The present invention relates to a secure component for protecting data in a storage entity and a method at the secure component of protecting data in the storage entity. Further, the present invention relates to a secure domain manager for securely associating a communicating party with a storage domain and a method at the secure domain manager of securely associating the communicating party with the storage domain. Moreover, the present invention relates to a trusted third party for verifying correctness of a launch package created by a secure domain manager to securely associate a communicating party with a storage domain and a method at the trusted third party to verify correctness of the launch package created by the secure domain manager to securely associate the communicating party with the storage domain.
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This application is a 35 U.S.C. .sctn. 371 National Phase Entry Application from PCT/SE2013/051299, filed Nov. 6, 2013, and designating the United States, which claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/822,488, filed May 13, 2013. The contents of both applications are incorporated by reference.
1. A method performed by a trusted platform (TP), comprising: transmitting to a trusted third party (TTP) information comprising a storage domain identifier identifying a particular storage domain; after transmitting the information to the TTP, receiving, from the TTP, a session domain key (SDa) for the storage domain identified by the storage domain identifier; obtaining, from a communicating party, a first request to store data in a storage entity of the particular storage domain identified by the storage domain identifier, wherein the storage entity is one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; generating a second request for a cryptographic key associated with the storage entity of the storage domain; encrypting the second request for the cryptographic key to protect confidentiality and authenticity of the second request, wherein the second request is encrypted using the session domain key (SDa) received from the TTP; sending, to the TTP, the encrypted second request; receiving, from the TTP, a message comprising an encrypted version of the cryptographic key; after receiving the encrypted cryptographic key, decrypting the received encrypted cryptographic key; associating the obtained cryptographic key with the storage domain and the communicating party; and encrypting the data with the cryptographic key and storing the encrypted data in said storage entity.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the session domain key (SDa) is generated by the TTP, the step of receiving the SDa from the TTP comprises receiving an encrypted message transmitted by the TPP, wherein the TTP generated the encrypted message using a public key belonging to the TP, the encrypted message comprises the SDa and the storage domain identifier (SDI), and the method further comprises the TP decrypting the encrypted message using a private key belonging to the TP.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the information transmitted to the TTP further comprises an encrypted nonce (Nvmmc) that was generated using a public key belonging to the TTP, and the encrypted message further comprises the none (Nvmmc).
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic key is generated by the TPP using a master key and a nonce, and the message received from the TPP further comprises i) an encrypted token, wherein the token comprises said nonce, and ii) an encrypted message authentication code (MAC) for authenticating the token.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the encrypted token and the encrypted MAC were encrypted using the session domain key of the storage domain.
6. The method of claim 5, further comprising the steps of: decrypting the encrypted token and the MAC; and associating the token and the MAC with the storage domain and the communicating party.
7. The method of claim 6, further comprising: receiving, from the communicating party, a third request to read the encrypted data; determining that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache; as a result of determining that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache, sending, to the trusted third party, a request message comprising the token and the MAC; and receiving, from the trusted third party, the cryptographic key.
8. The method of claim 1, further comprising: receiving, from the communicating party, a third request to read the encrypted data in said one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; fetching, from a local cache, the cryptographic key; and decrypting the encrypted data with the cryptographic key.
9. The method of claim 1, further comprising: receiving, from the communicating party, a third request to store new data in said one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; fetching, from a local cache, cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities; and encrypting the new data with the cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities and storing the encrypted new data in said one of a plurality of storage entities.
10. The method of claim 9, further comprising: receiving, from the communicating party, a third request to store new data in said one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; determining that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache; as a result of determining that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache, sending, to the trusted third party, a request message comprising the token and the MAC; receiving, from the trusted third party, the cryptographic key; and encrypting the new data with the cryptographic key.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein the communicating party is a virtual machine running on a trusted platform.
12. The method of claim 1, further comprising: sending a storage entity identifier to the communicating party to be used for identifying a storage entity associated with said storage entity identifier.
13. A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer readable medium storing a computer program comprising computer-executable instructions for causing a device to perform the steps recited in claim 1.
14. The method of claim 1, further comprising: prior to transmitting to the trusted third party (TTP) the information comprising the storage domain identifier, receiving a data structure (C) generated by a virtual machine management client (VMMC), the data structure comprising a launch message (M) comprising the storage domain identifier (DID) and an assertion (AS) that the VMMC is authorized to issue virtual machines (VMs) for the storage domain identified by the storage domain identifier.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein receiving, from the TTP, the session domain key (SDa) comprises: receiving an encrypted version of SDa, wherein the encrypted version of SDa was created using a public key associated with the trusted platform (TP) and decrypting the encrypted version of SDa using a private key belonging to the TP, thereby receiving SDa.
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the TP transmits the information comprising the storage domain identifier to the TPP in response to receiving the data structure.
17. The method of claim 16, wherein the information transmitted to the TTP further comprises the assertion (AS).
18. The method of claim 16, wherein the information transmitted to the TTP further comprises: i) a certificate issued from a trusted authority, wherein the certificate certifies a public key belonging to the VMMC, and ii) a signature generated using a private key belonging to the VMMC and the entire launch message.
19. A secure component for protecting data in a storage entity comprising: a processor and a memory, said memory containing instructions executable by said processor, wherein said secure component is operative to: transmit to trusted third party (TTP) information comprising a storage domain identifier identifying a particular storage domain; after transmitting the information to the TTP, receive, from the TTP, a session domain key (SDa) for the storage domain identified by the storage domain identifier; obtain, from a communicating party, a first request to store data in a storage entity of the particular storage domain identified by the storage domain identifier, wherein the storage entity is one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; generate a second request for a cryptographic key associated with the storage entity of the storage domain; encrypt the second request for the cryptographic key to protect confidentiality and authenticity of the second request, wherein the second request is encrypted using the session domain key received from the TTP; send, to the TTP, the encrypted second request; receive, from the TTP, a message comprising an encrypted version of the cryptographic key; after receiving the encrypted cryptographic key, decrypting the received encrypted cryptographic key; associating the obtained cryptographic key with the storage domain and the communicating party, and encrypting the data with the cryptographic key and storing the encrypted data in said storage entity.
20. The secure component of claim 19, wherein, the session domain key (SDa) is generated by the TTP, receiving the SDa from the TTP comprises receiving an encrypted message transmitted by the TPP, wherein the TTP generated the encrypted message using a public key belonging to the TP, the encrypted message comprises the SDa and the storage domain identifier (SDI), and the secure component (SC) is configured to decrypt the encrypted message using a private key belonging to the SC.
21. The secure component of claim 20, wherein the information transmitted to the TTP further comprises an encrypted nonce (Nvmmc) that was generated using a public key belonging to the TTP, and the encrypted message further comprises the none (Nvmmc).
22. The secure component of claim 21, wherein the cryptographic key is generated by the TPP using a master key and a nonce, and the message received from the TPP further comprises i) an encrypted token, wherein the token comprises said nonce, and ii) an encrypted message authentication code (MAC) for authenticating the token.
23. The secure component of claim 22, wherein the encrypted token and the encrypted MAC were encrypted using the session domain key of the storage domain.
24. The secure component of claim 23, further being operative to: decrypt the encrypted token and the MAC; associate the token and the MAC with the storage domain and the communicating party.
25. The secure component of claim 19, further being operative to: receive, from the communicating party, a third request to read the encrypted data in said one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; fetch, from a local cache, the cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities; and decrypt the encrypted data with the cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities.
26. The secure component of claim 25, further being operative to: receive, from the communicating party, a third request to read the encrypted data; determine that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache; as a result of determining that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache, send, to the trusted third party, a request message comprising the token and the MAC; and receive, from the trusted third party, the cryptographic key.
27. The secure component of claim 19, further being operative to: receive, from the communicating party, a third request to store new data in said one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; fetch, from a local cache, the cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities; and encrypt the new data with the cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities and storing the encrypted new data in said one of a plurality of storage entities.
28. The secure component of claim 27, further being operative to: receive, from the communicating party, a third request to store new data in said one of a plurality of storage entities of the storage domain; determine that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache; as a result of determining that the cryptographic key is not stored in a local cache, send, to the trusted third party, a request message comprising the token and the MAC; receive, from the trusted third party, the cryptographic key; and encrypt the new data with the cryptographic key.
29. The secure component of claim 19, wherein the communicating party is a virtual machine running on a trusted platform.
30. The secure component of claim 19, further being operative to: send a storage entity identifier to the communicating party to be used for identifying a storage entity associated with said storage entity identifier.
The present invention relates to a secure component for protecting data in a storage entity and a method at the secure component of protecting data in the storage entity. Further, the present invention relates to a secure domain manager for securely associating a communicating party with a storage domain and a method at the secure domain manager of securely associating the communicating party with the storage domain. Moreover, the present invention relates to a trusted third party for verifying correctness of a launch package created by a secure domain manager to securely associate a communicating party with a storage domain and a method at the trusted third party to verify correctness of the launch package created by the secure domain manager to securely associate the communicating party with the storage domain. The present invention relates further to corresponding computer programs and computer program products.
During recent years there has been a strong move in the marketplace towards the use of virtualization technologies. Among other capabilities, virtualization allows one to run unmodified legacy operating systems and applications on new hardware platforms using Virtual Machines (VMs). This is realized through on-the-fly translation from one hardware instruction set to another with the assistance of a so-called hypervisor or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). The VMM type considered here runs in the most privileged mode of a system and has full control over all vital system resources. A VMM-based system not only allows instruction translation but also, more importantly, increased system utilization as multiple VMs can run simultaneously on a single powerful hardware platform, opening for new business models and a new business landscape. This implies, for example, that existing services rather easily can be migrated into large and dynamic computing clusters, what often is referred to as "the cloud".
The cloud model where the customer is allowed to run a complete VM, including operating system, is often referred to as the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).
The new flexibility however has a price: increased security risks. Previously, physically isolated software systems might now run in VMs on the same physical node as other, completely unrelated, VMs. This allows for new types of attacks between VMs running simultaneously on the same hardware. Also, the VMM becomes a target for new types of attacks. Once the VMM is compromised the whole system is compromised. Furthermore, persistent data that was previously stored locally on a physical machine or within protected network boundaries in a central database, must now be available to a VM running in a potentially hostile network. Hence, there must be means to protect stored data and make sure that plaintext data only is exposed to VMs which are authorized to have access to it.
A large amount of academic and industry research has been carried out in the area of IaaS or "cloud" storage security.
For example, the prior art cryptographic storage system CloudProof allows read/write access that achieves integrity, confidentiality, fork-consistency and freshness, along with capabilities to provide proofs of data tampering. Kamara et al. introduced CS2 in "CS2: A searchable cryptographic cloud storage system", where in addition to the properties achieved in CloudProof, the cloud storage solution also achieves global integrity and scalable search. The latter is in particular achieved through the use of symmetric searchable encryption.
An IaaS cloud model may, e.g., use a so called OpenStack Nova architecture where a VM Management Client (VMMC) launches and controls VMs through well-defined API(s). From a security perspective, there are several problems. First, there must be means for the VMMC to have guarantees on that the VM instance not will be launched on an adverse host (wrongly configured or deliberately misconfigured host software/hardware platform).
Second, VM image integrity must be guaranteed prior to VM instance launch. These two conditions can be satisfied through alternative methods, as, e.g., implemented in CloudProof as well as in other prior art techniques using Trusted Computing Technologies as defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in combination with well-designed protocols for VM launch and migration.
However, these methods and protocols do not address the problem of how a VM instance (once it has been launched or migrated) obtains secure access to sensitive persistent data it is potentially dependent on. In particular, there should be means to protect both confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data during storage, and only allow authorized VM instances to have access to the plaintext representation of the data. While protection of data can be achieved through encryption and integrity protection, Message Authentication Codes (MAC) algorithms, the cryptographic keys used for encryption and MAC calculations must be available to the VM instance whenever it requires the data. Furthermore, cryptographic key handling schemes should minimize VMMC involvement in order to minimize the risks of mismanagement or client compromise.
An object of the present invention is to solve, or at least mitigate, these problems in the art.
The present invention addresses these problems by providing trusted VM launch, storage confidentiality and integrity protection of data to be stored.
This problem is addressed in a first aspect of the present invention by a method at a secure component of protecting data in a storage entity. The method comprises receiving, from a communicating party, a request to store data in one of a plurality of storage entities of a storage domain, encrypting a request for cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities with a session key of the storage domain to protect confidentiality and authenticity of the request, and sending, to a trusted third party, the encrypted request for cryptographic keys. Further, the method comprises receiving, from the trusted third party, cryptographic keys to protect confidentiality and integrity of the data to be stored, which cryptographic keys have been encrypted with the session key of the storage domain, decrypting the encrypted cryptographic keys, and associating the received cryptographic keys with the storage domain and the communicating party. Moreover, the method comprises encrypting the data with the cryptographic keys and storing the encrypted data in said one of a plurality of storage entities.
This problem is attained in a second aspect of the present invention by a method at a secure domain manager of securely associating a communicating party with a storage domain. The method comprises creating a launch package comprising an identifier for the storage domain, and an assertion that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the communicating party with said storage domain, and digitally signing the launch package. Further, the method comprises acquiring a certificate from a trusted certificate authority configured to certify a verification key corresponding to that used for digitally signing the launch package, and submitting the digitally signed launch package and the certificate to a trusted third party for verification, such that the communicating party subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain.
This problem is attained in a third aspect of the present invention by a method at a trusted third party to verify correctness of a launch package created by a secure domain manager to securely associate a communicating party with a storage domain. The method comprises receiving a digitally signed a launch package comprising an identifier for the storage domain, and an assertion that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the communicating party with said storage domain, and receiving a certificate issued by a trusted certificate authority for certifying a verification key corresponding to that used for digitally signing the launch package. Further, the method comprises verifying the assertion to ensure that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the communicating party with said storage domain, such that the communicating party subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain.
Further, a device according to the respective method is provided.
Thus, the problem is attained in a fourth aspect of the present invention by a secure component for protecting data in a storage entity. The secure component comprises a processor and a memory. The memory contains instructions executable by the processor, whereby the secure component is operative to receive, from a communicating party, a request to store data in one of a plurality of storage entities of a storage domain, and encrypt a request for cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities with a session key of the storage domain to protect confidentiality and authenticity of the request. Further, the secure component is operative to send, to a trusted third party, the encrypted request for cryptographic keys, and receive, from the trusted third party, cryptographic keys to protect confidentiality and integrity of the data to be stored, which cryptographic keys have been encrypted with the session key of the storage domain. Moreover, the secure component is operative to decrypt the encrypted cryptographic keys, associate the received cryptographic keys with the storage domain and the communicating party, and encrypt the data with the cryptographic keys and store the encrypted data in said one of a plurality of storage entities.
Thus, the problem is attained in a fifth aspect of the present invention by a secure domain manager for securely associating a communicating party with a storage domain. The secure domain manager comprises a processor and a memory. The memory contains instructions executable by the processor, whereby the secure domain manager is operative to create a launch package comprising an identifier for the storage domain and an assertion that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the communicating party with said storage domain, and digitally sign the launch package. Further the secure domain manager is operative to acquire a certificate from a trusted certificate authority configured to certify a verification key corresponding to that used for digitally signing the launch package, and submit the digitally signed launch package and the certificate to a trusted third party for verification, such that the communicating party subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain.
Thus, the problem is addressed in a sixth aspect of the present invention by a trusted third party for verifying correctness of a launch package created by a secure domain manager to securely associate a communicating party with a storage domain. The trusted third party comprises a processor and a memory. The memory contains instructions executable by the processor, whereby said trusted third party is operative to receive a digitally signed launch package comprising an identifier for the storage domain and an assertion that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the communicating party with said storage domain. Further the trusted third party is operative to receive a certificate issued by a trusted certificate authority for certifying a verification key corresponding to that used for digitally signing the launch package; and verify the assertion to ensure that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the communicating party with said storage domain, such that the communicating party subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain.
1. Data can be stored in the infrastructure cloud using any suitable storage units, such as block storage devices (e.g., Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI) or similar). Confidentiality and integrity of the data is advantageously protected during storage.
2. Confidentiality and integrity protection of data on IaaS compute hosts can advantageously be ensured by a trusted VMM or by an entity trusted by the VMM (e.g., a privileged VM domain), further referred to as a "Secure Component" (SC). The SC has access to the storage keys needed to perform the necessary cryptographic operations on the data during storage and information retrieval.
3. Data stored in the IaaS cloud using the scheme described in the present invention is associated with specific storage domains. In the present invention, a storage domain typically corresponds to a particular organization or administrative domain that utilizes the cloud services (including the storage service) offered by the IaaS provider, i.e., a single administrative domain that typically only handles data storage for its own domain and not for any other domains. All data in a single domain is advantageously protected with the same storage protection master key, the domain key.
4. During the entire lifetime of a communicating party, referred to throughout the description as a VM, the VM is advantageously securely associated with a particular storage domain.
5. All keys used to encrypt/decrypt and integrity check data in a single domain are advantageously handled by a special trusted entity in the network referred to as a Trusted Third Party (TTP). The TTP assigns and handles domain keys. The domain keys cannot ever leave the TTP.
As can be deducted from the above, the present invention advantageously introduces: Principles for securely assigning a communicating party in the form of a VM to a particular storage domain at VM launch. This is mainly undertaken by the secure domain manager according to the second aspect of the present invention, also referred to as the VMMC, and further by the TTP according to the third aspect of the present invention. Principles for the SC to securely retrieve encryption and integrity protection keys when writing data to a persistent data storage area in the IaaS cloud. Principles for the SC to securely retrieve decryption and integrity verification keys for data retrieval.
Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be set out in the following.
The present invention allows protection of persistent data at storage in an IaaS cloud almost transparently from the point of view of VMMC. To achieve this, the present invention only relies on a trusted third party and a trusted configuration of a communicating party, i.e. a target node. The trustworthiness of the target node is ensured through the TCG sealing mechanism which makes the trust explicit. Only trusted entities in the IaaS have access to the security critical storage parameters or plaintext data, allowing arbitrary storage medium to be used as long as reliability (not confidentiality and integrity) can be guaranteed for these storage mediums. This opens up for secure and cost efficient storage handling in IaaS clouds.
To this end, protection of data on storage units in a cloud environment is provided. The approach of protecting data comprises intercepting a secure storage read or write request from a trusted VM, assigning the requesting VM into a trusted storage domain determined by a storage domain identifier (ID), communicating with a trusted entity in the from of a TTP to acquire confidentiality and integrity protection keys for the trusted storage domain, determining an available storage resource, and confidentiality and/or integrity protecting the data requested to be stored by the VM. The storage domain ID is specified by the VMMC at VM launch. Preferably, the method is performed by a Secure Component (SC) running on a VMM, i.e., a node of a cloud environment.
In an embodiment of the present invention, the integrity and/or confidentiality protection keys acquired from the trusted entity are calculated using a domain wide master key which is kept protected by the trusted entity.
In a further embodiment of the present invention, the integrity and confidentiality keys are calculated using a random nonce provided by the trusted entity.
In yet another embodiment of the present invention, upon requesting a new storage confidentiality and integrity key, the random nonce chosen by the trusted entity is sent back to the SC in the form of a token and stored as part of a metadata field of the protected stored data.
In still another embodiment of the present invention, a key internally kept by the trusted entity, in the form of an integrity key is used to integrity protect the token and thus the metadata.
In embodiments of the present invention, when the VM requests read or write of protected data, the SC uses the metadata and sends it to the trusted entity in order to retrieve the confidentiality and/or integrity protection keys used to decrypt and/or verify the stored data, or encrypt and integrity protect data to be stored.
In an embodiment of the present invention, the storage domain ID assigned to the VM is provided by the VM owner to the VMMC at launch of the VM.
In further embodiments of the present invention, the storage confidentiality and/or integrity protection keys provided by the trusted entity are sealed, i.e., encrypted using a trusted platform module in the form of the session key of the storage domain, to a trusted state of the target platform which is hosting the SC, i.e., the VMM, such that the keys will only be available to the SC if it is running on a trusted platform.
In still further embodiments of the present invention, after successfully acquiring confidentiality and/or integrity protection keys from the trusted entity, the SC keeps these keys in a protected cache memory for future use.
In an embodiment of the present invention, the SC sends a reference to the chosen storage resource and domain to be used for future write read access to the storage resource back to the requesting VM.
In the third aspect of the present invention, upon request for storage integrity and/or confidentiality keys for a particular storage domain, the trusted entity checks that the client that has launched the VM is authorized to request based on any of the following parameters provided by the client at VM launch: the storage domain ID for the storage domain that the client intend to use for the VM, and an assertion authorizing the client to access and store protected data at the chosen storage domain.
In further embodiments of the present invention, the launch package comprises an ID of the VM to be launched and/or an encrypted nonce.
In the second aspect of the present invention, at launch via the trusted platform, the client (i.e. the VMMC) sends a launch message to the trusted entity, the launch message comprising a signature over parameters provided by the client at VM launch. Further, the client sends, via the trusted platform, a certificate certifying the key used to sign the launch message to the trusted entity.
Further embodiments of the present invention will be discussed in the detailed description.
Thus, embodiments of the present invention address enable trusted VM launch, key management, data access authorization, and persistent storage confidentiality and integrity protection, in order to ensure protected access to persistent VM instance sensitive data in IaaS models.
It is noted that the invention relates to all possible combinations of features recited in the claims. Further features of, and advantages with, the present invention will become apparent when studying the appended claims and the following description. Those skilled in the art realize that different features of the present invention can be combined to create embodiments other than those described in the following.
FIG. 8c shows a trusted third party according to an embodiment of the third aspect of the present invention.
FIG. 1 illustrates a system implementing embodiments of the second and third aspect of the present invention. The system set out in FIG. 1 will be described in detail in the following. However, before the detailed description is given, a more general embodiment of the method according to the second aspect of the present invention, as well as of the third aspect, will be described. The method according to the second aspect of the present invention of securely associating a communicating party, such as a VM 100, with a storage domain (not shown in FIG. 1; described in the following with reference to FIGS. 5 and 7) is performed at a secure domain manager, e.g. a VMMC 101. In practice, the method at the VMMC 101 is performed by a processing unit 115 embodied in the form of one or more microprocessors arranged to execute a computer program 117 downloaded to a suitable storage medium 116 associated with the microprocessor, such as a Random Access Memory (RAM), a Flash memory or a hard disk drive. The processing unit 115 is arranged to carry out the method according to embodiments of the first aspect of the present invention when the appropriate computer program 117 comprising computer-executable instructions is downloaded to the storage medium 116 and executed by the processing unit 115. The storage medium 116 may also be a computer program product comprising the computer program 117. Alternatively, the computer program 117 may be transferred to the storage medium 116 by means of a suitable computer program product, such as a floppy disk or a memory stick. As a further alternative, the computer program 117 may be downloaded to the storage medium 116 over a network. The processing unit 115 may alternatively be embodied in the form of a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a complex programmable logic device (CPLD), etc.
Now, in order to advantageously securely associate a communicating party, such as a VM 100, with a storage domain, an embodiment of a method according the second aspect of the present invention is proposed, a flowchart of which is shown in FIG. 2. Reference is further made to FIG. 1. In a first step, S101, the VMMC 101 creates a launch package comprising an identifier for the storage domain, and an assertion that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the VM 100 with said storage domain. In step S102, the VMMC 101 digitally signs the launch package using an appropriate signing key, and in step S103, the VMMC 101 acquires a certificate from a trusted certificate authority (not shown in FIG. 1) for certifying a verification key corresponding to the signing key previously used for digitally signing the launch package. Finally, in step S104, the VMMC 101 submits the digitally signed launch package and the certificate to a trusted third party 102 for verification, such that the VM 100 subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain.
Again with reference to FIG. 1, the method according to the third aspect of the present invention of verifying correctness of a launch package created by a VMMC 101 to securely associate a VM 100 a with a storage domain is performed at the TTP 102. In practice, similar to the description of the VMMC 101 hereinabove, the method at the TTP 102 is performed by a processing unit 118 embodied in the form of one or more microprocessors arranged to execute a computer program 120 downloaded to a suitable storage medium 119 associated with the microprocessor, as previously has been discussed with reference to the VMMC 101.
In order to advantageously verify correctness of a launch package created by the VMMC 101 to securely associate the VM 100 a with a storage domain, an embodiment of a method according the third aspect of the present invention is proposed, a flowchart of which is shown in FIG. 3. Reference is further made to FIG. 1. In a first step, S201, the TTP 102 receives, from the VMMC 101, a digitally signed launch package comprising an identifier for the storage domain, and an assertion that the VMMC 101 is authorized to associate the VM 100 with the storage domain. In a second step S202, the TTP 102 receives a certificate issued by a trusted certificate authority (not shown in FIG. 1) for certifying a verification key corresponding to that used for digitally signing the launch package. Thereafter, the TTP 102 verifies in step S203 the assertion to ensure that the VMMC 101 is authorized to associate the VM 100 with the storage domain, such that the VM 100 subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain.
FIG. 4 shows a flowchart of a further embodiment of the method according to the third aspect of the present invention. After step S203 has been performed by the TTP 102, it proceeds to step S204 of generating a session domain key for the storage domain and a target platform. Further, in step S205, the TTP 102 cryptographically protects the storage domain identifier and the session domain key with a secret key of a trusted platform 105:1, 105:2, 105:N on which the VM 100 is to reside before sending, in step S206, the cryptographically protected storage domain identifier and the session domain key to the trusted platform 105, wherein the trusted platform 105 can make available to a secure component the session domain key and securely associate the VM 100 with the storage domain.
Again with reference to FIG. 1, the VM 100 launch procedure illustrated therein according to embodiments of the second and third aspects of the present invention will be described in detail in the following. The VM launch procedure is undertaken for securely associating a VM 100 with a particular storage domain at VM launch.
a. A certain storage domain ID, DID. In the following, it is assumed DID=A.
b. An assertion, AS, proving to a TTP 102, that the VMMC 101 is authorized to issue VMs 100 for storage domain A, i.e. that the VMMC 101 is authorized to associate the VMs 100 with the storage domain A.
c. Optionally a nonce, N.sub.VMMC, encrypted with the public key of the TTP 102, K_Pu.sub.TTP.
d. Optional additional parameters such as required target Platform Security Level (SP), a VM identity, VM.sub.ID and a hash Hvm of the target VM image (i.e., the actual binary of the VM to be launched) or an encrypted key, Kvm that can be used to decrypt the encrypted target VM image E(VM).
S2. In addition, the VMMC 101 produces a digital signature, SIG, over all content in M using the private key of the VMMC 101, K_Pr.sub.VMMC.
S3. The VMMC 101 retrieves a certificate, Cert.sub.VMMC, from a trusted certificate authority (not shown in FIG. 1) that certifies the public key used by the VMMC 101. The corresponding private key is K_Pr.sub.VMMC.
S4. The VMMC 101 prepares a data structure C containing M, Cert.sub.VMMC and SIG. Thus, the data structure C is configured to comprise the signed launch package created in step S1 and the certificate acquired in step S3. The data structure C is sent to the IaaS provider, optionally along with E(VM) or an indication of the VM image that should be chosen for launch from a publicly available VM store (ID.sub.VMIMG).
S5. The IaaS provider, which in FIG. 1 is embodied in the form of a cloud controller 103 and a scheduler 104, selects a suitable available trusted platform (TP) 105 in the provider network and transfers the data structure C optionally together with the VM image (in encrypted or plaintext form) or the ID.sub.VMIMG to the chosen TP 105. Each TP 105 may optionally comprise a trusted platform module (TPM) for encrypting the storage confidentiality and/or integrity protection keys.
S6. When the data structure C reaches the intended TP 105, the TP 105 contacts the TTP 102 and sends the data structure C to the TTP 102 for verification.
S7. The TTP 102 verifies the certificate, Cert.sub.VMMC, and the signature SIG. If both Cert.sub.VMMC and SIG are valid, the TTP 102 proceeds with the next step; otherwise it aborts with an error message to the intended TP 105.
S8. The TTP 102 checks the assertion, AS (using the VMMC identity and key information provided in Cert.sub.VMMC) and checks if the VMMC 101 is authorized to use storage domain A. If so, the TTP 102 proceeds with the next step, otherwise it aborts with an error message to the intended TP 105.
S9. Using its private key, the TTP 102 decrypts N.sub.VMMC optionally received in the data structure C.
S10. The TTP 102 generates a session domain key (SD.sub.A) for domain A and the target platform.
Su. Parameters A and SD.sub.A (optionally together with other parameters such as N.sub.VMMC and H.sub.VM) are sealed to a protected state of the intended TP 105, i.e. encrypted with a public key of the TP 105 which has a property of only being available to the TP if the TP is booted in a trusted state. The encrypted message, denoted C2, is sent back to the intended TP 105.
S12. The intended TP 105 unseals (i.e. decrypts) C2 and makes sure SD.sub.A is available to the SC which is to run on the TP. The TP 105 optionally assigns the TP unique identity VM.sub.ID to the VM and associates that with domain A. The VM 100 is then launched in a secure isolated execution compartment on the TP 105.
FIG. 5 illustrates a system implementing the first aspect of the present invention. The system set out in FIG. 5 will be described in detail in the following. However, before the detailed description is given, a more general embodiment of the method according to the first aspect of the present invention will be described. The method according to the first aspect of the present invention of protecting data in a storage entity is performed at a secure component (SC) 106, such as, e.g., a computer, a server, a supervising entity in a telecom system, etc., i.e., a device having computing capabilities.
In practice, the method at the SC 106 is performed by a processing unit 121 embodied in the form of one or more microprocessors arranged to execute a computer program 123 downloaded to a suitable storage medium 122 associated with the microprocessor, as previously has been discussed in connection to FIG. 1 and the VMMC 101 and the TTP 102.
In order to advantageously protect data in a storage entity, an embodiment of a method according the first aspect of the present invention is proposed, a flowchart of which is shown in FIG. 6. Reference is further made to FIG. 5. In a first step, S301, the SC 106 receives, from a communicating party in the form of a VM 100, a request to store data in one of a plurality of storage entities 107 of a storage domain 109, which storage entity 107 may be embodied as a specific storage area on a storage resource such as a server 108a. In FIG. 5, a number of servers 108a, 108b, 108c make up the storage domain 109. It should be noted that the storage resources 108a-c comprised in the storage domain 109 could be remotely arranged, and are thus not necessarily adjacently located each other. In fact, they could even be located in different parts of the world. In a second step S302, the processing unit 121 encrypts a request for cryptographic keys associated with said one 107 of a plurality of storage entities with a session key of the storage domain 109 to protect confidentiality and authenticity of the request. Thereafter, in step S303, the SC 106 sends the encrypted request for cryptographic keys to a TTP 102. In a fourth step S304, the SC 106 receives from the TTP 102 cryptographic keys to protect confidentiality and integrity of the data to be stored, which cryptographic keys have been encrypted with the session key of the storage domain 109. In subsequent steps S305 and S306, the SC 106 decrypts the encrypted cryptographic keys and associates the received cryptographic keys with the storage domain 109 and the VM 100. Finally, in step S307, the SC 106 encrypts the data with the cryptographic keys and stores the encrypted data in said one 107 of a plurality of storage entities.
Again with reference to FIG. 5, the data set-up/first time write procedure illustrated therein according to embodiments of the first aspect of the present invention will be described in detail in the following.
S21. The VM 100 with identity VM.sub.ID running on the TP 105 requests access to a storage resource 108a, i.e., block device or database (denoted as SR), in the provider network being part of a storage domain 109 also comprising servers 108b and 108c. The storage resource reference is denoted SRID. Using SRID as reference, the VM 100 specifically requests a data write to a storage entity 107 denoted x in SR (this can be a block or other storage structure). This request is intercepted or received by the SC 106 and the following procedure applies.
a. The SC 106 sends, protected under key SD.sub.A, a request to the TTP 102 for new storage entity keys for entity x, domain A and SRID.
b. The TTP 102 checks, using the key SD.sub.A, that the request received above is correct. If so, the TTP 102 fetches the domain key for domain A and may generate a large enough nonce value, N.sub.TTP. Next, the TTP 102 optionally uses a suitable pseudorandom function (PRF), PRF(KM.sub.A, N.sub.TTP) to generate data encryption and integrity protection keys for storage entity x (denoted KE.sub.x and KI.sub.x respectively). Next the TTP 102 generates a token, T, consisting of N.sub.TPP, the domain ID A and SRID. Furthermore, the TTP 102 uses an internal integrity key to calculate an integrity check value, over token T, MAC(T).
c. Next, the TTP 102 sends T, MAC(T) and the keys KEx and KIx to the SC 106. This message is confidentiality and integrity protected using SD.sub.A.
d. The SC 106 receives the message generated in step c and decrypts T, MAC(T) and the KE.sub.x and KI.sub.x keys and associates them with domain A and VM.sub.ID.
S22. The SC 106 stores T and MAC(T) received from the TTP 102 in step d above as part of storage metadata for the new storage entity x in SR 108a.
S23. The SC 106 uses keys KE.sub.x and KI.sub.x to confidentiality and/or integrity protect the data stored in storage entity x in SR 108a.
In terms of performance and efficiency, it is advisable that the storage entity unit is selected so that the communication frequency between the SC 106 and TTP 102 and SC activities does not incur a larger performance penalty than what is acceptable by the involved parties. Also, the storage entity unit should be selected so that integrity protection meta-data does not consume a larger portion of storage than what is acceptable by the involved parties.
FIG. 7 illustrates the system of FIG. 5, but where a consecutive data write and read procedure is undertaken, i.e. after the set-up procedure illustrated in the flowchart of FIG. 6 with reference to steps S301-S307, and in greater detail in steps S21a-d, S22 and S23 of FIG. 5, has been undertaken. The consecutive data write/read procedure according to embodiments of the first aspect of the present invention is described in detail in the following.
S31. The VM 100, which may be identified to the TP 105 by the VM identifier VM.sub.ID, requests, e.g., by using the SRID reference, to write data to or read data from the entity x (denoted 107) in SR 108a being part of a storage domain 109 also comprising servers 108b and 108c. This request is intercepted or received by the SC 106 and the following procedure applies.
a. The SC 106 checks, using VM.sub.ID, if the required integrity and confidentiality keys needed to integrity protect and/or encrypt (write) or verify and/or decrypt (read) the requested storage entity x are already cached in a memory 116 of the SC 106. If that is the case, it proceeds to step 32 below. Otherwise, it locates T and MAC(T) (used to protect x) in SR storage metadata and continues to step b.
b. The SC 106 sends T and MAC(T) to the TTP 102, along with a request for the data entity keys for x, domain A and SRID. All is protected under key SD.sub.A.
c. The TTP 102 checks, using key SD.sub.A, that the request received above is correct. If so, the TTP 102 verifies the received token T (using its own internal MAC key). If the token is valid, the TTP 102 checks that the DID and SRID contained in T match the DID and SRID indicated by the SC 106. If all the above verifications are successful, The TTP 102 uses the KM.sub.A domain key and optionally the N.sub.TTP nonce in T to derive the KE.sub.x and KI.sub.x keys.
d. Next, the TTP 102 sends the keys KE.sub.x and KI.sub.x to the SC 106; the keys being confidentiality and integrity protected using SD.sub.A.
e. The SC 106 receives and decrypts the encrypted keys.
S32. The SC 106 uses keys KE.sub.x and KI.sub.x to encrypt and/or integrity protect (write) or decrypt and/or integrity check (read) data at storage entity x.
Thus, with the procedure illustrated in FIG. 7, secure data writes/reads can advantageously be made to/from the storage entity x.
FIG. 8a shows a secure component 106 according to an embodiment of the first aspect of the present invention. The secure component 106 comprises receiving means 130 adapted to receive, from a communicating party, a request to store data in one of a plurality of storage entities of a storage domain, and encrypting means 131 adapted to encrypt a request for cryptographic keys associated with said one of a plurality of storage entities with a session key of the storage domain to protect confidentiality and authenticity of the request. The secure component 106 further comprises sending means 132 adapted to send, to a trusted third party 102, the encrypted request for cryptographic keys, and the receiving means 130 further being adapted to receive, from the trusted third party, cryptographic keys to protect confidentiality and integrity of the data to be stored, which cryptographic keys have been encrypted with the session key of the storage domain. Moreover, the secure component 106 comprises decrypting means 133 adapted to decrypt the encrypted cryptographic keys, associating means 134 adapted to associate the received cryptographic keys with the storage domain and the communicating party. The encrypting means 131 is further adapted to encrypt the data with the cryptographic keys and store the encrypted data in said one of a plurality of storage entities. The receiving means 130 and sending means 132 may comprise a communications interface for receiving and providing information to other parties. The receiving means 130, encrypting means 131, sending means 132, decrypting means 133 and associating means 134 may (in analogy with the description given in connection to FIG. 5) be implemented by a processor embodied in the form of one or more microprocessors arranged to execute a computer program downloaded to a suitable storage medium associated with the microprocessor, such as a RAM, a Flash memory or a hard disk drive. The receiving means 130 and the sending means 132 may comprise one or more transmitters and/or receivers and/or transceivers, comprising analogue and digital components and a suitable number of antennae for radio communication.
FIG. 8b shows a secure domain manager 101 according to an embodiment of the second aspect of the present invention. The secure domain manager 101 comprises creating means 140 adapted to create a launch package comprising an identifier for a storage domain, and an assertion that the secure domain manager 101 is authorized to associate a communicating party with the storage domain, and further comprises signing means 141 adapted to digitally sign the launch package. Moreover, the secure domain manager 101 comprises acquiring means 142 adapted to acquire a certificate from a trusted certificate authority for certifying a verification key corresponding to that used for digitally signing the launch package, and further comprises submitting means 143 adapted to submit the digitally signed launch package and the certificate to a trusted third party for verification, such that the communicating party subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain. The submitting means 142 may comprise a communications interface providing information to (and possibly receiving information from) other parties. The creating means 140, signing means 141, acquiring means 142 and submitting means 143 may (in analogy with the description given in connection to FIG. 1) be implemented by a processor embodied in the form of one or more microprocessors arranged to execute a computer program downloaded to a suitable storage medium associated with the microprocessor, such as a RAM, a Flash memory or a hard disk drive. The submitting means 140 may comprise one or more transmitters and/or receivers and/or transceivers, comprising analogue and digital components and a suitable number of antennae for radio communication.
FIG. 8c shows a trusted third party 102 according to an embodiment of the third aspect of the present invention. The trusted third party 102 comprises receiving means 150 adapted to receive a digitally signed launch package comprising an identifier for a storage domain, and an assertion that a secure domain manager is authorized to associate a communicating party with the storage domain. The receiving means 150 is further adapted to receive a certificate issued by a trusted certificate authority for certifying a verification key corresponding to that used for digitally signing the launch package. Further, the trusted third party 102 comprises verifying means 151 adapted to verify the assertion to ensure that the secure domain manager is authorized to associate the communicating party with the storage domain, such that the communicating party subsequently can be securely associated with the storage domain. The receiving means 150 may comprise a communications interface receiving information from (and possibly providing information to) other parties. The receiving means 150 and verifying means 151 may (in analogy with the description given in connection to FIG. 1) be implemented by a processor embodied in the form of one or more microprocessors arranged to execute a computer program downloaded to a suitable storage medium associated with the microprocessor, such as a RAM, a Flash memory or a hard disk drive. The receiving means 150 may comprise one or more receivers and/or transmitters and/or transceivers, comprising analogue and digital components and a suitable number of antennae for radio communication.


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CD´s art installation by Elise Morin
August 11, 2017 by pcarvalho
Elise Morin was born in 1978 and lives and works in Paris. she is an artist with various art installation explored, but this one with cd's caught our attention. We can't imagine all the work behind this shiny floor.
From video art to installations, a certain affiliation with minimalism could be recognised in Elise Morin's practice. Expressed through the accumulation of identical materials, the repetition of a motif and the close relationship between her work and the spaces they occupy.
See also Wall art installation by Tatjana Este HERE!
This invented landscape was created as a thoughtful representation of the economical displacement of objects in our current society. It works to illuminate our cultural sensitization to our expanding environmental crisis.
The artwork, which covers 500 square meters, is made of 60,000 hand-sewn unsold or collected CDs. Waste Landscape is currently housed in Kunsthalie Košice, which in 2013 became the first hall of contemporary art in Slovakia. Upon seeing the space, Elise and her team immediately knew that the atypical cupola design and the arched architecture of the space would help to create the feeling of boundlessness that she needed for her installation.
Given the four walls of space that the piece resides in, there is a literal restriction to how big the piece can actually become. However, through the innovative use of lighting and music, the hills of Morin's Waste Landscape undulate endlessly between what is infinitely small and enormous. Through the repetition of motif and material, Elise Morin has succeeded in creating a minimalist work that helps to reconsider the modern world in which we live.
The emphasis is not only on decreasing material waste and potential damage to ecosystems, but also on rethinking the complex implications of transporting, storing, and showing artwork. Elise Morin's work offers a reassessment of landscape as a genre in contemporary art.
See also Ai Weiwei creates refugee crisis art installation HERE!

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Starokaypanovo (; , İśke Qaypan) is a rural locality (a selo) in Bul-Kaypanovsky Selsoviet, Tatyshlinsky District, Bashkortostan, Russia. The population was 357 as of 2010. There are 4 streets.

Geography
Starokaypanovo is located 15 km northwest of Verkhniye Tatyshly (the district's administrative centre) by road. Novokaypanovo is the nearest rural locality.

References

Rural localities in Tatyshlinsky District

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


I know many people think that everyone who chooses to homeschool knows what they are doing and everyday is full of laughter. I just laughed at myself for that previous statement. We have been homeschooling for almost 6 years, and I still wonder why I haven't lost my mind. I am very used to have a challenge thrown at me daily. But is there an easier way to homeschool without going crazy? Stephanie Walmsley has created the Successful Homeschool Made Easy system to help out old and new homeschooling parents.
Successful Homeschooling Made Easy Course is a 26 week course in which parents get a weekly PDF lesson that shows them how they can better plan out their homeschool schedule with their work schedules and other commitments. It's is available for the low cost of $10.00 a month (for 5 months) or a one time payment of $48.50.
Stephanie not only talks schedules and organization, but how you can get deeper into subjects including reading and math. She also really gets you to look at why you want to homeschool and what you want to accomplish from homeschooling your children. Her lessons cause you to sit down and really think about what you want to teach your children.
You can use Successful Homeschooling Made Easy Course, even if you are a veteran homeschooler. Maybe you need some help establishing a more set schedule and not sure where to turn. Messes are normal in every home, but maybe you are completely overwhelmed by the mess that accumulates daily. Or you might need help choosing a curriculum or schooling style that will fit your family. These are just a few of the topics that will be covered in this 26 week course.
If you are a family that unschools, then you may not find the planning part of Successful Homeschooling Made Easy Course helpful to you. She does encourage seat work for the students, and we do bookwork, but not the way that Ms. Walmsley suggests. I also have four different personalities to deal with in our kiddos, which most people do also. The kids do not always work well together. In one of the first lessons, it asks you to look at each personality and see when they work better. Do you work better in the morning or afternoon?
This is one area of planning that we are still struggling with, but working on trying the new suggestions.
Successful Homeschooling Made Easy Course is causing me to rethink my schedule and causing me to get a lot more organized. Since I work almost full-time from home plus homeschool, the house was really starting to get overrun. I have a ways to go, but just starting a few suggestions has helped take off some of the stress that I have been feeling about the mounting mess around me everyday.
When you homeschool, everything in your life is intertwined. If I work over and have extra work, it affects the amount of time I have for homeschooling the kids. If we have extra projects or a field trip, that affects my work time and when I can work. This in turn affects the amount of time I can spend with my husband in the evenings or the time that I have to get up in the morning. This affects my sleep, which then affects my health.
Teaching chores as school never really came to me. (Blame it also on my Type A Personality). But I really love that suggestion. This type of "schoolwork" doesn't take long, and really if you think about it, it's taught in public schools also. Cleaning/wiping tables, sweeping up messes in the classroom. It's part of a child's day in public school also. So chores and cleaning become part of our own daily schedule is not different as homeschoolers.
Since I am a parent of special needs children, this also presents a few more challenges. So some of the suggestions will not work for our kids. But what I have found so far, is that we will continue to benefit from using Successful Homeschooling Made Easy.
Each week's PDF lesson is delivered in my email weekly, and really doesn't take long for me to read through, but really gets me thinking about how I can improve myself and the various areas of our life to help with stress. You can easily print them off and keep them in a notebook. There is plenty of room on each page for me to make notes and work on how to implement the suggestions in our home.
I do really like that she refers to practical skills in many of the lessons. I am a firm believer in really teaching the kids practical everyday life skills. In fact this is very important for our older boys who have enough hurdles to overcome.
I look forward to each weekly lesson, and look forward to those that are still coming. Successful Homeschooling Made Easy Course is great for those who are just starting but also a great refresher for veteran homeschooler who need a little help remembering where they wanted to be.
Several members of the Schoolhouse Review Crew were given the opportunity to try out Successful Homeschooling Made Easy Course in their homes also. Still not sure if it's a fit for you, visit the Schoolhouse Review Crew blog to see how others used it in their homes.


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Lebanese Druze leader tries to calm fears after deadly attack in Syrian Druze village
Walid Jumblatt, the political leader of Lebanon's minority Druze sect, center background, stands with clerics shortly after a meeting of the Druze community's religious leadership in Beirut, Lebanon, Friday, June 12, 2015. Lebanon's political leader of the Druze community says this week's attack in northwestern Syria by al-Qaida's branch that many members of the sect dead was an individual incident. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein) (The Associated Press)
Druze clerics taking part in a meeting of the sect's religious leadership in Beirut, Lebanon, Friday, June 12, 2015. Lebanon's political leader of the Druze community says this week's attack in northwestern Syria by al-Qaida's branch that many members of the sect dead was an individual incident. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein) (The Associated Press)
BEIRUT – Lebanon's political leader of the Druze community is trying to calm members of Syria's minority sect after a deadly al-Qaida raid there killed as many as 20 Druze villagers.
Walid Jumblatt says the attack earlier this week on Qalb Lawzeh village in Idlib province was an "individual" incident. Syria's al-Qaida branch, the Nusra Front, killed at least 20 Druze members there.
Jumblatt spoke after meeting of the Druze religious leadership in Beirut on Friday.
The Idlib killings were the deadliest since Syria's civil war started in March 2011 against the minority Druze sect, which has been split between supporters and opponents of President Bashar Assad — but has largely stayed out of the fighting.
Jumblatt, a harsh critic of Assad, warned that any incitement "will endanger the Druze of Syria."


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Influential FPS Games #4: Doom (1993) – Part Two
This is my (pump action) Boomstick!
Welcome back, everyone. In the previous article, we investigated Doom's development, its inspirations and its diverse bestiary of demonic enemies. In particular, we saw how each enemy type was designed to fill a specific mutually supporting role with the other enemies. This resulted in combat that required tactics and target prioritisation as much as it required split-second reflexes.
In this, the second article in this three-part investigation of Doom 1993, its sequels, expansion packs and offshoots, we investigate Doom's iconic and influential arsenal of weapons and abilities.
The game's purposeful variety in enemies was matched by an equally purposeful variety of weapons with which to fight them. These weapons had a distinct hierarchy, with more and more powerful death dealers being acquired as the game progressed. This helped to balance out the increasingly dangerous demons you encountered, their ever-increasing numbers and the fiendishly challenging level designs they populated.
Each weapon had distinct pros and cons, and victory over the demonic hordes often depended on choosing the right tool for the right job - in the right situation. The list below explains this in greater detail. Note that the list is more-or-less in rank order of the weapon's firepower - from lowest to highest - and the order in which you obtained them during gameplay;
1. Fist
Your bare fists were your default starting melee weapon. Pretty much useless, but became devastating when paired with the berserk power-up.
2. Chainsaw
The chainsaw was great for dispatching weaker enemies at close range, but was useless at a distance and all but suicidal to use against the larger enemies.
3. Pistol
The pistol was both accurate at long range and economical with ammo but had a relatively slow rate of fire and its per-shot damage was rather anaemic.
4. Pump-Action Shotgun
The shotgun was very effective at close-to-medium range and its supply of ammo was plentiful, but its effectiveness was questionable against long-range targets. The inclusion of the shotgun may have been another of Aliens' inspirations.
5. Chain Gun / Minigun
The Chain Gun fired rapidly which was great against the easily stun-locked Cacodemons. However, its need to keep an enemy in your line of sight made it dangerous to use against enemies that were less easily stun-locked - especially if they were armed with hit scanning weapons themselves.
6. Rocket Launcher / RPG
The rocket launcher's explosion was devastating and caused splash damage. This made it effective against both larger enemies and whole groups of weaker ones; however, its splash damage made it dangerous to use close up. At long ranges, enemies could evade its relatively slow-moving rockets.
7. Plasma Rifle
The Plasma Rifle was great all-round, but its ammo was both in short supply and shared with the BFG, and thus had to be used sparingly.
8. BFG - Big Frickin' Gun
Dooms ultimate weapon - the BFG - used up a lot of its already scarce ammo per shot and thus had to be saved for when you really needed it. However, one shot from it was capable of clearing whole rooms of enemies. It could be considered Doom's equivalent of a 'smart bomb'.
Doom 2 Weapons - The Super Shotgun
Doom 2 added a new weapon to Doomguy's arsenal - the Double Barrell 'Super Shotgun'. Its rate of fire was slower than the pump-action shotgun and it chewed through your ammo supply twice as quickly, but at point-blank range its firepower was immense. Doom 2 was the first FPS to incorporate the now-iconic weapon, but it would not be the last. Indeed, the double-barrel shotgun has become a staple of FPS games ever since.
Influences of later FPS
This arsenal of melee weapon, pistol, shotgun, multi-barrel machinegun, rocket launcher, energy weapon and room clearance weapon would become commonplace in most FPS games that came after. What's more, most post-Doom FPS would more-or-less copy the order in which Doom introduced these weapons to the player during gameplay.
Incidentally, Doomguy was able to carry all of the above weapons at once, which was a trend almost all future FPS games would follow for some time. (Until the release of Halo with its two-gun mechanic.)
Traps n' Treasures
Doom is littered with secret areas, often hidden behind false walls that will raise to open upon walking up to them and pressing the 'use' key, or by hitting a switch elsewhere in the level. These hidden areas often contained useful pickups, such as armour, health packs and ammo. Some may have contained demons too, making them something of a double-edged chainsaw.
Some of the more significant secret areas would grant the player early access to heavier weapons which usually would not appear until much later. This makes these earlier levels far easier than they otherwise would be. Knowing the locations of such pickups is all but essential for survival on Doom's most punishing difficulty level, the aptly named 'Nightmare!'
Doom took the concept of secret areas a step further by including whole secret levels. These were often more challenging than the main-game levels at that stage of the campaign. Therefore, they were a bonus challenge for those seeking to test their mettle.
Secret areas and secret levels would become staples of many future FPS games, including the likes of Blood, Duke Nukem 3D and the Serious Sam franchise.
Doom featured several time-limited powerups, such as invisibility and invulnerability. Abilities such as these would become staples of many future FPS games. In some, they would also be implemented in the form of pickups, such as Unreal's Tournament's overshield. In others' they would be implemented as innate abilities, such as the semi-invisible cloaking device modes in the Crysis franchise, or when playing as a Predator in the Aliens vs Predator games.
Doom's berserk mode has also been implemented in several post-Doom FPS games in one guise or another. Examples include the Demon Morph from Painkiller and the maximum adrenaline 'Feral Abilities' sections in Far Cry Instincts.
Painkiller: Overdose Demon Mode
Painkiller's Demon Morph in all its gory glory
Red-on-Red Fire!
A novel feature in Doom is the friendly fire between demons. If a demon of one species were to hit a demon of a different species with a projectile weapon then the injured demon would turn on the demon who launched it. This could be particularly useful in crowded areas as it could quickly escalate into a free-for-all, thus saving you the trouble (and ammo) of having to fight them yourself. All you needed to do after the carnage had finished was mop up the survivors, who were usually in a weakened state. Sadly, relatively few post-Doom FPS games have implemented this mechanic, however, it may have indirectly influenced the three-way fighting found in games such as Half-Life.
So, Doom had a superb bestiary of monsters and an iconic set of weapons to shoot them with. It would have been disappointing then if the effects of said weapons upon said demons had been underwhelming. Thankfully the effects were anything but. Enemies would die in suitably gory fashion as you filled them with lead. Hitting a demon with a sufficiently over-powered weapon - say a rocket launcher or the berserk fist - would cause them to explode into a pile of bloody body parts. It has been claimed that Doom's liberal use of this mechanic is what popularised the term 'gib' - short for giblets.
Doom's Berserk mode
Doomguy subscribes to the 'Everything can be solved with punching' school of thought.
To complement the gameplay and visuals, Doom would need a suitably bombastic soundtrack. The inspiration for this allegedly came from the office stereo and the music the team enjoyed. Since Doom was being made in the early '90s this music was mostly rock and metal. As a result, many of the tracks in Doom had an uncanny resemblance to them, even in their MIDI format.
I did say the team behaved like rock stars remember?
Dooms soundscape was equally effective. The sound of the chainsaw, even when idling, felt empowering. The sound of the pump shotgun's pumping action sounded suitably 'ker-chunky' and the report of its blast was loud and full of base - just as a shotgun should be.
The noises made by the enemies was no less memorable. The hisses, roars and elephantine trumpeting of the demons were suitably unsettling, whilst their death sounds gave a tell-tale auditory cue confirming they had died. This was especially useful when taking out enemies who were no longer in your line of sight. This death sound mechanic would also become a mainstay of both single-player and multiplayer FPS games.
Doom 1 and 2 sound effects
Conclusion (of Part Two)
That concludes part two of our journey with Doom. Such an iconic and influential game deserves a three-part article, so that is exactly what it is going to get.
In the next article, we will look further into Doom 2 and what advances it brought to the table. We will also investigate the technical wizardry under Doom 1 and 2's hoods that allowed them to run on the hardware of the day. We will analyse Doom 1 and 2's commercial and critical success and the impact this had on PC gaming. We will also see how Doom kick-started both the multiplayer deathmatch and PC modding scenes and how Doom's legacy is still influencing games to this day. See you all then.
Did you learn something today? What are your thoughts on Doom's arsenal? Which was your favourite 'go-to' weapon? What are your thoughts on Doom's sound effects and music? Feel free to share your thought and experiences in the comments section below.
Iain is a 40+ author and gamer from England, who started his gaming journey on the Atari 2600 36 years ago. His specialities include obscure cult classics, retro games, mods and fan remakes. He hates all sports games and is allergic to on-line multi-player. Since he is British, his body is about 60% tea. He can be reached via Twitter at https://twitter.com/IainBaker17, and contacted via email at the_nomad78@outlook.com
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Influential FPS Games #17: Half-Life 2
Influential FPS Games #16: Halo 2
Influential FPS Games #15: Halo: Combat Evolved


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A Josten Live! Fridays @ Five Event
At the Grave of Maria Callas: How Does an Aria Turn into a Poem?
Northampton poet laureate Patrick Donnelly will explore the roots of his poetry in his training as an opera singer, and especially in his 50-year admiration of the art of Maria Callas.
Donnelly will debut a new sequence of poems about Callas, and introduce historic recordings and videos of the singer that some have called the most important artist of the 20th century. As well, Donnelly will explore the attraction of gay men to opera and to Callas in particular, and seek to answer what it is about opera that is consoling and inspiring for queer people. This multi-media event will interest lovers of music, theater, poetry, design, and fashion, and especially opera, a synthesis of all the arts.
Friday February 17, 2017, 5:00 PM
Werner Josten Performing Arts Library
Mendenhall Center
campus map: http://www.smith.edu/libraries/info/directions/map
Josten Live! is a patron-driven performance series that celebrates the creative lives of Josten Library users and the acoustic brilliance of its Mezzanine.
Patrick Donnelly
http://www.patrickdonnellypoems.com
The Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a man: It cannot be matured by law and precept, but by sensation and watchfulness in itself. —John Keats


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Les guerres culturelles désignent des débats profonds qui s'intensifient depuis les années 1960 au sein de la société américaine et qui concernent des enjeux moraux. Ces débats sont marqués par une polarisation du public autour de positions immuables fondées sur des conceptions opposées de l'ordre moral et culturel. Ils concernent des enjeux tels que le droit à l'avortement, les droits des homosexuels, l'éducation publique, la discrimination positive, le financement public des arts et le système de justice. Ce phénomène est remarqué par des chercheurs au tournant des années 1990, notamment par le sociologue . En 1991, il publie le livre  qui popularise le concept dans les milieux spécialisés en politique américaine et a alimenté les discussions sur l'ampleur de la polarisation au sein de la population américaine. Dans ce livre, il construit un modèle qui décrit les comportements politiques des Américains suivant une polarisation autour d'enjeux saillants. Ce modèle substitue les explications économiques traditionnelles, telles que les différences entre classes sociales. Ce terme va se répandre dans le discours médiatique et public dès 1992 suite à l'allocution du commentateur conservateur Pat Buchanan devant la convention du parti républicain. Durant ce discours, il accuse le candidat démocrate et futur président Bill Clinton d'adopter un programme politique féministe, en faveur des droits des homosexuels et d'être en contradiction avec les valeurs des Américains ordinaires, faisant « l'âme des États-Unis » l'ultime enjeu des élections présidentielles de 1992.

Enjeux des guerres culturelles

La famille
Plusieurs enjeux reliés aux guerres culturelles concernent la famille, notamment le droit à l'avortement, le rôle de la femme au sein de la famille ainsi que les droits des homosexuels. Selon le sociologue James Davison Hunter il s'agit du champ de bataille le plus évident en raison de son importance fondamentale comme institution dans la société américaine.

L'enjeu de l'avortement oppose les partisans du droit à l'avortement, qualifié de pro-choix, car selon eux, le choix de continuer ou de terminer la grossesse reviendrait à la femme enceinte, et les pro-vies, qui considèrent que la vie du fœtus prime sur le choix de la mère. Pour les pro-vies religieux, la vie du fœtus est sacrée et l'avortement est un meurtre. Selon Ted Mouw et Michel Sobel, ce débat est l'incarnation typique des guerres culturelles en raison de l'intransigeance des partisans de chaque côté. D'après James Davison Hunter ce débat n'est pas simplement l'expression d'une différence d'opinions et dépasse la controverse autour de l'avortement en tant que tel. Car, cette remise en question des obligations et des permissions de la femme au sein de la « famille bourgeoise » et de la société serait ultimement un affrontement sur la manière d'organiser la vie commune des Américains.

L'éducation
Plusieurs débats qui se rapportent à l'éducation s'orientent autour de l'opposition entre la laïcité et la présence de la religion et concernent, entre autres, la prière à l'école, l'éducation sexuelle, l'enseignement de la théorie de l'évolution et le corpus des sciences sociales. Suivant la typologie de James Davison Hunter, les progressistes reprochent aux orthodoxes de tenter d'imposer leur foi particulière aux étudiants, de remettre en question l'idéal libéral démocratique des États-Unis et de contrevenir au principe de séparation entre l'église et l'État. Les orthodoxes accusent les progressistes de soutenir un programme « humaniste et séculier », de promouvoir des idéaux anti-chrétiens et de sous-représenter les valeurs familiales traditionnelles et de la libre entreprise. Certains chercheurs considèrent que la controverse liée à l'enseignement de la théorie de l'évolution relève des guerres culturelles, car, pour certains créationnistes, l'opposition envers les enseignements de Charles Darwin provient de préoccupations morales plutôt que scientifique. Ces derniers lient le déclin moral de la société américaine avec l'enseignement de principes non chrétiens. Selon James Davison Hunter, l'éducation est un champ de bataille important parce qu'au-delà des connaissances et des compétences techniques, les écoles sont les principaux lieux de « reproductions des identités nationales et communautaires pour les générations futures d'Américains».

Le modèle de James Davison Hunter
Le sociologue James Davison Hunter élabore un modèle sociologique autour du concept des guerres culturelles. Il affirme que cette division du public est quelque chose de plus complexe qu'une simple différence d'opinions. Selon lui, les différentes joutes saillantes concernant les enjeux moraux qui polarisent la société américaine sont reliées entre-elles par un litige culturel principal. Il s'agit d'une lutte autour de l'identité nationale et de la domination de la signification de l'Amérique où chaque clan se considère comme les représentants légitimes de celles-ci. L'origine de la division croissante entre les Américains provient de deux impulsions contraires, une impulsion vers l'orthodoxie et une impulsion vers le progressisme. Les individus rattachés à l'impulsion orthodoxe défendent, par exemple, des positions telles que l'interdiction de mariage entre conjoints du même sexe, le créationnisme et l'économie de marché. Les individus rattachés à l'impulsion progressiste défendent des causes comme les droits des homosexuels, les droits de la femme, le financement public des arts et de l'éducation et la séparation entre l'église et l'État. Les individus associés à l'un ou l'autre des impulsions tentent de dominer les « moyens de production culturels » pour détenir le « pouvoir de définir le sens de l'Amérique ».

Dans ce modèle l'élément qui provoque la polarisation est la source de l'autorité morale. Pour Hunter, ce qui unit les orthodoxes, c'est « l'engagement de la part des adhérents envers une autorité externe, transcendante et définissable ». Cette autorité fournit un ensemble de lignes de conduite pour l'individu et la collectivité qui sont valables et suffisantes en tout temps. C'est notamment le cas des fondamentalistes religieux, comme certains évangéliques chrétiens pour qui la Bible doit être lue littéralement et pour qui l'autorité suprême est celle du Dieu chrétien. La source de l'autorité morale chez progressiste dépend du Zeitgeist et est marqué par l'esprit du rationalisme et du subjectivisme. La vision du monde qui caractérise l'impulsion progressive a tendance à « recontextualiser les croyances historiques à la lumière des suppositions dominantes de la vie moderne ». Hunter remarque que certains individus qui adoptent ce point de vue peuvent justifier la moralité de l'homosexualité grâce à la Bible, ou interpréter les passages contenant de l'homophobie dans la Bible comme une preuve qu'il s'agit d'un document humain et ne pas rejeter, pour autant, leur homosexualité et leur foi. Hunter souligne que ce n'est pas la religiosité qui alimente la polarisation, mais la manière dont celle-ci est perçue à travers le prisme de la source de l'autorité de morale. Les différentes impulsions vont occasionner autour d'elles des alliances inusitées qui transcendent les divergences doctrinales, lorsque celles-ci avaient été, selon Hunter les causes des conflits culturelles dans le passé.

Une caractéristique qui marque les guerres culturelles est la profonde hostilité que démontrent les individus pour les adhérents des impulsions opposés. Hunter considère que les différents enjeux représentent des champs symboliques et que le maintien de symboles communs est essentiel à la vie collective. Les points de dissension étant fondés sur des conceptions fondamentalement diffèrent de l'autorité morale, la position de l'autre est considérée comme antinomique avec les valeurs accordées à l'essence symbolique de la nation. Les adhérents d'une impulsion vont considérer les adhérents de l'impulsion inverse comme des ennemis, pour se représenter eux-mêmes comme les défenseurs des institutions et des traditions de la société américaine. Le langage utilisé par les individus situés aux deux pôles, pour décrire leurs adversaires, est similaire : l'autre est considéré comme extrémiste dans ses positions, intolérant par rapport à ceux qui ne partagent pas ses valeurs et infidèle envers les valeurs centrales des États-Unis.

Réception des thèses de James Davison Hunter
Le modèle des guerres culturelles de James Davison Hunter ainsi que le thème de la polarisation de la population américaine sur les enjeux moraux ont animé une certaine partie de la communauté universitaire. Le modèle fut testé à travers diverses publications scientifiques produisant des résultats disparates. La principale critique formulée contre la thèse des guerres culturelles est que si la polarisation sur certains enjeux saillants est évidente et profonde chez les élites associées à ceux-ci, la division ne se manifeste pas de manière explicite dans la population en général qui demeure plutôt modérée. Cette nuance est soulignée par James Davison Hunter dès 1991. Une autre critique stipule que si l'on retrouve une homogénéité de point de vue chez les élites politiques qui suivent une même impulsion, dans la population américaine l'adoption des perspectives est moins cohérente avec le modèle des guerres culturelles : d'un enjeu à l'autre, les individus disposent d'opinions associées aux deux pôles.

Le politologue Morris Fiorina de l'université Standford remet en question le modèle développé par Hunter et l'associe au mythe de la « 50/50 nation ». Il remarque que, suivant les élections de 2000, sont apparues des représentations des États-Unis à l'aide de carte où les États sont séparés entre les rouges et bleus : les États en rouge représentent ceux dont la population s'associe majoritairement au parti républicain et aux idéaux conservateurs la population de ceux en bleu supporte le parti démocrate et d'orientation libérale. Il remarque qu'il y a des différences idéologiques entre les populations de ces États, mais qu'il y a aussi des similitudes et que les différences ne sont pas assez drastiques pour être catégorisées comme des guerres culturelles. Fiorina avance plutôt que la population américaine est modérée et que la polarisation est un indice important seulement chez l'élite des partis. De plus, la division géographique illustrée par les cartes colorant les États selon l'allégeance partisane n'est pas un marqueur significatif, plutôt, les facteurs économiques sont des explications plus juste pour comprendre le comportement électoral des Américains. La polarisation qui est marquée chez les élites aurait aussi tendance à décourager la participation politique de la population des États-Unis.
Alan Abramowitz est un défenseur de la thèse de la polarisation et répond aux critiques formulées par Morris Fiorina et d'autres. Selon lui la polarisation croissante des élites remarquées durant les élections de 2000 et de 2004 s'accompagne d'une participation accrue au sein de la population qui n'est pas découragée par le comportement des élites. Pour d'autres chercheurs, les enjeux des guerres culturelles ont un tel impact sur les électeurs, que leurs opinions par rapport à ceux-ci les pousseraient à évaluer leur appartenance partisane et religieuse. Ce qui vient contredire une perception populaire dans l'étude du comportement politique des Américains que c'est l'appartenance partisane qui est responsable de la position qu'un individu adopte par rapport à un enjeu saillant.

Nouveaux enjeux des guerres culturelles
La question de la liberté de religion s'est transformée suivant les acquis légaux de la communauté LGBT durant la décennie de 2010 : le débat est caractérisé par un conflit entre les libertés religieuses de certains chrétiens et libertés civiles des individus de la communauté LGBT. Un exemple fort médiatisé fut celui de Kim Davis : cette greffière municipale a refusé de donner un certificat de mariage à un couple homosexuel pour des raisons religieuses contrevenant ainsi à l'arrêt Obergefell v. Hodges qui garantit le mariage homosexuel comme un droit constitutionnel. Cette dernière a passé du temps derrière les barreaux pour outrage au tribunal relativement à cette affaire. Certaines organisations veulent des exemptions en se basant sur la liberté de religion comme le cas de Hobby Lobby : cette chaîne de magasins d'artisanat a bénéficié d'exemption par rapport à la Loi sur la Protection des Patients et les Soins Abordables relativement au moyen de contraception sur des bases de liberté religieuse. Certains États ont tenté de passer des lois pour permettre de pratiquer la liberté religieuse et de contourner les jugements de la Cour suprême sur le mariage gai. C'est notamment le cas de l'Indiana en 2015 où le gouverneur et futur Vice-Président, Mike Pence, a signé le Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Le débat autour de la liberté d'expression s'est transformé dans les décennies suivant la publication en 1991 de Culture Wars : The Struggle to Define America de James Davison Hunter. Cette joute culturelle est marquée par l'opposition entre des défenseurs de la liberté d'expression et ce qu'ils considèrent comme une inflation du politiquement correct. Le candidat à la présidence et vainqueur en 2016, Donald Trump a été un fervent critique du politiquement correct. Les campus universitaires sont aussi devenus un lieu où cette guerre s'exerce : certains conservateurs accusent les universités qu'en plus de limiter la liberté d'expression des conservateurs (plainte soulignée par James Davison Hunter en 1991), elles isolent les étudiants auprès d'idées divergentes à travers les safe space sur les campus universitaire et les trigger warnings.

Notes et références

Voir aussi

Bibliographie

Articles connexes
 Hégémonie culturelle
 Métapolitique
 Autres conflits culturels:
 Kulturkampf
 Révolution culturelle

Liens externes

Culture aux États-Unis
Politique culturelle
Identité
Sociologie de la culture
Sociologie politique


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Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA) officially closed the Deepening Accountable Local Governance in Rwanda (DALGOR) project end of last month, January 2019. The overall objective of the project was to "contribute to improved capacity of local governments to confidently and effectively respond to upward, horizontal and downward accountability demands".
Among other activities the EU supported project conducted a study, "State of elected local councillors & constituency interactions in Rwanda: implications for accountable local governance". The project has been implemented in the Gasabo, Ngoma, Burera, Nyamasheke and Nyamagabe; districts with low performance in accountable governance before.
As the study aimed to assess the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors (ELC) and Constituencies and its implications for accountable local governance in Rwanda, RALGA organised policy dialogues basing on the findings, to share the findings and discuss the way forward.
This study found it was important to discuss accountable governance drawing on the fact that citizens' participation through decision making and demanding for accountability from leadership has been dynamic.
On his side, Mr Ladislas Ngendahimana, RALGA's Secretary General finds that the project largely attained its objective. He refers to the 2018 Citizen Score Card report by RGB showing a significant improvement in accountable governance in DALGOR beneficiary districts compared to the one of 2014.
The report shows that districts scored high, from 2014 to 2018: Nyamasheke (from 50.7 % in 2014 to 82.83 % in 2018), Nyamagabe(from 61.3 % to 78.94 %); Gasabo (from 63.2% to 89.31%); Burera (from 79.9% to 88.44%); and Ngoma(from 89.31% to 90.53%).
Though, there was more need to be done, as different Constituencies consequently entrusted Elected Local Councilors with power to decide on their behalf. The new the idea was that elected representatives will in principle represent the interests of their Constituents more effectively, then net levels of satisfaction by citizens became optimistic and encouraging.
Via the project, Elected Local Councillors and citizens agreed upon the fact that there have been considerable improvements as to the help by Elected Local Councillors to constituents in the collection of priority needs.
"The day where officials listen to citizens" problems was decided upon. Actually, this is the secret [for the improvement]. In the past, things could not move effectively because people couldn"t know when or on which day people"s problems would be heard. Nowadays, a specific day for that [listening] is well known. Everyone knows when to express his/her problems or ideas in the presence of [Elected Local] Councillors." (A citizen of Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District).
As the study stated, some councilors were elected for their own interest (political) rather than representing citizens.
Different factors that drove them into competition for councillorship, but only 49.5% of Elected Local Councilors revealed they were "willing to represent citizens", a reason confirmed by 51.6% of citizens.
Others, 50.2% of ELC said that they were requested by citizens to represent them, which was however only confirmed by 38.7% of citizens.
Addition to this, the fact that 5.6% of citizens indicated that some candidates compete for councillorship "while targeting other higher positions"; bears an empirical explanation.
All in all, "During the electoral period, some express their desire to compete and you could realize that they truly wanted that….uncertainty the major factor behind citizens" initiatives requesting their fellows to represent them. Citizens prefer to request, or to keep, the person who so far has served them satisfactorily or whom they know and trust. They are thus hesitant to replace him/her by, or to listen to, someone else whom they are not sure about his/or her potentials for future performance".
So, "When constituents encourage and elect the councilors of their choice, it is a sign of improvement in democracy in Rwanda. The constituents feel genuinely represented. As a result, [Elected Local] Councilors feel happy and much concerned with the development of the constituents." (A citizen of Gihombo Sector, Nyamasheke District).