text:
Exchange on Goetz and Taliaferro's Naturalism
Book Title:
Book Author:
Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro
A dialogue on Goetz and Taliaferro's "Naturalism".
Causal Closure Unjustifiable, Basic to Naturalism
Motivating Naturalism: Wanting Objectivity and Transparency
Begging the Question of Evidence
Intersubjective Empiricism and the Rational Basis for Naturalism
No Quarrel Between Science and Christianity
Objective vs. Subjective, Science vs. Christianity
Review of Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro's Naturalism
First Response from Goetz and Taliaferro
First Rejoinder from Clark
Second Response from Goetz and Taliaferro
Second Rejoinder from Clark
Third Response from Goetz and Taliaferro
Third Rejoinder from Clark
First response from Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro:
Dear Tom,
We recently read your review of our book entitled Naturalism and appreciate your thoughtful comments about it. Of course, we see things quite differently than you do. We would like to focus on one primary issue that we believe separates you (and other naturalists) from us. It is the matter of methodological commitment.
You state that it is "unfortunate that the methodological and epistemic commitments of naturalism, as contrasted with those of anti-naturalism, don't get more attention in this book, since it's these commitments that largely determine where these very different worldviews end up." We would like to point out, however, that Chapter 2 is entirely devoted to the naturalist's methodological commitment to the causal closure of the physical world. This commitment drives the naturalist's world view and leads naturalists to question and deny the reality of how things appear to ordinary human beings. You ask, "Why suppose that the apparent distinctness of the mental and physical necessarily reveals anything fundamental about their true nature?" Methodologically, this gets things backwards. Our question is this: Why suppose that the apparent distinction of the mental and physical does not reveal the true nature of things? Why not stick with "commonsensical appearances as guides to reality" unless we have a reason to doubt those appearances? As a methodological point, naturalists usually respond that we cannot stick with commonsensical appearances as guides to reality because of the methodological commitment to causal closure. In other words, naturalists do give a reason for not sticking with commonsensical appearances. What we have done is examine that argument and found it wanting. Hence, what we hoped naturalists like you would do is show us where our examination of the argument from causal closure goes wrong. This is precisely what you don't do in your review. Unless you can explain to us where our critique of the argument from causal closure goes wrong, we simply cannot find any reason to think that a person cannot embrace both science and the commonsensical appearances. Again, it is naturalists who say that the two cannot be simultaneously embraced and they invoke the causal closure argument to justify their assertion. We disagree, and have explained why we disagree.
Thus, as we see things, the causal closure argument is the pivotal point in the dispute between naturalists and non-naturalists. Until our response to it is addressed, there isn't much hope for progress in the debate. Hence, when you write that our argument for causal openness in the brain "assumes that reasons and purposeful behavior can't possibly be materially instantiated, that they can't find a sufficient substrate in neural mechanisms," we are led to respond that the burden is on you to give us a reason why we must think that they have to be materially instantiated or realized. Again, naturalists give an argument—the argument from causal closure, to which we have responded. The burden is not on us at the outset to explain why reasons and purposeful behavior cannot be materially instantiated. The burden is on naturalists to explain why they have to be materially instantiated, if they are to be taken as real. If the argument from causal closure doesn't work, and we have argued that it doesn't, then we await some other reason from members of your camp that would explain to us why reasons and purposeful behavior, if they are real, must be materially instantiated.
You quote Owen Flanagan's claim that causal closure is a justifiable regulative assumption in the mind sciences. We are very careful in pointing out the distinction between assuming casual closure in the context of scientific work and assuming causal closure universally. What we need to have from the naturalist is not a claim that causal closure is a justifiable regulative assumption in the context of scientific work (we agree with this), but an explanation for why any scientist who makes this regulative assumption must go on to assume universal causal closure. Once again, you provide no such explanation in your review. Instead, what you do is claim that assertion of causal interaction between a soul and mind has not been productive "because no researchable mechanism of their interaction has ever been produced." Our point is that success or failure in providing such a mechanism is neither here nor there when it comes to the scientific enterprise. Scientists can do their science without having to worry the least bit about whether or not the dualist can provide an explanation of how souls causally interact with bodies. What the dualist needs to do vis-à-vis science is make clear that the existence and causal activity of souls poses no problems to the practice of science. Those who claim that the existence of and causal activity of the soul does prove problematic for science typically justify their claim with the argument from causal closure. Hence, we hope that naturalists who read the book will point out to us where our critique of the causal closure argument goes wrong.
Several times, you make mention of the problem of causal interaction. You say that "The perennial difficulty with dualism . . . is that no transparent explanations seem forthcoming about such interaction." As we explained on p. 42, footnote 1, Kim (and if Kim isn't a naturalist, who is?) believes that causation is basically a generative or productive relation. We concur with Kim. So what ANY entity must have in order to be a causal agent is the power or capacity to generate or produce an effect in another entity. There is simply no reason to think that only material objects can have such a power. So what the dualist asks is, "What is the reason for believing that souls cannot have such a power and exercise it?." The standard naturalist answer is the argument from causal closure. Hence, one again, the explanation for why we devote Chapter 2 to that argument.
Finally, you say that "for a naturalist the best (and perhaps only) reason to believe in dualism, mental causation and libertarian free will would be if we had a clear, evidence-based picture (or even a plausible preliminary sketch) of the causal relations between soul and body." We shall make no attempt to deny what you say here. For you, this is presumably true. For us, we start with our first-person experience of the world and work from there. What we look for is a reason from the naturalist to doubt the integrity of that first-person experience. So far, we have not been convinced by the naturalist's argument from causal closure. Because we believe that argument fails, we cannot help but continue to trust our first-person experience as evidence. And we cannot help but trust that evidence while at the same time cheering on science as it seeks to do its work in curing diseases and providing for a better quality of life.
With gratitude and warmest wishes,
Stewart and Charles
First rejoinder to Goetz and Taliaferro:
The desire for objectivity and explanatory transparency motivates naturalism and militates against dualism and supernaturalism.
The argument against causal closure Objectivity Explanatory transparency
The epistemic rationale for causal closure Motivating naturalism
Dear Stewart and Charles,
Many thanks for your gracious response to my review of your book. Perhaps we can advance the debate in this exchange. I'll argue that the assumption of causal closure, the idea that "a scientific examination of bodily action leaves no explanatory room for anything non-physical" (p. 28), is methodologically sound. It's a defeasible assumption, not dogmatic. It's motivated by basic epistemic norms of objectivity and explanatory transparency that naturalists generally respect more than non-naturalists. Non-naturalists, I suggest, need to justify their epistemic laxity in appealing to mysterious dualistic mental causation. But first a bit about your argument against causal closure.
The argument against causal closure. You say in your book that the price for assuming causal closure is "absurdly high" (30) because it rules out any role for teleological purposes, consciousness, and libertarian (contra-causal) free will in explaining behavior. On your account these are ruled out by causal closure because they are mental phenomena in the sense of being categorically non-physical (immaterial). But there are viable accounts of purposes, beliefs, reasons and other causally effective mental states that don't invoke anything immaterial or contra-causal (see for example my review of Nancey Murphy and Warren Brown who are Christian physicalists). Further, it's possible that consciousness in the sense of qualitative, phenomenal experience (qualia) might be epiphenomenal.[1] So for the naturalist who assumes causal closure, mental states, understood for instance as physically instantiated information-bearing representational states, can play a role in explaining behavior even if it turns out that qualia are epiphenomenal (the jury is very much out on epiphenomenalism). Thus the assumption of causal closure leaves many of our intuitions about mental causation intact, while providing a productive framework for research into the mind. So the price for assuming it is reasonable, unless, of course, we insist that all folk metaphysical preconceptions about mind and behavior (what you call the "natural" view of ourselves) must be confirmed by philo-scientific investigation. Further reasons for accepting causal closure are set forth below.
Objectivity. When I said that I had hoped to see in your book more discussion of methodological and epistemic commitments, I was referring to differing stances on basic epistemic norms which end up driving our very different worldviews. For instance, we have conflicting opinions on the reliability of what you call elsewhere the "first person data" of how things subjectively seem to us in experience. You raise this issue in your response above: "Why suppose that the apparent distinction of the mental and physical does not reveal the true nature of things? Why not stick with 'commonsensical appearances as guides to reality', unless we have a reason to doubt those appearances?"
As I think you'd agree, in deciding what's objectively the case about the world we want to make sure that we filter out possibly distorting subjective perceptions and hopes about what's the case, otherwise we might end up deceived. The reason naturalists think we shouldn't stick with commonsensical appearances as guides to reality is not, as you say in your response, the assumption of causal closure, but that such appearances are notoriously prone to bias by wishful thinking and perceptual illusions. In particular, the subjective feeling that we possess a unitary non-physical soul might be a "user illusion" generated by the brain,[2] reinforced both by our desire for immortality and centuries of dualistic religious and pre-scientific teachings about the nature of persons. That millions (billions?) of people feel and believe they have souls isn't good evidence for the soul's existence, just as the fact that millions believe in paranormal powers and astrological influences isn't good evidence for those phenomena. To know that the soul objectively exists, we would need public, observational, intersubjective evidence, e.g., weighing a body just after death to see if it's slightly lighter due to the soul's departure (the fanciful basis for the film title "21 Grams"). Thus far there is no such evidence, indeed there's no observational specification for the soul that could guide the search for it.
Naturalists, by sticking with science in the pursuit of objectivity, are simply being more vigilant about insulating their beliefs from the influence of wishful thinking and other cognitive distortions than non-naturalists like yourselves, who admit non-scientific evidence as good grounds for belief. Naturalists want very much not to be deceived about the world, so we don't (or shouldn't) have a stake in any particular ontology; for instance we shouldn't dogmatically insist that only categorically material things exist.[3] Non-naturalists like yourselves, however, are committed to a particular ontology, one which includes supernatural God, the soul, and uncaused choices. This tends to bias theistic claims about what's real. I discuss this and other cognitional differences between naturalists and non-naturalists in more detail in a review of theologian John F. Haught's book God and the New Atheism and in some commentary on Austin Dacey's The Secular Conscience.
Explanatory transparency. Another epistemic value of central importance to naturalists, but less to anti-naturalists it seems, is explanatory transparency. As I pointed out in my review, you provide no account of how the soul accomplishes its work in guiding behavior via its influence on the brain. Its modes of operation are a complete mystery, yet you give it a pivotal role in explaining behavior. This is to posit an unexplained explainer whose function is to fill an explanatory gap, in this case the absence of a fully worked out naturalistic theory of intention and action. For the naturalist wanting explanatory transparency such a posit adds nothing to our understanding; it simply begs a whole set of questions about the nature of the soul and how its non-physical, supernaturally free mental powers have physical effects. For you, this shortcoming of the soul hypothesis doesn't count against it, whereas for naturalists it's a complete disqualification. Faced with an explanatory gap, we cheerfully admit our ignorance: we don't yet have a complete, transparent naturalistic understanding of mind and behavior. By contrast, you are happy to insert the explanatorily opaque soul and its mysterious free will.
The epistemic rationale for causal closure. There are thus two big strikes against the soul from the naturalist's perspective: the failure to respect the basic epistemic norms of intersubjective evidence (in service to maximizing objectivity) and transparent explanation (in service to knowing how things work). These norms help motivate the methodological assumption of causal closure in the philosophy of mind. The reason that the immaterial powers of the soul, or any other categorically non-physical entity, are justifiably ignored when explaining mind and behavior is that there is no good evidence for the soul's existence (see Objectivity above) and no explanation of how its immaterial powers influence the body (see Explanatory transparency above). The assumption of causal closure is simply a methodologically conservative and efficient stance in the absence of any evidence for, or explanatory advantage of hypothesizing a categorically immaterial realm or entity, and a fortiori any supernatural realm or entity. Were there any evidence or explanatory advantage, the scientist would seize upon it instantly, but there isn't. So she doesn't waste time on unobservable and unspecifiable non-physical/physical interactions, which is to say she operates under the defeasible assumption of causal closure. Defeasible, because we can't rule out the existence of the mental as a categorically separate domain; indeed a few scientists and philosophers still hold out hope for it (see note 3). The assumption of causal closure in the philosophy of mind therefore isn't dogmatic, but epistemically responsible and methodologically sound, given the goals of objectivity and transparency.
Motivating naturalism. You say "What we need to have from the naturalist is not a claim that causal closure is a justifiable regulative assumption in the context of scientific work (we agree with this), but an explanation for why any scientist who makes this regulative assumption must go on to assume universal causal closure." By universal causal closure you mean "that the relevant brain (neural) states can only be causally produced by events of other physical entities and not instead by mental events of immaterial souls alone when they choose and intend (plan) to act for purposes" (35, original emphasis). No one, of course, must go on to assume this, but if you want reliable beliefs about what's real and transparent explanations of phenomena, then it's rational to operate on this defeasible assumption, as opposed to believing in the existence of categorically immaterial and/or supernatural entities (God and the soul) for which there is currently no intersubjective evidence and which provide no explanatory gain.
Anyone wanting an objective view of things must filter out her preconceptions, wishes and cognitive illusions. Science does this best by far, and if we stick with it as our epistemology, science necessarily unifies our view of what exists into a single, natural realm, what we call nature (a realm that might, naturalists admit, possibly contain categorically non-physical entities according to some specification, even though there's currently no good evidence for this). Anyone wanting transparent explanations won't abide unexplained explainers, especially those that patently speak to her fondest hopes, such as God, the soul and libertarian free will. The upshot is that the desire for objectivity and transparency motivates naturalism and militates against dualism and supernaturalism.
Now, if you don't primarily want objectivity and transparency, but are more interested in defending a preconceived ontology, then by all means open yourself up to non-scientific ways of knowing [4] – put stock in subjective appearances, intuitions and revelations, and posit whatever immaterial and supernatural entities and forces you like. After all, the epistemic standards that motivate causal closure as a defeasible assumption are no longer controlling, in which case anything is possible: gods, souls, angels, demons, paranormal powers - whatever unchecked intuition and revelation can dream up.
You say on p. 37 that
…the actualization of a microparticles's capacity by a mental event on an occasion when a person chooses to act for a reason is not excluded by anything that is discovered in a scientific study of that capacity. And it is precisely on occasions like those involving the movements of our fingers and arms while typing that the neuroscientist will reasonably believe that the micro-physical neural impulses that led to those finger movements must ultimately have originated with the mental causal activity of a soul that was choosing to act for a purpose.
The naturalist agrees that science can't categorically exclude immaterial God, souls, free will and mental causes, that is, it can't categorically rule out their existence, but disagrees that there are scientific, empirical, intersubjective grounds for reasonably believing that they exist. Any neuroscientist or lay person who believes they exist does so on the basis of non-scientific, non-empirical, subjective claims to knowledge, claims that are unreliable routes to objectivity and that do little or nothing to explain the workings of the world. It seems to me that for these reasons it's difficult to defend dualistic, supernatural theism as an objective and explanatory worldview. Of course you won't agree with this assessment, so I welcome your thoughts on why theism should be considered objective and explanatory, or why there might be other good reasons to embrace it that naturalists have overlooked.
With all best wishes,
[1] Jaegwon Kim espouses qualia epiphenomenalism in his latest book on physicalism, and see here about epiphenomenalism generally.
[2] In his book Being No One, Thomas Metzinger argues that our sense of being a unitary self is a representational construction of the brain that makes us adaptively egoistic in our dealings with the world.
[3] For instance philosopher David Chalmers champions what he calls "naturalistic dualism" in his book The Conscious Mind, see p. 128 ff.
[4] In his book God and the New Atheism, theologian John F. Haught says we must assume "a posture of receptivity and readiness" in order to find God in personal revelation, pp. 46-47, discussed here.
Second response from Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro:
Many thanks for your response letter of August 21, 2008. With the hope that we are making some progress in trying to understand each other's positions, we offer the following thoughts about what you say in your August 21 letter.
In response to our critique of and position on the causal closure argument, you state that "there are viable accounts of purposes, beliefs, reasons and other causally effective mental states that don't invoke anything immaterial or contra-causal. . . . So for the naturalist who assumes causal closure, mental states, understood for instance as physically instantiated information-bearing representational states, can play a role in explaining behavior even if it turns out that qualia are epiphenomenal . . . Thus the assumption of causal closure leaves many of our intuitions about mental causation intact, while providing a productive framework for research into the mind."
We will not question your assertion that the assumption of causal closure leaves intact some intuitions about the mind, e.g., that qualia are real (which, by the way, seems to us to be an implicit acceptance of first-person data). However, we are confident that naturalist accounts of purposeful explanation supplant purposeful explanation with causal explanation. In short, such accounts eliminate teleological explanation.
Moreover, we never claimed that the naturalist could not employ the causal closure principle and try to retain certain elements of our intuitions about the mind. The question at issue is whether retaining a robust conception of the mind as a soul that makes libertarian choices for purposes in some way or other undermines the framework and practice of science. What naturalists argue is that retaining this robust conception of the mind does undermine science because of the causal closure principle. Again, we are looking for an explanation of where our critique of the causal closure principle goes wrong.
You proceed to assert the following: "[I]n deciding what's objectively the case about the world we want to make sure that we filter out possibly distorting subjective perceptions and hopes about what's the case, otherwise we might end up deceived. The reason naturalists think we shouldn't stick with commonsensical appearances as guides to reality is not . . . the assumption of causal closure, but that such appearances are notoriously prone to bias by wishful thinking and perceptual idiosyncrasies. . . . That millions (billions?) of people feel and believe they have souls isn't good evidence for the soul's existence, just as the fact that millions believe in paranormal powers and astrological influences isn't good evidence for those phenomena. To know that the soul objectively exists, we would need public, observational, intersubjective evidence . . . ."
Here (and at other points in your response), it seems to us that you have fundamentally begged the question against us. The issue is what counts as evidence, and you will only allow "scientific, empirical, intersubjective grounds" to count. You will only allow these grounds for evidence because you are a naturalist. We are not. Hence, what we need from naturalists is an argument for why naturalism is true. Again, the standard argument is the argument from causal closure to which we have authored our response in our book. At this point, you say "the reason naturalists think that we shouldn't stick with commonsensical appearances as guides to reality is not the assumption of causal closure, but that such appearances are notoriously prone to bias by wishful thinking."
Commonsensical appearances, such as that we think, hope, believe, and experience pain and pleasure, are not a product of bias and wishful thinking. The claim that they are is simply outlandish. Similarly, the commonsensical appearances that we are souls that make libertarian choices for purposes are not the product of bias or wishful thinking. As we see things, our debate with you (the naturalist) is not helped by such charges. After all, we could simply turn the tables and assert that your rejection of the soul, libertarian free will, ultimate and irreducible teleological explanation, and God are the product of bias and wishful thinking (assuming the naturalist admits the reality of thinking and, thereby, the possibility of bias). In his book, The Last Word, the well-known naturalist Thomas Nagel is honest about his bias and wishful thinking: "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that." Fair enough. But if we are going to try to reason with each other about these matters, shouldn't we leave our hopes and fears out of it? That is what we are trying to do, and as best as we have been able to determine the argument from causal closure plays the pivotal role in the naturalist's argument against the commonsensical view and for naturalism. That is why we keep returning to it and asking for an explanation of where our critique of the argument from causal closure is mistaken.
At different points in your response letter, you suggest that we posit the existence of the soul, libertarian free will, etc. In discussing our position about the soul, you write "This is to posit an unexplained explainer whose function is to fill an explanatory gap." We respectfully beg to differ. We never said that we posit the existence of the soul to fill an explanatory gap. Rather, we argued that there must be an explanatory gap in the physical world, given the existence of the soul and its choices to act. We are first convinced that the soul exists and makes libertarian choices for purposes and then go on to explain to our readers that the soul's existence and causal activity implies that there must be a gap in the physical explanatory story. We are not first convinced that there is a gap and then posit the soul with its explanatory power to fill that gap. At this juncture, you might point out that our response assumes that first-person appearances are reliable. Well, as we just pointed out, we see no reason to question them, unless one is already a naturalist. But all we ask of you is this: assume for the sake of argument that a soul with its explanatory power exists. Is there any reason to think that there cannot be a gap in the physical world into which this soul might insert its causal influence? Naturalists regularly respond that there cannot be such a gap because of the argument from causal closure. Need we say more at this point?
You, however, raise another issue: dualists cannot explain "how its [the soul's] immaterial powers influence the body." It is not clear to us what constitutes an explanation for you. As we explained in our book, a common and reasonable way of understanding the nature of ultimate physical entities is to regard them as essentially having causal powers and capacities. We believe that souls are also reasonably understood as entities with essential causal powers and capacities. Given this ontology and the starting point that souls make choices to act for reasons, it follows (as we have already stated above) that the physical world must be open the causal influence of souls. What we need to be committed to (in terms of our dispute with naturalists) is making sure that there are no problems created for science by this picture of the world. We can find none (as we have repeatedly stated in referring to our critique of the causal closure argument). You seem to believe that if we can't say more than this then dualism is completely disqualified. Well, it might be for you. It isn't for us because we cannot see how (and here we are repeating ourselves) dualism undermines the framework and practice of science.
We will stop here. We affirm once again our total support for the practice of science and enthusiastically cheer for those who devote countless hours in their labs working to discover the cures for diseases that will improve our quality of life.
Thanks so much for engaging in this informative exchange.
Second rejoinder to Goetz and Taliaferro:
To justify its claims to objectivity, a worldview must hew to intersubjective empiricism. Naturalism does, Christian dualistic theism and other varieties of supernaturalism do not.
Naturalizing teleology Subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity Meeting the insulation requirement Doubting causal gaps Dualism, science and naturalism The intersubjectivity requirement
Many thanks for your latest reply. Given this back and forth, I think we can now form a pretty clear picture of the differences between us. I'll cover them more or less in order of appearance in your last installment, then close with a brief addendum on the issue that most divides us: what counts as reliable evidence.
Naturalizing, not eliminating, purposeful behavior and mental states
You say "we are confident that naturalist accounts of purposeful explanation supplant purposeful explanation with causal explanation. In short, such accounts eliminate teleological explanation." I am equally confident that completely natural, physical, soulless beings can and do have purposes, and that causal explanations don't compete with or eliminate higher level teleological explanations described in terms of having mental states such as wanting, believing, hoping, etc. We legitimately attribute purposes to animals, perhaps even some complex machines (interesting question!), and other conceivable beings, artificial and natural, on the basis of their design and behavior. Agents don't need anything immaterial or contra-causal to have goals and therefore to act purposefully, whether consciously or (perhaps) unconsciously. Of course, if you define purposeful behavior as requiring an immaterial soul that transcends causal explanation, then there are no purposes in nature. But if it turned out we didn't have souls (an empirical question), it seems to me we'd still have purposes, just as do other (soulless) animals, so such a definition seems untenable, if indeed you hold it.
As I suggested in a previous response (see here), there's no contradiction between being caused, material beings and having efficacious reasons, since reasons only cause behavior via the neural networks that instantiate them. Without a material instantiation, our reasons – our representations to ourselves of our motives, beliefs and circumstances – couldn't have effects on the world. And the fact that our reasons themselves are causally determined doesn't deprive them of causal power. Again, see Murphy and Brown's Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? for a non-reductive physicalist account of how reasons "get a grip on the brain" such that strictly physical creatures like us can and do act purposefully. More generally, ascriptions of mental states play a legitimate, higher level role in explaining behavior even if causal closure holds, since mental states, for instance construed as representational states, need not involve anything immaterial (even if it seems they do from a first person perspective, about which see the next section).
Subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity: the rational basis for naturalism
You say: "The issue is what counts as evidence, and you will only allow 'scientific, empirical, intersubjective grounds' to count. You will only allow these grounds for evidence because you are a naturalist. We are not. Hence, what we need from naturalists is an argument for why naturalism is true. Again, the standard argument is the argument from causal closure to which we have authored our response in our book."
Our differing notions of what counts as good evidence is, I think, the main disagreement between us. The reason I stick with scientific, empirical, intersubjective evidence isn't because I'm a naturalist, but because I want the most reliable grounds for belief about what's real, and I stick with those grounds for deciding all factual questions. The argument for naturalism is essentially epistemological, not from causal closure. Causal closure, as I argued earlier, is a defeasible methodological assumption which has its basis in desires for objectivity and explanatory transparency. Here's the argument I'd make for the rational acceptability of naturalism and, by contrast, the irrationality of theism.
Surveying the various grounds for belief, it seems clear that that what might be called open intersubjective empiricism, exemplified by science, is the most reliable means for reducing the influence of subjective bias, wishful thinking, superstition, unfounded tradition, arbitrary authority, and other distorting influences on belief. If you want an objective view of things – and worldviews normally claim objectivity (see here and here) – you should insulate your beliefs from these influences as much as possible (which is why I call this the insulation requirement). Here is where we differ, since theists such as yourselves believe non-empirical, subjective intuitions about god, the soul and free will – first person data, as you call them – are reliable, undistorted reflections of reality. Naturalists think such intuitions often get reality wrong precisely because they are subjective: notoriously prone to personal and historical bias and without independent observational support.
Crucially, the judgment that intersubjective empiricism is a more reliable route to objectivity than intuition, revelation, tradition and authority is based on our everyday experience of the world, so it's a worldview neutral judgment, made independently of and prior to naturalism. If I want to know how things work, and if I want to reliably predict events and outcomes in service to my purposes, it's uncontroversially rational for me to stick with science and less exalted forms of intersubjective empiricism (asking my neighbor where to find good deals on Sony PlayStations); I don't trust my observationally uncorroborated intuitions. Now, you say that first person data are reliable reflections of reality when it comes to the soul and free will: "…we see no reason to question them, unless one is already a naturalist." But there are good, worldview neutral reasons to question them. Anyone not already wedded to dualist Christianity would want to know on what basis you have such confidence in subjective deliverances, when they are so often manifestly wrong (e.g., alien abduction, efficacy of anonymous prayer). They justifiably and rationally would want observational proof to back up your intuitions about the soul and free will, however commonsensical and natural they might seem to you. After all, your intuitions differ radically from those of some other religious denominations and those of non-believers. To depart from intersubjective empiricism when deciding matters of fact, especially such fundamental matters as the existence of the soul and free will, seems to me epistemically irresponsible and thus in need of further justification. This justification is what I'd be most interested in hearing from theists such as yourselves. Without it, naturalism – based in taking intersubjective empiricism as one's epistemology for all matters of fact – is clearly the rational choice among worldviews claiming objectivity.
Meeting the insulation requirement: naturalism vs. Christianity
You say "Commonsensical appearances, such as that we think, hope, believe, and experience pain and pleasure, are not a product of bias and wishful thinking. The claim that they are is simply outlandish. Similarly, the commonsensical appearances that we are souls that make libertarian choices for purposes are not the product of bias or wishful thinking." I didn't claim, outlandishly (or if I did, I withdraw the claim), that it's only wishful thinking to suppose we think, hope, believe, and experience pain and pleasure; we obviously experience and do all these things. Nor did I claim that it's wishful thinking to suppose many people have the experience or appearance of being souls who make purposeful libertarian choices; they obviously do have such experiences. Rather, I claim that what's likely wishful thinking is to suppose that the subjective experience of having a libertarian immortal soul – a very real appearance – corresponds to objective reality.
I absolutely agree, as you say, that "if we are going to try to reason with each other about these matters, …we [should] leave our hopes and fears out of it." Leaving hopes and fears behind when reasoning and deciding about reality - meeting the insulation requirement - is exactly the mission of science, which along with critical thinking and philosophy is the epistemic basis for naturalism. But it isn't the mission of Christianity, which has historically catered to humankind's fondest hopes – for immortality, a personal god, reunion with loved ones in the hereafter, and an ultimately meaningful universe with us at its center. When it comes to putting aside human hopes in service to objectivity and explanation, science simply has no competition, and when it comes to putting them first for their own sake, Christianity exactly fills the bill, which makes it patently suspect as an objective take on reality. Again, this judgment is simply based on what one observes about science and Christianity, so it's worldview neutral, not a judgment based in a commitment to naturalism.
Doubting causal gaps: no evidence for an entity that could exploit them
You say "We are first convinced that the soul exists and makes libertarian choices for purposes and then go on to explain to our readers that the soul's existence and causal activity implies that there must be a gap in the physical explanatory story. We are not first convinced that there is a gap and then posit the soul with its explanatory power to fill that gap…. Is there any reason to think that there cannot be a gap in the physical world into which this soul might insert its causal influence? Naturalists regularly respond that there cannot be such a gap because of the argument from causal closure."
Naturalists respond, or should respond, not on the basis of the argument from causal closure, but on the basis that there's no good, reliable (that is, intersubjective) evidence for something that could exploit such a gap. It's the lack of evidence for anything immaterial or contra-causal, plus the explanatory opacity of dualistic proposals, that motivates causal closure as a defeasible methodological assumption. Scientists don't and shouldn't waste time hypothesizing an obscure explanatory role for immaterial entities for which there is no observational basis. Should good, intersubjective evidence of the soul come to light, confirming your subjective intuition that it exists, then of course they would drop causal closure like a hot potato. So again (and we at least agree on this) the issue boils down to our divergent notions of what's reliable evidence. I think there are good, worldview neutral reasons to suppose intersubjective empiricism, exemplified by science, is a far more reliable reflection of objective reality in all its dimensions than first person data. When it comes to the soul, free will, God, and other fundamental matters of existence and human nature, you think the reverse, and I'm of course curious to know why.
You say that "…as best as we have been able to determine, the argument from causal closure plays the pivotal role in the naturalist's argument against the commonsensical view and for naturalism." I don't think this is correct. Rather, as suggested above and reiterated below, the basic argument for naturalism is epistemological: wanting reliable beliefs about reality and transparent explanations, some folks make a rational cognitive commitment to intersubjective empiricism, which in turn generates for them a unified, non-dualist ontology: the phenomena of the natural world, with no supernatural realm above it. This makes them naturalists.
Dualism, science and naturalism
You write: "What we need to be committed to (in terms of our dispute with naturalists) is making sure that there are no problems created for science by this picture of the world. We can find none (as we have repeatedly stated in referring to our critique of the causal closure argument). You seem to believe that if we can't say more than this then dualism is completely disqualified. Well, it might be for you. It isn't for us because we cannot see how…dualism undermines the framework and practice of science."
I agree that science has no argument with dualism, and that dualism doesn't threaten science. As you know, and as noted in a previous installment, there are naturalistic dualists such as David Chalmers who think there are reasons to suppose there might well be two sorts of categorically different things in nature, mental and physical. Dualism is only disqualified (for the moment, and here I differ with Chalmers) since as far as I can tell there isn't much going for it empirically and it has no explanatory contribution to make. So it doesn't do much to meet desires for objectivity (that is, for intersubjective empirical support) and explanatory transparency, the main epistemic goals of naturalists. If naturalists tend to be non-dualists, that's because philo-scientific investigation thus far tends to unify our understanding of what exists into a single reality, what we call nature. Should there ever be good evidential grounds for dividing reality into the categorically non-physical vs. the categorically physical, or the categorically natural vs. the categorically supernatural (these dualisms are of course strongly linked in your worldview, since God and the supernatural soul are non-physical), then I'll join you in your dualism. Until then, for me, an ultimately undivided nature is what there is good grounds to believe exists, and it's enough, more than enough.
Wrapping up: the intersubjective requirement for objectivity
As noted several times above, the primary difference between us is epistemic. You believe first person data, independent of publicly observable data, are reliable indicators of what's objectively the case about reality. When it comes to the existence of god, the soul and free will, you reject what I've called the public object requirement: that evidence outside personal experience is required to validate that experience as veridical. You believe that with respect to these phenomena, subjectivity is a direct route to objectivity. But of course the very notion of objectivity is in contrast to subjectivity. We commonsensically and uncontroversially know that subjective takes on the world can be, and often are, biased, incomplete, distorted and variable. Gaining objectivity is precisely to call subjectivity into question, to check its deliverances against public, intersubjective data. No matter how many individuals might agree about the existence of the soul, or god, or free will based on personal experience, they could all be wrong absent such validation. Objective facts, as opposed to hunches, intuitions, and faith, are just those claims about reality that pass the test of intersubjective empirical confirmation. When building a picture of reality – a worldview that aims for objectivity – it seems cognitively irresponsible and irrational to suppose that certain intuitions, however strong and natural they might seem, are exempt from this test. This is especially the case when deciding the big factual questions about the fundamental structure of existence, the origins of life and the cosmos, and human nature and human agency. Theism, dualism and supernaturalism, to the extent that they are based in non-empirical claims about reality, cannot make good their pretensions to objectivity.
You will strongly contest this charge, claiming that certain first person data – intuitions about god, the soul and free will which point to dualism and supernaturalism – are reliable guides to reality in the absence of external confirmation. But naturalists want to know why. In asking this question we aren't being harsh or unreasonable, only asking that theists and supernaturalists justify their evasion of what seem to us basic epistemic standards when it comes to formulating a worldview. If there are alternative standards that ground reliable cognition, we want to know about them.
I don't expect this debate to be resolved any time soon, if ever, given the variability in human nature and culture. Some folks are raised to believe in god, some aren't. Some are driven by the need for existential security, some by the desire for explanatory transparency. If we strongly identify with our beliefs, it's difficult to admit we might be wrong and change our minds (I am no exception). But all this makes for some very interesting conversation, and I'm glad we share the live-and-let-live cultural space in which to have it. In closing, I can only say I look forward to its continuation.
Third response from Goetz and Taliaferro:
Once again, we thank you for this informative exchange of letters. We will comment on and respond to various points in your letter of October 5, 2008.
We begin by saying that it is good to know that you agree with us that "science has no argument with dualism, and that dualism doesn't threaten science." This is significant because other naturalists disagree with the three of us about this issue. We focused on the causal closure argument in our book (Naturalism) because many naturalists argue that the role of causal closure in science makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a reasonable scientist to be a dualist who believes in libertarian free will and irreducible teleological explanation.
Your position is that while there is no quarrel between dualism and science, there is nevertheless no good reason to be a dualist who believes in libertarian free will (and, by implication, irreducible teleological explanation). At the heart of your argument for naturalism is epistemology, not causal closure. Before we address your position, we want to clarify once again that we do not argue that scientists do and should spend their time hypothesizing an explanatory role for immaterial entities for which there is no observational basis (the need for this clarification arises out of your claim that "Scientists don't and shouldn't waste time hypothesizing an obscure explanatory role for immaterial entities for which there is no observational basis"). As we stressed in Chapter 2 of our book, there is no reason for scientists who study the physical world in order to discover how physical entities interact with each other to hypothesize an explanatory role for immaterial entities.
What, then, about epistemology? You espouse a commitment to intersubjective empiricism, which stems from a desire for reliable beliefs about reality and transparent explanations. You state "that evidence outside personal experience is required to validate" experiences of the soul and free will (you call this the "public object requirement"). To bolster your claim, you maintain that "If I want to know how things work, and if I want to reliably predict events and outcomes in service to my purposes, it's uncontroversially rational for me to stick with science and less exalted forms of intersubjective empiricism (asking my neighbor where to find good deals on Sony PlayStations); I don't trust my observationally uncorroborated intuitions."
Were we interested in good deals on Sony PlayStations we too would consult with our neighbors who have expertise in purchasing them. But if we are interested in knowing whether or not we are experiencing pain or pleasure, thinking about naturalism, fearing a collapse in the economy, hoping for a rebound in the stock market, we do not check with our neighbors, spouses, philosophers, scientists, or anyone else. We regard our first-person awareness as sufficient for knowing these things. In other words, for those things that matter most to us (our pleasures, pains, hopes, fears, thoughts), our first-person experience is our source of information. And this first-person experience is non-empirical in nature. If an implication of intersubjective empiricism is that we simply cannot know whether we are experiencing pleasure, pain, hopes, fears, etc., without empirical evidence from science or our neighbors, then so much the worse for intersubjective empiricism. We claim in our September 15, 2008 letter that it is simply outlandish to maintain that our belief that we think, hope, believe, experience pain and pleasure is a product of bias and wishful thinking. You respond that "we obviously experience and do all these things." It is obvious. The relevant question here, however, is how do we know that we experience and do these things? Our position is that we know these things through non-empirical, first-person awareness of ourselves. At this point it is important to remember that brain science could not even get off the ground without acknowledging the first-person point of view. Brain science depends upon establishing correlations between brain events and mental/experiential events, and the source of the latter are the reports of subjects that are grounded in their non-empirical awareness of their own mental lives.
Throughout your correspondence with us, you stress the distinction between subjective and objective ways of knowing and claim that the latter is the superior (or the only way) of knowing. Your distinction seems to us to map nicely onto our distinction between first-person and third-person ways of knowing. We prefer our terminology because we think the subjective-objective terminology is often a source of confusion between epistemology and ontology. In our view of things, something known (epistemology) from the first-person point of view (subjectively, in your terminology) is just as objectively real (ontology) as something known (epistemology) from the third-person point of view (objectively, in your terminology). Because this is the case, the first-person point of view is just as much a source of what you term "world-view neutral reasons" as the third-person point of view. And let us be honest here: intersubjective empiricism is not the epistemologically world-view neutral position that you claim it is. It is a philosophically non-neutral point of view, and one that flies in the face of how human beings actually know certain objective facts, such as that they are experiencing pain, experiencing pleasure, thinking, hoping, fearing, desiring, etc.
What, then, about the existence of the soul and libertarian free will (and irreducible teleological explanation)? Well, if we can know from the first-person point of view that we experience pain and pleasure, and have hopes and fears, etc., why can't we also know from that point of view that we are souls that make libertarian free choices for irreducible purposes? Why draw the line at pains and pleasures, hopes and fears, etc., and say that while these are knowable from the first-person point of view, the soul and libertarian free will are not? You say that our "intuitions [about the soul and free will] differ radically from those of some other religious denominations and those of non-believers." Undoubtedly they do differ from the beliefs of naturalistic non-believers. It is our contention, however, that belief in the soul and libertarian free will is found wherever human beings breathe air. It is true that many individuals in what are historically thought of as more eastern traditions (e.g., Buddhism, Hinduism) deny the existence of the individual soul (as opposed, say, to the world soul), but it is important to emphasize that they admit that it seems to us that the soul exists and makes libertarian free choices. Like naturalists, though for different reasons, they claim that what seems to be the case with regard to the soul and our freedom is illusory. What one must do is examine their arguments for this claim to see if they are convincing. But once again, let us be honest here: if anyone's position differs radically from that of typical human beings it is that of the intersubjective empiricist, a person who denies the existence of the soul, libertarian free will, and irreducible teleological explanation.
Finally, we turn to your comments about the epistemic basis for naturalism versus Christianity. You agree with our comment in our September 15, 2008 letter that "if we are going to try to reason with each other about these matters, . . . we [should] leave our hopes and fears out of it." You then go on to state that the mission of science does leave out our hopes and fears when reasoning about reality and that this mission, along with critical thinking and philosophy, is the epistemic basis of naturalism. "But it isn't the mission of Christianity, which has historically catered to humankind's fondest hopes – for immortality, a personal god, reunion with loved ones in the hereafter, and an ultimately meaningful universe with us at its center. When it comes to putting aside human hopes in service to objectivity and explanation, science simply has no competition."
We started off this letter by citing your acknowledgement that there is no competition between science and dualism and that dualism does not threaten science. We also believe that there is no competition between science and Christianity, in part because we believe that Christianity at its core assumes dualism, libertarian free will, and irreducible teleological explanation. We also generally agree with your comment that science leaves aside our hopes and fears when reasoning about reality. This is because, as we stated in the third paragraph of this letter, it is concerned with understanding the physical world and how physical objects causally affect each other. But when it comes to explaining why science tries to understand the physical world, we believe that reference to human hopes and fears is ineliminable. Humans desire health. They also fear disease and hope for cures of it. It is because of these epistemologically first-person data that science exists. If science is anything it is surely an enterprise that is seeking the causes of and cures for much of the human suffering in this world. (One might point out that science also exists because of humankind's desire to know and understand the world. Our point is that this desire is precisely that: a desire. And like other desires it is directly knowable through non-empirical, first-person awareness of ourselves.
If science, however, finds the ultimate explanation for its existence in human hopes, fears, and desires, then Christianity shouldn't be suspect just because it finds its ultimate explanation in human hopes, fears, and desires. As you state, Christianity caters to the hope for immortality. But what is wrong with that? Science caters to the hope for cures for disease. We desire immortality because we have a desire for a kind of perfect happiness that can be shared with others but is not found in this world. Is someone who acknowledges such a desire and yearns for its fulfillment epistemologically inferior or suspect? It is hard to see why. And, yes, we believe that God exists and created us for the purpose of experiencing this kind of happiness. Again, we can find no reason to think that possession of this desire for perfect happiness and the hope for its fulfillment makes us epistemologically deficient, any more than possession by scientists of the desire and hope for the cure of diseases makes them epistemologically deficient.
You might concede that while the existence of science arises out of human hopes, fears, and desires, the intersubjective empiricist method employed by science is superior to any other method in excluding those psychological events or states from influencing our efforts to understand the universe in which we live. We are not convinced of its superiority. It seems to us that our exchange of views with you in these letters is perfectly good evidence for the falsity of the view that human hopes, fears, and desires automatically undermine the quality of thought about topics like the soul, free will, the nature of explanation, and God's existence. Are there people who allow their passions to overrule their reason when it comes to thinking about the soul, free will, etc? Certainly there are. But there are also scientists who allow their passions to overrule their reason when it comes to carrying out experimental work, recording data, etc. And just as it is possible to discover the influence of passions in the latter case and correct for it, so also it is possible to discover the influence of passions in the former case and correct for it (again, exchanges like these between the three of us suppress passions and elevate reason).
In conclusion, we reiterate the point with which we began this letter and with which you agree: there is no conflict between science and dualism, libertarian free will, irreducible teleological explanation, and (we now add) the existence of God. Indeed, we believe that science itself ultimately finds the explanation for its existence in human beings who are the subjects of an experiential life that is most directly knowable from the subjective or first-person point of view. This experiential life is as ontologically objective as the physical world studied by science. Indeed, without this experiential life, science wouldn't even exist. That is as much an objective fact as any objective fact discovered by science. And we cannot believe naturalism precisely because it denies these facts.
With all good wishes,
Third rejoinder from Clark:
Many thanks for your letter of October 31. Since the start of this exchange the major issue between us has been the epistemic status of what you call the "first-person data" of subjective experience. Most of what I say below concerns this and the related issue of whether and how science and Christianity are in competition. You say:
"If an implication of intersubjective empiricism is that we simply cannot know whether we are experiencing pleasure, pain, hopes, fears, etc., without empirical evidence from science or our neighbors, then so much the worse for intersubjective empiricism."
I'm not sure why you think intersubjective empiricism might deny the reality of subjective, first-person experience; it doesn't and I never suggested it did. It only says that subjective experience alone can't be trusted as a reliable indicator of how things objectively are. We need external validation via public objects to back up factual claims about the world outside our heads; this is intersubjective empiricism.
"In our view of things, something known (epistemology) from the first-person point of view (subjectively, in your terminology) is just as objectively real (ontology) as something known (epistemology) from the third-person point of view (objectively, in your terminology)."
Again, I'm not denying the reality of subjective experience, and naturalists need not and generally do not deny it. The fascinating philo-scientific question is how to explain subjective experience, aptly called the "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness.
"…if we can know from the first-person point of view that we experience pain and pleasure, and have hopes and fears, etc., why can't we also know from that point of view that we are souls that make libertarian free choices for irreducible purposes? Why draw the line at pains and pleasures, hopes and fears, etc., and say that while these are knowable from the first-person point of view, the soul and libertarian free will are not?"
Here's why, and it's the crucial, central point which you don't seem to recognize. Although we have non-inferential knowledge that we undergo experiences – pains and pleasures, hopes and fears, etc. – such experiences aren't necessarily accurate reflections of facts about the world outside the head. No naturalist would dream of denying that many people might have the vivid impression that they exist as a disembodied soul with libertarian free will, but what they do deny is that this impression is necessarily veridical. The (very real) experience of being a soul is one thing, whether it accurately models reality is another. This commonsense distinction between how things appear and how they really are drives intersubjective empiricism: we need confirmation via observation of public objects in order to know that our subjective intuitions and impressions aren't mistaken about how things are objectively. To collapse this distinction, as you seem to be doing in the case of intuitions about the supernatural, is to court deception.
"…if anyone's position differs radically from that of typical human beings it is that of the intersubjective empiricist, a person who denies the existence of the soul, libertarian free will, and irreducible teleological explanation."
Yes, intersubjective empiricism takes us far from commonsense in some cases, but that doesn't count against it. Over the last millennium, the view of typical human beings on many matters has been overturned and replaced with a scientific understanding. This is likely to continue as new facts come to light via public observation, experiment, etc.
"We started off this letter by citing your acknowledgement that there is no competition between science and dualism and that dualism does not threaten science. We also believe that there is no competition between science and Christianity, in part because we believe that Christianity at its core assumes dualism, libertarian free will, and irreducible teleological explanation."
There's no competition between science and dualism because dualism, as I suggested earlier in this exchange, is a possible (although not currently likely) conclusion science might reach on the basis of intersubjective evidence. But science competes with Christianity because both make differing factual claims about reality (e.g., about the existence of god, the soul, and free will) based on differing epistemologies and because Christianity has ontological commitments. If as you say Christianity assumes dualism, libertarian free will, etc. (Christian physicalists such as Nancey Murphy disagree with you about this), such an assumption is epistemically unwarranted from a scientific standpoint because science requires intersubjective evidence to support factual claims.
Science, unlike Christianity, makes no basic ontological commitments since it aims at clear explanations backed up by intersubjective evidence, wherever that leads us. Christianity, unlike science, doesn't rely strictly on intersubjective evidence, but instead claims there are other ways of securing reliable knowledge about reality. As I've argued in this exchange and most recently in Reality and its rivals, this claim is unfounded: there really isn't a good alternative to intersubjective empiricism if one is interested in reliably representing reality. Christianity purports to be objective, but its modes of knowing don't pass epistemic muster. So again, it competes with science (and comes up short, if one is interested in reliable knowledge and clear explanations) both in its conclusions about the world and how it reaches those conclusions.
"Science caters to the hope for cures for disease. We desire immortality because we have a desire for a kind of perfect happiness that can be shared with others but is not found in this world. Is someone who acknowledges such a desire and yearns for its fulfillment epistemologically inferior or suspect? It is hard to see why."
I think it's easy to see why. The desire to cure disease prompts us to gather accurate information about how the world works, for instance how viruses mutate. On the other hand, the desire for god and immortality can, and often does, bias our perceptions and cognitions. We might take the religious experience of God's presence as a true indicator of his existence because we strongly hope we will join him happily in the hereafter. Not to rigorously insulate such a conclusion about reality from the possible influence of such bias, and not to test that conclusion using public evidence, makes it epistemologically suspect.
"In conclusion, we reiterate the point with which we began this letter and with which you agree: there is no conflict between science and dualism, libertarian free will, irreducible teleological explanation, and (we now add) the existence of God."
You've moved from saying I agree there's no intrinsic conflict between science and the possibility of dualism (true), to saying that I agree there's no intrinsic conflict between science and asserting the existence of the supernatural, e.g., the soul, libertarian free will, irreducible teleological explanation, God, etc. (false). As mentioned above, intersubjective evidence might conceivably come to light supporting some sort of dualism, such that our best theories countenance two (or more) categorically different sorts of phenomena. But that would still be a naturalistic theory by virtue of being science-based. Science can't get us to the supernatural, since what it shows to (reliably) exist is what we call nature. It naturalizes what it shows to exist. To demonstrate the existence of the supernatural, you'd have to show that non-empirical, religious modes of knowing reliably establish the existence of something beyond nature. But that's exactly what hasn't been shown. These modes of knowing compete with science in purporting to be its rivals in representing reality and by coming to different conclusions about the existence of the supernatural (and, according to creationists and IDers, about how things happen in the natural world as well). But in this competition they fail to meet basic, worldview neutral standards of epistemic adequacy, which is how we judge competing ways of knowing. So if we want to get an objective view of things, we should avoid them.
"This experiential life is as ontologically objective as the physical world studied by science. Indeed, without this experiential life, science wouldn't even exist. That is as much an objective fact as any objective fact discovered by science. And we cannot believe naturalism precisely because it denies these facts."
I'll simply repeat what I said above and earlier in these exchanges: that naturalism doesn't deny the reality of our experiential lives, only that they are necessarily accurate models of the world outside our heads. Pointing this out, however, won't make you more likely to believe naturalism because of your antecedent commitment to a supernatural ontology.
Given that in this latest exchange we've simply reiterated our basic disagreements, I think we can draw things to a close. It seems to me you trespass against a basic epistemological caution in not recognizing that first-person experience about the soul, free will, etc. might be mistaken as the basis for factual claims about reality, and thus needs intersubjective validation. You would likely observe this caution with respect to all factual claims except when it comes to theological claims about the supernatural, and I don't see any good reason for carving out this exception. On the other hand, you think naturalists trespass against the natural view of ourselves by not according first person data the epistemic priority they deserve. As much as I've tried to cast doubt on this priority by pointing out the notorious fallibility of subjective intuitions, you stick with your guns. So be it. At least we have a clear view of our differences, which can remain safely unresolved in an open society that tolerates (sometimes even celebrates!) differences in worldviews. Many thanks for your tenacity and good will.
Best wishes always,
Resources > Book Reviews > Exchange On Goetz and Taliaferros Naturalism


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The upcoming episode of MBC's "We Got Married" will be showing BTOB's Yook Sungjae and Red Velvet's Joy going on a very special date.
On the last broadcast, Joy revealed that she did not have her ears pierced when Sungjae gifted her with a pair of earrings at their first meeting. During their second meeting, the on-screen couple visited a skincare clinic after the Red Velvet member worked up the courage and decided to finally get her ears pierced.
However, when she actually stepped into the clinic to go through with her decision, Joy was unable to hide her nervous state. Seeing this, Sungjae promised that he would be by her side to provide support.
While the BTOB member tried his best to distract Joy from her nerves by telling a funny story, nothing seemed to work. Finally, after staring at her for a bit, it is said that Sungjae offered his hand and told his on-screen wife, "Hold my hand." Although Joy hesitated at first due to the unexpected gesture, she ultimately took his hand and the two successfully had their very first hand-holding experience!


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chauvinism, economy, elections, history, politics, strategy, unions
Do You Have Some Ideas on What to Do?
On the day after the election, small groups of demonstrators hit the streets in a number of American cities. I just got a request that I join a call for a general strike — a national work stoppage — on Inaugural Day. I call this kind of non-thinking acting-out "knee jerk activism." It's more traditionally called "ultra-leftism" and has been correctly labeled, "the infantile disorder."
We had a tremendous general strike in 1877
Union activists are used to hearing people call "strike!" when they have no idea whether or not the tactic would work. A lot of them don't care. If a union called a strike every time some hothead wanted one, we'd get a lot of people fired for nothing. When my union ran a successful 15-month "work to rule" contract fight, there were people calling "strike" instead of doing the hard work of a long struggle. The three of them that I knew personally were all promoted to foreman immediately after the union won. They were company stooges, as it turned out. The company knew that the union might win the long battle, but we would almost certainly have lost a strike.
If you're reading along in Facebook, you've seen lots of responses to the Trump election victory, and nearly all of them are way less than helpful. Some are silly, and some are outright dangerous!
First, Figure Out What Happened
Nearly all the pollsters were wrong about the election results. The best single explanation I've seen was in a "letter to editor" in today's Dallas newspaper. A guy named, I think, Roland Young wrote that when the pollsters called, "We lied!" Some of Trump's voters may have been too ashamed to confess.
But the best explanation of the pollsters' failure is that their approaches are based on previous history, and the 2016 presidential race was, to state it modestly, unique.
Are Americans Mostly Chauvinists?
Elections are the best evidence we have of the national character. If the Electoral College puts Donald Trump in office, does that mean we're mostly chauvinists like him? Actually, more than half the electorate voted against him, and only 56% of all eligible voters went to the polls at all. The ones that went voted for marijuana and higher minimum wages by much better margins than they voted for Trump.
Everyone who voted for Trump did not do so because they wanted to express their chauvinism. They surely didn't vote for him because they think his far-flung ideas are actually going to solve America's problems.
What They Wanted Was Change
I think it is fair to say that they voted for change. We see this in the unions all the time. Members who haven't taken the time to investigate the candidates in union elections will nevertheless vote to "throw the bums out" against whoever is in office. Next election, you can't find anyone who admits they voted for the incumbents and it's "throw the bums out" again. After a lifetime in the public eye, and because of the outright duplicity of the national Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton was a perfect target for that kind of sentiment.
People voted for Trump over Clinton for the same reason that they had voted, in 2008, for Obama over Clinton. Change.
People voted for Donald Trump because they are dissatisfied with life in America and they don't know what else to do about it.
I don't exactly blame them. I'm dissatisfied too, but I know what to do about it.
Educate and Organize the Working People
Media pundits are blaming "white blue-collar workers" for electing Donald Trump. His voters were probably Anglos all right, but they didn't represent the working class. The working class is the solution, not the problem. The progressive leadership of the AFL-CIO is head and shoulders above any Democratic or Republican Party politician. For now, it's better to follow them than Bernie Sanders, too.
If we're willing to do the long hard work of educating and organizing America's workers, we could win elections. We could win strikes, even general strikes!
But it will take some work.
Click here if you want to know what I really think!
general strike
knee-jerk activism
ultraleftism

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


James has been operating and constructing ropes courses for over twenty years.
When he isn't in the office designing the courses he can be found on site leading the projects. Outside work James enjoys climbing and mountain biking.
John has been with JM Adventure for five years and a project manager for three years.
Before working for JM, John worked in outdoor education using the ropes courses he now builds.
Stef started managing projects at JM Adventure in 2011 and has been with JM since 2008.
Stef also comes from an outdoor education background and has used ropes courses for many years.
Adam started with JM Adventure in 2012. Previous operational roles in other industries has given him a great deal of experience in project planning and management, Heath and Safety and client liaison.


text:
News: Vaccine Can Prevent Bad Cholesterol from Accumulating in Blood Vessels, Potentially Prevent Heart Attacks
Heart disease is the leading cause of death of men and women in the US. Over half a million Americans die from it annually. Atherosclerosis — a build up of plaque in the arteries — is a common feature of heart disease and can be caused by smoking, fats and cholesterol in the blood, diabetes, and high blood pressure.
While not all heart attacks are caused by atherosclerosis, but halting plaque build up can help prevent some types of heart disease — specifically heart attacks that kill heart muscle by depriving it of oxygen. And now, a research team from Austria and The Netherlands have developed an anti-cholesterol vaccine that might help combat plaque. Mice with heart disease treated with the vaccine produced antibodies to cholesterol that lowered their blood levels of it and reduced plaque in their arteries.
The results show promising potential for lowering heart disease in humans. Study researcher Christine Landlinger from AFFiRis (the company that developed the vaccine) and her co-authors published the study in the May 2017 issue of the European Heart Journal.
Don't Miss: If You're Getting Shingles Flare-Ups Under 40, Get Your Heart Checked
The Fats We Don't See Can Hurt Us
Our liver makes cholesterol. The rest comes from food. Cholesterol circulates in our blood in a protein-fat complex called lipoprotein. Cholesterol is a vital part of the body, but too much of it causes problems.
Multiple types of lipoproteins circulate in our blood. Low-density lipoprotein or LDL is known as the 'bad cholesterol' because it distributes cholesterol throughout the body. High-density lipoprotein or HDL helps remove cholesterol from the bloodstream and is called 'good' cholesterol. High HDL can protect against heart disease, and an excess of LDL can cause plaques — accumulations of fat, cholesterol, calcium, and other substances — to develop along arterial walls.
Plaque build-up narrows arteries and slows blood flow through them. If blood cells stick to the plaque and form a clot, or part of the plaque breaks off, it can get stuck in a blood vessel, stop blood flow, and cause a heart attack or stroke.
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Drugs called statins can help reduce LDL cholesterol, but they have to be taken every day and can have some serious side effects. They also haven't been shown to have a significant effect on plaque reduction. Our body has some natural processes to help remove bad cholesterol from the blood, but they're not well understood.
We do know that an enzyme called Proprotein convertase subtilisin/kexin type 9 (PCSK9, for short) plays a role in keeping bad LDL cholesterol in the blood (a good thing if you're looking to have a heart attack, but a bad thing for sustaining life). Researchers have previously developed antibodies against PCSK9 (the antibodies latch onto the enzyme and turn off its activity) and turned them into a medication approved by the FDA to fight plaque buildup. Injections of these antibodies lower LDL 40-70%, but their effect doesn't last long, and they are costly. A vaccine that works by getting the body to produce its antibodies to PCSK9 has the potential to provide a longer lasting reduction of LDL cholesterol.
The new research study tested such a vaccine in mice with heart disease.
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The New Vaccine
AT04A is a vaccine against PCSK9 created by AFFiRis in Vienna, Austria. To test its effects in mice, researchers first fed the animals a high-fat diet to develop high cholesterol and atherosclerosis. They then injected the vaccine under the skin and studied its effects for 18 weeks.
(1) This image shows a cross section of aortic blood vessel a control mouse (which didn't get the vaccine) with a high amount of plaque. (2) This image shows a cross section of a mouse aortic blood vessel in a mouse immunized with AT04A, which has little or no plaque. Images via The Netherlands Organisation of Applied Scientific Research (1, 2)
Over 18 weeks, the total amount of cholesterol in the blood of vaccinated mice decreased by 53%, and the atherosclerotic lesions in their blood vessels decreased by 64%. Antibodies to PCSK9 developed in their blood and were still present at high levels at the end of the study. The unvaccinated mice fed high-fat diet didn't see these improvements.
If these findings translate successfully into humans, this could mean that, as the induced antibodies persist for months after a vaccination, we could develop a long-lasting therapy that, after the first vaccination, just needs an annual booster. This would result in an effective and more convenient treatment for patients, as well as higher patient compliance.
— Dr Günther Staffler, AFFiRis
A phase I clinical study is underway at the Medical University of Vienna, Austria, assessing the safety and activity of AT04A in humans. The researchers are expected to complete the study in September 2017. If the vaccine proves to be safe in humans, it can move to phase 2 and three clinical trials where the researchers will evaluate it in many more participants for its ability to reduce LDL and to monitor for any side effects.
One potential side effect, expressed in a paywalled editorial by other scientists, is that other drugs like statins can increase diabetes, so tests of the new vaccine need to monitor participants for similar effects. They did say, however, that the benefits of lowering LDL cholesterol outweigh the risks of developing diabetes from either statins or the vaccine.
A vaccine to reduce LDL cholesterol could significantly reduce a major contributor to heart disease and cause of death. Future studies on AT04 may show that vaccine can accomplish that in humans.
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Based on their own point of view, journalists of Carbuyer ranked the most beautiful cars on sale in the modern car market. Indeed, operation costs, specifications or reliability can be assessed by a simple logical data analysis. But as for the beauty, the assessment is individual.
The Jaguar F-Type is ranked the first (pictured above). It's hard to argue here. The sympathy of British journalists to British brand model can be fully understood.
We're somewhat embarrassed by presence of the Twingo in this ranking. However, the British experts found it stylish and more attractive than the Smart ForFour. The Renault Twingo is one of the most popular city cars in Europe.
When compiling the ranking, not just the exterior, but also the interior design and individuality were taken into account.


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Dumpsters are available* in Cerro.
Most Cerro dumpster rental companies will take care of securing this permit for you if you rent from them. Make sure that if you're planning to put the dumpster on the street, the company has made the appropriate arrangements. You should also ensure that you get the permit in a timely manner and at the correct cost. If you thought the dumpster company was getting a permit and they did not, you will be the one who will have to pay the fine that is issued by the authorities.
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Roll away from dumpsters are measured by the volume of cubic yards price of waste they can store inside, normally accessible in 10,20,35 and 40 yard products. These kind of dumpsters will likely be restricted not just by the amount of real debris they can hold, yet by the weight involved too. With in particular heavy components like concrete floor, containers should only be filled around half way, otherwise transporting them gets to be problematic.
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Market sectors utilize trash rental services to get rid of their throw away on completion of their manufacturing process utilizing the responsibility pertaining to environmental problems. industries typically requires large sized Dumpster to get rid of their throw away without they will harming the earth. The industrial throw away also includes building waste and that is result of building work in advance for different initiatives.
You can select the company near your place pertaining to convenience and also avoiding substantial hidden prices that the firm may cost for going. These companies obtain the trash from the place and also dispose a similar or recycling it.
After choosing the sizing, the next step are going to be to verify using the renter how much weight can be allowed within the container. It is very important to choose the appropriate weight limit, because if the particular contents meet or exceed the amount specified an additional cost is usually added in to the rental price.
Dumpsters are available in different sizes and choosing the best one is important for the reason that bigger dumpster you select, the more it'll cost. If you are conducting a house improving or property expansion venture, then you will have got to deal with many waste, that may require a dumpster sized 30-40 cubic feet. Selecting the best dumpster size not just determines the money necessary for these services, just about all determines how effectively you'll be able to move the particular waste from the property.
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Rent any dumpster services usually charge with different basic cost and every day fee. It will be possible to keep costs down by only purchasing units for any very distinct time frame, although that can from time to time make factors difficult for initiatives that over work. Most depots offer a long term lower price, so be sure to check while booking your own unit.
Lease Duration: Just how long do you need the particular dumpster for? Dumpsters may be rented through the month as well as on a long term basis (commonly with a 12-month deal). Keep in mind that if you keep a short term roll-off longer than the particular previously decided lease period, there can be more charges of your average $15-$50 every day.
When a enterprise or owner of a house decides on the size of dumpster that their house requires, they then need to start off evaluating rental organizations. The main thing which separates rental firms that may seem similar is their support. The person leasing the dumpster needs to know whether they would like your entire dumpster to be eliminated and a an alternative one put in it's place just about every pick up, or when the dumpster they have got will be emptied into a truck and put back as an alternative.
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A few projects like construction, home renovation and commercial disposal makes trash discretion inevitable. Leaving this rubbish for the typical disposal service providers will load the surroundings with the polluted surroundings. You have to take necessary actions against the piled up trash before it advances its relation to the environment. Trying to recycle the trash inside eco-friendly manner is among the effective procedures.
The process of collecting bin or dumpster also depends upon company to company. A few can provide an individual locked receptacles which are while filled are usually carried away by simply service provider. The actual bins are usually collected and brought in existence of you to enable you to have a look.
When you find yourself all done, though, you then be able to experience the good thing of dumpster rentals: professional rubbish removal. After you've done everything of upgrading or cleaning up your property, you can sit back and allow your local useless haul advantages handle the dumpster and take everything apart. A project isn't actually done before cleanup is all taken care of. After you rent a dumpster, you will be automatically caring for your cleanup upfront.
Reliability! If you would like delivery Some sort of.S.Some sort of.P, it'll be delivered Some sort of.S.Some sort of.P. If your disposal business can not suit your needs in a timely fashion they are honest or more front as to why they can't.
A lot of people look at renting some sort of dumpster as an expense. This can't be denied, simply because it costs money to borrow a dumpster from the company. On the other hand, people not often consider the personal savings that employing a dumpster can provide. Corporations often make use of them, because dumpsters are the most efficient approach to throw out a considerable quantity of waste. Yet, some sort of dumpster can also alleviate the strain while on an individual's budget. Here are three ways dumpsters save men and women money whenever they accept large projects.


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Ritchie Valens
La Bamba (Single Version)
Come On Lets Go
Ritchie Valens - The Ultimate Jukebox Generation Collection
Ritchie Valens Plus Ritchie Plus 8 Bonus Tracks
The Very Best of Ritchie Valens
Ritchie Valens - Vintage Cafè
Golden Star Collection
The Ox and the Frog
Those Draftin' Blues
Rockabilly Mania
Stars Legacy (Good Rockin' Tonight)
Melissa Violinista
Les Chaussettes Noires
and 157 other albums
About Ritchie Valens
Blowing open the doors for Latino rockers coming out of East L.A. in the late '50s, the legendary Ritchie Valens had a sharp, crisp sound that helped to define rock 'n' roll in its teething days. The classic sound of his twangy guitar and strong, swinging backbeats were created from a unique infusion of Latin into Rockabilly. Mark Murrmann
Bobby Fuller Four, Chris Montez, Eddie Cochran, Johnny Burnette, Los Lobos, Rick Nelson
'50s Rock 'n' Roll
Blowing open the doors for Latino rockers coming out of East L.A. in the late '50s, the legendary Ritchie Valens had a sharp, crisp sound that helped to define rock 'n' roll in its teething days. The classic sound of his twangy guitar and strong, swinging backbeats were created from a unique infusion of Latin into Rockabilly.
Electronica/Dance
Revolver Hits
Rock and Roll Party
The Tokens - In Concert at Little Darlin's Rock...
The Tokens
Arrows in the Gale