text:
447 U.S. 429 - Reeves Inc v. Stake
447 US 429 Reeves Inc v. Stake
REEVES, INC., Petitioner,
William STAKE et al.
Argued April 16, 1980.
For more than 50 years, South Dakota has operated a cement plant that produced cement for both state residents and out-of-state buyers. In 1978, because of a cement shortage, the State Cement Commission announced a policy to confine the sale of cement by the state plant to residents of the State. This policy forced petitioner ready-mix concrete distributor, one of the out-of-state buyers, to cut its production severely. Petitioner then brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the policy. The court granted injunctive relief on the ground that the policy violated the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the State had simply acted in a proprietary capacity.
Held : South Dakota's resident-preference program for the sale of cement does not violate the Commerce Clause. Pp. 434-447.
(a) "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 2498, 49 L.Ed.2d 220. Pp. 434-436.
(b) The Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace, and there is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market. Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, each State's role as guardian and trustee for its people, and the recognized right of a trader to exercise discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal. Moreover, state proprietary activities often are burdened with the same restrictions as private market participants. And, as this case illustrates, the competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis. Given these factors, the adjustment of interests in this context is, as a rule, better suited for Congress than this Court. Pp. 436-439.
(c) The arguments for invalidating South Dakota's resident-preference program—that the State, having long exploited the interstate market for cement, should not be permitted to withdraw from it when a shortage arises; that the program responds solely to the nongovernmental objective of protectionism; that hoarding may have undesirable consequences; that the program places South Dakota suppliers of ready-mix concrete at a competitive advantage in the out-of-state market; and that if South Dakota had not acted, free market forces would have generated an appropriate level of supply at free market prices for all buyers in the region—are weak at best. Whatever residual force inheres in them is more than offset by countervailing considerations of policy and fairness. To invalidate the program would discourage similar state projects and rob South Dakota of the intended benefit of its foresight, risk, and industry. Pp. 440-447.
603 F.2d 736, 8 Cir., affirmed.
Dennis M. Kirven, Buffalo, Wyo., for petitioner.
William J. Janklow, Pierre, S. D., for respondents.
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether, consistent with the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the State of South Dakota, in a time of shortage, may confine the sale of the cement it produces solely to its residents.
* In 1919, South Dakota undertook plans to build a cement plant. The project, a product of the State's then prevailing Progressive political movement, was initiated in response to recent regional cement shortages that "interfered with and delayed both public and private enterprises," and that were "threatening the people of this state." Eakin v. South Dakota State Cement Comm'n, 44 S.D. 268, 272, 183 N.W. 651, 652 (1921).1 In 1920, the South Dakota Cement Commission anticipated "[t]hat there would be a ready market for the entire output of the plant within the state." Report of State Cement Commission 9 (1920). The plant, however, located at Rapid City, soon produced more cement than South Dakotans could use. Over the years, buyers in no less than nine nearby States purchased cement from the State's plant. App. 26. Between 1970 and 1977, some 40% of the plant's output went outside the State.
The plant's list of out-of-state cement buyers included petitioner Reeves, Inc. Reeves is a ready-mix concrete2 distributor organized under Wyoming law and with facilities in Buffalo, Gillette, and Sheridan, Wyo. Id., at 15. From the beginning of its operations in 1958, and until 1978, Reeves purchased about 95% of its cement from the South Dakota plant. Id., at 15 and 22. In 1977, its purchases were $1,172,000. Id., at 17. In turn, Reeves has supplied three northwestern Wyoming counties with more than half their ready-mix concrete needs. Id., at 15. For 20 years the relationship between Reeves and the South Dakota cement plant was amicable, uninterrupted, and mutually profitable.
As the 1978 construction season approached, difficulties at the plant slowed production. Meanwhile, a booming construction industry spurred demand for cement both regionally and nationally. Id., at 13. The plant found itself unable to meet all orders. Faced with the same type of "serious cement shortage" that inspired the plant's construction, the Commission "reaffirmed its policy of supplying all South Dakota customers first and to honor all contract commitments, with the remaining volume allocated on a first come, first served basis." Ibid.3
Reeves, which had no pre-existing long-term supply contract, was hit hard and quickly by this development. On June 30, 1978, the plant informed Reeves that it could not continue to fill Reeves' orders, and on July 5, it turned away a Reeves truck. Id., at 17-18. Unable to find another supplier, id., at 21, Reeves was forced to cut production by 76% in mid-July. Id., at 20.
On July 19, Reeves brought this suit against the Commission, challenging the plant's policy of preferring South Dakota buyers, and seeking injunctive relief. Id., at 3-10. After conducting a hearing and receiving briefs and affidavits, the District Court found no substantial issue of material fact and permanently enjoined the Commission's practice. The court reasoned that South Dakota's "hoarding" was inimical to the national free market envisioned by the Commerce Clause. Id., at 27-30.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 8 Cir., 586 F.2d 1230, 1232 (1978). It concluded that the State had "simply acted in a proprietary capacity," as permitted by Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976). Petitioner sought certiorari. This Court granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 441 U.S. 939, 99 S.Ct. 2155, 60 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1979). On remand, the Court of Appeals distinguished that case.4 Again relying on Alexandria Scrap, the court abided by its previous holding. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 8 Cir., 603 F.2d 736 (1979). We granted Reeves' petition for certiorari to consider once again the impact of the Commerce Clause on state proprietary activity. 444 U.S. 1031, 100 S.Ct. 700, 62 L.Ed.2d 666 (1980).5
Alexandria Scrap concerned a Maryland program designed to remove abandoned automobiles from the State's roadways and junkyards. To encourage recycling, a "bounty" was offered for every Maryland-titled junk car converted into scrap. Processors located both in and outside Maryland were eligible to collect these subsidies. The legislation, as initially enacted in 1969, required a processor seeking a bounty to present documentation evidencing ownership of the wrecked car. This requirement however, did not apply to "hulks," inoperable automobiles over eight years old. In 1974, the statute was amended to extend documentation requirements to hulks, which comprised a large majority of the junk cars being processed. Departing from prior practice, the new law imposed more exacting documentation requirements on out-of-state than in-state processors. By making it less remunerative for suppliers to transfer vehicles outside Maryland, the reform triggered a "precipitate decline in the number of bounty-eligible hulks supplied to appellee's [Virginia] plant from Maryland sources." 426 U.S., at 801, 96 S.Ct., at 2494. Indeed, "[t]he practical effect was substantially the same as if Maryland had withdrawn altogether the availability of bounties on hulks delivered by unlicensed suppliers to licensed non-Maryland processors." Id., at 803, n. 13, 96 S.Ct., at 2495; see id., at 819, 96 S.Ct., at 2502 (dissenting opinion).
Invoking the Commerce Clause, a three-judge District Court struck down the legislation. 391 F.Supp. 46 (Md.1975). It observed that the amendment imposed "substantial burdens upon the free flow of interstate commerce," id., at 62, and reasoned that the discriminatory program was not the least disruptive means of achieving the State's articulated objective. Id., at 63. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970).6
This Court reversed. It recognized the persuasiveness of the lower court's analysis if the inherent restrictions of the Commerce Clause were deemed applicable. In the Court's view, however, Alexandria Scrap did not involve "the kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is concerned." 426 U.S., at 805, 96 S.Ct., at 2495. Unlike prior cases voiding state laws inhibiting interstate trade, "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up their price," id., at 806, 96 S.Ct., at 2496, "as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce," and has restricted "its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the State." Id., at 808, 96 S.Ct., at 2497.7
Having characterized Maryland as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the Court found no reason to "believe the Commerce Clause was intended to require independent justification for [the State's] action." Id., at 809, 96 S.Ct., at 2497. The Court couched its holding in unmistakably broad terms. "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id., at 810, 96 S.Ct., at 2498 (footnote omitted).8
The basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law. As that case explains, the Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace. Id., at 807-808, 96 S.Ct., at 2496-2497, citing H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539, 69 S.Ct. 657, 665, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949) (referring to "home embargoes," "customs duties," and "regulations" excluding imports). There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 336 (1978) ("the commerce clause was directed, as an historical matter, only at regulatory and taxing actions taken by states in their sovereign capacity"). The precedents comport with this distinction.9
Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty,10 the role of each State " 'as guardian and trustee for its people,' " Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191, 36 S.Ct. 78, 83, 60 L.Ed. 206 (1915), quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-223, 24 S.Ct. 124, 127-128, 48 L.Ed. 148 (1903),11 and "the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S.Ct. 465, 468, 63 L.Ed. 992 (1919).12 Moreover, state proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants.13 Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause. See State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 260, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 597, 75 N.W. 904, 906 (1898). Finally, as this case illustrates, the competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis. Given these factors, Alexandria Scrap wisely recognizes that, as a rule, the adjustment of interests in this context is a task better suited for Congress than this Court.
South Dakota, as a seller of cement, unquestionably fits the "market participant" label more comfortably than a State acting to subsidize local scrap processors. Thus, the general rule of Alexandria Scrap plainly applies here.14 Petitioner argues, however, that the exemption for marketplace participation necessarily admits of exceptions. While conceding that possibility, we perceive in this case no sufficient reason to depart from the general rule.
In finding a Commerce Clause violation, the District Court emphasized "that the Commission . . . made an election to become part of the interstate commerce system." App. 28. The gist of this reasoning, repeated by petitioner here, is that one good turn deserves another. Having long exploited the interstate market, South Dakota should not be permitted to withdraw from it when a shortage arises. This argument is not persuasive. It is somewhat self-serving to say that South Dakota has "exploited" the interstate market. An equally fair characterization is that neighboring States long have benefited from South Dakota's foresight and industry. Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that Alexandria Scrap rejected an argument that the 1974 Maryland legislation challenged there was invalid because cars abandoned in Maryland had been processed in neighboring States for five years. As in Alexandria Scrap, we must conclude that "this chronology does not distinguish the case, for Commerce Clause purposes, from one in which a State offered [cement] only to domestic [buyers] from the start." 426 U.S., at 809, 96 S.Ct., at 2497.15
Our rejection of petitioner's market-exploitation theory fundamentally refocuses analysis. It means that to reverse we would have to void a South Dakota "residents only" policy even if it had been enforced from the plant's very first days. Such a holding, however, would interfere significantly with a State's ability to structure relations exclusively with its own citizens. It would also threaten the future fashioning of effective and creative programs for solving local problems and distributing government largesse. See n. 1,supra. A healthy regard for federalism and good government renders us reluctant to risk these results.
"To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 52 S.Ct. 371, 386, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Undaunted by these considerations, petitioner advances four more arguments for reversal:
First, petitioner protests that South Dakota's preference for its residents responds solely to the "non-governmental objectiv[e]" of protectionism. Brief for Petitioner 25. Therefore, petitioner argues, the policy is per se invalid. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978).
We find the label "protectionism" of little help in this context. The State's refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is "protectionist" only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve. Petitioner's argument apparently also would characterize as "protectionist" rules restricting to state residents the enjoyment of state educational institutions, energy generated by a state-run plant, police and fire protection, and agricultural improvement and business development programs. Such policies, while perhaps "protectionist" in a loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government—to serve the citizens of the State.16
Second, petitioner echoes the District Court's warning:
"If a state in this union, were allowed to hoard its commodities or resources for the use of their own residents only, a drastic situation might evolve. For example, Pennsylvania or Wyoming might keep their coal, the northwest its timber, and the mining states their minerals. The result being that embargo may be retaliated by embargo and commerce would be halted at state lines." App. 29.
See, e. g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385-386, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1860-1861, 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). This argument, although rooted in the core purpose of the Commerce Clause, does not fit the present facts. Cement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals. Cf. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (minnows); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra (landfill sites); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923) (natural gas); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31 S.Ct. 564, 55 L.Ed. 716 (1911) (same); Note, 32 Rutgers L.Rev. 741 (1979). It is the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials. South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's limestone or other materials used to make cement. Nor has it restricted the ability of private firms or sister States to set up plants within its borders. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Moreover, petitioner has not suggested that South Dakota possesses unique access to the materials needed to produce cement.17 Whatever limits might exist on a State's ability to invoke the Alexandria Scrap exemption to hoard resources which by happenstance are found there, those limits do not apply here.
Third, it is suggested that the South Dakota program is infirm because it places South Dakota suppliers of ready-mix concrete at a competitive advantage in the out-of-state market; Wyoming suppliers, such as petitioner, have little chance against South Dakota suppliers who can purchase cement from the State's plant and freely sell beyond South Dakota's borders.
The force of this argument is seriously diminished, if not eliminated by several considerations. The argument necessarily implies that the South Dakota scheme would be unobjectionable if sales in other States were totally barred. It therefore proves too much, for it would tolerate even a greater measure of protectionism and stifling of interstate commerce than the challenge system allows. See K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 298, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (1977) ("It would be odd indeed to find that when a state becomes less parochial . . . its purpose becomes suspect under the Commerce Clause"). Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S., at 142, 90 S.Ct., at 847. ("And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend . . . on whether [the state interest] could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities"). Nor is it to be forgotten that Alexandria Scrap approved a state program that "not only . . . effectively protect[ed] scrap processors with existing plants in Maryland from the pressures of competitors with nearby out-of-state plants, but [that] implicitly offer[ed] to extend similar protection to any competitor . . . willing to erect a scrap processing facility within Maryland's boundaries." 391 F.Supp., at 63. Finally, the competitive plight of out-of-state ready-mix suppliers cannot be laid solely at the feet of South Dakota. It is attributable as well to their own States' not providing or attracting alternative sources of supply and to the suppliers' own failure to guard against shortages by executing long-term supply contracts with the South Dakota plant.
In its last argument, petitioner urges that, had South Dakota not acted, free market forces would have generated an appropriate level of supply at free market prices for all buyers in the region. Having replaced free market forces, South Dakota should be forced to replicate how the free market would have operated under prevailing conditions.
This argument appears to us to be simplistic and speculative. The very reason South Dakota built its plant was because the free market had failed adequately to supply the region with cement. See n. 1, supra. There is no indication, and no way to know, that private industry would have moved into petitioner's market area, and would have ensured a supply of cement to petitioner either prior to or during the 1978 construction season. Indeed, it is quite possible that petitioner would never have existed—far less operated successfully for 20 years—had it not been for South Dakota cement.18
We conclude, then, that the arguments for invalidating South Dakota's resident-preference program are weak at best. Whatever residual force inheres in them is more than offset by countervailing considerations of policy and fairness. Reversal would discourage similar state projects, even though this project demonstrably has served the needs of state residents and has helped the entire region for more than a half century. Reversal also would rob South Dakota of the intended benefit of its foresight, risk, and industry.19 Under these circumstances, there is no reason to depart from the general rule of Alexandria Scrap.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Mr. Justice POWELL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice WHITE, and Mr. Justice STEVENS join, dissenting.
The South Dakota Cement Commission has ordered that in times of shortage the state cement plant must turn away out-of-state customers until all orders from South Dakotans are filled. This policy represents precisely the kind of economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent.1 The Court, however, finds no violation of the Commerce Clause, solely because the State produces the cement. I agree with the Court that the State of South Dakota may provide cement for its public needs without violating the Commerce Clause. But I cannot agree that South Dakota may withhold its cement from interstate commerce in order to benefit private citizens and businesses within the State.
* The need to ensure unrestricted trade among the States created a major impetus for the drafting of the Constitution. "The power over commerce . . . was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government. . . ." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 190, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Indeed, the Constitutional Convention was called after an earlier convention on trade and commercial problems proved inconclusive. C. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution 61-63 (1935); S. Bloom, History of the Formation of the Union Under the Constitution 14-15 (1940). In the subsequent debate over ratification, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the importance of unrestricted interstate commerce:
"An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each, by an interchange of their respective productions. . . . Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple of one fails . . . it can call to its aid the staple of another." The Federalist, No. 11, p. 71 (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (A. Hamilton); see id., No. 42, p. 283 (J. Madison).
The Commerce Clause has proved an effective weapon against protectionism. The Court has used it to strike down limitations on access to local goods, be they animal, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (minnows); vegetable, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) (cantalopes); or mineral, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67 L.Ed.2d 1117 (1923) (natural gas). Only this Term, the Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute designed to exclude out-of-state investment advisers. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 100 S.Ct. 2009, 64 L.Ed.2d 702. As we observed in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 2494, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976), "this Nation is a common market in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of both raw materials and finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and demand."
This case presents a novel constitutional question. The Commerce Clause would bar legislation imposing on private parties the type of restraint on commerce adopted by South Dakota. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra; cf. Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 96 S.Ct. 923, 47 L.Ed.2d 55 (1976); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 1, 73 L.Ed. 147 (1928).2 Conversely, a private business constitutionally could adopt a marketing policy that excluded customers who come from another State. This case falls between those polar situations. The State, through its Commission, engages in a commercial enterprise and restricts its own interstate distribution. The question is whether the Commission's policy should be treated like state regulation of private parties or like the marketing policy of a private business.
The application of the Commerce Clause to this case should turn on the nature of the governmental activity involved. If a public enterprise undertakes an "integral operatio[n] in areas of traditional governmental functions," National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2474, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), the Commerce Clause is not directly relevant. If, however, the State enters the private market and operates a commercial enterprise for the advantage of its private citizens, it may not evade the constitutional policy against economic Balkanization.
This distinction derives from the power of governments to supply their own needs, see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127, 60 S.Ct. 869, 876, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 24 S.Ct. 124, 48 L.Ed. 148 (1903), and from the purpose of the Commerce Clause itself, which is designed to protect "the natural functioning of the interstate market," Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra, at 806, 96 S.Ct., at 2496. In procuring goods and services for the operation of government, a State may act without regard to the private marketplace and remove itself from the reach of the Commerce Clause. See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F.Supp. 719 (M.D.Fla.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 904, 93 S.Ct. 230, 34 L.Ed.2d 168 (1972). But when a State itself becomes a participant in the private market for other purposes, the Constitution forbids actions that would impede the flow of interstate commerce. These categories recognize no more than the "constitutional line between the State as government and the State as trader." New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946); see United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567 (1936); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 54 S.Ct. 725, 78 L.Ed. 1307 (1934); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 26 S.Ct. 110, 50 L.Ed. 261 (1905).
The Court holds that South Dakota, like a private business, should not be governed by the Commerce Clause when it enters the private market. But precisely because South Dakota is a State, it cannot be presumed to behave like an enterprise " 'engaged in an entirely private business.' " See ante, at 439, quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S.Ct. 465, 468, 63 L.Ed. 992 (1919). A State frequently will respond to market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic concerns. To use the Court's terms, a State may attempt to act as a "market regulator" rather than a "market participant." See ante, at 436. In that situation, it is a pretense to equate the State with a private economic actor. State action burdening interstate trade is no less state action because it is accomplished by a public agency authorized to participate in the private market.
The threshold issue is whether South Dakota has undertaken integral government operations in an area of traditional governmental functions, or whether it has participated in the marketplace as a private firm. If the latter characterization applies, we also must determine whether the State Commission's marketing policy burdens the flow of interstate trade. This analysis highlights the differences between the state action here and that before the Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.
In Alexandria Scrap, a Virginia scrap processor challenged a Maryland program to pay bounties for every junk car registered in Maryland that was converted into scrap. The program imposed more onerous documentation standards on non-Maryland processors, thereby diverting Maryland "hulks" to in-state processors. The Virginia plaintiff argued that this diversion burdened interstate commerce.
As the Court today notes, Alexandria Scrap determined that Maryland's bounty program constituted direct state participation in the market for automobile hulks. Ante, at 435. But the critical question—the second step in the opinion's analysis—was whether the bounty program constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Recognizing that the case did not fit neatly into conventional Commerce Clause theory, 426 U.S., at 807, 96 S.Ct., at 2496, we found no burden on commerce.
The Court first observed:
"Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up their price. There has been an impact upon the interstate flow of hulks only because . . . Maryland effectively has made it more lucrative for unlicensed suppliers to dispose of their hulks in Maryland . . . ." Id., at 806, 96 S.Ct., at 2496.
We further stated "that the novelty of this case is not its presentation of a new form of 'burden' upon commerce, but that appellee should characterize Maryland's action as a burden which the Commerce Clause was intended to make suspect." Id., at 807, 96 S.Ct., at 2496. The opinion then emphasized that "no trade barrier of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause, and involved in previous cases, impedes th[e] movement [of hulks] out of State." Id., at 809-810, 96 S.Ct., at 2498. Rather, the hulks "remain within Maryland in response to market forces, including that exerted by money from the State." Id., at 810, 96 S.Ct., at 2498. The Court concluded that the subsidies provided under the Maryland program erected no barriers to trade. Consequently, the Commerce Clause did not forbid the Maryland program.
Unlike the market subsidies at issue in Alexandria Scrap, the marketing policy of the South Dakota Cement Commission has cut off interstate trade.3 The State can raise such a bar when it enters the market to supply its own needs. In order to ensure an adequate supply of cement for public uses, the State can withhold from interstate commerce the cement needed for public projects. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, supra.
The State, however, has no parallel justification for favoring private, in-state customers over out-of-state customers.4 In response to political concerns that likely would be inconsequential to a private cement producer, South Dakota has shut off its cement sales to customers beyond its borders. That discrimination constitutes a direct barrier to trade "of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause, and involved in previous cases . . . ." Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S., at 810, 96 S.Ct., at 2498. The effect on interstate trade is the same as if the state legislature had imposed the policy on private cement producers. The Commerce Clause prohibits this severe restraint on commerce.
I share the Court's desire to preserve state sovereignty. But the Commerce Clause long has been recognized as a limitation on that sovereignty, consciously designed to maintain a national market and defeat economic provincialism. The Court today approves protectionist state policies. In the absence of contrary congressional action,5 those policies now can be implemented as long as the State itself directly participates in the market.6
By enforcing the Commerce Clause in this case, the Court would work no unfairness on the people of South Dakota. They still could reserve cement for public projects and share in whatever return the plant generated. They could not, however, use the power of the State to furnish themselves with cement forbidden to the people of neighboring States.
The creation of a free national economy was a major goal of the States when they resolved to unite under the Federal Constitution. The decision today cannot be reconciled with that purpose.
It was said that the plant was built because the only cement plant in the State "had been operating successfully for a number of years until it had been bought by the so-called trust and closed down." Report of South Dakota State Cement Commission 6 (1920). In its report advocating creation of a cement plant, the Commission noted both the substantial profits being made by private producers in the prevailing market, and the fact that producers outside the State were "now supplying all the cement used in" South Dakota. Under the circumstances, the Commission reasoned, it would not be to the "capitalists['] . . . advantage to build a new plant within the state." Id., at 8. This skepticism regarding private industry's ability to serve public needs was a hallmark of Progressivism. See, e. g., R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 227 (1955) ("In the Progressive era the entire structure of business . . . became the object of a widespread hostility"). South Dakota, earlier a bastion of Populism, id., at 50, became a leading Progressivist State. See R. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics 217-218 (1959); G. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement 155, and n. 125 (1946). Roosevelt carried South Dakota in the election of 1912, id., at 281, n. 69, and Robert La Follette—on a platform calling for public ownership of railroads and waterpower, see K. MacKay, The Progressive Movement of 1924, pp. 270-271 (app. 4) (1966)—ran strongly (36.9%) in the State in 1924. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U. S. Elections 287 (1975).
The backdrop against which the South Dakota cement project was initiated is described in H. Schell, History of South Dakota 268-269 (3d ed. 1975):
"Although a majority of the voters [in 1918] had seemingly subscribed to a state-ownership philosophy, it was a question how far the Republican administration at Pierre would go in fulfilling campaign promises. As [Governor] Norbeck entered upon his second term, he again urged a state hail insurance law and advocated steps toward a state-owned coal mine, cement plant, and state-owned stockyards. He also recommended an appropriation for surveying dam sites for hydroelectric development. The lawmakers readily enacted these recommendations into law, except for the stockyards proposal. . . .
". . . In retrospect, [Norbeck's] program must be viewed as a part of the Progressives' campaign against monopolistic prices. There was, moreover, the fervent desire to make the services of the state government available to agriculture. . . . These were basic tenets of the Progressive philosophy of government."
"[C]ement is a finely ground manufactured mineral product, usually gray in color. It is mixed with water and sand, gravel, crushed stone, or other aggregates to form concrete, the rock-like substance that is the most widely used construction material in the world." Portland Cement Association, The U. S. Cement Industry, An Economic Report 5 (2d ed. 1978). "Ready-mixed concrete is the term applied to ordinary concrete that is mixed at a central depot instead of on the construction site, and is distributed in special trucks." 4 Encyclopedia Britannica 1077 (1974).
It is not clear when the State initiated its policy preferring South Dakota customers. The record, however, shows that the policy was in place at least by 1974. App. 24.
We now agree with the Court of Appeals that Hughes v. Oklahoma does not bear on analysis here. That case involved a State's attempt " 'to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce.' " Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978), quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10, 49 S.Ct. 1, 4, 73 L.Ed. 147 (1928). Thus, it involved precisely the type of activity distinguished by the Court in Alexandria Scrap. See 426 U.S., at 805-806, 96 S.Ct. at 2495-2496.
During the pendency of this litigation, economic conditions have permitted South Dakota to discontinue enforcement of its resident-preference policy. We agree with the parties, however, that the case has not become moot. During at least three construction seasons within as many decades the cement plant has been unable, or nearly unable, to satisfy demand. See, e. g., Twelfth Biennial Report of the South Dakota State Cement Commission (1948); App. 23 (affidavit of C. A. Reeves). Under these circumstances, "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975).
Maryland sought to justify its reform as an effort to reduce bounties paid to out-of-state processors on Maryland-titled cars abandoned outside Maryland. The District Court concluded that Maryland could achieve this goal more satisfactorily by simply restricting the payment of bounties to only those cars abandoned in Maryland.
The Court invoked this rationale after explicitly reiterating the District Court's finding that the Maryland program imposed " 'substantial burdens upon the free flow of interstate commerce.' " 426 U.S., at 804, 96 S.Ct., at 2495. Moreover, the Court was willing to accept the Virginia processor's characterization of the Maryland program as "reducing in some manner the flow of goods in interstate commerce." Id., at 805, 96 S.Ct. at 2495. Given this concession, we are unable to accept the dissent's description of Alexandria Scrap as a case in which "we found no burden on commerce," post, at 451, "concluded that the subsidies . . . erected no barriers to trade," post, at 452, and determined that the Maryland program did not "cut off," ibid., or "impede the flow of interstate commerce," post, at 450. Indeed, even the dissent in the present case recognizes that the Maryland subsidy program "divert[ed] Maryland 'hulks' to in-state processors." Post, at 451. To be sure, Alexandria Scrap rejected the argument that "the bounty program constituted an impermissible burden on
interstatecommerce."Ibid. (emphasis added). It did so, however, solely because Maryland had "entered into the market itself." 426 U.S., at 806, 96 S.Ct., at 2496. Thus, the two-step analysis distilled by the dissent from Alexandria Scrap, see post, at 451-453, collapses into a single inquiry: whether the challenged "program constituted direct state participation in the market." Post, at 451. The dissent agrees that the question is to be answered in the affirmative here. Ibid.
The dissent's central criticisms of the result reached here seem to be that the South Dakota policy does not emanate from "the power of governments to supply their own needs," and that it threatens " 'the natural functioning of the interstate market.' " Post, at 450. The same observations, however, apply with equal force to the subsidy program challenged in Alexandria Scrap.
Alexandria Scrap does not stand alone. In American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F.Supp. 719 (MD Fla.1972), a three-judge District Court upheld a Florida statute requiring the State to obtain needed printing services from in-state shops. It reasoned that "state proprietary functions" are exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Id., at 725. This Court affirmed summarily. 409 U.S. 904, 93 S.Ct. 230, 34 L.Ed.2d 168 (1972). Numerous courts have rebuffed Commerce Clause challenges directed at similar preferences that exist in "a substantial majority of the states." Note, 58 Iowa L.Rev. 576 (1973). City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 533, 535, 514 P.2d 454, 456 (1973) (citing American Yearbook to reaffirm Schrey v. Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 75 Ariz. 282, 255 P.2d 604 (1953)); Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 266 P. 214 (1928); In re Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298 (1911); People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 Ill.2d 258, 274-275, 335 N.E.2d 469, 479 (1975) (citing American Yearbook ); State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258 (1917); Allen v. Labsap, 188 Mo. 692, 87 S.W. 926 (1905); Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 P. 30 (1913); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 75 N.W. 904 (1898). See also Dixon-Paul Printing Co. v. Board of Public Contracts, 117 Miss. 83, 77 So. 908 (1918); Luboil Heat & Power Corp. v. Pleydell, 178 Misc. 562, 564, 34 N.Y.S.2d 587, 591 (Sup.1942). The only clear departure from this pattern, People ex rel. Treat v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 144, 59 N.E. 776 (1901), drew a strong dissent, and has been uniformly criticized in later decisions. See, e. g., State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., supra; Allen v. Labsap, supra.
One other case merits comment. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, 276 Cal.App.2d 221, 80 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1969), the court struck down a California statute requiring the State to contract only with persons who promised to use or supply materials produced in the United States. In Opinion No. 69-253, 53 Op.Cal.Atty.Gen. 72 (1970), the State's Attorney General reasoned that Bethlehem Steel similarly prohibited, under the "foreign commerce" Clause, statutes giving a preference to California-produced goods. We have no occasion to explore the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the "foreign commerce" Clause or the constitutionality of "Buy American" legislation. Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, with K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977). We note, however, that Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County Of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 99 S.Ct. 1813, 60 L.Ed.2d 336 (1979).
See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F.Supp., at 725 ("ad hoc" inquiry into burdening of interstate commerce "would unduly interfere with state proprietary functions if not bring them to a standstill"). Considerations of sovereignty independently dictate that marketplace actions involving "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions"—such as the employment of certain state workers—may not be subject even to congressional regulation pursuant to the commerce power. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2474, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). It follows easily that the intrinsic limits of the Commerce Clause do not prohibit state marketplace conduct that falls within this sphere. Even where "integral operations" are not implicated, States may fairly claim some measure of a sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 56, 63 (1976).
See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S., at 13, 49 S.Ct., at 4 ("As the representative of its people, the State might have retained the shrimp for consumption and use therein"); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 409, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 1168, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948) (concurring opinion) (state power to provide for own citizens by developing food supply distinguished from interference with private transactions in food products); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427, 58 S.Ct. 969, 978, 82 L.Ed. 1427 (1938) (concurring opinion) ("The genius of our government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional action, the people . . . have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires").
When a State buys or sells, it has the attributes of both a political entity and a private business. Nonetheless, the dissent would dismiss altogether the "private business" element of such activity and focus solely on the State's political character. Post, at 450. The Court, however, heretofore has recognized that "[l]ike private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127, 60 S.Ct. 869, 876, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940) (emphasis added). While acknowledging that there may be limits on this sweepingly phrased principle, we cannot ignore the similarities of private businesses and public entities when they function in the marketplace.
See, e. g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 854, n. 18, 96 S.Ct., at 2475, n. 18; New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567 (1936). See also LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978).
The criticism received by Alexandria Scrap in part has been directed at its application of the proprietary immunity to state subsidy programs. See Note, 18 B.C.Ind & Com.L.Rev. 893, 924-925 (1977). But see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv.L.Rev., at 60-61. We have no occasion here to inquire whether subsidy programs unlike that involved in Alexandria Scrap warrant characterization as proprietary, rather than regulatory, activity. Cf. 18 B.C.Ind. & Com.L.Rev., at 913-915.
Alexandria Scrap explained:
"It is true that the state money initially was made available to licensed out-of-state processors as well as those located within Maryland, and not until the 1974 amendment was the financial benefit channeled, in practical effect, to domestic processors. But this chronology does not distinguish the case, for Commerce Clause purposes, from one in which a State offered bounties only to domestic processors from the start. Regardless of when the State's largesse is first confined to domestic processors, the effect upon the flow of hulks resting within the State is the same: they will tend to be processed inside the State rather than flowing to foreign processors. But no trade barrier of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause, and involved in previous cases, impedes their movement out of State. They remain within Maryland in response to market forces, including that exerted by money from the State." 426 U.S., at 809-810, 96 S.Ct., at 2497-2498. (Footnote omitted.)
Petitioner would distinguish Alexandria Scrap as involving state legislation designed to advance the nonprotectionist goal of environmentalism. This characterization is an oversimplification. The challenged feature of the Maryland program—the discriminatory documentation requirement—was not aimed at improving the environment; indeed by decreasing the profit margin a hulk supplier could expect to receive if he delivered to the most accessible recycling plant, it is likely that the amendment somewhat set back the goal of encouraging hulk processing. The stated justification for the discriminatory regulation—reducing payments to out-of-state processors for recycling of hulks abandoned outside Maryland—was not even mentioned by the Court in rebuffing the Virginia processor's Commerce Clause challenge. Indeed, the central point of the Court's analysis was that demonstration of an "independent justification" was unnecessary to sustain the State's program. See Note, 18 B.C.Ind. & Com.L.Rev., at 927-928. At bottom, the discrimination challenged in Alexandria Scrap was motivated by the same concern underlying South Dakota's resident-preference policy a desire to channel state benefits to the residents of the State supplying them. If some underlying "commendable as well as legitimate" purpose, 426 U.S., at 809, 96 S.Ct., at 2497, is also required, it is certainly present here. In establishing the plant, South Dakota sought the most unstartling governmental goal: improvement of the quality of life in that State by generating a supply of a previously scarce product needed for local construction and governmental improvements. A cement program, to be sure, may be a somewhat unusual or unorthodox way in which to utilize state funds to improve the quality of residents' lives. But "[a] State's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit. . . . A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it own and operate a railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges, street lights, or a sewage disposal plant. What might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensable." New York v. United States, 326 U.S., at 591, 66 S.Ct., at 318 (dissenting opinion).
Nor has South Dakota cut off access to its own cement altogether, for the policy does not bar resale of South Dakota cement to out-of-state purchasers. Although the out-of-state buyer in the secondary market will undoubtedly have to pay a markup not borne by South Dakota competitors, this result is not wholly unjust. There should be little question that South Dakota at least could exact a premium on out-of-state purchases to compensate it for the State's investment and risk in the plan. If one views the added markup paid by out-of-state buyers to South Dakota middlemen as the rough equivalent of this "premium," the challenged program equates with a permissible result. The "bottom line" of the scheme closely parallels the result in Alexandria Scrap : out-of-state concrete suppliers are not removed from the market altogether; to compete successfully with in-state competitors, however, they must achieve additional efficiencies or exploit natural advantage such as their location to offset the incremental advantage channeled by the State's own market behavior to in-state concrete suppliers.
Petitioner also seeks to distinguish Alexandria Scrap on the ground that there, unlike here, the State "created" the relevant market. See 426 U.S., at 814-817, 96 S.Ct., at 2500-2501 (concurring opinion). It is clear, however, that Alexandria Scrap could not, and did not, rest on the notion that Maryland had created the interstate market in hulks. Id., at 809, n. 18, 96 S.Ct., at 2497. See Id., at 824-826, n. 6, 96 S.Ct., at 2504-2506 (dissenting opinion); Note, 18 B.C.Ind. & Com.L.Rev., at 927; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv.L.Rev., at 62, n. 27; Note, 34 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 979, 995 (1977).
The risk borne by South Dakota in establishing the cement plant is not to be underestimated. As explained in n. 1, supra, the cement plant was one of several projects through which the Progressive state government sought to deal with local problems. The fate of other similar projects illustrates the risk borne by South Dakota taxpayers in setting up the cement plant at a cost of some $2 million. Thus, "[t]he coal mine was sold in early 1934 for $5,500 with an estimated loss of nearly $175,000 for its fourteen years of operation. The 1933 Legislature also liquidated the state bonding department and the state hail insurance project. The total loss to the taxpayers from the latter venture was approximately $265,000." H. Schell, History of South Dakota, 286 (3d ed. 1975).
By "protectionism," I refer to state policies designed to protect private economic interests within the State from the forces of the interstate market. I would exclude from this term policies relating to traditional governmental functions, such as education, and subsidy programs like the one at issue in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976). See infra, at 451-453.
The Court attempts to distinguish prior decisions that address the Commerce Clause limitations on a State's regulation of natural resource exploitation. E. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923). The Court contends that cement production, unlike the activities involved in those cases, "is the end product of a complex proces[s] whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials." Ante, at 444. The Court's distinction fails in two respects. First, the principles articulated in the natural resources cases also have been applied in decisions involving agricultural production, notably milk processing. E. g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 657, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). More fundamentally, the Court's definition of cement production describes all sophisticated economic activity, including the
exploitation of natural resources. The extraction of natural gas, for example, could hardly occur except through a "complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials."
The Court also suggests that the Commerce Clause has no application to this case because South Dakota does not "possess unique access to the materials needed to produce cement." Ante, at 444. But in its regional market, South Dakota has unique access to cement. A cutoff in cement sales has the same economic impact as a refusal to sell resources like natural gas. Customers can seek other sources of supply, or find a substitute product, or do without. Regardless of the nature of the product the State hoards, the consumer has been denied the guarantee of the Commerce Clause that he "may look to . . . free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any." H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, supra, at 539, 69 S.Ct., at 665.
One distinction between a private and a governmental function is whether the activity is supported with general tax funds, as was the case for the reprocessing program in Alexandria Scrap, or whether it is financed by the revenues it generates. In this case, South Dakota's cement plant has supported itself for many years. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. There is thus no need to consider the question whether a state-subsidized business could confine its sales to local residents.
The consequences of South Dakota's "residents-first" policy were devastating to petitioner Reeves, Inc., a Wyoming firm. For 20 years, Reeves had purchased about 95% of its cement from the South Dakota plant. When the State imposed its preference for South Dakota residents in 1978, Reeves had to reduce its production by over 75%. Ante, at 432-433. As a result, its South Dakota competitors were in a vastly superior position to compete for work in the region.
The Court explicitly does not exclude the possibility that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress might legislate against protectionist state policies. See ante, at 435-436.
Since the Court's decision contains no limiting principles, a State will be able to manufacture any commercial product and withhold it from citizens of other States. This prerogative could extend, for example, to pharmaceutical goods, food products, or even synthetic or processed energy sources.


text:
Novation Digital Music Systems Ltd. ist ein britischer Hersteller von Musikelektronik, der 1992 von Ian Jannaway und Mark Thompson als Novation Electronic Music Systems gegründet wurde. Heute fokussiert sich das Unternehmen auf MIDI-Controller, Keyboards, analoge und digitale Synthesizer und Software-Synthesizer und Soundkarten. Gegenwärtig werden die Produkte vorwiegend in China hergestellt. Das Unternehmen gehört seit 2004 zu Focusrite.

Geschichte

Novations erstes kommerzielles Produkt war 1992 Novation MM10, ein tragbares und batteriebetriebenes Keyboard, das als Steuergerät für den Vorgänger des Yamaha QY70, den Yamaha QY10 entwickelt wurde und basierte auf dem zuvor entwickelten Novation MidiCon. Der MM10 war in Kombination mit dem QY10 die erste vollständig portable Musikworkstation.

1993 folgte die Novation Bass Station (auch bekannt unter dem Namen Bass Station Keyboard), ähnlich wie die Roland TB-303 Bassline, ein tragbarer Synthesizer für Instrumentalbegleitung. Die Bass Station verwendete digital gesteuerte Oszillatoren, LFOs und Filter, um den Klang traditioneller monophoner Analogsynthesizer zu emulieren.

Kerntechnologie war das sogenannte Analogue Sound Modelling (ASM) von 1995 with, den Klang der Roland TR-808 and TR-909 emulierte indem digitale Modelle der Original Wellenformen erzeugt wurden.

Novations erster Direktor war Chris Huggett, welcher die Synthesizer Wasp and OSCar gebaut hatte und das operating system für den Akai S1000 entwickelt hatte. In der Folge war er auch an der Entwicklung der Bass Station und Drum Station beteiligt sowie an der Konstruktion der Supernova.

Produkte
MM10 (1992), portables Keyboard-System für Yamaha QY10, später ersetzt durch MM10-X.

BassStation (1993), auch BassStation Keyboard, mit 2 digital gesteuerten Analog-Oszillatoren (DCOs) mit Rechteck, Pulse und Sägezahl sowie LFOs.

BassStation Rack (1994) Dual-ADSR envelopes, 12/24db – Filter, LFO, DCOs und eingebautem MIDI/Control Voltage (CV) Konverter. Benutzer waren u. a. William Orbit, Biosphere, Massive Attack, Orbital, Apollo 440, Nine Inch Nails, Radiohead, Jimi Tenor, Laurent Garnier, ATB, Sneaker Pimps, Out of Logic and Underworld.

DrumStation (1995) verwendete 'Analogue Sound Modelling' (ASM), beinhaltete alle Klänge der TR-808 und des Nachfolgers TR-909, und hatte dieselben Controller für die Klangkontrolle, darunter tone, attack, decay, tuning, 'snappiness' und distortion.

Super BassStation (1997) kam mit Arpeggiator, Rauschquelle, Ringmodulator, weiterem LFO, Sub-Oscillator, Analoge Chorus und Verzerrungseffekte, keyboard filter tracking, Stereoausgänge mit panning, erweitertem Speicher, analoge trigger signal output, insgesamt näher am Original.
Supernova (1998) Polyphoner Synthesizer mit Multi-Effekt-Prozessor für all der 8 Audio-Ausgangs-Parts, 56 programmierbare Effekte, für alle Stimmen gleichzeitig verfügbar. Supernova enthielt ursprünglich eine 16-Noten-Polyphonie, die später mit einem neuen Betriebssystem auf 20 erweitert wurde, und drei DCOs mit ASM, um den klassischen analogen Synth-Sound darzustellen. Ein umfassendes Filter bot eine Low-, High- und Bandpassfilterung mit 12, 18 und 24 dB / Oktave mit Resonanz und Selbstoszillation sowie Overdrive- und Key-Tracking, wobei die Filterabstimmung der Tastatur folgen konnte. Zwei leistungsstarke LFOs und zwei Ringmodulatoren vervollständigten die Modifikationsfunktionen. Die Supernova-Spezifikation wurde durch acht analoge Ausgänge und eine vollständige MIDI-Implementierung abgerundet. Supernova und sein Nachfolger Supernova II wurden von Orbital, ATB, The Faint, Sinn, Jean-Michel Jarre und A Guy Called Gerald verwendet.

Nova (1999) Im Wesentlichen das Desktop-Leistungsmodul, welches auf derselben Synthesizer-Engine basiert.

Supernova II (2000) war in 24-, 36- und 48-stimmigen Modellen mit zusätzlichen 12- oder 24-stimmigen Erweiterungskarten erhältlich. Der Supernova II war in einem 3U-Rack-Format- und auch in einer 61-Noten-Performance-Tastaturversion mit Velocity und Aftertouch erhältlich, die eine Klangoptimierung während der Live-Performance ermöglichte. Die FM-Synthesefunktion war zusammen mit der Ringmodulation, zwei analogen Eingängen und einem 42-Band-Vocoder enthalten. Ein 8-teiliger Arpeggiator war ebenfalls an Bord und in seiner Vollversion bot das Produkt 8-teilige Multitimbralität und 48-stimmige Polyphonie, wobei 57 und 2304 Oszillatoren gleichzeitig liefen.

A-Station (2001) war ein cross over zwischen BassStation und Supernova. Da die Architektur auf der Supernova basiert, kamen in der A-Station eine 8-stimmige Polyphonie, eine einfache FM-Synthese-Engine, Hall und Verzögerung sowie ein 12-stimmiger Vocoder zur Verarbeitung externer Sounds hinzu, der auch als Oszillatorquelle verwendet werden konnte. Ein Arpeggiator wurde ebenfalls integriert.

K-Station (2002) war eine 2-Oktaven-Tastaturversion der A-Station mit 8-stimmiger Polyphonie, sie enthielt drei ASM-Oszillatoren mit einer Reihe von Wellenformen sowie FM-Synthese und Rauschquelle, einen 12-Band-Vocoder, einen Arpeggiator, zwei ADSR-Hüllkurvenformer und zwei LFOs sowie Hall- und Verzögerungseffekte.

KS Series (2002) : Die KS4, KS5 und KS Rack verwendeten verbesserte Versionen der K-Station-engine mit einer Reihe zusätzlicher Funktionen. Das KS4 war eine 4-Oktaven-Tastatur, während das KS5 fünf Oktaven bot. Die Keyboards sind halbgewichtet und verfügen über Aftertouch. Alle 33 Bedienknöpfe senden MIDI. Die KS-Serie umfasste vierstimmigen Multitimbralbetrieb mit mehreren zuweisbaren Audioausgängen, einen 14-Band-Vocoder und einen separaten Effektprozessor für jeden Part.

ReMOTE 25 MIDI controller keyboard (2003) wurde im Jahr 2003 konzipiert, um dem Computermusiker das "Hands-on" -Einstellen zu ermöglichen. Zusätzlich zum ReMOTE 25, der auf MIDI basiert, bot das ReMOTE 25 Audio die gleichen Funktionen mit einem eingebauten USB-Audio-Interface und entwickelte sich später zur X-Station. Die ReMOTE-Tastaturen wurden ursprünglich als Controller für Propellerhead Reason. entwickelt.

V-Station and B-Station (2003). Diese Softwareversionen boten virtuelle Emulationen der K-Station und der Bass Station – verfügbar für Macintosh und Windows, als VST and AU.

X-Station (2004) wurde entwickelt, um durch Hinz
ufügen eines Computers / Sequenzers, eines Mikrofons und einer Überwachung eine vollständige Musikumgebung zu ermöglichen. Sie enthielt eine 8-stimmige ASM-basierte Synth-Engine der Supernova-Klasse, vorlagenbasierte MIDI-Steuerung im ReMOTE-Stil, 2-in-2-out-Stereo-Audio-Interface und Multi-Effekt-Engine sowie ein halbgewichtetes Aftertouch-Keyboard.

ReMOTE Zero SL (2006) war eine Erweiterung der MIDI- und USB-Controller-Reihe von Novation – die meisten verfügen über Keyboards – ohne (Null-)Tasten. Das Remote Zero SL bot eine große Auswahl an Reglern, Tasten, Schiebereglern und Triggerpads, die praktisch jedem Hardwaregerät oder jeder Anwendung, die MIDI unterstützt, frei zugewiesen werden konnten. Das Herzstück der Remote SL-Reihe war Automap-Funktion Hiermit wurden der verwendete Sequenzer und die im Projekt verwendeten Software-Plugin-Instrumente erkannt. Anschließend wurden die Steuerelemente der Software intelligent im Host den Drehreglern, Schiebereglern und Drucktasten zugeordnet.

Nio 2|4 (2007) war ein multi-platform 2-in, 4-out USB audio interface für Musiker im Allgemeinen und Gitarristen im Besonderen, gebündelt mit einer speziell ausgewählten Auswahl von 20 Softwareeffekten in der Nio FX Rack-Anwendung, die über die Vorderseite des Geräts gesteuert wird und einem Gitarreneffektpedal ähnelt.

XioSynth (2007) war ein Keyboard-Synthesizer mit USB-Audio-Interface und vorlagenbasiertem MIDI-Controller, erhältlich mit 25 oder 49 Tasten. Wie die X-Station verfügte sie über das X / Y-Touchpad von Novation (das 'X-Pad') und enthielt eine auf der X-Station basierende Synth-Engine mit zusätzlichem Filter-Overdrive und dem X-Gator-Patch-Controller, der jeden Patch steuern konnte, um rhythmische Muster mit 16 bis 32 Schritten zu erzeugen, die mit dem MIDI-Takt synchronisiert wurden.

Nocturn (2008) Nimmt die Automap-Technologie aus der Remote SL-Reihe und wendet sie auf eine kompakte Steuerung an. Mithilfe der Automatisierungsframeworks, die von verschiedenen Plugin-Architekturen wie VST, Audio Units und RTAS verwendet werden, lädt Nocturn eine Liste der steuerbaren Einstellungen herunter, die von einem Plug-In bereitgestellt werden, und weist sie seiner Kombination aus Reglern und Schaltflächen zu. Acht berührungsempfindliche Drehwellen-Encoder-Bedienelemente mit jeweils einem LED-Ring, um die Einstellung anzuzeigen. berührungsempfindlicher Crossfader; und einen Kurzwahlknopf, der die Patch-Auswahl und die Steuerung aller Bildschirmparameter ermöglicht.

Die SL ReMOTE-Reihe wurde (2008–2009) auf SL ReMOTE Mk II aktualisiert und umfasst berührungsempfindliche Knöpfe und Schieberegler sowie die Automap-Technologie. SL MkII-Controller waren mit Tastaturen mit 25, 49 und 61 Notengeschwindigkeit / Aftertouch erhältlich. Enthält acht Drehwellengeber. Die Version ohne Tastatur wurde als ZeRO SL Mk II bezeichnet.

Launchpad (2009) ist ein Multi-Button-Controller für die beliebte Live-Steuerungsanwendung Ableton Live, mit einem Raster von 64 (8x8) hell beleuchteten quadratischen Tasten. Jede Schaltfläche kann einem Clip & mdash; Ein Stück Audio oder MIDI, das geloopt sein kann oder nicht. Zusätzliche Modi ermöglichen die automatische Steuerung von Funktionen und die Mischersteuerung.

Nocturn 25 und 49 (2009): Im Wesentlichen handelte es sich um den Nocturn-Drehgeber-Controller mit einer Geschwindigkeits- / Aftertouch-Tastatur mit 25 oder 49 Noten.

Automap for iPhone and iPod Touch (2009) ist eine App, die eine grundlegende Fernsteuerung von DAWs, Effekten, Sequenzern oder Plug-In-Parametern mithilfe von zwei Fadern und acht Tasten auf einem iOS-Gerät ermöglicht.

Dicer (2010) besteht aus einem Paar Hardware-Button-Sets & mdash; fünf große Bedientasten und drei Moduswahltasten & mdash; Entwickelt, um an den Ecken eines Plattenspielers oder Laptops befestigt zu werden und Benutzern von DJ-Anwendungen wie Traktor und Serato die Möglichkeit zu geben, Loops, Cues und Effekte zu steuern.'''UltraNova''' (2010) ist ein einteiliger Analogmodellierungssynthesizer mit USB-Bus der Nova-Serie mit einem Effektprozessor, der auf der Supernova II-Synth-Engine sowie einer Wavetable-Synthese, erweiterten Filtern, einem Software-Editor und einem neuen Touch-Sense-Leistungsmodus basiert. Bis zu 18 Stimmen, 14 Filtertypen, 36 Wavetables und 5 Effektsteckplätze, 37 Tasten und Aftertouch in voller Größe, ein 12-Band-Vocoder und eine 2-in-4-out-USB-Schnittstelle.

Twitch (2011) ist ein DJ-Controller mit Touchstrips anstelle von Plattenspieler-Emulatoren, mit denen man durch Tracks navigieren, Beats aufteilen und diese im laufenden Betrieb wieder zusammenmischen kann. Beinhaltet ein eingebautes Audio-Interface. Ursprünglich in Zusammenarbeit mit Serato entwickelt.

Impulse (2011) ist eine Reihe professioneller USB / MIDI-Controller, die ein halbgewichtetes Aftertouch-Keyboard mit 25, 49 oder 61 Noten Präzision kombinieren mit einer Bedienoberfläche zur DAW-Steuerung, einschließlich Mixer-, Transport- und Plug-In-Instrumenten und Effekten, die von der Automap-Steuerungssoftware unterstützt werden. Impulse verfügt außerdem über 8 hintergrundbeleuchtete Performance-Pads, die Drums, Effekte und das Starten von Live-Clips auslösen können.

MiniNova (2012) ist ein Mikro-Synthesizer mit 37-Noten-Tastatur, der auf der gleichen Synthesizer-Engine wie der UltraNova basiert, Kann Sounds mit bis zu 18 Stimmen und Effekten erstellen und bearbeiten. Die VocalTune-Funktion kann mit dem integrierten Vocoder ikonische Urban- und Hip-Hop-Vokalklänge sowie klassische House- und Techno-Voice-Effekte erzeugen. MiniNova ist ein Live-Synthesizer, mit dem Sounds in Echtzeit optimiert und modifiziert werden können. Eine Reihe kostenloser Soundpacks, die von bedeutenden Künstlern und Sounddesignern wie Chuckie, Daniel Fisher und anderen erstellt wurden, stehen zum Download bereit.

Launchkey (2013) ist eine Reihe von Tastatur-Controllern mit 25, 49 und 61 Noten mit bis zu 50 physischen Bedienelementen, einschließlich 16 geschwindigkeitsabhängiger mehrfarbiger Startknöpfe die Clips auslösen und Szenen in Ableton Live starten. Launchkey ermöglicht nicht nur die praktische Steuerung eines DAW-Mischpults, von Instrumenten und mehr, sondern ist auch ein integriertes Software- / Hardware-Instrument mit zwei Apps für das iPad: der Launchkey-App und der Launchpad-App sowie dem Synthesizer-Plug für V-Station und Bass Station. Die Launchkey-App enthält 60 Synth-Sounds, die mithilfe interaktiver Grafiken sofort geändert werden können. Die Launchpad-App ist eine App für das iPad, mit der Beats und Musik mithilfe einer umfangreichen Auswahl hochwertiger Loops erstellt und Sounds im mehrfarbigen 8x6-Launchpad-Raster kombiniert werden können. Acht Lautstärkeregler ermöglichen schnelle Lautstärkeänderungen und die FX-Modi bieten DJ-Effekte wie Beat-Repeater und synchronisierte Filtereffekte.

Launchpad S (2013) ist eine aktualisierte und hellere Version des originalen LaunchPad mit schnellerem Flimmern, schnellerer Antwortrate und helleren Tasten.

Bass Station II (2013) ist eine Überarbeitung des ursprünglichen Konzepts mit zwei Filtern, drei Oszillatoren, Patch Save und einem vollständig analogen Effektbereich und Signalpfad. Sie enthält einen Step-Mode-Sequenzer, einen Arpeggiator, eine anschlagsdynamische Klaviatur mit zwei Oktaven (25 Noten) und großen Tasten sowie einen umfassenden Modulationsbereich. Es gibt auch volle MIDI-E/A- und USB-Konnektivität. Der mit der Firmware v4.14 hinzugefügte AFX-Modus ermöglicht das Ändern von Patches auf Notenebene.

Launchpad Pro, Launchpad Mk2, Launchpad Mini, und Launchpad Mini Mk2 (2015) sind weitere aktualisierte Versionen des Launchpads. Launchpad Pro und Launchpad MkII führen eine neue RGB-Funktion ein. Launchpad Pro verfügt über Geschwindigkeits- und Aftertouch-Empfindlichkeit, 16 weitere Seitentasten und einen eigenständigen externen MIDI-E/A-Modus.

Circuit (2015) ist ein mehrteiliger Groovebox-Sequenzer mit zwei Synth-Engines (abgeleitet von MiniNova) und einer vierteiligen Drum-Maschine auf Sample-Basis. Es besteht aus einem 4x8-Sequenzer / Notenraster, 8 Reglern und ist batteriebetrieben.

Peak (2017) ist ein digital / analoger Hybridsynthesizer mit einer einzigartigen Oszillatorarchitektur von Chris Huggett, basierend auf einer FPGA-Technology. Der Peak verfügt über acht Polyphonie-Stimmen: drei Oszillatoren pro Stimme sowie eine unabhängige Rauschquelle. Während die Oszillatoren digital sind, ist das Filter analog, ebenso wie die Verzerrungsschaltungen (bestehend aus Vor- und Nachfilter-Overdrive und einem separaten Overdrive, der den Composite-Ausgang beeinflusst).

Circuit MonoStation (2017) ist ein analoger paraphonischer Synthesizer aus der Circuit-Familie. Er verwendet ein ähnliches 4x8-Raster, verfügt jedoch über mehr Steuerknöpfe für bestimmte Parameter der Synth-Engine. Die beiden Oszillatoren können zusammen sequenziell oder paraphonisch verwendet werden (eine Variation von Duophony, bei der die Tonhöhe jedes Oszillators separat gespielt werden kann, jedoch nur eine Master-Amp-Hüllkurve verwendet wird).

Launchpad X, Launchpad Mini Mk3 (2019) sind weitere aktualisierte Versionen des Launchpads. Besonders das Launchpad X zeichnet sich durch eine Reduzierung der Gesamthöhe aus, während das Launchpad Mini Mk3 hauptsächlich in Länge und Breite verkleinert wurde. Bei beiden Modellen sind die Seitentasten im Vergleich zu den Vorgängermodellen quadratisch und die USB-B Ports wurden durch USB-C Ports ersetzt. Zudem unterstützt die Firmware beider Launchpads benutzerdefinierte Modi, die sich durch Novations Components App erstellen, modifizieren und auf die Geräte laden lassen. Das Launchpad X verfügt wie das Launchpad Pro über anschlags- und druckempfindliche Pads.

Launchpad Pro Mk3 (2020) ist die aktualisierte Version des ursprünglichen Launchpad Pros. Es reiht sich vom Design und Konzept her zur Generation der Launchpads X und Mini Mk3 ein, indem es ebenfalls eine geringere Höhe, quadratische Seitentasten, einen USB-C Anschluss und benutzerdefinite Modi besitzt. Bei diesem Modell sind die Seitentasten nicht aus Silikon, sondern aus Hartplastik gefertigt. Zusätzlich zu den bereits auf dem Launchpad Pro zwei vorhandenen 3,5mm MIDI Ein- und Ausgängen befindet sich auf diesem Modell ein 3,5mm MIDI Through/Out Anschluss. Im Gegensatz zu allen bisherigen Launchpad Modellen kommt auf dem Launchpad Pro Mk3 ein Multithreading-fähiges Betriebssystem zum Einsatz, welches mit einem 4-spurigem 32-Schritt Sequenzer ausgestattet ist.

Weblinks
 The official Novation website
 Bass Station II Ultimate Patches Popular collection of 300 Bass Station II patches
 21 Years of inNovation Product history on the Novation official web site
 Vintage Synth Explorer, an online database, includes many instruments Novation has produced.

Einzelnachweise

Hersteller von elektronischen Musikinstrumenten
Gegründet 1992

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Tuesday, 17:30 - 19:00, Bldg. 50.35 HS a. F.
Additionally to the classes there will be weekly tutorials in small groups. Each week, a voluntary assignment will be handed out, which can be turned in online within 7 days. You must earn a tutorial certificate to pass the module. The certificate will be handed out if you pass a dedicated certificate exam.
The ILIAS course is password protected. The password is only visible within the KIT.


Last year Missouri car dealers attempted to halt sales of the Tesla Model S with a last-minute change to legislation.T hat rider was eventually dropped from the bill, allowing Tesla to continue with its direct sales strategy, but the Missouri Auto Dealers Association, or MADA hasn't given up.
A lawsuit filed by MADA against the state of Missouri seeks to halt Tesla sales, saying the direct sales model creates a "non-level playing field", reports the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Lawsuit aside though, that doesn't change the fact that the language of the law prohibits manufacturers from selling vehicles in competition with existing franchise dealerships. But since Tesla has no established franchises dealerships, Missouri's then-acting Department of Revenue chief explained that Tesla was operating within the law as it was written. That's why MADA tried to get the law changed.
But when that didn't pan out as hoped, it was only left with the litigation option, though the outcome isn't likely to change. Despite being on the absolute opposite end of the political spectrum from Massachusetts, Missouri is likely to come to the same conclusion as the Commonwealth; Tesla isn't breaking any laws, as the law is written.
Car dealers across the country have been scrambling to contain Tesla's direct sales model, meeting with success in some die-hard conservative states (and getting them nominated for a Luddite Award in the process). There's even been a national campaign to explain how car dealers manipulating sales process is somehow good for car buyers, even though just about everybody has a horror story about buying a car, new or otherwise. It would be hilarious if it wasn't so transparently loaded with lies about how manufacturers would attempt to screw customers if direct sales were the status quo. Yet when you ask buyers of the Tesla Model S how the purchasing experience was, they'll gush about it for as long as you'll listen.
This lawsuit against Tesla is the last desperate attempt by Missouri car dealers to prevent consumers from realizing, yes, there is a better way to sell cars. That way is the Tesla way.


This post was a little late because to be completely honest, I wasn't sure what to make. I had done brownies, oatmeal bars, and scones, and I am not a fan of cakes, so the choices were definitely limited. However, with a little browsing through my cookbooks for inspiration, I finally came upon a recipe in which to use Bob's Red Mill almond flour.
This almond flour is so light that you won't even taste it. Whereas the hazelnut meal I talked about earlier this week is coarser and very rich, this almond flour is similar to many other gluten-free flours you probably already use. The major upside, of course, is that it also has a high fat and protein content. That means, you can substitute it for flour combinations with almost no problem whatsoever. And the best part of this recipe is that I didn't even have to stick in xanthan gum! The result is a chewy, heavy-on-the-chocolate cookie that is as tasty as it is good for you!
This recipe is loosely based off the cookies found in La Tartine Gourmande's cookbook. Many of the ingredients are different, but my inspiration definitely came from there. Enjoy!
Preheat the oven to 375'. In the bowl of a stand mixer, combine the dry ingredients first, then the wet ingredients. Fold in the chocolate chips and cranberries at the very end.
Drop spoonfuls of batter onto a cookie sheet and bake for 14-16 minutes, or until the cookies are a darker brown. Remove from the oven and place on a cooling rack immediately.
Have you entered my awesome Bob's Red Mill gluten-free giveaway yet? This is just one of the four fun flours or mixes you will get to dabble in if you win! The contest closes on Sunday, so be sure and enter soon!


What behavioral factors influence the problem? Which of these behaviors are more important and which are more amenable to health promotion/ intervention? Which behaviors would you design a program/intervention for based on these considerations? What environmental aspects seem to also affect the health issue you selected? What are the predisposing, enabling, and reinforcing factors for the health behaviors you identified? Include any environmental influences. What policies, resources, and circumstances can facilitate or hinder your proposed program/intervention on the factors you identified? If you were doing a project in real life, and this would be a comprehensive plan, how would you gather your needs assessment data? What would be your data sources?


The photos below show one version of a pre-1945 railroad signal. Other models exist.
These were used on tracks when personnel worked close to, or on the railroad tracks.
When the train-driver ran over these, a loud explosion was heard which alarmed the driver to slow down and stop.
The thin zinc body was filled with a pyrotechnical mixture. The brass strap allowed the alarm to be fitted to the track.
I got these very nice photos below from Germany.
This is a 1930's wooden case that originally held the signals shown above.
The two photos below show the storage can for other "Knallkapseln", used by the West-German RailRoad Company (DB) in the 1960's.


In this tutorial, you will learn how to connect to Wi-Fi on iPhone using iOS 7.
Yes, it has been five years of hardship and frustration, sometimes anger while seeing our Android friends enjoying the benefits of quick Wi-Fi setup, while we went down in the setting menus anytime we wanted to change the network. But the day is bright and victory is at hand, as our dear engineer friends at Apple finally have put us in control of connecting and disconnecting our iOS devices via Wi-Fi.
Step 1. The ring of power in question is called Control Center, and with a single swipe up on your screen, you can invoke it from anywhere.
Step 2. You can then access the Wi-Fi toggle by tapping it and the iOS 7 will start looking for Macs, routers, modems, and anything else that speaks the wonderful language of 802.11 specifications.
Step 3. No matter how you access it: via Control Center or in the old way – from the home screen tap "Settings", then "Wi-Fi" and "Choose a Network", now you will be able to log into a wireless network with the same ease that our Android friends used to brag about.
Step 4. And while they will keep bumping their phones to share information, Apple gives us AirDrop, a much smoother and faster way of sending data. In fact, so smooth and slick that the new iOS7 will connect to your car display and computer with their new iOS's "In The Car" feature.
Result: So what are you waiting for? It looks like you have a Wi-Fi connection – bring your car over to join the fun!


Eurasian Watermilfoil in Oxnard, CA can be a real problem for municipal and home owners ponds and lakes as well as golf course ponds throughout the State of California. Now there is help with controlling and removing Eurasian Watermilfoil in Oxnard. See our aquamog fleet by clicking here.
Aquatic plants are plants that have adjusted to living in water environments (saltwater as well as freshwater). They are also often known as hydrophytes or macrophytes. These kinds of plants must have specific modifications for living submerged in water, or at the water's surface. The most popular variation is aerenchyma, but floating leaves and very finely dissected leaves are also normal. Aquatic plants can only grow in water or in soil which is entirely saturated with water. They're consequently a frequent part of wetlands.
Aquatic plants are most of the time a beneficial portion of the water body, be it a lagoon or perhaps water-feature. The water vegetation is a resource of nutrition, cover and oxygen to the creatures dwelling in the pond or body of water. But left uncontrolled these water plants are able to propagate easily and constrain the activities within the backyard pond or lagoon. That's when these types of water plants end up aquatic weeds.
A fairly simple description of an aquatic weed is a plant which grows (ordinarily too densely) within an area such that it impedes the value or enjoyment of the particular area. Several prevalent types of aquatic plants that could turn into unwanted weeds are water milfoil, duckweed, pondweed, hydrilla, water hyacinth, cattail, bulrush, ludwigia, and many others. They may grow throughout ponds, lakes, streams, streams, navigation channels, storm water basins and channels, wetlands and lagoons. The particular growth could be due to a range of factors which include excess nutrients within the water as well as arrival of rapidly-growing exotic varieties. The problems caused by water undesirable weeds are extensive, ranging from unpleasant growth and nuisance smells to blocking of waterways, flood damage, fishing boat damages, perhaps even drowning and impairment of water quality.
In most situations it's more practical plus cost effective to work with a professional water weed control organization to clear out and control your water weed situations. Throughout California the most skilled service provider is DK Environmental. DK Environmental can be found in the San Francisco Bay area however takes on water weed removals everywhere in the State of California. The equipment that DK Environmental utilizes is really different to the western Unites States. Featuring its number of Aquamogs DK can access any kind of water body.


text:
"The Handmaid's Tale" (Hulu/George Kraychyk)
Costa Rican women dress in "Handmaid's Tale" costumes for election-day protest
The crimson robes and white bonnets have become symbols for women's rights
Check out this article! https://www.salon.com/2018/02/06/costa-rican-women-dress-in-handmaids-tale-costumes-for-election-day-protest/
Rachel Leah
February 6, 2018 4:56PM (UTC)
In the U.S., Poland and Australia, protestors have dressed in the bright crimson robes and white bonnets made famous by the book and Hulu television series the "Handmaid's Tale" as a way to demonstrate against policies and politicians they feel are are oppressive to women.
Sunday, the protest traveled to Costa Rica, where a group of women donned such costumes to the polls to demonstrate against the statements and proposed policies of presidential front-runner Fabricio Alvarado, an evangelical Christian singer and legislator whose popularity in the current campaign is tied to a platform that appears regressive in relation to women's rights and is stridently against gay marriage.
According to Global News, there were eight women in total who wore the recognizable garb from the series based on Margaret Atwood's novel from 1985, when they showed up at a voting center in Heredia, outside San Jose.
The book, famous in its own right before its small-screen adaption, takes place in a future, dystopian America where a violent dictatorship has stripped women of their rights. Most of the women in the population are sterile. Those who remain fertile are taken captive, their bodies becoming the property of powerful men for whom they are forced to bear children.
The costumes of the handmaids have been use in real life to protest abortion restrictions in Ohio and Texas, to demonstrate against funding cuts to Planned Parenthood in Washington, D.C., in Sydney, Australia and other locales where women's rights have been under fire or up for debate.
In Costa Rica, the costumes were used not only in the fight for women's rights but also for that of gay marriage, a topic that has become front and center in the country's presidential election. Alvarado came out strongly against gay marriage, a stance that also served as political currency. Global News reported that approximately two-thirds of constituents in Costa Rica oppose same-sex marriage in their country. "The issue became a focus of the campaign following a January decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that said Costa Rica should allow same-sex couples to wed, adopt children and enjoy other rights afforded to married couples," Global News said. "The country is majority Roman Catholic with an increasing evangelical population."
The women behind the protest pledged their support for Alvarado's main opponent, Carlos Alvarado, a former journalist who worked under current President Luis Guillermo Solis as labor minister. Alvarado also is for gay marriage.
The women released the following statement:
Today we celebrate, and we decided to make it a costume party as well. Why? Because we want to and we can. Because protest is also a form of celebration. That's how lucky we still are. We can pretend to be part of a renowned work of fiction, in the face of a fundamentalist threat that is anything but fictitious.
We face a landscape where the material conditions for women have been a topic neglected by media and most political parties.
Most political proposals towards women have to do with caring for others, and an apparent obligation to reproduce.
Our obligation and participation as citizens, however, transcends that.
We protest in favor of a secular state that celebrates all liberties because there's still a lot of work to do before reaching true equality.
We vote for our rights. We vote for our safety. We vote for our freedom.
Today we use our voices — because we still count on them and don't plan on letting go.
Rachel Leah is a culture writer for Salon. You can follow her on Twitter: @rachelkleah.
MORE FROM Rachel Leah
Books Costa Rica Entertainment Gay Marriage Literature Margaret Atwood Politics Presidential Election Protest Television "the Handmaid's Tale" Tv Women's Rights
Justice Breyer sends out a warning
GOP moves to end equal rights for women
Bring your entertainment anywhere

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


To guaranty the defeat of Russia, axis forces must take enough territory before Winter sets in.
Axis forces including Romania, Finland, Italy, and Hungary must take enough territory before Winter sets in to guaranty the defeat of Russia. All the different armor and air types are represented. The Axis has the quality and the Russians have the quantity. You have control over the strategy and the composition of reinforcements. Use of air is critical for both the Axis and the Russians.


The gem mines are situated just west of Myaw-pyet. Mostly red spinels and fewer rubies are produced from the alluvium in open-pit mining schemes. In the same area, red spinels are found in the partially decomposed marble comprising a small scale karst topography.


text:
Q: How to Implement oAuth PHP for the Gmail Atom feed? I want to use oAuth in PHP to access Gmail's atom feed. I am not sure where or how to start coding this... on Google's page it says this:
To obtain access, you can use AuthSub or OAuth by requesting a token with scope=https://mail.google.com/mail/feed/atom

How to do that in PHP? Thanks for helping a programming newbie :D

A: See below URL it is very very use full for you with demo and source code. Read carefully
You can start with this example.
Get Unread Emails From Gmail Using Gmail Feed API, OAuth and PHP With Atom
http://lookmywebpage.com/api/google/get-unread-emails-from-gmail-using-gmail-feed-api-oauth-and-php/
At a basic level, the process is as follows:

*

*Your application requests access and gets an unauthorized request token from Google's authorization server.

*Google asks the user to grant you access to the required data. If the user is not already logged in, Google prompts the user to log in. Google then displays an authorization page that allows the user to see what Google service data your application is requesting access to.

*Your application gets an authorized request token from the authorization server. Each request token is valid for only one hour.

*You exchange the authorized request token for an access token.

*You use the access token to request data from Google's service access servers. By default, access tokens are long-lived. Each access token is specific to the user account specified in the original request for authorization, and grants access only to the services specified in that request. Your application should store the access token securely, because it's required for all access to a user's data.
How to start?
How to start - see below url
http://lookmywebpage.com/api/google/get-unread-emails-from-gmail-using-gmail-feed-api-oauth-and-php/

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Complex world problems require the coming together of multiple areas of expertise. As a result interdisciplinary collaborations are increasingly a vital characteristic of excellence in research. Intricate global issues also require a workforce which can combine depth of discipline knowledge with a broad experience of other disciplines' perspectives and insights.
This page considers the definition of interdisciplinarity and considers the benefits and challenges of interdisciplinary learning. Examples of interdisciplinary collaborations are offered as food for thought.
Multidisciplinarity: co-existence of a number of disciplines.This means participants can do their own work and do not need to know about, or take account of, other participants' work. A multidisciplinary degree would allow students to study several disciplines over the course of their programme.
Cross-Disciplinarity: 'A topic normally outside a field of study is investigated with no co-operation from others in the area of study concerned,' (Davis & Devlin, 2007, p3).
Interdisciplinarity: Recongises the obvious and subtle ways academic disciplines overlap. Levels of integration differ; from two or more subjects contributing 'their particular disciplinary knowledge on a common subject' (Grosskinsky, 2008, p3); to participant disciplines taking account of, and even modifying their methodologies and contributions, in light of other collaborators' work.
opportunities are created for students to use their disciplinary content knowledge and skills in new contexts.
If undergraduate students take modules outside their home discipline they may not have the necessary foundational knowledge, skills and cognitive frameworks. This may demand extra resources and staff support, as well as impacting content and pace in the classroom.
"The goal of an interdisciplinary curriculum is to train future scholars and practitioners who can bridge multiple disciplines in their work. These students not only gain fluency in the ideas and languages of various disciplines, but also in the behaviors (sic) expected of various disciplinary communities".
Establishing interdisciplinary teaching and learning contexts requires collaboration between experts who are traditionally focused on their particular discipline within their School or Department. These collaborations require significant staff time to negotiate the learning outcomes, the teaching methods, and assessment approaches to be. Time must also be given to devising and getting approval for procedural and logistical adjustments which may be required to the administrate the programme.
Grosskinsky, (2008, p5) asserts that "interdisciplinarity in education should be focused at the postgraduate and research stage". Across Queen's this argument is reflected in interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity being an increasing characteristic of postgraduate programmes and research collaborations.
University of Melbourne has also undertaken extensive curriculum review leading to the Melbourne Model. Within this model are interdisciplinary opportunities for undergraduate students within the six New Generation degrees.
Davis, M. & Devlin, M. (2007) 'Interdisciplinary higher education: Implications for teaching and learning', Centre for the Study of Higher education, University of Melbourne, Australia.
Grosskinsky,S. (2008) 'Interdisciplinarity in higher education: A case study of the Complexity Science DTC at Warwick', University of Warwick, Coventry.
Holley, K. (2009) 'The challenge of an interdisciplinary curriculum: a cultural analysis of a doctoral-degree program in neuroscience', Higher Education, 58, pp 241-255.


What you need for surgery?
Bariatric procedures. Surgery of obesity.
For many years you have been trying to lose weight through diet and various drugs, but to no avail. Don't lose heart.
Coming to your rescue in such a predicament is the surgical method of treating obesity (bariatric surgery). Its advantage is that it can guarantee you weight loss, changing thus your life. Sure enough, it is not a "magic wand" to make you wake up next morning thin and beautiful. But it is a new path for you to the world of common people, to a free and "easy" life. Do not expect a miracle, help yourself out. Do not pay attention to the opinion of others, think about your loved ones, about those who need you.
If you came to this site, you are in need of qualified assistance.
All bariatric operations are performed laparoscopically. This approach provides for a rapid recovery, safety for the patient with obesity, and pain relief after surgery.
Many patients ask: Is it necessary to undergo surgery? The question is self-evident, but the answer is intricate. As a rule, a decision to have recourse to surgery means being brought to the verge of desperation. The feeling of hopelessness arises simultaneously with acute health problems.
First symptom: Inability to maintain an active lifestyle. Each step is accompanied by pain in the joints, in the back. Climbing stairs is tantamount to a 10 kilometer race – resulting in shortness of breath, palpitations, fatigue.
Second symptom: Constant drowsiness – you fall asleep at any convenient or not entirely convenient place. As soon as you sit down at the desk you find yourself in a state of sleep. But you do not just sleep, you snore loudly and, worst of all, stop breathing. Yes, this is a state when all of a sudden, for a few seconds, and thereafter up to a few minutes, you will stop breathing – a condition called 'sleep apnea'. It is a life-threatening condition, as breathing might not be restored.
Third symptom: Steady increase in blood pressure, usually accompanied by frequent headaches. High blood pressure can lead to stroke.
Fourth symptom: Increase in blood glucose levels. Diabetes mellitus is a frequent companion of obesity. You are getting tired in no time, you feel sleepy, small cuts and sores on your skin take longer to heal, pimps appear, more often than not your vision becomes impaired – these are all early signs of diabetes.
Bariatric surgery, or, in other words, obesity surgery.
The compound 'bariatric' is derived from the ancient Greek words 'βάρος' – meaning weight, heaviness, and 'ἰατρεία' – meaning treatment. It is important to understand that this type of surgery is not aimed at achieving cosmetic results, as is the case with plastic surgery. Its aim is to change the principle of food intake and absorption in humans. In all conscience, the ultimate result for many patients amounts to a change in appearance and to a renewed desire to be beautiful. But at the heart of this sort of treatment a fundamental change in metabolism.
For whose treatment is bariatric surgery indicated?
1. For patients with BMI greater than 40 kg / m2.
2. For patients with BMI ranging at 35-40 kg / m2 with obesity-related diseases whose condition can be expected to improve with a decrease in body mass (diabetes, diseases of the cardiovascular system, arthropathies, associated psychological problems).
How much weight I lose after surgery?
How you lose a weight after surgery?