text:
Atil är en ort i Mexiko.   Den ligger i kommunen Atil och delstaten Sonora, i den nordvästra delen av landet,  km nordväst om huvudstaden Mexico City. Atil ligger  meter över havet och antalet invånare är .

Terrängen runt Atil är huvudsakligen platt, men österut är den kuperad. Atil ligger nere i en dal. Den högsta punkten i närheten är  meter över havet,  km öster om Atil.  Trakten runt Atil är nära nog obefolkad, med mindre än två invånare per kvadratkilometer. Atil är det största samhället i trakten. Omgivningarna runt Atil är i huvudsak ett öppet busklandskap.

I trakten råder ett hett ökenklimat. Årsmedeltemperaturen i trakten är  °C. Den varmaste månaden är juli, då medeltemperaturen är  °C, och den kallaste är december, med  °C. Genomsnittlig årsnederbörd är  millimeter. Den regnigaste månaden är september, med i genomsnitt  mm nederbörd, och den torraste är april, med  mm nederbörd.

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Orter i Sonora

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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As the system I was testing didn't work out the way I was hoping, I've changed to Fast FVP which is proving to be everything I've been looking for. A bit of loosening up of the rules has made it much more flexible and seems to have overcome most of the problems I have found with it before and with such systems as Simple Scanning and FVP.
Basically what I've done is to stick to what I said in the first paragraph of the Fast FVP article without adding the further complications in that article.
Fast FVP is intended to be used with a "catch-all" list, i.e. a full list of everything you have to do.
It is better to start off with a few tasks and build the list up gradually rather than attempt to write everything out to begin with. That way the list will build up naturally and you will be more aware of what is on it.
Dot the first task on the list. You can do it straight away if you want to, but if you don't want to you carry on scanning through the list dotting tasks that you intend to do.
At any stage you can either work on the task you have just dotted or carry on down the list dotting further tasks.
When you have worked on a task you cross it out and re-enter it at the end of the list if further work is needed on it.
You then can either work on the previous dotted task or carrying on dotting further tasks.
Whenever you reach the end of the list you must work on the last dotted task on the list.
Adding further dots after the task you have just done.
Fast FVP acts like a mixture of FV, FVP and Simple Scanning. In fact you can simulate FV and FVP within the rules of Fast FVP, and you can also simulate Simple Scanning with the one change that you have to do the first task on the list on each pass. You can also switch between them at any stage.
I'm not suggesting that you should consciously think about this while doing Fast FVP. I'm just pointing out how very flexible the system is.
Some recent comments have queried exactly what I mean by Speed and Direction in the context of High Intensity Time Management. So I think it would be a good idea to use a blog post to repeat and amplify my replies to those comments.
You only work on that for as long as you feel like it.
Subject to these any suitable scanning method may be used. The one I currently recommend is Simple Scanning, but I'm convinced that I can find a better way. I'm currently testing another system which may prove more suitable - or not. However what I'm about to say applies to any qualifying system.
There are two aspects to speed. First, there is the amount of time it takes to scan for the next task. On the one hand there would be a FIFO system in which you just do the tasks in the order they are written on the list. There would be effectively no time spent scanning at all. On the other hand would be a system in which you have to scan the entire list each time before selecting the next task. With a large list scanning would take a long time.
The second aspect is that speed is not just going through the whole list fast, but also doing the work fast. If you are bored and unmotivated your work slows to a crawl. But if you are fired up, you work much faster - and better too.
Unfortunately the two aspects contradict themselves to some extent. If you tried to do your work in a strictly FIFO order, you would probably end up bored to tears and very unmotivated. Any time saved in scanning would be easily outweighed by the slow speed of the actual work.
The ideal system has to be one in which the scanning time is kept as low as possible, but in which the emphasis is on keeping interest and motivation going.
It refers to giving direction to your life - as opposed, at the other extreme, to drifting aimlessly.
The idea behind HITM is that you have a big list which contains everything you might want to do. It's then by working the list that you discover what you really do want to do. Anything that you decide that you are not going to do gets weeded out. As I think I've said before, I think the precise mechanism is less important than the approach. Unlike other approaches where not getting everything on the list done is seen as a failure, with HITM not getting everything done is seen as a success, i.e. it's what's supposed to happen. It's the way you discover what you really want and ride the wave. In short it is what is called "being in the flow".
As I've said before, a list needs to become mature before it's really effective but even on Day 2 there has been some movement.
The most important is fitness. I did my 10,000 steps today and intend to keep that going. But I've yet to incorporate strength training.
French and German have added themselves to Welsh. I know French well and German not so well, but they are both far advanced from where I've got to with Welsh. I've also got moving again on learning the Armenian alphabet (39 letters compared with 26 for English).
Remember, these are not goals I've committed myself to or New Year resolutions. They are arising directly from what I am actually doing. I expect them to change and develop.
There are two huge omissions from that list: Exercise and Writing Blog Posts. But, hey, it was supposed to be a day off!
Now if I take this HITM thing seriously I should see my goals change and develop in ways which would be inaccessible otherwise.
I'm starting to test a new HITM (High Intensity Time Management) system today. This is designed to improve some of the problems I've been having with "Simple Scanning". Those of you who follow my blog will know that I made Simple Scanning the standard for HITM after the failure of another system for which I had high hopes. So Simple Scanning was always in default of a better system.
The main problem with all "catch all" lists is that as the list gets longer so it becomes more and more difficult to control the timing of tasks. The whole point of a "catch all" list is that it is long. That is because the idea is that the list will filter all the ideas that you have been having and make coherent sense of them in your life. If this sounds like a tall order, it is!
Another problem is that the longer the list the longer it takes to scan it. For instance FVP will scan a long list very thoroughly and effectively but takes a lot of scanning time to do so.
And yet another problem is that if you lose either speed or direction, or both, you lose momentum and eventually will get bored with the list.
What I have been working on for months now is the question of how to improve both speed and direction. I think I have now found an answer to this problem, but of course I won't really know until I've tested it thoroughly. The testing started first thing this morning.
If you haven't already read the previous article on Simple Scanning then you need to do so before reading this.
My original intention was to write a separate blog post about each of these characteristics of Simple Scanning. However it seems easier to write one post and cover all three in one go. They are by no means confined to Simple Scanning, but that seems to be the system which best combines them - the best I've been able to discover so far anyway.
In Simple Scanning tasks are written on the list when you think of them, without any attempt to classify or order them. But as one works the list, so the tasks which get done together will be re-entered on the list together. So the very action of using the system tends to mean that, as you progress, the amount of scanning time becomes progressively shorter and the speed at which you select tasks off the list gets faster. This particularly applies to routine tasks which need to be done at a particular time of day, such as a morning routine or an evening routine.
Attenuation is almost the opposite effect to clumping. It is what happens to tasks on the list that don't get done quickly. As other tasks around them get done so they get surrounded by deleted tasks. This has the effect of drawing attention to those undone tasks. The more the list gets attenuated the more the undone tasks stand out physically. This gives important information to your intuition. You can increase the contrast between tasks by joining contiguous deleted tasks by joining them together with a vertical line in the left margin. This gives you a very good picture at a glance of how many tasks remain on any given page.
When you start a new list, you can't expect to leap into full-ahead productivity immediately. It takes time for the list to mature. You usually find that you start off by working on easy, routine tasks. This is entirely how it should be because you need to get these routines well established before you can start on more challenging work. Gradually you will find that more and more of the "real work" gets incorporated in your routines. Routines are the basis of all good work. You will find it very difficult to keep up to date with your work if you only work on it by fits and starts.
When you add a new project it too takes time to get established. Unless it's urgent, your intuition will probably allow it to lie fallow for a bit, but once you start working on it it will become easier and easier to keep working on it.
The effect of these three working together provides a high-speed high-volume method of tackling your work which requires no more than writing down what you have to do on a list, scanning it and working on the tasks which stand out. The method itself require an absolute minimum of overhead.
As I said in an earlier blog post, I was using Simple Scanning as far back as twenty years ago. But at the time I did not realise its potential. I may say more about that in future posts.
Up to now I've never written any formal rules for Simple Scanning preferring to describe it as "going round and round the list, doing tasks which stand out".
There are several concepts there which need explanation, particularly if you haven't used any of my systems before.
Simple Scanning is what I call a "long list" system. In long list systems the aim is to write everything down that you have to do, want to do or think you might do in one long list in no particular order. There should be no attempt to categorise, prioritise, or emphasise particular tasks in any way. There are no rules about what size individual tasks have to be or how they should be worded.
Since this is an intuitive system it is recommended (but not essential) that you use paper and pen rather than electronic means. A lined notebook is ideal.
If you use electronic means, be wary of time management apps which try to make you categorise and/or prioritise. These will work against the effective use of the system.
The second concept which needs explanation is what I call "standing out". This basically consists of scanning through the list, doing tasks which you feel you want to do now. Don't ask yourself "Do I want to do this task now?". Just let the tasks stand out of their own accord.
For some people this comes easily and naturally, for others it takes longer to grasp.
Don't get too worried about it. There's no right number of tasks to select per pass. Assume you are doing it right unless you either find yourself selecting every single task or alternatively none at all. Allow it to find its own level naturally.
Another concept is that you should work on a task only for as long as you feel you want to. It is better to work "little and often" on tasks, than to work in huge bursts of activity - specially if the thought of a huge burst of activity puts you off from ever starting.
So however long your list is, you should be doing only tasks which you feel you want to do now and only for as long as you want to do them.
Write a list of things you have to do, would like to do or think you might do. One task per line.
If you are not sure about a task write it with a query (?) after it.
There is no need to make the list comprehensive because you can keep adding to it as you go along.
Don't make any additional markings to indicate category or priority.
There are no rules about how you write the task - just as long as you can understand what you meant when you come back to it.
Tasks can be as large or as small as you like.
When you have finished writing your initial list, read it through quickly once to remind yourself of what is on it and where.
Scan down the list until a task stands out as being ready to do.
Work on it for as long as you like.
When you have finished working on it for the time being, re-enter it at the end of the list if there is still work to be done on it or if it's a recurring task.
Cross out the task you have been working on.
Continue scanning down the list and repeat Rules 8. to 12. until it is time to stop working.
When you reach the end of the list, circle round to the beginning of the list.
At the beginning of the next work period, start again from where you got to.
Draw a line across the page at the beginning of each day. This helps to remind you whether you've done a daily task that day, and enables you to see how long any task has been on the list.
When re-entering a task, do it in the following order: 1) Re-write the task at the end of the list 2) Cross out the old one. This will prevent you from failing to remember to re-enter a task, and also from losing your place.
After a lot more experimenting, I haven't been able to find a system which works consistently better than Simple Scanning. So I taken the decision that I'm going to be concentrating on that from now on.
At the same time I've found out lots more about how Simple Scanning works and about what makes it suitable as the vehicle for High Intensity Use of Time.
Over the next few days I shall be writing about each of these (not necessarily in that order) to show how they work together to produce the high intensity.
I'm so pleased with this new system that I've decided that a blog post won't do it justice. So I'm aiming to write an ebook which I will make available on this website.
I haven't yet even begun to sketch out the contents, neither do I have any idea what the word-count of the book will be. So it will be a measure of the system's effectiveness how long it takes me to write the book without a publisher breathing down my neck.
All the rest of the details will begin to take shape once I start working on it.
Using my latest method, which is designed to be a High Intensity Use of Time, I have done 94 tasks out of 149 in the last 24 hours with 55 tasks remaining on the list, mostly re-entries.
During the day I was absent at a pub lunch with friends for four hours.
I experienced no resistance, got everything of importance done (and everything of lesser importance too). And instead of feeling exhausted, I have been getting steadily more energetic throughout the day.
By the time I went to bed less than four hours after posting the above I had done a further 30 tasks with 59 remaining on the list.
Copyright © 2018, Mark Forster. All rights reserved.


1. The District of Columbia Code is not a state statute for purposes of § 1257(2), and the lower court's upholding of the federal statute is therefore not reviewable by appeal but by certiorari. Pp. 394—397.
2. Not every judicial proceeding that implicates a charge, claim, or defense based on an Act of Congress or a law made under its authority must be presided over by an Art. III judge. Pp. 397 410.
(a) The jurisdictional grant respecting 'such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish' requires neither that only Art. III courts hear and decide cases within the judicial power of the United States nor that each inferior court be invested with all the jurisdiction flowing from Art. III, and federal criminal laws have been enforced by state, territorial, and military courts and judges who did not enjoy the Art. III protections. Pp. 397—404.
(b) The strictly local court system consisting of the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was created by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 pursuant to Congress' plenary Art. I power to legislate for the District of Columbia, and was intended to relieve the Art. III courts of the burdens of local civil and criminal litigation. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356, distinguished. Pp. 405—407.
Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted in part; 290 A.2d 573, affirmed.
Frank F. Flegal, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Sol. Gen. Erwin N. Griswold, for appellee.
Aside from an initial question of our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), this case requires us to decide whether a defendant charged with a felony under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure and salary under Art. III of the Constitution. We hold that under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, power to legislate for the District of Columbia, Congress may provide for trying local criminal cases before judges who, in accordance with the District of Columbia Code, are not accorded life tenure and protection against reduction in salary. In this respect, the position of the District of Columbia defendant is similar to that of the citizen of any of the 50 States when charged with violation of a state criminal law: Neither has a federal constitutional right to be tried before judges with tenure and salary guarantees.
* The facts are uncomplicated. In January 1971, two officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department observed a moving automobile with license tags suggesting that it was a rented vehicle. Although no traffic or other violation was then indicated, the officer stopped the vehicle for a spot-check of the driver's license and carrental agreement. Palmore, the driver of the vehicle, produced a rental agreement from the glove compartment of the car and explained why the car appeared to be, but was not, overdue. During this time, one of the officers observed the hammer mechanism of a gun protruding from under the armrest in the front seat of the vehicle. Palmore was arrested and later charged with the felony of carrying an unregistered pistol in the District of Columbia after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of the District of Columbia Code, § 22—3204 (1967).1 He was tried and found guilty in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Under Title I of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473 (Reorganization Act),2 the judges of the Superior Court are appointed by the President and serve for terms of 15 years. D.C.Code Ann. §§ 11—1501(a), 11—1502 (Supp. V, 1972).3 Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment against him, urging that only a court 'ordain(ed) and established(ed)' in accordance with Art. III of the United States Constitution could constitutionally try him for a felony prosecution under the District of Columbia Code. He also moved to suppress the pistol as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The motions were denied in the Superior Court, and Palmore was convicted.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed concluding that under the plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia, conferred by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, Congress had 'constitutional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only in the District and to select the appropriate court, whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I, to hear and determine these particular criminal cases within the District.' 290 A.2d 573, 576—577 (1972). Palmore filed a notice of appeal with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and his jurisdictional statement here, purporting to perfect an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). We postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to review this case by way of appeal to the hearing on the merits. 409 U.S. 840, 93 S.Ct. 66, 34 L.Ed.2d 79 (1972).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 12574 specifies the circumstances under which the final judgments of the highest court of a State may be reviewed in this Court by way of appeal or writ of certiorari. As amended in 1970 by § 172(a)(1) of the Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 590, the term 'highest court of a State' as used in § 1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Appeal lies from such courts only where a statute of the United States is struck down, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), or where a statute of a State is sustained against federal constitutional attack, id., § 1257(2). Because the statute at issue was upheld in this case, an appeal to this Court from that judgment lies only if the statute was a 'statute of any state' within the meaning of § 1257(2). Palmore insists that it is, but we cannot agree.
Jurisdictional statutes are to be construed 'with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes,' Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 212, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968); and we are particularly prone to accord 'strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals' to this Court. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 42 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 156, 157, 27 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). We will not, therefore, hold that Congress intended to treat the District of Columbia Code as a state statute for the purposes of § 1257(2). Cf. Farnsworth v. Territory of Montana, 129 U.S. 104, 112—114, 9 S.Ct. 253, 254 255, 32 L.Ed. 616 (1889).
Palmore relies on Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922), where an enactment of the territorial legislature of Puerto Rico was held to be a statute of a State within the meaning of the then-applicable statutory provisions governing appeals to this Court. That result has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1258; but, even so, the Balzac rationale was severely undermined in Fornaris, where we held that a statute passed by the legislature of Puerto Rico is not 'a State statute' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), and that it should not be treated as such in the absence of more definitive guidance from Congress.
We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction of the appeal filed in this case. Palmore presents federal constitutional issues, however, that are reviewable by writ of certiorari under § 1257(3); and treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari, cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2103, we grant the petition limited to the question of whether Palmore was entitled to be tried by a court ordained and established in accordance with Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution.6 It is to this issue that we now turn.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power '(t)o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over' the District of Columbia. The power is plenary. Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress 'may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a state might exercise within the State, and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the constitution of the United States.' Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5, 19 S.Ct. 580, 582, 43 L.Ed. 873 (1899). This has been the characteristic view in this Court of congressional powers with respect to the District.7 It is apparent that the power of Congress under Clause 17 permits it to legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it under Art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 408, 6 S.Ct. 427, 429, 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886).
It was under the judicial power conferred on the Superior Court by the 1970 Reorganization Act that Palmore was convicted of violation of § 22—3204 of the District of Columbia Code (1967). The conviction was clearly within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, unless, as Palmore contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prosecution for District of Columbia felonies must be presided over by a judge having the tenure and salary protections provided by Art. III.8 Palmore's argument is straightforward: Art. III vests the 'judicial Power' of the United States in courts with judges holding office during good behavior and whose salary cannot be diminished; the 'judicial Power' that these courts are to exercise 'shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . .'; the District of Columbia Code, having been enacted by Congress, is a law of the United States; his prosecution for violation of § 22—3204 of the Code is therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, involves an exercise of the 'judicial Power' of the United States, and must therefore be tried by an Art. III judge.
This position ultimately rests on the proposition that an Art. III judge must preside over every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense is based on an Act of Congress or a law made under its authority. At the very least, it asserts that criminal offenses under the laws passed by Congress may not be prosecuted except in courts established pursuant to Art. III. In our view, however, there is no support for this view in either constitutional text or in constitutional history and practice.
Article III describes the judicial power as extending to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is vested 'in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' The decision with respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of Congress. That body was not constitutionally required to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide cases within the judicial power of the United States, including those criminal cases arising under the laws of the United States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III. '(T)he judicial power of the United States . . . is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) . . . and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845).9 Congress plainly understood this, for until 1875 Congress refrained from providing the lower federal courts with general federal-question jurisdiction. Until that time, the state courts provided the only forum for vindicating many important federal claims. Even then, with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum for the trial of federal cases not involving the required jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retained concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, therefore, that trial and decision of all federal questions were reserved for Art. III judges. Nor, more particularly has the enforcement of federal criminal law been deemed the exclusive province of federal Art. III courts. Very early in our history, Congress left the enforcement of selected federal criminal laws to state courts and to state court judges who did not enjoy the protections prescribed for federal judges in Art. III. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv.L.Rev. 545, 551—553, 570—572 (1925); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 293 (1927); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 Harv.L.Rev. 966 (1947). More recently, this Court unanimously held that Congress could constitutionally require state courts to hear and decide Emergency Price Control Act cases involving the enforcement of federal penal laws; the fact 'that Rhode Island has an established policy against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other states and the United States which it deems penal, cannot be accepted as a 'valid excuse." Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392, 67 S.Ct. 810, 814, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947). Although recognizing the contrary sentiments expressed in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 615—616, 10 L.Ed. 1060 (1842), and other cases, the sense of the Testa opinion was that it merely reflected longstanding constitutional decision and policy represented by such cases as Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876), and Mondou v. New York N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327 (1912).
There is another context in which criminal cases arising under federal statutes are tried, and defendants convicted, in non-Art. III courts. Under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, power '(t)o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,' Congress has declared certain behavior by members of the Armed Forces to be criminal and provided for the trial of such cases by court-martial proceedings in the military mode, not by courts ordained and established under Art. III. Within their proper sphere, courts-martial are constitutional instruments to carry out congressional and executive well. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 82, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1857). The 'exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply,' O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1685, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969); and 'the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials,' U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17, 76 S.Ct. 1, 5, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955).
'The same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the result in (American Ins. Co. v. Canter, supra), has governed the decision in later cases sanctioning the creation of other courts with judges of limited tenure,' Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1471, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962), such as the Court of Private Land Claims, United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 85—86, 15 S.Ct. 16, 19, 39 L.Ed. 76 (1894); the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 19 S.Ct. 722, 43 L.Ed. 1041 (1899); Ex parte Joins, 191 U.S. 93, 24 S.Ct. 27, 48 L.Ed. 110 (1903); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 27 S.Ct. 363, 51 L.Ed. 547 (1907); courts created in unincorporated districts outside the mainland, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 266—267, 21 S.Ct. 770, 778—779, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S., at 312—313, 42 S.Ct., at 348—349, and the Consular Courts established by concessions from foreign countries, In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464—465, 480, 11 S.Ct. 897, 900—901, 905, 35 L.Ed. 581 (1891).
Whatever may be true in other instances, however, it is strongly argued that O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1933), constrains us to hold that all of the courts of the District of Columbia must be deemed Art. III courts and that the judges presiding over them must be appointed to serve during their good behavior in accordance with the requirements of Art. III. O'Donoghue involved the question whether the judges of the District of Columbia's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were constitutionally protected from having their salaries reduced by an Act of Congress. This Court, over three dissents and contrary to extensive prior dicta, see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450, 49 S.Ct. 411, 413, 73 L.Ed. 789 (1929); Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 5 S.Ct. 25, 28 L.Ed. 656 (1884); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 43 S.Ct. 445, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923); Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 50 S.Ct. 389, 74 L.Ed. 969 (1930), held that the two courts under consideration were constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United States and that the judges in question were not subject to the salary reduction legislation as they would have been had they been judges of legislative courts.
We cannot agree that O'Donoghue governs this case.13 The District of Columbia courts there involved, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, had authority not only in the District, but also over all those controversies, civil and criminal, arising under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and having nationwide application. These courts, as this Court noted in its opinion, were 'of equal rank and power with those of other inferior courts of the fedthose of other inferior courts of the federal system . . ..' O'Donoghue, supra, 289 U.S., at 534, 53 S.Ct., at 744. Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court considered that Congress, by consistently providing the judges of these courts with lifetime tenure, had indicated a 'congressional practice from the beginning (which) recognize(d) a complete parallelism between the courts of the District (of Columbia) and the District and Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States.' Id., at 549, 53 S.Ct., at 750. Moreover, these courts, constituted as they were, and being closer to the legislative department, 'exercise a more extensive jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general government and its various departments,' id., at 535, 53 S.Ct., at 744, and were the only courts within the District in which District inhabitants could exercise their 'right to have their cases arising under the Constitution heard and determined by federal courts created under, and vested with the judicial power conferred by, Art. III.' Id., at 540, 53 S.Ct., at 746.
The case before us is a far cry from O'Donoghue. Here Congress has expressly created two systems of courts in the District. One of them is made up of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which are constitutional courts manned by Art. III judges to which the citizens of the District must or may resort for consideration of those constitutional and statutory matters of general concern which so moved the Court in O'Donoghue. The other system is made up of strictly local courts, the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. These courts were expressly created pursuant to the plenary Art. I power to legislate for the District of Columbia. D.C.Code Ann. § 11—101(2) (Supp. V, 1972), and to exercise the 'powers of . . . a state government in all cases where legislation is possible.' Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 147, 9 S.Ct. 256, 257, 32 L.Ed. 637 (1889).
The O'donoghue Court had before it District of Columbia courts in which the consideration of 'purely local affairs (was) obviously subordinate and incidental.' O'Donoghue, supra, 289 U.S., at 539, 53 S.Ct. at 740. Here, on the other hand, we have courts the focus of whose work is primarily upon cases arising under the District of Columbia Code and to other matters of strictly local concern. They handle criminal cases only under statutes that are applicable to the District of Columbia alone. O'Donoghue did not concern itself with courts like these, and it is not controlling here.
It is apparent that neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law, or even every criminal prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection against salary reduction. Rather, both Congress and this Court have recognized that state courts are appropriate forums in which federal questions and federal crimes may at times be tried; and that the requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where law of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment. Here, Congress reorganized the court system in the District of Columbia and established one set of courts in the District with Art. III characteristics and devoted to matters of national concern. It also created a wholly separate court system designed primarily to concern itself with local law and to serve as a local court system for a large metropolitan area.
From its own studies, Congress had concluded that there was a crisis in the judicial system of the District of Columbia, that case loads had become unmanageable, and that neither those matters of national concern nor those of strictly local cognizance were being promptly tried and disposed of by the existing court system. See, e.g., 115 Cong.Rec. 25538 (1969); 116 Cong.Rec. 8091—8092 (1970).14 The remedy in part, was to relieve the regular Art. III courts, that is, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from the smothering responsibility for the great mass of litigation, civil and criminal, that inevitably characterizes the court system in a major city and to confine the work of those courts to that which, for the most part, they were designed to do, namely, to try cases arising under the Constitution and the nationally applicable laws of Congress. The other part of the remedy, equally essential, was to establish an entirely new court system with functions essentially similar to those of the local courts found in the 50 States of the Union with responsibility for trying and deciding those distinctively local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction. S.Rep. No. 91—405, pp. 1—3, 5, 18; H.R.Rep. No. 91—907, pp. 23—24, 33.
Furthermore, Congress, after careful consideration, determined that it preferred, and had the power to utilize, a local court system staffed by judges without lifetime tenure. S.Rep. No. 91—405, supra, at 17—18; H.R.Rep. No. 91—907, supra, at 44. Congress made a deliberate choice to create judgeships with terms of 15 years, D.C.Code Ann. § 11—1502 (Supp. V, 1972), and to subject judges in those positions to removal or suspension by a judicial commission under certain established circumstances. Id., §§ 11—1502, 11—1521 et seq. It was thought that such a system would be more workable and efficient in administering and discharging the work of a multifaceted metropolitan court system. See S.Rep. No. 91—405, supra, at 8—11; H.R.Rep. No. 91—907, supra, at 35—39.
In providing for fixed terms of office, Congress was cognizant of the fact that 'virtually no State has provided' for tenure during good behavior, S.Rep. No. 91—405, supra, at 8, see H.R.Rep. No. 91—907, supra, at 38, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noting that 46 of the 50 States have not provided life tenure for trial judges who hear felony cases, 290 A.2d, at 578 n. 12, and the provisions of the Act, with respect to court administration and to judicial removal and suspension, were considered by some as a model for the States. 115 Cong.Rec. 25538 (1969). See Hearings on H.R. 13689 and 12854 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 69, 71 (1969).
We do not discount the importance attached to the tenure and salary provisions of Art. III, but we conclude that Congress was not required to provide an Art. III court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its laws applicable only within the District of Columbia. Palmore's trial in the Superior Court was authorized by Congress' Art. I power to legislate for the District in all cases whatsoever. Palmore was no more disadvantaged and no more entitled to an Art. III judge than any other citizen of any of the 50 States who is tried for a strictly local crime. Nor did his trial by a nontenured judge deprive him of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment any more than the trial of the citizens of the various States for local crimes by judges without protection as to tenure deprives them of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Appellant, indicted for carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of D.C.Code Ann. § 22—3204, was tried and convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, an Art. I court created by Congress1 under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473. His timely objection is that he was tried, convicted, and sentenced by a court not established under Art. III.
—unlike Art. III judges, they can be removed from office by a five-member Commission4 through less formidable means of procedure than impeachment. While two of the five members must be lawyers (one a member of the District Bar in active practice for at least five of the ten years prior to his appointment and one an active or retired federal judge serving in the District) the other three may be laymen. One of the three must be a layman. D.C.Code Ann. § 11 1522 (Supp. V, 1972).
In other words, these Superior Court judges are not members of the independent judiciary which has been one of our proudest boasts, by reason of Art. III. The safeguards accorded Art. III judges were designed to protect litigants with unpopular or minority causes or litigants who belong to despised or suspect classes. The safeguards surround the judge and give him a measure of protection against the hostile press, the leftist or rightist demands of the party in power, the glowering looks of those in the top echelon in whose hands rest the power of reappointment.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides: 'The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States . . ..' This legislative power is plenary, giving Congress authority to establish the method by which the District of Columbia will be governed, and to alter from time to time the form of that government. District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 104—110, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 1009—1012, 97 L.Ed. 1480.
Legislative courts may be given executive and administrative duties, the examples being well known. But if they are given 'judicial Power,' as are the judges of the present Superior Court of the District, those trials have guarantees that are prescribed by the Constitution and Bill of Rights. First, as to jury trial, Art. III says: 'The Trial, of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.' But trial by jury is also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment in all criminal prosecutions. Even Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler, not known as Libertarians, thought 'all' meant 'all,' not permitting the exclusions of so-called 'petty' offenses. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 633, 57 S.Ct. 660, 665, 81 L.Ed. 843. Congress may not deprive an accused of that protection in a District of Columbia trial. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 74, 51 S.Ct. 52, 53, 75 L.Ed. 177; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223.
The Fifth Amendment provides for the right to indictment; and Congress may not dispense with that right for a local criminal offense in the District of Columbia. United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 42 S.Ct. 368, 66 L.Ed. 700.
Few, if any, of these guarantees, I assume, would be applicable to Art. I tribunals exercising legislative or administrative functions. But are any of them inapplicable in criminal prosecutions where the 'judicial Power' of the United States is exercised?
I have been unable to see how that is possible. Yet if those aspects of 'judicial Power,' as the term is used in Art. III, are all applicable, how can the requirements for an independent judiciary be made an exception? For it is as clearly required by Art. III for any exercise of 'judicial Power' as are the other guarantees.
'In drafting the tenure provision of the amended bill, the committee was conscious both of the inexactness of the art of judicial selection and of the importance of tenure in attracting the most competent men to the bench. The committee recognized that the constitutional requirement of 'good behavior' tenure has played a significant role in the historic high quality of the Federal bench. On the other hand, the committee was aware that virtually no State has provided such tenure for its judges, an apparent recognition that the opportunity to review the quality of a judge's performance also has its obvious advantages. The committee, therefore, sought a tenure provision that would combine the attractiveness of the federal system with the opportunity for some review of the judge's work.
'At present, the only means available to rid the local bench of a sick or venal judge is through the process of impeachment by the House of Representatives and trial by the U.S. Senate. To believe that the Congress at this time in our history has the time to police the local judiciary through the impeachment process is just not realistic. That process has not even proven viable when the conduct of Federal, good-behavior tenure judges is drawn into question.' S.Rep. No. 91—405, pp. 8, 11.
In O'Dodoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356, the Court held unconstitutional an Act of Congress reducing the salaries of trial and appellate judges in the District of Columbia. It held that inherent in the separation of powers was the idea that 'the acts of each shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments.' Id., at 530, 53 S.Ct., at 743. Since the District was formed of portions of two of the original States, the Court concluded it was 'not reasonable to assume that the cession stripped them of these (rights, guarantees and immunities of the Constitution), and that it was intended that at the very seat of the national government the people should be less fortified by the guaranty of an independent judiciary than in other parts of the Union.' Id., at 540, 53 S.Ct., at 744. The Court concluded that while Congress could not confer administrative or legislative functions on Art. III courts, it could grant such functions to District courts by reason of Art. I. Id., at 546, 53 S.Ct., at 749. But that power, it held, may not be used 'to destroy the operative effect of the judicial clause within the District.' Ibid. The present Act does precisely that. Hence today we make a major retreat from O'Donoghue.
That theory is opposed to the Jacksonian philosophy concerning election of state judges. But the present statutory scheme for control over Superior Court judges is even opposed to the Jacksonian theory. In the District of Columbia the people do not elect these Art. I judges. Nor do they 'recall' them as is done in some States. The Superior Court judges are named by the President and confirmed by the Senate and they are removable by a commission appointment by the President. The Superior Court judge has no opportunity to put his problems, his conduct, his behavior on the bench to the people. The gun of the commission is held at his head. All of the normal vices of a dependent, removable judiciary are accentuated in the District of Columbia.
The matter of 'law and order' naturally assumes in the minds of a majority of the people in the District an acute and special problem. A minority, however, sits as overlord, causing tensions to mount. The case of Harry Alexander, a judge on the Superior Court, has become prominent. Great pressures have been put on him to conform—or else. The problem goes not only to the viability of life in the District but to the vitality of the guarantees in Art. III and in the Bill of Rights. Those guarantees run to every 'person'; and the judges on the Art. III courts who sit in the District dispense justice evenly and never undertake to ration it. But some judges, like the Bill of Rights, are in the minds of some a threat to our security.
They, however, insure our security by administering justice evenhandedly. The ideals of Art. III and the Bill of Rights provide the mucilage which holds majorities and minorities together in the federal segment of our Nation, and make tolerable the existence of nonconformists who do not walk to the measure of the beat of the Chief Drummer.
We take a great step backward today when we deprive our federal regime in the District of that judicial independence which helps insure fearless and evenhanded dispensation of justice. No federal court exercising Art. III judicial power should be made a minion of any cabal that from accidents of politics comes into the ascendancy as an overlord of the District of Columbia. That effort unhappily succeeds today and is in disregard of one of our most cherished constitutional provisions.
As Mr. Justice Black and I put it in our dissent in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 589, 598, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1493, 1498, 8 L.Ed.2d 671, the essential problem in dealing with a 'judicial' function exercised by an Art. I court concerns the standards and procedures employed. If the power exercised is 'judicial power' defined in Art. III, as was true in the present case, then the standards and procedures must conform to Art. III, one of which is an independent judiciary.
'It is strongly impressed on my mind that the tenure of office by the judiciary of the United States during good behavior for life is incompatible with the spirit of republican government, and in this opinion I am fully sustained by the evidence of popular judgment upon this subject in the different States of the Union.
Manipulated judiciaries are common across the world, especially in communist and fascist nations. The faith in freedom which we profess and which is opposed to those ideologies assumes today an ominous cast. It is ominous because it indirectly associates the causes of crime with the Bill of Rights rather than with the sociological factors of poverty caused by unemployment and disemployment, the abrasive political tactics used against minorities, the blight of narcotics and the like. Those who holds the gun at the heads of Superior Court judges can retaliate against those who respect the spirit of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment and who stand firmly against the ancient practice of using the third degree to get confessions and who fervently believe that the end does not justify the means.
Before passage of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, the local court system consisted of one appellate court and three trial courts, two of which, the juvenile court and the tax court, were courts of special jurisdiction. The third trial court, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, was one of quite limited jurisdiction, its criminal jurisdiction consisting solely of that exercised concurrently with the United States District Court over misdemeanors and petty offenses, D.C.Code Ann. § 11—963 (1967). The court's civil jurisdiction was restricted to cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000, and it had jurisdiction over cases involving title to real property only as part of a divorce action. Id., §§ 11—961 and 11—1141. The judgments of the appellate court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, were subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id., § 11—321.
The United States District Court for the District had concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of General Sessions over most of the criminal and civil matters handled by that court, id., §§ 11—521, 11—522, and 11—523, and had exclusive jurisdiction over felony offenses, even though committed in violation of locally applicable laws, id., § 11—521. Thus, the District Court was filling the role of both a local and federal court.
Seeking to improve the performance of the court system, Congress, in Title I of the Reorganization Act, invested the local courts with jurisdiction equivalent to that exercised by state courts. S.Rep.No. 91—405, pp. 2—3; H.R.Rep.No.91—907, pp. 23—24. The three former trial courts were combined into the new Superior Court of the District of Columbia, D.C.Code Ann. § 11—901 (Supp. V, 1972), which was vested, with a minor exception, id., § 11 502(3), with exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal cases, including felonies, brought under laws applicable exclusively to the District, id., § 11—923(b). Its civil jurisdiction reached all civil actions and any other matter at law or in equity, brought in the District of Columbia, except those in which exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the United States District Court. Id., § 11—921. The local appeals court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, would ultimately not be subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals, id., § 11—301, and was declared to be the 'highest court of the District of Columbia' for purposes of further review by this Court. Id., § 11—102.
In addition to the shift in jurisdiction, the number of local judges was increased, their tenure was lengthened from 10 to 15 years, and their salaries were increased and fixed at a percentage of that of judges of the United States courts. Id., §§ 11—702, 11 703, 11—903, 11—904, and 11—1502; D.C.Code Ann. §§ 11—702, 11—902, 11—1502, 47—2402 (1967). The Reorganization Act established a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure to deal with suspension, retirement, or removal of local judges, D.C.Code Ann. § 11—1521 et seq. (Supp. V, 1972). It also provided for improved administration of the local courts, id., § 11—1701 et seq., including authorization for an Executive Officer responsible for the administration of the local court system. Id., § 11—1703.
The 15-year term is subject to the provision for mandatory retirement at age 70. D.C.Code Ann. § 11—1502 (Supp. V, 1972).
'(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
'(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
'(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
Because we postponed the question of our jurisdiction over this appeal to consideration of the merits, rather than entering an unrestricted notation of probable jurisdiction, there is no basis for inferring, from our finding this appeal improper, that our initial order must nevertheless be taken as having granted certiorari on any of the issues presented. Hence, our denial of the writ with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, rather than a dismissal, is proper. Cf. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512 513, 86 S.Ct. 958, 965—966, 16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966).
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 619, 9 L.Ed. 1181 (1838); Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U.S. 687, 690, 24 L.Ed. 1098 (1878); Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 407, 6 S.Ct. 427, 428, 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300, 13 S.Ct. 361, 391, 37 L.Ed. 170 (1893); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435, 52 S.Ct. 607, 609, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 545, 53 S.Ct. 740, 748, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1933).
'Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordian and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
'Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
'In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
This was the view of the Court prior to Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 7, 1 L.Ed. 718 (1799); United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812). And the contrary statements in Hunter's Lessee, supra, at 327—339, did not survive later cases. See for example, in addition to Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845), quoted in the text, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 721—722, 9 L.Ed. 1233 (1838); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Case of Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577—578, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233—234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82—83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922).
Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 447, 20 L.Ed. 659 (1872); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 655—656, 21 L.Ed. 966 (1874); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879); The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460, 25 L.Ed. 1061 (1880); McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 180—184, 11 S.Ct. 949, 951—952, 35 L.Ed. 693 (1891); United States v. McMillan, 165 U.S. 504, 510, 17 S.Ct. 395, 398, 41 L.Ed. 805 (1897); Romeu v. Todd, 206 U.S. 358, 369, 27 S.Ct. 724, 728, 51 L.Ed. 1093 (1907); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544—548, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1469—1471, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962).
See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 641 (1846); United States v. Tom, 1 Or. 26 (1853); Franklin v. United States, 1 Colo. 35 (1867); Pickett v. United States, 1 Idaho 523 (1874); United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 226 (1875); Fisher v. United States, 1 Okl. 252, 31 P. 195 (1892).
See, e.g., Territory of Oregon v. Coleman, 1 Or. 191 (1855); Gile v. People, 1 Colo. 60 (1867); People v. Waters, 1 Idaho 560 (1874); People v. Shafer, 1 Utah 260 (1875); Ex parte Larkin, 1 Okl. 53, 25 P. 745 (1891).
We should note here that in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, supra, it was urged that Art. III forbade the assignment of a judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to try a criminal case arising under the District of Columbia Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the judge in question was not an Art. III judge, Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, was sufficient authority for his assignment to try cases in the District. The United States there urged that this was true at least with respect to laws arising under the District of Columbia Code rather than under a law of national application. Mr. Justice Harlan, for himself and Justices Brennan and Stewart, found it unnecessary to reach this question, but considered it an open one, for he expressly reserved 'intimating any view as to the correctness of the holding below . . ..' 370 U.S., at 538, 82 S.Ct., at 1466. Apparently, for him, O'Donoghue had not foreclosed the issue with respect to the trial of the criminal case under the District of Columbia Code. Mr. Justice Clark, for himself and the Chief Justice, also thought the question open. See id., at 589 n. 4, 82 S.Ct., at 1493.
The Senate Committee noted that notwithstanding the visiting judge program, 'an unsurpassed number of days on the bench per district court judge,' and as many as 12 out of the 14 District Court judges being 'assigned full time to the trial of local felony offenses,' the backlog of criminal cases in the United States District Court numbered 1,669, and the median time lapse from filing to final disposition in felony trials in that court was more than triple that in other district courts. Additionally, the median time for civil jury trial in the District Court was nearly double that in other district courts. Though there had been an increase in the number of felonies committed in the District of Columbia, there was a concomitant decrease in the number of felonies prosecuted. S.Rep.No.91—405, supra. at 2—3.
D.C.Code Ann. § 11—502 (Supp. V, 1972).
'(C) any other conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice or which brings the judicial office into disrepute.' Ibid.
He shall be involuntarily retired if '(1) the Commission determines that the judge suffers from a mental or physical disability (including habitual intemperance) which is or is likely to become permanent and which prevents, or seriously interferes with, the proper performance of his judicial duties, and (2) the Commission files in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals an order of involuntary retirement and the order is affirmed on appeal or the time within which an appeal may be taken from the order has expired.' Id., § 11—1526(b).
The Act also contains elaborate provisions for the suspension of the judge without salary, or with retirement salary, or with salary dependent on the circumstances described in §§ 11 1526(c)(1), (2), and (3). The Act contains the procedure which the Commission must follow and the notice and hearing to which the judge is entitled. Id., § 11—1527.
Madison, 2 Journal of the Federal Convention 257 (G. Hunt ed. 1908).
H.R.Rep.No.135, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep.No.1504, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
H.R.Rep.No.135, supra, n. 6, at 2.
See Brown, The Rent in Our Judicial Armor, 10 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 127 (1941); Hyde, Judges: Their Selection and Tenure, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 389 (1949); E. Haynes, Selection and Tenure of Judges (1944); Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665 (1969).
'Any one of the three phenomena I have described—popular elections, short terms, and small salaries—would be sufficient to lower the character of the judiciary. Popular elections throw the choice into the hands of political parties, that is to say, of knots of wirepullers inclined to use every office as a means of rewarding political services, and garrisoning with grateful partisans posts which may conceivably become of political importance. Short terms . . . oblige the judge to remember and keep on good terms with those who have made him what he is, and in whose hands his fortunes lie. They induce timidity, they discourage independence.' 1 American Commonwealth, c. 42, p. 507 (3d ed. 1905).
The California system is discussed by Jack E. Frankel, Executive Secretary of the California Commission On Judicial Qualifications, in Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 166 (1963). Mr. Frankel was quoted with approval in the Senate Report proposing the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. S.Rep.No.91—405, p. 11.
Kurland, supra, n. 8, at 668.


Tourism in Papua New Guinea is on the verge of taking off. Despite the country's acknowledged potential, tourism is still a relatively under-exploited industry in PNG. But the scenario is changing rapidly. The national government now regards tourism as one of its key priority areas for the generation of income and employment.
"Unity in diversity" accurately describes the diverse terrains, cultures and people which make up the country. From the point of view of geographical setting, the country is a vast, primitive and sensationally beautiful destination for travellers. From a tourist's viewpoint it is the "last great frontier on earth". This diversity offers a potential for tourism development in PNG far in excess of that for other countries.
Due to the existence of rich mineral and forest resources, little political attention was focused on this service industry in the past. In 1980 the number of short-term visitors to PNG was 38,823. By 1994 it was still almost at the same level at 38,739. More than half of these visitors are from the neighbouring Oceania region, especially from Australia. The majority are here on business (with a steady increase from Asian countries). Only a third are holidaying visitors, though numbers fluctuate wildly over the years.
This poor performance can be attributed chiefly to a number of factors: restrictive aviation policies, governmental disinterest, high internal travel costs, lack of consistent promotional efforts and adverse and often misappropriate press coverage about law and order problems in certain parts of the country.
All these factors are currently being addressed as part of the country's new active drive for tourism growth.
The government established a new and specialised body, the Tourism Promotion Authority (TPA) in early 1993 to change the nature of tourism in the country. It is to operate as a stimulus for the private sector by encouraging overall demand for the country as a destination and by encouraging the development of facilities and infrastructure. The high potential in this area has been widely recognised by the World Bank, the Tourism Council of South Pacific and other international institutions.
The TPA's objective is to market Papua New Guinea overseas and domestically as a tourist destination, thereby stimulating strong economic growth in the sector. At the same time, it is committed to improving the standard of tourism products, facilities and services within the country.
Tourism products include adventure tourism such as diving, surfing, trekking, kayaking and white water rafting. Special interest tourism include bird watching, butterfly watching, game fishing, nature photography and botanist's studies and culture oriented tourism products. For interested and serious travellers, cruise trips through scenic and culturally vibrant regions such as Milne Bay and Sepik provide a memorable lifetime experience.
One of the major problems for tourism growth in PN G was lack of knowledge about its tourism products in the international market. No country was as largely absent from the tourism map of the world. In the past, no concerted effort was made to improve the situation. Since its inception in 1993, TPA has been very actively engaged in promoting the country's tourism image in identified markets. It has taken part in all major trade and consumer shows in Western Europe and Australia, in specialised shows in the USA, Japan and Singapore, and has also organised several road shows in Australia and Western Europe. As supportive measures TPA organised familiarisation tours of journalists, photographers, film and television crews and travel industry people from targeted markets. Advertising campaigns in specific product magazines are also ongoing activities of the TPA.
Along with promotional activities TPA has organised several educational and training workshops in sustainable tourism. It has placed high emphasis on training various segments of the industry such as tour guides, tour operators, accommodation units, provincial tourism offices etc. A large, very optimistic tourism awareness campaign for all sections of the people of the country is likely to be initiated shortly.
TPA assists local entrepreneurs with advisory, technical and administrative support. The country is not looking for large-scale urban oriented tourism. It is encouraging small and medium-sized facilities, villagebased, in traditional style guest houses and resorts. Conservation of the country's ecosystems (land and water) and its traditional culture is the key for developing its tourism future.
Papua New Guinea, with its vast untapped resources for tourism development, has now reached the stage of take-off for fast growth. The TPA's efforts are already paying off. Of the specific products where the country has a tremendous competitive edge, diving has already attracted considerable attention of the international experts and enthusiasts.
However the number of visitors to any destination cannot increase overnight. International tour operators plan their tour programmes and destinations well in advance. PNG is now being promoted actively by both governme nt agencies and the industry as an exciting tourist destination. With a usual gestation period of about two years, these concerted efforts are likely to yield results from 1996 onwards.
TPA expects there will be a significant upsurge of visitors in the near future, the great majority of them being holiday-makers. It is essential that the momentum and direction initiated by TPA be maintained. At the same time structural bottlenecks in the areas of aviation and other infrastructural areas need to be eased.
Development of a viable tourism industry in PNG can ease many of the economic problems the country is encountering today. It can offer effective solutions to social problems through the creation of employment and income generating opportunities for the unemployed and under-employed youth. PNG has all the prerequisites and potential to develop itself as a major tourism destination within a short period of time. It only requires a concerted effort by all the concerned parties to make it a reality.


Welcome to the Ranthambore National Park Hotels and resorts section of Travel Deals Finder. Here you will find the list of latest 2018 Ranthambore National Park hotels with packages, offers and discounts from various travel agents and hotel owners. Hotel Types available in Ranthambore National Park: Luxury hotels, budget hotels, resorts, 5 star hotels, 4 star hotels, 3 star hotels, Ranthambore National Park 2 star hotels, 1 star hotels, Cheap low cost budget hotels in Ranthambore National Park, heritage hotels, heritage resorts, home stays in Ranthambore National Park.
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• Source limited to: RedState
There is No Such Thing as Flurona, So Stop Trying to Make It Happen...
No need to fear....
UPDATE: With a SCOTUS Hearing Pending, Siemens Healthineers Employees Continue to Challenge the Vaccine Mandates...
Three Siemens Healthineers employees fight the good fight against the Biden vaccine mandates....
Eric Swalwell Busted Maskless in the Free State of Florida After Bashing GOP 'Liars'...
Who was that he was with......
Economist Glenn Loury: 'We Need a Lot' of Indians, Asians to Offset 'Mediocre, Laggardly' American Workers...
He says it's...
AG Garland's Remarks About Jan. 6 and 'One Rule' of Law Defy Belief...
What Garland says about who died is incredibly misleading....
Aaron Rodgers Lets It Rip on MVP Voter Who Refuses to Vote for Him Over COVID Politics...
This is who they allow to vote on the NFL MVP?...
VIP Gold Chat: The Boys Ring in the New Year!...
It is Wednesday and you know what that means — LIVE VIP Gold Chat!Join Thomas LaDuke and Scott Hounsell tonight as they welcome one of our favorites to have on the show, RedState's own Brad Sla......
Teachers Unions' Intransigence Confounds Their Members; Infuriates Parents...
The same elites who've done the teachers' unions' bidding for most of two years now sense the growing outrage....
Never Trumper Melts Down After Getting Blasted by Tucker and Others Over Youngkin Tweet...
You still wonder how Jonah Goldberg is Never Trump, when he thinks like this?...
Scary: NY Teacher Charged With Giving a Minor COVID Vaccine Without Parental Consent...
This is more than a little concerning....
The 'Dangerous Rise' of Right-Wing Men Who Refuse to Date 'Woke' Women...
Liz Cheney: Now Starring in Remake of 'The Shining'...
There's a remake now of "The Shining." 'The Donald' drives Liz Cheney to madness. Cheney sees things that aren't there. Every text has some maddening subtext that......
Chicago Teachers Go on Strike Again — and the Backlash Is Swift and Somewhat Hilarious...
To still strike, after everything teachers have been given by taxpayers, is monstrous stuff....
Media Preps to 'Celebrate' January 6, but Their Long-Running Fable Was Already Disproven in a Weekend...
So few care about the Jan. 6 commemoration in the media because their sham was exposed last fall....
The Chicago Teachers Union Can Go Straight To Hell...
I'm all out of grace for this one...
Ron DeSantis Foe Nikki Fried Takes Wild, Vulgar Swing at Him as Dem Desperation Sets In...
DeSantis's opponents continue to demonstrate they come straight out of Wackoville....
They're Finally Getting Honest About Those Masks They Forced You to Wear...
Masks are essentially safety theater....
Another Aide Abandons Kamala Harris Amid Even More Claims of Bullying...
Another member of Harris's team departs....
CNN's Chris Cillizza Gets Roundly Mocked After Sudden Realization About COVID-Shaming...
Unbelievable that Cillizza is trying to say this now....
2022 Banished Words...
A Lake Superior University list of "banned" words and phrases....
Gov. Ralph Northam Moonwalks His Foot Into His Mouth After I-95 Fiasco...
This... will not go over well....
Kyrsten Sinema Tells Chuck Schumer to Pound Sand and Leaves Democrats With Nowhere to Go...
What exactly was the plan here?...
CNN Flexes Its Inner Fascist With Grotesque, Dangerous Segment on the 'Unvaccinated'...
It should disturb everyone that this is being mainstreamed....
WATCH: AOC Doubles Down on the Weird With New Video...
Is this a member of Congress or a confused 12-year-old girl?...
Chuck Schumer Believes Americans Are Really, Really Stupid...
Schumer is brazenly trying to turn fantasy into reality, but we know better....
MSNBC Host Refused Service in NYC Restaurant Because of Four Year Old Unvaccinated Daughter...
This is where the psychosis has brought us....
Manchin Shatters Schumer's Fantasies on the Filibuster, Build Back Better...
Chuck better listen up, because Manchin isn't shy about blowing up his dreams......
Constitutionally Concerning: Jan. 6 Committee Now Asking to 'Speak' With Sean Hannity...
Talk about McCarthyism......
Just When You Thought Keanu Reeves Couldn't Be More Awesome...
The actor is known for doing random good deeds on a routine basis....
Joy Reid Show Tells Blatant Lie About the Death of Officer Brian Sicknick...
Where's Twitter Support to do something about this disgusting misinformation?...
Donald Trump Just Rained on the Democrats' January 6th Parade...
Democrats were banking on this fodder, and now they'll be denied it....
'Florida Man' Responds Accordingly to Keith Olbermann's 'Special Comment' on Avoiding the State...
Olbermann walked straight into that one....
Robert Malone Rips Fauci Apart, 'He Lies All the Time'...
The swamp still needs a whole lot of draining......
Joe Biden's Latest COVID Speech Is a Derogatory, Lie-Filled Mess That Ignores Key Data...
It's as if he's stuck in March of 2020....
Biden Forgets What Year It Is and Other Truly Bizarre Moments...
What he said about buses is...something else......
A Surpising About-Face in New York as Governor Hochul Requires More Detailed COVID Hospitalization Reporting...
Governor Hochul will now require New York hospitals to uncouple COVID hospitalizations, differentiating between those hospitalized because of COVID, and those there for other treatments but happened to test COVID positive....
The New York Times Is Right. Every Day Really Is Jan. 6...
But not for the reasons they would have you believe....
Let's Go Brandon Corn Hole - Patent Pending...
Let's go, Brandon....
'Let's Go, Brandon' Cornhole - Patent Pending...
Joe Biden Has Destroyed Another Great American Institution...
Can we really call ourselves a country at this point?...
The Next Rush Limbaugh...
The new Rush Limbaugh is someone we didn't expect....
Second Look at Pete Buttigieg After Insane Tone-Deaf Kamala Harris Tweet in Midst of I-95 Crisis...
Can't this woman get anything right?...
The 'Great Resignation' Narrative Ignores the Fallout From Vaccine Mandates...
In the rush to attach the Great Resignation and job turnover to an economic boom, the fallout from vaccine mandates is thoroughly being ignored....
Unvaccinated Novak Djokovic Allowed to Play in Australian Open Because ... Novak Djokovic, or Something...
The reigning men's tennis world champion has obtained a medical exemption to defend his title in the Land Down Under....
Liberal Journalist Mocks Republicans Trying to Help People Trapped in Snow on I-95...
Could there be a better example of liberal vs. conservative philosophy?...
Andrew Cuomo Gets off: NY County DA Drops Sexual Assault Charges...
To suggest he is almost as bulletproof as Bill Clinton back in his crazy heyday would not be an overstatement....
WATCH: Mary Katherine Ham Leaves CNN Anchors in Stitches With Hilarious Takedown of AOC...
AOC isn't going to like this......
Woke White Leftists Hardest Hit as Latino Groups Set to Give 'Latinx' Term a Fiery Death...
It's about danged time....
California Freelance Slayer Lorena Gonzalez Fletcher's Ego Wrote Checks Her Mouth Couldn't Cash...
After Gavin Newsom snubbed Gonzalez Fletcher for three high-profile appointments, she's leaving the CA Assembly to head the California Labor Federation....
Devastating Polling Provides a Window Into Why Democrats Are Trying to Change the 2022 Election Rules...
Democrats know an electoral Armageddon is coming, and they are willing to blow up everything to stay in power....

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
KCRW Exclusives
Press Play with Madeleine Brand
July 4 Special: Artist legacies on Lost Notes
On this holiday, we share two of our favorite episodes from KCRW's music documentary podcast Lost Notes.
Lost Notes: The Freeze's Rob Rosenthal on the album that saved his life
"The album I'm thinking of didn't save my life, but it saved me from being a close-minded a**hole – or at least I hope it did." - Rob Rosenthal
Apr. 26 from Music News
David Gray's 11th studio album Gold in a Brass Age has him experimenting with new electronic textures and sound palettes.
Mar. 26 from Morning Becomes Eclectic
As a child, Nick Waterhouse studied the trumpet, but when he was 13 he picked up the guitar and well, the rest is history.
Mar. 8 from Morning Becomes Eclectic
Feed Me Mix
Jon Gooch has positioned himself as a major player in the electronic scene under DJ alias, Feed Me.
Mar. 2 from Metropolis
Gary Clark Jr. performs all new tracks in this special live performance recorded for us in late February.
Benny Sings
Dutch born artist Benny Sings' sixth studio album City Pop is his most personal record to date.
Feb. 25 from Morning Becomes Eclectic
Channel Tres Mix
Hailing from Compton, L.A., producer Channel Tres points to a plethora of distinct formative influences in the formation of his musical character.
Feb. 23 from Metropolis
Erol Alkan Mix
A noted DJ, producer, collaborator, and label owner, Erol Alkan remains one of UK club culture's defining figures, strikingly original and wholly influential.
Matt Berninger's Serpentine Prison - The Valentine's Day Love Fest Edition
Matt Berninger (The National, EL VY) shares his favorite love songs on Morning Becomes Eclectic to celebrate Valentine's Day.
Enzo Siragusa Mix
It's been eight years since DJ/producer Enzo Siragusa founded Fuse, a underground London-based event series and record label that has carved out a spot in the worldwide techno and…
Feb. 9 from Metropolis
Steve Gunn showcases his guitar prowess and lyrical talents on his breakthrough fourth album The Unseen In Between.
Feb. 8 from Morning Becomes Eclectic
Harriet Brown
Harriet Brown produced, arranged, composed, and played every instrument on his new album Mall of Fortune. Hear his one-man band skills on his debut MBE session.
Cherry Glazerr
LA's Cherry Glazerr joins us on the day of their album release, where they'll play music from their new album Stuffed & Ready.
Boston indie rockers Guster join us in live performance on the heels of the release of their eighth studio album Look Alive.
Jan. 29 from Morning Becomes Eclectic
New music: Ozomatli, Charlotte Gainsbourg and more
KCRW DJ Anne Litt discusses new music from LA's own Ozomatli, Charlotte Gainsbourg, Deerhunter, Mercury Rev, Neal Francis.
Jan. 23 from Press Play with Madeleine Brand
Lindsey Jordan aka Snail Mail released her debut EP at 15, was signed to a major label at 18 and released her first album just shy of her 19th birthday.
Nightmares On Wax Mix
Whether or not you've heard the name, you're almost certainly familiar with the sound of Nightmares on Wax.
Jan. 19, 2019 from Metropolis
Four years after the release of her EP I Don't Want to Let You Down, Sharon is set to release her new album, Remind Me Tomorrow, to the masses.
Jan. 17, 2019 from Morning Becomes Eclectic
New music for the new year
A new year brings a fresh batch of new music.
Jan. 14, 2019 from Press Play with Madeleine Brand
Support KCRW
Wanda Felicia: "Until You're Mine" Today's Top Tune