text:
Tag Archives: abu ghraib
October 4, 2014 · 22:30
I Wish I Did Not Dream That Much…
"I wish I did not dream that much. They make me sometimes dread to go to sleep. Scenes from the war, are so constantly recalled, with bitter feelings I wish to never experience again. Lies, vanity, treachery, and carnage." Major General Gouverneur Warren, hero of Gettysburg in 1867 in a letter to his wife
I have had a pretty good couple of weeks with my trip to the Oktoberfest and this past week. Apart from being tired from the travel and trying to catch up and reset myself my sleep has been good, well until last night. It was surprising because I have been happy, good things are happening in my life and I found out that I am being inducted into my high school's Hall of Fame laster in the month. I have been catching up at work and preparing for the next iteration of the Gettysburg Staff Ride which I lead and I am working with a number of others on a new ethics class for our students. Likewise the baseball teams I want to win in the playoffs are winning, what could be wrong?
That being said since coming home I have been following the events in Iraq and Syria. Of course I have been horrified, but not surprised in the least at the latest public execution of an innocent hostage by the Islamic State. However, I have been watching the continued Islamic State advance in Al Anbar province where I served with out advisors and the Iraqi Army, Border and other security forces. Islamic State appears to be on the verge of capturing a number of important bases including Al Asad, and are advancing on Baghdad and may be in control of Abu Ghraib, nearly in artillery range of Baghdad International Airport. The fact that this is where I left so much of my heart and soul is particularly upsetting.
As the situation grows more serious and U.S. and allied involvement grows deeper I have no doubt that eventually ground troops will be fighting the Islamic State, which is perhaps exactly what they want. Last night I was surprised as I had a nightmare which went on and on. My wife Judy woke me up at one point, I was awoken again when I kicked the bookcase that serves as my nightstand. The nightmare did involve Iraq, but this time it was not set in the past, but in the future and it was frightening in its vividness and reality involving me as well as a number of people that I know from the military and other agencies including the State Department involved in a humanitarian mission.
As the politicians, pundits and preachers who lust after war and are seemingly eager to commit the sons and daughters of other people to a new ground war, without of course providing them the funding and equipment that will be needed because they would rather have tax cuts for the rich and corporations chum the waters; I am concerned. Sadly, we may have to commit ground forces, perhaps a sizable number to halt the advance of the Islamic State, and possibly even defeat them in Iraq. However, the Islamic State will not be stopped with military victories; they will regroup and morph into something else. I don't think that the war we are in won't end, at least in my lifetime. It will be like the Thirty Years War, but maybe longer. I would like to be wrong and I pray that I am, but the war keeps growing and nightmares keep coming.
On Thursday I was sitting in the waiting room of the doctor who prescribes my psych meds I caught the first part of an interview by Fox News with former President Bush. When I heard the questions and his answers I was livid, because it was Bush and his chicken-hawk advisers who in their ill-conceived and criminal invasion of Iraq helped birth the Islamic State, and now they were claiming that they predicted this. If these people were held to the same standard that we held the major war criminals of the Nazi regime at Nuremberg, they would all gone to the gallows. These people and their propaganda machine at Fox News keep trying to blame everyone, especially President Obama for their criminal negligence.
To me that it is infuriating. I know too many people whose lives have been devastated by their policies and decisions. I was so angry when I heard Bush say that "he understood the enemy" that had to tell the receptionist that I would be outside. The man has no clue about the enemy, he helped create them and will not take any responsibility for his decisions and the actions of his administration. Those decisions and actions were the seeds of a strategic defeat in terms of geo-politics and economics for us in the Middle East, a defeat from which we may never fully recover. As the former President spoke I wanted to rise up like the First Officer of Soviet Alpha Submarine Konovalov in The Hunt For Red October and say "You arrogant ass. You've killed us!"
Jesus says we are not to hate others, however I wrestle with this. When I experience the dreams and feelings that I have over the past couple of days I think I have to admit that I hate George W. Bush almost as much as I hate war and the Islamic State. Frankly
Maybe that is why I cannot sleep and why that nightmare was so terrifying and would not end. I can fully understand what Gouverneur Warren felt after the Civil War, because I feel the same way. "bitter feelings I wish to never experience again. Lies, vanity, treachery, and carnage."
I pray for sleep tonight and I pray that I am wrong about this war, but I know that I am right.
Filed under civil war, Foreign Policy, History, iraq,afghanistan, Military, Political Commentary, PTSD, Tour in Iraq
Tagged as abu ghraib, al asad, baghdad international airport, battle of gettysburg, dreams, fox news, george w bush, gouverneur warren, iraq, iraq war, isil, islamic state of iraq and the levant, nightmares, thirty years war
January 13, 2012 · 01:27
Atrocity in War: The Afghanistan Video
"Our men can't make this change from normal civilians into warriors and remain the same people … the abnormal world they have been plunged into, the new philosophies they have had to assume or perish inwardly, the horrors and delights … they are bound to be different people from those you sent away. They are rougher than when you knew them. Killing is a rough business." Ernie Pyle
Ernie Pyle was one of the most prolific wartime journalists that ever lived, in fact he was killed by Japanese machine gun fire on the island of Ie Jima while with the Army during the Okinawa campaign. Ernie Pyle understood war and the men that fight it. If he was alive today I imagine that his comments about what happens to men in combat would be no different now than it was then.
In the past two days we have heard much and seen a distressing video of four U.S. Marines from a Scout-Sniper Team of 3rd Battalion 2nd Marine Regiment urinating on dead Taliban fighters. The images are disturbing and because they are raw and offensive they have created a furor that could define the NATO campaign in Afghanistan as much as the Abu Ghraib torture photos harmed U.S. efforts in Iraq and the broader Middle East. When I was in Iraq I heard Marine leaders talking about the Abu Ghraib incident with distain and saying that those few soldiers that recorded their torture of prisoners were costing us the war.
3/2 was deployed in the northern area of Helmand Province and lost 6 Marines and a Navy Corpsman during their deployment. According to the Marine Corps Times Battle Rattle Blog author Dan Lamothe, Major General John Toolan said that the Scout Snipers of 3/2 may have killed up to 100 insurgents each during their tour, which would mean that they were engaged in many dangerous combat engagements. This in no way condones or excuses their actions but it does provide some context to view what happened.
However wrong the actions may be and how stupid it was for the Marines in this unit to record them and allow them onto the internet the truth is that war changes people. Ordinary men do things that they would not have contemplated before it including breaking the codes of honor that they pledge to uphold when volunteering to serve. Ernie Pyle understood this far better than most journalists before or since. In fact he understood it far better than the minuscule percentage of Americans who have ever served in the military much less in combat. Pyle wrote:
"Their life consisted wholly and solely of war, for they were and always had been front-line infantrymen. They survived because the fates were kind to them, certainly — but also because they had become hard and immensely wise in animal-like ways of self-preservation."
E.B Sledge who served throughout the Pacific War as a Marine infantryman and whose writings are dramatized in the HBO Series The Pacific wrote about fellow Marines that harvested gold teeth from dead Japanese soldiers, urinated in the mouths of the corpses of the Japanese and shot civilians. He was patriotic, religious and after the war wrote in his book With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa:
"The fierce struggle for survival in the abyss of Peleliu had eroded the veneer of civilization and made savages of us all. We existed in an environment totally incomprehensible to men behind the lines-service troops and civilians."
Mind you this is not an excuse for what these Marines did but it does offer an explanation for the act that they committed to video that we view without any context as to what led up to the incident or what they had been through. It seems that people are rushing to judgement and that this will be compared to Abu Ghraib as a defining image of the Afghanistan as much as Abu Ghraib became symbolic of Iraq. This is despite the fact that apart from being committed to video they are different. The Marines were infantrymen in one of the most desolate and dangerous combat zones of Afghanistan and the Abu Ghraib soldiers were jailers that had complete control of the prisoners. There is a major difference between the actions as deplorable as both are.
I see the American wounded every day, Marines and Sailors whose lives have been radically changed by service in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have seen horrors committed by Taliban, Al Qaida and other insurgents against their comrades as well as against Iraqi and Afghan civilians. The war is every bit as brutal as was waged in the Pacific and they fight a brutal and unforgiving enemy that is intent on driving the infidels out of Afghanistan.
The uncomfortable fact is that an incredibly small number of Americans are fighting a war that at best will be a draw and quite probably a strategic and political defeat despite our troops not losing any battles. The fact is that the action of these Marines will be used to not only prosecute them but to demonize them just as the actions of Lieutenant William Calley and his platoon at My Lai were used to demonize the Americans that fought in Vietnam. The sad truth is that most of those that will engage in such demonization have never served in harm's way or even known military service. Sledge wrote of critics of the Marines following the Second World War:
"In the post-war years, the U.S. Marine Corps came in for a great deal of undeserved criticism in my opinion, from well-meaning persons who did not comprehend the magnitude of stress and horror that combat can be. The technology that developed the rifle barrel, the machine gun and high explosive shells has turned war into prolonged, subhuman slaughter."
I know that a thorough investigation will be conducted and that we will find out what happened in this unit that caused this obvious breakdown in discipline. Right now we don't know who even posted the video on the internet and why they did so. Hopefully this is an isolated incident otherwise the incident will only grow in significance. During the investigation as well as news reports and interviews we will learn about the individual Marines involved in this action as well as their leaders. It will likely be uncomfortable and sad to watch. It could well damage the reputation of the Marine Corps in the eyes of many even if it is an isolated incident. What happened has already and will continue to reverberate here and in Afghanistan for a long time to come. I just wish that we our media and politicians were as wise as Ernie Pyle and Eugene Sledge in judging these men as individuals before we know the whole story.
As someone that has served with Marines in harm's way and know something of the stress that small teams of Marines can experience I have mixed feelings on this. I cannot approve of desecrating the remains of any human being at the same time I wonder what happened before this that might have contributed to the incident. Of course we will hear more details than we want.
P.S. I have written a number of articles about the political, ideological strategic and moral aspects of war which I have listed here:
War Without Mercy: Race, Religion, Ideology and Total War
Why History Matters: The Disastrous Effects of Long Insurgency Campaigns on the Nations that Wage them and the Armies that Fight Them
The Ideological War: How Hitler's Racial Theories Influenced German Operations in Poland and Russia
Filed under iraq,afghanistan, Military, national security, News and current events
Tagged as 3rd bn 2nd marines, abu ghraib, afghanistan video, afghanistan war, battle rattle blog, combat stress reaction, dan lamothe, e b sledge, effect of war on soldiers, ernie pyle, helmand province, iraq war, lt william calley, major general john toolan, marine corps times, my lai, my lai massacre, taliban, the pacific hbo mini-series, US Marine Corps, war crimes, war without mercy, with the old breed
French Mobile Group in Indochina
"Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 'have his head examined,' as General [Douglas] MacArthur so delicately put it." Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
The effects of the wars Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam on the French and American military organizations internally and in relationship to their nations piqued my interest in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced me to start asking the question of what short and long term effect that these wars might have on the U.S. military. As such I wondered what historical precedent that there was for the question. My interest was furthered by my deployment with Marine and Army advisors to Iraqi Army and Security forces in 2007-2008. My search led to the French experiences in Indo-China and Algeria and the American experience in Vietnam. Recently with the Iraq war winding down and ongoing war in Afghanistan which has gone from apparent victory to mounting concern that we are losing the war in Afghanistan as Taliban and Al Qaida have regained momentum amid widespread corruption by the Afghan government and weakness of NATO forces.
The counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the French and American militaries in Vietnam and Algeria had deep and long lasting effects on them as did the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The effects included developments in organization and tactics, relationship of the military to the government and people, and sociological changes. The effects were tumultuous and often corrosive. The French Army in Algeria revolted against the government. The US Army, scarred by Vietnam went through a crisis of leadership and confidence which eventually resulted in end of the draft and formation the all volunteer military. The Soviet not only lost their war but they saw their country collapse and the military with it. The effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are yet unknown but could result in similar situations to the militaries and governments involved.
French Surrender at Dien Bien Phu
There is a wealth of data regarding these wars. There are several types of materials. The accounts of soldiers, diplomats and reporters who experienced these events contained in memoirs and diaries. The best include David Hackworth's About Face and Steel My Soldiers Hearts; and General Harold Moore's We Were Soldiers Once… and Young. French works include Jules Roy's The Battle of Dien Bien Phu and General Paul Aussaresses' The Battle of the Casbah. There are innumerable popular accounts written by NCOs and junior officers. These accounts may contain a wealth of information, but are limited by a number of factors. First, the authors, veterans of the wars, only saw part of the overall picture and first-hand experience in war can skew a writer's objectivity. Those who have been through the trauma of war interpret war through their own experience. Physical and psychological wounds can have a major impact on the interpretation of these writers as can their experience and political ideology. Finally few of these writers are trained historians. Despite this they can be a valuable resource for the historian.
Viet Minh Main Force Soldiers
Another source is found in the official histories written by the military forces involved in the wars. Often these incorporate unit histories and individual narratives and analyze specific battles and the wider campaigns, but do little in regard to broader conditions that affected operations. While a good source, many are not as critical of their institutions as they should be.
Histories by trained historians and journalists provide another view. The most insightful of the journalist accounts include Bernard Fall' Street Without Joy and The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place. A limitation of all of these is that they are often heavily influenced by the political and societal events. This means that earlier accounts are more likely to be reactive and judgmental versus critical and balanced. Later accounts have the benefit of access to the opposing side and documents not available to earlier writers. Alistair Horn in A Savage War of Peace provides one of the most informative and balanced accounts of the war in Algeria. Martin Winslow does the same regarding Dien Bien Phu in The Last Valley.
Foreign Legion in Algeria
Another source is the writings of participants who critically examine their participation in the wars. Many of these, French and American provide insights into the minds of leaders who are reflective and critically examine what happened to their military institutions in these wars. The best of these is French Colonel David Galula whose books Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice provide first-hand accounts of the subject combined with critical reflection. Galula's works have been important to John Nagl, General David Petreus and others who helped write the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency manual. Andrew Krepinevich in The Army and Vietnam provides a critical analysis of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Other sources, both online and print, such as RAND, provide excellent analysis of selected topics within the scope of this essay, especially COIN.
Battles in the Streets of Algiers
The ability to dispassionately and critically examine and evaluate these sources over a period of several years was and integrate them with my own experience has been a critical to me. It has changed the way that I look at sources, and caused me to be much more aware of bias, the limitations of sources and the need to have a multiplicity of sources and points of view and to be suspicious of contemporary reports and accounts of the war in Afghanistan regardless of the source.
The conflicts in French Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam had major effects on the French and American military institutions. These effects can be classified in a number of ways. First, the manner in which each military waged war, including tactics employed and use and development of weapons systems was changed. The use of airpower, especially helicopters and use of riverine forces provided an added dimension of battlefield mobility but did not bring victory. As John Shy and Thomas Collier noted regarding the French in Indo-China: "French mobility and firepower could take them almost anywhere in Vietnam, but they could not stay, and could show only wasted resources and time for their efforts."[1]
Assassination and Terrorism in Algiers
The use of intelligence and psychological warfare, including the use of torture became common practice in both the French and American armies. The wars had an effect on the institutional culture of these armed services; neither completely embraced the idea of counterinsurgency and for the most part fought conventionally. Galula notes how the "legacy of conventional thinking" slowed the implementation of proper counterinsurgency tactics even after most commanders learned that "the population was the objective."[2] Krepinevich notes that "any changes that might have come about through the service's experience in Vietnam were effectively short-circuited by Army goals and policies."[3] Finally the wars had a chilling effect on the relationship between the both militaries and the state, veterans from each nation often felt betrayed or disconnected from their country and people. Unfortunately instances of all of these have occurred or can be seen in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
US Army in Vietnam
The French Army had the misfortune of fighting two major insurgencies back to back. The French military was handicapped even before it went into these wars. The Army came out of World War II defeated by the Germans, divided by loyalties to Vichy or one of the Free French factions. They were humiliated by the Japanese in Indo-China, while in Algeria France's crushing defeat was devastating. "Muslim minds, particularly sensitive to prestige and baraka, the humiliation made a deep impression."[4] French society was as divided as the Army; the economy in shambles, the government weak and divided. The Viet-Minh had prepared well making use of time and training to get ready for war. "Once full-scale hostilities broke out, the French, for budgetary and political reasons could not immediately make the large scale effort to contain the rebellion in the confines of small-scale warfare."[5]
Paras of the 1st Colonial Parachute Regiment jump in Algeria
In both Indo-China and Algeria the French attempted to fight the budding insurgencies in a conventional manner. This was particularly disastrous in Indo-China when on a number of occasions battalion and regimental combat team sized elements were annihilated by Viet-Minh regulars. Between October 1st and 17th 1950 every French garrison along the Chinese border was over-run. The French lost over 6000 troops and enough equipment to outfit "a whole additional Viet-Minh division." It was their worst colonial defeat since Montcalm at Quebec.[6] In Algeria when the fight began in earnest France's "ponderous ponderous N.A.T.O forces found themselves at an impossible disadvantage,"[7] unable to have any influence off the main roads.
Marcel Bigard: One of the most effective French commanders in Indochina and Algeria
In Vietnam the French did not absorb the lessons of fighting a well established insurgent force. French forces hoped to draw the Viet-Minh main forces into battles of attrition where their superior firepower could be brought to bear. Such was the case at Na San in December 1952 where the French established an "Air ground base" deep in Viet-Minh territory to draw Giap's forces into open battle. This worked, but just barely. General Giap, short of artillery and not planning on a long battle frittered away his troops in mass charges. However, the French, because of Na Son assumed they had found the key to victory. In their embrace of the "air ground base concept, French staff officers were following an intellectual tradition that had long been prone to seduction by elegant theories."[8] The result was the disaster at Dien Bien Phu the following year. The destruction of the elite Group-mobile 100 near Pleiku in 1954 was the coup de grace. In Indo-China the French made limited use of helicopters, used paratroops widely, and developed riverine forces. One thing they were critically short of was significant tactical air support.[9]
Roger Trinquier helped develop tactics in Indochina which helped turn the tide in Algeria, until the French Government ended the war leaving their soldiers to feel betrayed
The most inventive French creation in Indochina was the GCMA/GMI forces composed of mountain tribesmen led by French NCOs and Junior Officers. They were designed to provide "permanent guerilla groups rooted in remote areas" to harass and interdict Viet-Minh forces.[10] Trinquier noted that at the time of the Dien Bien Phu defeat that these forces had reached over 20,000 trained and equipped maquis in the Upper Region of Tonkin and Laos. These forces achieved their greatest success retaking Lao Cai and Lai Chau May 1954 as Dien Bien Phu fell.[11] Trinquier stated that "the sudden cessation of hostilities prevented us from exploiting our opportunities in depth."[12] The GMI units and their French leaders were abandoned fighting on for years after the defeat. One account noted a French NCO two years after the defeat cursing an aircraft patrolling the border "for not dropping them ammunition so they could die like men."[13] In the end the French left Indo-China and Giap remarked to Jules Roy in 1963 "If you were defeated, you were defeated by yourselves."[14]
Algeria was different being part of Metropolitan France; there the French had support of European settlers, the pieds-noir. Many French soldiers had come directly from Indo-China. There French made better adaptations to local conditions, and realized that they had to win the population and isolate the insurgents from it and outside support. As Galula said, victory is the destruction of the insurgent's political and military structures, plus "the permanent isolation from the population, not forced upon the population, but by and with the population."[15] The lessons learned by the French in both Algerian and Indo-China were lost upon the Americans.
US Armored Cavalry in Vietnam
The United States military, especially the Army approached the Vietnam War with a conventional mindset, referred to as the "Army concept." [16] It not only approached the war in this manner, but it trained and organized the South Vietnamese forces, ARVN into the American model. Americans re-organized ARVN into divisions "based upon the U.S. divisional force structure."[17] Due to the imposition of an American template and organizational structure upon it, ARVN was not structured appropriately for the threat that it faced."[18] The results were as to be expected. Large numbers of American troops poured in taking the lead against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong . The American method of counterinsurgency was costly. It was "almost a purely military approach"[19] which ignored political and social realities on the ground. Instead of focusing on protecting the Vietnamese people and denying the Communists a safe haven the Army in particular believed that massive firepower was the best means to be "utilized by the Army to achieve the desired end of the attrition strategy-the body count."[20] In the end the American defeat was a "failure of understanding and imagination."[21] The one shining success was the Marine Corps experimentation with "Combined Action Program" platoons which lived in the villages with militia for long periods of time. This program produced great results "in eliminating local guerillas"[22] but was killed by the Army.
US and ARVN Soldiers in Joint Operation
These wars tore the heart out French and American armies. For the French the defeats inflicted a terrible toll. In Indo-China many French career soldiers felt that the government's "lack of interest in the fate of both thousands of missing French prisoners and loyal North Vietnamese…as dishonorable."[23] Divisions arose between those who served and those who remained in France or Germany and created bitter enmity between soldiers. France would endure a military coup which involved many who had fought in Vietnam and Algeria. Having militarily won that war, were turned into what Jean Lartenguy called The Centurions had been turned into liars."[24] They were forced to abandon those who they had fought for and following the mutiny, tried, imprisoned, exiled or disgraced. Colonial troops who remained loyal to France were left without homes in their "independent" nations. They saw Dien Bien Phu as the defining moment. "They responded with that terrible cry of pain which pretends to free a man from his sworn duty, and promises such chaos to come: 'Nous sommes trahis!'-'We are betrayed.'"[25]
War Protests in the United States
The U.S. Army left Vietnam and returned to a country deeply divided by the war. Vietnam veterans remained ostracized by the society until the 1980s. As Harold Moore recounts "in our time battles were forgotten, our sacrifices were discounted, and both our sanity and suitability for life in polite American society were publically questioned." [26] The Army endured a massive reorganization that resulted in the formation of the All-Volunteer force, which would redeem itself and emerge from the ashes in the Gulf War.
Taliban in Afghanistan
The Americans would not learn the lessons of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency until forced to do so in Iraq in 2004-2007. These lessons however were not applied to Afghanistan and the Taliban which seemed to have been defeated have regained the initiative, policy is being debated amid discord in the west and there are reports of American and NATO forces becoming discouraged by the course of the war and concern that their efforts will be in vain. This is a dangerous situation to be in and if we learn from anything from our own history as well as that of foreign military forces in Afghanistan we need to be very careful in implementing strategy to get whatever we do right.
US Advisers with Afghanistan National Army Troops
The greatest success of the war was finally killing the leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden at his Pakistani hide-out. That did not occur in Afghanistan and was the result of smart work by the CIA and other American intelligence services and the superb conduct of the mission by Navy SEAL Team Six. It was not the product of our costly counter-insurgency and nation building campaign in Afghanistan. There are many professional think tank "experts" that now urge continuing the Afghan mission indefinitely despite its massive cost and questionable strategic value. The costs of the war which are over 2 billion dollars a week are staggering with little to be shown from the hundreds of billions already spent in Afghanistan, much of which is spent on projects where corrupt Afghan government officials and tribal leaders are the only ones to benefit. Likewise the long term health of the military is imperiled. The money that should go to modernizing the force and replacing equipment worn out by war as well as the enormous costs in lives and the continuing care needed by military personnel wounding in body, mind and spirit remaining on active duty and those in the Veteran's Administration system are imperiled.
Remote Training Team Base in Afghanistan
The effects of the wars in French Indochina, Algeria and Vietnam on the French and American military establishments were long lasting and often tragic. The acceptance of torture as a means to an end sullied even the hardest French officers. Men like Galula and Marcel Bigeard refused to countenance it, while others like Paul Aussaresses never recanted. Americans would repeat the tactic at Abu Ghraib rallying the Iraqis against them and nearly losing the war because of it.
Soviet Paratroops in Afghanistan
For the Americans, the effects of Vietnam continued at home. Race riots tore at the force while drug addictions and criminal activities were rampant. Many incompetent leaders who had "ticket punched" their careers kept their jobs and highly successful leaders who became whistle blowers like Hackworth were scorned by the Army institution. The years following Vietnam were a severe test of the US Military and took years for the military to recover. Likewise it took years before either the French or American veterans again felt a part of their countries. They ended up going to war, and when it was over; feeling abandoned, their deepest bonds were to their comrades who had fought by their side.
Osama Bin Laden leading Mujaheddin in 1984
If this is not enough we have the experiences of the Soviet Union, the British Empire and others that have attempted to rule Afghanistan as plumb lines to gauge our effectiveness. Others have tried and failed miserably at this. The Soviets learned the hard way and found that Afghanistan was one of the major reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reading the history of Soviet operations in Afghanistan is frighteningly like reading the history of our campaign.
Two Soviet Mi-24 "Hind" attack helicopters flying in an Afghan Valley
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 they used their 40th Army which initially was composed of "two motorized rifle divisions, an airborne division, an air assault brigade and separate motorized rifle regiments."[27] These forces totaled about 52,000 troops and were "considered sufficient to guarantee the viability of Afghanistan."[28] The 40th Army was a standard Cold War Soviet Combined Arms Army designed for high tempo conventional operations. It was not designed for nor trained in counterinsurgency operations or what the Soviets and Russians class as "anti-guerilla operations." It was poorly suited to mountain and dessert combat and at the beginning "not only had no practical skills in the conduct of counter-guerilla warfare, they also did not have a single well-developed theoretical manual, regulation or tactical guideline for fighting such a war."[29]
Downed Soviet Mi-4 "Hound" with Mujaheddin
The Soviets did not expect to be involved in combat operations and the Afghan population reacted to their presence with resistance which spread across the country both against their own government which they viewed as a puppet of the Soviets but also against the Soviet Forces. As time went on the Soviets attempted to use raids and large scale operations to attempt to bring Mujahidin forces to battle, however the insurgents were very skillful and the Soviets attempted to increase the training of their forces as well as their numbers. By 1986 the numbers on the ground had increased to 108,000 personnel in four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments and six separate battalions.[30] In the nearly 10 years of operations over a half million Soviet soldiers and support personnel served in Afghanistan. Tours for enlisted personnel who were primarily conscripts served 12-18 months in country and officers 2 years. Few returned for subsequent tours meaning that the 40th Army had few personnel very familiar with the country, its people and the challenges faced by Soviet forces. According to official sources the 40th Army suffered 13,833 killed in action or died of wounds, 49,985 wounded and 311 missing in action a figured of 1 in 8 Soviet Soldiers being casualties. 14.3 percent of the casualties were officers.[31] Of course the official figure is doubted many believing the number killed in action or died of wounds to be closer to 26,000.[32]
Soviet T-62 Tank guarding a convoy in a mountain pass
Like their American and French counterparts the Soviet veterans have experienced the unhealed wounds of war and a country that does not understand their experiences. The stigma of war wounds and PTSD haunt many Soviet veterans and were compounded by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in 1989. They returned home, lost their country and were by and large abandoned by their countrymen. A good number of these men and women travel to one of 5 centers across the country where according to one of the veterans come to for "social and psychological help." He said that "The best thing about this place is that it provides us with a chance to share our Afghan memories with comrades who understand what we are talking about." That camaraderie of being able to share their experiences with others that understand is helping some to return to something akin to "normal" life. They are joined by the soldiers that have experienced similar things in Chechnya. Russian veterans of the Afghan War are still so closely linked to it that they refer to themselves as "Afghans."
Soviet Mi-8 "Hip" Helicopters in Afghanistan preparing for a mission
The Soviet Forces supported the Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which numbered at their peak on average between 120,000-150,000 soldiers.[33] The Afghan forces, then as now were at the mercy of tribal, familial and communist party affiliations. Over 70 percent of the DRA was conscripted, desertions averaged 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers a month and units were usually optimistically 25-40 percent under their TO&E strength.[34]Limitations on training and leadership meant that typically DRA units could not conduct large scale missions without Soviet help. As such most of the fighting was done by Soviet formations.
Soviet Troops preparing to leave Afghanistan
Many of these problems have plagued the United States and ISAF throughout the first 9 years of the current Afghan War. As former Afghanistan Commander General Stanley McChrystal noted in his assessment "ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with the challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current culture and how we operate."[35]
We should have learned. A retired Red Army Colonel who served in Afghanistan from 1986-1988 who learned the Dari language in order to negotiate with the Afghan Mujahedeen warned what will happen when the Americans and NATO leave the country and the mistake that we made in entering Afghanistan. Frants Klinsevich now a member of the Russian Parliament comment to reporters at a wreath laying ceremony at a veteran's convention that "they (NATO and the United States) are 100 percent repeating the same mistake we made by entering into a war in that country" and that "As soon as the Americans and Europeans leave, the Taliban will crack down on everything." Klinsevich noted that he understood the American desire to tame Afghanistan but that "the problem of radical Islam will not be solved there, its violence cannot be solved. It is simply unsolvable." He said that he wished that the United States had consulted the Russians about Afghanistan saying "they should have invited Russian specialists, involved Russia, really studied how they could use Russia. But unfortunately Americans think they know everything." The former Russian commander understands far more that the majority of American policy makers on this subject. [36]
The fact is that we are hamstrung by the ongoing wars which limit our ability to respond to rapidly changing situations. We are in a similar situation to the Germans in 1942 and 1943 overcommitted, overstretched and lacking true strategic depth to respond to unanticipated situations as are now occurring across the Middle East. In 1942 and 1943 the Germans were always just short of the forces that would have turned the tide. Like the Germans our economy is laboring on the verge of collapse and we have to honestly answer the question "What is the strategic value in continuing to wage war in Afghanistan in the way that we are doing?"
What are the lessons to be learned from these campaigns as well as from the various accounts? Andrew Krepinevich prophetically noted that the failure to learn the lessons of Vietnam "represents a very dangerous mixture that in the end may see the Army again attempting to fight a conventional war against a very unconventional opponent."[37] Obviously, there are lessons to be learned, especially in understanding the nature of revolutionary war as well as the culture and history of our opponents. The U.S. has made some improvement in this regard but there is still much to be learned, especially since after the war the Army was "erecting barriers to avoid fighting another Vietnam War."[38] From these wars we learn that nations and incompetent governments who mismanage wars can alienate themselves from the soldiers that they send to fight, with serious consequences. As far as historiography we learn that certain historical fallacies are evident when one reads the accounts critically and recognize the bias and limitations of the various sources.
The fact is that we have learned little about such wars and are paying a terrible price for it. The debate now is should we continue the war as it is with minor withdraws of troops or begin a rapid exit in order to preserve and rebuild our force and to reduce the cost of these operations. But that debate and decision are well above my pay grade. But then maybe we need to remember what Field Marshall Gerd Von Rundstedt told his staff in September of 1944 when asked how to recover from the disastrous collapse of the German front following the Allied breakout from Normandy and dash across France. "Make peace you fools." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ch56NAL1C-I
[1] Shy, John and Collier, Thomas W. "Revolutionary War" in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age," Peter Paret editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1986 p.849
[2] Galula, David. Counterinsurgency in Algeria: 1956-1958. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 2006. First published by RAND in 1963. p.244
[3] Krepinevich, Andrew F. "The Army and Vietnam," The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986 p.213
[4] Horn, Alistair. "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962," a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006 p 41
[5] Fall, Bernard B. "Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina."Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961 p.27
[6] Ibid. p.33
[7] Horn. p.100.
[8] Windrow, Martin. "The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam," Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004 p.63
[9] Fall, Bernard B. "The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place." Da Capo Press, New York an unabridged reprint of the 1st Edition reprinted in arrangement with Harper and Row Publishers, New York. 1967 pp. 456-457 Fall discusses in depth the lack of French Air support and the antecedents that led to the shortage following World War II.
[10] Pottier, Philippe(2005)'Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War', Small Wars & Insurgencies,16:2,125 — 146http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079874
[11] Simpson, Howard K. "Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot,"Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey's Inc. 1994 pp. 170-171
[12] Trinquier, Roger. "Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency," translated from the French by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall. Praeger Security International, Westport CT and London. 1964 and 2006. Originally published under the title "La Guerre Moderne" by Editions Table Ronde. p.87
[13] Windrow. p.652.
[14] Roy, Jules. "The Battle of Dien Bien Phu" Carrol and Graf Publishers, New York 1984. Translated from the French by Robert Baldrick. English translation copyright 1965 by Harper and Row Publishers, New York. p.xxx
[15] Galula, David. "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice."Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006 p. 54
[16] Krepinevich. p.213
[17] Ibid. p.24
[18] Nagl, John A. "Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam," University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005 p.138
[19] Shy. p.856
[21] Spector, Ronald H. "After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam," Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993 p.314
[22] Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. "For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America." The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984 p.555
[23] Windrow. p.655
[24] Ibid. p.657
[26] Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. "We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam," Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992 p. xx
[27] The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost" translated and edited by Lester A. Grau and Michael A. Gress, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS 2002 p.17.
[32] Ibid. p.xix
[34] Ibid. pp.48-51
[35] McChrystal, Stanley. "Commander's Initial Assessment Commander International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan" dated 30 August 2009 pp. 1-2
[36] "Russian veteran warns of Afghan violence." Reuters 16 May 2011. Edited by Paul Tait and Daniel Magnowski obtained 11 June 2011 at http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/interview-russian-veteran-warns-of-unsolvable-afghan-violence/
Filed under Foreign Policy, History, iraq,afghanistan, middle east, Military, Political Commentary, vietnam, world war two in europe
Tagged as 5th fleet aor, 9-11 attacks, a bridge too far, a savage war of peace, about face, abu ghraib, afghan army, afghanistan, afghanistan casualties, air ground base concept, al qaida, algeria, alistair horne, Andrew Krepinevich, arvn, barak obama, bernard fall, carrier requirement for 5th fleet, chinese communists, COIN, combined action platoons, combined arms army, cost of war, counterinsurgency, david galula, david hackworth, democratic republic of Afghanistan, dien bien phu, erwin rommel, Frants Klinsevich, french army, french indochina, french wwii defeat, GCMA/GMI forces, General David Petreus, general giap, general harold "hal" moore, gerd von rundstedt, great britain, group mobile 100, intelligence and psychological warfare, iraq, iraq casualties, iraq war, isaf, jean lartenguy, jules roy, marcel bigeard, martin winslow, mcchrystal assessment, meu, middle east, mohammed karzai, na son, nato, north vietnamese, oef casualties, ostraciztion of vietnam veterans, Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, paul assaresses, pieds-noir, pleiku, RAND corporation, roger trinquier, secretary of defense robert gates, south vietnam, soviet casualties in afghanistan, soviet union, soviet veterans of afghanistan, soviet-afghan war, stanley mcchrystal, steel my soldiers hearts, strategic depth, street without joy, sun tzu, taliba, taliban, the army and vietnam, The Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, the battle of dien bien phu, The Battle of the Casbah, the centurions, the last valley, the siege ofdien bien phu: hell in a very small place, The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost", torture, us army, US Marine Corps, veterans administration, vichy france, viet cong, viet minh, vietnam, von rundstedt end the war quote, war on terrorism, we were soldiers once and young
May 5, 2011 · 23:00
Living in the Bizzaro Post Osama Bin Laden World: Another Denny Crane Moment for Padre Steve
Note to readers: Another of my Denny Crane moments which seem to be coming more likely, must be the Mad Cow
"Why don't you knock it off with them negative waves? Why don't you dig how beautiful it is out here? Why don't you say something righteous and hopeful for a change?" Oddball -Kelly's Heroes
I love that quote and everyone in this country needs to see the truth of it.
I think that I have stepped into the Bizzaro World. For the first time in a nearly ten year old war we get a real victory. Will killed the SOB who started it by killing thousands of our people. We do it the old fashioned mano on mano, look him in the eyes way and had Navy SEALS double tap him. We minimize the collateral damage by not plastering the place with bombs killing lots of other people. The President and the National Security team kept the plan a secret for months with no leaks that could have jeopardized Bin Laden's elimination. Likewise the uncompromised raid secured major intelligence bonanza including laptops, hard drives, cell phones and documents that probably have more raw and up to date intelligence from the source than we ever have had which likely lead to major victories against Bin Laden's fellow Al Qaeda leaders and their organization, finances and maybe even their contacts with other nations intelligence services. Such information will make it a far easier task to take the Al Qaeda organization apart at the seams. This is a victory that combined with pro-democracy revolutions across the Arab World could very well make the Middle East and the world a far safer place. There are dangers out there but this is something to celebrate so why can't we be happy? I know that some people are but as a nation we are not a happy bunch.
We have been through two terribly long was that have cost of thousands of dead and tens of thousands wounded. The military aspects of the wars alone have cost the nation well over a trillion dollars not counting the other economic costs. The 9-11 attacks created a massive wound on the American psyche which has been aggravated by our losses in the wars and the failure to kill or capture Bin Laden. We have given up a significant number of civil liberties in the name of security. The collective impact of these events compounded by the embarrassment of Abu Ghraib and the "Afghanistan "Kill Team" episodes the escapades of contractors like Blackwater and Kellogg Brown and Root- Halliburton have stained our conscience. Coupled with our massive economic problems and poisoned political climate these wars and losses have beaten us down.
Rather than be happy that we finally got one in the "win column" we have become so used to losing that we have forgotten that it is okay to win once in a while. Instead of thanking God that Osama Bin Laden is bottom feeder food in the Arabian Sea and is now rehearsing for the 2011 South Park "Christmas Time in Hell" musical joining Saddam Hussein and Hitler as they use their asbestos water skis on the Lake of Fire we are all glum or pissed off. Some are wringing their hands because Bin Laden was unarmed and didn't have a lot of security around him and that in the heat of the moment the SEALS double tapped his sorry ass. What the hell? Did they want a firefight that would have gotten a bunch of SEALS killed? Was it fair that he was unarmed but reaching for a gun when we capped his ass? But then was it fair to the 3000 people killed in the Twin Towers when Bin Laden directed the attack on those unarmed people?
Then there are people questioning the legality of the action. Sorry Bin Laden was a man that never stopped plotting the deaths of innocent people to the end of his days. While it might have been interesting to put him on trial you can be assured that some would have provided millions if not billions of dollars for his defense and that the proceedings would have dragged on at least a decade and that his allies would have gained inspiration from his incarceration just as they will his death. Those who question the fact that a SEAL shot him when he was unarmed does not understand the inherent danger in the action and split second decision making that went into that courageous man's decision to kill Bin Laden. Legally Bin Laden as a terrorist was accorded no protections under the Geneva Conventions.
Then there are the Christian objectors, those on the left that say he should have been captured and put on trial. Some Evangelicals that really don't care that he was killed but don't think that Christians should be happy about it or rejoice in his death. But I remember some of these same people smugly saying that the 9-11 attacks were "God's judgment on the United States." I'm sorry but many supposedly conservative Christians are schizophrenic on being pro life. Kill the unborn it's murder. Kill a man convicted in a state court in the United States on the basis of circumstantial evidence is okay, especially if you are from Texas where I think it's popularity is slightly below football and NASCAR. Have a terrorist kill 3000 of your countrymen, well God must be pissed at us but kill the man responsible for those deaths and be happy he's dead? Nope can't do that we should be sad that he died without knowing the Lord. Yes it is a sad that anyone would die without knowing the Lord but this man had no desire to convert to Christianity or anything else. He was convinced of his rightness and he made no move to surrender to U.S. or Saudi authorities for nearly 20 years and still didn't in his final moments. He made his bed beneath the sea. I personally think this is simply people that need to be morally superior to others spouting their opinions rather than people that are inconsistent in their application of their faith and ethics to a wide variety of issues.
Now the politicians are making political hay over this. Some Liberals are pissed that Obama actually had the balls to order the strike. Some Conservatives are pissed that Obama succeeded in doing something that Bush couldn't do and that he didn't give Bush any credit. But it serves me well that Bush never gave Clinton any credit for keeping the pressure on Saddam Hussein and keeping him from really building up his forces after the Gulf War using no-fly zones, the UN oil embargo/blockade of Iraq and selective military strikes to keep Saddam in check. So this is all politics as usual and once again it is detrimental to the county and makes light of the sacrifices of all that have fallen in these wars and the bravery of the SEALS that killed Bin Laden.
This really is a Bizzaro world. When Hitler died this country got happy and that happiness spanned the political, philosophical and religious divides in the country. We celebrated Hitler's death and the destruction of his murderous regime. Back then we actually understood the importance of such events and didn't wring our hands and shed faux tears when evil men perished. But now after nearly 10 years of war and thousands of causalities we get the perfidious bastard that started this and our collective jock straps and panties are in a wad. I don't get it. The reason that we went to war is dead and we have information that probably will decimate what is left of his network and we can't be happy. This is bizarre and I wish that people would stop with all the negative waves.
Filed under faith, Foreign Policy, History, iraq,afghanistan, middle east, Military, national security, philosophy, Political Commentary
Tagged as 9-11 2001, 9-11 attacks, abortion, abu ghraib, adolf hitler, afghanistan war, arab spring, arab world, bin laden killed, bizzaro world, blackwater, christian reaction to bin laden death, christmas time in hell, cost of iraq afghanistan wars, death penalty, halliburton, iraq war, kelly's heroes, kill team, navy seals, nazi germany, osama bin laden, political spin, president barak obama, president bill clinton, president george w bush, reactions to bin laden killing, saddam hussein, south park, twin towers
9-11-2001: A Date that Will Live in Infamy 9 Years Later
On September 11th 2001 I was the Chaplain for Headquarters Battalion 2nd Marine Division, Camp LeJeune North Carolina. I first learned of the attacks as I was logging off of my computer to go to PT after a couple of counseling cases in the early morning. The headline I saw on Yahoo's home page was "Airplane crashes into World Trade Center." I simply figured from that that a private pilot had flown a small aircraft into on e of the buildings. I got to my car and when I turned on the engine a talk radio host was screaming "Another airline has crashed into the second tower." I don't even remember what talk show host that it was. My mind immediately went to terrorism as the cause thinking about the bombing of the USS Cole. I drove to the French Creek gym to see if there was anything on the televisions. When I arrived I saw the trade centers burning and Marines and Sailors crowded around in stunned silence or whispering to each other in muted tones. I returned to my office, showered, got my uniform on and drove to our Battalion Headquarters where Colonel Richard Lake was gathering the staff. Within hours the base was locked down with combat ready Marines patrolling possible danger areas and with hasty roadblocks and checkpoints established around the base. We were locked down for almost four days as things began to settle out. By December I was the Chaplain for the USS Hue City and deployed in February 2002 to support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Southern Watch. In 2007 and 2008 I was deployed to Iraq serving with the Iraq Assistance Group and Marine, Army and other advisors serving with the Iraqi 1st and 7th Divisions and other security forces fighting insurgents in Al Anbar Province. I have many friends that have deployed numerous times between the 9-11 attacks and today, some have been wounded and others killed. Many suffer the psychological and spiritual trauma of PTSD and Traumatic Brain injury. Even if we were to be able to end these wars today we would be dealing with the ravages of this long war. I still serve working among many continue to deploy and return as well as treat those traumatized by war. I will return to Camp LeJeune next month as the Command Chaplain of the Naval Hospital which takes care of the Marines and Sailors of the II Marine Expeditionary Force, much of which is deployed to Afghanistan. I cannot forget 9-11. These are my thoughts.
I remember exactly where I was on that terrible day known simply now as 9-11. The events of that day and in the following changed our lives and our country possibly forever. The images of that day are seared into our individual and collective consciousness as Americans and usually conjure up deep emotions of anger, sadness, grief and pain. The sheer magnitude of attacks, especially those on the World Trade Center towers covered on live television shocked and stunned the nation as the nation saw us transition from peace to war before its eyes.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otK7c3Ushjw&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IetZuu_seb8&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lKZqqSI9-s
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sczTcrRp1bY&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_irMA5umVM&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQyRjf3eumo
The attack on the Pentagon was also dramatic but because it was a military target the psychological impact on most Americans was less than the attack on the Trade Center towers.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fxV2X0vwSas
The images are still disconcerting and when watched show the genius of Bin Laden as he struck at great symbols of American power. Bin Laden did what no enemy had done previously striking so hard at such symbolic targets; he destroyed our sense of safety. Of course that sense of safety was an illusion all along as with the advent of ICBMs and long range bombers we have been within reach of our enemies. Likewise we had seen terrorists attack us before including a 1993 attack on the WTC designed to bring the building down. But this was different than all those that came before, for the first time Americans no longer felt safe behind the "moats" of the oceans that surround the country. For the first time since the War of 1812 a foreign enemy had struck at the heart of America on the Continental United States itself and unlike then the nation saw the attack unfold in real time together. Only the attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Navy on December 7th 1941 has had such an impact on us. We watched as near 3000 Americans and others died in the towers, at the Pentagon and aboard Flight 93. Some would say that we need to "get over" 9-11, but those that say such things do not understand the magnitude of the affect of the attacks on the soul of this nation.
The emotions generated by these attacks even 9 years later in are almost visceral because they are symptomatic of the deep and yet unhealed wounds suffered on that day. The attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and United Flight 93 perpetrated in the caves of Afghanistan by Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and executed by 19 terrorists who hijacked the four aircraft involved did more than destroy or damage landmarks and kill innocent people; they wounded our nation both psychologically and spiritually.
That day also created an immense desire to see the perpetrators brought to justice and set us on a course for war a war that has no end in sight even 9 years after the 9-11 attacks. To put this in perspective from Pearl Harbor to VJ Day was just under 3 years and 9 months and even Vietnam from the Gulf of Tonkin incident to the cease fire was only 8 years 4 months. The young men and women now enlisting as 18 year olds in our armed forces were 9 years old when the attacks occurred, kids that were in 3rd or 4th grade playing little league baseball, soccer, pee-wee football and playing with their X-Box, PS-2 or Game Cubes. Now these children serve in harm's way with many dying as the average age of our casualties is about 20 years old.
After the attack Americans banded together as Americans for the first time that I can remember. There were remembrances, prayer vigils and rallies to show our unity to the world. Congress even banded together in a rare display of unity spontaneously breaking into "God Bless America"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybc3SnhCWGk
Three days later President Bush rallied the country from "Ground Zero" as it became known. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiSwqaQ4VbA&feature=related
He threw out the first pitch in Game Three of the World Series at Yankee Stadium to the cheers of an energized New York crowd. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/2001/worldseries/news/2001/10/30/bush_ap/
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evb489N11Q4
Irish Tenor Ronan Tynan sang "God Bless America" which has become a fixture since then at Major and Minor League games. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAtRb5oY3oM&p=C7401126B05C2B6D&playnext=1&index=28
Within a month President Bush launched our military into an attack on Al Qaeda bases and those of their Taliban allies in Afghanistan. With the help of different Afghan Mujahidin groups US Special Forces, Marines and Paratroops had driven the Taliban out of power and were searching for Bin Laden. Although American forces came close at the battle of Tora Bora to catching Bin Laden he escaped along with the leader of the Taliban Mullah Omar. Eventually the effort in Afghanistan became secondary as the United States focused its attention on Iraq and became involved in a bloody insurgency against Al Qaeda allies as well as Iraqi militants of various types. Mistakes were made by the administration in disbanding the Iraqi Army, police and Civil Service following our 2003 invasion. On the ground some American soldiers at Abu Ghraib videotaped acts of torture on prisoners and detainees which found their way into the world wide press creating a firestorm reaction which made the war that much more difficult as it made those on the fence more likely to at least give the insurgents aid and support. That changed in 2007 the "Surge" of extra combat troops to implement a true counter-insurgency strategy aided by Iraq security forces and the Anbar Awakening where the Sunnis turned against Al Qaeda. Iraq still has major issues but in the long run will likely do well as the Iraqis take control of the country. I know that there are many people including some experts who doubt this but knowing a number of Iraqi senior officers of both Sunni and Shi'a Moslem factions and the history of modern Iraq which is one of secularism, I believe that Iraq will do fine.
The strategic problem with Iraq was that it diverted attention from Afghanistan where we had an early chance to drive out and keep out both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The loss of emphasis in Afghanistan allowed the Taliban to regroup and reestablish their control throughout much of the country. The other thing was that it created a situation that cost the US Military a large number of casualties and made it difficult to fulfill other commitments and contingencies.
Nine years later we are still at war, American Soldiers ream in Iraq helping the Iraqis manage their own security and American troops lead NATO and Afghan forces in a bloody war against the resurgent Taliban which has claimed as of today 1257 Americans on top of the 4404 lost in Iraq. http://projects.washingtonpost.com/fallen/
The war in Afghanistan has blown up over the past two years as the Taliban often aided by elements of Pakistani intelligence services take advantage of the corrupt and unpopular Afghan government. The Afghan government led by President Karzai who at best can be described as an unreliable ally in the war against the Taliban is barely able to influence events in the capitol Kubul, but less in outlying areas where the Taliban has established a formidable shadow government.
At home the United States seems to be at war with itself, no longer united but bitterly divided even as American military personnel lay down their lives overseas. A controversy rages about an Islamic Cultural Center and Mosque to be built not far from Ground Zero while Fundamentalist Christian pastors threat to burn copies of the Koran inciting more rage against Americans deployed in harm's way. The President is increasingly unpopular and the Congress even less so. Sentiment is building for wholesale change with some even talking of revolution or secession. It doesn't seem that either the builders of the so called "Ground Zero Mosque," its opponents and the hate filled pastors have any clue about the propaganda victories that they hand our enemies on a daily basis. In a world-wide insurgency, which this has become propaganda is often more important than military power.
It seems that Osama Bin Laden is succeeding in his goals. In 2004 Bin Laden said on a video "All we have to do is send two mujaheddin . . . to raise a small piece of cloth on which is written 'al-Qaeda' in order to make the generals race there, to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses." Bin Laden and his allies have seen us abandon some of deepest principles of freedom of speech, movement and association as the government tries to ensure that no more attacks take place. However as any student of terrorism knows there is no way to stop every terrorist attack. Eventually another will succeed and when it does we will see freedom curtailed even more. If the attack is large enough the real possibility exists of Martial Law.
As this transpires American Military personnel of every race, color, creed and political persuasion do battle with the enemy. At home other military units train and prepare for battle. Police, security and intelligence officers from a myriad of Federal and state agencies conduct the painstaking work of trying to figure out where the next attack is coming from and try to stop it. Since 9-11 they have been successful but the law of averages says that eventually another attack will succeed because Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists while small are always seeking ways to further terrorize Americans and other westerners.
All I can imagine now is that our current state of division will last until we are shocked out of it by something worse than 9-11. I hope and pray that cooler heads will prevail and somehow we will recover our sense of who we are as Americans that sense of "e pluribus Unum" "Out of many, One" will take the place of hyphenated America and Red States versus Blue States. Bin Laden would like for nothing more for us to continue to be at war with ourselves.
Today we mark 9-11 and I hope and pray that the lessons of 9-11 will not be forgotten and that both the losses of that day and sacrifices since will not be in vain. As for me and the rest of us in uniform we will continue to serve to preserve and defend this country and our most cherished ideals. May God have mercy on us all.
Filed under Loose thoughts and musings
Tagged as 2001 world series, 9-11 2001, 9-11 attack videos, 9-11 attacks, 9-11 news coverage, abu ghraib, afghanistan, afghanistan casualty numbers, al qaeda, anbar awakening, camp lejeune, cnn, congress, ii marine expeditionary force, iraq, iraq casualty numbers, mohammed karzai, operation enduring freedom, operation iraqi freedom, osama bin laden, pakistan, pentagon, president bush 2001 world series, president bush world trade center, president george w bush, president obama, ronan tynan, taliban, the surge, today show, united flight 93, uss hue city, world trade center, yankee stadium
October 26, 2009 · 23:36
Lessons for the Afghan War: The Effects of Counterinsurgency Warfare on the French Army in Indo-China and Algeria and the United States Military in Vietnam
Note: This is an article that I wrote for a class a year ago which has been updated in order to show the lessons of history that can be useful in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
French Foreign Legionnaires in Indo-China
The effects of the wars Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam on the French and American military organizations internally and in relationship to their nations piqued my interest in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced me to start asking the question of what short and long term effect that these wars might have on the U.S. military. As such I wondered what historical precedent that there was for the question. My interest was furthered by my deployment with Marine and Army advisors to Iraqi Army and Security forces in 2007-2008. My search led to the French experiences in Indo-China and Algeria and the American experience in Vietnam. Recently with the Iraq war winding down and ongoing war in Afghanistan which has gone from apparent victory to mounting concern that the effort could fail as the Taliban and Al Qaida have regained momentum amid widespread corruption by the Afghan government and weakness of NATO forces.
The counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the French and American militaries in Vietnam and Algeria had deep and long lasting effects on them. The effects included developments in organization and tactics, relationship of the military to the government and people, and sociological changes. The effects were tumultuous and often corrosive. The French Army in Algeria revolted against the government. The US Army, scarred by Vietnam went through a crisis of leadership and confidence which eventually resulted in end of the draft and formation the all volunteer military. The effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are yet unknown but could result in similar situations to the militaries and governments involved,
French at Dien Bien Phu
Analysis of the Issue
Viet Minh Supply Columns were Never Stopped by French Air power or Artillery
Joint US and ARVN Operation
French Prisoners after Dien Bien Phu: Many Survivors Would be Fighting in Algeria within Two Years
French Troops and Tanks in Indo-China: Road Bound Forces were often Defeated by Viet- Minh Forces
US Heavy Forces including Armor had Little Utility in Many Parts of Vietnam
The United States military, especially the Army approached the Vietnam War with a conventional mindset, referred to as the "Army concept." [16] It not only approached the war in this manner, but it trained and organized the South Vietnamese forces, ARVN into the American model. Americans re-organized ARVN into divisions "based upon the U.S. divisional force structure."[17] Due to the imposition of an American template and organizational structure upon it, ARVN was not structured appropriately for the threat that it faced."[18] The results were as to be expected. Large numbers of American troops poured in taking the lead against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong . The American method of counterinsurgency was costly. It was "almost a purely military approach"[19] which ignored political and social realities on the ground. Instead of focusing on protecting the Vietnamese people and denying the Communists a safe haven the Army in particular believed that massive firepower was the best means to be"utilized by the Army to achieve the desired end of the attrition strategy-the body count."[20] In the end the American defeat was a "failure of understanding and imagination."[21] The one shining success was the Marine Corps experimentation with "Combined Action Program" platoons which lived in the villages with militia for long periods of time. This program produced great results "in eliminating local guerillas"[22] but was killed by the Army.
NVA Main Forces
US Veterans of Vietnam Would Return to a Deeply Divided Country that turned its Back on Them for Years
The U.S. Army left Vietnam and returned to a country deeply divided by the war. Vietnam veterans remained ostracized by the society until the 1980s. As Harold Moore recounts "in our time battles were forgotten, our sacrifices were discounted, and both our sanity and suitability for life in polite American society were publically questioned."[26] The Army endured a massive reorganization that resulted in the formation of the All-Volunteer force, which would redeem itself and emerge from the ashes in the Gulf War. The Americans would not learn the lessons of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency until forced to do so in Iraq in 2004-2007. These lessons however were not applied to Afghanistan and the Taliban which seemed to have been defeated have regained the initiative, policy is being debated amid discord in the west and there are reports of American and NATO forces becoming discouraged by the course of the war and concern that their efforts will be in vain. This is a dangerous situation to be in and if we learn from anything from our own history as well as that of foreign military forces in Afghanistan we need to be very careful in implementing strategy to get whatever we do right.
Training Team Base in Afghanistan: Some of these Bases Have proven Vulnerable to Well Planned and Coordinated Taliban Attacks
The effects of these wars on the French and American military establishments were long lasting and often tragic. The acceptance of torture as a means to an end sullied even the hardest French officers. Men like Galula and Marcel Bigeard refused to countenance it, while others like Paul Aussaresses never recanted. Americans would repeat the tactic at Abu Ghraib rallying the Iraqis against them and nearly losing the war because of it.
[5] Fall, Bernard B. "Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina." Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961 p.27
[10] Pottier, Philippe(2005)'Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War', Small Wars & Insurgencies,16:2,125 — 146 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079874
[11] Simpson, Howard K. "Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot," Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey's Inc. 1994 pp. 170-171
[15] Galula, David. "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006 p. 54
Filed under History, iraq,afghanistan, Military, vietnam
Tagged as a savage war of peace, about face, abu ghraib, afghanistan, air ground base concept, al qaida, algeria, alistair horne, Andrew Krepinevich, arvn, bernard fall, COIN, combined action platoons, counterinsurgency, david galula, david hackworth, dien bien phu, french army, french indochina, french wwii defeat, GCMA/GMI forces, general giap, general harold "hal" moore, group mobile 100, intelligence and psychological warfare, iraq, jean lartenguy, jules roy, marcel bigeard, martin winslow, na son, nato, ostraciztion of vietnam veterans, Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, paul assaresses, pieds-noir, pleiku, RAND corporation, roger trinquier, south vietnam, steel my soldiers hearts, street without joy, taliba, the army and vietnam, the battle of dien bien phu, The Battle of the Casbah, the centurions, the last valley, the siege ofdien bien phu: hell in a very small place, torture, us army, US Marine Corps, vichy france, viet cong, viet minh, vietnam, we were soldiers once and young
The Effects of Counter-Insurgency Operations on U.S. and French Forces in Vietnam and Algeria and Implications for Afghanistan
1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment in Indo-China
The effects of the wars Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam on the French and American military organizations internally and in relationship to their nations piqued my interest in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced me to start asking the question of what short and long term effect that these wars might have on the U.S. military. As such I wondered what historical precedent that there was for the question. My interest was furthered by my deployment with Marine and Army advisors to Iraqi Army and Security forces in 2007-2008. My search led to the French experiences in Indo-China and Algeria and the American experience in Vietnam.
The counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the French and American militaries in Vietnam and Algeria had deep and long lasting effects on them. The effects included developments in organization and tactics, relationship of the military to the government and people, and sociological changes. The effects were tumultuous and often corrosive. The French Army in Algeria revolted against the government. The US Army, scarred by Vietnam went through a crisis of leadership and confidence which eventually resulted in end of the draft and formation the all volunteer military.
Primitive but Effective- Viet Minh Supply Column The French Could Never Stop them
There is a wealth of data regarding these wars. There are several types of materials. The accounts of soldiers, diplomats and reporters who experienced these events contained in memoirs and diaries. The best include David Hackworth's About Face and Steel My Soldiers Hearts; and General Harold Moore's We Were Soldiers Once… and Young. French works include Jules Roy's The Battle of Dien Bein Phu and General Paul Aussaresses' The Battle of the Casbah. There are innumerable popular accounts written by NCOs and junior officers. These accounts may contain a wealth of information, but are limited by a number of factors. First, many only saw part of the overall picture and first-hand experience can skew objectivity. Those who have been through the trauma of war interpret war through their own experience. Physical and psychological wounds can have a major impact on the interpretation of these writers as can their experience and political ideology. Finally few of these writers are trained historians. Despite this they can be a valuable resource for the historian.
Another source is official histories. Often these incorporate unit histories and individual narratives and analyze specific battles and the wider campaigns, but do little in regard to broader conditions that affected operations. While a good source, many are not as critical of their institutions as they should be. Histories by trained historians and journalists provide another view. The most insightful of the journalist accounts include Bernard Fall' Street Without Joy and The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place. A limitation of all of these is that they are often heavily influenced by the political and societal events. This means that earlier accounts are more likely to be reactive and judgmental versus critical and balanced. Later accounts have the benefit of access to the opposing side and documents not available to earlier writers. Alistair Horn in A Savage War of Peace provides one of the most informative and balanced accounts of the war in Algeria. Martin Winslow does the same regarding Dien Bien Phu in The Last Valley.
Isolated and Besieged Dien Bien Phu
The ability to dispassionately and critically examine and evaluate these sources over a period of several years was and integrate them with my own experience has been a critical to me. It has changed the way that I look at sources, and caused me to be much more aware of bias, the limitations of sources and the need to have a multiplicity of sources and points of view.
Effects of Insurgencies on the Armies that Fought Them
The conflicts in French Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam had major effects on the French and American military institutions. These effects can be classified in a number of ways. First, the manner in which each military waged war, including tactics and weapons systems was changed. The use of airpower, especially helicopters and use of Riverine forces provided an added dimension of battlefield mobility but did not bring victory. As John Shy and Thomas Collier noted regarding the French in Indo-China: "French mobility and firepower could take them almost anywhere in Vietnam, but they could not stay, and could show only wasted resources and time for their efforts."[1] The use of intelligence and psychological warfare, including the use of torture became common practice in both the French and American armies. The wars had an effect on the institutional culture of these armed services; neither completely embraced the idea of counterinsurgency and for the most part fought conventionally. Galula notes how the "legacy of conventional thinking" slowed the implementation of proper counterinsurgency tactics even after most commanders learned that "the population was the objective."[2] Krepinevich notes that "any changes that might have come about through the service's experience in Vietnam were effectively short-circuited by Army goals and policies."[3] Finally the wars had a chilling effect on the relationship between the both militaries and the state, veterans from each nation often felt betrayed or disconnected from their country and people.
Surrender at Dien Bien Phu
In Vietnam the French did not absorb the lessons of fighting a well established insurgent force. French forces hoped to draw the Viet-Minh main forces into battles of attrition where their superior firepower could be brought to bear. Such was the case at Na San in December 1952 where the French established an "Air ground base" deep in Viet-Minh territory to draw Giap's forces into open battle. This worked, but just barely. Giap, short of artillery and not planning on a long battle frittered away his troops in mass charges. However, the French, because of Na Son assumed they had found the key to victory. In their embrace of the "air ground base concept, French staff officers were following an intellectual tradition that had long been prone to seduction by elegant theories."[8] The result was the disaster at Dien Bien Phu the following year. The destruction of the elite Group-mobile 100 near Pleiku in 1954 was the coup de grace. In Indo-China the French made limited use of helicopters, used paratroops widely, and developed Riverine forces. One thing they were critically short of was significant tactical air support.[9]
The most inventive French creation was the GCMA/GMI forces composed of mountain tribesmen led by French NCOs and Junior Officers. They were designed to provide "permanent guerilla groups rooted in remote areas" to harass and interdict Viet-Minh forces.[10] Trinquier noted that at the time of the Dien Bien Phu defeat that these forces had reached over 20,000 trained and equipped maquis in the Upper Region of Tonkin and Laos. These forces achieved their greatest success retaking Lao Cai and Lai Chau May 1954 as Dien Bien Phu fell.[11] Trinquier stated that "the sudden cessation of hostilities prevented us from exploiting our opportunities in depth."[12] The GMI units and their French leaders were abandoned fighting on for years after the defeat. One account noted a French NCO two years after the defeat cursing an aircraft patrolling the border "for not dropping them ammunition so they could die like men."[13] In the end the French left Indo-China and Giap remarked to Jules Roy in 1963 "If you were defeated, you were defeated by yourselves."[14]
The United States military, especially the Army approached the Vietnam War with a conventional mindset, the "Army concept." [16] It not only approached the war in this manner, but it trained and organized the South Vietnamese forces, ARVN into the American model. Americans re-organized ARVN into divisions "based upon the U.S. divisional force structure."[17] ARVN was not structured appropriately for the threat that it faced."[18] The results were as to be expected. Large numbers of troops poured in, American counterinsurgency was costly. It was "almost a purely military approach"[19] which ignored political and social realities on the ground. Massive firepower was the means "utilized by the Army to achieve the desired end of the attrition strategy-the body count."[20] In the end the American defeat was a "failure of understanding and imagination."[21] The one shining moment was the Marine Corps experimentation with "Combined Action Program" platoons which lived in the villages with militia for long periods of time. This program produced great results "in eliminating local guerillas"[22] but was killed by the Army.
For both the French and Americans these wars tore the heart out of their armies. For the French the defeats inflicted a terrible toll. In Indo-China many French career soldiers felt that the government's "lack of interest in the fate of both thousands of missing French prisoners and loyal North Vietnamese…as dishonorable."[23] Divisions arose between those who served and those who remained in France or Germany and created bitter enmity between soldiers. France would endure a military coup which involved many who had fought in Vietnam and Algeria. Having militarily won that war, were turned into what Jean Lartenguy called 'the Centurions" had been turned into liars."[24] They were forced to abandon those who they had fought for and following the mutiny, tried, imprisoned, exiled or disgraced. Colonial troops who remained loyal to France were left without homes in their "independent" nations. They saw Dien Bien Phu as the defining moment. "They responded with that terrible cry of pain which pretends to free a man from his sworn duty, and promises such chaos to come: 'Nous sommes trahis!'-'We are betrayed.'"[25]
Joint US-ARVN Operation
The U.S. Army returned to a country deeply divided and Vietnam veterans remained ostracized until the 1980s. As Harold Moore recounts "in our time battles were forgotten, our sacrifices were discounted, and both our sanity and suitability for life in polite American society were publically questioned."[26] The Army endured a massive reorganization that resulted in the formation of the All-Volunteer force, which would redeem itself and emerge from the ashes in the Gulf War. The Americans would not learn the lessons of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency until forced to do so in Iraq in 2004-2007.
Conclusions and Possibilities
The effects of these wars on the French and American military establishments were long lasting and often tragic. The acceptance of torture as a means to an end sullied even the hardest French officers. Men like Galula and Marcel Bigeard refused to countenance it, while others like Paul Aussaresses never recanted. Americans would repeat the tactic at Abu Ghraib rallying the Iraqis against them.
For the Americans, the debacle continued at home. Race riots tore at the force while drug addictions and criminal activities were rampant. Incompetent leaders kept their jobs and highly successful leaders who became whistle blowers like Hackworth were scorned by the Army institution. It took years before either the French or American veterans again felt a part of their countries. They ended up going to war, and when it was over; feeling abandoned, their deepest bonds were to their comrades who had fought by their side.
In Iraq the U.S. adapted, albeit belatedly to the nature of the insurgency and took advantage of Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) over-reach in the manner that they abused the Iraqi people. The situation turned dramatically in September of 2007 when Al Qaeda killed the most prominent Sunni Sheik outside of Ramadi. The Sheik had begun to work with Americans on security issues and his death turned much of the Sunni populace in Al Anbar and other provinces against AQI for the first time allying them with the Sh'ia dominated government. Changing focus the U.S. Forces focused on safeguarding the population and building up the capabilities of Iraqi forces. Within months because of the increased security and stability in Al Anbar the U.S. Marine trained and Iraqi led forces of the 1st Iraqi Division were able to be moved to Basra where they retook the city from insurgent forces and to Diyala where they helped the government gain the upper hand. Success in Iraq did not come easy, American forces suffered their greatest losses since the Vietnam War in the cities, villages and countryside of Iraq. The U.S. is now in the process of drawing down as the Iraqis take over their own security. The process is not perfect as there still tension between Sunni and Sh'ia factions as well as Kurds and other minority ethnic groups. However it is still going better than most experts predicted.
The Author and Advisors with Iraqi Border Troops near Syria
Afghanistan is another matter. After early success in overthrowing the Taliban and isolating Al Qaeda the Americans and NATO pretty ran a status quo operation attempting to legitimize the Karzai government, eliminate the Opium poppy crops and establish government presence and security in outlying areas. There was a problem in this; both the Taliban and Al Qaeda used border sanctuaries in Pakistan and financial support from worldwide Moslem groups to continue the fight. As Al Qaeda and the Taliban built themselves up the Afghan government lost support. This loss of support was in large part due to rampant government corruption as well as to the perception of U.S. and NATO forces being occupiers and not liberators. This perception of the U.S. and NATO forces was in large part because they had ignored the lessons of French Indo-China, Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq. Isolated from the population the bulk of NATO forces performed in a reactionary manner and often used aircraft and artillery to respond to Taliban forces often killing non-combatants by mistake. Each time this happened, the Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders used the results to further bolster their image and portray the allies as the oppressors. As the Taliban took back much of the country they also returned to oppressive means to subdue the population by fear and intimidation.
Taliban Insurgents
The new American commander, General Stanley McChrystal has asked for more forces in order to run a proper counter-insurgency campaign which focuses on the security of the population to isolate the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Whether General McChrystal gets his forces and whether they are enough to turn the tide before all political and public support in the U.S. and NATO countries is lost is another matter. Right now the situation is tenuous at best. There are means to win this war despite the history of Afghanistan which suggests that this is not possible. The key is he Afghan population, if they believe that the U.S. and NATO are n their side, that we respect them, their culture, religion and that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are the real oppressors the war can be won. This requires patience, forethought and deliberate measures to secure the population, build up a government that they can trust and de-legitimatize Al Qaeda and the Taliban. If that does not happen, the U.S. and NATO run the risk of repeating the story of the French in Indo-China. Unlike AQI and Iraqi insurgents the Taliban are very capable of running military operations capable of defeating small to medium sized units in isolated locations. They know the terrain, often have the support of the people, are highly mobile and not dependant on roads and can mass quickly at critical points. Last year the Taliban launched a large scale assault on an American COP which came close to overrunning it. They were repelled with heavy casualties but the incident demonstrated a capability that is growing. What I would be concerned about is the total destruction of an isolated post or a convoy which could be used to demoralize western nations. While I do not think that the Taliban could pull off the defeat of a major US or NATO base or force as the Viet-Minh did at Dien Bien Phu but the threat should not be minimized.
USMC Training Team in Afghanistan
How we learn the lessons of past insurgencies and revolutionary wars is important in Afghanistan. The stakes are higher than most would want to admit. A withdraw would be seen by militants outside of Afghanistan would be emboldened just as the Algerians were by the loss of the French in Indo-China. It would again provide Al Qaeda with a safe haven and secure base of operations. The stakes are high. Who knows what will happen?
Aussaresses, Paul, "The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture," translated by Robert L Miller. Enigma Books, New York, 2005. Originally published in French under the title of "SERVICES SPECIAUX Algerie 1955-1957" Perrin 2001
Fall, Bernard B. "The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place." Da Capo Press, New York an unabridged reprint of the 1st Edition reprinted in arrangement with Harper and Row Publishers, New York. 1967
Fall, Bernard B. "Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina." Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961
Galula, David. "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006
Galula, David. "Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958." RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA 2006. Originally published by RAND 1963
Hackworth, David H. and Sherman, Julie. "About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior," a Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, New York. 1989
Horn, Alistair. "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962," a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006
Karnow, Stanley. "Vietnam, a History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War," The Viking Press, New York, 1983
Krepinevich, Andrew F. "The Army and Vietnam," The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986
Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. "For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America." The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984
Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. "We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam," Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992
Nagl, John A. "Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam," University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005
Nolan, Keith William. "The Battle for Hue: Tet 1968," Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1983
Pottier, Philippe (2005) Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War, Small Wars & Insurgencies,16:2,125 — 146 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079874
Roy, Jules. "The Battle of Dien Bien Phu" Carrol and Graf Publishers, New York 1984. Translated from the French by Robert Baldrick. English translation copyright 1965 by Harper and Row Publishers, New York.
Sheehan, Neil. "A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam," Vintage Books, a division of Random House, New York, 1989
Shy, John and Collier, Thomas W. "Revolutionary War"in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age," Peter Paret editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1986
Simpson, Howard K. "Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot," Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey's Inc. 1994
Spector, Ronald H. "After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam," Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993
Trinquier, Roger. "Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency," translated from the French by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall. Praeger Security International, Westport CT and London. 1964 and 2006. Originally published under the title "La Guerre Moderne" by Editions Table Ronde.
West, F.J. "The Village," Pocket Books, a division of Simon and Schuster, New York. 1972.
Windrow, Martin. "The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam," Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004
Tagged as 1st iraqi division, a savage war of peace, abu ghraib, afghan army, afghan government corruption, afghanistan, air ground base concept, airpower, algeria, Alistair Horn, Andrew Krepinevich, arvn, bernard fall, COIN, combined action platoons, counter insurgency, david galula, dien bien phu, french indochina, GCMA/GMI forces, General David Petreus, groupe mobile 100, gulf war, harold moore, hell in a very small place, iraq, jean lartenguy, John Nagl, jules roy, marcel bigeard, mohammed karzai, na son, Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, paul assaresses, Paul Aussaresses, pieds-noir, RAND corporation, riverine forces, roger trinquier, street without joy, the army concept, The Battle of the Casbah, the centurions, us army, US Marine Corps, viet minh, vietnam
The Uncomfortable Legacy of Colonel General Ludwig Beck
"It is a lack of character and insight, when a soldier in high command sees his duty and mission only in the context of his military orders without realizing that the highest responsibility is to the people of his country." Ludwig Beck
Ludwig Beck Bundesarchiv Foto
This is one of those uncomfortable posts to write partially because I know that some people will take it completely wrong or ascribe meaning to it that I do not intend. I by training am a military historian, probably better at that than I am theology. One thing that fascinates me in the study of military history is the actions of men in the face of evil and the meetings of such people at the intersections of where military and government policy intersect. It is a timeless theme. The bulk of my study until the past few years was the German Army, particularly that of the Weimar Republic and the Wehrmacht to include policies, leaders, political attitudes and behavior in war and peace. Thus it makes sense for me to look at Colonel General Ludwig Beck who held the post of Chief of the German General Staff during the early part of the Nazi era.
Ludwig Beck is one of those characters in military history that makes professional military officers uncomfortable. Beck is not the perfect example of righteousness nor was he always correct in things that he supported. As an artillery regiment commander he defended the rights of soldiers and officers to be Nazi Party members though he himself was not one. He, like many military officers was a conservative military officer by nature and became Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht in 1935 two years after Hitler's ascension to power. Taking office Beck was troubled by some Nazi policies but not by the need for Germany to expand to areas that it had once controlled, he opposed the plan to attack Czechoslovakia not because of any love for the Czech state which he desired to be eliminated, but rather it being a war that Germany could not win. He resigned from his position a Chief of Staff in 1938 when he could not persuade the rest of the General Staff to resign in protest over Hitler's plan which he felt would be disastrous for Germany. Had the western powers led by Neville Chamberlain not caved at Munich it is likely that the Germans would have suffered badly against the Czech army and fortifications and with the entry of France into the war would have suffered a defeat that would have ended the Hitler regime. In fact German officers who saw the extent of Czech preparations on the frontier following the Munich deal were greatly relieved that they did not have to fight their way into the Czech state.
After his resignation Beck played a key role in the resistance movement. He was involved in the planning for a number of attempts on Hitler's life. Yet it was his leadership in the July 20th 1944 attempt on the life of Hitler that ensured his place in history. With Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg and others in the General Staff at the Front and in Germany he acted to avert further destruction in Europe and the certain destruction of Germany. The plot, Operation Valkyrie was marred by poor execution and failed to kill Hitler of seize power but for a few hours. The planners had left too much to chance and once Hitler had restored communications the coup attempted ended swiftly. Had the attempt succeeded Beck was in line to become either the leader of Germany or the Head of the Army. Instead while being interrogated after his capture he took his own life depriving Nazi leaders of the ability to put him up for a public trial at which he would have been humiliated and then executed. The Kasserne in Sonthofen where the Bundeswehr MP School and Staff School as well as NATO and EU military schools are located is named for him. It is there, ironically a former Adolf Hitler School that his memory and sacrifice is honored by the nation which emerged from the rubble of World War Two. He is honored in a small museum and with a plaque recognizing his sacrifice.
Ludwig Beck Kasserne Sonthofen
The reason that General Beck makes many of us in uniform uncomfortable (and I do include myself) is that he recognized that senior officers, especially those in high command who help set and execute policy cannot isolate themselves in the purely military aspects of the operations. Instead he believed that officers have a higher duty to the constitution and people and not just the military mission that they have been assigned. When he realized that he could not stop Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia he resigned and worked in the obscurity of a small and often divided resistance movement against Hitler. The bulk of the German high command, including many officers idolized in the United States did not recognize the higher duty. Many of these men were consummate professionals who did not support the evil of the Nazi regime and who conducted themselves honorably. Yet they effectively abetted its crimes by not opposing actions of their government that were against international law and morality as well as dangerous from purely a pragmatic military standpoint.
The problem is that military officers in any nation, including ours can face situations such as Beck faced. A military's character is demonstrated in how leaders deal with such situations. Beck recognized the situation early, the bulk of his fellow officers did not recognize a problem until Germany was embroiled in a war that it could no longer win. Even then most could not mount an opposition to Hitler because they did not want to be considered to be mutineers and violate their oath. The potential to abet evil when military professionals bury their heads by planning and executing purely military aspects of a campaign is great. If they ignore questionable policy or even policies that they know that have been judged by the international community to be illegal or immoral, such as torture of prisoners or waging wars of aggression against countries that have not attacked their nation they become complicit in their nations crimes. This was the case with German Officers who may not have committed any personal crime and even tried to mitigate the evils of the Nazi regime were morally complicit in that evil.
In the United States the military shows its fidelity by remembering our oath to the Constitution and being faithful to it and the people that we serve. As officers we represent all Americans and not just those of our political party, religious faith or social or economic interests, nor any political leader, faction or interest group within the nation. The Constitution, our military regulations, traditions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice are the standard by which we operate and by which we conduct ourselves and tools that protect us when policies or actions taken by the government or people within it violate those codes or international law. The UCMJ makes it clear those officers who take part in, plan or a complicit in illegal actions in war are committing crimes.
When a nation become involved in wars which are non-traditional, revolutionary wars or insurgencies that barriers to professional conduct can be broken down. The Mai Lai massacre committed by 2LT William Calley's platoon with the certain knowledge and maybe even approval of individuals in the chain of command is one example as were the uncontrolled chaos of prisoner abuse and torture at Abu Ghraib.
Times are difficult and we do not know what the future brings. Stress in societies caused by economic conditions, natural disasters, lawlessness on the streets and divided and ineffective governments sometimes remove the moral restraints of the society and even affect the military. One sees this in Weimar Germany as well as the 4th Republic in France which had to deal with post World War II economic difficulties, exacerbated by recriminations of political opponents for actions the others did during the war while France was occupied by Germany as well as the wars in Indo-China and Algeria which further divided the nation and the military.
It is in stressful and uncertain times that officers have to be men and women of principle who always uphold the highest traditions of their military as well as be the voice of conscience when governments, political parties, special interests or leaders begin to violate international norms in the conduct of war. Beck was not a perfect officer. He supported some of Hitler's policies until after his resignation but like much of the resistance believed that the Nazi regime could only end up destroying Germany. It is important to remember that like Ludwig Beck that officers do not need to sacrifice their honor to be faithful to their oath.
Peace, Steve+
Filed under History, leadership, Military, national security, world war two in europe
Tagged as abu ghraib, adolf hitler, adolf hitler school, algeria, bundeswehr, constitution, czechoslovokia, eu, french 4th republic, french indochina, general ludwig beck, german resistance movement, klaus von stauffenberg, lt william calley, mai lai massacre, military oath, munich agreement, nato, nazi germany, nazi party, neville chamberlain, operation valkyrie, ordungberg sonthofen, sonthofen, ucmj, vietnam war, war crimes, weimar republic, world war ii