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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 524 › Muscarello v. United States
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)
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Justia Opinion Summary and Annotations
Primary Holding
A person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in its glove compartment or truck, can be deemed to be within the scope of the statutory phrase "carries a firearm."
After he was convicted of drug trafficking, Muscarello argued that the mandatory five-year minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) should not apply to him. This statute provided for a mandatory minimum sentence when the defendant carries a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Muscarello pointed out that his gun was actually in the locked glove compartment of his car at the time, and Congress intended a literal meaning of "carry" that meant that the gun needed to be on the defendant's person.
Stephen G. Breyer (Author)
John Paul Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor
Anthony M. Kennedy
According to dictionaries and other types of ordinary usage, carrying a firearm includes conveying it in a vehicle. Both high-quality prose and everyday speakers use the word in this sense, and Congress did not intend a special legal meaning in this context. Dictionaries find that providing physical support for the gun is only a secondary meaning. Using the primary, broader meaning does not undermine the purpose of the statute to discourage the combination of drugs and guns, and the legislative history contains no support for the defendant's argument.
The defendant is incorrect in claiming that "carry" needs to have a narrow definition because it is different from "transport," a term with a broader meaning that is used in related statutes. There also is no need to interpret it narrowly just because "uses," which is the companion verb in the statute, is interpreted narrowly. Each word in a statute may be interpreted independently without transferring restrictions from others. Limitations elsewhere in the statute guard against overly broad interpretations of the word "carry," but the defendant's actions fall within those limitations. The rule of lenity does not need to be applied in this instance because it does not arise in every case of statutory ambiguity unless that ambiguity is significant and forces a court to guess as to the legislative intent.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Author)
William Hubbs Rehnquist
Antonin Scalia
David H. Souter
The statutory meaning of "carries" is different from the ordinary meaning that the majority finds in sources such as dictionaries. Imposing mandatory minimum sentences is appropriate only in the most dangerous of situations when guns are in the closest proximity to the defendant. The rule of lenity should be applied to resolve this major ambiguity in the defendant's favor.
Case Commentary
Even if the mandatory sentencing minimum had not applied, the court could have enhanced the defendant's sentence at its discretion because having the firearm in the car would have been an aggravating factor.
Opinions Audio & Media
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1654. Argued March 23, 1998-Decided June 8,1998*
A person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" is subject to a 5-year mandatory prison term. 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(I). In the first case, police officers found a handgun locked in the glove compartment of petitioner Muscarello's truck, which he was using to transport marijuana for sale. In the second case, federal agents at a drug-sale point found drugs and guns in the trunk of petitioners' car. In both cases, the Courts of Appeals found that petitioners had carried firearms in violation of § 924(c)(I).
Held: The phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Pp. 127-139.
(a) As a matter of ordinary English, one can "carry firearms" in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle which one accompanies. The word's first, or basic, meaning in dictionaries and the word's origin make clear that "carry" includes conveying in a vehicle. The greatest of writers have used "carry" with this meaning, as has the modern press. Contrary to the arguments of petitioners and the dissent, there is no linguistic reason to think that Congress intended to limit the word to its secondary meaning, which suggests support rather than movement or transportation, as when, for example, a column "carries" the weight of an arch. Given the word's ordinary meaning, it is not surprising that the Federal Courts of Appeals have unanimously concluded that "carry" is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly on the person but can include their carriage in a car. Pp. 127-132.
(b) Neither the statute's basic purpose-to combat the "dangerous combination" of "drugs and guns," Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 240-nor its legislative history supports circumscribing the scope of the word "carry" by applying an "on the person" limitation. Pp. 132-134.
(c) Petitioners' remaining arguments to the contrary-that the definition adopted here obliterates the statutory distinction between "carry" and "transport," a word used in other provisions of the "fire-
*Together with No. 96-8837, Cleveland et al. v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
arms" section of the United States Code; that it would be anomalous to construe "carry" broadly when the related phrase "uses ... a firearm," 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(I), has been construed narrowly to include only the "active employment" of a firearm, Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144; that this Court's reading of the statute would extend its coverage to passengers on buses, trains, or ships, who have placed a firearm, say, in checked luggage; and that the "rule of lenity" should apply because of statutory ambiguity-are unconvincing. Pp. 134-139.
No. 96-1654, 106 F.3d 636, and No. 96-8837, 106 F.3d 1056, affirmed.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and SOUTER, JJ., joined, post, p. 139.
Robert H. Klonoff argued the cause for petitioner in No. 96-1654. With him on the briefs were Gregory A. Castanias, Paul R. Reichert, and Ron S. Macaluso. Norman S. Zalkind, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 1074, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 96-8837. With him on the briefs were Elizabeth A. Lunt, David Duncan, and John H. Cunha, Jr., by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 1074.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.t
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A provision in the firearms chapter of the federal criminal code imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime." 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). The question before us is whether the phrase "carries a firearm" is limited to the carrying of firearms on the person. We hold that it is not so limited. Rather, it also applies to a person
tDaniel Kanstroom, David Porter, and Kyle O'Dowd filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Full Text of Opinion
who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies.
The question arises in two cases, which we have consolidated for argument. Petitioner in the first case, Frank J. Muscarello, unlawfully sold marijuana, which he carried in his truck to the place of sale. Police officers found a handgun locked in the truck's glove compartment. During plea proceedings, Muscarello admitted that he had "carried" the gun "for protection in relation" to the drug offense, App. in No. 96-1654, p. 12, though he later claimed to the contrary, and added that, in any event, his "carr[yingJ" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 96-1654, p. lOa.
Petitioners in the second case, Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana, placed several guns in a bag, put the bag in the trunk of a car, and then traveled by car to a proposed drug-sale point, where they intended to steal drugs from the sellers. Federal agents at the scene stopped them, searched the cars, found the guns and drugs, and arrested them.
In both cases the Courts of Appeals found that petitioners had "carrie[dJ" the guns during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 106 F.3d 636, 639 (CA5 1997); 106 F.3d 1056, 1068 (CA1 1997). We granted certiorari to determine whether the fact that the guns were found in the locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car precludes application of § 924(c)(1). We conclude that it does not.
II A
We begin with the statute's language. The parties vigorously contest the ordinary English meaning of the phrase
"carries a firearm." Because they essentially agree that Congress intended the phrase to convey its ordinary, and not some special legal, meaning, and because they argue the linguistic point at length, we too have looked into the matter in more than usual depth. Although the word "carry" has many different meanings, only two are relevant here. When one uses the word in the first, or primary, meaning, one can, as a matter of ordinary English, "carry firearms" in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies. When one uses the word in a different, rather special, way, to mean, for example, "bearing" or (in slang) "packing" (as in "packing a gun"), the matter is less clear. But, for reasons we shall set out below, we believe Congress intended to use the word in its primary sense and not in this latter, special way.
Consider first the word's primary meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as its first definition "convey, originally by cart or wagon, hence in any vehicle, by ship, on horseback, etc." 2 Oxford English Dictionary 919 (2d ed. 1989); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 343 (1986) (first definition: "move while supporting (as in a vehicle or in one's hands or arms)"); Random House Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 319 (2d ed. 1987) (first definition: "to take or support from one place to another; convey; transport").
The origin of the word "carries" explains why the first, or basic, meaning of the word "carry" includes conveyance in a vehicle. See Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 146 (1988) (tracing the word from Latin "carum," which means "car" or "cart"); 2 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 919 (tracing the word from Old French "carier" and the late Latin "carricare," which meant to "convey in a car"); Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 148 (C. Onions ed. 1966) (same); Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, supra, at 143 (explaining that the term "car" has been used to refer to the automobile since 1896).
The greatest of writers have used the word with this meaning. See, e. g., The King James Bible, 2 Kings 9:28 ("[H]is servants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem"); id., Isaiah 30:6 ("[T]hey will carry their riches upon the shoulders of young asses"). Robinson Crusoe says, "[w]ith my boat, I carry'd away every Thing." D. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe 174 (J. Crowley ed. 1972). And the owners of Queequeg's ship, Melville writes, "had lent him a [wheelbarrow], in which to carry his heavy chest to his boarding-house." H. Melville, Moby Dick 43 (D. Chicago 1952). This Court, too, has spoken of the "carrying" of drugs in a car or in its "trunk." California v. Acevedo, 500 D. S. 565, 572-573 (1991); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 D. S. 248, 249 (1991).
These examples do not speak directly about carrying guns.
But there is nothing linguistically special about the fact that weapons, rather than drugs, are being carried. Robinson Crusoe might have carried a gun in his boat; Queequeg might have borrowed a wheelbarrow in which to carry not a chest but a harpoon. And, to make certain that there is no special ordinary English restriction (unmentioned in dictionaries) upon the use of "carry" in respect to guns, we have surveyed modern press usage, albeit crudely, by searching computerized newspaper data bases-both the New York Times data base in Lexis/Nexis, and the "US News" data base in Westlaw. We looked for sentences in which the words "carry," "vehicle," and "weapon" (or variations thereof) all appear. We found thousands of such sentences, and random sampling suggests that many, perhaps more than one-third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at issue here, i. e., the carrying of guns in a car.
The New York Times, for example, writes about "an ex-con" who "arrives home driving a stolen car and carrying a load of handguns," Mar. 21, 1992, section 1, p. 18, col. 1, and an "official peace officer who carries a shotgun in his boat," June 19, 1988, section 12WC, p. 2, col. 1; cf. The New York
Times Manual of Style and Usage, a Desk Book of Guidelines for Writers and Editors, foreword (L. Jordan rev. ed. 1976) (restricting Times journalists and editors to the use of proper English). The Boston Globe refers to the arrest of a professional baseball player "for carrying a semiloaded automatic weapon in his car." Dec. 10, 1994, p. 75, col. 5. The Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph speaks of one "Russell" who "carries a gun hidden in his car." May 2, 1993, p. B1, col. 2. The Arkansas Gazette refers to a "house" that was "searched" in an effort to find "items that could be carried in a car, such as ... guns." Mar. 10, 1991, p. A1, col. 2. The San Diego Union-Tribune asks, "What, do they carry guns aboard these boats now?" Feb. 18, 1992, p. D2, col. 5.
Now consider a different, somewhat special meaning of the word "carry"-a meaning upon which the linguistic arguments of petitioners and the dissent must rest. The Oxford English Dictionary's twenty-sixth definition of "carry" is "bear, wear, hold up, or sustain, as one moves about; habitually to bear about with one." 2 Oxford English Dictionary, at 921. Webster's defines "carry" as "to move while supporting," not just in a vehicle, but also "in one's hands or arms." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 343. And Black's Law Dictionary defines the entire phrase "carry arms or weapons" as
"To wear, bear or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with another person." Black's Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1990).
These special definitions, however, do not purport to limit the "carrying of arms" to the circumstances they describe. No one doubts that one who bears arms on his person "carries a weapon." But to say that is not to deny that one may also "carry a weapon" tied to the saddle of a horse or placed in a bag in a car.
Nor is there any linguistic reason to think that Congress intended to limit the word "carries" in the statute to any of these special definitions. To the contrary, all these special definitions embody a form of an important, but secondary, meaning of "carry," a meaning that suggests support rather than movement or transportation, as when, for example, a column "carries" the weight of an arch. 2 Oxford English Dictionary, at 919, 921. In this sense a gangster might "carry" a gun (in colloquial language, he might "pack a gun") even though he does not move from his chair. It is difficult to believe, however, that Congress intended to limit the statutory word to this definition-imposing special punishment upon the comatose gangster while ignoring drug lords who drive to a sale carrying an arsenal of weapons in their van.
We recognize, as the dissent emphasizes, that the word "carry" has other meanings as well. But those other meanings (e. g., "carryall he knew," "carries no colours"), see post, at 143-144, are not relevant here. And the fact that speakers often do not add to the phrase "carry a gun" the words "in a car" is of no greater relevance here than the fact that millions of Americans did not see Muscarello carry a gun in his truck. The relevant linguistic facts are that the word "carry" in its ordinary sense includes carrying in a car and that the word, used in its ordinary sense, keeps the same meaning whether one carries a gun, a suitcase, or a banana.
Given the ordinary meaning of the word "carry," it is not surprising to find that the Federal Courts of Appeals have unanimously concluded that "carry" is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly on the person but can include their carriage in a car. United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 181 (CADC 1998); United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 708 (CA9 1998); United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 476 (CA3 1997); 106 F. 3d, at 1066 (case below); 106 F. 3d, at 639 (case below); United States v. Malcuit, 104 F.3d 880, 885, rehearing en banc granted, 116 F.3d 163 (CA6 1997); United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 653-654 (CA4 1997); United
States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 932 (CA7 1996); United States v. Willis, 89 F.3d 1371, 1379 (CA8 1996); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1259-1260 (1996), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (CAlO 1997); United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676-677 (CA2 1996); United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395-396 (CAll 1996).
We now explore more deeply the purely legal question of whether Congress intended to use the word "carry" in its ordinary sense, or whether it intended to limit the scope of the phrase to instances in which a gun is carried "on the person." We conclude that neither the statute's basic purpose nor its legislative history support circumscribing the scope of the word "carry" by applying an "on the person" limitation.
This Court has described the statute's basic purpose broadly, as an effort to combat the "dangerous combination" of "drugs and guns." Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 240 (1993). And the provision's chief legislative sponsor has said that the provision seeks "to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home." 114 Congo Rec. 22231 (1968) (Rep. Poff); see Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398, 405 (1980) (describing Poff's comments as "crucial material" in interpreting the purpose of § 924(c)); Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 13-14 (1978) (concluding that Poff's comments are "clearly probative" and "certainly entitled to weight"); see also 114 Congo Rec. 22243-22244 (statutes would apply to "the man who goes out taking a gun to commit a crime") (Rep. Hunt); id., at 22244 ("Of course, what we are trying to do by these penalties is to persuade the criminal to leave his gun at home") (Rep. Randall); id., at 22236 ("We are concerned ... with having the criminal leave his gun at home") (Rep. Meskill).
From the perspective of any such purpose (persuading a criminal "to leave his gun at home"), what sense would it
make for this statute to penalize one who walks with a gun in a bag to the site of a drug sale, but to ignore a similar individual who, like defendant Gray-Santana, travels to a similar site with a similar gun in a similar bag, but instead of walking, drives there with the gun in his car? How persuasive is a punishment that is without effect until a drug dealer who has brought his gun to a sale (indeed has it available for use) actually takes it from the trunk (or unlocks the glove compartment) of his car? It is difficult to say that, considered as a class, those who prepare, say, to sell drugs by placing guns in their cars are less dangerous, or less deserving of punishment, than those who carry handguns on their person.
We have found no significant indication elsewhere in the legislative history of any more narrowly focused relevant purpose. We have found an instance in which a legislator referred to the statute as applicable when an individual "has a firearm on his person," ibid. (Rep. Meskill); an instance in which a legislator speaks of "a criminal who takes a gun in his hand," id., at 22239 (Rep. Pucinski); and a reference in the Senate Report to a "gun carried in a pocket," S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 314, n. 10 (1983); see also 114 Congo Rec. 21788, 21789 (1968) (references to gun "carrying" without more). But in these instances no one purports to define the scope of the term "carries"; and the examples of guns carried on the person are not used to illustrate the reach of the term "carries" but to illustrate, or to criticize, a different aspect of the statute.
Regardless, in other instances, legislators suggest that the word "carries" has a broader scope. One legislator indicates that the statute responds in part to the concerns of law enforcement personnel, who had urged that "carrying short firearms in motor vehicles be classified as carrying such weapons concealed." Id., at 22242 (Rep. May). Another criticizes a version of the proposed statute by suggesting it might apply to drunken driving, and gives as an example a
drunken driver who has a "gun in his car." Id., at 21792 (Rep. Yates). Others describe the statute as criminalizing gun "possession"-a term that could stretch beyond both the "use" of a gun and the carrying of a gun on the person. See id., at 21793 (Rep. Casey); id., at 22236 (Rep. Meskill); id., at 30584 (Rep. Collier); id., at 30585 (Rep. Skubitz).
We are not convinced by petitioners' remaining arguments to the contrary. First, they say that our definition of "carry" makes it the equivalent of "transport." Yet, Congress elsewhere in related statutes used the word "transport" deliberately to signify a different, and broader, statutory coverage. The immediately preceding statutory subsection, for example, imposes a different set of penalties on one who, with an intent to commit a crime, "ships, transports, or receives a firearm" in interstate commerce. 18 U. S. C. § 924(b). Moreover, § 926A specifically "entitle[sJ" a person "not otherwise prohibited ... from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm" to "transport a firearm ... from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry" it to "any other place" where he may do so. Why, petitioners ask, would Congress have used the word "transport," or used both "carry" and "transport" in the same provision, if it had intended to obliterate the distinction between the two?
The short answer is that our definition does not equate "carry" and "transport." "Carry" implies personal agency and some degree of possession, whereas "transport" does not have such a limited connotation and, in addition, implies the movement of goods in bulk over great distances. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 343 (noting that "carry" means "moving to a location some distance away while supporting or maintaining off the ground" and "is a natural word to use in ref. to cargoes and loads on trucks, wagons, planes, ships, or even beasts of burden," while "transport refers to carriage in bulk or number over an ap-
preciable distance and, typically, by a customary or usual carrier agency"); see also Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms 141 (1942). If Smith, for example, calls a parcel delivery service, which sends a truck to Smith's house to pick up Smith's package and take it to Los Angeles, one might say that Smith has shipped the package and the parcel delivery service has transported the package. But only the truck driver has "carried" the package in the sense of "carry" that we believe Congress intended. Therefore, "transport" is a broader category that includes "carry" but also encompasses other activity.
The dissent refers to § 926A and to another statute where Congress used the word "transport" rather than "carry" to describe the movement of firearms. 18 U. S. C. § 925(a) (2)(B); post, at 146-147. According to the dissent, had Congress intended "carry" to have the meaning we give it, Congress would not have needed to use a different word in these provisions. But as we have discussed above, we believe the word "transport" is broader than the word "carry."
And, if Congress intended "carry" to have the limited definition the dissent contends, it would have been quite unnecessary to add the proviso in § 926A requiring a person, to be exempt from penalties, to store her firearm in a locked container not immediately accessible. See § 926A (quoted in full, post, at 146) (exempting from criminal penalties one who transports a firearm from a place where "he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm" but not exempting the "transportation" of a firearm if it is "readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle"). The statute simply could have said that such a person may not "carry" a firearm. But, of course, Congress did not say this because that is not what "carry" means.
As we interpret the statutory scheme, it makes sense.
Congress has imposed a variable penalty with no mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "transports" (or
"ships" or "receives") a firearm knowing it will be used to commit any "offense punishable by imprisonment for [more than] one year," § 924(b), and it has imposed a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence upon one who "carries" a firearm "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime," § 924(c). The first subsection imposes a less strict sentencing regime upon one who, say, ships firearms by mail for use in a crime elsewhere; the latter subsection imposes a mandatory sentence upon one who, say, brings a weapon with him (on his person or in his car) to the site of a drug sale.
Second, petitioners point out that, in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), we considered the related phrase "uses ... a firearm" found in the same statutory provision now before us. See 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) ("uses or carries a firearm"). We construed the term "use" narrowly, limiting its application to the "active employment" of a firearm. Bailey, 516 U. S., at 144. Petitioners argue that it would be anomalous to construe broadly the word "carries," its statutory next-door neighbor.
In Bailey, however, we limited "use" of a firearm to "active employment" in part because we assumed "that Congress ... intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning." Id., at 146. A broader interpretation of "use," we said, would have swallowed up the term "carry." Ibid. But "carry" as we interpret that word does not swallow up the term "use." "U se" retains the same independent meaning we found for it in Bailey, where we provided examples involving the displaying or the bartering of a gun. Ibid. "Carry" also retains an independent meaning, for, under Bailey, carrying a gun in a car does not necessarily involve the gun's "active employment." More importantly, having construed "use" narrowly in Bailey, we cannot also construe "carry" narrowly without undercutting the statute's basic objective. For the narrow interpretation would remove the act of carrying a gun in a car entirely from the statute's
reach, leaving a gap in coverage that we do not believe Congress intended.
Third, petitioners say that our reading of the statute would extend its coverage to passengers on buses, trains, or ships, who have placed a firearm, say, in checked luggage. To extend this statute so far, they argue, is unfair, going well beyond what Congress likely would have thought possible. They add that some lower courts, thinking approximately the same, have limited the scope of "carries" to instances where a gun in a car is immediately accessible, thereby most likely excluding from coverage a gun carried in a car's trunk or locked glove compartment. See, e. g., Foster, 133 F. 3d, at 708 (concluding that person "carries" a firearm in a car only if the firearm is immediately accessible); Giraldo, 80
In our view, this argument does not take adequate account of other limiting words in the statute-words that make the statute applicable only where a defendant "carries" a gun both "during and in relation to" a drug crime. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). Congress added these words in part to prevent prosecution where guns "played" no part in the crime. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 314, n. 10; cf. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (CA9 1985) (Kennedy, J.) (observing that" 'in relation to'" was "added to allay explicitly the concern that a person could be prosecuted ... for committing an entirely unrelated crime while in possession of a firearm"), overruled in part on other grounds, United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1257 (CA9 1996).
Once one takes account of the words "during" and "in relation to," it no longer seems beyond Congress' likely intent, or otherwise unfair, to interpret the statute as we have done. If one carries a gun in a car "during" and "in relation to" a drug sale, for example, the fact that the gun is carried in the car's trunk or locked glove compartment seems not only logically difficult to distinguish from the immediately accessible gun, but also beside the point.
At the same time, the narrow interpretation creates its own anomalies. The statute, for example, defines "firearm" to include a "bomb," "grenade," "rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces," or "missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce," where such device is "explosive," "incendiary," or delivers "poison gas." 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(4)(A). On petitioners' reading, the "carry" provision would not apply to instances where drug lords, engaged in a major transaction, took with them "firearms" such as these, which most likely could not be carried on the person.
Fourth, petitioners argue that we should construe the word "carry" to mean "immediately accessible." And, as we have said, they point out that several Courts of Appeals have limited the statute's scope in this way. See, e. g., Foster, supra, at 708; Giraldo, supra, at 676. That interpretation, however, is difficult to square with the statute's language, for one "carries" a gun in the glove compartment whether or not that glove compartment is locked. Nothing in the statute's history suggests that Congress intended that limitation. And, for reasons pointed out above, see supra, at 137, we believe that the words "during" and "in relation to" will limit the statute's application to the harms that Congress foresaw.
Finally, petitioners and the dissent invoke the "rule of lenity." The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree. Cf. Smith, 508 U. S., at 239 ("The mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction ... does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable"). "'The rule of lenity applies only if, "after seizing everything from which aid can be derived," ... we can make "no more than a guess as to what Congress intended."'" United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 499 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 65 (1995), in turn quoting Smith, supra, at 239, and Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958)). To invoke the rule, we must con-
clude that there is a '" "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty'" in the statute." Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 619, n. 17 (1994) (quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 463 (1991)). Certainly, our decision today is based on much more than a "guess as to what Congress intended," and there is no "grievous ambiguity" here. The problem of statutory interpretation in these cases is indeed no different from that in many of the criminal cases that confront us. Yet, this Court has never held that the rule of lenity automatically permits a defendant to win.
In sum, the "generally accepted contemporary meaning" of the word "carry" includes the carrying of a firearm in a vehicle. The purpose of this statute warrants its application in such circumstances. The limiting phrase "during and in relation to" should prevent misuse of the statute to penalize those whose conduct does not create the risks of harm at which the statute aims.
For these reasons, we conclude that petitioners' conduct falls within the scope of the phrase "carries a firearm." The judgments of the Courts of Appeals are affirmed.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting.
Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18, United States Code, is a punishment-enhancing provision; it imposes a mandatory five-year prison term when the defendant "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking ... uses or carries a firearm." In Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), this Court held that the term "uses," in the context of § 924(c)(1), means "active employment" of the firearm. In to day's cases we confront a related question: What does the term "carries" mean in the context of § 924(c)(1), the enhanced punishment prescription again at issue.
It is uncontested that § 924(c)(1) applies when the defendant bears a firearm, i. e., carries the weapon on or about his
person "for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict." Black's Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the phrase "carry arms or weapons"); see ante, at 130. The Court holds that, in addition, "carries a firearm," in the context of § 924(c)(1), means personally transporting, possessing, or keeping a firearm in a vehicle, anyplace in a vehicle.
Without doubt, "carries" is a word of many meanings, definable to mean or include carting about in a vehicle. But that encompassing definition is not a ubiquitously necessary one. Nor, in my judgment, is it a proper construction of "carries" as the term appears in § 924(c)(1). In line with Bailey and the principle of lenity the Court has long followed, I would confine "carries a firearm," for § 924(c)(1) purposes, to the undoubted meaning of that expression in the relevant context. I would read the words to indicate not merely keeping arms on one's premises or in one's vehicle, but bearing them in such manner as to be ready for use as a weapon.
I A
I note first what is at stake for petitioners. The question before the Court "is not whether possession of a gun [on the drug offender's premises or in his car, during and in relation to commission of the offense,] means a longer sentence for a convicted drug dealer. It most certainly does .... Rather, the question concerns which sentencing statute governs the precise length of the extra term of punishment," § 924(c)(1)'s "blunt 'mandatory minimum'" five-year sentence, or the more finely tuned "sentencing guideline statutes, under which extra punishment for drug-related gun possession varies with the seriousness of the drug crime." United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 466 (CA1 1994) (Breyer, C. J., dissenting).
Accordingly, there would be no "gap," see ante, at 137, no relevant conduct "ignore[d]," see ante, at 133, were the Court to reject the Government's broad reading of § 924(c)(1). To
be more specific, as cogently explained on another day by to day's opinion writer:
"The special 'mandatory minimum' sentencing statute says that anyone who 'uses or carries' a gun 'during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime' must receive a mandatory five-year prison term added on to his drug crime sentence. 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). At the same time, the Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated under the authority of a different statute, 28 U. S. C. § 994, provide for a two-level (i. e., a 30% to 40%) sentence enhancement where a 'firearm ... was possessed' by a drug offender, U. S. S. G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), unless the possession clearly was not 'connected with the [drug] offense.'" McFadden, 13 F. 3d, at 467 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting).
In Muscarello's case, for example, the underlying drug crimes involved the distribution of 3.6 kilograms of marijuana, and therefore carried a base offense level of 12. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(a)(3) (Nov. 1995). After adjusting for Muscarello's acceptance of responsibility, see id., § 3E1.1(a), his final offense level was 10, placing him in the 6-to-12 month sentencing range. See id., ch. 5, pt. A. The two-level enhancement for possessing a firearm, id., § 2D1.1(b)(1), would have increased his final offense level to 12 (a sentencing range of 10 to 16 months). In other words, the less rigid (tailored to "the seriousness of the drug crime," McFadden, 13 F. 3d, at 466) Guidelines regime would have added four months to Muscarello's prison time, in contrast to the five-year minimum addition the Court's reading of § 924(c)(1) mandates.1
1 The Sentencing Guidelines carry out "a major congressional effort to create a fairly sophisticated ... system that distinguishes among different kinds of criminal behavior and punishes accordingly." United States v. McFadden, 13 F. 3d, at 467-468 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). A "mandatory minimum" statute deviates from the general regime Congress installed. "Given the importance (to Congress) of the Guidelines system, ... courts should take care not to interpret [with unnecessary breadth] ... deviations
In sum, drug traffickers will receive significantly longer sentences if they are caught traveling in vehicles in which they have placed firearms. The question that divides the Court concerns the proper reference for enhancement in the cases at hand, the Guidelines or § 924(c)(1).
Unlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries,2 surveys of press reports,3 or the Bible 4 tell us, dispositively, what "car-
from the basic congressionally-directed effort to rationalize sentencing." Id., at 468.
2 I note, however, that the only legal dictionary the Court cites, Black's Law Dictionary, defines "carry arms or weapons" restrictively. See ante, at 130; supra, at 139-140.
3 Many newspapers, the New York Times among them, have published stories using "transport," rather than "carry," to describe gun placements resembling petitioners'. See, e. g., Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 27, 1998, p. 9D, col. 2 ("House members last week expanded gun laws by allowing weapons to be carried into restaurants or transported anywhere in cars."); Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1997, sports section, p. 13 ("Disabled hunters with permission to hunt from a standing vehicle would be able to transport a shotgun in an all-terrain vehicle as long as the gun is unloaded and the breech is open."); Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Aug. 4, 1996, p. ClO (British gun laws require "locked steel cases bolted onto a car for transporting guns from home to shooting range."); Detroit News, Oct. 26, 1997, p. D14 ("It is unlawful to carry afield or transport a rifle ... or shotgun if you have buckshot, slug, ball loads, or cut shells in possession except while traveling directly to deer camp or target range with firearm not readily available to vehicle occupants."); N. Y. Times, July 4, 1993, p. A21, col. 2 ("[T]he gun is supposed to be transported unloaded, in a locked box in the trunk."); Santa Rosa Press Democrat, Sept. 28, 1996, p. Bl ("Police and volunteers ask that participants ... transport [their guns] to the fairgrounds in the trunks of their cars."); Worcester Telegram & Gazette, July 16, 1996, p. B3 ("Only one gun can be turned in per person. Guns transported in a vehicle should be locked in the trunk.") (emphasis added in all quotations).
4 The translator of the Good Book, it appears, bore responsibility for determining whether the servants of Ahaziah "carried" his corpse to Jerusalem. Compare ante, at 129, with, e. g., The New English Bible, 2 Kings 9:28 ("His servants conveyed his body to Jerusalem."); Saint Joseph Edi-
ries" means embedded in § 924(c)(1). On definitions, "carry" in legal formulations could mean, inter alia, transport, possess, have in stock, prolong (carry over), be infectious, or wear or bear on one's person.5 At issue here is not "carries" at large but "carries a firearm." The Court's computer search of newspapers is revealing in this light. Carrying guns in a car showed up as the meaning "perhaps more than one-third" of the time. Ante, at 129. One is left to wonder what meaning showed up some two-thirds of the time. Surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution's Second Amendment ("keep and bear Arms") (emphasis added) and Black's Law Dictionary, at 214, indicate: "wear, bear, or carry ... upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose ... of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person."
On lessons from literature, a scan of Bartlett's and other quotation collections shows how highly selective the Court's choices are. See ante, at 129. If "[t]he greatest of writers" have used "carry" to mean conveyor transport in a vehicle, so have they used the hydra-headed word to mean, inter alia, carry in one's hand, arms, head, heart, or soul, sans vehicle. Consider, among countless examples:
"[H]e shall gather the lambs with his arm, and carry them in his bosom." The King James Bible, Isaiah 40:11.
"And still they gaz'd, and still the wonder grew,
tion of the New American Bible ("His servants brought him in a chariot to Jerusalem."); Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures ("His servants conveyed him in a chariot to Jerusalem."); see also id., Isaiah 30:6 ("They convey their wealth on the backs of asses."); The New Jerusalem Bible ("[T]hey bear their riches on donkeys' backs.") (emphasis added in all quotations).
5 The dictionary to which this Court referred in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145 (1995), contains 32 discrete definitions of "carry," including "[t]o make good or valid," "to bear the aspect of," and even "[t]o bear (a hawk) on the fist." See Webster's New International Dictionary 412 (2d ed. 1949).
That one small head could carry all he knew."
O. Goldsmith, The Deserted Village, 11. 215-216, in The Poetical Works of Oliver Goldsmith 30 (A. Dobson ed. 1949).
"There's a Legion that never was 'listed, That carries no colours or crest."
R. Kipling, The Lost Legion, st. 1, in Rudyard Kipling's Verse, 1885-1918, p. 222 (1920).
"There is a homely adage which runs, 'Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.'" T. Roosevelt, Speech at Minnesota State Fair, Sept. 2, 1901, in J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 575:16 (J. Kaplan ed. 1992).6
These and the Court's lexicological sources demonstrate vividly that "carry" is a word commonly used to convey various messages. Such references, given their variety, are not reliable indicators of what Congress meant, in § 924(c)(1), by "carries a firearm."
Noting the paradoxical statement, "'I use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to use it,'" the Court in Bailey, 516 U. S., at 143, emphasized the importance of contextthe statutory context. Just as "uses" was read to mean not simply "possession," but "active employment," so "carries," correspondingly, is properly read to signal the most danger-
6 Popular films and television productions provide corroborative illustrations. In "The Magnificent Seven," for example, O'Reilly (played by Charles Bronson) says: "You think I am brave because I carry a gun; well, your fathers are much braver because they carry responsibility, for you, your brothers, your sisters, and your mothers." See http://us.imdb.com/ M/search_quotes?for=carry. And in the television series "M* A *S*H," Hawkeye Pierce (played by Alan AIda) presciently proclaims: "I will not carry a gun .... I'll carry your books, I'll carry a torch, I'll carry a tune, I'll carryon, carryover, carry forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old Virginia, I'll even 'hari-kari' if you show me how, but I will not carry a gun!" See http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/8915/ mashquotes.html.
ous cases-the gun at hand, ready for use as a weapon.7 It is reasonable to comprehend Congress as having provided mandatory minimums for the most life-jeopardizing gunconnection cases (guns in or at the defendant's hand when committing an offense), leaving other, less imminently threatening, situations for the more flexible Guidelines regime.8 As the Ninth Circuit suggested, it is not apparent why possession of a gun in a drug dealer's moving vehicle would be thought more dangerous than gun possession on premises where drugs are sold: "A drug dealer who packs heat is more likely to hurt someone or provoke someone else to violence. A gun in a bag under a tarp in a truck bed [or in a bedroom closet] poses substantially less risk." United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 707 (1998) (en banc).9
For indicators from Congress itself, it is appropriate to consider word usage in other provisions of Title 18's chapter on "Firearms." See Bailey, 516 U. S., at 143, 146 (interpreting § 924(c)(1) in light of 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g), 922(j), 922(k), 922(0)(1), 924(d)(1), 930(a), 930(b)). The Court, however,
7 In my view, the Government would carry its burden by proving a firearm was kept so close to the person as to approximate placement in a pocket or holster, e. g., guns carried at one's side in a briefcase or handbag, or strapped to the saddle of a horse. See ante, at 130.
8The Court reports that the Courts of Appeals "have unanimously concluded that 'carry' is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly on the person." Ante, at 131. In Bailey, however, the Government's argument based on a similar observation did not carry the day. See Brief for United States in Bailey v. United States, O. T. 1995, Nos. 94-7448 and 94-7492, p. 16, n. 4. No Court of Appeals had previously adopted an "active employment" construction of "uses ... a firearm" in § 924(c)(I), yet this Court did exactly that. See 516 U. S., at 144.
9 The "Firearms" statutes indicate that Congress, unlike the Court, ante, at 132-133, recognizes that a gun in the hand is indeed more dangerous than a gun in the trunk. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 926A (permitting the transportation of firearms in a vehicle, but only if "neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle"); see infra, at 146-147.
does not derive from the statutory complex at issue its thesis that" '[c]arry' implies personal agency and some degree of possession, whereas 'transport' does not have such a limited connotation and, in addition, implies the movement of goods in bulk over great distances." Ante, at 134. Looking to provisions Congress enacted, one finds that the Legislature did not acknowledge or routinely adhere to the distinction the Court advances today; instead, Congress sometimes employed "transports" when, according to the Court, "carries" was the right word to use.
Section 925(a)(2)(B), for example, provides that no criminal sanction shall attend "the transportation of [a] firearm or ammunition carried out to enable a person, who lawfully received such firearm or ammunition from the Secretary of the Army, to engage in military training or in competitions." The full text of § 926A, rather than the truncated version the Court presents, see ibid., is also telling:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle:
Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver's compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console."
In describing when and how a person may travel in a vehicle that contains his firearm without violating the law,
§§ 925(a)(2)(B) and 926A use "transport," not "carry," to "impl[y] personal agency and some degree of possession." Ibid.10
Reading "carries" in § 924(c)(1) to mean "on or about [one's] person" is fully compatible with these and other "Firearms" statutes.ll For example, under § 925(a)(2)(B), one could carry his gun to a car, transport it to the shooting competition, and use it to shoot targets. Under the conditions of § 926A, one could transport her gun in a car, but under no circumstances could the gun be readily accessible while she travels in the car. "[C]ourts normally try to read language in different, but related, statutes, so as best to reconcile
10 The Court asserts that" 'transport' is a broader category that includes 'carry' but also encompasses other activity." Ante, at 135. "Carry," however, is not merely a subset of "transport." A person seated at a desk with a gun in hand or pocket is carrying the gun, but is not transporting it. Yes, the words "carry" and "transport" often can be employed interchangeably, as can the words "carry" and "use." But in Bailey, this Court settled on constructions that gave "carry" and "use" independent meanings. See 516 U. S., at 145-146. Without doubt, Congress is alert to the discrete meanings of "transport" and "carry" in the context of vehicles, as the Legislature's placement of each word in § 926A illustrates. The narrower reading of "carry" preserves discrete meanings for the two words, while in the context of vehicles the Court's interpretation of "carry" is altogether synonymous with "transport." Tellingly, when referring to firearms traveling in vehicles, the "Firearms" statutes routinely use a form of "transport"; they never use a form of "carry."
11 See infra, at 149, nn. 13, 14. The Government points to numerous federal statutes that authorize law enforcement officers to "carry firearms" and notes that, in those authorizing provisions, "carry" of course means "both on the person and in a vehicle." Brief for United States 31-32, and n. 18. Quite right. But as viewers of "Sesame Street" will quickly recognize, "one of these things [a statute authorizing conduct] is not like the other [a statute criminalizing conduct]." The authorizing statutes in question are properly accorded a construction compatible with the clear purpose of the legislation to aid federal law enforcers in the performance of their official duties. It is fundamental, however, that a penal statute is not to be construed generously in the Government's favor. See, e. g., United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).
those statutes, in light of their purposes and of common sense." McFadden, 13 F. 3d, at 467 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). So reading the "Firearms" statutes, I would not extend the word "carries" in § 924(c)(1) to mean transports out of hand's reach in a vehicle.12
Section 924(c)(1), as the foregoing discussion details, is not decisively clear one way or another. The sharp division in the Court on the proper reading of the measure confirms, "[a]t the very least, ... that the issue is subject to some doubt. Under these circumstances, we adhere to the familiar rule that, 'where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.'" Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 284-285 (1978) (citation omitted); see United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 54 (1994) ("[W]here text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct-we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor."). "Carry" bears many mean-
12 The Court places undue reliance on Representative Poff's statement that § 924(c)(1) seeks" 'to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home.''' Ante, at 132 (quoting 114 Congo Rec. 22231 (1968)). As the Government argued in its brief to this Court in Bailey:
"In making that statement, Representative Poff was not referring to the 'carries' prong of the original Section 924(c). As originally enacted, the 'carries' prong of the statute prohibited only the 'unlawful' carrying of a firearm while committing an offense. The statute would thus not have applied to an individual who, for instance, had a permit for carrying a gun and carried it with him when committing an offense, and it would have had no force in 'persuading' such an individual 'to leave his gun at home.' Instead, Representative Poffwas referring to the 'uses' prong of the original Section 924(c)." Brief for United States in Bailey V. United States, O. T. 1995, Nos. 94-7448 and 94-7492, p. 28.
Representative Poff's next sentence confirms that he was speaking of "uses," not "carries": "Any person should understand that if he uses his gun and is caught and convicted, he is going to jail." 114 Congo Rec., at 22231 (emphasis added).
ings, as the Court and the "Firearms" statutes demonstrate.13 The narrower "on or about [one's] person" interpretation is hardly implausible nor at odds with an accepted meaning of "carries a firearm."
Overlooking that there will be an enhanced sentence for the gun-possessing drug dealer in any event, see supra, at 140-142, the Court asks rhetorically: "How persuasive is a punishment that is without effect until a drug dealer who has brought his gun to a sale (indeed has it available for use) actually takes it from the trunk (or unlocks the glove compartment) of his car?" Ante, at 133. Correspondingly, the Court defines "carries a firearm" to cover "a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms [anyplace] in a vehicle ... which the person accompanies." Ante, at 126-127. Congress, however, hardly lacks competence to select the words "possesses" or "conveys" when that is what the Legislature means.14 Notably in view of the Legislature's capacity to speak plainly, and of overriding concern, the Court's inquiry
13 Any doubt on that score is dispelled by examining the provisions in the "Firearms" chapter, in addition to § 924(c)(I), that include a form of the word "carry": 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(5) ("carry out a bequest"); §§ 922(s)(6)(B)(ii), (iii) ("carry out this subsection"); § 922(u) ("carry away [a firearm]"); 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(6)(B)(ii) (1994 ed., Supp. II) ("carry or otherwise possess or discharge or otherwise use [a] handgun"); 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B) ("carrying of a firearm"); § 925(a)(2) ("carried out to enable a person"); § 926(a) ("carry out the provisions of this chapter"); § 926A ("lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm"); § 929(a)(I) ("uses or carries a firearm and is in possession of armor piercing ammunition"); § 930(d)(3) ("lawful carrying of firearms ... in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes") (emphasis added in all quotations).
14 See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(6)(B)(ii) (1994 ed., Supp. II) ("if the person sold ... a handgun ... to a juvenile knowing ... that the juvenile intended to carry or otherwise possess ... the handgun ... in the commission of a crime of violence"); 18 U. S. C. § 926A ("may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm"); § 929(a)(I) ("uses or carries a firearm and is in possession of armor piercing ammunition"); § 2277 ("brings, carries, or possesses any dangerous weapon") (emphasis added in all quotations).
pays scant attention to a core reason for the rule of lenity: "[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies 'the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.'" United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks 196,209 (1967)).
The narrower "on or about [one's] person" construction of "carries a firearm" is consistent with the Court's construction of "uses" in Bailey to entail an immediacy element. It respects the Guidelines system by resisting overbroad readings of statutes that deviate from that system. See McFadden, 13 F. 3d, at 468 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). It fits plausibly with other provisions of the "Firearms" chapter, and it adheres to the principle that, given two readings of a penal provision, both consistent with the statutory text, we do not choose the harsher construction. The Court, in my view, should leave it to Congress to speak "'in language that is clear and definite'" if the Legislature wishes to impose the sterner penalty. Bass, 404 U. S., at 347 (quoting United States v. Universal C. 1. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 222 (1952)). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the First and Fifth Circuits.
Oral Argument - March 23, 1998
First Party
Muscarello
Second Party
Argued
Chris Skelton Mountain View, CA


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Bowers Blog: 18/10/16 - Winning Is Overrated
The Championship is really what it's all about, right?
By MichaelBowers Oct 18, 2016, 12:51pm BST
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I kid, I kid.
I stick by my opinion that we are better than a number of the other sides in this division but even I am struggling to be positive after Saturday's defeat at Stoke City. Whilst I do think that Stoke are definitely better than being a bottom three club, we virtually gifted them that win at the weekend - it's becoming an embarrassingly frequent occurrence.
I actually thought we started the game brightly and even after Joe Allen scored the first goal, I felt we were more than in it. But once the crucial second went in, the game was over. Whereas Crystal Palace showed fighting spirit at the Stadium of Light a few weeks ago having gone behind by two, Sunderland simply surrendered.
The majority of our players did not look interested in the second-half and that's really telling. They did not look up for the fight.
I have defended David Moyes and I do still have faith in him long-term but I've got to start questioning his ability to manage or motivate the players when they step out onto that pitch. I don't want to sack yet another manager but if he isn't getting the best of a bunch of players who I believe are more than good enough to compete successfully in the Premier League then questions seriously need to be asked. Still, it's early days and he needs to be at least afforded some time.
For me, the players shouldn't need motivating, as if for some stupid reason they're not playing for the manager they should look at the constant numbers of fans they get both at the Stadium of Light and on the road as well. Unfortunately, it doesn't work like that.
If we haven't got at least five points from West Ham, Bournemouth and Hull then I'll probably start to think it's not going to work with Moyes.
Looking ahead to the weekend, West Ham are still not doing well even though they beat Crystal Palace away at the weekend. If - and it's a massive if - we can stop Dimitri Payet from running the show then we may have a chance of getting a result. But like Stoke, West Ham are a much better side than their position suggests in my opinion, so we need to be on the top of our game if we are to get a result.
Sunderland have never won at the London Stadium - let's change that at the weekend!
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Blending History, Horror, and Science Fiction
An interview with Robert Jeschonek, author of Rising Sun, Falling Shadows
Rising Sun, Falling Shadows is the first novel set in the Tannhäuser universe, and it is filled with action, suspense, mystery, and many of your favorite characters from the board game. Soon, you'll be able to follow all of the action in Robert Jeschonek's novel. In the meanwhile, we were lucky enough to get the writer to answer a few questions. Mr. Jeschonek is an accomplished writer, and some of his novels include My Favorite Band Does Not Exist, Earthshaker, and Day 9. He has kindly answered a few of our questions, and here are his responses. Gaining some insight Rising Sun, Falling Shadows is the first novel based on the Tannhäuser universe. Can you give us some insights into the process of translating the setting into this format? What challenges did you encounter? I studied the background material from the Tannhäuser game extensively, learning the characters and everything I could about their world. I also studied the materials developed for the new Shogunate module, which was still in the formative stages. This did create a challenge in the outline phase, as the module bible changed often, and I had to change the outline to match it. But once the module materials were locked, and I got the go ahead to write, the book fell together beautifully. If ever there were an ideal game to base a novel on, Tannhäuser is it. The history is so rich, and the characters are so vibrant, that it just inspires a million ideas and directions to take--which, of course, is one of the reasons it makes such an awesome game. What aspect of the Tannhäuser universe most excites you? I love the mix of genres inherent in the universe, which lets me blend together all sorts of styles, characters, and elements. Tannhäuser is many things all at once: a military story, an occult horror tale, an alternate history saga, and a science fiction story. I can write a hardcore battlefield scene in one chapter, then switch to a dark supernatural scene in the next. It's the perfect universe for me to work in, since my writing in general features lots of crossed genres, mixed influences, and surprising combinations. Developing a story What character from the Tannhäuser setting did you most enjoy developing? In terms of pre-existing characters, I really enjoyed writing Tala Aponi. She has such a bold, in-your-face personality, and she just jumped off the page and came to life for me. I also liked writing MacNeal, a true hero in the classic sense; he's the heart of Tannhäuser and the core of Rising Sun, Falling Shadows. But I have to say I had the most fun with the characters from the Shogunate, because they were brand new, and the game developers had done such a great job laying the groundwork. The Daimyo is totally cool, a master warrior with a complex personality. As for Itami, who wouldn't love writing a blue-skinned demonic monstrosity whose savage impulses exist side-by-side with an excellent vocabulary and misleadingly good manners? My absolute favorite, though, is a character I created for the book, a soldier named Hiruko. He's a decent man forced to take extreme action under extreme circumstances, and he has the soul of a poet. I hope I get the chance to develop him further in future novels set in this world. Without spoiling anything, can you give Tannhäuser fans some idea of what to expect from Rising Sun, Falling Shadows? Expect tons of action and lots of surprises. It's a fast-moving book with strong currents of horror and suspense. Readers will get to meet the Shogunate for the first time, which I think is exciting in its own right. But there's plenty of conflict between the Union forces and the Reich, in the person of Von Heïzinger and Zermann. Since the story's set in Kamchatka, under the dominion of the Matriarchy, you'll see plenty of Russians, too, as Holy Commissar Irina and her all new Bogatyr unit join the struggle. The Bogatyrs have their hands full with Oksana Gusarenko and the New Guard, who oppose the Black Angel Rasputin. So we bring in a lot of factions and favorite characters, showing off the awesome scope of the Tannhäuser universe. And they're all out to control a mystical artifact that could change the course of the war. Did I mention they're racing against time, because a massive volcano's about to erupt? Plus, there's lots of exciting Wolf action, as he's a major player in the quest and battle for the artifact. Thank you, Mr. Jeschonek! Check back for more information on this book in the next few weeks. In the meantime, pre-order your copy of Rising Sun, Falling Shadows from the iBookstore.


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Things to Do During the Winter in Meredith, NH
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Wolfeboro, New Hampshire is a popular tourist destination for its small town feel, year-round agenda of outdoor recreation and proximity to Lake Winnipesaukee. Settled in 1768, this historic town was originally a center of industry with manufacturing, lumber and agriculture providing the town's main sources of revenue. When the Wolfeboro Railroad reached the area in 1872, tourism blossomed. Visitors have been returning to enjoy the charm of Wolfeboro ever since.
In the winter, Wolfeboro is a prime location for skiing. The Abenaki Ski Area (Wolfeboronh.us/pages/WolfeboroNH_Recraetion/abenaki) is open from December through March, conditions permitting. Though the area's natural snow melts by February, Abenaki has a snowmaking system that extends its skiing opportunities a few weeks longer. This site has seven trails of varying skill levels, a terrain park, and a lodge for warming up between runs. Wolfeboro XC (wolfeboroxc.com) has more than 18 miles of trails available for both skiing and snowshoeing. On Saturdays in January, you can participate in guided two-hour snowshoe tours. Ski lessons are available for everyone from beginners to experienced skiers. If you prefer skates to skis, the Pop Whalen Ice Arena (Wolfeboronh.us/pages/WolfeboroNH_recreation/whalenarena) is open from October through March. This indoor facility is open to the public at scheduled times each week. In addition to the skating rink, you'll also have access to a comfortable lobby, snack bar, locker rooms and changing facilities.
Many dining opportunities in Wolfeboro avoid the predictability pitfall of chain restaurants. Wolfe's Tavern (wolfestavern.com), originally built in 1812, is a small piece of New Hampshire history. The menu features classic New England cuisine and an unbeatable assortment of beer. If you drink 100 different varieties, you can join the "Mug Club" and take home a personalized mug. The Yum Yum Shop (yumyumshop.net) has been a staple in Wolfeboro since 1948. Diners can enjoy freshly baked goods, a deli, homemade fudge, and New Hampshire maple candies, sugar and syrup. The Yum Yum Shop also has a souvenir gift shop so you can find something to take home. For a dining experience where your creativity can take full reign, head to Crepes Ooh La La (crepesoohlala.com). Your fresh crepes will be prepared while you watch, and customers are encouraged to create their own distinct combination of fillings.
Wolfeboro's parks offer enticing outdoor recreation year-round. Carry Beach and Brewster Beach, which are ideal for swimming and boating in summer, become hot spots for ice fishing in winter. Nearby trails are often used for cross county skiing. The six-mile Cotton Valley Rail-Trail follows historic out-of-use railroad tracks. In winter months, the trail can be used for cross country skiing and snowmobiling. Views of the pristine snow-covered lake from this path also make it appealing for a slow stroll. Though all of Wolfeboro's parks see something of a makeover in the winter, none is as drastic as Foss Field. What is a sports field in the summer becomes an outdoor ice rink in winter.
You can avoid the monotony of chain retailers and big box stores in Wolfeboro, with an assortment of local shops at your feet. Fight off the winter chill with a steaming cup of coffee and an intriguing fiction read at The Country Bookseller (thecountrybookseller.com). Made on Earth (madeonearthwolfeboro.com) is a small boutique with global imports handpicked from locations such as Bali, India and Thailand. The Kalled Gallery (kalledjewelrystudio.com) features the colorful jewelry designs of Jennifer Kalled. You'll find a vast selection of hand-casted pewter pieces at Hampshire Pewter (hampshirepewter.com), the only manufacturer in the United States to still use this casting method. If you prefer antiques to newly manufactured pieces, Birchknoll Antiques (birchknollantiques.com) is a family-run business selling antique furniture, art and home accessories.
Town of Wolfeboro, New Hampshire: About the Town
Town of Wolfeboro, New Hampshire: Abenaki Ski Area
Wolfeboro XC: Home
Town of Wolfeboro, New Hampshire: Pop Whalen Ice Arena
Town of Wolfeboro, New Hampshire: Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches
TrailLink: Cotton Valley Rail-Trail
The Country Bookseller: Home
The Kalled Gallery: About Us
Hampshire Pewter: Home
Birthknoll Antiques: Home
Wolfe's Tavern: Home
Yum Yum Shop: Home
Crepes Ooh La La: Home
Mandi Rogier is a freelance writer who enjoys writing about a wide range of topics. As a previous employee of Walt Disney World, she enjoys writing travel articles that make use of her extensive knowledge of Orlando theme parks.
Attribution: Fletcher6; License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license
Attribution: Fletcher; License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
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The view along the wide cobbled road of Mayfield Gardens, Edinburgh. The houses on each side stand behind walls and many have trees in the gardens. Ornate lampposts can be seen at the side of the road as a variety of horse drawn transport travels down the street. A lady in a long dress and short cloak is walking on the pavement. A man is standing on a set of ladders painting a fence.
Mayfield Gardens is a section of the A701 which runs south out of Edinburgh. This section continues south from Minto Street. Newington railway station was located at the southern end of this short stretch of road. The railway station was closed in 1964.


Amentotaxus argotaenia var. assamica (D.K.Ferguson) Eckenw., Conifers World: 647 (2009).
Amentotaxus assamica D.K.Ferguson, Kew Bull. 40: 115 (1985).
* Amentotaxus assamica D.K.Ferguson, Kew Bull. 40: 115 (1985).
Amentotaxus yunnanensis var. assamica (D.K.Ferguson) Silba, Phytologia 68: 25 (1990).


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ECerS launches open-access journal for ceramic materials
The European Ceramic Society AISBL, (ECerS), Mons, Belgium, has launched an official and peer-reviewed open-access journal titled Open Ceramics. The journal is published by Elsevier, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
According to ECerS, the journal publishes the results of original research and reviews relating to all classes of ceramic materials, from traditional to advanced ceramics, from glasses to refractories, and from bioceramics to ceramic matrix composites. Research results are said to be focused on raw materials, powders, fibres, coatings and porous or compacted bodies. Ceramic Injection Moulding also falls within the scope of the publication.
Contributions dealing with scientific aspects or applied research and reporting experimental, theoretical and modelling approaches and new perspectives will reportedly be welcomed on a fully international basis. The emphasis is believed to be on emerging science or technological developments highlighting the relationships between processing, microstructure and properties of ceramics, glasses and other nonmetallic inorganic materials, as well as their synthesis, manufacture and applications.
The society states that the key objective of the journal is to provide a venue for the dissemination of high quality, novel research and technological developments in ceramic and inorganic materials, targeting a wide audience ranging from academia to industry.
www.ecers.org
www.elsevier.com
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Local food: Sushi is huge in Tokyo, small pieces of raw seafood such as tuna and salmon are wrapped in seaweed and partnered with rice and vegetables. Tempura is another popular dish; prawns, fish and vegetables are covered in egg and deep fried in vegetable oil making a crunchy thin batter. Also try Sukiyaki, which is thinly sliced beef cooked at the table on hot plates with tofu and vegetables.
Located in the area of Omotesando just outside of Shibuya is the Danish café, Andersen with floor to ceiling windows, making it a bright breakfast retreat. Steering away from the many American pancake places to eat breakfast, this café embraces the simpler things in life from eggs and bacon (or sausage) and refillable tea or coffee to fresh Danish pastries, not to mention the bread baskets that come filled with a dozen different varieties of bread.
As Tokyo houses a large majority of Japan's sushi restaurants, it is fair to say standards are high, hence why bookings are made months in advance. On the third floor of the MC building in Ginza is Sawada, a two star Michelin restaurant, owned by chef Koji Sawadsa and his wife. Six seats surround the minimalistic wooden counter where the use of plates and chopsticks are encouraged not to be used. Sawada believes in loosely packed rice and is generous with wasabi. His specialities include sea urchin roll and giant clam which are cooked to perfection.
In east Tokyo's Hibya district, situated on the 24th floor of the famous Peninsular Hotel is Peter; a modern and very trendy restaurant with a contemporary French menu which even gives you the novelty of putting together your own meal of up to five courses. Highlights are the grill and Sunday brunch. Coloured lights and metallic trees adorn the restaurants dimmed light mood, whilst floor to ceiling windows allow for excellent views across the city and Hibiya Park.
Indian food seems to be a lunch time buffet favourite. Highly regarded in the Kyobashi region is Dhaba India. The menu mainly consists of southern Indian food from Tamil and Kerala and is great value for the price. Authentic curries combined with light dosas distinctive flavor dominate the wide menu. Finish lunch with some expertly made chai. The no PC rule at the table along with little emphasis on the décor creates an atmospheric restaurant.
Tokyo doesn't scream vegetarianism, although there are a few veggie only eateries. Near Takebashi station in east Tokyo is Kushi Garden Deli and Café, located on the ground floor of an office building. Casual dining and healthy eating are at Kush Garden's core. They also believe macrobiotic eating of staple foods and chewing thoroughly balances out over eating. Enjoy the veggie food in a pleasant surroundings decorated with potted trees which makes Kush Gardens a relaxing place to spend lunch.
Serving Kyushu cuisine along with eight specially chosen sakes and shochu (alcoholic beverages) from the southern island, Kyushu restaurant is one of Shibuya's best Japanese restaurants. Highly recommended on the menu is Kagoshima style tonkotsu, which is pork and daikon stewed in shochu and Nagasaki style sara udon with vegetables and meat, served over crisp fried noodles. The basement's lively atmospheric dining room has plenty of tatami seating and is open until 3am during the week.


Thank you to all the families and friends of Foundations Montessori School that came to visit us at our Open House on Saturday. We really appreciate everyone that came to join us, we had a great time together with you all! If you couldn't make it, our next Open House is in the Spring on Saturday, the 27th of April, 2019.


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Serves 8 / This satisfying side dish boasts skin-saving lycopene. Salting the tomatoes draws out water, preventing them from becoming mushy. Be sure to use coarse kosher salt; regular salt is too fine for this purpose.
1. Slice about 1/8 inch off top of tomatoes; core and seed with a teaspoon or grapefruit spoon. Sprinkle insides well with kosher salt, rotating to reach both sides and bottom. Lay tomatoes, cut-side down, on a plate lined with several paper towels. Allow to drain for 1/2 hour.
2. Soak raisins in water for 10 minutes; drain and finely chop. Pulse bread in a food processor to form about 2 cups coarse crumbs.
3. Preheat oven to 375º. In a medium skillet, heat 1 tablespoon oil with butter. When butter is melted, add shallots or onion and sauté until almost transparent, about 5 minutes. Add garlic and sauté 1 minute. Stir in raisins and sprinkle with kosher salt. Remove from heat and cool slightly.
4. In a medium bowl, mix breadcrumbs, cooled onion mixture, Parmesan cheese, and nuts. Add salt and pepper to taste and set aside.
5. After tomatoes have drained, use paper towels to dry insides. Arrange tomatoes in a single layer in a glass baking dish or foil-lined baking sheet. Spoon breadcrumb mixture into tomatoes, packing gently and mounding excess on top. Drizzle tomatoes with remaining 2 teaspoons olive oil. Bake until tops are golden brown and crispy, about 20 minutes.


You must have an appointment to be seen by our doctors. We will schedule your appointment for as soon as possible. If you have pain or an emergency, we will try to fit you in that day. We know your time is valuable, and we do our best to stay on schedule. Occasionally, there may be circumstances during a procedure that lengthen the time required by Dr. Wonder. Emergency cases also may cause a delay. We appreciate your understanding and patience.
Please let us know if you have a medical condition (e.g., diabetes, high blood pressure, artificial heart valves or joints, a history of rheumatic fever, etc.


Füzi has been with Noerr for more than 2.5 years, advising major international clients on a range of corporate, employment and investment advisory projects during his time at the company. He heads the employment and litigation practice in Budapest, the press release says. Before joining Noerr, he worked for Rödl & Partner for more than nine years.
After graduating from Eötvös Lóránd University (ELTE) in Budapest, Füzi completed his legal studies at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He is fluent in both German and English.
"Viktor has brought on board valuable market knowledge and client relationship skills and his appointment is evidence of the success of Noerr's growth strategy in Hungary and the CEE at large," said Zoltán Nádasdy, Noerr's office managing partner in Budapest.