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Clinical Negligence litigation relies on the opinion of medical experts, to identify and establish breach of duty, causation and quantum issues. Many of these medical experts work in both public and private sectors and many of whom have been called forward to healthcare's front line in the fight against Covid-19. This has created a shortage of available experts to give evidence on liability and/or quantum to support both the Claimant and Defendant.
In 2020, a new protocol was implemented to encourage positive behaviours from Claimant and Defendant lawyers. This protocol can be relied upon throughout the duration of the Covid-19 pandemic and recovery.
This protocol covers issues relating to limitation and extensions of time, telephone calls and emails, service by email (including new proceedings), medical examinations of clients for condition and prognosis reports, exchange of evidence, interim payments, settlement meetings and mediations, BACS payments, cost budgeting, and hearings including adjournments.
[Further information on the protocol can be found at: https://resolution.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Covid-19-Clinical-Negligence-Protocol-2020-1.pdf ]
How Covid-19 has affected us:
The impact upon disclosure of Medical Records
The first stage of a Clinical Negligence claim is for us to access and review the medical records with our experts. Some NHS trusts and GP practices have risen to the challenge and have continued to provide records within the statutory timescale of 30 days (GDPR 2018), whereas others have struggled significantly, with records taking many months or more to materialise.
It is a difficult call to make to seek a Court order for disclosure (which is the only way to force the issue), when we are all acutely aware of the challenges posed by the pandemic.
The impact on limitation
The Covid-19 protocol allows for an unchallengeable extension to limitation until 3 months after the end of the protocol (for participating organisations). This has the potential to lead to a significant number of cases where limitation occurs on the same (as yet unknown) date 3 months after the end of the protocol.
In order to avoid this backlog, we seek to agree a fixed limitation date for each file and review and extend it further if necessary.
The impact of self-isolation and working remotely
Like many companies, the pandemic led to a shift in our working dynamics, with all staff initially forced to work remotely.
Since the easing of restrictions many of our staff have been making a phased return to the office. We are also pleased to return to client-facing meetings, where necessary, socially distanced in one of our meeting rooms.
More recently, the NHS Track and Trace app has caused its own challenges with 'pings' to numerous members of the team, forcing them to self-isolate for up to 10 days. Thankfully working remotely is no longer an upheaval and our usual service remains.
Joining the firm in 2021 brought new challenges. Starting a new job in the in the midst of remote working was somewhat daunting as many of our colleagues have yet to return to work in the office. We found that we may know a name from through email, or over the phone, but it proves difficult putting a face to that name when people do attend the office.
The impact of Covid-19 on our work in the future
Covid-19 has caused significant delays within the healthcare sector, with many individual's treatments being pushed back. Recent news suggests that a potential 13 million patients may be waiting for routine procedures and investigations to be carried out in the next 12 months [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-57793122].
These delays will undoubtedly lead to an increase in avoidable poor outcomes for patients and their families.
For legal advice relation to Clinical Negligence contact us at medical@bttj.com
Similar to other medical negligence claims, head and brain injuries can vary greatly in terms of severity. As a result, the amount of compensation that you could receive varies too. It's unlikely that an online compensation calculator can adequately value your claim.
If you have suffered a brain injury in the last three years that was caused by someone else's negligence, then you should get in touch with our experienced medical negligence solicitors. Our team are legal professionals with medical knowledge and they can let you know if you have a valid case for brain injury compensation. We can talk you through the whole process.
To help you understand more about brain injury compensation, we have listed the different severities of brain injuries below.
Different Severities of Brain Injury
The figures below are taken from the government published Judicial College Guidelines, which are simply lump sums to illustrate the pain, suffering and loss of amenity you have suffered. However, these figures provide a guideline as to what compensation you may receive. The figures below are not definitive but they serve as a rough guideline as to what may be expected in various cases.
Severity of Injury
Injury Description
Potential Compensation Amount
Very Severe Brain Damage Serious brain damage that has a significant effect on the senses and severe physical limitation. The need for full-time care. The court will consider the degree of understanding the victim has, their life expectancy, and the extent of physical limitation. £247,280 – £354,260
Moderately Severe Brain Damage Cases of severe physical or cognitive disability which leave the victim substantially dependent on others and need constant care or other medical requirements. The court will consider the victim's life expectancy, degree of understanding, degree of dependence on others, the extent of their physical limitations, their ability to communicate, and behavioural abnormalities. £183,150 – £235,790
Moderate Brain Damage (Upper Tier) Moderate to severe damage to intellect and/or changes in personality. An effect on their sight, speech, and other senses, and a serious risk of epilepsy. £131,620 – £192,090
Moderate Brain Damage (Middle Tier) Moderate to modest damage to intellect. The possibility of the victim returning to employment is either greatly reduced or completely removed. Possible risk of epilepsy. £79,530 – £131,620
Moderate Brain Damage (Lower Tier)	 Concentration and memory are badly affected, and there is a lower risk of epilepsy. There is a reduction in the ability to work, but have very limited dependency on others. £37,760 – £79,530
Less Severe Brain Damage A good recovery has been made with a return to normal social and work life. There may be potential for on-going impairments such as poor concentration, memory loss or mood problems. For the upper end of this bracket, there may be a small risk of epilepsy. The court will consider any permanent disabilities or the chance of permanent disabilities, the severity of the initial injury, any changes in personality, and any depression. £13,430 – £37,760
Minor Brain or Head Injury Cases of minimal brain damage or non-existent. The court will consider the severity of the initial injury, time of recovery, any on-going symptoms, and the presence of headaches. £1,940 – £11,200
We understand how upsetting it can be to talk about what has happened and how overwhelming the consequences of negligence are. At BTTJ, we have a team of legal professionals and medical negligence specialists who are exceptionally experienced at handling these types of cases. All advice and information are treated with total confidentiality, compassion, and care.
Coventry lawyer and Head of the Medical Negligence team at BTTJ, Tom Barnes, has been awarded membership of the AvMA (Action Against Medical Accidents) Specialist Clinical Negligence Panel for a further five years.
Tom and his BTTJ medical negligence colleague Richard Stanford are the only AvMA panel members within Coventry and Warwickshire.
AvMA was established in 1982 and today the specialist clinical negligence panel is a highly sought after quality mark for medical negligence specialists.
Tom, who is also a member of the Law Society Clinical Negligence Panel, has focused on medical negligence claims since 1988 and represents clients nationwide. He has also been recognised recently by the Legal 500 which acknowledged Tom's huge amount of experience in this field.
If you need any advice on medical negligence, please feel free to contact Tom directly on tom.barnes@bttj.com or call 024 7653 1532
Dawn Slow, Medical Negligence lawyer at BTTJ, is currently involved with a complex case that for our client, LWR, combined a claim involving his employer as well as a claim involving medical negligence.
The client had an accident at work and injured his knee. He had pre existing arthritis. 7 months after the accident LWR was still in a lot of pain and underwent an arthroscopy, following which he could barely move his knee at all.
What did the experts say?
Experts agreed that LWR should not have undergone the arthroscopy due to the complications his arthritis would cause and to do this operation was negligent.
What did this mean in terms of who should settle?
This made the case much more complex and we now needed to ask "Did the client's ongoing pain arise from the accident or did it arise from the medical negligence?". This was a difficult question as on the face of it the accident injury was a relatively minor one. However it was necessary to ensure that there was no link between the accident injuries and the injury that occurred as a result of the arthroscopy before making any decision to settle the accident claim.
If there was any link at all between the ongoing pain and the accident injuries then the whole claim for all the injuries, including those arising from the medical negligence, would have to be settled by LWR's employers. This is because LWR would not have been referred for the arthroscopy had the accident at work not occurred and therefore all the pain and suffering he had could be directly linked back to the accident at work.
Anyone who suffers an accident where they are making a claim from any third party, who then suffers what is potentially a further injury at the hands of the NHS, must first look to see if the further injuries can be linked to the original accident. If they can, all the injuries regardless of any negligence on the part of any NHS employee (or other medic), must be claimed as part of the original claim. Only injuries arising from any medical negligence that there is a fair degree of certainty cannot be linked back to the original accident should be dealt with as a separate medical negligence claim. It is extremely important that a client understands the link between the two events and how that link may or may not have been broken so the two events might end up as separate claims.
Two separate experts advised that LWR would have been back to his pre accident condition within 3 months of his accident at work which was before the medical negligence took place. This meant that the two potential claims could be separated – but, there was a risk that the NHS could argue that the ongoing injuries were due to the accident at work and not due to any negligence on their part – and if a Judge agreed that argument, then, by settling the accident at work claim early, the client might risk not being able to claim for his ongoing injuries against the NHS.
What was the outcome?
LWR needed a lot of very complex and technical legal advice on this which Dawn Slow gave in a way that was easy for LWR to understand – this meant he could make a fully informed decision on which step to take next and whether or not to settle his claim for his accident at work before finalising the medical negligence claim.
LWR's accident claim was recently successfully settled at £5000 and his medical negligence claim is continuing.
NHS Resolution, which was formerly NHS Litigation Authority, has published research on the motivation of patients making a compensation claim when something has gone wrong with their healthcare.
The research, which was conducted in partnership with The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), surveyed 728 patients who had made a claim and looked at the incident that had occurred, how the patient felt it had been handled, how any subsequent complaint had been handled and the factors that led to the patient making a claim for compensation. BIT also did an in-depth telephone interview with 20 past claimants.
The findings show that, in general, the research participants were not satisfied with the reactions of NHS staff following an incident or how their complaint was handled within the NHS.
63% of patients who responded felt that they did not receive an explanation for why the incident occurred.
Only 31% said they felt they had received an apology.
71% of the people responding did not think that their healthcare provided undertook any actions to investigate the incident in the first instance.
Only 6% of respondents felt that actions were taken that would prevent the same incident happening again.
The majority rated the response to their complaint as 'poor or very poor' in terms of accuracy, empathy, speed of the response and level of detail.
It also found that both internal and external factors motivated patients to make a claim. Personal motivations included:
Wanting to prevent similar things happening to others.
Wanting to receive an apology or an explanation for the incident, or to trigger a detailed investigation of the incident.
Wanting the clinicians involved to be held to account.
Emotional responses (e.g. frustration and anger) brought about by poor incident or complaint handling.
Financial compensation.
External motivations included:
Suggestions from NHS staff that making a claim would be appropriate
Conversations with friends, family and wider social network
Helen Vernon, who is Chief Executive at NHS Resolution, said "This research confirms that claims for compensation can sometimes be made in the search of answers, which could have been provided when the incident occurred. Being open with patients when they suffer avoidable harm and taking tangible steps to learn from what happened are essential. We would like to thank the patients who spared the time to contribute to this valuable research, which will help us to build on our work with the NHS to improve the response when things go wrong."
Full details of the research conducted can be found on the NHS Resolution website.
As a Specialist Clinical Negligence Practitioner, I work solely for clients who have suffered as a result of medical negligence.
It is my role to work with clients from their initial contact with us, all the way through to getting the best possible settlement for them.
I find that clients can sometimes feel unsure about getting in touch with a law firm; they do not know what to expect and are concerned about how daunting it may be on top of the challenges they already face due to the negligence. When I first talk to my clients, I'll take them through what steps are involved so that they understand what will happen during the claim process.
I am part of a vastly experienced Clinical Negligence team at Brindley Twist Tafft and James (BTTJ) who have members with specialist accreditation from the Law Society and from AvMA (Action Against Medical Accidents) and who fully understand how emotionally difficult bringing a claim may be. We pride ourselves on making the process as straightforward as possible and do our best to put clients at ease.
Although each case is unique, the actions that I take to pursue compensation for clients that have suffered as a result of negligence can be broadly broken down into 4 main areas (which I also talk about in this video):
First I will obtain any relevant medical records – this helps me to establish a timeline of events.
Once I've assessed the records, I will ask an independent medical expert to assess the case and provide evidence as appropriate. At BTTJ we have a range of excellent independent medical professionals that we work with and will select an expert specific to each case.
Once we have received confirmation from an independent expert that negligence has occurred, I will formally make the allegations to the negligent party (the Defendant).
Finally I will obtain compensation for the harm that has been caused.
I support my clients throughout this whole process and am always on hand to explain what is happening and answer any questions.
If you have any queries about pursuing a medical negligence claim, please get in touch with us on 024 7653 1532 – or fill out an enquiry form – and we will be happy to help.
Angus Buchanan
Specialist Clinical Negligence Practitioner
Solicitor Richard Stanford was interviewed by the BBC with regards to the unique Clinical Negligence case that was recently concluded with Adam Weitzman QC.
You can watch the BBC story and extract from the interview below…
About the solicitor
Richard Stanford has experience of a very wide range of Clinical Negligence cases including Orthopaedic, Oncological, Urological, Infection, injury during surgery and the management of long term conditions such as diabetes and Crohn's Disease. He handles cases from inception to completion, including trial where necessary.
On Wednesday 22 November 2017 Richard Stanford, of Brindley Twist Tafft & James, and Adam Weitzman QC concluded what is believed to be a unique case in Clinical Negligence.
BG had filed a living will/advance directive in 2004 with her local hospital, essentially confirming she did not wish to receive medical treatment nor sustenance if she suffered a significant stroke, having watched her mother suffer for many years having suffered exactly that.
BG then suffered such a stroke and could no longer meaningfully communicate.
Very sadly the hospital had not filed the advance directive in an obvious place. The family were unaware of its existence.
BG spent the next 22 months attempting to refuse food and routinely pulled a feeding tube out. She ultimately underwent surgery so that she was PEG fed. In the absence of the advance directive this, and all other treatment/intervention, was believed to be in her best interests. The expert evidence confirmed that she understood what was happening to her and around her, and that with hindsight she was indicating she did not wish to be kept alive.
The advance directive was eventually discovered by chance within the records. A discussion with the family took place and BG died in comparative peace within a few days.
The hospital trust accepted liability in their Letter of Response, provided a comprehensive apology and explained that procedures are now in place to prevent further occurrences.
Quantum remained in dispute given the total absence of any similar reported cases. An uplift was sought for aggravated damages given the duration of the unwanted treatment, which constituted repeated assaults.
Settlement was agreed between the parties at £45,000, which will be distributed under the terms of BG's Will.
It was strange to be arguing that our client's mother did not die as quickly as she should have…
Members of the Society of Clinical Negligence Laywers (SCIL) have campaigned at Westminster against fixed fees for medical negligence claims.
The chairman of SCIL, Stephen Webber, said 'We believe the most important issue here is patient safety – if there can be improvements and lessons learnt then the level of negligence will be reduced. That must be the starting point for reform'
Lord Justice Jackson published a report in July on fixed costs in which he said a working group should be set up.
A response to a consultation on fixed costs for clinical negligence claims is still being prepared by The Department of Health.
The full story, as reported in the Law Society Gazette can be read here.
On 18 April 2013 Brindley Twist Tafft and James Solicitors and Barrister Teresa Hargreaves of Number 5 Chambers, Birmingham, represented the family of Jessica Strong at the inquest touching her life at Stoke Coroner's Court. The story of Jessica's short life and tragic death received coverage in the national press and on local television.
Jessica was born prematurely in Nuneaton and transferred to a specialist baby unit in Stoke, as the local units either did not have space or did not have the facilities to meet her requirements. Initially Jessica thrived despite her prematurity but she then became acutely unwell and sadly passed away at just 11 days old.
A post mortem revealed that baby Jessica had contracted Serratia Marcesans, a common bacteria which thrives in moist conditions and can be found in many bathrooms. The bacteria is readily fought off by adults and children but is aggressive and difficult to treat in the very young. In this particular instance the bacteria was known to have colonised, but not infected, a different baby on the unit and the treating doctors had not considered a link. Jessica only received the correct antibiotics for the infection a matter of hours before her death, by which time the damage was too severe.
Serratia Marcesans was found to have colonised six babies on the unit with another baby dying several days later. The Coroner recorded a narrative verdict that Jessica had died from extreme prematurity and infection spread by human contact, most likely as a result of poor hand washing practice in the unit.
Although the hospital suggested that it could have been members of the public who did not use the hand gels, the family were strongly of the opinion that the spread of infection must have been by hospital staff given that six different babies were colonised by the bacteria. The hospital staff confirmed that hand washing and other hygiene procedures are amongst the best in the country following a review of their practices.
The NHS Litigation Authority which represents the hospital trust made an early admission of liability prior to the inquest and compensation negotiations remain ongoing.
Full story: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2311636/Pair-newborn-babies-died-killer-bug-new-400m-University-Hospital-North-Staffordshire-hospital-people-neonatal-ward-failed-wash-hands.html
Richard Stanford
Richard Stanford is a Medical Negligence Solicitor at Brindley Twist Tafft & James and is very experienced in a wide range of clinical negligence cases.
A significant number of patients have been recalled as part of an investigation over the treatment given to cancer patients by urologist, and Channel 4's Embarrassing Bodies' doctor, Mr Arackal Manu Nair at Solihull Hospital (Heart of England NHS Trust) and the privately-run Spire Parkway Hospital. It is alleged Mr Nair operated on one man who did not have cancer, while leaving another incontinent and infertile.
Mr Arackal Manu Nair, otherwise known as Manu was suspended from his post as an NHS Consultant Urologist at Solihull Hospital when colleagues raised their suspicions about his surgery with hospital bosses and he was referred to the General Medical Council. He has subsequently resigned from his post at the Heart of England NHS Trust.
Concerns over Mr Nair's operations have led to a recall of Mr Nair's prostatectomy patients at Spire Parkway Hospital and BMI Priory Hospital, Birmingham. There are approximately 170 radical prostatectomy patients within the NHS who were treated at Solihull Hospital and Spire Healthcare group. A radical prostatectomy is a common surgical procedure to remove the prostate gland where patients are diagnosed with prostate cancer.
We understand that the central issues concern whether patients were properly advised and surgery was undertaken unnecessarily and the degree of the need for surgery. A prostatectomy is a fairly common operation for prostate cancer. It is an extensive operation to remove the whole of the prostate gland, but other treatment options are usually available, all of which should be discussed with the patient.
The Independent hospitals and the Heart of England NHS Trust asked the Royal College of Surgeons to review Mr Manu Nair's surgical practices both in the NHS and the private sector. It was in light of the result of this review from the Royal College of Surgeons that patients were subsequently recalled.
The investigation into Mr Manu Nair's practice has echoes of the investigations into the cases of 'cleavage-sparing mastectomy' by disgraced Solihull breast surgeon Mr Ian Paterson who performed hundreds of unrecognised operations at Spire Hospital at the Heart of England NHS Trust that breached medical guidelines and left women at a greater risk of breast cancer returning. Mr Paterson also performed unnecessary mastectomies, telling some patients they had cancer when they did not. Victims of Mr Paterson are stepping up their battle for justice and compensation against the Spire Hospitals by launching a petition. See the link provided for more information.
If you are one of the patients who had been recalled you may wish to do the following:
Review the letter you have received following your recall.
Do you wish to take the matter further?
If so would you like an apology and/or compensation?
Have you already lodged a complaint/spoken to solicitors?
Call us to talk through your concerns
We would like anybody who was a patient of Mr Manu Nair to be aware of the issues concerning his work and to have the opportunity, not only to be reassured medically, but to be able to make an informed decision on their rights and available actions.
If you have been treated by any doctor or clinician either as an NHS patient, or as a private patient, and have concerns relating to your treatment then do not hesitate to contact our Clinical Negligence team for a confidential, no-obligation discussion and free advice.
We are able to offer a Conditional Fee Agreement (i.e. no win, no fee) or act under Legal Aid in appropriate circumstances.
Roseanne Elkington & Richard Stanford
http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/heartlands-doctor-who-starred-tvs-10172871
http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/ian-paterson-cancer-surgery-victims-10101785
http://solihullobserver.co.uk/news/second-solihull-doctor-suspended-and-under-investigation-for-cancer-operations-6894/
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-34418228
The work of our Clinical Negligence team is wide and varied, ranging from low value claims for insignificant but unacceptable delays in treatment, to catastrophic brain injury caused by inappropriate medical treatment.
The most common cases we encounter include delays in diagnosing cancer, failure to diagnose fractures, falls in hospital and pressure sores. This article aims to provide more information on the last of those issues.
Pressure sores (or pressure ulcers) are caused when a person remains stationary for too long. The weight of the body prevents normal blood flow to the area which bears the weight, causing the skin and surrounding tissue to be starved of the necessary oxygen, and other components within the blood, to maintain and regenerate the tissue cells.
Pressure sores generally occur on the back of the heels, on the buttocks and on the sacrum (the base of the spine). The heels are especially at risk because the blood flow to the feet is less than elsewhere, there is little tissue between the skin and the bone and, crucially, the area does not usually bear any weight so is poorly adapted to do so.
Pressure sores are graded from 1 to 4 depending upon their severity. Higher graded sores can easily become infected and take years to treat. If infection takes hold (which is not uncommon if they occur in a hospital environment) it can lead to blood poisoning and, all too often, the amputation of affected limbs.
Some people are more at risk of developing pressure sores than others. Factors increasing risk and vulnerability include:
Immobility/reduced mobility (which can be through lifestyle or medical issues) will lead to the person spending too long with weight on "at risk" areas – the longer the pressure is applied, the greater the risk.
Circulatory problems such as those seen in diabetics or those with cardiac issues. The blood flow is already poor and it will take less pressure for the supply to be affected.
Blood disorders such as liver disease which will mean that the "quality" of the blood is below average, and any disruption to the usual supply will have negative effects more quickly.
Dermatological issues: If the person's skin is already compromised through age, disease or long term use of steroids or steroidal cream (as often prescribed for psoriasis and severe eczema) then it will be more susceptible to damage.
Mental Health issues can mean that an individual is unable to comprehend or follow instructions in respect of their own care. They may be entirely oblivious to any risks and may move around less than others.
Incontinence and Hygiene issues can leave the skin in a compromised state. Exposure to urine especially causes problems due to its proximity to the sacrum and buttocks; aside from the acid content of urine the prolonged dampness can also make the skin more vulnerable.
The risk is multiplied many times for individuals with a combination of the above factors. Because such risk factors are more commonly found in older patients, it is often they who are at the greatest risk, although the problem does not exclusively occur in old age.
Pressure Sores are a well-known challenge and a problem for treating clinicians. Extensive research has been carried out and the general view is that their occurrence (at some grade) may be as high as 10% of all hospital admissions. The costs of treating the same are far in excess of the necessary expenditure to prevent them, not to mention the distress and pain caused to the patient.
The management of patients in hospital who are deemed to be at risk of developing pressure sores is primarily a nursing issue with accurate assessment (initially and ongoing) and appropriate treatment being key to their prevention. The Royal College of Nursing provides the following Quick Reference Guide which is in use in many hospitals throughout the country – please click on the linkl below.
http://www.rcn.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/78501/001252.pdf
Although primarily a nursing issue all treating clinicians need to be aware of the risks of pressure sores. A particular problem is that some patients who require surgery may be kept stationary on an operating table under general anaesthetic for substantial periods of time. Operating tables are not generally designed with pressure relieving methods in mind, and patients are already at increased risk whilst under anaesthetic as blood flow is already compromised.
A quote from such circumstances appears in the opening pages of the Royal College of Nursing "Pressure Ulcer risk assessment and prevention guidelines" handbook, referenced above:
"I had an operation on my gallbladder. I told the staff I was prone to getting pressure sores. They assured me I would not get any while in their care. Low and behold when I came around from the anaesthetic, they found a beauty…it is now six and a half years old"
That situation is all too common.
Generally with appropriate care pressure sores should never develop in a modern hospital, even in individuals with a multitude of risk factors.
If you or a friend or relative has developed pressure sores, particularly whilst in hospital, there is a strong possibility that you or they will be entitled to compensation for the same. Should that be the case we invite you to contact our experienced team for free advice, in confidence and without obligation.
If you require more general advice or information concerning pressure sores it can be found here: http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Pressure-ulcers/Pages/Introduction.aspx


Software Downloads for "Toshiba Sd3300"
The Suite includes DVD to Toshiba TG01 Video Converter. The Toshiba TG01 Video Converter lets you easily and quickly convert DVD to Toshiba TG01 video (WMV format). And the Neoconvert DVD to Toshiba TG01 helps you convert DVD to Toshiba TG01 movie with high quality and fast conversion speed. Compared with other Toshiba TG01 Video/Movie converter, Neoconvert DVD To Toshiba TG01 Video Converter supports single-step conversion.You can also adjust the output files parameters with few clicks, such as Splitter large video file and so on.
Toshiba Dolby Control Center is a useful application that provide you with the powerful Dolby Sound Room and Dolby Home Theater technologies.
With the help of the two you can enjoy enhanced stereo sound and natural bass as well as the Dolby sound even with your headphones.
Toshiba Audio Enhancement is a useful application that is especially tailored for Toshiba laptops.
Toshiba Audio Enhancement was designed in order to provide you with a highly improved audio experience when listening your preferred music tracks.
Toshiba Modem on Hold is an application that was created in order to provide you with a simple means of controlling the communications over a telephone line.
You have to have an active Internet connection to successfully manage all your incoming and outgoing modem data with Toshiba Modem on Hold.
SOLO Studio for Toshiba offers an intuitive and uniquely WYSIWYG interface allowing users to design templates in any format with barcodes, images, symbols and other graphical elements, all exactly as they will be printed.
You can design labels with variable fields that will be sourced from database records or keyboard input when you need to print the label. Serial numbers, date/time stamps, price calculations and powerful macro scripts can all be added to the label design with the help of SOLO Studio 's intuitive wizards and interface controls.
Publisher: Image Computer Systems, Ltd.
LabelDirect For Toshiba is a program that is optimized for Toshiba printers and allows you to design your own labels. It will bring you unrivalled performance and control of your printers' features.
With Toshiba BookPlace you can easily mark your favorite pages and review them without having to browse through the whole book.
Toshiba laptops have always been an exciting epicenter for digital entertainment. But sometimes you want that big-screen, big-speaker experience you can only get at home.
This problem is, sharing music, clips and pictures throughout the house from your PC hasn't always been easy. Now it's time to spread the fun around the house - with Toshiba Media Controller.
Get Toshiba Media Controller and try it for yourself to see what it can actually do for you!
Toshiba 3G RF Power Control Utility is a software that was especially tailored for Toshiba laptop users who need to have the 3G connection active at startup.
The application is designed to work with any Toshiba notebook device that supports 3G connectivity.
Toshiba Wireless Manager is a handy utility that was created in order to provide you with a simple means of managing your mobile broadband connections.
With the help of Toshiba Wireless Manager you can easily check out the network usage and history using the dedicated section right from the main window of the GUI.


There are various benefits that we can achieve through regular massage therapy prescribed by the professional. Whether a person wants to have a feeling of relaxation or wants to reduce muscle tension or want to get relief from chronic pain, a therapeutic massage is the best option to go for that can strengthen your overall sense of physical and emotional prosperity.
Massage therapy can be used in both the ways, i.e., chronic and acute conditions. RMT's can work with a various patient's, of all age groups, by treating disability, illness or injury rehabilitation.
Massage therapists in today's time use their mastery of anatomy and physiology to merge both the techniques of Traditional Swedish Therapy and Modern Massage Therapy with other types of massages so as to treat the client in a better way. There is a wide range of research, which used to publish in journals, so as to prove the benefits of massage therapy for different circumstances.
Massage therapy can also be used as a part of the preventative care program. This may include- injury prevention, sports training, ongoing stress management and many more! By using both the therapies you can develop a new treatment plan with the help of your therapist based on your requirements. The schedule of the treatment can be changed accordingly, and you have no commitment to use the treatment therapy. Your treatment will only begin when you will give accept the consent.
Every person has its own definition and way of releasing stress. One of the most effective and a popular option is to go a body rub. The routine lives are filled with many stressful periods. So, to get relaxed is important on a regular basis for dealing with the stress and ease tension and mental pressure.
The human brain releases a chemical for stimulating the nerves for relieving stress and anxiety within the body. This is not possible unless a person is in a relaxed mood. Your brain cannot let go out tension, stress and anxiety unless your body feels relaxed. So, to go for some relaxation therapy go for massage therapy regularly to get rid of stressful and unhealthy lifestyle. There are different massages that you can go for, depends on the mood and stress of a person.
Most people feel that getting relaxed is to hear their favorite songs or go for sauna bath that will help them to ease out from stress. At times it is good, but you should go for massage therapy to get away from stress.
In Manhattan, Nuru massage beds are especially arranged for the clients who come for massage therapy.
← HOW CAN MASSAGE HELP MY HEALTH AND WELL-BEING?


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Ethics Index
The Committee has compiled an Index of Ethics Opinions from 1978-2009 to facilitate your research.
NOTE: In 2002 and 2005, no Ethics Opinions were issued.
Opinion 2011-1: Rules Discussed: 1.7(a)(2), 1.8(e), and 1.15
The inquirer, a Delaware attorney, seeks guidance on the issue of whether, during settlement of a matter, it is ethical for a lawyer to propose, demand, or agree, to personally indemnify or satisfy any and all claims by third persons as to settlement funds. The Committee is of the opinion that any agreement by a lawyer to personally satisfy of indemnify any claims to the settlement funds made by a third party is made in violation of Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(e) of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct ("DLRPC").
Opinion 2009-2: Rules Discussed: 1.5
The inquirer, a Delaware attorney (hereinafter "Attorney", seeks guidance on the following issue: Would it be ethically permissable to include a provision in a client engagement letter or retainer agreement which would say something to the effect that "in the event of default in payment, Client will pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in collecting said amount which may be due?"
Opinion 2009-1: Rules Discussed: 5.4 and 7.2
Compensation of a Law Firm's marketing professional may not be based upon a percentage formula based on total revenues received from new or old clients, or revenues specifically obtained through the efforts of a marketing professional.
The inquirer is a Delaware attorney (hereinafter "Attorney") who is employed by the City of WIlmington (the "City") as an Assistant City Solicitor. The Attorney has commenced a lawsuit against the City and two individuals who he claims have engaged in discriminatory and/or retaliatory conduct as a result of his filing an age discrimination charge with the Delaware Department of Labor. The Attorney seeks an opinion as to whether his continued employment by the City as an Assistant City Solicitor, while simultaneously pursing the lawsuit, violates Rule 1.7 of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct ("DLRPC"). The Committee is of the opinion that Attorney's continued employment by the City as an Assistant City Solicitor does not constitute a violation of DLRPC 1.7.
Opinion 2008-2: Rules Discussed: 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3
The inquirer seeks guidance as to whether it is permissible under the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct to include on a lawyer's website or in an email solicitation or newsletter that the lawyer has been designated "Super Lawyer" or "Best Lawyer" in a particular practice area.
The inquirer is a Delaware attorney (hereinafter "Attorney") who seeks to represent individuals or entities in negotiations or litigation, against insurance carriers for insurance coverage claims. The law firm would utilize non-attorney "experts" to determine the value of claims on behalf of the insured, and paralegals to assist with litigation. Attorney would be the supervising attorney in this practice. Non-Delaware attorneys would possibly be involved in this practice. Attorney wishes to charge a fee of 50% of any amount obtained on behalf of an insured (the client), in excess of the amount previously offered to the insured (the client) by the insurance company and prior to the retention of Attorney. Attorney seeks guidance as to whether this fee arrangement would be reasonable under the circumstances, and in light of the Delaware Lawyers' Rule of Professional Conduct (hereinafter "DLRPC").
Opinion 2007-1: Rules discussed: 1.5, 5.4
A partner of a PA LLP inquires whether the LLP (which is completely owned by attorneys) may be the sole ownership interest in a PA LLC which would qualify as a foreign LLC and engage in the practice of law in Delaware. The Committee determined that this arrangement would not violate DLRPC if the fees charged by the LLC to its clients are reasonable and the clients are advised in writing that the fees may be shared with a different entity. This would, of course, assume that the entire arrangement would comply with Delaware Supreme Court Rule 12(d).
Opinion 2006-2: Rules discussed 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.7(a)(2), 1.8, and 2.3
Attorney inquires whether he may provide information to a litigation loan financing company requesting information about a client's case at the request of the client. The company is designed to advance funds to clients who anticipate the success of a pending lawsuit. Upon the success of the suit, advanced monies must be repaid at a very high interest rate, and Attorney believes that this may not be in his client's best interest. The committee determined that Attorney may provide information to the company after obtaining informed consent from the client and advising the client about the possible consequences. In addition, the Committee determined that the Attorney should not provide the lending institution an opinion on the value of the case, co-sign or guarantee the loan, have any interest in the company, or allow the company to control the course of litigation.
Opinion 2006-1; Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.16 considered.
An Attorney desires to enter into a retention agreement to represent a client solely for divorce, and not ancillary matters. The retainer agreement and information letter to the client would specifically limit the scope of the representation in such fashion. The Attorney inquires whether she nonetheless may be required to represent the Client beyond the original limited scope. The Commitee concludes that the Attorney may need to obtain Court approval for a withdrawal, and may be required by the Court to perform beyond the terms of the retention agreement.
Opinion 2004-1: Rules Discussed: 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, and 7.5
The inquirer, a Delaware attorney, requests this Committee's opinion on whether he may state, in an advertisement, firm stationery, or other communication that otherwise conforms with the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct ("DLRPC") that the attorney is a Certified Public Accountant ("C.P.A.") if the use of the term C.P.A. conforms with other applicable Delaware law, rules or regulations concerning use of such term.
Opinion 2003-3; Rules Discussed: Rule 3.4
The inquiring attorney requested an opinion concerning the compensation and reimbursement of expenses by his Client Company of two Witnesses in connection with preparation and testifying at a Delaware Trial. The Committee analyzed the new Rule 3.4(b) (effective July 1, 2003), and concluded as follows: Witness B is retired from another unrelated company and currently operates an independent consulting business. Witness B may be reimbursed for his out of pocket expenses, and for the reasonable value of his lost time based upon his current rate of compensation in connection with his consulting business. Witness A is a retired former employee of the Client Company, has been retired for over three years and one half years and is presently unemployed. Witness A may be reimbursed for his out of pocket expenses. However, insufficient facts have been presented to the Committee to conclude that Witness A may be compensated for the loss of his time or to determine what rate of compensation would be appropriate under the circumstances.
Opinion 2003-2; Rules Discussed: 1.12(a), Rule 1.11(a), Rule 1.11(b)
Lawyer A formerly served as a law clerk to a Delaware state court judge, and in that capacity, participated personally and substantially in a civil matter. Lawyer A is now a Deputy Attorney General, and wishes to prosecute an administrative matter on behalf of the State of Delaware, when the target of that prosecution is a litigant that came before the Inquiring Attorney when she served as a state court judicial law clerk. The Committee considers whether the civil action and the administrative prosecution are the same matter within the meaning of Rule 1.12(a), and concludes in the negative. The Committee also concludes that a violation of Rule 1.12(b) will not occur by the representation. Finally, the Committee alternatively concludes that the administrative prosecution would not create an appearance of impropriety. One member of the Committee dissents from the analysis and conclusion of this Opinion (the " Dissent ").
Opinion 2003-1; Rules 1.10; 1.7; 1.6; 3.5
Lawyer A, employed by the Office of the Wilmington City Solicitor, sometimes represents the City of Wilmington Police Trial Board, which serves as the adjudicative body in police officer discipline cases. Lawyer B, also employed by the Office of the Wilmington City Solicitor, sometimes represents the City of Wilmington Office of Professional Standards, which serves as the prosecutorial body in police officer discipline cases. The issue presented is whether Attorneys A and B may, consistent with the rules of professional responsibility, represent their respective clients in the same disciplinary hearing. The Committee concludes that the Office of the Wilmington City Solicitor is a firm within the meaning of Rule 1.10,, and therefore Lawyers A and B may not engage in the dual representation unless a single lawyer could do so under Rule 1.7. The Committee concludes Rule 1.7(b) would prohibit a single lawyer from representing both agencies in the same proceeding. The conflict cannot be cured by obtaining a waiver from the clients. The Opinion contains related discussion of the application of Rules 1.6 and 3.5 to the presented facts.
Opinion 2001-2; Rules 1.6(a)
An attorney asked the Committee about the ethical propriety of transmitting confidential client information via e-mail and mobile (or cell) phone. The Committee opined that the transmission of confidential client information by way of e-mail or mobile (or cell) phone, absent extraordinary circumstances, does not violate Rule 1.6(a). The Committee opined that, for the most part, lawyers can communicate by way of e-mail and mobile (or cell) phone while secure in the knowledge that the transmission of client information will remain private and will be received only by the intended recipient(s).
Opinion 2001-1; Rules 1.2, 1.6, Rule 3.7
Whether a lawyer who is appointed an attorney guardian ad litem can comply with the corresponding statutory duties and responsibilities outlined in the legislation creating the Office of the Child Advocate, 29 Del. C. Ch. 90A without violating the Delaware Lawyers Rules of Professional Responsibility.
Opinion 2000-1; Rule 1.9
Attorney represents the plaintiff in litigation in Delaware. The defendant in the case is the Attorney's former client and is a corporation with employees in Delaware. The former client is the plaintiff's former employer. The Attorney's Firm is not required to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff under the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.9 does not require counsel to withdraw because of the mere duration of the prior representation. Rather, the facts or issues in the prior representation must be substantially related to those in the current litigation or confidences must have been likely or actually disclosed that could be detrimental to the former client in the present litigation.
Opinion 1999-2; Rules 1.10; 3.5; 8.4(e); 8.4(f)
The wife of a partner of a law firm is a judge in State Court. The partner concedes that he may not appear before her, but asks if other partners and members of the partner's firm may do so. The Committee cannot opine on what is appropriate under the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct. Under the Rules of Professional Responsibility, however, the other attorneys of the partner's firm may appear before the partner's wife. Rule 3.5 prevents the partner from communicating with his wife about any matter in which his firm is involved that is or might be pending before her. Rule 8.4(e) prohibits the partner or others in the partner's firm from stating or implying that they have an ability to influence her. Rule 8.4(f), read in conjunction with Judicial Canon 3.C(1)(d)(ii), prohibits the partner from appearing before his wife, but does not prevent other attorneys in the partner's firm from doing so. The partner's conflict is not imputed to others in his firm by virtue of Rule 1.10.
Where an attorney represents a second wife of a decedent and has no prior or current relationship with the adult children of the decedent, and where the client has instructed the lawyer that she wants the wrongful death action to be brought in her name only, Rule 1.2 provides that the attorney has no independent legal or ethical obligation to inform the children of their potential cause of action, even if it their claim will be barred by the second wife's suit. The Comment to Rule 1.2 provides that the "client has unlimited authority to determine the purpose to be served by legal representation" assuming the objectives are not unethical or illegal. Thus, a client has the right to limit an action brought on the client's behalf to the client alone, even if other parties might have legitimate claims under the same theory.
Opinion 1998-2; Rules 1.11(a); 1.11(b); 3.7(a)
An attorney who formerly worked for the Attorney General's Office was appointed to represent a criminal defendant charged with the murder of "Mr. Smith." After commencement of discovery, the attorney remembered that he had provided substantial assistance in a 1993 prosecution of Mr. Smith and recalled that Mr. Smith had a reputation as a fearless and dangerous criminal. The attorney intends to use this reputation evidence in his defense of his current client. The Court asked the Committee to advise whether Rules 1.11(a), 1.11(b) or 3.7(a) barred the attorney from representing the client.
The Committee advised that Rule 1.11(a) does not prohibit the attorney from continuing to represent the client because the prosecution of Mr. Smith in 1993 and the current prosecution of the client for the murder of Mr. Smith are not the same matter. Rule 1.11(b) does not preclude the representation because the information the attorney obtained about Mr. Smith while a government attorney is not confidential. To be confidential: the information must have been obtained under governmental authority, the government must be prohibited from disclosing it or have legal privilege it can asset to prevent disclosure, and the information must not otherwise have been made public. In this case, the issue is whether the government can assert a privilege to prevent disclosure of the information. The informant privilege does not survive Mr. Smith's death. Therefore, Rule 1.11(b) does not require that the attorney withdraw from representing the client. Moreover, even if the information was confidential, it cannot be used against Mr. Smith to his material disadvantage. The term "person" in the rule does not include a former government client, but refers only to third parties whom the former government lawyer may oppose on behalf of a private party after leaving government service. Therefore, even if the information were confidential, the Rule does not apply.
Rule 3.7(a) will not prevent the attorney from representing the client where the attorney has stated that there is no scenario under which he would testify. Moreover, a police detective has a recollection of Mr. Smith that is not inconsistent with the attorney's recollection. Therefore, it is unlikely that the attorney would be a necessary witness.
Opinion 1998-1; Rules 1.7; 1.9; 1.11
An attorney, formerly employed as a deputy attorney general, at times represented the Department of Correction in suits brought by prisoners for alleged civil rights violations. Currently, the attorney is employed by a different department within the State. Prior to commencing this employment, the attorney began representing a prisoner in a civil rights action against a former correctional officer. If the client prevails, there is a chance that the State will have to pay damages. Both the client and the department employing the attorney have been informed of the potential conflict and have consented to the continued representation. Based on the facts presented, the attorney's employer should be considered to be the department, rather than the State. Therefore, Rule 1.7 does not prohibit the representation, so long as the attorney believes that the representation of the client will not adversely affect the attorney's relationship with the department and that the attorney's employment with the department will not adversely affect the attorney's representation of the client. Rule 1.11(a), not Rule 1.9(a), governs the activity of a former government attorney. The attorney can undertake the representation so long as the attorney did not have personal and substantial involvement in the client's claims against the defendant while employed as a deputy attorney general. Rule 1.9(b) and Rule 1.11(b) are implicated if the attorney obtained any confidential information during the attorney's employment with the Attorney General's Office that would be relevant to the claims against the defendant in the client's civil rights claim. If the attorney obtained any such information, Rule 1.11(b) absolutely bars the attorney from representing the client.
Opinion 1997-5; Rules 1.9(b); 1.16(d); 3.4; 4.4
Attorneys A and B, each representing a criminal defendant, entered into a joint defense agreement, which provided, among other things, that each was to keep the information obtained pursuant to the agreement confidential and each was to return the information to the other in the event that the representation was terminated. Attorney A's representation was terminated and the new attorney for Attorney A's former client, Attorney C, requested that all the information, including the information obtained pursuant to the joint defense agreement, be provided to Attorney C. Attorney B objected to the production of the joint defense materials to Attorney C. The Committee advised that Rule 1.9(b) did not require that Attorney A turn over the joint defense materials to Attorney C, as Attorney A was not using the materials in a manner contemplated by the rules. Rule 1.16(d) did not require Attorney A to turn over the materials because the joint defense materials were not "papers and property to which the client is entitled." Finally, production of the materials under these circumstances could prejudice Attorney B's client and constitute a violation of Rule 3.4 (addressing fairness to opposing party in litigation) and/or Rule 4.4(prohibiting a lawyer from using methods of obtaining evidence that would violate the rights of third parties including adverse parties in litigation).
A law firm was retained as common counsel for ten officers and directors of a company to advise them regarding the effects a proposed merger would have on their employment agreements. The merger was not consummated and later the law firm was retained by the company in connection with the termination of the employment of one of the directors for cause. The director objected to the law firm's representation of the company. Based on the stipulated facts provided to the Committee, the Committee advised that Rule 1.9 did not preclude the law firm from representing the company. Based on the scope of the prior representation and the limited contact between the director and the law firm, there was no indication that the director ever provided or had any occasion to disclose confidential information to the law firm which could now be used against the director. Because there was no conflict, the Committee need not consider whether the waiver letter obtained from the director was sufficient to resolve the conflict.
Opinion 1997-3; Rule 1.11
A lawyer formerly employed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (the "ODC") may represent another lawyer in proceedings before the ODC, even though the former ODC lawyer worked on a matter while employed at the ODC that resulted in the client lawyer receiving a private admonition from the ODC. The ODC did not consent to the representation and argued that Rule 1.11 disqualified the former ODC lawyer because the previous private admonition would be a factor in connection with the discipline, if any, to be received by the client lawyer. The Committee advised that because the private admonition occurred six years earlier, and because the only relationship between the earlier private admonition and the current investigation was the degree of current discipline that might be imposed, the two matters were independent. Since the two investigations were not a single matter, Rule 1.11 did not prohibit the former ODC attorney from representing the client lawyer.
Opinion 1997-2; Rules 1.11; 3.7
Rule 3.7 provides that a firm may represent a client in litigation adverse to a defendant, where a partner in the firm is the chairman of a public agency that regulates the defendant, even though the partner may become a witness in the matter, provided that the partner does not act as an advocate and provided that Rules 1.7 and 1.9 are followed. Rule 1.11, which the Committee construes as governing concurrent as well as consecutive representation of the government and private parties, does not work a disqualification of the firm so long as the chairman recuses himself from all future participation in any of the agency's actions regarding the matter, whether formal or informal. If the chairman has already personally and substantially participated in actions of the agency regarding the litigation, the chairman must also gain the agency's approval of the firm's continued representation of the client, and must take steps to insure that the chairman receives no part of the fee earned by the firm for the matter. The chairman should provide written notice to the agency of the matter so that the agency can determine if it believes that the chairman has participated in the matter. Finally, the chairman must not disclose to the firm or to the clients any confidential information he learned regarding the matter by virtue of his position with the agency; the firm should impose a "cone of silence" on the chairman.
Opinion 1997-1; Rules 1.4(b); 1.7
Rule 1.7(a) is inapplicable in considering whether a lawyer of Law Firm A must obtain the consent of Law Firm A's clients to act as an expert witness on behalf of Law Firm B in a malpractice action against Law Firm B, where Law Firm B represents clients adverse to Law Firm A's clients in unrelated matters; Law Firm B is not a client of Law Firm A, since the lawyer would be retained as an expert witness not as counsel. Rule 1.7(b), however, requires that the lawyer consider whether acting as an expert witness for Law Firm B would materially limit the representation of Law Firm A's clients. In conducting this analysis, the relevant factors include: the relative importance of the matter to the represented lawyer; the relative size of the fee expected by the representing lawyer; the relative importance to each lawyer and to his or her clients of the matters involving the clients; the sensitivity of each matter; the similarity between the subject matter or issues of the matters; and, the nature of the relationship of one lawyer to the other and of each lawyer to his or her respective clients. The role of an expert witness is much more limited than that of counsel and therefore the personal financial interest of an expert witness is typically less than that of a representing lawyer, unless the lawyer harbors an expectation of future employment as an expert by Law Firm B. In considering Rule 1.7 in Delaware, the small size of the Delaware Bar should be taken into account to avoid too broad a construction of conflict. Otherwise, it may be impossible for Delaware lawyers to obtain counsel or experts. As long as the lawyer and Law Firm A reasonably believe that the lawyer's engagement as an expert on behalf of Law Firm B will not constrain Law Firm A's representation of it clients, Law Firm A need not obtain the consent of its clients involved in matters adverse to clients of Law Firm B before the lawyer agrees to act as an expert. Under these circumstances, Rule 1.4(b) does not require that the clients be notified of the representation.
Opinion 1995-2; Rules 3.1; 4.1; 4.4; 8.4
An attorney may threaten to press criminal charges against an opposing party in an attempt to gain relief for the attorney's client in a civil matter if: the civil matter is related to the client's civil claim; the attorney has a well founded belief that both the civil claim and the criminal charges are warranted under Delaware law and the facts; the attorney is not attempting to exert, nor suggesting the exertion of, improper influence over the criminal process; and the attorney and/or the client actually intend to proceed with presenting the criminal charges if the civil claim is not satisfied. Additionally, the attorney and/or the client may agree to refrain from reporting criminal charges in return for satisfaction of the client's civil claim.
Former Disciplinary Rule 7-105(a) provided an absolute bar to an attorney presenting, participating in presenting, or threatening to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage for a client in a civil matter. The Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1985, contain no such prohibition. The issue implicates the following rules: 3.1 (prohibiting assertion of frivolous claims); 4.1 (duty to be truthful in statements to others); 4.1 (use of means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden); and 8.4 (committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness). While the attorney's conduct could constitute crime of extortion 11 Del. C. § 846(4), it is an affirmative defense to this crime if the attorney believes the threatened criminal charge is true and his or her only purpose is to make right the wrong. 11 Del. C. § 847(b). Similarly, the attorney's conduct could constitute compounding a crime, in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1246(l). It is a defense to compounding a crime, however, if the benefit obtained does not exceed the amount the attorney believes to be due as restitution or indemnification for the harm caused by the underlying crime. 11 Del. C. § 1247. Therefore, it is unlikely that the attorney will violate the law or Rule 8.4 if the attorney seeks from the opposing party no more than the attorney believes is due the client as a result of the underlying crime.
Neither the current Rules nor the predecessor code prohibit an attorney from agreeing to refrain from reporting an opposing party's criminal violations as part of the settlement of a client's civil claim. An attorney who agrees to do this, however, risks compounding a crime in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1246(l). As discussed above, it is a defense to this crime if the benefit received by the client does not exceed the amount the client and the lawyer believe is due as restitution and/or indemnification for the harm caused by the crime. Therefore, provided that the attorney does not violate the law of Delaware, it is not a violation of the Rules of Professional Responsibility to agree to refrain from reporting the opposing party's potentially criminal conduct as part of a settlement of the client's civil claim.
Opinion 1995-1; Rule 1.16(b)
Rule 1.16(b) permits a lawyer to withdraw from representing a buyer of real estate where, due to an error, the original deed conveyed more property than what the parties had agreed would be transferred, and after the buyer and seller had executed deeds correcting the mistake, the buyer contacted the attorney and directed that the corrective deeds should not be recorded. The attorney was justified in refusing the seller's request that the corrective deeds be recorded; because the buyer had directed that the attorney not record the deeds, the attorney no longer had authority to record them. Even though the seller appeared to be sophisticated, to avoid any ambiguity with respect to the attorney's obligation to the seller, the attorney should suggest that the seller retain counsel. The attorney's role now appeared to be one of stake holder with respect to the deeds until the disagreement was resolved by judicial action or subsequent agreement of the parties.
Opinion 1994-3; Rule 1.8(e)
Rule 1.8(e) prevents an attorney from providing financial aid, in this case a loan, to a client "in connection with pending or contemplated litigation." Two of the purposes of the rule are to prohibit practices such as champerty and maintenance and to preserve the lawyer's independent judgment regarding the litigation. A loan is considered 'in connection with" the litigation where the only connection between the attorney and the client is the litigation and the repayment of the loan is expected to come from the settlement proceeds. The litigation is no longer pending when it has been terminated under the rules of the tribunal hearing the matter. When a claim is settled, the litigation would not be pending if the last act required by the tribunal to terminate the litigation has been completed.
Opinion 1994-2; Rules 1.2(c); 8.4(c)
Rule 1.2(c) provides that an attorney may provide legal services to a client on a limited basis as long as the client is fully informed of the limited scope of the representation and agrees to receive services on that basis. If the attorney provides significant assistance to a pro se litigant, the attorney must disclose this assistance and the limited scope of the representation in a letter to opposing counsel and the court. Assistance is deemed to be substantial if the representation "goes further than merely helping a litigant fill out an initial pleading, and/or providing initial general advice and information." (emphasis in original) Failure to make such a disclosure misleads the court and opposing counsel in violation of Rule 8.4(c).
Opinion 1994-1; Rule 3.4(b)
An attorney representing a plaintiff who has noticed a deposition of a former employee of the defendant may advise the plaintiff to pay the reasonable expenses (including the attorney's fees) of the former employee, without violating Rule 3.4(b) where: the former employee has indicated he is reluctant to testify without being represented by independent counsel; there is no agreement making the payment of such fees and expenses in any way contingent on the outcome of the former employee's testimony; and, the attorney neither knows or has reason to believe that the testimony is in any way contingent upon the payment and retention of fees. Additionally, the attorney's invitation to the defendant to share in the costs of the former employee's counsel further reduces any risk to the integrity of the testimony by virtue of the proposed payments.
Opinion 1993-2; Rules 1.7, 1.11
An attorney may, without violating Rule 1.7, represent a county official who is the subject of a State Attorney General's Office criminal investigation even though the attorney's partner is a member of the governing body of the county. The attorney's partner does not act in his capacity as an attorney for the county; thus, there is no issue of a direct conflict between the interests of two clients. The attorney must also reasonably believe that his representation of the client will not be adversely affected and the client must consent to the representation after being informed of the partner's position with the county government. Where the partner was approached by a former employee of the county regarding alleged improprieties proceeding the criminal investigation and the partner referred the matter to the Attorney General, Rule 1.11(e) does not preclude the attorney from representing the client if the partner is screened from any participation in the defense of the client and if the partner is not apportioned any part of the fee from the representation. Additionally, if the partner believes his participation in the matter was "personal and substantial," the attorney must give written notice of the representation to the county. Moreover, the attorney should not represent any client in any proceeding before the governing body of the county.
Opinion 1993-1; Rules 7.1(b)(1), 5.4(a)
A lawyer's advertisement stating "$400.00 flat fee for attorney's work" relating to "any residential real-estate settlement" and containing the required disclaimer set forth in Rule 7.1(b)(3)((b) violated Rule 7.1(b)(3)(a) because it did not identify with sufficient particularity the services to which the fee applied. Advertisement which provided that $50 of the $400 fee would be donated to a charity did not violate Rule 5.4(a) where: the donation derives from the lawyer's profit such that the clients are not being charged for the donation; there is no express agreement or de facto fee-sharing between the lawyer and the charity in exchange for the referral of clients; and copies of the advertisement are not placed on the premises of the charity.
Opinion 1992-3
With the consent and knowledge of the client, an attorney can properly execute an agreement which provides that payment for health-care services rendered to the attorney's client be made to the client's physician by the attorney from any funds obtained on behalf of the client. The attorney has a duty to provide his client with a full explanation of the practical and legal ramifications of such an agreement. As long as the client gives informed consent, then the ethical obligations addressed in Opinion 1981-3 are no bar to the agreement.
Opinion 1992-2; Rules 1.9; 3.7; 1.6; 1.16
An attorney may be disqualified from representing a decedent's estate where he reasonably believes the original administratrix has embezzled most of the estate assets. The attorney had previously represented the original administratrix in a minor personal injury action and this would almost assuredly involve a conflict of interest. Also, the attorney would likely be required to act as advocate at a trial in which he would be a necessary witness. The attorney may avoid disqualification if he retains outside counsel to prosecute a civil action against the original administratrix. The attorney may not report the original administratrix's embezzlement to criminal authorities but could give all confidential estate documents to the lawyer who he refers the matter to.
A firm can continue to represent a party when another attorney in the same firm agreed to represent the other adverse party, but terminated the relationship when the dual representation was recognized, if both parties consent. The consent would only be effective upon full disclosure to both clients. Even though the attorney-client relationship has been terminated with the first client, Rule 1.16 must still be followed and a Chinese Wall should be built around first client's lawyer.
Attorney is advised not to represent a client in a malpractice suit against a second attorney, where attorney may also be subject to a malpractice claim as a result of the alleged negligence of second attorney. Although the attorney is not Per se disqualified from representing the client, he is advised against it because there is a substantial likelihood that the attorney will not be able to zealously represent the interests of the client in such an action, or that a conflict will later arise that would make such representation improper.
Opinion 1991-3; Rules 8.3(a); 8.3(c); 1.6
Attorney's obligation under Rule 8.3(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct to report possible misconduct by a fellow Delaware attorney becomes exempt under Rule 8.3(c) if the disclosure made is an attorney-client communication.
Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit attorneys in the criminal division of the City Law Dept. from prosecuting an individual who is a member of City Council for violations of city and state criminal ordinances.
Opinion 1991-1; Rules 1.7 (b); 3.8; 1.10 (a) & (d); 1.11;
ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to Prosecution Function (1986) A Firm, but not the associate, may accept a malpractice case where the associate is presently under contract with the City of Wilmington to pursue several criminal prosecutions and civil actions against the defendant, provided the prospective client and City give informed consent in light of a possible conflict of interest. The attorney must maintain a code of silence concerning his representation of the City.
Opinion 1990-2; Rules 1.16, 3.1
If a client insists that an attorney pursue a claim which is meritless under Rule 3.1, Rule 1.16 requires that the attorney seek to withdraw from the representation.
Opinion 1990-1; Rules 1.6, 1.9, 1.8 (b)
A firm may not signal its client to expedite its work on a project for another client of the Firm who is considering suing the first client because of its delay on the project.
The Register of Wills is a judicial officer; the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct unequivocally prohibits the practice of law by a judicial officer; and therefore the Prospective Employee may not be hired.
Opinion 1989-5: Rule 1.8(i)
An attorney will not be prohibited from representing criminal defendants while her husband is a prosecutor with the state Attorney General's office (and he is not involved in cases in which she is representing criminal defendants) as long as adequate safeguards are implemented.
Opinion 1989-4; D.R. 1.7
There is no conflict of interest between representation of the executor as such and representation of the executor in his or her individual capacity. The term "estate" refers to the aggregate property interests of a decedent and is not a separate legal entity with its own legally cognizable interests. An estate cannot be a "client" as the term is used under Rule 1.7. An attorney does not serve as an "attorney for the estate" but rather as an attorney for the executor in that person's dealings concerning the estate of the decedent.
Opinion 1989-3; Rules 4.1, 4.3, 4.4; DR 7-108(D); DRE 606(b)
An attorney may contact jurors following trial in an effort to obtain evidence for a criminal defendant's use in a post-conviction relief proceeding if the attorney proceeds with the sensitivity for the juror's rights required by Rule 4.4 and confines his inquiry to a determination of whether the juror was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influence during his service as a juror.
Opinion 1989-2; Rule 7.1 (h) (1) (b)
Proposed mailing by attorney is prohibited by Rule 7.1(h)(1)(b) of Delaware Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct because it is intended to be "distributed at a time calculated to relate to events in the personal life of the recipient" even though that Rule might be unconstitutional.
Opinion 1989-1; Rule 7.1 (b) (l)
Delaware State Bar Association may list "AREAS OF PRACTICE" in its legal directory.
Lawyer has right under Rule 1.6 not to disclose fact that his partner's client, who lives with lawyer's client, has AIDS.
Opinion 1988-1; Rules 1.13, 1.16
Law firm should withdraw from case if Board of Elders of Church continues to fail to cooperate. Law firm should seek approval of Board of Elders before sending damaging (to Board of Elders) deposition transcripts to insurance carriers.
Opinion 1987
It is a violation of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) and Rule 3.7 for an attorney or any other attorney in his firm to represent any of the defendants or the third party in the pending litigation.
Opinion 1986-4; Rules 1.16 (a) (1); 1.4
An attorney must seek to withdraw from representation of a corporate client if communication cannot be made with any person authorized to act or speak on behalf of the corporation.
Opinion 1986-3; Rules 1.9; 1.11, 3.7
An attorney who previously worked for a government agency that rendered legal advice to the defendant, may now privately represent the defendant, as long as the agency consents.
Opinion 1986-2; DR 1.7; Rules 1.7, 1.10, 3.7
Where an attorney in the Public Defender's Office is required to withdraw in an earlier phase of the case, because of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Public Defender's Office is not then later barred from participating in the appeal, as long as the issue is not one of the withdrawing attorney's competency, and as long as said attorney does not personally participate. Dissent: When public defender represents a defendant at trial and is later required to withdraw because of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Public Defender's Office cannot subsequently appeal the conviction of that defendant. Note: The Supreme Court adopted the dissent by Order of October 29, 1986.
Opinion 1986-1; Canon 4; Rules 1.6, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11
A law student who clerked for the prosecution firm while in law school who later took a position with the defense firm would not be disqualified from defending cases prosecuted by the plaintiff's firm even though those cases may have been active during the law student's tenure as a law clerk with plaintiff's firm, so long as the law clerk had no meaningful contact with any such cases. The defense firm will be disqualified if law clerk-associate directly participated on a case at prosecution's firm in which defendant firm is now involved, unless defendant's firm insulates the law student for the defense of those cases.
Opinion 1985-3; DR3-101 (A); Canon 9
It would be unethical to allow a paralegal employed by a lawyer or an insurance adjuster, who was employed by a worker's compensation insurance carrier, to appear before the industrial accident board to conduct a pre-trial conference after a petition for worker's compensation has been filed.
Opinion 1985-2; DR4-101 (B); DR5-105 (A); DR 9-101 (B)
An attorney who was formerly employed by the legislative branch of one government entity, A, may represent his current employer, a second government entity, in litigation against entity A in the matter upon which the attorney was briefed pursuant to his employment by entity A, as long as no secrets or confidences of entity A, relative to the dispute were conveyed to him when he was briefed on the matter. Dissent: An attorney may not represent B in its dispute with entity A, because, having participated in briefing sessions with the attorney handling the litigation for entity A, he will be presumed to have received secrets or confidences of entity A relative to the dispute.
Opinion 1985-1; DR4-101 (B); Canon 9
An attorney formerly in private practice may not represent a governmental entity in matters where the entity's interests are adverse to those of the lawyer's former clients or his former firm unless the former client consents thereto. If an attorney must withdraw from the representation of a public entity because of his previous involvement in the matter, or one substantially related to it, his law department should also withdraw unless the attorney has adequately "screened" himself and the rest of his law department with respect to that particular matter.
Opinion 1983-3; DR5-102 (B)
Where a public defender represents A and an assistant public defender represents B, and the State has announced that it may call as a prosecution witness against A, the Assistant Public Defender of that testimony may be prejudicial to A, then the Public Defender's Office must withdraw from representation of defendant A.
Opinion 1983-2; DR2-102 (C)
The name of an associate in a law firm partnership may not appear in the name of the firm.
Opinion 1983-1; July 7, 1983; DR3-101 (A); DR3-103 (A)
For a lawyer to undertake employment with a financial planning firm and perform duties incident to the sale of life insurance and estate planning packages without violating his professional ethical obligations under the Code, the lawyer should withdraw from the active practice of law, and in his new occupation, refrain from holding himself out as a lawyer for the customers of the financial planning firm engaging in activities constituting the practice of law.
Opinion 1982-5, August 6 1982; DR8-101 (A); DR5-015 (d)
A lawyer-legislator is not prohibited from representing a state agency, county government, municipal corporation, school board, school district or other political subdivision.
There is no absolute ethical bar to a lawyer-legislator representing private clients against the State or its agencies. There is no per se ethical bar to a lawyer-legislator representing persons accused of criminal or traffic offenses as long as he does not use his position to repeal or amend existing law for a client's benefit.
There are no ethical strictures which would bar a lawyer-senator from carrying out the constitutionally established role in the appointment process of the judiciary and the executive branch.
If a lawyer, acting in his or her official capacity as a legislator, is contacted by a constituent for reasons related to legislative matters, the lawyer may not generate or seek to generate private legal business from the constituent.
There is no blanket prohibition against a lawyer-legislator supporting legislation which affects the client's interest, so long as he or she does not confine legislative initiative to favorably affect his or her clients.
If a lawyer-legislator is disqualified in a given instance, law partners and associates are similarly disqualified. Informal letter of opinion dated August 31, 1982 Letter from Rodman Ward, Jr., August 31, 1982 Lawyer had no obligation to assist client in fraud and was under no obligation to disclose the fraud to the court.
Opinion 1982-4, March 5, 1982; Canon 4; Canon 7
An attorney having once represented a bank in a debt collection matter cannot then defend the debtor in the proceeding by the bank's assignee to execute on a judgment based on the debtor's obligation to the bank without the full informed consent of the bank.
Opinion 1982-3, March 18,1982; Canon 2; DR2-103 (C) (D): DR2-105
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers ("AAML") cannot list themselves in the classified section of the local telephone book or participate in the referral service, unless they have been certified as a specialist group by the Delaware Supreme Court.
Opinion 1982-2, February 1, 1982; DR3-101 (A); DR3-103 (A); DR2-102 (A) (1)
An attorney may not list a private investigator on his calling card, but if the investigator exclusively works for the attorney, the investigator may list the attorney on his calling card, with the attorney now taking full responsibility for the investigator's actions.
Opinion 1982-1, January 19, 1983; Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9
A law firm, who is asked by a bank to do a title search and obtain insurance on a piece of property for a mortgage transaction, where the attorney's fees were paid to the law firm by the bank, who were subsequently reimbursed by the debtor, may later represent the bank in a foreclosure action against said debtor where no other attorney client relationship existed between the firm and the debtor.
Opinion 1981-6: June 12. 1981; DR 5-105 (c)
It is proper for an insurance carrier's attorney, while prosecuting a declaratory judgment action on coverage, to appear for the insured in a tort action as "co-counsel" in association with an attorney selected by the insured, if, and only if, the insured gives consent to this procedure.
A lawyer may represent an interest adverse to that of a former client in matters not substantially related to the former representation, unless facts not generally and publicly available were accessible to the lawyer in his former representation and are relevant to the pending litigation. Informal letter of opinion dated June 10, 1981 Letter from Rodman Ward, Jr., June 10, 1981. When the father of the accused gives the stolen goods to the accused attorney, the attorney has a duty to deliver the goods to the authorities, but should not testify as to the surrounding circumstances unless ordered by the Court.
In connection with the cross examination of a former client as a witness in an unrelated proceeding, it is ethical to cross examine the former client by reference to his publicly disclosed criminal record so long as the lawyer reveals no confidences or secrets reposed in him by his former client in connection with his former representation.
An attorney should try to persuade his personal injury client to pay the client's medical expenses, but the attorney has no responsibility to demand his client pay such medical expenses from funds received in settlement or by judgment, and the attorney is prohibited from forcing such payment against his client's wishes.
Opinion 1981-2, DR5-103 (B)
When an attorney requests medical-legal services of a physician, the Rules of Legal Ethics warrant the physician's reliance on the proposition that (i) the attorney will guarantee the payment of the reasonable fee; or (ii) the attorney will make clear to the physician in writing prior to using such services that only the client-patient will be responsible for the fees.
Opinion 1981-1; Canons 5, 6; DR4-101 (B) (C); DR5-105 (A) (B)
Where a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to defend its insured in a personal injury action and at the same time has been retained by the insurer in a separate action against the insured seeking a declaratory judgment that the personal injury claim is not covered by the insured's policy, the lawyer has conflicting interest and must withdraw from representation of the insurance company unless both clients consent to the multiple representation after full disclosure.
Opinion 1980-7; DR2-103 (A) (D)
A lawyer may participate in the founding of the Delaware Injured Workers Association even though it is probable injured workers might learn of the lawyer's identity, interest and expertise in the area of workmen's compensation law, so long as the lawyer complies with DR 103 (D).Opinion 1980-6
An attorney representing an estate may ethically purchase stock in the estate from a beneficiary after proper distribution of the bequest to the beneficiary and after full disclosure of all material facts known to the attorney with regard to the stock.
Opinion 1980-5; DR2-107; DR2-110 (A); DR2-110 (C) (2)
A forwarding attorney is not entitled to a percentage of the fee of the working attorney unless and except to the extent that the forwarding attorney retains the attorney-client relationship and retains ultimate responsibility to the client both as to communications and performance of legal services required. Where a forwarding firm charges a referral or administrative fee, the working firm should withdraw from representation of clients involved in such fee arrangement.
Opinion 1980-4: DR9-101
With respect to a lawyer's ability to practice law following his election as lieutenant governor of Delaware the committee provided the following guidelines:
Generally, there are no absolute prohibitions from practice, nor would he or any firm with which he is associated be restricted from representing an agency of the State.
The lawyer or a member of the firm with which he is associated may not represent parties in an action against the State.
The lawyer and any member of the firm with which he is associated may not represent defendants in criminal cases.
Opinion 1980-3; DR5-105 (D); DR9-101 (B)
A firm may not continue to represent a client in an administrative proceeding or related litigation with the state after hiring an associate who as a former government attorney has substantial responsibility in the matter unless the government and other parties specifically consent to the firm's representation of the client and to the screening procedures proposed by the firm to preclude the associate's participation in the litigation.
Opinion 1980-2; DR1-103; DR1-102 (A) (5); DR4-101 (C) (3); DR4-101 (D) (3)
Even if a lawyer's knowledge of past criminal conduct is acquired through non-privileged sources, the lawyer is under no ethical duty to make disclosure of such evidence independent of the duty imposed upon him by the substantive criminal law. However, if the evidence discloses an intention to engage in future criminal conduct, disclosure to proper authorities is required.
Opinion 1980-1; Canon 7; DR2-101, 102 (A) (4); DR7-107 (G) ED-733; EC8-6
While litigation is pending, a lawyer appearing in the action is not prohibited from appearing on a television program to discuss the pending proceeding so long as his comments conform to the limitations imposed by DR7-107 (G).
Opinion 1979-4; DR2-104 (A) (4); EC2-2. EC2-5
A lawyer may write a periodic column in a newspaper of general circulation which is either a "question and answer format, in which readers are invited to submit general questions of law, or the presentation of a hypothetical situation and the solution or an explanation of general legal procedures in various courts in Delaware, or a combination thereof."
Opinion 1979-3; DR3-102; DR3-103
A law firm may share the rental of office space with a CPA if the firms maintain total separation of identity and employment of the offices.
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Growing up in a house of female morticians, Lily Graves knows all about buried secrets. She knows that perfect senior-class president Erin Donohue isn't what she seems. She knows why Erin's ex-boyfriend, hot football player Matt Houser, broke up with her. And he also knows that, even though she says she and Matt are just friends, there is something brewing between them-something Erin definitely did not like.
So when Erin is found dead the day after attacking Lily in a jealous rage, Lily's and Matt's safe little lives, and the lives of everyone in their town of Potsdam, begin to unravel. And their relationship-which grew from innocent after-school tutoring sessions to late-night clandestine rendezvous-makes them both suspects.
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text:
Tuesday 7 July 2020 (other days)
Other saints: Blessed Peter To Rot
He was born in 1912 at Rakunai, a village on the Melanesian island of New Britain, today part of Papua New Guinea. His parents belonged to the region's first generation of Catholics. He was a pious boy and the parish priest thought that he should study for the priesthood, but his father felt that the tradition of Catholicism in the region was too short and none of the people were yet ready for the priesthood, so Peter became a catechist. He married in 1936 and had three children.
When the Japanese occupied the island during the war, all the missionaries and mission staff were imprisoned in a concentration camp and Peter was the only spiritual guide that Catholics had. He organized prayer services, gave religious instruction, baptized children, preserved the consecrated Hosts and administered them to the sick and dying, and gave help to the poor. The Japanese had destroyed the church when they arrived, so Peter built a new one out of the branches of trees.
After a quiet start, repression grew violent. The Japanese banned all Christian worship, public and private, and decided to reintroduce polygamy among the people. Peter was arrested in April or May 1945 and savagely "questioned" by officials. He was sentenced to two months in prison. A Japanese doctor came and injected him with poison, stuffed his ears and nose with cotton wool, and held him down and suffocated him until he died.
An immense crowd attended Peter's burial, at which no religious rite was permitted. He has been increasingly revered as a martyr ever since that day.
See also Pope John Paul II's sermon at Peter To Rot's beatification, on Vatican web site.
Other saints: Saint Maelruain (- c.791)
In 769 he founded the monastery at Tallaght, in County Dublin, Ireland. Together with St Aengus he wrote a detailed Rule for the community, which is an important document in the history of early monasticism.


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