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# **The Turkish AK Party and its Leader**

After landslide electoral victories, two referenda and a presidential election, thirteen years of AK Party rule have shattered many myths regarding Turkey's politics and the nature of the party itself.

This book argues that the last thirteen years are best understood via the AK Party's interaction with the social-political realm. It focuses on criticism, dissent and opposition from prominent organized groups in Turkish society, which themselves represent significantly different traditions, ideologies and interests. Bringing together specialists from across the field, its chapters explore key societal actors to reveal the dynamics behind the last decade of AK Party rule. Overall, the book throws light on the extent to which the government's character, trajectories, policies and leadership style have been interactively shaped by opposition and dissent.

Exploring the historically unprecedented and politically controversial rule of the AK Party, as well as the relationship between modern societal groups and a government driven by a conservative Islamic tradition, this book is a valuable resource for students and scholars of Turkish studies, as well as politics more generally.

**Ümit Cizre** is the former Director of the Center for Modern Turkish Studies at İstanbul Şehir University.

## **Routledge studies in Middle Eastern politics**

**67** **Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey, 1979–2000**
_Ekavi Athanassopoulou_

**68** **Ethnicity and Elections in Turkey**
_Gül Arıkan Akdağ_

**69** **The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq**
_Yaniv Voller_

**70** **Arab Regionalism**
_Silvia Ferabolli_

**71** **The Kurdish Issue in Turkey**
_Edited by Zeynep Gambetti and Joost Jongerden_

**72** **The Turkish Deep State**
_Mehtap Söyler_

**73** **Koreans in the Persian Gulf**
_Shirzad Azad_

**74** **Europeanization of Turkey**
_Ali Tekin and Aylin Güney_

**75** **Turkey's Kurdish Question**
_H. Akin Unver_

**76** **The Israeli Conflict System**
_Harvey Starr and Stanley Dubinsky_

**77** **Political Violence and Kurds in Turkey**
_Mehmet Orhan_

**78** **The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies**
_Ali Tekin and Aylin Güney_

**79** **Diasporic Activism in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict**
_Svenja Gertheiss_

**80** **Israel's Military Operations in Gaza**
_Marouf Hasian, Jr._

**81** **The Turkish AK Party and its Leader**
_Criticism, opposition and dissent Edited by Ümit Cizre_

**82** **Democratic Consolidation in Turkey**
_Edited by Cengiz Erisen and Paul Kubicek_
**The Turkish AK Party and its Leader**

Criticism, opposition and dissent

**Edited by Ümit Cizre**

First published 2016
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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© 2016 selection and editorial material, Ümit Cizre; individual chapters, the contributors

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ISBN: 978-1-138-64078-8 (hbk)
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# **Contents**

_Notes on contributors_

_Acknowledgments_

**1** **Introduction: the politics of redressing grievances —the AK Party and its leader**

ÜMIT CIZRE

**2** **Kemalist advocacy in a post-Kemalist era?**

SINAN CIDDI

**3** **Kemalist feminists in the era of the AK Party**

NIL MUTLUER

**4** **Alevi critique of the AK Party: criticizing "Islamism" or the Turkish State?**

ELISE MASSICARD

**5** **An intellectual left perspective on the AK Party governments: the Birikim journal**

ÜMIT CIZRE

**6** **The right to the city during the AK Party's Thermidor**

FERHAT KENTEL

**7** **Rising criticism of Erdoğan during the Gezi protests**

FAHRETTIN ALTUN

**8** **Pragmatic politics: the G�ovement and the AKP**

KIM SHIVELY

**9** **Mystifying nationalism: Kurdish Islamists and the Kurdish question**

AHMET YILDIZ

_Index_

# **Contributors**

**Associate Professor Fahrettin Altun** , is a member of the Department of Sociology at Medeniyet University, Istanbul, Turkey. He received his BA in Sociology from Istanbul University in 1998 and MA in Sociology from Mimar Sinan University in 2000. After earning his PhD titled "Comparative Analysis of Media Theories of McLuhan and Baudrillard" (Istanbul University, 2006), he joined the Fatih University faculty as assistant professor. He has also had visiting professorship at University of Utah, Salt Lake City. Professor Altun has written articles for _Middle East Critique_ , _Perceptions_ , _Toplum ve Bilim_ , _Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi_ , _Euro Agenda_ , _Sivil Toplum_ , _Divan_ , _Toplumbilim_ and contributed chapters to _Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce_ (Cilt 6: İslamcılık), _Sivil Toplum: Farklı Bakışlar_ , _Küresel Güçler_. He is the author of _Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş_. He was editor in chief of _Anlayış_ , and also hosted Ayrıntı, a live television program aired in TRT 2 and TRT Haber for two years. Dr. Altun's research focus covers sociology of media and communication, political communication, social media, Turkish modernization and political culture.

**Dr. Sinan Ciddi** was appointed as the fourth executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies in August 2011. Ciddi was born in Turkey and educated in the United Kingdom, where he gained his PhD in Political Science from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, in June 2007. He was previously an instructor at Sabancı University between 2004–08 and completed his Post-Doctoral Fellowship at the same institution between 2007–08. He recently published a book titled _Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party: Secularism and Nationalism_ (Routledge, 2009) focusing on the electoral weakness of the Republican People's Party. Between 2008–11, he established the Turkish Studies program at the University of Florida's Center for European Studies.

**Professor Ümit Cizre** (editor) is the former Director of the Center for Modern Turkish Studies at İstanbul Şehir University. She has published several articles, chapters in collected volumes and Working and Policy Papers. She is the editor of the volume, _Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey, the Making of the Justice and Development Party_ (Routledge, 2009); and the _ALMANAC Turkey 2005–2006, Security Sector and Its Democratic Oversight_ published by Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Her primary research interests cover Turkey's democracy problems in general; civil–military relations; democratic governance of the security sector; Turkish right, nationalism and political Islam–secular establishment nexus. She spent 2008–2009 academic year as the "Ertegün Visiting Professor in Turkish Studies" in Princeton University. Prior to that she completed Spring 2008 semester in Binghamton University of SUNY as "Levin Distinguished Scholar in Turkish Affairs." Professor Cizre is a former Fulbright Research Scholar at Princeton University (1996–97) and Jean Monnet Research Fellow at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy (1999–2000).

**Professor Ferhat Kentel** is a member of the Department of Sociology at İstanbul Şehir University. He worked previously at the French Department of Political Sciences of Marmara University (1990–99) and at the Department of Sociology of İstanbul Bilgi University (2001–10). Several times, he has been invited as professor and researcher to EHESS and Université de Paris I. His articles on modernity, everyday life, new social movements, religion, Islamic movements, intellectuals and ethnic communities have been published in different journals and books in Turkey and abroad. Some of his published researches and books are: _Euro-Türkler: Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında Köprü mü mü Engel mi? [Euro-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach, between Turkey and the European Union?]_ (with Ayhan Kaya) (İstanbul Bilgi University, 2005); _"Milletin bölünmez bütünlüğü": Demokratikleşme sürecinde parçalayan milliyetçilik(ler) ["Undivisible unity of Nation": Dividing nationalism(s) in the process of democratization]_ (with M. Ahıska and F. Genç) (TESEV, 2007); _Ehlileşmemek, düzleşmemek, direnmek [Undomesticated, unflatten, resisting]_ (Interview of E. Elmas) (Hayykitap, 2008); _Türkiye'de Ermeniler. Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş [Armenians in Turkey. Community-Individual-Citizen]_ , (with F. Üstel, G. Göksu Özdoğan, K. Karakaşlı), (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversity, 2009); _Yeni Bir Dil: Yeni bir Toplum [A New Language: A New Society]_ , (Interview of M.T. Çiçek, G. Tunalı Koç) (Bilsam, 2012).

**Dr. Elise Massicard** is a research fellow at the Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, Istanbul, Turkey, and an associated researcher at the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, France. She has authored _The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity_ (Routledge, 2012) and co-edited with Nicole Watts _Negotiating Political Power in Turkey: Breaking up the Party_ (Routledge, 2012). She has published extensively in journals including _European Journal of Turkish Studies_ , _New Perspectives on Turkey_ , _Politix_ and _Critique Internationale_. Dr. Massicard's research focus covers the political sociology of Turkey, in particular social movements, political parties, state–society relations, the politics of identity and political territoriality.

**Assistant Professor Nil Mutluer** graduated from the Bilkent University's Department of International Relations. She received her Master's Degree in Cultural Studies from İstanbul Bilgi University and did her PhD in Gender Studies at Central European University in Budapest. Currently she is the Head of Sociology Department at Nişantaşı University. She is also teaching a course on Human Rights and Democracy at Getronogan Armenian High School in Istanbul. She is one of the founders and an elected member of the party assembly of the Green and Left Future Party in Turkey. She is also a member of the executive board of Helsinki Citizens Assembly (hCA-hYd) and of the consultancy board of the Association for Supporting Women Candidates (Ka-der). She has edited books and written many scholarly and non-scholarly articles on gender, nationalism, belief, everyday life and urbanization.

**Associate Professor Kim Shively** is professor of Anthropology at Kutztown, University of Pennsylvania. She has published extensively in journals including _Anthropological Quarterly_ , the _Journal of Middle East_ , _Women's Studies_ , Practicing Anthropology, American Anthropologist, Vis-à-vis: Explorations in Anthropology and Anthropological Theory. Dr. Shively's research focus has been on the relationship between official definitions of Islam and secularism, nationalism, everyday religious life and women's religious practices. Her current research is directed toward religious movements in Turkey, as well as faith-based charitable organizations in Turkey and among Turkish immigrants in the United States.

**Associate Professor Ahmet Yıldız** is the Director of the Research Center of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. He has authored several books in Turkish and English among which are _"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene!" Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-seküler Sınırları [The Ethno-Secular Boundaries of Turkish National Identity] (1919–1938)_ , (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001); _Ulus Devletin Bunalımı_ , _Federalizm ve Kürt Meselesi (The Crisis of the Nation State: Federalism and the Kurdish Question)_ (İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2004). and _Islam, Human Rights and Secular Values_ (co-ed.) (İstanbul: Liberte, 2012). He is the country reporter of Turkey for the _Yearbook of Muslims in Europe_ since 2009. His articles have been published in Turkish and English in several books and journals such as _the Muslim World_ , _Tezkire_ and _Liberal Düşünce_. His research interests lie in Islam and politics in Turkey, the Kurdish Question, Turkish national Identity, Kemalist nationalism and democratization.

# **Acknowledgments**

The idea for this book evolved from a conference, 'Inside, Outside: The AK Party Revisited' at İstanbul Şehir University, organized by the Center for Modern Turkish Studies and Department of Political Science and International Relations, in May 2013. Thank you to Burhanettin Duran for reviewing some articles and providing usefuls comments.

The making of a collected volume is an arduous process involving much labor, patience and persistence. On that level, I thank Richard Peres who has continued to inspire me with his steady, thoughtful and loving advice since the day I met him. He has helped me to enrich and sustain my ideas, my work and my life beyond all these. I dedicate this book to him.

# 1 Introduction*

The politics of redressing grievances—the AK Party and its leader

_Ümit Cizre_

After six landslide victories in local and national elections, plus two referenda and a presidential election, the AK Party (Turkish acronym of the Justice and Development Party) has shattered many commonly held beliefs regarding what was formerly viewed as a quintessentially Islamic and conservative political force. Then came the June 7, 2015 parliamentary elections whose results interrupted the seemingly inexorable thirteen-year rise of its leader-as-party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. To understand the thirteen years of the AK Party in office, it is imperative to identify the defining characteristics and facts about the past story of the party and the leader. This retrospective analysis may help to comprehend the implications of the past which seems to have culminated in a milestone election "defeat" in 2015.

The central myth the party has punctured is the popular perception that Islamic or Islam-friendly movements are overly focused on belief-based moral issues and they do not follow global models of governance, which they scorn as "Western." This is a view that stems from the experience of the AK Party's predecessor, the Welfare Party (the Refah Party) (1983–98) which led a coalition government between 1996–97 until it was forced to resign by the secular establishment led by the high command, bureaucracy, media and judiciary.

However, in reality, the popularity the AK Party enjoyed has largely been attributed to its concern for governance issues, a working market economy, formulation of public policies centered around reforming old practices and implementing new agendas. As they were able to operate as truly "governing" party governments dealing with concrete public issues without being overly worried about "regime issues," AK Party governments illustrate the example of a political party that could adopt higher ambitions beyond obsession with Islam and that are fully in line with the modern capitalist world although coming from an Islamic lineage. More significantly perhaps, it shows the apex of the secular regime's long process of integrating, sometimes negotiating, and often "co-opting" Islamic/conservative movements while keeping constitutional, legal and moral restraints on them intact. Moreover, drawing support from center-right and left voters, the party leader's authority and appeal has depended not just on capturing the arithmetic majority but also on captivating the center ground of Turkish politics. In this sense, the AK Party can also be said to have easily broken another myth that Islam-sensitive political positions are part of the "radical right" as opposed to the more respectful centrist and more moderate political positions and discourses.

It follows that AK Party governments produced their own reality, which challenged the grandest myth of the republic, the secular–Islamist divide. The conventional view about the AK Party can be reduced to two bare essentials: the first is the presumed link between the character of the ruling party and its predecessor, the Refah Party, in terms of both being "Islamic," the term Islamic being defined in an essentialist manner. The second is the perception that the AK Party is the product of a time-tested conflict with the secular bloc. As a result, in the picture drawn by the orthodox analyses, the party only engages with a conservative-religious majority while harboring no affinity or sympathy for the secular, capitalist/affluent, liberal, urban lifestyle of the vast majority of Turks. However, what is missing in these accounts is the fact that permeation of global capitalism into societal mores in the last thirteen years has created a flood of changes in cultural, personal and family relations and a new balance of choices for Muslims regarding lifestyles and politics. Through the demonstration effect of conservative Muslims being transformed into dominant politicians and good capitalists with secular-like lifestyles while keeping their family values, cultural norms and religious beliefs intact, there has been a visible ascendancy of conservative values in the country parallel to a secularization tendency experienced by Muslims. This is not a truly paradoxical development. What needs to be acknowledged here is that the historically abused and misused secular–Islamist divide has been compromised and challenged by the emergence of a complex new synthesis between a secular modernizing lifestyle and a giant grass-roots movement putting Islam-derived values at the core of its political representation.

## "Politics of redressing" as a new genre of politics

In light of the above myths undermined by AK Party administrations, is there anything original or unpredicted about the travails of the AK Party? The answer is a qualified "yes" if the ruling party is measured against the imagery of a home-grown and more overtly "Islamist" party, the predecessor Refah Party, whose legacy is repudiated by the AK Party. There are a number of good reasons for declining to reclaim the Refah's legacy: the Refah Party went into history as failing to achieve anything much except a penchant for double-talk, empty mandates and a radical Islamic vocabulary which have all left a bitter taste even among its followers so as to set the tone for the "newness" of the AK Party's project.

The "newness," however, has been about a single-minded focus on "performance" as affirmation of the "effectiveness" (which turned out to be the most crucial aspect) of the AK Party as the political agency to restore identity, dignity and standing to Turkey's conservative sections of population who were failed twice: first, by the secular state's exclusionary policies and then by the recklessness of the Refah Party, whose brief tenure in power was terminated by military intervention in 1997. The AK party certainly represents a "new genre of politics" in Turkey in a specific sense: it has succeeded in exalting to a respectful level the category of those who "suffered" at the hands of the secular regime by being kept out of the central decision-making processes. The party's efforts to redress these wrongs have resulted in raising its constituents to respectable middle classes.

But the AK Party's success in this regard did not inject a craving for universal democratic rights and norms into the bloodstream of Turkey's Islam-sensitive sectors. What the politics of redressing has resulted in is the delivery of "affluence and prosperity" via sustained growth in an unfettered market economy, not the universal democratic norms and rights which the European Union (EU) reform process was all about.

More significantly, the new genre of politics, that is, the politics of redress, has bifurcated the political field into "victims" of the past system and everyone else, making it necessary to erect barricades to guard the interests of the new pious middle classes. This genre of politics, in other words, has reproduced the existential divide of the Ottoman-Turkish polity between secular and Islamic sectors in a different modality but with even more segregation, animosity and anxiety between them. It can be further argued that since Erdoğan himself was not committed to those rights and norms, the politics of redress produced further opportunities for the AK Party's leader in his quest for power.

On the other hand, this is not to say that there has not been some room for inventiveness in governance; some form of semi-intellectual engagement with the supporters of democratization; and a democratic-like sensibility at moments of commitment to executing reforms to fulfill the conditions for being a full member of the EU. The party certainly challenged, exposed and weakened the ideological foundations of the regime, the cornerstone of its triumphant moments including the dismantling or reshaping the role of traditional power centers. These centers represent the institutional leadership of the republican Kemalist ideology, namely the higher administrative courts, the Armed Forces, universities, civil bureaucracy and media. It is fair to say that AK Party governments have managed to undermine and disorient the establishment, in particular the military – arresting 10 percent of the generals as part of investigations of coup plots against the government – shaking it profoundly if not necessarily terminating its ethos. Regarding foreign policy, the AK Party governments and the party leader can also be credited for turning Turkey into a model in the region, if not at the time of this writing in the Fall of 2015, at least during their early years. Friendly to Islam but not identifiable with Jihadist militancy, using an Islamic lexicon and drawing on ideas of Ottoman revival, Erdoğan spoke of restoring dignity and confidence not just to Turkey's Muslims but also to the long-suffering Muslims of the entire Middle East. Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, however, Turkey has advanced no meaningful or credible ideas for solving the problems of the region, and so the country's stature has fallen.

It is widely accepted that upholding a conservative socio-cultural spirit and an unbridled market agenda, AK Party governments, under the political leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, currently the president of the republic, have indeed had a positive track record for making amends for the grievances of their followers: a soundly managed economy delivered jobs, housing, education, health care and rising living standards. Although basically following the same free market policies started by Kemal Dervis, the minister responsible for the economy in 2001, AK Party governments went further in terms of including more market-friendly technocrats like Ali Babacan in the cabinet and bureaucracy, privatizing more sectors, as well as generating more growth and higher income for all. Until the government launched a massive military offensive against the terrorist militant nationalist group, Kurdistan Workers' Party (the Turkish acronym being the PKK) after the June 7 elections in 2015, AK Party governments had made some milestone decisions like opening a peace process for the intractable Kurdish question, which had offered the best hope for a way out of the impasse for several generations of Turks.

Society's immersion in global patterns of consumerism and a massive generation of capital and investment took the edge off the battle with the secular camp. So much so that by 2010, even the secular opposition came to admit grudgingly the AK Party's modicum of success in managing the economy.

## Reinforcing the basic flaws of the system

The history of AK Party governments' thirteen years, however, will also be remembered as reinforcing the basic flaws of the regime, if not introducing new ones; exploiting the old regime's contradictions; undercutting or self-canceling their own democratic reforms in compliance with the EU accession process; and showing their own penchant for paradox. Essentially, the post-EU reform process remained reluctant, tenuous and partial, continuing to feed on and strengthen the dysfunctions of the existing system.

A perfect example is the present position of the president reneging on, after defending, the investigations, trials and convictions of a network of secular and ultra-nationalist military officers and civilian accomplices accused of planning coups against the AK Party governments beginning in 2003 (called the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer [Balyoz] trials). In what many described as the "trials of the century," generals, former force commanders and even a former chief of staff were given heavy sentences although the Constitutional Court overrode the verdicts which led to the release of almost all the defendants between 2014 and 2015. Erdoğan's statement in March 2015 that: "I never approved of the arrest of our commanders including our former chief of General Staff [Gen. İlker Başbuğ] whom I worked with," matches the technical definition of "retraction," as the then Prime Minister Erdoğan on various occasions expressed strong support for the trials as reaffirming his determination to prove the supremacy of elected civilians.

It is also true that the changing rhetoric of Erdoğan is motivated by his recrimination after the bitter fallout with the influential religious group called the Gülen movement (led by a conservative clergyman Fethullan Gülen) whose supporters are believed to have facilitated the trials by exposing the coup planners. Kim Shively, in her contribution to this volume, argues that the Gülen movement's general support for the AK Party in the past and its eventual rupture later represents a testimony to the pragmatism of the movement's politics rather than any "wedding" and "divorce" between Erdoğan and Gülen and their respective followers (see Chapter 8).

However, for Turkey's believers in genuine democracy, the trials had sent an unequivocal message about the unacceptability of coup making as part of the future role of the Turkish Army. As such, the president's disowning of his engagement with the trials has shattered hopes that establishing democratic civilian controls over the military could serve as the premise for a new program for a new Turkey that would qualify to join the European Union. On the contrary, it seemed as if the party, in aligning itself with a politically alert military, had come full circle and reinvigorated the traditional dogmas of the Kemalist regime.

## Periodization of the AK Party's travails

There is a pervasive acknowledgment that the travails of the AK Party governments can be viewed in two distinct phases, before and after the 2011 elections, as two complementary (for some) and conflicting (for others) projects.

### _The first stage_

In the first phase, granted that the EU-oriented, rights-based reforms by the government did not originate from a genuine engagement with democracy but from having to address a relentlessly aggressive and potentially hostile secular establishment that had treated the party with contempt and disdain, the AK Party governments upended the old politics, curbing its authoritarian mentality and reducing the role of extra-political institutions like big business, the military, the judiciary and the civilian bureaucracy as part of EU-driven reforms. Ironically, however, the government's adoption of a democratic reform discourse after the November 2002 elections unleashed the most intense fears and insecurities on the part of Kemalists, women, non-Muslim, non-Sunni and non-Turkish minorities, big business, socialists and liberals. The European-friendly reform promises were viewed as disguising the party's intentions to dismantle the key premises undergirding the "modern" and "secular" Turkish state.

It is only in the second phase, that is, after the 2011 election victory that the party demonstrated blatantly its capacity for reform and then, in contrast, to recreate the repressive state culture and institutions. Sinan Ciddi, in his contribution, examines the critiques of the AK Party presented by wider societal advocates of secular and modernizing foundational ideology of Kemalism other than the Republican People's Party (Turkish acronym CHP), the torchbearer of the secular ideology and the military. Neo-Kemalist circles are convinced that the gains of the Kemalist revolution including secularism are under threat from the AK Party rule, which is thought to represent continuity with the Refah Party and the movement it came from, namely, the 'National Outlook' movement, initiated by Necmettin Erbakan. This neo-Kemalist sense of "threat" carries a strong sense of conspiracy in the way that the AK Party's rise is perceived as a project by the imperialist nations—particularly the United States—to divide and ultimately dismember Turkey. Ciddi problematizes the neo-Kemalist idea of "the battle for survival" which leads to insistence on perceiving social issues in binary terms, demarcated by forces of the "good" against the forces of "evil." He also argues that the leitmotif offered by advocates of neo-Kemalism helps to foster and perpetuate a societal climate of polarization, engendering fear and reinforcing individuals' biases toward others (see Chapter 2).

Nil Mutluer's contribution investigates the varying impact of the outlook and policies of the ruling party on Kemalist feminists who range from conservative to reformist groups depending on how they interpret the principles and reforms of Atatürk. The AK Party governments led conservative Kemalist feminists to embrace "the arguments of first- and second-generation feminists in the women's movement of Turkey in the post-1980s with regard to equal citizenship, family, violence, and sexuality" while reformist Kemalist feminists found "the opportunity to convey their messages to their conservative counterparts with more dedication" (see Chapter 3).

The battle lines in the reform-friendly first stage were drawn between a simplified dichotomy of "nervous modernists" as they called themselves, and so-called Islamists, the latter pole conjuring up in the minds of the former, imageries of a religious, unenlightened, un-emancipated, primitive and masculine bloc of people huddling together. Apart from the consumerist craze which created a commonality between the so-called secular and Islamist camps, like all simplified categorizations, this cleavage has disguised the dialectical relations between the two sides which would soon re-emerge in the second phase especially by the AK Party's move to the nationalist, statist and security-driven priorities which sidelined an "individual rights-based" discourse.

In hindsight, the liberal, democratic and statist-secular critiques of Erdoğan and the AK Party tended to assign the authoritarian traits of governance that became more pronounced in the second stage to an "Islamist" character rather than purely political character of power, citizenship, state, society and the exercise of popular will independent of religion. Busy denouncing the AK Party as religious reactionaries, critics did not digest the bitter reality that the original reforms were instrumentally motivated by the grievances of the masses. Especially for Kemalist critics, whose own commitment to democracy was dubious, religion served to explain everything.

### _The second stage_

Since the 2011 election victory, however, as the argument goes, the chief foci of the critiques and political opposition have been on the dwindling state of freedoms and concentration of power in the executive. The attempts by the government to tamper with institutions of checks and balances including the Constitutional Court, media and especially the judiciary have been the essential deficits listed as evidence of the disappearance of Turkey's ephemeral democratic reforms. According to Freedom House's Annual Report of 2015, which evaluates the state of freedoms in 195 countries, the country drifted much further from democratic standards in such areas as freedom of expression, associational life, freedom of the media, rule of law and personal autonomy.1

At the heart of the criticisms of Erdoğan's conception of democracy and power is his unflinching commitment to introduce an executive presidency by changing the fundamental rules of the game from a parliamentary to an undefined (probably "alla Turca," that is, in the one-man rule style reminiscent of the Ottoman absolutism) system. In the second stage, before and after he assumed the presidency in 2014, Erdoğan de facto increased the concentration of power in the executive and ran the country from the presidential palace, circumventing the constitution which stipulates that the president is head of state, but the prime minister holds the most executive authority. Again, in this phase, purges of perceived opponents in the judiciary and police took place and the National Intelligence Organization was politically captured by the office of the president. The governments steadily stepped up their top-down attempts to restrict personal liberties and media freedoms while restructuring the judiciary via partisan appointments. The pronounced increase in attacks against democratic pluralism and civil liberties since 2011 by the members of the AK Party in their public addresses have added fuel to the pervasive antipathy and skepticism against the leader and the government. Meanwhile, Erdoğan's apparent disregard for basic values of democracy and his brash, confrontational rhetoric have raised eyebrows in the West. He pulls no punches regardless of his audience, confusing the rough-and-tumble battles of domestic politics with the hard, careful compromises of international relations.

An example in point is his initiative regarding the Kurdish peace process. The peace process initiated with the Kurds started as an "opening" in popular parlance in 2009 and followed a course of ups and downs. Negotiations launched with Abdullah Öcalan, the incarcerated leader of the PKK, at the end of 2012 resulted in a ceasefire by both the Turkish security forces and the PKK. It is probably safe to say that Erdoğan's governments launched this process out of necessity rather than a genuine engagement with democratic ideals like granting cultural rights to the Kurdish community.

The party leadership felt that addressing a relentlessly violent and seemingly intractable conflict that was overshadowing a stable image of the party and the leader was essential in the unbridled competition to electoral power. Rallying the Kurdish population behind the party was an early way station in the career of the party and the leader. Much of the leader's negative and unflattering rhetoric about the Kurdish political movement's policies and personalities even before the resumption of military offensive in July 2015 soon after the elections, affirm the suspicions that the process never had much chance or substance; and it had never looked genuinely historic. In reality, the leader's commitment to a peace process can be considered "cyclical" depending on "how much," "when" and "if" he needs nationalist-conservative votes.

The section "A Constructed Crisis?" at the end of this introduction confirms this argument by showing that when the AK Party failed to win an overall majority in the June 2015 elections for the first time since coming to power in 2002, the leader's controversial decision to announce snap elections on November 1 to recoup its electoral losses was based on the perception that the June 7 electoral setback was due to nationalist votes defecting to the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP being the Turkish acronym) as well as Kurdish conservative votes going back to the People's Democracy Party (HDP in Turkish). In an attempt to win back the nationalist votes, the leader shifted his position and broke the two-year ceasefire and adopted a pointedly ethnic Turkish nationalist and anti-terrorist stance, painting himself as fighting for the unity and integrity of one country and one nation.

## The value and importance of critique, opposition and dissent in the AK Party decade

The AK Party decade has been a historically unprecedented and politically controversial one, which has aroused a widespread and prolific critique, opposition and debate among diverse platforms, positions and players in society. One of the most compelling ways to understand the intersection of society and the AK Party during the AK Party decade is to study criticism, dissent and opposition by prominent organized groups in Turkish society. Whereas most approaches that inform the existing analyses of the AK Party in the last thirteen years are inflicted with a "snapshot" focus emphasizing either the party itself or its leadership unconnected with the intellectual, societal and political environment, it is the premise of this book that the AK Party's moment in history can not be inscribed in isolation. The book recasts the question of how to identify the AK Party, its decade and leader by placing them within a context of interaction with the social-political realm. The multiple and sometimes vociferous societal voices of this realm have played a defining and often transforming role in the AK Party governments' character, trajectories, policies, leadership style and operational logic.

An excellent example of how governmental power has been interactively shaped in the face of criticism and opposition comes from Istanbul's Gezi Park demonstrations of 2013: by their forceful protests, a new cadre of young urban activists forming a bloc with liberals, democrats, leftists, secularists and Kurds compelled the leadership of the party to revise its assumption that Turkey's youth are anti-political, dependent on social media and lacking in ideas of their own. Erdoğan's crackdown on the demonstrators and finger pointing at the West were harbingers of his move toward thwarting opposition with a more restrictive and power-oriented model of governance. The Gezi protests played an instrumental role in Erdoğan's adoption of an increasingly aggressive campaign against democratic pluralism and his search for unchecked power.

Articles by Fahrettin Altun and Ferhat Kentel in the volume take issue with the nature and significance of the Gezi protests as well as their effects on the subsequent modality of politics and leadership from different perspectives. Altun, in his work, refers to Chantal Mouffe's argument on the centrality of conflict to the construction of political reality. If conflict is not addressed within a legal domain, it may cause acute and inimical results. Applying Mouffe's argument, Altun focuses on the criticisms leveled at Erdoğan in the discourses of the Gezi protesters through a deconstruction of their Erdoğan imagery. He states that Erdoğan was viewed as an "antagonist" and an "enemy," rather than a political competitor. So much so that, criticisms were not directed toward the government or the AK Party's institutional identity, but exclusively toward Erdoğan's discourse and policies. Hence, Altun argues that as soon as the Gezi protests turned into massive demonstrations, they gained a different shape and environmental, and non-political criticisms were reduced to a reaction to Erdoğan's personality (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, Ferhat Kentel draws attention to the nature of the confrontation between the AK Party and the Gezi protesters. He argues that the conflict was not between a political party and an intellectual community appraising the former's deeds. Rather, the social movement that emerged from the confrontation was forged by its defiance in Taksim, a public square, against the capitalist urban policies implemented by the government in line with global capitalist economic logic. Thus, Kentel dwells on this confrontation from the perspective of the protesters as well as the transformation of the AK Party toward consolidating its power, causing massive social changes and implementing capitalist urban policies which triggered societal reactions (see Chapter 6).

### _Who are these groups? Why are they important?_

We have chosen seven critical groups or sets of actors which have come to prominence in society largely because they share and express a common cause or ideology and have the resources to express them effectively in the political arena. These actors are important because they have a serious capacity to provide agency and expression to the popular demands of their members and formulate critical rather than acquiescent perspectives on the AK Party's policies. More importantly, they express a higher political and cultural form of engagement in politics and more articulated perspectives than the unorganized clusters and individuals whose voices of discontent and alienation are lost in the public space. In Turkey's current restrictive political environment, it is compelling to address the discourse of pivotal societal groups which do not hide or make incidental their criticisms, expectations, demands and interests from the government. Tracing how the positions of the AK Party governments and these actors are interactively shaped also helps to shift the focus to "how" hegemony operates vis-à-vis societal critique.

The groups selected are:

•The critiques by the advocates of the most formidable anti-AK Party segment in society and politics, _the Kemalist civil society groups_ ;

• _Gender-driven republican-secular feminists_ who have been the most vocal critics of the AK Party's policies on women and family;

•The _Alevite community_ as the largest non-Sunni group in the country which has engaged in expressing compelling demands against the Sunni-dominated perspectives and policies of the AK Party leadership;

•The _Gülen movement_ as the most influential and largest religious movement in Turkey associated with Turkish preacher Fethullan Gülen;

•The eclectic coalition of ideological positions represented by the _Taksim Gezi protesters_ (two articles) which have played a huge role in prompting the subsequent undemocratic initiatives by the leader;

•" _The circle of Birikim journal_ " as the intellectual fountain of Turkey's socialists for more than four decades, with a moral influence far beyond the limited number of its readership;

• _Kurdish Islamist platforms and groups_ which combine a nationalist agenda for Kurdish existence from an Islamist perspective. As such, their principles and critiques of the government present an interesting ensemble of ambitions for the Islam-friendly but strongly Turkish nationalist leadership.

All this is not to say that these groups/circles are monolithic social, political and intellectual entities. Nor are their perceptions, understandings and expectations of politics in general, and their specific critiques, always coherent and consistent. It is clear that the differences in the resources these groups muster have an unequal impact on government and society. It is useful, however, to understand their sense of politics, change and diversity even when they do not produce a consistent and systematic critique. Moreover, diversity of views inside the organizations of these actors is a worthy subject to pursue as it may force a focus on an intellectual rather than a result-producing discourse.

The volume also turns attention to the much-needed inquiry of how these groups drive the issues concerning their community/group interests into national conversations and make an impact on the vast majority of Turks. Whether or not they can act as countervailing forces against the government, interact with it and make it responsive and accountable, the ideas and activities of these key groups help to enrich our understanding of the context in which the governmental power of the last thirteen years has been exercised.

The writers of this volume have selected key opinion leaders, public intellectuals, journalists, media people, actual spokesmen and platforms identified with the groups' visions and ideas as the "actors" who express the groups' perspectives. In addition to studying their publications, appearances on all forms of media including digital media and speaking engagements, some contributors have used in-depth interviews. The array of critiques that were covered ranged from appreciation to dissidence; reiteration to rejection of government statements/policies including expressions of cynicism; proposing alternative proposals; and vocal criticism and simple exposure of faults.

### _"Absence of ideas?"_

Furthermore, by connecting the AK Party decade with its socio-political context, the volume will help confirm or defy the conventional thinking that the age of global capitalism is marked by an "absence of ideas," intellectual energy and creativity, the combined effect of which has been to cause the atrophy of governments and public disenchantment with politics all around the world. This claim functions in tandem with another "given" that political participation suffers from lack of ideas, alternatives and conflicting paradigms on how to organize state and society. It is suggested that politics operates in a world where intellectual cross-fertilization has been at an all time low due to visual media eclipsing reading, learning and discussion standards.

Translated into the Turkish political context, by the same token, the AK Party's unrivalled hegemony is explained by the party being a product of a specific historical juncture where socialist, liberal and Kemalist narratives have been broken, discredited and no alternatives have yet been offered. The silence or collusion of intellectuals with the government and the ineffectiveness of the opposition are tied to the disappearance of passion, empathy and pivotal ideologies in politics, or the capitulation of minds to material gratifications. The power of the AKP or its leader is thus portrayed as natural, normal and legitimate by virtue of being powerful.

The volume is intended to address the widespread perception that Turkey's left-wing intellectuals, non-Muslim communities, feminists and Islamic thinkers are reduced to "impotency" in opposing the AK Party. It is hoped that contributions to the volume can confirm, challenge or pick holes in the premise of this perception that suggests that structural conditions of existence in the form of material gratifications granted by global capitalism kill intellectual engagements to transform these conditions.

## The authoritarian overreach of the leader

If one of the most critiqued issues in the second phase of AK Party rule has been the violation of freedom of speech and the press, the other has been the tenacity of the leader to create what is dubbed as an "imperial presidency." The chief argument the president and his team have put forward for their dogged commitment to this idea is that this measure would eliminate "the multiple centers of power" that preclude efficient decision-making in politics and hinder Turkey's progress toward being a global economic power. But the bulk of "the multiple centers of power" to which the president refers—state bureaucracy, the courts, the police, the domestic intelligence agency, the military, universities and their centralized administration—has already been co-opted, purged or packed with partisan appointees in the second phase of party rule. Especially alarming has been the targeting of judicial appointments, purging the police of opponents, and making the National Intelligence Organization as the most "loyal" bureaucratic enclave on the claim that the US-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen and his followers in the administration attempted a political and judicial coup against the government. The leader has called the checks and balances of the parliamentary system "multi-headedness" that disrupts effective governance.2

Indeed, the only other "center" that has some oppositional weight is the parliament with its legislative and investigative capacities. It seems clear that, at present, Erdoğan wants to craft a system that can bypass the parliament when the AK Party's majority is not a given.

Moreover, visible restrictions on freedom of expression, the governments' growing antipathy toward oppositional politics and its convergence with the nationalist, statist and security-driven priorities of the _ancien régime_ have elicited fears that the "national security state" of the past has been recreated as an anachronism for today. Elise Massicard's chapter is devoted to explaining the fears of Turkey's Alevites, a religious minority historically discriminated against but successfully integrated into Turkish society by the secular republican regime: under the increasing dominance of Erdoğan's Sunni leadership, Turkey's Alevis are now highly critical of the government for developing a growing antipathy toward their religious freedoms and their access to state positions. Interestingly, Massicard shows that the "Alevi opening" initiated by the AK Party governments has hardly been welcomed by many Alevis out of the fear that this would benefit exclusively the party's rule rather than the Alevite community.

A rather interesting critique of the AK Party and its leader is provided by Kurdish Islamists in Ahmet Yıldız's contribution to this volume. Kurdish Islamist critique considers the party's discourse on Islamic fraternity as an assimilationist posture. With some differences, Kurdish Islamist platforms equate the Kurdish right to a nation state with that of the Turkish nation's right to its own nation state, on moral grounds. The priority Kurdish Islamists place on the "Kurdistan" cause, rather than on a purely Islamic state which transcends nationalism and a national state, presents a crystal clear divergence from the AK Party's antipathy toward the Kurdish "nationalist" cause (see Chapter 9).

Erdoğan has proven to be a prescriptive one-man leader, a leader who has achieved the ability to continually engage in prescriptive politics regarding what people should think and believe and how they ought to live. The perspective that the AK Party and its leader have always displayed an "authoritarian" and prescriptive trait as part of their so-called Islamism, which the party disguised initially, is reductionist and suffers from characterizing the AK Party as essentially Islamist. A more convincing approach would be to connect the troubling features of the ruling party and the leader not directly and purely with Islamism but with the structural and philosophical foundations of the republic. The leader-as-party-and-country understanding of politics runs deep in Turkey, where the secular republican political tradition is built on a cult of personality. This tradition promotes an ideology of obedience among the citizenry; is intolerant of identities that are non-ethnic Turkish or non-Sunni; is obsessed with the security of the state; and depends on a party machine devoid of internal democracy. In other relatively democratic periods since 1946, memorable leaders like Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit and Turgut Özal also set the national agenda, framed policy and ruled their respective parties with an iron fist.

But Erdoğan's penchant for power cannot simply be solely attributed to the regime's DNA either. His reversal from democratic reforms is related to the real nature of his original mission. The grand purpose of this mission, as explained above, was to restore freedom of expression and social standing to the religious masses which is incorporated into his mass appeal and strong grass-roots support. As the party fulfilled its core mission, it became a state-like institution with increasing neo-patrimonial power. Erdoğan became the most powerful "chief executive" since the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, ruled the country under a single-party system from 1923–38.

The leader's endless utterances are always made to friendly crowds or media cartels. No one can remember a public appearance in which he was challenged in a genuinely democratic way, such as an open press conference. Nor does the Turkish legislature have the British-style question time, where the prime minister must respond impromptu to deputies' queries. The Turkish people have no idea how the indomitable Erdoğan would perform in such a democratic setting. This situation suggests that a major part of Erdoğan's tenure in power stems from his ability to macro-as well as micro-manage Turkish politics. Positioning himself at the center stage of each day's political events, day after day for thirteen years, and defining, more than any leader of the past, the dynamics and terms of the political agenda, he can dole out plenty of seductions/privileges and insecurities/punishments to his friends and foes.

How much of Erdoğan's leadership is a matter of uncovering, on one level, the leader's psychological make-up which shapes his own motivations, responsiveness to ideas and notions of good leadership is another engaging question. The post-June 7 election debacle in which the leader refused to abide by the election results and plunged the country into snap elections and a violent war with the Kurds seems to provoke an intellectual interest by the Birikim circle in identifying the sources of the authority- and power-centered personality traits of the leader (see Chapter 5).

Erdoğan retains a certain mass appeal that has helped to underpin the resilience of his leadership. But this grass-roots strength has an enormous downside: playing by no rules other than his own, accountable to no one, Erdoğan helped to portray the party as a personal vehicle, impotent in his shadow, rather than an institution. In fact, Erdoğan's leadership style has obscured deep divisions within the party, some of which are emerging in the post-June 7 elections phase as the party licked its wounds.

Another important issue that needs to be factored in understanding the leader's sustenance and search for unchecked power is the ready existence of an army of intellectuals, journalists, opinion leaders, media personalities and university professors who are willing to be "made" by Erdoğan and the party. It is safe to say that their proclivity to please the powerful is not derived from a position of intellectual power or professional fulfillment. On the contrary, through their unflinching support for the leader, they hope to overcome the daunting prospect of powerlessness and insignificance, an insecurity that would derive from not being embedded with the leader's circle of influence.

Running the country with a small coterie of bureaucrats and advisers, becoming distanced from society, making no time for reading and contemplation, disguising his lack of intellectual curiosity and disconnection from democratic values with pragmatism and arrogance, the only thing that could humble Erdoğan was the June 7 elections.

## The implications of the historic June 7, 2015 elections

The most significant aspect of the June 7 general elections was that they were a referendum on the position and vision of Erdoğan: he was elected as president with 52 percent of the vote the year before, and he campaigned aggressively preceding the elections on amending the constitution to enhance the (his) powers of the presidency to the detriment of the prime minister and Parliament. This aspiration alienated a vast number of voters, including his own party's constituency, for the Turkish constitution lays out a role for presidents that is "above politics." Erdoğan led his party's campaign personally, lobbing spiteful charges at his opponents with the titular head of the party, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, taking a back seat.

Erdoğan fought hard in the campaign to achieve three numerical objectives in Parliament: he wanted the two-thirds majority (367 seats) needed to change the constitution as he desired; failing that, he sought the three-fifths majority (330 seats) needed to call a referendum on the issue; and, as a last resort, he aimed for the 276 seats required to form another majority government. He failed on all three counts, winning only the most seats in Parliament, 258, but losing 10 percent of the votes it had received in the 2011 elections, amounting to sixty-nine seats.3

The second important aspect of the June 2015 elections was the success of the pro-Kurdish HDP and its young leader Selahattin Demirtaş, in passing the 10 percent threshold required for seats in Parliament. The party secured eighty seats which was on par with the number of seats won by its nemesis, the Turkish nationalist MHP. The HDP's gain stripped the AK Party of the number of seats needed to amend the constitution in line with the president's plans and forced it into coalition talks. The second largest party, the CHP, failed to increase its votes and kept the 25 percent it had received in 2011 elections.

Kurdish deputies from a series of parties representing the Kurdish nationalist movement have sat in Parliament since 1991, but they had to run either as independents or on other parties' lists to gain a seat and avoid the 10 percent requirement. Kurdish demands evolved over time, but in general entailed greater cultural freedoms, as well as full equality and citizenship rights. The electoral rise of the HDP in June 2015 was achieved by the liberal, democratic and progressive opposition to Erdoğan joining forces in supporting the HDP's breakthrough. This rainbow coalition illustrated and also raised the prospects that the HDP could break from its narrow Kurdish nationalist posture and move toward a more progressive discourse. The HDP's reinvention of itself even before the votes were tallied, and its adoption of a broader and "Turkified" allegiance to democracy with its stand against Erdoğan's scheme to strengthen the presidency, energized leftist political imaginations and proved to be a serious rival for the CHP, the main social democracy-oriented opposition party on the left during Erdoğan's thirteen years of rule. Moreover, Selahattin Demirtaş, the HDP's leader, helped to fashion a new profile for the party and presented a much-needed inspiring leader type for Turkey. From a provincial Kurdish background, Demirtaş turned into a star performer by exhibiting qualities opposite to Erdoğan's: he came across as humble, not proud; honest, not prone to secrecy; cool and collected, not angry at the world; democratic, not autocratic; calm not aggressive; and articulate, not tripped up by poor grammar.

## A constructed post-election crisis?

When it became clear that Demirtaş's HDP wrecked the President's plans to forge a powerful presidential system, Erdoğan launched a strategy to reverse the losses his party sustained and steered the country into repeating the general elections on November 1. In a speech in his hometown, Rize, on August 14, he stunned the public once more by his open admission that far from accepting the June 7 election results as binding, he was as determined as ever to advance the idea of Turkey's need to transform to a presidential system because:

whether it is accepted or not, Turkey's system of government has changed [he is alluding to the fact that following constitutional amendments in 2007 accepted by a popular referendum, the president is now elected by direct vote]. What needs to be done now is to clarify and confirm the legal framework of this de facto situation with a new Constitution.4

The president's strategy was to go to the polls again. To produce this outcome, his strategy rested on two legs: first, coalition talks with the other parties were launched as a "formality," and as a result, naturally grounded to a halt. For Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the opposition CHP, Erdoğan deliberately manipulated the negotiations to block a positive outcome which would have prevented him from going for new polls to achieve better results for the AK Party. He said: "democracy is currently suspended and the constitution is not working... we are faced with a civilian coup,"5 when Erdoğan refused to hand him the mandate to lead the second round of coalition talks as the leader of the second largest party.

Second, Erdoğan's pitch for snap elections seemed to be based on his simple math which told him that the party lost its parliamentary majority largely due to the defection of nationalist-conservative Kurdish voters, who had voted for the AK Party in the past, voting for the HDP. As the MHP and the AK Party are considered to be sharing more or less the same conservative-nationalist voter base, in a way, it was natural that some alienated voters of the AK Party had turned to the MHP which had opposed the peace process since 2012. In attempting to broker a peace deal with the Kurds beginning in 2013, Erdoğan knew he was risking the opposition of hard-line nationalists supporting the MHP. As long as his party commanded a parliamentary majority, this didn't seem to deter him. But, after the electoral failure of the AK Party in June 7 elections, Erdoğan's desperation for obtaining the numerical majority to boost the powers of his presidency caused a fresh resolve for getting back the nationalist conservative votes that had gone to the MHP.

Seen by many as a calculated move to win back nationalist and conservative votes, the government resumed extensive military operations against the PKK strongholds in northern Iraq and south-east Turkey in late July, which shattered a two-year ceasefire on the ostensible claim that the peace process had become impossible to maintain. The military offensive and the PKK's bloody retaliation, which shows it is ready to use terrorism as a tactic, have caused massive destruction and fatalities estimated to be in the hundreds. Special security zones were declared in fifteen provinces in south-eastern Turkey where nearly 100,000 people are said to have fled their homes to escape the violence. Analysts seem to agree that cracking down on the PKK, the state's fiercest and most violent "enemy," and reigniting the three-decade conflict is part of Erdoğan's strategy to portray his leadership and his party (although, in theory, he is above party politics) as a bulwark against terrorism while connecting the HDP with the PKK militants which have been branded as terrorists by the USA and many European countries.

For his part, HDP's leader Selahattin Demirtaş vehemently denies accusations that his party is a PKK front and that it favors an armed struggle to resolve the Kurdish demands. He has accused Erdoğan of orchestrating the post-election crisis as a battle to discredit and demonize the HDP and push its votes below 10 percent: "the military operations are not waged to protect our country's soil but to protect the future of the palace (presidential)."6 Despite Erdoğan's campaign to ostracize the party from the political arena (in late July, Erdoğan urged the parliament to strip politicians with links to militant organizations of their parliamentary immunity from prosecution), Demirtaş called for a ceasefire by the PKK without "ifs and buts" on August 23, with no positive response. On the other hand, for those Kurds angry at, and fearful of, the renewal of violence and instability in the region, the events unfolding since the elections have testified to the chilling reality which has retarded and obscured the acts of the "democratic" actors in the Kurdish movement: the Kurdish political landscape is fractious and that although the HDP has affinity with the PKK, it neither controls nor is controllable by the PKK.

Despite the predictions of the polls that the HDP will either keep or increase its voting share, it is also true that the PKK's refusal to comply with Demirtaş's peace calls and its huge contribution to the spiraling of violence on a scale as deadly as in the 1980s and 1990s raises existential issues which are more serious than the party's electoral prospects in the next elections: can the party resolve the problem of not being able to follow an effective Kurdish policy independent of the PKK? If so, how?

The government's decision to launch a military offensive against the PKK was made almost simultaneously with its decision to take a more active role in the fight of the American-led coalition against ISIS. The pro-active anti-ISIS stand was triggered when on July 20, thirty-two young pro-Kurdish activists were killed in a Turkish town on the Syrian border in a suicide bombing blamed on ISIS. To justify this two-pronged war, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu claimed that the PKK poses an equal threat to Turkey's territorial integrity as the ISIS militants across the border in Iraq and Syria.7 Many critics feel that waging a dual cross-border "anti-terror" offensive against ISIS militants in Syria and PKK rebels in Turkey and northern Iraq is a smokescreen to neutralize possible Western criticisms against the real plans of scrapping the peace talks with the Kurds and starting an all-out war against the PKK. One prominent critic, Cengiz Çandar claimed that: "the battle with terror is a pretext. The aim is to revenge for the June 7 elections."8

Ironically enough, polls conducted by three serious pollsters (MetroPoll, ANAR and Gezici) in late August and September all pointed out that the resumption of the war, escalation of violence and rising tide of nationalist rhetoric have caused a further decline in the support of the AKP among the Kurds. Özer Sancar, the head of MetroPoll Strategic and Social Research Center stated that it seems very likely that: "the snap elections will not generate a different political situation from the elections in June 7."9

This would mean that the AKP's campaign to identify the HDP as being controlled by ruthless militants will not have proven to be a workable strategy. For those who acknowledge that the Kurdish movement has grown out of a history of resistance and that the HDP today still embodies this rebel spirit, this fact would not be surprising. In a delicate but necessary act of balancing, the HDP has reinvented itself by injecting new global norms and ideas into its movement. There is still optimism in the country that post-June 7 developments instigated by the president, rather than undermining the moral basis and public resolve for resolving the conflict may in fact be strengthening it.

Looming above all these concerns are two grand questions: as Davutoğlu looks increasingly weak and dependent on Erdoğan, what would be the prospects of stability and democracy in Turkey with the most prominent party of the last thirteen years being reduced to a mere reflection of Erdoğan, a leader who actually has caused the AKP, once a symbol of hope and democratic reform, to shift from a center-right to the far-right position close to the MHP? What prospective role can we imagine for a political party whose leader's steadfast determination to turn the political context to his own advantage goes completely unchallenged within the party? Unfortunately, the leader-centered tradition and structure of Turkish political parties make the question of whether there is any opposition in the party strong enough to cause an implosion convincing Erdoğan to stay out of party politics and confine himself to his constitutional role irrelevant. No party official or rank-and-file member can come forward and risk disagreeing with the leader without destroying his/her career. The idea that seems to have found some traction in and outside party circles is in fact a reiteration of the dysfunctional nature of Turkish politics: only a "name from within the AK Party" like the former president Abdullah Gül, who is a co-founder of the party and who is known to have disagreements with Erdoğan, is assumed to be capable of emerging as a serious contender for Erdoğan by either forming a new party or challenging Davutoğlu in a leadership battle.

Much more importantly, at present, there are huge problems with the character and future profile of the party that are worrying: having lost its centrist position in Turkish politics, there is no significant cause, value or vision that defines the future profile of the AK Party as an appealing and functional moderate-centrist option for voters. The aftermath of June 7 elections by revealing Erdoğan's true approach to the Kurdish question has played a vital part in raising serious doubts about the position and direction of the party and its leader: although he was perfectly aware of the opposition and challenges coming from the far right, Erdoğan was not deterred from launching the peace negotiations at the end of 2012 which were followed by a ceasefire. His readiness to bury the ongoing ceasefire and the peace and quiet of the last two years after his party's electoral setback on June 7 shows that Erdoğan's Kurdish initiative was as a vehicle to secure the support of especially the conservative-pious Kurds and Kurdish businessmen behind his political ambitions. His seemingly fresh policy turn in 2012, in other words, was not put into action abandoning the traditional statist discourse of the Turkish state which evokes an almost knee-jerk militarist response. It seems that Erdoğan has always kept the doors open for the resumption of the tiring relic of ethnic Turkish nationalist strategies.

## Notes

* This chapter was written before the November 2015 elections.

1 See Freedom House, at: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf>

2 "Erdoğan'in Ucuncu Muhtarlar Toplantisindaki Konusmasi." _Milliyet_ (Istanbul daily), February 24, 2015.

3 The full results are posted on the website of the Supreme Election Board, at: www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/HaberDosya/2015MV-GeciciSecimSonuclari.pdf

4 "Erdoğan is Driving Turkey into a Hole." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , August 18, 2015.

5 " 'Civilian Coup Carried Out in Turkey' CHP Leader Says." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , August 23, 2015.

6 "Kurdish Party Chief Dismisses Turkey's anti-ISIS Raids as a 'Show'." _Agence France Press_ , July 30, 2015.

7 "Ahmet Davutoğlu'dan CHP ve MHP'ye: 'Kapim Hala Acik'." _Hürriyet_ , August 20, 2015.

8 Cengiz Çandar, "Bahane: Terörle Mücadele; Amaç: 7 Haziran'ın Rövanşı." _Radikal_ (Istanbul daily), July 27, 2015.

9 "Polls Show Turkey's AKP Short of Votes Needed To Form Government Alone." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , August 26, 2015.

## Bibliography

"Ahmet Davutoğlu'dan CHP ve MHP'ye: 'Kapim Hala Acik'." _Hürriyet_ , August 20, 2015.

Çandar, Cengiz. "Bahane: Terörle Mücadele; Amaç: 7 Haziran'ın Rövanşı." _Radikal_ (Istanbul daily), July 27, 2015.

" 'Civilian Coup Carried Out in Turkey' CHP Leader Says." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , August 23, 2015.

"Erdoğan is Driving Turkey into a Hole." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , August 18, 2015.

"Erdoğan'in Ucuncu Muhtarlar Toplantisindaki Konusmasi." _Milliyet_ (Istanbul daily), February 24, 2015.

Freedom House, at: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf>

"Kurdish Party Chief Dismisses Turkey's anti-ISIS Raids as a 'Show'." _Agence France Press_ , July 30, 2015.

"Polls Show Turkey's AKP Short of Votes Needed To Form Government Alone." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , August 26, 2015.

The Supreme Election Board, at: www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/HaberDosya/2015MV-GeciciSecimSonuclari.pdf

# **2** **Kemalist advocacy in a post-Kemalist era?**

_Sinan Ciddi_

## **Introduction**

Since the ascendency of the Justice and Development Party ( _Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi_ , AKP) to power in 2002, Kemalist civil society organizations have taken an increasingly alarmist tone regarding the political and economic trajectory of Turkey. This is not a new trend. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's founding and dominant ideology otherwise referred to as "Kemalism" has increasingly been identified as a top-down, elitist and monolithic modernization process that has failed to win the hearts and minds of the citizen body (Parla and Davidson 2004). As a socially, culturally and ethnically stratified society, the one-size-fits-all mold espoused by Kemalism during the 1920s is thought not to represent the interests of Turkish society since the democratic process gained momentum. The party of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the founding party of the Republic, the Republican People's Party ( _Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi_ , CHP) is the most identifiable embodiment of Kemalist ideals. During the single-party period (1923–46), the "six arrows" of Kemalism were first written into the party's program in 1931, and then later codified into the Turkish constitution in 1934. Other than the CHP, the Turkish Armed Forces are also historically identified as the protector and guarantor of Kemal Atatürk's societal vision and have carried out no less than three _coups d'état_ in its defense between 1960–80. More recently, particularly under the rule of the AKP, it has been suggested that Turkey and Turkish society are now in a "post-Kemalist phase of existence." Whilst the military has seemingly returned to its barracks, the overwhelming electoral majority of the AKP, and the seemingly perpetual role of "main opposition party" prescribed for the CHP has been interpreted by some as a clear sign that the founding party's societal vision may truly be obsolete.

That said, the advocacy of Kemalist ideals and goals is not limited to one political party or the military. Kemalism is a contested set of principles, which has altered meanings since its official codification in the 1930s. Indeed, a basic inquiry into what Kemalism actually stands for may reveal as many definitions as there are organizations and possibly individuals who claim to represent and embody its creed. Other than the CHP and the military, one can identify wider societal advocates of Kemalism: most notably the Atatürkist Thought Society ( _Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği_ , ADD), the Association in Support of Contemporary Living ( _Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği_ , CYDD) and the National Center ( _Milli Merkez_ , MM). Civil society advocates of Kemalism surfaced by and large just before or after the end of the Cold War. Many reasons explain this rise, namely due to the impact of a number of global and national transformations, it was felt that the rising tide of political Islam and ethno-nationalist movements in the country presented credible threats to the longevity of the state–society model espoused by Kemal Atatürk at this juncture.

Kemalist organizations can be divided into two categories: "official" representatives of Kemalism can be defined as the CHP and the armed forces. This stems from the fact that the tenets of Kemalism are codified first within the CHP's party program and second in the military's internal service code. Moreover, whilst they both define themselves as protectors of Kemalist ideals, it can also be argued that their status as representatives of "official" Kemalism is derived from the fact that the CHP is quite literally the _author_ of Kemalism and the military is the self-appointed _guardian_ of Atatürk's civilizational mission. A number of civil society organizations (CSOs) are the second category of Kemalist organizations and the focus of this article. The distinguishing feature about civil society organizations, which advocate Kemalism, is their status as "followers"—not initiators or codifiers of doctrinal tenets. As such, their very _raison d'être_ —as will be discussed below—is to protect, defend and disseminate principles, which have previously been promulgated.

The aim of this article is to pose and answer one main question: from the perspective of Kemalist civil society organizations (CSOs), what are the challenges threatening the longevity and prominence of Kemalist ideology during the AK Party's incumbency? Specifically, from the perspective of Kemalist advocacy groups, has the AK Party—during its time in office—attempted to undermine Kemalist principles and ideals; how have advocates of Kemalism reacted, and finally, does Kemalism continue to present a realistic developmental and/or guiding role for Turkey? Following an initial definition of Kemalist principles, the article proceeds to highlight the manner in which Kemalist principles have been challenged in the republican period of Turkey's history. This is then followed by outlining the specific reasons and an analysis of why advocates of Kemalism believe that Turkey's founding ideology is under increasing threat from the governing AK Party. The main premise of this argument focuses on the shift in hegemonic discourse, which has occurred under the AK Party period, and the relative loss of power for Kemalist societal actors.

## **From Kemalism to neo-Kemalism: challenging the founding doctrine**

In terms of origin, Kemalism has its roots as an anti-imperialist and national liberation movement, which sprang up during the lifetime of Turkey's Nationalist Struggle ( _Millî Mücadele_ ) period between 1919 and 1923. Although the First World War formally ended in 1918, the settlement of the so-called Eastern Question, or what was to be done with the remnants of the Ottoman Empire was not settled until later, in 1923. It was during this time, as most of Asia Minor was occupied by foreign military forces, that Kemalism began to gather substance. Emerging as the new leader of the Turks, Mustafa Kemal insisted that an equitable dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would only be achieved if full political and economic independence was established for Turks. It was from this narrative of sovereignty and independence that the Kemalist doctrine founded its building blocks.

As a movement, Kemalism was spearheaded by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his close associates, originating mainly from a military professional background. Following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the movement under—the direct leadership of Mustafa Kemal—continued down the path of implementing a cultural revolution, particularly from 1924 to 1928. He sought to transform the successor country and people of the Ottoman Empire into a modern and secular Turkish society—one that would resemble a Western country. Specifically, the "Kemalist conception of modernization involved mainly the adoption of western political and cultural institutions"; as embodied in the six arrows of Kemalism: secularism, nationalism, populism, etatism, revolutionism and republicanism. This was hoped to be achieved by imposing a hegemonic discourse which defined a new vision of what the "good life" entailed: a citizen body which was outwardly secular in thought, action and appearance; educated and enlightened to become rational actors and individuals. By definition, this discourse explicitly relied upon limiting religion to the individual realm. It was mainly achieved by abolishing both the Sultanate and Caliphate and subjugating religion to state control. Turkey's new administrative apparatus, as displayed in institutions and laws replaced the Ottoman past in a relatively short period of time. Notable changes included the adoption of a new civil code based on the Swiss model; the abolition of all religious brotherhoods and fraternities; the adoption of Western style dress codes; the end to gender segregation; and the outlawing of polygamy.

In addition to the principle of secularism (and arguably as important) was the concept of nationalism. The aim of the Kemalist order was to engender love of country—that of Turkey, and not necessarily by choice. The formal dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), obviously brought about a new entity: the Republic of Turkey. Former subjects of the Empire were reconstituted as citizens of a new state. That said, the Kemalist elite felt that for the new state entity to have longevity, it must first be respected, feared and admired by its population. Under the auspices of nation building, the Kemalists took to creating new symbols and official historiography to disestablish and banish the Ottoman past by establishing an exclusively Turkish counterpart. Chief among these creations was the alphabet reform: within a space of months (1927), gone was the Arabic script and it was replaced by the Latin alphabet. This not only ensured increased literacy rates, but also cut the cultural and linguistic ties with the Ottoman past. This was followed by further measures such as the so-called "purification" of the Turkish language, a pronounced effort on the part of the Turkish Language Society to rid modern Turkish from Arabic and Persian influences. Other symbolic measures included the rewriting of many episodes of Ottoman history, a strong emphasis now being placed on the Nationalist Struggle of 1919–23 as the binding experience, which united the first generation of Turks.

Individuals or groups who challenged the primacy of the Kemalist model were not tolerated. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed a considerable number of uprisings against the new order. At times, as in the case of the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), the Dersim massacre (1937) and the rebellions by the Kurds, the apparatus of the state felt that insurrections represented an intolerable threat to the national security of the nation and were brutally crushed by the regular army. In the case of ideological challenges, Kemalism seemed to face weak opposition from the advocates of communism—mainly the Turkish Communist Party (particularly following the 1929 Wall Street crash). In fact, one could go further and declare that any other "ism" other than Kemalism was outlawed, not necessarily as a result of fearing alternative forms of government, but more because the Kemalist elite did not wish to entertain any competitors against their primacy. Throughout the early period of the republic, but especially during the 1930s and 1940s, communism was exclusively banned and fought against institutionally through the auspices of the state-sanctioned 'Associations Combatting Communism' ( _Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri_ ). The most effective way of ensuring that the Kemalist modernization project remained unchallenged was through the maintenance of an authoritarian single-party government (1923–46), where popular elections were an acclamatory process, and opposition parties for the most part were banned. In parallel, the impact of the Kemalist mindset and the personal experiences, which shaped the worldview of leaders such as Kemal Atatürk and Turkey's second president İsmet Inonu, should not be underestimated. Both were interested in ensuring that the livelihood and continuity of the new republic was safeguarded. As leaders with military backgrounds, their early career, as well as the task of establishing the republic, was largely shaped by experiences of continuous warring and upheaval: the Balkan Wars, First World War and the period of the Nationalist Struggle. In other words, the Kemalist conception of nation building was one, which was predicated upon fear: the new order had to be protected from any competing political ideologies such as communism. From the 1930s onwards, the real fear which gripped the founding elite was based on the expectation that Turkey would be drawn into another global war. In sum, it was believed that the most effective way to anchor the nascent nation into what Kemal referred to as "contemporary civilization," would be through a vanguard approach. This would be achieved with Kemal and his close associates at the helm, implementing a developmental model, which they believed to be in the best interests of a predominantly illiterate and uneducated citizen body. This implied keeping a tight lid on competing political ideologies as well as ensuring that Turkey remained uninvolved in major international conflicts. As such, at the core of Kemalist ideology lays a predisposition toward vanguardism and an interpretation of democratic governance, which is tutelary.

With the inception of the Kemalist state appeared a pool of challenges against the sanctity and validity of the ideology's specific components. Following the removal of political controls and the advent of popular elections, the Democrat Party (DP) decade of the 1950s introduced a heavy dose of citizen-based participation, resulting in the notion that henceforth voter choices had to be represented. As a result, insistence on a monolithic and imposed Kemalist way of life began to be challenged following the transition to multiparty politics. Advancement into competitive and multiparty politics gained further momentum, following the promulgation of the 1961 constitution, which ushered in a new era of leftist fervor, directly challenging the validity of Kemalist certainty. So much so that even the veteran leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit, declared in a pamphlet in 1964 that whilst Kemalist ideals had been, and would continue to be the country's source of inspiration, these principles alone were "insufficient." It was following Ecevit's rise to the chairmanship that the CHP chose to incorporate patterns of democratic socialism onto the back of its Kemalist doctrine. The 1960s and 1970s proved to be a crucial test for the CHP as the new generation of party elites (who were not descendants of the formative elite of the party), implemented a difficult strategy of maintaining Kemalism's core principles, and at the same time attempting to transform the CHP into a truly representative party of the people and abandon vanguardism.

Following the end of the Cold War and more recently during the 2000s, the rise of identity politics (in the form of political Islam and Kurdish identity politics) within Turkey undermined the primacy of Kemalist doctrinal certainty. So much so, that a notable group of public intellectuals openly advocated for a declaration of a post-Kemalist 'second republic'. The late president Turgut Özal was thought to have silently championed this by emphasizing that Turkey in a post-Cold War environment, in which the quality of democratic governance would be the measure of a country, needed to emphasize and promote three types of liberty: individual, economic and religious. This opinion was felt to be most relevant with regard to Turkey's troubled ambitions to become a member of the European Community/Union. Put simply, a monolithic conception of Turkish identity, as defined by Kemalist ideals during the country's foundational years, was perceived to be inadequate by the standards of the European club of nations, which Turkey was aspiring to join. It was against this backdrop that the term "neo-Kemalism" was coined.

Kemalism as examined in the discussion above refers to a set of principles dedicated to building and maintaining a secular and unitary state, against the challenges initially presented by imperialism, and subsequently by social and economic underdevelopment. "Neo-Kemalism" in contrast, is a defensive reincarnation. Its advocates, mainly civil society organizations, replace the threat of imperialism and underdevelopment and the threats posed by politics of identity, specifically: political Islam, ethnic separatism and neoliberal economic policies. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, followed by intra-state conflicts, particularly in the vicinity of Turkey's own region (Caucasus and Balkans) helped fan the flame of Kurdish separatism within Turkey and thus placed immense strain on a singular conception of Turkish national identity. For the first time in the country's ninety year history, the Kurdish conflict between the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) emphasized the fact that not all persons residing within the country's borders were content in perceiving themselves—or be perceived—as Turks. Chronic mismanagement of the political and economic landscape by the country's center right and left parties during the 1990s, which was typified by corruption, economic crises and short-lived coalition governments, undermined many citizens' confidence in the country's guiding ideals. Such developments facilitated the political rise of the country's Islamist model.

In existence since the mid-1960s, the "National Outlook" movement and its various political party manifestations had denounced the Kemalist secular-nationalist model of development. The movement's leader, Necmettin Erbakan, stressed that the ills plaguing the country's economic and political structures were born out of a moral and spiritual deficit (read privatization of religion). By the early 1990s the movement's message became increasingly fine-tuned and refreshingly appealing in comparison to Kemalist secularist-nationalism. In direct contrast to the centrist parties, Erbakan's Welfare Party ( _Refah Partisi_ , RP) offered both an electorally appealing and a veiled anti-Kemalist political platform: the promise of a "just regime" ( _adil düzen_ ). This opening by Erbakan positioned the party to become attractive to both the economically dispossessed in society (the low income salaried masses), and to those who did not subscribe—in part or in whole—to a faithless way of public life, as decreed by the Kemalist principle of secularism. The initial rise of the RP, later followed by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) and the AK Party, called into question more seriously than ever the previous doctrinaire principle of secularism.

The assumption of power and the subsequent incumbency of the AK Party since 2002 can be perceived as one of the most prominent attempts to contest and erode the constitutive norms of the Kemalist state and order. Since 2002, the vanguard elite which were perceived to be the gatekeepers of Kemalist governance—the armed forces, judiciary and the foreign ministry—have arguably lost their ability to govern and influence political discourse. Suffice to say that for the first time since the establishment of the republic, a new generation of elites who do not subscribe to a Kemalist way of life is now in a governance position. It was against the rise of political Islam that neo-Kemalist ideology and its civil society representatives began to emerge. The Erbakan-led RP-DYP (center-right True Path Party) coalition government (1996–97) was perceived by the military as a direct existential threat to Turkey's Kemalist secular and nationalist order for two reasons. First, Erbakan was believed to be engaged in an open process to eliminate the secular order through the direct use of executive power. In addition, foreign trips to primarily Muslim countries such as Iran and Libya were perceived as an attempt to dislodge the country from its Western anchor. In cooperation with civil society organizations such as the ADD and CYDD, the military carried out a veiled _coup d'état_ , which unseated the government, in the months following a meeting of the National Security Council on February 28, 1997.

The pressuring out of the RP government became part of a larger initiative, which came to known as the "February 28 process." Spearheaded by the military, it involved the active collaboration of prominent secular individuals, government agencies, the media and neo-Kemalist civil society organizations in what they perceived to be the saving of Atatürk's republic from the forces of Islamic fundamentalism. The campaign was designed to extract Islamists from prominent positions within the bureaucracy, the military and other positions of public office. Legislative safeguards were implemented to constrain the Islamist agenda, exemplified by the promulgation of a compulsory eight-year state education. Crucially however, the process pulled the rug from underneath the National View political movement. The judicial system essentially cracked down on the movement by banning politicians from running for office, shutting down the RP and resorting to punitive measures such as the imprisonment of individuals such as Tayyip Erdoğan. When quizzed about the aims and procedures of the February 28 process, General Çevik Bir, who was the deputy chief of general staff during the "process," responded that they had "fine-tuned" Turkey's democracy.

## **Kemalist discourse in the AK Party era**

The ascendency of the AK Party to high office is possibly the single biggest threat identified by neo-Kemalist organizations. This is largely based on the notion that the AK Party controls not only the majority in parliament, but also the majority of local (provincial and district) government. Turkey's electoral law, in force (with minor revisions) since 1982 has helped facilitate landslide electoral victories for the AK Party in 2002, 2007 and nearly 50 percent in 2011. Similarly, at the 2009 local and municipal elections, the AK Party succeeded in winning 1,442 out of a total of 2,903 municipalities, and ten of the sixteen big city municipalities including Istanbul and Ankara. The party remains unchallenged in its ability to determine the allocation of resources, budgets, personnel and state investments. The legislative and executive prerogatives of the AK Party are largely unchallenged. Since coming to power, the party has benefited from a two-thirds (2002–07) to three-fifths seat majority in parliament. As of 2007, the presidency, which was occupied by Ahmet Necdet Sezer since 2000 (known for his anti-AK Party credentials) was taken by Abdullah Gül, a founding member of the AK Party, prime minister and foreign minister. In August 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected president and declared that he intended to be an "active president," which effectively implied that he would act outside the parameters of judicial oversight to pursue his political agenda.

One way to approach these developments is through a focus on party system change. Since 2002, electoral volatility has been significantly reduced and the country's party system has been transformed from being a highly fragmented and fractionalized party system to a dominant party system that subsequently changed into one that embraced a number of authoritarian traits by the dominating party. From the AK Party's perspective, this is perceived less in terms of party system change, and is projected as a victory of the "national will." This, however, is not how Kemalist organizations would describe the transformation. From their perspective, what has transpired since 2002 is the curtailment of Turkey's democratic structures and their replacement by an elected dictatorship of the majority, intent on pulling down the republic of Atatürk.

The maintenance and expansion of the AK Party's electoral gains has been attributed to its robust performance particularly in the economic realm. Since 2002, Turkey's GDP as a whole and per capita has increased exponentially and has made a visible difference to the daily lives of the citizen body. Successive government programs have concentrated on bread and butter issues: improving national and local infrastructure—roads, railways, public transportation and communications; improvements to the healthcare system; increased access to education; non-populist macro-economic policies helping the private sector make long-term investment and growth plans—and raising the profile of the country at both the national and international level. Such a strong track record of growth and visible development has undoubtedly resulted in the party being electorally rewarded at the polls. The last four national electoral cycles (2002–15) have resulted in the maximum representation of votes seen in the Turkish parliament. What is more, and for a time, the AK Party also boasted of the improvements it has made to Turkey's democratic governance. Headline improvements include: making the military accountable to civilian law; a service oriented state which is responsive to citizen's needs; the recognition of the Kurdish problem and the attempt to resolve it via the "Kurdish Opening" process; resolution of the headscarf problem; and also restoration of minority property rights. Another way of stating this is that the AK Party's government performance has, since 2002, been rewarded by a minimum amount of vote wastage in parliament. Given this performance, what arguments have Kemalist circles put forward to suggest that the government's performance is anything but progressive and results oriented?

## **Kemalist fears: elected dictatorship**

Neo-Kemalist fears and criticisms of the AK Party primarily represent a continuity of suspicion for the National Outlook movement and political Islam, which can be traced back to the ascendency of the Islamist RP in 1994. These fears focus on the movement's perceived clandestine plans to subvert and disestablish the secular republic, unravel Mustafa Kemal's reforms and transform Turkey into a theocratic state, governed by religious laws and customs. The neo-Kemalist discourse: "divides the political realm into two antagonistic and opposed camps and 'otherizes' the opposing side: secular/anti-secular; friend/enemy of the republic; progressives/reactionaries; patriots/separatists." It is a discourse of opposition based on injustice and a victimization mentality. The dominant views held in common by the all neo-Kemalist organizations focus on discourses that the republic has been surrounded and ambushed by the "others," traitors: Islamists, Kurdish separatists, neoliberals, supporters of globalization and privatization—all of whom are intent on destroying the republic of Atatürk for their own nefarious and particularistic interests. Within the AK Party era, neo-Kemalist organizations insist that little has changed since the days of the RP, often citing Erdoğan's personal remark from 1997, indicating that "democracy is not an end but only a vehicle." In other words, a strong track record of economic growth and a demonstrable commitment to improving the country's democratic governance structures is thought to be a smokescreen. It is perceived to be a pretense, which is designed to hide the true nature of the Islamist agenda. Representatives of neo-Kemalist CSO's, despite verbal assurances given by Erdoğan that he has "changed" since 1997, continue to believe that the real aim of the AK Party has and will continue to be the curtailment of Mustafa Kemal's Turkey. Such reservations have been further augmented following the Gezi protests of 2013 and the election of Erdoğan as president in 2014, when state authorities were directed to crack down on all forms of public protest and dissent directed at the AK Party government.

## **The Atatürkist Thought Society (ADD)**

The ADD was established in 1989, with a mission to "maintain the dominance of [Mustafa Kemal's] principles and revolution today and tomorrow, and as its guardian and watchman." The association's leading cadres are staffed by individuals from professional and secular/nationalist backgrounds: lawyers, academics, judges, military officers and teachers. It is estimated that the organization has over 115,000 individual members. Out of all the neo-Kemalist organizations in existence, it can be argued that the ADD is one of the most active and vociferous. It frequently conducts public seminars/talks, and releases press statements on matters of public debate. Its influential members are frequent contributors of opinion pieces to major daily newspapers. The main thrust of the organization's platform is its anti-AK Party focus. The ADD is more than an advocacy organization promoting and defending the ideas of Kemal Atatürk. It is also a source of opposition to the government.

In terms of its political discourse, the ADD accuses the AK Party of endangering the territorial unity and integrity of Turkey in the last ten years by engaging in a dialogue with Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the separatist Kurdish Workers Party, PKK). In relation to the ongoing peace negotiations initiated by Erdoğan in 2010, since dubbed the "Kurdish Opening," the ADD accuses the government of laying the foundation for the division of Turkey. A recent meeting between Erdoğan and the leader of the Kurdish Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, in northern Iraq, for instance, was identified as continuity of the Treaty of Sèvres and "what [Tayyip Erdoğan] understands by the 'new Turkey' is nothing more than the re-establishment of a feudal regime typified by the Sultanate and Caliphate, which was perceived to be acceptable by the architects of the Sevres plan." As chairwoman of the ADD, Tansel Çölaşan's press release continues this line of attack and criticism. On the anniversary of Atatürk's death, she states that the legacy of the AK Party decade is one which has "relentlessly divided Turkish society, has engaged in fascist politics and imposed its own moral values."

These accusations are based upon the ADD's interpretation of AK Party's legislative and constitutional initiatives: 2010 saw significant revisions made to the 1982 constitution, implemented via a public referendum. Of the revised constitutional articles, the reforms to the judiciary, specifically, judicial appointments proved to be the most divisive and controversial. The amendments changed the fundamental structure of the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges ( _Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu_ , HSYK). From the perspective of the AK Party, the revisions put an end to the caste system (read purging of Kemalist hierarchies) and helped reform and streamline the judiciary into a modern entity—one that was in conformity with the EU's Copenhagen Criteria. From the viewpoint of the ADD, these reforms represented nothing less than the "seizure of the judiciary by the incumbent." This opinion is largely predicated upon the view that the judiciary has been placed under increased political influence by allowing the minister of justice and the office of the president to have an increased say in judicial nominations and actual appointments. This is particularly the case, following the Gezi protests (June 2013) and the corruption probe that began against the government (December 2013). These two events are seen by the ADD as attempts whereby the incumbent "harbors clear intentions to influence the judiciary and subvert the judicial process" so that protesters at Gezi Park, and prosecutors investigating government corruption do not taint AK Party officials.

The anti-AK Party thrust is continued by an attempt to discredit the AK Party era economic cycle of growth by reducing it to a mere selling off of state assets, pandering to the whims of big capital and a large influx of short-term capital. As much as the target of the ADD's criticism is the government, the organization also targets Turkey's liberal opinion makers. Referred to as "yes—but not enough" people, the ADD blames the liberals and intellectuals who helped the government to pass the 2010 constitutional amendments. The commonly accepted explanation for the motives of the "yes—but not enough" voters is that such voters thought they were helping the cause of improving the quality of Turkey's democracy (despite objecting to specific amendments in the proposal), mainly because many of the articles were believed to put an end to tutelary measures in Turkey. Among such measures are included making military officers accountable to civilian law. It is the position of the ADD that liberal intellectuals and voters helped facilitate the growth of an increasingly authoritarian AK Party. From the ADD's perspective, individuals should have known better than to trust Erdoğan's motives and voted against any and all the AK Party legislative initiatives. ADD advocates firmly believe that if one is convinced by the democratic and secular credentials of the AK Party, this is naive at best and irresponsible at worst. The responsibility of public intellectuals as far as the ADD is concerned, is to warn voters and ordinary citizens away from the AK Party, to help expose the government for what it really stands for: the disestablishment of the Kemalist and secular state in its entirety. As far as the ADD is concerned, opposing the AK Party in its entirety is a survival campaign and such a campaign is the cause of the just: "we are the people and we will be born again, even after dying. We will continue our struggle for a modern-contemporary, secular and fully independent and democratic Turkey. We will succeed and the secular republic will win."

## **Association in Support of Contemporary Living (CYDD)**

Established in 1991, the CYDD carries out a mission to protect and disseminate the Kemalist revolution's principles and ideas mainly through the medium of supporting secular education. Since 1991, the institution has given millions of lira in educational grants to thousands of students at all levels of the educational spectrum, providing direct material support to learning needs. As a result, the CYDD appears to be a limited issue-based non-profit organization, focused on promoting particular educational goals: the education of young girls and more broadly, "the dissemination, development and protection of Atatürk's reforms and principles." These goals hope to ensure that Turkey succeeds in meeting the challenge of becoming a modern and prosperous society. Based on this platform, the CYDD believes that it has become the target of the AK Party.

During 2007, both the ADD and the CYDD co-sponsored the first anti-AK Party country-wide popular protests known as the "Republic Meetings" ( _Cumhuriyet Mitingleri_ ). The focus of the meetings was to protest Abdullah Gül's nomination for president in particular, and the perceived anti-secular direction which the country was seen to be taking. The meetings took place in the country's biggest cities, involving hundreds of thousands (millions according to some) of citizens parading Turkish flags and chanting slogans such as "Neither Sharia nor coup-[only] a completely independent Turkey!" and "We are Mustafa Kemal's soldiers!." Following these public rallies, the CYDD's octogenarian chairwoman Türkan Saylan, a renowned and respected professor was remanded in custody by the police, charged with allegedly conspiring to topple the AK Party government under the umbrella of the "Ergenekon" trials. Saylan and three other board members of the CYDD had criminal suits filed against them, as well as having their houses raided and searched.

One explanation, which is held by supporters of the CYDD for why the raids and arrests occurred is linked to the CYDD's uncompromising and persistent campaign to promote and uphold secular educational policies. Prior to a recent legislative change in 2012, Turkey maintained a state mandated policy which compelled all children to attend eight years of primary education—elementary through to middle school. The eight-year compulsory education law was passed by the Erbakan government (under duress) shortly before it was pressured out in 1997 by the military. The education law ensured that children received an education based on a national curriculum for the first eight years which not only focused on conventional subjects such as science, math, literature and language, but also on subjects which focused on the Kemalist revolution, the history of the Turkish republic and civic virtues advocated by Kemalist ideals, such as secularism and patriotism. In practical terms, the law prevented children from being able to attend vocational school alternatives until after eighth grade—specifically prayer leader schools ( _Imam ve Hatip Okullari_ ), which provide an education focused on religion. The new education law enacted in 2012 limits mandatory education to the first five years, and then presents a choice to parents as to whether their children continue with conventional schooling or attend vocational schools instead. The change in the national education law enacted by the AKP confirms the CYDD's worst suspicions: secular, Kemalist and science-based education is being eliminated.

A criticism which the CYDD has against the AK Party decade of rule centers on their accusation that there is an attempt to undermine the secular republican order. The CYDD's opposition efforts are mainly focused on education policies. At the 88th anniversary of the "Unity of Education Law" (passed in 1924), a press statement released by the CYDD stated: "throughout history, there have been those who have tried to shape societies based on oppression, personal and religious ambitions-even banditry; but they have never been successful. They will never be successful." The position is furthered in other writings, which accuse the ministry of education of giving preferential treatment to graduates of prayer leader schools in obtaining university positions, above those students who attended conventional high schools.

As far as the activities of the CYDD are concerned, the organization appears to be involved in an institutional battle for survival. Both the CYDD and ADD were complicit in the February 28 process. They supported the military's efforts to banish political Islam from the public realm and state institutions. As of late 2013, the CYDD was handed down stiff tax penalties from the ministry of finance. The ministry determined that the organization had been engaged in profit making schemes directly related to its fundraising initiatives at charity bazaars. From the perspective of the CYDD, this was an attempt by the government to "discourage, harass and pressure CYDD directors, to deter further donations to the organization, and to blunt its love of societal service for simply being an Ataturkist organization." For CYDD sympathizers and members, the arrests in 2007 and the tax fines they paid in 2013 represent a clear attempt by the Erdoğan government to rid the public realm of Kemalist organizations.

## **The National Center-MM**

Amongst the neo-Kemalist advocacy groups, the MM is the newest and also the most unconventional. This is mainly due to the fact that the MM is less of an organization than it is a movement. In comparison to the ADD and the CYDD it is a movement, which lacks a membership base, by-laws and organizational aims. Instead, it is a movement, which is focused on opposing the rule of the AK Party and interested in facilitating its democratic fall from office. Similar to the ADD and the CYDD, the founders and leadership of the movement are composed of elite members of Turkish society, including former parliamentarians, district governors, military officers, judges, journalists, academics and lawyers. In addition, some of the founding members of the MM are members of the ADD. As a strong believer in the country's independence, the central message put forward by the movement is that Kemalism's ideals must be maintained and defended by a vanguard elite.

Founded in April 2013, by the former speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the mission of the MM is:

to defend the Turkish republic and its people's unity and to further its social, political and societal ambitions, [by] coming together around the slogan of "we are united with Ataturk"... with the intention of coalescing together under the forces of patriotism.

How does this seemingly intangible set of aims translate into concrete strategic goals? Under AK Party rule, the MM believes that Turkey, which was established as a country following the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), has been progressively and intentionally undermined, as a result of "colluding with imperialists." Furthermore, much like the decade of the 1950s, impediments to religious fanaticism have been lifted. Specifically, since 2002, the government, in collusion with religious organizations like the _Akincilar_ and capital holders engaged in attempts to eradicate the "nation state." In partnership with the United States, it is alleged that the AK Party has been aiding the interests of imperialists, capitalists and religious organizations; they have been establishing the framework for the creation of a Kurdish state, promoting sectarian conflict (arming Syrian Sunni rebels) and have been involved in trying to supplant the Kemalist republic.

Unlike the ADD and the CYDD, the MM does not have a forward looking organizational program, but instead is reacting to AK Party policies. The movement proposes to hold provincial gatherings alongside the ADD and the CYDD, trade unions and youth organizations to expose the AK Party's secret intentions, to inform individuals throughout the country, and to mobilize voters to vote against the AK Party during all elections cycles: "If the AKP loses cities such as Ankara and Istanbul in 2014 local elections, they will likely lose Turkey." In line with neo-Kemalist discourse, the MM argues that the AK Party is: "in league with domestic imperialists, who are advocating the interests of the United States: to facilitate the dismemberment of the country." Since the 1990s, it is argued that prominent individuals who tried to draw attention to this, such as Uğur Mumcu, Muammer Aksoy and Ahmet Taner Kişlalı, have all been killed. The MM argues that the AK Party is: "using religion to break apart the foundations of Mustafa Kemal's republic and in its place help build a Kurdish state, which will lead to sectarian and ethnic violence." When asked why this would be in the interests of the government, the argument is made that: "this is what the United States wants: a weak and dismembered Turkey, amongst a sea of other small states, which will allow the US to dominate the region more effectively."

The leadership of the MM seeks to combat this by organizing a grass-roots "front" against the AK Party. This would involve divulging to the people at public rallies Erdoğan's secret intentions to break apart Turkey and to chastise his attempts to establish a Kurdish state. This would invigorate a popular citizen base to mobilize against the AK Party at elections. To this end, the MM has held public rallies on a variety of occasions including the Republic Day holiday (October 29, 2013) and on Atatürk Remembrance Day (May 19, 2013). The message that came out of these meetings is the intention to establish a new "national government"; one that is free of ideological considerations, and one which is united around defending Atatürk's principles of full political/economic independence and freedom from imperialist designs. Representatives of the MM's strategy believe that their best chance to put an end to AK Party rule is to mobilize electoral support against the government at any and all elections in the near future. When quizzed on what their reaction to a coup attempt against the AK Party would be, the response was: "we do not advocate for any military takeover of democratic governance, but we would not be sad if this happened against the AKP."

## **Critique: the impact and effectiveness of Kemalist CSO's**

The effectiveness of Kemalist organizations is difficult to assess. There is a broad electoral niche in Turkey convinced that the gains of the Kemalist revolution are under threat from the incumbency of the AK Party. This pertains to a perceived undermining of secularism in all aspects of public and private life. This is furthered by a narrative, which believes that there are domestic powers at work, conspiring with imperialist nations—particularly the United States—to divide and ultimately dismember Turkey. From this neo-Kemalist perspective, it appears that there is a battle for survival at stake. The battle is focused upon maintaining and saving the Kemalist way of life. This battle is presently being waged against the governing AK Party, which is thought to represent continuity with the "National Outlook" movement, initiated by Necmettin Erbakan and presently led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Kemalist CSOs are united around the notion that political Islam is undermining the secular nature of Turkish life, that is, the laws, regulations and education system which help perpetuate secularism and most importantly, that this is being done by using the advantages afforded to it by parliamentary democracy. In other words, for neo-Kemalists, the government's electoral majority in parliament is being used to engage in its own process of social engineering, one which seeks to supplant the Kemalist state, and in its place, establish an Islamic regime.

Two issues can be identified with the Kemalist CSOs' positioning against and critique of the AK Party: the first one is related to the base of Kemalist CSOs' support and the second, to their effectiveness in terms of achieving their aims. Regarding the first challenge, the neo-Kemalist paradigm and its diagnosis of the problems facing Turkey appears to lack widespread societal backing. Since 2002, the AK Party has run election campaigns which have not only focused on advocating the socio-economic and developmental needs of citizens, but ones which have championed putting an end to tutelary democracy. This has been exemplified by putting on trial the generals who instigated the 1980 coup, signaling an intent to supplant the military-commissioned 1982 constitution with a new civilian-authored document, and by attempting to provide an equitable resolution to the most enduring minority rights problem in the republic's history—the Kurdish conflict. Whether one doubts the sincerity of AK Party's intentions is, quite frankly, a moot point. It would appear that since 2002, championing such issues has found a broad electoral appeal. In comparison to this, the neo-Kemalist position is one which is by and large focused on a negative agenda of what is allegedly being lost, and on identifying the dangers that Tayyip Erdoğan and the AK Party stand for. Concrete policy alternatives have yet to be put forward. The one exception to this may be the position of the CYDD, which offers a consistent policy platform to maintain a secular national curriculum and the education of girls.

Having said this, it is necessary to point out that that comparison of the AK Party and neo-Kemalist CSOs is perhaps an unfair one. To begin with, the former is a governing party of the country with access to executive power, whilst the latter are a series of interest groups seeking to influence the governing party. A fairer basis of comparison might be related to comparing the political platform of the AK Party to its political counterpart—in this case, the CHP. However, the CHP in its entirety cannot be seen as an advocate of neo-Kemalist ideals. Particularly under the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (since 2010), the party has changed a considerable portion of its programmatic outlook, leadership and by-laws, mostly in an effort to distance itself from its popularly held elitist Kemalist image. That said, the neo-Kemalist faction within the party remains nonetheless. This faction by and large opposes CHP initiatives to lend support to the Kurdish Opening policy and fiercely opposes to the wearing of the headscarf in public offices and universities. It is widely believed that this faction within the party is what prevents the CHP from building a larger electoral alliance—one that breaks the 20-something percent barrier.

In terms of fulfilling their aims, neo-Kemalist CSOs lacked the capacity and quite possibly, the legitimacy to arrive at their objectives. Their desired aim is to facilitate a democratic end to the AK Party's rule. As they are not political parties running for office, the only way this can realistically be achieved is via mobilizing opinion and votes against the AK Party. The ADD and the CYDD have been very active in this realm especially since they organized the "Republic Meetings" of 2007. Along with MM, all three neo-Kemalist organizations were also active supporters of the Gezi Park protests, which swept through the country in the summer of 2013. However, these organizations are constrained by their membership bodies, which are for the most part passive. It is true that during times of organized public rallies and meetings the membership body of the organizations turn out in large numbers. These numbers are hard to estimate as there is no accurate record of actual membership and turnout rates at rallies. Furthermore, they are constrained from acting and pursuing their stated aims as they quickly become the open targets of government pressure. Indeed, individuals and organizations opposing the AK Party in Turkey have become targets of government investigations. This is particularly the case in organizations such as the ADD and the CYDD, whose leaders were initially detained and subsequently arrested for allegedly conspiring to bring down the government via extra-judicial means. This is the kind of political pressure which is jointly shared by the opposition political parties. In its capacity to function as the main opposition party, the CHP's provincial organizations have faced numerous cases of government investigations in cities such as Izmir and Eskişehir, where the party runs the municipal governments. In other words, challenging the will of a single-party government, which believes it is the electoral epitome of the national will, may not be easy. The fact that it is in charge of both national and local government and its seeming unwillingness to accommodate criticism represents a formidable constraining force of political parties and CSOs alike.

Finally, alongside the two issues described above, one must focus on the message agreed upon by Kemalist CSOs. Since the early 1990s and with the emergence of neo-Kemalist organizations, their modus operandi has not significantly changed. The proclivity to questioning the assumptions behind their program and philosophy is seldom attempted by neo-Kemalist organizations. The discourse of perceiving Turkey as being encircled by forces of neo-imperialism, forces which are spurred on by nefarious domestic governments is a narrative which has hardly shifted in the last quarter century. Insistence on perceiving social issues in binary terms, demarcated by forces of the "good," who are striving to maintain Turkey's secular and unitary identity against the forces of "evil," who are interested in promoting sectarian conflict and eventually compromising the country's territorial integrity, offers voters little more than conspiracy theories that have no substantive policy bases. Moreover, it can be argued that the leitmotif offered by advocates of neo-Kemalism help foster and perpetuate a societal climate of polarization, engendering fear and reinforcing individuals' biases toward the other.

All this being said, Turkey's governance under the AK Party and Tayyip Erdoğan has sharply eroded the country democratic governance structures, practices and institutions. Following the Gezi protests of 2013 and the corruption allegations leveled at Erdoğan and high-ranking AK Party officials, a great majority of the state's resources have been mobilized to protect the political standing of the AK Party, but more so that of Erdoğan, mainly to stave off the possibility of criminal prosecution and impeachment. This includes the stifling of dissent and criticism throughout Turkish society: journalists, academics, students and business circles have been direct targets of government pressure, intimidation and repression. Since failing to secure a ruling majority at the June 2015 parliamentary elections, Erdoğan and the AK Party have been singularly focused on trying to find any means possible to change the country's constitution and transform Turkey from being a parliamentary democracy to a presidential republic, ruled by a president who is largely unfettered by judicial oversight. Erdoğan supporters within the AK Party believed that only through such a transformation, would Erdoğan's desire to create a "new Turkey" be realized. It is such actions on the part of Erdoğan and the AK Party, which seems to have justified the fears of the Kemalist press, CSOs and the CHP. Furthermore, other than those affiliated with Kemalist organizations, all those who were consistently skeptical of Erdoğan's democratic credentials, as well as many public intellectuals who had lauded Erdoğan during his earlier rule as prime minister between 2003–07, have come around to the opinion that Erdoğan has dictatorial aspirations and intentions. Since fieldwork on this chapter was concluded, the author has not had an opportunity to conduct follow-up interviews with the three organizations discussed in this chapter. However, one remains confident that had such interviews occurred, a consistent message offered by representatives of the CSOs would have been along the lines of "we told you so!"

## Notes

 Taha Parla and Andrew Davison. _Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?_ (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004).

 Soner Cagaptay, _The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century's First Muslim Power_ (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2014).

 Ergun Ozbudun, "Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey," in Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), _Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems_ (İstanbul: Bogaziçi University Publications, 1975), pp. 49–52.

 Ibid., p. 43.

 Mete Tuncay, _Turkiye'de Sol Akımları_ (Ankara: AUSBF, 1967).

 Mete Tuncay, _Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yonetiminin Kurulması_ (İstanbul: TETAV, 1999).

 During the single party era (1923–46), elections were acclamatory with only CHP candidates being on the ballot. With the exception of two brief periods, opposition political parties were not permitted.

 Bülent Ecevit, _Ataturk and Devrimcilik_ (Ankara: Tekin, 1976), pp. 87–127.

 Sinan Ciddi, _Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, Secularism and Nationalism_ (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 30–65.

 In late 1991, intellectuals such as Mehmet Altan began calling for the promulgation of a second republic, one which would actualize the principles of substantive democratic governance, and replace the monolithic Kemalist state.

 Mehmet Altan, "Türkiye'nin Bütün Sorunu Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçememesindendir" in M. Sever and C. Dizdar (eds), _Ikinci Cumhuriyet Tartismalari_ (Ankara: Başak, 1993), p. 37.

 Necmi Erdoğan, "Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya," in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), _Kemalizm: Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 2 [Kemalizm: Political Thought in Modern Turkey 2]_ (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), pp. 584–91.

 Lisel Hintz, "Us vs. Them, Over and Over Again? National Identity Contestation in Turkey's Stalled EU Bid." _Turkish Policy Quarterly_ 12, no. 1 (2013): 155.

 Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çinar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process." _The South Atlantic Quarterly_ 102, no. 2/3 (2003).

 Ezgi Gürses, _28 Şubat: Demokrasi Ters Şeritte_ (İstanbul: Şule, 2012), pp. 79–90.

 The existence of a 10 percent electoral threshold favors the bigger parties. Parties which fail to cross the threshold automatically have their seats redistributed to the runner up. When the Nationalist Action Party failed to cross the electoral threshold in 2002, the AK Party swept up its seats, giving it a disproportionate 363 seat with less than 35 percent of the vote.

 Sezer holds the presidential record for vetoing the highest number of parliament-passed pieces of legislation: a total of 67 AKP-passed legislation was vetoed between 2002–07.

 Tayyip Erdoğan, in his victory speech at the June 2011 elections stated that "today the national will has once again triumphed." ("Hesaplaşma değil, Helalleşme Günüdür"), AK Party website, at: www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/hesaplasma-degil-helallesme-gunudur/8517 (accessed December 6, 2013).

 At the 2011 elections, out of all valid votes counted, 95 percent found representation in parliament (i.e., voter's choices actually being allotted seats in parliament). See Yahya Bostan and Hamdi Ates, "Mecliste Temsil Rekoru," _Sabah_ , June 14, 2011, at: www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/06/14/mecliste-temsil-rekoru

 Erdoğan, "Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya," p. 586.

 Quoted from the association's mission statement. "Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği: Kurulus Nedeni," at: www.add.org.tr/index.php/dernegimiz/tanitim/kurulus-nedeni (accessed December 8, 2013).

 This is an unofficial figure and the true membership level of the organization does not appear to be publicly disclosed.

 The Treaty of Sèvres is a document that was served to the Ottoman government in 1920. It outlined the dissolution of the remaining lands of the empire and their distribution to the victorious powers. It was rejected by Mustafa Kemal, resulting in a war lasting between 1919–22. It was subsequently replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which gave formal recognition to the Republic of Turkey.

 Birgül Ayman Güler, "Erdoğan Türkiye'yi Bölüyor" "Erdoğan is Dividing Turkey"], _Yurt_ newspaper, November 19, 2013. Reprinted on ADD's website, at: [www.add.org.tr/index.php/basindan/1050-erdogan-tuerkiye-yi-boelueyor (accessed January 15, 2014).

 Tansel Çölaşan, "10 Kasım Basın Acıklamasıdır," "November 10 Statement"], ADD website, January 15, 2014, at: [www.add.org.tr/index.php/genel-baskanimizdan/1033-10-kas-m-bas-n-ac-klamas-d-r

 Ibid.

 Tansel Çölaşan, "Yargidan Elinizi Çekin!" "Remove Your Hand from the Judiciary"], ADD Announcement, at: [http://add.org.tr/index.php/genel-baskanimizdan/1153-yarg-dan-elinizi-cekin

 Ibid.

 CYDD Mission Statement, CYDD website, January 2, 2014, at: www.cydd.org.tr/sayfa.asp?id=22

 Ibid.

 Known as the "Tevhid-I Tedrisat" law and passed in 1924, this legislation oversaw the promulgation and development of a secular national curriculum and tied all schools to the newly created Ministry of Education and closed down all religious schools.

 CYDD statement, CYDD website, January 3, 2014, at: www.cydd.org.tr/haberlerDetay.asp?id=223

 CYDD Press statement, CYDD website, December 12, 2013, at: www.cydd.org.tr/haberlerDetay.asp?id=348

 "Oğuz Oyan, a CHP member of parliament asked the government whether it was the intention of the finance ministry to close down the CYDD by issuing exorbitant and unjustified fines," Odatv Online News Source, December 14, 2013, at: www.odatv.com/n.php?n=cydd-mali-denetimlerle-feshedilmek-mi-isteniyir-1412131200

 "Milli Merkez Kurultay Bildirisi," ["National Center Convention Announcement"], official pamphlet, signed by the Executive Board.

 Ibid.

 Interviews with Ümit Ülgen (Deputy General Secretary MM) and Türker Ertürk (Retired Navy Admiral, Executive Board member of MM) on April 23, 2013, Istanbul, Turkey.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 The 2011 election slogan of the AK Party was "Civilian Constitution."

 The CHP parliamentarian Birgül Ayman Güler stated in January 2013 that "the Turkish nation cannot be held equal to that of the Kurdish peoples." Birgül Ayman Güler, "Türk ulusuyla Kürt milliyetini eşit, eş değerde gördüremezsiniz," _Sol_ Newspaper, January 24, 2013, at: http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/birgul-aymanguler-turk-ulusuyla-kurt-milliyetini-esit-es-degerde-gorduremezsiniz

 _Bugün_ Newspaper, October 11, 2013, at: http://politika.bugun.com.tr/basortusu-tepkisi-haberi/823722

 Sinan Ciddi and Berk Esen. "Turkey's Republican People's Party: Politics of Opposition Under a Dominant Party System." _Turkish Studies_ 15, no. 3 (2014): 419–41.

## Bibliography

AK Party, "Hesaplaşma değil, Helalleşme Günüdür", Erdoğan's victory speech, June 2011, at: www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/hesaplasma-degil-helallesme-gunudur/8517

Altan, Mehmet. "Türkiye'nin Bütün Sorunu Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçememesindendir," in M Sever and C. Dizdar (eds), _Ikinci Cumhuriyet Tartismalari_. Ankara: Başak, 1993, 1–40.

"Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği: Kurulus Nedeni," (ADD), at: www.add.org.tr/index.php/dernegimiz/tanitim/kurulus-nedeni

Bostan, Yahya, Hamdi Ates. "Mecliste Temsil Rekoru." _Sabah_ , June 14, 2011, at: www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/06/14/mecliste-temsil-rekoru

_Bugün_. October 11, 2013, at: http://politika.bugun.com.tr/basortusu-tepkisi-haberi/823722

Cagaptay, Soner. _The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century's First Muslim Power_. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2014.

Ciddi, Sinan. _Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, Secularism and Nationalism_. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Ciddi, Sinan and Esen, Berk. "Turkey's Republican People's Party: Politics of Opposition Under a Dominant Party System." _Turkish Studies_ 15, no. 3 (2014): 419–441.

CYDD Mission Statement, at: www.cydd.org.tr/sayfa.asp?id=22

CYDD statement, at: www.cydd.org.tr/haberlerDetay.asp?id=223

CYDD press statement, at: www.cydd.org.tr/haberlerDetay.asp?id=348

Cizre, Ümit and Cinar, Menderes. "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islam and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process." _The South Atlantic Quarterly_ 102, no. 2/3 (2003): 309–332.

Çölaşan, Tansel. "10 Kasım Basın Acıklamasıdır." "November 10 Statement"], at: [www.add.org.tr/index.php/genel-baskanimizdan/1033-10-kas-m-bas-n-ac-klamas-d-r

Ecevit, Bülent. _Atatürk ve Devrimcilik_. Ankara: Tekin, 1976.

Erdogan, Necmi. "Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya," in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), _Kemalizm: Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 2 [Kemalizm: Political Thought in Modern Turkey 2]_. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001, pp. 584–591.

"Güler, Birgül Ayman. "Erdoğan Türkiye'yi Bölüyor." "Erdoğan is Dividing Turkey"], _Yurt_ , November 19, 2013. Reprinted on ADD's website, at: [www.add.org.tr/index.php/basindan/1050-erdogan-tuerkiye-yi-boelueyor

Güler, Birgül Ayman. "Türk ulusuyla Kürt milliyetini eşit, eş değerde gördüremezsiniz." _Sol_ , January 24, 2013, at: http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/birgul-ayman-guler-turk-ulusuyla-kurt-milliyetini-esit-es-degerde-gorduremezsiniz

Gürses, Ezgi. _28 Şubat: Demokrasi Ters Şeritte_. Ankara: Şule, 2012.

Hintz, Lisel. "Us vs. Them, Over and Over Again? National Identity Contestation in Turkey's Stalled EU Bid." _Turkish Policy Quarterly_ 12, no. 1 (2013): 149–159.

Odatv Online News Source, at: www.odatv.com/n.php?n=cydd-mali-denetimlerle-feshedilmek-mi-isteniyir-1412131200 (accessed December 14, 2013).

Ozbudun, Ergun. "Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey," in Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), _Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems_. İstanbul: Bogaziçi University Publications, 1975, pp. 49–52.

Parla, Taha and Davison, Andrew. _Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?_ Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004.

Tuncay, Mete. _Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yonetiminin Kurulmasi_. İstanbul: TETAV, 1999.

Tuncay, Mete. _Turkiye'de Sol Akimlari_. Ankara: AUSBF, 1967.

# **3** **Kemalist feminists in the era of the AK Party**

_Nil Mutluer_

In June, I was speaking to some 400 women who had come together for the latest Women's Convention when I said "I believe this convention will reflect the spirit of _Gezi_ in terms of liberties and women's equality." I had quite enjoyed saying it too. During the briefing session, a friend of mine from the _Başkent Kadın Platformu_ (Capital City Women's Platform), whom I had worked with on a number of occasions, said, "You said the spirit of _Gezi_ and you ruined the meeting with a nationalistic discourse." I responded, "Many things have been associated with the _Gezi_ spirit or attitude, but nationalism is not one of them." She thought that I had declared my position right from the beginning. I tried to explain equality and freedom with the spirit of _Gezi_. It was to no avail. She repeated: "It was nationalistic enough for you to say _Gezi_ spirit." That's when I fell silent. Because that's what you do.

Sema Kendirci, Chairperson of the Turkish Women's Association, 2014

Silence...

Words, actions and concepts are restrained by the baggage of identities in modern politics. Nationalist, Kemalist, feminist, laicist, pro-coup, Islamist, _irticacı_ (reactionary) are just some prominent ones in the list. The modern political sphere is saddled with such concepts associated with identities. These concepts find support within the power relations surrounding issues that shape politics and the society. Sometimes, they are used to define an identity group. At other times, they are slurs for a particular group. People identify themselves within the knowledge spheres, persons and institutions they feel allegiance to, and embrace some concepts while excluding others. While experiences and concepts may be plural, insofar as they fail to be effective in the power and interest configurations of modern politics, much action goes unseen and many words are unheard.

What is surprising to those who are familiar with the confined and closed socio-political context in Turkey is the disappointment of the Chairperson of the _Türk Kadınlar Birliği_ (Turkish Women's Association) with being called "nationalistic"—more so when that Association is Turkey's first women's civil society organization founded in close alliance with the founding ideology of the Republic. Kendirci says that the period between the 1910s and 1950s is a major influence on her thinking and that she admires the women who criticized the Republican policies from the feminist point of view of the era. Hence she does not describe herself as nationalistic, _Atatürkçü_ or Kemalist. She is also critical of the official policy toward women adopted in the foundational years of the Republic. Yet, she emphasizes that, unlike her, many members of the association she heads would genuinely embrace these concepts. In her words, she is a feminist who advocates laicism, the rule of law and democracy.

The person Kendirci refers to in her quote is a member of the _Başkent Kadın Platformu_ (Capital City Women's Platform), an organization that received wide attention particularly during the struggle against the ban on the headscarf. If a layperson were to define these two women with the above anecdote or by their institutional allegiances, they may label the former "Kemalist" and the latter "Islamist" at the first instance. However, this would be a stereotypical, oversimplifying and fairly inadequate approach. Both women are political activists and have worked side by side on women's rights issues such as Civil Code and Criminal Code reforms. While their sustainability and effectiveness may be open to debate, the two women's efforts to rebuild an inclusive political environment, and the steps they took toward each other in the process, are noteworthy. The lack of communication described in Kendirci's words may only be explained by an extraordinary occurrence like the Gezi protests, which causes people to question political and sociological norms.

## **The ambiguous backdrop story of Kemalist "feminism"**

What shapes the polarized political and cultural environment of today's socio-political space is how Turkish modernization, particularly laicism as one of its key tenets, is described and implemented. Laicism in Turkey, instead of being the political guarantee of the freedom of faith, has been the reference point for the continuation of the top-down nationalist state policies since the proclamation of the Republic. The culturally and nationally sacred values of the new nation state were "modern," "laic," "civilized" and "Turk," and the antagonists were "traditional," "Islamist" and "Kurdish." The top-down, hegemonic model of Turkish modernization spawned the "laic–Islamist" antagonism and caused the fundamental values of the society to be built around these two poles. The tenet of laicism was influential in the rearrangement of socio-cultural values as well as shaping political and judicial regulations. Therefore, when one speaks of laicism in Turkey, it is possible to refer both to a value system and an identity that becomes manifest in the symbols of those who identified themselves with that system. As such, laicism is accompanied by its historical and political references and experiences in the memories of the communities and individuals constituting the society.

In the "laic–Islamist" dilemma, women, with their attire, appearance, conduct, and association with the family and society have always been the symbols of dominant values. During the early days of the Republic, women were involved in an active struggle for their rights. But when the struggle was appropriated by the state in the effort to build a new nation state, the position of women as independent actors was compromised. Kemalist men were not overly enthusiastic about having women actively involved in politics. The state appointed women to become "educated and trained" mothers who would raise future generations of Kemalists, and thus relegated them to the status of second-class citizens in the building of the nation state. This type of feminism, rather than regarding women as independent actors, positioned the liberated women who affirmed Kemalist principles in opposition to the other women who were yet to be liberated. Exclusion was based on religion, ethnicity and class. Men and women who did not adhere to the Kemalist values of the new Republic, in other words who were not urban dwellers, Westernized, middle-class were regarded as "others." This symbolism reduced not only women, but also all other groups who resisted identifying themselves with the norms and values of the new Republic, such as certain Muslim communities, Kurds and Alevis, to second-class citizenship before Kemalist men. Minorities that were mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty (1923), for their part, had been cast as excluded others even before the declaration of the Republic.

Understood in this polarized context, Kemalist feminist is an ambiguous term. It is possible to call all those who associate themselves with the principles and reforms of Atatürk and follow the Kemalist ideology "Kemalists." Yet it is difficult to regard Kemalists as a homogeneous group, even though Kemalism itself aimed at creating a monolithic society through its corporatist approach. The idiomatic use of Kemalist refers to the followers of the Kemalist ideology, but at present, in everyday life, it may also be used as a term referring to those who stand in opposition to the AK Party's (Adalet Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) policies in one or more issue areas. Also, it may be used as a shorthand reference to state-centric authoritarianism that is the hallmark of Kemalism. In short, the Kemalist–AK Party binary opposition is both conceptually and practically plural, as well as carrying different meanings depending on how the concept is perceived sociologically, which actors are using it and how.

"Feminist," for its part, is a concept, that is almost entirely excluded from public discourses as the "other." Regardless of the activity and history of the movement since the Ottoman era to the present day, feminism is associated with misandrogyny, and may be used as a "derogatory" term both by Kemalists and the AK Party supporters in a variety of settings. Sometimes, Islamist conservatives may use the term to refer to Kemalist women. Meanwhile, although Kemalist women and their organizations follow the principles and reforms of Atatürk, none of the institutions consider themselves feminist. There are different explanations of the theoretical and sociological association of feminism with Kemalists. Men and women intellectuals in the late Ottoman era, who would later play a part in the proclamation of the Republic, used the term feminism "for everyone who supports and makes demands for women." Until 1980s the words Kemalism and feminism were used as interchangeable terms. Even today, there are studies associating Kemalist feminists with state feminism and regard them as the carriers of national objectives, just as there are works regarding all Kemalist women to be feminists because of the work they have done for women's rights.

## **Kemalist women and "their" feminist movement after 1980**

Kemalist women who had been accustomed to be politically active for the principles and reforms of Atatürk without much of a challenge up until the military coup of 1980, faced a crisis of legitimacy when the state adopted a Turkish-Islamic synthesis as its dominant ideology. The organic power of Kemalism in state apparatuses was undermined by the purge of Kemalist bureaucrats during the Özal administrations. At the same time a second generation of feminists emerged as Kemalist's secure position of representing the ideal Turkish women lost ground. Kemalist women argued that the political changes after 1980s were against national unity and laicism. At the same time, the privileges granted to their organizations as "organizations for public benefit" were eroding after the 1980s making them feel that the Kemalist nationalist principles and outlook were disintegrating in politics. The crisis was exacerbated once Islam-friendly politics became active; the Kurdish issue came under limelight with the Kurdish independence movement gaining pace; and finally when the AK Party, which according to many Kemalists represents political Islam, achieved electoral victory in 2002. All these developments caused a diversification among organized Kemalist women.

In this diversification, there emerged different positions among Kemalist women in the ways they relate to Kemalist and feminist politics. These positions range from conservative to reformist. This article is an attempt to give voice to the unheard elements of these women and to bring forth nuances in what otherwise is perceived as a homogeneity. To that end, it seeks to reflect the intersectionality of women who are members of a Kemalist institution or/and describe themselves as _Atatürkçü_ or Kemalist, and also insist that they are feminists. It is a critical review of the ways in which Kemalist feminists respond to the policies of the AK Party in the last decade. It discusses the "sacred grounds" into which Kemalist nationalism and laicism on the one hand and the AK Party's cultural essentialism and neoliberalism on the other seek to confine women. My purpose is to understand how women who identify themselves both with Kemalism and feminism as well as feminist women who work actively in Kemalist organizations relate and respond to one another as well as to the AK Party policies in everyday life.

In this context, a major issue the article addresses is how Kemalist women relate to the women's movement and/or feminism when it comes to such issues as headscarf, militarism, family and women and nationalism. The relations that Kemalist feminists establish with the women's movement and feminist discussions in Turkey also transform their relationship with Kemalism from a conservative to a more reformist attitude. Kemalist feminists, while holding fast to their common reference points such as laicisim and republicanism, at the same time seek to reinterpret Kemalism in and through declarations which they describe as keeping up with "what is contemporary."

Since 1980 _coup d_ ' _état_ , some Kemalist women have adopted the second generation feminists' arguments whom they had previously dismissed as irrelevant but which they now embrace as a useful tool in their struggle against political Islam. In this vein, Kemalist feminists with a more conservative attitude reformulated their objections against the AK Party policies with arguments drawn from contemporary women's rights discourse. They have embraced the gains of feminist politics in areas they consider to be essential such as universal suffrage, education, work, abortion and others, but they keep their distance from the sort of plurality advocated by the third-generation feminist and queer movements.

The Kemalist feminists who actively participated in the struggle to bring about gender equality amendments to the Constitution, the Civil and Criminal Codes, generally show a relatively more pluralistic and reformist attitude. Many of them had long since adopted the arguments of radical feminism. While criticizing the AK Party, this group also seeks to reform Kemalism and in some cases the Kemalists as well. Approaching Kemalism idealistically, they think that Kemalism has been distorted under authoritarianism before being fully comprehended. They do not reject the social, political and cultural demands of Muslims, Kurds and headscarved women right from the start. Regarding issues in women's rights, they are critical not just of the incumbent AK Party, but also of the opposition CHP, and they even approach critically the male-dominated politics and policies that shaped the initial years of the Republic. It must also be emphasized that socialism and social democracy complement feminism in the critical and reformist attitude of this group.

As stated above, first the discourses developed by Kemalist feminists in response to the AK Party's policies regarding issue areas of the headscarf, militarism, family, gender, sexuality and nationalism will be analyzed. Second, the plurality of conservative and reformist positions reflected in the Kemalist feminist discourse will be identified. To that end, the manuscript will use in-depth interviews carried out with thirteen women living in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir as well as carrying out textual analyses of written materials, documents and declarations.

## **"Reformist" and "conservative" Kemalist feminists on the headscarf–turban: the flimsy boundaries of laicism**

The debate around the headscarf–turban dominates and deeply influences the public/political space in Turkey and reflects a mode of class conflict. This conflict is about what type of woman will be included in the public sphere and hence who will be empowered and whose values will become dominant in the political space of the Turkish Republic. Since laicist values were regarded as primary in the early Republican era, those who affirmed different values were excluded as the others who, in Elias's terms, needed to be "tamed and civilized." The relationship with the "other" in the modern nationalist world is directly correlated with fear. Those who are regarded as belonging to "us" are symbolized through attire, appearance and conduct, and the ones who do not conform to these norms are regarded as symbols of threat and uncertainty that contribute to suspicion and fear because they cannot be delimited and defined through science.

Although the Republic symbolized the lifestyle norms and conduct of the civilized through the representation of women, all restrictions on attire were imposed by men. Until the 1980s, covered women were regarded as lower class, and were not taken seriously, let alone being viewed as a political threat in the public sphere. After the 1971 coup, the Kemalists in the state bureaucracy began to thin out—a process which accelerated in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. At around the same time, political Islam gained impetus and headscarved women began to take active part in Islamic political parties. They also started to attend universities, all of which caused them to be visible in the public sphere. Beginning with 1984, headscarved students were banned from schools in general and higher education institutions in particular, and already registered female university students were pressured into uncovering their heads in the so-called ideological "persuasion rooms." Persuasion rooms highlighted the fact that the "headscarf–turban" became the symbolic issue in the conflict between the laic Kemalists and Islamic groups. While the Islamists called what they wore on their head "headscarves," the Kemalists claimed that the headscarf was the traditional attire of Anatolian women and used instead the term "turban" to distinguish it as the political symbol of anti-Kemalist, Islamic reaction.

When the repressive policies of the state singled out covered women as the symbol of anti-Kemalist reaction, Kemalist women who had been indoctrinated with the fear that laicism could be wrenched from their hands at any moment went to the opposite extreme. In their words, they felt that there was an existential "fear" and a "perception of threat" to the values of the laic Republican regime and hence to their accustomed style of life. Former CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party) deputy Gaye Erbatur says that the 1980s policies of exclusion divided women's groups who could otherwise very well cooperate on women's rights issues. She argues that "one's freedom of wearing a headscarf became a threat to the other's freedom of not wearing one."

Kemalist feminists do not have a unified explanation for the source of this fear or an agreed upon proposal as to how it can be alleviated. On the question of laicism and the headscarf as on other questions, it is possible to delineate two vaguely defined positions among Kemalist feminists: conservative or reformist. Regarding the issue of headscarves, Conservatives embrace the Kemalist understanding of laicism and the image of the modern women attached to it without questioning. The reformists, in contrast, seek to rethink Kemalism under the guidance of Western democratic values, and argue that the freedom to wear religious attire in all spheres of life can be achieved only through the internalization of a liberal understanding of laicism by all segments of the society.

Those closer to the conservative attitude consider the appearance of covered women in the public sphere after 1980 as a matter of pure political strategy on the part of the Islamists. They ask: "since such demands were not present in the early years of the Republic, why do we hear them now?" They do not however consider the possibility that these demands have always been there, yet were not heard precisely because of the exclusionary policies of the state—the very policies which precluded Kemalist women from establishing egalitarian relations with those "other" women. Now that the other women and their political demands have become visible even to them, they fear that their urban, middle-class lifestyle is under an existential threat.

Despite the perceived threat by the conservatives, there is now a general tendency among Kemalist feminists to recognize headscarved women's right to public existence. They do however distinguish between those who receive public services like education, justice, health care and so on, and those who provide them. The former, they say, can wear a headscarf as a matter of individual choice, yet the latter should not, for as public service providers they represent the state. While more or less all Kemalist feminists share this position, it is for different reasons. For the conservatives, the state is and should remain Kemalist. The reformists, however, think that if laicism were properly understood and practiced by all citizens, then it would not be a problem even for public service providers to dress as they like. Since, however, they think this is not the case, they find the ban of headscarf for public service providers to be a reasonable restriction on individual freedom.

The debate on religious attire resonates with another debate on how laicism should be understood and religion should be approached. Conservative Kemalist feminists take the early Republican era as an important reference point. They claim that far from denying religion, the Kemalist understanding of laicism embraced and furthered its true meaning. Some tell anecdotes about how people used to gather in their homes to read the Qu'ran, or how they learned Arabic at an early age to study the Qu'ran, or retell the stories of their mothers who willingly changed their religious attire with a modern one, yet remained as believers. Since they do not allow for any incompatibility between Kemalist understanding of laicism and religion, they think that young women would choose to wear a headscarf only under coercion from their families. Thus, they "tolerate" the wearing of a headscarf only because it gives them a leeway "to leave the home and receive education." In other words, they position religious attire somewhere between a political symbol and coercion, and they approach the issue from an instrumental point of view. In doing so they fail to consider the possibility that it can be a matter of faith and uncoerced choice. Their dilemma is to choose between positioning headscarved women either as political objects or as a repressed group. They do not even consider the possibility that head-scarved women could be making an autonomous public claim for equal citizenship.

Kemalist feminists who take this position on the headscarf issue do not problematize the way laicism is implemented in Turkey. Although there are some who believe that the repression of covered women has some negative consequences, they see the political demands of headscarved women not as one of individual liberty, but as a political leverage that the AK Party uses to further its anti-laicist agenda. They see laicism as the guarantee of a modern lifestyle, and find the bans on religious attire or other restriction of religious practice to be reasonable. Kemalists tend to define laicism in general terms, as "the separation of government and religious affairs." Yet conservative Kemalist feminists do not refrain from advocating government-imposed restrictions on religious practice in general, and the headscarf in particular. Some of them justify such restrictions with what they refer to as "scientific arguments": "Professional outfits are not compatible with religious attire." Others argue, that if judges or teachers wear a headscarf, it would "compromise their neutrality and objectivity." They also complain, that when working on common women's right projects, headscarved women tend to loose their "objectivity" and instead of focusing on problems common to all women, seek to assert their particular identity.

Kemalist feminists who adopt a more reformist approach, by contrast, not only criticize the policies of exclusion of the 1980s, but they also problematize the Kemalist understanding of laicism, which they argue is prone to create inequalities between citizens. They find the government imposed restrictions on faith problematic and advocate the adoption of a more inclusive and pluralistic understanding of laicism. They think that the headscarf issue can very well be solved by formulating it as a matter of civil liberties; yet they also emphasize that the current social, cultural and political conditions in Turkey are not yet ripe enough to embrace a fully liberal understanding of laicism. They admit that there are some Kemalists who ostracize headscarved women and threaten to stay out of any joint project to which headscarved women are invited as participants. In such cases, they make a point of siding with the headscarved women. That said, Kemalist feminists, be they conservative or reformists, have two main concerns regarding the headscarf issue. First, they think that the AK Party as well as the other political parties use it as an instrument to further their male-dominant policies. The AK Party in particular uses it to assert the moderate Islamic identity it seeks to create. Second, they think that since the liberal understanding of laicism has not been established yet, its meaning changes according to whoever is in power; thus the implications and meanings attributed to the headscarf changes continuously.

In fact, not only the reformists, but all Kemalist Feminists agree, that the headscarf issue is used as an instrument of male-dominant politics. Some of them point out the paradox that although the current the AK Party government owes its success, to a large extent, to the activities of headscarved women, they are treated rather unfairly by the AK Party's male politicians. What distinguishes reformist Kemalist feminists from the conservatives is that they do not take issue with Islam per se, but with the instrumentalized version of Islam, as used by those in power. This is related to the criticism they direct against the Kemalist understanding of laicism. They argue that freedom of thought and conscience must be unconditionally guaranteed for all citizens and not just for practicing Muslims. They also advocate democracy and democratization, which they think would only be possible with the establishment of true laicism. The way in which laicism is understood and practiced in Turkey, they say, leads to the exclusion of some from the public political sphere. And it is not only the religious people who suffer from exclusion. LGBTI individuals, to give an example, are also excluded.

Reformist Kemalist Feminists are also critical of what they call the "ideological predisposition of the judicial system." Şenal Sarıhan, lawyer and the founding president of the _Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği_ (the Society of the Women of the Republic) says: "I worry about which court will hear my case, and I am ashamed to do so." Sarıhan adds, that discrimination is not limited to political cases, it has spread to criminal cases as well. This lack of confidence in the judicial system adds to the Kemalist feminists' sense of insecurity.

Their advocacy of a more liberal and pluralistic understanding of laicism notwithstanding, it is because of this sense of insecurity, that reformist Kemalist feminists still object to public service providers wearing a headscarf. They think that thanks to the present form of male-dominant cultural conservatism within the society, wearing religious attire has turned into a complex political problem that cannot be solved simply by referring to individual rights and liberties. They further think that the problem of religious attire is usually formulated not as general problem of promoting the civil freedoms of all, but as a particular problem of furthering the political freedoms of the Islamicists. They point out that when it comes to joint projects of human rights advocacy, the representatives of political Islam cannot even stand the presence of, let alone cooperate with LGBTI individuals. They therefore ask of them, "whether the freedoms they demand for themselves, will apply to homosexuals as well."

This self-serving and selective advocacy of freedom on the part of the Islamicists, combined with the discriminatory practices observed in the judicial system, lead the reformist Kemalist feminists to believe that the authoritarian and patriarchal mentality for which the Kemalist regime has been accused in the past, has not changed in the present, and that the appointment of headscarved women as public servants would therefore simply generate a new form symbolic repression of all women in Turkey, including the headscarved. They know that even if the actors change, what remains the same in Turkish politics is the anti-democratic mentality. They find the revanchist approaches of the Islamicists, such as the motto "others have done it, why shouldn't we" highly disturbing. Former Prime Minister Erdoğan's exclusionary and in some cases even degrading declarations on women-related subjects is a further factor exacerbating their uneasiness.

This analysis suggests that the radical democratic demand to transform the authoritarian and unitary mentality that has marked Turkish politics since the inception of the Republic, into a more pluralistic and liberal direction, has made inroads, at least to certain extent, also among Kemalist feminists. With the notable exception of those who identify themselves with the radical nationalist ( _ulusalcı_ ) position, most Kemalist feminists accept, as a matter of fact, the existence of headscarved women as equal actors in the public sphere. However, even those who resist recognizing headscarved women as equal actors, admit that "everything cannot be as we wish" and that democracy requires them to endure certain things. Whether this acceptance is the result of the pressures of global politics, or of the confrontation with the AK Party who effectively challenged the decades long hegemony of the Kemalist ideology, the fact remains that "democracy" is now a term included in the conceptual vocabulary of the Kemalist feminists.

## **"Being ready for duty": the everyday manifestations of militarism**

Militarism is an indispensable part of the daily life in Turkey. It exalts the _raison d'être_ of the army and ensures the continuity of the Kemalist regime and its understanding of laicism. As such, it is a vital component of the socialization processes through which Turkish citizens internalize gender hierarchy and the gendered division of labor built in the nation state. Under this division of labor, "the ideal Turkish woman" is assigned the dual tasks of symbolizing modernity and transmitting the modernist values of the Kemalist Republic to future generations. The Kemalist ideology does not expect women to assume any direct political responsibility in public affairs, yet in this militarist division of labor, it symbolizes them as citizens charged with the task of protecting and providing for the survival of laicism and the laic Republic.

With the rise of the identity politics in the 1980s and 1990s, Kemalism has evolved into a vocal political identity, and Kemalists positioned themselves as the defenders of laicism and the laic Republic. In this process, the meaning of "political Islam" in the Kemalist consciousness, came to be associated with fear: the fear of a possible return to "sharia," and a perception that laicism and the modern life style is under an existential threat. The Kemalist ideology attributes supreme importance to the Turkish Armed Forces and this institution, in turn, regards Atatürk as its eternal commander-in-chief and views itself as the supreme guardian of Kemalism. Therefore, Kemalist feminists, particularly those closer to the conservative position, do not find anything wrong in teaming up with the army in defense of laicism. The conservatives see the army almost as a natural extension of the civilian domain. Thus they willingly embraced the Army's campaigns against the so-called "reactionary movements" and supported it by organizing and/or participating in mass protests.

Both during the "post-modern coup" of February 28, 1997, and during the run-up to the presidential elections in 2007, Kemalist civil society organizations in general, and Kemalist women's organizations in particular, held a series of rallies and demonstrations aimed at "protecting laicism and the laic Republic." Both instances coincided with the rise of a public controversy in which the dominant, that is to say, Kemalist understanding of laicism was challenged. During that period two headscarved women became the symbols of the issue around which the controversy revolved: In 1999 it was Merve Kavakçı who campaigned as a headscarved women and was elected as a deputy. In 2007 it was the Presidential Candidate Abdullah Gül's wife Hayrünnisa Gül, who was about to become the first headscarved First Lady in the history of Turkish Republic. Although Kemalist feminists differed in their responses to this situation, being caught up in the laic–Islamist controversy, they felt compelled to present a unified front against what they thought was the embodiment of the much-feared political Islam, namely the AK Party. Yet, despite the fact that they all participated in the so-called "Republican Rallies," Kemalist feminists differ in the ways they interpret these events.

Non-Kemalists in general and political Islamicists in particular, identify the Republican Rallies with a military interventionist political position. Some Kemalist feminists who were active in the organization of the rallies admit that there was indeed a visible and audible militarist symbolism involved in the rallies, but they emphasize the fact that this was not the original idea. The identification of the Republican Rallies with military interventionism, they think, stems from an older coincidence. Ten years prior to the Republican Rallies, Kemalist women's associations organized a "March against Shaira." The march took place on February 15, 1997 and the "post-modern coup" of February 28, came soon afterwards. It was because of the lingering suspicions raised by this coincidence, they say, that Kemalist women are still perceived to be pro-military intervention. Yet, Kemalist feminists stress, beyond that unfortunate coincidence, that the two events had nothing to do with one another. In fact, Emel Denizaslanı, who otherwise believes that the 1997 intervention was necessary and supports its aims, says that in the male-dominated public space of Turkish politics, "politicians never listen to women anyways."

One of the factors that motivated the organization of the "March Against Sharia" in 1997, long before the AK Party came to power, was a public statement by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then mayor of Istanbul, to the effect that "democracy is not an end, but only a means." Fearing "the end" Erdoğan had in mind was sharia, the organizers of the march chose to symbolize it with the picture of a woman in _çarşaf_. Seventeen years later, some Kemalist feminists criticize this choice of a symbol and note that headscarved women too participated in the march. According to them the sharia that they feared without knowing what it exactly was, was in any case, not their headscarved comrades.

What we meant by sharia there, was not my covered friend standing by my side. It was a grotesque, dangerous thing. You know those evil, fearsome, perilous things that exist but are invisible? It was an unidentified thing. But not the woman beside me.

Under the influence of this intoxicating fear, the more conservative of the Kemalist feminists think that in cases where the security of the state is at stake, military interventions can be seen as reasonable measures. Reformists, by contrast, are critical of the authoritarian and relatively discriminatory policies of the state, and do not approve of full-blown military coups under any condition. When it comes to public warnings issued by military commanders, however, their views differ. Some object to any form of military intervention in politics, including such warnings. Some, however, fail to see any difference between such warnings and the public declarations of other, non-military actors or civil society organizations.

The Republican Rallies of 2007 were one of the most important cases which occasioned Kemalist feminists to reconsider their relations with the military. The rallies and the public debate they initiated were shaped around the slogan "neither sharia, nor a military coup, a fully independent Turkey" and almost all the Kemalist feminists interviewed refer to the slogan affirmatively. Yet the meanings attributed to this slogan differ along the conservative–reformist axis.

The protection of the Republican regime is of special significance to Kemalist feminists with a conservative approach, because for them, the continuity of the regime also means the continuity of the resources and liberties with which they carry out their political activities. Starting with the changing international relations and rise of identity claims in the 1990s, the nationalist fear politics of "internal and external threats" gained more weight than ever since the foundation of the Republic. This discourse creates the illusion of a fragile context and extraordinary circumstances, and provides a fear-based justification for calling the military to duty when needed. Although there is nothing in the wording of the main slogan of the Republican Rallies that can be read as an invitation to military intervention, the comments of Necla Arat, one of the key figures of the rallies, reproduces the prohibitive and exclusionary understanding of laicism:

As one of the most staunch defenders of the Kemalist ideology, the Turkish Armed Forces is being tarnished by negative propaganda inside and outside. Members of the European Parliament never miss an opportunity to discredit our army. Voices raised in the EU and United States wish that the foundations on which the Republic is based are opened to discussion. For instance, they want us to replace the principle of laicism in the Constitution with "freedom of faith" to establish a religious–political affair based on religious communities, or a political structure that is predominantly religious.

At this point the nuance represented by Türkan Saylan is of particular political significance. Saylan was one of the speakers in the first rally and she was the first person to coin the slogan: "neither coup nor sharia." She was however not allowed to speak in the subsequent rallies. It is true that Saylan founded _Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği_ (Society for the Support of Modern Life) to struggle against the rise of political Islam and to protect the "modern" or "laic" lifestyle against the threat it poses. It is also true that she did not extend the democratic courtesy she advocated throughout her life to the headscarved women. Yet, she was highly critical of those who used Kemalism as an excuse to further their authoritarian agendas. In her own particular way, she sought to advocate a pluralistic framework based on universal human rights and it was because of this perspective, that the closed circle of nationalist Kemalists prevented her from speaking in subsequent rallies. Although her idea of democracy was rather limited by her positivist modern worldview and she was rather intolerant when it came to questions of freedom of faith, she respected humanism and human diversity, and she was a staunch critic of ethnic discrimination and racism.

Among Kemalist feminists closer to the conservative position, there are some who seek to explain away why Saylan was prevented from speaking in the rallies, with technical reasons. They also find her emphasis on "neither coup nor sharia" redundant, because they think that the "military intervenes whenever it thinks it is necessary anyway." However there are also Kemalist feminists who are highly critical of the radical nationalists who objected Saylan's taking the podium at the İzmir rally and ostracized her because of the anti-militarist position she took. They are also critical of the way in which the rallies have been subsequently transformed into show cases for militarist symbolism.

Some Kemalist feminists criticize the militarist symbolism of the rallies, and object to military interventions in politics, but at the same time they praise the foundational role that the military played in the establishment of the Republic. They see the transformation of the military from a "guardian" to a "governing" power as a major problem, but at the same time they evoke the sprit of _Kuvay-i Milliye_ (the national forces which won the so-called "independence war" under the chief commander Mustafa Kemal) and the myth of "combatant mothers" to express their gratitude to the army which founded the Republic. Some even refer to the militarist myth that "every Turk is born a soldier" to argue that "the army is nothing but the nation itself" and to interpret what they call "the foundational principles of the Republic," in this framework. This, they do, to emphasize that these principles are usually misconstrued in public political debates.

Another criticism voiced by the reformist Kemalist feminists is the incompatibility between the goal of societal democratization on the one hand, and the military symbolism that came to mark the rallies with the transformation of the organization, on the other. Kemalist feminists closer to the reformist position think that a public confrontation and democratic competition with the proponents of political Islam is both inevitable and necessary. Not all of them find the symbolic weight of the military necessarily problematic, yet they nonetheless find the military symbolism of the rallies as exclusionary. At this point the imagined social unity reproduces itself in the reformists' vision, but instead of disregarding the existence of the "other," it admits that the "other" exists:

There are people in this country who think otherwise. Our purpose should be to lead the entire society towards the same objective. When someone, somewhere says "I exist," the attitude should not be that of "I threaten you" but that of "I exist, please pay attention to me." When you utter words that offend some people, you sow enmities. This should not be the objective. We are members of the civil society organizations. The purpose of civil society organizations should be to create solutions that bring happiness, welfare and advancement to the entire society.

## **Kemalist feminists and the AK Party's politics of family and women**

"Make at least three babies so that our young population does not decrease."

These words by former Prime Minister Erdoğan are the keystone in the gender policies of the AK Party administration, and the criticism directed against it. Ruth Miller discusses the policies imposed upon reproduction by rulers, arguing that the uterus represents "the state of exception" because that is how societal values that create the modern citizen are kept under control. Constructing a society based on family and population policies is neither new nor specific to Turkey. The family is one of the main instruments used in the processes in which modern nation states are built, and the sexuality of the woman that represents the family reflects the values and hierarchy of the society. Both Kemalists and representatives of political Islam use the appearance of women in the public sphere and their role in the family to symbolize their respective visions of what a "decent" society should look like. Their respective mentalities are best reflected in the ongoing debate on the interrelated questions of reproduction and the public presence of women.

In order to create the new bourgeois society, Turkish modernization emphasized that men and women were equal. Women were positioned as equal, so that the future generations of the society could be raised by "enlightened" mothers. This equality positioned women as active, "educated and capable" citizens in all aspects of social life but at the same, it desexualized and controlled them through a corporatist and nationalist code of ethics.

Instead of criticizing this republican design right from the start, Kemalist feminists closer to the conservative position choose to focus on the fact that women have been granted equality only with the proclamation of the Republic. Thanks to the increase in the activities of the women's movement in the 1980s, some of them have indeed developed a basic awareness of the problems in the area of women's rights, but it is only with the AK Party's coming to power, that they started to call themselves "feminists." Reformists by contrast were in closer contact with the second-wave feminist activities of the 1980s and therefore they are critical not only of the way in which women were positioned in the early Republican era, but also of the present-day CHP approaches to issues of equal citizenship, sexuality and family. We must note that Kemalist feminists who are closer to the reformist approach in gender, sexuality and family issues may range from conservative to reformist in their approaches to other issues such as religious attire, attitude toward the military and ethnic pluralism. In other words, women who take a more conservative position in other issue areas may take a more reformist position in this issue area, or vice versa.

One issue that all Kemalist feminists from the conservative to the reformist have a consensus on is the restructuring of what previously was the Ministry of State for Women and Family as the Ministry of Family and Social Services by the AK Party administration. They all agree that with this change the role of the woman both in the family and in the society is reduced to that of a caregiver. This feminist critique of the AK Party's family-centered approach to women is common to all Kemalist feminists. However the ways in which they interpret the history of the evolution of family policies since the early Republican era show considerable differences along the conservative–reformist axis.

Conservatives argue that the AK Party's family policies resonate with the policies adopted since the 1950s by successive right-wing governments. One important source that they base their criticism on is Firdevs (Helvacıoğlu) Gümüşoğlu's work _Gender in Text Books 1928–2013_. They argue, that the textbooks still reflected the gender-equal, laic, populist and pro-enlightenment discourse of Atatürk and his friends until after the mid-1940s, but starting with the 1950s, this discourse has changed. They justify this argument, by referring either directly to the above-mentioned book, or only to the foreword written by Necla Arat to its first edition. This group does not, however, question the male-dominated construction of the family and the society in the early Republican era.

Kemalist feminists closer to the reformist position also refer to Gümüşoğlu's book to criticize the sexist and conservative policies implemented after the 1950s. However, they trace the sources of their criticism to an earlier time, namely to the women's movement in the late Ottoman era. They argue that it was this movement that influenced the foundational era of the Republic, and emphasize that it was CHP of those early years, that put off the demands of women. They also emphasize that the legal description of the "man" "as the leader of the household" positioned women as second-class citizens. It must be noted that the women in this group supported or worked actively for the changes in the Civil and Criminal Codes in 2002. The amendment to the Civil Code instituted gender equality in the family, and the amendment to the Criminal Code eliminated the reduction in the sentences in the honor-killings of women.

The AK Party's approach to gender policy since 2006 is most visibly manifested in such issue areas as violence against women, reproduction and social policy. On the one hand important steps were taken to fight violence against women, on the other, however, the AK Party adopted a political economy discourse that confines women to the "heterosexual" family and developed its social policies in this framework. Reproduction and sexuality are important issues in regulating the values of the society. In the AK Party administration, "desexualized" Kemalist women's policies were replaced with "sexualized" policies, or to be more specific with policies that regulates the sexuality of women, by restricting it to reproductive purposes. Particularly social and reproduction policies associate the public presence of women with the family. While neoliberal social policies regulated the women by reducing them to the status of a "care-giver mother," a deeply conservative discourse on such women-related issues as abortion sought to legitimize the bans on women's sexuality and her role in the family. While women were instructed to have three children, marriage became a prerequisite for fertility treatments. Although abortion is not banned yet, news of physicians who refuse to perform abortions, and the resulting discussions restrict women to a life centered on reproduction and the family.

Kemalist feminists criticize the AK Party policies on different levels. All of them are positive about the adoption of the "violence against women" law, and the efforts of the former Minister of Family and Social Policy, particularly in the first administration. However, they are unhappy about the fact that Minister Fatma Şahin backed former Prime Minister Erdoğan in the anti-abortion debate. Although they support the law, they complain about the patriarchal nature of the protective mechanism it describes, the failure of the courts to implement its full force, and the statistical rise in the number of murdered women.

Conservative Kemalists use the blanket term of " _irtica_ " (reactionary Islamic activism) to express their displeasure with such developments. This expression seems to reflect a pre-conditioned and unthoughtful reaction, rather than a carefully thought out criticism, for these policies fell well within the range of what is already expected of the AK Party given its culturally conservative ideological position. Reformists, by contrast, view the issue as part of a whole. First, they argue that since the anti-violence law privileges married, heterosexual women, single women, lesbians and transgender individuals are not fully protected. They also argue that by deriving women's rights from religious sources in general and from what is believed to be "women's creational characteristics," in particular, the law reflects the male-dominated mentality of its framers and as such it restricts women's sphere of action. Furthermore, since the recent reforms in the educational system now make it possible for families to homeschool their children, they feel that girls will be isolated from mainstream socialization processes. The reformists also follow and cooperate with the women's movement in general in its actions against violence against women.

Sexuality and division of labor within the family are issues that Kemalist feminists closer to the reformist position have been questioning since the 1980s, long before the AK Party started to formulate and implement its women's policies. They are critical of the fact that, despite the modern egalitarian discourse, the chastity of a woman is still a taboo, even in secular and modern circles. They believe that the AK Party's discourse and policies on women are deliberately formulated to polarize the laic–Islamist opposition. According to them, this allows the AK Party to keep the tensions between the value systems of the different segments of the society visible and polarized at all times. Thus for example, they argue, the AK Party sought to discredit the Gezi protests, by letting the pro-government mass media channels broadcast deliberately exaggerated stories about how headscarved women have been "victimized" by the protesters. They also draw attention to the question that Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly asked soon after the Gezi protests: "Who knows what boys and girls are doing in the same apartment?" The fact that CHP's Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu adopted this discourse as well is also mentioned as a particular disappointment by the reformist Kemalist feminists.

Should the existence of different sexual orientations be publicly accepted and recognized? Since Islamic circles already started to discuss this issue among themselves, Kemalist feminist feel that they ought to embrace it right from the start. Yet once again there are some differences in how they approach this issue. Beyond some general, affirmative comments, those closer to the conservative position do not have much to say about the subject. The reformists however are well conversant about the demands of the LGBTI community and are even self-critical of their own failures in combating homophobia.

The linkage that former Prime Minister Erdoğan concocted between the Roboski killings and the abortion issue is the final point which Kemalist feminists, particularly those who adopt a reformist attitude not only on gender issues but also on questions of ethnic pluralism, find worth mentioning. Thirty-four ethnic Kurds were killed by aerial bombardment while conducting cross-border trade in the vicinity of Roboski and the government did not provide a satisfactory explanation for these mass killings by the military forces. Just as the attitude of the government was under public scrutiny, former Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that "every abortion is a Uludere," meaning that a single abortion is no less a disaster than the killing of thirty-four innocent Kurds. Reformists believe that with this statement Erdoğan adds insult to injury and introduces ethnic discrimination into an issue that was sexist to begin with.

This linkage between abortion and the killing of thirty-four innocent Kurds implies, that the AK Party government in general and the Prime Minister Erdoğan in particular assign themselves the exclusive authority to make life-and-death decisions. Reformist Kemalist feminists criticize both the sexual and ethnic elements of discrimination played out on the boundary between life and death in the sacred womb (in the case of abortion) or on the sacred soil of the homeland (in the case of the Kurds). For conservatives, however, ethnic differences exist in a different manner. To understand why, we need to turn to their views on nationalism.

## **Kemalist feminists and "the others": nation and nationalism**

In Turkey, laicism is intertwined both with nationalism, that is, with what is considered to be worth identifying with the nation, and also with what can be excluded from the definition of the nation as the unworthy others. The excluded "other" groups, such as the Greeks, Armenians and Jews were defined in ethnic terms—they were all non-Turkish—but somewhat paradoxically this classification also coincided with religious differences: the others were all "Christians" whereas the mainstream of the nation consisted mostly of Sunni Muslims. Obviously there also were Muslim/other belief groups, who were not Sunni, such as the Alevis, but the republican commitment to laicism allowed their religious differences from the Sunni mainstream to be disregarded, and the republican state assimilated them into the ethnic-based definition of the "Turkish" nation. There also were Sunni groups who were ethnically not Turkish; most notably the majority of the Kurds fell in this category. The republican state first considered them to be a part of the Sunni mainstream and as such sought to assimilate them into the "Turkish nation," and when the Kurds resisted against assimilation by asserting their different ethnic identities, they were reclassified as "others" along with other ethno-religious groups.

During the foundational years of the Republic, women's struggle for freedom ran parallel to what was termed the national struggle for independence. Women supported the nationalist struggle, by criticizing the imperialistic tenets involved in their own intellectual sources of inspiration, namely the political thought and practice of the West in general and Western feminism in particular. As Şirin Tekeli shows, their criticism drew its strength from the self-sufficient and strong Muslim women's identity they created. The men of the era supported them and even became carriers of women's struggle themselves. This was because women's position fit very well to their understanding of laicism, which, in their formulation, was not fundamentally incompatible with Islam, as well to their notions of Westernization and nationalism.

Today, the relationship of Kemalist feminists with the "others" on the margins of nationalism is shaped around how they view the historical and current issues regarding Armenians and Kurds. Many prefer to use the term " _ulusalcılık_ ," which is Turkish and has a secular connotation, rather than " _milliyetçilik_ "—a term that has the same denotation, but is associated with the unity of the Muslims ( _ümmetçilik_ ) due to being Arabic in origin. Conservative Kemalist feminists embrace the term " _ulusalcılık_ " while reformists have their qualms about this concept as well.

As the centennial of the Armenian genocide approaches, the differences between reformist and conservative Kemalists' approaches to this issue have also become manifest. Conservative Kemalist feminists choose to neglect, or even disregard, the presence of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. However, this is less a reaction against the AK Party administration where the taboo word "genocide" is gaining currency and more an existential rejection, the roots of which goes back to the proclamation of the Republic. They dismiss the Wealth Tax, imposed in 1942 against minorities to create a national bourgeoisie, and the pogrom of September 6 and 7, 1955, which was directed at the minorities living in Istanbul's Pera district, by uttering statements like "Turks were always the working class; the minorities had most of the capital." Such approaches reeks of ethnic discrimination. The attempt at capital accumulation by transferring wealth from ethno-religious minorities to the Sunni Turkish bourgeois class identified with _the_ nation, is viewed as a legitimate move. Moreover, this attitude does not specifically target the "minorities" alone: Conservative Kemalists, regard not only the ethno-religious minorities, but also the rural Anatolian people as "others." For example, discussing the current power structure, they utter sentences like "the haughtiness of the hegomonic powers that be is rooted in Anatolia." While not all reformists call the events of 1915 a "genocide," they emphasize that the truth must be openly discussed, and that "it is impossible to take steps without confronting the truth."

For all Kemalist feminists, Hrant Dink is of special significance. When the Armenian issue is discussed, almost all of them are critical of the assassination of Dink. Conservatives assert that he was not properly understood, while reformists may claim that the state is connected with the murder and criticize the injustice regarding the criminal lawsuit. The reformists also argue that Dink had a language which was open to dialogue, and that this prevented nationalists ( _ulusalcı_ ) from rejecting the issue altogether.

The attitude that associates nationalism with religion the most visibly is the hierarchical placement of Armenians and Kurds with respect to their allegiance to Turkey. For example, when discussing the right to education in one's mother language and the status of Armenian and Greek schools, a conservative Kemalist feminist associates Turkish Armenians with Armenia:

They are not a generation that was steeped in the system, whether coming from Armenia or otherwise... But are we going to consider Kurds minorities? Will we separate Turkish soil from Turkish rock?

Centuries of Armenian presence in Anatolia is ignored in the Republican memories of conservative Kemalist feminists, which are shaped by nationalism infused with laicism. On the other hand, Kurdish demand for freedom to speak, learn and be educated in their mother language is perceived as an attempt at dividing _the nation_. The Kurdish issue becomes more layered and complex because their common religion prevents Kurds from being readily cast out as "others."

I believe in the indivisible unity of the nation. I think we must live through all good things together, but I consider education in the mother language the first step towards separation, much like the former Yugoslavian experience.

Starting in the 1990s, the involvement of Kurdish activists in the women's movement caused Kemalist women to encounter Kurds. This resulted in a division between Kemalist feminists with respect to reproducing nationalism in a new language, and accepting Kurds as Kurds albeit with some reluctance.

For the conservative Kemalist feminists, the easiest path is to blame the Kurds and tell them how _they_ caused the division. Today, Kemalist feminists do not call Kurds "murderers" or "terrorists" directly, which is a remnant of the "otherness" caused by the mainstream politics and media in the 1990s. There are some who argue that the actions on the day were necessary insofar as national interests were at stake, but years spent in the pluralism of women's movement has compelled Kemalist feminists to adopt a different language when formulating their discourse. Although some consider the peace process initiated by the AK Party administration as "the meddling of the foreign powers," they mostly defend the peace process and the elimination of discrimination. Since, however, in their politicized mindset the AK Party represents the absolute other from which nothing but an "existential threat" can emanate, and since the peace process was initiated by the AK Party, they cannot bring themselves to support it directly and unequivocally. It is therefore not surprising that even when they refer to the peace process affirmatively they qualify it with a big "but," and the reasoning that follows disregards the presence of the Kurdish identity and their political demands. This attitude blankets the ordeals and demands of women in sameness.

The most obvious example of this, is on the issue of violence. The first example that comes to the minds of Kemalist feminists is the Women's Assembly in İzmir in 2005, where Kurdish women demanded that a separate workshop be held for what was experienced in the war. Kemalist feminists reject the violence perpetrated by the state and the sufferings of Kurdish women due to the war. They argue that the claims of state-perpetrated violence prevent them from meeting on common demands, and that Kurdish women do this on purpose. The following is a statement by a conservative Kemalist feminist:

The subject was the violence perpetrated by the Turkish state on Kurdish women. We do not accept this. If there has been violence, we were all subjected to it. This is not something specific to the Kurds. They imply that the state has done it deliberately. We cannot accept that the state has done such a thing. When the issue goes off in a tangent, things we want to say about the assembly are compromised.

When asked about whether turning a blind eye to the war is some sort of discrimination, she explains that she does not discriminate against Kurds:

We definitely do not discriminate against women in the Southeast. We may all have Kurdish ancestors. We are not perturbed by this. Introducing such discrimination among women is not at all nice. It divides us and bothers us. It prevents us from uniting for a common cause. Of course we want peace at home and peace in the world. We believe that a time of peace will be great and bring much benefit to women. We know and understand the issues of the women there. We want them to understand us in return.

The willingness of conservative Kemalist feminists to hear the different experiences of Kurdish women is shaped and limited by the attitude of the traditional state discourse rather than the governments'. Although their thoughts about peace may indicate some change from the past to the present, their approach is shaped by the knowledge provided by the state and their relationship with the "other." For Kemalist feminists, especially for conservatives, the AK Party has generally been considered as the representative of political Islam, so as the other. Therefore, even before the Kurdish peace process, the AK Party's nationalist approach, which shares many common aspects with Kemalism, are not mentioned by Kemalist feminists. After the AK Party initiated the peace process, conservative Kemalist feminists found themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they feel that they have no choice but to support it with an anti-Kurdish discourse, and on the other hand they try to distance themselves from the AK Party by questioning party's policies without a significant reason. Being aware of this inadequate justification, they turn their attention to Kurdish women as main objects of criticism.

Conservative Kemalist feminists complain about not being heard, yet they are deaf to the experiences and opinions of "other" women, because they do not consider Kurdish and Muslim women as their equals. They reject the conditions of war told by Kurdish women, the inadequacy of the infrastructure in Eastern and south-eastern Turkey, and state policies in the region. Meanwhile, they position themselves as superior to Kurdish women, considering them to be members of the "other," lower ethnicity and class. Some of them seem to think, that it is up to them to save the Kurdish women, if necessary. In short, conservative Kemalist feminists still reproduce in their relations with the Kurds in the women's movement the hierarchies of the nationalistic discourse, but at least they do not anymore disregard the existence of Kurds. In this sense, the denial policy of the state in the 1980s is no longer observed. When speaking of their own experiences, they position Kurdish women not as actors but as political objects. They believe they have exclusive right to knowledge and understanding about the issue.

Kemalist feminists with a reformist attitude may still be cautious on the Kurdish issue due to the self-censure imposed by Kemalist nationalism, but they are critical of the assimilation and war policies of the state against the Kurds nevertheless. When criticizing the state, they also argue that the Kurdish nationalist discourse may prevent hearing what the other side has to say from the start. This approach is mostly shared by those who define themselves as socialist or social democrat, and they believe that the 1980 coup and the subsequent hegemony of neoliberal approaches are to blame for the rise of the nationalist attitude that prevents dialogue. In this respect, on the one hand they support the peace process and give credit to the AK Party as the initiator of the process, yet on the other hand, they problematize the relationship established between the state and the political Islamist groups in the post 1980s period. Particularly reformist Kemalist feminist take the issue with the so-called "September 12 trials," that is, the trials of the top ranking members of the military junta of the 1980 coup. They claim that the Islamists deliberately refrain from prosecuting all the responsible officers, torturers and civil groups involved in the coup. The reformist Kemalists, most of whom have themselves been direct or indirect victims of torture, believe that the Islamists simply stage a show trial of the leaders of the coup, to hush up the other perpetrators and state officials involved. In this context they use the word "Islamists" as a generic term denoting both the AK Party and other politically active Islamic groups.

Reformist Kemalist feminists discuss how, in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, benign words like " _örgüt_ " (organization) were wholly associated with the Kurds and branded as "criminal," and talk about the arguments that arose when they were attempting to use such words in their respective institutions. They are also critical of the assimilation policies of the state, namely such as the Diyarbakır Penitentiary experience, forced migration of the Kurds in the 1990s, the establishment of the "village marshals" system and people who went missing.

The Reformists admit the fact that the peace process was initiated by the AK Party and they welcome the ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish military as a significant development which has brought the decades long bloodshed to an end. Thus, they support the peace process and believe that it should continue under ceasefire conditions. They are, however, critical of the conduct of the parties in the process. They specifically emphasize that the parties need to listen to each other. They complain that some Kurdish politicians employ a language that is prejudicial, while saying that the way others speak may be an opportunity to help the nationalists understand the issue. For instance, a Kemalist feminist speaking about the attitude of BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Peace and Democracy Party) Deputy Pervin Buldan, who was the only Kurdish speaker in a meeting attended by Kemalists, was a good example:

It was a meeting on Turkish politics. Women from all parties were explaining their views. All other women spoke and were applauded. The final speaker was Pervin Buldan. There was grumbling among the audience when she took the floor. Buldan did not mind these and proceeded to speak calmly about what she had gone through as a human being and shared her experiences as a woman. The unhappy crowd became silent first. When she was done, they all applauded. Attitude and language are important. In terms of politics, I am closer to some of the Kurdish politicians I know than I am to Buldan, but they can be really harsh when on the podium. I am confident they can speak the language of dialogue. It is important that more people do so.

Reformist women also complain that people on opposing sides do not hear each other, but theirs is less a criticism of the other side, and more a sense of unhappiness with the mutual exclusion of the sides. This applies not only to Kurds, but also to headscarved women and all other identities. As Kendirci said:

One, we were unfair in listening to them. Two, we were unfair in recognizing them. Three, we did not make any effort.

Among Kemalist feminists who associate with the foundational approach of the Republic to varying degrees, the "other" religious and ethnic groups travel on a rigid line between existence and non-existence. This does not mean that they are unaware of or reject the presence of Kurds or the believers of other religions like the Armenians or Greeks. However, the difference with which they relate to these groups does mean that laicism or nationalism have different meanings. In other words, the meaning of laicism and nationalism differ among Kemalist feminists ranging from the conservative to the reformist, which sheds light on how they associate with the fundamental elements of the Republic.

For conservative Kemalist feminists the AK Party is the representative of the Islamic values positioned as the binary opposites of the secular values of the Republic. Regarding the Kurdish issue, the fact that it was the AK Party who initiated the peace process, put the conservatives in a double bind. On the one hand, even if they regard Kurds as the ethnic "others" and as such as an existential threat to the Kemalist republic, they feel that it would be politically damaging to them to be seen as favoring an armed conflict in which thousands of people (and particularly Turkish soldiers) have died. So they feel they cannot not support the peace process. Yet on the other hand, they cannot bring themselves to voice an explicit support for the peace process precisely because it was the AK Party who initiated it. What is interesting to note in their discourse is, however, that it reflects a recognition of both Muslim and Kurdish identities. Their encounter with the AK Party forced the conservatives to accept and admit the political existence of both groups, which they had denied altogether before the 1990s. Reformist Kemalist feminists, for their part, approve of the peace process which the AK Party initiated. Yet they express skepticism about the inclusiveness of these policies as discussed above.

## **Epilogue: a different thinking for Kemalist feminists, but how?**

The encounter of Kemalist feminists with the AK Party provides an opportunity for seeing nuances between them. The issues where these nuances emerge are the ones related to showing the disposition toward and relations of Kemalist feminists with religious attire, everyday militarism, family, reproductive policies, nation and "the others." Throughout the chapter, I tried to deal with women who associate themselves both with Kemalism and feminism not as a homogeneous group, but as a community of heterogeneous affiliations and relationships.

The encounter with the AK Party was a turning point for Kemalist women. Kemalist feminists now occupy a range of thought from conservative to reformist depending on how they interpret the principles and reforms of Atatürk, and how they relate to them. For those who embrace the conservative approach, their fundamental reference point for sexism, relationship with religious people, laicism, the nation and nationalism is the principles and reforms of Atatürk. Their idealized representatives are Atatürk and his friends. Although both radical secular feminists and Islamists became more active in the 1980s, these two groups did not confront each other in Turkey, contrary to what commonly happened in the Middle East. In the 1980s, the women's movement, which was dominated by radical feminism, was critical of Kemalism, and argued that Kemalist reforms made women the symbol of nationalism rather than liberating them. During that time, many of the conservative Kemalist feminists of today did not adopt feminism and found the women's movement to be marginal. While Yeşim Arat argues that Kemalist women transformed into Kemalist feminists against the Islamists in the 1980s and founded the _Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği_ (Society for the Support of Modern Life), these were not directly feminist initiatives, but the efforts of women who represented the Republic for "laicism and modernity." Since these women believed that they represented the Republic, they saw it as their exclusive duty to advocate women's rights. Their fundamental issue was to deal with political Islam, reactionary movements and religion, all of which they perceived as the "others" of Kemalism.

Conservative Kemalist feminists felt their "worst fears come true" when the AK Party, who for them represents political Islam, came to power. This led them, at the very least, to look at the liberal references nearby. Areas of struggle changed during this encounter. In reaction to the AK Party, they embraced the arguments of first- and second-generation feminists in the women's movement of Turkey in the post-1980s with regard to equal citizenship, family, violence and sexuality—arguments that they used to criticize and were criticized about. However, they have completely missed the plurality argument of the politics of difference that emerged with the third-generation feminists. Just as the Western, nationalist and liberal values were reproduced in the early Republican era without opposing local Islamic values, women today became symbols against the AK Party, along the lines of the local Kemalist attitude with values that are Western and nationalistic at the same time. That said, it must be emphasized that "the woman" that conservative Kemalist feminists have in mind is a mirror image of themselves and does not show any of the characteristics of the heterogeneity of class, ethnicity and religion in Turkey.

Kemalist feminists with a reformist attitude encompass new ideas and people, although continuing to hold the reforms and principles of Atatürk in high regard. They believe, however, that these principles must be rethought and even reformed in a manner that is compatible with the times. They underscore the necessity of a transformation in mentality for a more liberal understanding of laicism. For example, they have no problems with headscarved women receiving education and working in the private sector; however, they are cautious when it comes to working in the public service. They also argue that the tenet of populism is not implemented properly or given adequate consideration, and that the political system must be shaped in accordance with the needs of the people. In this respect, coming to terms with what has been experienced in the Kurdish issue, catering for local needs and ensuring that the peace process goes beyond a mere ceasefire are important to them.

Most of the reformist minded Kemalist feminists have started to position themselves as feminists long before the encounter with the AK Party. Some have worked with "others" such as headscarved women or Kurds in the various activities of the women's movement. When the AK Party came to power, reformist Kemalist feminists found the opportunity to convey their messages to their conservative counterparts with more dedication. With regard to the differences embraced by these third-generation feminists, they criticize the conservative attitude of their counterparts.

To sum up, the encounter with the AK Party is a crucial factor that introduced diversity into the Kemalist feminist group. The relationships between the conservative and the reformist groups are dynamic. The new political environment that emerged as a result of the release of the Ergenekon suspects, after the field study of this paper was completed, signifies that new relationships and associations are about to take place. Further studies may shed light on how these associations will be shaped.

For further studies, one should note down the tension between conservative/nationalist ( _ulusalcı_ ) and reformist sides not only among Kemalist feminists but also Kemalists in general. After the release of the Ergenekon suspects, the tension between the conservative nationalist ( _ulusalcı_ ) and reformist sides of Kemalists became visible. As a matter of fact, in our interview with Şenal Sarıhan, the ex-Chair of _Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği_ (Republican Women's Association), she had already given hints of such a tension. Sarıhan had criticized the AK Party's adoption of a softer language about the Ergenekon suspects after the corruption scandal of December 17 had broken out. She had emphasized that it was unfair that in the Ergenekon trials a number of unrelated people were prosecuted along with names known by their affiliation with the deep state. And yet she had also voiced her concern, that in an attempt to cover up the corruption allegations against the AK Party, it was quite possible for all the Ergenekon suspects to be acquitted without merit.

What Sarıhan had then foretold, did indeed happen. By what can plausibly be called a miscarriage of justice, all the Ergenekon suspects were acquitted, including the innocent victims as well as the conspirators of the so-called "deep state," and the conservative Kemalist position resumed its prominence in the Civil Society associations. It was in this context that during the 2014 general assembly meeting of the _Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği_ (Republican Women's Association), the ex-CHP member of parliament Canan Arıtman—who was known for her hardline ultra-nationalist stance and for releasing a photo of hers holding a gun to the press—displaced Şenal Sarıhan as the president of the association. A similar tension was observed in the general assembly of Kader ( _Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği_ , the Association for Supporting Women as Candidates) during that period. With the votes of women who were registered as members at the very last moment by the nationalist group, the nationalist ( _ulusalcı_ ) group managed to take the reins.

Although the release of the Ergenekon suspects resulted in heightening the activities of the conservative wing in _Atatürkçü_ and Kemalist civil society organizations, the CHP, the founding party of the Republic, was observed to adopt a more reformist language. Particularly in its campaign for June 7, 2015 elections, the CHP not only advocated populistic economic reform proposals to reach the more disadvantaged groups in the society, but it also adopted a more inclusive and democratic language embracing cultural and ethnic differences within the society and took a more pro-peace stance on the Kurdish issue. And despite the fact that Şenal Sarıhan was displaced as the president in the civil society organization in which she was active, she was elected as a CHP member of the Parliament.

To sum up, in the aftermaths of the March 2014 local, August 2014 presidential, and June 2015 general elections, the reformist approach that I observed to be existing among the Kemalist feminists during my field research has gradually—and no doubt with the help of the political conjuncture—gained more visibility and prominence in the language that the CHP, the founding party of the republic, adopted.

## Notes

 Interview with Sema Kendirci on January 11, 2014 in Ankara.

 Richard Jenkins, _Social Identity_ (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); Nil Mutluer, "Kimlik, Kültür ve Politikaları Üzerine Düşünmek" ["Thinking on Identity, Culture and Their Politics"], in Cem Erciyes (ed.), _Yeni Toplum Yeni Siyaset: Kürselleşme Çağında Yeni Sosyal Demokrat Yaklaşımlar [New Society, New Politics: New Social Democrat Perspectives at the Era of Globalization]_ (İstanbul: Kalkedon, SODEV Publications, 2012), pp. 261–75.

 Jenkins, _Social Identity_ ; Mutluer, "Thinking on Identity, Culture and Their Politics."

 I use the terms " _Atatürkçü_ " and "Kemalist" interchangeably. _Atatürkçü_ is a concept which started to be used after the 1980 _coup d'état_. I refer to everyone who adopts one or more of the principles and reforms of Atatürk, or explicitly identify themselves with the Kemalist ideology as Kemalists. I do not see Kemalists as a homogeneous group because, they are not. For an in-depth discussion, cf. Ahmet İnsel (ed.), _Kemalism_ (İstanbul: İletişim Publications, 2009 [2001]).

 Instances of spontaneous social disruption like the Gezi protests, are difficult to grasp by non-participants and the words and actions of those who are in positions of power can easily become major reference points in developing responses to them. During the Gezi protests, the AK Party claimed that it was an attempted coup, and drew parallels between Gezi and earlier instances of attempted and/or real coups, particularly that of February 28, 1997 which had a severe impact on Muslims. The protesters' banging pots and pans at night was a further reminder of those strenuous days. Having been outcast by the ruling institutions of the Republic since its foundation and not having access to unbiased news sources (the mainstream media has been anything but unbiased in its reporting of the Gezi protests), Muslims found the AK Party's interpretation of events persuasive. Thus in the public/political discourses of the post-Gezi era, the words "attempted coup" functioned as a dialogue-stopper, and as soon as it was spoken, people who identified themselves with being Muslim stopped listening to the words of the others; they went into denial and closed themselves off. This was because the words "attempted coup" reminded them of the Kemalist Army, the staunch protectors of Atatürk's principles and reforms. For a thoughtful discussion of the public/political dynamics of the Gezi protests, see Murat Özbank, _Gezi Ruhu ve Politik Teori [The Spirit of Gezi and Political Theory]_ (İstanbul: Kolektif, 2013).

 Hakan Mertcan, _Bitmeyen Kavga Laiklik: Türkiye'de Din-Devlet-Diyanet [Never Ending Struggle: Religion-State-Diyanet in Turkey]_ (Adana: Karahan Kitabevi, 2013 [2012]).

 Deniz Kandiyoti, _Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar: Kimlikler ve Toplumsal Dönüşümler [Odalisques, Sisters, Citizens: Identities and Social Transformations]_ (İstanbul: Metis, 1997); Yeşim Arat, "Türki ye'de Modernleşme Projesi ve Kadınlar" ["Modernization Project in Turkey and Women"] in S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds), _Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik [Modernization in Turkey and National Identity]_ (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), pp. 82–98; Fatmagül Berktay, "Cumhuriyetin 75 Yıllık Serüvenine Kadınlar Açısından Bakmak" ["The 75 Years Adventure of The Republic From Women's Perspective"] in _75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler/Bilanço 98 [Men and Women in 75 Years]_ (İstanbul: İş Bankası and Tarih Vakfı, 1998), pp. 1–11; Yaprak Zihnioğlu, _Yaprak Zihnioğlu, Kadınsız İnkılap [Revolution without Women]_ (İstanbul: Metis, 2003); Nil Mutluer (ed.), _Cinsiyet Halleri: Türkiye'de Toplumsal Cinsiyetin Kesişim Sınırları [The States of Gender: The Intersectional Borders of Gender in Turkey]_ (İstanbul: Varlık, 2008); Serpil Sancar, _Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti [The Gender of Turkish Modernization]_ (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014).

 Feminists like Şirin Tekeli calls the state's nationalist support of women rights in the early Republican era "state feminism" and they are critical both of the founders of the Republic who grant women their inborn rights as if they were "privileges" and of Kemalist women who feel gratitude to the Kemalist men for recognizing their rights. Having the same criticism in mind, Ömer Çaha argues that "state feminism" is a misnomer for the early Rebuplican women's policies, because the aim of these policies was less the emancipation of women, than the limiting of women's position in the nationalist project. Şirin Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Feminist İdeolojinin Anlamı ve Sınırları Üzerine" ["On The Meanings and Limits of Feminist Ideology in Turkey"] in _Kadınlar İçin için Yazılar 1977–1987 [Writings for Women 1977–1987]_ (İstanbul: Alan Yayınları, 1998), pp. 307–34; Şirin Tekeli, "Birinci ve İkinci Dalga Feminist Hareketlerin Karşılaştırmalı İncelenmesi Üzerine Bir Deneme" ["A Comparative Analysis of First and Second Wave Feminist Movements in Turkey"] in _75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler/Bilanço 98 [Men and Women in 75 Years]_ (İstanbul: İş Bankası and Tarih Vakfı, 1998), pp. 337–46; Ömer Çaha, _Sivil Kadın: Türkiye'de Kadın ve Sivil Toplum [Civil Women: Women and Civil Society in Turkey]_ (Ankara: Savaş Publications, 2000). For further discussion, also see Arat, "Türkiye'de Modernleşme Projesi ve Kadınlar" ["Modernization Project in Turkey and Women"]; Nermin Abadan Unat "Söylemden Protestoya: Türkiye'de Kadın Hareketlerinin Dönüşümü" ["From Discourse to Protest: The Transformation of Women's Movement in Turkey"] in _75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler/Bilanço 98 [Men and Women in 75 Years]_ (İstanbul: İş Bankası and Tarih Vakfı, 1998), pp. 323–36.

 Yeşim Arat uses the phrase "Kemalist feminist" interchangeably with the phrase "egalitarian feminist." In Arat's usage both phrases refer to Kemalist women of the Republican era who call themselves feminists. For a detailed discussion, see Arat, "Türkiye'de Modernleşme Projesi ve Kadınlar" ["Modernization Project in Turkey and Women"]; Abadan Unat, "Söylemden Protestoya" ["From Discourse to Protest"].

 Selin Çağatay, "From 'Daughters of the Republic' to Contentious Citizens: Kemalist Women's Activism in Historical Perspective," in Alexia Bumbaris, Veronika Helfert, Jessica Richter, Brigitte Semanek and Karolina Sigmund (eds), _Frauen-und Geschlechtergeschichte un/diszipliniert? Aktuelle Forschung_ (Studien zur Frauen-und Geschlechtergeschichte; 11) (Innsbruck _et al_.: StudienVerla, forthcoming 2016).

 Aynur Demirdirek, _Osmanlı Kadınlarının Hayat Hakkı Arayışının Bir Hikayesi [A Story of Ottoman Women's Quest for the Right to Life]_ (Ankara: Ayizi Kitap, 2011 [1993]), p. 69.

 Necla Arat, _Feminizmin ABC_ ' _si [ABC of Feminism]_ (İstanbul: Say, 2010); Arat, "Modernization Project in Turkey and Women"; Ayşe Durakbaşa "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Modern Kadın ve Erkek Kimliklerinin Oluşumu: Kemalist Kadın Kimliği ve 'Münevver Erkekler' " ["The Construction of Women and Men Identities in the Republican Era: Kemalist Women Identity and 'Enlightened Men' "]) in _75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler/Bilanço 98 [Men and Women in 75 Years]_ (İstanbul: İş Bankası and Tarih Vakfı, 1998), pp. 29–50; Ayşe Saktanber, "Kemalist Kadın Hakları Söylemi" ["Kemalist Women's Right Discourse"], in A. İnsel (ed.), _Kemalizm, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 2 [Kemalizm, Political Thought in Modern Turkey 2]_ (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), pp. 323–33.

 Turkish-Islamic synthesis is the mixture of Sunni Islam with Turkish nationalism and Westernist elements. It was first formulated by right wing Intellectual Hearts ( _Aydınlar Ocağı_ ) during 1970s, and it left its imprint on state policies after the 1980 _coup d_ ' _état_. The budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs ( _Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı_ ) and the number of mosques were increased, Qur'an courses were opened, compulsory religion courses on Sunni Islam in the state schools were introduced, religious bureaucrats and the _İmam Hatip_ (religious schools) graduates became more active in state bureaucracy after the 1980 coup. For further discussion, see Taha Parla, "Dinci Milliyetçilik" ["Religious Nationalism"] in _Yeni Gündem_ , Mayıs 19, 1986, pp. 40–41; Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, _Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket [State, Ocak, Dergah: Nationalist Movement from September 12 to1990s]_ (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Banu Eligür, _The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

 Necmi Erdoğan, "Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya" ["Neo-Kemalism, Organic Crisis and Hegemony"], in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), _Kemalizm: Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 2 [Kemalizm: Political Thought in Modern Turkey 2]_ (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), pp. 584–91; Halis Çetin, _Modernleşme ve Türkiye'de Modernleştirme Krizleri [Modernization Crisis in Turkey]_ (Ankara: Siyasal Kitapevi, 2003).

 The difference between waves or generations of feminists may be summarized as follows: The first-generation feminists, starting in the nineteenth century, fought for women's equality in voting, education and property rights. In the 1950s, the second generation worked to build a system that would respond to the needs of women in sexuality, social roles and relationships instead of a male-centered order. They criticized the domination of reproduction policies and sexuality on women. They enabled issues like birth control and abortion to be made into laws. The third generation of feminists was critical of how the previous generations disregarded differences among women, and stressed the need to fight against discrimination based on ethnicity, sexual orientation and class. One important theory that is relevant to the women's movement and feminist literature in Turkey and around the world, one that has become a part of activist movements is the queer theory. According to the queer theory, since gender and sexual orientation are defined with reference to what is considered "normal" within power relations, these boundaries are not as clear and solid as those defined by the people involved in gender identity. For further discussion in the case of Turkey, see Tekeli, "Birinci ve İkinci Dalga Feminist Hareketlerin Karşılaştırmalı İncelenmesi Üzerine Bir Deneme" ["A Comparative Analysis of First and Second Wave Feminist Movements in Turkey"]; Arat, "Türkiye'de Modernleşme Projesi ve Kadınlar" ["Modernization Project in Turkey and Women"].

 Çağatay, "From 'Daughters of the Republic' to Contentious Citizens: Kemalist Women's Activism in Historical Perspective."

 I distinguish between the women's movement and feminism because even though women's movement seems to be the more comprehensive term, in practice the indeterminacy of that group's ideas and actions has confined it to a discourse of women's identity and victimhood. See Aksu Bora, "Feminizm: Sınırlar ve İhlal İmkanı" ["Feminism: Borders and the Possibility of Transgression"], in _Birikim_ (İstanbul: İletişim, Issue: 184–185, Ağustos–Eylül 2004).

 Norbert Elias, _The Civilizing Process_ (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 2000 [1978]).

 Durakbaşa, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Modern Kadın ve Erkek Kimliklerinin Oluşumu: Kemalist Kadın Kimliği ve 'Münevver Erkekler' " ["The Construction of Women and Men Identities in the Republican Era: Kemalist Women Identity and 'Enlightened Men' "].

 Interviews with C. and I. on January 11–12, 2014 in Ankara, with D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul and with G., H. and L. on January 23, 2014 in İzmir.

 Interview with Gaye Erbatur on February 12, 2014 in Istanbul.

 Interviews with H. on January 23, 2014 in İzmir. Interviewee D. has the same idea (January 20, 2014 in Istanbul).

 Interview with B. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara.

 Interviews with C. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara and with D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul.

 Interviews with C. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara and with D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul.

 Interviews with G., H. and L. on January 23, 2014 in İzmir.

 Interviews with B. and C. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara and with G. and L. on January 23, 2014 in İzmir.

 Interviews with C. and J. on January 11–12, 2014 in Ankara and with D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul and with G. and H. on January 23, 2014 in İzmir.

 Muslim women have the same criticism. See Merve Kavakçı, "Kadınlar başörtülü diye milletvekili olamaz mı?" "Can't women be MP as they are headscarved?"]. _Akit_ , April 2, 2011; "Kavakçı Ak Parti'yi eleştirdi" ["Kavakçı criticized AK Party"]. _Milliyet_ , April 28, 2011, at: [www.milliyet.com.tr/kavakci-ak-parti-yi-elestirdi/siyaset/haberdetay/29.04.2011/1383814/default.htm

 Interview with Şenal Sarıhan on January 11, 2014 in Ankara.

 Here we must remember the significance of LGBTI individuals for Muslims. Most Muslims refrain from discussing this issue for religious reasons. Meanwhile, a small, Muslim democrat community supports LGBTI individuals' right to live and personal rights.

 Interview A. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara and with G. on January 23, 2014 in İzmir.

 Another debate that resonates with the question on whether public servants may wear headscarves when on duty, is whether deputies may wear a headscarf during parliamentary sessions. It has already been argued, that with the rise of moderate Islamicist movement, the headscarf has become the symbolc issue in the political polarization between laic and Islamic identities, and as such it has remained unresolved. This is evident in the manifest inability of the laic and Islamic groups to establish dialogical relations with one another. Thus, Muslim women, on the one hand, remonstrate that, except a handful of women's organizations, the women's movement stopped pursuing the headscarf issue once the AK Party came into power (Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, "Kadın Örgütlerinin İnkar Politikası" ["The Denial Policy of Women's Institution"]. _Serbestiyet_ , December 28, 2013, at: <http://serbestiyet.com/kadin-orgutlerinin-inkar-politikasi/>). Some Kemalist feminists who supported covered women in the 1990s, on the other hand, cannot understand how Muslim women came to forget the support they received from them (interviews with A. on January 10, 2014 in Ankara and with E. on February 12, 2014 in Istanbul).

 Interview with D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul.

 For a thoughtful discussion of militarism in Turkish politics, see Ümit Cizre, "Egemen İdeoloji ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve İlişkisel Bir Analiz" ["Hegemonic Ideology and Turkish Armed Forces: A Contextual and Relational Analysis"], in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), _Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 2: Kemalizm [Political Thought in Modern Turkey 2: Kemalism]_ (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2001), pp. 156–79; Ayşe Gül Altınay, _The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Education and Gender in Turkey_ (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

 Saktanber, "Kemalist Kadın Hakları Söylemi" ["Kemalist Women's Right Discourse"]; Altınay, _Myth of the Military-Nation_.

 Altınay, _Myth of the Military-Nation_.

 Since the Republican era Kemalism has always been a political identity, yet after the 1980s Kemalists started to define and construct their political identity explicitly in opposition to what they perceived as "other" political identities from which they perceived a real existential threat. Islamic and Kurdish identities, in particular, have emerged as vocal and challenging political actors in the landscape of Turkish politics and have served as the "constitutive outside" of the Kemalist identity in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. Gökçe Zeybek Kabakçı, "Neo-Kemalist Bir Hareket: Cumhuriyet Mitingleri" ["A Neo-Kemalist Act: Republican Miting"]. _İletişim: Journal of Selçuk Communication_ 7, Issue 1 (2011): 96–112; Cizre, "Egemen İdeoloji veTürk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve İlişkisel Bir Analiz" ["Hegemonic Ideology and Turkish Armed Forces: A Contextual and Relational Analysis"].

 Ahmet İnsel, _Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 2: Kemalizm [Political Thought in Modern Turkey 2: Kemalizm]_ (İstanbul: İletişim Publication 2001).

 Interview with Emel Denizaslanı on January 23, 2014 in İzmir.

 The religious attire that fully covers a woman's body.

 Interview with A. on January 10, 2014 in Ankara.

 Çağatay, "From 'Daughters of the Republic' to Contentious Citizens: Kemalist Women's Activism in Historical Perspective."

 Necla Arat, _Geldikleri Gibi Giderler [They will Go as They Come]_ (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Publications, 2009), p. 176.

 Baskın Oran, "Askerler ve Apoletsiz Askerler" "Soldiers and Soldiers Without Strap"]. _Radikal_ , Nisan 29, 2012, at: [www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/askerler_ve_apoletsiz_askerler-108653; Tanıl Bora, "Türkan Saylan: Bir İstisna" ["Türkan Saylan: An Exception"], _Birikim_ 242 (Haziran 2009).

 Çağatay, "From 'Daughters of the Republic' to Contentious Citizens: Kemalist Women's Activism in Historical Perspective."

 Interview with D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul.

 "Erdoğan: En az 3 çocuk yapın" "Erdoğan: Make at Least Three Babies"], _Yeni Şafak_ , March 7, 2008, at: [http://yenisafak.com.tr/politika-haber/erdogan-en-az-3-cocuk-yapin-07.03.2008-104290

 Ruth Miller, _The Limits of Bodily Integrity: Abortion, Adultery, and Rape Legislation in Comparative Perspective_ (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

 Nira Yuval-Davis, _Gender & Nation_ (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1997); Tamar Mayer, _Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Setting The Stage_ (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).

 Nilüfer Göle, _Modern Mahrem [Modern Private Sphere]_ (İstanbul: Metis Publications, 1991); Kandiyoti, _Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar: Kimlikler ve Toplumsal Dönüşümler [Odalisques, Sisters, Citizens: Identities and Social Transformations]_ ; Berktay, "Cumhuriyetin 75 Yıllık Serüvenine Kadınlar Açısından Bakmak" ["The 75 Years Adventure of The Republic From Women's Perspective"]; Durakbaşa "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Modern Kadın ve Erkek Kim liklerinin Oluşumu: Kemalist Kadın Kimliği ve 'Münevver Erkekler' " ["The Construction of Women and Men Identities in the Republican Era: Kemalist Women Identity and 'Enlightened Men' "]; Alan Duben and Cem Behar, _İstanbul Haneleri: Evlilik, Aile, Doğurganlık 1880–1940 [Istanbul Households, Marriage, Family, Reproduction 1880–1940]_ (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998); Çaha, _Sivil Kadın: Türki ye'de Kadın ve Sivil Toplum [Civil Women: Women and Civil Society in Turkey]_.

 Kandiyoti, _Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar: Kimlikler ve Toplumsal Dönüşümler [Odalisques, Sisters, Citizens: Identities and Social Transformations]_ , p. 97; Durakbaşa "Cumhuriyet Döne minde Modern Kadın ve Erkek Kimliklerinin Oluşumu: Kemalist Kadın Kimliği ve 'Münevver Erkekler' " ["The Construction of Women and Men Identities in the Republican Era: Kemalist Women Identity and 'Enlightened Men' "]; Saktanber, "Kemalist Kadın Haklari Söylemi" ["Ke malist Women's Right Discourse"].

 Ziya Gökalp, _Türkçülüğün Esasları [The Essentials of Pan-Turkizm]_ (İstanbul: Bilgeoğuz Publications 2013 [1923]); Çaha, _Sivil Kadın: Türkiye'de Kadın ve Sivil Toplum [Civil Women: Women and Civil Society in Turkey]_.

 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Ataerkil Örüntüler, Türk Toplumunda Erkek Egemenliğin Çözümlenmesine Yönelik Notlar" ["Patriarchal Networks, Notes on Analysis of Male Dominance in the Turkish Society"], _Kadın Bakış Açısından 1980'ler Türkiye'sinde Kadın [Women in the 1980_ ' _s Turkey from Women_ ' _s Perspective]_ ed. Şirin Tekeli (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), pp. 327–40.

 In 2011, Ministry Responsible from Women and Family was discontinued and Family and Social Services Ministry was founded instead.

 Firdevs Gümüşoğlu, _Ders Kitaplarında Toplumsal Cinsiyet 1928–2013 [Gender in Text Books 1928–2013]_ (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2013).

 For a thoughtful discussion on the late Ottoman and early Republican era women's movement see also Serpil Çakır, _Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi [Ottoman Women_ ' _sMovement]_ (İstanbul: Metis Women Studies Series, 1996); Fatmagül Berktay, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Feminizm" ["Feminism From Ottoman to Republic"], _Tarihin Cinsiyeti [Gender of the History]_ (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları 2006 [2000]), pp. 88–111.

 In recent years feminist movement started to call "honor killings" "woman's murder."

 Kandiyoti, "Ataerkil Örüntüler, Türk Toplumunda Erkek Egemenliğin Çözümlenmesine Yönelik Notlar" ["Patriarchal Networks, Notes on Analysis of Male Dominance in the Turkish Society"].

 "Erdoğan: En az 3 çocuk yapın" "Erdoğan: Make at Least Three Babies"], _Yeni Şafak_ , March 7, 2008, at: [http://yenisafak.com.tr/politika-haber/erdogan-en-az-3-cocuk-yapin-07.03.2008-104290

 Interview with C. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara, with K. on February 8, 2014 and with G. and M. on January 22–23, 2014 in İzmir.

 Former Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement, at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fc6GuLnUXdI (accessed July 3, 2014); CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's statement, at: , www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vNTAnmDnxI (accessed July 3, 2014).

 Uludere is the name given to Roboski by the state when many of the cities, villages, towns and neighborhoods' names were changed to Turkish as a result of state's Turkification policies in the early Republican era. As Kurds prefer to call the name of the town Roboski, I use this name. Former Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement, at: www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25352590./ (accessed September 15, 2014).

 See Tanıl Bora, _Milliyetçilik [Nationalism]_ (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), specifically Etienne Copeaux "Türk Milliyetçiliği: Sözcükler, Tarih, İşaretler" ["Turkish Nationalism: Words, History, Signs"], pp. 44–52.

 Tekeli, "Birinci ve İkinci Dalga Feminist Hareketlerin Karşılaştırmalı İncelenmesi Üzerine Bir Deneme" ["A Comparative Analysis of First and Second Wave Feminist Movements in Turkey"].

 Kandiyoti, _Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar: Kimlikler ve Toplumsal Dönüşümler [Odalisques, Sisters, Citizens: Identities and Social Transformations]_ ; Çaha, _Sivil Kadın: Türkiye'de Kadın ve Sivil Toplum [Civil Women: Women and Civil Society in Turkey]_.

 Interview with D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul.

 Interviews with C. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara, D. on January 20, 2014 in Istanbul and M. on January 22, 2014 in İzmir.

 One of the examples of this discourse can be found in the speeches of Türkan Saylan, the founder of _Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği [Society for the Support of Modern Life]_ ; Tanıl Bora, "Türkan Saylan: Bir İstisna" ["Türkan Saylan: An Exception"].

 Interview with C. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara.

 Ibid.

 Nil Mutluer, "Tactics in Between: Gendered Citizenship and Everyday Life of Internally Displaced Men in Tarlabaşı, Istanbul," (PhD thesis, Central European University, 2012), at: www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/gphmun01.pdfwww.etd.ceu.hu/2012/gphmun01.pdf

 "8. Kadın Kongresi Diyarbakır'da" "8th Women's Congress will be in Diyarbakır"], _bianet_ , May 13, 2005, at: [www.bianet.org/bianet/medya/67289-8-kadin-siginaklari-kurultayi-diyarbakirda

 Interview with H. on January 23, 2014 in İzmir.

 Ibid.

 Interviews with A. and B. on January 10–11, 2014 in Ankara, and with E. on February 12, 2014 in Istanbul.

 Interview with E. on February 12, 2014 in Istanbul.

 Interview with Sema Kendirci on January 10, 2014 in Ankara.

 Arat, "Türkiye'de Modernleşme Projesi ve Kadınlar" ["Modernization Project in Turkey and Women"].

 Ibid.

 Interview with B. on January 11, 2014 in Ankara.

 Ergenekon is an extra-legal ultra-nationalist Gladio-type organization closely associated with what is sometimes called the "deep state." The so-called Ergenekon trials are a group of trials in which hundreds of military officers, journalists and opposition lawmakers were accused of being members of this organization and of plotting a coup against the legitimate government of the Republic of Turkey.

 Interview with Şenal Sarıhan on January 11, 2014.

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## Newspaper articles

Kavakçı, Merve. "Kadınlar başörtülü diye miletvekili olamaz mı?" ["Can't women be MP as they are headscarved?"], _Akit_ , April 2, 2011.

Kavakçı, Merve. "Kavakçı Ak Parti'yi eleştirdi" "Kavakçı criticized AK Party"], _Milliyet_ , April 28, 2011, at: [www.milliyet.com.tr/kavakci-ak-parti-yi-elestirdi/siyaset/haberdetay/29.04.2011/1383814/default.htm

Oran, Baskın. "Askerler ve Apoletsiz Askerler" "Soldiers and Soldiers Without Strap"], _Radikal_ , Nisan 29, 2012, at: [www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/askerler_ve_apoletsiz_askerler-1086539

Şefkatli Tuksal, Hidayet. "Kadın Örgütlerinin İnkar Politikası" ["The Denial Policy of Women's Institution"], _Serbestiyet_ , December 28, 2013, at: <http://serbestiyet.com/kadin-orgutlerinin-inkar-politikasi>

## News broadcast

"Erdoğan: En az 3 çocuk yapın" "Erdoğan: Make at Least Three Babies"], _Yeni Şafak_ , March 7, 2008, at: [http://yenisafak.com.tr/politika-haber/erdogan-en-az-3-cocuk-yapin-07.03.2008-104290

Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement, at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fc6GuLnUXdI; CHP Chairman Kemal (accessed July 3, 2014).

Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement, at: www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25352590 (accessed Sepember 15, 2014).

Kılıçdaroğlu's statement, at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vNTAnmDnxI (accessed July 3, 2014).

"8. Kadın Kongresi Diyarbakır'da" "8th Women's Congress will be in Diyarbakır"], _bianet_ , May 13, 2005, at: [www.bianet.org/bianet/medya/67289-8-kadin-siginaklari-kurultayi-diyarbakirda

#  Alevi critique of the AK Party

Criticizing "Islamism" or the Turkish state?

_Elise Massicard_

The AK Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) decade in power has been very controversial in terms of the relationship between the state and religion, the hegemonic public discourse and democratization in Turkey, all of which have fueled widespread debate and critique. The Alevis have played a specific part in this general landscape. When the AK Party came to power, Alevis widely considered it to be a Sunni, or even an Islamist party, which excluded Alevis and their demands. It is unsurprising that AK Party rule has sparked considerable hostility and reaction from Alevis. More unexpectedly, however, the AK Party government took two historically unprecedented moves concerning the Alevi issue: it became the first government ever to launch a state policy designed to respond to the claims of Alevis and it was also the first to recognize the responsibility of the Turkish state in some past killings of Alevis.

Therefore, it would be too simplistic to assume a coherent, clear-cut position of Alevi groups against the AK Party. This paper aims to draw a more complex and nuanced picture of the critiques against AK Party rule that have been expressed in Alevi circles. Two dimensions have to be taken in account. First, Alevis are not a unified, monolithic group; many debates have split the Alevis on the question of how to consider AK Party rule, and while some organizations have been more critical of the party and its policies, some have been less vocal. Second, Alevi attitudes toward the AK Party have been formulated in interaction with the party's own strategies and moves, and have therefore evolved over the course of the decade. Some developments, such as the European reforms launched by the AK Party government, its "Alevi opening," but also the Syrian civil war or the Gezi movement, as well as various declarations by government executives, have strongly reshaped Alevi attitudes toward the party. In this context, this article aims to analytically assess and problematize Alevi criticism of the AK Party's time in power. While many critiques expressed by Alevis have been linked to grievances directly related to the Alevi issue, Alevis have also expressed broader political critiques; this article will try to identify their distinctive features. Ultimately, it aims to locate the Alevis in the broader picture of the critiques expressed against the AK Party, in order to assess their significance, but also the points on which they converge and diverge, and most importantly, the ways in which these different critiques communicate, overlap, clash and reinforce each other—or not.

This article focuses not on the opinion of Alevi citizens, but on the expression of public criticism by Alevi organizations and public actors. Therefore, it relies mostly on the deconstruction and analysis of writings, press declarations and speeches by some Alevi representatives. It draws on an analysis combining secondary sources, source texts and press analysis.

In the first part, the paper analyzes the changing patterns of Alevi–AK Party relations, especially focusing on the "Alevi opening" and its wake as a turning point. In the second part, it identifies some key themes of concern against the ruling party that have been systematically voiced by the Alevis over the years, and the ways in which they have been translated into a recurring critique.

## Changing patterns of Alevi–AK Party relationships

### _Long-standing parameters_

The role of the Alevis in the socio-political arena shapes the substance of their critique toward AK Party rule. Alevis are a heterodox group consisting of Turkish- and Kurdish-speaking, as well as some Arabic-speaking members also called Nusayris. There is no statistical data available that would help to evaluate the actual population of Alevis but estimates range from 5–25 million. The Alevi cult is both heterodox and syncretistic. It is characterized by diverse features, some of which are a reminder of Shi'a Islam (the cult of Ali and the twelve imams, _muharrem_ fasting) and Islamic mysticism (strong esoteric features). However, the requirements of Sunni Islam have little bearings on Alevi life: Alevis hardly fast during Ramadan—the holy month for Sunni Muslims—and they do not perform _namaz_ as a prayer. Instead, Aleviness is characterized by specific rituals (especially its main ceremony, the _cem_ ), institutions (its religious authorities being the _dede_ holy lineages) and cultural practices (especially oral poetry and music), which are hardly linked to Islam. Finally, Aleviness is quite diverse in terms of beliefs and practices, and has hardly established itself as a formal religion.

Alevis have a specific relational pattern with "power" that shapes their positions. They were stigmatized as heretics under the Ottoman Empire since the early sixteenth century, that is, when the state became a defender of Sunni Islam. Although most Alevis welcomed the creation of the Republic, they enjoyed no official status or recognition, contrary to some non-Muslim groups who gained the status of minority. One reason for this denial lies in the fact that Muslimhood was accepted as a kind of national marker of Turkishness. This nation-building perspective involved a stress on unity (of state, language, people and religion), and the fact that difference was considered a potential threat. Therefore, despite the fact that laicism ( _laiklik_ ) has been a constitutional principle since 1937, there is no strict separation of state and religion, but rather a domestication of religion by the state. This control manifests itself through the Directory of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, from now on DRA). This state institution manages both mosques and clergymen, whom it nominates and pays. Far from being religiously neutral, the Turkish state has therefore endorsed and institutionalized a particular vision, a Sunni interpretation of Islam, as a kind of official denomination by default (Bozarslan 1994). According to this difference-blindness, the DRA considers Alevis to be Muslims that have some extra traditions and practices. No different treatment is reserved or allowed to them: the mosques are supposed to offer public service to Alevis as they do to all other Muslims, too. Therefore Aleviness enjoys no official visibility or representation: while mosques, churches and synagogues alike enjoy the status of worship places, _cemevi_ do not (Koçan and Öncü 2004; Massicard 2012).

Alevis are unanimous in blaming state institutions for favoring Sunni Islam and denying Aleviness as a constitutive element of the country. According to popular Alevi narratives, for centuries, Alevi identity and culture were either denied recognition or assimilated into the majority Sunni identity. Likewise, most Alevis share feelings of marginalization, discrimination, persecution and victimhood, as well as collective traumas.1 Consequently, most Alevis agree on demanding that discriminatory practices against them should be ended and that the grievances and crimes against the Alevis perpetrated by the Turkish state and the radical-right groups and Islamists be acknowledged. Likewise, Alevi organizations unanimously seek public recognition of Aleviness as an equal and legitimate element of Turkish society, and an equal representation of Alevi culture in public. They blame the DRA for representing the Sunni interpretation of Islam only. Additionally, almost all Alevi organizations and a considerable number of Alevis alike criticize the "Religious Culture and Morality" course that is compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary public schools, for not teaching different religions and cultures, but instead Sunni beliefs and practices alone—thus for being biased and assimilatory. Most Alevi activists also demand that _cemevi_ s be given the status of places of worship, and benefit from the privileges that that provides, including free electricity, free water and the allocation of free building sites (Erman and Göker 2000; Soner and Toktaş 2011; Massicard 2012).

However, a wide range of disagreements have appeared among diverse Alevi groups—to some extent identifiable with organizations—that include the very definition of Aleviness, the claims to be made and the solutions to be adopted. Regarding the compulsory "Religious Culture and Morality" course, secular-minded Alevi organizations are firmly against the existence of mandatory religion classes and think this course should be abolished or at least made optional. This position is best represented by the Alevi Bektashi Federation (hereafter ABF), as well as the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association (hereafter PSAKD) and the Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (hereafter HBVAKV) or Hubyar Foundation. For them, the Turkish state should refrain from all activities related to religion, as a requirement of secularism. Consequently, these organizations do not want Aleviness to be integrated into DRA in any form, on the contrary, they oppose the latter's very existence.

Yet another group, composed of more conservative and religious-minded organizations, considers the secular state oppressive regarding religion, and suggests that this is what should be changed so that Alevis, as well as other Muslims, can practice their religion freely and equally. They argue that the content of the "Religious Culture and Morality" course should be religiously neutral, by, for instance, including teachings on Aleviness and possibly other religions as well. For instance, the Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı (Center for Republican Education and Culture Foundation, hereafter CEM Foundation) and the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation2 demand that Aleviness be represented within the DRA. They also claim that Alevi _dede_ s, like imams, should be trained and paid salaries by state institutions.

Consequently, the positions of Alevi organizations toward Islamist parties diverge. "Secular-minded" Alevi activists consider Islamists as their main enemies, willing to destroy Turkey's secularism in favor of a fully religious and Sunni power. They tend to position themselves mostly on the left of the political spectrum, some being close to the Kemalist RPP, while others find the latter too nationalist or not liberal enough. Most of these organizations are hostile to Islamist parties and consider the AK Party as such. "Religious-minded" Alevis, however, have traditionally maintained more links with the right wing, including Islamist parties, and approve of the role of religion in the public realm, even if they think that the impartiality of the state should be strengthened.

In its first governmental term (2002–07), the AK Party's (non-)policies toward Alevis conformed to the traditional view of both state institutions and former Islamist parties—downplaying the religious differences between Aleviness and Islam—rather than the party's declared principles of liberalism, pluralism, democracy and human rights (Soner and Toktaş 2011: 426). Prime Minister Erdoğan offered a pronounced version of this vision in October 2004, when he declared in a television show: "Being Alevi means being close to Ali, and I try to live like Ali. So I am more Alevi than them [the Alevis]." Therefore, he was denying religious specificity of Aleviness, implying that Alevist claims are groundless. After the AK Party came to power, Alevi organizations deplored the fact that government participation in Alevi activities had decreased. The left-wing PSAKD and the conservative CEM foundation alike lamented the fact that the previous dialogue with the government stopped.3 During the Alevi festival of Hacıbektaş (Central Anatolia) in 2003, the prime minister was booed, revealing the broad opposition of Alevis to the AK Party.4 In later years too, the AK Party parliamentarians participating in the festival, including the AK Party-turned former social-democrat Minister of Culture Ertuğrul Günay, were booed according to the Kemalist newspaper _Cumhuriyet_.5 During this period, the Alevi issue was not on the government's agenda.

There were some exceptions to this broadly negative stance, given that the AK Party's liberal turn and aggiornamento (compared with the former Islamist parties) aroused hope among some Alevis. In the first years of AK Party power, the incentive of EU integration accelerated social and political reforms, some of which were welcomed by certain Alevi organizations. For instance, Fermani Altun, the leader of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, paid tribute to the abolition of state security courts and harmonization reforms with the European Union,6 but this position was exceptional. As a matter of fact, reforms concerning Aleviness were almost non-existent. When the prospect of EU membership was taking more concrete form, the AK Party government changed the curriculum of compulsory religious courses. This move may have been a response to reports by the European Commission which were relaying Alevi complaints about the curriculum of the compulsory religious instruction courses not including Aleviness; it may also be read as an answer to the dissatisfaction of conservative-religious segments of the AK Party's electorate finding these courses superficial and insufficient (Soner and Toktaş 2011: 426–27). The new textbooks included a few pages on Aleviness, but they were drawn up in cooperation with the DRA and reflected its positions. The emphasis was on Ali and his family, presented as good practicing Muslims, and Hacı Bektaş, the mystic from the thirteenth century venerated by both Alevis and Sunnis.7 Many Alevis felt that the curriculum still propagated a Sunni vision of Islam (Türkmen 2009: 389). Since, specifically, Alevi institutions such as the _dede_ , _cem_ , _muharrem_ and _cemevi_ were not even mentioned, even religious-minded Alevis,8 including the CEM foundation, considered the new curriculum assimilationist. In any event, the harmonization reforms have been stalled since the mid-2000s because of the Cyprus gridlock, domestic political problems and internal crises within both the EU and Turkey.

### _The "Alevi opening" and its wake_

AK Party–Alevi relations became much more dynamic during the party's second term in government. In the 2007 legislative elections a couple of Alevis were elected MPs on the party ticket, including the popular novelist and Alevi activist Reha Çamuroğlu, who would become consultant to the prime minister on the Alevi issue.9 In 2007, in accordance with its growingly anti-status quo and liberal positioning on the issue of state–religion relations (see Soner and Toktaş 2011: 427), the AK Party government launched an "Alevi opening" ( _Alevi açılımı_ ) as part of a broader policy called "Democratic Opening." This policy called for a dialogue and aimed to discuss the problems of marginalized segments of society (including Kurds, religious minorities and Roma people) and to reconcile them with the Turkish state. It was the first time ever that the Turkish state officially listened to the Alevis and recognized them as a distinct group bearing that name. Thus, surprisingly, the AK Party is the first and only party to have launched a policy directly addressing Alevis' identity-based contentions (Köse 2010: 5). Even vocally oppositional Alevi organizations (namely, the HBVAKV and Alevi Kültür Dernekleri) acknowledged that the very fact that the ruling party had taken a step to listen to Alevi concerns was meaningful, despite their objections regarding the way this was implemented (see below) (HBVAKV 2009).

The early steps of the AK Party's "Alevi opening" policy had a strong symbolic dimension in acknowledging the Alevi issue. High-ranking statesmen and politicians, including the president, prime minister and cabinet members, made important discursive gestures (Köse 2010: 9). Prime Minister Erdoğan, together with numerous ministers and MPs, participated in Alevi _muharrem iftar_ s (breaking fast) in 2008 and 2009. It is hard to evaluate the repercussions of these gestures on Alevi opinion. The only source that provides some hints is an opinion poll conducted in September 2009 with 2,217 people (614 of whom declared themselves to be Alevis) and published by Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü—a think-tank known to be close to the AK Party. This poll shows that the impact of the symbolic gestures made by the government is ambiguous: only 34 percent of the Alevi respondents considered Prime Minister Erdoğan's participation in the _muharrem_ fast breaking to be a positive thing, 28.9 percent saw it as negative and 30 percent found it neither positive nor negative (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü 2009: 54).

An important dimension of this engagement policy was the public apologies. In December 2008, the (former social-democrat) Minister of Culture Günay apologized on behalf of the Turkish state for the past oppressions and direct violence on the part of the central authorities that the Alevis had suffered.10 It was the first time in Turkish history that ministers had acknowledged the victimhood of the Alevis and the responsibility of the Turkish state for injustice and past crimes. Prime Minister Erdoğan also gave signals that the government would move toward recognizing religious pluralism, in which citizens would be able to practice and express their beliefs free from the intervention of state authorities, and voiced a general commitment to accommodate Alevi requests, especially to change the status of _cemevi_ s.11 The creation of an Alevi unit in the DRA, giving a salary to Alevi _dede_ s and creating an official institute to train them were among the ideas debated in the media.

This policy was very much debated among Alevis. It was no surprise that these proposals dissatisfied the more secular-minded organizations. In February 2008, PSAKD organized a meeting to protest against the Alevi opening, and reasserted that secularism was impossible without the abolition of the DRA and compulsory religion courses.12 In the same way, the ABF qualified the AK Party's Alevi opening as an assimilatory trick and an attempt to create an artificial Alevilik from scratch, similar to Sunni Islam.13 More conservative or even religious-minded organizations were also very critical. The leader of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, which maintained links with the AK Party, criticized Prime Minister Erdoğan for failing to include Alevis in the party, for instrumentalizing Alevi groups instead and for lacking sincerity.14 In the end, none of the big organizations—neither secular-minded nor religiously-oriented—participated in the first Alevi fast breaking in January 2008. Only smaller, mostly conservative local organizations and religious authorities attended. The leader of CEM foundation made their participation conditional on a public commitment by the ruling party to accommodate Alevi demands—which was not given—and expressed doubts about the party's backing of Çamuroğlu's initiative.15 In November 2008 again, the ABF organized a meeting in order to express their claims. This demonstration was supported by numerous artists and intellectuals who published a manifesto criticizing the government's understanding of unity and claiming a more liberal, pluralist and egalitarian country, the end of compulsory religious courses and the implementation of more religious neutrality by the state.16 Altun, the leader of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation that is generally opposed to those secular-minded organizations, welcomed the initiative as a democratic move and called for a united reaction by Alevis to the _muharrem_ fast breaking ceremony to come.17 Eventually among the big Alevi organizations only the CEM foundation participated in the fast breaking ceremony organized by the government in January 2009.18

As a matter of fact, the policy of engagement with the Alevi issue was contested within the AK Party itself and in the DRA. The deputy prime minister declared that there was no Alevi opening on the government's agenda,19 while the President of the DRA declared that it was impossible to provide the _cemevi_ s with a legal status.20 Eventually, the Alevi issue fell out of the government's agenda as the AK Party was threatened with a closure case in March 2008. In June 2008, Çamuroğlu resigned from his position as advisor to the prime minister on this issue on the grounds that neither the party nor the government responded to the criticisms against the Alevi opening policy that had been expressed inside the party. He also deplored that the ruling party, despite its promises, was not dedicated to ending discrimination against Alevis within the state institutions.21 In the following years, he would continue opposing the AK Party.22

From June 2009 to January 2010, the AK Party government initiated the second phase of the Alevi opening policy in the form of a series of workshops, the minutes of which were published. The workshops were intended to incorporate a multiplicity of related actors into the process: the first meeting was launched with Alevi organizations; the second with some faculties of social sciences; the third with some faculties of theology; the fourth with civil society organizations; the fifth with media; and the sixth with current and former parliamentarians. A final workshop with certain participants from the six former meetings was organized in late January 2010. The workshops were conducted under the patronage of State Minister Ömer Çelik, who was also in charge of the DRA, and coordinated by Necdet Subaşı, a Sunni academician with a background in theology and social sciences.

Some Alevi leaders responded positively to these initiatives. Altun, the leader of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, declared that: "the Alevi workshops and the initiatives on the freedom of faith are an historical opportunity for Turkey."23 He welcomed the state's listening to the Alevis as a sign of hope and excitement. After the final workshop, some organizations—especially the CEM foundation—appreciated the fact that the meeting brought the opportunity to break down some prejudices.24 Even some organizations known for their oppositional character and left-wing stance, like the HBVAKV, participated in the workshops (although with a critical stance) because they were unprecedented. However, very few organizations supported the process to its end, and most were critical throughout or became increasingly critical. On November 8, 2009, in the middle of the meetings, the ABF—of which some of the member organizations were participating in the workshops—organized a meeting under the motto "equal citizenship under the rule of law," which attracted around 200,000 people in Istanbul. The demonstration had been planned before the workshops were launched, but some of the oppositional and secular-minded Alevi organizations used it as an opportunity to express their discontent with the workshops.

The Alevi critiques evolved during the process, but they had two main dimensions: first, the procedure itself, and second, the achievements of the "opening" policy. At the core of the first critique was the fact that the government had selected the participants. Many organizations complained that they had not even been consulted in making the list of participants, and more generally that the working procedures of the workshops were not shared with the Alevi organizations beforehand. Some asked that the Alevi organizations be included in the process of writing the final report (Alevi Report 2009: 94), which never materialized. Therefore, many organizations criticized the fact that they were not considered as partners in the process, but as passive objects. Furthermore, the organizational choices made were widely contested. Several Alevi organizations deplored the fact that they had been excluded (Alevi Report 2009: 25; Ecevitoğlu and Yalçınkaya 2013: 44ff.), yet according to the moderator for all the meetings who had the main role in organizing the workshops, they had turned down the invitation to participate. Whatever the truth may be, several Alevi organizations continued to criticize the method of choosing the participants. Before the first meeting, the rumor that the government had invited the number one suspect of the 1978 Maraş pogrom25 spread in media. The government's silence added to the uncertainty around the truth of the statement, but the very possibility was considered as an insult by many Alevi organizations.26 The HBVAKV and the secular-minded Alevi Cultural Centers published a declaration just after the first workshop (HBVAKV 2009) stating that the government's claim to have gathered the Alevi organizations and engaged in a dialogue with them was exaggerated and false. They criticized the fact that the representatives of the Alevi organizations in Europe were not invited, whereas the academic theologian Osman Eğri from Hitit Üniversity—who they considered as symbolizing the desire to "Sunnify" the Alevis27—was. More generally, they suspected that the government selected the participants according to its own interests, and discussed the issue with theologians and Sunnis more than with Alevis (see the report published by HBVAKV on the whole process Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı: 2011). Other points of procedural critique address the facts that the workshops were not open to the media (thus fueling the suspicion that the government was seeking a solution behind closed doors), that there were limits on discourse and dialogue during the meetings, and that some opinions that were expressed during the workshops were not included in the final report.

Second, after the process ended, many organizations criticized the insufficient nature of the policy changes. After the final report and the 2011 elections, the government put an end to the "Alevi opening." While the State Minister Çelik declared that "the activities had received favorable results,"28 the Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that: "the period in which our citizens were oppressed because of their clothing, their ethnic origin, or their faith, is over."29 Alevi organizations continued to deny this, and criticized almost unanimously the results of the "opening" in terms of achievements: Beyond the symbolic and discursive gestures of the first period, the government took few concrete steps to deal with the Alevi claims and the legal obstacles to the satisfaction of Alevist claims discussed during the workshops. Many issues were debated, but not settled. Regarding the status of _cemevi_ s, government members repeated at various occasions that the place of worship for Alevis was the mosque and Prime Minister Erdoğan reiterated the traditional state position on Aleviness, namely that it is a "culture" and not a "religion."

Many other issues remain pending, although there have been real opportunities for change since. Such is the dispute over the Madımak Hotel, the hotel that was set fire to in 1993 in Sivas and which Alevi organizations claimed should be transformed into a museum to commemorate the event. One of the main achievements following the workshops was the purchase of the hotel by public authorities and its subsequent transformation into a center for science and culture in 2011.30 However, most Alevi organizations remain critical, especially because the commemorative plaque mentions not only the victims of the assault, but also two individuals who were among the aggressors and died in the event—at the top of the list (Ecevitoğlu and Yalçınkaya 2013: 222ss). Although state authorities consider the Madımak issue as resolved, most Alevis do not. Likewise, the constitutional reform approved by referendum in September 2010 kept Article 24 of the Constitution on compulsory religion culture and ethics courses intact. Therefore, many Alevis considered that the government abandoned the concerns that had been addressed during the opening.

The report published by the HBVAKV on the whole process concludes that the Alevi workshops did not aim to find solutions to the Alevi issue, but to reproduce the existing domination and status quo (HBVAKV 2011). The director of the ABF, Selahattin Özel, declared in 2012 that all the democratic openings of the government had ended in failure.31 The director of the HBVAKV declared that the Alevi workshops tricked the Alevis, just like the Kurdish and Roma workshops.32 The leader of CEM foundation, Prof. İzzettin Doğan, expressed his dissatisfaction and declared that it was unrealistic to consider the workshops a success. He regretted that nothing had been achieved concerning the status of Alevi religious leaders, on the possibility that they could be employed by the state or their education.33 He claimed that: "the AK Party (...) has used [in the sense of instrumentalized] Aleviness."34 In 2013 he would say the workshops were "much ado about nothing."35 Even Altun, who had broadly welcomed and supported the opening process, concluded years later that the latter was interrupted because the government refused to provide the _cemevis_ with a legal status.36 Broadly speaking, Alevi organizations criticized the AK Party for not being "sincere."

This distrust can be exemplified by another move by the government regarding the recognition of past crimes. In November 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan apologized publicly, in the name of the Republic, for the mass killings committed by state authorities in the predominantly Kurdish and Alevi Dersim province in 1937–38 (on the Dersim campaign, see Kieser 2011). He showed an archival document stating that these events had caused the deaths of 13,806 people, and claiming that it therefore constituted "the most tragic event of our recent history." However, this initiative was downplayed by many Alevis. It was widely interpreted as a political move against the main opposition party, the RPP, which is (or claims to be) the successor of the single party in the 1920s and 1930s. Asserting the responsibility of the state in mass killings thus implies asserting the responsibility of the RPP—and indirectly the main opposition party, at least for not coming to terms with its past. This move was also widely interpreted as particularly targeting the RPP's leader, Kılıçdaroğlu, himself an Alevi Kurd originating from Dersim. Therefore, far from welcoming these state apologies, most Alevis criticized them for instrumentalizing a sensitive issue for political goals.

Opinions of Alevi citizens about the "Alevi opening" reflect widespread skepticism about its objectives and approaches and display a deep mistrust of the AK Party, at least according to the opinion poll mentioned earlier that was carried out during the workshop process. According to the poll, 49.2 percent of Alevi citizens expressed their discontent with the "opening," while only 14.9 percent said that they were happy about it (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü 2009: 50). Furthermore, 59.8 percent of the Alevi respondents said the AK Party's "Alevi opening" was a policy of Sunnification, whereas only 21.9 percent of the Alevi respondents agreed that "the Alevi opening intends to solve the problems of the people" (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü 2009: 56). Only 5.7 percent of the Alevi respondents said the government's opening could solve the Alevi issue, while 39.5 percent declared the opposite, and 42.2 percent answered "even if it does not fully solve it, it should be successful to a large extent" (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü 2009: 51). Only 2.6 percent of the Alevi respondents declared that the "Alevi opening" was sufficient to solve the Alevi issue, while 61.1 percent answered it was not.

In the following years, some organizations claimed that policy changes materialized against, rather than in accordance with, the demands Alevi organizations had articulated. For example, the DRA law passed in 2010 not only did not bear any trace of pluralization in its structuration of the DRA, but rather strengthened its monopoly over religion even further. Similarly, in 2012, optional courses on religion (including courses on the Qur'an and Mohammed, but possibly also on Christianity, Syriac Christianity, Judaism and Aleviness) were to be introduced in secondary schools.37 Even if this may be interpreted as an achievement, these courses are widely criticized for providing further opportunity for religious discrimination. This is first because these courses supplement rather than replace the existing mandatory course. Moreover, only courses on the Qur'an and Mohammed have been offered in all schools, whereas the opening of other courses is dependent on case-by-case decisions made by the ministry and a sufficient number of interested pupils. To my knowledge, as of 2014, no optional course on Aleviness had been opened. However, instances of pressure or even threats to choose courses on the Qur'an or Mohammed have been recorded (Hubyar 2013: 2; Ecevitoğlu and Yalçınkaya 2013: 207ss). Furthermore, as of 2013, questions from the "Religious Culture and Morality" course have been included in the university entrance exam. This reform has been widely interpreted by Alevis as further discrimination, since Alevi students are expected to have less knowledge on that topic than their Sunni counterparts (Ecevitoğlu and Yalçınkaya 2013: 209).

In late June 2013, in the course of the Gezi protests, the government announced that the Alevi opening was on the agenda again, and that it would launch its second stage in order to solve the problems that were put forth at the Alevi workshops by discussing the issues with Alevi opinion leaders. The status of _cemevi_ s and _dede_ s were expected to be readdressed.38 The government announced that two universities would be renamed: the university of Nevşehir as Hacı Bektaş Veli University after the thirteenth-century Alevi philosopher; and the university of Tunceli after Pir Sultan Abdal, a sixteenth-century Alevi poet and rebel. It also promised to transform the Madımak Hotel into a museum. However, when the prime minister eventually disclosed his democracy package on September 30, 2013, the Alevi organizations expressed disappointment that the only measure directed toward Alevis was the decision to rename Nevşehir University—something the Alevis had not previously demanded. The government claimed that new measures would be taken regarding Alevis, but in the following months none of them materialized.

Generally speaking, the "Alevi opening" did nothing to lessen the distrust of many Alevis toward the AK Party. The irony is that Alevis did not expect the AK Party to resolve their problems, but the very fact that this "opening" was launched raised expectations and then later led to disenchantment. In the wake of the "opening," this distrust spilled over into the hopelessness that many Alevi organizations expressed regarding other AK Party policies, such as the initiative to launch a new constitution.39

### _The Alevi's critique_

It is now time to problematize more analytically the critiques Alevis have addressed at the AK Party rule. They may be summarized into three categories: first, they condemn the assimilationist dimension of the AK Party's policies; second, they denounce its discriminatory stance; and third, they question its democratic nature.

### _Condemning the assimilationist dimension of AK Party policies_

Many Alevi organizations considered that the "Alevi opening" was an assimilationist policy. During the demonstration on November 9, 2009, for example, the workshops were criticized for attempting to moderate the opposition of Alevis, and to create the AK Party's "own Alevis."40 Many suspected that the opening was designed to bring Aleviness under state control. More broadly, one important point of critique was the AK Party's vision of Islam as an umbrella embracing Aleviness, and its emphasis on the similarities between Aleviness and Sunni Islam. Contrary to the AK Party's perception, most Alevi organizations want Aleviness to be accepted with all its specificities. In the words of Ali Balkız, the director of the ABF at the time, the "AK Party and the CEM foundation try to (...) clothe Aleviness and the Alevis in the garments of İslam or Alevi-İslam."41 Secular-minded organizations sometimes criticize the more religious ones, especially the CEM foundation, for participating in this assimilation-ist stance. It was the case concerning the _cami-cemevi_ project launched by the CEM foundation and the Gülen movement in 2013 aiming at bringing together both worship places and their attendants. In other instances however, the CEM foundation itself has criticized the government for its assimilationist policies.

This critique concerning the AK Party's desire to "Islamize" the Alevis refers to two crucial points: the refusal to give _cemevis_ the status of places of worship, and the mandatory "Religious Culture and Morality" courses. After the reform of the content of the courses, which was unwelcome by most Alevis, the question of how to present Aleviness in textbooks was examined afresh during the Alevi opening (see Massicard 2012: 106–07). State Minister Çelik declared that the government didn't agree to abolish the courses, but that it was possible to discuss their inadequacy and inclusiveness.42 The government prepared a new curriculum and the State Minister Çelik declared that Alevis had participated in the draft reorganizations, which the Alevi organizations denied.43 Whatever the truth may be, the new program that began in 2011 includes teachings about Alevi, Bektashi and Caferi beliefs. Specificities like _cem_ , the _muharrem_ fast or _musahiplik_ are now explained, and more space is given to Ali and other figures who are important for Alevis. However, Aleviness is still portrayed as being part of Islam and respectful of its main principles, and not as a separate belief. It is mostly included in sections about moral teachings, the history of Turkish Islam, or about "Interpretations in Islamic belief" in which brotherhoods like Nakshibandiye and Kadiriye are also presented. This syllabus has won the assent of the religiously-oriented Federation of Alevi Foundations (Alevi Vakıfları Federasyonu), but not of most other Alevis. The leader of the HBVAKV declared that the AK Party was "using Aleviness in order to legitimize the brotherhoods."44 Alevi organizations deplored the fact that promises which had been made were forgotten, which the government denied.45 This process shows to what extent the initiative to include Aleviness in religious instruction is not necessarily a response to Alevi activists' demands, but in fact is considered by most of them as something opposed to their interests.

One further major point of critique has been the position of the government on the status of _cemevi_ s. A parliamentary debate on the definition of the term "worship place" in 2006 had ended in the exclusion of _cemevi_ s from this category. The Alevi opening did not put an end to the debates over the nature and status of _cemevi_ s.46 In a statement released in December 2012, the Turkish Parliament reiterated that "it is not possible to consider _cemevis_ as places of worship, because Aleviness, as part of Islam, cannot have a place of worship other than mosques and masjids." Prime Minister Erdoğan declared several times that _cemevi_ s are not places of worship but cultural places, because mosques are supposed to be the only worship places in Islam and that stating the contrary would mean endangering the unity of Islam and be equivalent to separatism. During a meeting with the AK Party rank-and-file taking place in February 2013, Erdoğan declared that: "Alevis are Muslim like us. Cultural places should not be confused with worship places," fueling criticism by many Alevi organizations.47

Along with this kind of declaration denying the specificity of Aleviness, several public initiatives to have Alevis conform to mainstream Sunni worship have triggered Alevi critiques against what they call as the assimilationist tendencies. As one example among many others, in 2011 in Antalya, an AK Party member of the provincial assembly wanted to drag a loudspeaker into an Alevi mausoleum so that the call for prayer could be heard from there. A CHP deputy from Antalya, considering this initiative a "provocation," complained to the sub-governor and the sound system was disabled.48

In the end, the AK Party has come back to the traditional position of the state and the Islamists regarding the nature of Aleviness (see Massicard 2012: 75–76). At least since the 1990s, Islamists have considered Aleviness to be part of Islam and have downplayed or outright denied Alevi specificity. As a consequence, they see them as being like other Muslims and as not needing any separate places of worship whatsoever. In addition to this, there is also a strategy to encompass Aleviness into mainstream Islam. The Alevis' critique of the assimilationist stance of the AK Party relies on, but does not limit itself to, grievances directly concerning the status of Aleviness. One further, related point of critique concerns the very fact that the party leaders and cabinet members take a position on this kind of issue. For example, the General Secretary of ABF declared that the prime minister should not interfere in the religion, worship or the faith of the people, and had no right to do so.49 As early as 2004, the leader of the CEM foundation Doğan had criticized Erdoğan's claim to be more Alevi than the Alevis, and specifically the capacity of the prime minister of a secular state to take sides on religious matters and therefore to act as a religious authority.50 In that perspective, most Alevi organizations claim that the government oversteps its bounds, and deplore the fact that the AK Party mixes politics with religion. To some extent, this critique is coherent with a liberal perspective. What is expressed here is that the liberal discourse of the AK Party has been an illusion, at least concerning the Alevis.

From that perspective, many Alevis criticize AK Party rule for imposing Islam on society. For instance, Prime Minister Erdoğan's declaration in February 2012 that "we want to raise a pious youth" fueled criticisms from many Alevi organizations.51 Secular-minded Alevi organizations especially deplored the fact that the budget of the DRA had considerably increased. Additionally, they criticized public institutions like the Anadolu news agency or the public television channel TRT for making "Sunni propaganda." The 2011 educational reform also sparked critique because it increased the relative standing of the imam-hatip schools.52 This kind of critique was counterbalanced in September 2011 when the leader of the conservative CEM foundation expressed his satisfaction with the speech Prime Minister Erdoğan made in Egypt in which he stressed the importance of secularism ( _laiklik_ ), interpreted as the importance for the state to maintain its distance from religious matters, but also equal distance from all creeds.53 But on several other occasions, Doğan criticized the government's failure to do this very thing. To some extent, this critique is coherent with the broader critiques expressed against the government's attempts to interfere with the way of life of people and to reshape personal liberties in a more conservative and religious fashion.

An important dimension of (especially secular-minded) Alevi critique therefore targets the growing social and political pressure that they assume stems from the AK Party government—sometimes the role of the Hizmet movement is also denounced—and which they consider oppressive for those who are "different." Therefore the AK Party is criticized for maintaining a systematized and strengthened hegemony of political Islam, both in the public and in the private spheres. Some deplore the fact that "neighborhood pressure" ( _mahalle baskısı_ , i.e., social pressure for morality) has increased because of the alleged backing of the authorities.54

### _Denouncing AK Party policies' discriminatory stance_

A further dimension of Alevi critiques addresses the AK Party's alleged discrimination, exclusion or ostracism of Alevis.55 Many Alevi organizations express a classical Alevi critique targeting the state more broadly, rather than the AK Party in particular, for implicitly discriminating against Alevis because of their lack of official status. One type of event that triggers such criticism is the fact that when Alevi soldiers die in military combat, state representatives refuse to participate in the funeral ceremony held at the _cemevi_ s, and another, official ceremony has to be organized in a mosque (Ecevitoğlu and Yalçınkaya 2013: 228ff; Hubyar 2013). Another instance of that critique can be seen in the speech in the National Assembly by the famous Alevi singer and RPP Parliamentarian Sabahat Akkiraz. During the debate about the official apology for the Dersim massacre, she reminded the parliament that AK Party municipalities spent huge amounts of money for Ramadan celebrations (which most Alevis don't celebrate) and encouraged them to celebrate the Alevi fast _muharrem_ in the same manner.56

However, even if it addresses discrimination in the state institutions in general, this critique is amplified concerning the AK Party rule, because Alevis widely consider it to be anti-Alevi. In 2004, İzzettin Doğan, the leader of the CEM foundation, criticized the AK Party for having just one Alevi MP and compared it to the Democrat Party, another conservative liberal party that was in power in the 1950s, which had received the electoral support of many Alevis, and had no less than thirty-four Alevi MPs. Thus, he implied that far from being the successor of this party—as it often claims to be—the AK Party is much more a Sunni party.57 He also accused the AK Party of unequal treatment of the Alevis and of "judging" the faith of its people.58 Even Altun, the leader of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, deplored the fact that the many Alevis who had voted for the AK Party could not find what they were looking for in it and that there was not one single Alevi employee in the Istanbul municipality administration.59 In November 2011, Sabahat Akkiraz, the Alevi singer and RPP Parliamentarian mentioned above, reproached the government for not appointing any Alevis to positions of responsibility.60

This kind of critique does not only target the personnel management of the AK Party but also some of its policies which are considered differential or discriminatory. All organizations, including the leader of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, criticized the naming of the third bridge across the Bosporus inaugurated in 2013 as Yavuz Sultan Selim, an Ottoman Sultan of the sixteenth century who is known for great military conquests, but also for having massacred the ancestors of Alevis. Doğan criticized this gesture as proof of the failure to respect the Alevi people.61 While this issue attracted wide attention because it coincided with the Gezi protests, certain organizations stressed that this was not an isolated occurrence. For example, the Alevi inhabitants of a neighborhood in Istanbul which had been named after the same sultan, went to the AK Party Sultanbeyli municipality with a petition of 11,000 signatories, but were expelled by the mayor.

Therefore, the critique addresses the perceived lack of neutrality in the AK Party-dominated state institutions. A further dimension of this is the allegation that Prime Minister Erdoğan has intentionally emphasized the Aleviness of certain individuals in order to delegitimize them. For instance, when commenting on the ten-month prison sentence he received from the Supreme Court ( _Yargıtay_ ) in 1998 for reciting a poem with religious connotations, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared he had been judged by "representatives of a particular sect ( _mezhep_ )." In so doing, he implied that he had not been judged in accordance with law or general principles, but by the religious orientation of the judges, thus delegitimizing both the judgment and the institution itself. This was criticized by Selahattin Özel, then director of the secular-minded Alevi Cultural Associations.62

In the same way, some organizations have criticized the fact that AK Party leaders sometimes draw attention to the Alevi origin of the main opposition leader, Kılıçdaroğlu, in order to delegitimize him. In a letter to Prime Minister Erdoğan, the ABF criticized him for alluding to Aleviness in a negative way in his public speeches and for allowing people to jeer at a faith without reacting, therefore committing a hate crime.63 Özel made these complaints regarding the way the prime minister used the figure of Kılıçdaroğlu to have all Alevis booed at rallies during the 2010 referendum and the 2011 electoral campaign.64 In the same way, the director of the PSAKD, Fevzi Gümüş accused Prime Minister Erdoğan of expressing hostility toward Alevis during public addresses.65 Erdoğan repeatedly and openly suspected the CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu of being a supporter of the Syrian leader Assad solely based on his religion—relying on the similarities between Turkey's Alevis and Syria's Alawites. In September 2011, the AK Party's deputy chair Ömer Çelik publicly asked if Kılıçdaroğlu was looking after Syrian interests because of sectarian proximity, and qualified the main opposition party as the "Turkish Baath party,"66 which raised opposition from Alevis.67

One further related aspect of the critique deals with, in Özel's words, the AK Party's "mentality of factionalism."68 Alevi organizations accuse the party of acting according to sectarian affiliation rather than in an egalitarian way—favoring Sunnis over Alevis—first of all in foreign policy, but also in domestic politics. Doğan, for instance, criticized the government for discriminating among citizens, especially regarding the Syrian conflict.69 After twin car bombs exploded in the Hatay town of Reyhanlı in May 2013, Erdoğan lamented: "53 Sunni citizens" killed in the attack. This contentious comment did not go unnoticed.70 The head of the ABF, Özel, criticized the party for increasingly displaying a Sunni stance, or even supporting the creation of a "Sunni block" in the region.71 In the same way, some have suspected the AK Party government of supporting Sunni brotherhoods,72 or Al-Qaida in Syria. Alevi organizations also vehemently protested to the news that the police published statistics according to which 78 percent of the persons arrested during the Gezi protests were Alevi,73 and interpreted this as a proof that the state keeps record of Alevis and implements unequal treatment toward them.

These allegations are also based on declarations of Prime Minister Erdoğan, such as his depiction of the Karacaahmet _cemevi_ as _ucube_ (freak) because its construction was illegal, in a television program broadcast on August 5, 2012.74 In so doing, Erdoğan touched upon an issue that was particularly sensitive for two reasons. First, because it reminded many Alevis of the attempt made (just after Erdoğan was elected mayor) by the Istanbul municipality to demolish this very _cemevi_ in 1994 based on similar reasons of illegality (for a detailed analysis of this episode, see Massicard 2001). The demolition was ultimately not carried out, but the episode remains traumatic for Alevis. Second, the term _ucube_ recalled a similar depiction Prime Minister Erdoğan had made in early 2011 about the Statue of Humanity that had been commissioned by the RPP mayor of Kars as a gesture of the reconciliation with Armenia. This qualification and the subsequent demolition of the statue had triggered lots of criticism in public opinion. Many Alevi organizations saw the use of that same adjective to qualify Karacaahmet _cemevi_ as a proof of an anti-Alevi stance, and some also alleged that aggressions against Alevis subsequently increased.75

Almost all Alevi organizations deplored that the government did not sufficiently punish aggressions targeting Alevis. One such instance is the reaction of the government to the fact that Alevi houses were repeatedly marked by red crosses in different places. On February 29, 2012, twenty-five to thirty Alevi houses were marked with red crosses in Adıyaman. What triggered the anger of Alevi organizations was the declaration of Minister of Interior İdris Naim Şahin that it could have been done by children.76 Although the minister later justified this declaration by findings from the police, Alevi organizations interpreted it as a sign that the issue was downplayed by the government;77 and they deplored the fact that the authorities had not launched serious inquiries nor really looked for the perpetrators, because the victims were Alevis (Hubyar 2013).

Many Alevis also accuse the government of using polarization along Alevi/Sunni lines as a political tool to rally their base.78 In June 2013, Doğan declared that the AK Party government built its policies on the discrimination between Alevi and Sunni, and the conviction that it would remain in power with a Sunni identity.79 In fact, not only the Alevis but many in opposition criticize the AK Party government for allegedly playing the sectarian card and deepening ethnic and religious divisions. This is often linked with the denunciation of what some Alevi organizations consider as policies that are harmful for peaceful coexistence and increase tensions in society. In January 2011, the final declaration of the First Alevi Congress which brought together the most secular-minded Alevi organizations deplored the fact that AK Party rule had increased social and political tensions as well as social inequality; this was coupled with a critique against the government's neoliberal economic agenda, allegedly also responsible for growing inequalities.80

### _Questioning the democratic nature of AK Party rule_

A third type of critique expressed by Alevis, especially in the later years, concerns the AK Party's democratic character and relationship to the rule of law. Twenty years after the incident, the Sivas case was dropped in 2013 due to lapse of time. Many Alevis related this to the issue of discrimination against Alevis and interpreted it as a sign that the government was not really willing to punish the perpetrators, especially since some of them who had had contacts with official institutions were not "caught" (Ecevitoğlu and Yalçınkaya 2013: 224–25). But what really triggered the anger of the Alevi organizations is the prime minister's welcoming of the case being dropped in the courts due to the time lapse which was widely interpreted as his government's unwillingness to cope with history, and its inconsistency regarding the former declarations on the Dersim massacre.81

More broadly, Alevis have expressed concern that the AK Party does not defend the rule of law but rather infringes and impedes the law. Alevi organizations develop this argument especially concerning the fact that Turkish government fails to act upon ECHR's Zengin decision (2007) that urged Turkey to make adjustments to the religious education curriculum (including Aleviness) or make attendance to these classes optional.82 Although the Turkish Council of State issued a ruling in 2008 declaring that religion instruction in its current form could not be compulsory, referring to the ECHR ruling, the AK Party administration has still not acted upon it, and exemption from these courses are not provided easily: parents who want their children not to attend the course are asked to present a decision in their own name. In the same way, the general secretary of the ABF accused Prime Minister Erdoğan, regarding his refusal to consider the _cemevi_ s as a worship place, of overlooking the decision taken by the 16. Civil Court of First Instance in Ankara stating that _cemevi_ s were worship places and that no one except the people belonging of the faith in question can have the ability to judge whether or not they are worship places.83 Because of the very politicized dimension of the judiciary in Turkey, one may observe strong inconsistencies in case law so that decisions of supreme courts may not be taken up by lower courts. This phenomenon is especially relevant for the Alevi issue and is used by Alevi organizations as an argument to make the point of AK Party not respecting the law, interfering in the judiciary for its own interests, and undermining the autonomy of the judiciary, which is often evidenced in the reforms of the judiciary implemented in 2010 and 2014.

Far from only expressing a critique on this point, the conservative CEM foundation has intended judicial action against the government for the equal provision to all citizens of religious services as public services in 2005. As it lost its case and all internal judicial channels were exhausted, it finally resorted to the ECHR in 2010.84 Other organizations have resorted to national courts and the ECHR, thus enhancing a broader movement of judicialization of the Alevi issue, both in Turkey and at the European level (Massicard 2014).

Many Alevi organizations have also voiced doubts about the democratic nature of the AK Party rule—its democratic legitimacy and democratization agenda being one of the main arguments put forward by the AK Party because of its remarkable electoral victories. Most Alevi organizations have supported the initiatives that the AK Party government labeled as "democratic," including, for example, its moves to reform the constitution. Fermani Altun, the leader of the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, supported the initiatives to eliminate the 1980 Constitution. He also supported more broadly the AK Party's democratization policy.85 In the same way, Altun, Doğan and secular-minded organizations alike have supported the resolution process of the Kurdish issue.86 However, some—including Hacı Bektaş's alleged descendant, an important spiritual leader—have also voiced concerns about the resolution process being allegedly made on the common ground of Sunni Islam, therefore in a way against Alevis. Secular-minded organizations like the HBVAKV and PSAKD have deplored the fact that the Alevis, although they were considered at the beginning to be included in the Kurdish opening, were excluded from the resolution process; they also criticized the fact that the only Alevi to be appointed to the sixty-people "wise men" ( _akıl adamlar_ ) committee charged with communicating about the process with society, was İzzettin Doğan.87 Some Alevi organizations also deplored the AK Party's alleged intentions to instrumentalize the Kurdish resolution process for political aims. Moreover, some Alevis questioned the democratic credentials of some of these moves, especially regarding the 2010 Constitutional reform. Doğan suspected Prime Minister Erdoğan of preparing for establishing a totalitarian regime, especially concerning the judiciary, and questioned what was aimed in terms of separation of powers. He stressed that Alevis were suspicious that this reform aimed to discriminate against them.88

Therefore, even if Alevi organizations supported AK Party's "democratic" initiatives in principle, they often voiced doubts on their implementation: on the procedures, on the existence of real dialogue, on their own marginalization from those processes and on the alleged political interests of the AK Party. Some organizations have labeled the AK Party rule as anti-democratic, since it allegedly overlooked the faith of millions people,89 thus contesting the AK Party's definition of democracy as purely electoral, majoritarian rule, not embracing the whole nation. They strongly criticized the fact that some of the meetings and demonstrations they organized were qualified by government officials as radical or terrorist (N.A. 2009 [2]: 16), violating their right to express discontent in a democratic way. Finally, many have addressed the allegedly authoritarian character of AK Party rule, especially concerning the government's response to the Gezi protests.

Alevis were very involved in the Gezi protests. However, an overwhelming majority of the Alevis who did take part did so not with any particular Alevi agenda, or with their Alevi identities. Rather, they poured onto the streets as environmentalists, critics of urban renewal, labor union members and activists, democrats, secularists, Atatürkists, socialists and/or Kurds;90 the participation of Alevi organizations was minimal. Only the PSAKD had a platform in the Gezi Park during its occupation, and some _cemevi_ s in Istanbul, like Okmeydanı _cemevi_ (linked to the HBVAKV), supported the protest by providing food and organizing some activities in the park. It is noteworthy that during the Gezi incidents, unrest developed with demonstrations and clashes with the police almost on a daily basis during several weeks in neighborhoods bearing an important Alevi population like Sarıgazi, Gazi and Okmeydanı in Istanbul, or Tuzluçayır in Ankara. While these protests were organized primarily by leftist non-Alevi organizations, some of them were also supported by Alevi groups. Doğan, the leader of the CEM foundation, adopted a balanced stance: he called for moderation and responsibility from the protesters and for not letting the protest block the functioning of democracy. But he also, like secular-minded organizations, criticized the repression of the protests by the police and deplored the way Prime Minister Erdoğan approached the protesters, his inflexibility concerning the Taksim project, and the way he kept intervening in citizen's lives, contrasting it to the way he presents himself as the "servant at the service of the nation." Finally he questioned the responsibility of the AK Party government for damaging Turkey's international image as a rule of law state.91

Most Alevi organizations were very active in the post-Gezi critique of the government. They were even more concerned because all six youths killed during the Gezi protests were Alevis. For example, during the Kadıköy meeting organized by the PSAKD on June 23, 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan was vocally attacked as a "murderer" ( _katil_ ) and compared to Yavuz Sultan Selim.92 The graft probe in December 201393 again fueled Alevi critique of the AK Party rule, especially by the secular-minded organizations. In a press declaration issued in February 2014 Kemal Bülbül, the director of the PSAKD criticized the AK Party's policies as oppressive and as being anti-freedom oriented. He mentioned censorship, restrictions on the freedom of expression, repression, silencing, intimidation, control and filing. He further accused the AK Party of graft, theft, cheat and manipulation of public bids.94 In sum, those critics directed against the AK Party's allegedly growing authoritarian stance were not specific to the Alevis.

## A critique of the Alevi critiques against the AK Party

Both the AK Party's pro-Islamic background and its policies while in power—the poor achievements of the Alevi opening, the ruling party's sectarian stance especially regarding its Syrian policy, its discriminatory moves against Alevis, and its growing authoritarian tendencies—have triggered strong critique by Alevis. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the AK Party rule has fueled quite a consistent critique by Alevis and triggered a strong mobilization. The mass demonstrations calling for equal rights and citizenship organized by ABF in Ankara in 2008, in Istanbul in 2009 and in Izmir in 2011, attracted several tens of thousands of people—something the movement had not managed to achieve for more than a decade. Meanwhile, the pre-existing fault lines between secularist Alevis who have always been very critical against right-wing policies, and religious-minded Alevi organizations who have always been closer the latter, and less critical to the AK Party rule, have continued to some extent. However, certain moves by the AK Party government even fostered the unification of Alevis in opposition to it to a certain extent. In Özel's words, "Erdoğan's rhetoric on the Alevis has been very divisive, very ostracizing. Thanks to his attitude, we came to realize how petty our arguments are, that we are in fact struggling for our survival and thus we closed ranks."95

This growing unanimity of opinion among Alevis became obvious after the June 7, 2015 legislative elections. Almost all Alevi organizations welcomed its results which included the entrance of the People's Democratic Party (HDP) into the Parliament and the fact that the AK Party that could not garner absolute majority to form a government on its own. The main reason for their happiness with this result was that this new Assembly would not permit Erdoğan to change the constitution to a presidential regime, which many believed would open avenues to "dictatorship." However, Alevi organizations were much more critical in the aftermath of the elections. Many of them deplored the failure of the political parties to form a coalition government. Among them, the conservative and quite religiously-minded Federation of Alevi Foundations was quite vocal in this respect; it interpreted President Erdoğan's decision to call for new elections as disregarding the "national will" that the AK Party has constantly invoked as the source of its legitimacy. Almost all Alevi organizations in Turkey came together in August 2015 to issue a declaration, thus expressing an historical unanimity.96 They contested the very legitimacy of the interim government formed to pave way to another elections on November 1, whom they called "electoral government." They interpreted the call for a new elections by the president as a manifestation of his will to stay in power and establish a "dictatorship," and accused the AK Party of taking the people's will hostage for its own interests.

In the same way, all Alevi organizations unanimously issued critical statements about the growing violence that characterized the aftermath of the June elections, and the special security measures implemented by state authorities. They all called for "peace" and "fraternity." In their common declaration, they held the AK Party responsible for the growing tensions and violence. They unani mously criticized its Syrian policy and alleged support to ISIS. They disapproved of the AK Party's approach that excluded differences and blamed it for spreading hate against the Kurds and other groups, fueling racial and religious tensions. Unanimously, they interpret its anti-Kurdish move as revealing AK Party government's "true stance" toward the peace process, therefore delegitimizing its previous efforts and negating the support that some Alevi organizations had lent to the initiative back then. The Federation of Alevi Foundations joined the criticism against "terrorism," also blaming the PKK for the growing violence—while other Alevi organizations did not.

In addressing some of their critiques, especially those concerning the Islamization of lifestyle, endangering of secularism or the critique of authoritarianism and corruption, some Alevis align themselves politically with the RPP. However, this alignment is in no way systematic. First, because many of the (even secular) Alevis find the RPP itself not convincing and not pluralistic enough since Kılıçdaroğlu, who has tried to prioritize social issues over secularism more than his predecessor, became the leader. Second, because the RPP, even if it does also express or relay some of Alevis' critics to AK Party rule—especially about neutrality or secularism—has not convincingly shown a will to furthering their specific claims. Alevis obviously do not have the strength to influence the RPP in this direction. Indeed, some Alevis have increasingly, especially after the Gezi events, aligned with the pro-Kurdish parties—the BDP and since its formation in 2014 with the HDP, especially regarding the claims for diversity and democracy—even if the latter's agreement with the AK Party regarding the settlement of the Kurdish issue has made this alignment more difficult. The BDP and the HDP ended up being the parties having the biggest proportion of Alevi representatives in parliament. In the end, many Alevis do not align with any of the parties represented in parliament, and both Alevis organizations and Alevis keep being politically scattered.

In order to perceive Alevi critiques of the AK Party rule more precisely, some more questions should be addressed. What is specific in the Alevi criticism of the government? Broader critiques have also questioned the democratic dimension of AK Party rule, its commitment to a liberal agenda and its authoritarian tendencies. The specific dimension of Alevi grievances that come out strongly are the stresses on the imposition of a lifestyle linked to a specific identity, discrimination and assimilation.

In turn, what is specific to Alevi critiques of the AK Party, compared to, for example, the critique expressed by Alevis toward the Islamist parties that preceded the AK Party? Two critical dimensions of the critiques traditionally expressed by Alevis against the state (for being non-neutral, discriminatory and inegalitarian) and against political Islam (for being pro-Sunni, factionalist, reactionary and oppressive) merged and reinforced each other under the AK Party rule. Interestingly, some of the liberalizing reforms implemented by the AK Party rule especially in its first term, for example toward limiting military tutelage—that most Alevis would support in principle—have hardly been welcomed by many Alevis out of the fear that they would benefit exclusively the AK Party and its supporters, and that Alevis would in the end suffer more from AK Party rule. What comes out of this critique is the widespread lack of faith of most Alevis in the regime's observance of the rule of law and the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis all faiths and all citizens. They also seem to hold the view that the state is not an institutional phenomenon but an extension of the political interests and orientations of one party and one community.

The Alevi critiques do not seem to have had an effective impact on the ruling party. Some of the expressed claims have been addressed by the government, but mostly in ways that did not meet the expressed claims. The ruling AK Party has been urged to "deal with" the Alevi issue as it has turned into a more contentious issue triggering further anger by Alevis. Seen from an Alevi perspective, despite its innovating initiatives, AK Party rule has hardly changed the fault lines, and rather increased political polarization.

## Notes

1 Particularly important in this respect are some bloody episodes of recent Turkish history. During the politically polarized and violent late 1970s, pogroms by Sunni nationalists targeting leftist and Alevis ended in the death of more than 100 people. Alevis often draw a continuity with the "Sivas events" that took place on July 2, 1993: thirty-seven intellectuals—most of them Alevis—who had gathered for a cultural festival in Sivas were killed when a mob of radical Islamists set fire to their hotel.

2 This foundation stresses the similarities of Alevis with Shi'ite Islam.

3 Tankut Soykan, "Alevi tepkisi artıyor." _Radikal_ , October 9, 2004.

4 Miyase İlknur, "Erdoğan yuhalandı." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 17, 2003.

5 Erdem Gül, "AKP'de Alevi oyu alarmı." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 19, 2010; Selahattin Şahin, Alican Uludağ, "Hacıbektaş'ta AKP'ye tepki." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 17, 2011; Selahattin Şahin, "Yolumuz barış olsun." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 17, 2012.

6 Oral Çalışlar, "Aleviler soldan aradıklarını bulamadı AKP'yı destekleyenler karşılığını alamadı." _Radikal_ , November 17, 2008.

7 Aslıhan Altay Karataş, "Alevilik Ders Kitaplarında." _Yeni Şafak_ , February 7, 2005.

8 According to a _dede_ consulted on this subject by the AKP government. Interview, Istanbul, October 26, 2004.

9 The others were İbrahim Yiğit and Hüseyin Tuğcu.

10 "Bakan Günay Alevilerden devlet adına özür diledi." _Radikal_ , December 23, 2008.

11 "Erdoğan: Cemevi talebine uzak kalmayız." _Radikal_ , January 14, 2008; "Erdoğan: Birbirimizle Aynı Olmak Zorunda Değiliz." _Hürriyet_ , January 31, 2009.

12 "AKP'ye Alevi öfkesi." _Radikal_ , February 4, 2008.

13 "AKP Alevileri asimile etmeye çalışıyor." _Radikal_ , November 25, 2007.

14 O. Çalışlar, "Aleviler soldan aradıklarını bulamadı."

15 "CEM Vakfı'ndan iftara şartlı evet." _Cihan Haber Ajansı_ , December 26, 2007, at: www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1497&Itemid=2 (accessed February 10, 2014).

16 "Aydınlardan Alevi çağrısı." _Milliyet_ , November 7, 2008.

17 O. Çalışlar, "Aleviler soldan aradıklarını bulamadı."

18 Bawer Çakır, "Alevi Dernekleri: AKP'nin İftar Sofrasına Oturmayacağız!." _Bianet_ , January 6, 2009, at: www.bianet.org/bianet/bianet/111778-alevi-dernekleri-akp-niniftar-sofrasina-oturmayacagiz (accessed February 10, 2014).

19 "Alevi Açılımından 'Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Haberi Yok' İddiası." _Milliyet_ , November 29, 2007.

20 "Diyanet, cemevine statüye karşı çıktı." _Taraf_ , April 9, 2008.

21 "Alevi açılımı çöktü, Çamuroğlu 'Allahaısmarladık' dedi." _Radikal_ , June 12, 2008.

22 Fırat Bozok, "AKP'li Çamuroğlu isyan etti." _Cumhuriyet_ , January 31, 2010.

23 "Alevilere ibadeti, Sünnilere muhabbeti unutturdular." _Zaman_ , February 6, 2011.

24 "Bakan Çelik, Alevi Çalıştayı Sonucunu Bakanlar Kurulu'na Sunacak", _haberler.com_ , January 30, 2010, at: www.haberler.com/bakan-celik-alevi-calistayi-sonucunu-bakanlar-haberi/ (accessed February 10, 2014).

25 The pogrom perpetrated in Maraş in December 1978 was the bloodiest attack targeting leftist and Alevis in the late 1970, causing the death of more than 100 people.

26 "Maraş sanığı Şendiller'e Alevi çalıştayı daveti!." _Radikal_ , December 12, 2009.

27 "Aleviler çalıştay için umutsuz." _Milliyet_ , June 7, 2009.

28 Erdem Gül, "Alevi açılımına nokta koydu." _Cumhuriyet_ , July 10, 2011.

29 Göksel Genç and Sinan Gül, "Vatandaşlarımızın inancından dolayı baskı gördüğü dönemler geride kaldı." _Zaman_ , August 29, 2011.

30 "Madımak Oteli bilim ve kültür merkezi oldu." _Milliyet_ , June 30, 2011.

31 "Aleviler yeni anayasadan umutsuz." _CNN Türk_ , January 28, 2012, at: www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/01/28/aleviler.yeni.anayasadan.umutsuz/646812.0/ (accessed February 10, 2014).

32 "AKP bize Aleviliği öğretmeye kalktı." _Cumhuriyet_ , April 25, 2011.

33 "Cem Vakfı Başkanı Doğan: Kimseye 'şuraya ya da Buraya Oy Verin' Demem." haberler.com, April 5, 2011, at: www.haberler.com/cem-vakfi-baskani-dogan-kimseye-suraya-ya-da-2634448-haberi/ (accessed February 10, 2014).

34 Ali Açar, "Cem Vakfı başkanı Doğan: AKP çalıştay ile bizi kullandı." _Cumhuriyet_ , April 6, 2011.

35 Orhan Fırat, Hakan İnce, "İzzettin Doğan: Barış süreci olayların gölgesinde kalmamalı." _Cihan_ , June 6, 2013, at: www.cihan.com.tr/caption/Izzettin-Dogan-Barissureci-olaylarin-golgesinde-kalmamali-CHMTA1MTAwMy8x (accessed February 10, 2014).

36 "Keşke bugüne kadar bütün cumhurbaşkanları bunu yapsaydı." _Bugün_ , November 26, 2012.

37 Mahmut Ilıcalı, "Alevilere seçmeli ders." _Cumhuriyet_ , March 8, 2012.

38 "Alevi açılımı raftan indi." _Zaman_ , June 25, 2013.

39 "Aleviler yeni anayasadan umutsuz."

40 Bawer Çakır, "200 Bini Aşkın Kişi Alevilere Eşitlik İçin Kadıköy'deydi." _Bianet_ , November 8, 2009, at: http://bianet.org/bianet/din/118121-200-bini-askin-kisi-alevilereesitlik-icin-kadikoy-deydi (accessed February 10, 2014).

41 "Alevileri yok sayan çalıştay." _Cumhuriyet_ , January 29, 2010; "Evet diyen bizden değil!." _Cumhuriyet_ , February 13, 2010.

42 "Çelik'ten din dersi tepkisi." _Cumhuriyet_ , October 11, 2010.

43 "Alevilerin haberi yok." _Cumhuriyet_ , November 1, 2010.

44 Kıvanç El, "Bu da tarikat açılımı." _Cumhuriyet_ , January 18, 2011.

45 Fırat Bozok, "Alevi açılımında sözler unutuldu." _Cumhuriyet_ , December 14, 2011.

46 "Alevi raporu yetersiz." _Cumhuriyet_ , April 1, 2011.

47 Mehmet Menekşe, "Asıl ucube Başbakan." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 7, 2012.

48 Faruk Keskin, "AKP'liden ezan işgüzarlığı." _Cumhuriyet_ , December 22, 2011.

49 "Aleviler: ibadet yerimiz cemevi." _Cumhuriyet_ , February 23, 2013.

50 T. Soykan, "Alevi tepkisi artıyor."

51 Mehmet Menekşe, "Alevilerden sert tepki: Başbakan suç işliyor." _Cumhuriyet_ , February 4, 2012.

52 "Ercan Geçmez: Hükümet, Aleviliği ayrışma aracı olarak kullanıyor." _Aydınlık_ , November 14, 2013.

53 "İzzettin Doğan: Başbakanın laiklik vurgusu gizli ajandasının olmadığını gösterir." _Zaman_ , September 19, 2011.

54 "Büyük Alevi Kurultayı'nda AKP'ye öfke!." _Solportal_ , January 16, 2011, at: http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/buyuk-alevi-kurultayinda-akpye-ofke-haberi-38111 (accessed February 10, 2014).

55 See Özel's declaration in Ezgi Başaran, "Kürt Hareketinin Aleviler için ne yaptığını bilmiyorum." _Radikal_ , May 6, 2013.

56 "Akkiraz'dan Erdoğan'a: Zamane Yavuz Sultan Selim'i." _Radikal_ , November 25, 2011.

57 "İzzettin Doğan: AKP ile Gülen cemaati arasındaki kırılma noktasının nedeni Aleviler! . . " _t24_ , May 16, 2012, at: http://t24.com.tr/haber/izzettin-dogan-akp-ilegulen-cemaati-arasindaki-kirilma-noktasinin-nedeni-aleviler/204094 (accessed February 10, 2014).

58 T. Soykan, "Alevi tepkisi artıyor."

59 O. Çalışlar, "Aleviler soldan aradıklarını bulamadı."

60 "Akkiraz'dan Erdoğan'a."

61 Erhan Yılmaz, "İzzettin Doğan'dan 'Yavuz' tepkisi." _Hürriyet_ , May 30, 2013.

62 Mehmet Menekşe and Abidin Yağmur, "Alevilerde endişe büyüyor." _Cumhuriyet_ , September 15, 2010.

63 "Aleviler öfkeli! Başbakan'a açık mektup." _Radikal_ , May 25, 2011.

64 "Aleviler yeni anayasadan umutsuz."

65 M. Menekşe and A. Yağmur, "Alevilerde endişe büyüyor."

66 "Çelik'ten Kılıçdaroğlu'na 'mezhep' suçlaması." _Radikal_ , September 8, 2011.

67 "Türkiye'nin Baas'ı." _Cumhuriyet_ , September 9, 2011.

68 E. Başaran, "Kürt Hareketinin."

69 "İzzettin Doğan: AKP ile Gülen cemaati."

70 Constanze Letsch, "Syrian conflict brings sectarian tensions to Turkey's tolerant Hatay province." _Guardian_ , September 6, 2013.

71 E. Başaran, "Kürt Hareketinin."

72 T. Soykan, "Alevi tepkisi artıyor."

73 Tolga Şardan, "Gezi'den kalanlar ve farklı bir analiz." _Sabah_ , November 25, 2013.

74 " 'Karacaahmet Cemevi bir Ucube!'." _Vatan_ , August 6, 2012.

75 M. Menekşe, "Asıl ucube Başbakan."

76 "Şahin: işaretlemeler 3 çocuğun işi." _Sabah_ , March 2, 2012.

77 "İzzettin Doğan: AKP ile Gülen cemaati."

78 C. Letsch, "Syrian conflict."

79 "İzzettin Doğan: Barış süreci olayların gölgesinde kalmamalı." _Bugün_ , June 6, 2013.

80 "Büyük Alevi Kurultayı'nda."

81 "Binlerce Alevi'den AKP ye büyük öfke." _Yurt Gazetesi_ , June 23, 2013.

82 "Alevi group demands end to Turkish mandatory religious classes." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , November 7, 2010.

83 "Başbakan Erdoğan'a cemevi tepkisi." _CNN Türk_ , February 24, 2013, at: www.cnnturk.com/2013/guncel/02/24/basbakan.erdogana.cemevi.tepkisi/697753.0/ (accessed February 10, 2014).

84 "Aleviler AİHM'e gidiyor." _Milliyet_ , September 1, 2010.

85 "Fermani Altun'dan demokratik adımlara destek." _Bugün_ , April 4, 2011.

86 "Fermani Altun'dan AK Parti'ye destek." _InternetHaber_ , January 21, 2013, at: www.internethaber.com/fermani-altundan-ak-partiye-destek-496410h.htm (accessed February 10, 2014; "Alevi kurultayından çözüm sürecine destek, eşitlik ve demokrasi çağrısı." _t24_ , May 14, 2013, at: http://t24.com.tr/haber/alevi-kurultayindan-cozum-surecine-destek-esitlik-ve-demokrasi-cagrisi/229833 (accessed February 10, 2014).

87 "Alevi Kurultayından 'Barış' çıktı." _Radikal_ , May 12, 2013.

88 "Aleviler AİHM'e gidiyor."

89 "Aleviler: ibadet yerimiz cemevi."

90 Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, "Alevizing Gezi." _Jadaliyya_ , March 26, 2014, at: www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17087/alevizing-gezi (accessed October 6, 2014).

91 Orhan Fırat and Hakan İnce, "İzzettin Doğan: Demokrasiyi akamete uğratacak eylemlerden uzak durulmalı." _Zaman_ , June 5, 2013.

92 "Binlerce Alevi'den."

93 A far-reaching corruption and bribery investigation launched on December 17, 2013, involving several bureaucrats, businesspeople and key people in the government and the AK Party.

94 Kemal Bülbül, "Internet, sansür, AKP ve Bitiş sendromu... !!!." Facebook publication, February 7, 2014, at: <https://www.facebook.com/kemal.bulbul.370/posts/531664576946629> (accessed October 6, 2014).

95 E. Başaran, "Kürt Hareketinin."

96 "Aleviler Barış istiyor sonuç bildirgesi." August 8, 2015, at: www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?limitstart=5 (accessed October 9, 2015).

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Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı, Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi. _Alevi Çalıştayı. Birinci etap Alevi örgütleri ve Temsilcileri toplantısı değerlendirme, istem ve öneri raporu_ , Ankara, 2009, at: http://derdimartardaima.blogspot.com.tr/2012/02/kirmizi-kitap-calistay-degerlendirme.html (accessed February 10, 2014).

Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı. _Aleviler artık burada oturmuyor. Alevi çalıştayları nihai raporu üstüne bir değerlendirme_. Ankara, 2011.

Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği. _2012 Hak ihlalleri izleme raporu_. İstanbul, 2013.

Ilıcalı, Mahmut. "Alevilere seçmeli ders." _Cumhuriyet_ , March 8, 2012.

İlknur, Miyase. "Erdoğan yuhalandı." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 17, 2003.

Karakaya-Stump, Ayfer. "Alevizing Gezi." _Jadaliyya_ , March 26, 2014, at: www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17087/alevizing-gezi

Karataş, Aslıhan Altay. "Alevilik Ders Kitaplarında." _Yeni Şafak_ , February 7, 2005.

Keskin, Faruk. "AKP'liden ezan işgüzarlığı." _Cumhuriyet_ , December 22, 2011.

Kieser, Hans-Lukas. "Dersim Massacre, 1937–1938." _Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence_ , July 2011, at: www.massviolence.org/Dersim-Massacre-1937-1938

Koçan, Gürcan and Öncü, Ahmet. "Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial." _Journal of Historical Sociology_ 17, no. 4 (2004): 464–89.

Köse, Talha. _Alevi Opening and the Democratization Initiative in Turkey_. Ankara: SETA Policy report, March 2010.

Letsch, Constanze. "Syrian conflict brings sectarian tensions to Turkey's tolerant Hatay province." _Guardian_ , September 6, 2013.

Massicard, Elise. "L'alévisme en Turquie: une identité collective à sens multiples." _Etudes turques et ottomanes_ 9–10 (June 2001): 61–78.

Massicard, Elise. _The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity_. London, New York: Routledge, 2012.

Massicard, Elise. "Variations in the Judicialisation of the Alevi Issue. From Turkey to Europe." _Revue Française de Science Politique_ 64, no. 4 (2014): 711–33.

Menekşe, Mehmet; Yağmur, Abidin. "Alevilerde endişe büyüyor." _Cumhuriyet_ , September 15, 2010.

Menekşe, Mehmet. "Alevilerden sert tepki: Başbakan suç işliyor." _Cumhuriyet_ , February 4, 2012.

Menekşe, Mehmet. "Asıl ucube Başbakan." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 7, 2012.

Soner, Bayram Ali and Toktaş, Şule. "Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Partys's Alevi Opening." _Turkish Studies_ 12, no. 3 (2011): 419–34.

Soykan, Tankut. "Alevi tepkisi artıyor." _Radikal_ , October 9, 2004.

Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, _Alevi Raporu_ , Ankara, 2009.

Şahin, Selahattin. "Yolumuz barış olsun." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 17, 2012.

Şahin, Selahattin and Uludağ, Alican. "Hacıbektaş'ta AKP'ye tepki." _Cumhuriyet_ , August 17, 2011.

Şardan, Tolga. "Gezi'den kalanlar ve farklı bir analiz." _Sabah_ , November 25, 2013.

Türkmen, Buket. "A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of 'Religious Culture and Morality' Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula." _Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East_ 29, no. 3 (2009): 381–91.

T.C. Devlet Bakanlığı, _Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor_. Ankara: Devlet Bakanlığı, 2010.

## News and articles with no authors

"AKP Alevileri asimile etmeye çalışıyor." _Radikal_ , November 25, 2007.

"Alevi Açılımından 'Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Haberi Yok' İddiası." _Milliyet_ , November 29, 2007.

"CEM Vakfı'ndan iftara şartlı evet." _Cihan Haber Ajansı_ , December 26, 2007, at: www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1497&Itemid=2

"Erdoğan: Cemevi talebine uzak kalmayız." _Radikal_ , January 14, 2008.

"AKP'ye Alevi öfkesi." _Radikal_ , February 4, 2008.

"Diyanet, cemevine statüye karşı çıktı." _Taraf_ , April 9, 2008.

"Alevi açılımı çöktü, Çamuroğlu 'Allahaısmarladık' dedi." _Radikal_ , June 12, 2008.

"Aydınlardan Alevi çağrısı." _Milliyet_ , November 7, 2008.

"Bakan Günay Alevilerden devlet adına özür diledi." _Radikal_ , December 23, 2008.

"Erdoğan: Birbirimizle Aynı Olmak Zorunda Değiliz." _Hürriyet_ , January 31, 2009.

"Aleviler çalıştay için umutsuz." _Milliyet_ , June 7, 2009.

_1. Alevi Çalıştayı 03–04 Haziran 2009 Ankara_. Ankara: Devlet Bakanlığı, 2009.

_5. Alevi Çalıştayı 11 Kasım 2009 Ankara_. Ankara: Devlet Bakanlığı, 2009.

"Maraş sanığı Şendiller'e Alevi çalıştayı daveti!." _Radikal_ , December 12, 2009.

"Alevileri yok sayan çalıştay." _Cumhuriyet_ , January 29, 2010.

"Bakan Çelik, Alevi Çalıştayı Sonucunu Bakanlar Kurulu'na Sunacak." _haberler.com_, January 30, 2010, at: www.haberler.com/bakan-celik-alevi-calistayi-sonucunu-bakanlar-haberi/

"Alevi group demands end to Turkish mandatory religious classes." _Hürriyet Daily News_ , November 7, 2010.

"Evet diyen bizden değil!." _Cumhuriyet_ , February 13, 2010.

"Aleviler AİHM'e gidiyor." _Milliyet_ , September 1, 2010.

"Çelik'ten din dersi tepkisi." _Cumhuriyet_ , October 11, 2010.

"Alevilerin haberi yok." _Cumhuriyet_ , November 1, 2010.

"Büyük Alevi Kurultayı'nda AKP'ye öfke!." _Solportal_ , January 16, 2011, at: http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/buyuk-alevi-kurultayinda-akpye-ofke-haberi-38111

"Alevilere ibadeti, Sünnilere muhabbeti unutturdular." _Zaman_ , February 6, 2011.

"Alevi raporu yetersiz." _Cumhuriyet_ , April 1, 2011.

"Fermani Altun'dan demokratik adımlara destek." _Bugün_ , April 4, 2011.

"Cem Vakfı Başkanı Doğan: Kimseye 'şuraya ya da Buraya Oy Verin' Demem." _haberler.com_, April 5, 2011, at: www.haberler.com/cem-vakfi-baskani-dogan-kimseye-suraya-ya-da-2634448-haberi/

"AKP bize Aleviliği öğretmeye kalktı." _Cumhuriyet_ , April 25, 2011.

"Aleviler öfkeli! Başbakan'a açık mektup." _Radikal_ , May 25, 2011.

N.A. "Madımak Oteli bilim ve kültür merkezi oldu." _Milliyet_ , June 30, 2011.

"Türkiye'nin Baas'ı." _Cumhuriyet_ , September 9, 2011.

"Çelik'ten Kılıçdaroğlu'na 'mezhep' suçlaması." _Radikal_ , September 8, 2011.

"İzzettin Doğan: Başbakanın laiklik vurgusu gizli ajandasının olmadığını gösterir." _Zaman_ , September 19, 2011.

"Akkiraz'dan Erdoğan'a: Zamane Yavuz Sultan Selim'i." _Radikal_ , November 25, 2011.

"Aleviler yeni anayasadan umutsuz." _CNN Türk_ , January 28, 2012, at: www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/01/28/aleviler.yeni.anayasadan.umutsuz/646812.0/

"Şahin: işaretlemeler 3 çocuğun işi." _Sabah_ , March 2, 2012.

"İzzettin Doğan: AKP ile Gülen cemaati arasındaki kırılma noktasının nedeni Aleviler!..." _t24_ , May 16, 2012, at: http://t24.com.tr/haber/izzettin-dogan-akp-ile-gulen-cemaati-arasindaki-kirilma-noktasinin-nedeni-aleviler/204094

" 'Karacaahmet Cemevi bir Ucube!'." _Vatan_ , August 6, 2012.

"Keşke bugüne kadar bütün cumhurbaşkanları bunu yapsaydı." _Bugün_ , November 26, 2012.

"Fermani Altun'dan AK Parti'ye destek." _InternetHaber_ , January 21, 2013, at: www.internethaber.com/fermani-altundan-ak-partiye-destek-496410h.htm

"Aleviler: ibadet yerimiz cemevi." _Cumhuriyet_ , February 23, 2013.

"Başbakan Erdoğan'a cemevi tepkisi." _CNN Türk_ , February 24, 2013, at: www.cnnturk.com/2013/guncel/02/24/basbakan.erdogana.cemevi.tepkisi/697753.0/

"Alevi Kurultayından 'Barış' çıktı." _Radikal_ , May 12, 2013.

"Alevi kurultayından çözüm sürecine destek, eşitlik ve demokrasi çağrısı." _t24_ , May 14, 2013, at: http://t24.com.tr/haber/alevi-kurultayindan-cozum-surecine-destek-esitlik-ve-demokrasi-cagrisi/229833

"Erhan Yılmaz, "İzzettin Doğan'dan 'Yavuz' tepkisi." _Hürriyet_ , May 30, 2013.

"İzzettin Doğan: Barış süreci olayların gölgesinde kalmamalı." _Bugün_ , June 6, 2013.

"Binlerce Alevi'den AKP ye büyük öfke." _Yurt Gazetesi_ , June 23, 2013.

"Alevi açılımı raftan indi." _Zaman_ , June 25, 2013.

"Ercan Geçmez: Hükümet, Aleviliği ayrışma aracı olarak kullanıyor." _Aydınlık_ , November 14, 2013.

"Aleviler Barış istiyor sonuç bildirgesi." August 8, 2015, at: www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?limitstart=5

#  An intellectual left perspective on the AK Party governments

The Birikim journal

_Ümit Cizre_

It would be a truism to state that compared to the left's publication activism, right-wing groups in Turkey—as elsewhere—have been less preoccupied with intellectual debate and more concerned with actual mechanisms of keeping the status quo. Intellectual critique for the left has always been an existential practice in (re)structuring its position, maintaining its change-driven discourse and establishing its relevance for the populace. In the "Introduction" to their book, _Left Legalism/Left Critique_ , Wendy Hunter and Janet Halley provide an excellent analysis of the ambitions and missions of critique for the left which represents the same understanding of the term by Turkey's _Birikim_ journal:

critique focuses on the workings of ideology and power in the production of existing political and legal possibilities. It facilitates discernment of how the very problem we want to solve is itself produced... it invites us to analyze our... discontents and worries, indeed to let these discontents and worries themselves spirit the critique.1

It follows that the left-wing critique is not interested in objectivity, truth and concrete solutions, rather, it emerges from and reiterates a leftist " _perspective_ " and serves as a platform for opening up new avenues of thought and political possibilities for progressive change which is the premise of intellectual thinking within the left.

Why have the ideas expressed in the _Birikim_ journal vis-à-vis the AK Party become the focus of this chapter? _Birikim_ journal's importance and impact among its readers in Turkey is not measurable by its publication figures, which have hovered around 2,000–3,000 since 1989. Its prominence in Turkey's intellectual circles lies in the fact that from its beginnings in the early 1970s, the name _Birikim_ has represented a "concept" for its readers who do not feel limited to a spectrum of those bound by strict faith in socialist ideology. Basically, this concept represents the genre of the intellectual left which keeps "critique as perspective" alive as the main driving force of understanding and changing the status quo. The concept also includes _Birikim_ 's role in enhancing the sense of awareness in Turkey of marginalization, impotence, subordination and the exclusion of individuals in the face of the pervasiveness and complexity of the domination inherent in liberal capitalist orders, as well as the stifling power of the Kemalist state and right-wing forces. As a concept, and through its critique of the past and present, _Birikim_ for decades has been a symbolic beacon for its readers by illuminating, through its extraordinarily clever, creative and original discourse, their unfree and inegalitarian conditions and by helping them to develop a taste, approach and appetite for change in a non-capitalist direction. More importantly, it has not only provided a platform nurturing a blueprint for future socialist action but has also provided a resource to enable them to confront, understand, critique and lift the weight of their own past. In this sense, it is important to note that _Birikim_ journal's critique of Turkey's powerful ruling party since 2002, the Justice and Development Party (henceforth the AK Party as its Turkish acronym), not only represents the perspectives of the most prominent left-wing intellectual platform in the country about the ruling party but also serves to fulfill an existential condition for the sustenance of the Turkish left movement itself by putting its own ideological past in perspective.

Having said that, it would be fruitless and somewhat irrelevant for this article to suggest that _Birikim_ represents the ideas and perspectives that fall within a coherent and unified ideology, movement and position of the left. Nor is it relevant for this article to try to define a definite, all pervasive and consistently upheld definition of socialism. Rather, it is more sensible to emphasize that one critical feature of _Birikim_ 's socialist perspectives is its independence from "other-defined" socialist ideas. But in doing that, they always keep in touch with the personal socialist stories of those who make up the editorial team. Despite their nuances and "independence," the writers reveal remarkable convergences and parallels in their analyses which make it a worthy endeavor to write about " _Birikim_ " as a single totality. In fact, Murat Belge, a prominent intellectual and a founding member of _Birikim_ explains the paradox of having such a rich variety of independent minds and the plurality of ideas in the journal, while achieving some modicum of unity of thought:

Birikim does not express a socialist thought which has coherence in itself... but there is something in what Omer [Laçiner] and I write which consistently holds together... which also enables the writers who join Birikim to capture that spirit of 'Birikimci' [those who are pro-Birikim].2

The first issue of _Birikim_ journal was published in March 1974, the idea for it having been developed in Selimiye Military Prison in the early 1970s during conversations between two inmates: Murat Belge and Ömer Laçiner,3 who were incarcated for membership of an illegal leftist organization trying to subvert the state. These were the tumultuous days after the March 12, 1971 coup-by-memorandum which was delivered to the ruling party of the day (the center-right Justice Party government) by the National Security Council in an effort to end Turkey's "social and economic turmoil." The context for the coup was shaped by the increasing appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology among young people and the working class who had stepped up their militancy since the end of the 1960s. The result was violent street conflicts throughout the 1970s between these groups and the right-wing militias who supported the ultra-nationalist National Action Party. The bureaucracy, governments and security forces were by and large aligned with the right-wing political bloc, which included the media opposed to Turkey's left-wing movements, their leaders, rank-and-file members and militants. The goals of the right-wing bloc were to persecute the leftist movement and its members and to eradicate the spread of their ideology through mass-based organizations, whether clandestine or legal.

Wishing to emulate the model of the _New Left Review_ , Murat Belge, a young academic specializing in English literature and familiar with the English intellectual scene, and Ömer Laçiner decided to start the publication of _Birikim_ in the midst of a deep political crisis of not only the regime but also the status, identity and survival of left-wing movements. _Birikim_ , which also means "accumulation of knowledge" in Turkish, published sixty-one issues before it was closed down by the marshal law authorities of the pre-1980 coup era. It restarted its publication life in 1989.

Ahmet İnsel, a young academic doing his Ph.D in economics in France, who had been contributing to the journal since 1978 with his translations, joined _Birikim_ in 1989. Together with Murat Belge and Ömer Laçiner, they became the editorial policy-making team of the "second _Birikim_ " from 1989 up to the present. Tanıl Bora, who joined the journal in 1989, has been the most durable and consistent contributor to the journal both in terms of his writings but also in coordinating the editing and running of the journal in the last four years. The real troika today consists of Tanıl Bora, Ahmet İnsel and Ömer Laçiner with Murat Belge contributing infrequently but supporting the journal and the ideas of the troika from outside. This article will focus on the writings of these four pillar names of the journal on selected themes and topics and will refer to them as "the writers," "troika," "editorial board," or " _Birikim_ " interchangeably.

The initial goals of the journal, in its first phase from 1974 until its closure in 1980, were in Murat Belge's words, "to bridge the gap between knowledge and militancy,"4 and "to convey 'wisdom' to the militants while providing academia with elements of militancy."5 This view of _Birikim_ 's mission in its first phase reveals a hallmark critique of Turkish socialism, namely the huge gap between ideology and praxis. Even though the left "enjoyed a scarcely rivaled supremacy"6 in Turkey's intellectual life in the 1970s, the contrast between the left-wing militants on the ground who were doing the "dirty work" and the urbane milieu of sympathizers, ideologues and intellectuals who distanced themselves from them contributed to "the theoretical and cultural shallowness of the political cadres."7 Furthermore, as the socialist movement became more fractured in the 1970s, the journal found it even more difficult to bring coherence, consistency and relevance to various socialist factions and their principles of action.8 Nevertheless, the troika agrees on characterizing its first five years of the journal as a "socialist posture ( _tavir_ )" tasked with taking ideologically socialist positions and postures vis-à-vis issues confronted in real life9 and, according to Murat Belge, "failing" in the end.10

## The "second _Birikim_ 's" influence and significance

From 1989 on, _Birikim_ 's influence and significance expanded to non-socialist groups as the journal elevated the quality of its discussions and moved to the center stage of Turkish intellectual life. Labeled by the troika as a "platform journal" during this time, Ömer Laçiner has candidly explained _Birikim_ 's new inspirational prominence by the fact that after 1989 socialists had stopped taking positions throughout the world.11 Essentially, the socialist movement lacked the momentum and ideas to sustain taking socialist positions because of the prominence of the new neoliberal reality which had brought about profound changes in societies and pushed the once strong socialist tradition into decline.

What did "not taking a position" entail? What was original about it? Basically, in the words of Belge and Laçiner, it entailed a mission of "redefining socialism"12 which rested on three legs. The first was an unconditional acceptance that the old forces of the status quo and power relationships were being challenged and transformed by the realities of "new" post-1980 Turkey. Hunter and Halley's definition of the left's critique fits perfectly with this second stage of _Birikim_ 's existence under the assault of neoliberalism: the journal now has shifted more toward offering perspectives about "something that one experiences as constraining, something as limited or gagging,"13 that is, toward accepting, understanding, exposing and viewing "the hegemonic power of the new bourgeoisie and identifying its social dynamics." In the second phase, although the journal was still a school of thought for those who sympathized with socialism, instead of solely scorning free market ideology ad nauseam, it was also there to understand and intellectualize the new terrain to increase the likelihood of effectively influencing the new agenda of neoliberalism.

Second, trying to avert a further threat of weakening the status of socialism, _Birikim_ endorsed a distinctive break from the socialist views it espoused in the pre-1980 era in its call for some "selective" changes like ridding the old parties, leaders, and the institutional logic and guardian role of the military, and above all, the Kemalist regime's tutelary ideology and its outposts in politics. A vocal emphasis on "democracy first," in other words, became a sine qua non in its redefinition of socialism. The journal adopted the view that by wishing for and contributing to the establishment of a democratic context, it would serve its own interests. This stance circumvents the key categories of Marxist imagination and socialist mindset in bypassing the old agents of change, the party and the working class; and abandoning the old priority target of changing the capitalist state.

Third, _Birikim_ 's self-assigned mission to redefine socialism had to overcome strong opposition from fellow socialists,14 and the captivating old "tradition" rooted in the country's and the _Birikim_ group's own personal life stories. It meant breaking with the notion of a fixed ideological blueprint and revolutionary theory and embarking on a new way of thinking critically along socialist lines. The major questions in this regard were which core principles of socialism were open for debate and which ones were to be considered non-negotiable? The answers were muddled and have became a bone of contention among Turkey's socialists ever since. However, inevitably, the process embodied a powerful critique of universal socialism in the twentieth century. On that issue, the troika maintained that not the fundamental ideas and beliefs of socialism but rather the nineteenth-century formulation of Marxist thought which was outdated and prevented socialism from addressing new circumstances were to be dismissed.15 Moreover, "traditional" socialism gave primacy to changing "the conditions"—read as an obsessive impulse to capture the state—before liberating human lives from the restrictions and repressions they lived under to enjoy true equality and dignity.16 Capturing the capitalist state shifted the focus from changing the existing order to the issue of strategies and tactics directed by the leadership, including even the possible use of the military, for instance.17

Interestingly enough, the AK Party's emergence and search for a new identity overlap with Bora's, Belge's, Laçiner's and İnsel's continual ideological reckoning with the "tragic defeat" of socialism to be able to redefine their socialist identities. The AK Party's attempts to deal with its past while moving forward parallels _Birikim_ 's own efforts to keep the socialist consciousness alive while achieving the task of being a new intellectual agent.

Based on the troika's post-2002 analyses and commentaries, I analyzed four areas where _Birikim_ 's re-examination and redefinition of socialism result in critiques of the AK Party. The first is the nature of the AK Party's socio-political and class base, which supported its emergence in 2002. This area also involves how _Birikim_ deals with the religious/conservative, Islamic or Islam-friendly nature of the party. Bound up with this debate is whether _Birikim_ identifies the AK Party as a political peculiarity, a unique experience in republican Turkey, or whether it is comparable to past political entities.

Second, socialism in Turkey has continuously subordinated its causes to Kemalism and constantly been accused of refraining from articulating an ideology independent of the secular nationalist goals of Kemalism. Ömer Laçiner and Murat Belge in their excellent analyses of the Turkish left identify this malady as the "most pernicious legacy of Kemalism," namely the socialists' "affinity" with nationalism which derived from their attachment to anti-imperialism and the notion of Turkey's specificity18 which has made anti-imperialism an "euphemism for their deep-seated nationalism."19 In being consistently against the military's tutelage over politics and society—read as its refusal of Turkish specificity which requires assigning a special vanguard role to the military, _Birikim_ 's history has constituted a significant break with this trait of the mainstream socialist movement in Turkey. Given that the AK Party government's path-breaking offensive against the "military question" has caused a downsizing of the political role of the most prominent agent of Kemalist tutelage, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the key question that arises is how has this impacted on _Birikim_ 's perspectives on the ruling party?

Third, since 2002, the political inability of the left to challenge the sweeping changes brought by the new ruling class could no longer be isolated from the changes that occurred in social and cultural spheres dominated by identity politics. Given the historical antipathy of the left to identity claims based on secular notions, ethnicity, sect or religious belief, this article addresses the question as to whether the new socialist "emancipatory" agenda upheld by _Birikim_ comes to terms with the new realities on the Kurdish issue for instance. Most importantly, how does _Birikim_ 's editorial troika intellectualize and problematize the AK Party's political strategies toward the Kurdish claims unfolding in different stages since 2002?

Fourth, overcoming the democracy deficit of Marxism and its coercive tendency of democracy in its second phase occupies center stage in _Birikim_ 's own process of redefining socialism to "... enable the reader to fight against her own internal demons to achieve being a democrat."20 In this sense, the support _Birikim_ gives to the democratic achievements of the AK Party is motivated by its view that the establishment of a democratic setting is seen as a prerequisite for socialist ideas to thrive freely. It is therefore important to analyze critically _Birikim_ 's account of the AK Party's anti-democratic turns and policies and its increasingly confrontational discourse that rouse fears, suspicions and despair among the democracy-friendly sectors of society on an impending sense of "Islamic totalism" or a "plebiscitarian authoritarianism."

## Birikim _'s critique on the role and functions of "an authentic middle class" for the AK Party_

_Birikim_ 's characterization of the AK Party is perfectly compatible with the party's definition of itself as politically conservative. In addition, the party's class base is portrayed as representing something unprecedented in Turkey in terms of its "authenticity." Some conventional accounts, on the left and right, trace the political (not ideological) origins of the AK Party back to the center-right's Democrat Party (1950–60) which splintered from the powerful Kemalist Republican People's Party to express the grievances of the "peripheral" rural groups. Or, conversely, the party is portrayed as being premised on the legacy of the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) (1983–98) which formed a notorious coalition government in the 1990s and provoked the secular guardians of the regime into staging a coup-like intervention in 1997.

_Birikim_ does not endorse these conventional accounts. It critiques the left's perception of the AK Party simply as a continuation of the WP and the National Outlook Movement (Millî Görüş Hareketi, NOM) which denies the AK Party any "new" attributes or potential to transform Turkey's politico-social life. _Birikim_ also takes issue with the left's further misconception about the party being a foster child of Turkey's big bourgeoisie and capital, and the imperialist powers led by the USA.21

For _Birikim_ , the AK Party is a unique entity in Republican history in terms of not only being an entirely new party model but also representing a new form of Islamic politics appealing to middle and upper classes. It has been able to create a coalition of voters from the now defunct center-right (The Motherland Party [MP] and the True Path Party [TPP]), as well as from the center-left (Democratic Left Party [DSP]) and the far-right National Action Party (NAP) of the 1990s and has built a broader and a more elitist support base than any of the parties with which it is compared. However, that doesn't make it another DP or MP or WP in disguise.22

For _Birikim_ , the primary feature of the party is that it is "a party to class politics." There is a consensus among the writers that the AK Party represents a middle-class movement, propelled by what is termed as an "authentic bourgeoisie."23 This authenticity is attributed to the fact that the classes that propel the party do not owe their emergence, existence or fattening up to the trickling down effects of the "entrenched/established" big capital which forms the traditional state-dependent Turkish bourgeoisie.24 They are also different from the commercial interests the DP represented in the 1950s because the DP's commercial support base emerged from an intra-bourgeoisie split between state-dependent business and outlier small trade interests on the periphery. The AK Party's support base of provincial/rural conservative merchants and businesses from Central and Eastern Anatolia, however, represents distinct business interests whose process of emergence has been "more authentic and modest" under the impetus of free-market policies started by the MP and its leader Turgut Özal in the 1980s.25 The AK Party, because of this base of conservative merchants and entrepreneurs from Central and Eastern Anatolia's provincial towns,26 should be characterized as having an:

authentic identity in terms of being culturally conservative; not being shy of its religiosity; promoting independent business and "trade" as a favored occupational activity rather than promoting an economic policy which makes the state the dominant employer in the country; and being moderately nationalist.27

Laçiner's deconstruction of the AK Party's "conservative" identity into "nationalism" and "Islam" as its components presents a highly nuanced analysis.28 Contrary to most accounts, he takes the view that the party's actual commitment to conservative ideology is weak and this is grounded in the fact that these two component ideologies, which were popular in the 1990s, became involved in and identified with the moral and practical bankruptcy of the center-right, center-left and the NOM parties. The AK Party, Laçiner argues, actually bases its identity and policies on the premise that nationalism and Islamist ideologies have lost their significance and reference value in society. Therefore, rather than decontaminate and reinvent them, the ruling party tries to fill in the gap by espousing itself as "democrat."29

However, the troika admits, the party's "democratic" policies still kept the operational rules of the conservative-statist logic of the old state intact and reproduced its _raison d'état_. _Birikim_ raises the interesting point that the party's rather large room for maneuver enabled it to keep the term "conservative" in its books without totally committing itself to complying with the conservative demands of its electorate. The example Laçiner gives is the party's attitude and strategies toward beating the headscarf ban in public service in 2004: when the AK Party failed to act on the demands of its conservative base, it passed the blame on to the voters for failing to do enough to beat the establishment's resistance to it.30 By drawing attention to the party's vacillations on conservative ideals, _Birikim_ , in the early years of the AK Party's domination, opens the readers' eyes to an important motto of the party: the values it upheld, be they conservative, democrat and/or Islamic were rooted in its pursuit of a supreme value, that is, achieving power and prestige for itself, not the protection and representation of abstract rights and freedoms.

For the _Birikim_ troika, the rise of the AK Party as a pivotal actor in politics is said to be due to two things: conjuncture and chance. It was by conjuncture that its election victories represented a popular repudiation of the center-left, left and center-right forces, as well as the NOM tradition. Laçiner claims that "the AK Party has taken over the ownership of the house of center-right"31 vacated by the latter's frail performance and that of the center-left RPP, which aligned itself with the secular establishment and small and middle-sized contractors (the middle men).

International conjuncture is claimed to have worked in the AK Party's favor at first: the USA's initial suspicions and souring of relations at the time of the Turkish parliament's 2003 decision not to allow American infantry to pass through Turkey to occupy Iraq, soon gave way to inviting Turkey to play a critical role in the region as the pieces of the international chessboard were rearranged.32 However, since the Arab Spring, Turkey has failed to develop meaningful ideas and credible policies for the region and more importantly, AK Party leader's name recognition (President of the Republic since 2014) and Turkey's influence in the region have receded. New negative developments after the Arab uprisings in the region since 2010 such as the Shia ascendancy in Iraq; Iran and Saudi Arabia continuing to play out their differences in violent sectarianism in countries they chose as allies; and Turkey's policy of focusing on overthrowing the Assad regime by any means are listed as contributing to this situation. Among these factors, there is also Turkey's policy of—if necessary—turning a blind eye to the to the extremism of the so-called Islamic State forces (ISIS) which burst into the scene in 2014 when it seized large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq and engaged in mass killings, abductions and beheadings.

On the way to June 7 elections in 2015, and especially after the third election victory of the AK Party in 2011, the party's "non-authentic" bourgeoisie support was sidelined and the media under the AK Party's control was pulled toward a line of total consensus with the AK Party's leadership.33 The non-authentic capital turned into reluctant supporters of the main opposition party, RPP.34 For the first time in their history, Turkey's powerful old bourgeoisie was challenged by a middle-class movement that claimed power in itself and for itself.35

## Birikim _and the "silent revolution" of the middle classes_

Why does _Birikim_ give paramount importance to the AK Party's middle-class character while raising doubts about its "conservative" identity? What is the relationship between these traits? The answer to these questions lies in _Birikim_ 's insightful analysis of one fundamental issue which bedevils almost all analysts about the AK Party's identity: the _Birikim_ writers argue that this is not a party which prioritizes conservative moral values at the expense of "economic" achievement which seems to be a "must" in sustaining the middle-class support. The strong push of the base in the direction of climbing up the socio-economic ladder is said to enable the party to start a "democratic bourgeoisie revolution more silent and deeper and more comprehensive than the DP's 1946–1950."36 In addition, the crisis created by the secular bloc in the 2007 presidential elections has also given the party leadership the opportunity to go ahead with a bourgeoisie democratic revolution to terminate the hegemony of the tutelary system.37 Laçiner, as early as 2004, agrees that leftists, socialists and social democrats of Turkey have totally failed to provide an alternative to the AK Party's power that emanates from its "authentic" middle-class support.38

More significantly, _Birikim_ 's emphasis with the AK Party's middle-class character seems to enable them to sideline the Islamic component of the party's identity and push its class nature to the foreground. In mounting its counter-attacks on big business and the TAF after 2007, the government is considered to have acted more out of a "class-like motive" to protect the economic and political interests of its conservative, middle-class support base than Islamic concerns. Likewise, in its pivotal decision to integrate with the EU, İnsel claims that the party took up the EU flag to largely channel the potential dynamism and energy which would be unleashed by the integration process to serve the cause of empowerment and growth of the Anatolian bourgeoisie.39

_Birikim_ points out that the middle-class nature of the party also catalyzed new initiatives in the AK Party's foreign policy. Although Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was an enthusiastic supporter of Turkey playing a proactive role in the USA's occupation of Iraq in 2003, the defeat of the related motion in the parliament earned him undeserved prestige and admiration among the Arab population, who were unaware of the real nature of the process.40 Soon after, came the idea of the Greater Middle East project which, though shrouded in a discourse of democracy and freedom, was in fact military-, market- and imperialism-centered. Its object was to encourage free market modernization in the region by encouraging local enterprises. At a time when the Turkish military was being considered as a marketable export, the GME project provided the opportunity for the government not only to create a zone for Turkish business to invest in but also to mend relations with the USA which had cooled off after 2003.41

Since its 2011 election victory, the prominence of the middle classes in the AK Party's life, in _Birikim_ 's analyses, has continued with the addition of the "Sunni" qualifier.42 Erdoğan's government since the beginning of its third term in office has allegedly been increasingly critical of the Iraqi government's Shiite character and seemed to suddenly discover that the Syrian regime was a dictatorship of Alawites. This, according to _Birikim_ , was a clear manifestation that Turkey aligned with US foreign policy aspirations in the process of polarization in the region between Sunnis and Shiis, by placing herself on the Sunni side.43 _Birikim_ claims that the AK Party's interest in promoting the interests of Turkey's Sunni middle classes enabled the party leadership to acquire the vision and the motivation in its foreign policy choices reduced to three maxims: "money, nationalism and Sunnism."44

However, the historic elections on June 7, 2015 when the party lost its majority seats to form a government for the first time since 2002 is considered a watershed because it marked a shift from a "Sunni conservative" to a "Turkish conservative" stand.45 The reason for this shift was that for the first time in 13 years, the AK Party was no longer able to borrow votes from across the spectrum, especially from the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP) whose support base was closer to that of the AK Party than to any other. In June 7 elections, the MHP increased its seats from fifty-three in 2011 elections to eighty while the Kurdish HDP's number of deputies also rose spectacularly from thirty-five to eighty. Being denied the large majority he had sought to amend the constitution to expand the powers of the presidency by the MHP's and especially the HDP's numbers, Erdoğan, who even after he was elected president by popular vote in 2014 still dominated the party completely, embarked on a nationalist political course after the June 7 elections shattering the peace process with the Kurds and starting a military offensive against the militant wing of the Kurdish nationalist movement, the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (Turkish acronym PKK), which culminated in calling for another vote on November 1. For Laçiner, Erdoğan's strategy of winning back the Turkish nationalist votes lost to the MHP entailed a visible shift to a far-right political position and entering into a competition with the MHP on the issue of "who is more nationalist."46

Overall, _Birikim_ editors provide a compelling analysis that the magic of the AK Party is rooted in a restless and ambitious middle-class ready to catch up with the established big business. The editors convincingly shift the focus from the false preoccupation with the AK Party's "Islamist" ideas and "conservative" values to the primacy it attaches to socio-economic relations. One question that remains, however, is this: what is the huge impact of material enrichment on the religious identity of the middle classes? How does the transformation of material life reconstruct the attachment to faith? More significantly, what about the relationship between moving up in the ladder of capitalist empowerment, and the belief in democracy as the political identity, that is, the attachment of the new middle classes to democracy? We will deal with _Birikim_ 's answers to the latter issue in the last section of this article under democracy.

_Birikim_ provides one interesting short glimpse into the erosion of the moral ground/compass of religious conservative middle classes benefiting from the huge wave of material enrichment under the AK Party governments. The instance arose in these classes' response to the most serious crisis that shook Erdoğan's personal prestige and credibility as well as his government's to the core when the government became locked in a bitter fallout at the end of 2013 with the movement led by Fethullah Gülen, a self-exiled Muslim leader who wields tremendous influence in the country and had supported the AK Party in its three consecutive election victories since 2002. Ostensibly, Gülenists have been at odds with Erdoğan over the government's hawkish policy toward Israel, its stalling of EU reforms, its search for a compromise with the Kurdish movement and especially over its plans to shut down the Gülenist network of schools. The movement is known to have colonized the police force as a Gülenist enclave together with some parts of the judiciary. The important result was that with the help of these two organs, Gülenists orchestrated a huge graft probe, which included government ministers and the prime minister himself. In a still ongoing assault against the Gülenists, the ruling party purged hundreds of police chiefs, judges and prosecutors responsible for instigating the corruption investigation without "permission." _Birikim_ points at the complicity of the AK Party's middle-class social base which stood by the leader's vengeful recrimination on the Gülen movement rather than demand an objective investigation into the alleged corruption. This is, for the troika a sign of unprincipled and amoral behavior. This amazing lack of interest and engagement shown by Turkey's middle classes toward the December 17 "earthquake"—termed thus because of the alleged magnitude of the corruption involved—is, for _Birikim_ , a clear instance of this class substituting money for moral/ethical/religious correctness.

The issue that economic well-being is the prime motive for the AK Party's middle-class support is reignited after the party's June 7, 2015 election defeat. _Birikim_ acknowledges, like most critics, that Erdoğan's plunge into an all-out war with the state's most ferocious enemy, the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK, is considered to be a move to reverse the defection of its middle-class nationalist voters to the MHP. By portraying the AK Party and Erdoğan as the bulwarks against Kurdish nationalism and the PKK's terrorism, and demonstrating that the HDP which made a strong show in the polls is actually a "front" for the PKK, Erdoğan's strategy was to have another election and win. When the list of all the post-election developments are taken into account, including the breakdown of coalition talks by the leader's maneuvers, calling for snap elections on November 1, the timing of the offensive, and the violence that spiraled as a result, Laçiner feels that they clearly point at a huge desperation and utter failure of a leader to get what he wants and at all costs.47 Within this amoral political habitat produced largely by Erdoğan himself, how to explain the loyalty of those who made up the 40.8 percent support the party still received in June 7 elections? Laçiner comes to the conclusion that the fidelity of the AK Party's voters is not to be measured by their appreciation of his successful leadership qualities or his oratory skills. It is driven by their fear that if the party lost office, they would be targeted for recrimination by the vindictive opponents of the party48 who, no doubt, were aggravated by the leader's own measures of recrimination for those who critiqued or opposed him.

On the other hand, "truth-seeking" and "political correctness" on the part of the masses is as rare in many parts of the democratic world as in Turkey since it is a function of a well-rounded civil societal space, established practices of accountability, developed processes of public deliberation and a strong tradition of an independent and impartial justice system. It might be factually correct to refer to lack of sensitivity for freedom of expression, justice and corruption by the AK Party's middle-class supporters. But, on another level, these classes are also created, constructed and shaped by the power strategy of Turkey's ruling classes, at present and in the past. In emphasizing the mentalities, mindsets and supposedly self-serving attitudes of the conservative middle classes in influencing the authoritarian praxis of a government, the powerlessness of these classes are obscured and the AK Party's role as the prime mover in producing a confrontational, hateful and undemocratic habitat goes amiss.

## Birikim _and the AK Party's policies toward the military tutelage_

_Birikim_ troika's personal histories and ideological upbringings obviously position them against the TAF's tutelary role, which they hold responsible for the repression of a democratic life and thought in Turkey after 1980.49 Not surprisingly, this issue has been at the center stage of their critique of the ruling party. The editors believe that the breaking point for the post-1980 tutelary regime came on February 28, 1997 when the notion of military intervention proved to be still alive and on the books. The post-2002 clandestine coup plans within the army revealed in 2007, on the other hand, showed that the aspirations of the high command had moved from "tutelage to establishing a military dictatorship."50 With the institutions, actors, constitution and laws of the tutelary regime still being operative, the consensus in _Birikim_ is that the investigations and trials of Ergenekon51 helped reveal to the public beyond any doubt that the guardians of the republic were plotting to overthrow a constitutionally elected government and the trials "are delivering the last blow" to the guardians exhausting their "societal legitimacy." The end result is that the Kemalist "tutelary regime is dying."52 Challenging the military's hegemony is portrayed as being inevitably intertwined with the middle-class support base of the party in _Birikim_ 's analysis. As a party carrying out a bourgeoisie democratic revolution, it had to deal with the military question to release the huge energy and dynamism of the so far marginalized but nascent middle classes in their march up to the top.

The _Birikim_ group lauds the AK Party's robust posture that led to the disempowerment of the high command regarding the latter's political role. One feels that in assessing the government's performance on the issue, the _Birikim_ troika has given this government a special/preferential place which they denied to past governments, which, to be fair to them, it can be argued, were hindered in their own treatment of the military issue by broader Cold War strategic conditions. _Birikim_ 's critique also overlooks the initial years of the government in office when it followed a conflict avoidance approach and did not rattle the military's cage. This appreciation of the government represented the sentiments of the majority of socialists in the country who suffered physically and emotionally in the past because of the ideological character and self-assigned guardian role of the army. Laçiner sums up why _Birikim_ has supported the government on this issue regardless of alienating most left-wingers:

I have always known that the AK Party guys were conservative right-wingers... "Well then," they say "is the AK Party any good?" No, it isn't. It doesn't have to be good. It fulfilled a duty in the removal of the military's tutelage. I believed that it was terrible for Turkey for the army to have a say about the country's future... I thought it was extremely important that the status of those who did not consider the majority of the citizens as human beings and caused hell in the life of the country was pulled back... This is done. _I wish we were the ones to achieve this_ ( _UC's emphasis_ ).53

However, there are still some qualifications to this positive appraisal. The explanation for this is to be found in Laçiner's words:

I know that beginning from the days the AK Party has cut the powers of the army, it has been planning on how to bring the army under its control in this sense. I know this even if I may not see any visible signs of it. This is what the logic of politics demands.54

_Birikim_ senses a tendency on the part of the ruling party to keep close ties with the army high command to keep it as a last resort trump card against any serious opposition to its hegemony: "If, let's imagine, a serious left-wing opposition emerges in the future, the conservative government would want to try to prepare the military to stage a coup to serve the government's purposes."55 This point is confirmed by the huge reversal of the AK Party's military policy after 2013 when the leader and the government of the day supported the review of the verdicts of those officers and civilians accused of conspiring to overthrow the government by appeal courts and the subsequent ruling by the Constitutional Court that paved the way for the release of all those convicted. It is a well-known fact that the trials could not have taken place without Gülenist sympathizers in the army helping to reveal the coup plans. As a result, the government's empathy for the release of all those sentenced in the cases is interpreted as a de facto alliance between Erdoğan and the high command against the Gülen movement.

The troika's criticism of the Ergenekon trials hinges on precisely this last point. Although happy about the trials, _Birikim_ is concerned about the ruling party's focus on the political and criminal aspects of the case at the expense of confronting the structures, culture and mentality that constitute the root causes of Ergenekon, Susurluk and similar crises.56 _Birikim_ believes that penalizing the most visible actors at the center of the crisis obfuscates a lack of policies which address the cultural and structural conditions that produce military tutelage. Furthermore, by seeking a "closure" of the issue which is not transparent, the AK Party blocks questioning of Turkey's configuration of traditional politics.57 For _Birikim_ , this amounts to the perpetuation of the existing status quo and its acceptance by those who vote for the AK Party "... no matter how much we [the socialists] object to and suffer from it."58

_Birikim_ also provides a general criticism of the Ergenekon investigations on the grounds that they are not free from political influence by the AK Party: "this investigation has followed a course that shows and reminds us of how executive and judiciary branches can be used for illegal and dirty purposes and relations."59 In the light of the above, it can be suggested that Birikim's view on the issue of military reform converges with those of Turkey's liberals who hold that despite the progress made in curbing the political powers of the TAF, these changes suffer from the basic flaw of not being completed in a democratic way. Acknowledging the continuing uncertainty and insecurity surrounding Turkey's civil–military relations, İnsel warns about not being too complacent about the "warriors of the ancient regime" sitting still. "A coup of despair" may be possible but has zero chance of success because it will be obvious that it is a coup for seeking power for itself (the TAF) rather than a coup made for the good of the country.60

## _Birikim_ 's views on "identitarianism" ( _Kimlikcilik_ ) and the AK Party's Kurdish policy

Kurdish nationalist claims unsettle _Birikim_ 's ideological habitat resting on their own knowledge, moral reasoning and understanding of the world which basically regards identity politics as a negative reductionism from grander universal ideas, values and principles which should transcend the so-called sectarian, religious and ethnic "essence." _Birikim_ 's strong aversion to the definition of identity as a fixed trait in one's life is further built on the argument that the potency and attraction of identity politics have emerged as a coping strategy for the lost conditions of the middle class under the onslaught of neoliberal globalization which left them at the mercy of market forces.61 The troika developed an inventive new argument explaining that both Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms have shifted toward what _Birikim_ writers consider a venal mode of thought and practice which they label as "identitarianism" ( _kimlikcilik_ ) and characterize it as a hegemonic mode of thinking that has permeated traditional nationalisms and other movements in the first decade of the twenty-first century.62 The transformation of nationalisms into identitarian movements, for _Birikim_ , has produced a process of "desensitization" to other human fellows that has enhanced "otherization"—something that is worse than hatred.63

Identitarianism was coined in around 2006 in Europe by the New Right Movement as a term which advocates the preservation and development of ethnic and cultural identity as the central tenet of one's being and emphasizes the interests and perspectives of discrete identity groups. Although _Birikim_ writers give no references to identitarianism debates in the West, this is not important at all, since these groups who coined the phrase in the West carry no visibility or prominence on the intellectual scene. What is important in _Birikim_ 's case is that it identifies a shift in the discourse and trajectories of both Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms in the 2000s toward a hardened attachment to a self-centered ethnic, religious or sectarian definition, the prime mover being a virulent ideology, neoliberal globalization.

_Birikim_ 's idea of resolving the Kurdish issue is a "nostalgic" one, not a dynamic one: identities existed in the past too, they claim, but they existed "within" grander collective political and ideological discourses, movements, parties and platforms of all shades. In the past, identity consciousness of an individual encapsulated an awareness of the acceptance of an "emotional interest" in "the other."64 Whereas now, a feeling of weakness, helplessness and vulnerability in the context of relentless market relations propels individuals to turn to platforms and parties which are exclusively focused on identities and act like the fan clubs of football teams. Venues of compromise and dialogue are denied; sensitivity and empathy toward and possibilities of dialogue with the others are diminished. Restricted by the constitution and laws, identitarian movements have also had the effect of muddying the waters in the debates on the Kurdish issue forcing the movement, for many years, to pronounce its goals and aspirations in coded terms.

_Birikim_ 's most durable objection to the identitarian nationalism of the Kurds, however, is based on the textbook argument that socialism and nationalism are irreconcilable in terms of their historical origins, visions and priorities: for Laçiner, for instance, nationalism receives its legitimacy from natural laws which give precedence to the security of life and is not interested in equality, whereas socialism is a quest for the removal of systems of domination and exploitation of man by man to achieve full equality.65 In the post-World War II era, the attempt to reconcile the two ended in socialism being nationalized rather than nationalism being transformed into socialism.66 The Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (the Turkish acronym BDP) deputies resigned and joined the new umbrella party called the People's Democracy Party (HDP in Turkish) in April 2014 to move from being a party narrowly focused on "Kurdish rights" to the one that adopts a broader leftist perspective. Before the emergence of the HDP as the new voice on the Kurdish side, one of _Birikim_ 's criticisms is that the BDP, by running non-Kurdish socialist candidates in the 2011 general elections to prove that its political aspirations superseded narrow identitarian claims, may not be doing the right thing.67 Laçiner finds this marriage unworkable since it would result in the nullification of socialism and bring about a false synergy between the two ideologies.68

The _Birikim_ circle seem to fully support the Kurdish demands for democratic rights of citizenship but not if and when they are connected with narrow identity demands. One member of the troika, Tanıl Bora, sums up this position:

The Kurdish question can not be reduced to an identity and identity politics [...] [if so it leads to] politics being defined in terms of identities rather than interests, conflicts, demands, ideals and utopias [...] The paradox here is that [...] identity politics imposes constraints on the ability to change the state of the world, human relations and the status quo of "things," or even the will to conceive this change as a possibility.69

Therefore, in his words, "to be reduced to identity withers the left-wing ideology ( _sol ideoloji_ )."70

The writers argue that in the first few years of the twenty-first century, the energetic democratization program of the AK Party played a part in subduing identity claims. But in the broader post-September 11 environment, with the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, and most significantly, with the ruling party's muted tone on a "democracy" agenda, identity nationalism—read as an identitarian movement—was revived.71 As a result, _Birikim_ emphasizes that the game plan of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK in its Kurdish Acronym) included escalating violence. But this had nothing to do with its old style guerilla warfare. Instead, beginning from the PKK's decision in 2005 to reverse its ceasefire of 2004 June and adopt an "active defence," that is, acts of violence by mine and bomb explosions that cost lives in the townships of Semdinli and Yuksekova, this time, it had everything to do with making sure that the Kurdish conflict would stay as a constant destabilizer on the radar screen of Turkey, unless a negotiated settlement which included principal actors on the Kurdish side was made. This game plan included provoking the government into "military" solutions and repressing the Kurds violently.72 Indeed, the government responded to the insurgency's growing lethal violence since mid-2004 by relying on the traditional "military" solution and Turkish nationalism turned more vicious and resolutely radical, declaring an open desire to expel the Kurds from Turkish soil. Until the government embarked on its "peace and resolution" process in 2012, the AK Party acted in collusion with the ultra-nationalist NAP and the statist-secular RPP.73

## Birikim _on the AK Party's Kurdish policy_

The results of June 7, 2015 elections represent a turning point for the broad position of the Kurdish question and the HDP's and the AK Party's approach to the issue.

The elections on June 7, 2015 posed a deep challenge to the AK Party and its leader: when it became clear that the AK Party had failed to gain a majority (276) to form a government, let alone achieve a two-fifths (367) majority needed to change the constitution in the way the leader wanted, or a three-fifths majority (330) to be able to call a referendum on the issue, it is believed that Erdoğan activated a desperate strategy resuming the old war with the PKK in mid-July.74 For _Birikim_ , the offensive against the PKK had nothing to do with defeating the PKK but everything to do with score-settling with the HDP which the leader regarded as the chief obstacle for achieving a system of government (an executive presidency) via constitutional amendment by a parliamentary majority. Prior to June 2015 elections, the HDP came to be regarded as the only force capable of standing up to the authoritarian policies of President Erdoğan and preventing the AK Party from getting the necessary numbers of deputies to amend the constitution. The idea behind launching massive military operations against the PKK strongholds in the south-east and northern Iraq was to thwart this dazzling upward trend of the HDP and its young and popular leader Selahattin Demirtaş by tainting them by association with the PKK terrorism which the HDP could neither control or stop.75 Although the HDP continued to receive the majority vote of the Kurds in the country, its rising popularity was indeed due to its ability to provide a canopy for all shades of progressive political and social beliefs.

The rising level of violence by the PKK since 2005 and the AK Party's resumption of the "military solution" in July 2015 which has left in tatters a ceasefire and peace talks which began during November–December 2012 confirm _Birikim_ 's formulations on three key issues regarding the AK Party's approach to the Kurdish conflict. The first is whether or not the AK Party broke in any way from the long-standing pattern of the state's enforcement of a "military" solution in the region at any time. The answer in _Birikim_ 's analyses, once more, boils down to the AK Party's Kurdish strategy for the ruling party's middle-class concerns. In this account, the AK Party government did follow a two-tiered approach toward the Kurdish issue: on the one hand, it relied on the traditional "military approach," on the other, and in fact simultaneously, it depended on a new matrix of socio-economic relations in the region. This matrix is based on extending the bourgeois-democratic transformation it achieved in the rest of Turkey to include Turkey's Kurdish bourgeoisie."76 Birikim asserts that given the region's conservative-Islamic-Sunni fabric, the AK Party perceives itself as the most suitable political platform for integrating the authentic Kurdish middle classes into its capitalist paradigm just as it did in the rest of Turkey.77 The party, according to the _Birikim_ troika, considers itself to be as "local" as the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (the BDP) claims itself to be.78 Prime Minister Erdoğan's key goal is to serve and satisfy the economic interests of the Kurdish bourgeoisie whose integration into global capitalism would have a trick-ledown effect, benefiting the lower middle-class segments of the Kurdish society. Similarly, although the AK Party's clamp down against the Union of Kurdish Communities (Kurdish acronym KCK), the extension of the PKK in urban areas, is interpreted by most as a continuation of the old state-centered hardline strategy of trying to crush the Kurdish movement, the _Birikim_ group explains it by the above logic: in its wave of arrests of the KCK members, the government tried to pre-empt the KCK as the PKK's local power base rivaling the party leadership's own attempts to integrate the local social groups.79 The June 7 elections, for the _Birikim_ troika revealed once more that the AK Party had never totally abandoned the old state wisdom of giving priority to "blocking" rather than "winning" the Kurds.80

The post-June 7 anti-terror offensive against the PKK also confirms the suspicions of _Birikim_ on the peace initiative of the AK Party announced publicly as the "Imrali negotiations," with Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, incarcerated on Imrali island. _Birikim_ writers revealed skepticism on the initiative early on because the hardening attitudes of identitarianism81 on both sides were too deeply entrenched to allow a humanitarian, democratic and resilient resolution. Laçiner argued in June 2011, "I hope we discover with the least pain and embarrassment and before it is too late that a resolution is not impossible."82 The troika also downplayed the importance of the initiative by pointing at the "internationalization" of the Kurdish question as its main driver and the major shifts it will cause in regional balances.83

Third, _Birikim_ 's most serious misgivings about the outcome of the peace process were centered on the "history" of the AK Party leadership, who opposed none of the harsh state policies against the Kurds while they were still key players in predecessor parties and movements before forming the AK Party in 2001. The disparaging discourse of the AK Party leadership toward the leaders of the Kurdish movement until the eve of the peace initiative process84 came up as another effective critique by _Birikim_ justifying its lack of optimism for a positive outcome.

### _A pity-filled perspective only?_

What can be said by way of critiquing _Birikim_ 's critiques: the identitarianism argument and the implicit or explicit but constantly held view that nationalism is incompatible with socialism place the journal in a difficult spot regarding its position on the Kurdish issue. Historical evidence has illustrated how the rejection of minority nationalist claims because of established socialist principles served to reinforce oppressive practices of _anciens régimes_ which these nationalist movements oppose. In anticipation of this critique, Ömer Laçiner affirms that socialists cannot remain indifferent to depriving ethnic, religious and sectarian communities and other minorities of their basic rights and freedoms:85 "Socialists unconditionally support the struggle for equal citizenship and basic rights and freedoms as stipulated by the Constitution of nation-states."86 Having accepted a moral responsibility for socialists to intervene when these rights are endangered, he then switches to a "however" discourse: "however, this does not mean nationalisms of these communities can be tolerated and not be made subject to socialist critique."87

This "however" discourse is an affirmation of _Birikim_ 's reluctance to stake out a more constructive and creative criticism of established patterns of socialist thinking regarding identities. The ambivalence it portrays toward the Kurdish question makes it sound as if the moral responsibility of socialists toward Kurdish claims stops short of a critical point and remains essentially a "pity-filled" perspective regarding the infringement of basic rights and freedoms, and indifference toward the most fundamental cultural identity claims. The same critical perspective favoring socialist over ethnic identities re-emerged in the wake of the HDP's electoral success in June 7 elections: Laçiner questions whether the new/progressive identity of the HDP as representing a broad progressive coalition rather than narrow Kurdish interests is an ephemeral victory for universal-socialist ideas which has arisen out of the necessities of the conjuncture.88 His uncertainty on whether the HDP can inspire a new and grander/humanistic socialist agenda as a long-term replacement of political-ethnic identities harbors wishful thinking. This may be a misperception or a misreading of _Birikim_ 's stand on identities, but with its repeated criticism of "identity as an unchanging status derived from history,"89 it is easy for a reader to jump to the conclusion that identity is often an empty, shallow and apolitical vessel divorced from the broader dysfunctions of the political system and reduced to a struggle for nothing much.

## _Birikim_ on AK Party's stand on democracy, power and "authoritarianism"

### _AK Party and democracy until the "Gezi protests"_

Although there is disagreement among writers as to when it started, the _Birikim_ group reiterates that what has made the government's initial performance look democratic was conjuncture and concurs that there has been an anti-democratic thrust by the ruling party in terms of its attitude, policies and style: one date that stands out is 2004 when the EU offered 2005 as the date when negotiations for Turkey's candidacy would begin.90 Another one is post-2007 when the presidential crisis of 2007 was resolved by the electoral victory of the party.91 Yet another turning point is offered as the period since the June 2011 elections because until then "... even though not continuously, the AK Party governments were able to follow 'liberal and democratic sounding policies which forced the limits of their conservatism as the primary component of their identity.' "92

The _Birikim_ troika seems to take a more thoughtful and nuanced view than most intellectual forums in Turkey regarding the issue: they point to the persistent discourses of illiberal elements expressed by party organizations and networks, government institutions, programs, policies even when anti-establishment democratic achievements were made.93 It seems _Birikim_ tends to believe that both democratic and anti-democratic discourses coexisted as part of a single discourse for a long time. Moreover, they do not connect the anti-democratic practices of the government with the despotic tendencies of the leadership. Rather, they accept the reality that the different sets of political games/balances of power the AK Party pursues are dizzying combinations of discourses that serve to maintain, consolidate and broaden power rather than stick to any notion of consistency, ideology or principles.

The writers depart from the widely-held assumptions that the party has exhausted its change-oriented discourse. Instead, as the transformation it has caused is actually propelled by bottom-up rather than top-down forces, "[therefore] to claim absolutely that the AK Party cannot make any moves toward democratization is only possible if one adopts acutely elitist suspicions that exist in some sectors in the society."94 The departure from orthodox views rests on the troika's distinction between different types of authoritarianism. Ahmet İnsel puts forward that the one-man rule, as the critics define it, of the AK Party represents more than a simple authoritarianism: since 2007, the party leadership has manifested an "interventionist" type of authoritarian rule which has combined "conservative values, authoritarian reflexes and patriarchial mentality" to impose its own image of "acceptable ( _makbul_ ) society," visualized in terms of lifestyles, beliefs, values, behaviors and male–female relations.95 Change, in other words, is still on the books. Prime Minister Erdoğan believes he epitomizes the "acceptable ( _makbul_ )" part of the nation which constitutes the majority who voted for him.96 "Popular will," in this logic, is the will of "Erdogan's nation, i.e., ( _makbul_ ) majoritarian will."97 Those who are outside the majority are depicted as the "others" or the "marginal," who cause grief to the acceptable ( _makbul_ ) nation.98 The level of aggression embedded in the paternalist component of the authoritarian facet of the leadership increases when Erdoğan addresses the "others."99

One original thesis by _Birikim_ , however, puts the blame for the anti-democratic tendencies of the AK Party government on the compliance and silence of Islamic intellectuals. Islamic intellectuals, who supported basic freedoms, showed no bias against sectarian minorities and defended a democratic resolution of the Kurdish problem in the past, have turned silent vis-à-vis the ruling party during its second and third terms because they have acquired some lucrative power enclaves in pro-government media and think-tanks and do not want to risk losing them.100 They could no longer be the honest interpreters of Islam in the new socio-cultural context that has shaped the middle classes, that is, Turkey's conservative bourgeoisie, in such a way that they are already caught up in the forces of a capitalist consumption culture which has an irreligious logic of its own.

The _Birikim_ troika agrees with the conventional critiques that the AK Party leadership is bent on unlimited executive power, rejection of any legal limits to governmental authority and a presidential system—believing, rightly or wrongly that it will basically help establish a more powerful system of governance. They also converge with the general argument of the debate that attribute the party's unrivaled position in politics to the severe erosion of the center-right and left; the disingenuousness of the opposition platforms and parties; the ruling party's economy-first outlook; its international support; and its unprecedented foreign policy initiatives.

### _Middle classes again_

In understanding the AK Party leadership's increasingly top-down, offensive and crude tone, especially after 2007, the most important analytical framework the _Birikim_ group offers to the readers hinges once more on the party's middle-class constituency: this social base extends its unconditional support in filling the hegemony vacuum produced by the marginalization of Kemalist forces and actors.101 In İnsel's words, "there are signs that the AK Party tries to compensate for the 'hegemony' vacuum created by the collapse of the _ancien régime_ not by changing the institutions and practices but by making them dependent on the government."102 In a series of articles devoted to developing the "hegemony vacuum" thesis, Laçiner places the "authentic middle classes which have become the 'hegemonic factor' under the AK Party's management,"103 rather than the party itself at the heart of the "authoritarianism" debate. He contends that Prime Minister Erdoğan's lack of tolerance for criticism, his disrespect for his opponents, aggressive and patriarchal tone, and partiality to violent police methods represent an existential style of governance which resonate with the normal state of mind of the middle classes.104 As a leader carried to power by the middle classes, Erdoğan is aware that his style will not cost his party dramatic losses of votes among the conservative middle classes.105 The leadership's pause at the point of completing systematic reforms to remove the political muscle of the military, for instance, is explained by the middle classes' indifference to the process. _Birikim_ draws parallels between the affinity of the AK Party's support base to undemocratic politics and the middle classes' self-interested fight against the aristocracy in the West. There, too, those classes gave "precedence to their own economic efficiency and dynamics" while not being concerned about other issues.106 It is suggested that any real alternative that may emerge for the AK Party would have to question and transform the party's middle-class support base radically.107

The brutal police response to the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul that started on May 31, 2013 sparked an insightful and profound debate among the troika which has had bearings on the discussions about the AK Party's democratic/undemocratic character. The protests were, on the surface, about the preservation of a park in central Istanbul, against government plans to build a shopping mall in its place. The _Birikim_ group agrees with most liberal left-wing interpretations that the protests were driven by much more than that: they were a challenge to the top-down undemocratic decision-making process at local and central government levels and more broadly against corruption and lopsided wealth distribution as the effects of urban transformation and zoning projects of the AK Party's neoliberal capitalism.108 The real issue that baffled most, however, was the excessively violent methods the government allowed the police to use to clamp down the demonstrations. What was it that unsettled the government so hugely in Gezi and made it push buttons to reaffirm, re-enact and represent an undemocratic, autocratic and police-state character?

In addressing the question, the troika forms connections between the ruling party's perception of the nature and composition of Gezi and the party's essential character and obsessive fears: at first, the leadership of the party misconceived Gezi as leftist civil disobedience.109 When they realized the true nature of the movement as a medley with no particular political attachments, vision and leadership however, the prime minister's and his advisors' fear and anger and wish for reprisal against the demonstrators grew. Why?

The leadership of the party formulated a formidable threat perception premised on what they considered to be a fiercely anti-AK Party coalition of forces of Gezi: for _Birikim_ , the top policy-making cadre of the party quite rightly identified that the groups and sectors that were behind Gezi were powerful metropole businesses, middle to high income professionals employed by organizations and corporations owned by these big businesses, Turkey's qualified labor, intellectuals and young students. _Birikim_ 's first critical question is why, although all of these groups had been at the forefront of the capitalist economic transformation brought by the AK Party and had benefited from it, did they turn out to be the voice of Gezi's vocal opposition to the party? The second related question is that since the government should be comfortable with the windows of economic opportunity it created for these cross-class groups, what exactly were the concerns and apprehensions of the party?

_Birikim_ suggests that Erdoğan and his advisors quite rightly understood that the opposition expressed in Gezi was not about socio-economic grievances. Nor was it an expression of the same old politico-cultural animosity of the secular-white Turk establishment forces anxious about sustaining their "contemporary lifestyles" against the onslaught of "reactionary" Islamists.110 Gezi's social power and spirit "transcended" defending a modern lifestyle against the authoritarian conservative social engineering of the AK Party in terms of seeking to liberate their modern lifestyle from different kinds of limitations: Gezi protesters, who could be said to represent the new look of Turkey's individualist, self-absorbed, narcissistic and "unpolitical" sectors, were protecting their "freedoms as a way of existence," participating in a "rebellion of integrity."111 _Birikim_ argues, that the social coalition of forces that made up Gezi were the products of the social relations of neoliberal capitalism gathering tremendous force under the AK Party. As such, they formed the potential backbone of a left-wing political party that could emerge as a serious alternative to the AK Party.112 The social profile and the basic aims of the Gezi coalition intensified the threat perception of the ruling party and made them resort to a relentless and brutal use of militarized techniques of the police because they were considered to be a genuine anathema to the party.

_Birikim_ likens the leadership's reaction and recrimination against the Gülen movement in March 2014 to Gezi protesters of May 2013. Both incidents were considered major threats directed at shaking the AK Party's core support in society. That is why, on both occasions, the government and its "embedded media" are said to have applied a strategy of provoking the fears, complexes and basic biases kept in the dark corners of the conservative middle classes' minds, hearts and memory against the Atatürkist establishment forces and their Western supporters.113 The strategy was making up "lies" about Gezi's and the Gülen movements' character and intentions to conspire with outside powers to overthrow the government.114

### _From Gezi to post-June 7 elections: shift to the "leadership" perspective_

The _Birikim_ troika feels that on the road to and following the June 7 elections, the position of the opposition against the government now depended more than ever on the strategies and whims of President Erdoğan who concentrated power in his hands and sidelined the Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. In the days before and after these historic elections, _Birikim_ writers seem to devote more and more articles to unpacking Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership qualities on a personal level.115 The primary motive for this unusual focus is the chain-reaction that started with the life-and-death importance which the leader attached to the elections to enable him to change the constitution and bring in an imperial presidency. When the results came in, Erdoğan refused to accept them as binding and steered the country toward another elections on November 1, at a time when violence in the south-east threatened to spiral out of control. Noting these highly irregular series of events, even by Turkish standards, as instances of the leader's readiness to undermine democracy and his disregard for "fair play,"116 _Birikim_ writers turned their focus to understanding "the phenomenon of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan."117

Although his undemocratic traits have always been there, İnsel, Belge and Laçiner seem to agree that Erdoğan's increasing preoccupation with power and his antipathy to opposition and criticism has taken a turn for the worse since the Gezi protests. Calling it an explosion of ego at the spectre of threats to his power, the leader is claimed to have revealed his true colors by locking himself and his supporters into a vicious struggle against the "enemies" who were, in fact, created by his confrontational and divisive style.118

Laçiner traces the sources of Erdoğan's primal and confrontational leadership to the global emergence of less than superior leaders with average qualities and lesser moral and intellectual standards.119 He also compares Erdoğan to the leaders of Turkey's center-right tradition in a previous era (Menderes, Demirel and Özal) and comes to the conclusion that the latter represented higher inspirations and purposes and led their supporters, not just reaffirming the primal instincts of their followers, but showing true leadership.120

## Conclusion

_Birikim_ 's troika has been following a daring and remarkable course and discourse to help readers engage with socialist sensibilities on justice, equality, equity, human rights, dignity, integrity and universal rights at a time when an Islam-friendly conservative government has a substantial popular base, and has established itself as a credible political force on a national and international scale before it drew new battlelines after the 2011 elections and especially after the Gezi Park protests. These lines were between the government and its critics that extended from business and media to metropolitan youth and intellectuals, from Western governments, Gülenists and Kurds to Atatürkists. In offering a trade-off for relative prosperity to its "authentic" power base, the party has in return asked for them to "look the other way" when it came to _its crisis-provoking_ , control-oriented and illiberal policies. No doubt, Turkey's government-friendly media has also played a big part in shaping middle-class attitudes and postures in the direction of facilitating the rise of authoritarian practices independent of the "readiness" of leaders, movements and the masses. The authoritarian traits of Kemalism still existing within the framework of Turkey's democracy-unfriendly regime deserve a special place for being historically responsible for enabling the ruling party to combine some elements of liberal democracy with essentially authoritarian components.121

_Birikim_ also must endure the criticism that theirs is a downsized/shortsized socialist message in the age of the new realities of globalism. Laçiner confirms this tendency candidly when he says: "we acted on the philosophy of not arriving at the end goal but starting to take the road."122 It would be correct to claim that the sympathizers of leftist thought, most of whom are ardent _Birikim_ readers, have been asking themselves over the last thirteen years vexing questions on whether or not they can take the helm of the country and bring back the social state, a more regulated corporate world, more economic regulation, specific progressive policies for underprivileged sectors especially women and children, and highlight the physical, economic, sexual and political powers that shape our lives.

The prognosis for a positive answer is glim: in all fairness to _Birikim_ , it is true that injustices of capitalism, socio-economic crises and irregularities of democracy may no longer evoke the same negative sensibilities, reactions and shock. Consumerism, with its indispensable weapon of credit cards, is masking greed and insecure relationships, and breeding indifference to subversion of justice and democracy. Some major damages in individuals' economic, social, cultural and political lives caused by global capitalism have already been addressed and hijacked by Islam-friendly governments' well-organized welfare policies. The conviction that the existing order could be changed by credible platforms with coherent ideologies and programs is exhausted. The question becomes not what and how the political order will be like but "who" will rule, and that seems to be the facilitating condition for neoliberalism's hegemony.

Even when it is accepted that the left's future probably lies in partial, eclectic and leader-based explanations and projects, very few in the country actually believe that the indivisible hand of the market is just or fair, and that global capitalism is an equal opportunity game rather than one of cruel inequalities. There is room for thinking that the left can take advantage of such a radically unleveled playing field, work for those left behind and capture "unpolitical and indifferent"123 imaginations by new notions of egalitarianism, liberty, feminized politics and democracy. Overall, in keeping the flame alive both in terms of self- and general critique; being relevant intellectually on the level of democratic opposition; and in redefining socialist sensibilities and lexicon, _Birikim_ continues to play an important role.

## Notes

1 Wendy Hunter and Janet Halley, "Introduction," in Wendy Brown and Janet Halley (eds), _Left Legalism/Left Critique_ (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 27.

2 Ahmet İnsel, "Murat Belge ile Söyleşi: 250. Sayıda Neleri Yapamadık." _Birikim_ 160–61 (August–September 2010): 14.

3 Murat Belge (1943–) (now a retired professor and an active intellectual) was a PhD student in Istanbul University Faculty of Letters, while Ömer Laçiner (1946–) was at that time a young officer. They were both released from prison by the general amnesty of 1974.

4 İnsel, "Murat Belge ile Söyleşi," p. 13.

5 Ibid., p. 12.

6 Ahmet Samim, "The Left," in Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak (eds), _Turkey in Transition_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 169.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 13.

9 Ibid., p. 13 and "Ömer Laçiner'le Söyleşi: Birikim'in 250. Sayısında Anlatılan Nedir?" _Birikim_ 160–61 (August–September 2010): 21.

10 İnsel, "Murat Belge ile Söyleşi," p. 13.

11 "Ömer Laçiner'le Söyleşi," p. 20.

12 Ibid.

13 Hunter and Halley, "Introduction," p. 29.

14 Zeynep Miraç (interview with Ömer Laçiner) "Yetmez Ama Evet Dedim: Yine de AKP'ye Muhalifim." _Milli_ yet (Istanbul daily), February 18, 2013.

15 "Ömer Laçiner'le Söyleşi," p. 20.

16 Ömer Laçiner, "Muhafazakar Burjuvaziye Karsı Nasıl Bir Alternatif Yaratmak." _Birikim_ 278–79 (June–July 2012): 6.

17 Ibid., p. 7.

18 Ömer Laçiner, "Muhafazakar Burjuvaziye Karşı Nasıl Bir Alternatif Yaratmak"; and Murat Belge, "Nationalism, Democracy and the Left in Turkey." _Journal of Intercultural Studies_ 30, no. 1, (February 2009): 7–20.

19 Belge, "Nationalism, Democracy and the Left," p. 8.

20 İnsel, "Murat Belge ile Söyleşi," p. 14.

21 Ahmet İnsel, "AKP ve Solun Ezberleri: AKP'yi Teşhir Etmekle Yetinmenin Hafifliği." _Birikim_ 262 (February 2011): 9.

22 Ibid., p. 9.

23 Ibid., p. 3.

24 Ömer Laçiner, "29 Mart Secimleri: Bir Dönemin Sonunun Tescili." _Birikim_ 240 (April 2009): 4; Tanıl Bora, "AKP: Yeni Merkez Sağ," in Ümit Kurt (ed.), _AKP Yeni Merkez Sağ Mı?_ (Ankara: Dipnot, 2009), p. 127; Ahmet İnsel, "AKP ve Solun Ezberleri," p. 3.

25 Ömer Laçiner, "AKP'nin Kriz Yönetimi Sınavı." _Birikim_ 184–85 (August–September 2004): 4.

26 Laçiner, "29 Mart Seçimleri," p. 5.

27 İnsel, "AKP ve Solun Ezberleri," p. 3.

28 Laçiner, "AKP'nin Kriz Yönetimi Sınavı," p. 4.

29 Ibid., p. 3.

30 Ömer Laçiner, "AKP, Hikmet-i Hükümet ve Siyaset." _Birikim_ 183 (July 2004): 8.

31 Ömer Laçiner, "Büyük Orta Doğu Projesi ve AKP." _Birikim_ 179 (March 2004): 3.

32 Laçiner, "Büyük Orta Doğu Projesi ve AKP," p. 2.

33 Birikim cites the chairwoman of the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen-TUSIAD being talked down and humiliated by the prime minister in public as an example.

34 Laçiner, "Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ve AKP," p. 3.

35 İnsel, "AKP ve Solun Ezberleri: AKP'yi Teşhir Etmekle Yetinmenin Hafifliği," p. 3; Ömer Laçiner, "AKP, Neyin İktidari." _Birikim_ 283 (November 2012): 13.

36 İnsel, "AKP ve Solun Ezberleri," p. 4.

37 Ibid., p. 6.

38 Laçiner, "AKP'nin Kriz Yönetimi Sınavı," p. 4.

39 İnsel, "AKP ve Solun Ezberleri," p. 4.

40 Ömer Laçiner, "Orta Siniflar ve AKP: 'Orta'ligin Hukumranligi." _Birikim_ 280–81 (August–September 2012): 8.

41 Ömer Laçiner, "Büyük Orta Doğu Projesinde Ordu Girişimci Elele." _Birikim_ 195 (July 2005): 3–6.

42 Laçiner, "Orta Siniflar ve AKP," p. 7.

43 Ibid., p. 7.

44 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

45 Ömer Laçiner, "HDP'yi Ne Yapmali." _Birikim_ (weekly report), July 31, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1552/hdp-yi-ne-yapmali#.VkTDm9Bh2i4

46 Ibid.

47 Ömer Laçiner, "7 Haziran." _Birikim_ 314–15 (July 2015): 3–8, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim-yazi/7199/7-haziran#.VkTEP9Bh2i4

48 Ömer Laçiner, "Recep Tayyip Erdogan'in Liderligi." _Birikim_ (weekly report), May 26, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1474/recep-tayyip-erdogan-inliderligi#.VkTEkNBh2i4

49 Ahmet İnsel, "Vesayet Rejiminin Sonu ve Sonrası." _Birikim_ 251–52 (March–April 2010): 5.

50 Ibid., p. 5.

51 Labeled as the "court case of the century," Ergenekon is the name given to an alleged clandestine, ultra-nationalist organization in Turkey with ties to members of the military and civilian security forces aiming to overthrow the government. Investigation into their activities since 2007 has led, over many years, to the arrest and trial of over 100 people, including members of the secular-nationalist Republican People's Party, journalists, military and police officials, chief of army staff and a former secretary general of the National Security Council. The Constitutional Court ruled in June 2014 that mishandling of the evidence had violated the defendants' rights which led to the suspects' release and retrial. All of those convicted were acquitted in March 2015 after being retried.

52 İnsel, "Vesayet Rejiminin Sonu," p. 4.

53 Laçiner, "Yetmez Ama Evet Dedim."

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ömer Laçiner, "Ergenekon Davası ve Zihniyet Dünyamız." _Birikim_ 238 (February 2009): 3.

60 İnsel, "Vesayet Rejiminin Sonu," p. 6.

61 Ömer Laçiner, "Kim(lik) Vurduya Hayır." _Birikim_ 205–06 (May–June 2006): 4.

62 Ibid., p. 7.

63 Ibid., p. 3.

64 Laçiner, "Kim(lik) Vurduya Hayir," p. 2.

65 Ömer Laçiner, "Sosyalizm Versus Milliyetçilik." _Birikim_ 249 (January 2010): 69.

66 Ibid.

67 Ömer Laçiner, "12 Haziran Seçimleri: Tuzaklar ve İhtimaller." Birikim 267 (July 2011): 9.

68 Ibid., p. 10.

69 Tanıl Bora, _Sol, Sinizm, Pragmatizm_ (Ankara: Iletisim, 2010), p. 32.

70 Ibid., p. 76; Ömer Laçiner reiterates the same position in "Kim(lik) Vurduya Hayır," p. 6.

71 Laçiner, "Kim(lik) Vurduya Hayır," p. 3.

72 Ibid., p. 4.

73 Ömer Laçiner, "Kürt Sorunu: Seçimler Sonrası Ödeyeceğimiz Bedel." _Birikim_ 266 (June 2011): 6.

74 Laçiner, "HDP'yi Ne Yapmali?"

75 Ibid.

76 Ömer Laçiner, "Muhafazakar Demokratliğin Kaderi AKP: Zirveden Sonra." _Birikim_ 272 (December 2011): 6; Ahmet İnsel, "Muhafazakar-Otoriter İttifaki: AKP'nin Kendine Demokratliği, _Birikim_ 226 (February 2008): 9.

77 Ömer Laçiner, "AKP ve MHP"nin Kurt Sorunu Uzerinden Milliyetçilik Mucadelesi." _Birikim_ 236–37 (December–January 2009): 5, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim-yazi/3923/akp-ve-mhpnin-"kurt-sorunu"-uzerinden-milliyetcilik-mucadelesi#.VkTKM9Bh2i4

78 Ibid.

79 Laçiner, "Muhafazakar Demokratliğin Kaderi," p. 7.

80 Laçiner, "7 Haziran."

81 Ömer Laçiner, "Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Süreci: Fırtına Öncesi Sessizlik." _Birikim_ 288 (April 2013): 5.

82 Laçiner, "Kürt Sorunu: Seçimler Sonrası Ödeyeceğimiz Bedel," p. 6.

83 Laçiner, "Yetmez ama Evet Dedim."

84 Laçiner, "Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Süreci," p. 5.

85 Laçiner, "Sosyalizm versus Milliyetçilik," p. 67.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Laçiner, "7 Haziran."

89 Ibid.

90 Laçiner, "Büyük Orta Doğu Projesinde Ordu Girişimci Elele?," p. 4.

91 Laçiner, "AKP: Neyin İktidari," p. 12.

92 Laçiner, "Muhafazakar Demokratların Kaderi," p. 3.

93 Laçiner, "Orta Siniflar ve AKP," p. 5.

94 Ahmet İnsel, "Vesayet Rejiminin Sonu ve Sonrası." _Birikim_ 251–52 (March–April 2010): 6.

95 Ahmet İnsel, Tek Adam Günlerinde Otoriter Tahakkum." _Birikim_ 291–92 (July 2013): 14.

96 Ibid., p. 15.

97 Ibid., 16; and Tanıl Bora, "Başbakan Kendine Bir Millet Seçiyor." _Birikim_ (weekly report), Haziran 12, 2013, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/727/basbakan-kendine-bir-millet-seciyor#.VkTMzNBh2i4

98 İnsel, "Tek Adam Günlerinde," p. 15; Bora, "Başbakan Kendine Bir Millet Seçiyor."

99 İnsel, "Tek Adam Günlerinde," p. 15.

100 Ibid., p. 3.

101 Laçiner, "AKP: Neyin İktidarı," p. 2.

102 İnsel, "Vesayet Rejiminin Sonu ve Sonrası," p. 9.

103 Laçiner, "AKP: Neyin İktidarı," p. 123.

104 Laçiner, "Orta Siniflar ve AKP," p. 9.

105 Ibid.

106 Ömer Laçiner, "27 Nisan Muhtırası, Seçimler: 'Aristokratlar' ile Burjuvazi Mücadelesinde Son Aşamaya Doğru." _Birikim_ 218 (June 2007): 9.

107 Laçiner, "Ortaklığın Hükümranlığı," p. 11.

108 Laçiner, "Gezi İsyani," p. 10.

109 Laçiner, "Gezi İsyanı," p. 2.

110 Ibid., p. 8.

111 İnsel, "Tek Adam Günlerinde," p. 14.

112 Laçiner, "Gezi İsyani," p. 8.

113 Ömer Laçiner, "Cemaat-AKP çatışması İktidar için bir Devrin Sonu mu?" _Birikim_ 297 (January 2014): 5; Tanıl Bora, "Oparasyon." _Birikim_ 297 (January 2014): 11–14.

114 Laçiner, "Cemaat-AKP Catışması."; Ahmet İnsel, "Bir Devir Daha Kapanırken." _Birikim_ 297 (January 2014): 10.

115 Murat Belge, "7 Haziran Secimi." _Birikim_ (weekly report), June 1, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1483/7-haziran-secimi#.VkTU8dBh2i5; Ahmet İnsel, "Kimsenin Kimseye Guvenmedigi Toplumda Anayasa Nasil Degisir." _Birikim_ (weekly report), April 13, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1434/kimsenin-kimseye-guvenmedigi-toplumda-anayasa-nasil-degisir#.VkTWEdBh2i4; Murat Belge, "Erdogan'in Kendine Donusu." _Birikim_ (weekly report), February 23, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1389/erdogan-in-kendine-donusu#.VkT-WWdBh2i4; Laçiner, "7 Haziran."

116 Belge, "Erdogan'in Kendine Donusu."

117 Laçiner, "7 Haziran."

118 Belge, "Erdogan'in Kendine Donusu."

119 Ömer Laçiner, "Recep Tayyip Erdogan'in Liderligi." _Birikim_ (weekly report) May 26, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1474/recep-tayyip-erdogan-inliderligi#.VkTWqdBh2i4

120 Ibid.

121 Among the troika, Ahmet İnsel makes a passing reference to the legacy of Kemalism playing a role in the illiberal and authoritarian market capitalism model of the AK Party. See Ahmet İnsel, "Tayyip Erdoğan and Kalkınmacı Şeflik İdeali." _Birikim_ 285 (January 2013): 10.

122 Laçiner, "Yetmez ama Evet Dedim."

## Bibliography

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Belge, Murat. "7 Haziran Secimi." _Birikim_ (weekly report), June 1, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1483/7-haziran-secimi#.VkTU8dBh2i5

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Bora, Tanıl. "AKP: Yeni Merkez Sağ," in Ümit Kurt (ed.), _AKP Yeni Merkez Sağ Mı?_. Ankara: Dipnot, 2009, 123–130.

Bora, Tanıl. _Sol, Sinizm, Pragmatizm_. Ankara: Iletisim, 2010.

Bora, Tanıl. "Başbakan Kendine Bir Millet Seçiyor." _Birikim_ (weekly report), June 12, 2013. www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/727/basbakan-kendine-bir-millet-seciyor#.VkTMzNBh2i4

İnsel, Ahmet. "Muhafazakar-Otoriter İttifaki: AKP'nin Kendine Demokratliği." _Birikim_ 226 (2008): 9–13.

İnsel, Ahmet. "Birikim'in 250. Sayısında Anlatılan Nedir?." Interview with Ömer Laçiner: ["What Is Being Told in Birikim's 250. Issue"]. _Birikim_ 160–61 (2010): 17–21.

İnsel, Ahmet. "Murat Belge ile Söyleşi: 250. Sayıda Neleri Yapamadık." (Interview with Murat Belge: ["What We Couldn't Achieve in the 250th Issue"]. _Birikim_ 160–61 (2010): 11–16.

İnsel, Ahmet. "Vesayet Rejiminin Sonu ve Sonrası." _Birikim_ 251–52 (2010): 3–8.

İnsel, Ahmet. "AKP ve Solun Ezberleri: AKP'yi Teşhir Etmekle Yetinmenin Hafifliği." _Birikim_ 262 (2011): 3–12.

İnsel, Ahmet. "Tek Adam Günlerinde Otoriter Tahakkum." _Birikim_ 291–92 (2013): 12–19.

İnsel, Ahmet. "Tayyip Erdoğan and Kalkınmacı Şeflik İdeali." _Birikim_ 285 (2013): 7–10.

İnsel, Ahmet. "Kimsenin Kimseye Guvenmedigi Toplumda Anayasa Nasil Degisir." _Birikim_ (weekly report), April 13, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1434/kimsenin-kimseye-guvenmedigi-toplumda-anayasa-nasil-degisir#.VkTWEdBh2i4

Laçiner, Ömer. "Büyük Orta Doğu Projesi ve AKP." _Birikim_ 179 (2004): 3–7.

Laçiner, Ömer. "AKP'nin Kriz Yönetimi Sınavı." _Birikim_ 184–85 (2004): 3–6.

Laçiner, Ömer. "AKP, Hikmet-i Hükümet ve Siyaset." _Birikim_ 183 (2004): 6–8.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Büyük Orta Doğu Projesinde Ordu Girişimci Elele." _Birikim_ 195 (2005): 3–6.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Kim(lik) Vurduya Hayır." _Birikim_ 205–06 (2006): 3–10.

Laçiner, Ömer. "27 Nisan Muhtırası, Seçimler: 'Aristokratlar' ile Burjuvazi Mücadelesinde Son Aşamaya Doğru." _Birikim_ 218 (2007): 3–9.

Laçiner, Ömer. "29 Mart Secimleri: Bir Dönemin Sonunun Tescili." _Birikim_ 240 (2009): 3–7.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Ergenekon Davası ve Zihniyet Dünyamız." _Birikim_ 238 (2009): 3–8.

Laçiner, Ömer. "AKP ve MHP"nin Kürt Sorunu Üzerinden Milliyetçilik Mucadelesi." _Birikim_ 236–37 (2009): 3–7.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Sosyalizm Versus Milliyetçilik." _Birikim_ 249 (2010): 68–76.

Laçiner, Ömer. "12 Haziran Seçimleri: Tuzaklar ve İhtimaller." _Birikim_ 267 (2011): 3–10.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Kürt Sorunu: Seçimler Sonrası Ödeyeceğimiz Bedel." _Birikim_ 266 (2011): 3–6.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Muhafazakar Demokratliğin Kaderi AKP: Zirveden Sonra." _Birikim_ 272 (2011): 3–8.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Muhafazakar Burjuvaziye Karsı Nasıl Bir Alternatif Yaratmak." _Birikim_ 278–79 (2012): 3–8.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Süreci: Fırtına Öncesi Sessizlik." _Birikim_ 288 (2013): 3–7.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Cemaat-AKP çatışması İktidar için bir devrin sonu mu?" _Birikim_ 297 (2014): 3–7.

Laçiner, Ömer. "HDP'yi Ne Yapmali." _Birikim_ (weekly report), July 31, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1552/hdp-yi-ne-yapmali#.VkTDm9Bh2i4

Laçiner, Ömer. "7 Haziran." _Birikim_ 314–15 (2015): 3–8.

Laçiner, Ömer. "Recep Tayyip Erdogan'in Liderligi." _Birikim_ (weekly report), May 26, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1474/recep-tayyip-erdogan-in-liderligi#.VkTEkNBh2i4

Laçiner, Ömer. "Recep Tayyip Erdogan'in Liderligi." _Birikim_ (weekly report), May 26, 2015, at: www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/1474/recep-erdogan-liderligi#.VkTWqdBh2i4

Miraç, Zeynep. "Yetmez Ama Evet Dedim: Yine de AKP'ye Muhalifim." Interview with Ömer Laçiner: ["I Said 'Yes but I am Still Dissatisfied': I Still Object to the AKP"]. _Milliyet_ , February 18, 2013.

Samim, Ahmet. "The Left," in Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak (eds), _Turkey in Transition_. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 147–176.

#  The right to the city during the AK Party's Thermidor

_Ferhat Kentel_

_June 2013. Initial days of Gezi resistance..._
_A young man on a bus from Taksim is on the phone with a friend, relaying what is going on in Taksim: "Man, this is a disaster here. People are worried for their lives, God forbid... No, no. Thank God, the shops are intact... You wonder what are they doing? They want homosexuality and stuff, what do I know..."_

On the 27th day of May 2013, bulldozers and workers of Istanbul's municipality "charged" into Gezi Park, adjacent to the Taksim Square and began to chop down trees to clear the space for the construction of a shopping mall in the Park. At that time, no one could imagine that the objections of a few environmental activists to the destruction of park would inflame violent protests throughout the month of June. Furthermore, the protests grew rampant and escalated to a massive scale across the country, virtually turning into a matter of life and death for the "regime." Although there has been a constant undercurrent of secular reaction to the Justice and Development Party ( _Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi_ , AK Party) since it came to power in 2002, the Gezi resistance reached into the depths of the psyche of the secular front for the first time.

The events that unfolded in Taksim and Gezi Park for the next forty days revealed much of what the AK Party's nature turned out to be after its eleven-year rule. Furthermore, the Gezi events led to differing interpretations of the true meaning of these protests for both the AK Party and its opposition. It also harnessed the different opposition currents into one strong flow.

After the initial events of May 31, 2013, Turkey's public attention turned toward questions on the AK Party's governing style and its consequences. Harsh criticisms and accusations were exchanged between the AK Party and Gezi protesters. However, this confrontation did not come in the form of a clash between a political party and an intellectual camp criticizing the government's practices. The confrontation came in the form of a social movement, which started its resistance in a public square against the radical urban policies used by the government, which apparently obeyed a global capitalist economic rationale.

This article aims to analyze this confrontation while explaining the meaning of the AK Party's rationale and actions from the onset of the Islamic movement to this day. Further, this article will look into the AK Party's transformation in the course of its move toward the center, otherwise known as the AK Party "revolution." Finally, this article will study the AK Party's capitalistic urban policies and the opposition that emerged in its struggles against these policies.

## Turkish modernization and the roots of the AK Party

Islamism, which has its roots at the time of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, has developed as a social movement parallel to the modernization journey of Turkey. After various phases and changes, it came to power under the name of a political party, the AK Party, assuming a "conservative democratic" identity.

First of all, it would be useful to carefully examine the society in which the Islamic movement and thus the AK Party have evolved and the process and phases the two have undergone before the latter came to power. Modernization in Turkish society did not emerge in a way that followed its own societal structures. Rather, the "outcome" that appeared at a certain stage of the European modernization process was assembled to Turkish society. In other words, Turkish modernizers brought in a process that was alien to Turkey by looking at and being inspired by the European outcome and then applied it against Turkey's _ancien régime_ named after the French. Contrary to what Europe had gone through, Turkey's state elite imposed a strong top-down modernization and tried to implement a modeled outcome, resulting in harsh struggles and polarizations.

While this struggle for existence of certain traditional social segments against the pro-modernization elite became manifest in their tactics, the elites used the powerful language, techniques and procedures of the panoptic strategy, as suggested by Michel de Certeau.1 Using the conceptual framework of de Certeau's "ways of doing", states of existence, ways of understanding, giving meaning and modernity embedded in daily practices generated a "secondary" or another modernity because the original model was constantly "subverted" by different segments of the society that "modernized" differently.

Resistance and negotiation of different social and cultural groups have never followed a single route or pursued similar tactics. Certain groups became the faithful citizens of the regime while others raised their voices against the system in place, sometimes resorting to illegal methods. In any case, some ethnic or religious segments of Turkish society became subversive, either explicitly or implicitly. All these different negotiations, subversive resistances or explicit objections were labeled "counter-revolution" by Turkey's political class and in particular by the military. This elite class of the Turkish Republic continued to uphold the views of Kemalism, the founding philosophy of the Republic and anything that would counter these principles was considered revolutionary.

## Islamic movement and the AK Party "revolution"

The coup of February 28, 1997 proved to be a major turning point for the Islamic movement that had been gaining momentum since the coup of September 12, 1980. The 1997 coup targeted the Welfare Party-led coalition government at the time and various Islamic communities, including Fethullah Gülen's movement. The initial consequence was boycotting religious businessmen, known as "green capital." This led to the disintegration of the coalition government of the True Path Party and the Welfare Party (the Refahyol government). I argue that the February 28 offensive and the responses of the movement generated consequences in two directions. First, the members of the Islamic movement dispersed and became more invisible in everyday life—only to be known as "Muslim individuals." Paradoxically, this individualization and ordinariness strengthened the movement. The second consequence of this process was that the Islamic movement became more engaged in the machinery of the "domestication" of daily practical life. It adopted a more moderate discourse and lost its revolutionary fervor. It conformed to the existing economic-capitalist structures. Although the AK Party was founded in 2001 and immediately achieved a landslide electoral success in the 2002 general elections, it is an offshoot of the Islamic movement. However, it has gone through a process of constant change during its experience as the ruling party.

However, the class dimension of this change should be particularly emphasized. Although its origins as an ideology date back to the early twentieth century, the Islamic movement came to foreground as a real and strong social movement in the early 1980s. Moreover, it had a multifaceted class and cultural basis. Nevertheless, the "Welfare," "Virtue," and "Justice and Development" parties' political base comes from the lower social classes in Turkey, as they are more socially conservative and continue to interact with the Islamic movement. A closer look at the major constituent classes of these parties reveals that notables and tradesmen in various conservative Anatolian cities form another important constituency of Turkey's Islamic political parties. They are followed by segments of the Kurdish population, which adhere to the ideals of "the brotherhood of the Islamic _Ummah_ " vis-à-vis the "supremacy of Turkishness," embodied by Kemalism and other Turkish political parties that tout Turkish nationalism, and finally, the new urban classes, that is, the urban poor that have emerged as a consequence of migration and urbanization, resulting in a striking transformation of the social structure of Turkey.

The challenge created by these social groups and especially by the new urban classes is manifold. Turkey's Islamic movement has challenged the previously accepted norms of what a modernist mentality was shaped by in Turkey: modernization, Westernization, secularism and secular nationalism. The lower and middle classes that were excluded and tried to be assimilated through the Kemalist symbolism, rhetoric and ideology, have, in a sense, found a "dignified" haven or refuge through the Islamic movement. This follows Alain Touraine's definition of a "social movement." However, the Islamic movement possesses a second feature, which Touraine observes in social movements: it is a "revolutionary characteristic." This gives hope to the very same social classes for the future and offers them a future utopia. The Islamic movement in Turkey is both defensive and offensive in nature, and is in fact a typical social movement.2

In this regard, the Islamic movement is one of the segments "culturally" excluded by Kemalist modernization. Kemalism defined a "national religion" for the new nation. In response, Turkey's religious segments responded to their exclusion through religion. Quite naturally, they used their source of identity, their religiosity, as a response to the cultural attack by the Kemalist-secular regime. But, here, religion goes beyond the confessional and is transformed into a cultural and political expression. Moreover, even a movement primarily resting on a socio-economic foundation and building on the class relationships of the capitalist industrial society is not about "class" (or economy) alone.3 In other words, there exists a cultural dimension beyond the material and economic domain, which the modern paradigm has rendered more visible. This is applicable to the Islamic movement; beneath the image of a powerful religiosity, the driving force of the Islamic movement is the new urban classes and it has a very strong sense of class belonging. Thus, the economic exclusion inflicted by the cultural isolation mechanisms of the elite was countered culturally.

Becoming a cultural community or the sense of a strong group solidarity has strengthened the movement's potential for class solidarity. The new social classes that tried to survive in the cities after immigration have also created a significant movement of capital, as a consequence of the social mobility, involving practices of savings, religious solidarity and consumption, in conjunction with the rising value of the urban periphery within the machinery of political clientelism.4

Heterogeneous social classes were mobilized to bring the AK Party to power. At the AK Party's grass-roots base is the new and conservative bourgeoisie that gained momentum in Anatolia in the post-1980 period, strengthened by the sheer numbers of the new urban working class emerging in slum or poorer areas of Turkey's major cities. The AK Party victory has a revolutionary quality, even though this revolution was not brought about through violence nor does it hold the symbolic meaning of the French, Russian or Iranian Revolutions. The AK Party's coming to power is not an accident. It is the product of a class and cultural revolution that was in the making after a process of nearly 100 years. It is the outcome of Turkey's modern Republic, which matured through eruptions, withdrawals and against the trauma of building the "ideal citizen" under the yoke of authoritarian modernization. It took place over an extended period of time and moved ahead with "De Certeauian tactics" to finally reach concrete election victories.

Still using the metaphor of the French Revolution, one could say that this revolution has four phases or dimensions:

1. The AK Party revolution, similar to the French, was economically and politically spearheaded by a dynamic class with high organizational capabilities. This class pursued a course in conformity with the Turkish modernization process and capitalism.

2. The desire for change and demands of the "masses" migrating from rural to urban areas and the cultural codes they carried to the cities made them the "masses" of the revolution and AK Party's electoral base.

3. The ideological and philosophical discourse that the Islamic movement built connected the revolution with masses at different levels. Its particular emphasis on justice mobilized the power of the masses.

4. Despite the fact that the revolution granted new rights to a broad range of social classes (e.g., freedom of wearing headscarf at universities, improvements in health and education, recognition of the Kurdish language etc.), it essentially remains a revolution of a new bourgeoisie. Indeed, capitalism grew stronger, the market expanded, and the revolution accumulated considerable capital around the cadres of the AK Party in the name of development and growth.

An important point in understanding the performance of the AK Party is that whatever has transpired alternated between the arguments of revolution and counter-revolution.5 For instance, the old Turkey–new Turkey rhetoric of community leaders, policy makers, analysts and the media around the AK Party became just as widespread as the rhetoric of a radical polarization. Here, we need to remember that the instrument of socialization of the new republican generations, emerging in the wake of a Kemalist revolution in 1923, was the revolution–counter-revolution rhetoric. For example, the ascent of the right-wing conservative Democratic Party movement after 1950 was considered a counter-revolution by the perpetrators of the May 27 military coup of 1960 and their ideological followers. The February 28 coup was also justified as an intervention to the permanent counter-revolutionary attempts of the Islamist movement.6

### _What is left of the Islamic movement?_

The AK Party carries the traces of the struggle against the previous Kemalist secular nationalism and of the pluralism of the earlier Islamic movements. We need to remember that its "Islamic core" dissolved, as the movement continued to rise. Meanwhile, its various social, cultural and economic actors, which were embedded in the movement, became more visible and their interests gained more prominence. In this sense, the AK Party, as an actor in the Turkish political arena, is a movement obviously incorporating class-related (i.e., a new bourgeoisie and the new urban poor) and popular demands rather than a solely Islamic one. Today, being a member of the AK Party is a form of leverage for societal segments that desire to elevate their social and economic standing in society.

This paper has discussed the social dynamics at play in order to understand the revolutionary transformation of the Islamic movement into the political force of the AK Party, and its successive electoral victories. However, to better understand the AK Party today, the theoretical and ideological evolution of Turkey's Islamic movement has to be analyzed. Furthermore, the study of the AK Party's Islamic origins will shed light on the previously discussed capitalist transformation and the emergence of a new capitalist class in Turkey.

To understand the AK Party, a specific element of the pluralistic structure of Turkey's Islamic movement has to be highlighted: the emphasis on the present time. After the February 28 Coup, there was a progressive erosion of the utopia of a future Islamic state, which consisted of the recreation of the "Age of Happiness" ( _Asr-ı Saadet_ ) of a bygone time. The debate was shifted from focusing on the future to the here and now. It also set off intensive debates on criticism, self-criticism, and reflexivity within and among all the currents of the Islamic movement.

The _Tezkire_ ( _The Note_ ) Journal became one of the important Islamic intellectual journals of 2000s. It was a platform for the expression of modern Islamic thought and set the ground for these debates. The following statements are from a _Tezkire_ editorial: "Politics is not necessarily pursued in a single setting. Nor can it be practiced by being identified with the state, which is the best way of rendering an opposition movement ineffective."7 The magazine chose to keep a distance from traditional politics to maintain its independence and freedom. Nonetheless, _Tezkire_ also envisioned transformation. Similarly, the "new politics" that the Islamic movement should consider is the ability to adopt and remain able to adopt an attitude "against and together with the world" and by preserving its core.8 Thus, this transformation calls for criticism and self-criticism and may incorporate unexpected transformation. Indeed, Ömer Çelik and Yasin Aktay, (academician-sociologist) two of the writers of the independent and free _Tezkire_ , later became advisors to the prime minister and Çelik then served as a minister in various AK Party cabinets.

The professional and political journey of a number of _Tezkire_ writers are reflective of the movement in general. The political project that had the initial goal of creating an Islamic state was abandoned to radical and marginal groups of the movements, while magazines like _Tezkire_ and the social classes that followed them integrated into the capitalist economy and Turkey's "real politics,"9 which they had previously criticized so harshly.10 At this point, the true dichotomy of the Islamic movement unfolds: its integration with the established order goes through the AK Party on the one hand, and a de facto transformation imposed by practical necessities replaces the dream of a theory-propelled political project by the movement on the other. The political integration of the AK Party and its social base into Turkey's political system through political participation and power politics as well as economic development and growth resulted in employment in government circles. This political inclusion and participation managed to transform the Islamic movement and even seemingly the most independent Islamic intellectuals.

For various representatives of the Islamic movement, politics evolved from the emphasis on everyday life or the search for a new social perspective on the macro or real politics level. This situation certainly referred to something beyond the transformation of Islamists into "champions of construction." Businessmen and tradesmen of various scales who had nothing to do with the Islamic movement but who wanted to benefit from the new economy trailed after this movement, which headed for the center to become the new upper classes of the AK Party economy.11

In short, the Islamic movement underwent a significant change during the AK Party rule since 2002. In a sense, a large community movement disintegrated and was replaced by new manifestations of the religion as a consequence of this change, and was catalyzed by the February 28 coup. Segments that found a ground of legitimacy within these different manifestations integrated into the capitalist system or at least remained in accord with existing economic policies and justified this attitude with Islamic references.12 Other groups including the Anti-capitalist Muslims joined the opposition against AK Party's policies.13

This indicates that modernization has managed to penetrate into the traditional segments of the society and that religion has become heterogeneous and pluralistic together with the numerous trends in the society. So, Islam is losing the quality of being the discourse of an opposition movement. In other words, a broad variety of segments find a reference in Islam with which they feel they can express themselves and thus, Islam is not monopolized by a single group. This no doubt refers to religion as a "reservoir of meaning"14 as described by Danièle Hervieu-Léger.

As meanings were redefined and re-formed together with the end of the bipolar world, we are witnessing the disintegration of the compact nature of religion and a non-centric structuring, discourse and new forms of religiosity. Religion is no more a repertoire of meanings offering integrity to pre-modern societies nor is it a belief system swept aside and marginalized by modernism, awaiting extinction.

From the perspective of the AK Party, therefore, the Islamic movement came to power by being transformed. Yet, the Islamic identity or references were not used in the absolute sense while it assumed power. The AK Party did so with a rightist and neo-conservative identity, which conformed to the changing climate of its time, connected with the EU, negotiated with the state, and played the game by the rules of economic development and capitalism.

As mentioned above, the coming to power of the AK Party was the consequence of a revolutionary movement, not in the sense it is perceived worldwide but one which shook the foundations of previously ruling classes and granted the power to the new classes. This brought about many changes. Among these are a radical disruption of the economic and class hegemony, the emergence of new partnerships together with the new classes, and no doubt the profound erosion of the Kemalist military tutelage. Other changes include: popular reforms such as distribution of free course books to primary students, significant improvements in health care, municipal aids to the poor and restoring the reputation of imam-Hatip schools. Several taboos were destroyed, albeit some of them were only symbolic: the secular-nationalist pledge of allegiance compulsory to all primary school students was abolished; the ban on the Kurdish language was lifted although the practice does not extend to formal public education in; a condolence message was offered to Armenians; and the headscarf ban was removed.

## "Not enough, but yes"

The brightest and most tangible achievement of the twelve-year AK Party rule was the Constitutional referendum on September 12, 2010. Having constantly increased its votes in every election—with a single exception—since 2002,15 the AK Party prepared a constitutional reform package that amended the coup Constitution of 1982. The package was adopted by a referendum, where 58 percent of citizens voted for the amendments. The rate of approval indicated that the policies of the AK Party were favored by a significant majority of the society besides the AK Party voters, including certain socialist groups and Kurds. Of course, this did not mean that the AK Party enjoyed full support for all of its policies. Apart from the "absolutely yes" group, the "not-enough-but-yes" campaign of a group of liberals and socialists—amounting to 6 per cent of the votes according to a study16—was an explicit support to the AK Party offered for the purpose of weakening the military tutelage over civilian government.

Actually, this support had started as early as 2002 when the AK Party won its first election. This liberal and left wing support for the AK Party has, in a sense, become one of the major instruments of pluralizing the legitimacy struggle of the AK Party. The AK Party was saved from being imprisoned in a narrow "Islamic" image thanks to this support, which stood up against the threatening military discourse and coup attempts. It appeared not to fear the Islamic qualities of the AK Party and instead emphasized its civilian nature.17 These groups played a major role in deflecting and extinguishing the traditional Kemalist and Kemalist-left rhetoric of the "Sharia threat" that was raised against the government. As a result of this support, the traditional leftists and Kemalist groups who had positioned themselves as absolute AK Party opponents from the beginning declared these liberal and new left groups as "traitors." The not-enough-but-yes campaigners became virtually the only scapegoats of the AK Party discourses and policies, which, after the 2010 referendum, grew increasingly authoritarian. However, numerous other segments that struggled for democratic rights have benefited from the broadened democratic climate in addition to these groups, who played an important role in weakening the military tutelage. The environment became propitious for social movements and new ways of expression at a time when the military threats subsided. In other words, new social movements in Turkey, other than the Islamic movement, strengthened the legitimacy of the AK Party. Moreover, the increased power of the AK Party against the military tutelage diversified new social movements as well as the pathways for democratic political struggle.

The referendum presented the opportunity for debates around the judiciary on an unprecedented scale. The idea that the judiciary was a sanctified domain exercised solely by a god-like elite was transformed into a real issue open for discussion by the society itself. It was now deemed possible to "democratize" the judiciary.18 In short, the connective relationships mostly among the conservative, left, and liberal tendencies strengthened the democratic discourse in the public sphere during the first AK Party period until 2010, and even more evidently during the constitutional debates preceding the 2010 Referendum. For the first time, the conservatives recognized that socialists were not "monsters," while the socialists also clearly saw that conservatives were not "religious zealots."

After the referendum, however, the relationship between the political tendencies and movements that stayed "in-between" and the AK Party gradually weakened. The increasingly harsh rhetoric of Erdoğan caused a clear and sharp polarization within the groups involved in the protests during Taksim-Gezi events. In the aftermath of the referendum, all the election campaigns spear-headed by Erdoğan weakened "in-between politics" considerably. Erdoğan and his campaign strategists exploited every means to increase the tension in the society as a campaign tool.19

## A new ruling class fortified with construction

One thing already visible before the referendum became even clearer in its wake: Turkey turned into a construction worksite. The AK Party government allotted a number extensive permits and policies that facilitated "economic rent" and new legislation easing the way to unbridled capitalism. All of this unfolded through an interesting network of personal associations that some could even qualify as crony capitalism. The rapport between the contractors and the political elite was the conspicuous manifestation of a process where a specific political class arduously consolidated itself.

The newly established "Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning" could also be qualified by the age-old adage: the fox that was supposed to guard the henhouse and the Housing Development Administration (TOKI) of the Prime Ministry had no legal or practical barriers to their construction projects. Their urbanization and gentrification activities were conducted essentially under the umbrella of "urban transformation."

Leading figures of the AK Party and primarily Erdoğan built the rhetorical background of these activities. The backbone of this discourse was the concepts of "development," "national will" and "national economy" parallel to the improvements in macro indicators, like inflation and the payment of IMF debts. Accordingly, the AK Party launched campaigns for nuclear and hydro power plants in order to "meet the energy needs of the society that wanted to consume more."20 NGOs and villagers that objected to these power plants for concerns of adverse impacts on the environment were violently suppressed by security forces.21 The "developmentalist project" of the AK Party condemned any kind of environmental opposition, branding them as "anti-national." The media, which was restructured to organically bond with the AK Party, was a key instrument in the development of this discourse.

The course taken by the AK Party should be viewed within a more general framework, even though it also has a specific place as a "Turkish story." Weber's finding that the Protestant ethic feeds the spirit of capitalism provides us analytical tools that serve to better understand the relationship between the AK Party and the peripheral Muslim-conservatives and capitalism.22 Despite the profound differences in economic and political structures and certainly in conjunctures (e.g., early capitalism vs. global capitalism), we could at least argue that there is common ground between the "capitalist ethics" superimposed on the religiosity of various religious groups. In other words, the fact that religion was reduced to a label, and its centrality was replaced by capitalist accumulation for Weber's Protestants is also true for this small Muslim commercial class that adopted capitalism wholesale. However, this class did not give up being Muslims as they delved deeper into capitalism. Nevertheless the main focus of their lives became the economic domain in conjunction with elements such as business, trade, investment and profitability as well as the political sphere, which was essential to build this economic domain. This average "pro-AK Party ideal-type" entered in a struggle of life and death against the _ancien régime_ and used all possible means to become politically effective.

The struggle for establishing and maintaining this emerging class rule turned into a marketplace of mass housing projects and high-rises, and the rhetoric of "development" rejected any criticism at all costs. Thus, people were displaced and green fields were sacrificed in the name of urban transformation; traditional structures in harmony with the environment were replaced with concrete, and shopping malls became the indispensable hub of every city and even every neighborhood.

The reckless and lawless process of turning the biggest city of Turkey, İstanbul into a malleable instrument for the sake of economic rent and profit, which started in the ANAP (Motherland Party) period,23 extended and expanded under the AK Party administration. For example, the Roman quarter Sulukule adjacent to İstanbul's historical city walls and marked as a "degenerate" neighborhood was demolished in the name of "urban transformation" and the Romanis inhabiting the area were expelled. The luxury residences built in the area became home to the new elite. The Old Christian quarters (e.g., Tarlabaşı) in the modern central sections and green areas overlooking the sea were targeted for "urban transformation," or better, "gentrification," justified by concepts like "improvement," "hygienization," and "earthquake strengthening." The skyscrapers built by contractors close to the AK Party government in the most valuable parts of the city gave the Turkish economy the superficial dynamism it supposedly needed but at the irreversible expense of an overcrowded city with almost one-fourth of the entire population of the country, its own water supplies close to nil, its ecology in agony, and its energy and chronic problems incurable.

Paradoxically, though, the activities of this "conservative" party and the priorities of its electorate were no longer "conservative" in a context where life and development were measured in material terms. What matters now are the macroeconomic indicators, the figures and the height of skyscrapers. Nothing " _ancien_ " had the strength to resist this "new" development move, power and the arrogance intertwined with the claims of a new "grand Turkey."

Prior to the general elections of June 12, 2011, the AK Party made quite ambitious promises for Turkey's development and growth at the time of its election campaign. Among the promised construction endeavors called "Crazy Projects" was a new huge airport in İstanbul, a third bridge over the Bosphorus, and the particularly "crazy" Canal İstanbul—a second waterway parallel to the Bosphorus to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara.24

All of these projects created both positive and negative public repercussions. For example, the CEO of a real estate company stated that the brand-new city around the canal would offer new locations to the construction sector suffering from chronic spatial shrinkage in İstanbul.25 Canal İstanbul whetted the appetite of contractors, land speculators and real estate agents. These actors no doubt took courage from the government's discourse of "development," "growth," "progress," and "modernization," which was wrapped in a neutral image and which was "dissolved" in the normalized rhetoric of the globalized world. Because, for them, "new locations" meant new construction projects and possibilities for capitalist accumulation.

The performance of the AK Party administration and contractors of urban real estate projects in the guise of urban transformation or "crazy projects" is certainly not particular to Turkey. Cities and urban areas are the major sources of capital accumulation in many cities and countries. What David Harvey terms as "the capital surplus absorption" forces capitalists, under pressure of competition, to recapitalize and reinvest. This causes capitalism, as a system in general, to constantly discover new outlets for investment so that the "surplus" can be absorbed. The capital surplus is "absorbed" by these new locations and especially by the increasing urban lands, so that accumulation can continue. Failure to create outlets to absorb the surplus raises ever-present risks for systemic crisis.26

Harvey's groundbreaking studies on the social production of urban space argue that this is not something new. From Haussman's reconstruction of Paris in the second half of the nineteenth century to the Robert Moses-led urban policies in twentieth-century New York, development and redevelopment of space became a venue for generating value and easing the capital surplus absorption.27

Over the past two decades, cities from West to East have become the hubs of investment and profitability in tandem with the global capital and international financial institutions. Mega-urbanization projects of self-proclaimed creativity and of pretentious but dubious sources, which spread social injustice and deliver utmost harm to the environment have become the "normal" elements of the urban landscape.

Following Lefebvre, Harvey suggests the claims that liberalism and free market provide "freedom" and thus that urban interventions consistent with these policies ensure "progress" are but an ideological rhetoric. He argues that whatever transpires creates grave social and geographical inequalities at global, regional and local levels. The city space, which is no more an integrated space and which does not signify a meaning per se, according to Harvey,28 is a "social product" for Lefebvre; and it has powerful ideological and political dimensions.29 Lefebvre holds that the social production of urban space is key to the reproduction of the society and especially capitalism. The hegemonic class reproduces its sovereignty by dominating the social production of space. The space thus produced also serves as a tool of thoughts and of action. Therefore, urban space is "also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power" in addition to being a means of production.30

Coming back to Turkey, one could add that the AK Party, during its rule of more than a decade, has primarily fulfilled the requirements of a modern capitalist economy despite its "new Turkey" rhetoric and "conservative" and religious discourse. In doing so, it adopted a series of measures to make life easier for itself in urban operations. However, the AK Party lacks technocratic "heroes" like Haussman or Moses. Instead the role was replaced by laws and Prime Minister Erdoğan personally. While the laws maximized the margin of flexibility of the companies, the government and municipalities, the majority of which were dominated by the AK Party, Erdoğan himself virtually became the sole authority in charge of country-wide urban policies. His unofficial decisive role gradually became pivotal in decisions to sell land, expropriate property, redesign squares and authorize the building of high-rises.

The main legal amendments pertained to the strengthening of the Housing Development Administration (TOKI).31 Established in 1984, under the Prime Ministry, TOKI was constantly strengthened during the AK Party administration from 2002 onward. Gradually, TOKI started to act as a company in itself, with its partnerships and investments in land. The supporting legislation elevated TOKI to a position of monopoly over urban practices. The laws that facilitated urban transformation practices, on the one hand, and constantly strengthened TOKI on the other, expanded the means of the grand transformation day by day. TOKI seems to have forgotten its initial mandate to develop "social housing" for lower-income groups. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of houses it has built over the past years, it is currently in the process of building 282 thousand more and only 7 percent of these houses are for the poor and low-income groups. The same proportion is only 1.3 percent in İstanbul. The names TOKI chooses for its projects are not related to the traditional neighborhood culture. TOKI Projects, which are mostly called "New living spaces," "Satellite town" or "Smart buildings," generally target middle and middle-upper income groups. Within this period of time, TOKI has acted as the battering ram of urban transformation and a source of capital accumulation rather than building social houses.

The "Law on Greater City Municipalities" was introduced as another "creative" means for abolishing villages as administrative units and prolonging urban transformation or absorbing the capital surplus. This Law changed the category of settlements covering more than eighty of the total population from "rural" (more than 16,000 villages) to "urban."32

The statements given by a member of the Turkish parliament on the Law on behalf of the AK Party sums up the "modernist development rhetoric":

Now, there remains no rural–urban distinction for _service delivery_ in these 30 provinces. [...] These former villages will enjoy several exemptions until they become _modern quarters_. [...] The _permit processes will be facilitatedfor structures_ to be built in these villages. [...] [The villages] will not lose; they will gain and grow. [...] Lands and fields will become plots and thus gain value, enriching villagers (italics mine).33

"Service" is the magic word the ruling AK Party uses in its discourse on urban interventions. According to this discourse, "the aim of all the legal amendments is to promote efficiency, speed, and quality which are the essential elements in politics of delivery as well as the concept of modern local government."34

This was similar to the operation Lefebvre observed in France in the 1970s. Lefebvre argued that not only was urbanization central to the survival of capitalism and therefore bound to become a crucial focus of political and class struggle, but that it was obliterating step by step the distinctions between town and country through the production of integrated spaces across national territory.35 In this context, "the right to the city" had to mean the right to have a say in the whole urban process, which was increasingly dominating the countryside through phenomena ranging from agro-business to second homes and rural tourism.36

The AK Party has undergone a major change as these laws granted financial power to the class formation gathering around it and this class power became its unconditional financial broker In this sense, the AK Party both managed to "successfully" produce the capitalistic city but also reproduced the state of the former authoritarian Kemalist mentality instead of fulfilling minimal conditions like "democratic participation" in urban policies. The success of the AK Party government in its initial years lay in its claim to be the voice of civil society and Islamic modesty against the authoritarian state. However, it steadily grew toward a more centralist attitude in every domain. The government and AK Party municipalities, which acted not as "local" actors but rather agents of the Ankara government (or TOKI) made media-backed decisions of "urban transformation."

In the meantime, demolition work was underway in the Tarlabaşı quarter of Beyoğlu, Taksim, for the purpose of urban transformation. The demolition zone was separated from the nearby boulevard by huge billboards. The posters covering the billboards were a sort of "visual lapsus": they portrayed the future "happy life" of inhabitants of Tarlabaşı who almost altogether looked like Europeans with their blond(e) hair and green eyes; the average Anatolian figure, be it Turks or Kurds or Romanis that occupied Tarlabaşı before the transformation were nowhere to be seen.

"Fashionable" and "hygienic" arguments, that is, "clearing degenerate neighborhoods, ridding the city of criminality and focusing on safety as a core urban issue," were developed and propagated. These arguments were used as the basis of decisions of urban transformation in various neighborhoods, including Küçükbakkalköy, Ayazma, Sulukule, Tarlabaşı and Fikirtepe in the name of the "sole true rationality." These decisions were then harshly implemented, paying no heed to objections and expelling people out of their settlements. The policy was "zero tolerance" to any resistance in these areas, which were considered the "abominable nest of all filth, crime, and misguided urbanization."37

The tangible products of different ethnic and religious cultures tailored to different geographies and climates in the country began to vanish rapidly. Skyscrapers overstepped the tall Ottoman minarets, which were previously important to the Islamic conservatives.

Neoliberal capitalism dominates not only state apparatuses but also whole populations, "their lifestyles as well as their labor power, their cultural and political values as well as their mental conceptions of the world."38 Reading Harvey's arguments in _Rebel Cities_ in reference to Michel Foucault, Dušan Marinković holds that what is happening today with these cities captured in the traps of neoliberal capitalism is actually a refashioning of the Panopticon and its bio-politics. Because, the apparatuses used for implementing predatory urban practices are used for disciplining, controlling, supervising and punishing.39

For example, a "plan" developed by the Municipality of Beyoğlu (or, more precisely, by the government), İstanbul's main central and global showcase and an important cultural center across the country, proved to be a flawless means for the "appropriation" of the space by capitalist groups and for the control of human activity in the area. Of course, "conservation" was mentioned in the plan titled "Reconstruction Plan for the Conservation of Beyoğlu Historic Urban Site," which was approved by the İstanbul Greater City Municipality in 2010. However, the definition "sites for renewal" exposed Beyoğlu district, an area rich in culture, to direct capitalistic interventions. Ulus Atayurt argued that, using this opportunity, the AK Party aimed to appropriate a multilayered, profound and "unique" city culture, which had been shaped by all classes in Turkey and their culture and "in the making of which AK Party had had no role at all."40

The plan precludes any potential counter-argument or objection by the opposition. As immediately exemplified by the operations for Taksim's pedestrianization project, the plan, which incorporates banning all demonstrations and marches, including May Day clearly suggested that economic policies concerning urban space are indeed not independent from the state's authoritarianism.

However, as "growth" prevails as a bright and glossy rhetoric, urban spaces continue to break into fragments, inviting new conflicts. Of course, this fragmentation manifests itself not only at a cultural (ethnic, religious etc.) level but among classes that seem to seethe with deeper forms of anger and hatred. In this harsh world, gated communities and privatized spaces are designed to protect the rising classes, and a growing numbers of masses are ruthlessly and mercilessly isolated from all domains.41

Under these conditions, the city, which "creates" the identity of a modern society, fails to produce a sense of collective identity, citizenship or belonging. "The right to the city" is restricted in most cases to a small social group: the political and economic elite in urban spaces, which increasingly is separated into distinct groups. These elites are in a position to shape cities more and more after their own desires.42 In short, space has become the "stage of class confrontation," a device for producing social injustice more and more,43 and a field for struggle where the revolt against this injustice emanates from the least expected party, the actors themselves.

The AK Party activated a dynamic, which Kemalism had never been able to achieve through the instruments of the state: using the rhetoric of "development," it took major steps for capitalism to expand all around the country. The AK Party's achievement in doing so reproduced its discourse in the "win or lose" dilemma. The discourse of the AK Party, especially of Erdoğan, was driven by the subdued nationalism and ambition for success toward the West that dated back to the Ottomans. Using economic indicators, Erdoğan emphasized that Turkey is a world-class country on every occasion. He lashed out at the West or political and intellectual actors in Turkey who shared a Western line of thought. Erecting agigantic mosque atop Çamlıca, the highest hill overlooking the Bosphorus, giant skyscrapers all over İstanbul and the enormous Presidential Palace ("White Palace," _Ak Saray_ ) to replace the existing residence were the manifestations of this desire for "grandeur" and of the longing for "beating the psychosis of defeat against the West and showing off power."

Columnist Müfit Yüksel, a conservative sociologist, clearly explains how this move by Erdoğan and the "desire for modernization" of conservative segments have converged and how this move has thus been successful:

For generations, [...] members of conservative communities have longed for and looked up to advanced technology. [...] Their childhood fancies were full of the UN building, Japan's bullet trains, New York's dazzling skyscrapers and the supersonic Concorde. All these boiled down to frustrated contrasts: "Why cannot we do it, we must do it. We must build this technology. We must have our bullet trains and our Manhattans, Chicagos, Dallases." I have often met fellow members of my community whose only wish was to have a flat in this or that skyscraper and nothing else.44

The AK Party discourse that developed and the intrinsic "modesty" of the modern Islamist discourse were poles apart.

## The "Thermidor" of the AK Party revolution

The "Thermidorian period" refers to the post-revolutionary situation where, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the Directoire (Directory) regime was established after the coup of "9 Thermidor" (June 27, 1794) and more conservative policies were implemented. Jean-François Bayart conceptualizes the Thermidorian period for recent revolutions. Bayart argues that the Thermidorian paradigm corresponds to a process of institutionalization and professionalization of the "revolution," and also to a dynamic of integration into the capitalist world economy. In other words, it brings the revolutionary vocabulary and capitalist world economy together.45

In this period, professionalized revolutionaries postulate that the resulting order is already what is "desired" and "real" and that asking for more would be a "fantasy." Thus, they try to perpetuate what they have achieved. This achievement becomes the "sole meaning" and the initial revolutionary utopia ceases: their main profession becomes the "management of the state."

According to Bayart, like the Thermidorian period of the French revolution, the Sovietic and Iranian revolutions gave up their initial claim and transformed into a more conservative "counter-revolution" and they hence experienced the Thermidor. We can extrapolate this interpretation, at a metaphorical level, to the course taken by the AK Party in Turkey even though Bayart does not consider it a "revolution."

The masses that bore the AK Party and then became its actors certainly did not seize the "Çankaya Presidential Residence" in the sense that the "Bastille Prison of Paris," the "Winter Palace of the Tzar" or the "Azadi Square in Teheran" were captured. Nor did they engineer a physical attack like the French, Russians or Iranians. They did seize Çankaya symbolically by the ballot box, that is, by electing the second most prominent figure of the party, Abdullah Gül, president and making his headscarved wife the "First Lady."

History mainly highlights those revolutions—"real" or not—where mass movements seized power with "blood and violence" and only at a certain moment after lengthy struggles, whereas there is no "social law" requiring that all revolutions must be violent. What makes a revolution is not the blood of guardians of the _ancien régime_ upon which it rises but the shift of the "lower" to the "upper," the change in class and cultural power relations and a transformation in the nature of these power relations.

As mentioned above, what the AK Party movement achieved is also a revolution. Because, the movement ended an "era" and shattered the class balance of the traditional Kemalist structure. It overthrew the "military aristocracy of the state" and "secular clergy," and broke the web of hegemony they had interlaced with the capitalist groups of their own. It did so gradually and, just like the former revolutionaries, by gathering the support of large masses in their quest for "liberation" and "respect."

The leading class of the movement experiences the Thermidor today, as it has previously happened in the other revolutions, particularly the "revolutions of the bourgeoisie" which were achieved with the support of people. Presently, they are in the process of establishing a new rule of economy-politics together with the revolutionary cadres that brought down the _ancien régime_ and the capitalist groups in tow. The ruling class is now integrated with global capitalism, and they declare their own regime to be the regime of the society and the "sole reality." These professional cadres that "own the new regime" have already given up on the "utopia" which carried them to power. As the discourse of "Islam's promise of freedom and justice" is abandoned to marginal Islamist groups, the only reality for this new class of elites is to create urban spaces, as an attraction for the new urban classes and build skyscrapers.

## The Gezi resistance against neoliberal arrogance

Originally, the Taksim Gezi Park in Beyoğlu District was allocated to İstanbul's Greater City Municipality to be used solely for public services. However, the municipality made a decision in 2011 to transform the Park, despite the prohibition of İstanbul's 6th Administrative Court and 2nd Board of Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets. The transformation under the "Taksim Pedestrianization Project" comprised the construction of a shopping mall on one of the last remaining green spaces within central İstanbul, Gezi Park, without any permits. The architectural design of the planned shopping mall would be modeled after the Ottoman "Artillery Barracks" of Taksim, which was torn down by the Republic in 1940. The AK Party's main argument for defending this project (with traces of Russian and Indian architecture) was to revive this supposedly traditional Ottoman legacy.46

Several civil society organizations raised their voices against this municipal plan, which was actually put forth by the government, or, more precisely, by the prime minister. The "Taksim Solidarity" initiative comprising 128 civil society organizations issued a "Joint Declaration" on June 2, 2013, stating that Taksim is a "common cultural property under protection and the most important public space of the city." They demanded "the immediate cessation of the project" and a new project "with an honest, transparent, participatory, and democratic way."47

Objections against the planned shopping mall gradually intermingled with criticisms of the general policies of the AK Party. Certain decisions of the government and the municipality and the polarizing rhetoric of leading figures of the AK Party, primarily Erdoğan, led the Park advocates to build a counter-identity, albeit somewhat vague. A long list of concerns regarding the government's discourse interfering with "lifestyles" gave rise to a vocal opposition. Some of these were: threatening and provocative statements by the prime minister targeting various segments concerning the pro-government shifts in the ownership of media outlets; causing the dismissals of opposition columnists; restrictions on the internet; prohibiting cafés and restaurants in the vicinity of Taksim-Istiklal avenue to place outdoor tables on the streets; conservative and patriarchal remarks about sexual relationships; threats concerning the prohibition of abortion; and bans on the right to assembly.

Initially, only a few activists were camping out in the park to protect it. However, the number started growing when bulldozers entered the park and started leveling the trees on May 27. The reports of the event spread through social media, which only added to the numbers. Yet, the turning point was May 29, when masked assailants accompanied by the police burned down the tents of protesters occupying the park just before dawn. That day, the hashtag "#Occupygezi" appeared on Twitter and the news spread rapidly. This cruel raid unleashed mass protests in both Gezi Park and the squares of numerous provinces where crowds chanted support for Gezi protesters.

Soon, the events snowballed into a magnitude no one could have predicted. The discourse of Erdoğan and government representatives grew increasingly harsh against the expanding and excited Taksim Gezi Park protests and their particularly radical attitude against Erdoğan himself. Erdoğan's uncompromising, humiliating and bitter statements48 triggered larger crowds to join the already unfolding events. Ultimately, the initial "tree" issue came to scare the government, which began to argue that Gezi was part of a larger "coup" plot.

After the initial eruption of protests, the peaceful climate changed to violent night-time clashes that took place between the police and protesters, not only in İstanbul but also in İzmir and Ankara on June 2. The "Gezi resistance" assumed an atmosphere of "civil war" between the police shooting tear gas and a small number of protesters trying to "capture" the residence of the prime minister, located in Dolmabahçe, İstanbul.

A specific infirmary the protesters set up at the Bezm-i Alem Valide Sultan Mosque in Dolmabahçe quarter of İstanbul during the clashes became and remained the focus of debate. The initial claims that protesters drank alcohol and couples kissed in the mosque where they entered with their shoes on (meaning, they "violated" a sacred place of worship) were never proven. However, another "(im)moral" incident with "implications of sexuality" allegedly took place in Kabataş square: a veiled conservative woman claimed that a crowded group of half-naked protesters attacked and harassed her and then urinated on her.49 The incident became the subject of heated quarrels in the media between those who believed the allegations and those who did not. In the same period of time, the AK Party gathered hundreds of thousands of supporters in a massive rally in Kazlıçeşme, İstanbul, as a reaction to Gezi. The rally turned into an enormous display of power. The magnitude of the polarization became clearer when Erdoğan, on his return from a visit abroad, was met by large crowds that chanted: "Just say the word and we'll crush Taksim."50

While the tension was rising, the police disbanded the Gezi encampment on the evening of June 15. However, clashes of varying degrees continued in Taksim and nearby neighborhoods and different parts of the country. The Ministry of Interior stated that a total of 2.5 million people joined the protests in seventy-nine of the eighty-one cities; leaving nine dead—including a police officer, who fell off a bridge and was killed in the line of duty—and with a total of 8,163 injured.51 Parallel to this process, protesters who were physically expelled from the squares, gathered in other parks in several cities to create "forums" as venues for discussion and further mobilization at the grass-root level. Some of these forums continued regularly for a long time. Ultimately, the energy of Gezi was depleted.

The shopping mall was not built in Gezi (at least not yet, but the plans have not been forgotten either52) and the memory of Gezi is still alive. The Gezi protests and its repercussions will continue to be discussed for a long time. The readings of those who participated and those who did not will attribute new meanings to Gezi. As a matter of fact, what makes Gezi protests "interesting" and "unexpected" is that they occurred at a time when the AK Party was very powerful after having achieved significant progress in urban space policies, as has already been discussed in the course of this article. Despite the AK Party's previous success in implementing its urban vision, a surprising reaction was fueled against the decision to build a shopping mall in a small park next to Taksim Square. This radical movement, which alarmed the state bodies governed by the AK Party, marked a turning point. It was indeed surprising that the movement was kindled inside a community, which was deemed reticent and passive, and then it underwent an almost "tactical" change, to use the conceptualization of Michel de Certeau.

It was surprising because the sacrosanct discourse of developmentalism had already been embedded in the founding ideology of Turkey, shared to some extent by Kemalists, socialists, nationalists, conservatives and Islamists. From this aspect, the Gezi protests questioned an understanding, which encompassed all political currents.

Reading the "act of believing" ( _croire_ ) in reference to Michel de Certeau,53 modernism has emerged as the new religion taught by teachers as the "apostles" of modern times at "schools," the new forms of the "temple." Besides machines, airplanes, speed, communications, scientific inventions and technologies, which "facilitate life," people also believed in the sacredness of the flags of nation states, anthems, militarism and "blood." The new times have their peculiar esthetics, rituals and signs. Now, skyscrapers and shopping malls are part of the routine of the esthetics of the concrete-glass-steel world, and new normalcy and a way of believing is built.

New messages in the new world are communicated through the billboard jungles on the streets and television ads. New buildings, new shopping malls promise a better life for individuals and a better development for the country. Therefore, people believe that these concrete-glass-steel towers are normal signs of progress and modernism. The major front of this process of believing is definitely the leadership of the new religious class in this cycle of capitalistic investment and profit, using the rhetoric of "growth and development." They claim in the most self-confident and top-down manner that they are equipped with the knowledge of what to do and where, just like the Kemalist elite did before. They are building the "religion" of the new times: "their own" religion, the "religion of power, money and concrete." That is why even the most fertile agricultural plains of Turkey cannot escape the investments of TOKI; nor can İstanbul escape from new and "crazy" projects.

## A new social—not intellectual—movement, or carnival

The party secured an extraordinary success as a consequence of its electoral support through the mega projects it launched together with the construction companies in the cities that Molotch describes as the "growth machine,"54 with the web of financial interests and the shield of legitimacy granted by the media it held under control, and the populist policies of distributing a share of the resulting profits in the guise of "social assistance."

It might be surprising that the Gezi "eruption" had such considerable legitimacy. Nevertheless, different meanings and symbols developed around "Taksim" itself set the stage for the legitimacy of the "Gezi Resistance" which was formed against the AK Party's policies: From the late Ottoman times, Taksim has become one of the most important centers of the city; perhaps it is the most important one in a symbolic sense. In 1928, the Monument of the Republic was built there. After the _coup d'état_ of May 27, 1960, a bayonet statue was erected in the square to symbolize the new military regime. It was later removed by the perpetrators of September 12, 1980 coup. Afterwards, the Atatürk Cultural Center was opened in the Taksim area. The Center, built in a rigidly modernist architectural style, hosted performances of Western arts, including opera, ballet and theater. This was seen as an indication of the steps Turkey had taken in its journey to Westernization and modernization.

Taksim, which has been the city's hub of entertainment since the mid-nineteenth century, did not have a mosque, whereas it has the Orthodox Hagia Triada (Holy Trinity) Church. The square is also the natural public stage for all official ceremonies, celebrations in the aftermath of sports victories, as well as for New Year's Eve and Republican Day festivities. All of these have an important part in the symbolic construction of the Taksim Square. But perhaps most importantly, the square also hosts the celebrations of May Day.

The first May Day in the square was celebrated in 1976. In 1977, the celebrations turned violent by the provocations of undercover state forces, resulting in thirty-four deaths. It was thus named "Bloody May Day," and one year later, the celebrations in Taksim were banned. Unions attempted to restart the tradition in 2008, resulting in heavy clashes between the workers and the police. May Day in Taksim was finally permitted in 2010. However, it was banned again in 2013, citing the safety of participants due to the "Taksim Pedestrianization Project" which involved building a shopping mall.

Unlike the leftist and thus marginal May Day demonstrations, Gezi protests gathered the environmentalists, radical leftists, Alevites, Kemalists, part of the Kurdish political movement and a small but distinctive group called "anti-capitalist Muslims". Although this conglomeration of groups was created with different ingredients, the movement gained a meaning beyond its constituents.

Among these different groups, the "Gezi spirit" was mainly nourished by young people, made up of mostly university students. These young people, who are the "Millenial Generation" are extensively involved in computers, computer games and the internet. They are often portrayed as individualist, lonely, and apolitical but they established such a community spirit through the Gezi movement—something no one had predicted. They maintained lively communication on social media and virtually created an explosion of information and communication.

Setting aside the conspiracy theories favored by the government and government-controlled media that tried to convince everyone that this mass was manipulated by foreign powers, as part of a plot to overthrow the AK Party government,55 I will dwell upon the data of a survey which assessed the Gezi participants more objectively and closely.

According to the survey56 that the Konda research company conducted among protesters occupying Gezi Park on June 6–7, 2013, when the events were at their peak, the average age of protesters was twenty-eight; 37 percent of the protesters were students and 52 percent were employed.

Gezi participants included militants of left-wing organizations as mentioned above. This strengthened the argument of certain conspiracy theorists. However, an important component, which represented a new political sensibility, was highlighted. First of all, 79 percent of the protesters were not affiliated with "any political party, formation, association, foundation or platform." Ninety-three percent had joined the protests as "plain citizens" and not upon the call of an organization. Forty-four percent of the protesters had never participated in protests in their lives. Sixty-nine percent had learned of the events on social media. As for political choices, 31 percent of protesters were CHP voters and the remaining were non-voters or voted for independent candidates, indicating the signs of a new political formation.

Interestingly, the main motivation for participating in Gezi protests was not the initial "attempt at cutting down the trees." Of course, the removal of the trees was important, as the second reason that motivated people (19 percent); but, without the "police brutality," which was the biggest motivation according to the survey (49 percent), Gezi may have faded in a very short time as a failed environmental movement. Fourteen percent decided to come when they heard "the [polarizing] statements of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan" and 10 percent came when they "heard about the Taksim Pedestrianization Project."

The reasons stated by the participants indicate that what happened in Gezi Park during the last days of May 2013 was actually a catalyst. Fifty-eight percent of protesters stated they were there because of the "restrictions on freedoms." Thirty-seven percent joined the protests to stand against the "AK Party and its policies" and 30 percent because of their indignation with "Erdoğan's statements and attitude." The Konda report suggests also that almost 90 percent of protesters participated in the Gezi Park protests for a reason directly related to the policies of the government (violation of freedom and individual rights, asking for the PM's resignation, democracy and protesting police brutality and oppression).

In light of this diversity of Gezi protesters, it is possible to formulate a variety of readings (such as a revolutionary attempt, middle-class fears against AK Party policies, secular-Kemalist, anti-authoritarian or ecologist, etc.) and to argue that there is not one single Gezi. But, there is at least one common denominator: the majority of the young protesters grew up, or entered into adolescence and experienced socialization during the AK Party administration. In other words, a young man who was twenty years of age at the time of the protests in 2013 had lived in a country under AK Party rule since he was nine years old, and his perception of politics had been "shaped" by the AK Party government and municipalities. These young people learned about politics in a period when Turkey's militarist, authoritarian and tutelary system was weakened even if they did not have the means to make a comparison. Therefore, they never faced a serious danger and threat of an authoritarian state unlike the previous generations. That is exactly why they hit the streets as courageous individuals who had "tasted freedom" against the authoritarian urban policies of the AK Party government. Moreover, these young people did not have the standard polarizations of the previous generations nor was the traditional secularism–Islamism contrast very meaningful to them. That is why the constituents of Gezi included "anti-capitalist Muslims" and people from conservative families and Islamist groups. Joining the Gezi movement together with the leftist friends was just natural for this new Muslim youth that did not need a strict identity to define themselves.

Over the course of events, the uncompromising discourse of Erdoğan and the police violence infused a new dynamism into the movement. Erdoğan calling the protesters _çapulcu_ (bandits) was turned inside out and transformed into an identity which was embraced by the protesters. Although the events of Gezi shaped into a whirlpool of polarization, spiced by police violence and Erdoğan's harsh statements, the diversity of Gezi and its quality of a "new social movement" were perceived as a major threat by the powerful AK Party. That is, the opposition against AK Party was not traditional for the first time and this opposition did not use a polarizing language. Unlike the previous dichotomous oppositional language, which only served to strengthen the AK Party's hand, the humorous language of Gezi was pluralistic and it was not anti-religious.

However, this pluralistic language lacked a unifying content, crying out for various demands. Erdoğan and the government panicked and lost their composure when confronted by a language questioning their reputation. They labeled the protesters "civil coup plotters" and "puppets of the interest rate lobby," which allegedly tried to undermine the economic achievements of AK Party. The polarization occurred when Erdoğan used this war discourse and shouted threats57 at the rallies and tried to repress Gezi violently.

This polarization was quick to create respective camps. The leftist and liberal segments who had previously supported the AK Party government were dissociated from the hardline supporters. The dominant argument of the supporters was that Gezi was a counter-revolution. The AK Party Deputy Chairman, sociologist Yasin Aktay was among the protagonists of this rhetoric.

In Turkey, a people's revolution has been underway since 2002. These recent protests are nothing more than an attempted counter-revolution of the Egyptian Baltagiya [hatchet men]. [...] Because, the revolution is done already. This is just one of the numerous counter-revolutionary moves attempted against people since 2002.58

As mentioned before in reference to Bayart, the AK Party produced its own discourse calling the Gezi protesters counter-revolutionaries. The Gezi actors labeled as counter-revolutionaries were demonized by the pro-AK Party columnists, who constantly wrote that Gezi was in fact a plot by "dark powers" to undermine Turkey and prevent the resolution of the Kurdish issue.59 As they highlighted Gezi's inconsistencies, they discredited its complexity.60 What these writers failed to understand was that by characterizing the protests as inconsistent and ambiguous, they actually reaffirmed the true character of the movement which was indeed complex, harboring diverse actors and objectives within itself. This was even admitted by the protesters themselves.

Indeed, the complex and plural meanings of Gezi produced a kind of "non-identity." Therefore, everyone (including the protesters and those condemning the protests) has his or her own definition of Gezi. This non-identity encompasses all the different identities represented in Gezi Park that were unable to put their singular imprint on Gezi.61 Thus, the "Gezi identity" encompasses and transcends all these other identities.

The most important characteristic of the identity that developed in Gezi was the "encounter." For the first time after the demonstrations against military coups, Gezi became a real arena of encounter, bringing together secular, feminist, leftist or Kemalist groups with religious segments and women wearing headscarves with those who did not. Socialists guarded Muslims performing the Friday prayer inside the Park. During the Gezi events, secular protesters respected the holy nights (Kandil) observed by their religious peers and offered them "Kandil pretzels," the food traditionally eaten on Kandil. Different religious groups, though not in large numbers, issued declarations in support of the protests and openly criticized the government, which had supposedly "Islamic values."

Below is an excerpt from the declaration for signature on Gezi prepared by the Labor and Justice Platform, an Islamic civil society initiative:

[...] a small minority is getting rich more and more with the support of the State's invisible hand, millions are growing poorer. A political grammar in which capital and domination sets the scene, that sanctifies political power and economic growth does not reflect Islamic ethics.62

## Capturing speech, gaining a foothold

We need to remember that all of this happened during the AK Party reign. The military tutelage was weakened when the AK Party was in power; therefore, the social actors that had a role in it found themselves in a novel social arena. They overcame the fear of "action" together with the AK Party, which effectively contributed to the development of the democratic language and civil society movements.

As put by James Tully quoting Hannah Arendt, what constitutes the "politics" and thus "freedom"63 is the action, the activity itself beyond the differing goals and desires of different participants; the "creativity displayed in the game" and not the rules of the game, and walking the path and not the destination. Despite all the complexities and in spite of the segments in the movement with considerable democratic deficits, the Gezi protests (i.e., resistance, rebellion, new social movement) produced an unpredictable pluralism far beyond the people and organizations it involved, and "heterological meanings"—in the sense used by Michel de Certeau—different from the existing discourses and whatever we have known or thought before and after the one-month contestation, solidarity, occupation, festivity and carnival.64

In a sense, the spirit of Paris 1968 was repeated in İstanbul. Gezi protesters did "capture speech,"65 to quote De Certeau's characterization of the youth demonstrating in the streets of Paris in 1968. "Capture speech" as a term fits in with the Gezi demonstrations where the amalgamation of voices created by slogans and sensitivities that were sometimes totally unrelated to one another did, in fact, represent a multitude of social segments and thus created an intense effect. A technocratic operation, a form of dominance hidden behind rationality emerged in Gezi by appropriating an urban space with the "festival" logic66 or by way of a "carnivalesque" performance,67 which obliterated the logic of the whole system with boundless humor.

While the ship of "urban transformation" was cruising smoothly ahead and without the challenge of any adverse winds and at a time when capitalistic urban policies veiled by the rhetoric of modernization and urbanization were taking over, a new generation's social movement stood and voiced the "right to the city," even if not always very skillfully. The "right to the city" was thus forcefully introduced into the Turkish political scene. This "right" mediated a reflexive relationship between the Gezi movement and urban struggles in different parts of the world. Gezi met the globalism of movements from São Paolo to Tel Aviv, from Madrid ( _Indignados_ ) to New York, and from Athens to Cairo, with their squares occupied for different motivations. All of these movements represent a "new" search inherent in the present times even if they are motivated or kindled by different national or local reasons.

Compared to past social movements, millions of young people and educated people entered into a struggle around the demand for freedom against the system they were born into, without being led by a single outstanding leader, without bothering to define themselves by given ideologies, and under the influence of two powerful references, that is, Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring. It is indeed significant that many recent protests have snowballed informally, spontaneously or through networks into other cities that have been transformed by neoliberal policies.68 What is also significant is the centrality of squares in all of these movements. These struggles seem to aim at "gaining a foothold" vis-à-vis what authoritarian urban policies have taken away from the city. One could argue these are movements that demand a "right to the city" and speak (about power and resistance) out of the complexity of everyday life against a technocratic, developmentalist and humiliating language which tries to sweep away anything in its way. Having no specific program, these movements try to hold on to some "place" in these threatened urban spaces. This vindicates Harvey's assertion in reference to Lefebvre, that urban spaces are not only a very efficient means for capitalistic accumulation but also the arena of social movements and new freedom struggles.69

## Epilogue

After Gezi, the government was challenged by new threats, which can also be seen as new battlefields opened by the government itself. We could see traces of increasing tension and polarization among individuals and social groups in all of these battlefields. Gezi was followed by the corruption scandal involving members of the government that erupted in December 17–25 in the same year and the local and presidential elections of 2014. The general elections of June 7, 2015 were followed by the cessation of the peace/solution process for the Kurdish question and the rise of violence in the south-east, which cost hundreds of lives.

Let us first look at the conflict that was defined by the government as a "coup attempt organized by the Fethullah Gülen's community in cooperation with international powers" as a continuation of the Gezi Uprising. This confrontation, despite all of its particularities, is easily comparable to the situation of fighting brothers in a revolution. As in all revolutions, the government ended up fighting with its fellow revolutionary brothers, specifically the Gülen community, a "comrade community" on the road to the revolution. A police operation was launched on December 17 against government members involved in corruption. The government reacted very harshly to Fethullah Gülen's community, as it believed that the police officers involved in the operations were affiliated with the "community." The corruption investigation became the new episode of Erdoğan's "war of independence" against the _ancien régime_ and helped him justify his fight further. It was, however, for the first time that devout Muslims were polarized against other devout Muslims in Turkey, opening up a new fault line after the usual Alevite–Sunni, Turkish–Kurdish and secular–religious confrontations.70

The "parallel structure nesting within the State" rhetoric cleared all "gray" zones in the minds of the confused electorate. So, life became only "white" or "black" before the 2014 local and presidential elections. The AK Party movement adeptly manipulated the complex state–citizen relationship into simplicity and to its own advantage. Erdoğan chose to fight rather than hear the demands and convinced the masses who supported him that the fight was a "matter of life and death." He, thus, created his own deific figure. Another "father" figure was emerging to replace the gradually eroding Atatürk figure as the "father of Turks."

In August 2014, Erdoğan unsurprisingly won the presidential election in an atmosphere of animosity and conflict against the "parallel structure" within the state. But something significant happened for the first time in the Turkish political scene: Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-chair of the People's Democratic Party (HDP), a party that was labeled as a Kurdish party and that had not been able to gain more than 6 percent of the electorate in the previous elections, ran as a presidential candidate and won almost 10 percent of the votes. Thanks particularly to Demirtaş's soft style and rhetoric, the HDP was able to appeal not only to Kurds but also to Western Turkey and ethnic Turks.

The HDP's rise continued in the 2015 general election, when the party gained 13 percent of the votes and won eighty seats in the parliament. Hence this election proved to be a historical one that brought new or unrecognized voices of society to the parliament against the AK Party that was "statized." The HDP passed the 10 percent threshold instituted by the military government of the September 12 coup on the grounds of introducing "stability." This success came despite the AK Party's strong efforts to keep the threshold in place, let alone to change it, even though as a conservative democrat party, its predecessors had been repressed by such exclusionary policies. Therefore, the HDP's success in passing the threshold meant that the AK Party could not benefit from the threshold system as it had done in the past. The AK Party's hopes of relying on polarization through a revolutionary rhetoric that was based on an _ancien régime_ –new regime dichotomy failed, and while it retained its position as the first party, it lost the overall majority.

The results of the June 7 election, which prevented the AK Party from staying in power for another term and Erdoğan from realizing his dream of being the president in a presidential system, also caused a huge change in the "peace/solution" rhetoric that the AK Party had adopted with respect to the Kurdish question.

The election results delivered a blow to attempts to solve the Kurdish question which had been called the "Kurdish opening" or the "democratic opening" or the "National Unity and Fellowship Project." The fact that—apart from some exceptions—there were no armed conflicts and deaths since 2012; talks had begun between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK); the HDP was becoming a "party of Turkey"; and a "peace protocol" (known as the "Dolmabahçe consensus") was signed, had raised the hopes that Turkey might finally solve its Kurdish question.

However, tensions surrounding the June 7 elections struck a blow to the peace process as well. Especially President Erdoğan's toughened rhetoric, filled with phrases such as "the state will not negotiate with terrorists" and "the solution process is over"; the killing of thirty-two leftist young people in the south-east town of Suruç by a suicide bomber allegedly tied to the ISIS; and the assassination of two police officers, initially claimed by the PKK but later alleged to be the killings of "elements out of control," removed virtually any conditions for a potential dialogue.

Turkey's potential for change, carried by the AK Party which has grown stronger through its election victories since 2002 evolved into a dark period by 2015 when the war, heartily embraced by the PKK, recommenced. The Islamic movement, which has been one of the most important movements for the demilitarization of Turkey, turned toward the classical state mentality with the AK Party's ascent to power, missing the opportunity of contributing to the demilitarization of the dominant social discourse. So much so that the AK Party, especially during the last five years of its twelve years of rule, has radicalized the polarization of society to an unprecedented extent.

The opposition forces that did not agree with the way peace was defined by the AK Party, as the "disarmament of PKK," was categorized as anti-peace. In the meantime, the war with Gülen sympathizers and anti-Gülen propaganda were pursued with accusations of foreign powers being behind the traitors. This rhetoric which is reminiscent of the traditional state mentality, showed that a peace process aiming solely for disarmament is extremely difficult. As a matter of fact, the AK Party's discourse of "threats against the state" sent the message that the AK Party overlaps with the state.

It appears that Turkey surpassed the "classical Kemalist era" almost altogether. Given that, however, law and order, continuity and stability are crucial for a society which has an issue of trust, and considering the discourse of public order the AK Party tends to use more and more everyday, one could argue that Kemalism now has a refreshed voice and lifeblood. As a result, the AK Party's penetration into the state is also the penetration of the state into AK Party.

As a final word, one can comment on the present condition of politics and society: the AK Party is hoping that it can regain the votes it lost in June and secure an absolute majority of seats in the parliament with early elections in November, after cunningly blocking the possibilities of a coalition government. Hawkish circles within the state, which the AK Party is now a part of, seem to have put off the chances of progress toward more democracy that were made possible by the work of actors of civil society, due to the mechanism of war with the PKK, and the statist, nationalist ideology that feeds from the war.

## Notes

1 Michel de Certeau, _L'invention du quotidien. 1. Arts de faire_ , Paris: Gallimard, 1990.

2 Alain Touraine, _Le retour de l'acteur_ , _Essai de sociologie_ , Paris: Fayard, 1984; _La critique de la modernité_ , Paris: Fayard, 1992.

3 For the "non-economic" making of the working classes, see E.P. Thompson, _The Making of the English Working Class_ , Toronto: Penguin Books, 1991; and Jane Humphries, "Class Struggle and the Persistence of the Working-Class Family," in Anthony Giddens and David Held (eds), _Classes, Power and Conflict_ , Houndmills, London: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 470–91.

4 See Oğuz Işık, Melih Pınarcıoğlu, _Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk, Gecekondulaşma ve Kent Yoksulları: Sultanbeyli Örneği_. İletişim yay., 2009; Cihan Tuğal, _Pasif Devrim – İslami Muhalefetin Düzenle Bütünleşmesi_. İstanbul: Koç Üniv. Yay., 2010.

5 Etyen Mahçupyan described the success of the AK Party in the 2014 local elections as a "people's revolution": "Halk ihtilali." _Zaman_ daily, April 10, 2014.

6 For instance, on a internet site on "Traitors against the Republic," it describes a "Chronology of the counter-revolution," at: http://vatanhainleri.wordpress.com/karsi-devrim-kronolojisi/

7 "Bu Sayıda/Yaşadığımız Günler: Sağcılık, Siyasal İslâm ve KHK." _Tezkire_ 17 (2000): 10.

8 Ömer Çelik, "Melez Gündem, Melezlerin Gündemi." _Tezkire_ 17 (2000): 34.

9 A feature story by _Birikim_ magazine titled "O Messenger of God, We Beseech for Construction [more than Your Intercession]" (İnşaat ya Resulullah) indicates how Islamic/conservative groups became powerful economic actors particularly through the construction sector: _Birikim_ 270 (October 2011).

10 Yasin Aktay, "Sol, Metin, Tarih" ["Left, Text, History"]. _Tezkire_ 26 (2002): 50.

11 Former Marxist Ethem Sancak, who came to own various media outlets during the AK Party rule, is an example of businessmen embedded in the upper classes of AK Party. In an interview, Sancak expressed his admiration and adoration for Erdoğan: "Milyarlık aşk." _Taraf_ daily, September 2, 2014.

12 An example of this legitimization process is a fatwa by Hayrettin Karaman, a well-reputed religious scholar among Islamic groups. Karaman argued that businessmen or companies awarded public tenders may donate money to indicated charitable foundations. See H. Karaman, "Rüşvete ve yolsuzluğa fetva verilmez" ["No fatwa may favor bribery and corruption"]. _Yeni Şafak_ daily, December 27, 2013. This fatwa, which was issued with foundations and civil society organizations (e.g., youth organization TÜRGEV) close to AK Party, caused heated public debates, arguing that it downright meant bribery. See Mümtaz'er Türköne, "Hayrettin Hoca, rüşvete fetva vermiş oldu mu?" ["Has Hayrettin Hodja indeed issued a bribery fatwa?"]. _Zaman_ daily, January 16, 2014.

13 The group led by theologian İhsan Eliaçık started participating in the May Day festivities—dominated by the leftists in 2010. They were also among the Taksim-Gezi protesters.

14 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, _La religion pour mémoire_. Paris: Cerf, 1993; Patrick Michel, _Politique et religion_ , _La grande mutation_. Paris: Albin Michel, 1994.

15 The elections in which the AK Party has participated in are as follows: 2002 parliamentary elections: 34.6 percent; 2004 local elections: 41.7 percent; 2007 parliamentary elections: 46.6 percent; 2009 local elections: 38.8 percent; 2010 constitutional referendum: 57.9 percent (Yes); 2011 parliamentary elections: 49.9 percent; 2013 local elections: 43.4 percent; 2014 presidential elections: 51.8 percent (presidential candidate: Erdoğan).

16 TESEV, _Anayasa'ya dair tanım ve beklentiler araştırması_ (Survey: Definitions and Expectations Regarding the New Constitution), September 2012.

17 For instance, the "70 million steps against coups" was one of the significant initiatives against memorandums of the Turkish Armed Forces and coup plotters, like Ergenekon within the state: the initiative has organized several marches and demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people since 2008.

18 After the constitutional reform, Kenan Evren and Muhsin Batur, two generals of the September 12, 1980 coup (who were still alive), were brought before the court and sentenced to life imprisonment on June 18, 2014.

19 The statement by Aziz Babuşçu, Chairman of İstanbul's provincial organization of the AK Party, that they "no longer needed liberals" could be read as a typical effort to consolidate the camps or as a post-revolutionary dissociation. "Those who have been our stakeholders one way or the other during the past 10 years we were in power will no longer have that role in the coming 10 years." "Babuşcu: Gelecek 10 yıl, liberaller gibi eski paydaşlarımızın arzuladığı gibi olmayacak," _t24_ , April 1, 2013, at: http://t24.com.tr/haber/babuscu-onumuzdeki-10-yil-liberaller-gibi-eski-paydaslarimizin-kabullenecegi-gibi-olmayacak,226892.

20 Erdoğan said:

There are always people, [...] controversial types that tried to prevent it. [...] In this age, are we supposed to live without electricity, without power? Are we supposed to condemn ourselves to darkness? [...] Will we still rely on manual labor?

"Erdoğan: Nükleer enerjiye karşı çıkanlar bilgisayar kullanmıyor mu?." _Zaman_ daily, March 27, 2011.

21 For example, "Villagers resisting to HPP in Rize beaten," at: www.aktifhaber.com/rizede-hese-direnen-koylulere-dayak-994750h.htm; and "Villagers resisting to thermal plant attacked," at: http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/132515-termik-santral-istemeyen-koylulere-saldiri

22 Max Weber, _L'Ethique protestante et l'esprit du Capitalisme_ , Paris: Agora, 1985. There are also studies reading the Islam-capitalism relation with a Weberian approach. For example, the ESI report, "Les Calvinistes Islamiques Changements et conservatisme en Anatolie centrale," Berlin – Istanbul, 2005, at: www.esiweb.org

23 For example, a land within the boundaries of Dolmabahçe quarter in İstanbul was taken in 1994 by the ANAP government from the Welfare Party municipality of Beyoğlu, which restricted construction in the area, and it was given to the Şişli municipality, which was affiliated with ANAP. After this change, Süzer Holding Company built a 34-storey skyscraper on the land that had a view of the Bosphorus. The building, which was 154 meters high, was later tagged the "phallic structure of İstanbul." Gülay Atığ, the then-Mayor of Şişli, fled abroad from the corruption investigations that followed; she is still believed to be abroad. Süzer Holding was acquitted in all of the cases brought to court.

24 I will turn to one of the promised projects, the rebuilding of an Ottoman Artillery Barracks as a shopping mall, as it has triggered the strongest social movement of the AK Party's administration.

25 "Çılgın projeye patronlar talip!." _Hürriyet daily, Emlak Yaşam Eki [Real Estate – Lifestyle Supplement]_ , May 5, 2011.

26 David Harvey, _The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism_. London: Profile Books, 2010.

27 David Harvey: "The Right to the City." _New Left Review_ 53, September–October 2008; see "Urban Revolutions" section, pp. 25–29.

28 David Harvey, _Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution_. London and New York: Verso, 2013.

29 Henri Lefebvre, "Reflection on the Politics of Space," in N. Brenner and S. Elden (eds), _State, Space, World: Selected Essays by Henri Lefebvre_. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, pp. 167–85.

30 Henri Lefebvre, _The Production of Space_. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, p. 26.

31 For a detailed and comprehensive article on TOKI, see Evrim Yılmaz, "Kentsel dönüşüm politikaları ve TOKİ'nin önlenemez yükselişi." Heinrich Böll Stiftung Association, at: http://tr.boell.org/tr/2014/06/16/kentsel-doenuesuem-politikalari-vetokinin-oenlenemez-yuekselisi

32 See: www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/12/20121206-1.htm

33 See: www.manisadabugun.com/gundem/buyuksehire-bagli-koylerde-belediye-vergi-harclari-5-yil-alinmayacak-h773.html

34 Ak Parti Genel Merkezi Yerel Yönetimler Başkanlığı, Sorular ve Cevaplarla Yeni Büyükşehir Belediye Yasası, 2012, at: www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/akparti_buyuksehir_yasasi.pdf

35 Henri Lefebvre, _The Urban Revolution_. Trans. Robert Bononno. Minneapolis, Mn: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.

36 Harvey, "The Right to the City," p. 28.

37 David Harvey argues that violence was always used when creating a new urban world since the Haussman policies, which turned Paris upside down. The working class and other unruly elements were removed from the city center, as they were perceived as a threat to public order. (Harvey, "The Right to the City," p. 33).

38 Harvey, _Rebel Cities_ , p. 66.

39 Dušan Marinković, "Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution." (Book review). _Panoeconomicus_ 5 (2013): 699–705.

40 Ulus Atayurt, "AKP'nin ustalık dönemi hedefi: Taksim Projesi ve Beyoğlu – Kapitalizmin Simcity'si," _Express_ (Special issue on "Neo-Islam") 127, April 2012, at: http://birdirbir.org/akpnin-ustalik-donemi-hedefi-taksim-projesi-ve-beyoglu/

41 See, for example, Marcello Balbo, "Urban Planning and the Fragmented City of Developing Countries." _Third World Planning Review_ 15, no. 1 (1993): 23–35, cited by David Harvey, "The Right to the City." _New Left Review_ 53 (September–October 2008): 32.

42 Harvey, "The Right to the City", p. 38.

43 David Harvey, _Social Justice and the City_. University of Georgia Press, 2009.

44 Müfit Yüksel, "Gökdelenler neyimiz olur?" ["How are the skyscrapers related to us?"]. _Yeni Şafak_ daily, July 18, 2012.

45 Jean-François Bayart, _L'Islam républicain_ , _Ankara, Téhéran. Dakar_ , Paris: Albin Michel, 2010. See also "Le concept de situation thermidorienne: régimes néo-révolutionnaires et libéralisation économique." _Questions de Recherche/Research in Question_ , Centre d'études et de recherches internationales – Sciences Po, no. 24, Mars 2008.

46 Beyoğlu Mayor Demircan said that the shopping center would create a new "attraction." "Topçu Kışlası'na AVM cazibe alanı olacak." _NTV_ , February 5, 2013, at: www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/topcu-kislasina-avm-cazibe-alani-olacak,JY2Xdy2enEGnS7ZB6PiPKw. In 2011, Erdoğan stated that: "İstanbul deserves to become a brand name more than anywhere else": "İstanbul marka olmayi fazlasiyla hak ediyor," at: www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25199272/

47 See: http://taksimdayanisma.org/ortak-deklarasyon

48 For instance: "Biz birkaç çapulcunun yaptığını yapmayız. Onlar yakarlar yıkarlar" "We do not do what a few bandits do. They burn and destroy"]. "Bunlara ilk dersi sandıkta vermenizi istiyorum." _Sabah daily_ , June 9, 2013, at: [www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/06/09/basbakan-erdogan-konusuyor

49 The facts of the Kabataş assault never saw daylight. However, there was a possible verbal attack on a veiled woman and the incident was constantly used as propaganda by the pro-government media to blemish Gezi. See the interview (later revealed to be a false report) of Elif Çakır with the "victim": "Kadınlar küfrediyor, erkekler vuruyordu" ["Women were insulting, men were hitting"] _Star_ daily, June 13, 2013. This false incident aside, veiled women who were thought to be pro-AK Party were abused (e.g., insulted, pulling away the headscarf etc.) in İstanbul on various occasions during Gezi events.

50 "Yol ver gidelim Taksim'i ezelim." June 7, 2013, at: www.haberler.com/yol-vergidelim-taksim-i-ezelim-4707106-haberi/People did not march from Kazlıçeşme to Taksim, but voluntary militia attacked protesters with meat cleavers and sticks. A youth named Ali İsmail Korkmaz was killed in such an attack in Eskişehir.

51 See "2013 Taksim Gezi Parkı protestoları zaman çizelgesi," at: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Taksim_Gezi_Park%C4%B1_protestolar%C4%B1_zaman_%C3%A7izelgesi

52 See "Gezi Parkı'na koruma kalktı," at: www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/150127/Gezi_Parki_na_koruma_kalkti.html.

53 Michel de Certeau, "Believing and Making People Believe," in _The Practice of Everyday Life_. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984, pp. 177–89.

54 Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place." _American Journal of Sociology_ 82 (1976): 309–18, 326–32.

55 According to that conspiratorial mindset: all such "treacheries" are masterminded by "foreigners" and perpetrated by "their local accomplices." The allegations went as far to claim that Gezi Park protests were engineered by the Serbian youth movement "Otpor." Later, it was found that a dedicated investigation was launched into this allegation ( _Radikal_ , November 11, 2014). The news reports provided to pro-government papers about the "conspiracy" were indeed comical. According to these papers, the "foreign hand in the conspiracy" extended to a few Erasmus students who looked like Europeans (i.e., they were blond). "Gezi'de Yabancı Ajan Parmağı" "Foreign Agents in Gezi"]. _Yeni Şafak_ , June 4, 2013. For a detailed media review, see "Gezi direnişi ve medya 1-'Kökü Dışarıda'nın Yeni Versiyonu 'Yabancı Parmağı'," at: [http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/147556-koku-disarida-nin-yeni-versiyonu-yabanci-parmagi

56 Konda, _Gezi Report_ , June 5, 2014.

57 At a press conference during the most heated days of the protests, Erdoğan argued that the segments against the protesters were furious. He said: "We can barely hold the opposing 50% at home," "Başbakan: Yüzde 50'yi evinde zor tutuyorum." _Hürriyet_ , June 4, 2013, at: www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakan-yuzde-50basbakan-yuzde-50-yi-evinde-zor-tutuyorum-23429709

58 Yasin Aktay, "Halka karşı devrim" ["Revolution against people"]. _Yeni Şafak_ , June 29, 2013.

59 See, for instance, Reha Muhtar, " 'Barış'ı sabote edecekler" ["They will sabotage the peace"]. _Vatan_ , September 12, 2013.

60 See, for example, Hilal Kaplan, "Ama gezi ruhu bu değil" ["But this is not the Gezi spirit"]. _Yeni Şafak_ , July 14, 2013.

61 The television celebrity Okan Bayülgen was a Kemalist about this unseizability. He said he could not stand the PKK (Kurdish organization) flags in the area and the pictures of assassinated Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and that Gezi Park should be decorated only with Turkish flags and Atatürk posters. "Okan Bayülgen cannot stand being a bandit chapuller] for long," Marksist.org, June 9, 2013, at: [http://arsiv.marksist.org/haberler/11789-okan-bayulgen-capulculuga-fazla-dayanamadi

62 See: www.ihrc.org.uk/news/comment/10775-declaration-on-taksim-gezi-park-protests

63 James Tully, "The Agonic Freedom of Citizens." _Economy and Society_ 28, no. 2 (May 1999): 161–82, quoting Hannah Arendt, _The Human Condition_. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

64 M. de Certeau, _Histoire et psychanalyse entre science et fiction_. Paris: Gallimard, 2002.

65 M. de Certeau, _The Capture of Speech and Other Writings_. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

66 H. Lefebvre, _Everyday Life in the Modern World_ , S. Rabinovitch (trans.), New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1984, cited by Michael E. Gardiner, "Henri Lefebvre: philosopher of the ordinary," _Critiques of Everyday Life_ , Routledge, 2000, pp. 71–101.

67 Mikhail Bakhtin, _Rabelais and His World_ , H. Isowolsky (trans.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984, cited by Michael E. Gardiner, "Bakhtin's Prosaic Imagination," _Critiques of Everyday Life_ , Routledge, 2000, pp. 43–70.

68 Peter Beaumont, "Global Protest Grows as Citizens Lose Faith in Politics and the State." _The Observer_ , June 22, 2013.

69 Harvey, _Rebel Cities_ and "The Right to the City."

70 A similar polarization ensued when 301 miners were killed underground in a fire in a coal mine operated by Soma Holding in Soma district in Western Turkey on May 13, 2014. The civil society and the opposition put the blame jointly on the government and capitalistic circles, arguing that the "life of workers was too cheap." In response, Erdoğan was quick to be on the defensive: "This is in the nature of mining work. These are natural consequences. This is the destiny of miners. It happens everywhere, not in Turkey only." See: www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/erdogan-somada-konustu-bunlar-olagan-seylerdir

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# **7** **Rising criticism of Erdoğan during the Gezi protests**

_Fahrettin Altun_ 1

Chantal Mouffe, one of the prominent political philosophers of the twentieth century, underlines the centrality of conflict to the construction of political reality. Conflict is inevitable when socio-political existence is in question. Mouffe states that the greatest risk of modern political reality is that "conflict" could lead to antagonistic attitudes largely by ignoring the existence of "conflict." If conflict is not dealt within a legitimate and legal frame, violent and hostile patterns could emerge. In this process, the character and function of "politics" are different from "the political" as they would play into the equation by bringing together different conflicting elements that arise because of the nature of "the political" and form an order. Mouffe differentiates between "the antagonist" and "the competitor," and concludes that the ideal is to transform conflict into competition. If you see your opponent not as an antagonist but as a political competitor, then you will give him the space and opportunity to defend his ideas (Mouffe 2013).

An introduction of this kind to an article about the Gezi Park protests probably invokes the idea that what follows is about Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's "authoritarian policies," his "hostility towards a certain segment of society" and his "confrontational manner." This issue, which has been discussed widely in the literature formed since the Gezi Park protests, by and large problematizes Erdoğan's "rigid attitude."

I started with an analysis of Mouffe's work because I would like to look at the other side of the coin. Mouffe's views on political conflict turning into antagonistic positioning and the consideration of an opponent as an "enemy" instead of a "political competitor" are pertinent to the attitude adopted by the Gezi protesters and form a primary factor in determining their Erdoğan imagery. During the Gezi protests, Erdoğan was characterized as an "antagonist." Clearly, this profile had to do with the protesters' conviction that "Erdoğan saw them as enemies." However, this did not change the fact they saw him as an "enemy" and not as a political "competitor."

To this day several books, articles, and opinion pieces have been written about what the Gezi protests meant for Turkey's socio-political reality. Frankly, the main theme of Gezi protest literature was already formed while the protests were ongoing. Several books were published while the events were still intense and their effects on society were visible. Most of these publications promoted the Gezi protests and narrated the incidents as epic. Certain research companies and think-tanks conducted field research during the time of the protests (Ete and Taştan 2013; Konda Research and Consultation 2013). Several columnists actively supported the Gezi protests and dedicated their columns to the subject for almost two weeks. Yet, undoubtedly, the main medium of the events was social media, especially Twitter. Protesters were able to express their concerns, criticisms and the opposition's main arguments through Twitter and the popular hashtags created there.

Protests started on May 27, 2013 in Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park as a reaction to the news of the future destruction of Gezi Park and the building of a shopping mall in its place. The protests quickly spread all across Turkey and they were deemed significant for various reasons, especially for being the largest massive protests the AK Party government faced during its eleven years in power. The Gezi protests were not the first examples of anti-government protests: large crowds of people who position themselves against the government take to the streets and protest during the regular election campaigning seasons in Turkey. In this context, the first example we come across is the "Republic Protests" in 2007 organized by neo-Kemalists. Even though the Gezi Park protests did not originate from a homogenous group with a single political identity, at first the protesters had a common goal of forcing the government to resign by using mass protest tactics.

Focusing mainly on the social media, especially Twitter and hashtags, this study consists of two parts: the first aims to discuss the criticisms leveled against the AK Party during the Gezi protests that started in Taksim, Istanbul, on May 27, 2013; the second part discusses the possibilities and dilemmas these criticisms carry for Turkish politics and democracy culture. In this respect, the first point to highlight is the first round of criticisms voiced in the Gezi Park protests that were directed at the AK Party's urban development plans.

## **The substance of the first round of Gezi protests**

The Gezi Park occupiers claimed they were there to protest against the Taksim Pedestrianization Project and the uprooting of trees in Gezi Park. After the initial police action against the protesters, the first round of criticisms was still directed against the Taksim Pedestrianization Project and speculations regarding the construction of a shopping mall following the removal of Gezi Park. These criticisms speedily encompassed a broader framework: the AK Party government's urban planning policies along with its general policies of the recent past which were considered pro-Islamic. In a way, after the initial interference by the riot police, the intensity and the capacity of criticisms against the government and Istanbul municipality increased greatly.

During this period, it was claimed that the AK Party government produced urban development plans in a neoliberal framework, constructed an economy of loot and plunder, exhibited exclusionary governing patterns, and executed top-down decisions in undemocratic ways. In this context, Istanbul-centered "urban development projects" became the focus of criticism. Some of the projects/issues that were extensively criticized include: the increasing rate of shopping mall construction; the construction of a third bridge which will connect the European and Asian sides of Istanbul and naming it "Yavuz Sultan Selim"; the speculation about demolishing Taksim Atatürk Culture Center; plans of constructing a big mosque in Istanbul's Camlica hills; Istanbul Canal Project; the demolition of Beyoglu Emek Theater; allotting the old Tekel Cigarette Factory to a Waqf University; and building a demonstration space in Yenikapi. Those projects are being criticized by political opponents to AK Party government for several reasons. First, they are being taken as serious threats to symbolic cultural codes of modern secular lifestyle. Second, the political opponents of the AK Party government argue that these projects are not applied in a democratic, participatory and transparent process. Third, the political opponents reflect on those projects as a way of informal financing mechanism serving the AK Party government. And fourth, it was argued that the AK Party's vision for local governance for the city harms the people and the city itself.

At first Gezi Park protesters positioned themselves as environmentally-conscious actors who are against urbanization policies and neoliberal policies of city governance. Hence the Gezi protests were perceived by many of the activists and sympathetic writers as an environmentalist movement.

When I talked to people, I saw that their problem was not about politics at all. They wanted to be able to protect trees, leaves, flowers and birds. This is why they felt tormented but continued to ask: "Isn't there even one environmentalist AKP supporter, not even one environmentalist AKP deputy?" (Arman 2013: 12).

However, the extent and nature of the criticisms changed tremendously, shortly after the security forces' crackdown on the Gezi Park protesters. The target of these criticisms was not exactly the government or the AK Party's institutional identity but Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's discourse and policies. In Ahmet İnsel's words, what was "otherized" was "Erdoğan's jauntily displayed regime of tyranny" (İnsel 2013).

The new dimension introduced to the "third bridge" discussion is a good example of the shift in axis. It became a vital point of discussion during the Gezi protests, the focal point being its chosen name. The claim that the Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim committed history's greatest massacre of Alawis was used as a platform by many social media campaigns. The naming of the bridge after this Sultan met with the claim that the name was specifically chosen by Erdoğan for two reasons: 1) Erdoğan's dislike for Alawis; and 2) Erdoğan's desire to become a "Caliph" like "Yavuz Sultan Selim." Naming the third bridge after the Sultan was described as a new insult and threat to Alawis, as well as a direct governmental move against Alawi segments of the population. Thus the Alawi opposition was summoned to join the protests. In this process, all anti-Alawi incidents in Islamic and Turkish history were frequently remembered and discussed. It was also claimed that Turkey's Syria policy under Erdoğan's leadership was inspired by the government's anti-Alawi policies and accordingly, it was only normal that Erdoğan wanted to pick this name for Istanbul's new bridge. Giving a name to the third bridge which was anathema to Alawis was described as an "extension of government policy to mythologize criminals like Yavuz Sultan Selim who committed crimes against people."

Even though the Gezi protests started when environmentalists gathered in Gezi Park after hearing about government plans to cut down the trees, it could not be considered solely an environmentalist movement. The moment riot police interfered with the tents of the environmentalist groups, it evolved into a comprehensive political uprising, a "challenge-against-authority movement," and the most serious and broadly participated massive opposition rally against the AK Party chairman and Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government.

This article argues that as soon as the Gezi protests started to turn into massive protests, the "Gezi story" gained a new dimension. In other words the four arguments behind Gezi's criticisms mentioned above were suddenly reduced to a reaction to Erdoğan's persona and the culture of governance he is blamed of cultivating.

For this reason this article will focus on the criticisms directed at Erdoğan in the Gezi protesters' discourse by deconstructing the main elements of Erdoğan imagery that were popularized during these protests, which could also be read as an opposition and resistance movement.

The time-frame for this analysis will be between May 27 and June 15, 2013. The study examines columnists' writings which were supportive of the Gezi Park movement; posters and banners that circulated in Taksim; and prominent activists' Twitter accounts and tweets that were posted under the following hashtags: "#geziparki, #resist, #direngezi, #duranadam, #OccupyTaksim, #DirenGazeteci, #Palalı, #SalihMemecanHaklıSizeNeBATTI, #direndemokrasi, #bibergazı, #yeşiliçalmakornaçal, #ProvokatörBaşbakanİstemiyoruz, #iHtiyacımız OlanŞey, #Olmakİsterdim, #CapulchularTakipleşiyor, #AKPyeDirenEyHalk, #KenanEvreninOğluTayyipErdoğan, #delilimvar." Then, the pervasive critical political discourse will be discussed under two main subtitles: the first will analyze the four foundational elements of anti-Erdoğan criticisms that created the "Gezi Spirit"; and the second will examine the prospects and challenges these criticisms have created for the political culture of opposition in Turkey.

## **Images of Erdoğan presented during the Gezi protests**

The common point of groups with different identities and ideologies who joined the Gezi protests was their obvious dislike for Erdoğan, their common Erdoğan "antagonism" in Mouffe's terms. In the first few days of Gezi incidents, other publicly known names from the higher echelons of the party including President Abdullah Gül extended warm messages for a peaceful reconciliation (Gül 2013; Bagis 2013; Bayraktar 2013; Eroğlu 2013; Güler 2013; Topbaş 2013; Yıldız 2013). However, Prime Minister Erdoğan continued to use an uncompromising discourse toward the protesters, and he was criticized by them even more harshly. As will be explained in the following sections, the main reason behind his tough discourse was the issue of Erdoğan's threat perception: that from the very beginning the PM considered these protests as a "coup" directed against himself, not against his party. Long before Gezi, Erdoğan's image had surpassed the AK Party identity and policies and, as a result, his attitude and decisions had become the source of negative reactions and criticisms of protesters.

During the Gezi protests, the anti-Erdoğan political position was constructed on four foundational discursive elements. Erdoğan was portrayed as being:

1 Increasingly authoritarian and dictatorial;

2 Meddling in lifestyles;

3 Anti-democratic;

4 Displaying an attitude that polarized and evoked tension among the country's population.

While some who voiced these opinions had been against the political ontology that the AK Party and Erdoğan had represented since 2002, others underlined Erdoğan's change and "corruption" during the period he calls his "master stage," which followed his election victory for the third time in 2011.

## **Authoritarianism and dictatorship**

The most prominent criticism against Erdoğan was that he has increasingly become authoritarian by displaying dictatorial qualities in the political arena. During the protests, streets carried numerous banners and graffiti reading "Dictator Tayyip" (Kayaoğlu 2013: 8). Some of the Gezi actors claimed that Erdoğan's increase of power, especially since the 2011 elections, had caused the party to divert from its foundational ideals and quoted this as a clear example of "power poisoning." Others claimed that Erdoğan had been seeking this sort of power since the very beginning with a "secret agenda" and as soon as he found the opportunity, he showed his true colors.

According to supporters of the first proposition, the post-2000 AK Party governments built a new Turkey and society was transformed, but it wasn't Erdoğan and the AK Party's core cadres that achieved this transformation. Erdoğan to this day, they claim, seeks to use the "threat" he perceived coming from the secular establishment toward the existence of his party since the days he established the AK Party as a factor of advantage (Özdemir 2013a). What is emphasized here is that even though Erdoğan presented himself as a "servant" of the people, he turned bolder with each election success and his actions turned into those of a dictator (Özdemir 2013b). The ones who claim that Erdoğan has changed for the worse and those who claim he had a secret agenda from the beginning meet at a common point. In this perspective, one of the most popular criticisms of the Gezi opposition is that Erdoğan's power intoxication has turned him into an "arrogant Sultan" who knows and is capable of everything (Mumcu 2013a).

One person, just one person, cannot be an architectural genius, moral philosopher, square planner, Middle East conqueror, champion of agenda changing, doctor, social engineering guru, life coach of 75 million, and television critic all at the same time... If he tries to be, there will be a problem... Forget about it.

(Hakan 2013c)

Another reason the Gezi opposition depicted Erdoğan as an authoritarian political actor was the disproportional use of force by the riot police (Çakirözer 2013). It was suggested by opposition voices that the disproportional use of force was executed following direct orders from Erdoğan and this in turn caused a portion of the public to run out of patience.

Yet, one view blames Erdoğan's growing authoritarianism on misguidance from his close circle. It is necessary to point out that the thesis claiming that "his advisors and family are misguiding him" adds a conflicting dimension to the problem. While Erdoğan has been blamed for being a stubborn "authoritarian figure who does not take advise from anyone," he is also depicted as a "dependent political personality who can easily be guided by his advisors" (Hakan 2013a, 2013b; Mumcu 2013b).

An interesting contrast in portrayals of Erdoğan as a "dictator" is between those who claimed that he believes in an Islamic authoritarianism and uses democracy as a means to gain power and those who tried to draw parallels between the protests in Turkey and the Arab Spring, and accordingly identified Erdoğan with "secular" Arab dictators such as Bashar Al-Assad and Hosni Mubarak. The emphasis on Erdoğan not being any different from the old "secular" Arab dictators is a common remark made by Gezi protesters (Çandar 2013a).

The Gezi protests came to the agenda as "an outburst of anger and anxiety toward Erdoğan's governing style" rather than toward a "regime problem" (Çandar 2013b). In other words, the main reason behind the public discomfort was Erdoğan's monopoly of power (Çandar 2013d). In this context, "Gezi resistance" was formulated as a "revolt against authoritarianism" represented by Erdoğan.

## **Interference with lifestyles discourse**

Another main theme of the Gezi opposition was the government's—as represented by Erdoğan—"interference with lifestyles." According to the voices of the Gezi opposition, Erdoğan's increasing power has made him more authoritarian and boosted his confidence in his efforts to push society toward a single lifestyle. Erdoğan's governments have tried to redefine the public sphere through its own conservative identity and refused to recognize the different lifestyles embraced by various segments in society.

It could be argued that at first glance it seems like the Gezi opposition accepts the Habermasian "public space" and "system" distinction, and argues that the political "system" led by Erdoğan should not "colonize the public space." From this perspective, the Gezi opposition could be seen as a public oppositional movement that put forward its own tactics against governmental strategies, which in turn claim to put 'daily life' before 'system rationalization.' Nevertheless, we need to take a closer look at the Gezi opposition and evaluate its "interference with lifestyle" discourse.

The discourse of "interference with lifestyle" which was popularized by the Gezi protests is similar to discourses of the 1960s freedom movements in Europe and America; it is not a discourse to be understood without relating it to the fear of political "reaction" of Islamic activism that has developed in the political culture of the republic. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the time when French style radical secularist policies were being legitimized, Islam's potential of taking over modern politics, society and the public space has always been regarded as a threat. Feeding into the fear of "going back to the dark days" has become an effective tool for legitimizing republican actions from the 1930s to the 2000s. The Kemalist Regime, through its National Education Paradigm, imagined Islam as a religion restricted to the personal space and tried to neutralize its public and political effects. In this respect, it has, for years discriminated against religious groups and public representations of Islam. Religious politicians trying to exist in the political arena by voicing the demands of society's religious people were considered as a threat to Republican modernizations and Western, modern, secular lifestyles.

Until the formation of the first Islamic political party, "Millî Nizam Party" (National Order Party) (NOP) representing "Millî Görüş" (National View) ideology in 1970 which is the root ideology of the AK Party, the legitimacy of Islamic parties was regarded with suspicion. The degree to which they would be respectful to Western, modern and secular lifestyles in case they ever came to power was a constant theme of questioning. The same line of questioning continued with the emergence of successor parties—the Millî Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) in 1972 and the Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) in 1982—all formed after the predecessor party was closed. The debate was on whether they would interfere with "modern lifestyles," people's clothing, dining, drinking, cultural and entertainment habits. When the Refah Party established a coalition government with the center-right "Doğru Yol Party" (the True Path Party) in 1996, these discussions reached a climax after a remark made by the Refah leader Necmettin Erbakan on his wish to build a mosque in Taksim. During this period, most of anything a Refah Party official said about organizing the public space sparked a debate on the "interference with lifestyle" issue.

The AK Party, which came to power in 2002, has become an object of the same kind of fear and questioning as well. Radical laicism policies in Turkey, whose main objectives have been to keep religion and religious symbols outside the public realm, started to wear off as a result of the AK Party's successful policies regarding the rehabilitation of religion and state relations since the end of the 2000s. As the Turkish political arena started to break away from the bureaucratic oligarchy's tutelage, and the feeling of political normalization settled, the AK Party government started to follow a clearer "conservative" path of policies. However, institutional normalization was not reflected in the public perception and the fear that the AK Party will build a "religious state and society" continued to grow among some segments of society. In this context, "continuity of the myth" of "religious reaction" kept the fear of the AK Party's "interference with lifestyles" alive. Contrary to the view expressed by Cengiz Çandar, the discourse of "meddling with lifestyles" which found its place among the Gezi opposition has fed itself from the aforementioned tradition. If the images used by the Gezi opposition are carefully observed, this continuity can be discerned even more clearly.

The main actors of the Gezi protests formulated their actions as "a reaction of people who feel their lifestyles are more or less under threat" (İnsel 2013). Criticism that Erdoğan is pushing society toward a monotypic lifestyle and trying to ban a variety of lifestyles reached a higher level when the Turkish Parliament approved the collective bill that reregulated the sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks on May 24, 2013. The bill that was on the legislative agenda before the Gezi incidents which banned the sale of alcohol between 22.00–6.00 was received as a direct "alcohol ban." It was claimed that Erdoğan's conservative government raged a war against Western lifestyles represented in this instance by alcohol. In this context the slogan, "[He] banned Alcohol, [and] people sobered up" (İçkiyi Yasakladın, Millet Ayıldı), present on many posters and graffiti during the Gezi protests, is extremely symbolic (Aydın 2013). Gezi protesters popularized the discourse claiming "Erdoğan banned alcohol." The ban was seen as part of Erdoğan's "secret political project" or "secret agenda" criticisms that had been in circulation since 2002. Even Islamists who joined the Gezi opposition in limited numbers, also criticized Erdoğan's "intervening attitude."

To sum up, Erdoğan was believed to be meddling with individual lifestyles; his policies were reviewed as "interference with the different segments of society's lifestyles" (Basaran 2013b); and he was questioned on his laicism and on his intentions of whether or not he wants to build a religious society that would replace modern society. Erdoğan also has been described as "a hyperactive personality who believes he knows what is good, beautiful and right for everyone" (İnsel 2013). The Gezi protests themselves were described as "the tension between society's pluralist factors and the Erdoğan regime's authoritarian structure" (Mumcu 2013b) imposing his "codes of behavior" regarding what to wear, what to eat and drink, and how to act.

Do not declare your respectful or disrespectful opinion on how I should sit in the park, how to act in the underground, how to live, how to speak, how to dress, how to think, or how to eat and drink.

(Hakan 2013c)

On the other hand, some of Erdoğan's statements on pre-Gezi incidents and his comments on the Gezi protesters' daily habits were among the factors that gave impetus and strengthened the Gezi opposition's "interference with lifestyle" discourse. Erdoğan's emphasis on "raising a conservative youth"; his sharp criticisms regarding "female and male university students sharing houses"; his labeling of alcohol consumers as "alcoholic," and describing Gezi protesters as "looters" (çhapulcu) increased the criticism along the lines of "interference with lifestyles" and the "imposition of monotypic way of life."

They interfered with our bodies, our morals, on how to make love, how to walk, how to grow up. They interfered with our right to reproduce or not to reproduce!

(Arman 2013: 51)

## **Discourse on Erdoğan's problematic understanding of democracy**

Another criticism that was highlighted during the Gezi protests is that Erdoğan's way of governance is exclusionary, that it makes participatory politics impossible. The reason that lies behind this is Erdoğan's understanding of democracy which is claimed to reduce democracy to the "ballot box" and only "responds to the majority," completely "ignoring the people who did not vote for him." During the Gezi protests the phrases "deliberative democracy" and "participatory democracy" gained popularity; it was claimed that Erdoğan embraced a "majoritarian" instead of a "consensus democracy," and that this, in turn, weakened Turkish democracy.

During the Gezi protests, mass media made numerous comparisons between Western and Turkish democracies. It was a common call among the Gezi protesters that Turkish politics should reach a new level of democracy, for some a "consensus" and for others a "participatory" form. The transition carries the risk of "pluralist democracy" turning into "majority democracy," so the argument goes. For Gezi followers and participants, Turkish democracy was characterized as a majoritarian one because of the argument that when a charismatic leader gained popular success it would eventually go to his head and with the continuous support of the masses, he would inevitably embrace "an authoritarian psychological structure, not caring about what the minority thinks" (Karagöz 2013). The main recipient of these criticisms was without doubt Erdoğan. The prime minister's charismatic personality, success and support by the masses were some of the reasons behind his transformation of Turkish democracy into a majoritarian democracy (Karagöz 2013).

A key factor in criticizing Erdoğan was that he never internalized democracy because of his Islamist identity. Speakers of the Gezi opposition stated that their images of Turkey and those visualized by Erdoğan are completely different.

In Erdoğan's "dream of Turkey," there is no place for widespread inclusive societal agreement in the framework of participatory democracy. Erdoğan wants our country to take a different route, leaving behind the philosophy of the Turkish Republic's establishment and inevitably, this route of change was to face a strong opposition. Erdoğan only needs to silence this opposition and strengthen his one-man rule regime in order to come closer to his aim. Since Erdoğan saw the Gezi opposition as a threat to his one-man rule, he did what he had to do to move ahead with his plan.

(Ulagay 2013: 21)

Because he was "victimized" by the status quo, this line of thinking claims that Erdoğan positioned himself as "the defender of the victimized" and people believed him. Erdoğan, using this discourse became successful, yet he never chose to stand by victims. In this context, the Gezi opposition also criticized the Republican Party's pro-status quo approach and the party was not viewed as a political alternative to the AK Party as it always supported the "despotic state." In this process, "Islamists established their own authoritarian regime, transformed it from a khaki militarist regime to a green fascism and took the route towards a one-man regime" (Özkoray and Özkoray 2013: 130–31).

As part of the criticism that Erdoğan embraced majoritarian democracy, he is blamed for taking refuge behind an armor built on the notion of "national will" and as the sole representative of that will, considering criticisms directed at him as directed against the national will.

The most concrete criticism by the Gezi protesters concerns Erdoğan and his government's execution of reform and development plans without considering public opinions. In this respect, major changes effecting Gezi Park were planned without involving Istanbulites and rushing to cut the trees was directly related to the Erdoğan government's approach and policies unresponsive to the wishes of the citizenry which, in turn, was attributed to Erdoğan's "oppressive and authoritarian attitude."

The prime minister does not ever listen to anyone. He goes up on stage, speaks and the people who have been transported to the square with hired cars, buses and ferries start cheering and chanting slogans. The leader himself screaming wildly talks about Kuala Lumpur, how many people listening to him know that Kuala Lumpur is a city?

(Üzümcü 2013)

## **Erdoğan's polarizing and tension-based politics**

A popular and influential image of Erdoğan among the Gezi opposition was his "tension politics" and "polarizing attitude." This criticism developed along the lines of Erdoğan's "authoritarian policies" and his "deficient and faulty understanding of democracy." It was claimed, furthermore, that Erdoğan's use of a tough political discourse is an end product of his strategy to create a sense of animosity, increase his support and solidify his existing political base. However, it was argued that this strategy divided society and turned its segments against each other. In this context, an important thread of the criticisms directed at Erdoğan by the Gezi opposition focused on Erdoğan deliberately polarizing society to increase his political support but which, though offering him personal popular success, damaged societal harmony and its reflexes of coexistence.

Turkey cannot achieve an important part of its real potential with a governing style that does not take half of the people in the country seriously. The political tension created by an imperious attitude will cause serious energy loss in society and Turkey will become a marginalized country that cannot cope with the twenty-first century.

(Ulagay 2013: 27–28)

One of the important implications of this opposition is that the AK Party under Erdoğan's leadership has instigated ethnic, religious and sectarian differences in Turkey and has developed a political strategy in that direction. It has been suggested that Erdoğan created a fault line in society deliberately and divided the society along the lines of: Turks vs. Kurds, religious vs. secular, Sunnis vs. Shiites. Some of the protesters stated that the AK Party deepened existing differences, while others claimed that all these differences and tensions came to surface only because of the AK Party. Some even suggested that the Turkish–Kurdish conflict is the Erdoğan government's own doing. (Ete and Taştan 2013).

At the bottom of the polarization lies Erdoğan's otherizing attitude which he succumbs to because of his concern to protect his power.

(Çerkezoğlu 2013)

In the same vein, Erdoğan was seriously criticized by the Gezi opposition when he claimed in a speech that "at this moment we have more than 50 percent of the nation with us, we can hardly keep them at home." Erdoğan's Istanbul rally in Kazlıçeşme Square in the first week of the Gezi incidents, where over 1 million people were present, was used as an example of tension politics and a manifestation of his revengeful character. In the Kazlıçeşme rally Erdoğan highlighted the threat posed by the political climate rising from the Gezi incidents and emphasized that the Gezi protesters want Turkey to return to the 1990s when the conservatives were ousted from public space. Affected by this psychology, Kazlıçeşme Square was jam-packed.

Erdoğan also claimed that the "international financial lobbyists and major financiers who are their local allies" were behind financing the Gezi incidents. In this sense, Erdoğan and his supporters, perceived the protests that started in Gezi Park and spread across Turkey as partly an external intervention against the legally-elected government.

Despite all the criticisms and societal and political tensions aimed at Erdoğan's politics during the Gezi protests, he increased his support base and won a clear victory in both the March 2014 local and August 2014 presidential elections by repeating the same harsh discourse he used during the Gezi process in the election campaigns. His steadfastness unified his constituents; a fact that was directly reflected in the election results.

## **The possibilities and dilemmas of Gezi**

The Gezi opposition emphasized the call for a public space, which was democratic, participatory and pluralist. Granted that democratic dialogue processes must be initiated mutually, the question it has raised, however, is the extent to which the Gezi protesters, who came out as appreciative of diversity and pluralism, tried to "understand" and establish a dialogue with the political culture that they positioned themselves against. To this end, to help us understand the approach and policies of the ruling party toward Gezi, it may be fruitful to revisit the impact of its political evolution and transformations on its discourse.

The AK Party came onto the Turkish political stage with the foundational principles of "justice" and "development," claiming to bring morals to politics, and practicing politics beyond classic ideological polarizations. The AK Party organization, as a mass party with a charismatic leader, gained public support with the new and moderate faces it brought to the Turkish political scene. The party became a point of attraction due to its conciliatory political attitude; the past achievements of its party leader as the mayor of Istanbul; and its support for liberal economic integration policies and discourses that were responsive and harmonious with the issues of Turkish daily life as shaped after the 1980s.

When the AK Party came to power alone, national and international political actors saw it as a positive development that could unlock the political bottleneck and economic crises that were produced by ineffectual coalition governments of the 1990s. Its electoral victory in the November 2002 elections raised expectations of economic stability and hopes of restoring Turkey's political prestige by the support of a wide segment of the population, a great part of the media, and finance and bureaucracy circles.

Nevertheless, this societal pact was not able to sustain itself for long. The signs of opposition by the secular establishment centered on the historical contention around the so-called "secular versus Islamic" divide and the first turning point for the party came with the onslaught by the secular republican establishment led by the military on the plans to prevent the election of a prominent AK Party leader, Abdullah Gül, as the president. The e-coup of April 27, 2007 was followed by a series of protests called "Republican Protests," organized by the establishment against the government. Despite the annulment of the first round of elections by the Constitutional Court, Turkey went to early elections and on July 22, 2007 the AK Party won once more 47 percent of the votes.

The AK Party leader Erdoğan saw this process as a breaking point and believed that his success in the elections was due to a discourse of perseverance and struggle, rather than submission and victimization. He and his team attributed the huge electoral support in the 2007 elections to the AK Party's swift and clear reaction to the military's intervention in the presidential elections which helped the party to be understood as an active political subject, putting an end to the tradition of "army-has-the-last-say" in politics in Turkish political history, and which was whole-heartedly accepted by the society. After this point in time, Erdoğan emphasized and highlighted his contentious personality even more and started following a more conservative political agenda.

After the July 2007 elections, Abdullah Gül was elected as President of Turkish Republic and the government went ahead with a series of reforms including a plan for a new constitution. Yet, the AK Party's success did not lessen anti-AK Party sentiments; on the contrary, opposition became stronger on an ideological and institutional level, the latter including the higher courts. Indeed, when the AK Party and MHP worked together and changed the article in the constitution providing judicial justification for the headscarf ban, the Republican People's Party appealed to the Constitutional Court and that constitutional change was annulled. The MHP's and AK Party's joint proposal became the basis for a closure case against the AK Party, brought to the Constitutional Court by Turkey's chief prosecutor on March 14, 2007. The closure case failed but it made the party leadership realize once more the monumental structural blocks which aimed at curbing its ability to initiate dynamic initiatives and implement its mandate as much as possible. In order to deal with these extra-political interventions by the establishment actors, the party leadership once more developed a hardened and contentious political discourse, which has proven to be successful at every turning point.

After 2011 elections which the party won way ahead of its rivals, the party started showing qualities of a "dominant party," which included an acknowledgment by the leadership of being unchallenged, and introduced a series of different packages to resolve Turkey's structural problems which included drafting a new constitution; democratizing the civil–military relationship; solving the violent nature of the Kurdish issue; and eradicating problems surrounding state and religion relationship. Erdoğan became a popular political figure during the Arab Spring in the Middle East and continued his tough and contentious political discourse. He started emphasizing his party's conservative character further and accentuated his conservative discourse regarding women, the family and cultural policies.

The AK Party also took a step forward, which was seen as risky for the party's support base, by starting a new peace process which aimed to end the armed conflict with the PKK, disarm it and solve the Kurdish issue. The process started directly by negotiating with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan; Erdoğan owned the process and said "if need be, I will sacrifice my political career to solve this problem."

Against this background, the Gezi incidents, which took off in May 2013, were perceived by the AK Party and Erdoğan as a continuation of the "Republican Protests" and viewed as a part of reintroducing the tutelage of the ancient regime by new actors.

## **Revolt romanticism and Gezi**

According to some, the Gezi protests are elements of a democratic uprising; to others they are an illegal revolt against democratic politics. It is important to establish that the Gezi protests included both elements but took another form when marginally organized groups like the Revolutionary People's Party-Front (DHKP-C), infiltrated and used violence as a way of struggle. In a related sense, the Gezi protests injected the political arena with a political psychology that we can call "revolt romanticism."

Revolt per se is not an issue of freedom. People whose freedoms are restricted revolt against the government when they think they can successfully set up different power structures. In this sense, a revolt is primarily a demand for power and cannot be reduced to the demand by the oppressed for justice and freedom. The revolting subject does not ask for peace—he/she asks for a role and raises his/her voice when she/he believes she can set up an alternative.

The rhetoric of revolt has taken different forms in texts, literary products, political speeches, song lyrics and journal articles reflecting modern Turkish political culture. It is true that it has fed the policies applied by the Kemalist regime and the unequal distribution of powers created by the international system. The rhetoric of revolt in the past was applied mostly by Islamists and socialists criticizing the regime. Even though Islamist, socialist and even nationalist movements at various moments have adopted revolt romanticism in order to voice their opinions in the course of Turkish political history, only a limited part of society acknowledged these historical moments and the term revolt never took on a prevalent value.

Only the Kurdish political movement, however, was able to constitute a "reality" out of this rhetoric. Even then, Kurdish political and ideological performance has not been able to match the Gezi protests in placing the culture of revolt into Turkish political life. The Gezi protests transformed "revolt" into a popular political value and re-introduced its romanticism to public discourse. During the Gezi protests, revolt romanticism found a much wider acceptance in popular culture. What started as an environmentalist issue was presented as a societal revolt by the protesters themselves after the initial riot police interference. In a short time, under the spell of heavy romanticism, the Gezi protesters started expressing themselves with mystical overtones, using terms like the Gezi being a "notion close to the human spirit," "a fast spreading fire," and a fundamental quality of human nature. It is interesting to note that the Gezi protesters claimed that Erdoğan supporters are not rational due to being deceived by the AK Party, exhibiting the opposite traits of "revolting" which are "hand kissing" and "pledging allegiance" to the party, leader and the government.

The widespread international support for the Gezi protesters also gave impetus to revolt romanticism. Besides the revolt itself, the issue became "people" reacting against the government and demanding "an end to oppression." Not only was the state viewed as being against these "people," that is, the protesters, but the Gezi people also considered "people who were silent and who supported the government" as being against the Gezi's cause and spirit. Although the government supporters were described by some as "flocks of sheep," it is interesting to note that conservatives who clearly support the AK Party do not categorically disregard "revolt" and "rebellion"; on the contrary, they attribute an ontological value to it. In this respect, the atmosphere experienced after the Arab Spring and the AK Party's struggles against the Kemalist regime are seen as examples of "revolt" shaping their thinking.

Several people among the Gezi opposition argued that the elements in the Gezi protests which manifested forms of "looting" and "destroying" public property do not qualify as being part of a revolt. They believe that those should be viewed as a wave of natural reactions.

It is a point of controversy whether or not the Gezi protests have successfully contributed to furthering democratic politics in Turkey. If resolving the chronic problems of political life in Turkey necessitates bringing everyday life issues and concerns into the political arena, then the Gezi Park protests can be viewed as enabling a slice of representation of daily life in the political field. However, a healthy analysis of the Gezi should not just dwell on the positive possibilities it carries and avoid noting the anti-political elements like hate speech, vandalism, revolt romanticism and the rising wave of neo-nationalism that accompanied the Gezi incidents. We need to add to this a political ontology, which legitimizes "yellow journalism" as a struggle and resistance method, and the left's radicalism with its dreams of a revolution.

## **From the Gezi protests to June 7 elections**

Undoubtedly, the effects of the Gezi protests on Turkish political life are not limited to these. The Gezi protests did not only influence and shape the political culture of the AK Party's opposition but also the political culture of the AK Party, opening it up to new challenges.

The AK Party elite were conducting politics with self-confidence due to their belief that they were building a Turkey whose economy and regional power status were growing and democracy was normalizing. As a result, they thought that they would remain in power for at least three more terms. This self-confidence was affirmed by the March 30, 2014 local and August 10, 2014 presidential elections which the AK Party won. However, in June 7, 2015 elections, which were the first elections since the Gezi protests, the party did not receive the parliamentary majority to form a government by itself, despite coming in first with 41 percent of the votes. The main reason hindering the AK Party from being the government and running the administration by itself was the HDP's entrance into parliament as the fourth party with 13 percent of the votes. One of the most important dynamics that enabled the HDP to surpass the 10 percent election threshold and enter the parliament was the anti-Erdoğan feeling that had become concretized as the opposition identity after the Gezi protests.

Despite the fact that the HDP represents radical nationalist Kurdish politics and is believed to be the political representative of the armed Kurdish PKK movement by the AK Party as well as by many in Turkey, it has managed to position itself as the party representing the "spirit of Gezi." In truth, the HDP achieved this success through its campaign slogan of "we won't let you be president," directed against Erdoğan. Despite the surveys made during the Gezi protests showing that nearly 70 percent of those who joined the protests came from the sectors of society voting for the CHP (Genar 2013), one way or another June 7 elections showed that Gezi's political representation was captured by the HDP.

The anti-Erdoğanism that had risen throughout the Gezi protests began to form the common value of the opposition parties. Another theme the opposition referred to was the December 17 arrests of the bureaucrats close to the Gülen group, dubbed as "corruption probes" by some and a "coup attempt" by others. In short, the main arguments of anti-Erdoğanism that had been on the rise since the Gezi protests were formulated by the Gülen media, and voiced most prominently on the political realm by the HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş.

The Gezi protests and the December 17 incidents helped the AK Party to keep its support base consolidated behind it. Throughout this period, the AK Party gave the impression of transforming itself from a party of the masses to one of ideology, although it continued to send out messages to all parts of society. It formed its own media, called the "Kazlıçeşme media" (because it was centered in Kazlıçeşme, a working-class district of Istanbul), against Gezi media as well as all other opponents. This situation brought about a consolidation of the societal bases of all political parties, the AK Party foremost among them, as well as a rise in political polarization. In this period, "fears" gained value in the face of "rational behaviors."

At the point we have arrived, it is important to acknowledge and examine critically the role Erdoğan plays in political life, the policies he advances and his influence. This includes studying the Erdoğan phobia, which is one of the most important dynamics contributing to the polarization in Turkish politics.

## Notes

 I would like to thank Ümit Cizre, Eva Stamoulou, Hümeyra Doruk, Afra Arslan, M. Akif Memmi and Burhanettin Duran for their contributions to the process of writing this article.

 "Neo-Kemalists" are new political phenomena of post-2000 modern Turkish politics. Their political ontology is based on classical Kemalism of 1930s, Turkish Baathist socialism of 1960s and secularist nationalism of 2000s.

 Muawiya, the name of the killer of Ali who was the fourth Caliph and claimed to be the founder of Alawis, was often mentioned along with "Sivas Massacre" within which thirty-three Alawi authors and artists were killed in 1993.

 For exemplary tweets, see Hüseyin Aygun, Selami Ince, Özgur Mumcu, Vartan Estukyan, Mujgan Halis, Hale A., Efkan Bolac, Ismail Saymaz, Hande Kutay and Arif Nacar's Twitter accounts.

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#  Pragmatic politics

The Gülen movement and the AKP

_Kim Shively_

The religious movement associated with the Turkish preacher and theologian, Fethullah Gülen is one of the largest religious organizations operating in Turkey today and has significant influence in a number of countries around the world. Gülen's followers represent a major social and political force within Turkey, and therefore the movement's relationship with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP, _Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi_ ) is a matter of intense interest for understanding the shifting position of the AKP in the Turkish political arena. Since the AKP came to power, the party has maintained a fairly strong and stable support from Gülen movement members, as the interests of the movement and those of the party closely aligned in many essential ways, especially in terms of economic issues and the promotion of Islamic ethics.

But there have also been some significant differences between the two entities over a number of issues: the European Union accession process, relations with the Kurds, relations with Israel, the Gezi Park protests in 2013, and most significantly, the issue of corruption and the democratization process in Turkey after 2010. Gülen and some of his more prominent followers, especially members of the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF), have willingly voiced their disagreements with some AKP policies in public. Indeed, at the time of this writing, a major power struggle has erupted between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the followers of Gülen. In December 2013, a division of the Istanbul Security Directory took a number of officials affiliated with the AKP into custody on charges of fraud, bribery, corruption and smuggling. Erdoğan and his supporters accused members of the Gülen movement within the police and judiciary of working together to undermine the power of the AKP. In response, Erdoğan order several waves of "purges" of alleged Gülen supporters in the police and judiciary, a process that continued into the summer of 2014. These events created a sense of political crisis that initially affected Turkey's economy and international relations, though the AKP's continuing electoral successes in 2014 have indicated that the AKP survived the crisis largely intact. During the months after the December 2013 revelations, newspaper articles and blogs regularly used terms, such as "tense," "sour," "harsh," "breaking point," "crisis," and even "open war," to describe the relationship between the AKP government and the Gülen movement, while pro-AKP voices accused the movement of launching a "coup effort" through Gülen supporters within the judiciary.

While the events leading to the final breach between the party and the movement will be addressed here, this chapter will focus on broader issues regarding the political relationship between these two groups, examining trends that have developed over time. A major argument I will make in this chapter is that the Gülen movement's general support for the AKP in the past and its eventual rupture with the party has more to do with the pragmatism of the movement's politics rather than any "wedding" and "divorce" (to borrow once again from Turkish popular media) between Erdoğan and Gülen and their respective followers. That is, the Gülen movement is not a political party and does not so far aspire to become one. Nor does it maintain formal alliances with any political parties, as Gülen himself insisted in an interview with the _Wall Street Journal_ on January 20, 2014. But the movement does have a broad socio-political agenda of "shaping the [Turkish] public sphere by introducing ideas and promoting programs informed by Islamic values in order to transform society and the state" (Yavuz 2013: 200). Any political party that assists the movement in its goals will receive considerable support from the movement faithful, and as long as the AKP's socio-political agenda has aligned with that of the movement, Gülen's followers have tended to back the AKP. But once the goals of the party and movement diverged, the Gülenists began to withdraw their support and increasingly articulate their criticisms of the AKP, and they will have to look elsewhere for political allies who might further the movement's goals.

## Methodology

The information and analysis upon which in this chapter is based was drawn from multiple sources. One primary source is the writings, interviews and sermons by Fethullah Gülen himself presented over the past several decades, with a special focus on more recent works published since the rise of the AKP. I will also draw on works by various social scientists and observers who have conducted research on and written extensively about Fethullah Gülen and the Gülen movement. These include academics, as well as various writers and columnists from the Turkish and American media. A great deal of the material included here will come from interviews conducted with various members of the Gülen movement active in both Turkey and the USA. These include Fethullah Gülen's current and past religious students, influential members of Gülen-affiliated institutions, such as directors from Gülen-affiliated hospitals and schools, and with members of Gülen organizations, including the _Zaman_ and _Today's Zaman_ editorial staff and the Journalists and Writers Association in Istanbul. Finally, this analysis draws on participant observation research conducted among Gülen followers surrounding the Golden Generation compound in Pennsylvania, where Gülen currently resides, teaches and gives regular sermons.

## The nature and structure of the Gülen movement

The development of the movement has been gradual, emerging from the works, teachings and shifting perspectives of the Fethullah Gülen himself. Much has been written on the growth of the Gülen movement, and though I will only provide a brief overview here, it is quite remarkable that the Gülen movement has become one of the largest and most influential Islamic groups in Turkey and is the best known in the international context (Turam 2007: 19). Gülen himself is a trained theologian, and beginning in the 1960s he served as a government-appointed imam in several Turkish cities, most famously in Edirne and Izmir. His religious viewpoints have consistently been influenced by several Turkish theologians, but he is especially inspired by Bediüzzaman Said Nursî, who propounded a form of Islam that could be accommodated to the concerns of the modern world. As Gülen himself became a popular preacher in the 1970s and 1980s, he drew on Nursî's teachings, accepting the Qur'an as the true revelation of God, while recognizing the role of reason both to interpret the Qur'an and engage in scientific research. As Ahmet Kuru has put it (2003), Gülen sought a "middle way" between modernity and the Muslim tradition, thus developing his own moderate form of Islamic thought and practice that includes a message of respect for the secular state. Until the late 1990s, Gülen's interpretation of Islam and politics genuinely appealed to the secularist elites (See Laçiner 1995).

Gülen's teachings are spread through various channels. A system of presses and newspapers run by Gülen's supporters publish and translate his writings and sermons. In the past his sermons have circulated on cassettes and more recently, on the internet and through affiliated television channels. At a more grass-roots level, informal study groups or study centers ( _dershane_ s) composed of interested people who meet to study the Qur'an and _hadith_ and to read the works of Said Nursî and Fethullah Gülen (his students call this "the four-text method"). Modeled on the _dershane_ s of earlier Nurcu movements, the Gülen _dershane_ s can be found in villages and neighborhoods all over Turkey and in other countries that host a Turkish diaspora. These study groups not only provide an environment in which religious knowledge is transmitted, but they are also places in which educated followers may tutor students in academic subjects, such as math and science, in preparation for the high-stakes high school and university exams crucial to a student's educational success. Some observers have noted that these _dershane_ s serve as channels by which the movement identifies particularly talented youth who they then attempt to cultivate—through educational and social support—into pious social, economic and political leaders. These _dershane_ s may overlap with the _ışıkevler_ (lighthouses), which are often single-sex residences where young students stay while they pursue their education. At the same time they remain in a community in which proper piety and moral values are cultivated and reinforced. All together these study groups, _dershane_ s and lighthouses serve "to create an obedient individual who has less interaction with and is less influenced by the outside world, and this also facilitates a more cohesive collective identity" (Keskin 2012: 135).

Gülen and members of the movement make no secret of the overarching goal of these _dershane_ s and lighthouses: to remake Turkish society by creating a new "golden generation" of moral, pious individuals who value science, education and economic engagement with the world. As long as the aspirations of the movement and any political party, including the AKP, have been in alignment, the ruling party have left the Gülen _dershane_ s alone or even supported them as politically useful institutions. But as conflicts between the movement and the party have intensified, the status of these institutions stands at the center of the political dispute that erupted between the Gülen movement and the AKP beginning in 2013, not least because the _dershane_ s and lighthouses are essential to the popular power of the movement, as will be discussed below.

Beyond the educational and devotional organization of the movement, Gülen and his followers have also developed the notion of _hizmet_ (service) to society as essential to religious devotion—the movement is often known as the Hizmet movement. Much of the movement's civic engagement both within and outside of Turkey has been to develop a number of non-governmental institutions to deal with the problems of poverty, discord and ignorance. For example, Hizmet participants have contributed to the development of hospitals, student dormitories, scholarships, inter-faith/intercultural dialogue centers and an international aid association (Kimse Yok Mu), among other projects. But the movement is most closely associated with the construction and running of hundreds of modern, scientifically oriented schools and universities in Turkey and elsewhere, especially in Central Asia and Africa. Domestically and internationally, these schools often serve as fine institutions of education in areas where good educational options may be lacking. And because they largely employ pious, well-educated Turkish teachers, the schools also function to spread Gülen's message, and in international settings they also establish business ties to Turkey and enhance an appreciation of Turkish culture and language.

Gülen's education and social engagement orientation has led the movement to take advantage of modern forms of commerce and communication. Members of the movement have created networks of business leaders—TUSKON and ISHAD1—that have substantial economic influence throughout Turkey and beyond. The movement also established an important Turkish newspaper, _Zaman_ , its English language version ( _Today's Zaman_ ), several television channels, and a series of presses in Turkish and English by which the values and ideas of the movement have been spread.

## The Gülen movement's position in the Turkish political arena

As the above discussion makes clear, the scope of the movement's ventures clearly indicates that one cannot easily characterize the Cemaat as a purely religious organization. As long-time Gülen observer, M. Hakan Yavuz, has pointed out:

[The Gülen movement] is an amalgamation of diverse socio-religio-political ideas and interests which defy traditional categorizations [...] It is essentially a religious movement with its own agenda for shaping the public sphere by introducing ideas and promoting programs informed by Islamic values in order to transform society and the state. In other words, a sharply delineated boundary between what is religious or what is profane may not be very helpful in categorizing the movement, since it transgresses these arbitrary boundaries of secular and religious, social and political, national and transnational, and private and public.

(Yavuz 2013: 200)

Though the content and intentions of the movement crosses many categorical boundaries, it is certainly accurate to say that it is most recognizable and influential as a part Turkish civil society. That is, the Gülen movement is a non-governmental association that connects independent social actors—in this case, devout and educated individuals—and the state. It operates in the public sphere, separate from the state, but it is also shaped and influenced by political concerns and state structures (Turam 2007: 31–32).

According to a number of spokespeople, the Gülen movement itself is supposed to maintain a public message of political neutrality. Indeed, Gülen has been very critical of attempts to use Islam in politics, which is one reason why Gülen disassociated himself from the politics of the Islamist Millî Görüş2 (National Vision) movement and the government of the MG leader, Necmettin Erbakan (Turam 2007: 135). According to Gülen, Islam is not a political undertaking to be enforced, but it instead "establishes fundamental principles that orient a government's general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstances" (2001: 135–36; see also Gülen 2005: 449–51). Such a stance is a far cry from political party advocacy, since Gülen only suggested that followers should shape their political actions according to their religious and ethical concerns. One effect of this is that Gülen and his followers may ally themselves with political parties and leaders who are seen as adhering to the ethical principles Gülen lays out in his many sermons, but if those same political actors seem to stray from those principles, then support may very well be lost. In sum, for Gülen and the movement, political parties and leaders are a means to a social-ethical ends, not ends in themselves.

In terms of political activity, almost all the members of the Gülen movement I interviewed stated that even if the movement is supposedly apolitical, individual members may have particular points of view and may even proclaim or publicize those points of view. For example, Gülen followers publish editorials in the newspapers associated with the movement or issue statements, such as those from the influential, Gülen-affiliated Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF). Movement members argue that the Hizmet movement itself makes no political claims as a body, though it might be more accurate to say, it does not act in the government as a unified political force. Yet when asked, Gülen will sometimes make political statements, such as a response to the 2013 Gezi protests or in response to the Erdoğan's push to shut down preparatory schools throughout Turkey in 2013, many of which are associated with the Gülen movement. Even those statements are not supposed to be interpreted as Gülen speaking officially for the movement but are his own points of view.

But such a claim—that the Gülen movement as a whole is politically neutral—is somewhat disingenuous and undermined by a number of factors. First of all, there are many highly influential and strategically placed political individuals who support Gülen and are active in the movement. These individuals, though not working officially as representatives of the movement, may engage in political activities or promote policies that are widely seen as favoring the Gülen movement. The actions of these people may not be directed by Gülen himself, but they do indicate that the movement has significant political influence. For example, the JWF has long provided a platform for criticism of the traditional secularist regime in Turkey, and the foundation's explicit political statements and advocacy around certain positions only reinforce the sense that the Gülen movement acts as a unified political entity (Keskin 2012: 131). Moreover, because Gülen activists are so clearly involved in political activities, such as occupying positions in the judiciary and security sectors, protestations that the movement is non-political may come across as entirely misleading.

The claim of movement's political neutrality also fails to take into account the charisma and influence Gülen has over his followers. Many devotees may take his word as a directive rather than a reflection of his own views, even if Gülen himself doesn't have this intention. In a discussion I had with one of Gülen's students in America, the student noted that Turkish educational institutions generally cultivate in students a complete obedience to the instructor—questioning and contradiction are not encouraged and may even be punished. Similarly, just as many traditional Sufi orders and cemaats require complete obedience of the student to the _şeyh_ , Gülen's followers may take that attitude of submission and acceptance toward Gülen. So all claims of political neutrality, even if sincerely meant, may not be so easy to maintain in reality. As such, any statements on the part of Gülen about the AKP or any other political matter would almost certainly carry more weight than a simple expression of opinion.

Yet this is not to say that Gülen's followers act in complete lock-step with the leader either, though many outside observers assume this is the case. While many of Gülen's supporters do adhere to the expectations of local groups and leaders, not everyone maintains the same political allegiances. Among the many people I met within the Gülen movement both in Turkey and in the United States, I found that individuals held many different political points of view regarding the AKP and Turkish politics, and some of these people's opinions changed over time in reaction to events. For example, I myself met Gülen followers who were lifelong supporters of the Republican People's Party (CHP), the party of the secularist elites. These particular interlocutors came from Izmir, a traditional bastion of left-leaning secular politics, and so they may have felt that a vote for the CHP was a vote for their own community. Their politics seemed to be more pragmatic than ideological.

Another issue that calls into question the movement's claim of political neutrality is that such an assertion relies on a very narrow definition of politics as the organization and actions of political parties. Members of the Gülen movement consistently fail to recognize the inherently political nature of civil society organizations, such as their own, that attempt to enact significant social transformation. As Jeremy Walton (2014: 183–84) has put it, the Hizmet movement sees "civil society as an apolitical domain of authentic desires and identities, entirely separate from the messy turf of political society," when in reality civil organizations enact "a distinctive modality of politics," where they are involved in politics without necessarily aspiring to govern. That is, the Gülen movement seeks to promote a set of values and activities that would ideally create a particular type of society (post-secular, neoliberal) and a particular kind of citizen (pious, educated, industrious). Such activities are still political, even if they operate outside of traditional political parties (See also Hendrick 2013: 18–31).

## The Gülen movement and the AKP: convergences

### _The historical trajectories of the AKP and the movement_

The interests of the Gülen Movement and the AKP have historically intersected in many ways, and for much of the period of AKP hegemony, the movement and the party have supported one another, though not without tensions. Prior to the rise of the AKP at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the old secularist elite—especially the military and judiciary—saw themselves as embodying the Turkish state. Secularist concerns were state concerns, and any entity that was seen as deviating from the secularist-Kemalist order was often demonized in public discourse and even officially classified as a threat to the state (see, for example, Altınay 2004). The political actors involved in the Millî Görüş movement or the various cemaats active in Turkish society, including the Gülen movement, were just such entities, and were thus excluded from the dominant Kemalist discourse and the secularist political order. As such, the rise of the AKP and the increasing visibility of the Gülen movement in the Turkish public sphere in the 2000s disrupt the traditional association between Kemalism and the state (Turam 2012: 7).

Nevertheless, the Millî Görüş movement had a political presence in Turkey for decades, and most strikingly in the mid-1990s a party of the MG, the Welfare Party, dominated elections enough to take part in a coalition government with Erbakan as Prime Minister. But the clearly pro-Islam, anti-secular actions of Erbakan brought him and the party under military suspicion, so that in 1997 the military generals forced the government to resign in what has been called a "soft coup." The Constitutional Court ruled that the Welfare Party was unconstitutional because it violated the secular principles of the 1982 constitution. The party was forced to disband, and Erbakan himself was barred from politics for life. After several years, the AKP emerged from the younger, more moderate wing of the MG movement, and these young members, such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, put forth a pro-business, pro-secularism message that appeased the military enough to allow the new party to run for elections and take power, even though the party members maintained religious preferences and practices that marked them as devout.

Although Gülen had traditionally been viewed favorably by the military and Kemalist elite, after the 1997 coup Gülen came under suspicion for planning the Islamicization of Turkey. While Gülen kept a low profile after the 1997 soft coup and had received some declarations of allegiance with the leaders of the coalition government that replaced the Welfare government, the staunchly secularist military sought to bring him down. Beginning on June 21, 1999, media outlets controlled by the military mobilized a fierce propaganda campaign against Gülen by branding him a reactionary and fundamentalist threat to the Turkish State and declaring his activities illegal. They girded their position by producing videos of Gülen's sermons in which he suggested that his organization was gaining power within the Turkish government (Gülen claimed the remarks were taken out of context). Though this attack may have been part of a larger plan by the military to weaken the civilian government of Bülent Ecevit, who had been relatively generous with Gülen, the final effect was chilling. Gülen attempted to counter these attacks and continued to organize religious conferences and activities with moderate themes. Prior to the media blitz, Gülen had gone to the United States to seek treatment for medical problems, and subsequently he never returned to Turkey. He now lives permanently in the United States in a small compound in eastern Pennsylvania, though he maintains an active worldwide following. He rarely leaves his home and guards his health.

## Convergences

Both the AKP and the Gülen movement are organizations with religious orientations and both have had negative experiences with the traditional secularist organs of the Turkish state. It is therefore not surprising that both have shared many interests and priorities. Indeed, the Hizmet-associated media largely supported the goals of the AKP, and in turn the party has often been responsive to the needs of the movement. For example, the AKP government overhauled the outdated Turkish penal code and included a change in counter-terrorism laws that provided the legal means for the Ankara Criminal Court to acquit Fethullah Gülen of all charges and declare activities led by Gülen to be legal, though Gülen never returned to Turkey.

In fact, the points on which the AKP and the Gülen movement converged are many. Both shared a criticism of the military and its rigid conception of a secular society that severely limited freedom of expression and belief. Historically, Fethullah Gülen had been supportive of the military, especially in the early years after the 1980 coup, because he saw it as a bulwark against anarchist and leftist forces that were quashed in the coup. But the military's increased persecution of religious groups in the late 1990s and beyond led Gülen and his followers to become more openly critical of the military, partly because it seemed to them that the military was more interested in defending a particular ideology, Kemalism, than defending the Turkish nation (Yavuz 2013: 208). It is no surprise, then, that when the AKP took actions against the military—such as opening up trials against those military officers who acted as coup plotters targeted in the Ergenekon investigation3—the members of judiciary who were supporters of Gülen played essential roles in carrying out these legal actions. Similarly, the Gülen-affiliated press gave these events a lot of space and urgency, generally backing the actions of the AKP in its drive to use the trials to undermine the military's traditionally excessive involvement in Turkey's supposedly civilian government.

Another important point of convergence is that both the AKP and the Gülen movement have developed relatively moderate forms of piety and have maintained a somewhat positive view of secularism. Gülen has long had a record of moderate views on religion and religious practices, advocating social integration of Islamic values rather than promoting separatism or government transformation. For him democracy is the only viable political system in the modern world in that it allows people to express their own values through political channels. In the past, he has taken an accommodationist position toward the policies of the secularist government, too. For example, in the mid-1990s, religiously devout individuals organized a number of protests against universities for banning female students who wore the Islamic headscarf. Gülen himself supported the rights of women to cover their heads for religious reasons, but he also argued that education was more important than wearing the headscarf, and if a girl had to, she should remove her headscarf to go to school. Even now, girls in Gülen affiliated schools in Turkey do not wear headscarves, so that the schools would be in compliance with school uniform regulations set forth by the Turkish Ministry of Education.

Furthermore, Gülen does see Islam and a secular state as compatible (Yılmaz 2005: 395–96), though the type of secularism he seems to advocate is more in the vein of Anglo-American secularism where the state and religion remain separate rather than the Turkish version of laicism where the state controls public religious expression. By contrast, Erdoğan and members of the AKP emerged from the Millî Görüş organization and were protégés of Erbakan. After the experiences of Erbakan and the Welfare Party and the suppression of Islamic-leaning parties in the late 1990s, Erdoğan moderated his discourse to be more politically expedient. This trend led to Erdoğan's break from the MG faction and the establishment of a newer, more centrist AKP that was able to appeal to a broader base than Erbakan's parties had. At the same time there was a general moderation of Islamic identity in Turkey due to the integration of more radical Islamist groups into Turkey's economically dynamic society, a process Cihan Tuğal has explored in detail (2009). In sum, both the movement and the AKP share a social conservatism and wish to create a moral Muslim society, but neither advocates the establishment of an Islamic state (Turam 2007: 138–39).

Turkish Islam provides the basis of national identity for both the AKP and the Gülen movement. Unlike the ethnic nationalism of the Kemalist political establishment, both the AKP and the movement have tended to see shared Muslim identity as a more inclusive national bond and source of legitimacy, thus facilitating the national integration of Muslim ethnic minorities, such as Kurds and Arabs. For both groups, an appreciation of the Ottoman Empire has been integral to the formulation of Muslim nationalism. The rise of Neo-Ottomanism has led some pious Turks to adopt a more tolerant attitude toward minorities, including non-Muslims, by recalling the (much romanticized) Ottoman millet system in which each minority community was supposedly left in peace. Instead, new and revived (or re-imagined) symbols of Turkey's Ottoman past and Islamic identity were becoming more dominant in a popular trend of "Ottomania" (nostalgia for Ottoman culture). For example, Conquest Day, commemorating Mehmet II's conquest of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, is vying with Independence Day on October 29 as the dominant national holiday. Similarly, the AKP government established "Holy Birth Week" to commemorate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, which some Turks interpreted as a rival to the traditional Kemalist holiday, National Sovereignty and Children's Day on April 23 (White 2013: 9–10).

Certainly, the Gülen movement has shared in this Ottomania trend. In his sermons, Gülen frequently draws on the interethnic, interfaith harmony that purportedly existed under the Ottomans to provide a model for Hizmet's interfaith and intercultural dialogue efforts. Furthermore, Gülen sees Turkish Islam as distinct from the more rigid types of Islam, such as Wahhabism, found in the Arabic-speaking countries. Turkish Muslimhood is supposedly more flexible, open to interpretation, and accepting of spiritual-mystical religious experiences (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı 2010: 226–27). This perception of Turkish Islam is, in the eyes of movement members, an ideal model for bringing a message of peace and cooperation to the troubled Middle East and beyond.

Another point of convergence between the AKP and the Gülen movement has been the support of neoliberal economic policies and the privatization that has benefited small-business owners in the conservative towns and villages of the Anatolian provinces. The liberalization process really began during the leadership of Turgut Özal in the 1980s but continued apace through the 1990s and accelerated under the AKP with the withdrawal of trade barriers and rapid privatization of public enterprises. The small and medium businesses in Anatolia were able to integrate into international markets through commodity chains in certain production sectors, such as textiles, furniture and housewares. This led to the emergence of the pious, wealthy bourgeoisie that had once felt excluded from the old secularist order and thus voted for the AKP in large numbers in 2002 (Gumuşçu 2010; Keskin 2012).

Likewise, Fethullah Gülen has encouraged economic entrepreneurship, investment and thrift among his followers not only as a way to create prosperity but also to imbue social development made possible by economic success with proper Islamic morality (Gülen 2011: 57–60). This process was facilitated by the Islamic-friendly business associations TUSKON and ISHAD. These associations represented the interests of many business owners in Anatolia while publicly supporting traditional religious values. It was both of these networks that crucially advocated the integration of the Anatolian businesses into the international markets, and facilitated the growth of wealth and power of provincial entrepreneurs.

This combination of governmental and non-governmental liberalization created a pious middle class with conservative values and a disposable income. The once-excluded pious provincials, including members of the Gülen movement, now had a stake in the system and directed their political energies toward sustaining that system. Because many of Gülen's followers are well-educated and successful, Gülen followers have openly filled the ranks of a number of bureaucratic offices, such as the judiciary and the police, and until recently, their presence greatly benefited the efforts of the AKP to carry out their political projects.

More generally, many members of the Gülen movement continued to support the AKP whose economic and social goals so matched their own. This merging of economic interests was made plain when I was in Turkey with a group of Gülen followers just prior to the national elections in 2011. The many members I talked to at that time were mostly in support of the continuing dominance of the AKP. During one meeting, a student of religion pulled out a chart—part of the party's campaign literature—to show the economic benefits the AKP had supposedly brought to Turkey, to emphasize that his own support for AKP was not only about religion but about the overall well-being of Turkey that the AKP promised. That widespread support among movement members faded by 2013, even before the public break between Erdoğan and the Hizmet movement, as I will discuss.

## Divergences between the Gülen movement and the AKP

Even though the Gülen movement and the AKP have historically shared so many interests and goals, there have been some issues on which the movement and the party have disagreed, and Gülen and some of his followers have publicly criticized the actions of the party. Those criticisms have intensified in recent years so that by the time of this writing, a very public and fierce conflict between the two groups has arisen which has led to a sharp political fissure that may have long-term repercussions for the AKP and the Gülen movement.

To put these disagreements in context, there are a few points I should make clear. First of all, the AKP and pious Turks in the general population, including members of the Gülen movement, have not always agreed on all issues all the time, but the relationships have changed over time depending on circumstances. As noted, not all cemaat members have consistently supported the AKP but may vote for parties that fit their own immediate and local priorities. This is true for members of other cemaats, such as the Nakşibendi, as it has been for those in the Gülen movement (Introvigne 2006: 42). This supports Berna Turam's contention that:

The pious political leaders and ordinary Muslim actors—whether they are organized in civil society or not—cannot be taken for granted either as overlapping or permeating categories... Similar to other relations between different parts of the state and various sections of society, they have shifting interests, over which they disagree, negotiate, and cooperate... Like other people, the pious also have competing priorities in negotiating power, which may occasionally put them closer to the nonreligious and even facilitate emergent cooperations with various social and political groups.

(Turam 2012: 2)

It is therefore important to remember that the AKP and the Gülen movement have never been in perfect agreement, but rather, both entities have looked to one another to further their own agendas.

Over time, the two groups have regarded each other with some degree of suspicion. As the movement has gained public visibility and has had a greater and greater role in the government, the AKP has grown wary of the potential influence the movement may have on politics and policy making. Besides the presence of pro-Gülenist bureaucrats in the government, members of the movement have been publicly lobbying on several issues, such as the Kurdish issue and the European Union accession process. This lobbying activity has upset members of the AKP, such as speaker of the Parliament Cemil Çiçek, not only because the AKP sees the movement as a potential political rival, but as M. Hakan Yavuz suggests (2013: 218–19), old-style Turkish politicians, such as Çiçek and Erdoğan, are simply not used to policy input from civil society organizations. For them, political influence from the recently emerging civil society is not seen as part of the normal give and take of actors in the public sphere but as interference in matters best left to the bureaucracy. That is, the top-down style of the AKP politics may be threatened by more bottom-up civil organizations, such as the Gülen movement and other groups.

Furthermore, members of the AKP have been clearly threatened by the fact that actors within the government—presumably supporters of the Gülen movement—have engaged in covert activities that have targeted Erdoğan, fellow party members and even members of Erdoğan's family. Unauthorized wire-tappings of phone conversations and political meetings that were released on the internet seemed to reveal illegal actions on the part of Erdoğan and his son, Bilal, (though the authenticity of the wire-tapping recordings is questionable). Other revelations relating to both domestic politics and foreign relations seemed to be geared toward undermining Erdoğan's legitimacy. Erdoğan has reacted by accusing Gülen's supporters in the government of being a "parallel structure" that must be expunged from the government bureaucracy, judiciary and security forces.

Even before the events beginning in December 2013, Gülen and members of the Hizmet movement have expressed wariness about Erdoğan and the AKP, especially in the last few years. As Gülen stated in the January 20, 2014, interview with the _Wall Street Journal_ ,

During the period between 2003 and 2010, the overall trend was toward democratic reforms and a broad spectrum of Turkish population supported them. This was evident in the constitutional referendum of 2010 which received 58% approval. Indeed Turkey has made economic and democratic progress over the last 15 years. But we would like these democratizing reforms to continue. Turkish people who supported the constitutional amendments of 20104 with the phrase "good but not sufficient" are upset that in the last two years the democratic progress is now being reversed. A new, civilian-drafted, democratic constitution would consolidate the democratic gains and would anchor Turkey at democratic values of EU. Unfortunately, that effort has now been abandoned.

(Gülen 2014)

As this statement makes clear, Gülen, along with many movement members, has begun to express a degree of disenchantment with the AKP, especially with Erdoğan. Some of the specific points of criticism include:

_EU accession_. During its early years, the AKP and especially Erdoğan were enthusiastic supporters of Turkey's accession to the European Union, and the government enacted laws and revised the civil and penal codes to bring Turkey in alignment with EU requirements. By 2005 the process had progressed far enough for accession negotiations to begin with the European Council. But by the next year, the process began to stall. Disagreements over the status of Cyprus emerged first, but increasing anti-Islam sentiment in Europe and the economic and political crises in Europe after 2007 made EU accession seem less desirable to Erdoğan and the AKP. It was not clear that membership in the EU would be of any use to Turkey, which was experiencing an economic boom. Even the 2010 effort to bring the Turkish constitution in line with EU standards have stalled and failed, as Gülen noted in the _Wall Street Journal_ interview (Gülen 2014).

For social, political and economic reasons, Gülen and his supporters have continued to support EU accession. Gülen views integration with the EU, along with business ventures in other geographical areas, as essential to Turkey's continued economic success and as a way to spread the message of Turkish Islam to the rest of the world. In terms of social and political development, Gülen has argued that democracy is the best way "to control radicalism and to integrate marginal groups into the political and economic system. The EU is essential for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Thus, moderation requires Turkey's entry into the EU" (Yavuz 2013: 219). Again, for Gülen, the economic and political process of accession serves as a means to engineer a particular social morality based on inclusion and democracy. As long as the AKP expedited this process, the Gülen movement pragmatically supported the party's efforts, but when the goals of the two groups diverged, that support was withdrawn and Gülen criticized the AKP's growing disinterest in the EU accession process.

_The Kurdish Issue_. The Hizmet movement has had a long interest in integrating the Kurds into the broader national polity, and Gülen's support for EU accession is tied in with the goal of the integrating marginal groups, such as the Kurds. As mentioned above, both the AKP and the Gülen movement have put forth a version of Muslim nationalism in which shared religion and citizenship rather than shared ethnicity should provide the basis of national identity. Kurds fit easily into this concept of Muslim brotherhood. So upon electoral victory in 2002, the AKP made conciliatory statements toward the Kurds and eventually (under pressure from the EU accession process) made steps to loosen restrictions on Kurdish cultural identity, allowing limited publishing and television and radio broadcasting in Kurdish, and permitting Kurdish names to be used. Likewise, the Gülen movement established a number of charitable projects in the Kurdish south-east, including building high-quality schools and tutoring centers in Diyarbakır and other Kurdish-dominated cities. (These projects even extended into the Kurdish region in northern Iraq.) The actions of both the AKP and the Gülen movement have been not only to integrate the Kurds into the body politic but also to counteract the radicalism of the PKK, the Marxist militant organization that has been involved in a violent separatist campaign in south-east Turkey since the 1980s. Both recognized that if the Kurds felt they had a stake in the Turkish nation, the appeal of separatism would wane—and it did to some extent.

But conflicts emerged in this arena as well. In 2008, the Gülen movement had organized its annual Abant5 conference in Diyarbakır on "The Kurdish Question," but the AKP had the conference canceled with the excuse that the state could not provide sufficient security for the conference. Members of the movement complained that the AKP saw the conference as detracting from the Erdoğan's own announcement of a reform package going on around the same time, but the Gülenists also suspected that Erdoğan was actively trying to undermine the movement's efforts in the Kurdish region, perhaps because the movement was too powerful there (Turam 2012: 9–10).

Tensions between the Gülen movement and the Erdoğan government sharpened considerably in February 2012 when a conflict emerged between the Istanbul prosecutor's office and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). A special-authority prosecutor, Sadrettin Sarıkaya attempted to question MIT Chief Hakan Fidan and others about a probe into the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). This move was seen as a direct attack on MIT officials who were appointed by Erdoğan by members of the judiciary, who were believed to be supporters of Gülen. The conflict intensified when it also emerged that Sarıkaya was going to question the MIT officials over secret talks between the MIT and the Kurdistan Workers Party (the PKK), who were officially considered a terrorist organization. Prosecutor Sarıkaya probably would have had Fidan and others arrested and removed from power, though the Erdoğan government stepped in to prevent this. Sarıkaya was instead removed from his position, and the law was amended to protect MIT officials from any similar action.

In 2013, tensions between AKP and the Gülen movement continued to mount on the issue of relations between the Turkish state and the PKK when the prime minister arranged to negotiate with the PKK for peace in the region. For Gülen and his followers, the PKK is a violent Marxist organization that is contrary to everything the movement has been trying to accomplish in the south-east. The fear—and the source of disagreement with the AKP—was that negotiations with the separatist movement would weaken and perhaps even threaten the various institutions the Gülenists had established in the broader Kurdish region, while strengthening the AKP's regional position.

_The Mavi Marmara and Relations with Israel_. One of the sharpest public splits between the AKP and Gülen came after _Mavi Marmara_ incident of May 31, 2010. The _Mavi Marmara_ was one of the ships taking part in the "Freedom Flotilla," which was attempting to break Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip. The Freedom Flotilla had been organized by İHH ( _İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı_ ), an Islamic charity based in Istanbul, and was designed to bring badly needed supplies to the Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip. While the flotilla was still in international waters, however, Israeli forces forcibly boarded the _Mavi Marmara_ , killing nine Turkish citizens on board. In response to this attack, anti-Israel demonstrations erupted all around Turkey, and Erdoğan issued fierce condemnations, calling the attack a "historic mistake." In a speech to parliament, Erdoğan stated: "No one should test Turkey's patience. Turkey's hostility is as strong as its friendship."

But Gülen himself took a stance of appeasement toward Israel. He criticized the İHH and the flotilla itself, saying in a June 6 interview with the _Wall Street Journal_ that the organizers' failure to get permission from Israel before attempting to deliver aid "is a sign of defying authority, and will not lead to fruitful matters" (Lauria 2010). These statements were met with intense condemnation by the AKP and other Islamist supporters of the AKP, some of whom accused Gülen as being a puppet of the CIA and of Israel. But as M. Hakan Yavuz pointed out, Gülen's controversial position was actually well in keeping with his past behavior and statements, for example, in dealing with the Turkish military. "As both a tactic and a strategy, he favors conciliation and mediation over conflict and challenge," and he is "wary of the tactics of disruptive civil disobedience to bring about social change" (Yavuz 2013: 238). Again, Gülen has not been reluctant to speak out against the attitudes and policies of the AKP if they don't match his own social goals and sense of morality.

_The Gezi Protests and Istanbul's Rapid Development_. The relationship between the AKP and the Gülen movement also were at odds at least somewhat during the Gezi Park protest movement that spread through Istanbul—and later other cities in Turkey—beginning on May 28, 2013.6 At first, Gülen himself was critical of the AKP government's authorization of the excessive police force used to remove peaceful protesters from Gezi Park, though he was also critical of the (much less lethal) violence shown by the protesters in response to police action. In a sermon given on June 6, 2013 (published on the website herkul.org), Gülen argued that the government's actions were causing more problems than just the original protest. As he put it, "We are committing so many wrongdoings just to eliminate one wrongdoing. We cause various kinds of wrongdoings and injustice to happen." He also urged the government not to dismiss the demands of the protesters but take them seriously, in contradiction to Erdoğan's public disdained the protesters as "extremists."

Gülen stated that protesters had a right to make their claims, but also blamed the escalating violence on the part of the protesters as the result of a "public [that] was alienated from their spiritual heritage." He argued that the protesters were illogical and inhuman—destroying property while protesting the destruction of property. The problem was with the "system," he stated, but in this case the "system" was not the political and economic structures that may have resulted in the popular unrest. Instead, the system that needed revision in Gülen's view was the one that provides the moral education of the nation's youth. The problems were the psychological and moral deficiencies found in individual Turkish youth, and only proper moral training would deal with the problem. Gülen himself said little about the more systemic problems—rapid development, the disappearances of public parks, economic programs that favored the wealthy—that many of the protesters articulated. In line with Erdoğan, Gülen was not above suggesting that the protests were organized by "certain circles within the country" and "others from abroad." Overall, then, Gülen had criticism for Erdoğan's reaction to the protests, but he also expressed some ideas that accorded with the position of the AKP.

Yet here, the Gülen movement cannot be reduced to the statements of Fethullah Gülen, in that the reactions of movement members—even prominent members—were not always so accommodating to the views of the AKP. Certainly, there were many writers and columnists in the Gülen movement's newspaper _Zaman_ who expressed criticism of the Gezi protesters, but not all were unsympathetic to the Gezi movement, and some Gülen supporters even took part in the protests (see Tuğal 2013). Among the Gülen followers I talked to during and after the protests, many expressed criticism and even anger at the AKP and its actions. Cemal Uşak, a vice-president of the JWF, told me in an interview soon after the outbreak of the protests that he was very much against the construction plans Erdoğan was enabling in Taksim Square. When I asked him about the protests, he grabbed a newspaper lying on his desk and pointed to his name among a list of the original members of the Istanbul committee that had unanimously voted against the construction plans for Gezi Park. Mr. Uşak had many concerns about the environmental impact of the rapid development of Istanbul and in keeping with that, he has also expressed public disapproval of Erdoğan's plans to build a mosque in Çamlıca park on the Asian side of the Bosphorus. He genuinely supported the environmental concerns of original Gezi protesters, though as the protests grew, he didn't necessarily support the demands of all the protesters (he too found the message of the protesters too diverse).

Another member of the movement, an administrator at one of the Gülen universities, articulated a different critique of the AKP government: its cronyism especially as far as building contracts were concerned. This young man believed that Erdoğan is trying to create a rich class of people that would consistently support him and his party. So many luxury housing developments have been erected haphazardly around Istanbul, often displacing poor and minority residents of the city. The young administrator believed these developments came about as favors to Erdoğan's real estate "friends," and in his view, the protesters had a right to bring attention to these problems. Similar criticism came from members of the movement I conversed with in the United States as the protests continued to spread in Turkey. Several of Gülen's students told me—independently—that they would no longer support the Erdoğan because he had become too "authoritarian," or "rude," or "greedy" (in the varying views of my interlocutors). The relationship between the movement and the party had been fraying for a long time, and it seemed in the summer of 2013 that the process had begun to accelerate.

_The Dershane Debate and Corruption Charges_. The tensions came to a head in November 2013 when Erdoğan began an action to close down the many test-preparation schools ( _dershane_ ) that are common around Turkey. The excuse for this extraordinary action is that the schools operate as a secondary educational system and are against the Union of Education law passed after the founding of the Turkish Republic. But the actual target seemed to be the many schools run by Gülenists, which accounts for 25 percent of the total. As discussed above, the _dershane_ s are where the movement recruits many of its members and are a major source of revenue, and so they function as an important engine in the growth of the Hizmet movement. The general media and many Gülen followers saw Erdoğan's action as an effort to limit the power of the movement by cutting off its resources. Gülen movement spokespeople issued statements critical of the legal actions to close the _dershane_ s, while in a _Zaman_ article published on November 15, 2013, Gülen urged followers to persist in their mission despite the obstacles. Nevertheless, Erdoğan remained insistent on carrying through with the plan.

The tensions between movement and party increased when on December 2 _Taraf_ newspaper (Baransu 2013) released documents revealing that in 2004 the AKP and the military had signed an agreement to bring down the Gülen movement. AKP officials stated that such an agreement was necessary when the military was still powerfully involved in the political process, but this did not help ease the already strained relationship. It was in this context that the events of December 17 took place as a possible retribution against the actions of the AKP: Some of Gülen's followers in positions of authority in the judiciary system charged the sons of three AKP ministers with corruption and implicated a number of businessmen with links to Erdoğan and his son, Bilal. The investigators uncovered millions of dollars in cash found in shoe boxes in a closet belonging to the chief executive of a bank, while extra-legal business ties to Iran were brought to light. They also revealed that bribery in construction projects took place, and the publicity surrounding specific acts of graft in the government was highly sensational and had the effect of putting Erdoğan and the AKP on the defensive. Erdoğan also sought to assert greater and greater personal control over legal processes and the media, sometimes making personal calls to media outlets about what stories to run. He ordered the blockage of popular social media sites, such as Twitter and YouTube, because these had been the venues on which some of the most damaging revelations had aired. Several AKP ministers resigned (later to return to the party), while the prime minister oversaw the reassignment of hundreds of police officers and the removal of a number of judges—all of whom were presumably followers of Fethullah Gülen—on charges that they formed a disloyal political block that threatened the integrity of the AKP government. Both Gülen and Erdoğan and their respective followers have issued statements of intense criticism and mutual suspicion.

The electoral victories of the AKP in 2014 clearly indicated that the party had gained the upper hand, at least in the context of Turkish domestic politics. The March 30, 2014, local elections—considered by many to be a referendum on the AKP party after the scandals of the previous months—delivered more than 40 percent of the votes to AKP candidates, indicating that the party had not lost significant support. There have been many speculations about why that was the case: the opposition provided no viable alternative to the economically successful Erdoğan government; many voters assume corruption has been a characteristic of every Turkish government; the pious conservative core that has supported the AKP do not want to return to the pre-AKP days when popular religious practice was often curtailed, etc.

It was clear that the Gülen movement members seriously miscalculated the electorate's reaction when they uncovered the corruption and financial misdeeds of the AKP and people closely associated with the party. Instead of damaging Erdoğan's reputation (and by extension, the party's reputation), many of Erdoğan's traditional supporters actually backed him more fervently precisely because of the scandals that the Gülen movement actors exposed. Erdoğan was able to present the systematic release of wiretaps on the internet as a conspiracy or "foreign plot" against the government that was perpetrated by a "parallel state," just as he was able to persuade many that the bans on Twitter and YouTube were reasonable actions to take against traitorous entities ( _Middle East Monitor_ 2014). Thus, his followers rallied to his and the party's defense. As Mustafa Akyol (among others) has pointed out (2014), the fact that the Gülen movement gave vocal support to the opposition CHP ahead of the March 30, 2014, elections was also "a grave sin for most conservatives" who make up the bulk of the Turkish electorate. "In other words, the movement isolated itself from the bulk of the Islamic camp and attracted the wrath of Erdoğan." And certainly traditional secularists who would normally support the CHP would not back the goals of the Gülen movement, especially those goals relating to creating a genuine Muslim society.

The Gülen movement has isolated itself in other ways. In particular, the movement's claim of political neutrality comes across as especially duplicitous when so many self-proclaimed followers of Gülen have been active in the security forces and in the judiciary, and have taken it upon themselves to carry out self-interested investigations of AKP wrong-doing. For many observers, the movement's actions of December 2013 appear hypocritical, since Gülen movement members had earlier been involved in ethically questionable government activities, such as the Ergenekon affair. While movement members may have hoped to be viewed as honestly concerned whistle-blowers, they instead used legally dubious means to expose the AKP's faults that the Gülen movement had conveniently ignored or cooperated with in the past. By attacking the AKP, they alienated people who had traditionally supported them. Simultaneously, critics of the AKP who might have benefited from the exposure of AKP corruption were already alienated from the Gülen movement because of its previous support of the AKP. The movement has become cut off in the political context of Turkey, even if it maintains a robust following worldwide and continues to operate popular institutions, such as schools, hospitals and universities.

The break between party and movement is complete for the time being. If another religiously oriented, center-right party emerges, perhaps many of Gülen's followers will shift their allegiances there, but probably only if that party satisfies the pragmatic needs of the movement in its broader goals. As long as Gülen is alive, it seems doubtful that the movement would found a party of its own, since Gülen himself has been less interested in party politics than in the larger socio-political project of creating a just and moral society that adheres to the standards of Islam, as he understands them. But of course, Gülen is aging and in poor health, and how the movement continues on after his death is not clear. As in the case of the followers of Bediüzzaman Said Nursî, the followers of Gülen may fragment into different groups, each of which has its own religious views and its own political goals.

## Conclusion

At the beginning of the millennium, many Turks who had felt excluded from the power and economic energy of Turkish society had great hopes that the rise of the AKP would usher in a new and more democratic Turkey. In many ways those hopes were met—Turkey has enjoyed a fantastic period of economic development and has benefited from many legal changes that the AKP has brought about. But the events of 2013, 2014 and 2015 have shown that the lessons of democracy have not been well learned by the AKP. Erdoğan attempted to rid the judiciary and security forces of all supporters of Gülen and replace them with his own supporters, thus weakening the separation of powers and compromising the idea of an independent and impartial judiciary. More remarkably, in their October, 2014 meeting with the government, Turkey's National Security Council placed the Gülen movement as an "internal enemy" in the Security Policy Document because its attempted "coup" (i.e., corruption investigations) supposedly represented a national security threat.

While Erdoğan may have a right to pursue and prosecute those Gülen supporters in the government who broke the law, he set his sights on the community as a whole. As Gursel put it, Erdoğan: "mounted a new, strategic offensive against the Gülen movement, which appears aimed at disabling the community and purging it from almost every realm" (Gursel 2014). For example, Erdoğan has acted to remove "parallels" (Gülen-supporters) from the administration of public universities, which are controlled by the state through the Higher Education Board. He also attempted to force the closure of all of Turkey's popular university prep courses, a move seen by many observers as targeting the Gülen prep courses, which constitute a significant percentage of those available in Turkey. The forced closure was halted by the Constitutional Court only in July 2015, which indicates that at least that judicial body remains somewhat independent of government influence. Erdoğan and other AKP members have also attacked Gülen schools abroad. In a tour of Africa in January 2015, Erdoğan pressured African leaders to shut down the Gülen schools and allow the Turkish Education Ministry to replace them, though only Gambia agreed to the deal in exchange for aid from Ankara (Taştekin 2015). Other (non-Gülen) opposition media outlets were also attacked by Erdoğan supporters in the lead up to the November 2015 elections

The Gülen movement remains a target of AKP ire, though other groups and organizations have also drawn Erdoğan's opprobrium over the course of 2015. The Kurds have especially come under attack. After the AKP failed to maintain its parliamentary majority in the general elections of June 7, 2015, Erdoğan and members of the AKP increased their anti-Kurdish rhetoric, in part because of the breakdown of peace negotiations with the PKK (the Kurdish separatist movement) and also because of the fact that the Kurdish-dominated People's Democratic Party (HDP) passed the 10 percent threshold, allowing them to gain seats in the parliament at the expense of the AKP. Erdoğan's targeting of Kurdish groups has resulted in considerable violence as AKP supporters have attacked HDP sites and the military has virtually laid siege against Kurdish communities near the Syrian border.

The journalist Suzy Hansen summed up well the political situation in Turkey—especially the relationship between the AKP and the Gülen movement—in an article in the _New York Time Magazine_ :

The Turkish Model—the idea that the A.K.P.'s softer vision of Islam was compatible with democracy—suggested a way forward for Middle Eastern countries. But Turkey's biggest problem, its authoritarian structure, has little to do with Islam. The state remains a tool for accumulating disproportionate power, and when threatened, it sacrifices its citizens to save itself. If a prime minister can co-opt the laws and the media, and if a self-interested group can prosecute trials of dubious legality, and if the citizens have nowhere to express themselves but in the streets, then the state institutions are broken.

(Hansen 2014)

Perhaps her assessment is too pessimistic, since there are institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, that maintain some degree of independence and democratic vigor. But while the AKP's political situation grows ever more precarious in Turkey and while the Gülen movement survives as a globally popular religious movement, it remains to be seen how both the party and the movement fare in the long run.

## Notes

1 TUSKON is the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (Türkiye _İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu_ ). ISHAD is the Association of Solidarity in Business Life ( _İş Hayatı Dayanışma Dergneğı_ ).

2 Founded in 1969 by Necmettin Erbakan, the Millî Görüş movement emphasized the spread of Islamic values in Turkish society, the strengthening of ties with Muslim countries, and the turning away from Western nations and secularist values.

3 The Ergenekon investigation was aimed at an alleged network of military and civilian actors who were accused of planning a series of high-profile murders and acts on public and international targets that was aimed at destabilizing and toppling the AKP government. Over 500 people were arrested in this investigation, though many have accused the AKP government of turning the Ergenekon affair into a witch hunt to silence political critics, even if some of the original claims were true. For a discussion of Gülen-affiliated political use of media in this case and others, see Hendrick 2013: 174–205.

4 On September 12, 2010, Turkey held a referendum on advancing constitutional changes to bring the Turkish constitution into harmony with EU standards. Gülen publicly supported the referendum, and it passed with 58 percent in favor of changes.

5 The Abant Platforms are annual conferences organized by the JWF in which important social, economic and political issues are discussed by international scholars and public figures.

6 The Gezi Protests began as a campaign against the city's plan to remove the old trees in Gezi Park in Taksim Square, Istanbul, to make way for a shopping mall. At first, the protests were small, but when the police used excessive violence to disperse the protesters, thousands joined in the protests to voice grievances about many different issues, such as the overdevelopment of Istanbul, a perceived increase in socially repressive practices, and the eroding of secularist principles in the Turkey.

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# **9** **Mystifying nationalism**

Kurdish Islamists and the Kurdish question

_Ahmet Yıldız_

## **Introduction**

The rise of Kurdish Islamism in the political scene is a relatively new phenomenon. Its ideological appeal is much stronger than its mass following. Both as a political agenda and as an umbrella movement that brings together miscellaneous formations, Kurdish Islamism with its Kurdish-Islamic synthesis and pan-Kurdist vision seems to be a new dimension to the Kurdish politics in present-day Turkey. In the present article, I will first try to describe the ideological position of Kurdish Islamism, its political agenda, the process of its differentiation from Turkish Islamism and its articulation of an outright Kurdish nationalist discourse. Then I will try to explain its heterogeneous components, the criticisms leveled against it, giving special attention to the Justice and Development Party's (hereafter the AK Party) political posture regarding the so-called "Kurdish question."

To begin with, Kurdish Islamism is an elusive concept. At the cost of disregarding the universal dimension of Islamism by qualifying it with national appellations, Islamism in the guise of miscellaneous nationalisms is a factually observed state of affairs in the world of nation states. Therefore, we must essentially understand the concept more as a special variant of Kurdish nationalism, and less as a Kurdish version of political Islamism. If Islamism is a specific understanding of politicization of Islam and thus intrinsically "historical," then it stands on the same plane as any other ideology. Kurdish Islamists, accordingly, refer to those Kurds who view the Kurdish question as their central concern while keeping their ideological adherence to a certain understanding of Islamism distanced from the Turkish Islamist movement prevailing in Turkey. In other words, Kurdish Islamism refers to the "Kurdishness" of the members of Islamist/Islamic organizations composed of exclusively ethnic Kurds in terms of their cadres who place the Kurdish/Kurdistan question in the center of their political involvement. The basic assumption of Kurdish Islamism is the acceptance and advocacy of the state of nationhood for the Kurds and the requisites thereof. Immanent within this strand of thought is some sort of Kurdish-Islamic synthesis. Thus, in this article, I will use two distinctive parameters to describe Kurdish Islamism: the first parameter is sticking to Kurdish question as a question of political geography characterized by Kurdish nationhood structured as a question of national sovereignty (i.e., rephrasing the Kurdish question as the question of Kurdistan). The second one is viewing the national equality vis-à-vis the dominant state of "Turkishness" as the sole form of nationness through adherence to the ethno-political Kurdism colored by Islamic credentials.

In this sense, we might say that Kurdish Islamists have a distinct place under the heading of Islamism in Turkey, or better, it represents a different strand of thought from the dominant form of Islamism in Turkey by refraining from having an Islamic internationalism and paying pure homage to the plight of the Kurds. While we can trace back the re-emergence of Islamism in Turkey to the early 1950s, Kurdish Islamism as a separate and distinct conception/movement came into being only after 1990s. In the backdrop, there was the formation of Kurdish political space created and dominated by the nationalist-leftist Kurdistan Workers Party (hereafter PKK). Kurdish Islamism has held a legitimate place thanks to the opportunity space formed by the PKK and the Kurdish nationalist movement and was heavily influenced by them. Accordingly, traditional _tariqats_ and other religious groupings, even if they have Kurdish origins or originated in Kurdistan, are, to a great extent, being left outside the scope of Kurdish Islamism because of their well-integrated fabric to the wider Turkey and to the mindset of the so-called "Turkish Islamism."

The characteristic feature of Kurdish Islamism is to express a Kurdish-Kurdic and Kurdistan-centered ( _Kurdistani_ ) posture alongside their Islamic identity and to address essentially people with Kurdish-Islamic awareness while revealing an embracing pan-Kurdist posture. Kurdish Islamism does not refer to a homogeneous, monolithic construction, however. Rather, it has two basic opposing tendencies, one being more nationalistic and the other more Islamic oriented. The most radical variant of Kurdish Islamists proposes the separation of Kurds from Turks both in their mental and organizational networks and hence dissociate themselves from Turkish Islamists for the emancipation of Kurds, recalling the kind of autarchic rupture from the world capitalist system of the Dependency School. The thesis is that continuing to work in organizations which co-engage Turks and Kurds may lead to the alienation of Kurdish Islamists from the cause of the liberation of Kurdish people due to the presence of Turkish nationalism under the guise of Islamism. The classification of Islamists in Turkey as Turkish and Kurdish is reasonably meaningful given their increasingly diverging comprehension of the Kurdish question, deepened by the ongoing transformation of Islamist Kurds into Kurdish/Kurdist Islamists, and hence becoming in a way, the Islamic wing of the Kurdish national movement.

According to Kurdish Islamists, the Kurdish question is not any more an issue to be resolved through the assumption of political power by Islamists in view of the fact that Islamism is an ideology of survival developed during the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. The AK Party experience in government is also a case in point. The AK Party represents the "conservative democrat" vision of Turkish Islamism. The Islamism of Turks is both Turkist and statist. Kurdish Islamists are harshly critical of Turkish Islamists in their indifference to the Kurdish question, characterized by their immanent nationalism and masked by the ostensibly _ummah_ -centered feelings of Islamic fraternity. Their question is "Does the road of _ummah_ pass through Kurdistan anyway?" To them, the Turkish Islamists, including the AK Party have been unsuccessful in distancing themselves from nationalism and statism of the Turkist-Kemalist formation, the fundamental systemic cause of the Kurdish plight.

Since Kurdish Islamists define their basic position through their dissociation from the Turkish nature of state and the state-hijacked Islamic fraternity, they are closer to the Kurdish nationalist groups, including, to some extent, the PKK line than Turkish Islamists including the AK Party. Their priority is formed through what is Kurdish and Kurdistani, be it Islamic or not. In this regard, they conceive Islam as an intra/inter-Kurdish issue.

Socio-political developments since the beginning of the 1990s and the AK Party experience in post-2002 era have led the religious segment of the Kurdish people into new quests for a reformulation of the linkage between political power, Islam and Kurds. This quest is structured on two reactive pillars: (1) A state of alert against the policies suggested by the AK Party government regarding the solution of the so-called Kurdish question; and (2) That not only the AK Party but Turkish Islamists as a whole are not in a good position to resolve the issue due to their survivalist mental map: "Either you must divorce from Turkish statist Islamism or do not talk to us about Islamic fraternity."

Kurdish Islamists, despite their common denominator of being "plainly Kurdish," have some differences, at least in discursive terms. While Huda-Par, the political wing of the notorious Kurdish Hezbollah, reveals the position of a Kurdish-Islamic synthesis as a more Islamic and less Kurdish one, Azadi Initiative is essentially an intellectual formation that equals what is Kurdish to what is Islamic. The Nubihar circle, a fringe of the Nur Movement, appearing basically as a Kurdish culture oriented group, a fringe of which is on the footstep of Azadi Initiative while Back to the Roots Platform ( _Öze Dönüş Platform_ ) has a clear group identity and reveals a highly ideological mood similar to that of the _Azadi_. Thus, in this article, I will take up mainly the following formations as included within the cluster of Kurdish Islamist movement/conception:

• HUDA-PAR (The Free Cause Party)

• _Öze Dönüş Platform_ (Back to the Roots Platform)

• _Hak, Adalet ve Hürriyet için Kürdistan İslami İnisiyatifi/Azadi İnisiyatifi_ (Kurdistan Islamic Initiative for Right, Justice and Liberty) (Azadi Initiative)

• Nubihar Circle of Zehra Group within the Nur Movement

• Miscellaneous Independent Kurdish Thinkers and _Mullahs_

There are some other groups actively involved in the process of the Kurdish question that are not limited to "Kurdistan" in terms of their scope of activities and holding a "mixed," that is, Kurdish-Turkish structure, like Özgür-Der. I keep them outside the definition of Kurdish Islamism. Finally yet importantly, the Azadi Initiative prefers itself to be called Islamic instead of Islamist and Kurdish instead of Kurdist. This preference can be interpreted as a sign of a decreasing appeal of the term Islamism. Although one may observe the debasement of this concept in recent times, this does not mean the death of Islamism as an identity, ideology or political movement, however.

## **The basic tenets and tendencies of Kurdish Islamists**

It was during the reign of the AK Party governments that the Kurdish question was spelled out and debated publicly with all its ramifications for the first time inthe history of the Turkish Republic. Thanks to the AK Party governments, Islamists, be they Turkish or Kurdish, started discussing the question in its entirety in miscellaneous socio-political environments. During the 1990s, the political discourse of the Islamist's circles was dominated by the motto that "Islam/Islamic brotherhood is the solution." Hence, if Islamists could take over the power, the question would be resolved on the basis of brotherhood. However, the Kurdish question has not been resolved in the aftermath of Muslims' takeover of political power. As historical subjects, the AK Party's religious political cadres have proved that their mindset is shaped under the influence of the Turkish/Kemalist state _raison d'être_. The Islamic brotherhood assures the rights of non-ethnic brothers in moral terms. Nonetheless, this concept has been misused and contaminated by political powers. Yavuz Delal, a prominent figure of Kurdish Islamistsand a member of the Azadi Initiative, argues that the Kurdish issue unmasked Turkish Islamists because "Turkish Islamists are not Muslim on the Kurdish issue; therefore Kurds may not trust them in this regard." The discourse of brotherhood in practice has meant the substitution of Muslimness instead of Kurdishness. Just as secular Turkishness could not suppress Kurds via their "Turkification," religious "Turkishness" would not be able to do it via "Muslimization." Living under the same state cannot be tied to "Muslimness." If citizenship does not have any religious relevance, then Kurds have the same right to be a Kurd while simultaneously holding Muslim identity.

According to the Kurdish Islamist narrative, the Kurdish question is caused by the lack of recognition of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic/national formation of the Republic and is perpetuated by the vicious cycle of uprisings against denials of the state and the ensuing suppression. Therefore, the fundamental element of the Kurdish question is the lack of emancipation of the Kurds within their land, that is, Kurdistan, from the yoke of the Turkish nation state, perpetuated by the support delivered by Turkish Islamists. Accordingly, the appellation of the so-called "Kurdish question" is not a proper one; the right appellation is "the question of Kurdistan." The "natural" national rights of Kurds have been denied by the Turkish state. The struggle launched against the removal of the subaltern state of Kurds will necessarily turn into a national one against the invading assimilationist Turkish Kemalist nationalism. This struggle aims at equality, justice and liberty for Kurds. Therefore, the Kurdish national struggle cannot be compared to the nationalism of the oppressors.

For Kurdish Islamists, Kurdistan is not only a geographical term. It must also refer to the land of the Kurdish people; that is, it is the national home of all Kurds. Therefore the Kurdish question in its gist is the question of Kurdistan. The Kurdistani comprehension of the Kurdish question defines Kurdishness not only as an identity but also as an ideology and a national movement, which encompasses necessarily the right to national self-determination for Kurds.

According to the Kurdish Islamists, Muslims in Turkey either remained as spectators or indifferent to the suffering of the Kurds because they have been co-opted by the nationalism of the Turkish state. The perspective of Turkish Islamists on the Kurdish question has been shaped by the nationalistic worldview. Their way of treating the Kurdish identity has been one of the underlying causes of the present subaltern, humiliated position of Kurds in Turkey. Accordingly, while they treat Kurds as their co-religious brothers, they categorically reject the Kurds' right to nationhood: "Muslims in Turkey are not Muslim on the Kurdish question." They approach the Kurdish question within the paradigm of the syndrome of the national survival that champions unity and solidarity without any recognition of ethno-religious pluralism. In their cognition, recognition of Kurdishness may pave the way for separatism. They never acknowledge Kurdishness as nationhood either in the context of human rights or of Islamic allegiance.

The question of the Kurds and Kurdistan is that of national self-determination ( _Azadi-_ emancipation) in secular terms. This is sanctified by Islam as well. No one except Kurds has the right to decide on the issue. Accordingly, all alternatives of shared sovereignty are legitimate to discuss: regional autonomy, territorialization of Turkey along autonomous regional administrations, federalism, independent Kurdistan, or even a pan-Kurdistan, that is, "democratic confederalism."

The Turkish–Kurdish cleavage is basic to the Kurdish/Kurdist Islamists' comprehension of the Kurdish question. For Kurdish Islamists, the discursive subject is either Turk or Kurd. There is no other distinction that may matter. In order to gain cognitive clarity and establish a plain Kurdish posture, non-involvement with Turks in organizational and intellectual terms is a must. All Kurdish Islamists share this assertion either verbally or in de facto terms.

The position of not only Turkish Islamists but also that of traditional _tariqats_ and religious groupings are seen as more pro-assimilationist/integrationist. The members of these groups have treated Kurds morally equal not in identity terms, as Kurds, which caused Kurds to be unaware of their identity, a process of hidden humiliation of Kurdish people: "Good Kurds are non-Kurdish Kurds." Therefore, there is no ground to be together with them in political terms.

Kurdish/Kurdist Islamists are quite vocal in dubbing the _ummah_ -based discourse of fraternity as a nationalist political language concealing assimilation of Kurdish existence. To them, the discourse of the Islamic fraternity ends up with the negation of the state of nationhood for Kurds while the prerequisite of this discourse must have been the establishment of the equality and justice inspired by the notion of equity. They raise objections to the use of the concept of _ummah_ as a political discourse for Kurds both on theoretical and procedural terms.

They question the sincerity of Turkish Islamists in their activism for Palestine or Myanmar Muslims while there are suffering Kurds in their very proximity. Their notion of fraternity embraces all Kurds, including non-religious Kurds who strive for the national cause, that is, Partisans of Kurdish nation, including the PKK-BDP (pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, hereafter BDP) line. The Hüda-Par position may be an exception here.

To Kurdish/Kurdist Islamists, there is no contradiction between Islamic injunctions and Kurdish national demands. There can be no Islamic justification for delegitimizing Kurdish rights and their claim to sovereignty. The prominence of Islam is an issue that may follow the securing of Kurdish demands. Just as the Prophet Moses led the Children of Israel to liberation from the dominance of native Egyptians, the enslavement/subalternity of Kurds will end through the realization of Kurdish national demands championed by the PKK-BDP and supported by Kurdish Islamists.

They support PKK-BDP not in their armed struggle, but in their endeavor for the recognition of Kurdish rights, and credit them for this because it is they who depicted the subaltern position of Kurds first and because they have suffered the most in human cost. Despite their objection to the armed struggle, however, they have some sympathy toward it. Therefore, the scope of their fraternity also encompasses non-religious Kurds who have contributed to the Kurdish cause. Nonetheless, the political position of the PKK-BDP-movement in the peace/settlement process is seen as compromising.

Although it is a Kurdistani formation, the Hüda-Par circle does not share other Kurdish Islamists' position regarding the rejection of involvement of non-Kurds in their organizations. They keep their _ummah_ -centered perspective, though with a special focus on Kurds, and do not prioritize the formation of a Kurdish state as the preferred option for the political status of Kurds. Their motto is "Islam for Kurdistan." In practice, however, they remain a Kurdish-only organization.

## **Kurdish Islamists, justice and development party and the Kurdish question**

The AK Party, a conservative democrat party in power since 2002, with overt Islamic sensitivities, launched a package of democratizing reforms aimed at ending the prolonged state of low intensity war with the PKK. The purpose was to disarm and hence to integrate it into national politics in a peaceful manner by recognizing the cultural rights of Kurds in the process through negotiations with the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Kurdish Islamists' position in the peace/settlement process swings between the AK Party and the PKK-BDP line.

They are suspicious of both sides, but it seems that they are more critical of the AK Party than the PKK-BDP line. The so-called settlement process led by the AK Party and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan is not seen as final, but as the starting phase of the liberation of the Kurds. They say: "Yes, but not enough" for the settlement process because: "the AK Party is a huge angel run into the devil and its adulators are little angels hijacked by the Satan." Kurdish Islamists blame the AK Party for switching from time to time to the assimilationist position of the Kemalist state as exemplified in the government's insistence not to apologize for the killing of thirty-four Kurdish civilians in Roboski (Uludere). This triggered the search of Kurdish Islamist nationalists for new ventures in order to find a viable solution to the Kurdish question. Roboski incident is seen as an indication of the AK Party's immanent nationalist-statist position vis-à-vis the Kurdish question.

The settlement process has proved to be problematic because the AK Party felt difficulties in distancing itself from the securitization perspective of the traditional state position. Accordingly, the AK Party's charismatic leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's political discourse has revealed many high and low tides. It shifted from the recognition of "the Kurdish question" to "the question of my Kurdish brother" implying that the question is ethnopersonal rather than ideological and identity based. Against the rising nationalist concerns, the AK Party turned to security-first policies and gave up its democratic priorities. In the final stage, however, the AK Party leadership opted for an acceleration of negotiations with the PKK leader Öcalan. Needless to say, this signaled a very serious concern regarding the credibility of the process.

Any equation of the Kurdish question with the PKK question is problematic. In fact, one of the basic criticisms leveled against the so-called settlement process is that it must be limited to the negotiation of the management of disarming the PKK. The negotiation for the solution of the Kurdish question requires addressing all sides to the Kurdish question, not only the nationalist-socialist Kurdish circles. The common point of all Kurdish Islamist formations is that the government must talk to the PKK in order to end the political violence; but it must bring together all the Kurdish formations for negotiations aiming at the resolution of the "Kurdish question."

## **Criticisms leveled against Kurdish Islamists**

The nationalist discourse championed by Kurdish Islamists is severely criticized by the PKK-BDP, the main backbone of the Kurdish political movement. To them, Kurdish Islamism is a reactive position which emerged against Turkish Islamism and which is risky for the Kurdish cause because it represents an effort to create a Kurdish-Islamic synthesis. It is a backward step that would harm the Kurdish search for emancipation.

For Islamists/Turkish Islamists, the main critics of Kurdish Islamists, there are essentially two fundamental foci of criticisms leveled against Kurdish Islamists. The first one suggests that their nationalist position disregards Islamic allegiance and focuses solely on ethnic bondage. The other criticism is their equalization of Kurdish nationhood with the right to an independent Kurdish state. According to this critical narrative, Kurdish Islamists' political discourse is extremely ideological, polemical and even open to racist considerations with apartheid connotations. It lacks a prudent reading of the practical con-straints and exhibits an "irrational" idealism that may contribute only to the perpetuation of the conflict. They generalize their criticism of Turkish Islamist groups, giving the impression that they all have a state centric nationalist view of the Kurdish question, which is misleading.

The Islamist critics assert that the political position of Kurdish Islamists on the Kurdish issue is purely nationalistic; they cannot accommodate Islamic identity. The discourse of Kurdish Islamists perpetuates nationalist identity, and therefore, it has a secularizing impact. The fact that the Kurdish people are an oppressed and weakened people ( _mustazaf)_ does not confer legitimacy on the nationalist solution of the Kurdish question. The discourse of the Islamic fraternity cannot be condemned to a religious variant of the official assimilationist discourse. It might have possibly been used as such; however, this does not decrease the value of Islamic fraternity for Muslims in providing the feeling of brotherhood that goes beyond national/ist boundaries. The political discourse adopted by Kurdish Islamists against non-Kurdish Muslim groups and opinion holders is insulting, divisive and breaks the ties of brotherhood. The Kurdish Islamists suffer from the Stockholm syndrome by applauding the secular socialist-nationalist Kurdish movement.

For the Islamists, Kurdish Islamists position themselves outside the legacy of Islamists in Turkey. Instead of rejecting this legacy of which they are a part, however, they must face it and reckon with it. Muslims in Turkey as a whole are the victims of the Kemalist political system. The subordination of Kurds is an intrinsic part of this picture. Therefore, the claim that Muslims have remained indifferent to the agonies of the Kurds is baseless. A Kurdish state solution is not what Muslims necessarily need for the solution of the so-called Kurdish question. The problems caused by the logic of a certain nation state cannot be remedied by the establishment of another one. If so, this would lead to the re-emergence of the vicious circle of what nation states lead to in terms of human pluralism and national self-identity.

The Islamist argumentation goes on that "Kurdification"/nationalization of the Kurdish question is different from the "Kurdistanization" of the issue. The first is linked to the communal existence in cultural terms and may be justified on an individual human rights basis. The latter, however, is related to the politically defined territorialization of the communal existence. There is no necessary connection between being a nation in socio-cultural terms and being a nation in politically defined territorial terms. In other words, the state of nationhood canbe preserved without forging a necessary correlation with statehood. The present-day picture of Kurdish Islamists is that they have become the Islamist wing of the Kurdish national movement, thus being articulated into the nationalist creed while loosening their supranational, Islamic perspective. Mehmet Emin Ekmen, former Batman MP for the AK Party, argues that Kurdish Islamists are pure nationalists; they express themselves essentially from within an ethno-national paradigm. Their emphasis does not prioritize education in their mother tongue, crimes committed against Kurds during the 1990s, the consolidation of basic rights and liberties or the empowerment of local administrations. The establishment of an independent Kurdistan is their fixation. Building new borders in a globalized world, where borders become blurred is a manifestation of the syndrome of "late nationalism."

## **Political groupings of Kurdish Islamists**

### _Kurdish Hezbollah/Hüda-Par_

Called Hezbollah (Party of God) by its opponents, an appellation adopted by itas well, the group was set up in 1979 by Hüseyin Velioğlu, the late leader of the movement. In the early 1990s, the group experienced a fierce factional war and consequently was divided into two wings under the respective names: _İlimci_ s and _Menzilci_ s. Later the first faction ( _İlimci_ s) took the name of Hezbollah while the latter withdrew itself from the political scene and came into being later under the name of _Öze Dönüş Platform_ (Back to the Roots Platform). Blamed as being used by the deep state against the PKK, the so-called _Menzilci_ rejected violence as a political method and started organizing in civil society after 2004 with the establishment of _Mustazaf-Der_. It became a political party in December 2012 and participated in the general local elections held on March 30, 2014.

The Free Cause Party, whose acronym "Hüda-Par" also means Hezbollah, pays homage to Islam and forms its course of action in accordance with the alleged Kurdish dedication to Islam. It positions itself as more national than its secular rival the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the PKK's political extension, and a "more Muslim" alternative than the ruling AK Party. Hüda-Par's Islamist agenda, however, encompasses a strong appeal for Kurdish autonomy. It challenges BDP's efforts to attract religious Kurds while demonstrating that the AK Party's vision of Islamic fraternity alone is no longer the only Islamic discourse on the Kurdish political scene.

The ideological posture of the group, with which the PKK has a blood feud yet to be resolved, is a graphic example of the Kurdish Islamic synthesis preaching "Kurdishness" as the form and Islam as the content. The group has an important mass following and owns a media network, including a television channel, Çağrı (the Call or Message); _Mızgin_ (Good News) is its Kurdish periodical. According to its political manifesto, the group is multi-ethnic and rejects the political aspirations of the Kurdish national movement. It conceives the Kurdish question not only in the context of the Kurds, but also for all the Muslim _ummah_. The framework for the resolution of the question is to decline the policy of assimilation, non-recognition and suppression, and to find a just solution co-made by allthe Muslims. This solution must guarantee all Islamic and humanitarian rights for the Kurdish people that may include autonomy, federation and independence on the grounds of political expediency. No compromise is possible from the cause that may eventually lead to the establishment of an Islamic government in compliance with the faith, culture and rights of the Kurdish people.

The Hezbollah community sees the whole territorial space of Turkey as its arena of political activities while concentrating its works in Northern Kurdistan (Article 6). It presents itself to be part of international Islamic movement and adopts a holistic approach to the problems of the Muslim world. It advocates the freedom and independence of all Muslims on the grounds of the unity of the Islamic _ummah_ (Art. 17). It prescribes the adoption of Kurdish as an official language and demands the use of Kurdish in education and in the delivery of public services in all realms of life (Art. 20).

In its capacity as a political party, Hüda-Par suggests that the Kurds are one of the founding peoples of Turkey like Turks, and as such, Kurds should be recognized as a nation on the constitutional level, and accordingly, the acculturation process of Kurds must be the same for Turks from the Western Thrace or any other place. Regarding the so-called peace/settlement process initiated by the AK Party government with the PKK, Hüda-Par expresses its concerns that it may lead the PKK to be the patron of all Kurds. The PKK is the right party to negotiate for ending the political violence, but not to discuss the Kurdish question because the Kurdish question is multi-faceted and cannot be left to the patronage of the PKK.

### _Back to the Roots Platform (Öze Dönüş platform/Menzil group)_

This platform was established in 2011 and is an offshoot of Kurdish Hezbollah, previously known as " _Menzilci_." It is a cluster of associations organized in various Kurdish majority cities. Its motto is not to sacrifice Islam and Kurdish nationality at the expense of one another. It was part of the preparatory committee and a participant of the North Kurdistan Unity and Settlement Conference of 2013. According to the Platform's paper submitted in the Conference, the Kurds' right to national self-determination must be taken for granted. Forcibly settled Kurds during the 1990s must be rehabilitated and compensated for their losses. Non-violence must be a continuous ground in order to create a stable peace and a solution for the Kurdish question. A new constitution that would guarantee the rights of Kurds, their identity, the official position of Kurdish language and pave the way for the voluntary union of Kurds is sine qua non for a pluralist Turkey.

The reconstruction of Kurdish "mind" by refreshing and remaking it on the Islamic memory is considered to be an inherent component of the Kurdish (national) selfhood. Patriotism is not against the Islamic allegiance. Kurdistani Islamic movements must in the first place take into account the needs and conditions of the political geography of which they are part, and work with a view to elevate their society. The national zeal must be amplified by the Islamic zeal. The group describes itself as a Kurdistani formation by pointing out that the idea of an Islamic _ummah_ being much exaggerated in Turkey has served as an opium for Kurdish national self-awareness, and as such was supported by the state as a catalyzing force in the process of assimilation. The Platform distances itself from the position of Muslims who are either pro-state or inclined to the PKK's political discourse and claims that there is a third, original position that is both Islamic and Kurdistani.

The group embraces peaceful means to serve its goals stated in its Foundational Text of Reconciliation. The basic position of the group regarding the Kurdish issue is a pluralistic definition of citizenship at the constitutional level providing for ethnic diversity. In doing this, the state must address all the Kurds, while recognizing the PKK as its sole interlocutor in ending the political violence. The group is not uneasy in declaring that Kurds are entitled to national self-determination, including setting up their own state.

The Platform argues that the ongoing peace process has to incorporate all Kurdish bodies, not only the PKK. The creation of a peaceful environment by disarming the PKK requires the belligerent sides to reach an agreement. Exclusion of other actors of Kurdish politics other than the PKK would be self-defeating for peace efforts. It is not acceptable to proceed peace negotiations through a leader that is "captive" and through an intelligence service, that is, MIT, which gives security considerations top priority. An important figure that represents the views of the Platform, Fikri Amedi, asserts that Abdullah Öcalan's reference to Islamic brotherhood, common history and the Çanakkale spirit that united Turks and Kurds in the same zeal against imperialist powers, namely the British and the National Pact, in his 2013 Newroz message must be taken with precaution. According to Amedi, this is the reproduction of the assimilationist discourse of the state whereby Islam has been used to negate the rights of non-Turkish brothers. Against the allegations that the Platform tends to be nationalistic, it is argued that love of motherland is a natural affinity and an Islamically substantiated value. It is interesting to note that in this understanding of nationalism without Islam is equated to racism and condemned as such. The group distances itself from the use of violence as a means to attain its goals and considers legality and social legitimacy as its ground of activity characterized by openness and respect for plurality. In the past, armed struggle for recognition of Kurdish rights may have arisen out of necessity, but in the present conditions, there is no need to resort to arms.

## **Cazadi initiative**

The Initiative was formed in Diyarbakır by a group of Kurdish intellectuals with Islamic orientation in 2012. The initiative was named in Kurdish as "Ji Bo Maf, Dad û Azadiyê Înîsiyatîfa Îslamî Ya Kurdıstanê" (Kurdistan Islamic Initiative for Right, Justice and Liberty). What was unique to the formation was the creation of an organization that is purely Kurdistan-based, and distinct and separate from Turkish Islamism. The Declaration of the Initiative is a clear manifestation of Kurdish-Islamic synthesis. It is inspired by Islam, but not defined by it. It inherits the Shaikh Said's motto of merging Kurdish zeal ( _hamiyet_ ) with Islamic firmness ( _salabet_ ). It highlights the following: All parts of Kurdistan are under the occupation of other Muslim nations; it must be ruled by Kurdistanis, however. Homogenization of religion, language and ethnic identity as is the case with the Turkish Republic is rejected. It envisages that the divine and universal laws assure the diversity of religions, sects, ethnicities and life styles. Accordingly, the collective rights pertaining to religious and ethnic groups must be guaranteed. It asserts that Kurdistan is a part of Islamic geography, and that Kurdistani people are part of the people of the world. The Kurdish right to national self-determination, including autonomy, federation and independence on the basis of free will of the Kurdish people is not something open to question.

The initiative is against the use of violence as a political means, but does not condemn the PKK for its armed struggle. It sees this as an issue of choice. It lends support to all kinds of democratic means of political opposition, including civil disobedience. It is not pro or anti any Kurdish formation, movement, religious group or political party. It underlines the principles of justice and solidarity as the denominator of cooperation and alliances in its relations with all Kurds in North Kurdistan.

Sıtkı Zilan, a member of the executive committee, and later the Secretary General of the Initiative, argues that Kemalism has poisoned both Islamic and Kurdish identities. He describes the Initiative as Islamic not Islamist and as Kurdistani not Kurdist. According to him, the Initiative aims at making a positive contribution to the demand of Kurdistani people for justice and liberty, not the establishment of an Islamist government. To line up with the rights of all is its motto. "Those who are wrongdoers must be opposed even if they are my co-religionist." All people and individuals inhabiting Kurdistan are equal in rights without any distinction. Zilan locates the initiative in the center, in contrast to the PKK and Kurdish Hezbollah, and defines it as an Islamically referenced (not Islamist) Kurdistani-national movement. The initiative would act as a source of pressure advancing Islamicity vis-à-vis the PKK and national sensitivity vis-à-vis Hüda-Par.

Another member of the Initiative's Executive Committee, Ibrahim Sediyani, poses a pan-Kurdistani picture. To him, Kurdistan has been divided into five parts and the Kurdish people have been separated from one another through artificial national borderlines. What emanates from such a characterization is that, contrary to what Islamist-conservative circles argue, the Kurdistan question is a unifying matter and once it has been resolved it will prompt the unity of Islamic _ummah_ , not divide it. Education in the Kurdish language and the restoration of Kurdish names for locations are two essential parameters of liberty for Kurdish people living in the Turkish part of Kurdistan.

An interesting figure from the Initiative is its representative of Van province, Abdulbasit Bildirici. He proposes the rejection of any engagement with anything that may connote Turkishness. According to Bildirici, the vision of Kurds must be determined solely by Kurdish considerations and free of Turkish involvement in intellectual, emotional, political and cultural terms. Kurds must decline to speak Turkish, vote for Turkish parties operating in Kurdistan and stop all interaction with the Turkish "side." What makes the Initiative unique is its Kurdistani allegiance and "Turkishlessness." With its umbrella "Kurdishness" embracing Zaza dialect as a dialect of Kurdish as well, the Initiative rejects all treaties and covenants that have divided Kurdistan, namely, Kasr-ı Şirin of 1639, Sykes–Picot of 1916 and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. To him, the Initiative must sympathize with the PKK-BDP line, not be against it. The same isolationist position is reiterated by Yavuz Delal, another intellectual from the Initiative. To Delal, the Kurdish question has debunked Turkish Muslims. Turkish Muslim circles are not Muslim on this issue, a state of affairs that ruins the sense of trust Kurds may feel toward them.

The main criticism leveled against Turkish Islamic groups and parties, including Kurdish Islamists within these movements is their silence and disregard of atrocities committed against the Kurdish people by their respective governments, while showing an extreme sensitivity for the sorrows of distant Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine and Afghanistan. During the 1990s, there have been some minor changes in this regard. Muslim groups in Turkey started talking about the issue within the overall context of Muslim victimization. The rupture of Kurdish Islamists has become an indispensability when it has become evident that the AK Party government essentially keeps the main orientation of the Kemalist state. The establishment of the Initiative, the executive panel of which comprised individual representatives of various Islamic Kurdish groups by referring in its name to the Kurdish nationalist formation that organized the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion, was the harbinger of Kurdish national awareness with some Islamic sensitivities. It also has the advantage of not being the continuation of any other Kurdish political formation. The political grounds of the Initiative removes the posited dilemma for the Kurds of being either a Kurd or Muslim by embracing Islam while remaining Kurdish.

### _Zehra group/Nubihar circle_

Zehra group is a breakaway faction of the Kurdish Nurcu group called "Med-Zehra." Its leader Izzettin Yıldırım was kidnapped and allegedly murdered by Kurdish Hezbollah in 2000. _Nubihar_ , which literally means new spring and refers to the Kurdish Sufi poet Ahmad Khani's work, is a periodical of Kurdish literature and culture published since 1992 in Kurdish. It is inspired by the teachings of Kurdish Muslim scholar Bediüzzaman Said Nursî. Presently, the group publishes Kurdish classics, tries to popularize the use of Kurdish and exhibits a low political profile with a timid affinity to Kurdish nationalist movement.

The group justifies its position through the notion of equal brotherhood, meaning standing on equal terms with Turks, Arabs or any other nation. Kurds are "the orphans of the _ummah_ ," implying the prevailing discrimination against Kurds in their respective (Muslim) nation states where they live. Islamic brotherhood needs to be qualified with concrete suggestions for the political status of Kurds and education in their mother tongue. Otherwise, Islamists are not eligible to speak on the Kurdish issue. It is not just a matter of treating Islamists as if they are the generators of the Kurdish question, however. Some Islamist intellectuals and groups, on the other hand, have been influenced by the official ideology and their perception has been shaped by Turkish nationalismand the ideology of the nation state. These circles are suffering from ignorance because they do not follow the literature on nationalism and the institutional evolution of nation states. It seems that their Islamic understanding is conditioned by the Lancer Catechism ( _Mızrakli İlmihal_ ). They use such Islamic references as Islamic brotherhood and _ummah_ as if they comprise the vocabulary of a French style Turkish nationalism. Since there is no real counterpart of the idea of Islamic _ummah_ in the present-day nation state system, the Kurdish right to national self-determination cannot be delegitimized on the grounds of the Islamic unity.

The Islamist opposition to the process of formation of the national subjectivity by Kurds cannot be justified on behalf of humanity, Islam and justice. The discourse of Islamic brotherhood is devoid of content. In an increasingly globalizing world however, it would be wiser for Kurds to be a part of a united Islamic "commonwealth" on the basis of justice of equality, instead of creating their tiny states that may trigger conflicts with neighboring ethnies.

### _Miscellaneous independent Kurdish thinkers and_ mullahs

Comprehension of the Kurdish question by Kurdish Muslim intellectuals and _mullah_ s (i.e., Islamic clerics) reflects a wide array of different perspectives, which range from the recognition of the Kurdish identity without any political implication within the concept of the integrity of the state to a traditional religious discourse to a radical questioning of the assimilationist state policies by recourse and to a radical discourse of Kurdish nationhood in the form of acknowledging the right to an independent Kurdistan.

Common themes in the traditional discourse embracing the present form of state put the first priority on peace between "brothers." All steps taken to end the state of armed conflict are welcome, hence the AK Party government's launch of negotiations with the jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, has been applauded. What is important is to be Muslim, not to be Kurdish or Turkish. "Believers are brothers." The racism that has nurtured ethnic nationalism must be abandoned. The peace process requires sincerity and both parties have to act accordingly because there is no energy left for fighting. Peace is the essence of social existence. There can be no life without peace. The state must be just and compassionate toward Kurds. Turks and Kurds share a common history. They all shed their blood for the fatherland in the First World War and the Turkish War of Liberation. The people are well aware of what is going on and are full of hope and expectation for the peace process. The opportunity cost of the peace is too high, considering the last thirty years that has witnessed the death of thousands. There could be a solution at the bottom of the barrel. Islam is the common denominator of an equal togetherness.

In the Kurdish Forum organized by Mazlum-der, a human rights association with Islamic tendencies, Abdullah Deniz, a Kurdish Muslim activist and politician, described the appellation of the Kurdish question as a glance to the issue via the notion of individual rights. For him, considering the issue as the question of Kurdistan, on the other hand, is a perspective emanating from the vantage point of the notion of collective rights. Accordingly, the Kurdish question pertains to the use of Kurdish in education, the restoration of Kurdish names for geographical divisions and the use of Kurdish in public services. On the other hand, the Kurdistan question is a question of acquiring an equal political status in the form of autonomy, federation or independence that can be decided by the free will of the Kurdish people.

Ayhan Geveri, a Kurdish language teacher and activist, asserts that the present "Kurdish" problem is a legacy of Ottoman-Turkish modernity which started with the Tanzimat Edict and continued during the Republican era. Turkish Muslims are obliged to be an active partner in the process of conferring back the rights of Kurdish Muslims. For this, they must learn Kurdish and establish a better emphatic relation toward what Kurds feel. According to Mehmet Bekaroğlu, an Islamist of Turkish origin, politician and psychiatrist, during the armed conflict, Kurds and Turks preserved their state of living together, but two events led to the emotional break of Kurdish people, religious or not. The first one was the killing of thirty-four people in 2011 in Roboski, and the other was the sexual harassment of jailed Kurdish children in Pozantı Prison in 2011. What was shocking was the lack of Turkish Muslims to voice and share the grievances caused in these cases.

Reha Ruhavioğlu, a Kurdish Muslim activist and writer, succintly delineated the contours of Turkish Islamism regarding the Kurdish issue. For him, the most problematic of all this was the articulation of Turkish nationalism into Islam, which led Turkishness to be its immanent part. As a result, all sacred elements of the nation-state are considered to be natural by Turkish Muslims. A sad manifestation of this nationalist mindset was seen in the attack committed against a group during Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting; they carried a banner saying: "The road to the unity of _ummah_ goes through Diyarbakır" during the fast-breaking dinner in the name of "Justice for Roboski". The aggressors, who were bearded and armed, belonged to the residents of Fatih district, known forits religiosity. What inhibits Turkish Muslims from recognizing the natural rights of the Kurds is the inherited secularized, nationalist mindset of being the dominant nation ( _millet-i hakime_ ). Ruhavioğlu rejects the arguments advanced by Turkish Muslims for the case of a Kurdish secession and states that what the Kurds want is just to have equal status with the Turks. If Turkish Muslims do not divorce themselves from nationalism, then definitely, the Kurds will divorce themselves from the Turks. The gist of the question is not cultural; it is purely political and may be expressed as the sharing of sovereignty.

Contrary to this divorce metaphor, Nurettin Şirin, an Islamist Turkish activist and journalist, approaches the question from a different angle and suggests that Kurds and Turks cannot divorce because Turks need Kurds given the fact that Kurdish intellectuals and the _mullah_ s have a pioneering place in the Islamic movement in Turkey, as seen in the martyrs of _Mavi Marmara_ incident. Islamists gradually have been able to accept the existence of the question over time. This can be related to their articulation with the political right and the state apparatus that they became accustomed to rule. Since Islamists reduced the Kurdish question into the PKK and because the PKK was perceived to be an entirely Marxist political organization, they declined to propose concrete policies aiming at a solution for the problem. Thus, they distanced themselves from the question due both to religious reasons and fear of the state.

## **Conclusion**

Historically, the Turkish Islamist political movement gained legal publicity under the cover of nationalism. The National Outlook Movement has continued this tradition of nationalist religiosity and grasped the Kurdish issue from the vantage point of Islamic brotherhood. Entertaining the idea that all Muslims are equal without paying attention to ethnic plurality, this tradition, sometimes approximated to an assimilationist position while on some occasions it took a more pluralistic-integrationist approach. Springing from the National Outlook tradition, the AK Party defined itself as conservative democrat. Despite strong nationalist tendencies within the party rank-and-file and leadership cadres, it changed the Republican ethno-secular paradigm of assimilation and adopted an ethno-plural posture of citizenship. The democratic opening and later the negotiation process launched in late 2009 by the AK Party government have constituted a historical peak regarding the resolution of the armed side of the conflict.

While the socialization of the Islamic identity via Turkishness has lost its momentum over time, the harshly secular character of Kurdish nationalism along the PKK lines has contributed to Kurdish Islamists' strong attachment to the mainstream Islamist current in Turkey. As the level of Kurdishness/Kurdification on a mass as well as on an elite level has gained ascendancy, and the capability of state power has lost its upper hand in its traditional way of ethnic management—swinging between assimilation and elimination, Kurdish zeal has become increasingly differentiated from Islamic allegiance. This has found a powerful reflection in some Kurdish Islamist individuals and groups. "We are first Kurdish, though we are essentially Muslim; therefore first Kurds and Kurdistan, then Islam" has become a kind of underlying motto of the centrifugal line of nationalist Kurdish Islamists. This stance considers the discourse of Islamic fraternity as the Islamic face of the assimilationist posture, and, with some differences, equates Kurds' right to a nation state with that of the Turks' right on moral grounds. The prioritizing of the Kurdish Islamists' grasp of the Kurdish question, or better, the Kurdistan cause, under the common denominator of "Kurdishness" over the espousal of a purely Islamic approach neutralizing national identities presents a crystal clear contrast to that of the AK Party and the BDP, that favor an integrationist approach.

### _A note on recent developments_

After the finalization of the article, we have witnessed the consolidation of the Kurdish Islamism around the Kurdish nationalist movement in ideological terms. In political terms, the general elections held on June 7, 2015 revealed that the political orientation of Kurdish Islamists has been crystallized around the People's Democracy Party (HDP). Founded on the suggestion of Abdullah Öcalan, the incarcerated leader of the PKK, the HDP as a "leftist and anti-nationalist" party claims to represent not only the Kurds, but also all the oppressed segments of the society, including conservative Muslims, through espousing a political agenda inspired by radical democracy.

The emergence of a powerful Kurdish movement in the north of Syria has become the most important factor halting the advancement of the Islamic State (IS) there, a development that paved the way for the PKK as well as its Syrian branch the PYD to gain Western support and sympathy. Against this background, the president of Turkey and the former leader of the AK Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan conducted an election campaign widely perceived to be anti-Kurdish in the Kurdish circles. Erdoğan's policy and the AK Party's hesitancy insupporting the PYD's resistance against IS fueled an anti-Erdoğan mood in the Kurdish electorate. Erdoğan's campaign for the AK Party before the June 7 elections announced that there was no longer anything that might be called the Kurdish question and that one may only talk about the problems of Kurdish citizenry. Erdoğan vehemently argued that there is nothing left to be done for the Kurds. This "humiliating" political discourse exacerbated the "great escape" of Kurds from the AK Party.

The election results confirmed that the AK Party lost its dominant party status largely because the "Kurdish party" HDP got 13.2 percent of the total votes and some eighty members of parliament. Apart from the socialist left and the Alevites, the HDP became the party of all Kurds regardless of their ideological preferences. Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the HDP, thanked all the groups that lent support to his party in the June 7 elections, including the Nurcu groups, MED-Zehra and Nubihar and the Back to the Roots Platform. The Azadi Initiative was already an ally of the HDP, and its secretary general Adem Özcaner was elected as a member of parliament from Van province. Through its claim to be the voice of all the oppressed from all over Turkey, the HDP assumed a momentum going beyond the Kurdish nationalist movement and became a center of gravity for all Kurds.

The exception to the HDP's position as an all-Kurdish party is Hüda-Par. The party participated in the June 7 elections with independent candidates and decided to withdraw from the upcoming November 1 elections on the grounds that election security is under serious threat from the PKK-HDP. In the meantime, the peace process has come to an end with the KCK's declaration that theceasefire is no longer in force.

To summarize, Kurdish Islamism has been well integrated into the HDP at the political level after the radical, emotional alienation of Kurds from the AK Party before the June 7 elections. Ideologically, Kurdish Islamists represent the most radical variant of Kurdish nationalism by framing their main concern as Kurdistan instead of Kurdish rights.

## Notes

 See, for example, the interview with Abdulbasit Bildirici, a Kurdish Islamist activist, "Kürdistan'ın Yönetimi Kürdistanlılara Bırakılmalı" "The Rule of Kurdistan should be left to the people of Kurdistan"], at: [www.inisiyatifazadi.com/etkinlik-kurdistan-119 (accessed April 1, 2014).

 The papers submitted in the Second Kurdish Forum organized by Mazlumder (Association of Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed) is an evident indication of the publicization of Kurdish Islamist posture. See _Mazlum-Der İkinci Kürt Forumu 17–18 Kasım 2012 İznik-Bursa_ (Ankara: Mazlum-Der, 2013). The position of being the Islamic-Islamist wing of Kurdistan cause is also stated by Sıtkı Zilan, a prominent member of the intellectual-based Kurdish Islamist formation, and presently the Secretary General of the Azadi Initiative, in an email sent to me on May 3, 2013.

 See the interview with journalist Ali Akel by Ruşen Çakır, "Türk ve Kürt Islamcıların Yolları Hızla Ayrılıyor" "Turkish and Kurdish Islamists are Getting Distant from Each Other Rapidly"], at: [www.rusencakir.com/Soylesi-Turk-ve-Kurt-Islamcilarin-yollari-hizla-ayriliyor%E2%80%94-Ali-Akel/1881 (accessed February 16, 2013).

 See, for example, Ibrahim Sediyani, "Kürtler'in Mücadelesi Hürriyet ve İstiklâl Mücadelesi Olmalıdır" "Kurds' Struggle must be a Struggle for Liberty and Independence"], at: [www.haberdiyarbakir.com/kurtlerin-mucadelesi-hurriyet-ve-istiklal-mucadelesi-olmalidir-59202h/#ixzz329rUVsze (accessed May 20, 2014).

 For a succint summary of the rejection of the discourse of Islamic fraternity implying the recognition of Kurdishness as antithetical of Islamic identity, see, among many others, Mücahit Bilici, "Kardeşlikte Zorlama Yoktur" ["There is no Compulsion in Fraternity"]. _Taraf_ , August 17, 2013.

 From a statement by Sıtkı Zilan, in an email sent to me on May 3, 2013.

 _Mazlum-Der İkinci Kürt Forumu_ , p. 261.

 Ibid., p. 9.

 Ibid., p. 242.

 Mücahit Bilici, "Türklüğün Şartları Üçten İkiye İndi: Kültürel Anayasa ve Kürtler" ["The Terms of Turkishness have Decreased from Three to Two"], at:, <http://hurbakis.net/content/turklugun-sartlari-ucten-ikiye-indi-kulturel-anayasa-ve-kurtler> (accessed November 30, 2012).

 The sociologist and columnist Mücahit Bilici uses the appellation of "zimmi" (the protected) for the position of Muslim Kurds vis-à-vis Turkish Islamists. See his piece "Kürtler zımmi midir?" ["Are Kurds Zimmis?"] in _Taraf_ , September 21, 2013.

 For a sharp criticism of adherents of Turkish Islam using Islam as a nationality imbued with Turkish identity in order to hide their negation of Kurdishness or as a precondition for recognition of Kurds as "religious brothers," see Bilici, "Türklüğün Şartları Üçten İkiye İndi: Kültürel Anayasa ve Kürtler," at: <http://hurbakis.net/content/turklugun-sartlari-ucten-ikiye-indi-kulturel-anayasa-ve-kurtler> (accessed November 30, 2012).

 See Yavuz Delal, _Hz Musa ve Ezilen Halkın Ulusal Mücadelesi The Moses and the National Struggle of an Oppressed People]_. (İstanbul: Hivda, 2008), pp. 289–91; also see Yavuz Delal, "İhkak-ı Hak; Kürt Milliyetçiliği veya İslamcı Kürtler" ["Kurdish Nationalism or Islamist Kurds"], at: [www.hinishaber.net/ihkak-i-hak-kurt-milliyetciligi-veya-islamci-kurtler-makale,3537.html (accessed May 13, 2014).

 For the reform initiative of the AK Party called the process of settlement, see _Demokratik Açılım Süreci [The Process of Democratic Opening]_ (Ankara: AK Party Publication, 2010).

 See Yavuz Delal's views in _Mazlum-Der İkinci Kürt Forumu_ , p. 42.

 "Türk ve Kürt Islamcıların Yolları Hızla Ayrılıyor" "Turkish and Kurdish Islamistsare Getting Distant from Each Other Rapidly"], an interview with the journalist Ali Akel by Ruşen Çakır, at: [www.rusencakir.com/Soylesi-Turk-ve-Kurt-Islamcilarin-yollari-hizla-ayriliyor%E2%80%94-Ali-Akel/1881 (accessed February 16, 2013).

 Ibrahim Sediyani, "Roboskê'de Asıl Konuşulması Gereken?" ["What Really Needs tobe Discussed about the Roboski Incident?"]. _Taraf_ , January 2, 2014.

 Mustafa Erdoğan, "Kürt Sorununda Işık Göründü mü?" ["Is there Hope Left in the Kurdish Question?"]. _Milliyet_ , January 16, 2013.

 See the statement of Ayhan Bilgen, a former Islamist and member of Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People's Democratic Party, HDP) before the PKK-backed "Democratic Islam Congress" held in Diyarbakir on May 11–12, 2014: "Kürt-İslam anlayışı risklidir" "The Conception of Kurdish-Islam is Risky"], at: [www.taraf.com.tr/haber-kurt-islam-anlayisi-risklidir-153785/ (accessed May 5, 2014).

 As an example of emphasizing the differentiation of Kurdish Islamism from Turkish Islamism, see Abdulbasit Bildirici, "İstanbul İslamcılığı ve Kürdistan" "Islamism of Istanbul and Kurdistan"], at: [www.hinishaber.net/istanbul-islamciligi-ve-kurdistan-makale,2840.html (accessed November 27, 2013).

 See Hamza Türkmen, "Türk İslamcı, Kürt İslamcı Olur mu?" "Can There Be Such Things as Turkish-Islamist, Kurdish-Islamist?"], at: [www.haksozhaber.net/turk-islamci,-kurt-islamci-olur-mu-2-17688yy.htm (accessed February 16, 2014).

 See Sibel Eraslan, "İslamcılar Kürt Meselesinden Sarf-ı Nazar Ettiler mi?" ["Have Islamists Declined the Kurdish Question as an Issue?"]. _Star_ , October 12, 2011.

 Hamza Türkmen, _Açılım Politikaları, Kemalizm ve Müslümanlar [Democratic Opening, Kemalism and Muslims]_. (Istanbul: Ekin, 2010), pp. 79–85.

 Sibel Eraslan, "İslamcılık Antoloji mi, Birikim mi?" ["Is Islamism an Anthology or Accumulation?"]. _Star_ , October 14, 2011.

 Hamza Türkmen, "Türk İslamcı, Kürt İslamcı Olur mu?" "Can There Be Turkish-Islamist or Kurdish-Islamist?"], at: [www.haksozhaber.net/turk-islamci,-kurt-islamciolur-mu-2-17688yy.htm (accessed February 16, 2014).

 _Mazlum-Der İkinci Kürt Forumu_ , pp. 197–98. Also see Mehmet Emin Ekmen, "Mazlumder tertip etti 'İslamcılar' Kürt meselesini tartıştı" ["Mazlum-Der Organized, Islamists Discussed the Kurdish Question"], at: <http://haber.stargazete.com/acikgorus/mazlumder-tertip-etti-islamcilar-kurt-meselesini-tartisti/haber-706732> (accessed March 20, 2014).

 "Mustazaflar Derneği Parti Kuruyor" ["The Association of the Weakened Turns into a Political Party"], _t24_ , at: <http://t24.com.tr/haber/mustazaflar-dernegi-parti-kuruyor,219148> (accessed May 5, 2014).

 "Hüda-Par Varlık Gösteremedi" ["The Free Cause Party Registered Very Poor"], at: <http://staff.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/huda-par-varlik-gosteremedi> (accessed May 5, 2014). The party took 0.19 percent of the votes, comparatively a very small share of the total.

 See "Islamist Kurdish Group Seeks Role in Southeast Turkey," at: www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/free-cause-party-kurdish-islamist-group-huda-par.html# (accessed February 21, 2014).

 Ibid.

 "Hizbullah Cemaati'nin Manifestosu Yayınlandı" "The Manifesto of the Hizbullah Community was Published"], at: [www.dogruhaber.com.tr/Haber/Hizbullah-Cemaatinin-Manifestosu-Yayinlandi-21776.html (accessed January 18, 2014).

 Ibid.

 The same themes are reiterated in the Party program. For the party program, see: <http://hudapar.org/Detay/Sayfalar/205/parti-programi.aspx> (accessed May 5, 2014).

 See "Islamist Kurdish Group Seeks Role in Southeast Turkey," at: www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/free-cause-party-kurdish-islamist-group-huda-par.html# (accessed February 21, 2014).

 "Öze Dönüş Platformu Kuzey Kürdistan Konferansı Tebliği" "Paper Submitted by the Back to the Roots Platform in the North Kurdistan Conference"], at: [www.haberdiyarbakir.com/oze-donus-platformu-kuzey-kurdistan-konferansi-tebligi-59058h/ (accessed March 12, 2014).

 Ibid.

 See the interview with Fikri Amedi, "Öze Dönüş ve Düşünce Geleneği" ["Back to the Roots and its Tradition of Thought"], at: <http://fikriamedi.blogspot.com.tr/2013/06/oze-donus-ve-dusunce-gelenegi.html> (accessed March 31, 2014).

 Ibid.

 "Öze Dönüş Platformu Kuruluş Mutabakat Metni" ["The Founding Text of the Back to the Roots Platform"], at: <http://islamiinsiyatif.blogspot.com.tr/2012/06/oze-donus-platformu-kurulus-mutabakat.html> (accessed February 13, 2014).

 See: <http://fikriamedi.blogspot.com.tr/2013/06/oze-donus-ve-dusunce-gelenegi.html> (accessed March 31, 2014).

 Ibid.

 See Abdulbasit Bildirici, "Azadi İnisiyatifi Üzerine" ["On the Azadi Initiative"], at: <http://hurbakis.net/content/azadi-inisiyatifi-uzerine> (accessed February 16, 2014).

 See: www.inisiyatifazadi.com/deklerasyon-trand,www.inisiyatifazadi.com/deklerasyon-ku (accessed February 16, 2014).

 Ibid.

 See the statement by Sıtkı Zilan, in an email sent to me on May 3, 2013.

 _Mazlum-Der İkinci Kürt Forumu_ , p. 72.

 See: www.inisiyatifazadi.com/etkinlik-kurdler-in-kurdistani-olma-zorunlulugu-bulunmaktadir-120 (accessed February 16, 2014).

 See: www.inisiyatifazadi.com/etkinlik-kurdistan-119 (accessed on February 16, 2014).

 _Mazlumder 2. Kürt Sorunu Forumu_ , p. 242.

 See: <http://fikriamedi.blogspot.com.tr/2012/06/azadi-hareketi.html#more> (accessed February 16, 2014).

 See the press statement by Nûbihar Eğitim ve Kültür Derneği Nubihar Association of Education and Culture] on the fighting between the student factions affiliated with Hüda-Par and the PKK, at: [www.ilkehaber.com/haber/nbihar-dernegi-dude-yasananolaylara-iliskin-aciklama-yapti-25874.htm (accessed May 10, 2014).

 The phrase used in the title of the book by the Egyptian writer Fehmi Şinnavi, _İslam Ümmetinin Yetimleri Kürtler [Kurds: the Orphans of the Muslim Ummah]_ , trans. Recep Perçinli (İstanbul: Şura, 1997).

 See "Kürtlerin İttifakı, Ortadoğu Barışının Anahtarıdır" ["The Unity of Kurds is Keyto the Middle East Peace"], an interview with the Head of the Nubihar Association, at: <http://komanubihar.org/kurmanci/?p=161> (accessed May 14, 2014).

 See the views expressed by the representative of the Nubihar Association, Muhyeddin Kaya, in Kurdish Forum organized by Mazlum-Der, "Tanımlama Ekseninde 'Kürt Sorunu' " ["Kurdish Problem: Question of Definition"], in _Mazlumder 2. Kürt Sorunu Forumu_ , p. 103.

 Ibid., pp. 104–05.

 See the views of Mehmet Arif Koçer, _Mazlumder 2. Kürt Sorunu Forumu_ , p. 268.

 See "30 Yıllık Duaların Kabul Olma Zamanı Geldi" "The Time has Come for the Acceptance of the 30 Year Prayers"], at: [www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1001221-30-yillik-dualarin-kabul-olma-zamani-geldi (accessed May 12, 2014).

 _Mazlum-Der İkinci Kürt Forumu_ , p. 16.

 Ibid., p. 26.

 Ibid., pp. 83–84.

 Ibid., p. 99.

 Ibid., p. 115.

 Ibid., p. 116. For the insult incident against the Mazlum-Der sympathizers in the public meeting held under the banner of "Adalet için İftar Vakti" "Fast Breaking Time for Justice"], see: [www.timeturk.com/tr/2012/08/09/mazlumder-yuruyusunesaldirdilar.html#.U3xu8NKB1HQ (accessed March 30, 2014).

 Ibid., pp. 117–18.

 Ibid., p. 206.

 Ibid., pp. 134–35.

 See the Halkların Demokratik Partisi website, at: www.hdp.org.tr/ (accessed September 21, 2015).

 See "Neden HDP Oldular?" "Why Have They Become HDP?"], at: [www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber-analiz/neden-hdp-oldular (accessed May 2, 2014).

 See "Artık HDP Gerçek bir Türkiye Partisidir" "Now HDP Became a Real all-Turkey"], at: [www.radikal.com.tr/politika/demirtas_muhtesem_bir_zafer_ve_muazzam_bir_basari_elde_ettik-1374876 (accessed September 21, 2015).

 See "1 Kasımda Seçime Girmiyoruz" ["We are not Competing in the November 1 Elections"], at: <http://hudapar.org/Detay/Haber/1070/1-kasimda-secime-girmiyoruz.aspx> (accessed September 21, 2015).

 See "KCK Ateşkesin Bittiğini Açıkladı" ["KKC Declared the End of the Ceasefire"], at: <http://t24.com.tr/haber/kck-ateskesin-bittigini-acikladi-bundan-sonra-tum-barajlargerillanin-hedefinde-olacaktir,302608> (accessed September 21, 2015).

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# Index

ABF (Alevi Bektashi Federation) –, , , , , , , ,

abortion –,

ADD (Atatürkist Thought Society) –, –, ,

AK Party: Alevi critique of –; and authoritarianism –, –, –; basic flaws of the regime –; and _Birikim_ journal –; Constitutional referendum –; corruption , , , –; and democracy –, , , , –, , –, , –, , –; trials –, , –, , –; gender policies of –; and Gezi Park demonstrations , 65n5, –, –, –, –, –, –; and Gülen movement –, , , –, , –; and importance of critique and dissent –; intellectual left's view of –; and Islamic movement –; June 2015 elections –, –, , , , , –, ; and Kemalist advocacy –; and Kemalist feminists –, –; and Kurds , –, , , , , , –, –, , –; and the middle classes –, , –; and military tutelage –; myths of –; as new genre of politics –; origins of , –; "revolution" of –, –; and rule of law –; seven critical groups of –; "Thermidorian period" –; travails of –; and urban expansion –; _see also_ Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip

Akkiraz, Sabahat ,

Aktay, Yasin ,

Akyol, Mustafa

Alawis, and Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge –

alcohol ban

Alevi Bektashi Federation (ABF) –, , , , , , , ,

Alevi groups –; and AK Party 1st term –; and AK Party's 2nd term –; "Alevi opening" –; and apologies of AK Party ; and assimilation –; characteristics of ; critique of AK Party –; critique of their critiques –; and democracy –; disagreements among –; and discrimination –; and Gezi protests ; Islamization of ; and June 2015 elections –; and Kurds , ; long-standing parameters of –; as MPs , ; and power –; and religious teaching in schools –, , , –, , –, ; and RPP ; and rule of law –; status of ; and workshops –,

Altun, Fermani , , , ,

Amedi, Fikri

Anatolia , , , –

Arat, Necla

Arat, Yeşim

Arıtman, Canan

Arman, A. ,

Armenians –

assimilation, and Alevis –

Association in Support of Contemporary Living (CYDD) –, , ,

Atatürkist Thought Society (ADD) –, –, ,

Atayurt, Ulus

authoritarianism –, –, –

Azadi Initiative –, –,

Back to the Roots Platform (Öze Dönüş Platform) , , –

Balkız, Ali

Bayart, Jean-François –

BDP (Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party) , , , , ,

Bekaroğlu, Mehmet

Belge, Murat , ,

Bezm-i Alem Valide Sultan Mosque

Bildirici, Abdulbasit –

_Birikim_ journal –; and AK Party foreign policy –; and authoritarianism –; and conservatism of AK Party –; and corruption ; critique of their critiques ; and democracy –; and Erdoğan's leadership –; and Gezi Park demonstrations –; identitarianism –; initial goals of ; and Kemalism ; and Kurds , , –; and the middle classes –, –; and military tutelage –; origins of –; and rise of AK Party ; "second _Birikim_ 's" influence and significance –; significance of –; and socialism –, , , –

Bora, Tanıl ,

Bülbül, Kemal

Buldan, Pervin

Çamuroğlu, Reha ,

Çandar, Cengiz ,

Capital City Women's Platform ,

capitalism –

Çelik, Ömer , , , ,

CEM (Center for Republican Education and Culture Foundation) , , , , , , , ,

_cemevis_ , , , , –, , –

CHP (Republican People's Party) , , , , , , , , , –,

Çölaşan, Tansel –

communism

Constitutional referendum (2010) , , –

construction projects –

corruption , , , –

coups: (1971) ; (1980) ; (1997) –, , –, , ; trials –, , –, , –

CYDD (Association in Support of Contemporary Living) –, , ,

Davutoğlu, Ahmet

de Certeau, Michel , , –

Delal, Yavuz ,

Demirtaş, Selahattin , , , ,

democracy: and Alevi critique of AK Party –; and _Birikim_ journal , –, –; and Constitutional referendum ; disappearance of –, , –; and Erdoğan –, , , , , , , –, –; and Gülen movement , –; and Kemalists , , –,

Deniz, Abdullah

Denizsalanı, Emel

_dershanes_ –, –

Dersim massacre (1937–8) , ,

Dink, Hrant –

Directory of Religious Affairs _see_ DRA

Doğan, İzzettin , , –, , , ,

DP (Democrat Party) , ,

DRA (Directory of Religious Affairs) –, , , , , –,

Ecevit, Bülent

economic expansion , –, –

Eğri, Osman

Ehl-i Beyt Foundation , , , , ,

Ekmen, Mehmet Emin

elections: November 2002 ; July 2007 ; March 2014 ; June 2015 –, –, , , , , –, ; local elections ; presidential elections –, , ,

Erbakan, Necmettin , , ,

Erbatur, Gaye

Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip: and abortion ; and Alevis , , , , –, , ; and authoritarianism –, –; and _Birikim_ journal –; as deific figure ; and democracy –, , , , , , , –, –; and dictatorship , –; and EU ; and executive presidency –, –; and Gezi Park demonstrations , , , , –; and Gülen movement –, , , , –, –; and interference with lifestyles –; and June 2015 elections , –, , , ; and Kurds , , , ; and the middle classes –; no challenge to –; polarizing attitude of –; and power ; and presidential election ; and tension politics –; and Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge –; _see also_ AK Party

Ergenekon trials –, , –, , –

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ,

European Union , –, ,

family policies –

February 28 Process ,

Federation of Alevi Foundations , ,

feminism _see_ Kemalist feminists

Free Cause Party (Hüda-Par) , , –,

gender policies –

Geveri, Ayhan

Gezi Park demonstrations: aftermath of –, –, –; AK Party , 65n5, –, –, –, –, –, –; and Alevis ; background to –; and _Birikim_ journal –; and capturing speech –; and civil society organizations ; and conspiracy theories –; and democracy –; and Erdoğan , , , , –; first round of protests –; and Gülen movement –; importance of Taksim ; and interference with lifestyles discourse –; and June 2015 elections –, ; Kemalists , , ; motivation of participants –, , –, –, –; as a new movement –; plural meanings of ; possibilities and dilemmas of –; profile of the participants –, ; protest literature –; resistance against neoliberal arrogance –; and revolt romanticism –; snowballing of events –; and social media ; and tension politics –; and urban transformation –; violent clashes –,

Greater Middle East project

Gül, Abdullah , , , ,

Gül, Fethullah –, , –, –, , –, –

Gül, Hayrünnisa –

Gülen movement: and AK Party –, , , –, , –; and _Birikim_ journal –; convergences with AKP –; and corruption charges –; and coup attempt ; current relationship with AK Party –, –; and _Dershane_ debate ; and divergences with AKP –; and Ergenekon trials –, , –, , –; and EU accession ; and Gezi protests –; and Israel ; and Kurdish issue –; methodology of the research ; and nationalism ; nature and structure of –; and neoliberalism –; Ottomania ; in political arena , –; and religion –; and secularism –,

Gümüş, Fevzi

Gümüşoğlu, Firdevs

Günay, Ertuğrul

Gursel, Kadri

Hakan, A.

Halley, Janet ,

Hansen, Suzy

Harvey, David ,

HBVAKV (Hubyar Foundation) , , , , , ,

HDP (People's Democracy Party) ; and Alevis ; and _Birikim_ –, ; June 2015 elections –, , , –, , –, , , ; and PKK , , , –, ; reinvention of , ; rise of –, –,

headscarf issue –,

Hezzbollah –

Hizmet movement , , , , , –,

housing –

Housing Development Administration (TOKI)

Hubyar Foundation (HBVAKV) , , , , , ,

Hüda-Par (Free Cause Party) , , –,

Hunter, Wendy ,

identitarianism , –

İHH

Inonu, İsmet

İnsel, Ahmet , , , , , ,

intellectual left _see_ _Birikim_ journal

Iraq ,

ISIS

Islamic movement –

Israel

Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) , ,

judiciary: and Alevis –; reforms of ,

Kabataş square incident

Karacaahmet _cemevi_

Kazlıçeşme Square rally ,

KCK ,

Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk)

Kemalist advocacy –; ADD –, –, , ; and AK Party –; CYDD –, , , ; and elected dictatorship –; fears of –; impact and effectiveness of –; National Center-MM –, ; and nationalism –; organizations of ; origin of the movement –; and principles of Kemalism ; and secularism ; _see also_ Kemalist feminists

Kemalist feminists –; after 1980 –; and AK Party –, –; and AK Party's family politics –; ambiguous backdrop story of –; different thinking for –; headscarf issue –; and militarism –; and nationalism –; _see also_ Kemalist advocacy

Kendirci, Sema –

Keskin, Tuğral

Kılıçdaroğlu, Kemal , , , , –,

Konda report –

Kurdish Forum –

Kurdish Hezbollah –

Kurdish Islamists –; and AK Party , –; basic tenets and tendencies of –; characteristics of –; concept of –; criticisms against –; differences among –; June 2015 elections ; and Kurdistan –; political groupings of –; recent developments –; and Turkish Islamists –, ; _see also_ Kurdish peace process; Kurds; PKK

Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) , , , , ,

Kurdish peace process , , , –; and _Birikim_ journal –; Kemalist feminists –, –, –; and PKK , , , –, –

Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) ,

Kurdistan Workers' Party _see_ PKK

Kurds: and AK Party , –, , , , , , –, –, , –; and Alevi groups , ; BDP , , , , , ; and _Birikim_ journal , , –; and Erdoğan , , , ; and Gülen movement –; June 2015 elections –; KCK , ; and Kemalist feminists –; and national identity –; resumption of military operations against , –, , , –, ; Roboski killings ; _see also_ Kurdish Islamists; Kurdish peace process; PKK

Kuru, Ahmet

Labor and Justice Platform

Laçiner, Omer: and Erdoğan's leadership , ; and identitarianism ; and Kurdish policy , ; and middle classes –, , , ; and military tutelage –; and origins of _Birikim_ , ; and socialism , , ,

Law on Greater City Municipalities –

Lefebvre, Henri ,

left wing perspective _see_ Birikim journal

LGBTI community ,

lifestyle discourse –

Madımak Hotel

March Against Sharia

Marinković, Dušan

_Mavi Marmara_ incident

MHP (Nationalist Action Party) –, ,

middle classes –, , –

militarism, Kemalist feminists –

military: Ergenekon trials –, , –, , –; and Gülen movement –, –; and Kemalist feminists –; military tutelage , , –,

Miller, Ruth

Millî Göruş movement (National View) , , –

Ministry of Family and Social Services –

MIT (National Intelligence Organization)

MM (National Center) –,

modernism

modernization of Turkey

Molotch, Harvey

Mouffe, Chantal ,

Mumcu, Özgur

National Center-MM –,

National Intelligence Organization (MIT)

National Outlook movement –, , ,

National View (Millî Göruş movement) , , –

nationalism: identitarianism –; and Kemalism –, –; and Kurds –

Nationalist Action Party (MHP) –, ,

neoliberalism: and _Birikim_ , , , ; and Gezi Park protests , –; and Gülen movement –

North Kurdistan Unity and Settlement Conference

Nubihar circle , –

Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said ,

Öcalan, Abdullah , , , ,

Ottomania

Özal, Turgut

Öze Dönüş Platform (Back to the Roots Platform) , , –

Özel, Selahattin , , ,

Özkoray, E.

Özkoray, N.

People's Democracy Party _see_ HDP

PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party): and Alevi ; and _Birikim_ journal , , –; and Gülen movement –; and KCK , ; and Kurdish Islamists , , , , , , –; and peace process , , , –, –; resumption of military operations against , –, , , –,

PKK-BDP ,

"politics of redressing" –

presidential elections: (2007) –, , ; (2014)

PSAKD (Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association) , , , , ,

PYD

Refah Partisi (RP/Welfare Party) , , –, –, , , –

reproduction, sexual , –

Republic Meetings

Republican People's Party (CHP) , , , , , , , , , –,

Republican Rallies ,

Republican Women's Association

revolt romanticism –

Roboski killings ,

RP _see_ Refah Partisi

RPP , ,

Ruhavioğlu, Reha

rule of law, and AK Party –

Said Nursî, Bediüzzaman ,

Sancar, Özer

Sarıhan, Şenal ,

Sarıkaya, Sadrettin

Saylan, Türkan , –

schools: DRA (Directory of Religious Affairs) –, , , , , –, ; Gülen ,

Sediyani, Ibrahim

September 12 trials

sexuality –, –

Şirin, Nurettin

Society for the Support of Modern Life –,

state feminism 65n8

Statue of Humanity

Syria , –

Taksim Gezi Park _see_ Gezi Park demonstrations

Taksim Solidarity initiative

Tekeli, Şirin

_Tezkire_ Journal

"Thermidor" of AK Party revolution –

TOKI (Housing Development Administration)

Touraine, Alain

Tully, James

Turam, Berna

Turkish Women's Association –

Twitter, Gezi Park demonstrations

Ulagay, O. ,

urban transformation –; _see also_ Gezi Park demonstrations

Uşak, Cemal

violence against women , ,

Walton, Jeremy

Welfare Party (Refah Partisi/RP) , , –, –, , , –

women _see_ Kemalist feminists

Women's Assembly (2005)

Yavuz, M. Hakan , –, , ,

Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge , –

Yüksel, Müfit

Zehra group –

Zilan, Sıtkı

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaBook