and uncomfortable! :) ... my name is Giuliano, but Eagle is ok, name me as you want it. Another forist who want to say his/her name is accepted!
There was no formal declaration of war, so what? If this is such a huge issue, then what the hell were Argentine troops doing attacking the Falklands without one? You can't complain that we sunk your ship without a declaration of war when you attacked our people without one. Sheer hypocrisy! Frankly, as has been said before, it would have been perfectly okay for us to sail a submarine into one of your harbours and sink all the military ships there.
Sorry, but this is just more examples of constructive interpretation to complain that the fact you lost was somehow "unfair".
If there was no declaration of war, surely the UK should be sueing Argentina for Sheffield, Coventry and Antelope.
Was the General Belgrano a threat to the Task force around the islands? No, not directly at that time. But bear in mind the the sealanes had to be kept open to allow the British to supply their task force, you don't want a crusier cutting about ready to spring an attack on to them as they sail. The guns would have ripped modern ships apart so there was a credible threat potental.
Why was he in the area though? I don't think the Argentine navy sent out a cruiser to mince about around the exclusion zone for no reason. Or maybe they did, the whole thing could have been a flag waving operation for the navy which went horribly wrong.
I am looking in to the declaration of war/paperwork thing, but what was definitly sent was a letter telling the Argentines that the Taskforce was on its way and any hinderence to this fleet would be met with suitable countermeasures. Less than a week later the Belgrano was torpedoed. This was a completley different bit of paper to the exclusion zone warning.
With regards to the descison, if you have a firing solution on an enemy warship why not? true, Conqueror had stalked the belgrano for two days, and could maybe have stalked him till he was inside the exclusion zone and then put one in him anyway. That ties up a sub though, and the Belgrano could have eluded them at some point, or even found the conq. Much safer to sink him, especially with the Carrrier group just entering the TEZ to the north.
As the Carrier Battle Group approached the eastern edge of the TEZ, frigates "Brilliant" and "Plymouth" joined up on Thursday from South Georgia carrying No.2 SBS and D Sqdn SAS. Next day the TEZ came into force, and on Saturday 1st May, the Royal Navy sailed in to start the softening-up attacks designed to establish air and sea superiority. Earlier in the week, Argentine trawler "Narwhal" was warned to keep clear of the Task Force and on Sunday, off to the south west, cruiser "General Belgrano" was torpedoed and sunk by the "Conqueror". That same Sunday, "Tidespring" and "Antrim" departed South Georgia for Ascension carrying the Argentine POW's.
Good read this by the wayhttp://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_1/4.htm
Does anyone know if they found him? From Feb 2003.
A scientific expedition will set sail on Saturday to try to locate the wreck of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, almost 21 years after she was sunk by a British submarine in the South Atlantic.
An Argentine naval vessel will accompany the mission, carrying another 20 survivors and relatives of those who died. Many of these bitterly opposed the NGS inviting two former crewmembers from HMS Conqueror, the nuclear submarine that sank the General Belgrano.
Interesting thing on the naming of ships Eagle, I know the Russians always call theres "He", possibly because Russia is the motherland?
Call me Ted, Giuliano.
Besides, before April the 28th Argentina and the United Kingdom stayed in a extremely tension state, but not at war.
The UK would have been well within it's rights to regard a state of war as being in place. Invading something regarded to be part of another country by that other country has been casus belli since the beginning of recorded history...
Apparently the 25e de Mayo (?) was to the north of the islands trying to get in position to launch a strike by Seahawks at the British fleet at the same time. The RN knew it was out there but the shadowing SSNs had lost contact. As such, they believed the only way to remove the threat was do sink the Belgrano and in turn scare the ARA back into port. It appears to have worked.
Ummm... why would it not be? The RN had no other ships down there that could fight it out with the Belgrano (AIUI the Harriers had no suitable weapons, which just leaves a handful of Exocet armed destroyers and the 4.5" deck guns). IMHO if the Belgrano got within gunfire range of the British fleet it would probably win any engagement.
The murmurs about that the objective of the british attack was in order to lock the negociations of an offer made by the Peruvian President (an offer that could benefit a lot to Argentina) is true.
Does it not take two sides to negotiate? If so, why would the British sink a warship to get the Argentinians to stay away rather than just refusing to negotiate themselves. Certainly they would lose diplomatically by staying away, but less so than they did by sinking the Belgrano. This doesn't make logical sense.
The decision to sink the Belgrano was Tactical, rather than Political & was made by Adm. Sandy Woodward, task force commander.
See his book "One Hundred Days" for a full account of why he felt it to be necessary.
There was no formal declaration of war, so what? If this is such a huge issue, then what the hell were Argentine troops doing attacking the Falklands without one?
The Argentine Navy troops didn't attack to any British soldier in the Malvinas until May. They only recovered them by the same actions that the British forces did without any real right, 149 years before.-
You can't complain that we sunk your ship without a declaration of war when you attacked our people without one. Sheer hypocrisy!
I repeat, the Argentine forces didn't attacked to British people. They only attacked the British forces on May the 1st. Before that the British forces attacked to the Argentine forces in Argentine Port, Grytviken Port and Darwin Port.
Frankly, as has been said before, it would have been perfectly okay for us to sail a submarine into one of your harbours and sink all the military ships there.
Of course, if that is your humanism thoughts and ethics you have. And I really doubt it. Our S-2 Trackers, SH-3 Sea Kings and corvettes were well-prepared to repel any submarine thread, specially in local waters. I remember at least two cases when sonar echos were disappeared by the Argentine forces, one on May the 5th by an S-2 Tracker and a SH-3 Sea King, and another case on May the 15th, attacked by an argentine destroyer, both near the Argentine costs.
No it isn't I didn't complain anything about the Harrier attacks over Argentine Port and the Argentine deaths there, or the Sinking of the Argentine ship Formosa, attacked into the Exclusion Zone. If the United Kingdom would attacked the Belgrano into the Exclusion Zone, or outside of it, but incredibly close to the Task Force, I could understand it.
You still showing a position of hostility, like a thought of superiority against the Argentine members. I noted it a long time ago… Am I Wrong? If I am, I am sorry, but you never sounded as Firefly, Cuts or Ted. I prefer (And I think all of us prefer) a respectable and partnership treaty here… could you use it please?
I'm not so sure… The Belgrano was in Argentine waters, near the Argentine cost, on the outsides of the Exclusion zone, unilaterally declared by the United Kingdom, and in a time when the war could had been possibly avoided. The Sheffield, the Coventry and the Antelope were in the middle of the battles, in the Exclusion Zone, thousands of miles from his nearest military bases.
Argentina didn't complain the attack to the "Formosa", the "Río Carcarañá" or the "Santa Fe" ships, that were into the Exclusion Zone, or in a really compromising position.
Ted, the HMS Conqueror had had been following the cruiser by more than a week. The crew and all the British government knew that it wasn't a real thread on May the 2. If the cruiser would have returned itself a thread, advancing to the British fleet, the submarine could attack it whenever it wanted, so, the Belgrano could be attacked when it was a real thread, but don't tell me about it was a serious thread, it wasn't. His guns? Yeah, he had a good range, but the most of the British ships had installed Sea-Sea missiles MM-38, with a range of more than 20 miles, that is twice the range of the largest range cannon of the Argentine Cruiser. It could be repelled easily by a frigate or a destroyer if the Belgrano would become a real thread.
Why was he in the area though? I don't think the Argentine navy sent out a cruiser to mince about around the exclusion zone for no reason.
It was on the Argentine waters, near a naval base. It wasn't on the other side, on the east of the Exclusion Zone, so you cannot say that it was mincing about around the Exclusion Zone.
But the cruiser was not a hindrance or an obstacle to the Task Force mate. The Belgrano wasn't between Ascension island and the Malvinas archipelago. The Belgrano wasn't at east of the Malvinas. Trying to stop the Royal Navy's attack.
Oh, Come on ted! The Belgrano was not a modern ship with all the newest systems and radars. His ASW systems were from the WWII, absolutely nulls to 1982 so he had no possibility of "catching" with his sonar a modern submarine. If the Belgrano hadn't detected the Conqueror when it was at two miles with a relatively good sea, it would never do it! And of course the Belgrano couldn't have eluded the submarine, his power plants were ancient and his top speed was really slow.
And when the Belgrano was sunk, the Aircraft Carrier ARA 25 de Mayo and its escorts were out from the Exclusion Zone.
Really interesting, specially this:
"Peru's initiative on 2 May seemed a last chance for peace but as it was being considered, the British submarine, HMS Conqueror, torpedoed and sank the Argentinian cruiser, ARA General Belgrano. Argentina dropped all further consideration of the Peruvian mediation. Whether the motive for her sinking was purely military can be debated. This event and other escalatory activities throughout the mediation process seemed to suggest a lack of emphasis by Britain to achieving a peaceful negotiated settlement."
That quote is just what I was talking about in my post of three days ago.
The text has some mistakes, as the number of death people in the attack. It says 360, when were 323 exactly.
No, the expedition failed a long time ago.
[quote]Interesting thing on the naming of ships Eagle, I know the Russians always call theres "He", possibly because Russia is the motherland? [quote]
That could be true! But in the Spanish language, the problem is that a lot of words that you use as only one, here are different by the "sex". For instance, DOG. In Spanish, Perro. But if the dog is female, is not Perro, is "Perra". The same with cat… Gato (male) or Gata (female). When you use "A" (there's A cat) in Spanish it changes depending the sex too… for instance, if you say there's a cat (male)… hay UN Gato. But if you say a female, "hay unA Gata"…
And with the ships is the same… there are some ships that were named all the time as UN and others, as UNA.
UN Destructor (destroyer)
UN Portaaviones (aircraft carrier)
UN Submarino (submarine)
UNA Fragata (frigate)
UNA Corbeta (corvette)
No problem if you cannot understand it, I am not an accelerated Spanish language teacher!
Greetings mate!
Apparently the 25 de Mayo (?) was to the north of the islands trying to get in position to launch a strike by Seahawks at the British fleet at the same time. The RN knew it was out there but the shadowing SSNs had lost contact. As such, they believed the only way to remove the threat was do sink the Belgrano and in turn scare the ARA back into port. It appears to have worked.
*Yes, the Aircraft Carrier "25 de Mayo" (I don't know why the question symbol) was to the North of the Malvinas, preparing itself to launch an attack.
*The Aircraft Carrier "25 de Mayo" hadn't any Sea Hawk. Moreover, the Argentine Navy never had any SH-60. His air fleet was formed by 8 combat aircrafts A-4B+ Skyhawk, 3 ASW helicopters SH-3 Sea King, 3 ASW aircraft S-2 Trackers and 3 assault helicopters SA-316 Allouette.
*Although the Aircraft Carrier was planning an attack with his A-4s, S-2s and SH-3s, the Royal Navy didn't noticed that until the end of the war. It wasn't the point of why the Belgrano was sunk.
The Belgrano hadn't the possibility of take to the Royal Navy on his gunfire range at all. And there was different picket groups from all around the islands, on south too. If the Belgrano would had been detected advancing to the heart of the Royal Navy, different group of ships could intercept him easily, and the Sea-Sea Missiles would have done all the job. Three Exocets would have destroyed the cruiser at 20 miles from the launching platform, too far to use the weapons of the Belgrano.
Topor, when a big part of the British official story of the Malvinas War was opened the last year, it said that the order was directly sent from London, in a communication with the Submarine's captain, minutes before the attack.
Well, I think that this topic is one of that where we will never find a point of agreement, the British will keep their thoughts that the cruiser was sunk by loyal mediums, and the Argentines (or only me) will keep their posture about the illegality of the sinking. So I think it is not really debatable... what do you think?
I believe that Argentina thought the exclusion zone was a warfighting zone. I'm not sure they were led to believe otherwise.
While not an illegal act the sinking of the Belgrano may have been done in haste, for very valid reasons from the UK point of view.
Exactly the same thing would have happened I also believe if the situation was reversed and an Argentine submarine had the opportunity to sink a major UK warship outside of this zone, they would have taken it.
War isnt about being fair and giving your enemy a chance, its about achieving your aims as quickly as possible and at minimum loss to your own side and not the enemies.
It could be argued that all the British ships were also sunk in territorial waters.
Although it may appear to be a cyncal ploy to scupper negotians, which I doubt, Maggie would have got a victory even had the Argentines just packed up and left with no bloodshed.
I doubt she actually wanted to go to war, many in the world didn't believe that the war could be won by Britian!!! She wouldn't want an expensive failure.
If the Brits are guilty of anything it would be not fully thinking through the repercusions of the attack. Belgrano was a ship of war of a country's navy that was at war or at least situations of high tension and potential conflict. That he found himself in the target picture of a enemy submarine is unfortunate, the fact that the crew had not secured water tight hatches and rigged the ship for battle is tradgic.
The location of ship is completely irrelevant in this. The TEZ was purely in place to protect Argentine, and British, shipping that was not part of the war and neutral shipping. All warships were at risk however. I have also heard that the Argentines threw their own TEZ around the islands that were even bigger than the British one!!!! But can't find much on it, is it a myth?
The arguement that the Argentines hadn't attacked Britian is flawed. The Argentine flag was flying on the Falklands and Georgia in lieu of the Union Flag. White phos had been used in room clearence at Moody Brook, not to mention machine gun cut off groups on the doors and mortars. A fierce firefight had ensued around government house and on Georgia resulting in death and injury to Argentine troops and British troops alike. That is what I would call an attack.
I thought all the AIDES-esqueness had ended. Oh well!
To try to say that Argentine forces did not attack British forces on the Falklands thus instigating the conflict is palpable nonsense, and trying to say that the British defence was in fact an "attack" is just ridiculous, like when the North Koreans claim that America started the Korean War.
If the Belgrano was in Argentine waters, what were scientists doing looking for it 180 km from the Argentine coast? Surely that's 158 km too far out if it was in Argentine waters?
Actually Eagle I think it is debateable.
I pride myself that I am willing to change my point of view on any subject if I am presented with reasonable and convincing information to prove that my ideas are flawed.
To try to claim that the invasion of the Falklands by the Argentine armed forces was not an attack is disingenuous at best, the fact that the rds & WP at Moody Brook injured no-one is only due to the fact that Royal was out of bed before 601.
Anyway, do we have to redo all the discussion of sovereignty & dates again ?
I'd hate to have to bring up the ownership of the Argentine mainland by the indigenous population. That they may not have used the word 'state' for their land makes not one jot of difference.
The General Belgrano was an older warhip admittedly, but the available int on her was also dated - the Argentine fitters could easily have fitted or jury rigged Exocet launchers on board prior to departure.
Let's face it the government of the time weren't big on freedom of information and would have liked nothing better than to announce to the populace that one of their ships had sunk a Brit one.
As has been mentioned earlier the TEZ was not a 'games ring,' the players couldn't just reach out and touch the edge and call "Home !" as if in a playground.
Warships in a war are fair game regardless where they happen to be, neutral ports excepted.
I'm impressed at the restraint shown by all the cmdrs in the Royal Navy chain of command at the time, but then I've not yet reached the level where one's rank can be affected by politics - I'm more interested that my blokes get home intact.
The Junta started the dust up for political reasons, and wrongly - very wrongly - assumed that they could present fait d'accompli to the world.
It doesn't work like that.
Question mark was simply because I wasn't sure of the name and was too lazy to look it up ;)
The Seahawk was also an obselete British 1950s carrier jet fighter later sold to India. I mixed the two up - my bad.
That's unclear. Rather an interesting book is "We Come Unseen" by Jim Ring (ISBN 0-7195-5694-5) which is about the only one I've found to date which covers RN cold war submarine ops in any detail. Even then most of it is anecdotal, but it has a reasonable section on Falklands ops. It states the following:
- Immediately before the Belgrano was sunk, Spartan and Splendid were patrolling to the north of the Falklands looking for the 25 de Mayo. It further states that they were directed by "satellite intelligence" (implication being US photo-recon satellites, but not directly stated). They failed to gain contact.
- At 0330 on the 2nd of May, Admiral Woodward (task force commander) was informed that a Sea Harrier had located the 25 de Mayo 200 miles NW of his carrier group. From this he concluded that the carrier would launch a dawn attack, and that the Belgrano would attempt some form of attack at the same time.
- As neither Splendid nor Spartan were in contact with the carrier, sinking it was not an option. Therefore it was decided to sink the Belgrano to at least reduce the danger.
- The book also states that Woodward considered the main danger from the Belgrano group to be Exocets. Quite why this ties in with the decision to sink the Belgrano and not the escorts I'm unsure. It may be related to the fact that the only reliable torpedoes the RN SSNs had were a WW2 vintage design that may not have been suitable to attack fast, manouverable targets.
Assuming it was detected. Carriers retained guns for a surprisingly long time because of this very threat.
The Cruiser ARA General Belgrano:
Built 1935-38 at New York Shipbuilding, USS Phoenix was one of nine Brooklyn Class light cruisers built for the US Navy. She was present at the attack on Pearl Harbor, where she escaped damage and first developed a reputation for being a 'lucky ship." .
USS Phoenix
http://www.crube.org/CRU001.jpg
The cruiser saw extensive action in the Pacific during WWII, earning 9 battlestars
In 1946 was decomissioned by the U.S Navy. In 1951 was adquird with his sistership cruiser USS Boise by the Argentine Navy.
The USS Boise was named ARA 9 de julio and the USS Phoenix ARA 17 de Octubre, (october 17th was an important date in the peronist calendar) in 1955 after the downfall of Peron the cruiser was renamed ARA General Belgrano.
http://www.crube.org/fotosHund/Casco%20sin%20mancha.jpg
Excuse me but...who was Belgrano after all ?
The ship is named after Argentine political figure and revolutionary general Manuel Belgrano (1770-1820)
is considered one of the founders of the Argentine Republic. Although he was not always victorious, his efforts saved the patriot cause at several crucial times.
http://www.argentour.com/images/manuel_belgrano.jpg
Manuel Belgrano was born in Buenos Aires on June 3, 1770, into a wealthy and prominent criollo (Creole) family. He studied in Spain at the University of Salamanca in 1786 and at Valladolid, where he graduated with a degree in law in 1793. During his residence in Spain he studied languages and economics and acquainted himself with the ideas of enlightened French and Spanish authors.
When Charles IV named Belgrano secretary of the newly organized Consulado of Buenos Aires, he enthusiastically accepted.
While on the Consulado he petitioned for certain reforms: he urged opening new educational institutes and called for legislation to foster development of agriculture, commerce, trade, and communications. Most of his proposals were considered too costly or were thought to threaten privileges held by Spaniards and were vetoed. Disillusioned with the Spaniards, he was convinced that no progressive reforms could ever be expected from them.
When the English invaded Buenos Aires in 1806, Belgrano, an honorary captain, found himself commanding troops despite the fact that he had no military experience. But he was instrumental in organizing forces which later expelled the invaders. Belgrano and other criollos consequently acquired a sense of their own importance and power.
After 1807 Belgrano became increasingly critical of the Spanish system and found others who agreed with him. A secret society of revolutionists was organized with Belgrano reportedly a member. His caustic comments on Spanish regulations were disseminated through the Correo de comercio, a newspaper he helped found in March 1810. In April he resigned from the Consulado, pleading illness. But in May, when news reached Buenos Aires that the Spanish junta established in 1808 had been disbanded, Belgrano and his compatriots quickly advocated the creation of a local junta. On May 25, 1810, when the junta was organized, Belgrano was elected a member.
The initial concern of the junta was defending Buenos Aires while securing the support of the surrounding provincial cities. Because of Belgrano's military record and the fact that other criollos had even less experience, he was named a general and ordered to assemble an army. In September 1810 the ill-equipped and poorly trained force made an unsuccessful foray into Paraguay. Belgrano was blamed for the disaster, but after an investigation he was cleared in August 1811.
He was subsequently appointed commander of an army defending the northwestern district from a Spanish invasion from Upper Peru (modern Bolivia). As a standard for the troops, he designed a banner which later became the national flag. With the outbreak of hostilities Belgrano was forced to retreat, but at the battle of Tucumán, on Sept. 24, 1812, he disobeyed orders, stood, fought, and checked further Spanish advances.
Battle of Tucuman:
http://www.camdipsalta.gov.ar/INFSALTA/imagen2/tucuman1.jpg
Buenos Aires was spared, and his disobedience overlooked. Belgrano followed up the victory with an advance into the northwest. At Salta, on Feb. 20, 1813, he gained another stunning victory over the royalists, and the way was open for an invasion of Upper Peru. However, his armies were forced to withdraw after suffering a series of setbacks.
Battle of Salta:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/95/Battle_of_Salta.jpg
Belgrano, again in disfavor, was sent on a diplomatic mission to Europe to secure British recognition for the Buenos Aires government and to search for a monarch. He returned in February 1816, unsuccessful in obtaining either. Back in favor, he resumed his military career. At the Congress of Tucumán, Belgrano was an outspoken advocate for a declaration of independence and the establishment of a monarchy with a descendant of the Inca on the throne. Reappointed to his old command as chief of the army of the North, for the next 3 years he fought not only Spanish regulars but armies of provincial caudillos as well. The constant traveling and campaigning exhausted him. He returned to Buenos Aires in March 1820 and died on June 20.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9d/Manuelbelgrano.jpg/250px-Manuelbelgrano.jpg
15.2 cm Mark 16
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-47_mk16_Oklahoma_City_bow_pic.jpg
These guns were used to arm the Brooklyn and Cleveland class light cruisers, the latter being the most numerous class of cruisers ever built. Developed from experiments with old 6"/50 (15.2 cm) Mark 8 (http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-50_mk8.htm) guns with various modifications to test new ideas, this weapon was to a new design and was capable of using the "super heavy" AP projectile. These new projectiles had almost double the penetration performance when compared against the previous 6"/53 (15.2 cm) (http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-53_mk12.htm) gun used on the Omaha class (CL-4) light cruisers. Constructed of monobloc autofretted barrel secured to the housing by a bayonet joint. Later mods included chrome plating and a tapered liner. All used a semi-automatic vertical sliding breech block.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-47_mk16_Manchester_pic.jpg
Gun Characteristics.
In Service 1937 Gun Weight 6.5 tons (6.6 mt)
Gun Length 300 in (7.620 m)
Barrel and Bore Length 282.3 in (7.169 m)
Rifling Length 238.3 in (6.053 m)
Twist Uniform `
RH 1 in 25
Chamber Volume 1,470 in3 (24.1 dm3)
Rate Of Fire 8 - 10 rounds per minute.
Ammunition.
Type Separate Projectile
Types and Weights
AP Mark 35 (super heavy) - 130 lbs. (59 kg)
AP - 105 lbs. (47.6 kg)
HC Mark 34 - 105 lbs. (47.6 kg)
HE Common - 105 lbs. (47.6 kg)
AA Common - 105 lbs. (47.6 kg)
Bursting Charge AP Mark 35 - 2 lbs. (0.9 kg)
HC - 13.65 lbs. (6.2 kg)
HE Common - 2.52 lbs (1.1 kg)
AA Common - 13.65 lbs. (6.2 kg)
Projectile Length AP Mark 35 - 27 in (68.6 cm)
Others: 24 in (61 cm)
Propellant Charge 32 lbs. (14.5 kg) NC
Charge case weighed 28.2 lbs. (12.8 kg)
Muzzle Velocity AP (super heavy) - 2,500 fps (762 mps)
HC - 2,800 fps (853 mps)
HE Common - 2,800 fps (853 mps)Working Pressure18.5 tons/in2 (2,910 kg/cm2)
Approximate Barrel Life 750 - 1,050 rounds
Ammunition stowage per gun 200 rounds
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-47_mk16_Brooklyn_cases_pic.jpg
Strange the deck is awash with the charges like that. I thought cloth bags were used for guns of this size, rather than brass cartridges.
Strange the deck is awash with the charges like that. I thought cloth bags were used for guns of this size, rather than brass cartridges
I am not sure if it was brass, is more like a charge container.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-47_mk16_Oklahoma_City_canister_pic.jpg
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_6-47_mk16_pics.htm
The Ship in Naval base.
http://www.crube.org/fotosHund/Entra%20dique%20seco.jpg
Could be, never seen that sort of container on a ship before either.
The cruiser also mounted some Seacats AA missiles since 1968.
http://www.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/seacat/seacat_s.jpg
Didn't she lose a lot of armour too?
I'm sure she had her armour belt and torpedo bulges removed.
Interesting - would torpedo bulges have stopped her going down in 1982?
Probably not, she was an old lady and crewed mainly by conscripted cadets with little or no real training.
Many couldn't even work the signalling devices in the life rafts.
One of the torpedoes that hit her, pretty much vented the bow area to sea, she was sailing at a leisurely 10 knots at the time and not prepped for battle. Doors were open and most of the crew stood down.
The second hit between the two largest compartments on the ship. Once the boilers in these rooms started exploding, as the cold sea water hit the red hot boilers, the crew could do very little.
Added to this was the fact that this torpedo also cut power to the whole ship. This is why no distress call was ever made by radio. The Destroyers didn't know she was doomed, and couldn't see the flares and lights that were frantically calling for assistance. They, lacking any serious ASW equipment, sped off and did not engage the Submarine.
Although she was steaming AWAY from the Falklands this was only after the Argentines had decided conditions were unfavourable for an attack. She was steaming towards Argentina, but not to Argentina. The Captain was awaiting further orders.
Of the three groups of ships, only the 2nd flottila (centred around the 25 de Mayo carrier) engaged the Royal Navy en route to the Falklands. Mainly becaues of bad coordination.
The Argentine government were aware taht the British could strike ANY military vessel ANYWHERE, ANYTIME in the world. But this was not passed on to the Capt of the Belgrano. It is this part of the British warning to the Argentines and the set up of the exclusion zone that centres the whole arguement.
The torpedos were WW2 vintage design, and so was the Belgrano. She had been at sea for 50 years, and was only given an annual refit, which was cut short in '82 to provide work men for the rest of the fleets refits and repairs etc.
It is odd that the key attack on Britian (regarding the sinking) is that
1. She was sailing away from the Islands (sometimes believed to be going to port but this was not the case) and of no threat to the British.
This was AFTER an intended attack had been canceled, that she would have taken part in. QED she was a threat.
2. She was outside the TEZ. She was still inside the much larger TEZ imposed by the Argentines, after the British imposed theirs. The British had indicated that Argentine military ships and aircraft or civil ships and aircraft undertaking military operations, including reconnaissence of the task force would be dealt with.
On the 23rd April 1982 the following message was passed, via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires, to the Argentine government.
In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaged in surveillance of these British forces, will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.
Interviews conducted by Martin Middlebrook for his book, The Fight For The Malvinas, indicated that Argentine Naval officers understood the intent of the message was to indicate that any ships operating near the exclusion zone could be attacked. Argentine Rear-Admiral Allara who was in charge of the task force that the Belgrano was part of said, "After that message of 23 April, the entire South Atlantic was an operational theatre for both sides. We, as professionals, said it was just too bad that we lost the Belgrano".
3. The attack was a deliberate ploy to scupper the peace process. Although the Argentine Junta decided to wait for the outcome of the Peruvian Peace Proposal, and thus suspended operations on the 1st of May. The Argies had ALREADY conducted attacks on the British, well in fact they wanted to. It's just none of them came off.
After hostilities broke out on May 1, 1982, the Argentine carrier attempted to launch a wave of Skyhawk jets against the Royal Navy Task Force after her S-2 Trackers detected the British fleet. Poor winds prevented the heavily loaded jets from being launched.
It is important to remember that the crux of the whole Argentine plan, to retake the islands, revolved around one thing. They owned them, keep the British away, until the South Atlantic winter and then hope they got to keep them by the time Spring came. After discussions.
To say that the British scuppered the peace process, after the Argies took the Falklands through aggression, not just lethargy on the British part. And attempted to engage the British Task Force whilst they were on route.
From http://www.bobhenneman.info/belgrano.htm
The Argentine Navy launched an ambitious operation, to project their power around the Falklands and perhaps even catch the incoming British task force and take it under attack before it was ready. Task Force 79 was formed, and disposed into three groups. Task Force 79.1 was the carrier 25 de Mayo, while 79.2 was her escort of two British built Type 42 destroyers, Hercules and Santisima Trinidad. Force 79.3 was the Belgrano and two escorting destroyers, and Force 79.4 consisted of 3 frigates. Force 79.4 sailed South of the Falklands, where it played no part in the following week's events, and was recalled to base May 2.
79.1 & 2 sailed north of the Falklands, where they found nothing but misfortune. First, Santisima Trinidad's Lynx helicopter crashed. Then the force was detected by a British Sea Harrier (no 801). Hercules attempted to launch a Sea Dart missile against it, but the launcher would not fire so the Sea Harrier escaped unscathed. Finally, 25 de Mayo was unable to launch her Skyhawk attack planes to locate and attack the British, as the carrier was too short to operate the aircraft without a significant head wind, and it was an unusually calm day in the South Atlantic. Having been discovered by an enemy they could not themselves locate, the Argentine Navy called off the operation and turned for home.
So the British are bad because they got the drop on the Argies? I take it the Argies would be holding themselves to such charges of scuppering hte peace process had they managed to shoot down the Harrier or actually got an air attack in the air to engage the British Task Force.
Found on another webforum.
Found this: scotlandonsunday.scots...=660082007
My part in sinking of the Belgrano
A REMARKABLE first-hand account of the hours leading up to one of the most controversial episodes of the Falklands War has emerged from a Scottish police constable.
Steve McIntosh was a 17-year-old Royal Navy submariner when he helped hunt down and torpedo the General Belgrano, an action that cost the lives of 300 Argentinian sailors and remains hotly debated 25 years later.
McIntosh, now a community beat officer with Strathclyde Police, was in the control room of HMS Conqueror, the submarine that sank the Belgrano, working in the key role of contact evaluation plotter.
The veteran, in what is believed to be the first personal account of events leading up to the attack, makes a number of extraordinary revelations, including:
• HMS Conqueror was earlier in position to sink the Argentinian aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo - a mission that could have shortened the war - but the British government refused permission to engage;
• The submarine tracked the Belgrano for a week, unsuccessfully seeking permission to fire on several occasions before they were finally given the go-ahead on May 2, 1982;
• The crew's initial euphoria at sinking the Belgrano turned to horror when it emerged Argentinian support ships had fled, leaving sailors to drown;
• The captain of HMS Conqueror, Commander Chris Wreford-Brown, led his crew in a service to pray for the enemy dead only hours after two of their torpedoes had ripped the Belgrano to pieces.
Worth reading in full.
Not sure how sinking the carrier would have had any differing effect on the war. She never left port after the Belgrano was sunk anyway, I would say that had the carrier gone down she would have had the same effect on the Navy. Without the political bullsh1t, seeing as she had attempted to engage the taskforce, and was within the TEZ.
As mentioned before, the Argies had been trying to draw their swords for quite some time prior to the sinking. It appears, if true, that the British trying to keep the peace far more than the Argies.
The fact that the gennys (and the aux gennys) were out of action should have had no effect on the txion of a distress signal or message.
Military ships are also required to conform to SOLAS, and until 1999 carried MF Tx/Rx eqpt for this purpose in addition to their own mil rdos, plus similar eqpt for use in the liferafts.
As a back-up to the ship's own ac power, an array of lead-acid batts were required to be maintained and an accuate log of their SG, voltage and charge rate kept.
These batts were easily sufficient to ensure that the distress signal (12 x 4-sec dashes with 1 sec intervals) and the distress message (locstat, c/s, name of vessel, situation and type of assistance reqd,) could be sent, and distress traffic carried out as long as is possible.
Should a SOLAS representative have applied to board a ship, merchant or military, they were always permitted to do so, and if the batt array failed inspection the vessel would not have left that port.
Huge fines and loss of competency certs for the skipper & Rdo Offrs or w/ops concerned always ensued.
Both Aldis and maroons were used to attract attention to the ship, so it seems beyond credibility that Capt Bonzo forbade the txion of distress signals/messages on mil or civ freqs, therefore I can only surmise that the reason neither were sent is due to one of the following:
1. The batt array had been destroyed.
2. The w/ops had not maintained the batts.
3. The w/ops had been killed.
4. The w/ops had gapped it.
It would be interesting to interview those responsible for the lack of comms, as had the other Argentine ships made it to the liferafts more quickly, many fewer men would have lost their lives.
Nice links.
The armor was nor removed being an integral part of the ship s hull. , probably without that the ship would sunk faster than she did. Ithink it was soem between 127-140 mm in the thicker section.
Horror ? and who said the crew feels horror ? :roll:
The cruiser in the Ushuaia port, Tierra del Fuego april 1982.
http://www.crube.org/fotosHund/Muelle%20USU.jpg
Steve McIntosh.
To bulk out Cuts reply to panzerknacker, the horror of the crew is said by Steve McIntosh.
[quote]Steve McIntosh was a 17-year-old Royal Navy submariner when he helped hunt down and torpedo the General Belgrano...
McIntosh, now a community beat officer with Strathclyde Police, was in the control room of HMS Conqueror, the submarine that sank the Belgrano, working in the key role of contact evaluation plotter.[quote]
He is the provider of the above quote, and the claim of horror.
It is quite probable that they experienced horror, bear in mind that the RN have quite a tradition of rescuing ones comrades, even if it does put your boat in danger. Something only ever not done, in the Atlantic war by the Convoys.
They were not expressing horror at their torpedoing, that is something that is part of their job. But horror at teh two excorts hitting the gas and not stopping till they ran up the beach in Argentina.
Currently seeing if I can track down info, but the removal of torpedo bulges wouldn't be that hard, and they are not part of the ships structure. The 5in Armour belt would be harder, but would still be possible.
Cuts ref the batts. I found it hard to understand how a war ship could suffer such catastrophic damage from just one torpedo, but if you factor in that she was mainly crewed by conscripts then the maintainence of complex equipment may have fallen lower than standard.
Likewise, she was an old girl and her annual maintainence period in '82 was cut short.
17 years ? that is young, I undestand the "horror" in such young man, but honestly i cannot visualize (and I could be wrong) a experienced RN crew crying about sinking a enemy warship, as you said is their work after all.
The destroyers escort behavior had 2 lectures.
A) Cowardice, leaving the surviving men at your own.
B) Common sence, helping the crew would make them sitting ducks for the HMS Conqueror.
I really cannot decide between both.
I could visualise it Panzerknacker. Just because a job is done, doesn't mean that it can't be regretted.
The Boers at Spion Kop openly wept for the British soldiers they had slaughtered in the battle. As the bodies were huddled together in pathetically shallow trenches.
What is done in the heat of battle, is not always celebrated.
The 17 yo in this case may well have believed the Destroyers would pick up the crew of Belgrano. A submarine often departs sharpish after launching torpedoes, so the Destroyers could have turned around.
The deaths in the initial attack aside, the majority died in the rafts. Waiting for rescue, a fact that it would take days for a SAR op would have been well known to the crew of Conqueror.
Don't paint the crew of the Conqueror as inhuman monsters because it suits your, or your countries needs. They are men, as many on this forum are.
That they carry out horrible deeds, doesn't mean they relish them.
Did any of your soldiers not cry or be affected by the suffering they imposed?
From another forum (from 2004) http://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/discus/messages/6937/87826.html?1110808428
Here are what some of my work colleagues say: (from a work intranet discussion)
"The comment that caught my attention, which I have never heard before in
previous documentaries, was that both Argie Groups received orders from
Fleet Command for them to reverse course and hold to the west of the Islands
(Cpt Bonzo stated that there was no reason given with the order - which is
somewhat fishy) it suggests to me that the Argies at HQ had intel that the
ships were about to be hit. What was the source? USSR or somewhere a little
closer?
What a strange man this Cpt Bonzo?
"My Crew were well trained and very professional".......Mmmmmm
Why did the escorts have Sonar Off?
Why were all the WT doors/Hatches open?
Why were the ships not at action stations ?
Why did the DD/FF's not notice when their 13000 ton charge suddenly
explodes, is lost on Radar/radio and disappears beneath the waves?
Why did the ships not hear the distress calls on 2182Khz from the Liferaft
radios?
There is a lot of strange behaviour going on that has not been explained
(and probably won't be)."
also from http://www.britishcouncil.org/learnenglish-central-history-belgrano.htm
Several hours after the attack on the cruiser, Royal Navy Lynx helicopters early on May 3 fired Sea Skua missiles at an 8004 ton armed tug (believed to be carrying a crew of about 50) and damaged another vessel after both had fired on British helicopters about 90 miles within the TEZ, north of East Falkland. The task force mounted an air-sea rescue operation for survivors.
Giving details of the attack on these two vessels, the Ministry of Defence described them as "ocean-going armed patrol craft"; one had been provisionally identified as the Alferez Sobral, in which event "she would, according to all the references, be armed with 40mm and 20mm guns". Whereas British reports said that the vessel sank, the Argentinian Navy announced on May 7 that the Alferez Sobral had reached Puerto Deseado (in Argentina) but that eight people on board had been killed.
Following the sinking of the General Belgrano, the UN Secretary-General, Sr Javier Pérez de Cuellar, expressed deep concern on May 4 over the mounting loss of life in the Falklands conflict and called for the immediate implementation of security Council Resolution 502. Member countries of the European Community (notably France, West Germany and the Netherlands) expressed similar concern, while the Spanish Government warned Britain on May 2 that any broader military action would be a "grave historical error". Both the Spanish Prime Minister, Sr Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, and King Juan Carlos of Spain offered to mediate in the conflict in early May.
Or from a Time magazine report.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,923192,00.html
Sinking Prestige A self-inflicted disaster
No single episode in the 74-day Falklands war so upset world opinion as the seemingly heartless British sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, in which a total of 321 Argentine sailors perished.
For Britain, the episode was a monumental public relations disaster. Ironically, TIME learned last week, the damage to British prestige was largely self-inflicted—a direct result of the Ministry of Defense's penchant for supersecrecy. Soon after the Belgrano was hit, London sent a top-secret communication to the Argentine high command in Buenos Aires assuring it that the Belgrano's two escort vessels would have free passage to begin rescue operations.
Despite the signal, the Argentines allowed a fatal day to pass before returning to the scene. A high Argentine naval official says that the destroyers were too far away, and the seas too rough, to permit a speedy rescue—explanations the British dismiss. For reasons unknown, the British Defense Ministry decided to keep silent about the secret message. Said a British intelligence source last week: "Those bloody fools threw away an ace card to satisfy their appetite for secrecy. As a result we were denounced as killers."
From http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921199-3,00.html
The British government's explanation was that on April 23 it had warned that any Argentine ship or plane representing a clear threat to the fleet would risk an "appropriate response." The dangers of broadening the war, British officials asserted, had to be measured against the risk of allowing the Belgrano to train its impressive firepower on the British task force. As Prime Minister Thatcher told the House of Commons, "The worry that I live with hourly is that Argentine forces, in attacks both naval and air, will get through to our forces."
The Argentine reaction to the Belgrano's sinking was heated. At first, Buenos Aires said that Britain's announcement was "a lie" and part of a campaign of "psychological warfare." The next day, however, Argentina conceded the ship's loss and denounced the attack as a "treacherous act of armed aggression."
As well as the Belgrano, the Argentines announced—mistakenly it turned out—that yet another navy vessel had been lost. According to Buenos Aires, a dispatch ship, the Sobral, had been fired on by British missile-carrying Lynx helicopters as it searched for a downed Canberra bomber crew within the 200-mile zone. The British said that the Sobral and another Argentine boat had been hit and at least one sunk. A day later, the Sobral limped back into the Argentine port of Deseado with eight dead crewmen.
I love all this "rule for us, rule for you" business. Sinking a cruiser, whilst at a heightened state of near war if not actual war is seen as a "treacherous act of armed aggression" but attacking Moody Brooks Barracks with Willie Pete, mortars and MG stop groups completely out of the blue isn't?
That and the fact that the Argentines seem, repeatedly, to not pass on important information. ie the fact taht the Belgrano would still be viewed as a target, and that the destroyers could return for survivors.
You made the post and you aswered yourself 1000y :shock: , I already said in other thread that the the sinking of the cruiser was not unjustified.
Ha, ha, ha... my godness, what a sindrome, :D describe wich part of my post "I paint" the british seamen as monsters. You are too tense, I suggest that get relaxed a bit.
Cuts ref the batts. I found it hard to understand how a war ship could suffer such catastrophic damage from just one torpedo, but if you factor in that she was mainly crewed by conscripts then the maintainence of complex equipment may have fallen lower than standard
It was hit by two torpedos, one in the machine room and the other ahead the first turret.
http://www.crube.org/CRU006P.jpg
I still find the lack of a distress signal very odd.
As I said earlier, there seem to be only four possibilities:
Whats your take on it ?
The two torps hit the bow, and one in the bulkhead between two engine compartments. These are the largest areas on the ship.
The first was far for'ard, and didn't damage much in the way of ships systems, although did vent the bow to the sea.
The second vented the boiler room. This caused massive explosions as the boilers cooked off, when the cold water hit them, and at some point severed the power.
What neither Cuts or myself can figure is....
Why just two torpedos brought a WW2 vintage Cruiser to a complete power down?
The radio room has auxilary batteries, mounted high on the ship, right next to the radio room. These were not damaged, yet no distress call? Power was lost to the ship, yet there are other aux power supplies. Even aux diesal generators, away from the engine room.
Likewise, why were teh distress flares and signal lights (that seem to be still working) not seen by the destroyers?
The reasons from the Argentines, that the Destroyers were too far away? They had sailed away, so surely they could sail back in equal time. Sooner than it would take to sail from Argentina, for sure.
Just two ?
I am far to be a naval expert but I think 2 x 21 inch torpedos are a very heavy damage.
Respect to the other question.. no idea, you are asking the wrong guy.
I dont know the cases of the soldiers but being pilots all the men who sink british ship the aswer is no.
None of them has clam to be "horrofied" by the result of his combat mission. I know a case recently wich one of the A-4 pilot who attacked the HMS Sir Galahand meet one of the badly burn british soldiers, but I didnt hear him talking about horror.
I am not a Naval expert either. But it is my understanding that the two torpedoes used would not have wrecked the whole ship. Pictures of the ship in her death throes show very little if any damage to the top of the ship.
Power WAS found to traverse one turret at least (common practice to stabilse briefly a capsizing ship).
The ship was lost due to poor drills in the run up (ie she was not rigged for battle, water tight doors were left open and many crew were off duty) and what can only be ineffective damage control afterwards. There are accounts that damage control in the boiler rooms (the two largest compartments of the ship) were practically non existant after the boilers began to cook off.
Likewise in the bow, 10 kts going forward surely = 10 kts worth of water flow going in through the bow.
The torpedoes could not have damaged the superstructure of the ship, thus the radio shack shouldn't have been damaged, nor should the emergency radios.
I also speak from a small experience, Thanks to the Andy, of training in various damage control skills from HMS Raleigh and Excellent. Also a bit of dunking in helicoptors.
see here for a insight.....
http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/server/show/nav.3443
http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/server/show/conWebDoc.1044
Nonsense. The damage control crew was killed by the torpedo wich hits in the machine room, actually that caused 250 deads of the total 323, you cannot accuse dead people of "poor drills". Not to mention the torp wich hit ahead the the first turret wich sawed off the bow.
http://www.crube.org/fotosHund/belgrano01.jpg
The damaged control party were not ALL killed in the first explosion.
The ship was not rigged for any sort of alert, to that end damage control parties were NOT yet formed.
The ship would have gone to their alert state, such as General Quarters. The men assigned to the various duties would man their posts, the surplus would provide the Damage Control Parties. In the event of the whole boiler room personnel being killed it is highly likely the gunners (having nothing to do may have been sent down).
These Damage Control Parties do not include the personnel who would have immediatly attempted to bring the damaged to repair.
A ship such as Belgrano should not sink with only, what, 4 - 5 compartments vented.
She is a Cruiser, designed to take a punishing.
No one can predict how a ship reacts when hit. The Titanic was unsinkable after all. Torpodoes dont just hurt where they hit, whole decks away can be affected by the shock where a deck 2 feet away might not. In my limited experience of the Navy, damage control parties dont all sit in the same place, that would be as stupid as parking all your aircraft on a Hawian air strip.
It's worth noting that USN ships of the era the Belgrano was built in could take a hell of a lot of punishment. It's been said that USN Destroyers of the time could take more damage than light cruisers of other nations and still make it back to port.
And what is your source for the thing above ?
How many torpedos take ( in your all wise opinion) to sink a cruiser?
I was looking for more info and you are right in some part at list.
http://www.fuerzasnavales.com/mag18_2.htm
Use Babelfish in case that non-spanish speaker, is 90 % accurate.
The end of the day, in this case two torpedos were enough to kill the Belgrano. I personally believe that one could also have done it, in this case.
I also believe however that she could have been kept up for a dam sight longer had she been rigged for combat, better maintained and her crew better trained.
WRT Titanic, no one in the know ever referred to her as unsinkable. That was used on a piece of advertising and placed their by a non technical type who didn't know any better.
In the run up to the Titanic, the Trans-Atlantic vessals actually became more sinkable, as bulkheads and compartments became larger and more open. The Great Eastern (i think) was older, but more safe in terms of bulkheads.
It is true wrt different ships and different effects. Titanic sank in hours, after caterstrophic damage which vented 5 - 7 compartments to the sea. She was only designed to have 4 flooded. As is common knowledge, water merely flowed over the top and filled each one in turn.
When the iceberg struck, her water tight doors were ALL shut. Sealling the compartments.
Her sistership Britannic was launched after Titanic. She had much improved protection, double hulls and water tight compartments extending far above the waterline for example. She sank in less than an hour after a mine strike.
The problem? Her watertight doors were open, the minstrike hit between compartments 2 and 3 but damaged the door in compartment 1. Worse other doors could not be shut. To really hammer it in, most of her port holes were open, when they reached the waterline, they allowed more water in to the ship.
48 mins from mine strike to the Capt leaving hte ship, and walking in to the water from the bridge.
My point here is that the survival of the ship is as much about the crews actions before and after, as it is about the actual design and strength of the ship.
The end of the day, in this case two torpedos were enough to kill the Belgrano
I hope that this kind of brainy conclusion dont exausted you too much.
Now, now Panzerknacker. Let's keep it adult shall we?
Read the post about Titanic and Brittanic. Why did one sink faster than the other? Bearing in mind Brittanic should have been less sinkable than Titanic.
Now compare to Belgrano. Other cruisers of the vintage, lasted longer. Even the torpedos were WW2 vintage.
NO.. I dont going to waste my time reading that, this topic is about the Cruiser ARA General Belgrano and nothing more, I know that you always like to derail a bit but dont count me for that.
Just because it says ARA General Belgrano at the top doesn't mean you can't expand out a little bit.
The question that was coming up was... why did she sink so fast, after all the damage to her was severe and in most cases uncalled for. ie the power completely going down.
We know that ships of her size carry diesal auxileries for power, and batteries. It is simple, when main power drops the batteries take over and the diesals are started. Why was there no power for the radios?
Why were the sailers (some of them) sleeping out of kit? They were issued immersion suits because they were half naked. Why were so many sailers of duty? Why was the ship not rigged for any threat and just sailing like a pleasue yahth?
What were the damage control systems like? or the crews?
These are all pertinent questions, to which I have put up a very fine example of two almost identical ships (of the same class no less). Which should give an example of the differences in ships.
Or you can just ignore this, and go back to your rhetoric as per usual.
As soon as I find some examples of similar (hopefully sister) ships to the USS Pheonix being sunk and how I will come back. But most ships of hte day could stand some awesome damage and still be functioning.
Then we can move on to why the Destroyers never stopped for survivors.
Mister Margaret Tatcher talking about the sinking.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1aZdAyHVjzQ
That is the sort of leader a country SHOULD have.
For those who do not know, she is on a morning TV programme, called TVAM, being interviewed by David Frost. This would be broadcast to the whole country.
I beleive the early part of the interview was in relation to the incorrect information given to the House of Commons (where our PM lives) in that the Cruiser was believed to be heading IN to the TEZ.
Once it was known by Mrs T that the Cruiser was actually heading AWAY she immediatly had it announced with all details known.
As she says. The Cruiser (as part of the 3rd Argentine Task Force) was a threat to "our boys". The three task forces were lurking around the Falklands in order to stop the British Task Force from landing.
I hardly think that they would have done this with coloured smoke and foul language.
That conditions did not pan out for them to engage the British (esp the 25 of Mays air attack that was planned for around the same time as the sinking, put off due to bad weather) is unlucky for the Argentines, lucky for us.
Although the Torpedoes were easily up to the task (as demonstrated) of sinking the Belgrano, it is highly likely that NOTHING else the British had could have done so.
Exocets carry small, shaped charges. Which would not have had much impact on the armoured superstructure of the cruiser, designed to absorb numourous shells.
The Harriers do not carry big enough bombs.
Nothing in the gun inventory could touch the Belgrano (4.5 inch is hardly a bee sting to a WW2 era Cruiser).
Ergo she is a THREAT to "our boys", with or without the Exocets she may have been carrying (as believed at the time).
Threat meets HMS Conqueror, Threat goes down.
That simple.
And I do believe that if any further targets had been found they too would have been sunk. Had the Argentine Navy ever left port again after the sinking it is highly likely that the one and only carrier in the Argentine fleet would also have been targetted.
You don't leave the heavyweights out there if you can take them off the map.
Gun Plumber
Its simple.... Falklands/England 1 Argentina 0
It was a warship belonging to a navy in the middle of a war - I can't believe that anyone could be stupid enough to think it shouldn't be sunk?
But BDL you forget, the British were supposed to just hand the islands over and stay in the North. Or pussy foot around until the South Atlantic Winter hit, thus preventing them from retaking them.
By coming down so fast, and with the means and werewithal to fight, they broke the rules.
My apologies, I should said Madam tatcher, I forgot she was a women for a while.
Man...as if we havent enough brainy thinkers in this forum.
Easy mistake to make, she did have more balls than your Junta put together!!!! :D :D :D :D
Seriously though. What is the big deal about the sinking of ARA General Belgrano? I don't seem to see people in Britain whinging about the ships taht were sunk in the Royal Navy, nor do I see people whinging about the submarine Santa Fe.
She has been painted out to be this doddering, old and ineffective ship. SHe was a cruiser, heavily armoured and armed and spoiling for a rumble. Why else would she be there.
That she sailed in harms way, and came to grieve is unfortunate. But she is ship of war, and her crew must have known the consequences of going to war.... if not, well, I can't really comment.
Claims that she was in Argentine waters (which have come up) are rubbish too. She was a good 170 miles into International waters.
No brains required :D , the Belgrano was an enemy ship and it got sunk. It matters not one jot where it was, where it was pointing or who it was pointing at. Argentina can't wage war AND expect to choose which of their forces isn't playing.
Rising Sun*
Oh, Dear!
This is the simplistic clarity of thought which results in one side attacking the forces of the other side, wherever they find them.
What an odd way to fight a war.
Still, I suppose it's that odd British way of seeking out the enemy and destroying him where found that makes the British so much more original in warfare than any other nation.
No doubt Argentina was busily playing cricket and bowls, to display its contempt for such vicious attitudes to war, while the nasty British were sneaking up on their cricket grounds and bowling greens to attack the unsuspecting Argies.
FFS!
My bold.
Sounds like someone has more than a passing acquaintance with the Role of the Inf.
That's odd!....I thought it was the 'Tars' that had sunk it, not the 'Tommies'? :confused:
Wrong post ! :D
Perhaps...but a good one! :D
Well, I know they play rugger - so you could be right! :D
Well, this topic has become too british for mi taste I stay away for a time :rolleyes:
Why not just lock the thread ?
panzerknacker wrote
Well, this topic has become too british for mi taste I stay away for a time
Does that mean you have no answers to the questions posed by this sinking or just a steadfast refusel to believe the facts that these questions bring to light?
ie. That Belgrano was a fair target and that Argentina had fair warning of the actions that would be taken if she was found to be interfereing with the task forces.
Her Capt was unaware of these rules, and for some inexplicable reason was sailing back towards the mainland as if on some pleasure cruise on a lake, rather than on a warship in what was shaping up to be a war, in the middle of an ever worsening South Atlantic.
Maintainence of the ship and training on board was lacking. The annual refit was cut short, and it is highly likely the crew were not up to the task of keeping such an old craft properly maintained at sea. The fact that she neeeded and annual service tells us much, very few other ships require 40 odd days a year alongside.
Her destroyers left her and her crew for dead. A communique sent by the British that the DDs could return to collect the survivors was not acted upon, and then stupid reasons of the DDs were too far away or the sea was wet were given to explain the time taken to rescue the survivors. (Actual reason was that the sea was too rough for rescue ops).
This was the first taste the Argentines had had, of modern war. And it was a bitter pill to swallow after the joy and jubilatoin of the invasion of the Falklands.... and for the Junta it was the first indication that the British were not sticking to the plan they had devised.
The fun part, for the Argetnines, was over.
Nah, that'd be too sophisticated for me.
I thought the role of the ground huggers was to protect armour which was protecting artillery which was protecting the cooks who were fighting the service corps to get the food to feed the ground huggers which the depot staff had been stealing to sell to the occupied civilians, far from the sound of gun fire. :evil:
Having come in late, I've read this thread from the start and have formed these opinions on the basis of those comments and wider history.
1. The Belgrano had significance for Argentinians far beyond its naval capacity.
2. The sinking of the Belgrano consequently had much more significance for Argentinians than the sinking of British ships did for Britons in the same conflict.
3. Argentinian sensitivity to Argentine losses was, and is, a consequence of Argentinians having no experience of modern war before the Falklands, having played no active part in the hostilities in either World War or since.
4. Argentinians consequently had no experience of the losses associated with modern wars.
5. Argentina's military experience was limited to internal conflicts where the ruling forces could prevail over weaker enemies.
6. Argentina's military leaders therefore developed a conceited and wholly unfounded belief in their military ability and capacity.
7. The net result of Argentina's isolation from the realities of modern wars was that it embarked upon a war with a nation with vastly more experience and ability in modern war. Argentina duly lost. It still cannot comprehend that the causes of its loss were wholly to do with its own deficiencies in beginning and fighting the war rather than anything untoward in the way Britain conducted the war.
8. To avoid Argentina's responsibility for starting the war and then losing it, the sinking of the Belgrano has been elevated in some Argentine thinking into something akin to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor so that Argentina by convoluted reasoning is now presented, rather like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the victim of a beastly act by an unprincipled and ruthless enemy in a war it started. In reality, judged against the experience of Britain and other nations with serious experience in 20th century wars, sinking the Belgrano was just a routine naval event in a modern war and is completely undeserving of any more attention than the sinking of countless ships in any other 20th century war.
9. To avoid Argentinian responsibility for starting and then losing the war, there is an evident desire to shift blame to Britain for sinking a legitimate target which results in facile and irrelevant claims that, for example, it was an old ship with not a lot of big guns with not a vast range and no or limited missile capacity. This is despite the fact that if competently commanded and crewed (of which there seems to have been little prospect) it could have cleaned up most of the British ships in the area without putting itself at risk.
10. The sinking of the Belgrano was a necessary part of the successful maritime campaign to repossess the Falklands after its unprovoked seizure by Argentina. The elimination of the latter's fleet inside territorial waters was a precondition for British victory.
Those really responsible for the deaths of the Argentinian sailors on board the old cruiser were the military junta led by General Galtieri. In 1994, Buenos Aires concurred with the Thatcher administration that the Belgrano sinking had been a 'legal act of war', and the Argentinian governments since have not had change of heart on this matter.
http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/a-b/belgrano.html
I dont see any reasons to do that.
No, it means than I dont like to discuss with you, because knowing your style we probably end talking about anything else and I should have to go mad deniying things I never posted.
Those really responsible for the deaths of the Argentinian sailors on board the old cruiser were the military junta led by General Galtieri.
I think is more a responsability of the Navy high Command.
The point in my quote was sheeting home the responsibility to the Argentinian government for starting the war.
Why is the Navy high command more responsible than the national government?
The point in my quote was sheeting home the responsibility to the Argentinian government for starting the war
Sorry but I wont get caught in there.
Easy one, bad planification of the attack against the RN.
Basically Panzerknacker, Rising Sun* is spot on.
I applaud you RS for putting your thoughts forwards so well and so clearly.
Panzerknacker, read, learn and absorb. YOUR country started it, MY country finished it. Any losses on your side, were caused (ultimately) by your own leadership.
Belgrano could well have caused severe damage to the RN task force. Her guns and her armour were from another era, one that we had forgot. That she was sunk is indeed unfortuante, but a key part to OUR winning of the war.
Or you could sulk.
Again madam Tatcher confronted with the Belgrano sinking, questioned by a strong opinioned british lady.
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2602397355053672059&q=falklands+site%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fvideo.google.com
Incidentally this lady bring to the table the peruvian peace proposal by the President Belaunde Therry, thing that I already had forgot.
By the way, nobody come to me any more with the war crime bullshit, I never,ever wrote that this Cruiser was not a legal target for the HMS Conqueror.
The woman in the call (not Maggie) is just a hand wringing apologist.
As Maggie says, she was a danger to the British. She was sunk end of.
Mrs T... What a lady.
Like I say, the Argentinians had ALREADY planned and attempted to execute an attack on the Royal Navy. Thus did the British scupper the peace attempt? Or had the Argentines already scuppered them?
No one neccesarily beleives YOU personally don't believe the sinking is wrong. Eagle had some pretty extreme views on the matter (to the point of even trying to say the Belgrano was never a threat with his pop guns and no exocets) and you have different views also. The fact remains though that the concenous of opinion in Argentina is that we Brits behaved in some way underhanded in sinking the belgrano.
Bearing in mind that Argentinians have tried to take the Royal Navy to court.
You are Argentinian, thus you have to shoulder some of these claims occaisionally, in the same way other people will carry our countries actions and beleives.
No one neccesarily beleives YOU personally don't believe the sinking is wrong. Eagle had some pretty extreme views on the matter (to the point of even trying to say the Belgrano was never a threat with his pop guns and no exocets) and you have different views also. The fact remains though that the concenous of opinion in Argentina is that we Brits behaved in some way underhanded in sinking the belgrano
My dear 1000yds, you are free to believe whatever you like, there is different opinions here as also seems to be in your country...or is that you agree with the lady confronting Madam tatcher ?.. NO you definately dont.
And just to the record, I am not Eagle, I know the town where Eagle lives but that is all.
I've scanned this thread again, to try to understand the Argentinian position and the strength of feeling behind it which seems to affect Argentinian objectivity.
I don't see anything in this thread that alters this clear statement by the OP in post #1.
I can appreciate that Argentinians may have invested their big ship with a lot of national pride; that they were profoundly shocked and wounded by its loss, particularly after seeming to be so victorious in their land assaults; and that they understandably want to blame Britain for somehow doing something underhand rather than accept the fact that their ship was at worst incompetently commanded and at best simply outfought.
I'm not an Argentinian so I can't understand their national feeling.
I am even more perplexed by the strength of Argentinian feeling as in the quite possibly unlawful sinking of one of our cruisers, HMAS Sydney, in WWII my nation lost about the same number of men as Argentina lost in the whole of the Falklands war. http://www.awm.gov.au/Encyclopedia/hmas_sydney/action.htm
There remains considerable debate in the very limited circles interested in the Sydney's sinking about whether the Kormoran revealed its true colours before opening fire. Or even whether Sydney was sunk by a Japanese submarine, which is not supported by any serious understanding of the event. But we have only the German survivors' versions to go on.
Be all that as it may, Australia and Australians generally (but not all the crews' families and others closely associated with it) had drawn a line under the sinking of the Sydney long, long before 25 years had passed from the sinking.
Maybe learning to accept war's terrible misfortunes and gross injustices is part of the acquired character of Australia and other British dominions which, like but to a much lesser early extent than Britain, are among the few nations that have been involved in long and sapping conflicts in two world wars from start to finish (not just a couple of months like the Falklands), and that, like America and Britain, were involved in another one in Korea less than a decade after the end of WWII and, like America, was involved in another one in Vietnam well before the 25 year mark from Sydney's sinking. When a nation gets used to losing ships and men, the sinking of something like the Belgrano is a great but passing misfortune. It is not grounds for a sense of national persecution and eternal whingeing.
Whatever the reasons for drawing a line under things, it's 25 years since the Belgrano went down, so isn't it time to draw a line under it, and move on?
Wasn't the General Belgrano originally a United States Navy WWII cruiser?
Gen. Sandworm
Yes USS Phoenix
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARA_General_Belgrano
More on that page 2 in this topic:
The Argentine Government had ample warning that all of its warships were at risk. On 23 April a message was passed via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine government, it read:
The course at the time was irrelevant, the order to attack the task force had not been rescinded, the order was merely on hold waiting for more favourable weather for the Argentine carrier to launch an air strike. In reality the Argentine navy had been lucky, HMS Splendid had been in position to launch a torpedo attack on the carrier, it was only stopped by ROE requiring visual ID of the target.
The 2001 legal action was doomed from the start, the Argentine Government itself acknowledged that the sinking was a legitimate act of war in 1994.
The word of one survivor.
http://img407.imageshack.us/img407/758/belgranoke2.jpg
Extracted from the daily Telegraph.
Major Lies by HMG over Belgrano sinking
The Belgrano was approaching the task force and was a threat to it.
It kept changing direction throughout the day.
It was heading for the shallow waters of the Burdwood bank, where it could have been lost by the Conqueror.
It was part of a 'pincer movement' attack on the task force.
The Conqueror detected the Belgrano on May 2nd.
The decision to fire was made by the submarine commander.
News of the Peruvian peace proposals did not reach London until after the attack.
leccy
Are those lies by HMG (Her Majesties Government) or are you stating facts that were true. A little more info to go with your post would be appreciated.
tankgeezer
Being the new guy James1, you don't know your way around the place yet, but we usually will post some type of source authority information to support whatever statements we make. Links to the information so we can reference it to expand on a post. I hope you will enjoy your visits here, there is alot to see.
Even if all of that is true, the Belgrano was still a legitimate target. Even if it was at anchor in Buenos Aires with the captain and crew fast asleep.
All warships of a warring nation are targets for the other nation.
From the inside:
Em ... some of the debate In Here on this point seems a bit unrealistic. "De facto war" has, historically, been the norm. In the 20th century in particular, states as respectable as the USA and the UK - and as less-than-respectable as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan have made war de facto, without any concern about niceties like declarations of war. I seem to recall a statement by Hitler that he would never sign a declaration of war. Mind you, he did declare war on the USA - though I do not think he ever signed a declaration.
I recall the period of the Falklands/Malvinas War very well, for the odd reason that I was in the early stage of "negotiations" with my (still) wife at the time. In Ireland, feelings about the whole thing tended to be very mixed. On the one hand, what was perceived as unprovoked aggression by the Argentine military dictatorship was viewed as unacceptable. On the other, there was an understandable (if not justifiable) sympathy with Argentina as a "victim of British oppression". The Irish folk group, the Wolfe Tones (once notably described as "the Musical Wing of the IRA") summed up the latter sentiment in their song of the period, dedicated to Admiral William Brown - the founder of the Argentinian Navy and (bizarrely) born in Foxford, County Mayo in the West of Ireland -
"From a County Mayo Town came a man of great renown
As a sailor and a soldier was none bolder
He went to America at an early age they say
As a cabin boy to sail the wide world over
Then adventure took him south to the Del La Plata Mouth
San Martin was on the route in Argentina
So three whaling ships he bought and Brazil and Spain he fought
And freedom they he sought for Argentina
Now Admiral William Brown you're a man of courage shown
And in battles fought the odds were all against you
But your Irish heart was strong and in memory still lives on
And in Ireland there are some that don't forget you
On St. Patrick's Day it's told you had many victories bold
And you defeated all invaders thugs and bullies
Then through the Pampas rose and you found a happy home--
Las Islas Malvinas Argentina
He had heard of Irish hands in the noble gallant bands
That helped to free the land called Argentina
He had heard with great acclaim the Patricios name
And fame, when in 1806 the British came for slaughter
And to this very day in the Argentine they say
The English ran away from Buenos Aires
To the islands further down and they took them for the crown --
We remember William Brown and his land of great renown
He, invader of the islands from your country
When 1833 where by pirates force to flee
And in Ireland sure we know the story fully
And the people that went too to the Argentine when new,
To escape the English laws and wars and famine
They proved a loyal crew just like all the Irish do--
The old colonial days and the cruel English ways
With her thunder plunder we will teach the natives
For the Brits are going to war just like Whitelock did before
With her ships & guns & drums & flags & banners
In the Empire days of old when they murdered for the gold
And paraded it around the streets of London
Oh no human rights were given to the natives dead or living--
In the Argentine he died Father Fahey by his side,
Fifty-seven was the year his father mourned him
A hero of the nation he's remembered with elation,
Throughout the world were freedom still abounds
And the Southern Cross take note were bold Willie Bulfin wrote
"The Irish still support you Argentina"
With the Empire tumbling down let no Paddies back the crown--
Las Islas Malvinas Argentina".
Er ... er ...
Yours from South Georgia,
On 14 October 1939, German u-boat captain Gunther Prien sailed his u-boat undetected into Scapa Flow and torpedoed the British battleship HMS Royal Oak - riding at anchor - to the consternation of the UK and the elation of the Germans. 833 British sailors lost their lives. Question: Did the British take the Germans to court and sue them over the "illegal" sinking of their "helpless" battleship, and, if so, what was the outcome of the court case? England and Germany were at war at the time of the sinking.
Was this "completely different"? If so, how?
Yes, it was completely different.
The difference is that Britain didn't destroy Argentina from the air; on the sea; and on land, and then occupy it and try its leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity as Britain did to Germany in conjunction with the other Allies in WWII.
Argentina inflicted damaged on the Falklands but, unlike Germany, never experienced an attack on its own land in that conflict and has not the faintest understanding of what modern total war is like. This allows it to get excited and sulk about the Belgrano which, frankly, was a trivial event in the scale of things that happened in a major war of the sort that Britain and many other nations have fought over the past few centuries.
As I said at #78 above
Right you are RS - completely different. I'm not familiar with the word "whingeing" but assume from the context that it's the same meaning as the American "whining".
I'm not familiar with the word "whingeing" but assume from the context that it's the same meaning as the American "whining".


The vascular access team and the critical care trained nurses at my hospital retouinely remove PICCs and CVCs in accordance with INS procedure. We have not removed temporary (nontunnelled) hemodialysis catheters. I couldn't find the rationale for not removing them so I asked some nurses who would have some historical knowledge. They spoke of the cather large bore size and the need to hold pressure for a greater period of time. The rationale was that it tied the nurse up longer than when removing a CVC or picc, so the MD's were only allowed to remove them. Is this outdated or is there any evidence that anyone can point me to? We don't have dozens of them but we do get them and there is now controversy over whether the RN should remove them or not.
In our hospital they are considered a CVC. Nurses remove them following the proper procedure with our CVC removal. One thought on the size of this catheter is similar to the cordis for a swan line. Nurses remove a cordis.
This is only a large bore CVC so a nurse with documented competency should be able to remove it. Same as removing any other percutaneous CVC. Control bleeding but air emboli prevention is more of an issue.
Thank you Lynn and Maggie. At my hospital we also do not remove the cordis and the renal doctors/intensivists/interventional radiologists often put a stitch in when removing a cordis or a temporary HD cath. I am not opposed to having my IV nurses do this, but they have very large asignments and I do have concerns about how long they might have to stay at the bedside holding pressure ince we would not be able to place a stitch. Any comments about your experience with the differences in time of holding pressure betwenn a cvc and an HD cath woud be helpful to me.
Length of time for pressure is a patient-specific thing based on clotting factors. Yes the hole will be large but I have not seen any one use a suture to close it and have doubts that it really serves any purpose. Some CVADs also leave very large holes. There would still be the need for pressure until hemostasis and a petroleum based dressing to seal the hole and prevent air embolism.
I have personally not held pressure for more than 5 -7 minutes. But, as Lynn stated it does depend on the specific patient. Once the line is out you can sit them up and hold pressure, lightly. I can only say with 30 years of ICU nursing it has never been a problem.


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Australian drone laws 2019 - dronenr.
Drone laws, not only in Australia are confusing, to say the least. From many first pilots not knowing there are even any drone laws to seasoned pilots only knowing a few of the laws.
This article aims to support all drone pilots in Australia to fly safe, stay out of trouble and to know your flying rights.
Anyone flying that is 16 years or younger must be supervised by an 18 year old that has been accredited via a new online quiz.
A To fly you must accredited via an online video and a quiz testing basic flight knowledge.
Being accredited will cost $20 for recreational pilots and $100-$160 per drone for commercial pilots.
Ensuring there is a buffer between your RPA and any controlled airspace above it.
There are a few main rules that have been enforced by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to keep both pilots and the public safe. Here is a list of the 8 simple rules that must be followed on all flights.
Only fly your drone during daylight hours as well as only flying in line of sight so you are able to see your drone with your own eyes.
You must not fly your drone over 120 meters above the ground.
While flying your drone use must stay 30 meters away from other people.
You must not fly in areas in use by emergency services or that could affect public safety.
You must only fly 1 drone at a time.
You must not fly above people, including beaches, parks, or sports games.
If your drone weighs more than 100 grams you must not fly within 5.5 kilometres of a controlled aerodrome. You are allowed to fly within 5.5 kilometres of an uncontrolled aerodrome but you will have to land if you see an aircraft.
You must not fly over other people's property as this can be seen as a breach of privacy as well as a few other laws. You must also not take photos of people that have not given consent (if they are recognisable).
Every time you go out to fly there are a few steps to take to ensure that you are able to fly, the flight will be safe and successful. To ensure a safe flight there are 3 rules to follow.
1.Make sure you have the Can I Fly There app downloaded and correctly working.
2.Once you check your location on the app and your all good to go check your surroundings for other people, watch the sky for a few minutes to check if there are any aircraft flying around. (especially if you are flying near the coastline).
3.Make sure your drone is working correctly, check the batteries, transmission between the drone and controller and ensure the software is up to date before you leave the house.
Several fines can be given to you in certain situations. Some fines valuing in up to $100,000 all the way down to a caution or a warning.
1.Flying in controlled aerodromes and no-fly zones can get you fined $10,000.
2.Flying within 300 meters of marine mammals (dolphins and whales) can get you a fine ranging from $300 to $110,000.
3.Flying from or in private property can get you caution from the property owner or even a trespassing fine if the property owner isn't happy with the flight.
The drone laws are forever changing and the authorities don't always make it clear and easy to understand for all. This article will update when new laws or any changes that are important are made.
If you are looking for more information, have any questions or would just like to have a chat feel free to leave a comment below or get in touch via our social media accounts.
Josh Spires and dronenr. cannot be held accountable for any consequences that you are faced with in connection to this article. This article is more of a guide to loosely follow if you aren't sure of anything always check the CASA website.
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Licensed New York City guide. Member GANYC GANYC certified Member, IATDG Walking tours as well as bus, Subway, limo, even pedicab tours of Manhattan, and walking tours of Brooklyn. American, colonial, British Empire history. World geography, world customs. I create custom tours for specialized groups. I have a wide knowledge base to draw from when working with pretty much anyone from the English-speaking world. I'm funny; tourists enjoy taking bus tours with me. I've been to Canada many times, as well as Japan, Germany, Italy and Ireland. I prefer to work with couples, groups and singles. Adults and seniors, but not teenagers. Though American, I can sing La Marseillaise, Oh Canada, Pomp & Circumstance, and the first line of Kuch Kuch Hota Hai. I'm especially strong in the history of Science and Technology. I do Brooklyn Bridge tours, architecture tours, tours about theaters, churches, black history, Chinese culture in America, chocolate in Midtown, Central Park and the growth of parks in New York City. What may I create for you?
I was what they called a walking encyclopedia in grade school and high school. I read voraciously about the world. My best subjects were history and geography.
After college, I came to New York City and worked in broadcast news, learning a great deal more about the world and New York. It's one of the world's great cities, and I'm proud to be a part of it.
I joined the Guide Association of New York City (GANYC) after 5 years as a guide, and served as an officer for two years.
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