text:
"It must be fictitious!" Aeroperu 603
9 Nov 18 23 Comments
On the 2nd of October in 1996, Aeroperú 603 made history with a frantic and heartbreaking 25-minute flight that ended with the loss of the aircraft and all on board. This accident highlighted the importance of the pitot-static system and the effects of spatial disorientation in a way that is hard to over-emphasise. With the loss of Lion Air flight 610 last week, which seems to be related to AoA and unreliable speed indications, Aeroperú flight 603 is being referenced in aviation forums and opinion pieces as a similar crash.
I'm not sure Aeroperú 603 does a lot to help us understand the Lion Air crash. Lion Air's Boeing 737 had an angle of attack indicator which the Boeing 757 did not have, the Lion Air flight happened during the day in daylight and clear weather whereas the Aeroperú flight took place at night and in cloud. Nevertheless, I think it's worth looking at what happened that night and the critical factors of airspeed, altitude and angle of attack in flight.
Aeroperú flight 603 was a scheduled passenger flight which departed Miami on Tuesday the 1st of October for Santiago, Chile, with a planned stop at Jorge Chaves International Airport in Lima, Peru's main international and domestic airport.
The accident aircraft photographed at Miami eight months before the accident.
The aircraft for the flight to Santiago, a four-year-old Boeing 757-23A, had suffered a bird strike, including 'avian ingestion' into the right engine, and required repairs. The maintenance team at Lima replaced two turbine blades (damaged by the birds sucked into the engine) and repaired the hydraulic pump. The last stage was to clean and polish the lower front part of the fuselage. This was done by a line mechanic, who started by covering the static ports with masking take to make sure that none of the polish or other foreign material would interfere with the air intake.
The pitot-static system is critical to flight. The pitot measures the dynamic air pressure and the static ports measure the static air pressure: between them, they feed the altitude and the airspeed to the flight crew. It is vital that they are protected from contamination.
So, the line mechanic covered the static ports with masking tape to protect them and then he cleaned and polished the fuselage, as per his instructions. He should have removed the tape when he finished but somehow, he didn't. The standard procedure is that a Quality Control staff member supervises the finishing of the job. Responsibility for the aircraft then goes to the duty supervisor who then hands over the aircraft to the line chief. The line chief then hands it over to the pilot responsible for the flight, in this case the captain. The tape was a dull silver colour and the static ports are high off the ground; none of the people who should have been involved in the handover noticed that the tape had not been removed. Finally, the pre-flight checks included the specific task of checking that the static ports were clear; however when the captain did his walk-around, he never noticed the tape.
The flight crew prepared for take off. There were seven cabin crew and sixty-one passengers for the flight to Santiago. The Boeing 757 took off from runway 15 just after midnight local time.
As they climbed away, the first officer called for the landing gear to be retracted. Instinctively checking their height at this point, he realised there was something wrong. The altimeter appeared to be stuck.
As he called out, he was interrupted by the wind shear alarm which sounded three times. The wind shear alarm is to warn the flight crew of a sudden change in wind speed or direction, for example a microburst. Effectively, it means that you are heading through an unpredictable set of fast winds.
The captain warned the first officer, the pilot flying, to keep his airspeed up. Then he asked if they were descending, while the first officer insisted that he was climbing. The captain attempted to notify ATC but then he was interrupted by the rudder ratio alarm. The rudder ratio alarm means that the pilots need to avoid any abrupt rudder inputs.
As the alarms blared, the captain reiterated that they did not appear to be climbing properly. The first officer, as pilot flying, knew that he had put the power on and had the aircraft pitched up for a climb. He was more worried about the the low indicated airspeed, which would be made worse by increasing his climb rate. He briefly levelled out the aircraft to gain more airspeed and then continued the climb. ATC watched the Boeing disappeared into the clouds.
Recreation of flight 603 departing Lima by artist Anynobody.
At the same time, the captain tried to find out why the rudder ratio alarm was sounding while the first officer looked at the source selector, which was exactly the right thing to do in the case of a blocked static port. This changes the source, using a different static port, which should reinstate access to correct altitude and airspeed data. However, in this case it made no difference because all of the static ports had been taped up. Worse, the ports were only partially blocked. A stuck altimeter is easy to ignore but one that appears to be responding is more difficult to make sense of.
The mach trim warning started to sound, which means that the airspeed is too high and the stabiliser has stopped functioning. The rudder ratio alarm was still sounding. The captain called for them to go to basic instruments, again, the right thing to do in the case of unreliable air data caused by a blocked static ports.
At the same time, the first officer declared an emergency to ATC. At this stage, they were unsure of their height, their speed, the state of their rudder and the state of their stabiliser. They were flying through a low layer of cloud at night with no visual references. If they made the wrong decision, they knew it could be fatal. If they didn't take a decision, they knew it would definitely be. Not doing something was the worst course of action, they had to do something. But what?
Jorge Chavez International Airport had a radar surveillance system which was being tested, so the controller asked them to switch frequencies so that they could offer radar advice and support.
The captain took control of the Boeing 757 while the first officer coordinated with ATC for a return to the airport using the Instrument Landing System (ILS). Meanwhile, they both continued to try to make sense of what was happening.
The flight crew took the aircraft out to sea, so that they wouldn't have to worry about the terrain; just north of Lima were the foothills of the Andes. By climbing away over the sea, they would gain some time and space to troubleshoot and safely return to the airport.
The first officer asked the air traffic controller for the aircraft's flight level and speed. The radar controller confirmed that they were at 4,000 feet. This must have been a great relief to the flight crew, as it corresponded to what the altimeter was showing. They focused again on the rudder ratio and their airspeed, which still appeared to be low.
But the controller was using secondary radar, which means that he was picking up the airspeed and altitude information from the aircraft's transponder. Rather than confirming their height, he has simply repeated the same altitude information that their instruments were showing them. The partially blocked static ports were not able to measure their altitude correctly and so the information displayed on his radar was just as wrong as it was in the cockpit.
However, now that the crew believed that they had independent verification of their height above sea level, they stopped worrying about their altitude and focused on the other systems.
They continued to climb. The first officer then asked the controller again to confirm their airspeed and their altitude. Those are the two parameters needed for safe instrument flight. The controller responded that they were currently climbing through 6,000 feet. The first officer said that their altimeter showed 7,000 feet and the controller confirmed that was correct: "Now reading seven zero."
It didn't occur to anyone that they were all referring to the same faulty data and the controller did not respond in regards to their ground speed, which is measured independently by the radar system.
They couldn't use the autopilot, which was receiving the same bad data that they were. The first officer told the controller that they had control problems. There was no reason why the aircraft should have been handling badly, so this must was probably a reference to the rudder ratio and mach trim alarms.
Earlier that same year, another Boeing 757 suffered these same inexplicable warnings. In that case, the NTSB investigation concluded that the pitot-static system had failed because of a wasp's nest built in the pitot tube, obstructing it. They recommended that the 757 flight manual include the information that if the rudder ratio and the mach trim alarms go off at the same time, it's a symptom of an airspeed discrepancy and likely a failure of the air data. However, as it had only happened once, this information was not disseminated as a matter of urgency and the Aeroperú flight crew had no idea.
The captain wanted to find out what was wrong with the aircraft and solve it, if possible, before returning to intercept the localiser on the ILS, the Instrument Landing System. An Instrument Landing System is based on airport runway information being transmitted from the ground and received in the cockpit, so the data is not affected by the faulty systems on the aircraft. It consists of a localiser and a glide slope. If they could intercept the localiser, they would be able to follow the glide slope to bring them down.
In the cockpit, they worked through what seemed to be the relevant checklists while climbing to 12,000 feet out to sea. The first officer checked the alternate air again, unable to believe what the instruments were showing…but again, because all of the ports were partially blocked, it did not help. They were unable to make sense of the warnings or stop the alarms from sounding.
He pressed the captain to stop troubleshooting and to return the airport. The captain wanted to stay high over the water where they were safe and work out what was wrong. They were both right and they were both wrong.
The first officer asked ATC for assistance with altitudes and speed until they could be guided to the localiser. It was clear to both of them that their instruments couldn't be trusted.
Air Traffic Control gave them a new heading to turn them back towards the airfield with full instructions, just in case they lost radio communications. The controller told them that next they would turn right to intercept the localiser with an initial descent to 4,000 feet.
Aeroperú 603 flight track
The flight crew followed the vectors from ATC and attempt to set up for a landing with no Flight Director, no auto-pilot and no auto-throttle.
As they began their descent, the displayed airspeed started to increase rapidly. The overspeed warning sounded. This is another warning which needs immediate attention and action. It means that they were going over the structural and engine tolerance limits: the aircraft was going faster than Boeing deemed safe for a 757.
It is worth considering that all of this is happening over the course of a few minutes. It was clear to the crew that not all of the alarms could be correct. Both pilots expressed disbelief that their speed was still increasing after they had reduced the thrust and put the speed brakes on. The rudder ratio alarm sounded again. Both pilots stated at different points that the air data must be wrong: the first officer called out for alternate air and the captain advised that they should use only 'basic' instruments. But nothing helped to shed light on what was happening. They couldn't see out and they couldn't trust their senses. Nothing was obvious.
ATC confirmed that the aircraft was 31 miles west of the airport at just over 10,000 feet with a speed of 270 knots over the ground. This was the first time that ATC had given the flight crew their groundspeed. Meanwhile, the cockpit display showed an airspeed of 350 knots.
Ground speed is, as it says, the speed you are travelling across the ground. Airspeed is how quickly you are moving through the air. The performance of an aircraft is affected by the speed that the aircraft moves through the air; it is critical for the aircraft's Angle of Attack. If your aircraft is about to stall and you aren't able to reduce the angle of attack, you will crash. A common cause for a stall is that the airspeed is too low: the wings lose lift and it doesn't matter one bit what your groundspeed is, your aircraft will stop flying. On the other hand, if your airspeed gets too high, it can cause fatal structural damage to the aircraft.
In both of these cases, your ground speed is not relevant. However, if you know the wind direction and speed as well as the aircraft's ground speed, you can work out something close to your current airspeed. Unfortunately, by now the flight crew were so overloaded, they couldn't deal with this additional information.
Reassured by the radar controller that they were at 10,000 feet, they continued their descent. The overspeed alarm sounded again and continued to sound, even though they'd reduced the thrust and activated the air brakes.
Then the stick shaker activated, the control columns vibrating violently. This indicates a high angle of attack, which means that the aircraft is in danger of stalling. The captain stopped their descent in order to gain time to think.
In the Boeing 757, the stick shaker is triggered by the actual air flow (or lack of it, rather), over the wings. This is physical evidence and unaffected by the air data. If the flight crew had understood that, or at least had a moment to think clearly, they would have realised that this meant the overspeed warnings were incorrect and could be disregarded. But with five different alarms sounding and chaos in the cockpit, they never made that connection. As far as they were concerned, the Boeing 757 was either flying dangerously slowly or overspeeding. Both alarms were urgent, both required action, but which one was true?
The first officer asked for another aircraft to help them understand the situation. If someone could fly alongside, that would help them determine whether their airspeed was dangerously high or critically low. It would also confirm their altitude.
The flight crew did not know it but the aircraft had entered a gentle descent. The altimeter was not changing and the controller repeatedly confirmed their altitude, so they believed that they were flying straight and level.
The controller told them that they had another aircraft almost ready for take-off that would come and fly with them as a guide plane but it would take another 15 minutes.
Despite the descent, the stick shakers activated again, vibrating their control columns. The overspeeding alarm continued to sound, along with the mach trim warnings and the rudder ratio alarm. It must have been a nightmare trying to think straight.
The captain believed the overspeed warning while the first officer was convinced that they were stalling. Both of them believed that they were safely at 9,500 feet.
The next alarm to sound was the Ground Proximity Warning System, calling out TOO LOW, TERRAIN, TOO LOW, TERRAIN. This contradicted the one piece of information that they had confirmed as correct. The warning sounded twenty-two times over 45 seconds. The captain believed that they must have inadvertently overflown the coastline and heading into the mountains of the Andes, where he knew the terrain swiftly rose to ten thousand feet. The first officer called ATC who said that no, radar showed them as out to sea and at FL100, that is, 10,000 feet.
However, the Ground Proximity Warning System uses the radio altimeter, not the barometric altimeter. The radio altimeter is specifically useful for low level flight, as it bounces off the ground to give you your true height above terrain. Once the radio altimeter responds, which means you have descended below 2,500 feet above the ground, the Ground Proximity Warning System will sound if the aircraft is not configured for landing.
This meant that they now had three references to information that they could trust: their groundspeed as picked up by radar, their altitude as measured by the radio altimeter and the stick shaker demonstrating that their angle of attack was approaching stall point.
However, they were so bombarded with information that they were unable to make sense of this data. The cockpit resource management (CRM) had completely fallen apart and the flight crew were not acting as a team. Instead, they argued about what instruments to believe. They referred to the checklists over and over again, even though there was clearly nothing there that can help them.
And they were no longer competently flying the plane. The Boeing 757 entered a gentle climb, taking them above 2,500 feet. The Ground Proximity Warning System stopped sounding. As far as the (barometric) altimeter was concerned, they'd been flying straight and level the entire time, so the flight crew saw this as confirmation that the GPWS warning was wrong, or 'fictitious' as the captain put it. The flight crew clearly did not have sufficient training to diagnose the problem and recognise the true indications against the false ones.
All of the alarms and warnings could not be true; some of them must be based on unreliable data. Unfortunately, the captain chose exactly the wrong warning to call fictitious.
With low airspeed and the aircraft in a climb, the aircraft suddenly dropped 700 feet; a stall. The SINK RATE alarm sounded. The Ground Proximity Warning System sounded as they dropped below 2,000 feet above the water.
The flight crew intentionally put the aircraft into a climb this time. However, they were still unaware of their previous descent and gentle climb. Based on the FDR data, the aircraft climbed to 2,400 feet and then descended to 1,300 feet and then climbed again to 4,000 feet and levelled out. Throughout these manoeuvres, the altimeter showed that they were above 9,000 feet. The controller confirmed it.
Ready for the attempt to intercept the localiser for the instrument landing system, they turned.
The overspeed warning continued to blare although they had reduced the thrust to idle. TOO LOW, TERRAIN sounded again in the cockpit and continued to sound. The first officer asked for the controller again to confirm their altitude, clearly struggling to believe what he was being told. The controller reported that they were at 9,700 feet.
Desperate to get the aircraft onto the ground, they descended again, ignoring the Ground Proximity Warning System. From 4,000 feet above sea level, they began their 5,700 foot descent to intercept the ILS.
Suddenly, the lights of the Boeing must have illuminated the dark waves of the sea. The aircraft touched the water and the first officer cut off his call to the controller to shout pull up, pull up! The controller also shouted after hearing the warning sounds in the cockpit. "Go up, go up if it indicates pull up!" This was the first indication that the Ground Proximity Warning System should be trusted over the radar information that he had been giving them. The captain pulled up and the GPWS warnings stopped. But it was too late; with idle thrust and already dangerously slow, the speed decayed to nothing. The captain realised he'd lost control of the aircraft, saying just 'we are going to invert' as the wing dropped and the Boeing banked left. There was nothing he could do to recover.
As they crashed into the water, the captain's instruments showed that their airspeed was 450 knots and the altimeter still read 9,700 feet above sea level. Only in the last seconds would the passengers have been aware, as the previous climbs and descent were too gentle to be felt, even in the cockpit. They, like the flight crew, could see nothing out of the windows other than the black night and the lights of the wings reflecting off the cloud. The cabin crew, unprepared for the emergency, could not offer any help. There were no life jackets nor life rafts for the passengers.
The aircraft plunged into the water and sank. The winter water temperatures were likely near to freezing; anyone who survived the impact and escaped the cabin would have had less than 15 minutes in those temperatures before falling unconscious or collapsing with exhaustion. However, it's unlikely that anyone made it out of the aircraft at all.
The fog never lifted and the seas were rough. By the following evening, rescue workers had recovered only ten bodies. There were no survivors.
The conversation from the cockpit voice recorder was released and can be heard online. But be warned, it is harrowing to listen to, even if you don't speak Spanish.
Investigators could not recover the aircraft; however underwater photography proved that the captain's static port was blocked by tape. It wasn't hard to follow the trail from there and understand what had happened.
Underwater photograph showing tape covering the static ports of the captain and the first officer.
From an unofficial translation of the accident report by the Peru Ministry of Transport:
It can be deduced from the investigation carried out that the maintenance staff did not remove the protective adhesive tape from the static ports. This tape was not detected during the various phases of the aircraft's release to the line mechanic, its transfer to the passenger boarding apron and, lastly, the inspection by the crew responsible for the flight (the walk-around or pre-flight check), which was carried out by the pilot-in-command, according to the mechanic responsible for the aircraft on the day of the accident.
The pilot-in-command made a personal error by not complying with the procedure for GPWS alarms and not noticing the readings of the radio altimeters in order to discard everything which he believed to be fictitious.
The co-pilot made a personal error by not being more insistent, assertive and convincing in alerting the pilot-in-command much more emphatically to the ground proximity alarms.
In the aftermath, Aeroperú filed for bankruptcy while Boeing paid compensation to the families of the victims, taking responsibility for failing to train pilots to deal with this circumstance rather than for the disaster itself. The static ports being covered were, Boeing said, a clear case of careless maintenance followed by a negligent pre-flight inspection by the captain.
The line mechanic was convicted of negligent homicide.
* Final Report by La Comision de Investigacion de Accidentes
* Unofficial English translation
* Close-Up: Aeroperu 603 Voice Recorder Transcription (English Translation)
Category: Accident Reports,
Harrow says:
Pitot tube covers, control surface motion limiters, and other ground-only safety locks always have a highly visible tag or banner attached. I recommend that when tape is used, the end of a strip of brightly colored ribbon should be inserted under the last few turns of tape allowing the ribbon to hang down to serve as a safety tag.
My first thought was that the tape itself should have been in a contrasting color; I'd think an assorted set of gaffer's tape (no-residue tape used to hold down lighting cables in theaters) would be easier to keep on hand than ribbons in contrasting colors. (A long-enough ribbon might not need to be contrasting, but would get in the way of work.) But there certainly should have been \something/ making the covering more apparent.
Things are different now; here's a description by a mechanic: According to our company procedure, the cleaners notify us that they need to do an external wash on aircraft XYZ. We cover the static ports using a bright red self-adhesive plasic tape, to which we attach long flags (appr. 1 metre) of red and white danger tape. Additionally a laminated card stating "CAUTION! STATIC PORTS COVERED!" will be attached to the captain's steering wheel. Then a tech log entry stating that the static ports have been covered is made.
At the time, it depended on the operator (although I don't think there was anywhere that specifically advocated using dull grey tape!)
Manga Ray says:
The wrong tape was actually used. The procedure called for bright highly reflective tape. The mechanic couldnt find any, and instead decided to use regular gray duct tape.
Well, sure you can put a strip of bright ribbon on the tape, but then you can also remember to take the tape off. I feel if someone's conscientious to do the ribbon, then they're the type to just remember to pull the tape off. Plus that does seem to be fairly obvious tape. I don't think the pilot even really looked at it.
I do not agree with the accident report findings. The plane was lost long before the GPWS alarms.
I think the radar controller was far more at-fault than even the mechanic. By grossly misleading the flight crew with incorrect information, he destroyed any hope of troubleshooting things and made them believe the incorrect instrument readings. When the stick shakers went off, I'm sure they felt they were drowning in a sea of conflicting information.
It became standard to use contrasting tape after this (usually applied as a big X), to at least to allow someone further down the chain a chance to spot the issue. The radar facility was new; I don't know if the controller was badly trained, hadn't paid attention or just happened to get thrown into the situation because he was there that night. But yes, it's frustrating to see him confirm, over and over again, that they are at a safe height.
RogerB says:
A controller can only give the information he can see on his screen; he did not know what problems the crew had and seems to have only been told about control problems, nothing else. I cannot see why you wish to blame the controller, he had no idea that his information could be wrong. If the controller had tried to second guess anything about the information he was giving to the crew, then he may very well have given them totally wrong information and confused the situation even further.
Mendel says:
The controller should know where the information on their screen originates: which part of it originates with local sensors (and what their capabilities are), and which part originates with aircraft sensors and is transmitted to the ground. Understanding the system you are working with is the result of training; if the understanding of the operator is incomplete, they were badly trained.
There is no need to second-guess anything in this scenario, all it needs is the knowledge which information comes from local sensors and which does not.
Sylvia — "This indicates a low angle of attack, which means that the aircraft is in danger of stalling" seems wrong; a stall happens when the angle of attack is too high. Also, was the artificial horizon not usable, or was there no mention of checking this on CVR? IIRC the gyros don't depend on the static port.
This is interesting because it shows a point failure, unlike most of your cases where a lot of errors piled up to cause a crash. It can be argued that the crew should have handled the problems better — but I wonder whether this kind of instrument failure is included in any simulation, as it seems unusual.
GAH! Yes, dammit, I started talking about airspeed and then realised that was wrong and changed it without noticing that it still said it was low. I've now corrected the text, thank you!
There's no reference to the artificial horizon but I wondered if the gentle climb/descent were such that it wasn't easy to see the pitch change. But it is clear that the crew weren't able to focus on the instruments that were trustworthy. The report refers to 'tunnel vision'.
This type of failure is definitely included in modern sim training. At the time, though, I suspect it wasn't.
Neil Higgs says:
Does this not make a case for a GPS? I know this does not give airspeed, but with altitude and ground speed, one can work out airspeed and by watching altitude change, get at least a rough idea of AoA? Independently. The controller was also seriously at fault. But a super scary story.
Yes it does, in fact. In a modern aircraft, you would have your groundspeed available throughout and having just taken off, you could probably work out your airspeed fairly quickly. Also, modern Boeings have a specific sensor for testing AoA (which is at the heart of the Lion Air investigation right now).
H_E says:
The copilot can be heard calling out speed during the takeoff roll. What was he reading it from?
I've read the article again and I realised that they did have the speed readings, just wrong ones – the indicated airspeed was higher than the real airspeed. Does it mean that they took off at a speed lower than usual? If so, why didn't they notice that?
Modern aircraft all have navigation systems based on GPS.
Older aircraft have them retrofitted because the old navigation from beacon to beacon is long obsolete. Today it is nearly impossible to make a flight plan without having access to computer systems that also integrate with ATC because airspace is so crowded, parallel routes are used between GPS-based waypoints.
ATC cannot really be blamed, their information as Sylvia's article demonstrated came from the same source the aircraft's transponder. And that, in turn, got it's data from the Air Data Computer which (in this unfortunate chain) was in turn getting false information.
As H_E mentions: the mystery is what speeds were shown during take-off? As he aircraft was still accelerating on the ground, the ports would still have recorded the ambient pressure and speed read-outs must have been close enough to normal not to cause alarm:
During the nightmare scenario that developed the pilots were obviously totally overloaded. I know a few pilots who may have had the skills to work it all out, they were test pilots. They were selected from the very best and were used to, indeed were highly trained to cope with extreme situations. But most probably would have lost control of the situation.
I agree that it should be mandatory to use a highly visible contrasting colour if the ports must be masked off. And a procedure, where a ground crew MUST notify a responsible member of the engineering staff before masking off the ports should be mandatory too..
I understand airplane GPS systems not reporting airspeed; they can't, without the information that was already blocked. However, can they report groundspeed, or is that considered a distraction? (The handheld automobile GPS that I inherited reports groundspeed, AFAICT more accurately than my speedometer, but I can see situations in which the difference between groundspeed and airspeed would be big enough to be a problem.) It does seem to me that ATC shouldn't be telling the pilots airspeed, since that's secondary info; it's not clear whether ATC radar is precise enough to determine groundspeed, but even if it were there's still the problem of the difference from airspeed (which governs whether the plane flies or falls).
I agree with Sylvia!
Giacomo Sangalli Fernández says:
I still remember my dad waking me up early that morning and telling me that my uncle's plane had an accident. He was David Fernández, the co-pilot.
I've never been able to fly without picturing what they went through in that cabin.
My family has had the recording of the CVR for 20 years and it took me this long to build up the courage to listen to it. I can't believe I would find it on YouTube.
I shivered through the entire recording hearing my uncle's voice, I cried the last few minutes, not quietly.
I miss him very much.
The recording is hard to listen to, even for a complete stranger. I'm sorry for your loss. What happened to your uncle and everyone on that plane was terrible and should never have been.
Olivier says:
It is a nasty failure – losing static data. Because it's basically never trained, contrary to unreliable airspeed. Also because there's immediately a partial loss of situation awareness (altitude) and a risk of greater loss of situation awareness – as tragically demonstrated by this accident. You can fairly easily control your flight path without reliable airspeed indications. Without barometric altimeters, however, it seems more complicated to understand the overall situation (for instance, the fact that the transponder is using static data too…). Conflicting warnings and ensuing loud noise increase the stress level and the workload, making things even worse.
Not a pleasant situation.
Leslie Rodriguez says:
It is so sad that the one thing they felt they could rely on, their altitude reading was faulty. It must have been a relief when they thought they were high enough to work out the rest of the issues, then, too late, they discover that they are not. Not knowing which information to trust and which to discard, not realizing they could not trust air traffic control, not having visual data, was a perfect storm. Why were they not trained to fly and land the plane in the event that the high tech computer systems failed them? Why so much reliance on computers to the point that human pilots are secondary? While these big corporations like Boeing work out the kinks of their most high tech planes, I imagine that more incidents like this will occur. Some might say that if it had not been for human negligence the computers would have worked fine. That is true. But still, humans need to know how to take over in the event that "any" issue causes the computers to give false information. I think Boeing needs to care more about human beings and less about being the most advanced corporation around!
To be fair, it wasn't a "high tech system" that failed, but the simple, tried and true pressure altimeter.
The high-tech radar altimeter was working and could have saved them.


text:
Business jet crashes onto Georgia football field, killing 4 aboard
A Tennessee-bound jet crashed Thursday, killing all four people aboard, when it plunged onto a Georgia football field.
Graham Cawthon
Associated Press SOURCE: Associated Press
ATLANTA (AP) — A Tennessee-bound business jet crashed Thursday, killing all four people aboard, when it plunged onto a football field at an Atlanta park, igniting its fuel and sending thick smoke over a nearby neighborhood, officials said.A home behind the sports field was damaged, but no injuries on the ground were reported, Atlanta Fire Rescue Sgt. Cortez Stafford said.The plane's wreckage was spread out on the field over about 100 yards (90 meters), he said.The aircraft was "shooting out of the sky," witness Reggie Dumas told reporters at the scene."As it was going down, you could see the wings shifting back and forth," said Dumas, who saw the aircraft plunge as he drove along a nearby road. He said he jumped out of his car to see if he could help anyone, but saw no survivors — only smoke.The plane was a Cessna Citation V jet, Federal Aviation Administration spokeswoman Kathleen Bergen told The Associated Press.The plane was headed to the Millington-Memphis Airport when it went down, airport Executive Director Roy Remington said.Remington said a fire official at the Millington airport, located about 20 miles (32 kilometers) north of Memphis, was working with authorities in Atlanta to determine the identities of those killed. Remington says the victims were believed to be from the Memphis area."This is a tragedy," he said.The jet had departed from a runway at nearby Fulton County Airport-Brown Field and went down about 1.5 miles (2.4 kilometers) east of the airport shortly after noon, Bergen said. The airport itself is about 10 miles (16 kilometers) west of downtown Atlanta.The plane's wreckage is not far from a small set of metal bleachers and the yellow goal post in the end zone of the football field, video from WAGA-TV shows. Most of the plane is badly burned. Its tail is one of the only parts that appear to be intact.Firefighters had to make their way through jet fuel to put out the flames on the football field, Stafford said.The airport is a busy general aviation facility with an air traffic control tower and fire station. It averages a combined 164 takeoffs and landings each day.The National Transportation Safety Board said it is investigating the crash.
ATLANTA (AP) — A Tennessee-bound business jet crashed Thursday, killing all four people aboard, when it plunged onto a football field at an Atlanta park, igniting its fuel and sending thick smoke over a nearby neighborhood, officials said.
A home behind the sports field was damaged, but no injuries on the ground were reported, Atlanta Fire Rescue Sgt. Cortez Stafford said.
The plane's wreckage was spread out on the field over about 100 yards (90 meters), he said.
The aircraft was "shooting out of the sky," witness Reggie Dumas told reporters at the scene.
"As it was going down, you could see the wings shifting back and forth," said Dumas, who saw the aircraft plunge as he drove along a nearby road. He said he jumped out of his car to see if he could help anyone, but saw no survivors — only smoke.
The plane was a Cessna Citation V jet, Federal Aviation Administration spokeswoman Kathleen Bergen told The Associated Press.
The plane was headed to the Millington-Memphis Airport when it went down, airport Executive Director Roy Remington said.
Remington said a fire official at the Millington airport, located about 20 miles (32 kilometers) north of Memphis, was working with authorities in Atlanta to determine the identities of those killed. Remington says the victims were believed to be from the Memphis area.
"This is a tragedy," he said.
The jet had departed from a runway at nearby Fulton County Airport-Brown Field and went down about 1.5 miles (2.4 kilometers) east of the airport shortly after noon, Bergen said. The airport itself is about 10 miles (16 kilometers) west of downtown Atlanta.
The plane's wreckage is not far from a small set of metal bleachers and the yellow goal post in the end zone of the football field, video from WAGA-TV shows. Most of the plane is badly burned. Its tail is one of the only parts that appear to be intact.
Firefighters had to make their way through jet fuel to put out the flames on the football field, Stafford said.
The airport is a busy general aviation facility with an air traffic control tower and fire station. It averages a combined 164 takeoffs and landings each day.
The National Transportation Safety Board said it is investigating the crash.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


We hope you can find what you need here. We always effort to show a picture with HD resolution or at least with perfect images. Pre K Printable Worksheets Free Abc Worksheets for Pre K Inspirational Back to School can be beneficial inspiration for those who seek an image according specific categories; you can find it in this site. Finally all pictures we have been displayed in this site will inspire you all..


text:
Toshiba's New 1.8-inch SATA HDD Achieves 160GB
Toshiba Corporation today announced a new line-up of 1.8-inch hard disk drives adopting a serial ATA interface, including the industry's first drive of this type with a capacity of 160 gigabytes. The new 160GB drive, MK1617GSG, and an 80GB drive, MK8017GSG, will enter mass production in August.
Toshiba's new 1.8-inch HDDs boost interface speed to 1.5Gbps and offer a rotation speed of 5,400 rpm, faster than the current generation of Toshiba 1.8-inch HDD (MK1214GAH, parallel ATA, 120GB).
By realizing the industry's first 160GB 1.8-inch drive with a serial ATA interface, Toshiba assures that mobile PCs will be able to meet the most demanding user needs.
The new MK1617GSG drive is more environmentally efficient than Toshiba's current MK1216GSG (120GB) model, and raises energy consumption efficiency, as defined under the Japanese legal standard, to 0.00281W/GB, a 25% improvement. The drive improves the maximum internal data transfer rate by approximately 17%, and supports faster data access in reading and writing that enhances overall performance.
Alongside Toshiba's 1.8-inch HDD of 80GB and 120GB serial ATA interface drives already in the market, the new drives will provide product manufacturers with a broad line-up that supports diverse applications. The new drives will also contribute to achievement of environmentally conscious products in full compliance with the EU's RoHS directive.
Source: Toshiba
Citation: Toshiba's New 1.8-inch SATA HDD Achieves 160GB (2008, June 12) retrieved 29 January 2023 from https://phys.org/news/2008-06-toshiba-inch-sata-hdd-160gb.html
Colonists nibble at Gran Chaco, South America's other big forest
Up to 32 frog species thought to be extinct may not be, new research shows
New device may offer a better way to prevent tick bites
Plagues of the past have a lot to tell us about current crises, according to a new study
Cover crops can lower yields, according to new study
First 'Run 3' physics result from the Large Hadron Collider's compact muon solenoid
China's Huawei unveils chip for global big data market
New 28-GHz transceiver paves the way for future 5G devices
China maintains reign over world supercomputer rankings: survey
China tops global supercomputer speed list for 7th year (Update)
Microsoft testing underwater datacenters
New Intel chip technology designed to foil hackers


text:
Gingrich's War on the Judiciary
By George Will / Syndicated Columnist
Friday, December 23rd, 2011 at 12:05am
WASHINGTON – When discussing his amazingness, Newt Gingrich sometimes exaggerates somewhat, as when, discussing Bosnia and Washington, D.C., street violence, he said, "People like me are what stand between us and Auschwitz." (The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Jan. 16, 1994). What primarily stands between us and misrule, however, is the Constitution, buttressed by an independent judiciary.
But Gingrich's hunger for distinction has surely been slaked by his full-throated attack on such a judiciary. He is the first presidential candidate to propose a thorough assault on the rule of law. That is the meaning of his vow to break courts to the saddle of politicians, particularly to members of Congress, who rarely even read the laws they pass.
Gingrich's most lurid evidence that courts are "grotesquely dictatorial" is a Texas judge's aggressive decision concerning religious observances at high school functions, a decision a higher court promptly (and dictatorially?) overturned. Gingrich's epiphany about judicial tyranny occurred in 2002, when a circuit court ruled unconstitutional the Pledge of Allegiance phrase declaring America a nation "under God." Gingrich likened this to the 1857 Dred Scott decision that led to 625,000 Civil War dead. The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the circuit court's "under God" nonsense.
He says the Founders considered the judiciary the "weakest" branch. Not exactly. Alexander Hamilton called the judiciary the "least dangerous" branch (Federalist 78) because, wielding neither the sword nor the purse, its power resides solely in persuasive "judgment." That, however, is not weakness but strength based on the public's respect for public reasoning. Gingrich yearns to shatter that respect and trump such reasoning with raw political power, in the name of majoritarianism.
Judicial deference to majorities can, however, be a dereliction of the judicial duty to oppose actions irreconcilable with constitutional limits on what majorities may do. Gingrich's campaign against courts repudiates contemporary conservatism's core commitment to limited government.
Logically, Gingrich should regret the dictatorial Supreme Court decisions that have stymied congressional majorities by overturning portions of McCain-Feingold and other restrictions on political speech. Logic, however, is a flimsy leash for a mind as protean as Gingrich's, which applauds those decisions – and the Kelo decision. In Kelo, the court eschewed dictatorship and deferred to the New London, Conn., City Council majority that imposed a stunning abuse of eminent domain. Conservatives were appalled; Gingrich, inexplicably but conveniently, says he is, too.
Although not a historian, Gingrich plays one on television, where he recently cited Franklin Roosevelt (and Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln) as "just like" him in being "prepared to take on the judiciary." Roosevelt, infuriated by Supreme Court decisions declaring various progressive policies incompatible with the Constitution's architecture of limited government, tried to "pack" the court by enlarging it, and attempted to purge from Congress some Democrats who opposed him. Voters, who generally respect the court much more than other government institutions, re-elected those Democrats and so thoroughly rebuked FDR's overreaching that Congress lacked a liberal legislating majority for a generation.
To teach courts the virtue of modesty, President Gingrich would attempt to abolish some courts and to impeach judges whose decisions annoy him – decisions he says he might ignore while urging Congress to do likewise. He favors compelling judges to appear before Congress to justify decisions "out of sync" with majorities, and would sic police or marshals on judges who resist congressional coercion. Never mind that judges always explain themselves in written opinions, concurrences and dissents.
Gingrich's unsurprising descent into sinister radicalism – intimidation of courts – is redundant evidence that he is not merely the least conservative candidate, he is thoroughly anti-conservative. He disdains the central conservative virtue, prudence, and exemplifies progressivism's defining attribute – impatience with impediments to the political branches' wielding of untrammeled power. He exalts the will of the majority of the moment, at least as he, tribune of the vox populi, interprets it.
Atop the Republican ticket, Gingrich would guarantee Barack Obama's re-election, would probably doom Republicans' hopes of capturing the Senate and might cost them control of the House. If so, Gingrich would at last have achieved something – wreckage, but something – proportional to his swollen sense of himself.
Disclosure: This columnist's wife, Mari Will, is an adviser to Rick Perry.
Will's columns, including those not published in the Journal, can be read at ABQjournal.com/opinion – look for the syndicated columnist link. Email: georgewill@washpost.com; copyright, Washington Post Writers Group.


Sâmata strives to be the leader in spa, massage and aromatherapy products in Cambodia by providing exceptional quality in all of our services. The studio and product line is led by an internationally trained and registered physiotherapist and massage therapist, with years of experience teaching physiotherapy, massage and aromatherapy.
Sâmata Aromatherapy is the first Cambodian aromatherapy line to offer aromatherapy products blended in Cambodia by a team of health, wellness and aromatherapy professionals—eliminating the need for customs clearance. These products are made with 100% pure, premium natural oils, sourced from all over the world and are carefully selected for their therapeutic properties and quality.
We have many years of experience supplying products and services to Cambodian spas, gift and cosmetic retailers, and individuals. We have a strong sense of professionalism and work hard to build long-term relationships with customers and business partners based on good ethics and fair practices. Our line of products are available for retail and wholesale at Sâmata's main location on Street 306.


There are 40 beautifully refurbished rooms spread over nearly a third of the 300 acre private island offering each guest there own secluded hideaway.
These spacious rooms enjoy beautiful views of the sea and feature a four poster bed, beautiful bathroom, sitting area and either a terrace or balcony. Each room has its own special elegance and is individually styled.
A unique octagon shaped building, the Rondavels feature a wraparound terraces with spectacular views of the ocean and a hammock for relaxing and enjoying the Caribbean sunshine. The rooms have a four-poster bed, sitting area and bathroom with a large shower and outdoor garden with another shower.
These gorgeous rooms have interiors that complement rather than compete with the beautiful island setting that surround the accommodation. Also featuring a four poster bed, sitting area, indoor and outdoor showers as well and a pedestal soaking tub set in a calming private courtyard, these rooms also have ocean views.
These rooms offer comfort and privacy in a spacious setting. Each bedroom has a four-poster bed, separate living area, bath with large walking shower as well as a private outdoor garden with rain shower. The room also has a wraparound terrace with a hammock to sit and relax and take in the views of the crystal clear ocean surrounds.
Situated near Pond Bay, the resorts latest suites feature a private courtyard with a fountain, generous living room and bedroom areas, a spacious bathroom with a indoor tub, vanity table and an outdoor shower set in a private courtyard. The terraces have a private plunge pool with views of the Caribbean Sea.
Perfect for a family or for two couples these suites are octagon in shape and feature two rooms with 4 poster beds a private bathroom, large walk in shower and private outdoor garden with rain shower. The living room opens onto a wrap around terraces with a hammock and lovely views of the garden and Sea.
Designed to offer expansive views of the sea and to create an indoor/outdoor living experience, these two-and three-bedroom villas are the ultimate in luxurious accommodation.
Each features a large kitchen, a living room that opens onto a magnificent terrace and a private plunge pool. They are decorated in the most unique and elegant furnishings and features cable TV and VCR.
A gracious collection of 3- to 4-bedroom residences, the Pond Bay Villas are terraced along the dramatic cove overlooking Jumby Bay Beach. Each has been designed with casually elegant Caribbean interior decor. A private courtyard featuring a secluded pool meets guests upon entering. Surrounding the pool, the four villas offer expansive views, large patios, floor-to-ceiling doors, a large kitchen, living room and bedrooms with spacious bathrooms.


Many of the Crossroads congregation have been reading God's Word aloud since 2:00 p.m. on Easter.
It is very moving to sit and listen, to sit and pray or to sit and watch far enough back that you cannot really hear what is being said, but you still care deeply about each word. And the silence of the auditorium swallows your thoughts and needs and allows you to feel the presence of God and wonder how many lives have been changed for eternity in the chair in which you sit.
I fall more and more deeply in love with Him as I remember story after story that I haven't thought about for a long time...in some cases years. As I passed the Easter painting of the Samaritan Woman, I thought about the fact that everyone of these Biblical characters were regular people just like us. People in need of a savior, people who felt like outcasts sure they had sinned way too badly to ever be forgiven, or even accepted by peers and family.
People came and read out of reverence for the Lord even though some of them told me they were terrified to read in front of others. This was not about us, this was time to focus on Him. I love my Lord and I love my community at Crossroads...my extended family.


text:
Jewish World Review August 13, 2013/ 7 Elul, 5773
Making the Walk to School an Adult-Intensive Project
http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | Walking to school is a lovely, age-old, generally safe activity that has been almost abandoned over the past generation.
Today only about 1 in 10 children still walk to school, in part because some new schools have been built on the outskirts of town and in part because some neighborhoods are so car-centric that there is no decent on-foot route to school but also in great part because parents have been warned every which way that their kids are never safe doing anything outside on their own.
Enter Michelle Obama, who dearly wishes kids would start moving again. Recently, she endorsed the idea of the walking school bus, which is a bunch of kids walking together and picking up kids along the way (like a bus), along with at least one adult chaperon.
The idea of kids walking is wonderful, of course. But the idea that this is such a dangerous activity that it requires ongoing chaperoning is troubling. I'm sure Michelle couldn't come out and endorse kids just walking on their own, because that's truly dangerous in some neighborhoods, and she is first lady for the whole country.
However, in promoting the idea that even a group of kids walking together needs an adult, she inadvertently perpetuates the problem of kids not moving. Here's what it says at http://www.walkingschoolbus.org about adult oversight:
"The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommend one adult for every six children. If children are age 10 or older, fewer adults may be needed. If children are ages 4 to 6, one adult per three children is recommended."
Really — even a group of 10-year-olds needs an adult chaperon? That's your problem right there. Ten-year-olds in most of the rest of the world have been walking to school on their own for three years! (And in Japan, many 5-year-olds do it.)
Meantime, the 1-3 ratio for younger kids makes walking to school sound as if you're signing your kid up for scuba lessons.
We are turning walking to school into an adult-intensive project.
If parents are told kids can only be "safe" outside with a guardian watching over them, what are the chances that they will send their kids outside after school to play? They won't. Kids will end up inside. No parent has hours and hours after school — and whole days free on weekends — to stand outside and supervise.
Just the other night, I went walking in our apartment building's courtyard and spied a little girl going round and round on her scooter. Well, actually, I spied her go round and round twice. Then it was time to go in. Her dad, who was watching her (despite no public access to the courtyard and no cars), was ready to go inside. He was done watching, so she was done scootering.
Hands down, a walking school bus beats a parade of cars dropping the kids off at school. I'm glad the first lady brought that issue to national attention. Props to her. But will it get kids back to moving — as in running, jumping and playing — any other time of day? No.
Alas, no.
<? if (strpos(, "printer_friendly") === 0) {} else { =<<<FOOT_DELIMITER <P>Every weekday JewishWorldReview.com publishes what many in in the media and Washington consider "must-reading". Sign up for the daily JWR update. It's free. Just click here.
Comment on JWR contributor Lenore Skenazy's column by clicking here.


text:
Svoboda, Elizabeth
http://www.sapiens.org/culture/postindustrial-world-chicago-steel/
Publisher: Sapiens
On the wind-whipped shore of Lake Michigan, a little over 10 miles from downtown Chicago, Illinois, stand what look like the foundations of a massive fortress. These hulks of concrete are the silent remnants of the U.S. Steel South Works production plant--an industrial behemoth that, in its heyday, employed more than 20,000 residents of the Chicago area. Though the plant shut down in 1992, the 30-foot-tall walls endure. "They tried to demolish them," Christine Walley says, 'but they were so big and heavy that they just couldn't do it. So they decided to leave them as monuments."
Just beyond the ruins is a dead-end channel carved into the lakeshore--the slip where ore boats once arrived. Most days, for more than a century, the boats would drop off hundreds of tons of raw materials to be forged into steel slabs and beams that strengthened bridges and kept skyscrapers aloft. But no ore boat has docked in this slip for more than 20 years.
postindustrial world - Anthropologist Christine Walley investigates questions about work and identity that first arose for her when her dad was laid off from his job at a steel mill.
Anthropologist Christine Walley investigates questions about work and identity that first arose for her when her dad was laid off from his job at a steel mill. Elizabeth Svoboda
As the middle daughter of three born to a Chicago steelworking family, Walley feels the weight of these ruins more than most. Her father, a longtime veteran of nearby Wisconsin Steel, lost his job when the mill closed in 1980 without warning. As other mill closures followed, Walley's family and community fractured in ways that defied easy mending.


Written by Scott Joseph on 28 October 2015 on 28 October 2015 .
I got to go back to Ireland the other day, just for a few hours.
The occasion was the 10th anniversary dinner at Raglan Road, the denouement of a months long journey that included an actual trip to Ireland. The dinner at Raglan Road, which recently changed its address to Disney Springs without having to actually move, was prepared by the winners of a contest the restaurant had as part of the celebration. They included Central Floridians Aaron Van Swearingen, Colleen Kerney and Janice Epaillard, and Heather McBroom Walker of Scottsdale, Ariz. Linda Rohr of Darien, Conn., was unable to attend the dinner.
Contestants had submitted YouTube videos telling Raglan's chef/partner Kevin Dundon what they would prepare for a 10th anniversary dinner. From those videos, Dundon selected the five winners, then flew them to Ireland and his Dunbrody Country House where he also has a cooking school.
In the modern kitchen classroom of the old country estate, Dundon took each cook's recipe and changed it, keeping the main ingredients but improving on it as only a master chef can, adding foam here or fancy croquettes there. They practiced and prepared, and then flew home to await the big day.
Colleen Kerney, left, and Heather McBroom Walker plate one of the courses while Kevin Dundon orchestrates from behind.
Epaillard was up next with Janice's Georges Banks Sea Scallop on a Smoky Bacon & Potato Foam, with Salmon Roe & Smoked Speck. A delicious scallop, but what else is needed when you've got bacon and potato foam? Cape Mentelle Sauvignon Blanc Semillon, from Australia's Margaret River, was the perfect pairing. I liked that there was plenty of fruit in the nose and the palate but that it was light on grapefruit — not always the case with sauv blancs. A lovely wine.
McBroom Walker's course, Heather's Pan Seared North Atlantic Haddock, with Pea Puree & a Jonah Crab Croquette, was the third course of the decidedly seafood centric menu. It was a beautiful chunk of firm fish, deftly seared and with a buttery note. Peas, both pureed and un-, surrounded the haddock. The fish perhaps was not as fresh as those that we all caught from a fishing boat on the Irish Sea then cooked that evening, but it was pretty close. Vocoret Chablis from Burgundy added flavors of peach and lemon. This wine really came forward when it was tasted with the food.
The team and Raglan's cooks pitched in to prepare Rohr's course, Linda's Lamb Noisette with Heirloom Tomato Monde, Dandelion Greens & Natural Pan Jus. They all did her proud. The lamb was a perfect medium rare and had the distinctive light gamey characteristic. And could there be a better pairing than a 2010 Aurelien Verdet Gevrey-Chambertin? The answer is no. Rich forward red fruit flavors — I alternated sips with bites of lamb and then did something I rarely do at these dinners: I cleaned my plate.
Van Swearingen finished things up with Aaron's Caramelized Bartlett Pear & Star Anise Tarte Tatin, with Jameson Butterscotch Ice-cream. How could it not be Jameson? The Veuve Clicqout Demi-Sec was a dessert in its own right.
Van Swearingen, who is a professional photographer, presented Dundon and his Raglan Road partners Paul Nolan and John Cooke a bound book of photographs that he and others on the trip had captured. It was a beautiful collage of images that had me longing to go back to Ireland. That was something I never thought I would say. I had been twice before, and had pleasant experiences, but nothing that made me long to return.
Until now. Now I find myself reminiscing about the sights we saw and the kind people we met — the true Ireland beyond the pubs of Dublin. And I find myself looking over the schedule of cooking classes at Dundon's Dunbrody Cookery School. I know I'll go back.


Tonight... Partly cloudy this evening, then mostly cloudy with scattered showers after midnight. Lows in the upper 60s. Southwest winds 15 to 20 mph. Chance of rain 30 percent.
Friday... Mostly cloudy. A chance of showers with a slight chance of thunderstorms in the morning, then showers likely with isolated thunderstorms in the afternoon. Some thunderstorms May produce damaging winds in the afternoon. Breezy with highs in the upper 70s. Southwest winds 15 to 25 mph. Chance of rain 70 percent.
Friday Night... Partly cloudy with a chance of showers with isolated thunderstorms in the evening, then clear after midnight. Some thunderstorms May produce damaging winds in the evening. Lows in the mid 50s. West winds 15 to 20 mph, becoming northwest after midnight. Chance of rain 50 percent.
Saturday... Sunny. Highs in the lower 70s. Northwest winds around 10 mph with gusts up to 20 mph, becoming southwest in the afternoon.
Saturday Night... Clear. Lows in the upper 50s. Southwest winds around 10 mph with gusts up to 20 mph.
Sunday Night... Partly cloudy. Lows in the lower 60s. Highs in the mid 70s.
Monday... Partly cloudy. Lows in the lower 60s. Highs in the mid 70s.
Tuesday... Partly cloudy. Lows in the lower 60s. Highs in the mid 70s.
Tuesday Night... Mostly clear. Lows in the mid 60s.
Wednesday... Partly cloudy. Highs in the upper 70s. Lows in the mid 60s.
Carolina Beach, NC Weather Forecast - Find local 28428 Carolina Beach, North Carolina weather forecasts and current conditions. Continually striving to be your best resource for Local Carolina Beach, North Carolina Weather!