Once again, thanks for your comments, insights, and wisdom.
Your last paragraph is so true. Gray is a tough word for many/most engineers.
they certainly are not naive when accepting this risk.
As someone who has closely followed the space program from the very beginning, I remember the excitement of the 1960's and all the accomplishments of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. In particular, I remember the Apollo fire, the first Saturn V launch, the first lunar landing, and Apollo 13.
I'm hoping to live long enough to see NASA return to those days when our whole country was full of excitement about space exploration and kids were inspired to study math, science, and engineering. In recent years, Eileen Collins did the best job of articulating those dreams.
I think NASA is fortunate to have experienced and thoughtful people like you and Gerst.
Mr. Wayne. I agree to its concern to if keeping the security, through rigorous definitive procedures and understand its preference for the prudence before the courage. I cannot only leave to question if it is the case to create a commission specialized in the bureaucratic development. NASA, that I believe to have as principle the evolution of technologies, cannot create historical sacrum sanctity in its way to proceed. If it desires to NASA one constant growth, a constant evolution, must mainly improve its bureaucratic procedures. It does not treat to loosen the severity, but to become more efficient, that is rapidity and perfection (I believe that it is the work to add rapidity to the perfection). The evolution immobility of the bureaucratic procedures hardens and limits the proper scientific production, with certainty. It is as a tree: it tends to grow, but if you props and ropes mooring cable the twigs, and she cuts them, so that they always follow a way, will create a dwarfed tree. It will give some fruits, but it will be more subjects to the shade of a bigger tree that grows with more freedom. NASA is the greater of the trees, is certain, but it can give fruits still more if she will be able to balance to the wind.
Sending our astronauts on other's vehicles is not an entirely new proposition.
Although not a totally independent space vehicle, since it was parasitic off the Shuttle, the Spacehab Module was commercially designed, developed, tested, certified, integrated, and operated during flight by a team of approximately 185 commercially funded Spacehab people with minimal NASA oversight by four NASA civil servants during the course of the Commercial Middeck Augmentation Module contract from about 1991-1995. A couple of us, the civil servants who oversaw the Spacehab effort, had developed, written and edited the human interface standards (NASA Std 3000) and then had developed the human interface requirements for space station. We also had considerable direct experience in subsystem management and in payload integration, including safety certification for payloads on Shuttle. NASA's job was to ensure that NASA was happy that Spacehab was safe. Spacehab's job was to ensure that each mission could be accomplished. Mission success was not a NASA responsibility.
Spacehab was considered a Shuttle payload, and therefore the Shuttle safety review panels got to review all aspects of the module and its contents to ensure NASA was satisfied that safety requirements were met. In the case of the commercial Spacehab module, we made certain that the Spacehab engineers, managers and the payload developers were fully apprised of the NASA/Shuttle requirements and standards, and we ensured that the Safety Review Panels were happy they were getting full cooperation and information from Spacehab. Spacehab did not always agree 100% with the NASA requirements, but in all cases we worked out agreements to everyone's fully understanding and satisfaction.
Spacehab's successful, positive and very effective, efficient work during CMAM led to the company/module selection for the subsequent Mir support missions and also led to development of the Spacehab double module.
Another example; during the Mir missions, for the first time NASA was sending our people and equipment to ride on another country's spacecraft. We did not completely agree on the safety certification or integration processes and in fact our organizations and many of our working processes were distinctly different.
We negotiated a series of contracts, agreements, processes, and documents (US/R-001, 002 and 004) that thoroughly documented the requirements and served to integrate the two country's organizations and processes, and that both sides worked to with great success between 1996 and the end of the NASA-Mir Program.
NASA built several of the mechanical, electrical and data management systems for the last Mir element, Priroda, and the Russians made significant modifications to accommodate the US systems. Almost all of the US hardware was manufactured on-site at JSC and all hardware was thoroughly tested to meet Shuttle and Proton/Mir requirements. The philosophy was to make the interfaces in the Russian module nearly identical to the interfaces in the Shuttle middeck and the Spacehab module.
With a series of Shuttle flights planned, and with compatibility between Shuttle, Spacehab and Mir established, we were able to fly payloads from every NASA center, CSA, and ESA.
The processes were understood and agreed upon well enough that we could go from concept to hardware development to use in orbit, routinely in six months.
The first COSS computer system is a prime example. It was recognized that the computer system was required in July, 1995, after Norm Thagard's return from the first long duration US stay on Mir. We got direction to develop the system in August. We immediately laid out the plans and negotiated within JSC for developing the hardware and software. The NASA-Mir Program office funded the effort. JSC Life Sciences managed the COSS Project and Mir and Shuttle/Spacehab integration and operations. JSC Engineering built much of the hardware. JSC Mission Operations was responsible for the software library. The physical work commenced in September; we built a half dozen flight and training units and began development of the software library, which included developing the first US crew training materials designed for use in orbit during long duration missions. We trained Shannon Lucid in Star City in November and conducted a series of acceptance and integration tests with the Russians in November and December 1995. The hardware met all US and Russian safety and certification requirements. The hardware was launched on STS-76 in March, 1996.
Clear lines of responsibility and thorough familiarity with the NASA organization, processes and requirements were instrumental in ensuring that NASA's interests, capabilities and requirements met Russian expectations and vice versa and that we could implement successfully on an expedited basis.
As a long-time project manager, I've found that communications, or lack thereof, is often the cause of most project problems. Of course, I've never shot anyone into space (yet), but the practice of Project Management is, or should be, the same everywhere. That being said, change is hard on most people, but if they can be shown that there are opportunities in change, and helped to find and exploit those opportunities, then change can be very beneficial for both the people and the organization. However, that requires clear, steady, courageous and strong Leadership (the capital "L" is intentional) which is something we as a nation seem to have little of these days.
3 disasters within a couple of days of the same point of the year. That's what I call a tight statistical grouping. It is more than co-incidence. Cold weather was a factor.
3 accidents roughly 20 years apart. I am half convinced its a generational thing. The next generation of engineers, managers and administrators forgets the hard lessons of the past generation. Also is it partly due to the post holidays effect, people let their guard down as 3 accidents have occurred in January and February. No crewed space craft will ever be safe. It may be safe enough but never safe. I seriously doubt that the next generation of rockets and capsules will be that much safer than the Shuttle as past history shows that isnt true. Airliners crash on a regular basis but no one suggests we stop flying airliners. Learn from the mistakes and improve because throughout human history that has always been the case. Same should apply to crewed spaceflight.
All organisations take risk. Government is in a position to take risks that the private sector cannot.
The private sector comes in 'for-profit' and 'not-for-profit' varieties. The varieties are not 'take-risks' and 'not-take-risks'. The private sector may be dynamic, but the dynamism often occurs due to risks not being understood.
The biggest risk taker in the world is President of the US. Who in their right mind would want the job of fighting wars, making peace, being responsible for the economy, health care, the banking crisis, etc.
The US government takes risks no other organisation can. Congress should think more about that. No other Government has sent people to the moon and won't any time soon.
While the Russians have mastered the safe journey to and from the ISS, there are few volunteers to go elsewhere with them.
When it comes to risks, NASA is one of the best managers there is.
Unfortunately, the "culture" that exists at NASA today exists in most large corporations as well as throughout our nation. It is that of a reductionist approach to solving complex problems. There is a belief that with enough analysis, we can completely understand and predict the dynamics of a system (risk equals zero). This possibility has been mathematically disproven through chaos and systems theories.
In many cases, today, our ability to "rationally analyze" problems has become the reason for the stalemates and lack of progress seen in most organizations. There is a belief that pervades most industrial and social cirlces today that problems can be broken down into their simplest elements, analyzed, and put together to reveal the true dynamics of systems. This, however, is not the case. Most systems are too chaotic or complex to be analyzed this way.
The primitive approach of trial and error that helped organisms evlove for most of evolutionary history and taught them how systems work and where the points of influence existed in each one and how to survive has in today's rational society gone out the window. It was through this process that organisms truly "learned" and kept them from repeating mistakes. It is in understanding those points of influence and how the system behaves that allowed human beings to evolve forward and become "masters" of their environments.
It is obviously no small task, but unless you can reteach the organization how to learn again, the same culture will continue to fuel itself. You don't have to focus on "taking more risk with spaceflight", but there are thousands of decisions made at NASA every day that don't have a direct impact on the safety of flight systems, and if you can get people to learn by trial and error through some of those decisions(without attaining the "perception of zero risk" first), then at some point, momentum will lead to more innovative (and not necessarily more risky) thinking in all areas (including spaceflight) as the culture changes.
Good Luck – I wish you the best!
Funny, NASA seems perfectly able to do this with the Russians with whom they have no control but not American companies that are designing to NASA's standards. Sorry, this doesn't make sense.
I agree with especially the last paragraph but not re your statements about putting our people on other than NASA launchers. You seem to forget we put them frequently on Russian launchers. NASA does not have configuration control of the Russian launchers and I doubt if we even now are informed of all changes before our people fly. If we do that is a great step forward. I also doubt we still have oversight or even indepth insight of the Russian launcher design or manufacturing quality processes. That said I would prefer to put our people on US manufactured launchers–commercial or DOD sponsored like EELVs–than to continue to fly them on Russian systems because I believe we will have better access to the design and manufacturing data. Allowing a foreign nation to control out human access to space on a trust me basis seems to me to be insane just as it would be insane to trust a US commercial vehicle on the same basis.
Looks to me like a new breed of lawyer will be created. One that will sue the pants off "Boeing" or "Lockheed" or whomever the new contractor gets the job.
Mr. Hale… I'm afraid you live in a world that no longer exists. A world before Star Trek, Star Wars, Avatar. Hollywood is what's wrong with the space program. Everyone expects NASA to build a small quick plane that can take off and then enter warp 10 in the blink of an eye.
Well, there will have to be a cultural change at NASA, and its usual contractors and government sponsors as well. The issue of safety is one but not all. I see this as a structural, intrinsic problem of how we perform in the HSF realm. For many years after Shuttle first flew there have been several programs for its replacement and none of them succeeded for a reason or another. Today: Ares/Orion is doomed for yet another failure. Worse: The choice for Constellation was based on vehicles we were all supposed to know in and out – the SRB, Shuttle and Apollo. Odd isn't it? All the ingredients were gathered, supposedly, for a first flight in 2012, and even possibly in 2011. Where are we today? Why did NASA fail? Some argue it is the budget, some it is the technical or management incompetence. So what is it? Why should we believe that the next program will be right this time: Yes another chance please! Well it does not work that way or at least it should not. I will argue that NASA is not the sole party responsible for this fiasco. The overseers should have detected the problems early on and I mean the WH and Congress. So today someone wants to try the private sector but that is not all that is meant. It also means COTS-type contracts, not cost-plus ones. It means to try a "new" way for doing things. Some argue that "private" space is not safe and that Ares would be. Based on what? Why is Ares I so much safer than any other rocket? Where is the data to support this argument? See, NASA is slowly but surely losing its credibility, yet it is populated with exceptional engineers and scientists. So again what is it? I am sure if someone figures why this is happening then NASA will eventually be back, stronger and meaner than ever before. In the mean time we as a people have to give a chance to an alternative if we want HSF to survive or it'll be lost soon for many decades to come. Is it possible the "privates" fail? Sure it is, but what is the cost comparison? Does it not favor "new" space over "old" space? How many times can the private sector try if it were given $9 billions over 5 years?
NASA is plagued with the "not invented here" syndrom. The fear of "commercial" space is unfounded if we consider the fact that the employees of these companies used to be contractors or civil servants of NASA. They carry the same knowledge as the rest of the industry.
These commercial companies have the luxury of not only carrying forward the harsh technical lessons learned, but they also have the opportunity to revisit the organizational lessons learned and develop processes and procedures that provide the same scrutiny without the bureacracy.
Too many people forget that bureacracy is an inefficient implementation of process improvement.
Not to be argumentative, but NASA has been "flying its people on someone eles's rocket" for nearly fifteen years now–since Norm Thaggard's 1995 flight to Mir on a Soyuz. So what is perhaps most strking is the continued pervasiveness of the "not invented here" mentality in 2010.
I'm going to sound mean–I don't want to, but perhaps there's no way around it–NASA has spent nearly my entire lifetime on a series of bad decisions. In particular, NASA "bet the farm" twice on manned spaceflight systems that turned out to be very poor value: Shuttle (monstrously expensive, lacking in capability, disappointing on safety, and an utter failure in terms of its stated goals) and ISS (scarcely capable of maintaining itself, much less returning science…and that science, again, largely of the "looking at stars, peeing in jars" variety). ISS, in particular, is incapable of undertaking or supporting any activity that deserves to be called "exploration" in the 21st centruy.
Plainly, this can't continue. And, in the current political and economic culture, I just don't know how much willingness there is to give NASA a big pot of money and let them run with it.
Wayne has hit the nail on the head again.
I totally agree with the previous comments about purchasing seats on Russian craft. Why is this different from purchasing seats on American-made corporate craft? Only because it's not been done before. I desperately hope that changes.
Additionally there are comments about risk-averse cultures in corporate America but specifically in comment 12 (anon poster) about reductionist analysis and approaches. Not in my experience. I've been building spacecraft for 12 years, and have NEVER seen this.
The 'emergent behavior' of systems as complex as even the simplest satellite I've worked on (LCROSS) was taken into consideration from the earliest discussions. And LCROSS was done on time and on budget and was a spectacular success. THIS is the kind of approach that needs to be taken, and cross-generational engineering groups are key to making that happen. We had people who worked on Apollo, Shuttle, BIG DOD satellites, little NASA and commercial satellites, guys back to work post-retirement and new college grads all working together, shoulder-to-shoulder motivated by a common goal: THE MOON.
And a little bit of showing people that it could be done when many believed we'd fail.
Space is HARD. The euphemism "rocket science" is accurate. Risks need to be taken, but they need to be deliberately evaluated and decided on. You have to take that bull by the horns, look him square in the eye and tell him every day "Not on my watch". We can't be cavalier and arrogant, but we can't be a patsy either.
You probably did more to propagate the dysfunctional culture at NASA as any one man could possibly hope to do. Your relentless purge of dissenting employees and refusal to admit and correct mistakes with the JSC culture could be bound in volumes and studied and taught by behavioral scientists, cognitive scientists and group decision theory experts for years to come. Your pompous, holier than thou blogs, e-mails, etc. seem to come from on high. What you fail to see is that you and others of your ilk are the problem and have been the problem which can be traced to the cause of the two accidents we have experienced at NASA. Your numerous outbursts at high-level meetings and abusive behavior to people who disagreed with your view of the world or the safety of the Shuttle and its crew is unconscionable.
NASA JSC is in still on its first step of a 12-step recovery program; it is still in denial.
Accepting risk is understood; accepting unnecessary risk which can and should be avoided easily to meet schedule and cost constraints is not wise or prudent.
Get a clue, your "Epiphany" post Columbia was a sham and you of all people should not be the voice for culture change at NASA.
Great article, well written. But here are a few more thoughts from a guy that started the same time as you at JSC in the 70s….
My recollection of the engineers from Apollo is that they concentrated on getting to the Moon with little thought about the cost to do so. When is the last time we did that? In their world, things like earned value, full cost accounting, etc didn't exist. Year long POP (PPBE) cycles didn't exist. They also didn't spend their time performing periodic (and essentially meaningless) training for HazMat, records management, No Fear Act, Environmental responsiblities, and list goes on and on.
Today even at the lowest managemement levels, we spend 90% of our time addressing cost issues, not technical ones. New NASA programs live in an abstract world where we constantly trade architecture options against each other for cost: life cycle, recurring, maybe just FY10 and FY11 limitations, etc. We won't succeed because we can't afford to jump back into the real world and actually get it to happen with the limited money available.
Can you imagine a NASA world where we all spend 90% of our time doing technical work? Can you imagine a world where you go to work, hold a meeting, decide to buy something and test it next month? Shedding ourselves of the fiscal and bureaucratic constraints. What a wonderful world that would be. As engineers, we all tend to be pretty dang fiscally conservative anyway. I even re-use my brown bags for lunch. If only we could live in the world that Apollo was allowed to flurish in. I would eat baloney sandwiches if I could get us out of low earth orbit once again.
There really is only one fix for NASA : don't follow the water. Follow the money (or lack therof). Get at least 90% of us doing techincal work 90% of our time again.
I believe strongly that the final paragraph, to the STS staff, is correct. However, with all due respect, what I see here continues to reflect a disconnect in the way that NASA has come to view safety over the past several decades–the fact that all risk, including to humans, is not created equal. That is, the difference between calculated and engineered risk. Take the difference between Challenger, and Apollo 1 (you can see the discontinuity there).
Apollo 1 was an example of calculated risk gone wrong. There was a great deal of uncertainty in the design of the capsule, including the hatch, the environmental system, the fabric-like materials and the electrical system. It was cutting edge. There was always a palpable probability that something would fail. It did, and three American astronauts–good men–died as a result. NASA calculated the odds of success, rolled the dice and eventually they came up snake-eyes. When you take risks, ultimately you can't fight statistics. That doesn't mean the risk is less worthy.
In the case of Challenger, risk was engineered into the technical design, the management process, the LCC, the VAB stacking procedure… the list goes on. Not only were the risks known, they weren't officially accepted (and managed). They were neglected. The shuttle design itself was the result of a bureaucratic nightmare and the compromise nobody liked. It was flawed by design, and flown on the idea that a sufficiently complex bureaucracy could mitigate those flaws. Combined with a vastly reduced launch rate, and pressure for those few to be successful, the recipe for disaster was set. It was only a matter of time.
The difference between these two approaches to risk doesn't take a rocket scientist to appreciate. That's why people believe NASA is risk averse: because what the Agency has adopted as its course over time just *is*. The only thing that separates the public's perception of that, from those of us in the industry, is that we can do the math.
The reality is that private aerospace contractors built ALL the United States human rated rockets currently used and used in the past….they just did not design them exclusively by themselves. The entire history of Human Space Flight is based on the NASA partnership with private aerospace contractor (with stocks and board of directors). It is this design culture that needs to change not all of NASA. A new kind of partnership needs to be established that allows for the private industry to construct the rocket to specifications of reliability and safety that NASA requires. The vehicle that the crew will ride in at first should be built as in the past…designed by a NASA\private contractor partnership….to evolve into privately designed vehicles that NASA purchases rides on like the Russian Soyuz rocket\vehicle combination that is built by a private Russian corporation (RSC-Energia). Why is this a huge paradign shift? We're already doing almost all of it already?
"if American astronauts are to ride to the international space station on a rocketship that NASA did not build" That's happening on a regular basis. Can you say SOYUZ?
NASA has just been taken out of the human space exploration business. We will not have a NASA manned launch vehicle within the next decade. We are diluting the funds over 7 businesses that should be going to 2 or 3 at most. Spreading them over 7 is just wasting money and time. I believe Ares 1 should be taken off the drawing board but NASA should be allowed to develop an Ares V type launch vehicle and go ahead with the Orion capsule design.
Let's hope the 7 private companies can come up with a safe design in the next few years. Space X will be launching the Dragon cargo vehicles this year and with modification the Dragon can be man rated. That is if NASA can give their design the go ahead.
Now that we are committed to commercial cargo and manned flights, NASA must decide which system to go with and proceed. It's time to make hard decisions. To paraphrase an old expression, it's time to go or get off the pot!
My vote is for Space X, they have a system ready for cargo flights to ISS and with the proper funding they can have a man rated craft the soonest. All the other contenders are too far behind to be ready within the next few years.
I have a very hard time resolving claims of NASA's risk averse culture with what the Challenger Accident Investigation Board found – a tendency for NASA to normalize risk. It seems that depending on who's talking, NASA is either too risky, or not risky enough. The folks I know are constantly asking themselves how much risk is too much. It's a difficult tightrope & I think they deserve a little credit for walking it every day.
Next Next post: Where is Delos D. Harriman when we need him?


the reason classic vehicle restoration can become a thing of the past as value of vintage cars plummet. In September, Coutts announced a 10.4 per cent decline in the Price of vintage motors over the past twelve months.
Philip Warner, co-founder of the vehicle & Classic website, told the Mail on-line: "Prices have tumbled & which is in portion because of the dire shortage of skilled mechanics.
"My generation was enable to of Utilize a manual to strip drop a vehicle & put back together once more.
See a number of classic cars up for auction in the Britain with visiting the Sun Motors purchase department.
The likes of Lewis Hamilton, Nico Rosberg & Sebastian Vettel have all been brilliant in the modern era however to put it simply, they aren't at the standard of the German driver.
just Brazilian driver Ayrton Senna could lay appeal to being at Schumacher's standard, by the German virtually dominating the sport in the late 1990's & 2000's.
Fans have been desperate to get their hands on any memorabilia from the German driver & This time, 1 of his generality famous cars is going up for discount.
Schumacher's 2001 Monaco Grand Prix winning Ferrari F2001 going to be held at a Sotheby's NY 'Contemporary Fine Art auction, the premier time a vehicle has been purveyed at the event.
by Schumacher's vehicle being purveyed, fans going to too be happy to know which the German driver is supposedly doing well after his horrific skiing accident in 2013.
PH Audi A8 2018 value & specs has been revealedThe Fresh Audi A8 going to of on discount in the UK in early 2018 by prices starting at £69,hundred.
Audi has approved further strongV8 & W12 versions going to go on ale in UK later in 2018.
Audi A8 2018 uncovered in pictures Mon, October two, 2017 Audi A8 2018 uncovered in pictures Play slideshow one of 51Its Fresh design is further muscular & advanced a stretched pentagon grille finished in chrome, that not just modernises the vehicle's looks however too helps the vehicle look further premium.
may the generality noteworthy & exciting additions to the A8 range is the autonomous/semi-autonomous technologies.
Audi Artificial intelligence traffic jam pilot takes charge of the controls while in slow-moving traffic in speeds up to 37mph where a physical barrier separates two carriageways.


For the next two weeks I am spending my days working at a school in an informal settlement in Bangalore called Drishya Kalika Kendra.
My collaborators are Jay Silver from MIT Media Lab and Uday from Drishya school. Over the two weeks we are teaching 14 young people (12-16) to tell stories through maps, animations and interactive media.
On the first day we wanted to start to imagine the relationships between humans, non-humans and the environment that all are situated in.
First we did an exercise where we measured the class using elements of our bodies such as wingspan, hands and feet.
Next we used these measurements to draw plan and elevation views of the room we were in on the chalkboard.
Finally, we constructed paper models of the room.
This session helped us position our bodies in relationship to the proportion of the classroom, and to start to understand how to define inside / outside space and massing. (Which will help us in later GoogleSketchUp components of the class). Some students got really excited about this project and started adding tons of details to their paper models, such switch boxes, fans and then adding other rooms.
Next we sent students outside of the classroom with Cell Phone cameras donated from Nokia, and asked them to find images in living things in their environment.
This real-time Urban Ecology study was a great success. Students had fun taking photographs, and explaining why they chose them, and we took geocordinates using a GPS unit at each of the sites they identified as important. These images and geodata will come in handy tomorrow when the students will create small plays based on these living non-human actors and start to create a community map.
Finally we spent the afternoon doing a small GeoCache.


text:
The Ohio Women's Convention at Akron in 1851 met on May 28-29, 1851 at Akron, Ohio. There, the abolitionist and preacher, Sojourner Truth, delivered one of the most famous speeches in American history. The speech, which did not have a title at the time, became known as the 'Ain't I a Woman?' speech.

History
The Ohio Women's Convention at Akron met for two days on May 28-29, 1851 in Akron, Ohio. The convention was led by Francis Dana Barker Gage, who had previously presided over a similar event in McConnelsville. The convention was not well received locally and several men, including local ministers, heckled speakers at it. During the convention, one of the speakers was the abolitionist and preacher, Sojourner Truth, who gave what became one of the most notable speeches in American women's history. Without a title at the time, the speech later became known under the title of  'Ain't I a Woman?' Truth was the only black woman in attendance at the conference and many of the other women present did not want her to speak. Truth delivered the speech from the steps of the Old Stone Church, on the second day of the convention. The church was located in downtown Akron, but is no longer standing. It was published by journalist Marius Robinson in The Anti-Slavery Bugle on June 21, 1851.

Legacy
In 2022 the Summit Suffrage Centennial Committee is due to unveil a statue of Sojourner Truth in Akron, commemorating the speech. The commissioned work is made of bronze, ten feet tall and will be cast by the local artist Woodrow Nash. Groundbreaking for the surrounding park, the Sojourner Truth Memorial Plaza, occurred in August 2022.

See also

 List of women's rights conventions in the United States
 Women's suffrage in Ohio
Ohio Women's Convention at Massillon in 1852

References

History of women's rights in the United States
1851 in the United States
Feminism and history
History of women in Ohio
1851 in Ohio
1851 conferences
May 1851 events
Women's conferences
Ohio suffrage

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Archidela es un género de coleópteros adéfagos de la familia Carabidae.

Especies
Contiene las siguientes especies:

 Archidela darwini (Sloane, 1909)
 Archidela nigrina (W.J. MacLeay, 1888)

Referencias

Enlaces externos
 ION
 Nomenclator Zoologicus

Cicindelina
Géneros de coleópteros


text:
Q: Parsing nested, "named" objects in Postman I am trying to parse JSON data returned in a Postman test for the first time but the complexity of my payload is causing parsing issues: how can I get to the "stage-guid" field in
{
    "Workflow": {
        "com.mycom.MyWorkflow": {
            "id": 10,
            "stages": [
                {
                    "com.mycom.MyStage": {
                        "id": 22,
                        "stage-guid": "00000000-0000-1111-1111-123456789012",

The following gets me to the Workflow object, but I have not figured out how to access inside the com.mycom.MyWorkflow object.
        var responseInJson = pm.response.json();
        var workFlowData = responseInJson.Workflow;
        console.log("in workflow", workFlowData);

I have tried workflowData.id, workflowData.object.id, workflowData.Object.id, workflowData[pm.variables.get("stage-guid")] but the test case never proceeds beyond these (incorrect) access attempts.

A: You would need to walk down the structure to get the value that you need. As there are objects and arrays to navigate, you would need to reference these correctly.
You also have property names with dots and dashes in them so you would need to use a mixture of dot and bracket notation to correctly reference those.
This should log that guide value in the console:
let responseInJson = pm.response.json(),
    workFlowData = responseInJson.Workflow["com.mycom.MyWorkflow"].stages[0]["com.mycom.MyStage"]["stage-guid"];

console.log(workFlowData);

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


В NetBeans 8.0.2 есть проблема.
Предположим, нужно создать проект с удаленными исходниками - то есть, когда исходники лежат на удаленном сервере. Это обычно необходимо, если пользователь хочет сделать отладку по xdebug.
Both, NetBeans and PhpStorm, are including JSch as an external library. You can exchange the file using a prepared file or compile it yourself (see below). In the case of NetBeans you have to look for a file called modules/com-jcraft-jsch.jar and for PhpStorm you have to replace lib/jsch-0.1.50.jar. The latter my have a different version in your case.
Hopefully this fixes the issue! If not or if you'd like to compile and pack your own version or if you want to read some more details, read on.
As you can see here and here this issue is known and there is also a patch to solve this issue. So to get a fixed version of JSch you need to download the library, apply the patch and build the jar file. Afterwards you can insert the library in the module folder of your IDE.
Finally, since I'm a happy gentoo user, I decided to create a ebuild for this. This way I can use emerge to update JSch and reinstall NetBeans.
То есть, нужно закрыть NetBeans, скачать файл с правильной реализацией SSH http://www.svrnm.de/files/jsch.jar, и заменить им файл NetBeans 8.0.2/ide/modules/com-jcraft-jsch.jar. На всякий случай рекомендуется сделать резервную копию заменяемого файла.


Found a Dark Shadows Wiki.
According to the last edit on February 17, 2013 in this Wiki John La Motta / John LaMotta is uncredited in Episode 826.
I think we should use this information.
We have only 1 profile listed in CLT and this was contributed on March 16, 2007 and never edited.


Passive or non-powered subwoofers are sound reinforcement speakers that have NO built-in amplifiers. These kinds of speakers need to be powered by an external amplifier to power them so they can emit sound. The advantage of passive loudspeakers is that they are much lighter than powered speakers and can be placed or flown in locations that require a smaller or lighter speaker to be installed or to be used for mobile venues or DJs.


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Q: az storage account network-rule not working for Microsoft Hosted agent(Azure DevOps) I have to delete all the files in azure blob storage(specific container) automatically via azure release pipelines. So I have configured a task to get the IP address of Microsoft agent dynamically  and add the IP address into blob Firewall. Below script working successfully sometimes, but I'm not able to see the IP in the Firewall list.
Also same script is failing many times and throwing a error like

The request may be blocked by network rules of storage account. Please
check network rule set using 'az storage account show -n accountname
--query networkRuleSet'.If you want to change the default action to apply when no rule matches, please use
'az storage account update'.

IP=`curl -s http://ipinfo.io/json | jq -r  '.ip'`

echo "Opening firewall for the IP : $IP"

az storage account network-rule add -g custom-web --account-name   "customwebapp" --ip-address $IP

I'm not sure on this , Any one able to advise me a best way to achieve this or Another alternate secure way for connecting the azure blob via Microsoft hosted agent  ?
References
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account/network-rule?view=azure-cli-latest

A: Work around is to temporary enable public access:
az storage account update --resource-group "$ResourceGroupName" --name "$Name" --default-action Allow

And after you are done with your operation you can turn it off again.

A: Communication between microsoft hosted agents and storage account behind firewall is always a troublesome one, even with the above work around of dynamically opening the storage firewall for that specific microsoft hosted agents IP address. This is mainly due to limitations on the storage account side.
1. Each storage account supports up to 200 IP network rules.
So we cannot add the entire IP ranges of hosted agents that spin up from any of your ADO orgs geographical region. If organization is hosted in West Europe, then hosted agents can come up from North and West Europe. So the no. of IP ranges that should be whitelisted will be more than 200.
Due to this, users go with the above work around of allowing the particular hosted agent IP address. however the following limitations will not make the above workaround fool proof. When the hosted agent spin up in the same region as your storage account, workaround does not work.
2. Services deployed in the same region as the storage account use private Azure IP addresses for communication.
3. IP network rules have no effect on requests originating from the same Azure region as the storage account


Kate Thornhill, of Suttons Bay, hopes to set a world record for the largest raft made of canoes and kayaks.
SUTTONS BAY, MI — Kate Thornhill is used to difficult challenges; she has traveled solo more than once deep into the Minnesota Boundary Waters paddling the wooden kayak she built.
But on Sept. 1, she is going for the gold: a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records. And Thornhill, a certified public accountant, hopes 2,000 or more paddlers will join her.
The Holland native is organizing an event called the Sutton's Bay Floatilla with the intent of breaking the world record for the largest raft of canoes and kayaks ever to float together. The current record is 1,902 canoes and kayaks. That was set last September on Fourth Lake in New York's Adirondacks. That event was called "One Square Mile of Hope." It was sponsored by the Central Adirondack Paddlers Society.
The event, a fundraiser for Susan G. Komen for the Cure for breast cancer research, drew paddlers from 14 states. Photos of the giant raft of boats made Sports Illustrated and National Geographic.
"I couldn't get the vision out of my head of what it would look like on Suttons Bay waters," Thornhill said of the inspiration she had upon seeing photos while hiking in Utah with a friend who had participated.
"I thought this would be a great fundraiser for our schools. I am hoping it will raise in excess of $50,000," said Thornhill, a mother of two. Her son, a senior at Suttons Bay High School this fall, will be floating alongside her. The proceeds will go to the Suttons Bay Schools Student Activities Fund for programs that no longer get public funding, such as a team-building camp that parents now pay for.
"The money will pay for kids whose families cannot afford it," Thornhill said.
The official count for the Suttons Bay Floatilla begins at 12:45 p.m. Boats must be launched by 12:30 p.m. Only those who register can participate. Paddlers can register online at www.sbfloatilla.com.
Thornhill, a professional guide for Adventures in Good Company, a woman's adventure-travel company based in Baltimore, Md., got "addicted to kayaking" 12 years ago. She has been to the Minnesota Boundary Waters nearly 20 times, she said.
The northern Michigan event will be a family-friendly affair.
"We're getting interest from a diverse group of people. We have people coming from Chicago, New Orleans, Rhode Island and Arizona," Thornhill said.
Guinness World Record rules specify only kayaks and canoes are allowed. No boats can be tied together. Inflatable canoes/kayaks and standup paddleboards are not permitted. The raft of boats has to float without touching shore or bottom for 30 seconds.
The Suttons Bay group will have competition. An event called Floatzilla, which can be found at www.floatzilla.org, is mounting a challenge. That event was Saturday on the Mississippi River at Davenport, Iowa. Official results are months away.
That attempt to get 2,000 boats in 2011 fell short with only 1,535 canoes and kayaks. It also was short of a 2010 Pittsburgh Guinness record-breaking event called "Paddle at the Point" which drew 1,619 canoes and kayaks. You can find a time-lapse clip by visiting www.paddleatthepoint.com.
"I don't think it (Floatzilla) is a serious challenge," Thornhill said.
Michigan has received a lot of news coverage for being a travel destination. Having a world record like this would reinforce that Michigan has places to visit and things to do.
So, if you've got a canoe or kayak of any sort — it is not an event that will require considerable skill — consider putting the Sept. 1 floatilla on your calendar and the boats on your car. It is bound to be a good time, win or lose.
This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged Canoe, Canoeing, Guinness World Record, Kate Thornhill, Kayak, Kayaking, Paddling, Suttons Bay. Bookmark the permalink.


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Home » Organizational Change » What Is the Power Distance Index (PDI)?
Organizational Change WalkMe TeamUpdated March 22, 2021
What Is the Power Distance Index (PDI)?
The power distance index (PDI) is a measure that describes how people relate to authority.
Cultural values such as this affect, among other things, the way people communicate and interact at work – particularly the way they interact with their superiors.
In this post, we'll answer a few key questions about this measurement, then learn how it can be used to build a more aligned, cohesive team culture.
How Does the PDI Affect Employee Attitudes and Behaviors?
Is There Such a Thing as an "Ideal" PDI?
How Are Organizational Structure and Power Distance Related?
How Do You Align Employees with Organizational Culture?
The power distance index (PDI) is a sociological measure that indicates the extent to which less powerful members of a group accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.
This metric is one of six measures in the Hofstede cultural dimensions theory.
The other measures include:
Uncertainty avoidance. How tolerant people are of ambiguity and uncertainty.
Masculinity vs. femininity. Traits such as assertiveness versus cooperativeness.
Collectivism vs. individualism. How much a culture emphasizes group-orientation versus orientation towards the individual.
Short-term vs. long-term. Whether people prefer traits such as steadfastness or whether they prefer pragmatism and problem-solving.
Restraint vs. indulgence. How free people are to indulge in fulfilling "human desires."
This cultural model has been used to describe areas such as people's attitudes, behaviors, and communication styles in the context of society.
It has also been used extensively in other domains, such as business and politics. Since it offers insight into why people behave and communicate the way they do, it can be a useful tool for improving relationships, communication, and even employee productivity.
Managers and business leaders, for instance, can use these traits to learn more about their own employees' communication styles and, as a result, design more effective organizational communication strategies.
Culture adds to the complexity of managing employees.
After all, the way people perceive the world around them is determined by their cultural values.
Also, since today's workforce is so diverse, it is more important than ever to understand the relationship between areas such as:
Individual cultural values
Team dynamics
Communication styles
How do you maintain company culture without the office routine?
Learn top tips for improving #productivity even while working remotely, including a hack for keeping the "hallway chatter" alive, in our mostly digital reality.https://t.co/45TJp0bMx9
— WalkMe (@WalkMeInc) June 28, 2020
All of the cultural attributes covered above, including PDI, affect how employees interact, how well they fit into a culture, and they can also impact the outcomes of business initiatives, such as business transformation programs.
In particular, PDI affects how individuals perceive and relate to authority, as mentioned above, so it is a good idea to for managers to assess employees' attitudes to authority early on in the relationship.
There is no such thing as an ideal PDI any more than there is such a thing as an ideal organizational culture.
Instead, what matters is whether the organization's culture and structure fit with an employee's values.
For instance, some organizations have structures that are flatter – others, however, are more hierarchical and rigid in their command structure. Likewise, some countries lean in one direction or the other – a point to note for those planning to work overseas.
Neither approach is "better" than the other.
Rather, the focus should be on aligning employees with the organization's values and structure.
Managers and leaders, therefore, should keep this in mind when composing teams and hiring new employees – and employees, for their part, should also remember this when evaluating potential employers.
Different organizational structures distribute authority and power differently.
Functional organizations divide business units laterally by specialty, such as IT and marketing, while having a hierarchical command structure that almost all of us are familiar with
Divisional structures essentially break a company apart into several autonomous mini-companies, which can be useful for large organizations that focus on different types of markets or different geographical regions
Matrix is a structure that may blend different command structures and have employees operating in several units at once
Flat organizations are more democratic in nature and distribute authority more equally among team members
Power distance, again, refers to how willing people are to accept the unequal distribution of power.
The organizational structure in question, therefore, will have less of an impact on power distance than employees' individual values will.
For instance, an employee who spent years working in co-ops may find it difficult to work in more hierarchical organizations, such as a functional organization.
On the other hand, an employee who prefers a hierarchical structure may find flat structures to be unsuitable for their tastes.
There are a few techniques to ensure that employees align with the culture of a team, department, or organization.
Is your #leadership style the thing that's holding you back? Upgrade your culture with these 3 steps:https://t.co/wKKuqbRhh8 via @FastCompany #HR #management
— WalkMe (@WalkMeInc) October 20, 2018
For instance, ask employees questions to assess culture fit when interviewing them. Find out what types of organizational structures employees have worked at in the past, then ascertain which ones they preferred and which ones they were most successful in.
Or, when constructing a new cross-functional team, consider adapting that team structure to employees' work styles. For example, if a specific set of high-level IT specialists is needed for a project, it is probably best to find a command structure that suits their needs, rather than compelling them to conform to an unsuitable team structure.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl