We've learned middle Tennessee receives its annual rainfall allotment all during a period of two months. This means five or six day stretches of nothing but torrential downfall. I'm not talking about little refreshing showers, I'm talking about torrents of water gushing from the heavens for days. This leaves flooded roads, washed out sidewalks, mud pits the size of a shopping mall, and one very hyper 2 year old with a ton of energy to burn after being cooped up for so many wet days in a row.
So while the rains came down and the floods came up, my boys completely adapted. All you need is a circular loop in the house somewhere and that makes for hours of endless games.
Harrison names the routine something different every night. So far we have played, "1-2-3!", "Get you!", "Ka-chow!", "Ka-chee-ka!", and dozens of other Harrison named chases. But they all involve running the loop on each other's heels and ending in a wrestling heap on the floor. And they all involve a happy little guy, rain and all!


text:
Q: Make an array case-insensitive I am trying to remove a div that contains specific words.
Here's the sample jquery code:
var someArray = [
        'someword',
        'someword2',
        'someword3'
  ];

    for (var i = 0; i < someArray.length; i++) {
        $("div:contains('"+someArray[i]+"').remove();
  }

Only the divs including the word "someword" is removed, but not "Someword, SOMEWORD, soMeWoRd" etc.
How do I make the array case insentisive matching both combinations?

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
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THE ARTISTIC SETTING OF GIOVANNI RICCA'S SAINT CATHERINE
Ribera and his circle in Naples
Gallerie d'Italia - Palazzo Zevallos Stigliano
Intesa Sanpaolo's Museum in Naples
5 March 2016 - 5 June 2016
Exhibition curated by Giuseppe Porzio
Naples, 4 March 2016 - Reconsideration of some lesser-known personages linked to the art of Jusepe de Ribera in order to publicise the historical and cultural value of one of the most fervent periods in the art of Italy's Mezzogiorno: this is the objective of the elegant and refined exhibition-dossier that the Gallerie of Palazzo Zevallos Stigliano is dedicating to Neapolitan painting in the first half of the 17th century.
The exhibition, born out of a collaboration between Intesa Sanpaolo, the Fondazione Torino Musei – in whose central museum at Palazzo Madama in Turin the show was presented last December – and theDepartment of Human and Social Sciences of Naples "Orientale" University, is being reproposed in Naples in a revised and wider form thanks to the opportunities given by material present in the area. In this way recognition is given to the particular importance of the city that in recent decades has been the main laboratory for getting to know and appreciate the artistice heritage of the South.
The exhibition is centred on acknowledging Giovanni Ricca as the artist of one of the most fascinating and mysterious paintings of Italian 17th century art, Saint Catherine of Alexandria (c.1630), housed in Turin's Palazzo Madama and formerly belonging to the collection of the publisher Giulio Einaudi. A radical philological review, based on previously unsuspected links between works of art and partially known documents, many of which unpublished, has unravelled a complex critical question and led to the painting being attributed to the Neapolitan artist, unknown by the general public and probably unfamilair to many experts, but who it is becoming increasingly clear was one of the leading members of the circle of Jusepe de Ribera, known as "Lo Spagnoletto" (the Little Spaniard).
Starting from new critiques of Saint Catherine, the exhibition recreates a fundamental moment in Italian art of the 1600s, that was heavily influenced by the genius of Ribera, the great Spanish artist who arrived in Naples in 1616 as part of the entourage of the Viceroy the Duke of Osuna, and remained there until his death in 1652.
The intensity and variety of expression of his figurative language shaped the development of painting in the Viceroyalty's capital.
The exhibition includes three works from the permanent collection of the Gallerie di Palazzo Zevallos Stigliano. The canvasses by Francesco Guarino, the Maestro degli Annunci ai pastori and Hendrick de Somer, amongst the best examples of late Riberesque naturalism, integrated into a careful selection of paintings, allow comparisons and links to be made to better understand Ricca's artistic character. In addition, the display of two large canvasses stored at the Prefecture of Naples, from the Church of Santa Maria della Sapienza and inaccessible for years, are a continuation of Intesa Sanpaolo's commitment to the restoration and restitution of the city's artistic heritage. That commitment and effort is aimed at getting young people to use and enjoy the cultural wealth of the country through the use of different artistic media.
In that context, the Gallerie di Palazzo Zevallos Stigliano will be working with Comicon, International Cartoon and Animation Festival, scheduled for 22 to 25 April in Naples, as part of COMIC(ON) OFF, involving cartoonists/illustrators in some new creations inspired by works on show in the temporary exhibition.
Via Toledo 185, Napoli
Tuesday-Friday: 10 a.m.-6 p.m. (last entrance 5.30 p.m.)
Saturday and Sunday: 10 a.m.-8 p.m. (last entrance 7.30 p.m.)
Extra opening days
27 March Easter Sunday
28 March Easter Monday
25 April Liberation Day
2 June Republic Day
Call free 800.454229 (Italy only)
info@palazzozevallos.com
www.gallerieditalia.com
Combined ticket valid for the exhibition and the permanent collection
Full €5 - Reduced €3
Ufficio Media Attività Istituzionali, Sociali e Culturali
Tel. +39 011 5555922 - +39 331 6270041
Last updated 4 March 2016 at 11:02
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Bullhorn Welcomes New Vice President of Global Sales and Business Development
Nick Worswick, High Growth, Sales and Business Development Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) Executive, Joins Bullhorn
Nick's track record of delivering high growth sales and building new sources of revenue will enable Bullhorn to create a worldwide leadership position that will also benefit our customers through greater innovation, complementary solutions from our partners and increased customer satisfaction.
Boston, MA (PRWEB) June 15, 2009
Bullhorn, the global leader in On Demand, front office staffing and recruiting software, today announced the addition of Nick Worswick, vice president of global sales and business development, to its management team. Worswick will be responsible for driving Bullhorn's worldwide revenue growth and developing strategic partnerships to increase Bullhorn's market leadership position and create new revenue streams.
"Nick Worswick is an outstanding addition to the Bullhorn team, and he'll play an integral role in spearheading our global sales expansion and partnerships," said Art Papas, CEO and co-founder of Bullhorn. "Nick's track record of delivering high growth sales and building new sources of revenue will enable Bullhorn to create a worldwide leadership position that will also benefit our customers through greater innovation, complementary solutions from our partners and increased customer satisfaction."
Worswick joins Bullhorn with more than 13 years experience of team-building and leadership in high-growth, Internet and SaaS environments. He possesses a deep understanding of how to expand existing and new markets and achieve leverage through direct and channel sales initiatives. Prior to Bullhorn, Worswick was senior vice president, sales, at IntraLinks, Inc., a Software-as-a-Service provider of information exchange solutions. He ran the sales team in the United States and Canada which accounted for 70% of the company's revenues. During his tenure the company's revenues increased from $8 million to $150 million with an average compounded annual growth rate of 40%. Worswick also was a director of business development at Walker Digital, the company that founded Priceline.com. He began his career as a consultant and financial analyst at KPMG. Worswick is a graduate of Cornell University.
Bullhorn is the staffing and recruiting industry's only On Demand, integrated fron office solution. Comprising email, calendaring, candidate sourcing, an applicant tracking solution, customer relationship management and job management, Bullhorn enables users to communicate and collaborate with contacts, candidates, colleagues and clients in real-time to generate, source and fill job orders, or make placements, at anytime and from anyplace. Bullhorn's users include staffing and recruiting firms of all sizes, from a wide range of industries - including information technology, professional services, office/clerical and healthcare. The Bullhorn Blogger is the company's online community where customers, partners, Bullhorn professionals and prospective customers share ideas and best practices to advance the productivity of the staffing and recruiting industry through the innovative use of Bullhorn's On Demand, integrated front office staffing and recruiting software.
About Bullhorn, Inc.:
Bullhorn is the global leader in On Demand, front office staffing and recruiting software, providing the only completely integrated front office solution for staffing and recruiting firms. Bullhorn's customers achieve the highest placement rates in the industry. By enabling recruiting, sales and management to live and work together, Bullhorn synchronizes sales and recruiting to generate, source and fill job orders in real-time, at anytime and from anyplace. Delivered through software as a service, Bullhorn continually meets the evolving business needs of its customers. More than 1,400 firms and 14,000 users worldwide, including some of the largest global staffing firms, partner with Bullhorn to meet the employment demands of the global economy. For more information, visit http://www.bullhorn.com or call +1(888)GoLive8.
Bullhorn is a registered trademark of Bullhorn, Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Copyright © 2009 Bullhorn, Inc. All rights reserved.
JOE CORDO
Bullhorn, Inc.


text:
Ein asymptotischer Punkt einer Kurve ist in der Analysis und der Geometrie – weit gefasst – eine asymptotische Linie, die zu einem Punkt entartet ist.

In diesem Sinne kann man einen asymptotischen Punkt als einen Häufungspunkt von Kurvenpunkten auffassen, der selbst kein Kurvenpunkt ist.

Auch eine stetig behebbare Definitionslücke ist danach ein asymptotischer Punkt.

Oft wird der Begriff aber eingeschränkt auf Punkte, die die Kurve unendlich oft umkreist, ohne sie schließlich zu erreichen. Bei Funktionsgraphen ist dies nicht möglich; typisch für diese Art von asymptotischen Punkten sind Spiralen.

Die logarithmische Spirale hat einen asymptotischen  Punkt, die Klothoide zwei.

Eine präzise Definition dieses Begriffs von asymptotischem Punkt ist nicht ganz einfach. Sie läuft darauf hinaus, dass der Tangentenwinkel der Kurve bei Annäherung an den Häufungspunkt dem Grenzwert ±∞ zustrebt.

In dieser Form wird der Begriff auch in der Kugelgeometrie verwendet.

Einzelnachweise

Analysis
Geometrie

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Reviewing ODA or China policy?
This article benefited from the constructive criticisms of Dr. Peter Van Ness, the Contemporary China Center at the Australian National University, Dr. Isabelle Thireau, Centre d'Etudes sur la Chine Moderne et Contemporaine and Mr. Kinichi Komano, Japan's Ambassador to Afghanistan. The author thanks Representative Yasuhisa Shiozaki for his co-operation with the interview.
"In order to maintain and strengthen the security and prosperity of Japan, the maintenance of a peaceful environment is essential as, indeed above all, are the stability and prosperity of the East Asia region in which Japan is located. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to create an environment of co-operation in which no country in the region is isolated. It is desirable from Japan's perspective to have a more open and more stable society in China that is willing and able to fulfil its responsibilities as a member of the international community "2.
2That is, Japanese diplomacy has a concrete tool, which other western countries do not have, of its policy of engagement with China. In other words, ODA has been a vital element of Japan's China policy. On the one hand Japan has tried to establish a solid foundation of economic interdependence between Japan and China through ODA, mainly invested in China's construction of its economic infrastructure, which would be expected to contribute towards China becoming a "responsible power" in the international community. On the other hand, especially after the end of the Cold War, Japan has come to understand ODA as a form of sanctions3. Japan has twice suspended ODA to China: in 1989 following the Tiananmen incident; and in 1995, in response to China's decision to continue nuclear testing. However in both cases, the suspensions were only symbolic as they had little material impact on the Chinese economy. From both of these perspectives, it seems sensible that Japan preserve ODA to China as a diplomatic tool of its policy of engagement policy.
"If China becomes a major military power and a serious threat to Japan due to Japanese economic co-operation that eventually enables China to increase its military spending every year, the meaning of Japan's ODA to China will surely come into question. … Behind China's maritime activities lies Peking's maritime strategy, which sees sea waters as a stage for China's political, economic and military struggle to secure its interests and resources. Unless China changes that strategy, its maritime activities in waters surrounding Japan may continue. We want China to clearly explain this point to dispel concern"4.
4Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has more recently understood that there is "a need to listen to public opinion" and decided on May 11th 2000, that the ministry would set up the Advisory Group on Japan's Economic Co-operation to China in the Twenty-First Century (Advisory Group) as a private advisory body to the director-general of the Economic Co-operation Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a process of development of the Country Assistance Programme to China supposedly to be concluded by the end of March 2001 based on "a great concern and critical opinion among Japanese people"5. Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) also started to review Japan's policy on ODA to China in September 2000 at the Small Committee on Evaluation of Economic Co-operation (Small Committee) and wrote the Generalisation and Guidelines of Economic Aid to and Co-operation with China (Guidelines) at the end of 2000.
5The purpose of this paper is to clarify the policy-making process for Japan's policy on ODA to China. Relations between Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Liberal Democratic Party are central to understanding Japan's present stance, and to posit a number of the issues which Japan will be faced with in the near future.
6The country assistance programmes are regarded as one of the government's efforts to enhance the efficiency and transparency of ODA based on Japan's Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance. Taking account of the political, economic and social situations in recipient countries, they outline Japan's assistance plans for an approximate five-year period, incorporating both the plans and the issues that must be tackled in the development process. The Country Assistance Programme to China was supposedly to be written by the end of March 2001. Although the Programme was not drafted and announced by the end of March, the course of the programme had become obvious before then6.
7The Second Study Group on Country Assistance to China set up at Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) in August 1997 produced a final report in February 1999. The report pointed out that the ODA to China should prioritise the elimination of poverty, of differentials among regions and environmental protection. It concluded also that the ODA should be extended mainly to inland China7. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it clear in the Annual Report of the fiscal year of 1999, which reported to the Cabinet that the government would attach greater importance to projects of environment, agriculture and inland China8. The ministry did not have to set up the advisory body because the course of the Country Assistance Programme to China had already been made public before it decided to set up the Advisory Group. In response to mounting domestic criticism of the ODA to China recently, the ministry felt it necessary to take measures to develop a new assistance programme to China.
8Japan's white paper on its ODA policy, published at the end of March 2001, admitted for the first time that there were "harsh views about (overseas) assistance to China" among the Japanese public, pointing out the need to "reconsider how the assistance should be given"9. The "harsh views" were caused mainly by a cooling of public feelings towards China. A poll reported in 1996 and 1997 by Japan's prime minister's office showed that the percentage of the Japanese who did not have feelings of friendship towards China exceeded the percentage of those who did10, while another poll in 2000 showed that a record 31% of the public thought Japan could be drawn into a war, up 10% from a 1997 poll, because of the delicate situation in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait11. Although his visit to Japan in 1998 expected to ease Japanese pessimistic views of China, China's President Jiang Zemin repeated condemnations of Japan over the wartime apology issue, along with ritualistic warnings of revived Japanese militarism, which did nothing to improve these views.
9Partly in response to these adverse trends, "harsh views" about Japan's ODA to China have been on the rise since the end of the 1990s. China ranked second following Indonesia in terms of total ODA received, and first in recent years. Harsh criticism against Japan's economic co-operation with China rose among the Japanese public, especially in 200012.
Source: Naikakuhu Ddijinkanbou kouhoushitsu (Japanese prime minister's office), Gaiko ni kansuru yoronchos (A poll on diplomacy), October 2002. Available from the homepage of the Japanese prime minister's office (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-gaikou/images/zu05.gif).
10The first "harsh view" insists that the ODA has enabled China to reinforce its military power and this may violate the principles of the ODA Charter decided by the cabinet on June 30th 199213. Taro Kohno, a LDP congressman in the House of Representatives, pointed out in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: "If China is in the process of increasing its strategic nuclear missiles, Japan must make a different diplomatic policy in which its ODA policy towards China must be reconsidered"14.
11The second "harsh view" stems from public discontent in Japan that China has shown little gratitude for the ODA. Japanese Ambassador to China Tanino Sakutaro pointed out that a "harsh view among the Diet and newspapers" to the Chinese side in Peking arose when both governments signed the Loan Aid Exchange of Notes in the fiscal year of 1999 on March 27th 2000. He also requested that, "China should tell the Japanese that Japan's assistance in the past twenty years has been useful to China's economic development"15. Yan Wenchang, vice-minister of foreign affairs of the PRC, responded to Tanino's request, saying, "We highly value the role of Japan's Yen Loan to China in contributing to the building of our economy". In spite of Yan's remarks, at the Special Committee on Overseas Economic Co-operation of the LDP held on March 29th 2000, some members of the committee showed dissatisfaction with his use of the phrase "highly value". Shinzo Abe, a member of the committee and the House of Representatives, said, "China recognises Japan's ODA as a sort of a compensation". Strong dissatisfaction of a lack of expressed appreciation was voiced in the committee16.
12The third "harsh view" is based on the fact that China is now expanding its aid to third countries. Sankei Shimbun on May 14th 2000 reported this issue with the headline, "China's Strategic Aid is growing steadily". Sankei Shimbun on July 17th 2000 reported this again on the front page, insisting that they could not help being sceptical about Japan's offering ODA to China based on the fact that China's 'strategic aid' has reached six billion Japanese yen a year to fifteen developing countries17. Review of Japan's ODA to China has been insisted upon in the Diet and the LDP based also on China's strategic aid. At a plenary session of the House of Councillors on September 26th 2000, Yoshitada Konoike, a member of the LDP and the House of Councillors, said, "China gives six billion yen in aid to fifteen developing countries. We should reconsider what our ODA to this country should be"18.
13The Japanese public is critical of their country's ODA to China for a number of reasons. In the first half of 2000, they especially regarded it as contravening a principle of the ODA Charter that full attention be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, arms exports, and to extending ODA such that it might strengthen the recipient country's military power.
"At a committee of the LDP held this morning, it was pointed out that China's growth in military expenditure which was made public at the National People Congress, exceeds greatly the economic growth rate. They discussed this seriously with regard to Japan's ODA Charter "19.
15Japanese foreign minister Yohei Kono also expressed concern over China's increasing defence budget, saying that Japan would review its ODA to China following criticism in Japan about aid offered to this country with a booming economy in his meeting with Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan on May 10th 2000 in Tokyo20.
16The LDP's foreign and related panels required the foreign ministry to convey this intention to review its ODA to China to the Chinese side immediately before the foreign ministerial talks. At the sectional meeting, some members criticised China's active saving of money to buy more military expenditure owing to Japan's ODA21.
"We are not certain of the detail of China's overseas aid." "We are wondering if Japan is in a position to criticise since we also extended assistance to developing countries with a loan from the World Bank. Malaysia and Singapore have also recently started to extend assistance [after receiving ODA from Japan]"22.
18Mounting domestic criticism of the ODA given to China arose not only among the public but also in the Japanese political arenas, and reflected Japanese frustration with China's rapid military modernisation. But the Japanese foreign ministry was unable to deal with public frustration.
19A factor that accelerated Japan's review of its ODA policy towards China was, as already mentioned, the increased activity of Chinese intelligence-gathering ships and naval vessels around Japan at the end of the 1990s. It is assumed that the Haibing-723 that passed through the Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits investigated Japanese military information in its circuit of Japan. Dongdiao-232, another naval intelligence-gathering vessel, was in operation off the Irako Promontory and the Kii Peninsula to the south in July 200023.
21However, Japan's complaint about the ships was rejected by China, which said, "There is no problem." Neither has China complied with a request to gain prior approval to carry out marine research.
22Two weeks after the first meeting of the Advisory Group, the Japanese government decided to offer "special low-interest yen loans" totalling 17.2 billion yen (US$159 million) to China for two projects. The Japanese foreign ministry explained that to extend "special yen loans" to China did not contradict the review of ODA to China because the "special yen loans" to Asian countries affected by the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 came under a separate heading, and the projects under such a loan would be subject to environmental protection and inland development27. In addition it is important to note that it is compulsory for recipient countries of the special loan to supply a half of the amount of the loan extended by Japan. Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organisations) telephoned Yasuhisa Shiozaki, chairman of a sectional meeting of the LDP on foreign affairs saying, "it is necessary to offer the special yen loan to China for the sake of Japan's national interest"28. Not a few LPD members also supported this view.
23The Japanese foreign ministry explained the plan to extend a "special yen loan" to China at a special committee on overseas economic co-operation of the LDP on August 2nd 200029. A number of the members, however, criticised the government's plan to offer the loan to China considering the Chinese activity around Japan's territorial waters30. Yutaka Iimura, Director-General of the Economic Co-operation Bureau of the foreign ministry, stressed the significance of ODA, calling it a "linchpin of Japan-China co-operation" at an executive meeting on foreign affairs of the LDP held on August 3rd 2000. Despite this, the LDP did not give its permission for a special yen loan to be offered to China. Keizo Takemi, a member of the House of Councillors, pointed out at the meeting that a series of documents about the activities by Chinese intelligence-gathering ships and navel vessels was pressure on Japan to stop its economic co-operation with China.
24The foreign affairs and related panels of the LDP held on August 8th 2000, came to a consensus on the activities of these ships and naval vessels, concluding that they "threatened Japanese sovereignty". The LDP required the foreign ministry to reconsider how the ODA to China should be set in motion, and the offering of a special yen loan. The panel also decided on the setting up of another sectional meeting to study Japan's economic co-operation with China31. The foreign and related panels of the LDP held on August 9th 2000 heard a number of criticisms and anger about the government's plan to extend the loan. Some members however insisted that the government's course should continue. The LDP could not agree about the loan. Chairman Shiozaki, at a sectional meeting on foreign affairs, proposed that foreign minister Kono would convey the critical atmosphere among LDP members in his visit to China at the end of August and the LDP would have another consultation after the foreign minister's visit32. The LDP considered the issues on the special yen loan to China at August 24th foreign affairs panels. The panel concluded that the activities of the Chinese ships were an "issue relating to national security" and decided to postpone the approval for a special yen loan33. Furthermore, a LDP sectional meeting on foreign affairs handed over a letter to minister Kono, which required that he convey the Japanese anxiety about Chinese naval activities around Japanese territorial waters.
25The Japanese foreign ministry responded to the LDP's criticism saying, "We have never begun any procedure for a special yen loan during the foreign minister's visit." According to Hidenao Nakagawa, chief cabinet secretary in the Japanese government, however, the government would never change the course of extending the loan to China34. Japanese foreign minister Kono was also unwilling to change it, "I will not overlook today's problems, but we should not overreact. We should sit down and talk"35. In view of the unsettled atmosphere in the party, foreign minister Kono conveyed this concern and anxiety to China's foreign minister during his visit to Peking at the end of August. During the talks, Kono also demanded that China enhance the transparency of its assistance to third countries and Chinese security policy. As for the issues of Chinese intelligence-gathering ships, both ministers agreed that the two sides would build a framework of giving prior notice.
26Some members in the LDP tried to cool criticism of ODA to China. After the foreign minister's visit to Peking, foreign and related panels of the LDP were held on September 7th. Muneo Suzuki, a representative, supported offering the loans to China, "an appropriate person in China agreed to build a 'framework of prior notice'. Japan already promised to offer special yen loans to China"36. Further refutation of the criticism of ODA to China, based on China's wish to sponsor the Commemoration of Twenty Years of Economic Co-operation Between Japan and China sponsored by the Chinese government in October 2000 was also expressed at the meeting37.
"To develop an item-by-item discussion on what our economic co-operation with China should be, contributes to deepening our general understanding of the nature of the Japan-China relationship"39.
28Japan's foreign ministry began to actively cool criticism of ODA to China from October 2000. This was necessary in view of China's wish to sponsor the Commemoration of Twenty Years of Economic Co-operation Between Japan and China, and also for China's premier Zhu Rongji's visit to Japan in the same month. The commemoration ceremony sponsored by Chinese government was held in Peking on October 8th 2000. Chinese Councillor Wu Yi addressed the Commemoration stating at the ceremony "on behalf of the Government of China, I would like to express my gratitude to the Government of Japan for the support extended for the construction of the Chinese economy". Zhu made reference to Japan's role in furthering China's economic modernisation to Mr Nonaka, the secretary-general of the LDP who had also joined the ceremony. Zhu also stated that China would strengthen publicity about Japan's ODA to China and its gratitude to Japanese prime minister Mori when he visited Japan.
29Muneo Suzuki, a deputy chairman of a special committee on overseas co-operation, reported the visit by the secretary-generals of the LDP to China at the panels on foreign affairs on October 11th 2000. He stressed the significance of the ODA to China by referring to Zhu's remarks40. The Japanese foreign ministry also explained the scheduled visit to Japan by Zhu at the joint meeting. The ministry explained that the aim of Chinese Premier's visit was to cement the Japan-China partnership of friendship and co-operation and to settle a series of troublesome issues such as the Chinese intelligence-gathering ships. After Zhu's visit, the LDP convened foreign affairs and related panels on October 15th 2000. The Japanese foreign ministry explained the significance of Zhu's visit to Japan as Japan-China friendship on the basis of the framework of prior notice41.
30With criticism of ODA to China cooling to some degree, the foreign ministry and the LDP began concrete discussions on conduct the reports. The fourth meeting of the Advisory Group was held at the end of September. Yutaka Iimura, Director-General of the Economic Co-operation Bureau of the foreign ministry, showed a proposal for the recommendations at the meeting. After this meeting, members of the group discussed mainly priority issues and focus areas of Japan's ODA policy towards China as well as the current status of Japan-China relations and the outlook for the future.
31A public concern about the recommendations of the advisory group was whether the amount of ODA to China would be reduced. Iimura at the fifth meeting of the advisory group remained deliberately vague, "the LDP is discussing Japan's economic co-operation", and "I feel it is difficult to conclude the recommendations without referring to the amount"42. Again, at the sixth meeting, he said that a focus of the recommendations was the amount of ODA to China. Tokyo Shimbun on October 18th 2000 reported in its morning paper that the government had made a decision to reduce by 10% to 20% the ODA to China. In response Iimura emphasised that any decision to reduce the ODA to China would be made by the Japanese government. "The government is now aiming to develop the Country Assistance Programme to China. We will settle a way of considering the amount during the development process"43. Although the Japanese foreign ministry felt it difficult to conclude a recommendation without referring to the amount, Iimura preferred not to make public the recommendations about cutting ODA to China because the ministry regarded the ODA as a "linchpin of Japan-China co-operation".
32Japan feared Chinese anger if it made public the reduction on the grounds of Chinese military and diplomatic issues44.
33Yet, on November 9th 2000, Sizuka Kamei, the Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the LDP, suddenly proposed reducing the ODA budget across the board by approximately 30%. The foreign affairs and related panels of the LDP held on November 14th tabled the "Kamei Remarks" as a main agenda for discussion. At this meeting, the deputy-chairman Tanitsu explained that the remarks intended that ODA should consider public opinion, the economic and fiscal situation, and the national interest45. While a number of participants criticised the remarks for being unexpected and proposed without prior consultation, the majority supported review and reduction. Katsuto Asano, a parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs, stressed the importance of ODA as a "diplomatic tool" by stating, "Japan is a trading country. For our country, promoting world peace and the free trade system contributes to our national interest. The aim of expending ODA is right".
34At the end of November 2000, the advisory group concluded an original plan of the recommendations and reported it at a joint meeting on foreign affairs of the LDP on November 29th. The group and the foreign ministry considered how to determine the amount of ODA to be offered to China, as well as six focus areas in economic co-operation with China, making the deciding factor for the level of ODA comprising of yen loans, grant aid and technical co-operation the so-called "projects accumulation formula", but without previous levels being a prerequisite in this decision. In other words, according to the final recommendations by the advisory group, "while responding to new requirements to aid in China, it is appropriate to examine and implement each individual project requested, with a focus on the priority areas and issues as outlined in the following section, taking into consideration the severe economic and fiscal situation Japan currently faces"46.
35Paying attention to this original plan of the recommendations and the so-called "projects accumulation formula", the evening edition of Nikkei Shimbun on November 29th and the morning edition of Asahi Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun on November 30th reported that the government would reduce the amount of ODA to China47. Yutaka Iimura stressed that the foreign ministry was considering the "projects accumulation formula" in a round-table discussion with the press on November 30th 2000. He explained that the amount of ODA to China could increase and decrease on the basis of the "projects accumulation formula"48.
Graph 2: Good sino-Japanese relations ?
36Responding to the Kamei remarks, a joint meeting on foreign affairs of the LDP held on December 7th 2000 discussed the ODA budget for the fiscal year of 2001 and came to a consensus to conclude a report on Japan's economic co-operation to China. The December 7th meeting was led by the representative Muneo Suzuki who had become a deputy-chairman of the special committee on overseas economic co-operation owing to the fact that Chairman Seishiro Eto had been transferred to a parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs and drastic criticism was dormant49. The importance of the economic co-operation to China was agreed on the whole, with "some problems" referring to a series of criticisms50. The leaders of the ruling parties agreed on a position built by the ruling parties' project team to scale reductions in the ODA budget51. Japan's ruling LDP demanded in a top-level meeting of the government and the ruling parties that the loan be cut by more than 3%, to meet this scale52. The Small Committee concluded an original plan for the Guidelines in the first week of December 2000, and Chairman Keizo Takemi reported the original plan at the LDP's foreign affairs and related panels on December 15th. The joint meeting basically agreed on the original plan though two passages noting Japan's co-operation with Chinese agriculture and forestry were amended53.
37The Guidelines says in their introduction, "ODA is an aid which comprises a part of Japan's co-operation (with China)". The PLD had reviewed not only Japan's ODA to China but also a series of "co-operation" policies: an untied loan by the former Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM); the use of Japanese public funds supplemented by NEDO to subsidise environmental protection in China. The report also insists that "aid and co-operation" to China provided by these funds have achieved the basic goal, which was stated to be to "develop the (Japan-China) economic relationship focusing on the private sectors". The report highlighted the necessity for "an ongoing evaluation" of ODA to China based on public opposition to its continuation revealed by the review process. According to the report such an evaluation would cover security issues. The LDP thus clearly positioned ODA to China not merely as "aid" but as an integral part of Japan's foreign and security policy54.
38On the other hand, the Advisory Group had its final (9th) meeting on December 15th 2000, when the chairman Isamu Miyazaki, special advisor to Daiwa Institute of Research (former minister of state for the Economic Planning Agency), handed in the recommendations for the coming five-year term to foreign minister Kono55. Although the Group "conducted a comprehensive review of Japan's ODA to China, begun in 1979 on a cumulative basis, the subject of the review was actually only "ODA to China in the Twenty-First century". The recommendations clearly state that, "even as Japan continues to extend ODA to China, efforts should be made to ensure co-ordination with other types of public funds and also with private-sector capital in order to ensure even greater efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the goals of Japan's co-operation with China", but the subject of the review is limited to ODA to China in general. The recommendations consider the aim of extending ODA to China in the late 1970s as being "from the view that supporting China's opening and reform policy would promote the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asian region and the world as a whole", and stressed the need to "encourage China's enhanced participation in the international community and to assist it in progressing towards open society through such assistance" (ODA). They make no reference to the degree of achievement of the aims set in the starting point to extend the ODA to China.
"Japan and China have agreed to the establishment of a new partnership through which they will move beyond the stage of bilateral "good-neighbourliness and friendship" and they will co-operate to resolve various issues facing the East Asian region and the entire international community. In fostering this partnership, it is extremely important to also achieve concrete results through ODA. For example, Japan promotes a so-called South-South co-operation, through which it works together with nations such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to assist other developing countries. Similarly, together with China, Japan should co-operate in assistance to third party countries in Africa and elsewhere. For example, by making use of the achievements that Japan has made in focused support for human resources development centres such as the Japan-China Friendship Hospital".
40THE CHINESE gave no negative reaction to the series of Japanese discussions on the review of ODA to China. Regardless of China's positive attitude to ODA, Japan's move towards reviewing its ODA to China was inevitable. This may imply a discrepancy in the evaluation of Chinese status by the LDP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
41Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is doing all it can to preserve ODA to China as a diplomatic tool of its engagement policy, explaining that China is still a developing country where the priorities are poverty alleviation, environmental protection, and so on. The Japanese foreign ministry does not deny that China is an "emerging power", yet in the foreseeable future China will remain a developing country needing economic assistance from Japan. The Japanese foreign ministry has not expressed the standard neither to the LDP nor to the Japanese public, by which China would graduate to become a developing country.
42According to Japan's 2001 Economic Co-operation Programme for China, "China achieved an average real GDP growth rate of 9.6% a year in the twenty-one-year period from 1979 to 1999, and emerged as the seventh largest country in the world in terms of GDP". It may be understood from this that Japan's ODA contributed greatly to the growth of the Chinese economy. In response to this situation of an "emergent China", Japan-China relations are no longer able to be labelled as being between "donor-recipient countries". The LDP has as a result required the foreign ministry to change the title of the new ODA plan from Country "Assistance" Programme to Economic "Co-operation" Programme, because the party does not evaluate China as a developing country that needs economic assistance from Japan. That is, the Japanese foreign ministry reviewed conditions in order to extend ODA to China as a developing country and the LDP began a review of the whole of Japan's policy to China as an emerging power.
43It is hard to deny the importance of developing a stable and co-operative relationship with China. The LDP asked, what sort of future scenarios with China would be desirable for Japanese national interests. Based on this, the party tried to develop a new national policy towards China as an "emerging power" focusing on economic co-operation. The foreign ministry must therefore reconsider not only ODA but also its policy towards China in the near future. Since Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi and Chinese president Jiang Zemin now share a common view, the basic framework of Japan-China relations have already shifted from one of mutual "good neighbour and friendship" to a new "partnership of friendship and co-operation" for peace and development in Asia56. Asian countries as well, hope both countries will contribute to Asian peace and development in an age of globalisation. In both Japan and China, however, public support for a new partnership seems fragile. What response officials in Tokyo and Peking will give after the review of Japan's ODA to China must be a test case for whether Japan-China relations can move beyond the stage of "good neighbour and friendship" to a new partnership and whether the Japanese government can rebuild public support for it.
1 "Ohira souridaijin no chugokuhomon ni kansuru kyodo shimbun happyo"(Joint press communiqué on Prime Minister Ohira's visit to China), December 7th 1978, in Gaimusho (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed., Waga gaikou no kinkyo (Blue paper on Japan's Foreign Policy), Vol. 24, 1980, pp. 422-424.
2 Japanese foreign ministry, Economic Co-operation Programme for China (October 2001). Available from the homepage of Japanese foreign ministry (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/China-2.html).
3 See for example, Peter Van Ness, "Understanding Japan's ODA as International Sanctions: The Case of Sino-Japanese Relations", in Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln C. Chen eds., In Pursuit of Common Values in Asia: Japan's ODA Charter Re-evaluated, Tokyo, Tokai University Press, 1997, pp. 195-213.
4 Yomiuri Shimbun (editorial), October 14th 2000.
6 The Country Assistance Programme to China was drafted and announced on October 22nd 2001 by the Japanese foreign ministry. Yet the title of the programme changed to the "economic co-operation plan to China" based on LDP's request.
7 Chugoku kunibetsu enjo kenkyukai hokokusho(Dai ni ji) (Final report by the second study group on country assistance to China), (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, February 1999), pp. 31-62.
8 Gaimusho (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Waga kuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo no jisshijokyo: senkyuhyakukyujukyu nendo ni kansuru hokoku (annual report of official development assistance: the fiscal year of 1999), Tokyo, Okurasho Insatsukyoku, October 2000, p. 36.
9 Gaimusho keizai kyoryo kukyoku (the Economic Co-operation Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed., Wagakuni no seifukaihastuenjo (Japan's official development assistance), first volume, Tokyo, Kokusai suishin kyoukai, 2001, p. 70.
10 Sourifu Naikakusoridaijin kanbo kohoshitsu (Japanese prime minister's office), Gaiko ni kansuru seronchosa (A poll on the diplomacy), October 1997, pp. 49-50.
11 Yomiuri Shimbun (editorial), May 22nd 2000.
12 Sourifu Naikakusouridaijin kanbo kohoshitsu ed., ibid., pp. 69-70. See, Yoshihisa Komori, "Machigaidarake no taichu enjo" (Japan's aid toward China with a number of mistakes), Chuho Kouron, Vol. 115, No. 4, May 2000, pp. 94-109.
13 The following four points are stated as principles in implementing ODA: 1) Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem; 2) Any use of ODA for military purposes for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided; 3) Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and their exports of arms; and 4) Full attention should be paid to efforts to promote democratisation and the introduction of a market-oriented economy, as well as the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient countries (Cabinet Decision on June 30th 1992).
14 Kanpou (gougai): dai hyakuyonjunana kai kokkai shugiin gaimu iinkai kiroku (Gazette (extra volume): the minutes of the House committee on foreign affairs, 147th Diet), No. 2, March 22nd 2000, pp. 3-4.
15 "Denshin dai senyonhyakurokujuichi: taichu enshakkan" ("official telegram, No. 1461: Yen Loan to China"), (March 27th 2000), and "FAX koshin F dai sanzenroppyakuhachijuroku gou: taichu ensyakkan" (FAX (F- No. 3686): Yen Loan to China), May 14th 2001. The author claimed the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the telegram and fax on May 8th 2001. The ministry decided to make public them on June 1st 2001(Claim number: 2001-01029).
16 Sankei Shimbun, March 30th 2000.
17 Sankei Shimbun, May 14th 2000; Sankei Shimbun, July 17th 2000.
18 Kanpou (gougai): dai hyakugoju kai kokkai sangiin honkaigi kaigiroku (Gazette (extra volume): the minutes of the plenary session of the House of Councillors, 150th Diet), No. 2, September 26th 2000, p. 10.
19 "Denshin dai sengohyakuju go: taichu musho shikin kyoryoku" (A telegraph, No. 1510: grant assistance to China), March 29th 2000. The author claimed the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the telegram public on May 8th 2001. The ministry decided to make it public on June 1st 2001 (Claim number: 2001-01028). See also Sankei Shimbun, March 30th 2000.
20 Yomiuri Shimbun, May 11th 2000.
21 Asahi Shimbun, May 12th 2000; Mainichi Shimbun, May 13th 2000.
22 "Nijuich seiki ni muketa taichu keizai kyoryoku no arikata ni kansuru kondankai: dai ni kai kaigo, kiroku" (The advisory group on Japan's economic co-operation to China in the 21st century: the minutes of the second meeting). The author claimed the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the minutes on April 2nd 2001. The ministry decided to make them public on May 2nd 2001 (Claim number: 2001-01001).
23 Boei kenkyusyo (The national institute for defence studies) ed., Higashi aziya senryaku gaikan, 2001 (East Asian security review 2001), Tokyo, Boeicho Boei Kenkyusho, 2001, pp. 153-155.
24 Yomiuri Shimbun, June 20th 2000.
25 Sankei Shimbun, June 20th 2000.
26 Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), July 29th 2000.
27 Nikkei Shimbun, August 3rd 2000.
28 Author's interview with Yasuhisa Shiozaki, a member of LDP and the House of Representatives, Tokyo, May 10th 2000.
29 Tokyo Shimbun(evening edition), August 9th 2000.
30 Nikkei Shimbun, August 3rd 2001.
31 Sankei Shimbun, August 9th 2000; Asahi Shimbun, August 9th 2000.
32 Nikkei Shimbun (evening edition), August 9th 2000; Tokyo Shimbun (evening edition), August 9th 2000.
33 Jiyu Minshu (A bulletin of the LDP), No. 1970, September 5th 2000.
34 Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), August 24th 2000.
35 Tokyo Shimbun(evening edition), August 9th 2000.
36 Asahi Shimbun, September 8th 2000.
37 Author's interview with Yasuhisa Shiozaki, a member of the LDP and the House of Representatives, Tokyo, May 10th 2000.
38 Jiyu Minshu, No. 1972, September 19th 2000.
39 Jiyu Minshu, No. 1973, September 26th 2000.
40 Jiyu Minshu, No. 1977, October 24th 2000.
41 Jiyu Minshu, No. 1978, October 31st 2000.
42 "Nijuich seiki ni muketa taichu keizai kyoryoku no arikata ni kansuru kondankai: dai go kai kaigo, kiroku " (The advisory group on Japan's economic co-operation to China in the 21st century: the minutes of the fifth meeting). The author claimed the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the minutes on April 2nd 2001 (claim number: 2001-01001).
43 "Nijuichi seiki ni muketa taichu keizai kyoryoku no arikata ni kansuru kondankai: dai roku kai kaigo, kiroku " ("the advisory group on Japan's economic co-operation to China in the 21st century: the minutes of the sixth meeting") The author claimed the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the minutes on April 2nd 2001, (claim number: 2001-01001).
45 Jiyu Minshu, No. 1982, November 28th 2000.
46 "Nijuichi seiki ni muketa taichu keizai kyoryoku no arikata ni kansuru kondankai teigen" (The recommendation by the advisory group on Japan's economic co-operation to China in the 21st century), December 2000. Available from the homepage of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_1/sei_1_13_4.html.
47 Nikkei Shimbun (evening edition), November 29th 2000; Asahi Shimbun, November 30th 2000; Sankei Shimbun, November 30th 2000. Yomiuri Shimbun on November 30th reported, "The recommendation will not refer to the reduction according to the 'projects accumulation formula'".
48 Author's interview with a reporter for Nikkei Shimbun, Tokyo, May 8th 2001.
49 Mainichi Shimbun, December 8th 2000.
50 Jiyu Minshu, No. 1985, December 19th 2000.
51 Mainichi Shimbun, December 9th 2000; Sankei Shimbun, December 9th 2000.
52 Yomiuri Shimbun, December 13th 2000.
53 "Juni gatsu jugo nich: Chugoku ni taisuru keizai enjo oyobi kyoryoku no sokatsu to shishin torimatome to happyo" (The concluding and announcement of the generalisation and guidelines on economic aid and co-operation with China). Available from Councillor Keizo Takemi's homepage at: http://www.takemi.net/cont/news/cont_main.html; Asahi Shimbun, December 16th 2000.
54 Taigai keizai kyoryoku tokubetsu iinkai keizai kyoryoku hyoka shoiinkai (the small committee on the evaluation of economic co-operation in the special committee on overseas economic co-operation), "Chugoku ni taisuru keizai enjo oyobi kyoryoku no sokatsu to shishin"(The Guidelines), December 15th 2000. Available from the homepage of the Liberal Democratic Party at http://www.jimin.or.jp/jimin/saishin00/pdf/seisaku-033.pdf.
55 "Nijuichi seiki ni muketa taichu keizai kyoryoku no arikata ni kansuru kondankai teigen no happyo ni tsuite" (On publication of the recommendation by the advisory group on Japan's economic co-operation to China in the 21st century), December 2000. Available from the homepage of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_1/sei_1_13_1.html.
56 "Japan-China Joint Declaration On Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development", November 26th 1998. Available from the homepage of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html.


Replacing the rotors on your F-150 is very important on the life of your brakes. This job is best to be done with the replacement of your brake pads. The rotors can be dented or grooved when the caliper has been ran with bare brake pads. When you are replacing your pads you can go ahead and do the full brake job and replace the rotors,bearings and races. You will also have a chance to repack the bearings and this process will improve braking quality. You will notice a quieter and smoother operation from constant braking.
Jack the front of the F-150 where there is clearance between the ground and the bottom of the tire. Be sure the back wheel is chocked. It does not matter which front tire as you will do both.
Remove the front tire. You can inspect the brake pads and the rotor at this point.
Remove the two bolts holding in the caliper. The bolts will be either torx or allen fittings.
Place the caliper out of the way. Be careful as there is a hydraulic line attached so do not place it to far from the rotor.
Remove the dust cap from the spindle assembly. You will see a lock nut and bearings beyond the dust cap.
Pull the cotter pin from the lock nut with a pair of pliers. You will need to straighten out the bottom of the pin as it will be bent to keep from slipping out.
Back the lock nut out with a wrench or a pair of pliers. The bearing and race should slide right out.
Pull the rotor off the spindle. You may want to clean the spindle as it will be greasy and the race and back bearing may have stuck on it.
Place the new bearings in a tub.The bearings will need to absorb the grease. This is called packing the bearings.
Pull the larger bearing and race from the grease and place it in the back of the rotor. You will need to tap the wheel seal in the back of the rotor. You can do this with a hammer. be sure to tap it on the back till it is flush with the rotor.
Load the back end of the rotor with lithium grease to keep it lubricated. This will further help pack the bearings.
Slide the rotor back on the spindle. The spindle should slide to the back of the spindle and leave enough room for the bearings and lock nut.
Place the smaller bearings and race along the spindle. Slide all the way till it stops.
Pack the entire front end of the spindle with grease. This will help the packing as well.
Tighten the lock nut back on the spindle until it is snug. Then turn the nut back half a turn.
Slide the cotter pin back through the hole in the lock nut. Separate the bottom of the pin to keep it from slipping out.
Attach the dust cover back on the end of the spindle. This cover will stick on.
Slide the caliper back on the rotor. Be sure to tighten the bolts snug.
Mount the wheel back on the axle. You can lower the jack once the wheel is tightened back on.
Prepare to change out the rotor on the other side. Repeat the steps to replace the other rotor.
Be sure to replace any existing washers if any. This will help with the spacing.
Be careful as you are working on a vehicle on a jack. Be sure to chock the vehicle and set the parking brake.


What Can We Learn About Walking in the Spirit from Galatians 5?
Thomas Schreiner on July 31st, 2017. Tagged under Galatians.
Due to the influence of law-heavy teaching, the Galatians struggled to understand how to mature as Christians. Did they become righteous by following a set of moral precepts as their forefathers believed, or was there more to it than that?
Throughout the book of Galatians, Paul teaches the Galatians about the relationship between the law and Christian living, and in the 5th chapter of his epistle to the Galatians, Paul begins to explain how the spiritual life works in relationship to Christ and the Holy Spirit.
In his online course on Galatians, Thomas R. Schreiner walks us through Galatians 5. The following post is adapted from Schreiner's course.
If believers want to conquer the flesh, they must continually yield to the Holy Spirit.
Slavery consists in capitulating to the desires of the flesh, while freedom comes from yielding to the Holy Spirit. Freedom is ultimately not attainable by human potentiality; it is a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. So too, serving others in love cannot be accomplished by those who are still in Adam, for those who remain under the dominion of the flesh. Such loving service becomes a reality only through the power of the Holy Spirit. The word "walk" (περιπατεῖτε) denotes the need to submit to the Spirit day by day. There is a tension in the verse between divine enablement and human choice. On the one hand, believers must choose to live by the Spirit, while on the other hand, the Spirit empowers believers to live a life pleasing to God.
The emphatic subjunctive clause ("you will never fulfill," [οὐ μὴ τελέσητε]) should not be construed as an imperative here but as a promise. If believers live in the Spirit, then they will not put into practice the desires of the flesh. The desires of the flesh will be thwarted and conquered as long as the Galatians yield to the Holy Spirit. Believers are not immune to the desires of the old Adam. They still beckon them and are immensely attractive, but believers triumph over those desires as they walk in the Spirit.
Now Paul begins to explain why it's so crucial to walk in the Spirit: a great battle wages in the hearts of believers. Believers are indwelt by the Holy Spirit, and hence the promised gift of the age to come is now theirs. And yet the present evil age has not passed away (1:4). The flesh remains a reality as well, and its desires are not absent. Furthermore, the desires of the flesh are implacably opposed to the things of the Spirit. Nonetheless, the continuing desires of the flesh are not the whole story. Believers are also indwelt by the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit within them impels them to righteousness, so that believers have powerful desires for goodness as well.
What is inferred in the first part of the verse is expressed clearly here. The Spirit and the flesh stand in opposition to each other, so neither the desires of the flesh nor the desires of the Spirit are actualized. Even though Christians enjoy the life of the age to come through the Holy Spirit, a battle with the flesh remains. The flesh and the Spirit vie against one another constantly so that temptations continue to harass believers.
The last clause in this verse is particularly nettlesome. It could be read a number of different ways.
The two texts must be distinguished, for the latter says nothing about the Holy Spirit!
Further, this view does not explain how 5:17 functions as a ground for 5:16. The argument as a whole (5:16–18) does not propound such a pessimistic view of the Christian life, as if Christian existence is marked by constant frustration regarding doing the will of God.
The second view is quite creative, for it sees a parenthesis in the verse. "For the flesh desires what is contrary to the Spirit (and the Spirit what is contrary to the flesh, for they are in conflict with each other) in order that you might not do what you want." The central problem with this view is that it is scarcely apparent that a parenthesis exists. The proposal fails because it is too clever and sophisticated.
The battle between the flesh and Spirit produces a stalemate, so neither the flesh nor the Spirit fulfills its desires. This view suffers from the same problem as some of the others above, for it does not explain the optimism of 5:16 and 5:18, and 5:17 ends up taking both of these verses hostage.
Believers cannot remain neutral in the struggle between the flesh and the Spirit. The "so that" (ἵνα) here is construed as result rather than purpose. This is how most commentators construe this clause.
Perhaps the best explanation understands "so that" (ἵνα) here to denote purpose.Paul gives the reason why the flesh and Spirit resist one another, i.e., so that the desires of the flesh will not become a reality and so that the desires of the Spirit will not be realized. With the coming of the Spirit, a new eschatological reality has dawned. A conflict between the flesh and the Spirit has ensued, explaining why it is so vital for believers to walk in and to be led by the Spirit.
Therefore, walking in the Spirit is not the same thing as coasting along in a fair breeze, for the flesh wars against the Spirit and the Spirit wars against the flesh. Still, Paul is fundamentally optimistic here, claiming that as one walks by the Spirit and is led by the Spirit, there is substantial, significant, and observable victory over the flesh.
We must not think, however, that Paul's view of the Christian life is fundamentally pessimistic. The gift of the new age, the Holy Spirit, now belongs to believers. Believers who live by the Spirit will not carry out the flesh's desires. Those who yield to the Spirit will not live under the dominion of law and sin. A new quality of life (5:22–23) is the result of the Spirit's work. The old age no longer reigns over believers. The old Adam has been crucified with its passions and desires, so that the flesh no longer enslaves believers.
In other words, believers enjoy a substantial, significant, and observable victory in their new life in Christ. Since believers live in the interval between the already and not yet, perfection is not their portion. Yet believers now have the firstfruits of the Spirit and are a new creation (2 Cor 5:17), and hence Paul is fundamentally optimistic about the new life that is possible for saints.
The Spirit's empowering presence grants believers the ability to conquer the desires of the flesh. The word "if" should be read as conditional and should not be translated as "since." The condition beckons the readers to fulfill the hypothesis. The word "led" (ἄγω) is used elsewhere of being guided by the Holy Spirit (Rom 8:14; cf. Luke 4:1), of being led by idols (1 Cor 12:2), of women being moved by their sinful desires (2 Tim 3:6), or of people being brought to repentance (Rom 2:4). The point here is not so much specific guidance for daily decisions as it is being directed by the Spirit to live a life that pleases God. Paul may well draw here on Isaiah 63:11–15, which refers to God's end-time leading of his people by his Spirit.
Those who are impelled by the Spirit are not "under the law." It might seem that freedom from the law means that those who are directed by the Spirit transcend moral norms; they are free to do whatever they wish whether it accords with moral norms or not. The verses that immediately follow indicate that Paul is not teaching antinomianism. Whether one is guided by the flesh or the Spirit can be discerned objectively (cf. 5:19–23).
Paul makes a salvation-historical argument here, for those who are led by the Spirit do not belong to the old era of redemptive history when the law reigned. To be "under law" is to be "under a curse" (3:10), "under sin" (3:22), "under the custodian" (3:25), "under guardians and managers" (4:2), "enslaved under the elements of the world" (4:3), and in need of redemption (4:4–5). If one is "under law," then one is not "under grace" (Rom 6:14–15).
Paul's argument here is illuminating and fits with what he says in Romans 6 as well. Those who are directed by the Spirit are no longer under the law, and therefore they no longer live in the old era of redemptive history under the reign of sin. Freedom from law does not, according to Paul, mean freedom to sin; it means freedom from sin.
Conversely, those who are under the law live under the dominion of the sin. Hence, for the Galatians to subjugate themselves to the message of the Judaizers would be a disaster, for it would open the floodgates for the power of sin to be unleashed in the Galatian community. The answer to the dominion of sin is the cross of Christ and the gift of the Spirit. If the Galatians follow the Spirit, they will not live under the tyranny of sin and the law.
The new age of the Spirit has arrived, and believers are no longer in their Adamic bonds. They have crucified the flesh with its desires, and they now belong to Christ Jesus. Still, believers live in the interval between the already and the not yet. Desires for sin are not absent, and sometimes such desires are incredibly strong (5:17). They are so intense that warfare between the flesh and Spirit takes place in believers.
Therefore, the Christian life is not an ethereal existence in which the conflicts of this world are left behind. Believers do not "float" into a new sphere that cuts them off from the pressures and desires of the present evil age. Desires for evil still afflict us and bedevil us. It is far too simplistic, then, to say that believers must "let go and let God," or to promise that the fight against sin will vanish in this life if a certain formula for spiritual victory is applied. The war against the world, the flesh, and the devil continues until the day of death.
This post is adapted from Thomas Schreiner's Galatians online course. To learn more about the book of Galatians, sign up for the course today.


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https://www.middletownpress.com/mlb/article/Astros-take-2-1-series-lead-over-Royals-11791711.php
Astros take 2-1 series lead over Royals
Kristie Rieken The Associated Press
Published 8:38 pm EDT, Sunday, October 11, 2015
The Astros' Dallas Keuchel throws a pitch to the Royals' Lorenzo Cain during the first inning Sunday.
Photo: David J. Phillip — The Associated Press
HOUSTON >> Dallas Keuchel remained perfect at home with seven gutsy innings and Chris Carter homered Sunday, leading the Houston Astros to a 4-2 win over the Kansas City Royals to take a 2-1 lead in the American League Division Series.
The Astros could wrap up the best-of-five series with a win over the defending AL champions in Game 4 on Monday.
Keuchel, who shut down the Yankees in the AL wild-card game, worked out of jam after jam, allowing five hits and one run with seven strikeouts after going 15-0 at home this season, a modern major league record.
"The ball in Dallas Keuchel's hand brings an awful lot of confidence to a lot of people. Including me," Astros manager A.J. Hinch said. "And he came up with some excellent pitches."
Luke Gregerson gave up a leadoff homer in the ninth to Alex Gordon before finishing off the Astros first playoff game in Houston in 10 years with a four-out save. It was his first save of more than three outs in three years.
Jason Castro drove in two runs with a single in the fifth that made it 2-1. Carlos Gomez, who has a rib muscle strain, started for the first time in the series and had an RBI single in the sixth.
Carter's soaring solo homer, which landed on the train tracks atop the wall in left-center, and came on Danny Duffy's first pitch of the seventh pushed the lead to 4-1.
Carter, batting .199 in the regular season but .455 in the postseason, was a triple shy of the cycle for the Astros, who were hosting a playoff game for the first time since the 2005 World Series.
Lorenzo Cain hit a solo homer in the fourth for the Royals, who are on the brink of elimination after reaching the World Series last season.
Kansas City starter Edinson Volquez fell to 0-3 in his postseason career by allowing five hits and three runs in 5 2-3 innings.
The Astros are one win away from reaching the AL championship series just two years after losing a franchise-worst 111 games. They took the series lead in front of a rowdy, playoff-starved sellout crowd of 42,674. The group was mostly clad in orange and dotted with fans sporting fake beards in support of the star lefty who has become all but untouchable at home.
They were given inflatable orange sticks at the door and spent the afternoon beating them as they cheered, making the roar in the closed-roof stadium deafening at times.
""Electric crowd, and it was 10 years coming," Keuchel said.
Keuchel wasn't as sharp as he was in New York, but he was able to tiptoe out of trouble again and again and got deep in the game despite a pitch count that got high early. He finished with a season-high 124 pitches.
The Astros scored three runs in the first two innings of both of the first two games, but couldn't get anything going early on Sunday.
Colby Rasmus, who homered in Houston's first three playoff games, got a kooky single in the eighth when his pop fly caromed off the ceiling and back into play.
The Astros' first hit didn't come until a single by Carter to start the third inning, but he was thrown out trying to stretch it into a double. Luis Valbuena drew a walk with one out in the fifth and Carter followed with the team's second hit, a liner to the left-field corner for a double. Castro got hit first hit of the postseason on two-strike groundball to center field to score them both to make it 2-1.
George Springer doubled to start Houston's sixth when Cain sprinted and dived to grab his flyball, but it bounced in and out of his glove and onto the ground. Cain slid across the warning track on his stomach and punched the wall in frustration when he got back to his feet.
Gomez's two-out single to center field scored Springer to extend the lead to 3-1.
Cain's first career homer in the postseason came when he launched the 10th pitch of the at-bat, a hanging 80 mph slider, into the seats in left field to start the fourth inning and make it 1-0.
Presidential pitch
Former President George H.W. Bush, in a wheelchair and wearing a neck brace, threw out the ceremonial first pitch before the game. The 91-year-old Bush, recovering after breaking a vertebra in his neck in a summer spill, smiled broadly when the crowd cheered after he was brought onto the field. With wife Barbara by his side, he bounced a short throw from about five feet in front of the plate to Houston's Jed Lowrie, who was set up to catch.