The rain did not dampen Yewande and Colin's mood on their wedding. You could say that is one of the evidence of two people that are hopelessly in love.
Walking down the street, never mind fancy shoes and sequin dresses, drew applause from bystanders and chorus of congratulations from complete stranger as we made our way to the war memorial for some pre-wedding photos. What happens when you have a group of great friends on a bus, in celebration mood? They sing that is, sometimes off key to be sure, but it was melodious.
They were surrounded by family and friends as they exchanged vows and the thunderous sound of the confetti cannons made their exit even more memorable. The reception was filled with love, fun, laughter and a whole lot of dancing. I am so honored to have captured this beautiful love story and preserve the memories for generations to come.


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Only the most highly qualified families can become Angels' resource parents. We recognize that fostering young children coming from difficult life situations is not a fit for every family. By carefully screening our candidate families, we ensure that each child has a safe, loving home able to meet his/her needs.
Angels' primary focus is always the well-being of the very young children we serve. Because of the specialized needs of infants and toddlers in foster care, Angels has some unique fostering requirements. Angels requires our families to have the ability to parent their Angels child full-time, providing for the optimal social-emotional development of these vulnerable children. Angels also promotes stability for foster children by asking Angels resource parents to commit to caring for their Angels child for however long it takes for permanency to be achieved. Additionally, Angels only places one child or one sibling group with an Angels family to allow for the Angels child to benefit from being the focus of that family's attention and caring.
Every Angels child deserves a safe and comfortable home. Angels inspects each resource home to ensure compliance with licensing regulations and to help our parents prepare a hazard-free environment for their young Angels child. Furthermore, Angels staff work closely with each prospective family to evaluate their readiness for fostering. If you would like to learn more about beginning the process of fostering with Angels, please contact us.


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Home » Cyber News, News » Cyber readiness levels stall as attacks reach new intensity: Hiscox
Cyber readiness levels stall as attacks reach new intensity: Hiscox
Hiscox Cyber Readiness Report 2019 assesses & ranks cyber security strategy, execution
London, UK (Apr. 23, 2019) – A sharp increase in the number and cost of cyber attacks is the key finding in a study of more than 5,400 organisations across seven countries, commissioned by insurer Hiscox. More than three out of five firms (61%) report one or more attacks in the past year, yet the proportion achieving top scores for their cyber security readiness is marginally down year-on-year.
The Hiscox Cyber Readiness Report 2019 surveyed a representative sample of private and public sector organizations in the US, UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. Each firm was assessed on its cyber security strategy and execution, and ranked accordingly. Only 10% achieved high enough marks in both areas to qualify as cyber security 'experts'.
Cyber attacks reach a new intensity: More than three in every five firms (61%) experienced a cyber incident in the past year, up from 45% in the 2018 report. The frequency of attacks also increased. Belgian firms were the most heavily targeted.
More small and medium-sized firms attacked this year: While larger firms are still the most likely to suffer a cyber attack, the proportion of small firms (defined as those with less than 50 employees) reporting an incident is up from 33% to 47%. Among medium-sized firms (50 to 249 employees) the proportion has leapt from 36% to 63%.
Cyber losses soar: Among firms reporting attacks, average losses associated with all cyber incidents have risen from $229,000 last year to $369,000 – an increase of 61%. For large firms with between 250 and 999 employees cyber-related losses now top $700,000 on average compared with $162,000 a year ago. German firms suffered the most, with one reporting a cost for all incidents of $48 million.
More firms fail cyber readiness test: Using a quantitative model to assess firms for their cyber readiness, only one in ten (10%) achieved 'expert' status this year, slightly down from 11% in 2018. Nearly three-quarters (74%) ranked as unprepared 'novices'. There was a sharp drop in the number of larger US and German firms achieving 'expert' scores.
Cyber security spending up by a quarter: The average spend on cyber security is now $1.45 million, up 24% on 2018, and the pace of spending is accelerating. The total spend by the 5,400 firms in the survey comes to $7.9 billion. Two-thirds of respondents (67%) plan to increase their cyber security budgets by 5% or more in the year ahead.
"This is the third Hiscox Cyber Readiness Report and, for the first time, a significant majority of firms report one or more cyber attacks in the past 12 months," said Gareth Wharton, Hiscox Cyber CEO. "Where hackers formerly focused on larger companies, small and medium-sized firms now look equally vulnerable. The cyber threat has become the unavoidable cost of doing business today. The one positive is that we see more firms taking a structured approach to the problem, with a defined role for managing cyber strategy and an increased readiness to transfer the risk to an insurer by way of a standalone cyber insurance policy."
The study also shows:
Wide disparity in readiness scores: Overall, US, German and Belgian firms score highest on the cyber readiness model, while more than four-fifths of French firms (81%) are in the 'novice' category. Along with the Netherlands, France has the smallest proportion of large and enterprise firms that rank as 'experts', at 9%.
Cost figures skewed by large incidents: Among firms that were targeted by hackers, there has been a sharp rise in the cost of the biggest single incident reported in the past year. The mean cost has jumped from $34,000 to a fraction under $200,000.
Supply chain incidents now commonplace: Nearly two-thirds of firms (65%) have experienced cyber-related issues in their supply chain in the past year. Worst affected are technology, media and telecoms (TMT) and transport firms. The majority of firms (54%) now evaluate the security of their supply chains at least once a quarter or on an ad hoc basis.
Reasons to be optimistic: The proportion of firms with no defined role for cyber security has halved in the past year – from 32% to 16% – and there has been a marked fall in the number of respondents saying they changed nothing following a cyber incident (from 47% to 32%). New regulation has also prompted action, with 84% of Continental European firms saying they have made changes following the advent of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The figure for UK firms is 80%.
Rising uptake of cyber insurance: More than two out of five firms (41%) say they have taken out cyber cover in the past year (up from 33% in 2018). A further 30% plan to take out cover in the year ahead. More than half of larger firms now have cover but only 27% of small firms.
Hiscox commissioned Forrester Consulting to assess organisations' cyber readiness. In total 5,392 professionals involved in their organisation's cyber security effort were contacted (1,000-plus each from the UK, US, and Germany, and 500 each from Belgium, France, Spain and the Netherlands). Drawn from a representative sample of organisations by size and sector, these are the men and women on the front line of the business battle against cyber crime. Respondents completed the online survey between 12 October and 7 December 2018.
About The Hiscox Group
Hiscox is a global specialist insurer, headquartered in Bermuda and listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE:HSX). Our ambition is to be a respected specialist insurer with a diverse portfolio by product and geography. We believe that building balance between catastrophe-exposed business and less volatile local specialty business gives us opportunities for profitable growth throughout the insurance cycle. It's a long-standing strategy which in 2018 saw the business deliver a profit before tax of $137.4 million in a challenging year for insurers.
The Hiscox Group employs over 3,300 people in 14 countries, and has customers worldwide. Through the retail businesses in the UK, Europe, Asia and the US, we offer a range of specialist insurance for professionals and business customers as well as homeowners. Internationally traded, bigger ticket business and reinsurance is underwritten through Hiscox London Market and Hiscox Re & ILS.
Our values define our business, with a focus on people, quality, courage and excellence in execution. We pride ourselves on being true to our word and our award-winning claims service is testament to that.
For further information, visit www.hiscox.com.
Source: Hiscox
Tags: cyber attacks, Cyber Insurance, Hiscox

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Open Source Observatory (OSOR)
CollaborationFree and open source software in Public AdministrationsICT standardisation in eGovernment+1 topics
Checking in on the implementation of the Italian open source procurement and reuse law.
Italy's law favouring open source software in public procurement and sharing of code is generally considered to be a good example of primary law. Yet, the law is also thought to have had little real…
Free and open source softwareEuropean PoliciesCollaboration+4 topics
The DigitALL Public conference dedicated a full session to the role of open source in the public sector.
By addressing the challenges and opportunities of using open source in the public domain, the session focused on the benefits that public administration could gain from open source and drew ideas to…
Free and open source softwareLicensingInformation+5 topics
Developers Italia: Case Studies on Sustainability of Public Sector Open Source Communities
This is the fourth of a series of five studies exploring the sustainability of open source software communities in the public sector. INTRODUCTION Developers Italia is the name of both a community of…
Business and competition (1)
eGovernment (175)
(-)Collaboration (3)
Free and open source software in Public Administrations (175)
ICT standardisation in eGovernment (3)
Free and open source software (6)
Licensing (2)
Industry and production (1)
European Policies (2)
(-)Italy (3)


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Home ➤ Case Studies ➤ Silas Mason Mansion
Silas Mason Mansion
AccessibilityInstallation
The three-story, 9,500-square-foot mansion started out in the 1820s as a small brick cottage. A separate two-story building was built about 1840 and was used as the main house. Then in the late 19th century, Silas Mason bought the house and began renovations based on architectural details he had seen in his extensive travels.
The Silas Mason Mansion is located in the Lewisburg Historic District. Florian Schleiff converted the home into office space and needed access to the second and third floors for ADA compliancy. The two wings of the house have been converted to apartments and are rented. An accounting firm and the law firm of Dinsmore and Shohl occupy offices in the main house.
The home, a landmark within the historic district of Lewisburg, created a challenge as we had to work within the limitations of the Historical Society. Specifically, the location designated for the lift was a tower enclosing an existing porch. The roofline and exterior of this area could not be altered, thus creating an issue with the overhead clearance needed for an elevator.
DC Elevator installed a Symmetry Vertical Platform Lift-Hybrid Unit to solve the overhead clearance issue, as it has a non-load bearing ceiling. The custom cab with glass panels, surrounded by a wrap-around staircase, showcases the painted walls of the hoistway and surrounding walls of the space, while natural light floods the area.
In mid-August, Margaret Schleiff was painting the interior of a lift that has been installed in Mason Mansion that will provide access to the second and third floors, removing an invisible barrier. "Nine years later, this is the last phase," she said. To meet city and fire codes, a tower for a staircase and lift were added on the rear of the house.
Since the hoistway is open, the exterior walls are constructed of fire-rated materials. The 1400 lb. constant pressure lift provides accessibility while keeping the integrity of the existing roof line of the home.
Top-Down View of the Hoistway of the Silas Mason Mansion
The Symmetry Hybrid platform lift, looks and feels like an elevator, but operates like a lift. Available in many different sizes and configurations, features include a full height car, non-load bearing ceiling, and a wide variety of optional features and finishes. Customize the doors and car to match the style and decor of your commercial facility or home.
Source: Rosalie Earle, The Charleston Gazette-Mail
Florian Schleiff
311 Feamster Road, Lewisburg, WV 24901
Accessibility to and ADA compliance of this building were critical for the project's success. DC Elevator retrofitted a functional and good looking elevator within our budget. Ron Rucker went beyond our expectations. We have received many compliments from tenants, seniors, and the historically conscious folks in town. Thank you so much!
Florian Schleiff, Owner
Schleiff LLC


Clearwater Compliance is a leading provider of hospital and health system compliance and cybersecurity management solutions. Exclusively endorsed by the American Hospital Association, Clearwater has worked with hospitals and health systems, including over 40 of the top Integrated Delivery Networks in the country, Fortune 100 organizations and federal government institutions. "Hospital C-suites and Boards, today, lack the knowledge and experience to understand the scope and severity of cyber risk challenges," says CEO Bob Chaput. "Hospital leaders place a high premium on quality of care, patient safety and financial stability— yet those priorities are jeopardized when their organizations take a fragmented approach to data security." Consulting caught up with Chaput to discuss Clearwater Compliance's financial performance and revenue growth over the last three years.
dress evolving threats to hospitals.
Consulting: How is this year shaping up for your firm? Chaput: Clearwater experienced unprecedented growth with double digit new client wins, expanded contracts. New endorsements by state hospital associations in Georgia and Montana add more than 200 hospitals. New partnerships include Intel and the National Institute of Standards and Technology and being selected to join the NIST National Cybersecurity Excellence Partnership.
Consulting: Where do you see the most opportunities? Chaput: The healthcare industry will continue to suffer from damaging cyber attacks that pose direct patient safety risks. Board members and Executive Leadership are starting to understand that cyber risks and patient safety are directly related. Clearwater offers comprehensive solutions to look at the expanded ecosystem of the healthcare organization.
Consulting: What does being named one of Consulting's Fastest Growing Firms mean to your firm, your employees and your clients? Chaput: Inclusion in Consulting Magazine's Fastest Growing Firms is a significant milestone for all Clearwater colleagues and speaks to how Clearwater's cybersecurity solutions are creating value for hospital leaders. With the threat landscape becoming more complex than ever for hospitals, Clearwater is experiencing unprecedented growth with double digit new client wins.


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The Best Sawzall Blades to Cut Anything
Sawzall saw blades or reciprocating saw blades, rely on the push and pull motion of the blade (also known as reciprocating motion). Sawzall saw blades are manufactured by a wide range of companies. Some of the best Sawzall blades, however, are the creation of Milwaukee Tools.
Are you considering the selection of the best Sawzall blades that will give you an opportunity to cut through just about everything? If so, here are a few of the top saws to consider:
1. Milwaukee 9-Inch Carbide Sawzall Blade
The Milwaukee 9-Inch Carbide Sawzall Blade is a specialty blade has a number of characteristics that turn it in a favorite among buyers. The ease of use and the versatility are two of the most prominent features of this circular saw blade.
This bi-metal blade is a tungsten carbide-tipped blade and is designed to cut through just about every material out there, including tough options like cast iron and other ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fiberglass, ceramic tile, hardwood floors, stainless steel, plaster, stone, and other kinds of tile.
The length of this combination blade is nine inches, as the name indicates and it comes with a ½-inch universal tang that makes it fit all kinds of Sawzall. These characteristics and the toughness of the blade make it suitable both for household and for commercial applications.
This is the first entry in the list because of the numerous positive customer reviews that it's gotten. People who have tested the blade report that it can cut effortlessly through metal pipes and cast iron objects. If you're looking for optimal performance, this blade will be the best one for you. Since it's incredibly reasonably priced and provided with a 5-year warranty, the blade doesn't pose any risk to first-time buyers.
In addition, reports suggest that the blade lasts a lot longer than other options on the market. It remains in a good condition even after daily use and being tested on an array of tough materials.
2. Milwaukee Sawzall Blade 6" Diamond Grit
If you're looking for something even tougher than the first entry in the list, the Milwaukee Sawzall Blade 6" Diamond Grit would be the right pick for you. Manufactured in the United States and incredibly tough the Sawzall blade can be used to cut through just about any material out there.
According to the official manufacturer presentation, the blade features TPI/Grit diamond coarse grit – the secret behind its incredible toughness. The diamond grit increases the longevity of the blade by approximately 30 % in comparison to the standard carbide grit blade. In addition, it can cut through just about any material nearly two times faster than the regular Sawzall blade.
Reviewers have given this tool mostly positive reviews. According to their testimonials, it can do the job when most other reciprocating blades will fail. One reviewer reported that the blade was the only one capable of cutting through an old, thick cast iron soil pipe. Both carbide grit and bi-metal blades failed the task.
Some reviewers report using it on granite, marble and other incredibly tough natural materials. The blade does an excellent job every single time.
One complaint that reviewers have is that depending on the toughness of the material, the blade may be a bit slow. While the job may require some time to be finalized, the blade will deliver the expected results every single time.
3. 14TPI 9-Inch Thin Kerf Ice Hardened Sawzall Blade
This option is a bit more expensive due to the innovative technology used to harden the blade. Still, the 14TPI 9-Inch Thin Kerf Ice Hardened Sawzall Blade is another buyer favorite due to its toughness and ease of use.
Manufactured in the US, the blade undergoes a cryogenic heat treatment process that permanently changes the properties of the metal that the blade is made of. Ice-hardened blades like this one can be expected to have a 50% longer life than a standard Sawzall blade, which justifies the additional expenditure.
There are a few cool characteristics that maximize the strength and the toughness of the blade. The tough neck ribs are used to strengthen the tang of the blade and reduce the risk of breakage. Milwaukee Tools also relies on its Grid Iron honeycomb pattern to maximize the rigidity of the blade.
One other cool characteristic is the maximized flexibility in comparison to other Sawzall blades. This characteristic reduces the risk of shock or shattering, maximizing the safety of blade usage.
The nine-inch Sawzall blade comes with a 14 TPI and a ½-inch universal shank. The blade has a thin kerf profile and it's just one of the Milwaukee Tools ice hardened Sawzall blades.
4. Milwaukee 49-22-1129 Ultimate Demolition Sawzall Blade Set
This product is specially created for the needs of people who'd prefer to buy an entire set rather than acquire one blade after the other. The Milwaukee 49-22-1129 Ultimate Demolition Sawzall Blade Set consists of 12 items, which makes it suitable for handling just about every DIY and professional project.
All of the 12 reciprocating saw blades are created for cutting through a vast range of materials, including some of the toughest possibilities out there. The company has brought together an assortment of its most popular demolition blades, which are thicker than the standard Sawzall blade. The added thickness increases the longevity of the blades and reduces the risk of shattering.
A few of the options included in the set are a nail cutting blade, a general purpose demolition cutting blade, and a metal cutting product. A durable case is also provided for the effortless storage of the demolition blades.
The blades have a couple of innovative characteristics that ensure their quality. The Milwaukee Tool Nail Guard technology brings together a 5 TPI pattern for faster cutting with a unique design that reduces the risk of tooth fracture. Fang Tip design is used on the wood cutting blades to make them faster. Finally, double relief angle design reduces the stress on the blade teeth to increase the lifespan of these products.
Since the products are provided in kit form, they're a lot cheaper to purchase this way than to acquire each one of the Sawzall items individually.
Tags: cut anything reciprocating saw blades sawzall blades sawzall saw


To begin, let's analyze the statement — Mental health is health.
A first layer of analysis will recognize that this is a performative utterance (see J.L. Austin) expressed to reduce stigma and change societal attitudes.
One influential response came from philosopher René Descartes. This position has been called substance dualism, i.e., there are two distinct types of things — physical and mental. Historically, as sociologist Andrew Scull has written in his book Madness: A Very Short Introduction (2011) Descartes' dualism was adopted by the medical profession as part of "the medical profession's defence of its claim to jurisdiction over the management of the mad." The reasoning at the time was that the mind — identical to the immortal soul — was incapable of error, so any pathology must lie in the material, mortal body.
And Scull underscored in Madness that "Until well into the second half of the 19th century, medical men would rehearse these arguments, which rapidly became the ruling orthodoxy in their midst." And so the stage was set for someone like psychiatrist and neurologist Wilhelm Griesinger (1817-1868) to declare that "mental illnesses are brain diseases" though he did recognize a multifactorial aetiology.
The WPA-Lancet Psychiatry Commission on the Future of Psychiatry spoke of the integration of a contemporary neuroscience with traditions of psychotherapy and social psychiatry. I postulate that this integration will be an impossible task without proper philosophical underpinnings.
What are some ways forward?
Without getting into the details of Davidson's argument (see SEP article), I would like to highlight that his theory supports a position called predicate dualism, i.e., "the theory that psychological or mentalistic predicates are (a) essential for a full description of the world and (b) are not reducible to physicalistic predicates." In other words, there are events in the world. These events can be described using mental predicates or physical predicates (predicate dualism). Importantly, the events are not "mental" or "physical" per se (ontological monism).
For instance, schizophrenia can be described as a disorder of a given set of brain circuits; in this sense, it is a physical issue. Equally, schizophrenia can be described mentally in a phenomenology of schizophrenia, seeing schizophrenia as a disorder of consciousness and self-experience. The term "schizophrenia" refers to one set of events, which can be described "mentally" or "physically." While the ontology is identical, mental predicates/properties are not reducible to physical predicates/properties. In this sense, the mind supervenes on the brain but is not reducible to the brain (or more properly in anomalous monism, irreducible to base-level physical properties, such as those in physics).
Mental health professionals, including psychiatrists, are likely working with an additional and distinct set of predicates, such as in a phenomenology of psychopathology, i.e., a structure of meanings in beliefs, thoughts, and feelings. As such, this set of predicates may require going beyond what has been conventionally defined as the domain of medicine/natural sciences, namely, to the humanities and social sciences. While the body and its organs can be described using physical predicates, there are no mental predicates that apply. On the other hand, psychiatry is dealing with a set of events that can be given either/both mental and physical predicates. And meanings as manifested in conscious life or someone's stream of consciousness reside in the realm of mental predicates, not physical predicates.
So, given that meanings are involved a priori, it may be that the necessary language to meet this challenge is one that draws from anthropology, sociology, history, philosophy, and other areas. And it may be that this is not merely useful, but is demanded by what psychiatry is constitutively where meanings are involved a priori.
All of this speaks to how we think about mental health and physical health. Increasingly, there is a desire to find out how these two interrelate and how psychiatric expertise can be better integrated in mainstream medicine.
To paraphrase Andrew Scull, philosophical investigations into the mind-body problem have very real consequences, such as in how mental disorders are conceptualized, diagnosed, and treated.
Thank you for this article and for highlighting the challenges of addressing mind-body in a holistic and integrated manner.
Like trauma, the mind-body problem is one of the elephants in the room, notable when it comes to the medical approach to illness.
I think you will be pleasantly surprised to find out, down the road, that the challenges of working with the mind, with trauma and with embodied subjectivity are being addresses more and more seamlessly in areas of the field of mental health.
I'm reading The Heart of Trauma now by Bonnie Badenoch, and she quite readily moves from concepts of mind, to physiology to complex areas of developmental traumas and psychological adaptations to the social embeddedness of mind. With more attention to the autonomic nervous system and the HPA axis, there is a dawning sense of an interface between mind and body rather than a split.
This is an exciting time. The future will demand that psychiatry and medicine evolve to meet these challenges of complexity and of treating at the mind-body level.


The Department of Clinical Gerontology at the Princess Royal University Hospital (PRUH), a division of Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, is looking for enthusiastic and committed physicians with a passion for patient centred, fully integrated Gerontology care to join our friendly forward looking team.
The posts provide an exciting range of opportunities, from Acute Frailty to Community Outreach, Orthogeriatrics and Surgical Liaison. Applicants will have the choice of sub-specialty. This includes working across the Acute Frailty Unit on the PRUH site and the new Community Facing Frailty Wards at Orpington Hospital, Movement Disorder and Falls clinics. Other specialist areas of interest within Geriatrics are encouraged and can be discussed on application. The post holders will work closely with colleagues in ED, Acute Medicine and will be involved in the unselected GIM take.
There will be many opportunities to help develop clinical pathways within acute care as well as in the community including GP liaison systems and multidisciplinary team working to provide excellent patient-centred care. Applications for job sharing are welcome. We welcome informal visits.
The Princess Royal University Hospital and Orpington Hospital are close to Bromley and Orpington town centres which have fast rail links to central London (18 minute journey) in addition to being only 20 minutes' drive from the M25. The leafy suburban location is a great place to live and work.
For further information please contact Dr Aza Abdulla, Clinical Lead 01689 863709, or Nick Yard, Service Manager on 01689 865878.


Recently, I attended an archive induction at the V&A Clothworkers' Centre organized by the British Fashion Council. There, I was honoured to meet fashion designer Dame Zandra Rhodes and David Sassoon who designed clothing for the royal family in the 60's.
To begin with, the Clothworkers' Centre manager Suzanne Smith showed us all the new storage the Victoria and Albert Museum had installed. I was shown gowns that our current Queen had worn, the pearl dress or sometimes known as the 'elvis dress' that princess Diana had worn to the British Fashion Awards and Elsa Schiaparelli dress the infamous fabric ripping print designed by Salvador Dali.
In the second half of the day we had an objects discussion with Sonnet Stanfill who's the senior fashion curator. I further learnt that the V&A holds over 100,000 pieces and on average, an exhibition takes up to 5 years to plan.
I now appreciate how much time and thought is spent on organising an exhibition. I'm fortunate to have been able to visit the V&A archive, they've kindly offered their archive to us as a means of future referencing and research.


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Q: Angular JS remove hash from URL not working I am trying to get rid of the url looking like http://example.com/#/album/0 and have it look more like http://example.com/album/0.
I have the following code
(function() {
var app = angular.module('chp', ['ngRoute', 'projectControllers']);

app.config(['$routeProvider', '$locationProvider',
  function($routeProvider, $locationProvider) {
    $routeProvider.
      when('/', {
        templateUrl: 'partials/directory.html',
        controller: 'ProjectsCtrl'
      }).
      when('/album/:id', {
        templateUrl: 'partials/album.html',
        controller: 'ProjectDetailCtrl'
      }).
      otherwise({
        redirectTo: '/'
      });

      $locationProvider.html5Mode(true);
  }]);

var projectControllers = angular.module('projectControllers', []);

projectControllers.controller('ProjectsCtrl', ['$scope', '$http',
  function ($scope, $http) {
    $scope.projects = albums;
    $scope.filters = { };
  }]);

projectControllers.controller('ProjectDetailCtrl', ['$scope', '$routeParams', '$sce',
  function($scope, $routeParams, $sce) {
    $scope.project = albums[$routeParams.id];
})();

but this is causing my app the break entirely once I add in $locationProvider in the three places shown. Any idea as to why this is not working for me? Also I am including angular-route.js just after jquery and angular.js so that cant be the problem

A: At a glance it looks all right to me, but you must make sure your server is set up to serve http://example.com/index.html for any route, otherwise it will try to load http://example.com/album/0/index.html before bootstrapping your angular application. What do you see when you enable html5? 404 not found? Console error?
You might also need to add
<base href="/" /> inside <head></head> in your index.html file

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


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Europcar Updates Cost-Saving Plan
April 20, 2020 • by ARN Staff
Europcar continues to deploy its plan to reduce the volume and cost of its fleet and renegotiate some of its contracts and using partial unemployment.
Photo via Max Pexels.
As part of the cost-saving and cash preservation plan to reduce its costs, Europcar Mobility Group announced that on April 13 it finalized its first lines of financing, 70% guaranteed by the Spanish State for an amount of 36 million euros ($39 million).
These financing lines, with a three-year maturity for its two operating subsidiaries in Spain are intended to consolidate the Group's liquidity to enable it to meet its vehicle financing needs and its corporate needs related to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Group is continuing its efforts to obtain additional financing guaranteed by the French State via the BPI. The Group has contacts of the same type through its foreign subsidiaries in countries where similar support measures have been deployed.
Related: Europcar Mobility Group to Provide Free Vehicles to Doctors, Nurses
Read more about COVID-19 Europcar Mobility Group Financing


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Ends of Enlightenment
John Bender
Stanford University Press
Ends of Enlightenment explores three realms of eighteenth-century European innovation that remain active in the twenty-first century: the realist novel, philosophical thought, and the physical sciences, especially human anatomy. The European Enlightenment was a state of being, a personal stance, and an orientation to the world. Ways of probing experience and knowledge in the novel and in the visual arts were interleaved with methods of experimentation in science and philosophy. This book's fresh perspective considers the novel as an art but also as a force in thinking. The critical distance afforded by a view back across the centuries allows Bender to redefine such novelists as Defoe, Fielding, Goldsmith, Godwin, and Laclos by placing them alongside philosophers and scientists like Newton, Locke, and Hume but also alongside engravings by Hogarth and by the anatomist William Hunter. His book probes the kinship among realism, hypothesis, and scientific fact, defining in the process the rhetorical basis of public communication during the Enlightenment.
At Stanford Since: 1967
John Bender's research and teaching focus on the eighteenth century in England and France. His special concerns include the relationship of literature to the visual arts, to philosophy and science, as well as to the sociology of literature and critical theory. He is on the faculty in both English and Comparative Literature. Bender is the author of Spenser and Literary Pictorialism (1972), Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in 18th-Century England (1987), which received the Gottschalk Prize of the American Society for 18th-Century Studies, and (as co-author with Michael Marrinan) The Culture of Diagram (2010). He has published articles on Shakespeare, Piranesi, Hogarth, Hume, Goldsmith, Blake, Godwin, Laclos and on theoretical issues including fictionality and scientific inquiry. Many of his essays are collected in Ends of Enlightenment (2012). He is co-editor of The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory, Practice (1990), Chronotypes: The Construction of Time (1991), The Columbia History of the British Novel (1994), the Oxford World Classics edition of Tom Jones (1996), and Regimes of Description: In the Archive of the Eighteenth Century (2005).


I made an infographic. I hope you enjoy.
The last one wasn't an invention, but I don't think you were arguing about that. If you do want to argue about that one, I know some 80+ year old Vets who you could talk to that would gladly show you exactly what happened to the Nazis they came across.
go and read wikipedia or some other credible source regarding radio, television, electricity, the telephone, the personal computer for instance. some of your claims are dubious whilst others are out and out wrong. i can't even be bothered to check the rest but i'm sure others are probably wrong too.
as for ww2... thanks for the backup and all that but you joined in 2 years late. ww2 begun in 1939, not 1941.
i thought it was fairly common knowledge that tim berners lee invented the internet as well.
And as far as Wikipedia - I suggest you actually check Wikipedia for all those names I listed for yourself.
And as far as entering the war too late - we didn't go looking for a war, we entered the war when the war came to us. And once it did - we finished it.
I thought it was fairly common knowledge that Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web, and that the Web and the Internet were 2 different things, and that Tim Berners-Lee would be the first person to clarify that distinction.


Since I'm going to Brunei for 4-5 days [reason: a conference that has nothing to do with maps and related services], is it okay for me to use my GPS device in that country (for tracing roads, collecting POI's)?
First hits at internet search engines say that some time ago only three countries banned the use of GPS devices: Egypt, Syria nad North Korea.
In the meantime Egypt is said to have allowed the use.
In case of doubt, ask at your local embassy of the country you want to go by email.


CLICKY OR REVERSE CLICKY ???????
Is this supposed to be water-proof?
Do you use a phone as a flashlight?
Is this wrong of me?!
Is the older Version always better?
Who won the flashlight raffle?
I want this light, where to buy?
Mobil 1 oil ok for plastic lights?
Are we reaching the peak in flashlight innovation?
Where can I get a 2AA extension for a Jetbeam MkII?
Lowest priced light for AR15?
why does it feel so wrong to order a mag?
Anyone have Light with Serial Number as 1???
Fenix P3D - flickers strongly near end of battery?
Battery option for my Surefire M3T??
RCR123A and Fenix digitals - does this combo work well?
Surefire E2L Cree vs. Japanese steel & the wild...and the winner is???


There are a lot of controversies surrounding the sale and consumption of marijuana across all the continents of the world until recently when discoveries through medical science made it imperative for the world and governments of nations to take another look of the drug from the positive angle.
If marijuana is actually useful in some respects; for an answer; get full details through Marijuana Stock Magazine Online ca. What you need is your internet connections and with it, you can get all the info you need on marijuana from their web pages.
It is still illegal in some parts of the world. Some people had fallen on the bad side of the law for contravening restrictions on this drug. If you want to avoid this form of embarrassments, then you have to get a copy of Online Investor Magazine ca.
It is an online publication and you will get all the info that you need on their pages about cannabis. When you are new to a country, and you do not want to fall foul on restrictions placed on the drug in that country; the ideal thing to do is to get a copy of Cannabis Investors Magazine Ca.
You will get all the useful info. Do you know that this drug has medicinal uses? The details on it can be found on the pages of the magazine. This magazine is indeed an excellent work of academics aimed at telling it all on issues bothering on marijuana.


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Government of Canada Invests $14.7M in Conservation Projects in Five Mountain National Parks to Prevent and Manage Aquatic Invasive Species (Dec 4, 2021)
Parks Canada.
On December 4, the Minister of Environment and Climate Change and Minister responsible for Parks Canada, the Honourable Steven Guilbeault, announced federal investments of $14.7 million over the next five years for conservation projects to prevent and manage aquatic invasive species in Banff, Jasper, Kootenay, Waterton Lakes and Yoho national parks.
The mountain national parks are particularly vulnerable to aquatic invasive species due to the high amount of water recreationists who visit each year. Aquatic invasive species alter aquatic ecosystems, cause irreversible damage, impact vulnerable species at risk, and spread downstream beyond park boundaries through the interconnected river systems. Of particular concern for the mountain national parks are invasive mussels, which deplete available nutrients and in turn affects the entire food web by altering water chemistry and quality, as well as the parasite that causes whirling disease, which leads to skeletal deformities for native species. This investment will help address major threats to aquatic ecosystems by funding programs to prevent and educate against the spread of aquatic invasive species.
Interior Awards $942,206 to Eradicate Invasive Species in Insular Areas (May 20, 2020)
DOI. Office of Insular Affairs.
U.S. Department of the Interior Assistant Secretary, Insular and International Affairs, Douglas W. Domenech announced $942,206 in fiscal year (FY) 2020 Coral Reef and Natural Resources Initiative grants to eradicate and control the spread of invasive species in the U.S. territories of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), as well as in the Republic of Palau, and Yap, in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). Funding will be used to introduce biological control of coconut rhinoceros beetles, control and eradicate feral cats and monitor lizards, and destroy wild vines, all of which are disruptive to ecological systems and impacting communities and livelihoods in the islands.
Interior Office of Insular Affairs Announces Nearly $3 Million to Protect Coral Reefs and Combat Invasive Species in the Insular Areas (Sep 29, 2021)
The U.S. Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) has announced $2,772,443 in Coral Reef and Natural Resources Initiative (CRNR) grant funds to protect coral reef resources in the U.S. territories and the freely associated states. The funding includes $1,541,421 that will support efforts to control and eradicate invasive species in the insular areas. Grants for fiscal year 2021 to combat invasive species have been awarded as follows:
University of Guam for research and related efforts to counter the Coconut Rhinoceros Beetle - $866,423
Micronesia Conservation Trust, a regional non-governmental organization, for the eradication, control, and management of invasive species in Kosrae, Chuuk, and Yap - $300,000
Island Conservation, a non-profit organization, for the removal of invasive rats in Mili Atoll, Marshall Islands - $299,838
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Government for Sabana Pandanus Forest control and native trees restoration project - $75,160
Interior Provides $1.5 Million to Combat Invasive Species and Protect Natural Resources in the Insular Areas (Aug 20, 2018)
Doug Domenech, U.S. Department of the Interior Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs this week announced $1,488,890 in fiscal year 2018 grants to combat invasive species and protect natural resources in the U.S. Territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as the freely associated states of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau. "Invasive species in the islands are disruptive for both marine and terrestrial resources in the islands, which already face a delicate balance," said Assistant Secretary Domenech. "Secretary Zinke and I are pleased to help control and eradicate invasive species in the islands in order to protect public health, livelihoods, and fragile environments and economies."
New Grant Program Gives $100,000 for Control, Eradication of Aquatic Invasive Plants in Michigan's Inland Lakes (Jun 3, 2019)
Michgan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy.
The Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy's Water Resources Division announces a new grant program to aid in the control or eradication of aquatic invasive plants in Michigan's inland lakes. This year, approximately $100,000 will be available through the Aquatic Invasive Plant (AIP) Control Grant for the reimbursement of permit fees required for projects to control or eradicate inland lake aquatic invasive plant species using physical, biological or chemical control activities that occur in 2019. The grant handbook and application process are currently being developed. The handbook will contain detailed information on eligibility, instructions for applying for the grant, and items to be included with the grant application. Grant applications will be accepted from June 1 through July 1. The handbook will be made available on the Michigan Aquatic Invasive Plant Control Grant Program webpage on June 1.
Pennsylvania Sea Grant Receives $800,000 to Combat Invasive Species (Jul 27, 2018)
Pennsylvania State University.
An $800,000 grant from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service will support a two-year effort to control and prevent the spread of aquatic invasive species across Pennsylvania, with an emphasis on the Lake Erie Basin. The funding, through the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative, supports efforts to implement Pennsylvania's Aquatic Invasive Species (AIS) Management Plan. It will directly support nine field projects to prevent or control the spread of aquatic invasive species, including: targeted control of Hydrilla (Hydrilla verticillata) in Pymatuning Lake; the removal of red-eared slider turtles from Presque Isle Bay; and surveys of Natural Heritage Areas within the Lake Erie watershed.
United Nations Launches Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Zika Virus Response (May 6, 2016)
United Nations.
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Enjoy the versatility of Blindsgalore® Cordless Top Down Bottom Up Pleated Shades. Pull the shade half way down from the top or half way up from the bottom to allow natural light into your room or completely close the shade to maintain some privacy. With the cordless top down bottom up feature, you can customize the way you want your room to be shaded.


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2002 AUMF
How the 2002 Iraq AUMF Got to Be So Dangerous, Part 2: Interpretation and Implications
By Scott R. Anderson
Tuesday, November 29, 2022, 8:01 AM
American soldier during firefight in Adhamiyah, Baghdad (Operation Phantom Thunder). (Source: US. Army photo by Sgt. Michael Pryor, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division Public Affairs, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.)
Editor's Note: This is the second in a two-part series on the history and interpretation of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, or 2002 Iraq AUMF. Part one examines how the 2002 Iraq AUMF has been used over its 20-year history. This article analyzes how the executive branch has come to interpret the 2002 Iraq AUMF and what this means for its potential repeal.
By most accounts, when Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, it was authorizing the George W. Bush administration to go to war with the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. But as the first article in this series documented, use of the 2002 Iraq AUMF did not stop there. Over the subsequent two decades, its language authorizing the use of the U.S. armed forces to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" was used not just to remove the Hussein regime but also to facilitate the subsequent occupation of Iraq, including the assumption of responsibility for Iraq's internal and external security. After the occupation ended, it was cited as the legal basis for an array of similar activities in support of the new Iraqi government, most notably its efforts at combatting al-Qaeda-associated terrorist groups. These efforts ended after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011 but were revived in 2014 when the Obama administration once again intervened in Iraq to lead a military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist group. The Trump administration in turn implemented a broader campaign against Iran-backed militias in Iraq and even against agents of Iran itself. All of this has been framed as falling within the scope of what the executive branch has consistently described as the 2002 Iraq AUMF's dual purposes: "helping to establish a stable, democratic Iraq and addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq."
This article examines the interpretive framework that has allowed the executive branch to read the 2002 Iraq AUMF so broadly. In recent years, the executive branch has increasingly justified its interpretations of both the 2001 AUMF—which separately authorizes military operations against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, and provides the domestic legal basis for most global counterterrorism operations—and the 2002 Iraq AUMF in terms of its own historical practice. Specifically, it has argued that, where Congress is aware that the executive branch has advanced or acted upon a particular interpretation of the AUMFs, any legislation that appropriates funds for or otherwise engages in those activities serves to confirm Congress's acceptance of the validity of that interpretation. Viewed through this lens, the 2002 Iraq AUMF becomes an exceptionally broad congressional authorization to use military force so long as there is some relation to Iraq. And while there are ample grounds for criticizing this approach, the fact that it has endured across presidential administrations of both political parties and in spite of legal challenges in the courts suggests that it is unlikely to go away any time soon.
Congress must bear this framework and the interpretations it leads to in mind as it debates the possibility of repeal. Concerns that repeal will limit the executive branch's ability to confront Iranian militias and other actors threatening U.S. diplomatic and military personnel are misplaced, as the president has substantial authority to act in defense of U.S. personnel and facilities even without statutory authorization. Instead, what repeal will limit is future presidents' ability to go beyond limited military action and engage in another major war in the Middle East without consulting Congress, which the 2002 Iraq AUMF—as currently interpreted by the executive branch—could readily be read to authorize. While the Biden administration seems unlikely to stretch the 2002 Iraq AUMF to this potential upper bound, future presidents might view the issue differently, especially given Iraq's complex and often challenging relationship with its neighbor Iran. Nor is it clear whether the Biden administration and federal courts are able and willing to do anything to prevent this from happening unless Congress acts first.
Historical Practice and AUMF Interpretation
The idea that subsequent practice should bear on how one interprets a statute is, in many ways, a strange one. Modern courts often use such practice to interpret other types of legal texts, such as contracts and treaties, but not statutes enacted by Congress. When interpreting statutes, courts instead look first and foremost to the text of the statute and then potentially to legislative history where the meaning of that text is unclear or otherwise not dispositive. Executive branch views are sometimes cited as confirmation of interpretations based on other grounds and may be entitled to interpretive deference in certain contexts. But the focus is otherwise generally on the intent of the Congress that enacted the statute, not the actions of those who implement the statute afterward.
Subsequent practice does, however, play a central role in how the executive branch approaches the president's authority to use military force in a variety of other contexts. In discussing the scope of the president's constitutional authority to use military force absent any congressional authorization, for example, recent presidential administrations have routinely maintained that "historical practice is an important indication of constitutional meaning" as it "reflects the two political branches' practical understanding … of their respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense[.]" Over time, persistent practice can in turn put a "historical gloss" on how the Constitution is understood to distribute authority. As discussed further below, the executive branch specifically argues that, in the case of war powers, this gloss confirms that the president has broad authority to use military force absent express authorization from Congress, even though the Constitution gives Congress the authority "[t]o declare War."
The executive branch has also argued that "Congress [can] authoriz[e] and ratif[y] executive branch action through appropriations measures" and other subsequent legislation adopted after the fact, so long as it has the requisite intent to do so. For example, in a 2000 opinion by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) justifying military intervention in Kosovo, the executive branch asserted that "where the President has requested an appropriation in order to continue military operations, evidence showing that Members of Congress were specifically aware of the purposes of the appropriation request will tend to show that Congress intended to authorize continuing military operations[.]" (In the same opinion, OLC also rejected the validity of a provision of the 1973 War Powers Resolution that prohibited Congress from implicitly authorizing the use of force through appropriations and similar measures, on the grounds that one Congress cannot restrict how a future Congress chooses to exercise its legislative authority.)
The executive branch approaches the AUMFs through a combination of these two lenses. Specifically, it has argued that Congress has functionally ratified executive branch interpretations of the AUMFs by knowingly enacting subsequent legislation that appropriates funds for or authorizes activities premised on those interpretations. Of course, this is just one interpretive tool of many that the executive branch applies to the AUMFs. But as use of the two AUMFs has accumulated over their 20-year history, interpretations rooted in past practice have taken on greater significance—especially for the 2002 Iraq AUMF.
The executive branch has made similar arguments about implicit congressional approval since at least the 1970s, if not earlier. But this approach is perhaps most clearly spelled out in the Obama administration's December 2016 report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the executive branch's use of military force and related activities. That report defended the executive branch's position that the 2001 AUMF extended to ISIL by noting that "Congress has repeatedly and specifically funded the President's military operation against ISIL through an unbroken stream of appropriations over multiple years." It observed that Congress had also enacted other legislation contingent on the application of the 2001 AUMF to ISIL, including authorizations for "lethal and nonlethal assistance to select groups and forces fighting ISIL in Iraq and Syria." Perhaps most importantly, Congress did so while engaging in "close congressional oversight of the status and scope of U.S. counter-ISIL activities, and with knowledge of the specific measures the President was taking to counter ISIL and the statutory provisions under which he was acting." Together, the report concluded, these measures "convey Congress's support for the President's use of force against ISIL, including his determination that he had and continues to have authority to act under prior congressional authorizations for the use of military force."
In an endnote, the report also applied this same interpretive framework to the 2002 Iraq AUMF. Echoing earlier statements by officials in the Bush and Obama administrations, among others discussed in the prior piece in this series, it states:
Although the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq was the primary focus of the 2002 AUMF, the statute, in accordance with its express goals, has always been understood to authorize the use of force for the related dual purposes of helping to establish a stable, democratic Iraq and of addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq. After Saddam Hussein's regime fell in 2003, the United States continued to take military action in Iraq under the 2002 AUMF to further these purposes, including action against [al-Qaeda in Iraq] (now known as ISIL). Then, as now, that organization posed a terrorist threat to the United States and its partners and undermined stability and democracy in Iraq. Congress ratified this understanding of the 2002 AUMF by appropriating billions of dollars to support continued military operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.
The Trump administration later reiterated this understanding of the 2002 Iraq AUMF in its own related 2018 war powers report, while expressly adding the (previously implicit) caveat that, "although the Iraq AUMF limits the use of force to address threats to, or stemming from, Iraq, it (like the 2001 AUMF) contains no geographic limitation on where authorized force may be employed."
By some measures, this interpretive approach may be seen as relatively conservative compared to possible alternatives. At a minimum, it does not lend itself to novel applications that do not have some analogy in prior practice that was arguably ratified by congressional action, though other interpretive tools might fill this gap. And the executive branch is not arguing that subsequent appropriations and other legislation enactments provide independent statutory authorization for military action, as it did in relation to Kosovo—meaning that the plain language of the AUMFs themselves may still impose constraints on what the executive branch can read them as authorizing.
But in the specific case of the 2002 Iraq AUMF, these limits appear to be few and far between. As documented in the first article in this series, the 2002 Iraq AUMF has been cited as authorization for an incredibly broad and diverse array of military activities over its 20-year history, all in full view of—and using funds repeatedly appropriated by—Congress. And the AUMF's plain language imposes few clear limits on the executive branch, aside from requiring a certification that the George W. Bush administration issued in 2003 and imposing certain reporting requirements. The Trump administration implied as much in its 2020 OLC opinion justifying the January 2020 strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, an Iranian official who headed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC's) paramilitary Quds Force, as well as the leadership of the Iraqi militia group Kataib Hezbollah. Specifically, OLC emphasized the deferential language the 2002 AUMF uses in authorizing the use of the armed forces "as [the president] determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to … defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" (emphasis in original). For the purposes of the Soleimani strike, OLC concluded that it was sufficient that the executive branch believed "the Qods Force [that Soleimani headed] would continue to undermine stability in Iraq and continue to threaten U.S. personnel in Iraq" and that the operation targeting him "was narrowly tailored to Soleimani's presence in Iraq and to his support to and direction of militias operating in Iraq." Given the Trump administration's clear statement elsewhere that the 2002 Iraq AUMF imposes no geographic limitations, this is best read as requiring some nexus to Iraq as opposed to a requirement that uses of force occur within Iraq. Whatever such a nexus might look like, the requirement for one appears to be the main constraint that the executive branch sees on the 2002 AUMF's authorization for the use of force to address threats to the stability of Iraq or from terrorist groups operating there.
Congress may also have imposed another limitation in April 2020, when bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate enacted a joint resolution directing a withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from hostilities with Iran. It included a finding that the 2002 AUMF "do[es] not serve as a specific statutory authorization for the use of force against Iran." At a minimum, the adoption of this statement by a majority in both chambers of Congress makes it much harder for the executive branch to argue that Congress has uniformly acquiesced to its prior suggestions that the 2002 AUMF might reach Iran. But this statement also appears in the nonbinding "findings" section of the resolution. And the joint resolution itself was vetoed by then-President Trump and never enacted into law. As a result, the extent to which the executive branch (or the courts) will view this resolution as constraining possible applications of the 2002 Iraq AUMF against Iran moving forward is unclear.
To date, no federal court has passed judgment on the executive branch's interpretations of the scope of applicability of the AUMFs. Federal courts have been notoriously reticent to weigh in on war powers questions in recent decades and have often used flexible justiciability standards and other doctrinal tools to avoid reaching the merits of legal challenges that raise them. This remains true even though the Supreme Court has arguably narrowed the scope of one of the main non-justiciability doctrines invoked in earlier war powers cases, the political question doctrine, by suggesting that the political question doctrine should not apply where the president acts contrary to a statute enacted by Congress.
In line with this practice, the only two significant legal challenges that have been brought against the 2001 and 2002 AUMF interpretations underlying the counter-ISIL campaign in Iraq and Syria have concluded without ever reaching the merits. In Smith v. Obama—a lawsuit launched by a U.S. service member set to deploy to Syria—the district court declined to reach the merits on justiciability grounds, while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held the matter on its docket for more than a year until the plaintiff's military commitment ended, at which point it dismissed the case as moot. Meanwhile, in Doe v. Mattis—a legal challenge launched by a U.S. national being detained by a U.S. partner group in Syria on suspicion of being a member of ISIL—the district court issued an order requiring that the government notify it before transferring the plaintiff (that was in turn upheld by the D.C. Circuit) but otherwise allowed the matter to remain in process for over a year without resolution, until the plaintiff and U.S. officials agreed on a disposition that similarly mooted the case. (Notably, the Obama and Trump administrations both deployed arguments relating to subsequent practice and congressional ratification in these matters.)
Whether deliberately or not, these justiciability barriers reinforce the executive branch's interpretive approach by insulating executive branch interpretations of the AUMFs from judicial review absent a clear sign of congressional disagreement. Citing an array of federal court opinions adopting a similar approach that date back to the 1970s, the district court in Smith v. Obama drove this point home, stating:
Plaintiff has not pointed the Court toward any action that Congress has taken since the beginning of [the counter-ISIL campaign] that would indicate that Congress believes that further specific authorization (beyond the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs relied on by President Obama in his communications with Congress) is required …. This lack of conflict is relevant to the justiciability of Plaintiff's claims under the political question doctrine because judicial intervention into military affairs is particularly inappropriate when the two political branches to whom war-making powers are committed are not in dispute as to the military action at issue ….
… Congress is vested with considerable power to restrain the President in the conduct of military operations …. Such powers may not always be sufficient, and judicial intervention may be necessary when they fail. But in this case, where these powers have not been exercised and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two political branches as to the legality of a live military operation, the Court finds it inappropriate to inject itself into these affairs.
Under this logic, executive branch interpretations of AUMFs are justiciable only where there are clear signs that Congress disagrees with them—a standard that, not coincidentally, aligns with a focus on subsequent practice and congressional acquiescence when interpreting AUMFs. In this sense, the executive branch's interpretive approach may be best understood less as a method of statutory interpretation and more as a strategy for keeping the executive branch within the range of interpretations that federal courts are unlikely to subject to judicial scrutiny.
There are good reasons to be skeptical of this interpretive approach. At a minimum, it's a departure from the normal methods of statutory interpretation and their focus on text and intent—a point driven home by many critiques of the executive branch's broad readings of the AUMFs. If anything, it employs a logic that is closer to that of the Youngstown framework that federal courts often use to evaluate claims of executive branch authority, which ties the validity of such claims to the extent to which the executive branch is acting consistent with "the expressed or implied will of Congress." The strong implication is that, at least when it comes to uses of military force, broader separation of power concerns outweigh the quotidian concerns of conventional statutory interpretation—an implicit case for applying an exceptional standard to war-related questions that may strike some as hard to swallow, if not downright dangerous.
These reservations notwithstanding, however, the executive branch's interpretive approach does more or less align with general judicial practice, outlining the range of potential interpretations that are least likely to face legal pushback, even if they strain the usual bounds of credibility. For these reasons, it's perhaps not surprising that such interpretations continue to be put forward as an option—with, no doubt, some warnings and caveats—by executive branch lawyers who understand their primary responsibility to be to advise policymakers on how to advance their preferred policy goals in a legally defensible manner, not to restrain those options to what they understand to be the best view of the law. Nor is this tendency likely to decline now that this interpretive approach has been employed across presidential administrations of both parties, in full view of Congress and the broader public. Instead, how the executive branch makes use of subsequent practice in interpreting the AUMFs is simply a reality that Congress must take into account when it enacts such pieces of legislation—and debates their later modification or repeal.
Implications for Repeal
This framework helps explain how the executive branch has used the 2002 Iraq AUMF in the past. More importantly, it may also help anticipate how it may yet be used in the future. This is the most important consideration for Congress as it weighs repeal, as it sheds light on how repeal will likely impact military operations that future presidents will otherwise see themselves as having the legal authority to pursue. And for the 2002 Iraq AUMF in particular, the impact of repeal is both less and, in important ways, far more than some may anticipate.
Even absent an AUMF or other statutory authorization, the executive branch has long maintained that the president has the independent constitutional authority to use military force to defend the United States and its nationals—including its diplomatic and military personnel—from attacks and the imminent threat thereof. For these reasons, repeal of the 2002 AUMF would not—as the Biden administration has repeatedly emphasized in its own strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, which it has premised on this Article II authority—leave U.S. personnel in Iraq undefended; to the contrary, the president would have the same substantial authority to defend them from attack as he has to defend U.S. personnel in various other hostile corners of the world.
Nor would repeal of the 2002 Iraq AUMF necessarily prevent presidents from taking limited action in defense of U.S. partner forces or even to advance Iraqi stability, if a president believed that doing so was in the national interest of the United States. While the issue continues to be hotly debated, recent presidents of both political parties have also argued that Article II of the Constitution gives them the independent constitutional authority to direct the use of military force in pursuit of various other U.S. national interests.
The main limitation to this Article II authority—acknowledged as a possibility in OLC opinions issued by presidential administrations of both parties—is that the "anticipated nature, scope, and duration" of any resulting use of military force must be limited, so that it falls below the threshold of a war requiring congressional authorization under the Constitution's Declare War Clause. Where exactly this threshold lies is unclear. No court has ever encountered the question, and the executive branch's analyses generally incorporate an inconsistent array of case-specific factors in ways that are designed to justify executive branch action more than subject it to meaningful scrutiny. Past presidents have pursued substantial armed conflicts on the basis of similar claims of authority; the Korean War often serves as the "high water mark" for this standard, if not an example of a case that may well have exceeded it. (Some observers have also suggested that this limitation might not apply in at least some cases of national self-defense, citing OLC opinions from shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks that do not acknowledge it.) Regardless, the contemporary understanding has generally been that Article II-based uses of force risk crossing this threshold where they involve "prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period," or where they pose a significant risk of escalating into such a conflict. In other words, while presidents can deploy the armed forces for a variety of purposes on their own authority, the one thing they cannot do without Congress is commit the United States to a major war.
This constitutional limitation on a president's ability to initiate major conflicts is in turn reinforced by the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which further requires that presidents not only report to Congress within 48 hours when they deploy U.S. armed forces into hostilities without congressional authorization but also end U.S. participation in those hostilities within 60 to 90 days if Congress does not authorize it after the fact. While past presidents have occasionally questioned the constitutionality of this withdrawal requirement, more recent administrations have seemed to acknowledge its likely validity. None to date have proved willing to ignore this requirement outright, though several have employed narrow interpretations of the term "hostilities" and other strategies for evading it.
The main effect of the 2002 Iraq AUMF—and other similar authorizations for the use of force—is that it provides an escape hatch from these limitations on major war, both constitutional and statutory. By relying on the statutory authorization provided by the 2002 AUMF, the executive branch could in theory pursue a conflict of any type or scale—and involving any risk of escalation—without being limited by the Declare War Clause or triggering the War Powers Resolution 60- to 90-day withdrawal requirement. The only limitations would be those that the executive branch recognizes as being imposed by the 2002 AUMF itself—namely, that it be intended to advance the stability of Iraq or protect U.S. or partner forces operating there and have some nexus to Iraq itself.
In other contexts, such limitations might be enough to constrain U.S. action and prevent further entanglement in a major conflict. But this is simply not the case with Iraq. Cultural, economic, and historical ties, as well as geographic proximity, closely link events in Iraq to its neighbor, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet Iran is also a major U.S. rival, as underscored by the recent "maximum pressure" sanctions campaign leveled against it by the Trump administration. In recent years, Iran has also pursued a broad campaign of interference in Iraq, including by undermining its governmental institutions and supporting various armed militias that have come to operate with relative impunity in much of the country. The same militias have also been involved in attacks on U.S. diplomatic and military personnel, the tempo of which has tended to reflect the state of broader U.S.-Iranian relations. Given these facts, it will not be hard for an executive branch intent on pursuing a major armed conflict with Iran to conclude that Iran threatens Iraqi stability or U.S. personnel located there and thus falls within the scope of the 2002 Iraq AUMF.
Indeed, the Trump administration may have already reached this conclusion. After all, the 2020 OLC opinion laying out the legal justification for the Soleimani strike—a heavily redacted version of which was secured via litigation in 2021—focuses on "Iran's past and present activities in Iraq" (emphasis added), not just those of Soleimani himself or the IRGC Quds Force he headed. Elsewhere, OLC's analysis similarly notes that the purpose of the strikes was to "deter Iran from conducting or supporting further attacks" and "degrade Iran's and [Quds Force]-backed militias' ability to conduct attacks, and end Iran's strategic escalation of attacks on U.S. interests" (emphasis added). The implication is that the Trump administration determined that the legitimate target of the strike was not limited to Soleimani or the Quds Force, but extended more broadly to Iran itself. Focusing on Soleimani and his support for militias in Iraq helped provide the Iraq nexus required by the 2002 AUMF, but numerous other Iranian targets within Iraq—and maybe some outside Iraq, if they had a different nexus to the country—might well have done the same. The 2020 joint resolution that a majority of the House and Senate later adopted that cast aspersions on the idea that the 2002 Iraq AUMF authorizes the use of force against Iran may make this conclusion harder to reach today, but it is hard to know for certain.
Of course, Iran isn't the only perceived threat that might trigger use of the 2002 AUMF. Since U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the country has also faced a major incursion by ISIL in 2014 and a brief-lived civil war with its autonomous Kurdish region in 2017, either of which could readily have been framed as a threat to Iraqi stability. So could many other more mundane, if still serious, threats to Iraq's national security.
Some observers who continue to favor U.S. support for Iraqi security and stability—as the author does—may see some advantage in keeping the 2002 Iraq AUMF on the books in order to maintain maximum flexibility in crafting future U.S. policy. But this misreads the dynamics surrounding U.S. military intervention in Iraq. The U.S. occupation of Iraq remains highly controversial among Iraqis and continues to trigger widespread opposition to U.S. military activities there. While the U.S. military continues to play a central role in combating ISIL and provides other forms of security assistance at the Iraqi government's request, these limited missions—neither of which rely on the 2002 Iraq AUMF for authorization—are all the Iraqi government seems willing and able to support. When the Trump administration pursued a broader campaign of airstrikes against Iran-backed militias in 2019 and 2020 without the Iraqi government's consent, the Iraqi parliament held a nonbinding vote to require a U.S. withdrawal. This in turn led the Iraqi government to pressure the Trump administration into negotiations to end the U.S. military presence there.
For the moment, the Biden administration appears to have satisfied these demands by symbolically ending the U.S. combat mission in Iraq in 2021, allowing other types of security cooperation to continue. But the most significant ongoing U.S. interests that require at least some military presence in Iraq—combating ISIL and strengthening the central government's official security sector—are still at risk of being undermined by Iraqi perceptions of U.S. military overreach. Repealing the 2002 Iraq AUMF may make clear that the United States has no intention of reoccupying Iraq or pursuing broader activities there, outside of combating ISIL. And it may help reinforce that the other limited military actions the United States does continue to pursue—including self-defense strikes against Iran-backed militias—are necessary and proportional responses to that will end when Iran and its agents can no longer threaten U.S. personnel.
Arguments that repeal of the 2002 Iraq AUMF will embolden Iran are not persuasive, either. The 2002 Iraq AUMF has not prevented Iran from acting provocatively in Iraq for the past 20 years, and it is unlikely to do so in the future. If anything, Iran often seeks to provoke the United States into military responses that it knows will undermine popular Iraqi support for U.S. cooperation. Repeal will weaken the narrative of American imposition that Iran often seeks to cultivate and reinforce through such provocations. By taking away a seeming blanket authorization to act against Iran for ambiguous activities in Iraq, repeal may also help make clear that the executive branch sees its ability to act militarily against Iran as correlating more strictly with the extent to which Iranian agents threaten U.S. personnel, providing a more directly linked incentive to refrain from such provocations. And if nothing else, repeal also provides assurances that, if the United States does at some point decide that broader military action against Iran is warranted, the executive branch will pursue it with Congress's express and specific support, not on such weak and controversial grounds as an antiquated authorization for a different war that ended more than a decade ago.
For better or worse, the trajectory of modern war powers has been towards greater executive branch authority. Self-aggrandizement by the executive branch has played a central role in this evolution, but so have congressional acquiescence and judicial abdication. The last clear redoubt of Congress's constitutional authority is over major wars, which even the executive branch acknowledges as requiring affirmative congressional consent under the Constitution. The 2002 Iraq AUMF in turn serves as a significant—and dangerous—carveout from this reservoir of authority. Through it, the executive branch views Congress as—effectively, if not intentionally—having provided its advance authorization to nearly any sort of armed conflict with a nexus to Iraq, a country cursed with a wide array of challenges, including a troubled relationship with a major U.S. rival. Political considerations have thus far discouraged recent presidents from relying solely on the 2002 Iraq AUMF for military action, to the point that its repeal would not compromise any ongoing military operations. But in weighing repeal, Congress must ask itself how confident it is that this will remain true moving forward—and how much of its own remaining authority over war and peace it is willing to wager.
The experience of the 2002 Iraq AUMF offers Congress many lessons about authorizing the use of military force. Open-ended and deferential language of the type used in the 2002 Iraq AUMF invites broad interpretations by the executive branch, in ways that Congress might not anticipate or intend. When Congress then appropriates funds for or enacts legislation relating to activities that rely on these broad interpretations, this may well be seen as implicitly ratifying those interpretations, even if this is not what Congress intends. And no federal court seems likely to step in and limit these interpretations unless Congress makes its institutional disagreement clear. But Congress may be able to set clearer limits by using narrower and more specific authorizing language when drafting AUMFs, making clear that appropriations and other framework legislation does not authorize activities not authorized elsewhere, and building sunsets into AUMFs that require periodic congressional review and reauthorization, among other measures.
But such proposals come too late for the 2002 Iraq AUMF. The diverse ways in which the executive branch has used the 2002 AUMF over the past 20 years—and Congress's interactions with them—have already left a historical gloss that dramatically expands its meaning in the eyes of the executive branch that interprets and applies it. This view has been reiterated across presidential administrations of both political parties, underscoring its durability. Nor do the federal courts seem inclined to constrain it, unless Congress does something to change the statutory status quo on which it is based.
Repeal is the most straightforward way for Congress to do this. A bipartisan majority of Congress has already voted once to limit military action against Iran under the 2002 Iraq AUMF, and assessments of votes in the current 117th Congress suggest that the Senate repeal proposal—which has been approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but has not received a floor vote like its companion legislation in the House—would have enough votes to pass, even over a potential filibuster. The only question is whether repeal can be incorporated into one of the remaining pieces of end-of-year omnibus legislation, or will be seen as warranting some of the limited floor time that this Congress has left to advance its remaining legislative agenda. Either way, what hangs in the balance is not a mere act of administrative housekeeping, but a dangerous exception to one of the few areas where Congress still has primary authority over matters of war and peace.
Iraq,
2002 AUMF,
Scott R. Anderson is a fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution and a Senior Fellow in the National Security Law Program at Columbia Law School. He previously served as an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State and as the legal advisor for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.
S_R_Anders
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Nintendo is to release some of its popular games on a rival manufacturer's console for the first time in decades.
Some of the company's older games from the discontinued Wii console will appear on the Nvidia Shield set-top box in China.
Historically, Nintendo has rarely licensed its original games and characters to rival console-makers.
The Japanese gaming giant does not currently sell its latest console, Nintendo Switch, in China.
The video games market in China was valued at $24bn (£18bn) in 2016.
However, most people play on PCs or mobile devices, despite China relaxing its rules on the sale of foreign consoles in 2014.
Among the Nintendo games being made available on the Nvidia Shield are The Legend of Zelda: Twilight Princess, first released in 2006, and New Super Mario Bros Wii, from 2009.
Nintendo has not previously released the games for consoles other than its own devices. However, it has experimented with mobile games such as Super Mario Run and Animal Crossing: Pocket Camp.
The Wii titles to be rereleased for the Nvidia Shield will have their graphics upgraded to high-definition and be streamed through Nvidia's Geforce Now platform.
"Nvidia has an established partnership with Nintendo through the supply of its Tegra X1 processor for use in the Switch console. This content deal is an extension of this relationship and offers benefits to both parties," said Piers Harding-Rolls, from technology consultancy IHS Markit.


Soon after this Cork fell to English Parliamentary forces and Cromwell himself entered Cork in 1649, we can assume that the Cathedral organ, as with all other church organs, was destroyed at the time. However there are several mentions of restoration work on an organ after 1674, and in 1710 a resolution was passed that a new instrument be ordered from one John Baptiste Cuvillie who worked in Dublin.
In 1735 the Mediaeval Cathedral was pulled down, and the Cuvillie organ was installed in the new, plain, classical Cathedral in 1739. Henry Leffler gives a specification of this organ in 1805 with the maker's name as Renatus Harris.
At this time the organ had 3 manuals: Great (12 stops), Choir, (5 stops), and Swell (4 stops). However by the early 19th century this was giving trouble and in 1816 a new organ was ordered from Flight and Robson: this organ had a relatively short life-span since in 1865 the classical cathedral was pulled down to make room for the present building.
found in the Cathedral archives.
Eventually the organ was built in the West Gallery by William Hill of London and was ready for the consecration of the new cathedral on St. Andrew's Day, 30th November, 1870.
It had 3 manuals and 40 stops with some form of pneumatic action (possibly Barker Lever) on the Great, and tracker for the rest.
The West Gallery position, while excellent for the organ itself, must have posed problems when the choir at the East End had to be accompanied. After continued controversy, Dean Madden proposed that the organ be moved and, to avoid obscuring the stained glass windows and mosaics, a large pit, 14 ft. deep, was dug in the North Transept. In 1889 the organ was moved into this chamber by the Cork firm T.W. Megahy so that only the tops of the tallest pipes were showing. He added three 'pneumatic machines' to the action and three new stops - though it is not entirely clear which these were.
The organ was enlarged in 1906 by Hele & Co. of Plymouth who added a fourth (Solo) manual. By this stage the action of the organ was pneumatic.
In 1965/66 J.W. Walker & Sons of London rebuilt the organ. They overhauled the sound-boards, installed a new console with electro-pneumatic action, and lowered the pitch to 'standard' C: 523./3. The organ now had 4 manuals, 56 stops, and 3012 pipes.
By 2010 it became clear to the Cathedral authorities that the organ was in need of serious repair. Following professional advice, it was decided to completely rebuild, redesign and augment the existing instrument.
For details of the newly rebuilt instrument click the link below.


A narrative approach to the analysis of letters?
Re: A narrative approach to the analysis of letters?
BNIM - do non-westerners have different concepts of 'narrative'? How might one proceed do 'adapt BNIM' appropriately?
Re: BNIM - do non-westerners have different concepts of 'narrative'? How might one proceed do 'adapt BNIM' appropriately?
BNIM Schutze's process structures - what are they?
Re: BNIM Schutze's process structures - what are they?
FW: BNIM - do non-westerners have different concepts of 'narrative'? How might one proceed do 'adapt BNIM' appropriately?
Research Committee "Biography and Society" at the XVII ISA World Congress. It takes place in Gothenburg (Sweden) July 11-17.2010.
Supported self-training in BNIM interviewing - free feedback offer!


This guide will provide step-by-step instructions on how to set up a mass deployment for the Desktop App using Munki. The instructions provided assume you have a working Munki server and properly configured clients, however you can achieve the same result using other mass deployment tools by creating the initial_setup.config file that is described under the Installation Settings - Customizing Defaults section.
If you have never used Munki before, we recommend testing the deployment of various types of .app and .pkg installations to familiarize yourself with the general deployment process. You can learn more on the project's website: https://github.com/munki/munki.
You must have the Munki Tools package installed on your machine to complete the steps in this section. The default settings gathered by the munkiimport utility should suffice. You may customize the default settings at your discretion; however, we recommend using a consistent name when importing packages so Munki can properly identify updates to our client. If you are new to munki, we recommend using the 'testing' catalog so you can test the deployment in a lab before pushing it out to all clients. For simplicity, examples in this guide will use the testing catalog.
You will need to edit an XML configuration information for the Desktop App package if you want to customize default settings and properly handle installation / removal of the package. On the Munki server, look in the pkgsinfo folder and open the configuration file for the Desktop App package (it is a .plist file if you used the default settings when importing the installer).
Upon first launch, the Desktop App looks for ~/Library/Application Support/Egnyte Connect/initial_setup.config in each user directory to initialize custom defaults. The following parameters can be optionally configured in the configuration file. If you do not use a parameter, the application will use the default setting from the regular installation. Note that this approach allows you to customize the app with tools other than Munki, as long as you ensure that the initial_setup.config file is placed in the correct location prior to the Desktop App running.
# Config text file format syntax.
Optional. User will be prompted for username during when drive first mounts.
Optional. User can go directly to the specified folder without having to traverse your Egnyte file structure.
No. Default will be No if not specified.
Yes, if isProxyEnabled is enabled.
Sample script: This will create and preconfigure a drive for all user accounts on a the target Mac.
chown $userName "/Users/$userName/Library/Application Support/Egnyte Connect"
chmod 755 "/Users/$userName/Library/Application Support/Egnyte Connect"
cp "/tmp/initial_setup.config" "/Users/$userName/Library/Application Support/Egnyte Connect/initial_setup.config"
Remember, if you want to test this now, make sure to save your changes and rebuild your catalogs using the makecatalogs utility.
As usual with Munki, you should import the new version of the Desktop App installer. The import utility should recognize the package and use the old installer as a template. If this is not working, make sure you are using the same name for the package as used before and ensure that the version numbers from the previous and updated installers are correct.
Removing the software involves running the Egnyte Connect Uninstaller.app that is located in ~/Library/Application Support/Egnyte Connect.
Make sure your pkgsinfo files include the following keys and settings.
If deploying to macOS High Sierra or Mojave, ensure you approve Egnyte's kernel extension.
Once installed, the end user will need to launch Egnyte Connect from the Applications folder to run it for the first time. They will be prompted to enter their username (if not specified) and password at this step.
You may want to share the training videos provided at the link below to your end users. Under Cloud Collaboration, they can play the Egnyte Connect Desktop App training video.


Q: I signed a contract to build a townhouse, with an estimated completion date of December 2009. I am a first time home buyer and would like to take advantage of the first-time buyer's tax credit for a new home purchased prior to December 1, 2009. Is it possible to close on the loan prior to 100 percent completion of the home and qualify for the tax credit? If so, what do I need to do?
A: The short answer to your query is, unfortunately, no. You cannot close on the loan separately from the property. The house is the collateral for the loan, so your lender wouldn't close without having anything to back up against the loan in case you default.
But you can purchase the home and close on the loan before the home is 100 percent completed. There is a catch, however. Most lenders won't close on their loans until the home is virtually complete.
This puts you in a Catch-22 situation: If your builder is close to completion, but not close enough for the lender to agree to your closing date, you could easily blow the December 1, 2009 deadline for receiving the $8,000 tax credit.
Finally, according to the IRS and several enrolled agents I consulted, you must close, be the owner of and have title to the new home by end-of-day on December 1, 2009.


Sometimes you may have difficulty logging in or connecting to games using your iDevice. If this happens, one possible solution may be to clear out your device's cookies and log in again. Luckily, this should be relatively simple to do. For steps on how to clear out this information, please click here.
Once the cookies have been cleared, restart your device. After this your Roblox cookies should be successfully removed.