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The News Feed is a curated selection of the most important China-Africa news edited by CAP's editors in Asia and Africa.
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the fifth installment in the six-part series. Angola Rule of Law Reporter Ji Dongye Translation by Erik Myxter Du Qing (pseudonym) is one of Beijing Construction Group's electrical engineers. Since the beginning of 2009 until the end of 2012 he was in West Africa's Angola. Because the project was completed, 32-year-old Du Qing came back from Angola to China. Because of his family he does not plan to come back to Angola again. Du Qing's company's project was in a suburb of Angola's capital. After more than 27 years of civil war, the inequality between the rich and the poor has become a huge phenomenon. "Here there are many Chinese people. It is said that the local population (of Angola) is around 20 million people, where the population of Chinese people here is 260,000. But the foundation of the Chinese in Angola are people who come to work on a project, do business or are migrant workers, there aren't any people who are immigrating here to stay." He said, "There are many engineers and also some people who engage in foreign trade." The rhythm of live in Angola is not particularly fast. Here the local people go to work at nine in the morning and get off of work at three in the afternoon. That being said, many of the Chinese people will work overtime. Some Chinese people find it difficult to accept Angola's leisurely lifestyle. "At customs, the workers inspect baggage in a laid-back manner. This will make the Chinese people who are eager to go home very worried." Du Qing says. Every time he goes to the supermarket checkout Du Qing must sort out his money and put it on the counter. "In the past some Chinese people did not head to this custom and they threw money at the worker, if you do that the (Angolan) people will be very angry." Working in Angola is hard, but the salary is comparatively higher so there are many people who still come here. "Chinese people are very hard working, they especially can eat bitterness and worked tirelessly. Chinese people can easily take all of these jobs in Africa." Before he went abroad, Du Qing's company gave him relatively good amount of training, but now there is less training available and it just mostly covers safety. Xie Fei (pseudonym) and Du Qing worked for the same company doing office administrative work for almost two years. Xie Fei told Rule of Law reporters "before I left, the company would be united in giving anti-infectious disease vaccines." "In that company and at China Iron and CITIC we usually could not go out alone. We don't have much contact with other projects Chinese people are doing. Most often we are focused on doing our work." Du Qing said. Du Qing genuinely felt that Chinese people have made a large contribution over there. "For example we have constructed basic infrastructure, residential areas, roads and railways." "The economy is developing quickly over there, there are large supermarket chains and tons of infrastructure has been built up." Du Qing said. In Angola, most of the local people are very friendly towards Chinese people. Xie Fei says: "Most of the people are very enthused about China's attitude. I have heard that some other Chinese company's host parties with their local African employees; everyone gets together and has a great time. "Local traffic police enforcement is relatively strict, they can stop you to see if you have a fire extinguisher inside your car or if you brought your passport or if you broke one of the traffic rules." Du Qing said. "But on the other hand, they are not as strict with the local population." Xie Fei said. In Angola, personal safety is always Du Qing focal point. "You must rely on yourself to be safe." Du Qing told the reporter, "When you go outside you want to go with someone else, do not go out alone. Also before you go out you want to tell your company. Let your leaders know where you are going and if they need to how can they get in contact with you." A normal day's work is very hard, Xie Fei and Du Qing both only had one day off a week. "The company's organization structure is like a small island, where the scenery was beautiful, and I could eat all the shrimp I wanted. I also had the chance to go to Moon Bay, which was naturally formed by crater landscape." Xie Fei said. 安哥拉 法治周末记者 汲东野 杜清(化名)是北京建工集团一名机电工程师。从2009年初到2012年年底,他在西非国家安哥拉待了近四年时间。随着一期工程完工,32岁的杜清从安哥拉回国。因为家庭原因,以后不打算再出去了。 杜清公司的项目在安哥拉的首都郊区。经历过27年内战,首都存在贫富差距现象。"这里的中国人很多。据说当地一共有人口两千万左右,中国人就占到二十六万。不过基本都是过去做项目或经商的流动人员,没有移民过去留下的。"他说,"工程类的多,还有一些搞外贸生意的。" 安哥拉人的生活节奏不是特别快,当地人上午九点上班,下午三点就下班了。不过,在那的中国人还是会加班干点活。 对于安哥拉的悠闲,有些中国人还是很难接受。"在海关的时候,他们会不慌不忙地检查你的行李。这就会让回家心切的中国人很着急。"杜清说。 每次去超市,结账时,杜清都要把钱整理好,把手放在柜台上,"板正地给"。"以前有些中国人不注意这个,扔给人家,人家就会很生气。" 在安哥拉工作也很辛苦,但相对于更高的工资,还是有很多人来到这里。"中国人很勤劳,特别能吃苦耐劳。这些在非洲的活儿,中国人干起来得心应手。" 以前出国时,杜清的公司会给比较多的培训,现在少了,主要都是讲安全方面。 谢霏(化名)和杜清就职于同一家企业,她在非洲做办公行政工作接近两年时间。她告诉法治周末记者:"过去之前,公司会统一打一些防传染疾病的疫苗。" "在那边的公司还有中铁、中信等。不过,我们一般不会一个人出去,和别的工程的中国人接触的也不太多,平时主要还是以干活为主。"杜清说。 杜清打心眼儿里感觉,中国人在那边的贡献挺大。"比如基础设施的建设,社区、道路、铁路建设。" "那边发展得很快,大型连锁超市啊、很多基础设施都建起来了。"杜清说。 在安哥拉,大多数当地人对中国人是友好的。谢霏说:"大部分人对中国态度都挺热情。听说,有其他中国公司还和非洲当地人一起办晚会呢,一起玩得很开心。 "当地的交警执法也比较严,他们会注意到你的车上有没有灭火器,是否带护照,是否违反交通规则。如果出现问题,会有金钱上的惩罚。有时候移民局也要查护照。"杜清说。 "不过,他们对于当地人或许没有这么严格。"谢霏说。 在安哥拉,人身安全一直是杜清所重视的。"靠自己注意安全。"杜清对记者说,"出门都要结伴,不允许一个人出去。而且出门前要跟公司报告,让领导知道你去哪里了,必须得能联系的上你。" 平日工作辛苦,谢霏和杜清都会期待一周一次的休息日。"公司组织去过一个小岛,风景很美,还可以吃龙虾自助餐。还去过当地的月亮湾,有天然形成的大坑地貌。"谢霏说。
Chinese People in Africa: An Inside View Into Their Daily Lives (Translation) Part 5 – Angola
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the fifth installment in the six-part series.
Rule of Law Reporter Ji Dongye Translation by Erik Myxter
Du Qing (pseudonym) is one of Beijing Construction Group's electrical engineers. Since the beginning of 2009 until the end of 2012 he was in West Africa's Angola. Because the project was completed, 32-year-old Du Qing came back from Angola to China. Because of his family he does not plan to come back to Angola again.
Du Qing's company's project was in a suburb of Angola's capital. After more than 27 years of civil war, the inequality between the rich and the poor has become a huge phenomenon. "Here there are many Chinese people. It is said that the local population (of Angola) is around 20 million people, where the population of Chinese people here is 260,000. But the foundation of the Chinese in Angola are people who come to work on a project, do business or are migrant workers, there aren't any people who are immigrating here to stay." He said, "There are many engineers and also some people who engage in foreign trade."
The rhythm of live in Angola is not particularly fast. Here the local people go to work at nine in the morning and get off of work at three in the afternoon. That being said, many of the Chinese people will work overtime.
Some Chinese people find it difficult to accept Angola's leisurely lifestyle. "At customs, the workers inspect baggage in a laid-back manner. This will make the Chinese people who are eager to go home very worried." Du Qing says.
Every time he goes to the supermarket checkout Du Qing must sort out his money and put it on the counter. "In the past some Chinese people did not head to this custom and they threw money at the worker, if you do that the (Angolan) people will be very angry."
Working in Angola is hard, but the salary is comparatively higher so there are many people who still come here. "Chinese people are very hard working, they especially can eat bitterness and worked tirelessly. Chinese people can easily take all of these jobs in Africa."
Before he went abroad, Du Qing's company gave him relatively good amount of training, but now there is less training available and it just mostly covers safety.
Xie Fei (pseudonym) and Du Qing worked for the same company doing office administrative work for almost two years. Xie Fei told Rule of Law reporters "before I left, the company would be united in giving anti-infectious disease vaccines."
"In that company and at China Iron and CITIC we usually could not go out alone. We don't have much contact with other projects Chinese people are doing. Most often we are focused on doing our work." Du Qing said.
Du Qing genuinely felt that Chinese people have made a large contribution over there. "For example we have constructed basic infrastructure, residential areas, roads and railways."
"The economy is developing quickly over there, there are large supermarket chains and tons of infrastructure has been built up." Du Qing said.
In Angola, most of the local people are very friendly towards Chinese people. Xie Fei says: "Most of the people are very enthused about China's attitude. I have heard that some other Chinese company's host parties with their local African employees; everyone gets together and has a great time.
"Local traffic police enforcement is relatively strict, they can stop you to see if you have a fire extinguisher inside your car or if you brought your passport or if you broke one of the traffic rules." Du Qing said. "But on the other hand, they are not as strict with the local population." Xie Fei said.
In Angola, personal safety is always Du Qing focal point. "You must rely on yourself to be safe." Du Qing told the reporter, "When you go outside you want to go with someone else, do not go out alone. Also before you go out you want to tell your company. Let your leaders know where you are going and if they need to how can they get in contact with you."
A normal day's work is very hard, Xie Fei and Du Qing both only had one day off a week. "The company's organization structure is like a small island, where the scenery was beautiful, and I could eat all the shrimp I wanted. I also had the chance to go to Moon Bay, which was naturally formed by crater landscape." Xie Fei said.
法治周末记者 汲东野
杜清(化名)是北京建工集团一名机电工程师。从2009年初到2012年年底,他在西非国家安哥拉待了近四年时间。随着一期工程完工,32岁的杜清从安哥拉回国。因为家庭原因,以后不打算再出去了。
杜清公司的项目在安哥拉的首都郊区。经历过27年内战,首都存在贫富差距现象。"这里的中国人很多。据说当地一共有人口两千万左右,中国人就占到二十六万。不过基本都是过去做项目或经商的流动人员,没有移民过去留下的。"他说,"工程类的多,还有一些搞外贸生意的。"
安哥拉人的生活节奏不是特别快,当地人上午九点上班,下午三点就下班了。不过,在那的中国人还是会加班干点活。
对于安哥拉的悠闲,有些中国人还是很难接受。"在海关的时候,他们会不慌不忙地检查你的行李。这就会让回家心切的中国人很着急。"杜清说。
每次去超市,结账时,杜清都要把钱整理好,把手放在柜台上,"板正地给"。"以前有些中国人不注意这个,扔给人家,人家就会很生气。"
在安哥拉工作也很辛苦,但相对于更高的工资,还是有很多人来到这里。"中国人很勤劳,特别能吃苦耐劳。这些在非洲的活儿,中国人干起来得心应手。"
以前出国时,杜清的公司会给比较多的培训,现在少了,主要都是讲安全方面。
谢霏(化名)和杜清就职于同一家企业,她在非洲做办公行政工作接近两年时间。她告诉法治周末记者:"过去之前,公司会统一打一些防传染疾病的疫苗。"
"在那边的公司还有中铁、中信等。不过,我们一般不会一个人出去,和别的工程的中国人接触的也不太多,平时主要还是以干活为主。"杜清说。
杜清打心眼儿里感觉,中国人在那边的贡献挺大。"比如基础设施的建设,社区、道路、铁路建设。"
"那边发展得很快,大型连锁超市啊、很多基础设施都建起来了。"杜清说。
在安哥拉,大多数当地人对中国人是友好的。谢霏说:"大部分人对中国态度都挺热情。听说,有其他中国公司还和非洲当地人一起办晚会呢,一起玩得很开心。
"当地的交警执法也比较严,他们会注意到你的车上有没有灭火器,是否带护照,是否违反交通规则。如果出现问题,会有金钱上的惩罚。有时候移民局也要查护照。"杜清说。
"不过,他们对于当地人或许没有这么严格。"谢霏说。
在安哥拉,人身安全一直是杜清所重视的。"靠自己注意安全。"杜清对记者说,"出门都要结伴,不允许一个人出去。而且出门前要跟公司报告,让领导知道你去哪里了,必须得能联系的上你。"
平日工作辛苦,谢霏和杜清都会期待一周一次的休息日。"公司组织去过一个小岛,风景很美,还可以吃龙虾自助餐。还去过当地的月亮湾,有天然形成的大坑地貌。"谢霏说。
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the first installment in the six-part series. Chinese People in Africa: An Inside View into Their Daily Lives (Translation) April 24th 2013 1:27am Source: Rule of Law Weekly Reporter: Gao Jin Translation by Erik Myxter Although it acts as a major transportation hub for several continents, today the Dubai airport feels a bit like a Chinese airport. Look around and about 80% of who you will see are Chinese business men, company employees, government officials and workers. Their next stop: Africa. On March of this year the newly appointed head of China, Xi Jinping arrived in Africa to make visits to Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo. He also was one of the major leaders to attend the fifth ever BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa. Although Africa's economy has a weak foundation and its infrastructure is in need of improvement, however the area is rapidly developing and the potential market is huge. With each passing day Chinese-African relations are becoming deeper, and more and more Chinese people are choosing this completely wild and hopeful land to work and live. But for many people who have not been to Africa, Africa still is somewhat of a mystery. Where in Africa are there Chinese people? What do they do for work? How do they live? What kind of "African Rules" have they encountered? Nigeria Rule of Law Weekly reporter Gao Jin Five years ago, Zhou Yifeng (pseudonym) was sent to work for a company in Nigeria. Before this time he had already gone to Egypt, Kenya and a few other countries for short vacations, so when he was preparing to go to Nigeria, he wasn't very worried. When he arrived, Zhou Yifeng still felt the same: "It has been a little better than I expected. I hadn't had any culture shock." More differences started to become apparent in his experiences with customers and his living environment. As an employee of a major Chinese automotive parts company, Zhou Yifeng's work in Nigeria made him often have to deal with other local businesses. "The local people have respect for big Chinese companies", he said. Outside of his time at work, Zhou Yifeng likes to hang out or stay at his home. In his eyes, Africa is like a semi-virgin land. "If it is a country with a good environment, and has law and order, I can lead a long life here", he said. 作为几大洲的交通枢纽,如今的迪拜机场有些像中国国内机场,到处都是中国人的面孔。商务人士、公司职员、国内官员、务工人员……80%的中国人,下一站会是非洲。 今年3月,新任国家主席习近平也来到了非洲,并出访坦桑尼亚, 南非和刚果(布)三国,还出席在南非德班举行的金砖国家领导人第五次会晤。 非洲经济底子薄,基础设施待完善,但却是一个快速发展的地方,市场潜力巨大。在中非关系日益深化的今天,越来越多的中国人选择来到这片充满野性和希望的大陆上,工作、生活。 而对于许多并未到过非洲的国人来说,非洲却依然显得有些神秘。 那些在非洲的中国人,怎样工作、生活?他们遭遇过怎样的"非洲规则"? 法治周末记者采访了6位在非工作、生活的国人,他们在不同国家、从事着不同职业。每个人都有一段真实而独特的非洲故事。 尼日利亚 法治周末记者 高欣 5年前,赵一峰(化名)被公司派往尼日利亚。之前,他已去过埃及,肯尼亚等地做短期旅游,所以赴尼日利亚之前,他并未有太大担心。 到了当地,赵一峰还是感觉到:"比想象中要好一些。没有文化冲击。" 更多的差异,体现在客户和生活环境上。 作为国内某大型汽车零部件企业员工,赵一峰在尼日利亚的工作经常需要和当地企业及有关部门打交道。"当地人对来自中国的大企业多是尊敬的。"他说。 工作以外的时间,赵一峰或闲逛、或宅在家。在他看来,非洲就像是一片半处女地。"如果是环境好、治安好的国家,是可以长期生活的。"他说。
Chinese People in Africa: An Inside View Into Their Daily Lives (Translation) Part 1 – Intro / Nigeria
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the first installment in the six-part series.
Chinese People in Africa: An Inside View into Their Daily Lives (Translation)
April 24th 2013 1:27am Source: Rule of Law Weekly Reporter: Gao Jin Translation by Erik Myxter
Although it acts as a major transportation hub for several continents, today the Dubai airport feels a bit like a Chinese airport. Look around and about 80% of who you will see are Chinese business men, company employees, government officials and workers. Their next stop: Africa.
On March of this year the newly appointed head of China, Xi Jinping arrived in Africa to make visits to Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo. He also was one of the major leaders to attend the fifth ever BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa.
Although Africa's economy has a weak foundation and its infrastructure is in need of improvement, however the area is rapidly developing and the potential market is huge. With each passing day Chinese-African relations are becoming deeper, and more and more Chinese people are choosing this completely wild and hopeful land to work and live.
But for many people who have not been to Africa, Africa still is somewhat of a mystery.
Where in Africa are there Chinese people? What do they do for work? How do they live? What kind of "African Rules" have they encountered?
Rule of Law Weekly reporter Gao Jin
Five years ago, Zhou Yifeng (pseudonym) was sent to work for a company in Nigeria. Before this time he had already gone to Egypt, Kenya and a few other countries for short vacations, so when he was preparing to go to Nigeria, he wasn't very worried.
When he arrived, Zhou Yifeng still felt the same: "It has been a little better than I expected. I hadn't had any culture shock."
More differences started to become apparent in his experiences with customers and his living environment.
As an employee of a major Chinese automotive parts company, Zhou Yifeng's work in Nigeria made him often have to deal with other local businesses. "The local people have respect for big Chinese companies", he said.
Outside of his time at work, Zhou Yifeng likes to hang out or stay at his home. In his eyes, Africa is like a semi-virgin land. "If it is a country with a good environment, and has law and order, I can lead a long life here", he said.
作为几大洲的交通枢纽,如今的迪拜机场有些像中国国内机场,到处都是中国人的面孔。商务人士、公司职员、国内官员、务工人员……80%的中国人,下一站会是非洲。
今年3月,新任国家主席习近平也来到了非洲,并出访坦桑尼亚, 南非和刚果(布)三国,还出席在南非德班举行的金砖国家领导人第五次会晤。
非洲经济底子薄,基础设施待完善,但却是一个快速发展的地方,市场潜力巨大。在中非关系日益深化的今天,越来越多的中国人选择来到这片充满野性和希望的大陆上,工作、生活。
而对于许多并未到过非洲的国人来说,非洲却依然显得有些神秘。
那些在非洲的中国人,怎样工作、生活?他们遭遇过怎样的"非洲规则"?
法治周末记者采访了6位在非工作、生活的国人,他们在不同国家、从事着不同职业。每个人都有一段真实而独特的非洲故事。
法治周末记者 高欣
5年前,赵一峰(化名)被公司派往尼日利亚。之前,他已去过埃及,肯尼亚等地做短期旅游,所以赴尼日利亚之前,他并未有太大担心。
到了当地,赵一峰还是感觉到:"比想象中要好一些。没有文化冲击。"
更多的差异,体现在客户和生活环境上。
作为国内某大型汽车零部件企业员工,赵一峰在尼日利亚的工作经常需要和当地企业及有关部门打交道。"当地人对来自中国的大企业多是尊敬的。"他说。
工作以外的时间,赵一峰或闲逛、或宅在家。在他看来,非洲就像是一片半处女地。"如果是环境好、治安好的国家,是可以长期生活的。"他说。
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the fourth installment in the six-part series. Gabon Rule of Law Reporter Yi Li Translation by Erik Myxter May is just around the corner and Li Qiang (pseudonym) an employ at a large state owned company is busy packing her suitcase. Her destination is Africa's Republic of Gabon. This country is located in the middle of Africa's east coast. On August 17, 1960, Gabon declared independence from France. On April 20th 1974 China and Gabon instated diplomatic relations. Li Qiang's reason to go to such a distant land was because of work. "We can choose to go to Africa, South America or the Middle East." Li Qiang said. Because he wanted a larger salary so he could prepare to buy a house on his returns home, he chose the cost-effective option of going to Africa. In fact, Li Qiang is no longer a stranger to Gabon because last summer he spent a year's time in the rural areas of Gabon, doing the same type of work he is doing now. In order to make sure of employees safety, the company employees a teacher who teaches close-combat skills, fortunately on his last trip to Africa he did not have to use these skills. Gabon has two points that took this young Chinese man by surprise. "First although there are a few rich people, the local countryside is still relatively backwards. Secondly, people are very friendly towards Chinese people." Li Qiang explains, in Gabon he has seen many houses, many of them are made of wood, he rarely sees buildings that have reinforced concrete. Because Li Qiang works in a company with closed-end management techniques, he is not able to freely go on vacation in this tropical country. "Our passports are all with the company for safekeeping". Li Qiang said. The main reason behind doing is for the consideration of staff safety. "Gabon's police enforcement is very strict." Li Qiang told our Rule of Law reporter. In his view, the local order was good. When Li Qiang's company hired some local young people he saw, "The contract must be signed on a month-to-month basis, this showed me there is a strong local awareness of the protection of worker's rights. Also when you terminate a contract, not only does one must go through some troublesome procedures, but the company also has to compensate the local workers." On a normal day, except for eating and sleeping, the company's Chinese and Gabonese staffs are always together and get along very harmoniously. After the two groups became harmonious, Li Qiang found Gabonese people's personalities have special characteristics. "They are very content with their lives, this is very unlike doing business with local Chinese people who are always working actively to make more money." However, the content Gabonese people also can very easily smell a business opportunity when they see Chinese people. Many street peddlers' can speak a few words of Chinese. Li Qiang said; "On the one hand they are envious of China's ability to develop so quickly, but on the other hand they are very willing to work with Chinese people do to business. In accordance with Gabonese's law, it is forbidden to trade Ivory. In 1981 the central African states wrote legislation forbidding the killing of elephants. However, today there are still many foreigners who take the risk because of the potential earnings they can make. Li Qiang disclosed that Chinese firms have banned employees from buying ivory products, and his company has never had an individual try to buy ivory. This is related to how thorough Gabon's custom's inspection handles affairs where the consequences can range from "fines to not being able to re-enter the country." One could easily sum up Li Qiang's life in Africa as being very relaxed. Outside of work he has a lot of free time. The other young workers are the same as him in often watching movies from their removable hard drives during their free time. "I rely on this (watching movies) to pass the time." In rural Gabon, people mainly rely on collecting plants, fruits, roots and hunting to get food. Most of everyday living products are "made in China", but the availability of them is limited and the prices are high. For example, the local villagers consider cameras, cell phones and other electronic goods luxury items. "You can sell a feature phone in China from 200-300 Yuan, but in Gabon the price for a phone converted into RMB would equal more than 1000 Yuan. " Li Qiang said. Outside of State Owned Enterprises, there are a good amount of Chinese businessmen who are in Gabon panning for gold. Some others run small convenience stores and some others come to Gabon to buy wood to export to China. The Gabonese people see the same thing as the Chinese people. Chinese people see this African country has much room for development and is "full of hope". For his own reasons it has been a more practical option to come to Gabon to work in order to scrape together a down payment to buy a house in China. Li Qiang hopes that his time in Gabon won't last too long. 加蓬 法治周末记者 尹丽 五月渐近,某大型国企工作人员李强(化名)开始忙碌地收拾行囊。 他的目的地,是非洲加蓬共和国。这是一个位于非洲中部东海岸的国家。1960年8月17日,加蓬脱离法国统治独立。1974年4月20日,中国与加蓬建交。 而李强之所以要前往这个遥远的国度,是因为工作需要。 "我们可以选择去非洲、南美洲还是中东地区。"李强说,自己因为希望有更多收入,好为回国买房做准备,于是选择了"性价比"相对较高的非洲。 事实上,加蓬对于李强而言,已经并不陌生。去年夏天,他就曾在加蓬农村地区呆过大半年的时间。同样是因为工作。 公司为了确保员工的安全,请人教授赴非洲的员工近身格斗技巧。但在上一次的非洲之旅中,李强庆幸自己没能用上。 加蓬有两点让这个中国青年人感到意外:"一是当地农村还比较落后,虽然也有一些人富裕起来了。二是人们对中国人挺友善。" 李强介绍,在加蓬,自己看到的多数房子,都是木头搭成的简陋住所。很少看到钢筋混凝土的建筑物。 由于李强所在的公司采用封闭式管理,他无法自由地在这个热带国家游玩。"我们的护照都是公司统一保管"。李强说,这也主要是为员工的安全问题考虑。 "加蓬的警察管理执法很严格。"李强告诉法治周末记者。在他看来,当地治安还不错。 李强所在的公司在加蓬当地聘请了一些青年,"合同一个月一签。当地保护工人权益的意识很强。如果中途解约,不仅手续麻烦,还需要赔偿当地工人"。 平日里,除了吃饭睡觉,公司的中国工人和加蓬工人都在一起,相处也很融洽。与他们接触后,李强眼中的加蓬人的性格特点是"很知足常乐,不像在当地做生意的中国人,总是很积极地努力干活挣钱"。 但是,知足常乐的加蓬人,也很容易就从远道而来的中国人身上嗅到了商机。 很多当地的小贩,都会说几个中国词。李强说:"他们一方面羡慕中国能发展得那么快,一方面也很愿意和中国人做生意。" 依据加蓬法律,象牙是禁止交易的。1981年,这个中非国家就已经立法禁止捕杀大象。然而,在利益的驱使下,还是有不少外国人铤而走险。 李强透露,中国公司明令禁止员工购买象牙制品,公司也从来没有人会购买象牙。因为如被加蓬海关查获,后果"轻则罚款,重则不准再次入境"。 总的来说,李强在非洲的日子还算轻松。工作之外,他有大把的闲暇时间。公司的年轻人和他一样,人手一个移动硬盘,里面都是各自喜欢的电影。"就靠这个打发时间了。" 在加蓬农村,人们主要靠采集植物的果实、根茎以及捕猎来获得食物。生活用品多是"中国制造"。但是不仅数量很少,价格也贵。 而相机、手机等电子产品,对当地农村人来说,更是奢侈品。 "一部2G手机,中国可能也就卖两三百元。但在加蓬,价格折算成人民币要一千多元。"李强说。 除了国企之外,不少中国生意人也在加蓬淘金。他们有的做日用品生意,有的从加蓬买木材出口到中国。就像加蓬人眼中的中国一样,中国人眼中的这个非洲国家,也有很大的发展空间,"充满希望"。 对他自己而言,更为实际的是,能够顺利争取到再次赴加蓬工作的机会,接着凑在中国买房的首付。李强希望,这一次的加蓬之旅,时间不要太长。
Chinese People in Africa: An Inside View Into Their Daily Lives (Translation)Part 4 – Gabon
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the fourth installment in the six-part series.
Rule of Law Reporter Yi Li Translation by Erik Myxter
May is just around the corner and Li Qiang (pseudonym) an employ at a large state owned company is busy packing her suitcase.
Her destination is Africa's Republic of Gabon. This country is located in the middle of Africa's east coast. On August 17, 1960, Gabon declared independence from France. On April 20th 1974 China and Gabon instated diplomatic relations.
Li Qiang's reason to go to such a distant land was because of work.
"We can choose to go to Africa, South America or the Middle East." Li Qiang said. Because he wanted a larger salary so he could prepare to buy a house on his returns home, he chose the cost-effective option of going to Africa.
In fact, Li Qiang is no longer a stranger to Gabon because last summer he spent a year's time in the rural areas of Gabon, doing the same type of work he is doing now.
In order to make sure of employees safety, the company employees a teacher who teaches close-combat skills, fortunately on his last trip to Africa he did not have to use these skills.
Gabon has two points that took this young Chinese man by surprise. "First although there are a few rich people, the local countryside is still relatively backwards. Secondly, people are very friendly towards Chinese people."
Li Qiang explains, in Gabon he has seen many houses, many of them are made of wood, he rarely sees buildings that have reinforced concrete.
Because Li Qiang works in a company with closed-end management techniques, he is not able to freely go on vacation in this tropical country. "Our passports are all with the company for safekeeping". Li Qiang said. The main reason behind doing is for the consideration of staff safety.
"Gabon's police enforcement is very strict." Li Qiang told our Rule of Law reporter. In his view, the local order was good.
When Li Qiang's company hired some local young people he saw, "The contract must be signed on a month-to-month basis, this showed me there is a strong local awareness of the protection of worker's rights. Also when you terminate a contract, not only does one must go through some troublesome procedures, but the company also has to compensate the local workers."
On a normal day, except for eating and sleeping, the company's Chinese and Gabonese staffs are always together and get along very harmoniously. After the two groups became harmonious, Li Qiang found Gabonese people's personalities have special characteristics. "They are very content with their lives, this is very unlike doing business with local Chinese people who are always working actively to make more money."
However, the content Gabonese people also can very easily smell a business opportunity when they see Chinese people.
Many street peddlers' can speak a few words of Chinese. Li Qiang said; "On the one hand they are envious of China's ability to develop so quickly, but on the other hand they are very willing to work with Chinese people do to business.
In accordance with Gabonese's law, it is forbidden to trade Ivory. In 1981 the central African states wrote legislation forbidding the killing of elephants. However, today there are still many foreigners who take the risk because of the potential earnings they can make.
Li Qiang disclosed that Chinese firms have banned employees from buying ivory products, and his company has never had an individual try to buy ivory. This is related to how thorough Gabon's custom's inspection handles affairs where the consequences can range from "fines to not being able to re-enter the country."
One could easily sum up Li Qiang's life in Africa as being very relaxed. Outside of work he has a lot of free time. The other young workers are the same as him in often watching movies from their removable hard drives during their free time. "I rely on this (watching movies) to pass the time."
In rural Gabon, people mainly rely on collecting plants, fruits, roots and hunting to get food. Most of everyday living products are "made in China", but the availability of them is limited and the prices are high.
For example, the local villagers consider cameras, cell phones and other electronic goods luxury items.
"You can sell a feature phone in China from 200-300 Yuan, but in Gabon the price for a phone converted into RMB would equal more than 1000 Yuan. " Li Qiang said.
Outside of State Owned Enterprises, there are a good amount of Chinese businessmen who are in Gabon panning for gold. Some others run small convenience stores and some others come to Gabon to buy wood to export to China. The Gabonese people see the same thing as the Chinese people. Chinese people see this African country has much room for development and is "full of hope".
For his own reasons it has been a more practical option to come to Gabon to work in order to scrape together a down payment to buy a house in China. Li Qiang hopes that his time in Gabon won't last too long.
法治周末记者 尹丽
五月渐近,某大型国企工作人员李强(化名)开始忙碌地收拾行囊。
他的目的地,是非洲加蓬共和国。这是一个位于非洲中部东海岸的国家。1960年8月17日,加蓬脱离法国统治独立。1974年4月20日,中国与加蓬建交。
而李强之所以要前往这个遥远的国度,是因为工作需要。
"我们可以选择去非洲、南美洲还是中东地区。"李强说,自己因为希望有更多收入,好为回国买房做准备,于是选择了"性价比"相对较高的非洲。
事实上,加蓬对于李强而言,已经并不陌生。去年夏天,他就曾在加蓬农村地区呆过大半年的时间。同样是因为工作。
公司为了确保员工的安全,请人教授赴非洲的员工近身格斗技巧。但在上一次的非洲之旅中,李强庆幸自己没能用上。
加蓬有两点让这个中国青年人感到意外:"一是当地农村还比较落后,虽然也有一些人富裕起来了。二是人们对中国人挺友善。"
李强介绍,在加蓬,自己看到的多数房子,都是木头搭成的简陋住所。很少看到钢筋混凝土的建筑物。
由于李强所在的公司采用封闭式管理,他无法自由地在这个热带国家游玩。"我们的护照都是公司统一保管"。李强说,这也主要是为员工的安全问题考虑。
"加蓬的警察管理执法很严格。"李强告诉法治周末记者。在他看来,当地治安还不错。
李强所在的公司在加蓬当地聘请了一些青年,"合同一个月一签。当地保护工人权益的意识很强。如果中途解约,不仅手续麻烦,还需要赔偿当地工人"。
平日里,除了吃饭睡觉,公司的中国工人和加蓬工人都在一起,相处也很融洽。与他们接触后,李强眼中的加蓬人的性格特点是"很知足常乐,不像在当地做生意的中国人,总是很积极地努力干活挣钱"。
但是,知足常乐的加蓬人,也很容易就从远道而来的中国人身上嗅到了商机。
很多当地的小贩,都会说几个中国词。李强说:"他们一方面羡慕中国能发展得那么快,一方面也很愿意和中国人做生意。"
依据加蓬法律,象牙是禁止交易的。1981年,这个中非国家就已经立法禁止捕杀大象。然而,在利益的驱使下,还是有不少外国人铤而走险。
李强透露,中国公司明令禁止员工购买象牙制品,公司也从来没有人会购买象牙。因为如被加蓬海关查获,后果"轻则罚款,重则不准再次入境"。
总的来说,李强在非洲的日子还算轻松。工作之外,他有大把的闲暇时间。公司的年轻人和他一样,人手一个移动硬盘,里面都是各自喜欢的电影。"就靠这个打发时间了。"
在加蓬农村,人们主要靠采集植物的果实、根茎以及捕猎来获得食物。生活用品多是"中国制造"。但是不仅数量很少,价格也贵。
而相机、手机等电子产品,对当地农村人来说,更是奢侈品。
"一部2G手机,中国可能也就卖两三百元。但在加蓬,价格折算成人民币要一千多元。"李强说。
除了国企之外,不少中国生意人也在加蓬淘金。他们有的做日用品生意,有的从加蓬买木材出口到中国。就像加蓬人眼中的中国一样,中国人眼中的这个非洲国家,也有很大的发展空间,"充满希望"。
对他自己而言,更为实际的是,能够顺利争取到再次赴加蓬工作的机会,接着凑在中国买房的首付。李强希望,这一次的加蓬之旅,时间不要太长。
Ch Get a daily ...
Chinese People in Africa: An Inside View into Their Daily Lives (Translation) Part 3 – Ghana
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the second installment in the six-part series. Algeria Rule of Law weekly reporter Gao Yin Translation by Erik Myxter July 2012, Wang Qing (pseudonym) was sent the North African country Algeria to work as in human resources for a Chinese telecommunications company. Before arriving, she was worried about disease, but after she arrived she discovered that there was no need to worry. She enjoyed the friendly environment and has since gradually started to enjoy her new life. In Algeria there are many Chinese companies. The largest companies work mainly in infrastructure such as building bridges, roads and so on. Wang Qing feels that the local people are quite kind to the Chinese here, "They think Chinese people are very hard working." she said. Our company has a very mature representation department to handle local affairs, this makes room and board very convenient. Also because it is a Chinese company, the local employs believe that the Chinese workers are the boss, so there isn't much trouble with communication at work." she noted. Wang Qing's is in constant correspondence with local employees, because of that one must be proficient in English. One also must be well acquainted with local labor laws and personnel policies but even with this knowledge, the company cannot avoid sometimes having to deal with the local labor bureau. "The local people handle affairs in a laid back manner." she says. Although Wang Qing has been involved and familiar with local laws and policies, after she arrived in Africa, the company and her colleagues informed her on some important matters and gave her a formal introduction and training on the local laws and regulations. This did not have any effect on Wang Qing's very quick adaptation to Algerian life. "Sometimes Chinese people who live here complain about the food because they cannot eat pork." she said, "But the thing I love most about here is the non-polluted, blue sky. At first glance the green grasslands looks like the setting for the Lord of the Rings movies." The area has incredibly abundant natural resources, but at the same time many local people are out of work, "If they can take full advantages of their resources, the economy will grow very quickly." Living in Africa, entertainment activities are limited and not as vibrant as those in China. Living in Algeria took some time to adapt but "When I discovered Africa's attractive places, I started to fall in love with life here." she said. Her time after work is often spent with her fellow co-workers, going out to see the beautiful scenery, walking, or tasting the delicious local food. "At work I have many Algerian colleagues and they have all become good friends of mine." Wang Qing said. As for the future, Wang Qing says that she cannot stay in Africa for a long time, "Because I have family (in China)". 阿尔及利亚 法治周末记者 高欣 2012年7月,王青(化名)被所在中国某通讯企业,派至北非国家阿尔及利亚,主要负责公司的人力资源工作。 出发前,她最担心的是疾病。但过去之后,她发现并不需要担心。而当地宜人的气候,让她渐渐能够享受这里的新生活了。 在阿尔及利亚,中国企业非常多,主要是基础设施建设,如桥梁、道路等。王青感觉,当地人对中国人比较友好,"认为中国人勤奋"。 "我们公司在当地有非常成熟的代表处,衣食住行都非常方便。因为是中国公司,本地员工会认你是boss(老板),工作沟通无大障碍。"她说。 王青的工作与当地员工打交道较多,因此英语需熟练,对当地劳动法及相关人事政策需要比较了解,也免不了和当地的劳动局打交道。 "本地人办事不慌不忙。"她说。 虽然已对工作所涉及到的当地 " 法律及政策较熟悉,但王青告诉记者,她刚到非洲时,公司和同事告诉自己一些在阿的注意事项,并未正式接受过有关当地" 法律法规的介绍或培训。 这并不影响王青很快适应了在阿生活。"在这里的中国人,就是偶尔抱怨下饮食,因为不可以吃猪肉。"她说,"最喜爱的是这里没有被污染过的" 蓝天和一眼望去如电影《魔戒》中的绿草原。" 当地有非常丰富的物质和资源,但不少当地人没有工作,"如能充分利用,经济会发展非常快"。 在非生活,娱乐活动比较少,不如国内丰富。但王青觉得,这需要自己去调节适应。"只有发现了非洲有魅力的地方,同样也会适应并爱上这里的生活。"她说 工作以外的时间,她会和同事一起,或到风景区旅游,或散步,或品尝当地美食。"在公司上班的很多阿尔及利亚同事,也都成为大家的朋友。"王青说。 提及未来,王青表示不会长期呆在非洲,"为了家人"。
Chinese People in Africa: An Inside View Into Their Daily Lives (Translation) Part 2 – Algeria
Chinese law magazine "Rule of Law Weekly" interviewed six Chinese people who are working in Africa. Each individual works in a different country and they all have a story to tell. The following is the second installment in the six-part series.
Rule of Law weekly reporter Gao Yin Translation by Erik Myxter
July 2012, Wang Qing (pseudonym) was sent the North African country Algeria to work as in human resources for a Chinese telecommunications company.
Before arriving, she was worried about disease, but after she arrived she discovered that there was no need to worry. She enjoyed the friendly environment and has since gradually started to enjoy her new life.
In Algeria there are many Chinese companies. The largest companies work mainly in infrastructure such as building bridges, roads and so on. Wang Qing feels that the local people are quite kind to the Chinese here, "They think Chinese people are very hard working." she said.
Our company has a very mature representation department to handle local affairs, this makes room and board very convenient. Also because it is a Chinese company, the local employs believe that the Chinese workers are the boss, so there isn't much trouble with communication at work." she noted.
Wang Qing's is in constant correspondence with local employees, because of that one must be proficient in English. One also must be well acquainted with local labor laws and personnel policies but even with this knowledge, the company cannot avoid sometimes having to deal with the local labor bureau.
"The local people handle affairs in a laid back manner." she says.
Although Wang Qing has been involved and familiar with local laws and policies, after she arrived in Africa, the company and her colleagues informed her on some important matters and gave her a formal introduction and training on the local laws and regulations.
This did not have any effect on Wang Qing's very quick adaptation to Algerian life. "Sometimes Chinese people who live here complain about the food because they cannot eat pork." she said, "But the thing I love most about here is the non-polluted, blue sky. At first glance the green grasslands looks like the setting for the Lord of the Rings movies."
The area has incredibly abundant natural resources, but at the same time many local people are out of work, "If they can take full advantages of their resources, the economy will grow very quickly."
Living in Africa, entertainment activities are limited and not as vibrant as those in China. Living in Algeria took some time to adapt but "When I discovered Africa's attractive places, I started to fall in love with life here." she said.
Her time after work is often spent with her fellow co-workers, going out to see the beautiful scenery, walking, or tasting the delicious local food. "At work I have many Algerian colleagues and they have all become good friends of mine." Wang Qing said.
As for the future, Wang Qing says that she cannot stay in Africa for a long time, "Because I have family (in China)".
2012年7月,王青(化名)被所在中国某通讯企业,派至北非国家阿尔及利亚,主要负责公司的人力资源工作。
出发前,她最担心的是疾病。但过去之后,她发现并不需要担心。而当地宜人的气候,让她渐渐能够享受这里的新生活了。
在阿尔及利亚,中国企业非常多,主要是基础设施建设,如桥梁、道路等。王青感觉,当地人对中国人比较友好,"认为中国人勤奋"。
"我们公司在当地有非常成熟的代表处,衣食住行都非常方便。因为是中国公司,本地员工会认你是boss(老板),工作沟通无大障碍。"她说。
王青的工作与当地员工打交道较多,因此英语需熟练,对当地劳动法及相关人事政策需要比较了解,也免不了和当地的劳动局打交道。
"本地人办事不慌不忙。"她说。
虽然已对工作所涉及到的当地 " 法律及政策较熟悉,但王青告诉记者,她刚到非洲时,公司和同事告诉自己一些在阿的注意事项,并未正式接受过有关当地" 法律法规的介绍或培训。
这并不影响王青很快适应了在阿生活。"在这里的中国人,就是偶尔抱怨下饮食,因为不可以吃猪肉。"她说,"最喜爱的是这里没有被污染过的" 蓝天和一眼望去如电影《魔戒》中的绿草原。"
当地有非常丰富的物质和资源,但不少当地人没有工作,"如能充分利用,经济会发展非常快"。
在非生活,娱乐活动比较少,不如国内丰富。但王青觉得,这需要自己去调节适应。"只有发现了非洲有魅力的地方,同样也会适应并爱上这里的生活。"她说
工作以外的时间,她会和同事一起,或到风景区旅游,或散步,或品尝当地美食。"在公司上班的很多阿尔及利亚同事,也都成为大家的朋友。"王青说。
提及未来,王青表示不会长期呆在非洲,"为了家人"。
Re Get a daily ...
Will Western Media Report Good News About the Chinese in Africa?
At least in the governmental level, promoting "people-to-people exchange" between China and Africa was mentioned all the time. However, most of the people-to-people interactions between Chinese and Africans are not through government initiatives of sending a group of African students to a Chinese university in Zhejiang Province, or dispatching a medical team from a Chinese hospital to the hinterland of Congo. Daily "people-to-people interaction" can be violent and nasty. On 19th June 2012, the day this blog entrance is being written, "more than 100 Africans protested…outside a police station in China's southern Guangdong province after an African man died in police custody", reported by Reuters. This has caused severe traffic jam in the area, and through the photos we can find armed police trying to maintain the order around a large group of Africans in the middle of the road. This is not the first time Africans rioted on the street of Guangzhou, the city which hosts more than 200,000 Africans (see my blog post series in July 2011). In 2009, a similar incident happened – over 100 Africans protested against the Guangzhou authority after a Nigerian man was killed in an immigration raid led by the city's police. In one of my blog entrances, I narrated my experience of witnessing many African demonstrators standing against the angry city policemen. How should we look at this new social problem in China, a country so homogenous in its racial profile now confronting with international migration issues? In these years increasing number of scholars have involved in researching the African community in China. The most famous work is the published book by the University of Hong Kong researcher Dr. Adams Bodomo after thorough study of the community. Dr. Bodomo showed deep concern of Chinese police's incompetence and brutality while dealing with African migrants in Guangzhou. He urged African diplomats to raise this issue to the governmental level talks with China, such as Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). However, if the real issue is racial discrimination, can government initiatives really solve the problem? For years, I was terrified to find how Chinese people describe Africans. If you randomly go to a Chinese online discussion forum (or called BBS, a social media platform), you probably will be horrified by hearing how people comment on the Africans in their mind. I translate some into English here: "A large number of blacks caused many social problems in China, such as fights, rapes, drug trafficking, seducing Chinese girls, spreading AIDS, and child of mixed parentage after marring Chinese women. This is hideous!" "China belongs to the Chinese. The ancestors leave us land for yellow skin and black hair Chinese people to settle down. We can't let it become a colony of alien's breeds." "I want to throw up when I see these blacks…I can't believe they are going after our Chinese women! They are going to spread AIDS in our city now!" Please refer here and here for links to the online bulletin boards where these messages were posted (in Chinese). Generally speaking, today, no matter whether a Chinese actually encountered an African in his or her life, the impression has already been pre-occupied with negative images over the Africans from the media, movies and some shallow knowledge of the colonial history. They often think Africans are ugly, poor, crazy, uneducated and violent. Most of the Chinese would never want to deal with them. I believe in the mind of some policemen in Guangzhou who have probably been tired of dealing with the illegal activities incurred by the African community, "African people must go back and give a cleaner place back to us." The situation is laying a clear picture in front of us. On one side, government officials talk about people-to-people exchange and praise the historical friendship between China and Africa. On the other side – the grassroots side – Chinese people continuously impose their discrimination against Africans through words and actions; and Africans under such suppression have no choice but to riot and strive for their basic human rights in China. Or thousands of miles away, some African government may even decide to raid the Chinese trader communities in order to retaliate. What a messy picture of misunderstandings! When will the vicious circle stop? UPDATE: Jun 20th, 2012 Additional thoughts: I hope to let the Africans in China know this. When protesting in the public, it is really not wise to block the road to cause traffic congestion. Chinese people are not used to public protest, and they wouldn't tolerate a group of foreigners (especially Africans who they dislike) to block the traffic in China for any justified reason. Given the discrimination against Africans amongst the general public, what Africans were doing on the 19th June will only increase Chinese' antipathy against the African communities in Guangzhou. I have already seen Chinese commenting on this incident online, and the comments are generally negative, nationalist and racist. We shouldn't let this trend to continue.
Anti-African Discrimination on the Rise in China
At least in the governmental level, promoting "people-to-people exchange" between China and Africa was mentioned all the time. However, most of the people-to-people interactions between Chinese and Africans are not through government initiatives of sending a group of African students to a Chinese university in Zhejiang Province, or dispatching a medical team from a Chinese hospital to the hinterland of Congo.
Daily "people-to-people interaction" can be violent and nasty.
On 19th June 2012, the day this blog entrance is being written, "more than 100 Africans protested…outside a police station in China's southern Guangdong province after an African man died in police custody", reported by Reuters. This has caused severe traffic jam in the area, and through the photos we can find armed police trying to maintain the order around a large group of Africans in the middle of the road.
This is not the first time Africans rioted on the street of Guangzhou, the city which hosts more than 200,000 Africans (see my blog post series in July 2011). In 2009, a similar incident happened – over 100 Africans protested against the Guangzhou authority after a Nigerian man was killed in an immigration raid led by the city's police. In one of my blog entrances, I narrated my experience of witnessing many African demonstrators standing against the angry city policemen.
How should we look at this new social problem in China, a country so homogenous in its racial profile now confronting with international migration issues?
In these years increasing number of scholars have involved in researching the African community in China. The most famous work is the published book by the University of Hong Kong researcher Dr. Adams Bodomo after thorough study of the community. Dr. Bodomo showed deep concern of Chinese police's incompetence and brutality while dealing with African migrants in Guangzhou. He urged African diplomats to raise this issue to the governmental level talks with China, such as Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
However, if the real issue is racial discrimination, can government initiatives really solve the problem?
For years, I was terrified to find how Chinese people describe Africans. If you randomly go to a Chinese online discussion forum (or called BBS, a social media platform), you probably will be horrified by hearing how people comment on the Africans in their mind. I translate some into English here:
"A large number of blacks caused many social problems in China, such as fights, rapes, drug trafficking, seducing Chinese girls, spreading AIDS, and child of mixed parentage after marring Chinese women. This is hideous!"
"China belongs to the Chinese. The ancestors leave us land for yellow skin and black hair Chinese people to settle down. We can't let it become a colony of alien's breeds."
"I want to throw up when I see these blacks…I can't believe they are going after our Chinese women! They are going to spread AIDS in our city now!"
Please refer here and here for links to the online bulletin boards where these messages were posted (in Chinese).
Generally speaking, today, no matter whether a Chinese actually encountered an African in his or her life, the impression has already been pre-occupied with negative images over the Africans from the media, movies and some shallow knowledge of the colonial history. They often think Africans are ugly, poor, crazy, uneducated and violent. Most of the Chinese would never want to deal with them. I believe in the mind of some policemen in Guangzhou who have probably been tired of dealing with the illegal activities incurred by the African community, "African people must go back and give a cleaner place back to us."
The situation is laying a clear picture in front of us. On one side, government officials talk about people-to-people exchange and praise the historical friendship between China and Africa. On the other side – the grassroots side – Chinese people continuously impose their discrimination against Africans through words and actions; and Africans under such suppression have no choice but to riot and strive for their basic human rights in China. Or thousands of miles away, some African government may even decide to raid the Chinese trader communities in order to retaliate.
What a messy picture of misunderstandings! When will the vicious circle stop?
UPDATE: Jun 20th, 2012
Additional thoughts: I hope to let the Africans in China know this. When protesting in the public, it is really not wise to block the road to cause traffic congestion. Chinese people are not used to public protest, and they wouldn't tolerate a group of foreigners (especially Africans who they dislike) to block the traffic in China for any justified reason. Given the discrimination against Africans amongst the general public, what Africans were doing on the 19th June will only increase Chinese' antipathy against the African communities in Guangzhou. I have already seen Chinese commenting on this incident online, and the comments are generally negative, nationalist and racist. We shouldn't let this trend to continue.
The controversial 2007 Sicomines infrastructure-for-natural resources deal between China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a milestone in Sino-Africa ties as it's one of the largest agreements of its kind on record. Originally valued at 9 billion dollars (it has seen been reduced), the deal stunned many in the West, particularly at the International Monetary Fund, as it was widely interpreted as a direct challenge to the half-century old order that governs Western management of aid and development assistance in Africa. For more on why the Sicomines deal is so controversial and how it was portrayed in the Western media, watch BBC Newsnight's special coverage: part 1, part 2 and part 3. Johanna Jansson is a Phd candidate at Roskilde University in Demark and among the world's leading scholars on China's resource extraction policies in Africa, particularly in the DRC and Gabon. Jansson has done considerable field research in the DRC where she spent much of 2011 working on a research paper on the subject for the South African Institute of International Affairs: "The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the Democratic Republic of Congo's International Relations" (download PDF). CHINA AFRICA PROJECT: The Sicomines deal is often held up as an example of the power of the Chinese government's drive to secure natural resources in Africa. While many believe these deals emanate from a coordinated policy decision at the political level in Beijing, you contend it isn't that straight forward. If the government isn't 'ordering' this type of massive investment in the DRC then where does it come from? JOHANNA JANSSON: The Chinese government knows very well that it needs to secure access to resources to keep its economy going. This was one of the key motivations behind its 2001 Going Global Strategy, called zou chu qu in Mandarin. The essence of this strategy was that China's state-owned enterprises, the SOEs, were encouraged to 'go out'. Besides securing access to resources, the other key motivations for the Going Global Strategy were to gain experience and become competitive globally, and to gain market traction for Chinese exports. Now, we must remember that the relations between the Chinese state and China's state-owned companies are greatly complex. The Going Global Strategy does guide the Chinese SOEs' operations abroad in a broad sense. But the expansion strategies pursued by each company, and other types of decisions these companies take, are determined mainly by commercial considerations. As a matter of fact, the SOEs often fiercely compete with each other, also in African countries. Before discussing the Sicomines agreement as an indirect embodiment of the Going Global Strategy in the DRC, I'd like us to take a step back and contextualise China's foreign policy ambitions. China is not the only country pursuing goals such as those formulated in the Going Global Strategy. On the contrary, these are central foreign policy consideration for most countries. Let's take a few examples. Securing access to oil is, as we all know very well, of paramount importance to the United States. France is actively supporting its nuclear giant Areva in its endeavour to secure access to uranium in Africa. As Senate Testimony on China in Africa in November last year aptly illustrates, American politicians are seriously worried that the inroads of Chinese consumer goods to African markets threaten, not African, but American jobs, since they take over the potential markets for American products. My take on China's foreign policy endeavour, both globally and towards Africa, is therefore that it must be understood as part and parcel of the game of the contemporary global political economy. Now, let's return to the Sicomines agreement in the DRC. I argue that it should not be understood as the result of a direct order by the Chinese government. Yes, it is a result of the Going Global strategy, but less directly so than is often believed. This has to do with the dynamics of state-company relations in China that I mentioned earlier. Indeed, the large companies involved in the agreement are owned by the Chinese state. Yet the Sicomines agreement was not initiated by the Chinese government, but by the state-owned enterprise China Railway Engineering Corporation, or CREC. CREC is one of the world's largest construction companies, and it identified the concessions in the DRC as it was in the process of implementing its diversification strategy to expand into resource extraction activities. There are two links between the Sicomines agreement and the Going Global Strategy. The first is that CREC's pursuit for global markets was triggered by it at the onset. The second is that the credit lines extended by China Exim Bank are one of the most important tools to implement the Going Global Strategy. The credit line extended to the DRC was of major political importance in ensuring that CREC got access to the concessions in the DRC, where decisions to allocate concessions are taken on opaque grounds. China Exim Bank's support indicates that the Chinese leadership regards CREC's expansion into the DRC as a highly important strategic move. The Western view is that in a country like the DRC, development is more likely to occur where corruption has been reduced. A common Chinese view is the opposite: in a desperately poor country like the DRC, corruption will be reduced when economic development comes about. CAP: When the Sicomines deal was first unveiled in 2007, it was widely interpreted as a rebuff to traditional donors (US, EU, IMF, etc...) in place of an alternative, less interventionist development partner in Beijing. Was this in fact the case? JJ: Before responding to that question, I would like to stress that China is not likely to 'take over' as a donor to the DRC any time soon. The Western donors and the multilaterals remain very important to the DRC. Regarding the approaches, yes, they differ. In two main ways. First, the Chinese government is not interventionist. Some Western donors work in the DRC although they have no bilateral aid agreement with the country. One example is my own home country Sweden, which does not give bilateral aid since it does not deem the situation in terms of corruption and aid efficiency satisfactory. China would never do that. Even though its non-interference policy has softened somewhat over the past two decades, it remains firmly committed to it. It is rooted strongly in China's own experience during the 'century of humiliation' from the first opium war in 1839 to Mao's proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The second point follows from the first. China's support to the DRC is quite different from that of the West. A great deal of the Western donor community's work in the DRC concerns capacity building in terms of justice, rights and transparency. These are, for well-known reasons, not the main concerns of the Congolese government. China only provides support that is in line with the host government's priorities, both because of its non-interference stance, but also because it interprets the relation between 'corruption' and 'development' quite differently from the West. The Western view is that in a country like the DRC, development is more likely to occur where corruption has been reduced. A common Chinese view is the opposite: in a desperately poor country like the DRC, corruption will be reduced when economic development comes about. A well-placed Chinese respondent explained to me that the Chinese party in the Sicomines agreement is well aware of the corruption problems in the DRC. However, the respondent said, it is better to engage and improve the country's possibilities for economic development through infrastructure refurbishment, since economic development in turn will reduce corruption. Many listeners will now object and say that these explanations do nothing more than hide the geo-strategic reasons for China's conduct in the DRC. This is not wrong, in the sense that all external actors have strategic reasons for being active in the DRC. Not all of them have direct interests in the Congo's resources – many donors provide aid for autobiographical reasons, for example. As regards China, it has always been explicit about its own interest in the DRC's minerals. But beyond the geo-strategic dimension, anyone interested in really understanding why China does what it does in the DRC needs to take the different interpretations of 'interference' and 'governance' into account. CAP: Who has more at risk in the current configuration of the Sicomines deal, the Congolese or the Chinese? JJ: The DRC is a risky place. It is highly volatile politically. The elections in November 2011 were rife with fraud, as reported by International Crisis Group among others. As we speak in March 2012, uncertainty after the elections, as well as the recent death of the President's chief adviser Augustin Katumba Mwanke, put a break on activities for all investors, as reported by Reuters. Any analysis of the Sicomines agreement has to take this into account. As to the question of who carries the risk in the current configuration of the Sicomines deal, the views diverge. Some, including the Chinese parties to the deal, argue that given the volatile political environment and the removal of the guarantee for the returns on the investment into the mining operation, the risk is now on the Chinese side. Others argue that while the exact quantities of minerals contained by the concessions allocated to the Sino-Congolese consortium are uncertain, it is beyond a doubt sufficiently large to repay the loans extended by China Exim Bank. I think that given the situation in the DRC, it is difficult to claim the one or the other with certainty. Yes, the Chinese take an enormous risk. If the credit line towards infrastructure is fully disbursed, then China Exim Bank will have ploughed US$ 3 billion into infrastructure projects in the DRC – a big loss if it turns out that the concessions are not worth enough and the Congolese government cannot pay. But one also has to be clear about the fact that investors are interested in the DRC's mining sector because the potential returns are enormous. A representative for one mining company told me that at the same mining cost, they have a 5 percent return rate in the DRC, and 0.5 percent return rate in another operation in the developed world. It's not difficult to see, then, why companies put up with all the hassle of operating in the DRC. Higher stakes, higher returns. In other words, I would caution against any decisive conclusions in terms of the risk at this point. About Johanna Jasson Johanna Jansson is a PhD candidate in International Development Studies at the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark. Her PhD project explores the DRC's relations with its emerging and traditional development partners. Prior to resuming her studies, Johanna worked as a researcher for the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Johanna holds an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies from Umeå University, Sweden, a BA with Honours in Political Science from Stellenbosch University, and a BA in Political Science from Lund University, Sweden. Johanna has conducted field research in the DRC, Gabon, South Africa, Uganda and Cameroon.
3Qi: China's Landmark Sicomines Deal in the DR Congo
The controversial 2007 Sicomines infrastructure-for-natural resources deal between China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a milestone in Sino-Africa ties as it's one of the largest agreements of its kind on record. Originally valued at 9 billion dollars (it has seen been reduced), the deal stunned many in the West, particularly at the International Monetary Fund, as it was widely interpreted as a direct challenge to the half-century old order that governs Western management of aid and development assistance in Africa.
For more on why the Sicomines deal is so controversial and how it was portrayed in the Western media, watch BBC Newsnight's special coverage: part 1, part 2 and part 3.
Johanna Jansson is a Phd candidate at Roskilde University in Demark and among the world's leading scholars on China's resource extraction policies in Africa, particularly in the DRC and Gabon. Jansson has done considerable field research in the DRC where she spent much of 2011 working on a research paper on the subject for the South African Institute of International Affairs: "The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the Democratic Republic of Congo's International Relations" (download PDF).
CHINA AFRICA PROJECT: The Sicomines deal is often held up as an example of the power of the Chinese government's drive to secure natural resources in Africa. While many believe these deals emanate from a coordinated policy decision at the political level in Beijing, you contend it isn't that straight forward. If the government isn't 'ordering' this type of massive investment in the DRC then where does it come from?
JOHANNA JANSSON: The Chinese government knows very well that it needs to secure access to resources to keep its economy going. This was one of the key motivations behind its 2001 Going Global Strategy, called zou chu qu in Mandarin. The essence of this strategy was that China's state-owned enterprises, the SOEs, were encouraged to 'go out'. Besides securing access to resources, the other key motivations for the Going Global Strategy were to gain experience and become competitive globally, and to gain market traction for Chinese exports. Now, we must remember that the relations between the Chinese state and China's state-owned companies are greatly complex. The Going Global Strategy does guide the Chinese SOEs' operations abroad in a broad sense. But the expansion strategies pursued by each company, and other types of decisions these companies take, are determined mainly by commercial considerations. As a matter of fact, the SOEs often fiercely compete with each other, also in African countries.
Before discussing the Sicomines agreement as an indirect embodiment of the Going Global Strategy in the DRC, I'd like us to take a step back and contextualise China's foreign policy ambitions. China is not the only country pursuing goals such as those formulated in the Going Global Strategy. On the contrary, these are central foreign policy consideration for most countries. Let's take a few examples. Securing access to oil is, as we all know very well, of paramount importance to the United States. France is actively supporting its nuclear giant Areva in its endeavour to secure access to uranium in Africa. As Senate Testimony on China in Africa in November last year aptly illustrates, American politicians are seriously worried that the inroads of Chinese consumer goods to African markets threaten, not African, but American jobs, since they take over the potential markets for American products. My take on China's foreign policy endeavour, both globally and towards Africa, is therefore that it must be understood as part and parcel of the game of the contemporary global political economy.
Now, let's return to the Sicomines agreement in the DRC. I argue that it should not be understood as the result of a direct order by the Chinese government. Yes, it is a result of the Going Global strategy, but less directly so than is often believed. This has to do with the dynamics of state-company relations in China that I mentioned earlier. Indeed, the large companies involved in the agreement are owned by the Chinese state. Yet the Sicomines agreement was not initiated by the Chinese government, but by the state-owned enterprise China Railway Engineering Corporation, or CREC. CREC is one of the world's largest construction companies, and it identified the concessions in the DRC as it was in the process of implementing its diversification strategy to expand into resource extraction activities. There are two links between the Sicomines agreement and the Going Global Strategy. The first is that CREC's pursuit for global markets was triggered by it at the onset. The second is that the credit lines extended by China Exim Bank are one of the most important tools to implement the Going Global Strategy. The credit line extended to the DRC was of major political importance in ensuring that CREC got access to the concessions in the DRC, where decisions to allocate concessions are taken on opaque grounds. China Exim Bank's support indicates that the Chinese leadership regards CREC's expansion into the DRC as a highly important strategic move.
The Western view is that in a country like the DRC, development is more likely to occur where corruption has been reduced. A common Chinese view is the opposite: in a desperately poor country like the DRC, corruption will be reduced when economic development comes about.
CAP: When the Sicomines deal was first unveiled in 2007, it was widely interpreted as a rebuff to traditional donors (US, EU, IMF, etc...) in place of an alternative, less interventionist development partner in Beijing. Was this in fact the case?
JJ: Before responding to that question, I would like to stress that China is not likely to 'take over' as a donor to the DRC any time soon. The Western donors and the multilaterals remain very important to the DRC. Regarding the approaches, yes, they differ. In two main ways.
First, the Chinese government is not interventionist. Some Western donors work in the DRC although they have no bilateral aid agreement with the country. One example is my own home country Sweden, which does not give bilateral aid since it does not deem the situation in terms of corruption and aid efficiency satisfactory. China would never do that. Even though its non-interference policy has softened somewhat over the past two decades, it remains firmly committed to it. It is rooted strongly in China's own experience during the 'century of humiliation' from the first opium war in 1839 to Mao's proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
The second point follows from the first. China's support to the DRC is quite different from that of the West. A great deal of the Western donor community's work in the DRC concerns capacity building in terms of justice, rights and transparency. These are, for well-known reasons, not the main concerns of the Congolese government. China only provides support that is in line with the host government's priorities, both because of its non-interference stance, but also because it interprets the relation between 'corruption' and 'development' quite differently from the West. The Western view is that in a country like the DRC, development is more likely to occur where corruption has been reduced. A common Chinese view is the opposite: in a desperately poor country like the DRC, corruption will be reduced when economic development comes about. A well-placed Chinese respondent explained to me that the Chinese party in the Sicomines agreement is well aware of the corruption problems in the DRC. However, the respondent said, it is better to engage and improve the country's possibilities for economic development through infrastructure refurbishment, since economic development in turn will reduce corruption.
Many listeners will now object and say that these explanations do nothing more than hide the geo-strategic reasons for China's conduct in the DRC. This is not wrong, in the sense that all external actors have strategic reasons for being active in the DRC. Not all of them have direct interests in the Congo's resources – many donors provide aid for autobiographical reasons, for example. As regards China, it has always been explicit about its own interest in the DRC's minerals. But beyond the geo-strategic dimension, anyone interested in really understanding why China does what it does in the DRC needs to take the different interpretations of 'interference' and 'governance' into account.
CAP: Who has more at risk in the current configuration of the Sicomines deal, the Congolese or the Chinese?
JJ: The DRC is a risky place. It is highly volatile politically. The elections in November 2011 were rife with fraud, as reported by International Crisis Group among others. As we speak in March 2012, uncertainty after the elections, as well as the recent death of the President's chief adviser Augustin Katumba Mwanke, put a break on activities for all investors, as reported by Reuters. Any analysis of the Sicomines agreement has to take this into account.
As to the question of who carries the risk in the current configuration of the Sicomines deal, the views diverge. Some, including the Chinese parties to the deal, argue that given the volatile political environment and the removal of the guarantee for the returns on the investment into the mining operation, the risk is now on the Chinese side. Others argue that while the exact quantities of minerals contained by the concessions allocated to the Sino-Congolese consortium are uncertain, it is beyond a doubt sufficiently large to repay the loans extended by China Exim Bank. I think that given the situation in the DRC, it is difficult to claim the one or the other with certainty. Yes, the Chinese take an enormous risk. If the credit line towards infrastructure is fully disbursed, then China Exim Bank will have ploughed US$ 3 billion into infrastructure projects in the DRC – a big loss if it turns out that the concessions are not worth enough and the Congolese government cannot pay. But one also has to be clear about the fact that investors are interested in the DRC's mining sector because the potential returns are enormous. A representative for one mining company told me that at the same mining cost, they have a 5 percent return rate in the DRC, and 0.5 percent return rate in another operation in the developed world. It's not difficult to see, then, why companies put up with all the hassle of operating in the DRC. Higher stakes, higher returns. In other words, I would caution against any decisive conclusions in terms of the risk at this point.
About Johanna Jasson
Johanna Jansson is a PhD candidate in International Development Studies at the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark. Her PhD project explores the DRC's relations with its emerging and traditional development partners. Prior to resuming her studies, Johanna worked as a researcher for the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Johanna holds an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies from Umeå University, Sweden, a BA with Honours in Political Science from Stellenbosch University, and a BA in Political Science from Lund University, Sweden. Johanna has conducted field research in the DRC, Gabon, South Africa, Uganda and Cameroon.
Few African countries have closer links with China than Zambia. The relationship goes back decades and Chinese investment in Zambian copper mines have led to both economic growth and an anti-Chinese backlash. The recent arrest of four Chinese mining technicians on charges of sex with underage prostitutes is pushing this relationship into uncomfortable new territory. The miners are bored, the local women are poor - as I say, the math was pretty simple during the American gold rush and it is pretty simple in the African shantytowns surrounding big mines. The sexual math of mining is pretty simple. Mining overwhelmingly takes place far away from urban centers. Mines overwhelmingly employ men. There isn't a lot for these men to do during their free time, because the mine is so far away from the city. The local women don't have many options, because extractive industries don't tend to employ many unskilled women and they don't add much to the local communities. What follows is what a friend of mine recently called 'the less-celebrated kind of foreign direct investment'. The miners are bored, the local women are poor - as I say, the math was pretty simple during the American gold rush and it is pretty simple in the African shantytowns surrounding big mines. However, nowadays most large-scale extractive industries are dominated by multinational corporations and here the situation becomes complicated fast. Throw in the rhetoric of neo-colonial exploitation and you have an explosive combination of cultural difference, historical resentment and sex. Four Chinese technicians recently became the center of exactly this kind of miasma when they were arrested for having sex with underaged prostitutes in Zambia. The four - two carpenters, a bricklayer and a welder - worked for the China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Group in Luanshya, a poor shantytown in Zambia's Copperbelt. They are currently in jail and face anything from fifteen years to life with hard labour for indecent assault. The whole situation is clearly quite sad and sordid, but what intrigued me is that while the prosecution is basing its case on the fact that the young women were younger than sixteen, Zambia's legal age of consent, the Zambian press seems to assume that they offered their services willingly. And this is far from the only case of underage prostitution in Zambia's Copperbelt region - in fact, the implication seems to be that it is not only routine, but routinely ignored - one aspect of the desperate times facing this Copperbelt town. Some of the community members interviewed made it clear that the only reason this particular case is getting this level of attention is because the defendants are Chinese. I don't particularly wish to defend the Chinese men. If they're guilty, they're guilty of doing something despicable, even if these girls offered themselves up. But it also seems to me that these technicians have haplessly triggered some kind of post-colonial resentment bomb where sex and historical trauma become the fuel for a press bonfire. What makes it more symbolic is that China has in the past stoked exactly this kind of bonfire. In 2002 a Chinese businessman was staying in a hotel in Zhuhai when he wandered into a massive orgy involving 400 Japanese businessmen and 500 local prostitutes. The next day the hungover Japanese businessmen woke to nationalist outrage on front pages across China. The outrage was based on an unfortunate detail - the orgy took place on the exact anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China in 1931. It is unclear to which extent the Japanese businessmen were aware of the symbolic significance of the date of their shindig. However, the mix of sex and history, particularly a narrative of historical victimhood, were like gasoline and birthday candles - a perfect recipe for a bad party. In the end it didn't really matter whether they knew or not. In the bigger context of Japan's history in China the scandal took on a life of its own. It drew attention all over East Asia and the Japanese government was forced to apologize. China's lightning growth has created a new category in international relations - the aid recipient turned aid donor. To me the sex scandal in Zambia seems like a warning to China as it engages more with Africa: no continent on earth has a bigger historical chip on its shoulder than Africa. Nowhere else is the grappling with historical victimhood closer to the surface. With more Chinese moving to Africa, with more rural underdevelopment coming face to face with Chinese workers with money, and especially with African journalists and politicians (like Zambia's own Michael Sata) describing the China-Africa relationship as a new form of colonialism, we can expect many more sex-and-history bombs in the future. ZAMBIA : Chinese Underage Sex Scandal Sparks Emotive Debate - IPS ipsnews.net. 'I stepped out of the lift and into an orgy' - Telegraph.
China's Zambian Sex Scandal
Few African countries have closer links with China than Zambia. The relationship goes back decades and Chinese investment in Zambian copper mines have led to both economic growth and an anti-Chinese backlash. The recent arrest of four Chinese mining technicians on charges of sex with underage prostitutes is pushing this relationship into uncomfortable new territory.
The miners are bored, the local women are poor - as I say, the math was pretty simple during the American gold rush and it is pretty simple in the African shantytowns surrounding big mines.
The sexual math of mining is pretty simple. Mining overwhelmingly takes place far away from urban centers. Mines overwhelmingly employ men. There isn't a lot for these men to do during their free time, because the mine is so far away from the city. The local women don't have many options, because extractive industries don't tend to employ many unskilled women and they don't add much to the local communities. What follows is what a friend of mine recently called 'the less-celebrated kind of foreign direct investment'. The miners are bored, the local women are poor - as I say, the math was pretty simple during the American gold rush and it is pretty simple in the African shantytowns surrounding big mines.
However, nowadays most large-scale extractive industries are dominated by multinational corporations and here the situation becomes complicated fast. Throw in the rhetoric of neo-colonial exploitation and you have an explosive combination of cultural difference, historical resentment and sex. Four Chinese technicians recently became the center of exactly this kind of miasma when they were arrested for having sex with underaged prostitutes in Zambia. The four - two carpenters, a bricklayer and a welder - worked for the China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Group in Luanshya, a poor shantytown in Zambia's Copperbelt. They are currently in jail and face anything from fifteen years to life with hard labour for indecent assault. The whole situation is clearly quite sad and sordid, but what intrigued me is that while the prosecution is basing its case on the fact that the young women were younger than sixteen, Zambia's legal age of consent, the Zambian press seems to assume that they offered their services willingly. And this is far from the only case of underage prostitution in Zambia's Copperbelt region - in fact, the implication seems to be that it is not only routine, but routinely ignored - one aspect of the desperate times facing this Copperbelt town. Some of the community members interviewed made it clear that the only reason this particular case is getting this level of attention is because the defendants are Chinese.
I don't particularly wish to defend the Chinese men. If they're guilty, they're guilty of doing something despicable, even if these girls offered themselves up. But it also seems to me that these technicians have haplessly triggered some kind of post-colonial resentment bomb where sex and historical trauma become the fuel for a press bonfire. What makes it more symbolic is that China has in the past stoked exactly this kind of bonfire.
In 2002 a Chinese businessman was staying in a hotel in Zhuhai when he wandered into a massive orgy involving 400 Japanese businessmen and 500 local prostitutes. The next day the hungover Japanese businessmen woke to nationalist outrage on front pages across China. The outrage was based on an unfortunate detail - the orgy took place on the exact anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China in 1931. It is unclear to which extent the Japanese businessmen were aware of the symbolic significance of the date of their shindig. However, the mix of sex and history, particularly a narrative of historical victimhood, were like gasoline and birthday candles - a perfect recipe for a bad party. In the end it didn't really matter whether they knew or not. In the bigger context of Japan's history in China the scandal took on a life of its own. It drew attention all over East Asia and the Japanese government was forced to apologize.
China's lightning growth has created a new category in international relations - the aid recipient turned aid donor. To me the sex scandal in Zambia seems like a warning to China as it engages more with Africa: no continent on earth has a bigger historical chip on its shoulder than Africa. Nowhere else is the grappling with historical victimhood closer to the surface. With more Chinese moving to Africa, with more rural underdevelopment coming face to face with Chinese workers with money, and especially with African journalists and politicians (like Zambia's own Michael Sata) describing the China-Africa relationship as a new form of colonialism, we can expect many more sex-and-history bombs in the future.
ZAMBIA : Chinese Underage Sex Scandal Sparks Emotive Debate - IPS ipsnews.net.
'I stepped out of the lift and into an orgy' - Telegraph.
Al Jazeera's King Cobra and the Dragon
From Algeria to Angola, the Chinese population across Africa is growing rapidly. In less than a decade, hundreds of thousands of immigrants have made the long journey from mainland China to cities and villages throughout the continent. Today, as this vast population settles in, they are having a transformative effect on the culture, economics and even politics of their new African communities. There are no precise figures on just how many Chinese live in Africa. Estimates, though, place the number of immigrants somewhere between 750,000 and a million continent-wide. If those estimates are accurate, it means there are more Chinese migrants living in Africa today then there were expatriate French people at the peak of their African empire in the mid-20thcentury. But just who are all these Chinese people and what draws them to Africa? It should go without saying that any population as large and diverse as the Chinese defies simple characterization. The Chinese immigrant population in Africa is extremely diverse across all lines of class and culture. In my experience, overseas Chinese migrants on the continent can broadly be divided into four distinct categories: The Elites: Senior Chinese diplomats and executive management of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) there to manage Beijing's growing natural resource investments on the continent or oversee China's massive infrastructure development initiatives. These people largely live in African capitals, often in the same walled-compounds as their Western counterparts. The Managers: The often highly educated engineers and managers on the ground who lead the construction and natural resource extraction projects across the continent. These engineers give the Chinese such an advantage when bidding on projects since their salaries are a small fraction of comparable Western wages. These managers largely isolate themselves from the broader African society and stay in country anywhere from 3-5 years until they are assigned to a new project in a different country. The Entrepreneurs: These individuals operate independent of any corporate or governmental entity. They have moved to Africa because they see an opportunity in the marketplace to make money. These entrepreneurs often start small- to medium-sized enterprises that leverage trading relationships back in China. Due to the business imperative of speaking the local language and understanding the culture, this group of immigrants is often highly assimilated. The Peasants: For this group, the transition from the Chinese countryside to Africa is largely viewed as a horizontal move. They are accustomed to high levels of poverty, corruption and societal instability. Too poor to isolate themselves in a Chinese "ghetto,", these immigrants live right alongside Africans in both urban and village communities across the continent. Out of sheer necessity, they are often highly assimilated in both language and culture. In contrast to the other three groups of Chinese migrants, once these low-income Chinese migrants are in Africa, they will likely never return home as they are just too poor. There are no indications that Chinese migration to Africa is slowing. If anything, as Africa's economies continue to grow, we can likely expect even more Chinese migrants to make the long journey across the Indian Ocean. It may be hard to imagine, but a large and growing Chinese population is now a permanent fixture of Africa's demography.
Who are the Chinese in Africa?
From Algeria to Angola, the Chinese population across Africa is growing rapidly. In less than a decade, hundreds of thousands of immigrants have made the long journey from mainland China to cities and villages throughout the continent. Today, as this vast population settles in, they are having a transformative effect on the culture, economics and even politics of their new African communities.
There are no precise figures on just how many Chinese live in Africa. Estimates, though, place the number of immigrants somewhere between 750,000 and a million continent-wide. If those estimates are accurate, it means there are more Chinese migrants living in Africa today then there were expatriate French people at the peak of their African empire in the mid-20thcentury.
But just who are all these Chinese people and what draws them to Africa?
It should go without saying that any population as large and diverse as the Chinese defies simple characterization. The Chinese immigrant population in Africa is extremely diverse across all lines of class and culture. In my experience, overseas Chinese migrants on the continent can broadly be divided into four distinct categories:
The Elites: Senior Chinese diplomats and executive management of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) there to manage Beijing's growing natural resource investments on the continent or oversee China's massive infrastructure development initiatives. These people largely live in African capitals, often in the same walled-compounds as their Western counterparts.
The Managers: The often highly educated engineers and managers on the ground who lead the construction and natural resource extraction projects across the continent. These engineers give the Chinese such an advantage when bidding on projects since their salaries are a small fraction of comparable Western wages. These managers largely isolate themselves from the broader African society and stay in country anywhere from 3-5 years until they are assigned to a new project in a different country.
The Entrepreneurs: These individuals operate independent of any corporate or governmental entity. They have moved to Africa because they see an opportunity in the marketplace to make money. These entrepreneurs often start small- to medium-sized enterprises that leverage trading relationships back in China. Due to the business imperative of speaking the local language and understanding the culture, this group of immigrants is often highly assimilated.
The Peasants: For this group, the transition from the Chinese countryside to Africa is largely viewed as a horizontal move. They are accustomed to high levels of poverty, corruption and societal instability. Too poor to isolate themselves in a Chinese "ghetto,", these immigrants live right alongside Africans in both urban and village communities across the continent. Out of sheer necessity, they are often highly assimilated in both language and culture. In contrast to the other three groups of Chinese migrants, once these low-income Chinese migrants are in Africa, they will likely never return home as they are just too poor.
There are no indications that Chinese migration to Africa is slowing. If anything, as Africa's economies continue to grow, we can likely expect even more Chinese migrants to make the long journey across the Indian Ocean. It may be hard to imagine, but a large and growing Chinese population is now a permanent fixture of Africa's demography.
[VIDEO] Angola's Labour Pains
A Get a ...
[VIDEO] China Faces New Scrutiny in Africa (But This Time It's Different)
Wikileaks Reveals Failures of Western Aid in Africa
Analysis from Cobus van Staden
Anyone who knows a South African will be amply aware that the country is currently undergoing economically ruinous rolling blackouts labeled 'loadshedding.' Even if you don't know them, South Africans are liable to follow you down the street, foam-flecked and shouting about Eskom, the corruption-addled state power utility.
The loadshedding scandal is rooted in corruption. It's only the most visible part of a historical tragedy: how the ruling African National Congress ...
A Chinese Giant's Complicity in South Africa's Corruption Disaster
Why the U.S. Just Doesn't Have a Chance Against the Chinese in Africa
It really shouldn't comes as a huge surprise that African governments have become tired of the West's indulgent aid and development programs that place a significantly higher emphasis on "process" over actual results. ...
[caption id="attachment_195" align="alignleft" width="300"] Click for full-size image[/caption] The French radio network "Radio France Internationale" has published a very interesting interactive map detailing Chinese investments, populations and infrastructure projects across Africa. Although the map is in French it's nonetheless easy to follow for non-Francophones and offers a great visualization of how vast China's engagement with Africa has become. It is important to remember that just five years ago this map would have looked entirely, with just a fraction of the dots on the map that highlight China's economic activity. For better and for worse, the Chinese have moved with unprecedented speed to enhance diplomatic ties with governments across the continent. Furthermore, the migration of hundreds of thousands of Chinese peasants, laborers and entrepreneurs is another important facet of this engagement that the RFI map nicely illustrates.
Les Chinois En Afrique
[caption id="attachment_195" align="alignleft" width="300"] Click for full-size image[/caption]
The French radio network "Radio France Internationale" has published a very interesting interactive map detailing Chinese investments, populations and infrastructure projects across Africa. Although the map is in French it's nonetheless easy to follow for non-Francophones and offers a great visualization of how vast China's engagement with Africa has become.
It is important to remember that just five years ago this map would have looked entirely, with just a fraction of the dots on the map that highlight China's economic activity. For better and for worse, the Chinese have moved with unprecedented speed to enhance diplomatic ties with governments across the continent. Furthermore, the migration of hundreds of thousands of Chinese peasants, laborers and entrepreneurs is another important facet of this engagement that the RFI map nicely illustrates.
For most people, the Chinese engagement with Africa is an enigma. The combination of these two peoples, cultures and, increasingly their politics, are just so foreign to most of us that we do ...
[TRANSLATION] The Personal Challenge of Being Chinese in Africa
Both China and France share a common frustration with the international media and that their country's "story" is not being accurately conveyed via the CNNs, BBCs and Al Jazeeras of the world. After years of bitterly complaining about the injustices of international (read Western) news reporting, they both came to same conclusion: "if you can't beat 'em join 'em." In December 2006, the French-government launched FRANCE 24, its tri-lingual (French, Arabic and English) 24-hour news service distributed around the world via satellite and on the internet. Similarly, the 2010 launch of CNC World marks China's third attempt to persuade english language audiences around the world to "see the world through a Chinese perspective." The other two networks, CCTV 9 (now re-branded "CCTV International") and Blue Ocean Network (BON Live) are both on-air but have had little-to-no impact among its target demographic of english-speakers around the world. In contrast to the various Chinese international TV networks now available globally, FRANCE 24 appears to be gaining considerable traction with audiences in the US and Africa among other regions. Why? China's media leaders may want to consider the French approach with France24 if they want to grow audience share with their own media properties: 1. Editorial autonomy + Higher Content Legitimacy = Audience Loyalty It is hard to tell if online users and TV viewers of FRANCE 24 clearly understand that they are consuming a media property owned and operated by the French government. Just as viewers of Al Jazeera may not be fully aware of the Qatari government's backing of that network. What's important here is that both France24 and Al Jazeera afford their editorial staff considerable editorial autonomy in determining the news. I can speak from personal experience (full disclosure: I am currently a freelance journalist at FRANCE 24′s english language online service) to attest that there is never any concern among the editorial staff about government censorship or oversight of any kind. Conversely, the pressure from management is to produce the highest quality news comparable to the standards of any of the international newsrooms I have worked in, including CNN, CNBC Asia and the Associated Press among others. Consider this example from July 14, 2010, France's national holiday. In an effort to rebuild relations with its former African colonies, the French government invited those states celebrating 50 years of independence to have a delegation of military representatives march in the grand Bastille Day parade up the Champs Elysees. In China, such national day festivities would be greeted with patriotic enthusiasm by official media organs, but not so in France. The Chinese are making it much harder than it needs to be for international viewers to access their content online. Both the TV and online editors at France24 led with stories of accusations from a federation of international human rights groups that war criminals may be among those marching in the parade. The headline (left) led the coverage for most of the day and never was there a concern that France24 was embarrassing France's leaders or the state itself. Instead, the story generated above-average traffic online. The lesson here for China's own media entities is that by giving experienced media producers greater autonomy to report a story, even if it may be critical of China, will ultimately improve the content's legitimacy among its target audiences and thus lead to increased user loyalty. I fully understand how difficult it would be for some within the Propaganda Ministry, and even in the State Council, to loosen the reigns of media control. However, it should be considered essential if the ultimate objective is to persuade sophisticated international media consumers to divert themselves from rival websites and TV channels to CNC World, BON Live or CCTV International. 2. Make it Easy to Watch and Access the Content When CNC World debuted in July 2010, I rushed to find the live stream online the very first day it went on the air. It went without saying that CNC would have a live-stream, or even on-demand video available, considering the importance the government had placed on reaching out to international viewers like myself. Yet after four attempts using three computers on two platforms, I have still not been able to access the CNC World live stream. CNC World is making it much more difficult than it needs to be for viewers to access their content online. Here are a few suggestions on how the network can improve its usability to make it significantly easier for viewers, such as myself, to watch CNC World over the internet: A. Domain Name: select an easy to remember URL. https://www.xhstv.com is NOT a good domain name for an international audience. Now, as a Chinese speaker, I understand that XHS stands for 新华社, the average American viewer will not. B. Make it Mac Compatible: No, in fact, make it platform agnostic. Currently, CNC World can only be viewed on PCs which eliminates tens of millions of prospective viewers who use Apple's products. This is critical in both the United States and Europe. C. No Plug-ins!: This is a massive mistake on the part of Xinhua. First of all, web users in the U.S. and Europe are accustomed to watching online video using any of the established methods ranging from Flash to HTML5. The era of downloading additional software applications to run video ended about five years. Secondly, Western internet users will NEVER download a plug-in prompted by text written in Chinese! This is a screen grab of the prompt to download the program "UUSEE" to watch CNC World. To the vast majority of non-Chinese speaking Westerners, this looks extremely ominous. D. Do not use Chinese characters: Even if a user in the U.S. or Europe wanted to download the UUSEE plug-in, there is a very good chance that s/he would not be able to because many of the anti-virus programs block Chinese language applications. This is even more so on corporate networks that often have much stricter security measures than most home users. To avoid this restrictions, the English-language streaming site should be entirely in English with no Chinese language prompts for plug in requirements or any Chinese-character metadata that will trigger the security programs to block the site. 3. Quality Counts Just as China is not a native-English speaking country, France faces a similar challenge in how it staffs its English language media channels. Unlike most of China's multilingual media outlets, FRANCE 24′s english and Arabic services are staffed by native speakers. In China, by contrast, CCTV9, China Radio International and other channels are often staffed with Chinese employees whose english skills are quite strong relative to other mainland Chinese however nowhere near international broadcast standards. Subsequently, there are significantly higher levels of on air and online mistakes that are often directly associated with language abilities. In an extremely competitive news markets, these kinds of mistakes are unacceptable as it undermines the credibility of the product and encourages consumers to seek elsewhere for similar information. There is ample evidence of poor language and copy editing skills of China's international media editors. On three separate occasions over the course of a single week, the home page of CNTV (left) featured prominent spelling errors and template layout mistakes that, once again, indicate China's media products are just not competing at the same level as French and other international media outlets.
3 Lessons France Can Offer China About Government-Run Media
Both China and France share a common frustration with the international media and that their country's "story" is not being accurately conveyed via the CNNs, BBCs and Al Jazeeras of the world. After years of bitterly complaining about the injustices of international (read Western) news reporting, they both came to same conclusion: "if you can't beat 'em join 'em." In December 2006, the French-government launched FRANCE 24, its tri-lingual (French, Arabic and English) 24-hour news service distributed around the world via satellite and on the internet. Similarly, the 2010 launch of CNC World marks China's third attempt to persuade english language audiences around the world to "see the world through a Chinese perspective." The other two networks, CCTV 9 (now re-branded "CCTV International") and Blue Ocean Network (BON Live) are both on-air but have had little-to-no impact among its target demographic of english-speakers around the world. In contrast to the various Chinese international TV networks now available globally, FRANCE 24 appears to be gaining considerable traction with audiences in the US and Africa among other regions.
China's media leaders may want to consider the French approach with France24 if they want to grow audience share with their own media properties:
1. Editorial autonomy + Higher Content Legitimacy = Audience Loyalty
It is hard to tell if online users and TV viewers of FRANCE 24 clearly understand that they are consuming a media property owned and operated by the French government. Just as viewers of Al Jazeera may not be fully aware of the Qatari government's backing of that network. What's important here is that both France24 and Al Jazeera afford their editorial staff considerable editorial autonomy in determining the news. I can speak from personal experience (full disclosure: I am currently a freelance journalist at FRANCE 24′s english language online service) to attest that there is never any concern among the editorial staff about government censorship or oversight of any kind. Conversely, the pressure from management is to produce the highest quality news comparable to the standards of any of the international newsrooms I have worked in, including CNN, CNBC Asia and the Associated Press among others. Consider this example from July 14, 2010, France's national holiday. In an effort to rebuild relations with its former African colonies, the French government invited those states celebrating 50 years of independence to have a delegation of military representatives march in the grand Bastille Day parade up the Champs Elysees. In China, such national day festivities would be greeted with patriotic enthusiasm by official media organs, but not so in France.
The Chinese are making it much harder than it needs to be for international viewers to access their content online.
Both the TV and online editors at France24 led with stories of accusations from a federation of international human rights groups that war criminals may be among those marching in the parade. The headline (left) led the coverage for most of the day and never was there a concern that France24 was embarrassing France's leaders or the state itself. Instead, the story generated above-average traffic online.
The lesson here for China's own media entities is that by giving experienced media producers greater autonomy to report a story, even if it may be critical of China, will ultimately improve the content's legitimacy among its target audiences and thus lead to increased user loyalty. I fully understand how difficult it would be for some within the Propaganda Ministry, and even in the State Council, to loosen the reigns of media control. However, it should be considered essential if the ultimate objective is to persuade sophisticated international media consumers to divert themselves from rival websites and TV channels to CNC World, BON Live or CCTV International.
2. Make it Easy to Watch and Access the Content
When CNC World debuted in July 2010, I rushed to find the live stream online the very first day it went on the air. It went without saying that CNC would have a live-stream, or even on-demand video available, considering the importance the government had placed on reaching out to international viewers like myself. Yet after four attempts using three computers on two platforms, I have still not been able to access the CNC World live stream. CNC World is making it much more difficult than it needs to be for viewers to access their content online. Here are a few suggestions on how the network can improve its usability to make it significantly easier for viewers, such as myself, to watch CNC World over the internet:
A. Domain Name: select an easy to remember URL. https://www.xhstv.com is NOT a good domain name for an international audience. Now, as a Chinese speaker, I understand that XHS stands for 新华社, the average American viewer will not.
B. Make it Mac Compatible: No, in fact, make it platform agnostic. Currently, CNC World can only be viewed on PCs which eliminates tens of millions of prospective viewers who use Apple's products. This is critical in both the United States and Europe.
C. No Plug-ins!: This is a massive mistake on the part of Xinhua. First of all, web users in the U.S. and Europe are accustomed to watching online video using any of the established methods ranging from Flash to HTML5. The era of downloading additional software applications to run video ended about five years. Secondly, Western internet users will NEVER download a plug-in prompted by text written in Chinese! This is a screen grab of the prompt to download the program "UUSEE" to watch CNC World. To the vast majority of non-Chinese speaking Westerners, this looks extremely ominous.
D. Do not use Chinese characters: Even if a user in the U.S. or Europe wanted to download the UUSEE plug-in, there is a very good chance that s/he would not be able to because many of the anti-virus programs block Chinese language applications. This is even more so on corporate networks that often have much stricter security measures than most home users. To avoid this restrictions, the English-language streaming site should be entirely in English with no Chinese language prompts for plug in requirements or any Chinese-character metadata that will trigger the security programs to block the site.
3. Quality Counts
Just as China is not a native-English speaking country, France faces a similar challenge in how it staffs its English language media channels. Unlike most of China's multilingual media outlets, FRANCE 24′s english and Arabic services are staffed by native speakers. In China, by contrast, CCTV9, China Radio International and other channels are often staffed with Chinese employees whose english skills are quite strong relative to other mainland Chinese however nowhere near international broadcast standards. Subsequently, there are significantly higher levels of on air and online mistakes that are often directly associated with language abilities. In an extremely competitive news markets, these kinds of mistakes are unacceptable as it undermines the credibility of the product and encourages consumers to seek elsewhere for similar information. There is ample evidence of poor language and copy editing skills of China's international media editors. On three separate occasions over the course of a single week, the home page of CNTV (left) featured prominent spelling errors and template layout mistakes that, once again, indicate China's media products are just not competing at the same level as French and other international media outlets.
There is a discernable generational divide when it comes to opinions about the Chinese in Africa. It isn't subtle and the split lines up according to age. In almost every instance, those over 40 years old frame the issue in "colonial terms" clearly influenced by their own early education of Western imperial activity on the continent. For these critics, Beijing's engagement in Africa is binary — it's either good or bad. This explains why so much of the news coverage on the subject is structured in such simple terms with headlines like "Is China Good For Africa," et al. For this generation, the memories of decolonization, Live Aid and the countless Hollywood portrayal of a female aid worker (and they are always women in the movies) gently holding a starving African child have had a profound impact on their worldview. For the over 40 crowd, their education in the West never clearly condemned colonialism for its brutal failings. There was always a hint that European, and even American attempts, to "civilize" the "natives" was a benevolent ambition. A new generation of bloggers and scholars is emerging who approach Sino-African relations with significantly more sophistication than older observers who are burdened by their early education of Western imperial activity on the continent. Since the launch of China in Africa" podcast two months ago, I have found there is an entirely different perspective from a new generation of twenty and thirty something bloggers and academics who are unburdened by this conventional thinking. They seem to approach the topic with a refreshing lack of intellectual baggage that permits a far more nuanced view of the issue that doesn't frame the subject in that "good vs. bad" framework that is so typical of their older peers. In universities across Europe and in South Africa (none in the United States that I have found so far), a new crop of students and bloggers is emerging who approach the subject with an unprecedented of level of sophistication. To these younger observers, China's activities in Africa are evaluated much more comprehensively, taking into account the histories of both Africans and Chinese. Furthermore, there is a sense the Chinese should be judged in isolation rather than in the context of Western imperial policies of the past. And unlike their older peers, this under-40 group generally approaches the subject with significantly less prejudice about China, instead focusing on the tangible impact of Beijing's policies on the continent. Judge for yourself: 1. Lu Jinghao: South Africa blogger and China-Africa analyst who writes the "A Chinese in Africa" blog (https://china-africa-jinghao.blogspot.com/) and is also a contributor to the China Global South Project. 2. Lila Buckley: Oxford University graduate student who is focusing on Chinese engagement in African agriculture. She recently posted a guest blog on Deborah Brautigam's "China in Africa: The Real Story" about her research in Senegal. 3. Johanna Jesson: Researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Phd. candidate at the Roskilde University who specializes in transparency issues related to Chinese aid and investment on the continent. In particular, she has written extensively on Chinese investment patterns in both the DRC and Gabon. 4. Henry Hall: Masters candidate at the London School of Economics who is doing research on Chinese-Zambian relations. Henry also publishes the weekly email newsletter and website China Africa News. 5. Dr. David Robinson: African historian who lectures at Perth, Australia's Edith Cowan University. Dr. Robinson recently published "Hearts, Minds and Wallet: Lessons from China's Growing Relationship with Africa." So while age by itself should not be considered the determining factor in judging the competence of any journalist, blogger or scholar, it does seem that younger observers are engaging the Sino-African issue with a very different perspective. This is a particular issue that is extremely complex with intersecting histories, cultures and peoples who defy the simple stereotypes that are depressingly common in much of the mainstream press' an academia's coverage.
China in Africa: If You're Over 40 Years Old Then You Probably Don't Get It
There is a discernable generational divide when it comes to opinions about the Chinese in Africa. It isn't subtle and the split lines up according to age. In almost every instance, those over 40 years old frame the issue in "colonial terms" clearly influenced by their own early education of Western imperial activity on the continent. For these critics, Beijing's engagement in Africa is binary — it's either good or bad. This explains why so much of the news coverage on the subject is structured in such simple terms with headlines like "Is China Good For Africa," et al. For this generation, the memories of decolonization, Live Aid and the countless Hollywood portrayal of a female aid worker (and they are always women in the movies) gently holding a starving African child have had a profound impact on their worldview. For the over 40 crowd, their education in the West never clearly condemned colonialism for its brutal failings. There was always a hint that European, and even American attempts, to "civilize" the "natives" was a benevolent ambition.
A new generation of bloggers and scholars is emerging who approach Sino-African relations with significantly more sophistication than older observers who are burdened by their early education of Western imperial activity on the continent.
Since the launch of China in Africa" podcast two months ago, I have found there is an entirely different perspective from a new generation of twenty and thirty something bloggers and academics who are unburdened by this conventional thinking. They seem to approach the topic with a refreshing lack of intellectual baggage that permits a far more nuanced view of the issue that doesn't frame the subject in that "good vs. bad" framework that is so typical of their older peers. In universities across Europe and in South Africa (none in the United States that I have found so far), a new crop of students and bloggers is emerging who approach the subject with an unprecedented of level of sophistication. To these younger observers, China's activities in Africa are evaluated much more comprehensively, taking into account the histories of both Africans and Chinese. Furthermore, there is a sense the Chinese should be judged in isolation rather than in the context of Western imperial policies of the past. And unlike their older peers, this under-40 group generally approaches the subject with significantly less prejudice about China, instead focusing on the tangible impact of Beijing's policies on the continent.
Judge for yourself:
1. Lu Jinghao: South Africa blogger and China-Africa analyst who writes the "A Chinese in Africa" blog (https://china-africa-jinghao.blogspot.com/) and is also a contributor to the China Global South Project.
2. Lila Buckley: Oxford University graduate student who is focusing on Chinese engagement in African agriculture. She recently posted a guest blog on Deborah Brautigam's "China in Africa: The Real Story" about her research in Senegal.
3. Johanna Jesson: Researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Phd. candidate at the Roskilde University who specializes in transparency issues related to Chinese aid and investment on the continent. In particular, she has written extensively on Chinese investment patterns in both the DRC and Gabon.
4. Henry Hall: Masters candidate at the London School of Economics who is doing research on Chinese-Zambian relations. Henry also publishes the weekly email newsletter and website China Africa News.
5. Dr. David Robinson: African historian who lectures at Perth, Australia's Edith Cowan University. Dr. Robinson recently published "Hearts, Minds and Wallet: Lessons from China's Growing Relationship with Africa."
So while age by itself should not be considered the determining factor in judging the competence of any journalist, blogger or scholar, it does seem that younger observers are engaging the Sino-African issue with a very different perspective. This is a particular issue that is extremely complex with intersecting histories, cultures and peoples who defy the simple stereotypes that are depressingly common in much of the mainstream press' an academia's coverage.
Transparency is a loaded word in the development business. The idea that aid and investments in places like Africa should be subject to external audits and review is a sacrosanct principle within the industry. Never mind the irony that organizations like USAID, the United Nations and the World Bank among others devote a majority of their time/effort with their aid programs to sorting through a byzantine bureaucracy that is anything but transparent — nonetheless, these very organizations maintain the "black box" that is China's aid and investment agenda in Africa is alarming. However, transparency can cut both ways and ultimately the West may regret its insistence that China pull back the curtain.The issue first came to my attention in Kinshasa at the posh athletic club "Cercle Elais" where I was enjoying an afternoon drink by the pool. Sitting behind me were a pair of European construction executives who were seemingly drowning their sorrows in pint after pint of lager. The two echoed a story detailed in the compelling book "China Safari" by complaining loudly over their inability to compete with Chinese construction firms who submitted bids 50-60% lower than everyone else. "There's just no way we can compete," one declared, "yeah, we're fucked," the other slurred. Now, the interesting part of this story is who these two accused of screwing up their business in the DRC. It didn't seem like they blamed the Chinese. No. Instead, it was the World Bank and MONUC (the United Nations operation in the DRC)! Hopefully advocates of greater transparency will apply the same enthusiasm they do for criticizing Chinese aid and investment initiatives in Africa to the bloated, inefficient procurement system that protects an indefensible level of Western corruption. Under intense pressure to increase "transparency," construction firms bidding on major infrastructure projects in the region have increasingly been required to submit "open bids." Before "open bidding," governments and international organizations evaluated proposals using various criteria beyond just price (e.g. quality of materials, labor sourcing, etc…). Yet as the transparency drive forced open the bidding process, price naturally became the dominant issue. And as we know, when it comes to price, the Chinese are hard to beat. While there is ample evidence in Chinese construction and manufacturing industries to illustrate how Chinese companies employ substandard labor practices and production methods to keep their costs as low as possible, there is an important alternative perspective that should be considered as well. The Chinese construction firms in places like the DRC work harder, longer and cheaper than their Western counterparts: Do Chinese construction executives stay in five star accommodations like Kinshasa's Hotel Memling at a cost to international taxpayers of $500-$600 per night? No. Do Chinese project managers live in expensive expatriate communities with security details, chauffeur driven cars and consume imported food as their Western counterparts do? No. Do Chinese construction projects operate only five days a week, forcing the project to take longer to build and ultimately cost more? No. Hopefully advocates of greater transparency will apply the same enthusiasm for criticizing Chinese aid and investment initiatives in Africa to the bloated, inefficient procurement system that protects an indefensible level of Western corruption. After all, the UN and the World Bank's funds are all of our tax money, so if Chinese companies can offer a comparable service at half the price, well, that's capitalism, right? Footnote: this is by no means a new issue. The Chinese began under bidding projects in Africa as early as 2005, prompting louder calls for improved transparency in the infrastructure procurement process.
China in Africa: The Transparency Paradox
Transparency is a loaded word in the development business. The idea that aid and investments in places like Africa should be subject to external audits and review is a sacrosanct principle within the industry. Never mind the irony that organizations like USAID, the United Nations and the World Bank among others devote a majority of their time/effort with their aid programs to sorting through a byzantine bureaucracy that is anything but transparent — nonetheless, these very organizations maintain the "black box" that is China's aid and investment agenda in Africa is alarming. However, transparency can cut both ways and ultimately the West may regret its insistence that China pull back the curtain.The issue first came to my attention in Kinshasa at the posh athletic club "Cercle Elais" where I was enjoying an afternoon drink by the pool. Sitting behind me were a pair of European construction executives who were seemingly drowning their sorrows in pint after pint of lager. The two echoed a story detailed in the compelling book "China Safari" by complaining loudly over their inability to compete with Chinese construction firms who submitted bids 50-60% lower than everyone else. "There's just no way we can compete," one declared, "yeah, we're fucked," the other slurred. Now, the interesting part of this story is who these two accused of screwing up their business in the DRC. It didn't seem like they blamed the Chinese. No. Instead, it was the World Bank and MONUC (the United Nations operation in the DRC)!
Hopefully advocates of greater transparency will apply the same enthusiasm they do for criticizing Chinese aid and investment initiatives in Africa to the bloated, inefficient procurement system that protects an indefensible level of Western corruption.
Under intense pressure to increase "transparency," construction firms bidding on major infrastructure projects in the region have increasingly been required to submit "open bids." Before "open bidding," governments and international organizations evaluated proposals using various criteria beyond just price (e.g. quality of materials, labor sourcing, etc…). Yet as the transparency drive forced open the bidding process, price naturally became the dominant issue. And as we know, when it comes to price, the Chinese are hard to beat. While there is ample evidence in Chinese construction and manufacturing industries to illustrate how Chinese companies employ substandard labor practices and production methods to keep their costs as low as possible, there is an important alternative perspective that should be considered as well. The Chinese construction firms in places like the DRC work harder, longer and cheaper than their Western counterparts:
Do Chinese construction executives stay in five star accommodations like Kinshasa's Hotel Memling at a cost to international taxpayers of $500-$600 per night? No.
Do Chinese project managers live in expensive expatriate communities with security details, chauffeur driven cars and consume imported food as their Western counterparts do? No.
Do Chinese construction projects operate only five days a week, forcing the project to take longer to build and ultimately cost more? No.
Hopefully advocates of greater transparency will apply the same enthusiasm for criticizing Chinese aid and investment initiatives in Africa to the bloated, inefficient procurement system that protects an indefensible level of Western corruption. After all, the UN and the World Bank's funds are all of our tax money, so if Chinese companies can offer a comparable service at half the price, well, that's capitalism, right?
Footnote: this is by no means a new issue. The Chinese began under bidding projects in Africa as early as 2005, prompting louder calls for improved transparency in the infrastructure procurement process.
It may be hard to believe but half of all construction work underway in Kenya is now being done by Chinese firms, according to the U.S. public radio program "The World" (audio link below). It appears the Chinese infrastructure building juggernaut in Africa is showing no signs of slowing down. Kenya's Business Daily newspaper reports the capital's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport has received a new round of funding for expansion and modernization where much of the work will likely go to Chinese contractors. Already, China National Aero-Technology International Engineering Company (CATIC) is on board to build out the airport's new terminal four and a larger parking facility. One would likely expect Chinese construction and engineering firms to compete vigorously for the millions of other dollars that have yet to be assigned. Public Radio International's (PRI) daily news program "The World" has done some very good reporting recently on the Chinese in Africa and specifically the Chinese construction boom in Kenya.
The Chinese Construction Boom in Kenya
It may be hard to believe but half of all construction work underway in Kenya is now being done by Chinese firms, according to the U.S. public radio program "The World" (audio link below). It appears the Chinese infrastructure building juggernaut in Africa is showing no signs of slowing down. Kenya's Business Daily newspaper reports the capital's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport has received a new round of funding for expansion and modernization where much of the work will likely go to Chinese contractors. Already, China National Aero-Technology International Engineering Company (CATIC) is on board to build out the airport's new terminal four and a larger parking facility. One would likely expect Chinese construction and engineering firms to compete vigorously for the millions of other dollars that have yet to be assigned.
Public Radio International's (PRI) daily news program "The World" has done some very good reporting recently on the Chinese in Africa and specifically the Chinese construction boom in Kenya.
Question and Answers About Chinese People in South Africa
The Canadian Broadcast Corporation sent their Beijing correspondent to do some rather extensive reporting on the surge of Chinese investment in Africa. In contrast to much of the other recent coverage of the topic, Anthony Germain's reporting from Zambia was refreshingly balanced. The highlight of his reporting centers on the question of how China is taking full advantage of the failures of 50 years of Western aid. Several of his sources pointed out that despite spending hundreds of billions of dollars in Africa, Western aid programs have very little to show. The Chinese, by contrast, move quickly and efficiently and demonstrate visible results from their engagement. That said, Germain rightly points out that Beijing asks for very little in return from its African partners in the form of political accountability and transparency. While I fully appreciate the importance of this kind of political pressure, it always strikes me as ironic to hear this perspective from Western critics, most notably through the Western media. Specifically, the West (and by default the Western media) appear to be rather selective with their demands for political accountability. Although the international aid industry spends billions of dollars each year in the very same countries that China is operating, there is virtually no scrutiny of the effectiveness of that money and the negative impact it often has on political accountability in under-developed countries across Africa. Moreover, that same level of accountability is not regularly included in coverage of European and American companies operating in Africa. It is not obvious to me, yet, how the Chinese behavior in Africa is different from that of French, American or German owned resource extraction companies operating in the region. None of this is meant to exclude the Chinese from scrutiny, instead to highlight the obvious hypocrisy that is regularly employed by outside observers of the Chinese in Africa. Anytime a comparison is done between Chinese and Western aid strategies in Africa, it is worth noting that each brings a distinctive mindset to this endeavor. The issue over "effectiveness" is one that is loaded with considerably different meaning in the West and in China. The United States, for example, has a governmental system made populated disproportionately by lawyers. Results, or effectiveness, is therefore passed through this legalistic (or administrative in the case of many European governments) filter. China, in contrast, is a government made up of technocrats with an engineering background. In this case, each problem or project is seen in the context of a start point and end point. Period. The engineer will solve any problem that arises in the interim of these two points with the end result in mind. Consider the following scenario: Say the Chinese have been tasked to build a road in Madagascar. The construction veers off course by 4 degrees, prompting the road to bend slightly to the left. For the Chinese project managers, this is a simple problem with an easy answer: continue building the road but just pull it to the right a bit to make the road as a straight as possible but do not waste more time discussing the issue. If the Americans or Europeans were building that same road and encountered the identical problem the solution would look radically different. Construction would likely stop immediately. The construction manager would call in the grants officer from the relevant international development agency for guidance who would then demand a written report be provided within 48 hours on why the road veered to the left 4 degrees. A second report would then be generated by the grants officer to be submitted to superiors at the appropriate embassy, prompting a conference call with headquarters in Washington, New York or Brussels. Several meetings would then be convened to discuss the environmental and financial impacts of the bend in the road. Yet another report would be generated by a far away official that would provide the necessary guidance to the grants officer back in Madagascar on how to proceed. Throughout this whole 6-8 week process (at a minimum), construction would stop indefinitely until the entire administrative process is completed to insure the project remains compliant with the respective country's development funding guidelines. While this is a gross oversimplification of the issue, it does highlight the key cultural difference in how the Chinese and the West approach the development process. While the Chinese process may be viewed by many in the West as "steamrolling," it does generate results considerably faster than what comparable Western development agencies can produce. The next step for correspondents, such as Germain, is to go beyond the surface comparison between the Chinese and Western approach to aid in Africa and explore the underlying cultural differences that motivate each side. Germain's CBC reports did a nice job flirting with this issue, but it is definitely worthy of deeper evaluation. Footnote: In addition to the text article, Germain also produced an insightful 12 minute radio piece and also took some excellent pictures that are displayed in a beautiful photo gallery format.
Chinese Aid in Africa: No Strings Attached
The Canadian Broadcast Corporation sent their Beijing correspondent to do some rather extensive reporting on the surge of Chinese investment in Africa. In contrast to much of the other recent coverage of the topic, Anthony Germain's reporting from Zambia was refreshingly balanced. The highlight of his reporting centers on the question of how China is taking full advantage of the failures of 50 years of Western aid. Several of his sources pointed out that despite spending hundreds of billions of dollars in Africa, Western aid programs have very little to show.
The Chinese, by contrast, move quickly and efficiently and demonstrate visible results from their engagement. That said, Germain rightly points out that Beijing asks for very little in return from its African partners in the form of political accountability and transparency. While I fully appreciate the importance of this kind of political pressure, it always strikes me as ironic to hear this perspective from Western critics, most notably through the Western media. Specifically, the West (and by default the Western media) appear to be rather selective with their demands for political accountability.
Although the international aid industry spends billions of dollars each year in the very same countries that China is operating, there is virtually no scrutiny of the effectiveness of that money and the negative impact it often has on political accountability in under-developed countries across Africa. Moreover, that same level of accountability is not regularly included in coverage of European and American companies operating in Africa. It is not obvious to me, yet, how the Chinese behavior in Africa is different from that of French, American or German owned resource extraction companies operating in the region.
None of this is meant to exclude the Chinese from scrutiny, instead to highlight the obvious hypocrisy that is regularly employed by outside observers of the Chinese in Africa. Anytime a comparison is done between Chinese and Western aid strategies in Africa, it is worth noting that each brings a distinctive mindset to this endeavor. The issue over "effectiveness" is one that is loaded with considerably different meaning in the West and in China. The United States, for example, has a governmental system made populated disproportionately by lawyers. Results, or effectiveness, is therefore passed through this legalistic (or administrative in the case of many European governments) filter. China, in contrast, is a government made up of technocrats with an engineering background. In this case, each problem or project is seen in the context of a start point and end point. Period. The engineer will solve any problem that arises in the interim of these two points with the end result in mind.
Consider the following scenario: Say the Chinese have been tasked to build a road in Madagascar. The construction veers off course by 4 degrees, prompting the road to bend slightly to the left. For the Chinese project managers, this is a simple problem with an easy answer: continue building the road but just pull it to the right a bit to make the road as a straight as possible but do not waste more time discussing the issue. If the Americans or Europeans were building that same road and encountered the identical problem the solution would look radically different. Construction would likely stop immediately. The construction manager would call in the grants officer from the relevant international development agency for guidance who would then demand a written report be provided within 48 hours on why the road veered to the left 4 degrees. A second report would then be generated by the grants officer to be submitted to superiors at the appropriate embassy, prompting a conference call with headquarters in Washington, New York or Brussels. Several meetings would then be convened to discuss the environmental and financial impacts of the bend in the road. Yet another report would be generated by a far away official that would provide the necessary guidance to the grants officer back in Madagascar on how to proceed. Throughout this whole 6-8 week process (at a minimum), construction would stop indefinitely until the entire administrative process is completed to insure the project remains compliant with the respective country's development funding guidelines.
While this is a gross oversimplification of the issue, it does highlight the key cultural difference in how the Chinese and the West approach the development process. While the Chinese process may be viewed by many in the West as "steamrolling," it does generate results considerably faster than what comparable Western development agencies can produce. The next step for correspondents, such as Germain, is to go beyond the surface comparison between the Chinese and Western approach to aid in Africa and explore the underlying cultural differences that motivate each side. Germain's CBC reports did a nice job flirting with this issue, but it is definitely worthy of deeper evaluation. Footnote: In addition to the text article, Germain also produced an insightful 12 minute radio piece and also took some excellent pictures that are displayed in a beautiful photo gallery format.
For most outsiders, the Chinese operations in Africa run largely as an opaque mystery. Seemingly every Western book or in-depth news article on the subject features the same complaint of not receiving any help from either Chinese officials or businesses there about how the mechanics of their investments in the region function. Basic questions like how are factories acquired or what kind of support do Chinese embassies offer local businesses in the region largely go unanswered. For some perspective on these issues, I came across a fascinating bulletin board site (BBS) that offers remarkable insights into the inner-workings of Chinese business on the continent: www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/ The site is exclusively in Chinese, so for the benefit of CTP's English-only readers, here are some highlights of recent entries: https://www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=6400&extra=page%3D1 _______________________________________ 非洲中国商人眼中的中国使馆 How Chinese Businesses in Africa see the Chinese Embassy One entry submitted by a writer with the handle "Old African Trader" posts what appears to be an open letter to the Chinese government appealing on behalf of business leaders for more help from Chinese embassies on the continent. The posts starts by saying how much pride there is seeing the Chinese flag rise over Africa and the emergence of China as a global power. However, he goes on to sharply criticize the government for its lack of support of small businesses operating in Africa: "Although Chinese African exchanges are deepening and broadening and more investors are coming to Africa, and everyone can say that those in Africa live a lonely, solitary life devoted to work and the embassy offers almost no help to these businesses" 随着中非交流的深入和推广,一批批商人来到非洲投资,大家可以说都是在非洲孤独的生活工作着,在生意上似乎很少有得到使馆帮助的。 If this writer is accurate, it offers a fascinating insight into the limitations of the "public-private partnership" that so many outside observers take for granted when evaluating Chinese investments in Africa. On several occasions in Kinshasa and elsewhere, U.S. diplomats expressed their frustration that Chinese businesses had an unfair business advantage over American companies because of the close diplomatic/corporate relationship that allegedly exists among Chinese enterprises investing in Africa. Yet this open letter exposes that there are limits to the Chinese government's support of businesses. Where Chinese embassies draw the line on what business to support is hard to know, it's obvious that major State Owned Enterprise (SOE) multinationals operating mining and telecommunications concessions among other deals in places the DRC are very likely getting a lot of support from the embassy whereas medium and small investors, as the writer appears to represent, may not be getting very much assistance. https://www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=17011&sid=Zd9phz _______________________________________ 牙膏厂寻求非洲贸易伙伴 Toothpaste Factory Seeks African Trade Partner If you are interested in importing "Angola" brand toothpaste to Africa, then this post will be of interest. The author of this post appears to be seeking business partners in Africa to import this toothpaste. What's most interesting about this post is the advertised price of the toothpaste at just 1.2 RMB per unit. This sheds some light on China's low-cost export strategy that we have been discussing on CTP. At just 1.2 RMB per unit, this toothpaste is affordable for a wide-spectrum of consumers at the lowest end of the economic spectrum. https://www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=6201&sid=Zd9phz _______________________________________ 多哥SINOCAR汽车销售有限公司修理厂致多哥华人朋友! Togo Sinocar Auto Sales and Repair [Welcomes/Greets] Togo-based Chinese Friends If you happen to live in the small West African country of Togo and want to either purchase a Chinese-made vehicle or get your "Great Wall" car repaired, then Togo Sinocar is the place to go. The author of this post, seemingly the owner or manager of Togo Sinocar, explains how this venture is the first Chinese auto sales and repair company in the country. Togo Sinocar has 10 employees and two Chinese engineers to serve the community. What's most interesting here is the range of services they offer. In the U.S. or Europe, an auto repair or sales dealer does just that, whereas with Togo Sinocar, the list of services is much broader. In addition to emergency tow services they'll also help you secure either your Togo or international drivers licenses as well. There are hundreds of other posts on this BBS that are worthy of exploration, some very personal about finding lost relatives who went to Africa and those searching for love in Africa. We'll bring you more posts in the coming weeks as this site offers a truly unique view into Chinese life on the continent that is hard to come by even among those living there.
A Behind the Scenes View of the Chinese in Africa
For most outsiders, the Chinese operations in Africa run largely as an opaque mystery. Seemingly every Western book or in-depth news article on the subject features the same complaint of not receiving any help from either Chinese officials or businesses there about how the mechanics of their investments in the region function. Basic questions like how are factories acquired or what kind of support do Chinese embassies offer local businesses in the region largely go unanswered.
For some perspective on these issues, I came across a fascinating bulletin board site (BBS) that offers remarkable insights into the inner-workings of Chinese business on the continent: www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/ The site is exclusively in Chinese, so for the benefit of CTP's English-only readers, here are some highlights of recent entries:
https://www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=6400&extra=page%3D1
非洲中国商人眼中的中国使馆
How Chinese Businesses in Africa see the
Chinese Embassy
One entry submitted by a writer with the handle "Old African Trader" posts what appears to be an open letter to the Chinese government appealing on behalf of business leaders for more help from Chinese embassies on the continent. The posts starts by saying how much pride there is seeing the Chinese flag rise over Africa and the emergence of China as a global power. However, he goes on to sharply criticize the government for its lack of support of small businesses operating in Africa:
"Although Chinese African exchanges are deepening and broadening and more investors are coming to Africa, and everyone can say that those in Africa live a lonely, solitary life devoted to work and the embassy offers almost no help to these businesses"
随着中非交流的深入和推广,一批批商人来到非洲投资,大家可以说都是在非洲孤独的生活工作着,在生意上似乎很少有得到使馆帮助的。
If this writer is accurate, it offers a fascinating insight into the limitations of the "public-private partnership" that so many outside observers take for granted when evaluating Chinese investments in Africa. On several occasions in Kinshasa and elsewhere, U.S. diplomats expressed their frustration that Chinese businesses had an unfair business advantage over American companies because of the close diplomatic/corporate relationship that allegedly exists among Chinese enterprises investing in Africa. Yet this open letter exposes that there are limits to the Chinese government's support of businesses. Where Chinese embassies draw the line on what business to support is hard to know, it's obvious that major State Owned Enterprise (SOE) multinationals operating mining and telecommunications concessions among other deals in places the DRC are very likely getting a lot of support from the embassy whereas medium and small investors, as the writer appears to represent, may not be getting very much assistance.
https://www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=17011&sid=Zd9phz
牙膏厂寻求非洲贸易伙伴
Toothpaste Factory Seeks African Trade Partner
If you are interested in importing "Angola" brand toothpaste to Africa, then this post will be of interest. The author of this post appears to be seeking business partners in Africa to import this toothpaste. What's most interesting about this post is the advertised price of the toothpaste at just 1.2 RMB per unit. This sheds some light on China's low-cost export strategy that we have been discussing on CTP. At just 1.2 RMB per unit, this toothpaste is affordable for a wide-spectrum of consumers at the lowest end of the economic spectrum.
https://www.chineseinafrica.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=6201&sid=Zd9phz
多哥SINOCAR汽车销售有限公司修理厂致多哥华人朋友!
Togo Sinocar Auto Sales and Repair [Welcomes/Greets] Togo-based Chinese Friends
If you happen to live in the small West African country of Togo and want to either purchase a Chinese-made vehicle or get your "Great Wall" car repaired, then Togo Sinocar is the place to go. The author of this post, seemingly the owner or manager of Togo Sinocar, explains how this venture is the first Chinese auto sales and repair company in the country. Togo Sinocar has 10 employees and two Chinese engineers to serve the community. What's most interesting here is the range of services they offer. In the U.S. or Europe, an auto repair or sales dealer does just that, whereas with Togo Sinocar, the list of services is much broader. In addition to emergency tow services they'll also help you secure either your Togo or international drivers licenses as well.
There are hundreds of other posts on this BBS that are worthy of exploration, some very personal about finding lost relatives who went to Africa and those searching for love in Africa. We'll bring you more posts in the coming weeks as this site offers a truly unique view into Chinese life on the continent that is hard to come by even among those living there.
China in Africa: A Critique of Howard French's "Empire" Article
It's not often that senior Chinese officials make themselves available for interviews with the international media, especially in English. So when I first heard that ...
China in Africa: the BBC's Annoying Interview of Liu Guijin
By any measure China's awe inspiring embrace of Africa is impressive. Let's put aside the staggering financial statistics on how many billions of dollars Beijing is spreading across the continent or even the scale of its natural resource haul. Honestly, there is no comparison because no other country or countries come close to the breadth and depth of China'sengagement here. While the Americans and Europeans meet in conferences and write report after report on the dismal political and humanitarian conditions in Africa, the Chinese are building deep roots here as part of a century-long investment. From Algeria to Angola, tens of thousands of Chinese construction crews are laying the foundation of that investment with the building of countless roads, bridges, hospitals and other desperately needed infrastructure. For that, there is widespread appreciation across many levels of society for Beijing's ability to persevere where both national governments and international donors have largely failed. Not far away, though, from those construction sites, problems are beginning to simmer that if go unchecked could severely compromise Beijing's long term agenda in Africa. China is not just bringing piles of cash and construction trucks to Africa, hundreds of thousands of immigrants are also making the long journey to resettle in cities like right here in Kinshasa. These immigrants, like Mister Chen who we profiled earlier, are coming here in search of opportunity and to build a better life for their families. They are opening businesses large and small in out of the way neighborhoods that largely go unseen by the casual observer. In so many ways, the Chinese entrepreneurial enthusiasm is a welcome addition to poor and dysfunctional communities that essentially operate outside of the formal economy. In short, the Chinese are bringing desperately needed jobs, goods and services. Human culture being what it is though, there is also tremendous risk with how the Chinese ultimately assimilate with Congolese and other African cultures. Initially, the arrival of those Chinese business were greeted either with indifference or welcomed as a positive addition to the community. Now, however, the first rumblings of unease are beginning to emerge as some communities find the Chinese presence to be more problematic than they had initially thought. This issue was most recently brought to light in Namibia where the growing competition from Chinese hair salon owners prompted the government to place an outright ban on Chinese ownership of these types of beauty parlors. Separately, I am hearing more and more firsthand reports from Congolese who have friends and relatives working on Chinese construction projects who complain that Chinese foremen are becoming increasingly aggressive with their local employees. It has been well documented that in countries such as Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and Algeria (source: China Safari, 2009) that many Chinese employers lack cultural sensitivity skills that would endear them to local populations. To many Chinese, these so-called "soft skills" are meaningless. The common retort from many Chinese business owners and project managers is that local workers complain because the Chinese work harder and demand more from their employees than do African companies. The fact that local workers are complaining about working for low wages or not being paid at all just further reinforces that Chinese mindset. In fact, the emotional standoff between Chinese merchants and their African critics is very similar to the same arguments made about cultural insensitivity by the Chinese in certain minority -populated provinces in China. Now, let me be very clear here. I do not have an opinion as to whether or not the popular sentiment held by the majority Han culture in China is correct or the views of minorities who feel their cultures are being paved over. I will leave those questions to far more learned observers. My point is that the debate is so similar. The Han perspective emphasizes economic development as evidence by infrastructure construction. Sentimentality for culture or religion is rarely a priority when measured against infrastructure development in economically deprived regions. Considering the tremendous speed the Chinese are moving in Africa, particularly here in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there may good reason to allocate a small percentage of that investment to building cultural ties between the Chinese and their African hosts. The Congolese, for example, seem overwhelmingly positive about the Chinese arrival. They regard the Chinese initiatives with optimism and see their enthusiasm for Africa as welcome relief from the failed policies of the West. That said, the DRC is an extremely volatile country where a spark can light a blaze in seconds. If the Chinese are not carefully with their cultural investment, it could handicap their broader regional agenda.
Rant: China Might Want to Consider Soft Power Too
By any measure China's awe inspiring embrace of Africa is impressive. Let's put aside the staggering financial statistics on how many billions of dollars Beijing is spreading across the continent or even the scale of its natural resource haul. Honestly, there is no comparison because no other country or countries come close to the breadth and depth of China'sengagement here. While the Americans and Europeans meet in conferences and write report after report on the dismal political and humanitarian conditions in Africa, the Chinese are building deep roots here as part of a century-long investment. From Algeria to Angola, tens of thousands of Chinese construction crews are laying the foundation of that investment with the building of countless roads, bridges, hospitals and other desperately needed infrastructure. For that, there is widespread appreciation across many levels of society for Beijing's ability to persevere where both national governments and international donors have largely failed. Not far away, though, from those construction sites, problems are beginning to simmer that if go unchecked could severely compromise Beijing's long term agenda in Africa.
China is not just bringing piles of cash and construction trucks to Africa, hundreds of thousands of immigrants are also making the long journey to resettle in cities like right here in Kinshasa. These immigrants, like Mister Chen who we profiled earlier, are coming here in search of opportunity and to build a better life for their families. They are opening businesses large and small in out of the way neighborhoods that largely go unseen by the casual observer. In so many ways, the Chinese entrepreneurial enthusiasm is a welcome addition to poor and dysfunctional communities that essentially operate outside of the formal economy. In short, the Chinese are bringing desperately needed jobs, goods and services. Human culture being what it is though, there is also tremendous risk with how the Chinese ultimately assimilate with Congolese and other African cultures. Initially, the arrival of those Chinese business were greeted either with indifference or welcomed as a positive addition to the community. Now, however, the first rumblings of unease are beginning to emerge as some communities find the Chinese presence to be more problematic than they had initially thought. This issue was most recently brought to light in Namibia where the growing competition from Chinese hair salon owners prompted the government to place an outright ban on Chinese ownership of these types of beauty parlors. Separately, I am hearing more and more firsthand reports from Congolese who have friends and relatives working on Chinese construction projects who complain that Chinese foremen are becoming increasingly aggressive with their local employees. It has been well documented that in countries such as Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and Algeria (source: China Safari, 2009) that many Chinese employers lack cultural sensitivity skills that would endear them to local populations.
To many Chinese, these so-called "soft skills" are meaningless. The common retort from many Chinese business owners and project managers is that local workers complain because the Chinese work harder and demand more from their employees than do African companies. The fact that local workers are complaining about working for low wages or not being paid at all just further reinforces that Chinese mindset. In fact, the emotional standoff between Chinese merchants and their African critics is very similar to the same arguments made about cultural insensitivity by the Chinese in certain minority -populated provinces in China. Now, let me be very clear here. I do not have an opinion as to whether or not the popular sentiment held by the majority Han culture in China is correct or the views of minorities who feel their cultures are being paved over. I will leave those questions to far more learned observers. My point is that the debate is so similar. The Han perspective emphasizes economic development as evidence by infrastructure construction. Sentimentality for culture or religion is rarely a priority when measured against infrastructure development in economically deprived regions.
Considering the tremendous speed the Chinese are moving in Africa, particularly here in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there may good reason to allocate a small percentage of that investment to building cultural ties between the Chinese and their African hosts. The Congolese, for example, seem overwhelmingly positive about the Chinese arrival. They regard the Chinese initiatives with optimism and see their enthusiasm for Africa as welcome relief from the failed policies of the West. That said, the DRC is an extremely volatile country where a spark can light a blaze in seconds. If the Chinese are not carefully with their cultural investment, it could handicap their broader regional agenda.
Scan the headlines about the Chinese in Africa and the predominant theme focuses almost exclusively on the infrastructure-for-natural resource deals. The Chinese are signing multi-billion dollar oil and mineral deals up and down the continent while spending a comparable fortune building desperately needed infrastructure in many of the least developed countries on earth. Here in Kinshasa, evidence of China's foreign and trade policies is everywhere. New roads, hospitals, parliament buildings are all being built at record speeds by Chinese construction conglomerates. Yet not far away from the heavy earth moving trucks and the billion dollar mineral deals, a separate, yet equally transformative revolution is underway. Quietly, tens of thousands, possibly even hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants are moving in to neighborhoods across Kinshasa and dozens of African cities. While there is no reliable data available to estimate just how many emigres have come here, there is no doubt the Chinese population is rising quickly. When I first heard that Kinshasa was now home to thousands of Chinese immigrants, I naturally assumed there would some sort of "Chinatown" with a population cluster just as there is in Paris, Los Angeles, Buenos Aires and even Asian cities like Kuala Lumpur. It just made sense that the first wave of Chinese arrivals would huddle together as immigrants have done the world over for generations. "So where is the Chinese community?" I asked a several of our local staff. Puzzled, they responded "what do you mean? There is no Chinese community here, they live with us." Time and again I received the same answer. The Chinese immigrants in Kinshasa are skipping an entire phase of assimilation by moving directly to the sprawling neighborhoods and shantytowns that is home to the capital's 8-10 million residents. By any standard, this is a remarkable phenomenon as there are few more seemingly divergent cultures than Chinese and Congolese. Yet despite overwhelming differences in language, race and culture, the Chinese are adapting in ways that Westerners could never begin to imagine. Mister Chen is one of those thousands of new arrivals to Kinshasa. He and his family moved from China's southern Fuzhou province three years ago to come to Africa. When he first learned of the opportunity to come to the DRC he admitted that he knew nothing about the country as was made clear by their decision to settle in the eastern Congolese city of Kivu. Traveling over land from the Rwandan capital of Kigali, they arrived in Kivu unaware that it is the epicenter of Congo's violent 10-year war. Hundreds of thousands of people, possibly millions, have died in the region surrounding Kivu and after three weeks he packed up his family to move west across the country to the relative safety of Kinshasa. Upon arrival here he was introduced to a "Chinese association" that would provide him the logistical and financial support for him to open a small shop in one of Kinshasa's vast, densely populated neighborhoods. These associations are critical to understanding the success of the Chinese, both here in Kinshasa and the world over. Just as Chinese immigrant associations in San Francisco and New York, the Chinese associations in the DRC provide what is essentially a micro-loan to new immigrants and the necessary logistical support to open a small business. The association handles the legal paperwork, ensures the necessary bribes are paid to relevant neighborhood police and government authorities; connects the shop owner with a distribution network of Chinese importers to supply their business. Mister Chen said he arrived from China with "only a few dollars" but was able to get his start through the help of the association. In turn, as his business develops, he re-pays the association back in small increments until the loan is fully paid. The association also plays another critical role that insulates the shop owner from the volatility of daily life in Kinshasa. When the police or some other government authority comes to his store for bribes or extortion, he simply calls the association who then quickly respond to handle the situation. This rapid response and protection from the association is an immensely important aspect of the Chinese entrepreneurial success here as it offers a level of reliability largely unavailable in a society as unstable as Kinshasa. Mister Chen's store has the feel of an inner-city American liquor store where all of the products are on display behind a think glass window. He largely sells cheap, low quality Chinese-made knick-knacks that range from one-dollar headphones to shoes to plastic tableware. Although business in his 1,500 square foot (estimate) shop was brisk during my 45-minute mid-day visit, not once did I see him sell a single product. Instead, locals would approach the counter, throw down a $20 or $50 US bill and he or one of his local staff members would hurl a wad of Congolese francs and dollars back at the customer. In addition to selling low-cost Chinese imports, shop owners like Mister Chen have also established themselves as among the most reliable money changers in the city. "I trust the Chinese more than I do Congolese," one customer explained when I asked why he changed his money with Mister Chen and not at one of the countless money changers on the street. "They give us a fair price and don't cheat us." By selling low-cost products along with doing a brisk currency trading business, Mister Chen said he is able to squeeze out a small profit. "It's not a lot because the Congolese are very poor but I earn more here than what I was making back in Fuzhou," he said. When you consider the hundreds of billions of dollars Western governments and NGOs have spent in Africa to help build civil society programs none seem anywhere near as effective as what Mister Chen is doing. His small business is simultaneously providing jobs, goods and services that are vital in a region desperate for this kind of economic activity. Mister Chen does not think of his business as anything other than a means to earn a meager living. What he may not realize is that what he and his family are doing is part of a larger, more powerful trend that will re-shape Africa in a far more profound way than any of the roads and hospitals Beijing is building here.
The Chinese in Africa: Meet Mister Chen
Scan the headlines about the Chinese in Africa and the predominant theme focuses almost exclusively on the infrastructure-for-natural resource deals. The Chinese are signing multi-billion dollar oil and mineral deals up and down the continent while spending a comparable fortune building desperately needed infrastructure in many of the least developed countries on earth. Here in Kinshasa, evidence of China's foreign and trade policies is everywhere. New roads, hospitals, parliament buildings are all being built at record speeds by Chinese construction conglomerates. Yet not far away from the heavy earth moving trucks and the billion dollar mineral deals, a separate, yet equally transformative revolution is underway. Quietly, tens of thousands, possibly even hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants are moving in to neighborhoods across Kinshasa and dozens of African cities. While there is no reliable data available to estimate just how many emigres have come here, there is no doubt the Chinese population is rising quickly.
When I first heard that Kinshasa was now home to thousands of Chinese immigrants, I naturally assumed there would some sort of "Chinatown" with a population cluster just as there is in Paris, Los Angeles, Buenos Aires and even Asian cities like Kuala Lumpur. It just made sense that the first wave of Chinese arrivals would huddle together as immigrants have done the world over for generations. "So where is the Chinese community?" I asked a several of our local staff. Puzzled, they responded "what do you mean? There is no Chinese community here, they live with us." Time and again I received the same answer. The Chinese immigrants in Kinshasa are skipping an entire phase of assimilation by moving directly to the sprawling neighborhoods and shantytowns that is home to the capital's 8-10 million residents. By any standard, this is a remarkable phenomenon as there are few more seemingly divergent cultures than Chinese and Congolese. Yet despite overwhelming differences in language, race and culture, the Chinese are adapting in ways that Westerners could never begin to imagine.
Mister Chen is one of those thousands of new arrivals to Kinshasa. He and his family moved from China's southern Fuzhou province three years ago to come to Africa. When he first learned of the opportunity to come to the DRC he admitted that he knew nothing about the country as was made clear by their decision to settle in the eastern Congolese city of Kivu. Traveling over land from the Rwandan capital of Kigali, they arrived in Kivu unaware that it is the epicenter of Congo's violent 10-year war. Hundreds of thousands of people, possibly millions, have died in the region surrounding Kivu and after three weeks he packed up his family to move west across the country to the relative safety of Kinshasa. Upon arrival here he was introduced to a "Chinese association" that would provide him the logistical and financial support for him to open a small shop in one of Kinshasa's vast, densely populated neighborhoods. These associations are critical to understanding the success of the Chinese, both here in Kinshasa and the world over. Just as Chinese immigrant associations in San Francisco and New York, the Chinese associations in the DRC provide what is essentially a micro-loan to new immigrants and the necessary logistical support to open a small business. The association handles the legal paperwork, ensures the necessary bribes are paid to relevant neighborhood police and government authorities; connects the shop owner with a distribution network of Chinese importers to supply their business. Mister Chen said he arrived from China with "only a few dollars" but was able to get his start through the help of the association. In turn, as his business develops, he re-pays the association back in small increments until the loan is fully paid. The association also plays another critical role that insulates the shop owner from the volatility of daily life in Kinshasa. When the police or some other government authority comes to his store for bribes or extortion, he simply calls the association who then quickly respond to handle the situation. This rapid response and protection from the association is an immensely important aspect of the Chinese entrepreneurial success here as it offers a level of reliability largely unavailable in a society as unstable as Kinshasa.
Mister Chen's store has the feel of an inner-city American liquor store where all of the products are on display behind a think glass window. He largely sells cheap, low quality Chinese-made knick-knacks that range from one-dollar headphones to shoes to plastic tableware. Although business in his 1,500 square foot (estimate) shop was brisk during my 45-minute mid-day visit, not once did I see him sell a single product. Instead, locals would approach the counter, throw down a $20 or $50 US bill and he or one of his local staff members would hurl a wad of Congolese francs and dollars back at the customer. In addition to selling low-cost Chinese imports, shop owners like Mister Chen have also established themselves as among the most reliable money changers in the city. "I trust the Chinese more than I do Congolese," one customer explained when I asked why he changed his money with Mister Chen and not at one of the countless money changers on the street. "They give us a fair price and don't cheat us." By selling low-cost products along with doing a brisk currency trading business, Mister Chen said he is able to squeeze out a small profit. "It's not a lot because the Congolese are very poor but I earn more here than what I was making back in Fuzhou," he said.
When you consider the hundreds of billions of dollars Western governments and NGOs have spent in Africa to help build civil society programs none seem anywhere near as effective as what Mister Chen is doing. His small business is simultaneously providing jobs, goods and services that are vital in a region desperate for this kind of economic activity. Mister Chen does not think of his business as anything other than a means to earn a meager living. What he may not realize is that what he and his family are doing is part of a larger, more powerful trend that will re-shape Africa in a far more profound way than any of the roads and hospitals Beijing is building here.
I have been living in Kinshasa for almost three weeks now and since I landed here I've been asked countless times what I find the most interesting/bizarre/unusual about life in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For me, the answer is clear. It's not the vibrancy of Congolese culture, how incredibly warm most people are, or even the tragedy of the endemic poverty that defines life here for so many. No, the biggest surprise so far comes from the attitudes of the many American aid and development personnel I have met. These are the people who work in both the large multinational relief organizations or in the development sector of the US government itself. Pretty much, anytime you socialize with these folks the conversations almost always centers on who is more dysfunctional: Congolese society or their employers at the major NGO/government agencies. Beer after beer goes down while they detail the overwhelming bureaucratic challenges they confront each day just to do their jobs. They complain passionately how their management rarely cares if anything actually gets done just whether or not reports are written and rules are followed. So it's in this context that I raise the issue that I consider to be the proverbial elephant in the room. If you accept that a global battle of ideas is currently underway among three competing ideologies: religious extremism (the Middle East, North Africa, the Persian Gulf and arguably even in the United States itself), the so-called Western democracy agenda promoted by the U.S. and Europe and then what's referred to as the "Beijing Consensus." This "Beijing Consensus" at its core is an ideology modeled after China's own 30-year economic success that emphasizes social/economic issues over civil/political rights. China is exporting that philosophy across the developing world, especially in Africa, where governments are being lured with billions of dollars in low interest loans, debt forgiveness and massive infrastructure projects in exchange for access to natural resources. The Chinese bring to Africa their own development experience from working in comparably disadvantaged environments. Specifically, the Chinese have developed low-water agricultural expertise, enhanced irrigation techniques and an unrivaled efficiency for building infrastructure projects. Yet none of this — and I mean NONE — matters to the Western development staff that I have met so far. The Chinese, in their minds, are "communist dictators" who don't value "democracy" and "transparency." Just like that, the conversation ends. They have no patience to talk about anything the Chinese are doing other than fueling corruption, importing poorly made products and exporting dictatorship. What I find so interesting about these discussions with supposed "professional development specialists" is how remarkably unsophisticated they are about alternative models from non-Western countries. There is a confidence in the American/Western method that borders on evangelical. The real tragedy here is that none of what I am observing here in the DRC among Western aid officials is new. Experts having been sounding the alarm over this blind spot for years. Prominent Sino-African relations scholar Professor Deborah Brautigam raised the issue in 1998 when she too singled out western aid agencies for their nativism. "Ignorance about China's development aid program [in Africa] is even more complete among development analysts," she wrote. Professor Brautigam explains some of the reasons for this ignorance, attributing it to the language barrier, China's former diplomatic isolation and "the Chinese work style which emphasizes productive labor over report writing" (source: Deborah Brautigam, Chinese Aid and African Development, 1998). While the Western development agencies bury themselves in reports, spreadsheets and analysis, the Chinese are out there seven days a week building roads, dams, bridges, hospitals and more. Simply put, traditional Chinese pragmatism is getting things done while the Western model dithers and dithers and dithers with endless paperwork. After dozens of conversations with Congolese on this subject, it is abundantly clear that either the Western development officials either don't see or don't care that they are in fact losing the ideological battle for hearts and minds. The Congolese can see firsthand the immediate impact of Chinese development. They can feel it, touch it and understand it. The same cannot be said for American and European aid where the complex world of spreadsheets, templates and development models is lost on the very people they are trying to help. The Chinese live in a practical world, a world the Congolese can identify with. Westerners may have once been as pragmatic and practical, but no more. The mere fact that these aid officials can't even discuss it illustrates how serious the problem is.
The West's Tragic Blindspot in Africa
I have been living in Kinshasa for almost three weeks now and since I landed here I've been asked countless times what I find the most interesting/bizarre/unusual about life in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For me, the answer is clear. It's not the vibrancy of Congolese culture, how incredibly warm most people are, or even the tragedy of the endemic poverty that defines life here for so many. No, the biggest surprise so far comes from the attitudes of the many American aid and development personnel I have met. These are the people who work in both the large multinational relief organizations or in the development sector of the US government itself. Pretty much, anytime you socialize with these folks the conversations almost always centers on who is more dysfunctional: Congolese society or their employers at the major NGO/government agencies. Beer after beer goes down while they detail the overwhelming bureaucratic challenges they confront each day just to do their jobs. They complain passionately how their management rarely cares if anything actually gets done just whether or not reports are written and rules are followed.
So it's in this context that I raise the issue that I consider to be the proverbial elephant in the room. If you accept that a global battle of ideas is currently underway among three competing ideologies: religious extremism (the Middle East, North Africa, the Persian Gulf and arguably even in the United States itself), the so-called Western democracy agenda promoted by the U.S. and Europe and then what's referred to as the "Beijing Consensus." This "Beijing Consensus" at its core is an ideology modeled after China's own 30-year economic success that emphasizes social/economic issues over civil/political rights. China is exporting that philosophy across the developing world, especially in Africa, where governments are being lured with billions of dollars in low interest loans, debt forgiveness and massive infrastructure projects in exchange for access to natural resources. The Chinese bring to Africa their own development experience from working in comparably disadvantaged environments. Specifically, the Chinese have developed low-water agricultural expertise, enhanced irrigation techniques and an unrivaled efficiency for building infrastructure projects. Yet none of this — and I mean NONE — matters to the Western development staff that I have met so far.
The Chinese, in their minds, are "communist dictators" who don't value "democracy" and "transparency." Just like that, the conversation ends. They have no patience to talk about anything the Chinese are doing other than fueling corruption, importing poorly made products and exporting dictatorship. What I find so interesting about these discussions with supposed "professional development specialists" is how remarkably unsophisticated they are about alternative models from non-Western countries. There is a confidence in the American/Western method that borders on evangelical.
The real tragedy here is that none of what I am observing here in the DRC among Western aid officials is new. Experts having been sounding the alarm over this blind spot for years. Prominent Sino-African relations scholar Professor Deborah Brautigam raised the issue in 1998 when she too singled out western aid agencies for their nativism. "Ignorance about China's development aid program [in Africa] is even more complete among development analysts," she wrote. Professor Brautigam explains some of the reasons for this ignorance, attributing it to the language barrier, China's former diplomatic isolation and "the Chinese work style which emphasizes productive labor over report writing" (source: Deborah Brautigam, Chinese Aid and African Development, 1998).
While the Western development agencies bury themselves in reports, spreadsheets and analysis, the Chinese are out there seven days a week building roads, dams, bridges, hospitals and more. Simply put, traditional Chinese pragmatism is getting things done while the Western model dithers and dithers and dithers with endless paperwork. After dozens of conversations with Congolese on this subject, it is abundantly clear that either the Western development officials either don't see or don't care that they are in fact losing the ideological battle for hearts and minds. The Congolese can see firsthand the immediate impact of Chinese development. They can feel it, touch it and understand it. The same cannot be said for American and European aid where the complex world of spreadsheets, templates and development models is lost on the very people they are trying to help.
The Chinese live in a practical world, a world the Congolese can identify with. Westerners may have once been as pragmatic and practical, but no more. The mere fact that these aid officials can't even discuss it illustrates how serious the problem is.
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