No, winter hasn't come early. In fact it's nearly 100 degrees in Central Illinois right now. 25 Degrees refers to a brand new burger lounge in downtown Chicago that's filled with mouth-watering food and plenty of wine and spirits.
The Chicago restaurant was opened by Joe and Mac Boumaroun, brothers who had previously owned the Lebanese restaurant Aladdin's Eatery in Chicago. They were intrigued by the concept of an upscale burger place and this particular chain had taken off on the west coast. They are putting it all together with acclaimed chef Tim Goodell, who has added a few things to the menu (like the Potato & Three Cheese Fritters) that are unique to this location. The official opening was just last week and it looks like a place the windy city will see around for a long time.
The 25 Degrees is the difference between a medium-rare burger and one that is well-done. The latter is my preference and the Wisconsin sirloin was cooked to perfection, juicy without any red. I topped it with roasted tomato, avocado and a Winelaise, an aged cheddar-blue cheese combo that completed the taste. It was a perfect choice, but the key here is that each person gets to make their own perfect choice with 15 different toppings, 15 unique cheeses and 15 different sauces.
While i waited for my personally designed burger, I had an incredible salad of heirloom tomatoes, goat cheese and watermelon in Parmesan truffle oil. I also tasted some of the French fries, onion rings and sweet potato fries with three of the sauces -- Garlic Parmesan, Tarragon Remoulade and Pesto. They were all tasty, but my favorite combo was the Sweet Potato Fries with the Tarragon.
I couldn't even come close to finishing the monster burger (which is priced only around $10 to start) and brought it home along with the fries for two more lunches. I also took an (unspiked) Double Chocolate Milkshake for the road, which satisfied my cocoa craving for the week!
If you aren't in the mood for burgers, 25 Degrees also has small plates with items like Spicy Tuna, Bacon Wrapped Figs, Hot Dogs and more. It's also worth a trip for drinks in their comfy booths. It's quite a selection, with about 20 unusual wines by the glass (or jug), hand crafted cocktails and spiked milk shakes. I had to drive over two hours home or I would have been tempted to try one, like their Guiness Shake with Vanilla Haagen Das and Chocolate Sauce.
You can find 25 Degrees, which also serves brunch in front of their large TVs, at North Clark Street. visit their website or Facebook page for more information.
Congrats Joe and Mac. Next time in the windy city I will definitely stop by for a burger and drink:) Your new place sounds great!! Way to go!!!!
P.S. tell the family I said hello.


How can I create multiple submit buttons that will go to different email addresses?
I want to be able to create separate submit buttons that will email the completed form to the clinic the patient will be visiting, but when I edit the submit properties and change the email of the notification, the email goes to the default email address, not the one in the notification section of the form.
I haven't put the form on a web site. It's just in draft form on the JotForm site.
You can add as much submit buttons to your form as you want. Unfortunately, you can not set the condition based on the clicked Submit button, but there are enough options that can be used as a work around.
You can change the thank you page depends on the selected element on a form.


We are horrified at three recent assassinations of social leaders in Puerto Asís, Putumayo Department: rural organizers Milena García and her husband, Darwin Reyes, and Doctor Zonia Rosero.
On February 23, abductors took Milena García and Darwin Reyes from the urban center of Puerto Asís to the Tres Bocanas Zone (a rural area about 9km away) where they killed them and threw their bodies into the Putumayo River. Milena's body was found the next day. Darwin remains missing.
The married couple were community leaders in the rural reserve Zona de Reserva Campesina Perla Amazónica (ZRCPA), where they helped coordinate voluntary crop substitution programs. Putumayo is one of Colombia's most productive coca-producing regions and a strategic corridor for drugs trafficking. Replacing coca plantations with legal crops was one of the core components of the 2016 peace agreement. The zone where Milena and Darwin were killed is known for paramilitary activity.
One day later, Doctor Zonia Rosero, age 45, became the next social leader attacked in Puerto Asís. On February 24 armed men entered the clinic where she worked and shot her several times. She was taken to a medical center in Pasto, Narino Deparment, and treated in an intensive care unit. She died two days later.
Zonia Rosero had always worked in healthcare (first as a nurse, then as a doctor) and had focused her efforts in communities most affected by poor social conditions and state abandonment. She was well-known for her defense of women's rights and peace. She had helped coordinate a regional campaign against gender-based violence. She was planning to announce her candidacy for mayor of Puerto Asís, promoting education and health as fundamental rights for all communities.
These attacks have occurred amid a wave of violence against women in the regions of Medio and Bajo Putumayo. Although communities have warned authorities about paramilitary threats, little has been done to address the issue, leading to increased security concerns.


One of the highlights of the hearing in the Sabarimala case in Supreme Court on February 6 was the stance taken by the State controlled Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) in the review petition.
The TDB had, during the hearing of the original case, taken a stand against the State and opposed entry of women. However, at the review stage, it decided to change it stance and not seek review of the decision.
This was not just based on the argument that . . .


text:
Financial supervisory architecture since the Global Crisis: Supervisory models remain diverse, but more powers for central banks
Daniel Calvo, Juan Carlos Crisanto, Stefan Hohl 23 November 2018
A well designed financial supervisory architecture is essential for the effective functioning of any financial system. Using a survey of 82 jurisdictions, this column describes the state of financial supervisory models around the world and highlights the key institutional changes after the Global Crisis. It finds that the prevailing financial supervisory model continues to be sectoral, but that there have been incremental but important changes within existing models. Central banks have acquired more financial oversight responsibilities after the Global Crisis, and many jurisdictions have enhanced or are in the process of enhancing their consumer/investor protection supervision.
Financial regulation: Not yet an efficient outcome
Angus Armstrong, Philip Davis
The Eurozone crisis: A consensus view of the causes and a few possible solutions
Richard Baldwin, Francesco Giavazzi
Financial regulation: Can we avoid another great recession?
John Van Reenen
Reforming the financial supervision architecture
Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn
Following the Global Crisis, a number of significant regulatory reforms have helped to improve both crisis prevention and crisis management systems. Yet an effective financial supervisory architecture is essential to optimise the positive effect of the post-crisis reforms. When referring to a financial supervisory architecture, we mean an institutional supervisory setup that: (i) assigns specific functions to individual financial authorities; (ii) establishes coordination and cooperation mechanisms among those authorities; and (iii) specifies other approaches and arrangements to avoid potential conflicts of mandates. Deciding on the above institutional issues generally entails trade-offs between synergies across functions and potentially conflicting goals. In addition, the choices are influenced by the structure of the financial sector, past experience with financial crises, and legal, historical, cultural and political economy considerations. Moreover, the effectiveness of a financial supervisory architecture is very much related to the financial authorities' ability to act with clear objectives, operational autonomy, comprehensive and effective powers, sufficient resources and adequate incentives.
Accordingly, jurisdictions have assigned financial sector responsibilities to authorities in line with a variety of institutional setups that roughly correspond to one of the following financial supervisory models: sectoral (i.e., separate authorities supervising different financial sectors); integrated (i.e., a single supervisory agency responsible for overseeing the financial sector); or partially integrated.1 The latter generally includes the Twin Peaks model (i.e., two different agencies in charge of prudential oversight and conduct of business for all types of financial institutions, respectively) and the Two Agency model (i.e., one agency responsible for supervising both solvency and consumer/investor protection for banks and insurance companies, and a second agency responsible for market integrity as well as securities business).2 A key feature of any financial supervisory model is the particular role assigned to central banks in the context of financial sector oversight.
Our study (Calvo et al. 2018) describes the state of financial supervisory models around the world and highlights the key institutional changes after the Global Crisis. The study is based on a survey covering 82 jurisdictions worldwide and also builds upon previous Financial Stability Institute work on institutional arrangements for financial sector supervision.3 The main findings of our study are:
Despite some movement towards integrated arrangements, the prevailing financial supervisory model continues to be sectoral.
There have been incremental but important changes within existing financial supervisory models.
Central banks have acquired more financial oversight responsibilities after the Global Crisis.
A significant number of jurisdictions have enhanced or are in the process of enhancing their consumer/investor protection supervision.
Despite some movement towards integrated arrangements, the prevailing financial supervisory model continues to be sectoral
Since the onset of the Global Crisis, a limited number of jurisdictions have changed their financial supervisory models (close to 15% of jurisdictions in the sample – Table 1). Most jurisdictions that reported changes have been shifting away from a sectoral model towards a more integrated one. Despite the importance of these changes, they have not crystallised into a preferred model. In fact, the prevailing model of financial sector supervision continues to be sectoral. Table 2 displays the regional breakdown.
Table 1 Changes in the model of financial sector supervision
Source: Calvo et al. (2018).
Note: Changes are shaded.
Table 2. Model of supervision by region (in rounded percentages)
There have been incremental but important changes within existing financial supervisory models
Our study shows that, after the Global Crisis, a number of jurisdictions have adjusted their existing supervisory models to: (i) incorporate new functions, such as macroprudential policies (Table 3) and resolution; (ii) improve the monitoring of financial stability (Table 4); and (iii) enhance the institutional setup for consumer/investor protection supervision.
Many jurisdictions have adopted or enhanced their macroprudential policy frameworks. This has included modifying legislation to adopt new macroprudential tools and assigning them to existing or newly created authorities. In fact, 86% of jurisdictions indicated that they have set up a macroprudential authority. In 25% of jurisdictions, specific bodies have been created with the purpose of either activating or recommending macroprudential policies. Finally, most of the jurisdictions in the survey indicated that they have introduced changes in the setup to monitor financial stability, typically by setting up inter-agency committees.
Table 3 Primary authority responsible for macroprudential policy
Table 4 Changes in the setup for monitoring financial stability
Note: The green dots represent the specific institutional setup for monitoring financial stability mentioned in the corresponding row (i.e., dedicated committee, financial stability coordination committee or financial stability unit or department). The last column shows the number of jurisdictions in which that institutional setup operates (e.g., 21 jurisdictions in which there is a dedicated committee for monitoring financial stability). More than one green dot per column represents more than one authority responsible for monitoring financial stability, and the last row shows the number of jurisdictions in which a specific combination of authorities exists (e.g., three jurisdictions in which there is a dedicated committee and a financial stability unit/department for monitoring financial stability).
A critical new function for financial authorities stems from new resolution standards.4 Most of the observed changes in resolution regimes since the Global Crisis (40% of jurisdictions) have taken place in Financial Stability Board member jurisdictions and EU countries (30% of jurisdictions), mostly home jurisdictions of global systemically important banks. Among the respondents, nearly 25% of jurisdictions have announced plans to change their resolution framework. Therefore, changes in the institutional setup of resolution regimes continue to be work in progress.
Central banks have acquired more financial oversight responsibilities after the Global Crisis
The post-Global Crisis changes broadly point to models where the central bank has a more central role in prudential supervision (Table 5). These include the 'integrated central bank' model, the Twin Peaks model (where the prudential 'peak' is located at the central bank), and the Two Agency model (where the central bank hosts the supervisory authority for banks and insurance companies). More specifically, nearly a third of crisis-affected jurisdictions5have changed their model and have tended to give more supervisory powers to their central banks.
Moreover, central banks remain the predominant primary microprudential banking supervisor,6,7 with even more reallocation of supervisory responsibility for banks from single supervisory agencies to central banks.
Central banks are also the lead authority for macroprudential policy in most jurisdictions. Macroprudential responsibilities are more likely to be given to the central bank when the central bank is also the microprudential supervisor for banking. Dedicated committees8 are responsible for macroprudential policy in a number of jurisdictions and typically include government representatives, central bankers and supervisory officials. The macroprudential responsibility is largely aligned with the banking microprudential responsibility when central banks are also in charge of the latter (close to 80% of the cases).
Finally, the primary resolution authority is typically located within the authority responsible for the microprudential supervision of banks, especially when the latter is the central bank. In a number of jurisdictions (close to 40%), bank resolution requires the involvement of more than one agency. Central banks play a key role, as they are typically involved in the resolution process even when the central bank is not the single resolution authority.9
Table 5 Central banks as a prudential authority under different financial supervisory models10
Source: Calvo et al. (2018) and Financial Stability Institute staff calculations.
A significant number of jurisdictions have enhanced or are in the process of enhancing their consumer/investor protection supervision
Significant changes in the institutional setup for consumer/investor protection have taken place since the Global Crisis (Table 6). These changes include new oversight powers for conduct-of-business rules, new dispute resolution procedures, and the creation of new bodies or specialised departments within existing agencies. The most common type of reported change is the establishment of either a new unit or a department dedicated to consumer protection within the supervisory authority. The changes have affected all three financial sectors, although this has not led to the creation of an integrated supervisor for the conduct of business. Nevertheless, further changes are expected, as indicated in the responses from a number of jurisdictions.
In many cases, consumer/investor protection supervision is performed by more than one agency. In a number of jurisdictions, a dedicated consumer protection agency has a wide set of responsibilities to protect consumer interests. In the case of financial products, this function is mostly shared with other authorities. The prudential supervisor, independent of the chosen supervisory model, is in most cases responsible for consumer/investor protection in connection with banking products. In the case of insurance products, the supervision of consumer protection is predominantly located in a single supervisory agency. Single supervisory agencies, by a large majority, have responsibility for investor protection in the securities sector.
Table 6 Reported changes in the institutional setup for consumer/investor protection supervision in the financial sector
Source: Calvo et al (2018).
Since the onset of the Global Crisis, a limited number of jurisdictions have changed their financial supervisory models but a significant number have made adjustments within their existing models to incorporate resolution, macroprudential and other financial stability functions. Largely due to these adjustments, central banks have taken on more financial oversight responsibilities. Another important observation from our study relates to the institutional adjustments that have taken place, or are in the process of taking place, to strengthen consumer/investor protection supervision.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that there has not been a clear convergence towards a single preferred financial supervisory model after the Global Crisis. This result, however, is consistent with the different trade-offs that supervisory models face and perhaps the lack of one-size-fits-all formulae to appropriately deal with those trade-offs across different jurisdictions.
Calvo, D, J C Crisanto, S Hohl and O Pascual (2018), "Financial supervisory architecture: What has changed after the crisis?", Financial Stability Institute papers 8, Bank for International Settlements.
Financial Stability Board (2014), "Key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions".
Financial Stability Institute (2007), "Institutional arrangements for financial sector supervision: Results of the 2006 FSI survey", Occasional paper 7.
[1] The sectoral supervisory model involves three separate authorities supervising three different financial sectors – banking, insurance and securities. Each authority typically has a prudential role and a conduct-of-business role in the sector it supervises. The integrated supervisory model involves a single agency – which could be the central bank or a single supervisory agency – which is responsible for both prudential and conduct-of-business functions in all three sectors. In the partially integrated supervisory model, financial sector responsibilities are grouped according to supervisory objectives or financial sectors.
[2] Despite this broad classification, in practice, a number of jurisdictions have implemented various forms of hybrid supervisory models. For instance, in countries with integrated supervisors, there often exist separate agencies with specific investor/consumer protection responsibilities. In addition, in jurisdictions with separate agencies for prudential monitoring and conduct-of-business supervision, the prudential oversight of investment firms or asset managers is often assigned to the latter.
[3] See Financial Stability Institute (2007).
[4] See Financial Stability Board (2014).
[5] There are 19 crisis-affected jurisdictions in our sample.
[6] Two thirds of the jurisdictions assign banking supervision to the central bank and about one third allocate it to a single supervisory agency.
[7] In contrast to banking, the supervision of insurance companies is performed by a single supervisory agency in about two thirds of cases. The role of single supervisory agencies is even more predominant in the regulation and supervision of securities business and securities firms. This is conducted by a single supervisory agency in slightly more than 80% of cases. The main change in the supervision of the insurance sector has been migration from a single supervisory agency to the central bank (close to 9% of jurisdictions). Only a few changes have been observed since the Global Crisis regarding the location of the microprudential supervisor for securities firms. The main shift in responsibilities has been a reassignment from a single supervisory agency to the central bank, in line with other financial sectors.
[8] These are inter-agency councils with a macroprudential orientation.
[9] Central banks are involved in more than 70% of jurisdictions, while single supervisory agencies participate in the resolution process in 35% of jurisdictions. A specialised resolution authority, a dedicated authority or a deposit insurance agency outside the central bank exist in close to 25% of jurisdictions.
[10] The Bank for International Settlements was unable to classify three countries – Cyprus, the Kyrgyz Republic and Timor-Leste.
Topics: Financial regulation and banking Global economy
Tags: financial supervisory architecture, global crisis, Central Banks, regulation
Daniel Calvo
Senior Economist, Central Bank of Chile
Juan Carlos Crisanto
Deputy Chair of the Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements
Stefan Hohl
Senior Advisor, Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
2398 East Camelback Road
Phoenix office page
Net Lease // Retail
Chris Doty
Vice President Investments
Direct: (602) 687-6758 Email Chris
Chris Doty started his career in the Seattle office of Marcus & Millichap in 1999 specializing in the sale of multi-family housing where he closed numerous apartment transactions ranging from 18-units to 175-units. In 2003, Chris moved to the Phoenix office to specialize in single tenant net leased investments nationwide. Over his career he has closed in excess of $150-million in transactions.
Chris provides extensive advisory services and representation to private clients and companies throughout the country in their disposition, acquisition, and sale leaseback of single tenant assets.
License: AZ: SA540467000
Sales Recognition Award: 2004


Hi, I can help. Flip the canister on it's back. Remove all crews. Should pull apart from there. If not check around body to see if it's clipped. You may have to pry the sides apart. That will give you access. Be careful and pay attention to where everything is. Good luck.
I had the same issue. What I found upon taking it apart was that it must have fallen and the case was not making contact with one of the safety switches. Taking it apart was easy a mix of phillips head screws and torx screws. Took me 15 minutes to take apart and find the bad spot. I hope your fix is this easy.
How do you take apart a Vicks 3700 humidifier and clean the fan?
Here is a Youtube video that should help you clean your humidifier.
If not exactly search through Youtube for more specific details. You may find many helpful videos with proper search, but be sure to watch video completely to be sure it is the task you are trying to accomplish.
Might be a fuse BUT it is enclosed in the unit. You would have to take it apart to see. IT could also be other parts in the power supply that have failed, With that in mind, if you do take it apart, take pictures so that you can put it back together.
How do you take the unit apart?
You have to take the fan apart. They didn't design it with the convenience of the customer who likes to keep things clean in mind, so you have to get out a bunch of screwdrivers and stuff and roll around on the ground and fight with it until you get it apart. I posted a lengthy post on how to get this model apart, as I just did mine yesterday. Just look for my name on the Lasko models like this one. But be careful and don't try it if you don't think you can pull it off without getting hurt.
Living Air Model XL-15C: the red-neon FT ionizer bulb does light.
Corrosion in the cicuitry at the connection are unseen until you take them apart, can cause this. The male and female connectors might be together but rotted inside the boots unseen and not connected. That happens sometimes. Gently pull those connections apart and look inside both connection areas and check.
When you cleaned everything did you also turn the whole unit upside down and gently shake to remove trapped dirt in the bottom of the unit. As for taking this unit apart to clean throughly there is no need. Just use some q-tips with 91% Isopropal alcohol not Rubbing alcohol to get to the small areas. Pay close attention to the small arrow shaped metal contact near the bottom of the unit. Make sure it is wiped clean and everything is completely dry. Plug unit back into power and the red button should turn green.
I hope your not allergec to pets or something else in the new place.If it is the smoke do not hesitate, invest in air purifier/electronic air cleaner.They work great in filtering smoke but need cleaning often.
On this model both sides should come apart. The ioniser plate is glass with metal in it. Soak in dishwashing liquid sollution and rinse thorothly with fresh water and dry completely. clean the contacts that attaches to with a emory coth or very light sand paper. While you have apart inspect all wire connections and if you see a pc board look for any burnt marks. I could not access your email but mine is eboukater@gmail.com.
Have a manual for Kaz Air Purifiers?


text:
require 'spec_helper'

describe LiveFront::TabHelper do
  describe '#nav_link' do
    before do
      allow(self).to receive(:action_name).and_return('foo')
    end

    it 'captures block output' do
      expect(nav_link { 'Testing Blocks' }).to match(/Testing Blocks/)
    end

    it 'performs checks on the current controller' do
      expect(nav_link(controller: :foo)).to match(/
/)
      expect(nav_link(controller: :bar)).not_to match(/active/)
      expect(nav_link(controller: [:foo, :bar])).to match(/active/)
    end

    it 'performs checks on the current action' do
      expect(nav_link(action: :foo)).to match(/
/)
      expect(nav_link(action: :bar)).not_to match(/active/)
      expect(nav_link(action: [:foo, :bar])).to match(/active/)
    end

    it 'performs checks on both controller and action when both are present' do
      expect(nav_link(controller: :bar, action: :foo)).not_to match(/active/)
      expect(nav_link(controller: :foo, action: :bar)).not_to match(/active/)
      expect(nav_link(controller: :foo, action: :foo)).to match(/active/)
    end

    it 'accepts a path shorthand' do
      expect(nav_link(path: 'foo#bar')).not_to match(/active/)
      expect(nav_link(path: 'foo#foo')).to match(/active/)
    end

    it 'accepts a params value and checks if they are correct' do
      expect(nav_link(path: 'foo#foo', params: { p1: :s1 })).to match(/active/)
      expect(nav_link(path: 'foo#foo', params: { p2: [:_blank, :s2] })).to match(/active/)
      expect(nav_link(path: 'foo#foo', params: { p2: :s1 })).not_to match(/active/)
    end

    it 'passes extra html options to the list element' do
      expect(
        nav_link(action: :foo, html_options: { class: 'home' })
      ).to match(/
/)
      expect(nav_link(html_options: { class: 'active' })).to match(/
/)
    end
  end
end

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Preview: UFC Fight Night 'Maia vs. LaFlare'
Maia vs. LaFlare
Patrick Wyman Mar 19, 2015 Comments
Few fighters can deal with Demian Maia's grappling skills. | Photo: Marcelo Alonso/Sherdog.com
The Ultimate Fighting Championship returns to Fox Sports 1 with a decent lineup of fights that has been gutted by injuries. Following an injury to Raphael Assuncao, Urijah Faber was pulled from the card and slotted into the upcoming Philippines show, leaving veteran Demian Maia to take on the relatively unknown Ryan LaFlare in the main event.
The headliner should be interesting -- Maia remains a solid fighter, and LaFlare is one of the best fighters nobody is talking about -- but the name value drops off quickly after that. Josh Koscheck steps up for the injured Ben Saunders on short notice to fight one-round dynamo Erick Silva, while the rest of the lineup is full of "The Ultimate Fighter: Brazil" competitors, prospects and journeymen. Many of the bouts have the potential for action and finishes, but the fights themselves might get ugly.
Let us take a look at each matchup at UFC Fight Night "Maia vs. LaFlare" this Saturday at Maracanazinho Gymnasium in Rio de Janeiro:
WELTERWEIGHTS
Demian Maia (19-6, 13-6 UFC) vs. Ryan LaFlare (11-0, 4-0 UFC)
Photo: Ryan O'Leary/Sherdog/MMAViking.com
LaFlare pushes the pace pace.
THE MATCHUP: While not exactly oozing with name value, this is an excellent matchup. LaFlare has flown under the radar, but he has won four straight to open his UFC career, including victories over John Howard, Court McGee and Santiago Ponzinibbio. Maia is a veteran who will be making his 20th UFC appearance, and he has only lost to the elite at welterweight and middleweight during his long and productive career. LaFlare has a real chance to jump into the welterweight mix with a win here, while Maia can maintain his spot near the top of the division.
To a certain extent, Maia has aged like fine wine. After a period of wandering in the wilderness, during which he put too much focus on his underwhelming striking game, he rediscovered his suffocating, lethal wrestle-grappling wheelhouse. Like many veterans, Maia has pared down his game to only its most efficient and high-percentage aspects. Unless he absolutely has to, he makes little use of his southpaw boxing repertoire, which features a crisp straight left and solid pressuring footwork. His real goal is to force his opponent toward the fence, where he can make the best use of his excellent clinch game. Maia is suffocating with his hands on his opponent, chipping away with the occasional knees and punches while steadily working trips, throws and positional advances to the back. It must be said, however, that his shot takedowns at range are fairly underwhelming. He has a habit of shooting from too far away, which makes him relatively easy to stuff; if he gets in on the hips, however, Maia is a killer chain-wrestler.
Once he gets the fight to the ground, Maia's cool, methodical approach really shines. He works a variety of quick passes to the mount, throws a few ground strikes and then attempts to reach the back, where he has a slick array of setups for his rear-naked chokes and neck cranks. Simply put, Maia is a wizard on the ground and one of the very best grapplers in the sport's history. The problem with this pared-down approach is that any sort of backup plan is essentially impossible, while his age makes it difficult for Maia to work at a quick pace.
LaFlare's well-rounded game revolves around his excellent cardio and work rate. He can operate in every phase with some measure of skill, but what sets him apart and marks him as a fighter on the rise is his high offensive output, which he carries through into everything he does. At range, LaFlare works behind a steady diet of punch-kick combinations, with a distinct preference for the left kick to the body from his southpaw stance. The clinch is also a strong suit, as LaFlare controls well and regularly hits hard elbows and knees. He is not terribly powerful and he is relatively hittable, but few opponents can operate at his preferred pace for long.
While he is a solid striker, wrestling is LaFlare's best skill set, especially offensively. He can hit a bewildering variety of takedowns, ranging from lateral drops, outside trips and blast doubles to low singles and everything in between, and he excels at wrestling from his knees and scrambling on the mat. Defensively, however, he tends to rely on that scrambling ability and often gives up the initial takedown in the hopes of creating a transition. He is more of a rinse-and-repeat takedown artist than someone who controls his opponent on the mat, but again, the transitions and scrambles that result from that approach are his greatest strength. He excels at landing knees, punches and elbows as his opponent gets back to his feet or reacts to a level change. While he is not especially dangerous, LaFlare breaks his opponents with his pace and ability to weave together the different facets of his game into a seamless whole.
THE PICK: This is an intriguing matchup that revolves around two questions. First, how will Maia deal with LaFlare's pace, especially at his age? Second, will LaFlare trust his excellent takedown and transitional games against a wrestle-grappler of Maia's caliber or will he try to maintain range at all costs? The American is the better striker by a wide margin, and if LaFlare can stay out of Maia's wheelhouse in the clinch and on the ground, he should be able to crack the Brazilian repeatedly and wear him down. If Maia gets in on LaFlare's hips, he could control the American on the ground and finish this early. Given Maia's advancing age and LaFlare's consistent improvements, however, I think the matchup favors the younger man, especially over five rounds. The pick here is LaFlare by decision, with the possibility of a late knockout.
Next Fight » Erick Silva vs. Josh Koscheck
Page 1 - Maia vs. LaFlarePage 2 - Silva vs. KoscheckPage 3 - Santos vs. MartinPage 4 - Nunes vs. BaszlerPage 5 - Burns vs. OliveiraPage 6 - Castro vs. FiliPage 7 - The Prelims
Sherdog.com's 2015 Robbery of the Year
Update: Jorge Oliveira Tests Positive for Steroids at UFC Fight Night 'Maia vs. LaFlare'
All UFC Fight Night 'Maia vs. LaFlare' Drug Tests Come Back Clean
CABMMA Reverses Course, Overturns Silva-Dober UFC Fight Night Result
Brazilian Commission: Drew Dober's Loss at UFC Fight Night Can't Be Overturned


Svetlana Bolkovaya is the restorative justice program coordinator in Urai in Russia. With the rate of juvenile delinquency in Uria increasing in recent years, it became clear to criminal justice officials and others that the accepted measures of dealing with juvenile offenders and their parents were not successful. New approaches were needed to respond to juveniles with destructive and deviant behavior, as well as with troubled families. Therefore, in 2000 she and others took part in a restorative justice seminar in Tyumen, the seminar being led by the Public Centre for Legal and Judicial Reform. Bolkovaya explains how this led to the development of restorative justice initiatives in Urai, and she describes some of the cases being handled through restorative principles and processes.


Whether you're building a new home, knocking down walls or adding a fresh new look to a tired old space, you will want to check out these inspiring home remodeling design trends that are trending in the Lafayette, Indiana area this year.
In a continual push for more open space, designers and homeowners alike are nixing traditional upper cabinets in favor of a single storage wall. With all your kitchen storage in one place, you'll free up the rest of the space for an open and airy feel. Searching for a storage look that's uniquely you? Think outside the box and consider repurposing old file cabinets, console, or a chest of drawers for the storage you need with the vintage style you crave.
Studies show that the eye focuses green directly on the retina, allowing the muscles of the eye to relax. So it's no wonder that "Greenery," Pantone's color of the year for 2017, is a hit with homeowners looking to bring the calming effect of nature back into the kitchen. This zesty color is bright and cheery, too, for homeowners looking to compliment the warm tones of natural wood.
Does your laundry room need a little love? Most people spend a significant time doing laundry, so why do it in a dark, uninviting space? Consider updating your laundry room design to include smart storage and more light. The added functionality doesn't cost a bundle, either. According to Houzz, homeowners are spending an average of just $2,700 (including appliances) to update laundry rooms of 150 square feet or more.
If you're trying to free up space in a small to medium-sized kitchen, these counter-depth refrigerators are for you. We know comfort in your new kitchen remodel can be reduced to shaving off those last few inches. Counter-depth refrigerators sit flush with the surrounding countertops and cabinetry, giving you a little extra room to move around while making a stylish contribution to your streamlined kitchen design.
Are you ready for the next viral kitchen trend? The vote is in, and matte finish appliances have won. According to designer Bobby Berk in an interview with House Beautiful, Matte appliance finishes create an unexpected layer of interest for your design while stripping away the distractions that accompany surface sheen. Give this cutting edge trend a try in your 2017 remodel for the latest in kitchen chic.
If you haven't noticed it already, marble is back in full force. Especially when it's paired with wood and metal, marble countertops are a modern take on a luxury classic – perfect for your kitchen, bathroom, and more. But you don't have to break the bank to get the look. With genuine marble countertops coming in at nearly $250 per square foot, marble-look quartz is the next best thing with all the gravitas at half the cost.
Marble isn't just for countertops anymore. In fact, the marble-look trend is showing up all over the interior design industry (not to mention Pinterest) – from carpets and fabric to marble motif wallpaper. The soft look of marble motif wallpaper is especially elegant in powder rooms and on accent walls, but you could add it in just about anywhere!
In true throwback style, this trend is plucked straight out of the turn of the 20th century. Subway tiles are nothing new, but this classic element boasts infinite versatility. Better yet, it's entirely affordable. "It seems to be cementing itself as a style element of our generation," Bobby Berk explained in an interview with House Beautiful. Available in a range of materials, subway tiles can complement almost any style or finish – from modern minimalist to classic farmhouse.
Speaking of, it's time to break out the cozy quilts and shop for weathered antiques (if you haven't already) because farmhouse style is here to stay! The classic apron-front sink is a timeless focal point in any kitchen, too. Practically speaking, apron-front sinks are deep enough to handle large pots and platters for and they provide improved accessibility for shorter people and children. However, keep in mind that farmhouse sinks are a visually weighty item best suited to medium to large kitchen spaces.
Everyone loves hardwood floors. But why shell out for hardwood when the new-and-improved wood-look tile is a dead ringer for the real thing? Recently, homeowners are opting for wood-look tile on everything from floors to fireplaces, praising its waterproof convenience in places like the kitchen, bathroom, beach house, and more.
For more remodeling design trends, check out our portfolio of featured projects. Then, take the next step toward your 2017 home remodel and schedule an in-home meeting with your very own personal design consultant.


text:
Artist (France)
208 K Artworks have been viewed 208,220 times.
150 Artworks have been added to favourites 150 times.
442 442 artworks.
Jacques Joseph Tissot (15 October 1836 – 8 August 1902), Anglicized as James Tissot, was a French painter and illustrator. He was a successful painter of Paris society before moving to London in 1871. He became famous as a genre painter of fashionably dressed women shown in various scenes of everyday life. He also painted scenes and characters from the Bible. Studied from c.1856 at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, Paris, under Lamothe and H. Flandrin; became friendly with Whistler and Degas. Early influenced by Henri Leys and painted pictures of Faust and Marguerite. Later turned to scenes from contemporary life, especially of fashionable women, under the influence of Manet and Alfred Stevens.
Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Tissot
Tate www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/james-tissot-2048
Mark Almont Artist (United States)
Taehhh X Art Lover (5)
Thiago Gil Art Lover (5)
chris peng Art Lover (10)
Portrait of the Marquise de Miramon, née, Thérèse Feuillant 1866
James Tissot (FR)
The Gallery of HMS Calcutta (Portsmouth) 1876
Women of Paris: The Circus Lover 1885
The Ball on Shipboard 1874
The Widower 1876
Jesus Ministered to by Angels 1894
Portret van Mademoiselle L.L. 1864
The Shop Girl 1885
Hide and Seek 1877
On the Thames, A Heron 1866
An interesting story
Portsmouth Dockyard 1877
The Voice from on High 1894
Portrait of the Marquis and Marchioness of Miramon and... 1865
Les deux soeurs 1863
Faust and Marguerite in the Garden 1861


text:
package io.github.olyutorskii.jarabradix;

import org.junit.After;
import org.junit.AfterClass;
import org.junit.Before;
import org.junit.BeforeClass;
import org.junit.Test;

import static org.junit.Assert.*;

/**
 *
 */
public class ArabicEncoderTest {

    public ArabicEncoderTest() {
    }

    @BeforeClass
    public static void setUpClass() {
    }

    @AfterClass
    public static void tearDownClass() {
    }

    @Before
    public void setUp() {
    }

    @After
    public void tearDown() {
    }

    /**
     * Test of int2Arabic method, of class ArabicEncoder.
     */
    @Test
    public void testInt2Arabic_int_charArr() {
        System.out.println("int2Arabic");

        char[] cbuf;
        int buflen;
        int result;

        cbuf = new char[12];
        buflen = cbuf.length;

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(123, cbuf);
        assertEquals(3, result);
        assertEquals("123", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(0, cbuf);
        assertEquals(1, result);
        assertEquals("0", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(-1, cbuf);
        assertEquals(2, result);
        assertEquals("-1", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(1, cbuf);
        assertEquals(1, result);
        assertEquals("1", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(1234567890, cbuf);
        assertEquals(10, result);
        assertEquals("1234567890", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(-1234567890, cbuf);
        assertEquals(11, result);
        assertEquals("-1234567890", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(65536, cbuf);
        assertEquals(5, result);
        assertEquals("65536", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(65535, cbuf);
        assertEquals(5, result);
        assertEquals("65535", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(Integer.MAX_VALUE, cbuf);
        assertEquals(10, result);
        assertEquals("2147483647", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(Integer.MIN_VALUE, cbuf);
        assertEquals(11, result);
        assertEquals("-2147483648", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(Integer.MIN_VALUE + 1, cbuf);
        assertEquals(11, result);
        assertEquals("-2147483647", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        return;
    }

    /**
     * Test of int2Arabic method, of class ArabicEncoder.
     */
    @Test
    public void testInt2Arabic_3args() {
        System.out.println("int2Arabic");

        char[] cbuf;
        int buflen;
        int result;

        cbuf = new char[10];
        buflen = cbuf.length;

        result = ArabicEncoder.int2Arabic(123, cbuf, 5);
        assertEquals(3, result);
        assertEquals("123", new String(cbuf, 5 - result + 1, result));

        return;
    }

    /**
     * Test of long2Arabic method, of class ArabicEncoder.
     */
    @Test
    public void testLong2Arabic_long_charArr() {
        System.out.println("long2Arabic");

        char[] cbuf;
        int buflen;
        int result;

        cbuf = new char[20];
        buflen = cbuf.length;

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(123L, cbuf);
        assertEquals(3, result);
        assertEquals("123", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(0L, cbuf);
        assertEquals(1, result);
        assertEquals("0", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(-123L, cbuf);
        assertEquals(4, result);
        assertEquals("-123", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(1234567890L, cbuf);
        assertEquals(10, result);
        assertEquals("1234567890", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(123456789012345L, cbuf);
        assertEquals(15, result);
        assertEquals("123456789012345", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(Long.MAX_VALUE, cbuf);
        assertEquals(19, result);
        assertEquals("9223372036854775807", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(Long.MIN_VALUE, cbuf);
        assertEquals(20, result);
        assertEquals("-9223372036854775808", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(Long.MIN_VALUE + 1L, cbuf);
        assertEquals(20, result);
        assertEquals("-9223372036854775807", new String(cbuf, buflen - result, result));

        return;
    }

    /**
     * Test of long2Arabic method, of class ArabicEncoder.
     */
    @Test
    public void testLong2Arabic_3args() {
        System.out.println("long2Arabic");

        char[] cbuf;
        int result;

        cbuf = new char[10];

        result = ArabicEncoder.long2Arabic(123L, cbuf, 5);
        assertEquals(3, result);
        assertEquals("123", new String(cbuf, 5 - result + 1, result));

        return;
    }

}


text:
The Road to Minsk
Abraham Brumberg
Boris Yeltsin; drawing by David Levine
The collapse of the Soviet Union has been hailed by much of the Western press as prefiguring a new and hopeful era in contemporary history. True, there have been occasional pleas for caution and some grim prognostications. Secretary of State Baker has said we must wait to see what will happen, while Robert Gates, the new head of the CIA, warned a House subcommittee of the chaos and mayhem that would result from dismantling the (once evil) empire.1
Mostly, however, optimism prevailed. Typical of this view is a recent column in The Wall Street Journal. There is no sign, says the author, of widespread disorder in either Russia or the other republics, as some have warned; the threat of hunger is imaginary; unemployment is a serious matter, "but is it better to have full employment with half the people doing unproductive or counter-productive things…or to turn them loose to scrounge for a living providing real goods and services?"2 Other observers have been more restrained, arguing that the Commonwealth has gotten off to a good start, and that with proper support from the West, it is bound to succeed. Still others gloated over the end of Gorbachev and extolled his de facto successor, Boris Yeltsin.3
The climate was rather different in Moscow and other cities that I visited last November. The politicians of the new regime were appropriately triumphant. Many people, however, talked of another Putsch, perhaps mounted by disgruntled generals. The satisfaction with the imminent fall of "the center" was attenuated by the daily economic grind, the hours (three, four, even seven) spent in queues for a loaf of bread or a sack of potatoes, the harrowing absence of basic medications and articles of clothing. "Don't talk to me about politics," said one Moscow intelligent, who in the past wanted to speak of nothing but. "All I can think of these days is whether there's going to be food on my plate in the evening."
The pervasive mood—in the long lines waiting to get into stores or at metro stations—was one of weariness, cynicism, and anger, directed at all politicians, from Yeltsin down. Contemptuous of the old (and still powerful) nomenklatura, people as readily dismissed "the so called democrats," who after being elected to office proved more adept at feathering their nests than attending to the grievances of their constituents. "They are all the same, these robbers," was a view I heard constantly expressed.
Who is right, the "optimists" or the "pessimists"? To answer this question, a brief glance at the events of the past three months is in order, and, in particular, at the failed coup of August 18–22. And not only at what happened but also, in the words of Hugh Trevor-Roper, at what "might have" happened.4 For here, I believe, lies the key to understanding the emergence of the new Commonwealth of Independent States and to the problems it will face in the months and years ahead.
Though it collapsed almost as soon as it was staged, the coup has inspired a number of myths. That "people's power" brought down the "State Committee for the State of Emergency" is one: supposedly, the minority that engaged in active resistance was backed by the rest of the population, certainly in Moscow and other large cities.
Not quite. Public opinion polls conducted during the Putsch showed that half of the respondents considered the Putsch "illegal," about 25 percent approved of it, and the rest had no opinion. In other words, as one Soviet observer put it, "a significant part of the population in no way expressed its support for the democratic forces."5
Many anecdotes confirm these surveys. A couple I know, both resolute liberals, who live adjacent to the "White House" and thus had a ringside seat for the events, described it as an "eerie experience. Even a block away from where we live crowds were milling around, for all the world oblivious to what was going on only eight hundred meters away." For many Muscovites, especially young ones, this was, as one of them put it, "the finest moment of my life." For others it offered an opportunity to let off steam and flout social conventions ("there is going to be a rash of 'Putsch babies' come next May," as one person said).
Another myth has it that the Putschists were Communists. In fact, although they were all high-ranking Party members, they were above all "statists"—that is, bureaucrats concerned about the preservation of the organs of central government that guaranteed their power and privileges (villas, special rest homes, provisions for their children to study abroad, and the like). Hence the timing of the coup, one day before the signing of a "union treaty" that would have taken power away from their ministries and institutions (which controlled, for instance, the monetary and banking systems, food distribution, energy exports, and security services) and assigned much of that power to the republican governments.
But what of Trevor-Roper's "might have been"? What if the plotters had not launched their misbegotten enterprise? In the version of recent history now proffered by some Soviet politicians, and especially by Yeltsin, the union had been doomed for a long time, and the Putsch was merely the final nail in its coffin. Yeltsin refines this version by claiming that he personally had long opposed Gorbachev's notion of a "state," favoring instead a loose "federation" or "confederation." Gorbachev's "stubbornness," he claims, had finally forced him to give up his hopes for a confederation and to create, with his Belarussian and Ukrainian friends, the new Commonwealth.6
This is, at best, a half-truth. Before the abortive coup, most Soviet republics were ready to sign a "Union Treaty" preserving the state, in however feeble a form. In the text that was to be signed on August 20, the Union of Sovereign States was described as the successor state of the USSR, with a federative structure based on its own new constitution. The preservation and renewal of a union was explicitly endorsed. Moreover, the text listed a variety of treaties and agreements as within the exclusive competence of the Union, as well as those within the joint competence of the Union and the states signing the treaty.
On August 22, at the "Rally of Victors" outside the White House, Yeltsin declared emphatically that there should be no delay in signing the Union Treaty, although revisions would be needed.7 As late as November 30, only two days before Ukraine voted for independence on December 2, Yeltsin said on central television that he could not imagine a Union without Ukraine, and that if Ukraine did not sign a union treaty neither would Russia. Anatoli Sobchak, Petersburg's mayor, was even more forceful in his support of the union. In his address to the USSR Supreme Soviet on August 28, Sobchak argued in favor of the coordinating and arbitrating role of the central government, warning of the possible "catastrophic consequences" of control of nuclear weapons by the separate states.8 He repeated his warning as late as December 14, observing that the liquidation of all central government bodies could bring "anarchy" and "massive violations of human rights."9
Until the coup, a new union treaty was supported by most of the country except the Baltic republics, Moldavia (now Moldova), and Georgia. Each successive version weakened the power of the center; each was approved by Gorbachev and the other republics. Sentiment against the central government kept growing, but it wasn't until the coup that it became transformed, often for opportunistic reasons, into the demand for outright independence. Georgi Shakhnazarov, one of Gorbachev's closest political advisors, called the Putsch the "detonator" of the breakup of the Union, which until then most political leaders from Kiev to Ashkabad had thought it prudent to retain, despite the contradictions in the new Union Treaty which raised serious questions whether it would be effective.10
Last December 10, Leonid Kravchuk, the President of Ukraine, told his country's parliament that "the breakup of the USSR did not occur on December 7–8″—that is, at the meeting in Minsk which laid the foundations of the new Commonwealth—"but at the beginning of the period of perestroika—and we know precisely who is the author of this breakup."11 The agile Kravchuk leaped on the nationalist bandwagon last spring, after taking an active part in the Party's campaign against the nationalist Ukrainian movement Rukh in 1988 and 1989. Quick to recognize the huge popular support that Rukh and its position in favor of Ukrainian sovereignty commanded, Kravchuk put distance between himself and Moscow; he became an increasingly fervid supporter of Ukrainian sovereignty—though stopping short of advocating full independence. During the first two days of the Putsch, he, in effect, recognized the Emergency Committee; he then turned anti-Putsch—and indeed, anti-Communist and ardently pro-independence—after the Putsch failed.12
In Central Asia, where the idea of a new union had considerable support, largely because of fear of Russian imperial tendencies, the local Party authorities outdid Kravchuk in hypocrisy. After waffling about the Putsch, they used it to consolidate their power and swoop down on their political opponents. In Uzbekistan, Gorbachev's portraits disappeared on August 19. A day later, the police arrested leaders of the political opposition for "violating" the Emergency Committee's prohibition on public meetings and demonstrations. On August 22, when it was already obvious that the coup had come to grief, Islam Karimov, the republic's president, signed a decree making the Committee's directives illegal on Uzbek territory. At the same time, he issued more decrees banning oppositional activity. Uzbekistan, he explained to visiting Western journalists, wasn't ready for democracy.13
Similar developments took place in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Kirgizstan was the sole exception, because the local Party organization was reckless enough to try to overthrow the republic's popular president, Askar Akaev. Elected less than a year earlier, Akaev defeated the Party plotters by drawing on the support of local liberal reformers (such as republican Minister of Internal Affairs Feliks Kulov, who ordered local MVD units to keep conservative Communist forces out of the Central Committee building, the telegraph office, and the radio and TV center), by swiftly firing the local KGB chairman and appointing as his successor a supporter of the Movement for Democratic Reform, and by allying himself with Yeltsin in Moscow. Within days Akaev finished off the power of the Kirgiz Party, confiscating party buildings and banning party influence in workplaces; the coup de grâce was the ban on collecting dues.
In several cases, then, the coup acted as a catalyst—or "detonator"—for the consolidation of autocratic rule. Compromise on the division of power between the union and its constituent republics became less and less possible, though efforts to create an agreement on a new federal distribution of power continued, with Yeltsin's cooperation.
It was only in November that Yeltsin came to demand that the new Union of Sovereign States not be a state, as Gorbachev insisted, but a loose confederation. Nonetheless, on November 14 he agreed to Gorbachev's formula of a "confederative democratic state," i.e., a state in which largely independent units would recognize a central state power that would be accepted as such in international law. Gorbachev had insisted that such a formula was the prerequisite for effective reform; without it, the possibility increased that the Soviet Union would follow the disastrous example of Yugoslavia. On November 25 a new draft was prepared, repeating the pre-coup definition of the Union of Sovereign States as a "confederative democratic state" with its own citizenship, territory, integrated armed forces, and government. 14
Unlike the system envisaged in the August 15 draft, however, the new Union proposed on November 25 would have no separate constitution, and its formerly exclusive powers would be replaced by multilateral treaties between it and the participating states on economic coordination, defence and security issues, foreign policy, scientific and technical programs, human rights, ecology, transportation, communications, space, crime, education and culture, and the financing of the Union itself. A new article gave member states the right to create their own armies, with the Union government in charge of an integrated armed force "under centralized control." To placate Russian fears of secessionist tendencies among the autonomous republics within the Russian federation, they were no longer designated as parties to the treaty. (This was strikingly similar to Gorbachev's insistence that too many concessions to the constituent republics would lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.)
Although the treaty shifted real as well as symbolic power from the center to the republics, the draft was not initialed and the champagne ceremony planned for November 25 was canceled at the last moment. Instead, the states involved decided to submit the treaty draft to their respective parliaments for approval. Yeltsin's objections were among the main factors that caused the representatives at the November 25 meeting not to initial the new treaty. According to one participant he put forward a whole new set of amendments, although what they called for remains unclear.15
What caused this shifting back and forth? Gennadi Burbulis, deputy chairman of the Russian republic and now the second most powerful man in the Russian government, exerted heavy pressure against the treaty. A lecturer on Marxism-Leninism and founder, in 1988, of the "Discussion Tribune" in Sverdlovsk, a political club in support of democratization, Burbulis has consistently urged that Russia, and not a new union, be declared the lawful successor (pravopreyemnik) to the USSR. In addition, Ukraine's growing opposition to the treaty after the coup made revisions necessary, especially if Yeltsin was to have a central role in the new relationship. "What, after all, is the Union without Ukraine?" he asked on Soviet television four days later.
Had there been no coup, would Ukraine have signed the treaty?
Until August, only a few extreme nationalist organizations wanted both independence and secession from the union. Even Rukh, the Ukrainian organization that led the struggle for sovereignty, was, as late as last spring, not ready to advocate statehood without ties to the other Soviet republics. In the referendum that was held last March 17, over 80 percent of Ukrainian citizens agreed that Ukraine "should be part of a Union of Sovereign States on the principles of the declaration on state sovereignty of Ukraine" (the latter formally proclaimed by the Ukrainian republic's Supreme Soviet in July 1990). In the same referendum, in response to a rather different question—"Do you consider necessary the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?"—over 70 percent voted affirmatively. It is by no means clear that either the members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet who drew up the questions for the Ukrainian referendum, or the citizens who supported it overwhelmingly, knew exactly what such a union would entail.
During the summer, Ukraine participated in several discussions of econmic ties between members of the union, but put off signing the Union Treaty until after it adopted its new constitution and elected a president, both scheduled for early December. While the Ukraine might have pulled out of the Union after other republics, including the Russian republic, had approved the new Union Treaty—as they were going to do on August 20—there is no indication that this would have happened. What the Ukrainian government was after was more power for itself and less for the central government. As Kravchuk put it in July, Ukraine wanted first to produce its own draft of a treaty and then settle the differences between the two documents, all of which "requires time."16 In view of Gorbachev's (and Yeltsin's) eagerness to secure Ukraine's cooperation, those differences would have most likely been resolved.
The situation changed radically, as I suggested, after the Putsch. 17 For most Ukrainian citizens (including many of the 12 million Russians and about 3 million other non-Ukrainians, out of a total population of 52 million), hostility toward Moscow was now compounded by contempt for the plotters and for the Union itself—a union so shaky that a squalid plot could take place within its highest circles. If before the coup perhaps only a small percentage of Ukrainians were in favor of complete independence, now the sentiment for breaking with Moscow altogether became overwhelming. On December 1, almost 90 percent of the voters said "yes" to independence. Even in Crimea and the Donbass, where the population is predominantly non-Ukrainian, the votes for independence were over 60 and 70 percent respectively. No one wanted to be ruled from Moscow.18
"Moscow" was not only "Soviet," and not only the "center"—it also was and is Russian. And this, too, helps to explain the December 1 landslide. Although the ties between Russians and Ukrainians are so intimate as to blur national distinctions (half of all the Ukrainians in Ukraine, for instance, speak only Russian, as do all the Ukrainians living outside Ukraine), relations between the two people have often been marked by tension if not outright hostility even before the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Ukrainians, like so many other ethnic groups in Eastern Europe, became drawn to nationalism. For many Ukrainians, the Russians to the East, much as the Poles to the West, were not only national but, even more, class enemies—noblemen and landowners lording it over the downtrodden but proud peasant masses of the "borderland."19
Russians, for their part, have tended to treat the Ukrainians with condescension (often referring to them in the past as "Little Russians") or with disdain. The tendency persists. A Russian intelligent, an otherwise sophisticated man, asked me how anyone could support "independence for those lovers of Petlura and Bandera," referring respectively to the first and only president of the Ukrainian republic in 1918 and 1919, whose armies committed extensive atrocities against Jews, and to a Ukrainian partisan leader who collaborated with the Nazis. A young woman teacher in Kiev, herself half-Ukrainian, half-Russian, thought the idea of Ukrainian statehood "ridiculous." She expressed sympathy for Ukrainian cultural autonomy, agreeing with her father, a Ukrainian historian, that it was "scandalous" that until recently most elementary and high-school classes were taught in Russian, that Kharkov, the republic's second largest city, still lacks a single Ukrainian-language school, and that three quarters of Kiev's children still attend only Russian-language schools.
That they did so, she said, was not merely a reflection of a natural desire of parents to send their children to schools that give them a better chance to succeed in life, but the consequence of a deliberate policy of Russification.20 It was only fair that Ukrainians have greater administrative autonomy. "But couldn't all these problems," she said, "be resolved without cutting ourselves off from Russia entirely, and stationing customs control guards along our borders?"
Perhaps they could before August 22. But not since. Ukrainians, already suspicious of Russia's desire to make Moscow the center of its own empire, were angered and worried by the appointment of Russian officials to posts in the central administration immediately after the coup and by a flurry of statements coming from Yeltsin's assistants. When Pavel Voshchanov, Yeltsin's press secretary, asserted the Russian federation had the right to raise questions about its borders with republics declaring themselves independent, the alarmed Ukrainian reaction prompted Yeltsin to send a delegation, including Anatoli Sobchak, to meet with Ukrainian political leaders to reassure them that Russia was not claiming any such right.
Tensions were also exacerbated by a story appearing in Moscow's Nezavisimaya gazeta ("Independent Newspaper"), to the effect that Russia was contemplating a "nuclear strike" on the Ukraine if the latter insisted on retaining all its nuclear weapons. Such well-known "liberals" as Oleg Rumyantsev, a prominent social democrat, and Sergei Stankevitch, then deputy-mayor of Moscow, as well as Gennadi Burbulis and Russlan Khasbulatov, both members of Yeltsin's entourage, made statements that smacked of what used to be referred to as "Great Russian chauvinism." Burbulis, for instance, characterized Russia as "the only republic that could and must become the rightful heir to the [Soviet] Union and all of its structures."21
A spokesman for Rukh commented:
Once more, just as it did seventy-two years ago, an attempt at a Ukrainian rebirth calls forth high-handed rejection from certain newly democratized leaders of Russia—victors over the Red putschists. Once more, illusions of messianism, once more the "Big Brother" syndrome, imperial aspirations regarding one's neighbors.22
Yeltsin issued a clarification denying any desire to change Russia's borders and the others fell silent. But as the eminent sociologist Yuri Levada told me in Moscow, "even if you withdraw, your credibility suffers." In Kiev, the historian Vladimir Yevtukh was still bothered by these statements three months later: "This amounts to pressure, and it is stupid and counter-productive." Despite a number of apparently cooperative meetings between Russians and Ukrainians, including the meeting first establishing a Commonwealth in early December, tensions remain, and there are many disagreements on issues ranging from economic ties to control of the Black Sea fleet, which includes some of the USSR's most powerful naval forces.
The presence of Russians and more than one hundred other nationalities in Ukraine is likely to bedevil it for years to come. In Russia, the independence of the Ukraine, complete with its own armed forces, currency, and foreign policy, is resented by groups both on the left and on the right. Nikolai Travkin heads the Russian Democratic Party, which, with 50,000 members, is the largest political organization in Russia. Travkin believes that the Russians in Crimea (since 1954 part of Ukraine) are "bound to become restive." When they do, "Kravchuk will send troops into the Crimea much as Yeltsin did in the case of the Chechen-Ingush republic." In fact, Yeltsin's order to send in troops was annulled by the Russian Parliament and they were never deployed.23 But Travkin approved of Yeltsin's decision. On the day we spoke, in late November, his party and two other minor political groups ostentatiously bolted the Democratic Russia coalition, on the grounds that it was insufficiently firm in protecting the territorial integrity of Russia.
On the right, the most dangerous threat to amicable relations between Ukraine and the Russians, and indeed to the survival of democracy in Russia, is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head of the Liberal Democratic Party, who last June ran for president of Russia, winning seven million votes, the third largest total after Yeltsin and Gorbachev's former prime minister of the USSR, Nikolai Ryzhkov. A figure both odious and comical, Zhirinovsky, whose patronymic is Volfovich (from Volf), is eager to be seen as a fullblooded ethnic Russian. His mother was a "pure Russian," he claims, while his father, who died when Vladimir was two, "might have been Ukrainian or Polish." (Hence the quip that "according to Zhirinovsky, his mother was Russian and his father a lawyer.")
Zhirinovsky advocates "an authoritarian regime," the suspension of all political parties, and the scuttling of market reforms. He is also fiercely xenophobic. (Once, when asked whether he wasn't concerned about "following lines that parallel Hitler," he replied that he was "not following any parallels. Adolf was just an illiterate corporal, while I graduated from two higher educational institutions and speak four languages."24 ) In Moscow as late as December 22 he and the right-wing army colonel Viktor Alksnis led a demonstration of several thousand people demanding that the Soviet Union be retained and that all steps leading to "capitalism" be rescinded.
In Ukraine, the Rukh organization as well as the major political parties are aware of the potential of virulent nationalism and intolerance, and have gone to considerable lengths to reassure the minorities, such as Russians, Tatars, Armenians, Poles, and others. They have also benefited from the experience of the Baltic countries, and from Gorbachev's disastrous failure to pay proper heed to national aspirations in the former USSR. The problem of the status of the Ukrainian language—particularly sticky in a country where half of the population doesn't speak it—seems to have been settled amicably. According to a law passed in late 1989, Ukrainian will be the republic's official language, but other languages will be accorded "governmental status" in those areas where they are spoken. The Crimean Tatars are being settled in their old territories from which they had been exiled during the war, and other ethnic groups in that area, particularly the Russians, have been assured they would have autonomy.
The most impressive accomplishment, for which Rukh is primarily responsible, is to assure the rights of Ukraine's large Jewish community. Kiev, once a flourishing center of Yiddish scholarship and culture, now has several Jewish newspapers (though not in Yiddish—few people under sixty speak it), theatrical groups, clubs, political organizations (mostly Zionist), and schools.
Oleksandr Burakovski, chairman of the Rukh's Council on Nationalities and himself involved in Jewish activities, told me that many of Rukh's leaders were painfully aware of Ukraine's appalling record of anti-Semitism: more than 80,000 Jews perished in pogroms between 1918 and 1919; tens of thousands of Ukrainians collaborated with the Nazis during the war, with many of them serving in the SS extermination squads; and in the late 1960s and 1970s some of the most repulsive anti-Jewish tracts appeared in Kiev. Rukh, he said, is determined to rid the country of this ugly legacy. Above all, in his words, Ukraine "wants to be recognized as a true modern country, and this cannot be accomplished with the stain of anti-Semitism upon it, and without the unity of all ethnic groups on its territory." He pointed out that Ukraine doesn't have a single newspaper or journal comparable to the poisonously anti-Semitic and xenophobic Russian publications such as Molodaya gvardiia, Sovremennik, and Moskva.
This is not to say that anti-Semitism does not continue to thrive, or that the record of the Ukrainian democrats is all that clean. In particular, some of the latter have attempted to exonerate Simon Petlura, under whose administration some of the most savage killings following World War I were committed, on the grounds that he wasn't "personally" anti-Semitic—a claim which aside from its dubious morality is also false, as many studies have shown.25
Despite the Ukrainian government's desire to deal with legitimate grievances of the minorities, the future remains clouded. In an atmosphere of unrestrained "sovereignty," passions may heat up, and ethnic demands may intensify. On September 4, 1991, the Crimean Supreme Soviet declared the "state sovereignty" of the Crimea as a constituent part of the Ukraine, but ever since, the movement for Crimean self-determination—in effect secession—has had strong support. Several civic groups are pressing for a referendum to determine Crimea's status—whether it should remain within Ukraine or be united with the Russian republic. A leader of the "Party of Democratic Rebirth," a mildly social democratic group organized on the same principles as the "Democratic Platform" (later Republican) Party in Russia, told me in Kiev that the policy of "inundating Crimea with Ukrainian books" and official documents in Ukrainian tends to be seen by some Russians as an "attempt at forced Ukrainization." Last October, the Ukrainian legislature passed a law stipulating three to seven years of deprivation of freedom for acts "aimed at dismembering the Ukraine or changing its state system"—if not an ominous move, then at least a gratuitous one.
I have tried to suggest that the failed coup was a major factor in the breakup of the Soviet Union. Had the new union come into existence on August 19, with considerable powers vested in the individual republics, but with a central government exercising control over matters such as coordination of economic policies ("a unified economic space") and the armed forces (including nuclear weapons), some of the critical problems now facing the new Commonwealth could have been ameliorated or deferred. Now that the Commonwealth of Independent States is, formally at least, a fait accompli, the problems should be squarely faced.
First, and astonishingly, the agreement signed by the eleven republics of the Commonwealth (CIS) said absolutely nothing about economic policies, although without an explicit mechanism of coordination the Commonwealth would in all likelihood come apart, and many of the republics would sink into penury and chaos. Subsequently some beginning steps have been taken toward coordinating economic policies, but the differences between the economic structures of the republics are enormous. Some are one-crop economies, with Uzbekistan, for example, growing mostly cotton; others are rich in natural resources but depend on subsidies they have been receiving annually from Russia (in 1988, for instance, to the tune of 64 billion rubles) in order to maintain their standard of living and social stability. Such subsidies may no longer be forthcoming.
The eminent Russian economist Nikolai Shmelev is bitterly aware of the dangers:
Nobody should have any illusions: No republic, including the Baltic states, will survive on its own without a rich and kind uncle ready to pay all of its accounts for at least ten to fifteen years. Is there such an uncle? They say that there is: America, the Common Market, Scandinavia, and, finally, their own diaspora dispersed throughout the world. Lies. There is no such uncle in the world today and no diaspora to pay annual subsidies to the republics to cover multibillion deficits from the unavoidable transition to world prices and hard currency clearing in trade with Russia. They will give money for a church, a hospital, and perhaps even for a university…. But supporting someone in this stormy world of ours…a world in which entire continents still live in inhuman poverty? Come now, you must be joking, gentlemen!26
Reading such comments, it is well to remember that during the last two years at least six economic programs were put forward by the Gorbachev administration and none was carried out. But the economic reforms on which Russia is now embarking will inevitably create appalling strains, and pressures on its neighbors to follow suit. Kazakhstan's president, for example, announced in early November that the Russian reform program, especially price liberalization, would force Kazakhstan to lift price controls much sooner than planned; the Belarussians said much the same. If prices increase in some republics but not in others, economic warfare—complete with trade barriers and export limitations—seems likely. Moreover, price increases alone will not lure produce and products into places where they are scarce so long as the currency remains worthless, and it is not yet clear which of the various monetary reform schemes proposed will prevail.27
Yeltsin has replaced one economic "tsar" and one set of proposals with another (though he acidly criticized Gorbachev precisely for following that pattern). One of his most useful proposals is to allow peasants to own their own land. Still, in the main he is following a line similar to the "shock therapy" introduced in Poland two years ago on the advice of Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard. In Poland this policy has led to the creation of many profitable private businesses, but it has already caused a drop of nearly 40 percent in production, enormous hardships and social turmoil, and helped to bring about the collapse of two governments.28 In Russia the results are bound to be much grimmer if, as seems likely, inflation rises and production falls.
Even more threatening than uncoordinated and impetuous economic plans are separatist passions, which have become more intense since August. The Tatars in their Autonomous Republic in Russia (Tatarstan) as well as other minorities in the Siberian Far East are heatedly debating the issue of independent status. In late November, for instance, Ingush voters overwhelmingly (97.4 percent) supported the formation of a separate Ingush republic within the Russian federation. The Chechens' triumph in defying the Russian government is likely to whet the appetites of others for independence. Yeltsin is determined to uphold the territorial integrity of his republic. To some ethnic groups, this is nothing but Russian imperialism.
Without a centrally controlled military force to keep them in check, ethnic clashes are likely to increase. Since the removal of Soviet troops from Nagorno-Karabakh, the bloody conflict between the Azeris and Armenians has become bloodier. Gorbachev's warnings of incipient civil wars—dismissed by his critics at home and such commentators as Vladimir Bukovsky in the West as a refusal to relinquish personal power—may yet prove to be chillingly correct.
In Alma Ata on December 21, the eleven republics pledged "to build democratic states ruled by law." Where power is vested in autocrats who run the single party in the state (with or without the word "Communist" in its name), such pledges can hardly be taken seriously. They become positively suspect when accompanied by the sycophantic assurances given to Secretary of State Baker that the republics will base their policies (such as building "capitalism") on Baker's "five principles" guiding the United States in its relations with the new Commonwealth (such as respect for "democracy" and "human rights"). Nor is the appetite for authoritarian rule restricted to some of the Central Asian countries or to the non-Commonwealth Georgia.
A year and a half ago I described, in these pages, a meeting of "Moscow Tribune," a liberal discussion club founded by Sakharov, which convened to consider Gorbachev's demand for special presidential powers.29 Last November, the very same club convened to discuss Yeltsin's demands for additional powers to enact a package of radical economic reforms and to limit political activity. In late October Yeltsin had asked for extraordinary powers to rule by decree until the end of the following year, even if such powers contravened Soviet and Russian laws. He also requested the power to ban any election in the Russian federation until the end of next year. It was an uncanny experience: one person after another rose to denounce Yeltsin for his "authoritarian tendencies" and to warn against "uncritical support" of the Russian president. Both denunciations and warnings echoed what I had heard eighteen months before about Gorbachev.
Yeltsin had aroused the opposition of some of his formerly enthusiastic democratic supporters by creating an executive secretariat responsible for vetting all administrative decisions without any coordination with the State Council, the body charged by the Russian Parliament with formulating all basic policies of the Russian republic. As head of the new administrative staff Yeltsin appointed Yuri Petrov, a Party apparatchik who had worked with Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk and was then ambassador to Cuba. Petrov, in turn, appointed other Sverdlovsk friends to various positions on his staff. 30
Members of the State Council were not only excluded from the policy-making process, but for a time they, as well as other democratic deputies and even his own vice-president, could not get through to see Yeltsin. Finally, after a meeting with the radical historian and chairman of Democratic Russia Yuri Afanasyev, Yeltsin slightly appeased his liberal "critical supporters," as they call themselves, by promising to meet regularly with representatives of Democratic Russia and to curb the powers of Petrov and his associates. He has also given more authority to "young Turks" such as Yegor Gaidar; the deputy premier in charge of economic ministries.
Some of Yeltsin's actions after the Alma Ata meeting of December 21, all smacking of his love of power, while petty, were gratuitously abrasive. On December 25, right after Gorbachev's resignation speech, Yeltsin issued a decree privatizing Gorbachev's state-owned apartment in Moscow, and two days later he moved into Gorbachev's office without giving the former Soviet president a chance to clean it out first.31 On the same day, Yeltsin (by presidential decree) removed his own vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoi, from the chairmanship of five special Russian executive committees in what was widely construed as punishment for Rutskoi's criticism of some of Yeltsin's policies. Rutskoi had criticized Yeltsin's ban on the Communist Party, but in particular the liberalization of retail prices, on the ground that it would lead to the impoverishment of most of the population, and to "unpredictable social consequences."
Similar charges of autocratic behavior have been made against the mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoli Sobchak, and the Moscow mayor, Gavriil Popov—in the case of the latter, at least, with considerable justification. Force of habit and the absence of democratic political traditions were almost bound to breed authoritarian behavior, and they may not yet pose a serious threat to the survival of democratic institutions in Russia and other republics. But authoritarianism and dictatorship feed on economic and political instability. The Putsch of last August, while it resulted in the emergence of new democratic institutions in many parts of the former Soviet Union, has also accelerated the breakdown of nearly everything else—from public medicine to road maintenance, food production and distribution, refuse collection, transport, and police protection. To some political observers, such as the deputy chief editor of Moscow News, Stepan Kiselyov, "the viruses of totalitarianism are vigorously multiplying." Another, Andronik Migranian, told me that he fully expected Yeltsin to dissolve the parliament if he finds it recalcitrant.
Such predictions should be taken with much skepticism. The democratic institutions spawned by Gorbachev's reforms—and we ought not forget that they were, indeed, his reforms—have thus far proved remarkably resilient in the European republics, if less so in Central Asia.32 Many of the problems I have described here may be resolved, or mitigated. Some would be unavoidable under any circumstances. But the least that can be said is that what might have been more easily accomplished through a commonly agreed upon and regulated process may now become more unmanageable. The road to Minsk presents so many hurdles that some of those who have set out on it may well be tempted to turn back, even if it is too late.
More by Abraham Brumberg
Jews in Poland
'Neighbors'
'Struggle for the Kremlin': An Exchange
Abraham Brumberg (1926–2008) was an essayist, editor and translator. His memoir, Journey Through Vanishing Worlds, was published by New Academia in 2007.
The New York Times, December 11, 1991. ↩
"Breaking Up Is Hard, But Let's Not Freak Out," by George Melloan, The Wall Street Journal, December 16, 1991. ↩
For a particularly nasty example of the former, see the characteristically entitled "Goodbye, Gorby, And Good Riddance," by Vladimir Bukovsky, Op-Ed page, The New York Times December 18, 1991, A29. For a view that makes the success of the Commonwealth depend on appropriate Western aid, see "Help Russia Now," by Anders Aslund and Richard Layard, Op-Ed page, The New York Times, December 5, 1991. ↩
At any given moment [in history] there are alternatives, and to dismiss them…because they were not realized is to take the reality out of the situation." H.R. Trevor-Roper, History and Imagination (Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 2. ↩
Leonid Gordon, "In Anticipation of the Shock," Moskovskie novosti, October 13, 1991. It should be noted that these figures constitute the average responses, and that in some areas proor anti-Putsch sentiment varied by as much as 70 percent. ↩
"Intervista a Boris Eltsin," by Enrico Franceschini, la Repubblica, December 17, 1991, p. 2. ↩
Izvestia, August 23, 1991. ↩
Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 16, 1991. ↩
Literaturnaia gazeta, November 6, 1991. ↩
Izvestia, December 11, 1991. ↩
"I feel that the committee that has just been formed has already made quite a few mistakes. Well, that's normal, because it is a new formation; it has not found itself yet. But can this be corrected? I think it can." ("Ukraine: Kravchuk's Role," by Roman Solchanyk, Report on the USSR, Munich, September 6, 1991, p. 48.) I was told by a Ukrainian scholar in Kiev, a firm believer in Ukrainian independence, that Kravchuk was concerned less about popular pressure than about the consequences of the ban on the Soviet and Russian Communist parties immediately after the coup. In order to avoid having Moscow's anti-Communist officials descend upon Kiev, Kravchuk, with the approval of his party, proclaimed Ukrainian independence (subject to a referendum) on August 25, which caused one deputy in the Supreme Soviet "to burst into tears—she didn't want independence to come from these scoundrels." A few days later, Kravchuk banned the Communist Party. ↩
See "Uncoupled Train Car," by Valery Vyzhutovich, Izvestia, September 13, p. 3. Translation in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVIII, No. 37 (1991), p. 14. ↩
For a detailed analysis, see Ann Sheehy, "The Union Treaty: A Further Setback," Report on the USSR, December 6, 1991, pp. 1–4. ↩
Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the Union Treaty," Report on the USSR, July 26, 1991, p. 23. ↩
See Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine: Kravchuk's Role," Report on the USSR, September 6, 1991, p. 47. ↩
The parallel with 1917–1918 is striking. At that time, too, post-tsarist Russia was confronted with a Ukrainian national movement. "If Russia had remained a democratic republic," writes the historian Richard Pipes, the Ukrainian national movement would have been content with broad territorial autonomy…. The Bolshevik coup d'état changed the situation overnight." (See the introduction to The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution, Taras Hunczak, editor, Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 2.) ↩
The word Ukraina comes from the Russian okraina, meaning outskirts, or borderland. Unlike his Russian counterpart, the individual Ukrainian peasant was not subordinated to the commune (mir). Many Ukrainian historians also consider the sixteenth-and seventeenth-century struggles of the free Cossacks of Zaporozhe against the Poles and the Russians as attempts to form an independent Ukrainian state. ↩
The same policies proved even more damaging in Belarus, where to this day there is not a single school in which Belarussian is the language of instruction. ↩
Izvestia, October 2, 1991. ↩
Quoted by Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: Before and After the Coup," Report on the USSR, September 27, 1991, p. 16. ↩
The Chechens and Ingushes are combative Caucasian peoples who were conquered by tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century and exiled by Stalin during the war for their alleged pro-German inclinations. After the failed coup of August 18–22, a Chechen general, Dzhakhar Dudaev, head of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People, seized power in Checheno-Ingushetia (an autonomous republic within the Russian federation), on the ground that its Communist authorities supported the coup. Yeltsin at first supported Dudaev, but when the latter declared independence in November, he decreed a state of emergency, and sent troops to enforce it. At this point the Ingushes, who had hitherto stayed on the fence, turned against Yeltsin, too. The Russian federation's Supreme Soviet rescinded Yeltsin's decree, and the troops went home. Relations between Yeltsin and the Chechen-Ingush authorities remain tense and unresolved. ↩
Izvestia, September 4, 1991, p. 2. ↩
See, for instance, Saul S. Friedman, Pogromchik—The Assassination of Simon Petlura (Hart, (1976). ↩
Nikolai Shmelev, "A Chance for Salvation," Izvestia, October 19, 1991. ↩
For an excellent summary of the problems connected with fiscal reform, see Ben Slay, "On the Economics of Interrepublican Trade," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 48 (November 29, 1991), pp. 1–7. ↩
I discuss these matters in "Poland Revisited," Los Angeles Weekly, December 26, 1991. ↩
"The Turning Point?" The New York Review, June 28, 1990. ↩
See "Thirty Days After the Putsch," text of a memorandum issued by "one of Russia's parliament committees" and leaked to Moscow News, September 29, 1991. ↩
The New York Times, December 28, 1991, and Izvestia, December 27, 1991. ↩
The New York Times reported on December 28 that the president of Uzbekistan had pardoned several former officials imprisoned for corruption in the "cotton case" crackdown of the late 1980s, and that the Communist Party had reemerged in Tajikistan after a three month ban. ↩
Giovanni Agnelli Foundation
The Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize
March 17, 1988 issue
Christa Wolf, translated by Henning Gutmann
A Speech in East Berlin
From a New Year's Day Speech
Martin Garbus
New Mag in Moscow
Jane Yett Kiely
If the Fighting Had Taken Place Here


The BirdLife Partnership works with governments, regional fisheries management organisations, international conventions and fishing fleets around the world to reduce seabird mortality through fishing "bycatch", which has made seabirds the most threatened of all groups of bids. BirdLife Partners have also been engaged in mapping the most important marine areas (including coastal waters and the high seas) for seabirds. More than 3000 marine Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas have so far been recognised, the largest network of sites of importance for marine biodiversity.
A series of national workshops were held by BirdLife Partners to launch the marine IBA identification programme. An initial list of candidate marine IBAs has now been compiled for all relevant countries in Asia, and BirdLife's Partners are working to ensure that they are included in national and international networks of protected areas.
Today we celebrate World Oceans Day as we finally reach a record-breaking 10 million data points in the Seabird Tracking Database.
Penguins are among the world's most charming and recognisable birds but from south pole to equator a web of threats is seeing them slide ever-closer towards extinction.


This wasn't always the case. Growing up in a loving but dysfunctional family, Luke was a lonely little boy who never felt that he belonged. While his parents adored him, the whole family knew that due to a mix-up at the hospital, Luke wasn't their biological child. His parents did the best they could to make the lad feel special. But it was his beloved uncle Terence who Luke felt most close to, a man who enchanted (and frightened) the lad with tales of the other—eldritch beings, hedge folks, and other fables of Celtic myth.
In everything we do, every decision we make and every action we undertake, our identities define us... yet we never really know who we are. We know who we were—we tell ourselves we do, to be sure—but like all memories, these recollections lose their sharpness with time, and, invariably, some of their truth, too. And while we think we know who we will be, these are projections at best; messy guesses subject to sudden and surprising changes in circumstance.
Take Luke Arnold, the central perspective of The Kind Folk by Ramsey Campbell. He thought he was the only son of Maurice and Freda Arnold, but as a DNA test taken on television demonstrates, he's not; the hospital must have given the couple he calls mum and dad the wrong baby. "He still has all his memories; nothing has changed them or what he is, let alone the people who are still his parents in surely every way that counts." (p.19) Nevertheless, this sensational revelation alters Luke's perception of his past, and that, in turn, has huge ramifications on his future.
Who, then, is the man caught in the middle?
A father-to-be, in the first, because Luke's wife, the singer/songwriter Sophie Drew, is expecting. And although the doctors at the hospital give clean bills of health to both of the prospective parents, they take Luke to one side to say that it would be "in the interest of your child to discover what you can about your origins." (p.73) Origins that, try as he might to divine them in the subsequent months, don't seem to be entirely natural in nature.
It just so happens he already has an inkling as to where else he could conceivably have come from, because as a boy, he was haunted by bad dreams, imaginary companions and a compulsion to twist the fingers of his hands into shapes seen by some as satanic. The child psychologist little Luke saw all those years ago thought this was the fault of Luke's beloved uncle, Terence, and his tales of the Kind Folk.
"That was what people used to call the fairies to try and stop them getting up to anything too wicked, the Kind Folk," (p.90) and for Terence, they were something of an obsession—an obsession Luke comes to believe might hold the key to his own otherwise inexplicable origins when his dear uncle dies and he inherits a journal of strange stories and seemingly nonsensical notes. These allude to "the legend of the changeling—an inhuman or demonic baby substituted for a human one soon after birth," (p.120) and as Luke retraces Terence's travels, he becomes increasingly gripped by the fear that he is just such a creature.
These are places where the borders between worlds have been worn so thin, he thinks, that he might stand a chance of speaking to the beings he's beginning to believe in. Luke's burgeoning beliefs are reinforced by the reading he does in his down-time, in the course of which he learns that changelings "learned to pass for human by imitating traits they observed, a camouflage as innate as the chameleon's. Many displayed their talent for mimicry, while quite a few gained fame with it." (p.120) Fame such as he has gained, I dare say, making for a nominally unreliable narrator.
In a world so unerringly intent, a world in which even the detail is dangerous, it's not hard to believe that there may be others out there after all, be they Kind Folk or fairies or demons or dreams. I urge you only to be careful what you call 'em. Names are of course a source of power in the old stories, entangled are they are in questions of identity; questions that The Kind Folk asks—and eventually, evocatively, answers—to unforgettable effect.
This, dear reader, is a novel with a name... a novel that knows exactly what it is... and what it is, is brilliant.