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449 F. 2d 871 - Johnson v. New York State Education Department
449 F2d 871 Johnson v. New York State Education Department
Daisy JOHNSON, Dorothy Miller, Forestine Pressy, individually and on behalf of their minor children and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Docket 71-1006.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Decided August 13, 1971.
Carl Jay Nathanson, Westbury, N. Y. (Nassau County Law Services Committee, Inc., Leonard S. Clark, Westbury, N. Y., Burr C. Hollister, Mineola, N. Y., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Joel Lewittes, New York City (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of N. Y., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, Iris A. Steel, New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees New York State Dept. of Education and Ewald B. Nyquist.
Henry A. Weinstein, Mineola, N. Y., for defendant-appellee Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 27.
Robert Pressman, Paul R. Dimond, Jeffrey Kobrick, J. Harold Flannery, Cambridge, Mass., for Center for Law and Education, amicus curiae.
Before MOORE, KAUFMAN and TIMBERS,* Circuit Judges.
MOORE, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellants are mothers of minor children and bring this action not only individually and on behalf of their children but also on behalf of others similarly situated (a class action). The children attend school in the Union Free School District No. 27, Town of Hempstead (the School District). The action is against the New York State Department of Education, Ewald B. Nyquist, as Commissioner of the New York State Education Department and the Board of Education of District No. 27 (the School Board).
Prior to 1965, each school system in New York State had to provide its own financing for the purchase of textbooks. In 1965, New York Education Law §§ 701 and 703 (McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 16, 1971) were amended. Quite simply, § 701 provides for state financial assistance ($10 per pupil) for the purchase of textbooks in grades seven through twelve. § 703 provides that qualified voters within a school district may vote a tax for textbooks for grades one through six. Under § 701, a School Board must supply textbooks to all children in grades seven through twelve residing in its district, regardless of whether they attend public or private schools. Under § 703, textbooks must be supplied to children in grades one through six wherever the voters authorize a tax for this purpose.
Where the voters fail to approve a proposed real estate tax to finance school operations, the Board may nevertheless levy a real estate tax on the property owners living within the School District, but only for such amounts as are necessary for "ordinary contingent expenses" of such School District. New York State Education Law, § 2023 (McKinney's Consol. Laws 1971).1
On three occasions, the voters of this School District rejected a budget for the 1970-1971 school year proposed by the defendant School Board, after which the Board assessed a tax in accordance with § 2023.
The Board concluded on the basis of Opinion Number 213 of the Counsel to the Education Department, dated July 6, 1967, that expenditures for textbooks are not considered to be "ordinary contingent expense" items within the meaning of § 2023 of the Education Law. This opinion was based in part on the fact that § 703 authorizes a vote on such expenses. Therefore, the Board decided that it was not legally entitled to tax to raise money for textbooks.2
The complaint sought the following relief:
(1) that a three judge District Court be convened to determine the controversy;
(2) that preliminary and permanent injunctions be entered enjoining defendants from enforcing § 701 of the New York Education Law on the ground that the classification of pupils in grades one to six and grades seven to twelve is "arbitrary, irrational and discriminatory"; and
(3) that a declaratory judgment be entered declaring § 701 et seq. unconstitutional as violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
More specifically, the First Cause of Action claims that § 701 "individiously discriminates * * * by creating an arbitrary and discriminatory classification which deprives plaintiffs and members of their class of equal protection of the law and an adequate education." A Second Cause of Action alleges that §§ 701 and 703 impose a majority vote approval of a tax assessment to enable children in grades one to six to receive free textbooks and that this constitutes a denial of equal protection. A Third Cause of Action states that pursuant to §§ 701 and 703 textbooks can be obtained in grades one to six only upon the payment of a rental fee ($7.50 per pupil); that plaintiffs are indigent and cannot pay a fee;3 and that by reason of their poverty their children are deprived of equal educational opportunity. They describe the potential situation quite realistically by alleging (Complaint, XII (b)):
"Indigent children sitting bookless, side by side in the same classroom with other more wealthy children learning with purchase [sic] textbooks engenders a widespread feeling of inferiority and unfitness in poor children and is psychologically, emotionally and educationally disastrous to their well being."
An order to show cause for a temporary restraining order was issued by Judge Travia. Affidavits and memoranda were submitted in support of and in opposition to the application. The Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools answered demanding dismissal of the complaint.
In his decision, Judge Travia assumed jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 13434 and proceeded to consider "the claimed deficiencies on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. F.R.C.P. 12(b) (6)." 319 F.Supp. at 278. In essence the court held that in enacting §§ 701 and 703, the Legislature acted on a reasonable basis free from irrationality or arbitrariness; that "the Legislature was entitled to allocate its grant to pupils in those grades where it would do the most good"; and "[that] New York State has a legitimate compelling interest in seeing to it that as many as possible of its children receive textbooks." 319 F.Supp. at 280. The court, therefore, denied plaintiffs' motion and dismissed the complaint. From the denial of the motion for the convening of a three judge statutory court, and the dismissal of the complaint, plaintiffs appeal. In addition to the briefs of the parties, this court has the advantage of a well-prepared brief and reply brief submitted by the Center for Law and Education of Harvard University.
At the outset, there must be a determination as to whether Judge Travia properly denied plaintiffs' motion for the convening of a three judge court. If a three judge court is ultimately to decide upon the rationality of the New York State Legislature's enactment of §§ 701 and 703, there is little to be gained by having this court of three judges subject its own rationality to further scrutiny.
The guidelines stated by the Supreme Court in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 1296, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962) were that the "[district] court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the three judge statute." But what is "substantial"? And who is to make this decision? Quite obviously, only the court of last resort — and even then the concept of rationality of legislative judgment may be decreed by the narrow margin of a five to four vote. Searching further in a field where precedent is supposedly helpful, we find that the district court may reject a constitutional claim "because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose the subject." California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 255, 58 S.Ct. 865, 867, 82 L.Ed. 1323 (1938).
This admonition requires research into decisions of the Supreme Court which might "foreclose the subject." If the decisions justify such a conclusion, the Supreme Court with all its pressing business should not have to cope with indiscriminate three judge appeals. This case is an example. The district judge hears the case and this court hears it. Four judges. Should this court send the case to a three-judge court, two more? Then to the Supreme Court. Fifteen judges in all will have reviewed the rationality of a legislative body. If we affirm, four judges will have been involved and the Supreme Court at least will have the privilege of deciding whether they wish to become further involved.
Recently the three judge court problem was considered by this court in Miller v. New York Stock Exchange, 425 F. 2d 1074, cert. den. 398 U.S. 905, 90 S. Ct. 1696, 26 L.Ed.2d 64 (1970), wherein the question was whether "we must nevertheless reverse because the result was not so clearly predestined that he could dispense with having two other judges, possibly two of us, help him reach it — and this even though the State, for whose benefit the three-judge provision was enacted, was quite content to have him act alone." We concluded that it was unnecessary to reverse under these circumstances even though it denied the plaintiffs a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. We referred to the guidelines set forth in Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 449 (2nd Cir.), cert. den., 389 U.S. 1048, 88 S.Ct. 768, 19 L.Ed.2d 840 (1967), Judge (now Chief Judge) Friendly saying:
"But [not having a direct appeal to the Supreme Court] is hardly of great moment in view of the immediate availability of certiorari to the Court of Appeals and the likelihood of this being granted if the Supreme Court thinks a constitutional claim may have been erroneously rejected."
The limited area for the three judge court was further defined by Judge Kaufman in Astro Cinema Corp., Inc. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293, 298 (2nd Cir. 1970):
"This is particularly so when the aim of § 2281 was to protect the States against declarations of unconstitutionality emanating from a single district judge. While it is true that plaintiff loses his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, not only is that body capable of remedying any injustice through the device of certiorari, but the direct appeal provision, in context, seems far more likely to have been for the benefit of the state than the plaintiff."5
The easiest solution for the district judge, whenever the words "United States Constitution" or "Fourteenth Amendment" appear in a complaint, would be to relieve himself of two-thirds of the responsibility for the decision by requesting the convening of a three judge court. This would seemingly be the approach of the Fifth Circuit as declared in Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910, 913 (1968), in which the Court believed that "unless it is determined that it was an open and shut case three Judges must pass on the merits even though it means that three more must do so again." The Court felt that it would be better to "constitute a three judge court, and allow that court to determine initially" whether it should have been constituted. This Court recently declined to adopt this policy. A district judge should not feel that he is merely a rubber stamp or that he exercises his judgment at his peril. In Heaney v. Allen, 425 F.2d 869, 871, 872 (1970), this Court said:
"If a three-judge Court is once assembled, the temptation to stay together is strong. Indeed, as pointed out in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398, 410 (S.D.N.Y.1964), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 382 U.S. 111, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194 (1965), aff'd, 364 F.2d 241 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1036, 87 S.Ct. 776, 17 L.Ed.2d 683 (1967), it is usually rather idle for the three judges to waste time deciding whether they have been properly assembled, since the three-judge court has jurisdiction in any event whereas a wrong decision to return the issue to a single judge can create all sorts of trouble. The Fifth Circuit practice thus means in effect not only that three judges will have been called together to decide a question that in fact was determinable by one but that an appeal will almost certainly be added to the Supreme Court's docket, an unfortunate burden on that overworked tribunal."
No disagreement is voiced with the Fifth Circuit's concern that "it takes judicial prescience of a Delphic order to say with certainty that the attack is insubstantial" (Jackson at p. 913 of 404 F.2d), but the prophetess did not abstain from her prophecies because of doubt. She merely couched them (not unlike some court decisions) in terms that lent themselves to divers constructions. Therefore, although this case may not be "open and shut" (so few cases are), the decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts which are as analogous as possible to this case should be examined to ascertain whether they "foreclose the subject." If they do, we should avoid a procedure which will make for repetition. Of course, no two cases involving equal protection are alike as to facts and, were mere factual variation the test, all cases should be channeled to the Supreme Court on the chance that some distinguishing feature might be found. However, the Supreme Court reminds us that "[t]he Three-judge requirement is a technical one to be narrowly construed. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 [61 S.Ct. 480, 483, 85 L.Ed. 800]" Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 at 33, 82 S.Ct. 549 at 551, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962). See also Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 671, 24 L.Ed.2d 663 (1969); Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, supra, Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.S. 383, 90 S.Ct. 2013, 26 L.Ed.2d 684 (1970). We believe that a review of the Supreme Court's decisions in related situations justifies affirmance of Judge Travia's opinion and our own in not remanding to a three judge court.
Our function is not to enact laws for the State of NewYork or to tell the Legislature how better they could have legislated. We are restricted to making an examination of the law as actually enacted and to declaring whether there is a reasonable basis for this classification.
Any state-created classification which is attacked as a denial of equal protection must be examined against either of two constitutional standards: (A) that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state end (see McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)); or (B) that the classification is justified by a compelling state interest. See, e. g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).
Judge Travia applied standard (B) and found a compelling state interest (319 F.Supp. at 278). The legislative purpose behind § 701 indicates that the Legislature sought to promote education in the fields of science, mathematics and foreign languages — an end which could be accomplished through the furnishing of textbooks in the grades which covered those subjects (seven through twelve). Judge Travia therefore reasoned that whichever standard is applied is of little consequence because the legislative scheme is reasonable; it is buttressed by compelling state justifications; and it is not tainted with the slightest hint of invidious discrimination.
Supreme Court decisions would indicate that standard (A) is also appropriate in cases such as this.
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), the Supreme Court stated that "[I]f the classification has some `reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification `is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 [31 S. Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369]." There, the State of Maryland had "to reconcile the demands of its needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet these demands." Dandridge, at p. 472, 90 S.Ct. at 1155. The Court recognized that in the area of economics and social welfare, even where such legislation involves "basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," "the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy." Dandridge, at pp. 485, 486, 90 S.Ct. at 1162.
This proposition has long been accepted by the Supreme Court. In McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S. at 426, 81 S.Ct. at 1105 the Court said:
"Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests upon grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objectives. * * * A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Similarly, in McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L. Ed.2d 739 (1969), the court (Warren, Chief Justice) said:
"Though the wide leeway allowed the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation that appears to affect similarly situated people differently, and the presumption of statutory validity that adheres thereto, admit of no settled formula, some basic guidelines have been firmly fixed. The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally * * * and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them [citations omitted]. With this much discretion, a legislature traditionally has been allowed to take reform `one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind,' Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 [75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L. Ed. 563] (1955); and a legislature need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked. * *"
Consistent with this theory, in Briggs v. Kerrigan, 431 F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir. 1970), aff'g 307 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1969), the Court approved of a Boston practice of giving free lunch only to children in the secondary grades, citing "the wisdom of the reminder in Dandridge that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require government either to attack a program in its entirety or not at all." With limited resources, the reason for mandating textbooks only for children in the upper grades is made apparent by the following statement of purpose which accompanied the passage of § 701 by the New York Legislature:
"The security and welfare of the nation require the fullest development of the mental resources and skills of its youth. This calls for more adequate educational opportunities and increased efforts to educate more of the talent of our nation and requiring the correction of those imbalances in our educational programs which have led to an insufficient proportion of our population educated in the fields of science, mathematics, foreign languages and other non-sectarian subjects. * * * It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state that the public welfare and safety require that the state and local communities give assistance to educational programs which are important to our national defense and the general welfare of the state." (Laws of 1965, Ch. 320, Sec. 1).
In the opinion of the Legislature, the goals sought to be achieved were best realized by supplying books during the years in which the specified subjects principally were taught. Sound argument can be made that children in the formation years in grades one to six should have books and of a value far in excess of $7.50 if a maximum of educational opportunity is to be achieved. However, the Legislature was not required to address itself to this argument where the action it did take was clearly justified in terms of the goals it sought thereby to advance. Thus, plaintiff's first claim does not raise a substantial constitutional question, the answer to which is not to be found in Supreme Court precedential guidance.
The second claim made by plaintiffs, that they were subjected to an unfair burden in that they could not have books unless the voters approved is clearly foreclosed by James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971). That case involved a California statute which provided that low-income housing could not be built without voter approval. As the dissenting opinion there pointed out "[p]ublicly assisted housing developments designed to accommodate the aged, veterans, state employees, persons of moderate income, or any class of citizens other than the poor, need not be approved by prior referenda." However, the Supreme Court approved this arrangement because "referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice." § 701 does not make any such differentiation based on the income level of the proposed recipients, but instead draws the lines according to grade level.6 Thus, clearly this law is a valid means by which New York leaves some control over the school budgets to the voters of the affected school districts.
The claim that § 701 discriminates against indigents is also without merit. In so far as this claim suggests that the State should rearrange its scheme for financing public school education so as to obviate the necessity for voter approval of funds for textbooks for primary school children, it is precluded by Valtierra for the reasons stated above.
At oral argument, plaintiffs did not press any broader attack on New York's failure to provide textbooks, conceding that if New York had not provided textbooks to students in the secondary grades, their contentions would fail. The amicus raises a broader question which is hinted at by the plaintiffs in their brief: that wherever the State undertakes to provide education,7 there is a duty to provide free textbooks.8
Given that it is clear that the State was privileged to assign to the School District the task of financing textbooks used in the lower grades and that it was privileged to assign the voters of such School District the task of deciding whether or not to supply the funds for such textbooks, the only remaining question is whether the voters were privileged to deny such requests for funds while still endeavoring to provide an education for the students of the District. The argument that they were not so privileged is based on two related lines of case law. The first is that group of cases providing indigents, especially indigents accused of crime, access to the Courts and free legal counsel.9 The reasoning of these cases is that the State is required to provide these services and access because to do otherwise would be to deprive indigents of due process. Obviously, though, due process is not involved here. The other more general line of cases relates to the Equal Protection Clause. These cases, which are strictly limited in their scope, all deal with conditioning the exercise of some fundamental right on the payment of money, or forfeiture of benefits otherwise available, without a showing of "compelling state interest."10 These cases are inapplicable here for although education is no doubt an area of fundamental importance, the Supreme Court has made clear its view that in the area of social welfare, the "compelling state interest" theory does not apply even though basic needs may be involved.11 Plaintiffs suggest that McMillan v. Board of Education, supra, held that question involving the right of poor people to educational services presents substantial constitutional issues. In that case, brain damaged children who could afford private school tuition of approximately $3000, who gained admission to such schools and actually attended them, received a grant from New York in the amount of $2000; other brain damaged children received special public education, at a cost well in excess of $2000. Plaintiffs could not gain entry to the public schools because of a waiting list and could not afford the private school tuition differential. The Court felt that the fact that indigents received nothing from the program while others received large sums in cash or equivalent services was sufficient to justify a remand to a three judge court, although the Court thereby remanding was "not suggesting that [the issues] will necessarily be resolved in plaintiff's favor."
However, that Court expressly recognized that the State was under no constitutional duty to provide any grants whatever to such students, and that it could remove constitutional doubts merely by providing $2000 grants to all children similarly affected. Here all similarly situated students are being treated alike; no public money whatever is being spent in the School District for the provision of textbooks to children in the primary grades. It is undisputed that such money as the School Board has to spend is being spent in such a way as to benefit all students (i. e. on teachers' salaries, building maintenance and the like).12 In McMillan, had $2000 grants been made to all students not attending public schools, which the McMillan Court felt would remove constitutional doubt from the statute, those who spent the additional money and attended private schools would receive a better education. Similarly, in this case those who can afford textbooks will also no doubt receive a better education than those who cannot but that is because they had the financial means to supplement that which the State provides and not because the State has provided them with more than has been provided plaintiffs.13
Unless the courts are to take over legislative functions and to decree that all children in all grades are to have free textbooks, the judgment of the Legislature should control. That judgment was not exercised in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Although the Legislature differentiated between two groups of grades in its allotment, the discrimination cannot be characterized as "invidious." Upon the record and the decisions relating to the appointment of three judge courts and upon the merits, Judge Travia acted properly in denying the convening of a three judge court and in dismissing the complaint.
Chief Judge, District of Connecticut, sitting by designation when oral argument was heard
Section 2023 provides:
"If the qualified voters shall neglect or refuse to vote the sum necessary for teachers' salaries, after applying thereto the public school moneys, and other moneys received to be received for that purpose, or if they shall neglect or refuse to vote the sum estimated necessary for ordinary contingent expenses, the sole trustee, board of trustees, or board of education may levy a tax for the same, in like manner as if the same had been voted by the qualified voters."
Because no budget was approved, it was necessary for the School Board to charge for various other optional services and supplies. Thus, children living less than a given distance from the school (which varied according to age) were required to walk to school or pay a fee for transportation, and charges were made for certain other supplies including workbooks, duplicating paper, materials, etc. Children were also required to provide their own pens, pencils, notebooks and the like. Although these facts were mentioned in the complaint, this action only attacks the failure of the defendants to provide textbooks
§ 131-a of the New York State Social Services Law (McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 55, Supp. 1971) provides maximum amounts for benefits to be paid to plaintiffs, and abolishes the old system of special grants for specific items of need, replacing them with fixed grants to be determined based on the needs of families in the area where the recipient lives. Plaintiffs allege that under the old system, grants were made to pay for textbooks. In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970), the Supreme Court held this section, as originally enacted, to be in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23) which requires that a state in order to receive federal benefits must not lower the standard of need in use in that state on January 1, 1967. Thereafter, the New York State Legislature passed the new version of § 131-a now in effect, excluding from the maximums such items as housing, fuel for heating, furniture, child care services and the like. In the face of the new law, New York has continued to receive federal funds, and no allegation is made here that § 131-a is still inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23). Thus it would appear that the fixed allowance received by plaintiffs was intended to cover this as well as other contingent needs. This is especially so since the failure to provide books resulted in a similar expense for all children in the School District
Since we conclude that the District Judge properly dismissed the entire complaint, we need not discuss which defendants were appropriate parties under § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment. See McMillan v. Board of Education, 430 F.2d 1145, 1148, 1149 (2nd Cir. 1970)
In that case, we refused to remand for a three judge court even though we felt that the constitutional objections raised were "not clearly insubstantial" and even though we directed defendant therein to return to plaintiffs an allegedly obscene film which the defendant District Attorney had seized from plaintiffs, because it appeared that an injunction would not there have been an appropriate form of relief. So too here. The defendant School Board in its answer indicated that it favored supplying all children with textbooks, and that it had suggested to the voters that such action be taken. Under these circumstances, it is clear that declaratory relief would be sufficient in the event that the complaint had been meritorious. Furthermore, under Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820, 90 S.Ct. 1517, 25 L.Ed.2d 806 (1970), it is now clear that where such relief is granted, there is no direct appeal to the Supreme Court, and, although we are not called on to decide the question herein, afterCatholic Medical Center, it is dubious that a three judge court need be convened in any event where it is evident that injunctive relief will not be granted.
The enactment of § 701 provided public funds for textbooks of children in private and parochial schools for the first time in the modern history of New York State. The passage of § 701 resulted in large part from pressure from those whose children attended these schools and in the face of substantial constitutional challenge on church-state grounds, which challenge was rejected in Board of Education of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968). It is not unlikely that the legislature felt that funds supplied to children attending private schools should be subject in part to voter acceptance of local school budgets, just as are portions of the funds going to public school children. Thus, persons who would otherwise have no stake in the school budget because their children attended non-public schools were given such a stake, and the difficulties involved in habitual opposition to school budgets from those with no stake in such budgets were lessened. So delicate, complex and fair a political balance should not be the subject of rearrangement by the federal courts
Since there is no affirmative federal constitutional duty for the States to provide education to its students, duties imposed on the States are imposed on the basis of a finding that the state is discriminating invidiously in the way it conducts such education as it chooses to provide. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954); Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964)
From a procedural point of view, it is clear why plaintiffs have not pressed this contention. The complaint asks only that § 701 be declared unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined, but that section in no way prevents the School Board from providing textbooks and § 703 specifically authorizes the voters to assess a tax for such purpose. If it is a constitutional requirement that schools provide children with free textbooks where the children are being provided a free education, it is not the State statute that is offensive but rather the legislative action of the voters of the School District in failing to do that which is allegedly constitutionally required, for surely if the voters of all School Districts in the State subject to §§ 701 and 703 approved taxes for textbooks, no constitutional violation under this third theory could be claimed. Thus, this theory is actually an attack on a local act and is not properly the subject of a three judge court regardless of its merits
Furthermore, in order to properly raise this question, plaintiffs would also have to amend their complaint to attack the constitutionality of the voters' action.
See e. g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1209 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)
See e. g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) [right to travel guaranteed by privileges and immunities clause may not be conditioned upon the forfeiture of welfare benefits]; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) [right against deprivation of liberty without due process may not be conditioned upon payment of a fine where no jail sentence imposed and person unable to pay fine]; Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) [right to vote guaranteed by fourteenth and fifteenth amendments may not be subjected to poll tax even where twenty-fourth amendment is inapplicable]
Certainly, no one would contend that a student's need for textbooks is any more fundamental than such items as food and clothing which are provided through welfare grants
Plaintiffs were of course given the benefit of such instruction notwithstanding that they did not rent textbooks. Compare Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1960) (Blackmun,Judge) [student excluded from public school for failure to pay enrollment fee denied federal relief].
Plaintiffs ignore the impact of the welfare benefits they receive, which under the applicable federal statute and Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970),supra, should be adequate to cover this type of expense.
KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
I dissent and would hold that plaintiffs have established at the very least a substantial claim that as applied in the Union Free School District No. 20, Town of West Hempstead, where their children are enrolled in the public schools, New York Education Law § 703 deprives indigent children of the equal protection of the laws.1
Despite the tone and intimations in the lead opinion's discussion of the appropriate standard for convening a three-judge court, I understand Judge Moore ultimately to agree that we are indeed bound on this appeal to inquire no further should we find a "substantial" claim made out, Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962), viz. one not virtually "foreclosed" by controlling precedent, California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 255, 58 S.Ct. 865, 82 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1938). Nor do I interpret my own opinion in Astro Cinema Corp., Inc. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1970), declining to convene a three-judge court to evaluate plaintiffs' "futile" request that an impending criminal prosecution be enjoined, which the panel found "completely unwarranted," as in any sense suggesting that we are empowered to decide more at this juncture than whether plaintiffs' claim is "substantial."
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to analyze further the interesting question raised by the majority as to the relation between the three-judge court statute applicable here, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and considerations of judicial economy. While I do not question the majority's arithmetic, I do suggest that the implication that over the long term, applying a stricter standard on review of a decision refusing to convene a three-judge court will consume fewer judges' energies amounts at best to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The lead opinion overlooks that convening a three-judge court in the first instance, because it bypasses the normal appellate level, can be expected for that reason to involve fewer judges in the ultimate disposition of a case than does a refusal to convene such a court. Not only will two fewer appellate judges then pass on the merits than otherwise (there will be only one additional district judge) — assuming an appeal would have been taken from a district court judgment refusing to convene a three-judge court — but the possibility of full in banc consideration at the appellate level is avoided. Nor is this the end of the matter, for the majority's own analysis of the large number of judges necessarily drawn in when an application for a three-judge court is improperly denied, far from supporting a stricter standard than that established by precedent, leads to the conclusion that the "substantial claim" test may lead to the most efficient operation of the three-judge court scheme as presently constituted. I agree with Judge Moore, as I said in Astro-Cinema, that the primary purpose of this three-judge court statute is to prevent a single judge from interfering with a state's governmental operations. But the implication of this is not, as one might at first impression suppose, that it is futile to convene a three-judge court other than to ratify a single district judge's own conclusion that a state statute is indeed unconstitutional. If district courts did apply that harsher standard, there would inevitably be a higher percentage of reversals on appeal, and thus a greater waste of judicial resources.
This is not to say that the three-judge district court procedure remains the desirable and efficient procedure envisioned when Congress provided for it. At least for administrative reasons and perhaps because of more basic flaws in its structure as well, it is often in practice costly, cumbersome and time-consuming, particularly in the face of the great increase in the volume of cases in appellate courts and the corresponding influx of demands for three-judge courts. But until Congress overhauls the system, I believe judges should not in their frustration yield to the temptation to legislate their own solutions [a principle rigorously adhered to by the author of the lead opinion in the past, see Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 439 F.2d 118, (2 Cir., 1971)], especially, as here, when the judicial statutory amendment is as likely to increase burdens and delays as to alleviate pressures. The test is and should remain — is there a substantial claim?
On the merits, it is difficult to square the majority's conclusion that the claim presented in this case is not substantial with its admission that "education [is] an area of fundamental importance" and its recognition of binding precedent requiring the state to demonstrate a "compelling state interest" to justify conditioning the exercise of fundamental rights or the enjoyment of fundamental "privileges" upon the payment of money. The majority also concludes that the plaintiffs "realistically" describe the situation of their sons and daughters when they portray "[i]ndigent children sitting bookless, side by side in the same classroom with other more wealthy children learning with purchase[d] textbooks," a situation that inevitably "engenders a widespread feeling of inferiority and unfitness in poor children and is psychologically, emotionally and educationally disastrous to their well being." No authority supports the melancholy conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to describe even a substantial claim that their children, severely handicapped relative to their more affluent classmates solely by the operation of the statute complained of, are deprived of equal protection.
The ideal of education in our society is to free men and women to pursue their own lives more fully. Economic and social mobility, cultural richness and diversity, the inheritance of arts, skills, thoughts and values, the strong and flexible operation of democratic political processes, the growth and function of private institutions and associations, the habits, structures, virtues and idiosyncrasies that make our society unique and coherent take root in formal and informal education. In New York State, as elsewhere in the United States and in most other developed countries, the government has arrogated to itself responsibility for administering and enforcing a formal and public system of education. It has done so both by the requirement of law that all children receive schooling until they reach a specified age and by providing schools, free to their users, supported by tax revenues. Courts have been alert to the potential for unwarranted incursions by the states into constitutionally protected spheres of individual liberty — which are nothing less than rights to self-education and self-direction — inherent in compulsory and public education. They have also rightly viewed with skepticism and suspicion state action that has resulted in systematic inequality between the quality of public education offered different classes of children.
The capstone of cases recognizing and protecting children's rights against overzealous state attempts to regulate their lives beyond constitutional bounds is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1970) counting freedom from unjustified prior restraints of speech and expression among the "fundamental rights which the State must respect" in administering their public schools. Id. at 511, 89 S.Ct. at 739. The majority opinion in this case is inconsistent with the philosophy of Tinker and its predecessors, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), as expressed in West Virginia, State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 637, 63 S.Ct. 1178, at 87 L.Ed. 1628, quoted in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507, 89 S.Ct. at 737:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures — Board of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.
Unless inequality based on wealth is a principle of our government, I am unable to reconcile these words with today's opinion.
Nor are the words of the fountainhead of parallel and complementary precedent guaranteeing equal educational opportunity without the vestige of invidious discrimination, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 any less incompatible with the majority's resolution of this case:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Despite this, the defendants have admitted in their formal answer in this litigation that plaintiffs' children are not offered an education on terms equal to those of other children attending the same schools whose parents happen to be wealthier than are theirs. In evaluating the adequacy of the present complaint to support impaneling a three-judge court, we must accept as true its averment that because the voters in plaintiffs' school district refused to provide, as they were empowered to do, free school books to children in grades one through six of their public schools, or at least to those whose parents cannot afford to rent them, plaintiffs' children must attend school without the aid of textbooks provided to other children in the same schools and same grades whose parents can afford the rental fee charged by the state for their use. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 373, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). Defendants have admitted that "textbooks * * * are essential to a quality educational program and a necessary and basic tool in the education of youngsters."
Curricula not keyed to textbooks are advocated by some educators and have been put into practice in some private and public schools. But defendants do not dispute that New York's own public education system continues to rely extensively on the traditional method of teaching from texts. Children without the benefit of these texts one must imagine and as affidavits before us aver, are afforded a markedly inferior education during their early years of schooling than are their non-indigent peers. The psychological and social impact of the badge of inferiority implied by their disfavored treatment must extend far beyond the classrooms and aggravate to an incalculable degree other disadvantages these indigent students must in our society inevitably struggle against as a result of the financial straits of their parents. The enduring lesson they are thus taught in the public schools they attend without books is that wealth breeds favored treatment while disadvantage leads on to still greater handicaps.
In short, the legislative scheme here creates two classes of children, not physically separate yet unequal — the poor suffer while the rich receive the full benefits of the state's educational program. But "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race * * *, are traditionally disfavored." Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966).
In Boddie v. Wyman, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), decided this term, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that required the payment of an average $60 in court fees and costs as a prerequisite to obtaining a divorce on the ground that the fees effectively barred some indigents from dissolving their marriage contracts. The fees required by New York here as a prerequisite to the distribution of textbooks, according to evidence presently in the record, range from $6.00 to $58.50 per household, and effectively bar plaintiffs' children from receiving an adequate public education.
The majority attempts to dismiss Boddie in a footnote by labelling it a "due process" rather than an "equal protection" case. But Boddie is grounded on the "basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values." Only "through the looking glass" might one rank a child's interest in education lower on the scale of this nation's traditional values than an adult's interest in a divorce.
The majority's similar disposal of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) in the same footnote with Boddie as only another "due process" case is even more unavailing, for that decision rested by its own language squarely on the equal protection guarantee, as well as on due process, holding that a state may not deny a free transcript to an indigent where necessary to take a direct appeal from a criminal conviction. The court's observation in Griffin that "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color," id. at 17, 76 S.Ct. at 590, applies with equal force to the fundamentally important institution of public education. See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). Failure to appoint free counsel for an indigent's first appeal as of right from state criminal conviction is unconstitutional "discrimination against the indigent."
Entirely apart from Supreme Court precedent, today's decision is strikingly inconsistent with a recent decision of this court, McMillan v. Board of Education, 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970), requiring that a three-judge court be convened to consider plaintiffs' claim that their poverty would not permit them to take advantage of the state's offer to pay $2,000 toward the tuition of special private schools for handicapped children. Plaintiffs in McMillan alleged they were ineligible for the stipend bcause they could not afford the difference between the grant and full tuition. McMillan was a less compelling case than is this one for convening a three-judge court, since the state's usual public education facilities were open to plaintiffs' children on an equal basis with other children. In McMillan, the students were unable to make full use of these facilities because of their own physical handicaps. Here the state itself has artificially handicapped indigent children by denying them school books provided to others who can afford them.
It will not do to say, as does the majority, that in this case "public funds are distributed equally." The same argument would apply if schools charged a toll to defray the cost of operating public school buses. Were indigent children denied entry to the bus that passed their doors each morning because they could not bear their share of the cost — and thus were barred from public schools attended by their richer neighbors — would the answer also be "equal expenditures and an offer on equal terms to each child is sufficient"?
Here, as in McMillan, the essence of the claim is unequal educational opportunity based on wealth. The state has not justified the inequity sufficiently to warrant the refusal to convene a three-judge court.
InBoddie, the argument found decisive by the district court and by the majority here — that the state has primary responsibility for deciding how to spend limited resources — was explicitly considered and rejected. I agree that McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. Ill.1968) (decided by a three-judge court), aff'd 394 U.S. 322, 89 S.Ct. 1197, 22 L.Ed.2d 308 (1969) (per curiam) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), among the cases cited by the majority render insubstantial plaintiffs' subsidiary theories that New York discriminates between elementary school students and those in higher grades by providing only the latter with free books, or by conditioning free books for the former only on a vote of the electorate. Unfortunately, discussion of these insubstantial arguments consumed the entire opinion of the district court below and also claims the preponderance of the discussion of the majority here. But the essence of plaintiffs' case is discrimination between poor children in elementary schools without books and their more affluent classmates who can afford texts. The limited resources argument is no more availing to answer that claim than it was in Boddie — or Griffin, Douglas, and Harper, infra.


text:
Andreas I.  (* 1015; † 1060), Sohn des Vazul aus dem Geschlecht der Árpáden, war von 1047 bis kurz vor seinem Tod König von Ungarn.

Leben
Nach einer Phase der Thronkämpfe, die auf den Tod Stephans I. (1038) folgte, gelangten nach dem Tod Peter Orseolos mit Andreas wieder ein Arpade auf den ungarischen Thron. Unter Sámuel Abas Herrschaft waren Andreas und sein Bruder Levente zuvor aus Ungarn verbannt worden und hatten in der Kiewer Rus Zuflucht gefunden. Als sie von dort 1046 nach Ungarn zurückkehrten, unterstützten der heidnische Levente und der christlich getaufte Andreas zunächst die heidnischen Kreise, die während der Thronwirren an Einfluss gewonnen hatten. Nachdem Andreas 1047 in Stuhlweißenburg zum König gekrönt worden war und seine Herrschaft durch militärische Erfolge gefestigt hatte, trieb er jedoch erneut die Christianisierung voran.

Auch als ungarischer König blieb Andreas eng mit seinem ehemaligen Exil, der Kiewer Rus, verbunden. So heiratete er Anastasia die dritte Tochter des Kiewer Großfürsten Jaroslaw.

Das Verhältnis zum Reich blieb gespannt: 1051 und 1052 unternahm Heinrich III. zwei weitgehend erfolglose Feldzüge gegen Ungarn. Andreas verbündete sich 1053 mit Konrad I. von Bayern und unterstützte so die Opposition gegen den Kaiser.

1057 versuchte Andreas seine Nachfolge zu regeln, indem er seinen fünfjährigen Sohn Salomon zum König krönen ließ. Dieser konnte sein Erbe jedoch vorerst nicht antreten, da Béla I. seinen Bruder Andreas stürzte und den Thron einnahm.

Andreas und seine Familie liegen in der Familiengruft der Abteikirche Tihany am Plattensee begraben.

Nachkommen
Aus der Ehe mit Anastasia von Kiew:

 Salomon I. (* 1052; † 1087), König von Ungarn
 David († nach 1094)
 Adelheid (* 1040; † 1062), ⚭ Vratislav II., König von Böhmen

Literatur
 János M. Bak: Andreas I. In: Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas. Band 1. München 1974, S. 68 f.
 Gyula Kristó: I. András. In: Gyula Kristó, Ferenc Makk: Az Árpád-házi uralkodók. Interpress, Budapest 1988, ISBN 963-7222-39-1, , S. 69.

Weblinks

 Andrew I – 1047–1061. (PDF, S. 7.) auf numismatas.com

Einzelnachweise

Árpáde
König (Ungarn)
Herrscher (11. Jahrhundert)
Geboren 1015
Gestorben 1060
Mann

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11.7 ceramic products manufacturing 11.7.1 general1 3 ceramics are defined as a class of inorganic, nonmetallic solids that are subjected to high temperature in manufacture and/or use.


Shoppers in stores this summer and fall may not immediately notice a difference in the apparel, but upon closer inspection they will. They'll find cotton blended with more polyester and other synthetics, and less detailing on linings and labels. And to top it off, prices will be higher.
With major cotton-growing regions ravaged by bad weather, prices have soared. They now hover near $1.80 a pound, compared with about 70 cents a pound a year ago. Labor and shipping costs are also rising, and the turmoil in the Middle East is already threatening to exacerbate the increases. Clothing manufacturers are scrambling to find ways to manage costs. They're seeking cotton substitutes, trimming back design elements, and boosting prices, which they've been loath to do during the downturn.
The problems hit just as the apparel market was recovering from a punishing downturn. U.S. sales of adult clothing totaled $160.4 billion in 2010, up 3% from 2009, which was down steeply from 2008, according to market research firm NPD Group Inc.
Mass market teen retailers whose bread and butter is cotton jeans and polo and T-shirts have already begun testing price hikes of 6% to 15%.
A�ropostale Inc., where the average item costs about $12, is experimenting with increases but also exploring other money-saving stra-tegies, as too much of an uptick would alienate its young customers. Options include working with vendors to get better deals; using technology to ensure efficiencies in regional merchandise selections; and forgoing extras, such as fancy stitching on garment tags.
"There's detailing here and there that we can take out of the product that's not noticeable to the customer," said Kenneth Ohashi, vice president of investor relations at A�ropostale, which had $2.2 billion in sales last year.
Less cotton isn't always viewed as a loss, though.
While Mr. Ohashi noted that using too much synthetic fabric can negatively affect a garment's texture, some retail experts said that some materials function better as blends. For example, Lyocell, a fiber synthesized from wood pulp, can be used with cotton to create a more relaxed, fluid fabric. Such combos also meet increasing demand for clothing that doesn't require ironing.
"People are blending denim a lot," said Philippa Wagner, a materials and innovation consultant at Stylesight, a trend-tracking firm. On the runways last fall, designers from Celine to Calvin Klein showed several mixed-denim looks for summer 2011.
Local designers are also shopping for new and less pricey materials. At Tucker, a brand based in the meatpacking district that sells in more than 300 stores, including Barneys and Bloomingdale's, owner Gaby Basora is examining acrylics and polyesters to supplement her customary silk and cotton garments.
"We've only segued minimally into those territories, but as the business grows, we will have to," said Ms. Basora, whose sales are up 50% this spring compared with spring of 2010.
Meanwhile, top designers were clearly testing alternatives at New York Fashion Week earlier this month. Marc Jacobs included rubber trousers in his runway show, while Derek Lam and Isaac Mizrahi worked with polyester and rayon.
Contemporary design house Tibi does not typically use a lot of cotton, but founder Amy Smilovic is exploring the fabric to add freshness to her collections, which generate annual revenues of about $30 million. She said that sateen cotton costs the same as the rough material but has a finished look that is more like evening wear, which justifies a higher price.
"You have to go with options that look more expensive, because [the final product] will be more expensive," Ms. Smilovic said.
But committing to replacements before gauging consumer reaction could be risky, according to designer Wenlan Chia of Twinkle By Wenlan, who is hunting for silk and wool alternatives.
"We are trying to source high-end synthetic fabric to hopefully substitute some of the silk, but so far we have not been able to do a test wide enough to see our customers' response," Ms. Chia said.


text:
Q: Excel Macro Only recognizing some dates I just got assigned editing this macro and I have not ever used one before. It is importing data from a text file. Everything is pretty much done I just have to add 6 or so columns. And I just followed what they had adding more to .TextFileColumnDataTypes and .TextFileFixedColumnWdiths.
.TextFileColumnDataTypes = Array(1, 2, 2, 5, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1,     1, 1, _
    1, 5, 1, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1, 5, 5, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 5, 5, 1, 5, 5, 2, 2)
.TextFileFixedColumnWidths = Array(1, 8, 9, 8, 35, 35, 35, 6, 2, 1, 8, 21, 6, 6, 8, 2, 1, 1, _
    6, 6, 6, 6, 8, 2, 8, 8, 8, 6, 6, 3, 3, 8, 8, 8, 6, 4, 8, 8, 6, 1, 8, 6, 1, 21, 9, 8, 35, 35, 35, 8, 2, 3, 6, 2, 8, 8, 2, 8, 8, 2, 1)

The weird part is that the third to last date field is recognized, while the fourth to last is not.
The input file has the dates formatted as yyyymmdd. For example 20140530 For 5/30/2014. All dates are formatted this way, and I'm only having trouble with 3 or so of the ones I added.
Let me give more information, the line of data coming into my additions is this:
20131103SF081000050122013022620130401HT2013040220131009AD
And I want it to look like this:
11/3/2013   SF  81  50  12  02/26/2013  4/1/2013    HT  04/02/2013  10/9/2013   AD
When Instead It looks like this:
11/3/2013   SF  81  50  12  20130226    4/1/2013    HT  20130402    10/9/2013   AD

A: It may be only a posting error, but your two arrays have different Ubounds

A: The problem was because the datatype array had an incorrect number of fields. Thus they were off by one. I did not notice it because it did not affect their results since the data for that column was not there yet. Thank you for your assistance.

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text:
Ranking The Top Small Forwards in the NBA 2015-16 | GFR 1
September 3rd, 2015 Team S.U. NBA
(Cleveland Cavaliers)
SF Rank – #1
Position – SF | 6′ 8″, 250 lbs| Cleveland Cavaliers
Born – Dec 30, 1984 in Akron, OH
Drafted – 2003: 1st Rnd, 1st by CLE
College – None
Experience – 12 years
Sports Unbiased Staff G.F.R. Analysis
Keith Rivas – I already know that putting LeBron James at No. 2 in any basketball-related rankings sounds insane to many but it's the truth.
For a guy that's made it to four straight NBA Finals, the only time I really felt like we were seeing the real LeBron was when Kevin Love and Kyrie Irving both got injured en route to last year's second place finish.
It's not like he had a choice though — if he didn't take over, that Cleveland team would've been lucky to beat the Bulls or Hawks.
And last I checked, Kings don't settle for second place.
Jr. Williams – LeBron is slowly winning me over in believing that he's one of if not the greatest basketball player in the game since the Jordan era. We're talking about a player who took a team from obscurity and transformed them into a legitimate NBA title contender in a single season. I mean seriously, who does that? James has performed highly proficient in all categories ranging from offense to defense, and his post-up game has become a consistent part of his offensive weaponry.
LeBron has been the ultimate floor leader and teammate, and honestly, I don't think even Jordan can transform a team in the same manner as LeBron (basically from zero to hero). He facilitates without doubting his teammates abilities, runs the floor like a guard, and can defend all five positions on the court. Next season don't be surprised if he is the leading candidate for MVP.
Sauping R. Arguello – James did everything he could to bring a championship to his hometown Cleveland but fell short vs the Warriors. He is entering his final years of his prime and must win at least two more championships to be considered among the greatest ever (Jordan, Magic, Kareem, Kobe).
Ben Buchanan – When all's said and done LeBron James will be one of the greatest players of all time. LeBron plays the role of a "Point Forward" where he facilitates the offense from the SF position, and he's one of the best creators in the entire NBA so clearly it makes sense. His style of play is rough, he's one of the most athletic players the NBA has ever seen, he gets to the rim, gets his teammates open, and he finds them on most occasions.
But that doesn't mean he can't shoot, although he struggled from the three-point line in the 2014-2015 playoffs (22 percent), he's a career 35 percent from 3. While that's not a great number, let's be clear, if you leave LeBron alone he'll embarrass you. Overall, LeBron James is probably the most polarizing figure in all of professional sports and is definitely the best SF in all of basketball.
Click here for a full list of GFR (Player ratings)
8.8 GFR Score
With an 8.83 GFR, LeBron James is the consensus No.1 SF in the league. His team impact is a perfect 10 and his defensive ability is second to only Kawhi Leonard. Gut Feeling Rating Score (GFR) = 8.83, MVP Caliber (Click here for more info on the GFR rating system)
9 Offensive Ability
8.8 Defensive Ability
7.5 Ball Protection
8.5 Clutch Factor
10 Team Impact
9 Durability
GFR Rating
gut feeling rating
Lebron James gfr rating
NBA GFR
Team S.U. NBA
More you should read...
Wilt Chamberlain: 100 point game
NBA's Toughest Players Ever: The Goon Squad
Why James Harden deserves to be the NBA MVP

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text:
2024 GOP Primary Lineup Identifies Itself
by Daren Jonescu · January 3, 2021
A group of nine U.S. senators, including, inevitably, Ted Cruz — the most pathetically compromised man from a state apparently now comprised of nothing but pathetically compromised men — has issued a joint statement declaring their intention to oppose the certification of electoral college votes until the completion of a "ten-day emergency audit" that they have fabricated. In other words, those nine senators are considering presidential runs in 2024, and know that this pro-Trump publicity stunt is a prerequisite for having any hope of winning the support of the Trump cult during the primaries.
Shamelessness knows no bounds in Washington, D.C. As has become the norm, this group of nine blowhards cites as grounds for their nonsense the fact that Trump's personality cult refuses to believe that Trump could ever lose an election, as if that qualified as evidence of something.
In the statement, the senators cited a poll that showed about 40 percent of Americans believe the election was rigged and contend that additional vetting is needed to restore trust in U.S. elections.
"But, whether or not our elected officials or journalists believe it, that deep distrust of our democratic processes will not magically disappear," they said. "It should concern us all. And it poses an ongoing threat to the legitimacy of any subsequent administrations."
Trump, a manipulative cult leader, told his followers, with the help of his allies and bootlickers in the "conservative media," that Trump's loss could only be explained as resulting from fraud. He was slinging this hash even before the election, ramped up the inflammatory rhetoric on election night, and has turned his Twitter account into a non-stop rant against "fraud" and "rigged elections." Since no other president has ever been so brazenly abusive of his position, as well as so overtly cynical about his supporters, Trump has convinced a lot of them that the election was indeed "stolen" from them. This is not evidence that an emergency audit is needed to restore trust in the electoral system. It is evidence that it is time to stop feeding the cult monster.
Trump, as I have said more times than I can count, is a wrecking ball sent to Washington by nefarious interests to lay waste to the Tea Party, civil order, and whatever was left of the U.S. Constitution. Mission accomplished.
Tags: electoral collegeTed Cruz
Opinions in Transition
by Daren Jonescu · Published November 17, 2020
Exploding Houses
by Daren Jonescu · Published January 2, 2021
Trump kills ISIS leader with his (tiny) bare hands!
Next story Begging for the FEMA Camps
Previous story This Was Always the Way It Had to End


Clever Choice Comfort EZ Pen Needles, 31 Gauge x 5mm 50/Bx – Coast to Coast Pharmacy, Inc.
Clever Choice Comfort EZ Pen Needles, 31 Gauge x 5mm 50/Bx is for all pens, and for anyone who needs it. The ease and comfort it has compared to others is noticeable, due to the special lubrication on the needle.


text:
Q: Best way to slow down ajax call/xhr requests Not sure if I'm phrasing my question right, but I have the code below. Basically want to make an ajax request, check the call back, and re-perform the ajax until it gets the desired response (in the example connectedvoter==1).
The problem is it only takes like 80ms and the amount of xhr's gets to huge numbers really fast at that speed. I tried to come up with a way to 'pause' but everything I could think of ate up cpu.
Is there a way to 'slow down' the amount of requests made, to say once a second or two without eating up cpu?
var connctedvoter = 0;
var govoters = function () {
        $.ajaxSetup({
            async: false
        });
        var url = "getconnectedvoter.php";
        var data = {
            userid: userid
        };
        $.getJSON(url, data, callback);
    };
var pausevoters = function () {
        console.log("pausing ajax voters");
    };
var callback = function (response) {
        if (response.error) {
            return;
        }
        if (response.connectedvoter == 0) {
            setTimeout(govoters, 150);
            //govoters();
        } else {
            $('#vanid').html(response.vanid);
            $('#name').html(response.name);
            $("#mapurl").attr("src", response.mapurl);
            $('.call').fadeIn();
            return;
        }
    };
//DO THIS TO START
setTimeout(govoters, 150);
pausevoters();

A: Just increase the delay of the timeout:
if(!response.connectedvoter) {
  setTimeout(govoters, 2000); // instead of 150
}

Instead of 10 requests for a second:
setTimeout(govoters, 150); // one request every 150 millisecond.

Note that for start you can change from this:
//DO THIS TO START
setTimeout(govoters, 150);

To this:
//DO THIS TO START
govoters();

There isn't really a need for a timeout here.

A: Just change lines with this code:
setTimeout(govoters, 150);

with:
setTimeout(govoters, 1000); // 1 second


If you're a Network Solutions website hosting customer with email service, when setting up email on Apple mobile devices, the default folders may not work, and may not coincide with what is used in the Network Solutions web based email or the Apple OS X desktop Mail client. This is because the iOS and OS X mail clients are somewhat different in how they work. As a result, you might end up with emails going into different folders or no folder at all. This is especially a problem for Sent Mail and Archived mail.
As mentioned above, iOS and OS X use different default mail folders on some email services. Additionally, the OS X desktop mail client doesn't allow you to specify what folders to use . The iOS mail client does let you select what folders to use. Folders such as Drafts, Sent Messages, Deleted Messages, and the Archive Mailbox can be assigned however you wish in the iOS environment.
Another difference between the platforms is that OS X won't synchronize with Microsoft Hotmail, but iOS will. So, with Apple mobile devices, you can enjoy the convenience and assuance of knowing that when you delete messages or move them to folders on your mobile device, the same will be done on the Microsoft Hotmail server. However, with the desktop mail client, only downloading of messages is possible (using the decades old POP3 standard).
The Network Solutions email system does not have an Archive folder by default. If you create one under My Folders on the server in the web interface, it will immediately be given an icon and moved to the top level folders under Trash. Other folders you create under My Folders will remain there with a folder icon, but the Archive folder is special so it gets moved to the quick links favorites area.
This Archive folder is what iOS can use. It will show up in iOS as a top-level folder called Saved in Advanced Mail settings. This is a little bit confusing since you'd be looking for a folder called Archive .
To get to this setting, on your mobile device, go to Settings > Mail > Choose the mail account you want to configure > Click on the email address next to Account > then click on Advanced.
The Archive Folder is a very useful folder to have since many email systems will have a one-click button to move read messages from the Inbox to the Archive folder. It saves a person from the steps required to move messages to a folder (select message, click move, choose destination folder).
An alternative is to go ahead and use the longer three-click process to manually Archive messages by moving them to a folder.
Before folders on the server are assigned to email roles as described below, they will initially appear in the Advanced settings under the On the Server heading below Inbox. Once they are assigned to a role on the iOS device, regardless of what they are called on the server, they will no longer show up under Inbox, but instead they will appear at the top level as an iOS alias name with an icon. The remaining folders available on the server will be listed, but not the ones having been assigned.
Take a look at the image above. Notice the folders under On the Server and Inbox. When you first setup an email account, or before you've configured the folder assignment, every folder on the server will show up under Inbox. Once you select the assignment, they won't show up anymore. So, the top level folders Drafts, Sent Messages, Deleted Messages, are the generic names representing whatever setting /assignment you chose for that folder.
For the remaining instructions, you'll need to go into the Advanced settings to configure your iOS Mail settings.
Some people will always use a website to check their emails. Other people always use a mail software program to read and compose emails. If you are someone who uses the web interface, you'll want your folders to be the same on your iOS device. Use these settings on the iOS device to match the Network Solutions default folders.
Drafts — Use Draft folder at the top level On the Server, not the Drafts folder under the inbox tree of subfolders.
Sent — Use the Sent folder at the top level On the Server, not the Sent Messages under the inbox tree of subfolders.
Deleted — Use the Trash folder at the top level On the Server, not the Deleted Messages under the inbox tree of subfolders.
Archive – Use the Saved folder at the top level On the Server, not the Archive folder under the inbox tree of subfolders.
Spam – Use the Spam folder under the inbox tree of subfolders.
For iOS 9.2.1 on iPad use the iOS settings above if you're using the web interface a lot and want the defaults to work, or use the OS X settings described below if you want the Apple Mail client and your iOS devices to be the same. Unlike the iPhone, the folders won't show up as top level or sub folders in iOS on the iPad. They will all be at the same level so pay attention to the names.
Note that iOS lets you customize server folders for IMAP, but OS X doesn't allow this. The OS X Mail client creates non-standard folders on the server and forces those to be used. So, in other words, drafts created with OS X will show up in Inbox>Drafts, but drafts created with iOS (or the web interface for the NetSol email) will show up in the top level Drafts folder. The real problem here is created by the fact that Apple Mail on the desktop creates new folders on the server rather than using the existing default server folders. So, the iOS device must be configured accordingly.
With the desktop Apple Mail program, the following folders will be created on the server and you can't change or remove them (they will be created again by Mail if you do). It's important to note that the default settings in Mail may not be correct when you setup a new email account. To check this, go to Mail > Preferences > Accounts > click on the new account > go to Mailbox Behaviors. Be sure to check all boxes in order to save all Drafts, Sent, Junk, and Trash on the server. In this way, all these messages will be available on your various devices.
Here's an example of what can happen if you don't store messages on the server. In the morning you might write up an important email and send it out. Then, later in the day, from your phone, you want to see that message again, but you won't find it in Sent messages because it's not available on the server, it was just locally stored on your Apple computer.
Here is the folder structure setup on the mail server by the Apple Mail program.
Drafts – This will be a folder called Drafts created by Mail on the server under Inbox tree of subfolders.
Sent – This will be a folder called Sent Messages created by Mail on the server under Inbox tree of subfolders.
Deleted – This will be a folder called Deleted Messages created by Mail on the server under Inbox tree of subfolders.
Archive – The Apple OS X Mail Client will use the Archive folder created on the server. It should be setup first on the server so it's properly recognized at that level in the display of the web interface. Otherwise, it will remain in the tree of subfolders under the My folders heading without an icon in the web interface. If needed, you can move any emails already in the folder to a different folder. Then delete the Archive folder (once you're certain the emails are moved and backed up). Then when you recreate the folder on the server, it will move to the top-level with an icon.
Junk – This will be a folder called Junk created by Mail on the server under Inbox tree of subfolders. This is called Spam in iOS.
Note that in iOS 9.2.1 on the iPad the top level folders may be mixed in with the sub-folders.
Handoff is one of the new Continuity features introduced in iOS 8 and OS X Yosemite, letting users begin a task on one device and seamlessly pick it up on another.
To use Handoff, you must login to iCloud on your Apple computer and iOS device first and have the feature turned on. On Apple computers, this is found under Settings > General. On Apple mobile devices, this is found under Settings > General > Handoff & Suggested Apps.
Handoff may already be on by default. If so, you may have noticed alerts for incoming phone calls on your computer screen or you may have noticed a small icon in the lower left corner of your iPhone (or iPad/iPod) lock screen. This icon indicates that a supported app/program is running on your desktop Apple computer and you can access the same app and whatever file or task you were doing in the identical spot. On the desktop computer, you may notice an additional icon to the left of the Dock.
There are probably many specialized programs on either your computer or iOS mobile device. The Handoff feature only works with selected programs that are on both systems such as Pages, Keynote, Numbers, and the Safari or Chrome browsers (for example).
Below is a video by MacRumors showing how to setup and use Handoff.
When performing a search of your contacts on the iPhone using iOS 8, you may notice that the name at the bottom of the list can't be seen or selected if the search results fill more than a screen. The last contact in the results will be hidden below the viewable area on the screen.
You can move the search results page up (by pushing it up), but it snaps back again and the last name on the list again returns below the viewable screen area.
In the example below, a search for "wireless" in contacts produces many results. The last few results at the bottom of the list are shown.
By pressing up on the list (scrolling down), the hidden result shows.
The only work-around for this at present would be to create a contact entry that will show up at the very bottom alphabetically for the search result.
It's possible to setup iMessage to function with other email addresses. For example, if someone uses your email address (instead of your mobile phone number) to send you a text message (instead of sending you an email to your email address) it's possible to configure iMessage to recognize that and deliver that text message to the iMessage program on your iOS device(s). This requires an existing Apple iMessage account.
Follow these instructions to configure iMessage to function with an additional email address.
Start iMessage on your Apple computer. Do this by clicking on the Messages icon in your Applications list.
From the Messages menu, choose Preferences.
Choose your iMessage account listed in the left column.
Click on the Add Email button on the right.
Type the new email address in the space provided. Once entered, that address will be gray with a message next to it saying Email Sent. It will remain gray and unchecked until you confirm that you're the owner of that account.
The link will send you to the My Apple ID page on Apple's website. Login with your Apple ID cloud account. This step, and the previous two steps, ensure that you are the authentic owner of the email address and also of the Apple cloud account being used.
You should get a message on screen that says, Email address verified.
In iMessage Preferences, the new email address should no longer be gray, but instead be black with a checkmark next to it.


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InDepthNH.org (http://indepthnh.org/2019/03/26/councilors-quiz-meyers-contractors-about-1b-medicaid-contracts/)
Councilors Quiz Meyers, Contractors About $1B Medicaid Contracts
By GARRY RAYNO, InDepthNH.org | March 26, 2019
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Health and Human Services Commissioner Jeffrey Meyers talks to the Executive Council Tuesday about the new, five-year agreement with three managed care organizations to administer the state's Medicaid program. District 1 Executive Councilor Michael Cryans, D-Hanover, is on the left and AG Gordon MacDonald is in the center.
By GARRY RAYNO, InDepthNH
CONCORD — The nearly $1 billion contracts with three managed care companies that will administer the state's Medicaid program are expected to be decided by the Executive Council on Wednesday.
The five councilors spent several hours Tuesday questioning Health and Human Services Commissioner Jeffrey Meyers and representatives of the three companies about the contracts.
Most of the discussion centered on administrative costs, profits, drug rebates and the percentage of money the organizations spend on medical claims.
At an earlier meeting with the companies, District 4 Executive Councilor Ted Gatsas, R-Manchester, questioned the 9 percent the companies are allowed to spend on administrative costs under a guideline proposed by the state's actuary.
The contracts will provide medical coverage to the approximately 180,000 people on the state's Medicaid program.
Meyers said the federal government requires the Medicaid contracts to be actuarily sound. He said the actuaries take the program information, past experience and the population served and determine what the rates will be, along with the projected administrative costs and a profit margin of about 1.5 percent.
The rate setting is separate from the procurement process, he noted.
He said the contracts require additional services from the current contract in place that is held by two of the three companies selected for the new five-year contract.
Under the contracts, the managed care companies have to spend at least 85 percent of the premium for medical care, the same percentage required under federal guidelines established by the Affordable Care Act.
Meyers said the legislature set the threshold for New Hampshire when it approved Medicaid expansion.
If the companies spend less than 85 percent then they have to repay the difference to the department, but representatives of the three companies said they expect to spend more than 85 percent on medical care.
At the earlier meeting, several councilors asked about drug company rebates and who would receive them under the contracts.
Meyers told the councilors there are three separate rebates, one through the federal government, which is shared with states, a state rebate program tied to its preferred drug list and a separate one the companies can negotiate with drug manufacturers.
Meyers said in the current contract, the managed care companies receive the rebates from the drug manufacturers and set the preferred drug list, but under the new contracts, the state will receive the rebates and set the preferred drug list every quarter.
Councilor Russell Prescott asked if a managed care company could favor a drug in order to receive a rebate, but Henry Lipman, Medicaid Director for HHS, said there is a working group that sets the list, which may be adjusted every quarter to account for new medications and studies.
The three companies selected for the new, five-year plan that would pay them nearly $1 billion annually are Boston Medical Center Health Plan Inc. or Well Sense Health Plan, Granite State Health Plan Inc. or New Hampshire Healthy Families, and newcomer AmeriHealth Caritas New Hampshire, Inc. of Philadelphia.
Well Sense and NH Healthy Families currently administer coverage for the 180,000 enrolled in the program, while AmeriHealth is new but was the top-ranked company in the selection process.
Several councilors raised concerns last month when the contracts were first on their agenda, because AmeriHealth withdrew from Iowa's managed care program in 2017 as its largest provider when negotiations to increase rates failed, forcing about 200,000 patients to move to other companies.
That issue was addressed at the earlier informational meeting.
At Tuesday's meeting, Gatsas wanted to know if any of the companies were asked to reduce their administrative costs, or profits or return rebates to the state during the bidding process and all said they were not.
AmeriHealth's regional president Russ Gianforcaro said under the bidding process the rates were developed and the company agreed to work within those rates.
Other managed care company officials agreed there was no discussion of reducing the administrative costs or profit margin, and that the process was based on the work done by the state's actuaries.
Gatsas said, "No one asked you to sharpen your pencil on the administrative costs?"
Well Sense Executive Director Lisabritt Solsky said she recalled some discussion about the administrative costs, but it was more whether it was high enough given "the robust set of deliverables" the state requires in the new contract.
District 3 Executive Councilor Prescott, R-Kingston, asked the three companies if they would follow the federal guidelines in determining patient care or whether "they would do the right thing" when instances arise.
All three said they would do the right thing and not necessarily follow the federal guidelines in order to do what is best for their member and his or her family.
Karen Michael, vice president for population health, said by providing what the patient needs, he or she will be healthier and "our medical costs go down and that is better for everyone."
The contracts were originally to begin July 1, but under the current time line are expected to become effective Sept. 1.
New Hampshire's Medicaid managed care program began Dec. 1, 2013, after years of fits and starts with three companies, but one withdrew — like AmeriHealth did in Iowa — seven months later.
Meridian Health Plan of Detroit, Michigan, withdrew citing its growing business in the Midwest. The company had the fewest Medicaid recipients enrolled in its program when it withdrew.
The three companies initially failed to reach reimbursement rate agreements with providers and had a prolonged negotiation with the community mental health system delaying the program for 18 months.
The Medicaid managed care program covers medical, mental health and substance abuse treatment services for low-income individuals, families and children, and the disabled, but does not encompass long-term care services such as nursing homes.
Generally, the federal and state government share program costs along with counties and school districts. Under the Medicaid expansion program, the federal government pays 90 percent of the cost and the state 10 percent. About 50,000 residents are in the Medicaid expansion program, which began with private insurance coverage, but this fiscal year switched to the traditional Medicaid managed-care system.
Garry Rayno may be reached at garry.rayno@yahoo.com
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text:
Cléopâtre
Jeanne d'Alcy, Georges Méliès
Directed by Georges Méliès
A man with diabolical intent hacks the Queen's mummy to bits, then resurrects the woman from a smoking brazier.
This first mini-epic Cleopatra ever, 2 minutes long, was filmed by one of the giants of the early French cinema, Georges Méliès (1861-1938), only 4 years after he saw the Lumière Brothers' presentation of the first ever projected film screenings in late 1895. The film was considered lost for a long time, until it was rediscovered in a 'secret depot' in France in 2005. The film has, however, so far remained unavailable to the public. English title: "Cleopatra's Tomb". US-release: "Robbing Cleopatra's Tomb".


text:
4 Tips To Build Social Media Engagement
How one credit union built on a history of quirky videos to engage members via social media and capture more than 100,000 views.
By Sharon Simpson
CU QUICK FACTS
Elevations Credit Union
Data as of 03.31.17
HQ: Boulder, CO
ASSETS: $1.9B
BRANCHES: 12
12-MO SHARE GROWTH: 12.5%
12-MO LOAN GROWTH: 13.6%
ROA: 1.25%
When Elevations Credit Union ($1.9B, Boulder, CO) began entering into new market areas, the leadership team quickly realized the credit union needed to build market and brand awareness.
So, the credit union launched its first-ever TV commercials starting in 2016. It also developed a new series for social media, "Adventures in Localism."
The "Hey Neighbor" and "Community Egg Lending" videos that were part of that series got the community talking and engaged employees in new ways, says Susan Green, senior vice president of marketing at Elevations.
What made the video series so successful? And what lessons can other credit unions learn from Elevations' success?
Green offers several reasons for the series popularity as well as DIY tips and a bit about the credit union's future plans.
Susan Green, SVP of Marketing, Elevations Credit Union
Tip No. 1: Know The Members And Stay True To The Brand
"Sometimes I think people are nervous about showing the lighter side of things," Green says. "But as long as you are true to your brand, you can have a lot of fun on social media."
In Elevations' case, previous YouTube videos showcasing the credit union's lighter side had already been well-received by members. And when the branch stayed open for business during filming for the new series, members responded positively.
"They got a kick out of it," Green says.
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Tip No. 2: Don't Underestimate The Importance Of Staff Engagement
In addition to using on-site shooting, Elevations cast the series' active roles with credit union staff. And employees liked that.
"The amount of staff engagement has been bigger than we anticipated," Green says. "For the first video, we had to talk people into participating. But now they are excited to be involved."
Despite initial nerves, the infectious feeling that it is fun to work at Elevations plus the quality of the first videos has encouraged staffers to join in.
"We just shot the third video in the series," Green says. "So many people volunteered, we couldn't accommodate everyone."
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Tip No. 3: Leverage Outside Expertise
"Hey Neighbor" and "Community Egg Lending" were the most complex productions that Elevations had ever undertaken, so it sought outside expertise. In addition to agency partners, who helped with the concept and ensured a high-quality finished product, Elevations hired a professional director.
"We had a wonderful director who pulled great performances out of each person," Green says.
The crew and a cast of 45 people shot videos at the Elevations flagship branch over a two-day period. The fact that the faces in the videos are also front-line employees means members recognize the "actors" and feel a deeper sense of engagement. And these newfound stars embraced their role.
"We went from introverted, shy staff members to a lot of budding stars that did an awesome job," Green says.
Tip No. 4: Set High Goals And Define Success
Elevations has layers of metrics to analyze its social media efforts, but it's overarching goal is to stay in the Top 25 of the Financial Brand's Power 100 credit unions using social media.
This is a lofty goal, especially when considering this quarterly standard aggregates activity and engagement for all credit unions in North America — as well as several from Europe and Australia — that use social media channels.
"We've always been in the top 25, even though we are probably the 150th credit union based on asset size within the United States," says Green.
For "Adventures in Localism," the credit union primarily wanted to create awareness. Previous YouTube videos for Elevations had garnered between 15,000 and 20,000 views, and the credit union wanted to push things to the next level. So, it set a goal to reach 100,000 views on Facebook and YouTube. To help get there, Elevations sponsored a contest that donated money to local nonprofits and included a cash prize for the winner. This strategy underpinned its highest-ever level of social media engagement.
The credit union recently wrapped its third video in the series and plans to continue developing new social media video campaigns over the coming year.
$1B Or More Colorado Digital Marketing Tips Elevations Credit Union Feature Article Social Media Technology
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