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I'm Surprised By How "Black" Assassin's Creed Liberation Feels
Evan Narcisse
Filed to:Assassin's Creed
History often seems lightyears away, doesn't it? Even game franchises like Civilization-where you zip from ancient Rome to space flight in the span of hours-put a layer of abstraction over the experience that make it feel distant. The Assassin's Creed games use history exceedingly well, but none of them have felt as personal as Assassin's Creed III: Liberation does. As a black man and parent of a bi-racial daughter, this game hits home for me. But what really surprised me is how this portable Assassin's Creed game comments on racial dynamics in a specific moment in time. You can feel history moving through the game.
Liberation proves that game design inspiration can be found in the ugliest moments of history. But American history doesn't just inspire the mechanics and rules of Liberation's gameplay. The game's story and characters feel more alive thanks to a smart infusion of tropes drawn from the history of black people in the United States. I'm going to point out few examples, some of which contain spoilers. If you want a fresh experience with Liberation's plot, stop reading now.
Liberation's main character is a subversion of the tragic mulatto trope, which uses the circumstance of mixed heritage to fuel melodrama and social commentary. Aveline's character arc is much more empowered than the ones in the books and movies where the tragic mulatto concept was created but Liberation's story nevertheless owes a lot to the idea.
Aveline's father talks to the heroine about not being able to marry her mom. Her father once owned and later freed Aveline's mother, but they couldn't be married. Similarly, Aveline's sidekick Gerald can't woo her even though he cares for her. His love stays mostly unrequited. While the laws of the day would probably make any nuptials illegal, the player is also left to wonder if the social impropriety is also what's stopping Gerald.
Along with the conceit of biracial people as tragic, exotic or favored entities, ACL also invokes the idea that slaves could return to Africa. Throughout the centuries, the suggestion that black people could reverse the Middle Passage and repatriate to their ancestral continent has been thrown out as both an exclusionary insult and a hoped-for dream. One character Aveline rescues has no use for her offers of assistance and rebukes them by saying, essentially, he's just going to go back home. He's not African-American, just African.
A variant of the back-to-Africa trope recognizes that those descended from the diaspora couldn't just up and re-integrate back into West African cultures and holds out instead for a new homeland that they could call their own. Part of Liberation happens in just such a place and it's a utopia for some. The freedom to live as they please is enough to wash away the pain of how these laborers got to the place they work.
One of the game's biggest surprises is that there's even a character who could be construed as an Uncle Tom.
Pages from the diary of Aveline's mother Jeanne are some of the collectibles that players can chase down in Liberation. The very first page of those writings talks about how Jeanne must hide her incipient literacy, as slaves weren't allowed to learn to read or write. The more pages you find, the more maturity and humanity you can hear in Jeanne's writing voice. This little slice of subplot creates a disproportionately large sense of heartbreak.
And if all of the above wasn't enough, at one point in Liberation, you kill an overseer and then use his whip to kill the other guards. It's slave revenge fantasy of the highest order, right up there with the kind of stuff being promised in Quentin Tarantino's upcoming Django Unchained.
When other Assassin's Creed games recreate time-lost versions of cities like Renaissance-era Venice and resurrect iconic personages like Ben Franklin, they use the locales as playgrounds and the people as quest-givers. Liberation does those things but goes deeper to really feel like an examination of the times as they might have felt. All the glitches in the world don't diminish that.


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SEZ benefits for Food Parks
Home SEZ benefits for Food Parks
The Government is proposing to extend benefits of Special Economic Zones ("SEZ") to food parks to promote India as a hub for food processing. SEZ benefits are currently available only to SEZ Developers and units. Mega Food Park Scheme presently operates under different set of guidelines framed by the Government. In the 11th Plan, the Ministry of Food Processing approved a new scheme to establish thirty (30) Mega Food Parks with a view to provide state-of-the-art infrastructure for food processing sector in the country on a pre-identified cluster basis with a strong backward and forward linkage and to provide value addition of agriculture commodities including poultry, dairy, etc. in a demand driven manner. The ownership and management of the Mega Food Park would vest with a Special Purpose Vehicle in which organized retailers, processors, service providers, farmer groups etc. may be the equity holders. The products of the Food Processing Industries located in a Mega Food Park can be sold to domestic as well as export market.
PSA view – The concept of food parks is novel and the idea of extending SEZ benefits to these food parks is laudable. Given the increasing activity and potential in this sector, this step will boost the investor-confidence and add to the needs of the sector. It is definitely an incentive for investors looking to explore prospects in the Indian food sector for it will not only mean tax advantages and concessions but also good infrastructure coupled with forward and backward chains.
Centralization of drug licensing faces stiff opposition from pharma SMEs
The Union Government's efforts to streamline export licensing and centralization of drug licensing by creation of the Central Drug Authority ("CDA") is facing stiff opposition from pharma units in the Small Scale Industry ("SSI") category manufacturing drugs. The SME Pharma Industry Confederation ("SPIC"), representing the SSI units in the sector has made several representations to both houses of the Parliament seeking to stop the efforts of the government to streamline export licensing and drug licensing. SPIC has sent letters to a number of parliamentarians seeking their intervention in stopping the centralization of drug licensing and export licensing. The opposition from SPIC follows from the implementation of the changes made to Schedule M of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act as amended in 2001 which calls for higher standards for drug manufacture as provided by WHO. This had caused several SSIs which could not bear the heavy cost of upgradation to the WHO-GMP standards to shut shop. SPIC also raises fears of corruption in CDA which may be influenced by large multinational pharmaceutical companies to eliminate the remaining SSIs and along with increased cost of drugs.
PSA view –
While the implementation of the CDA and streamlining of drug licensing and export in line with WHO-GMP standards will open up global markets for Indian manufactured drugs, the SSI segment in this sector will face heavy burden, in terms of strict compliance and cost of implementation of higher standards for drug manufacture. The fears of the SSI segment regarding corruption in the CDA, being the only authority for drug licensing and export certification, in the Indian context may be justified and was one of the objections put forth to the Select Committee of the Ministry of Health in January 2008; however, may not be grave enough to prevent the centralization of drug licensing in India. Since this objection has been raised, the law makers should carefully consider the structure and functions of the CDA so as to avoid external influence from powerful pharmaceutical companies. Further, the law makers need to give thought to providing assistance to the battered SSI segment in terms of coping with the cost of complying with the WHO-GMP standards.
FSSAI making new guidelines
After introducing a code on advertising to check the claims on nutritional values of food items, the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India ("FSSAI") is planning to regulate several other areas of food to ensure better safety and standards. P. I. Suvarthan, Chairperson, FSSAI, aims to widen the scope of ensuring safety of food products and is all set to introduce the following –
(A) Regulation for the amount of trans fat in packaged foods – Trans fat or hydrogenated fats are artificially made and are found in biscuits, confectionery, fried foods, fast foods, etc, which harms the body by increasing the cholesterol level in the blood.
(B) Comprehensive standards for water – As an ingredient and finished product water are significantly related to food. Though standards exist for packaged water and potable water, drafting norms for water as an ingredient would be all-encompassing.
(C) Food Safety and Quality Standards and Regulatory guidelines suggesting the procedure to be followed for adjudication of cases, procedure of appeal, procedure for determination of cases for referring to appropriate courts and time frame for such determination, assist in notifying standards and guidelines in relation to articles for food.
(D) New licensing system classifying the food processing as high-risk products and low-risk products. This will allow regulating the small vendors. The new regulation will require small vendors to undergo a simple registration process at the base level and companies with inter-state operations will be brought under a common regulatory system.
Food articles are vigilantly regulated in most of the countries and there was a long pending demand for these regulations in India. The global limit of trans fat is between 2% – 5% of the total fat diet and FSSAI is also looking for a similar limit. Now, the proposed new standards for water will include the flavored water category, packaged water (branded or pouch based) and natural resource water within its purview. FSSAI has already issued draft regulations for hotels, banquet halls, caterers, restaurant, or eateries that serve food to obtain license under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. Now the smaller operators are also being included within the purview. All these steps will boost the confidence of people in the packaged food products and will ensure that the safety standards are not compromised at any point in India.
Food & Pharma Team
Ashutosh Chandola
Priyatha Rao
Neeraj Dubey

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Bibliographic details for Riversdale
Page name: Riversdale
Permanent URL: https://heald.nga.gov/mediawiki/index.php?title=Riversdale&oldid=1987
Citation styles for Riversdale
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title = "Riversdale --- History of Early American Landscape Design{,} ",
url = "https://heald.nga.gov/mediawiki/index.php?title=Riversdale&oldid=1987",
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Musgrove House Boutique Bed & Breakfast is located 0.9 mi from Chichester Cathedral. The bed and breakfast offers free off-street parking, and all rooms offer an private bathroom with silk duvets, high thread count linens, shower and bath, free toiletries, hair dryers, flat-screen TVs with DVD players. Fresh milk and a selection of organic teas/coffee making facilities are provided for all rooms. Goodwood Motor Circuit is 1.8 mi from Musgrove House Bed & Breakfast. The nearest airport is Southampton Airport, 34 mi from the property.


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199 F. 3d 968 - Tommy Hopkins v. John L Saunders
199 F.3d
199 F3d 968 Tommy Hopkins v. John L Saunders
199 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 1999)
TOMMY D. HOPKINS, PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
JOHN L. SAUNDERS, KYLE VICKERS, CHARLES AUSFAHL, ROY TEMPLE, BETH M. WHEELER, DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES.
TOMMY D. HOPKINS, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
JOHN L. SAUNDERS, KYLE VICKERS, DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS,
CHARLES AUSFAHL, DEFENDANT,
ROY TEMPLE, BETH M. WHEELER, DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS.
No. 98-2803, 98-2948
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Submitted: September 14, 1999
Filed: December 16, 1999
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied Jan. 26, 2000
Appeals from the United States No. 98-2948 District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Heaney and Beam, Circuit Judges.
Wollman, Chief Judge.
Tommy D. Hopkins appeals from the district court's denial of his claim for reinstatement and from the court's failure to rule on his claims that John L. Saunders and other state officials (collectively, the officials) violated his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.1 The officials cross-appeal, contending that the district court erred in finding that Hopkins had a property interest in his job and in awarding Hopkins nominal damages and attorney fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
This case comes before us for the second time. We outline only those facts relevant to this appeal, referring the reader to a more complete recitation of the facts found in our first opinion, Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 524-25 (8th Cir. 1996) (Hopkins I). On June 10, 1994, Hopkins was dismissed from his position as director of the Division of Grain Inspection and Warehousing (the Division) of the Missouri Department of Agriculture (the Department) without receiving prior notice or a hearing.
Hopkins sought review of his dismissal by filing an appeal with the Agriculture Personnel Review Board (APRB), an entity formed pursuant to a merit system plan adopted by the Department in 1978 (1978 plan). The purpose of this plan and the APRB was to ensure that Division employees were employed on the basis of job qualifications rather than political affiliations. The Department responded to Hopkins' appeal with a letter explaining that the 1978 plan was void and that the APRB no longer existed.
Hopkins then filed an appeal with the Personnel Advisory Board (PAB), an employment termination review board established under Chapter 36 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Chapter 36 is a state merit system law that was enacted by the Missouri legislature in 1979; the Department formally adopted the PAB's dismissal procedures in 1982. Following a hearing, the PAB found that Missouri Revised Statute section 36.030.1(1) expressly excludes division directors, such as Hopkins, from the PAB's appeal procedures, and, furthermore, that the 1978 plan remained applicable to those employees who were excepted from the PAB's procedures. The PAB therefore dismissed Hopkins' claim, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal and that the proper forum for such an appeal was the APRB.
Hopkins then brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against Saunders, Director of the Department, and several other state officials, alleging that he was dismissed in violation of his due process rights and in violation of Missouri's whistleblower statute. The officials moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, whereupon the officials took an interlocutory appeal to this court on the question of immunity. We reversed, finding that the officials were entitled to both qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings regarding Hopkins' claim for equitable relief. See Hopkins I, 93 F.3d at 527. On remand, the district court found by way of cross motions for summary judgment that Hopkins had a property interest in his position as Division director under the 1978 plan and that he had been dismissed in violation of his procedural due process rights. Following a hearing, the district court also found that Hopkins would have been dismissed from his position even if he had received due process. The court therefore awarded Hopkins nominal damages only, along with attorney fees, and entered a final judgment on all of Hopkins' claims.
Hopkins first argues that the district court denied him the opportunity to pursue claims that he was discharged in violation of the First Amendment and Title VII.2 He contends that these claims were sufficiently raised in his second amended complaint but were never properly resolved, inasmuch as we did not dispose of them on immunity grounds in Hopkins I and the district court failed to rule on them on remand. Thus, Hopkins contends that the district court, by entering a final judgment in Hopkins' action against the officials, wrongly foreclosed his ability to pursue these claims and that we should therefore reinstate them.
Our determination whether to reinstate Hopkins' First Amendment and Title VII claims rests upon three key inquiries. First, we must determine whether Hopkins sufficiently raised First Amendment and Title VII claims in his complaint. The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 714 (8th Cir. 1979)). "[I]t is the facts well pleaded, not the theory of recovery or legal conclusions," that state a cause of action and put a party on notice. Economy Housing Co. v. Continental Forest Products, Inc., 757 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1983)).
We conclude that Hopkins' second amended complaint, while not a model of clarity, alleged facts sufficient to put the officials on notice of Hopkins' First Amendment and Title VII claims. Hopkins' complaint does not assert First Amendment and Title VII claims in separately numbered counts, as it does his due process and whistleblower claims. It does, however, list the First Amendment as a basis for the district court's jurisdiction and, more importantly, generally alleges in its due process count that Hopkins was dismissed because of statements he made regarding an employee's sexual harassment complaint and the Department's hiring practices. These factual allegations suggest First Amendment and Title VII claims and thus are sufficient, albeit perhaps marginally so, to satisfy the liberal pleading requirements of the federal rules.
Second, we must determine whether Hopkins' First Amendment and Title VII claims were encompassed within our qualified immunity ruling in Hopkins I. Our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal challenging a district court's denial of qualified immunity "is limited to the resolution of the issue of qualified immunity." Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1202 (8th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we have held that where a district court's summary judgment order addresses qualified immunity only as it relates to some of a plaintiff's claims and not to others, even though all such claims are part of a single action, we have jurisdiction only over those claims to which the district court expressly applied the principle of qualified immunity. See Jones v. Coonce, 7 F.3d 1359, 1365 (8th Cir. 1993).
The district court's summary judgment order considered the officials' qualified immunity only as it related to Hopkins' due process and whistleblower claims. See Hopkins v. Saunders, No. 94-4458, slip op. at 23-27 (W.D.Mo. Jan. 9, 1996). Our jurisdiction in Hopkins I was therefore limited to these claims and did not extend to Hopkins' First Amendment and Title VII claims. As a result, Hopkins I did not dispose of Hopkins' First Amendment and Title VII claims.
Finally, we must decide whether Hopkins waived his right to pursue his First Amendment and Title VII claims. "It is an axiom of trial procedure that counsel must take the initiative in protecting the rights of his clients." McNeely v. United States, 353 F.2d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1965). "To obtain appellate review of a trial court's acts or omissions a party must have made known to the trial court the action which the party desires the court to take . . . ." Porterco, Inc. v. Igloo Products Corp., 955 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
We recently applied these principles in Becker v. University of Nebraska at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1999). There, Becker asserted in his trial brief to the district court that the defendant university had expressly consented to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to Becker's ADEA claim. Id. at 909 n.4. The district court, however, dismissed Becker's ADEA claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds without ever ruling on Becker's waiver argument. Id. at 907, 909 n.4. On appeal, Becker reasserted his waiver argument, but we refused to reach the merits of this issue, finding that Becker had failed to preserve it for appellate review. Id. at 909 n.4. We noted that although Becker had asserted this argument in his trial brief, this alone was insufficient to preserve it for appeal where the district court never ruled on the issue. Id. Rather, we explained that to preserve his waiver argument for appeal Becker "should have called the district court's attention to its failure to decide the waiver issue." Id. Because Becker failed to actively assert this argument to the district court, we refused to consider it on appeal.
As in Becker, Hopkins failed to adequately assert his First Amendment and Title VII claims to the district court. Although Hopkins' second amended complaint marginally set forth these claims, the record is devoid of any evidence that Hopkins otherwise asserted them to the district court. At oral argument, Hopkins attempted to explain his failure to actively assert these claims by stating that he believed that the district court was first going to deal with his due process claim alone and then move on to his other claims. Although this may explain Hopkins' inactivity prior to the court's entry of a final judgment, it does not explain why he took no affirmative action immediately following the entry of judgment to call the district court's attention to the fact that it had not ruled on his First Amendment and Title VII claims. Hopkins challenged the district court's final judgment in two separate motions, but in neither motion did he raise his First Amendment or Title VII claims.
Therefore, although we believe that Hopkins sufficiently asserted First Amendment and Title VII claims in his complaint and that these claims were not resolved by either this court or the district court, we nevertheless conclude that Hopkins waived his right to assert these arguments on appeal. "A party may not stand idly by, watching the proceedings and allowing the district court to commit error on which the party subsequently complains." Becker, 191 F.3d at 909 n.4 (quoting McNeely, 353 F.2d at 917). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's entry of a final judgment on all of Hopkins' claims, including his First Amendment and Title VII claims.
We turn next to issues regarding Hopkins' section 1983 procedural due process claim. The district court found that Hopkins had a property interest in his job under the 1978 plan and that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive notice or a hearing prior to his dismissal. The court also found, however, that Hopkins was dismissed for cause and therefore refused to reinstate him, instead awarding him only nominal damages. Both parties challenge aspects of this ruling. Hopkins contends that the court's failure to order reinstatement is erroneous as a matter of law, fact, and procedure. The officials, in their cross-appeal, contend that the court erred in finding that Hopkins possessed a property interest in his job. The officials also argue that, even if the court was correct in its property interest finding, it erred in awarding Hopkins nominal damages and attorney fees.
For the sake of analytical clarity, we turn first to the officials' claims on cross-appeal. The officials first assert that the district court erred in finding that Hopkins possessed a recognized property interest in his position as Division director under the 1978 plan. We review this finding de novo, made as it was on cross-motions for summary judgment. Hossaini v. Western Mo. Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1140, 1142 (8th Cir.1998) (reviewing grant of summary judgment de novo).
To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a protected property or liberty interest at stake and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law. See Marler v. Mo. State Bd. of Optometry, 102 F.3d 1453, 1456 (8th Cir. 1996). A protected property interest exists where a plaintiff has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to a benefit that is derived from a source such as state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A plaintiff has a protected property interest in his employment if he can show "that he could have been fired only for good cause." Spitzmiller v. Hawkins, 183 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 1999).
To determine whether Hopkins had a protected property interest in his position as Division director, we must answer three questions. First, we must determine whether the 1978 plan applied to Hopkins in his capacity as Division director. Section BII of the plan, which is entitled "Coverage of the System," states that "the [merit] system established by this plan shall apply to, all offices, positions and employees of the Division of Grain Inspection, Weighing and Warehousing." This section then sets forth in detail the employees excluded from the coverage of the plan, listing six divisions within the Department and the staff of the Department's director as among those employees excepted from the plan.
Section BII therefore lends substantial support to the district court's conclusion that the 1978 plan was intended to apply to Hopkins. Section BII's reference to "all offices, positions and employees" is sufficiently broad to encompass Hopkins' position as director of the Division. Furthermore, Section BII carefully defines those positions that are not covered by the plan, yet it fails to denote Hopkins' office as such a position. To be sure, Section BII is not entirely consistent with other language within the 1978 plan. Most notably, the plan's appeal procedures require Hopkins, in his capacity as director, to sit on the APRB to review employee terminations, which, if followed literally, would require Hopkins to review his own termination. While this result may be unorthodox (and there is no indication that recusal would not be permitted, if indeed not required, in that situation), we do not believe that it is sufficient to overcome the clear language of Section BII. Therefore, we find that the 1978 plan applied to Hopkins in his capacity as Division director.
Second, we must determine whether the 1978 plan was in effect at the time of Hopkins' dismissal. In adopting the appeal procedures of Chapter 36, the Department made clear that division directors and other specified Department employees were excluded from those procedures. There is no evidence, however, that the Department intended to abrogate existing merit systems governing those employees excluded from Chapter 36's coverage, nor does Chapter 36 itself suggest such an effect. Absent a clear intent to repeal existing merit systems, such as the 1978 plan, we cannot say that the district court erred in finding that the 1978 plan remained in effect at the time of Hopkins' discharge. Cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) ("[A] later statute will not be held to have implicitly repealed an earlier one unless there is a clear repugnancy between the two."); Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1331 (8th Cir. 1987).
Finally, we must determine whether Hopkins had a legitimate entitlement to continued employment under the 1978 plan. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Rule Number VI(1)(A) of the plan states that "dismissals from employment shall be made for cause under rules uniformly applicable to all positions of employment," and that "[n]o . . . dismissal shall be made because of favoritism, prejudice or discrimination." Rule Number VI(2)(A) reiterates this position by stating that management may not use "non-merit factors" in deciding whether to retain an employee. The clear import of these and other provisions of the 1978 plan is that division directors such as Hopkins are not employees-at-will but may be dismissed only for cause, creating in the division directors a property interest protected by the rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See Spitzmiller, 183 F.3d at 916; Pace v. Moriarty, 83 F.3d 261, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Hopkins had a protected property interest in his position as Division director under the 1978 plan.
The officials' second contention on cross-appeal is that the district court erred in awarding Hopkins nominal damages and attorney fees for the officials' violation of Hopkins' procedural due process rights. The propriety of the district court's nominal damage award, and derivatively its fee award, rests upon one issue: Whether a nominal damage award in a section 1983 action for the violation of procedural due process rights is legal or equitable in nature. In Hopkins I, we held that the officials were entitled to both qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity.3 See Hopkins I, 93 F.3d at 527. Qualified immunity insulates a defendant from all claims for legal damages, but it does not shield a defendant from claims for equitable relief. See Pace, 83 F.3d at 263. The Eleventh Amendment protects a state official sued in his official capacity from all claims except for certain forms of prospective equitable relief, such as reinstatement. See Campbell v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Cir. 1998). Recognizing that our immunity rulings had foreclosed all legal remedies, we concluded Hopkins I by instructing the district court to rule only on Hopkins' "claim for equitable relief." Hopkins I, 93 F.3d at 527. Thus, Hopkins I, by both its remand instruction and its holdings, prohibited the district court from awarding Hopkins any form of legal relief. Therefore, if the nominal damage award is found to be legal in nature, it must be vacated.
The fact that a remedy may require one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the remedy as "legal relief." Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 894 (1988). However, because money damages was the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law, "federal law has consistently held that money damages are generally characterized as a legal remedy." Kampa v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 115 F.3d 585, 586 (1997) (citing Terry, 494 U.S. at 570). Accordingly, a monetary award will be characterized as equitable only if it possesses one of the two fundamental attributes of an equitable remedy. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570; see also Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 642 (8th Cir. 1996).
First, a monetary award may be an equitable remedy if the award is "restitutionary" in nature, "such as in actions for disgorgement of improper profits." Terry, 494 U.S. at 470 (citations omitted); see also Cass County, 88 F.3d at 642. Here, the district court's nominal damage award was not in the form of restitution. By ordering the officials to pay $1.00 to Hopkins, the court was not restoring to Hopkins anything that was rightfully his, nor was it putting him in the position he would have been in had his due process rights been observed. See Black's Law Dictionary 1313 (6th ed. 1990) (defining restitution). Rather, the court's nominal damage award, like all nominal damages awarded for violations of procedural due process rights, merely signified that "the law recognizes the importance to organized society that [procedural due process] rights be scrupulously observed." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
Second, a monetary award may be deemed an equitable remedy if the award is "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief." Terry, 494 U.S. at 571; see also Cass County, 88 F.3d at 643. Because the district court refused to grant Hopkins reinstatement or any other injunctive relief, the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief.
Under the Supreme Court's framework in Terry, therefore, the district court's nominal damage award was legal in nature. This conclusion is consistent with rulings from other circuits that have expressly held that nominal damages are inherently a legal remedy, regardless of the context in which they are awarded. See, e.g., United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1219-20, n.5 (9th Cir. 1999); Griffith v. Col. Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1327 (10th Cir. 1994); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd in part, 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989).
We have analyzed the nature of nominal damages in two contexts. In White v. Armontrout, we affirmed the district court's vacation of a nominal damage award on qualified immunity grounds. 29 F.3d 357, 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1985). In doing so, we intimated that nominal damages are legal in nature, because qualified immunity erects a barrier to legal remedies only. See Pace, 83 F.3d at 263. Several other circuits have also implicitly recognized the legal nature of nominal damages by finding them to be barred by qualified immunity. See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 (9th Cir. 1999); Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1994); Fox v. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 141 (2nd Cir. 1994); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 155 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1988); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1980).
We have implied a contrary view of nominal damages in the context of a Title VII action. Prior to 1991, Title VII's remedies were statutorily limited to injunctions and "such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include . . . reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay, or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Despite this limitation, we held in Dean v. Civiletti that a plaintiff who had established all the elements of a Title VII claim but was unable to show actual damages could recover nominal damages. 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see also Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1992); Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep't, 802 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1986). Dean thus implied that, at least under Title VII, nominal damages are equitable in nature.
However ambiguous our earlier holdings, we are convinced that the court's damage award in the present case constitutes legal relief. First, the court's damage award does not possess either of the attributes of equitable relief set forth by the Supreme Court in Terry. Second, the majority of circuits have characterized nominal damages as legal in nature, either expressly or implicitly through rulings in qualified immunity cases. Finally, we believe that White and its view of nominal damages is more apposite to the present case than the view intimated in Dean. White involved a section 1983 claim and the assertion of qualified immunity as a defense to that claim, see White, 29 F.3d at 360-61, whereas Dean involved a claim under Title VII and its narrow pre-1991 remedial framework, see Dean, 670 F.2d at 100. Hopkins' claim has much in common with the claim in White: it is based on section 1983 and is being challenged, at least in part, on qualified immunity grounds. In contrast, Hopkins' claim differs significantly from the claim in Dean: it does not implicate a statutory limitation on damages, such as that which existed under pre-1991 Title VII, or the concerns raised by such a limitation. Thus, we believe that White's suggestion that nominal damages are legal in nature applies in this case; and we see no reason to expand Dean's implicit view of nominal damages beyond the context of Title VII.
In summary, then, we conclude that because the award of nominal damages to Hopkins constitutes legal rather than equitable relief, it runs counter to our remand instructions and our immunity holdings in Hopkins I and therefore must be reversed.
Likewise, we must also vacate the award of attorney fees to Hopkins. Section 1988 of Title 42 provides that the court, in its discretion, may grant "the prevailing party" reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). Absent the nominal damage award, Hopkins has obtained no relief on the merits of his claim. Hopkins received only a declaration that his procedural due process rights were violated. The "moral satisfaction" of such a declaration, without more, is not sufficient to confer prevailing party status on a plaintiff. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1987).
We turn next to Hopkins' challenges to the district court's resolution of his procedural due process claim, all of which attack the court's refusal to reinstate Hopkins to his position as Division director. First, Hopkins argues that Missouri law, not federal law, establishes the appropriate remedy for the procedural due process deprivation that he suffered and that the remedy required by Missouri law is reinstatement. Thus, according to Hopkins, the district court erred by refusing to look to Missouri law in fashioning a remedy. Because the decision whether to follow state law involves a question of law, we review the district court's ruling de novo. See McCuskey v. Central Trailer Serv., Ltd., 37 F.3d 1329, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1994) (reviewing district court's legal conclusions de novo).
The Supreme Court defined the proper remedy for the denial of procedural due process in Carey v. Piphus, holding that the remedy for a procedural due process violation is defined by the extent of the injury that resulted from the denial of constitutionally required process. 435 U.S. at 263-64; see also Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 1987). Thus, in the context of public employment, reinstatement is proper only where a tenured employee would not have been dismissed if his procedural due process rights had been observed. See Brewer v. Chauvin, 938 F.2d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1991). Where an employee would have been discharged even if he had received due process, i.e. was discharged for cause, his sole injury is the lack of process and only nominal damages are proper. See id.
Carey therefore makes clear that federal law defines the proper remedy for a procedural due process violation. See Brewer, 938 F.2d at 863 (quoting Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 1987)). Carey looks solely to the process to which a plaintiff is entitled, which is also defined by federal law, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985), and determines the degree of injury that occurred because of the denial of that constitutionally mandated process. See Brewer, 938 F.2d at 863-64. State law is irrelevant to this analysis. Therefore, the district court properly looked to federal law, rather than Missouri law, in determining the proper remedy for Hopkins' procedural due process deprivation.
Hopkins also contends that, even if the district court was correct in applying the Carey remedial framework, there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Hopkins was dismissed for cause. Whether an employee "would have been fired even if he had been accorded due process is a finding of fact, which we may not set aside unless clearly erroneous." Rogers v. Kelly, 866 F.2d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 1989). We therefore must affirm the court's finding if its "account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety." Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Hopkins was discharged because his confrontational and autonomous managerial style conflicted with the cooperative, consensus-based form of management that Saunders was attempting to create within the Department. The court thus found that Hopkins would have been dismissed even if he had received due process. This finding is supported by evidence that Hopkins repeatedly resisted Saunders' attempts to coordinate matters at the director level. For example, Hopkins refused to rely on the central personnel office, instead maintaining his own employee files, and disregarded Saunders' attempt to coordinate certain functions through the Department's Administrative Services. In addition, there was testimony that Hopkins managed his own division through intimidation and fear. This dictatorial managerial style both conflicted with Saunders' approach and harmed employee morale within the Division. Accordingly, we can not say that the district court committed clear error in finding that Hopkins would have been dismissed even if he had received due process.
Finally, Hopkins argues that the district court's evidentiary hearing regarding the cause of his dismissal was procedurally defective in several respects. First, Hopkins contends that he was denied procedural due process at the hearing itself because he was never given a written notice prior to the hearing setting forth the officials' alleged basis for his dismissal. Although it is not clear that no such notice was provided to Hopkins prior to the hearing, we believe that even if he never received a formal notice, Hopkins was not denied due process because the fundamental purposes of due process--"notice and an opportunity to respond"--were served. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; see also Heinen v. Brewer, 171 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1999). Hopkins had the benefit of and utilized discovery and the power of subpoena to prepare for the hearing. He was therefore able to fully apprise himself of the officials' asserted grounds for dismissal and could adequately present a defense at the hearing.
Second, Hopkins contends that the district court incorrectly denied his Rule 60(b) motion for relief, in which he alleged that defense witnesses "systematically manipulated" their testimony by conversing in the hallway prior to testifying at the hearing. We review the district court's ruling on this issue for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Covington, 133 F.3d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying abuse of discretion review to the district court's refusal to grant a mistrial because of communication between witnesses). No such abuse exists here. Hopkins supports his claim of witness misconduct with five affidavits that assert that several defense witnesses conversed in the hallway outside of the courtroom. However, evidence of communication between witnesses, by itself, is insufficient to warrant relief under Rule 60(b) for improper witness communication. See id. In order to obtain Rule 60(b) relief, Hopkins must also demonstrate that the contact between witnesses "resulted in the tailoring of witness testimony . . . or the development of less than candid testimony." Covington, 133 F.3d at 645 (quoting United States v. Kindle, 925 F.2d 272, 276 (8th Cir. 1991). Hopkins has made no such showing.
Third, Hopkins asserts that the district court improperly permitted Carol Heminghaus, a defense witness, to be present in the courtroom prior to her testifying. The decision whether to exclude a witness from the courtroom is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." United States v. Wilson, 103 F.3d 1402, 1406 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, the court acted well within its discretion. Heminghaus was a member of the APRB that would have heard Hopkins' appeal in 1994 had a hearing been held, and her testimony at trial concerned whether she would have affirmed Hopkins' dismissal at that time. Thus, Heminghaus was "a person whose presence . . . [was] essential to the presentation of the party's cause," Fed. R. of Evid. 615, because in order to credibly testify regarding how she would have ruled in 1994, it was necessary that Heminghaus first hear the evidence that she would have heard in 1994.
Thus, not only was Heminghaus's presence in the courtroom permissible, it may have been essential.
We reverse that portion of the district court's judgment which awards Hopkins nominal damages and attorney fees. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We grant Hopkins' motion to supplement the record.
Hopkins also contends that he was improperly foreclosed from asserting a claim based upon the Missouri Constitution's counterpart to the First Amendment. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the phrase "First Amendment" as used in this opinion refers to both Hopkins' federal and state constitutional speech claims.
Despite our rulings in Hopkins I, Hopkins reasserts his contention that the officials are not entitled to qualified or Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because these arguments are precluded by the law of the case doctrine, we need not reconsider them. See Kinman v. Omaha Public School Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir 1999).


As parents, you may remember preparing for the sacraments of Confession, First Holy Communion, and Confirmation at school or in a parish group. The celebration of the Sacraments are always joyful occasions as they help to deepen our faith, grow in holiness and become better disciples of the Lord.
The Sacraments are important for each of us. In order to receive these wonderful gifts we have to spend some time in preparation. The best preparation for receiving any Sacrament is at home, within the family, as you celebrate your faith together. As your child grows and approaches the age when it is time to receive the Sacraments of Reconciliation, Holy Communion and Confirmation, the Catholic Parishes of Worcester will help. It is important for families to understand the commitment that you, your child and, family make in preparing and celebrating the Sacraments, and in ensuring that the faith is practiced.
Preparation for First Reconciliation and First Holy Communion takes place at school through the RE Curriculum when the children begin year 3. There are a number of 'parent sessions' to help families participate in the preparation together.
Confirmation preparation also takes place at school through the RE Curriculum for year 6 children. These are accompanied by a number of 'parent sessions' to help families participate in preparation for the celebration of the Sacrament.
Preparation for the Sacraments of Reconciliation, First Holy Communion and Confirmation take place at Saturday morning classes in the Parish Hall at St George's. One session is for children entering year 3 for Reconciliation and First Holy Communion. This is followed by a second session for those entering year 6 for Confirmation preparation. There are also a number of 'parent sessions' to help celebrate these important moments as a family.
For more information contact the parish office (details at the bottom of this page).
For more information contact St Joseph's parish office (details at the bottom of this page).


eka.boo.button is a magical circus weirdo hailing from the far off reaches of the turquoise universe. She lives in a cardboard castle in the clouds of San Francisco where she pursues acrobatic wizardry through the art of aerial rope. When she is not upside-down, eka can be found creating wearable bits of whimsy for her costume company, ButtonBeguiled. She holds a BFA in fashion design from Academy of Art University and currently enjoys working independently as well as with the legendary Vau de Vire Society. Follow her adventures on instagram @ekaboo.button!


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Ecosocialist Bookshelf, November
Ian Angus
Climate and Capitalism editor Ian Angus presents five new books for reds and greens.
Climate Change is Racist: Race, Privilege and the Struggle for Climate Justice
By Jeremy Williams
Icon Books, 2021
When we talk about racism, we often mean personal prejudice or institutional biases. Climate change doesn't work that way. It is structurally racist, disproportionately caused by majority white people in majority white countries, with the damage unleashed overwhelmingly on people of colour. A short, urgent journey across the globe, from Kenya to India, the United States to Australia, to understand how white privilege and climate change overlap.
Planetary Health: Safeguarding Human Health and the Environment in the Anthropocene
By Andy Haines and Howard Frumkin
Cambridge University Press, 2021
We live in an epoch when human activities are driving multiple environmental changes, including climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution of the air, soil and water. The authors explore the many environmental changes that undermine progress in human health, and discuss specific policies, technologies, and interventions that are needed to achieve the scale of change required.
The Wretched Atom: America's Global Gamble With Peaceful Nuclear Technology
By Jacob Darwin Hamblin
After World War II, the United States promoted civilian nuclear power as a peaceful and safe technology that would cure diseases, produce new foods, make deserts bloom, and provide abundant energy for all. It was an immense gamble, and it was never truly peaceful. While the US promised peace and plenty, it planted the seeds of dependency and set in motion the creation of today's expanded nuclear club.
Silent Earth: Averting the Insect Apocalypse
By Dave Goulson
HarperCollins, 2021
Award-winning entomologist and conservationist Dave Goulson explains the importance of insects to human survival, and offers a clarion call to avoid a looming ecological disaster caused by the indiscriminate use of chemical pesticides. He explores the intrinsic connections between climate change, nature, wildlife, and the shrinking biodiversity and analyses the harmful impact for the Earth and its inhabitants.
The Life and Death of a Minke Whale in the Amazon: Dispatches from the Brazilian Rainforest
By Fábio Zuker
Milkweed Editions, 2020
Intimate stories of life in the rainforest and its surrounding cities during an age of raging wildfires, mass migration, populist politics, and increasing deforestation. The people interviewed are often torn between ties with their ancestral territories and a push toward capitalist gains. Fabio Zuker captures the friction between their worlds and the resilience of movements for autonomy, self-definition, and respect for the land.
[Reprinted from Climate and Capitalism. Inclusion of a book does not imply endorsement.]
ecosocialist bookshelf
Green Left's 30th birthday should be celebrated in style because it is second to none in reporting and acting on social issues within our communities and our workplaces.
Barney Gardner Save Millers Point, retired MUA


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Colorado's most anti-gay state senator eyes Jared Polis' congressional seat
Colorado State Sen. Kevin Lundberg is contemplating a run for Congress. Lundberg, perhaps the most conservative state senator and most definitely the most anti-gay lawmaker under the dome, tweeted he might want to advance his political career to Washington D.C.
By Nic Garcia
Out Front Colorado Wednesday, December 7, 2011
DENVER — State Sen. Kevin Lundberg is contemplating a run for Congress.
Lundberg, perhaps the most conservative state senator and most definitely the most anti-gay lawmaker under the dome, tweeted he might want to advance his political career to Washington D.C.
Kevin Lundberg
And who does he plan to take down on his road to the capital? Well, out gay Congressman Jared Polis of Boulder.
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Lundberg was the most vocal advocate against the 2011 Colorado Civil Union Act introduced by Sen. Pat Steadman and Rep. Mark Ferrandino.
Lundberg led the unsuccessful fight to stop the bill in the Senate. It passed in that chamber with bipartisan support. But that didn't stop Lundberg from continuing his crusade against the legislation. The day the bill was heard before the House Judiciary Committee (where it eventually died), Lundberg led a protest and prayer group on the east side of the Capitol while supporters rallied on the west steps.
Now with Congressional redistricting set, we can all expect to see more folks lining up to run for Congress.
KDVR-TV reports:
Lundberg's launched a website, www.kevinlundberg2012.com, to gauge support and hopes to make a decision by the end of the year.
"If the support is sufficient, we'll move forward," he said.
Lundberg's announcement is a head scratcher. While its true Polis' district now includes part of Larimer County (far more conservative then Boulder County), the seat is still considered safe for Democrats. Couple that with Polis' money and influence on fundraising and you'd think only a crazy person would step up for that kind of a fight.
Then again, maybe we'll just leave it at that.
Nic Garcia is the senior managing editor of Out Front Colorado.
© 2011, Out Front Colorado. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted by permission.
Boulder CO, Colorado, Denver, Jared Polis, U.S. Congress
Hillary Clinton's historic LGBT speech provides hope and change
British coroner rules anti-bullying advocate's death a result of suicide
Fans are going nuts for Doja Cat's drag king-esque look
George Santos accused of faking man's signature on campaign finance forms
Anti-LGBTQ+ baker loses appeal when court rules he discriminated against trans woman
Failed gubernatorial candidate Doug Mastriano plans to introduce a drag ban bill
More in News (USA)
Jack Phillips has spent years fighting for the right to discriminate against LGBTQ+ people. He just lost his battle.
The move follows right-wing outrage over a queer prom in the state that featured a drag performance.
Republicans introduced a bill to ban students who identify as animals from public schools
A&W pulled a fast one on Fox & now everyone is laughing
Apparently, self-awareness is not a prerequisite to getting on air.
Arkansas moves forward on criminalizing drag shows
The measure endangers trans people, too.
Lesbian shop owners allegedly forced out of town by anti-LGBTQ+ harassment
"We couldn't escape. We couldn't do business."
More than half of LGBTQ+ parents in Florida are considering moving out of state
Gov. Ron DeSantis and state Republicans have terrified queer families into leaving.
Supreme Court may be forced to consider transgender bathroom bans
The court may have to take up the issue following a lower court decision denying a transgender student access to the boys' restroom at his public high school.
Indiana GOP introduces slate of anti-LGBTQ+ bills including two Don't Say Gay bills
The ACLU of Indiana called the new bills a "slate of hate."


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The Department of Campus Security is a service-driven department committed to providing security and promoting safety for the community of Lee University. The department is under the direct supervision of the Director of Campus Security and Vice President for Business & Finance.
Campus Security is composed of 11 personnel who patrol the campus on foot and in marked patrol vehicles who provide security 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. These officers observe and detect crimes and violations of campus policies and work with state and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies. They are not sworn or armed police officers, but protect the campus from outside threats by restricting campus access to authorized personnel, students, staff, and faculty or their guests, as well as controlling the security of campus facilities. Campus Security Officers have direct radio and telephone communication with local police, fire, and emergency medical services, ensuring that officers can initiate and direct necessary emergency responders to the scene. All Campus Security officers are first aid, CPR, and AED certified.
Lee University administration, faculty, staff, students, and guests are to report all criminal incidents, threats, injuries, property loss, accidents, safety hazards, etc. to the Department of Campus Security at 423-303-4444. If a person is in imminent danger or is threatened, he/she should call the Cleveland Police Department (911) then call Campus Security. Prompt notification helps to facilitate reporting to the necessary authorities and assists in documenting trouble spots where corrective measures can be taken, thereby enhancing crime prevention.
Campus Security Office
1000 Barnes Street NE
Email: security@leeuniversity.edu Hours:
Monday - Friday 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM EST
Ticket AppealsClery ActTitle IXLost & FoundTrolley ScheduleRegistration & ParkingSafety RideDaily Crime LogCampus AlertsCrime StatisticsServicesTimely WarningsCampus Security
HUNTER WHITE
English Literature, TESOL
Class of Spring 2019
Hunter White, from Maryville, Tennessee, was originally skeptical about going to a university so close to his hometown, but after visiting Lee and meeting with Dr. Christopher Blake, associate professor of TESOL and linguistics, he knew Lee's was the program he wanted to join.
Hunter serves as the assistant to the director in Lee's English Language Center, where he helped teach English to people in the community and works to make the program run efficiently.
"The professors have had the biggest impact on me and helped to steer my future," said Hunter. "Whether it's academic or just life advice, they've really taken me under their wing, and I didn't expect to find that in college."
Now in his senior year, Hunter has remained active on campus throughout his time at Lee. He has presented academic papers at the Lee English and Sigma Tau Delta English honor society symposiums. He is both an honor student and Centennial Scholar, and was honored to be featured his sophomore year in Lee's alumni magazine.
Hunter plans to attend graduate school after graduating from Lee.
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We all have a leader within us. All we need is that slight push to discover those skills, polish them and use them to our benefit! Joining Toastmasters helps people all around the globe to discover and build the skills they need to become more confident, both as public speakers and stronger leaders in every area of their lives. Toastmasters International offers a proven education program that comprises of two tracks: Communication and Leadership, which lead to many benefits in one's personality development. One gains confidence and encouragement in a positive environment, besides being exposed to a network of friendship.
A shining example of a star and a leader born out of this program and the conducive environment provided by Toastmasters is Ms Ramona Smith. A 31-year-old high-school teacher from Houston, Ramona Smith outlasted more than 30,000 other speakers from around the world over the six-month World Championship of Public Speaking contest, the largest of its kind. The finals of the Championship were held in Chicago during the annual Toastmasters International Convention, on 25th Aug 2018, that was attended by over 2000 Toastmasters from all over the world. Smith is just the second African-American woman and the fifth woman overall to win the public-speaking championship since it began in 1938. Smith's winning speech, titled "STILL STANDING," explored how she found strength in the face of adversity throughout her life.
Toastmasters in Kuwait (Divisions E and F) are pleased to announce having Ms Ramona Smith in Kuwait and have organized two events with her for the benefit of Toastmasters as well as non-Toastmasters.


Puerto Rico is an amazing option for getting married. For one, if you are a U.S. citizen, you don't have to worry about asking your guests to get passports for your destination wedding. That is a big plus! If you reside in Puerto Rico, you only have a ferry ride away to get to the beautiful sandy beaches of Culebra or Viequez for a gorgeous beach wedding, similar to the one inspiring this blog post. The first photo above is one of my photos from my trip that inspired the Puerto Rico Beach watercolor wedding invitation.
The other inspiration I collected for couples considering or planning a Puerto Rico wedding focuses on the simple beauty of the island, with flairs of bright color to reflect the colorful Puerto Rican culture.


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info@hhcharitable.org info@hhmin.org
Diana's Medical Fund for treating her Neurological Disorder
YOUR HELP MAKES A DIFFERENCE
Diana's Story told by Sharon LaBella
I first met Diana, while walking out of a Whole Foods store in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was apparent that she was struggling putting her cart away and getting into her car. She turned and looked up at me with the nicest smile and noticing she did not have groceries in her car, I asked her if I could get anything in the store for her. She thanked me and said there are certain items she purchases at Whole Foods that seem to help her, but she found herself feeling too weak to shop today. We started a conversation that has continued for several months now.
Through our many conversations, I have learned so much about Diana and her illness which has now rendered her unable to drive, homeless and financially destitute. Diana's family assisted in bringing her to Boise, Idaho but her living situation with them was only temporary. Coincidentally (is it?) she learned of a well renowned wellness clinic for neurological disorders exists literally in Boise!
The physicians' offer treatment that over time should restore her strength and give her a chance to get her life back. It's a struggle for Diana to meet her most basic needs and she's a spirited, faithful and a kind person who finally sees hope in these physicians and their process and treatment.
The doctors start by doing extensive blood work, identify toxicities, and restoring the body to a healthy state. This is a 12-month program. As you can see from the picture, Diana is in urgent need of this medical treatment it's her only hope to regain her strength and to carry on a normal life.
A dear old friend told me about Helping Hands, what a blessing. I feel in my heart of hearts there's hope for Diana, finally. I asked her to share more with me about her condition so that I could share more details with you. (Diana has said many times she doesn't want sympathy, nor has she once asked me for $1). Diana told me she has a combination of chronic illnesses mainly around a severe neurological disorder – neurotoxicity caused by allergic reactions to chemicals creating a hypersensitive sensory system which causes predisposition to migraines in addition to an auto-immune deficiency. She most recently has developed severe neuropathy and has trouble walking, she is now using a cane. When I met her in July, she was somewhat unsteady and fragile in appearance, but able to walk and drive.
Thank you for reading this and for considering assisting Diana in her journey to restored health.
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The Northern Ireland conflict is the international name of the conflict. Some people also call this conflict as low intensity war or even guerilla war.
The conflict in Belfast did not have anything to do with religion. It was mainly focused on the political aspect even though sectarian and ethnic aspect involved in the conflict.
Do you know the primary issue in the conflict? It was centered on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.
The loyalists or unionists called themselves as British people. Most of them wanted Northern Ireland to stay as a part of United Kingdom. Talking about the faith, most of them were Protestants.
The republicans or nationalists called themselves as Irish people. They did not want to remain within United Kingdom. These people wanted Northern Ireland to unite with Ireland. Most of them were Catholics.
Another issue was related to the conflict of both communities. The nationalists or Catholics were the minority there.
As a minority in the country, the nationalists or Catholics wanted to end the discrimination. The conflict started amid that campaign. They felt discriminated because the police force and the government were dominated by the unionists or Protestants. Find facts about British soldiers here.
The republican paramilitaries were one of the main participants in conflict in Belfast such as Irish National Liberation Army and Provisional Irish Republican Army. Other participants include British state security forces, loyalist paramilitaries, politicians and political activists. The smaller role was taken by security forces.
In conflict in Belfast, there were 3,500 people killed. The civilians occupied 52 percent of the victims. Get facts about Conflict in Afghanistan here.
The republicans killed 60 percent of the casualties. The security forces killed 10 percent of them.
Do you have any comment on facts about conflict in Belfast?
Facts about Crime and Punishment in Victorian Times are good to learn. You will love the information given below.


Defending our national motto: "In God We Trust"
Ask someone to recite our national motto, and you might just get a couple different responses. Such has been the confusion about our national motto that in a speech President Obama delivered in 2010, the President even said, "In the United States, our motto is 'E pluribus unum' — out of many, one." Actually, "E pluribus unum" is the phrase on the official Seal of the United States. In fact, our official national motto has been "In God We Trust" for decades. This July will mark the 60th anniversary of its official adoption, but sadly the motto is now being challenged in federal court.
The story of our national motto started during the Civil War in 1864, when "In God We Trust" was stamped on our coinage by an act of Congress. In 1956, Congress passed, and President Eisenhower signed, a joint resolution into law that established "In God We Trust" as the nation's official national motto. Our nation was founded on Judeo-Christian values and the belief in God, and throughout our history we have acknowledged that our rights come from God, not from the government. The Founders of our country and signers of the Declaration of Independence had no qualms with acknowledging God and that we are endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights.
In 2003, a Gallup survey of Americans found that 90 percent of respondents approved of the use of "In God We Trust" on coins. Despite the motto's popularity, there is a consistent attempt to drive it, and other time-honored expressions of our religious heritage out of the public square. To defend the national motto in a recent court case, I was proud to sign onto an amicus brief filed last week by the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) to counter a lawsuit seeking to invalidate the nation's motto on U.S. coins and currency. The legal brief argues: first, there is significant historical justification for keeping the motto; second, the First Amendment doesn't compel redaction of references to God on atheistic preferences; third, that a message derived from the government is not compelling individuals to support or make a similar statement; and fourth, that the plaintiffs have no standing, since there is no harm perpetrated.
The ACLJ legal brief that I signed also quotes Thomas Jefferson, who in 1782 wrote, "[C]an the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with His wrath?" One wonders what Thomas Jefferson would think of the current controversy and attempts to erase signs of our nation's faith heritage.
I am committed to safeguard our history and our spiritual foundations. Let's remember "In God We Trust," and keep it as our national motto.