I find myself genuinely sympathetic to both sides because it seems to me that both sides genuinely want to affirm something valuable about God and want to avoid certain deeply problematic extremes. My hope is that with some careful definitions and distinctions we can find room for at least a partial rapprochement.
First, let me state some preliminary assumptions that I hope all parties can agree on.
The Anselmian intuition that God, whatever else we may say about Him, is necessarily and essentially the greatest possible being. As Plantinga glosses this idea, God is "maximally excellent", i.e., instantiates a maximally great property set in all [metaphysically] possible worlds. Most philosophical theists, myself included, take this intuition to be axiomatic for theism. Debates among theists tend to center around what that maximal property set consists in, not whether God instantiates such a set. For example, classical theists tend to think that a maximally excellent being must be immutable, timeless, wholly impassible, etc., whereas open and relational theists tend to think that such a being need not be any of those things.
That God has differential preferences from among the various causally possible futures. There are some causally possible futures that, relatively speaking, God would prefer not occur and others that, relatively speaking, God would prefer to occur. For example, given the Bible's explicit declaration that God hates evil (especially moral evil, i.e., sin), it is clear that, all other things equal, God prefers futures with less moral evil over futures with more moral evil.
That God is impassible in nature and passible in knowledge, to use Richard Creel's helpful distinction between four different types of impassibility (nature, will, knowledge, and feeling). Impassibility in nature means that God's character is immutable and essential to God. God cannot become less than perfectly loving, perfectly holy, etc. Passibility in knowledge means that what God knows depends, to some extent, on what creatures do. This sort of passibility is an entailment of open theism, to which all parties to this dispute are committed. Whether God is impassible in will or not, depends on whether God has done exhaustive contingency planning from the get-go. Since I believe that God can do such contingency planning and that God has compelling moral reasons to do so if He can, I believe that God is necessarily impassible in will, but some open theists (e.g., John Sanders) demure, preferring to see God as making some decisions on the fly in dynamic response to creaturely developments. Let's set this issue aside. The primary issue here is whether God is passible in feeling, that is, whether God's original intra-Trinitarian tranquility can come to be perturbed, even slightly, by creaturely actions. There are, I believe, strong considerations pulling in both directions.
That God is impassible in feeling is plausibly thought to be entailed by the Anselmian intuition and creation ex nihilo. Thus, if God by definition is essentially an intrinsically maximally excellent being, and if being in a state of emotional bliss is a genuine perfection, then it seems that God's intra-Trinitarian bliss prior to creation must be essential to Him and therefore cannot be lost or perturbed.
In addition, if God does exhaustive contingency planning from the get-go, then He can't ever be caught "off guard" by anything that creatures may do since He's already prepared for every possibility. Hence, it may be argued, nothing creatures do or can do could possibly upset God's pre-creation intra-Trinitarian bliss.
Setting the Incarnation and Crucifixion aside because they involve metaphysical complications that would take us far afield, the differential preferences thesis poses a serious challenge for impassibilism. If that thesis is right—and how can open theists avoid it?—then God cannot be indifferent concerning how things turn out. God must, rather, be at least somewhat disappointed when we choose selfishness over love and when we gratuitously inflict pain on others. For while God permits us to do such things, He also clearly desires that we not do so. And since many such evils have occurred, God must be keenly aware of the rather large gap that exists between all of the more ideal "what could have beens" and the relatively screwed up "what is". Recognition of that gap is the basis for disappointment, and it's a sentiment that the Bible amply attests when it speaks of Divine repentance, regret, sorrow, and anger in response to human sinfulness.
Strong passibilism in feeling: God's emotions can be perturbed by creaturely actions to the point that God can be, if not temporarily overwhelmed by them, then at least temporarily functionally impaired by them. In other words, in response to, say, a major unexpected disappointment (the Fall?) God may need some time to "process" it (by "venting"?) before continuing as usual.
Weak passibilism in feeling: God's emotions can be perturbed by creaturely actions, but the degree of perturbation is such that God cannot in any degree be functionally impaired by them.
Impassibilism in feeling: God's emotions cannot be perturbed at all by creaturely actions. God's intra-Trinitarian bliss is maintained is perfect equanimity regardless of creaturely actions.
As I see it, the second view (weak passibilism in feeling) is clearly the most defensible and may, if accepted, go some distance toward a rapprochement by avoiding the extremes that may worry passibilists and impassibilists, respectively.
A God who could be emotionally perturbed to the point of functional impairment would not be omnicompetent. He would be emotionally fragile in a way that is all too human, but unfitting for a maximally excellent being as per the Anselmian intuition. An essentially omniscient God who creates ex nihilo would know ahead of time the extent to which evil is possible in creation and how such evils would feel to His creatures (since He designed them with the capacity to feel in just that way), and He would know in advance that He is competent to deal with even the worst-case scenario, should it come to pass. So there's no reason why God should be overwhelmed or even functionally impaired by disappointment.
A God who couldn't be perturbed at all couldn't be omnibenevolent given the open theist commitment to morally significant creaturely freedom and an open future. The mere fact that God has differential preferences regarding creaturely outcomes requires that God be able to feel disappointment, in some sense, when things go contrary to God's preferences, and be pleased, in some sense, when things go according to God's preferences. In other words, while believers in divine meticulous providence may consistently affirm that God is impassible in feeling because on such views God gets exactly what God has chosen and so shouldn't be even slightly disappointed or pleasantly surprised by anything, on open theism and doctrines of general providence more broadly, God should feel differently depending on what happens.
But then what about the idea that God's intra-Trinitarian bliss prior to creation must be essential to Him and therefore cannot be lost or perturbed? I think what open theists have to say is that it's not that God's pre-creational bliss cannot be perturbed, but that it cannot be perturbed apart from God's choice. God's inner tranquility is not essentially independent of creaturely actions, but it is initially so independent. God is not essentially invulnerable to disappointment, but can willingly make Himself so vulnerable, for such is a necessary concomitant of creating a world containing morally free creatures. A God that couldn't make Himself vulnerable to disappointment could also never be pleasantly surprised by anything, and therefore would necessarily miss out on an important positive emotional experience that humans can enjoy. It may be argued, then, that God's maximal excellence is not diminished but is actually enhanced by the ability to make Himself vulnerable to disappointment.
I think it does map some of the terrain well. You've been up front about setting aside some major components of the rift so as to simplify the conflict (e.g. the Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection, etc. of Jesus Christ). While I think that may be helpful, I also think this may lead to a normalization of a non-christocentric theological methodology. The life of Messiah Jesus of Nazareth, as it is passed down by the apostolic Evangelists in the New Testament forms the starting place and anchoring commitment for my theological method. So, while I believe I can indeed affirm the "Anselmian Axiom," the set of attributes that obtain in a maximally excellent God will never trump the attributes that can be discerned in God's self-revelation in Jesus. For me, Jesus reveals the maximally excellent God and no other god exists.
Your conclusion (i.e. that God can be and indeed is perturbed by human sin and evil, but is not "functionally impaired" by it) is what I've advocated from the start. Even when Jesus reveals that God is passionate and is perturbed by human sin, it does not prevent him from carrying on in his mission. I would, however, register a complaint about the term "overwhelmed". In normal use, this term is a perfectly adequate descriptor of Jesus's response in many cases. I still don't know anyone who has sweat blood, while I have read that it is possible and medically documented in rare cases. Jesus also wept when his friend Lazarus died, all the while knowing he had the power to raise him from the dead.
Finally (for now), I think the view you outline and call the most defensible is actually just "passibilism." No one (that I know of) has argued that God is "functionally impaired" by God's response to sin. So, semantics and labels has been a large part of what has perpetuated this rift. Tom and Dwayne don't want to be associated with "passibilism" for whatever reason (they link it with kenoticism for some reason and consider kenoticism a heresy, from what I can tell), so they have only conceded to what they call "weak impassibility". But if they affirm what you're calling "weak passibilism in feeling" then they would be affirming what I've advocated all along.
Thanks for the comments, T.C. I'm glad that you like my proposal of "weak passibility in feeling". I'm hopeful that Tom and Dwayne can accept that as well. Of course, their accepting it wouldn't eliminate room for further distinctions and debate concerning the ways in which or the extent to which divine disappointment (and pleasant surprise) makes a broadly emotional difference in God. I've only argued that, for open theists at least, it must make a difference, one that I characterized purely negatively as not functionally impairing.
As for Jesus being "overwhelmed" by emotion, the reason I set the Incarnation aside is because it introduces complications about how the two natures of Jesus relate to each other, complications that go well beyond what's required by open theism simpliciter. Given human finitude, it is no surprise that Jesus-qua-human can be, and sometimes was, overcome by emotions like grief and sorrow. But it is not a trivial matter to infer from there that Jesus-qua-divine can be and sometimes was overcome by emotion in similar fashion. For my part, I think the Anselmian intuition weighs rather strongly against such an inference.
With God's free choice to create, God created the context for differential preferences and correspondence differing aesthetic content based upon outcomes.
In other words, in creating, God has covenanted with himself to be sensitive and responsive to expectations He has for Creation…and whether or not (and to what degree) those expectations are met. The free choices of sentient creatures can determine the quantitative amount of creaturely beauty that God can and does experience at any given time. And Creation can either fail or meet divine expectations to certain degrees…and God knows and appreciates the variances appropriately. This ensures morally significant creaturely freedom. It's how God graciously allows us to truly MEAN something to God.
Equanimity (via inner fullness) **necessarily entails** absolute indifference/insensitivity to all possible outcomes that can happen, and therefore, absolute indifference/insensitivity to all preferences. This means that perfect equanimity, in effect, DENIES that God has differential preferences.
Tom and I (following Greg ala "Trinity and Process" )would say that equanimity means that a person's self-defining emotional states are NOT circumscribed by preferences and outcomes (met or unmet) dealing with external factors. This is not the same thing as saying that equanimity involves absolute aesthetic indifference/insensitivity to differential preferences and outcomes. Taken to God, the qualitative experience of the intra-Trinitarian infinitely intense love, joy, and peace (bliss) defines God as God; it simply IS divine "fullness of life" that satisfies God aesthetically and renders God "without lack". At the same time, having this love, joy, and peace does NOT preclude God from having differential preferences and expectations for Creation…and aesthetic response corresponsive to met and unmet expectations. It is conceivable for a personal being to have self-defining "fullness" and perfect acceptance of reality as it stands…while having appropriate emotional response to achieved or non-achieved goals and working for a better future.
For example, let's say that you have a praise dancer who dances out of an "inner fulness" that she has from her relationship with Christ, such that all of her dancing does not constitute her fulness but merely expresses it. The dancer can miss a step or two of her choreographed dance, recognize such, and experienced "what could have been" aesthetically…and concentrate to do better. It is also possible that the dancer could performed a particular move flawlessly which she expected to flounder, and experience the pleasant surprise of pulling it off. Both experiences can be experienced by the dancer while NOT defining/constituted the "fullness" she has, either positively or negatively. If the above example is intelligible (and I believe that it is), this shows that fullness-borne equanimity does NOT necessitate indifference/insensitivity to preferences and outcomes.
Looking at everything, I would say that Tom and I fit well within a combination of your "weak passibilism" and "impassibilism": the self-defining aspect of the divine emotional life (ala perfect equanimity grounded in intra-Trinitarian fullness of infinitely intense love, joy, and peace) cannot be perturbed…while the totality of God's emotional life does allow for variance of aesthetic experience corresponsive to differential preferences. We would completely deny the strong passibilism option, as you have it described.
I would submit that if a person AGREES with Tom and myself that equanimity via fulness does not NECESSITATE aesthetic indifference/insensitivity to differential preferences, such a person may find that "weak IMpassibilism in feeling" (a place between your "weak passibilism" and "impassibilism") is the most defensible position.
Hi Dwayne. Thanks so much for your thoughtful comments!
I'm not sure I perfectly follow what you say. I had thought that the way I characterized "weak passibilism" and "impassibilism" didn't leave room for any logical space between them, for one affirms and the other denies that God can be emotionally "perturbed" by creaturely actions. (I might add that I'm using the word "perturbed" in the sense of "making a difference". I don't mean anything more by it than that.) Yet you seem to want to straddle that distinction in advocating for "weak impassibilism".
But I don't think I am saying that. I'm only arguing that God's having differential preferences, which we all agree on, plus a genuinely open future, which we all agree on, entails that certain creaturely actions must make a genuine emotional (or aesthetic, if you prefer) difference to God, a difference that I've characterized as either "disappointment" or being "pleasantly surprised", as the case may be. I argued, further, that this difference cannot be "functionally impairing" for God. But I didn't offer any positive account of what such differences amount to. I think that's where there's room for further refinement and debate.
In straddling the "weak passibilist" / "impassibilist" distinction you make a distinction between the "self-defining aspect of the divine emotional life" and the "totality of God's emotional life". I'm not sure that I understand this distinction. That may be in part because you use terminology (e.g., "self-defining") that I don't find readily intelligible, although I'm sure makes sense to you. If what you mean by the "self-defining aspect" is simply God's essential nature, then I agree that that is impassible. In fact, it almost goes with saying that God's experience simply qua God's and independent of creation is, well, independent of creation. But this is a rather abstract way of looking at things since, as things concretely stand with respect to the "totality of God's emotional life," there is a creation that God stands in relation to and with respect to which God has differential preferences. If I'm reading you correctly, I think you actually agree with what I've called "weak passibilism in feeling" with an added emphasis that God is emphatically not passible in nature.
You are correct. The issue is that God's impassibility in nature is inextricably linked to a degree of impassibility in feeling, simply because the inter-Trinitarian "bliss" is an non-contingent feature of the triune essential existence of the necessary God. You can't separate God's character and self-relational triunity, for that triunity is **how** God IS essentially love. At the same time, you cannot separate the triunity from the FEELING/aesthetic reality involved in that triunity self-perceived by God. When you work all this out, it says that creaturely actions do make a genuine emotional difference to God, but they don't disturb, increase, or diminish the emotional content of God's experience of his own triunity. In other words, God's emotional experience of Creation doesn't make ANY difference to the divine satisfaction and emotional equanimity found in the infinitely intense beauty of triune self-relationality. See what I'm saying?
T. C.: This simply isn't Open theism, and *IS* simply Classical theism, perhaps even Thomism. This is to affirm complete impassibility—which we have already ruled out as a possibility for Open theists.
Dwayne's conception of God cannot be perturbed, therefore, Dwayne's conception of God is incompatible with the Open theist conception of God.
"Impassibility is the most dubious of the divine attributes discussed in classical theism, because it suggests that God does not experience sorrow, sadness or pain. It appears to deny that God is touched by the feelings of our infirmities, despite what the Bible eloquently say about his love and his sorrow. How can God be loving and not pained by evil? How can God be impassible when the incarnate Son experienced suffering and death?
The suffering or pathos of God is a strong biblical theme—God's love, wrath, jealousy and suffering are all prominent. God suffers when there is a broken relationship between humanity and himself. In this context, God agonizes over his people and says: 'My heart recoils within me, my compassion grows warm and tender' (Hosea 11:8 RSV). God is not cool and collected but is deeply involved and can be wounded. The idea of God's impassibility arises more from Plato than from the Bible.
– Clark Pinnock (God rest his brilliant soul), _The Openness of God_, p.118-119.
The best analogy I have is a Christian's relationship with Christ and the Father in the Spirit. It is conceivable that a Christian's emotional experience of the world doesn't disturb, increase, or diminish the "soul satisfaction" and emotional equanimity said Christian has in their intensely intimate love, joy, and peace they have in the Trinity. Not that a Christian doesn't really experience true emotional variation with experiences in the world…but NONE of those variances define the their identity in Christ or the emotional content of that identity for them. It's the same way with God's relationship to his own triunity, as I see it. Feel me?
"–Weak passibilism in feeling: God's emotions can be perturbed by creaturely actions, but the degree of perturbation is such that God cannot in any degree be functionally impaired by them.
Thanks for challenging us on this issue, Alan. Very grateful.
On the Anselmian intuition, agree. On creation ex nihilo (CEN), agree. On Creel's distinctions (impassible in nature but passible in knowledge), also totally agree, though I think his misapplies '(im)passibilism' throughout his book. I think he means 'mutable; in knowledge. (Im)passibilism has to do with affective states or aesthetic perception (experience of beatitude), not mutability per se. But I agree with his point. I agree that none of us in-house would identify with your 'Strong Passibilist' (though there's a point here I'd make about the relationship between God's 'character' and 'competency' and God's experience of aesthetic value, cf. below).
I think the differences between us might emerge with your differential preference thesis (cf. below).
(1) TC suspects that philosophical thought "may lead to a normalization of a non-christocentric theological methodology." I'm equally suspicious of displacing Christ within our methodology, but I don't think an impassibilist needs to displace Christ to discern impassibilism within NT Christology. Making the apostolic witness to Christ a methodological center doesn't get you passibilism in any straightforward way.
(2) Whether what I believe qualifies as 'open theism' is beside the point for me. I'm not interested in these issues from that perspective.
(3) I think there's a fair question to be asked of all passibilists regarding what it is about God (which 'would' have to be immutable) which secures God's competency once God's aesthetic experience is viewed as being mutable. While passibilists would agree God remains competent, I'm not sure they have a satisfactory defense against the claim that it is at least conceivable, for example, that a passibilist God would be rendered less than competent in some measure. For Dwayne and me, divine competency and character can't be extracted from divine aesthetic satisfaction; i.e., his competency is the competency of a particular aesthetic satisfaction, or said otherwise, divine competency and character are a function of his experienced beatitude.
(4) On God's differential preferences we're talking about the very nature of how what's happening in the world 'motivates' God. I read you as saying that God's having such preferences poses a threat to impassibilism. You understand God's preferences has affectively motivated by the relevant good or evil of the possibilities contemplated such that God couldn't be said to 'prefer' the possibility of our feeding the poor over the possibility of our 'ignoring them' without his experiencing a measurable diminishing of beatitude when contemplating the latter over the former possibility. And this measurable difference in feeling motivates God to prefer the former. On that reading of motivation God's 'aesthetic experience' fluctuates and that in itself is passibilism.
Thanks for chiming in. I greatly appreciate it. As I have time I will reply to each part of your reply in turn. In the end, I don't think we're necessarily as far apart as you seem to think.
Briefly, though, I agree with (1).
Regarding (2), I think openness is relevant in this context in that it's much easier to maintain a strong impassibilist position on the assumption of meticulous providence since God's ultimate (or sovereign) will can never be disappointed.
Regarding (3), you say that "it is at least conceivable … that a passibilist God would be rendered less than competent in some measure." I'll grant that it's conceivable, but it doesn't strike me as plausible. I would need to see an argument for the claim that passibilism necessarily diminishes competence.
Regarding (4), you misstate my view when you say that in simply "contemplating" the possibilities of one's feeding the poor versus ignoring them God experiences a "measurable diminishing of beatitude". There are two things wrong with this. First, I don't think God's mere *contemplation* of possibilities, however dispreferred, poses any difficulty for impassibility. Rather, I'm suggesting that it's God actual *experience* of a dispreferred outcome that poses a problem. Second, I never suggested that whatever *difference* disappointment would make for God would in any sense be "measurable". Maybe it would. Maybe it wouldn't. I leave it as a further question as to *how* exactly that difference would be *felt* by God.
Thanks for clarifying (4). Interesting. So your 'differential preference thesis' doesn't apply to God's preference of "possibilities"? It's only "actualities" which God (dis)prefers. That does seem strange. I certain prefer some possibilities over others. But if you'd agree that God prefers possible goods over possible evils, how does this "preferring" obtain consistently with, say, impassibility? Wouldn't the "preference" obtain equally in aesthetic/felt terms? I should think so (on the view you're describing). I'm not suggesting there's no difference between possibilities and actualities. But I don't see that "preference" relates only to the latter. The 'preferring' of one possible outcome over another is at least an instance of the same species of preference which is experienced relative to actualities. So it seems to me that if God cannot be indifferent to actual evils, as you say, surely he cannot be indifferent to possible evils (though the feeling would obviously be different). And the (dis)preference in each case would be of the same species (aesthetically speaking). And once you agree that contemplated possibilities are proper objects of differential preference, then I'd like to know how you think they're integrated into an unalloyed bliss sans creation.
Secondly, if "measurability" doesn't fit, my point is to refer to the "change" or "difference" you suppose outcomes must make to God. If the difference you're wanting to secure isn't measurable (by God even if not by us), then I don't see the point, i.e., I don't see how impassibilism is threatened. Essentially, all I mean by a 'measurable difference' in this instance is 'perceivable difference'. It may not clock-out on any means or scales we have for discerning that difference, but surely God would perceive the 'depth' or 'sense' or 'extent' to which dispreferred outcomes 'affect' him.
Tom: So your 'differential preference thesis' doesn't apply to God's preference of "possibilities"? It's only "actualities" which God (dis)prefers.
Alan: No. God has differential preferences concerning possibilities. My point was that any sense of disappointment could only come in response to actualities, not mere possibilities.
Tom: If the difference you're wanting to secure isn't measurable (by God even if not by us), then I don't see the point, i.e., I don't see how impassibilism is threatened.
Alan: I take impassibilism to entail a *no difference* thesis, whereas I'm arguing for a *difference* thesis. But that difference can be understood in ways that are more or less congenial to impassibilism, and that's why I said that our positions aren't necessarily that far apart. A difference that decreased or augmented God's joy by a finite percentage would be very far removed from impassibilism. But a difference that was only infinitesimal would be very close to impassibilism.
(a) It would seem impossible on this view of divine preference to go on to say, as you do, that whatever God feels, God freely chooses to feel (i.e., "…God's bliss cannot be perturbed apart from God's choice"). Presumably God's choices by definition already include his feelings, so what feeling would motivate God's choice to allow himself to be perturbed? I don't follow how that would work.
(b) We have good examples of loving responses to human suffering that don't include any perceivable diminishing of joy. Creel mentions several. One of his examples was my own experience recently while camping (the child with a skinned knee and the father who demonstrated preferential love without any measurable loss of joy). It seems clear to me that Greg's definition of love as "meeting another's need at cost to one's self" is just mistaken. It "may" involve a cost or sacrifice, but 'sacrifice' isn't intrinsic to every act of love. This is an important point because it has to do with your claim that unless God could be perturbed then (given the open view) he couldn't be love.
(c) I've discussed the self-motivating fullness of God's beatitude here (http://anopenorthodoxy.wordpress.com/2014/07/10/divine-experience-of-beatitude-the-summum-bonum-part-2/). I don't see why God should be thought to be impersonal and insensitive if it were the case that he needn't be motivated to act in our best interest by first being made to feel measurably worse by our pain. That would make grace on behalf of restoring our well-being also intended to restore his own well-being. It seems to me that the differential preferences thesis only need entail that acting in love to relieve the suffering of another must be motivated and that such acts are in response to the suffering of others. But it seems possible to conceive of a personal satisfaction which need not be diminished by the suffering of others before it can benevolently intend their well-being and act on their behalf. A present fullness may be its own motivation to pursue the well-being of others as an expression of its own completeness.
Dwayne and I may differ slightly on this. I may lean more impassibilist (minus absolute immutability and timelessness of course) than him. Not sure. Talk of divine motivation in the psychological terms derived from our experience is tricky. That said, Dwayne suggested a good analogy that helped me. Take the instance of Jesus and his disciples pushing through the crowds. Everybody's touching everyone else. Yet one lady in faith touches Christ and Jesus feels 'power' (or 'virtue') leave him. He stops and asks who touched him. You know the rest. Human need accessed God's power to heal and Jesus perceived the transaction. Did this "leaving" of power constitute a "diminishing" of power? I think not. There was a real perception by Christ of grace going out of him to respond to human need, but there's no consequent diminishing of grace or power in Christ.
If we don't have the language to express this in aesthetic terms, hopefully we'll find them. But that's roughly an analogy (Dwayne's) of how God genuinely responds to human need, how there's an 'expenditure' (to use that word for the moment) to meet that need, but no consequent 'expense' in terms of depletion. Does God perceive our suffering as an occasion for reaching out to us in love to meet that need? Of course. Is this perception an 'aesthetic evaluation' or, to use your phrase, a 'differential preference' which defines God's response to less than perfect situations? I'm fine with those terms. Does this mean God is "disappointed"? Here I pause, because that word suggests to me a measurable depletion of aesthetic value in God. Given the father's response to his daughter's skinned knee as loving and compassion without any measurable loss or "disappointment," I don't know that disappointment is intrinsic to 'preference' (of imagined or actual evils) per se. I don't pretend to have this all hammered out in perfect terms that don't require any further adjusting. But I can say that most of the passibilist construals of God I run into have zero appreciation for these distinctions.
In my previous reply, Tom, I addressed a couple ways in which your point (4) gets my view wrong. Some of those remarks may apply to your (4.a)-(4.c) as well, but here I'll just take each point on it's own.
Regarding (4.a), what I meant by "…God's bliss cannot be perturbed apart from God's choice" is not that God could directly *choose* to have a less than perfectly blissful experience, but rather that God could choose to create a world in which he could come to experience genuine disappointment as a result of creaturely actions. In other words, God doesn't choose to be perturbed, He chooses to bring about circumstances in which it is possible for Him to be perturbed.
Regarding (4.b), you say that "We have good examples of loving responses to human suffering that don't include any perceivable diminishing of joy." In reply I would make two points: (a) human cases, supposing they are as you describe, do not readily transfer to the divine case. No human can possibly feel our pain as fully as God can. (b) A key word here may be "perceivable." It's akin to your use of the term "measurable" when you expressed your point (4) above. But I'm not committed to any such qualifier. All I'm arguing is that given open futurism creaturely actions must be able to make some *difference* to the emotional quality of God's experience. I'm ready to grant that that difference might be infinitesimal–a drop of disappointment in an infinite ocean of joy–but there must, I think, be a difference, for if there isn't then God's experience would be *exactly as if* God doesn't care.
As for Greg's definition of love, I agree with you that it is false. As you aptly put it, "'sacrifice' isn't intrinsic to every act of love." But my claim is different than Greg's. My claim is that unless God *could* be perturbed, given open futurism and differential preferences, then He wouldn't be perfectly loving. Love (for another free person) doesn't require that a cost be paid (pace Greg), but it does entail the *possibility* that a cost will be paid.
For (4.c) you write that "I don't see why God should be thought to be impersonal and insensitive if it were the case that he needn't be motivated to act in our best interest by first being made to feel measurably worse by our pain. That would make grace on behalf of restoring our well-being also intended to restore his own well-being." I agree, but I don't think I said or implied anything like that. (I observe that you use the word "measurable" again.) I said nothing in my post about divine motivation, but for the record I think (as you do) that God's love is all the motivation He needs to act on our behalf. My point was that if God really *wants* what's best for us (and He does), then when due to our own poor choices we bring about tragic circumstances that are emphatically *not* good for us when we could have chosen otherwise, then He *should* feel something like disappointment. To remain completely *unmoved* when preventable tragedy befalls those one loves is a failure of love, not its perfection, or so it seems to me.
One last comment; actually a question for you, Alan. We both grant that God eternally knows causally-open possibilities. You mention this as part of your understanding of the 'differential preference thesis'. This knowing also involves God's eternally preferring some possible outcomes over others. Given your understanding of preference as involving a felt difference or discomfort (whichever term best explains the aesthetic apprehension involved in not preferring some outcomes), wouldn't it follow for you that God is eternally discomforted or 'perturbed'? I think it would. I'm wondering what this might mean for how you conceive of God's pre-creational triune "unallowed bliss." How unallowed is it if God is eternally defined by the perturbation or dis_________ (whatever word works to express the less than optimally positive feeling chosen to account for divine preference) God experiences over non-preferred outcomes?
Tom: Given your understanding of preference as involving a felt difference or discomfort (whichever term best explains the aesthetic apprehension involved in not preferring some outcomes), wouldn't it follow for you that God is eternally discomforted or 'perturbed'?
Alan: Well, since I don't think *preference* involves felt difference or discomfort, this doesn't follow for me at all. My argument is that differential preferences + open futurism entail the *possibility* of divine disappointment, on the one hand, and pleasant surprise, on the other, and that such feelings must make some real *difference* to God's emotional state, however that difference be understood. Perhaps it only makes an infinitesimally small difference, but that's still a difference.
Well put, Alan. I agree. If the world makes no "difference" to God, then Jesus can't possibly reveal a God who is love, nor a God concerned about the world enough for the Son of God to lay down his life for the world on the Cross. Not only is your thesis necessary for Open theists, it is necessary for Christianity.
It wasn't me that suggested passibilism need only reflect an infinitesimal difference to God. That was Alan. I was just following up on it.
To conclude that I don't believe we make a difference to God is to interpret me in terms of your view. I've clearly said we make a difference to God. I'm just not convinced that difference must be either aesthetic improvement or diminishment, and there are no shortage of good analogies that make my view conceivable, actually, plausible if we're talking about existential/emotional health.
So, it's emotionally-healthy *Not* to emphasize with people who are hurting. Actually, no, it's not. It's emotionally-unhealthy if a person cannot emphasize with others. In the extreme, it's sociopathic. Certainly, the God revealed in Jesus is not a sociopath.
Thanks so much Alan. I have some serious questions about several things, but I'll shelve them for now because evidently I'm not following your 'differential preference thesis'. Perhaps Dwayne has a better grip on it and I'll see it in due time. I will say, though, that IF we're defining "impassibilism" as the view that we "make no difference" to God, then I'm not an impassibilist, for I believe creation means something to God and I think he prefers good and disprefers evil. I'm less inclined to agree this difference amounts to a devaluation of God's (aesthetic) experience. If, as you say, the conversation over just what constitutes this "difference" and what motivates this preference is open, then I'm fine. But you argue this 'difference' could only be a felt depreciation in aesthetic value for God. Dwayne seems to have an easier time than I in agreeing to that sort of difference, but if it can play out in terms of some of the analogies I've suggested, then I don't have an issue with it, but I'm disinclined from the very start to agree with your definition of "impassibilism." I don't know of any impassibilist who'd agree to boiling it down to a "makes no difference" claim. But IF that's the proposition we're debating, then I don't hold it.
I think the number of passibilists who limit divine disappointment to the kind of infinitesimal perturbation you're arguing for is equally small. ;o) And given the kind of experiences passibilists attribute to God, the extent to which God should be thought of as "pissed off" or unworthy of worship, I'm inclined to define impassibilism in terms of your infinitesimal difference and camp there just for the advantage of dissociating myself from the belief that love equals being pissed off. Give that sentiment, I have far more in common with impassibilists. But if you can get TC to agree that we make an infinitesimal difference to God, I'll follow you anywhere!
(c) they only end up making this difference to God because of his antecedent differential preferences?
OR do you imagine differential preferences to be determined by God on the spot once good and bad things occur?
Re-reading several times now, Alan, I think I follow your DP thesis. It seems pretty clear that the thesis describes divine evaluative judgments of causally-possible future goods/evil and is the ground upon which God is later disappointed or pleased regarding actual outcomes). I still think this commits you to believing God feels differently regarding possible goods and evils as well (i.e., the thesis, on your account, cannot consistently be limited to God's response to actualities but is also God's evaluative judgment of contemplated possibilities), which in turn makes an "unallowed bliss" inconceivable, but I'm happy to stretch that conversation out long-term if you're open to it.
Regarding your comment about the analogy of the father's undisturbed (to our notice) response to his daughter who skims her knee, you thought this probably doesn't transfer over to our understanding of God since "no human can feel our pain as fully as God can." But this assumes the point of debate (exactly how God feels our pain), and in the end it's beside the point (of the analogy): we in fact do demonstrate loving behavior toward others who are suffering without experiencing any noticable pain. That God perceives the truth of things more accurately than we do is irrelevant here because the father's attention to his daughter is not rendered other than genuinely loving by anybody on account of having a perspective on her pain that doesn't cause him perceivable pain. Nobody thinks he'd be more loving (more like God) if it cried as she did, or if the difference his daughter made to him was a felt disappointment over her pain. I don't see any reason to suppose a perfect love for her (indeed, God's very love for her at that moment) would suggest a felt decrease or diminishment of please. But it would be wrong to suppose that this means she means nothing to her father. If she meant nothing, he'd 'do' nothing (not notice, not attend to her, not extend his arms, certainly not 'smile' as he moved in her direction).
Regarding my earlier (2) (i.e., that whether what I believe about this qualifies me as an "open theist" in the eyes of other open theists is beside the point for me), you seem to have taken me to me that the truth of open futurism's core claim (future causal openness and divine epistemic openness) was irrelevant. I don't think it's irrelevant. I agree this core thesis is very relevant (as you say, it's how/why it is that God's prefers this possibility or that possibility). What I'm saying is that what motivates me to seek truth on the question of (im)passibility is not whether or not a group that self-identifies as "open theists" continues to consider me a member.
Lots of typos. They disappoint me!
TC: So, it's emotionally-healthy *Not* to emphasize with people who are hurting. Actually, no, it's not. It's emotionally-unhealthy if a person cannot emphasize with others. In the extreme, it's sociopathic. Certainly, the God revealed in Jesus is not a sociopath.
Tom: If there's anyone incapable of lovingly empathizing with me, TC, it'd be you. But anybody who knows my view knows I don't think emotionally healthy people disregard the feelings or well-being of those in need or manifest the antisocial behavior of a sociopath.
Are you OK with Alan's *infinitesimal difference*, that the difference our worst pain makes to God is a "drop of disappointment in a sea of joy"? I'll meet you there, TC. And if you'll meet me there, I'll concede to Alan's performing our wedding ceremony and I'll agree to adopt the family name of 'Passible' in your honor.
Tom: This knowing also involves God's eternally preferring some possible outcomes over others. Given your understanding of preference as involving a felt difference or discomfort (whichever term best explains the aesthetic apprehension involved in not preferring some outcomes), wouldn't it follow for you that God is eternally discomforted or 'perturbed'? I think it would. I'm wondering what this might mean for how you conceive of God's pre-creational triune "unallowed bliss." How unallowed is it if God is eternally defined by the perturbation or dis_________ (whatever word works to express the less than optimally positive feeling chosen to account for divine preference) God experiences over non-preferred outcomes?
J: That seems right to me, too, Tom; i.e., if divine omniscience is defined as the foreknowledge of all future contingencies at any past time. But I'm not an Anselmian in that sense, so I only posit those divine beliefs and classes of beliefs that actually explain some facet or aspect of my experience that seems otherwise inexplicable. This seems reasonable to me since I have no idea how to account for the correspondence of divine beliefs and reality non-serendipitously in the first place. I think C.S. Lewis, Noah Porter etal showed that apart from competent, benevolent teleology, we can't conceive of an intelligible distinction between warranted belief and unwarranted human belief that coheres with our claims thereof. But I see no way to account for the "warrantedness" (i.e., the non-serendipitousness) of divine belief. Nevertheless, that means there is a theistic way to account for what an atheistic epistemology can't, true or no. And it's an utterly important accounting.
J: I agree. But I can't see how we can come up with a formula that implies passibilism equates to incompetence no matter how great divine suffering might be. God either has the power to act loving despite that suffering or not. Such a capacity must just be posited of God to render God explanatory. By analogy, soldiers refuse to divulge military strategy when torchered by their enemies merely because they have the inner strength to restrain themselves despite the impulse to alleviate the suffering. This doesn't seem psychologically problematic to me. So I'm not seeing how Alan can logically limit a quantity of divine suffering or perturbation once we've entered into bona-fide passibilism. As I see it, God's necessary, perfect, long-term perspective is the necessary source of His motivation which renders Him competent against any finite amount of suffering. I posit that God's long-term perspective is compelling in its impelling because of how it relates to His sentient nature. Indeed, I think that's why faith is so important for us. The stronger the belief, the more compelling the impulse to act off of the belief rather than mere immediate circumstances.
As Hebrews says, Jesus endured the shame for the JOY set before him. This seems to just be perfectly conceivable long-term, teleological motivation. Of course it also seems to require that the moral order is such that all LONG-TERM self-interest is consistent with and conducive to the greatest LONG-TERM self-interest of all others. You might find that view of love problematic since it's consequentialist. I find the negation of it to be the elimination of all explanation since desire/motivation has to be unto some yet future sentient state per the definitions of those words. This is why motive is used in court cases–because it explains events. No motivation (as defined in conventional language), no explanation of those events. Moreover, it explains why God's benevolence in no way contradicts the scriptural claim that creation is for the Father and the Son rather than for creatures.
As such, I have to limit myself to a necessary sociality of God the Father rather than a necessary blissful social interaction with the Son. In short, I don't know how to give up desire/motivation as defined in conventional language and explain anything. Because even the validity of induction (and therefore a discursively-discovered true foundationalism) is based upon the teleological fit of the real and the preferred as even Hart admits.
syn: desire, craving, longing, yearning suggest feelings that impel a person to the attainment or possession of something. desire is a strong wish, worthy or unworthy, for something that is or seems to be within reach: a desire for success. craving implies a deep and compelling wish for something, arising from a feeling of (literal or figurative) hunger: a craving for food; a craving for companionship. longing is an intense wish, generally repeated or enduring, for something that is at the moment beyond reach but may be attainable in the future: a longing to visit Europe. yearning suggests persistent, uneasy, and sometimes wistful or tender longing: a yearning for one's native land.
I should clarify a bit about my claim about the necessary conditions of explanation. By my comments, I mean to say that explanations or predictive heuristics (like analogical extrapolation) that actually have enough relevance to the future (as opposed to merely the past) to help us know how best to choose depend upon the use of motivation. E.g., there is no way that I'm aware of to account for the validity of induction unless there is a non-serendipitous fit between what humans prefer and how extra-ego beings will behave in the future. And the only conceivable way, to my knowledge, to account for that fit is by a benevolent, competent design of such an order. But design/teleology is conceived of in terms of motivation unto some end or ends which instantiates or possibly (when the design is risky) instantiates some yet-experienced sentient state.
But even when a design is risky, the risk is FOR an end whether or not the end is attained. And this is why we can conceive of even divine teleological risk as a free act. If the NT is on to the truth about such matters, it seems safe to say that God has rendered creation risk-free for the Son; at least in the sense that the Son's sufferings are not worthy to be compared to the joy attained thereby. The same works for humans. But maybe Greg is right in saying that at least the Father can just plain risk in the sense that He might end up truly sacrificing some temporal over-all bliss (if the choices of creatures aren't fitted to God's preference) to assure that the Son and humans are competently loved.
This is how properly-conceived open theism in part (I don't see how it does all the theodicy work by itself) explains rationally how a competent, benevolent Designer can create freely (i.e., by teleological risk). I see no logical problem with that kind of theism. On the other hand, I see no implications or elements of implications, and therefore nothing about "god" that gives me a clue how to live, of any putatively real events by the positing of a truly impassible God. And that's why I think the Eastern Orthodox are right to appeal to mystery rather than rational explanation to do that. But if they're right about theism, I can't see how theism has any epistemological role whatsoever in the thinking of those who receive no a-rational "knowledge" from God.
There's one other consideration I think is worth noting with respect to the relation of open theism to divine passibility. And that's how we can rationally hold to creation ex nihilo.
Free divine risk has the advantage of accounting for bona-fide creation ex theo (aka creation ex nihilo or CEN). Because a freely taken risk is not something that one has a perpetual, innate impulse unto. It has to be consciously and intentionally contemplated and chosen precisely because there are motives contrary to the risk-taking as well as motives unto the risk-taking.
But any other explanation of creation like, e.g., a divine motive to extend the circle of divine love, or a divine motive to gift god-self, have no conceivable contrary motive if God is sentiently impassible. Thus, these "explanations" are not rational explanations at all of creation ex nihilo, best I can tell. Because a divine motive to something for which there is no counter-motive amounts to divine compatibilism rather than divine freedom. And this in turn amounts to a necessary god-world relationship unless you just posit that God is a-temporal sans creation.
1) It is hard to even conceive of a-temporal existence. Because we seem foundationally-wired to think of existence as having positive duration to even be contrasted with non-existence.
2) It seemingly requires that God causes creation instantaneously such that cause does not precede effect (since God can't exist temporally prior to creating), and that seems to imply that God, in the act of creation, acts causally without being conscious since a distinguishable state (conscious vs. unconscious) of absolutely zero duration seems unintelligible. Nor does positing a-temporal existence of God sans creation explain anything whatsoever about the world of beings we infer exists. Nor does it solve any logical problem that I'm aware of. As such (and if so), it has no inductive plausibility. For per induction, plausibility has to do with the existence or normative quality of explanations or predictive heuristics, not mere non-explanatory/non-predictive positings. For such positings tell us nothing about how we should adjudicate our future voluntary choices. Let alone is there any obvious reason why humans should disassociate with one another or discriminate against one another over such positings.
The problem with a necessary god-world relationship enters in if the necessary world contains volitional beings. For in the first place, a volitional being is the one kind of being that rules out absolute creatio continua. There seems to be no way to reconcile absolute creatio continua with a bona-fide capacity of non-divine beings to act as final causes. Because creatio continua just seems to mean that the state of affairs of all non-divine reality at any given time is literally instantiated by God alone. This includes the mental states and mental content of every non-divine, conscious being. I suppose one way out is to assume, if it's categorically conceivable (and it doesn't seem to be to me), that time is not continuous. But is this assumption any more plausible than divine risk in the first place?
On the other hand, if creatio continua is not the case for a necessary god-world relationship, then induction wouldn't seem to be valid for that "world." For induction seems to require that explanation has finality for finite minds and that causality is valid as a principle. For, if causality is not true as a principle, then we'd need a criteria for determining which events are caused. But there is seemingly no such criteria. An uncaused event can't be expected in terms of any conceivable criteria. This means that the inductive criteria that would otherwise be useful for judging best explanations is pragmatically worthless since there is no reason to believe any event is caused in the first place if causality is not true as a principle. But if induction requires that world (i.e., non-divine) events have finality of explanation and that events are caused, there must be a beginning of world events unless there are no such thing as means (i.e., naturally-caused events). But if there are no means, then such a necessary world would be neither teleological nor cognizable in terms of induction.
Thus, if we believe induction is valid in our "world," then our world can't be the necessary world such a God is putatively necessarily in relationship with. Because induction seems to require both the finality of explanation of world events and the validity of the principle of causality. And that seems explicable only in terms of a freely-created (hence, the finality of explanation consistent with the principle of causality) world that we are inductively inferring. Thus, we seem to live in a world that is created (assuming induction is valid) freely (even naturalists incessantly speak of evolution in teleological verbage, using the teleological infinitive and so on, precisely because there is no extant hypothetico-deductive explanation of, or even predictive heuristic for, biological evolution).
But if we're not in the world that God is necessarily in relationship with, how does a necessary God-world relationship explain anything at all about our world?
So it's not as though he thought he could, in any clear or obvious way, account for the coherence of his thesis in terms of both human categories and divine impassibilism .
And it seems to me that the "eternal bliss of emotion" was broken when Jesus cried out: "My God, My God, why have You forsaken Me?". But this is a difficult verse to perceive. Do you have any articles on this verse Alan Rhoda?
Thanks for the comment. Unfortunately, I don't have anything specifically on that verse. As you point out, on an orthodox Christology it's hard to see how this verse doesn't imply some kind of passibility in God.


Azerbaijan's capital on the Caspian Sea combines a medieval old town with 19th-century European palaces and today's ultramodern skyline. Once notoriously expensive and now affordable, this relatively unknown travel destination has something to suit everyone – from history buffs to food connoisseurs. Here are 20 of the best Baku attractions.
Baku's UNESCO-listed fortified old town was once the medieval capital of the Shirvan Shahs. Today, it's the capital's heart with Maiden Tower, traditional carpet weavers, bars and restaurants. Visiting traders in a bygone era often referred to Icheri Sheher as the Acropolis of Baku.
The cylindrical tower has a mysterious story. Dating back to more than 1000 years, experts believe the UNESCO-listed Maiden Tower served as a Zoroastrian temple before becoming a watchtower in the 18th century. Follow the spiral staircase to the top of the 29 metre-structure (95.1 feet) for the best views of Ischeri Sheher.
The Palace of the Shirvan Shahs, the ruling dynasty for 800 years, is on the back of the 10 Manat banknote. The 15th century UNESCO-listed complex has a palace, mosque, burial vaults and a mausoleum making it one of the top Baku attractions in Icheri Sheher.
Travel gives you the opportunity to learn about the world and see exhibits and artefacts you otherwise would miss. The Museum of History, inside an Italian Renaissance-style mansion, has more than 300,000 artefacts. Exhibits cover everything from ancient to modern history and ethnography making it the largest museum in Azerbaijan and a top Baku attraction.
4 Hadji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, Baku, Azerbaijan. Tel: +994 12 493 23 87.
The opulent baroque House of Government on Neftchiler Avenue was built in 1952 by the Soviets. Ministry offices occupy the space inside. The main attraction is the architectural beauty, especially when it lights up at night.
Uzeyir Hajibeyov, Baku AZ 1000, Azerbaijan. Tel: +994 12 493 70 64.
The pedestrianised Fountain Square, formerly Parapet, is one of the must-see Baku attractions. Dozens of fountains fill the area stretching from Nizami Street to the eastern walls of Icheri Scherer. Several bars, cafés and restaurants with outdoor terraces fill the lower floors.
The tallest of the three Flame Towers reaches 182 metres (597 feet) and is perched majestically above Baku Bay. From a distance, the trio resembles flames. And at night, the exterior lights up in the colours of fire.
National Flag Square marks the western end of Baku Boulevard. Officially opening in 2007, the square is a symbol of national pride. The giant flag measuring 70 by 35 metres (229.7 by 114.9 feet) on a flagpole standing 162 metres (531.5 feet) was once in the Guinness Book of Records. Tajikistan now holds the record.
Baku Boulevard, a 3.5 kilometre-promenade (2.2 miles), hugs the Caspian Sea with an amusement park, bars and cafés along with a cacti garden, Mini-Venice, and the Baku Eye. Beginning at National Flag Square and ending at Freedom Square, this is the best spot for views of the Flame Towers and a relaxing stroll along the coast.
If you haven't visited The City of Canals, Baku's mini-Venice will give you a taste. The small area on Baku Boulevard has two large islands and smaller ones interconnected with bridges. Locals and tourists pay a few Manat to ride the Azerbaijani version of gondolas through the artificial canal system first opened in the 1960s. A top Baku attraction for a romantic evening.
Opening hours: 10:30am to 11:30pm.
Three years after the completion of Central Baku's sandstone Teze Pir, the mosque with gold plated minarets fell victim to the 1917 October Revolution. Bolshevik-ruled Baku turned the mosque into a cinema and later a barn. It reopened as a mosque again in 1943.
The funicular takes passengers from Neftchilar Avenue to Martyrs Alley. Views from the top start with Icheri Sheher and the Old City in the near distance and the new skyscrapers towards the horizon.
The extravagant Venetian gothic palace has a sad story. Early 20th century oil baron Agha Musa Naghiyev lost his son, Ismayil, to tuberculosis. He hired world-class Polish architect Jozef Plosko to design the building in memory of his son, which opened in 1913. The baron paid for the project and then donated it to the Islamic Charity. It became a meeting and assembly hall, and is now the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences.
Another first for Azerbaijan: The Carpet Museum, established in 1967, became the world's first. Enter the building that resembles a rolled carpet decorated with motifs and learn about traditional carpet-weaving and its importance in Azerbaijani culture.
The Palace of Happiness, also known as the Palace of Marriage Registration today, combines elegance with romance and heartbreak. Oil baron Murtuza Mukhtarov replicated a building his wife admired in France. In 1912, Murtuza surprised his sweetheart with the large neo-gothic palace, another Jozef Plosko masterpiece. They lived happily for eight years until the Bolsheviks arrived in 1920. He shot the Bolshevik officers before killing himself; they imprisoned her.
What can be a better way to see the evening skyline than taking a Caspian Sea cruise? The terminal lies in the centre of Baku Boulevard. Cruises go into the bay for approximately one hour, costing 6AZN ($3.50). Highlights are the glowing Flame Towers and the sparkling city of Baku.
Pre-Soviet Baku was rich from their first oil boom, attracting the best European architects of the day. The Theatre, designed by Nikolai Bayev, opened in 1911. Today, you can catch a performance or visit to marvel at the magnificent art nouveau architecture.
Towards the end of pedestrianised Nizami Street near Icheri Sheher stands the Museum of Literature. Named after 12th century Persian poet, the building has an attractive façade with six statues of famous poets and writers.
Opening Hours: 10:00am to 5:00pm Monday to Saturday. Admission: 10AZN ($6).
Many of Baku's beaches suffer from oil pollution. But head 35 kilometres (21.7 miles) northeast to Bilgah and you'll find a clean, sandy beach against the Caspian Sea. Admission is free, but you have to pay a small amount to use the sun beds.


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Entertainment • Videos
Watch Movie "Manikarnika: The Queen of Jhansi" This Weekend
January 25th, 2019 | Updated on March 30th, 2019
Story of Rani Lakshmibai, one of the leading figures of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and her resistance to the British Raj. Story of Rani Lakshmibai, one of the leading figures of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and her resistance to the British Raj.
Manikarnika: The Queen Of Jhansi, which will open in theaters on Friday. The film showcases the journey of Rani Laxmi Bai from a widow to a warrior. The biopic has been co-directed by Radha Krishna Jagarlamudi and Kangana Ranaut. Besides Kangana, the film also features Danny Denzongpa, Atul Kulkarni, Mishti and Jisshu Sengupta among others. The film also marks the Bollywood debut of television actress Ankita Lokhande, who is best-known for her performance in the TV show Pavitra Rishta.
The trailer of Manikarnika: The Queen Of Jhansi released last month and it went insanely viral. The trailer has over 25 million views on YouTube as of now.
Watch New Bollywood Movie Trailer Of "Manikarnika: The Queen of Jhansi"
Movie Reviews "Manikarnika: The Queen of Jhansi"
Movie Review: Times NOW
'Khoob ladi mardaani woh toh Jhansi waali Rani thi' – call her Rani Laxmi Bai, Manikarnika or the warrior queen, she is arguably the most popular woman freedom fighter in the country and only one of the few who made it to our history books as a name to be reckoned with. So, actress Kangana Ranaut had a huge responsibility on her shoulder when she decided to bring alive the great warrior queen on the big screen. Kangana Ranaut's Manikarnika: The Queen of Jhansi lives up to the hype.
It is no Sanjay Leela Bhansali war-drama, but the makers have ensured that the film got the scale it deserved. To begin with, the cinematography is just breath-taking right from the word go. Amitabh Bachchan's voiceover brings back the nostalgia of Lagaan while Kangana Ranaut's portrayal of one of the most iconic women in Indian history is certainly praise-worthy. Her nuanced grasp of a rebel warrior will certainly win you over.
For Full Movie Review, Click Here.
Movie Review: NEWS 18
Manikarnika, is based on a story that most Indians are familiar with; that of the legendary Jhansi Ki Rani a fearless warrior as brave and courageous as any man. Part impetuous, one who has no fear in speaking her mind or defiantly following her Rajdharma, the Rani of Jhansi is most certainly a character that any female actor would like to sink her teeth into. And Kananga Ranaut, both leading lady and co-director, deserves plaudits for breathing life and humanity into the deified historical character she plays. Ranaut channels her inherent feistiness for the part but also displays great finesse in the way she goes from playful acts of bravery to a deliberated feline like fierceness.
Movie Review: The WIRE
Manikarnika, co-directed by Kangana Ranaut, opens to Jhansi in 1842. In an early scene, the eponymous protagonist (Ranaut) is hunting a tiger. The beast growls and leaps; she points her arrow and shoots. The tiger falls to the ground, lying below her feet. But it's not dead. Manikarnika had just injured it. The villagers are saved, the animal didn't die and the heroine proved her point: this, in short, is the language of stardom – till now mostly the domain of male stars. (Tiger Zinda Hai had a similar scene, too.)
Manikarnika then, as this scene suggests, isn't trying to probe the language of status quo; it is merely confirming – in fact, celebrating – it from a different lens.
Ranaut faithfully follows the footsteps of Bollywood stars. Several scenes, almost existing outside the film, reinforce Manikarnika's courage and resolve. Often times, it feels as if Ranaut isn't playing a character but performing for the camera, giving an elaborate audition. One moment she's locking swords with the veteran warriors; the next, she is jumping on them, landing on an elephant. She stares, warns and protests. She tames horses, rescues a calf and, despite being a queen, dances with the villagers. She can do no wrong.
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


The world of sports gives compelling examples that high-lactate and high-rep quad training can produce excellent development.
Speed skaters, skiers, and cyclists all have one thing in common: Their sports all involve bouts of effort that go beyond a short 10-15 second burst. They use varying degrees of extensive amounts of time under tension and most athletes in each discipline have impressive legs to show for it.
The SAID (specific adaptation to imposed demands) principle states that if you repeatedly place a demand on a muscle group, it'll grow bigger and stronger to accommodate that demand. Of course, these big-legged athletes also use heavy weight training as part of the program, but bodybuilders would do well to emulate them by upping the reps while training quads, especially in isolation.
That means foregoing the paltry sets of 8 when using the leg extension machine or when going duck footed on the leg press or hack squat. Chase a pump with 12 to 20 reps and you'll see the gains.
The video shows Tom Platz and John Meadows clearly putting this idea to practice.


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Happy holidays? Florida school district walks back decision to nix Hanukkah presentation
The drive for Christain nationalism in Florida is in full drive mode. Stuff relating to Christians is allowed, Jewish and Black holidays are not allowed. To justifying denying the presentation of what Hanukkah is the superintendent said that they would have to teach Kwanza and Diwali." This is added to the anything positive about the LGBTQI+ is banned but right wing fascism is good for teaching. Hugs
A spokesperson for the district said officials a 'trying to be careful' in light of the new Parents' Bill of Rights.
Pasco County Schools says it has reversed its decision to deny a mother's request to give a Hanukkah presentation to her son's fifth grade class after reporters contacted the district for an explanation.
A district spokesperson said the mother would have to first meet with school staff to set up guidelines, but that the presentation has been otherwise approved.
Rachel Long has visited each of her children's classes yearly to explain Hanukkah — the Jewish "Festival of Lights" that takes place around the same time as Christmas and similarly involves gift giving — since her eldest son was in preschool. He's now in 10th grade.
Her short presentation includes no mention of God or religion, Long said. Instead, it consists of her reading from a book explaining Hanukkah (also written as "Chanukah"), sharing traditional food, displaying a menorah, and giving toy tops (dreidels) to each child for an in-class game.
Not counting the pandemic in 2020 and 2021, the schools Long's children attended welcomed her into the classroom every year without issue. That was until last week when she reached out to her youngest child's fifth-grade teacher at his elementary school in New Port Richey to ask when she could come in this year.
Initially, the teacher seemed open to the idea. She told Long she would confer with school higher-ups "to determine what day and time would be best."
A few days later, however, the teacher said that after speaking with school staff and district administrators, they recommended she deny Long's request, citing Florida's relatively new Parents' Bill of Rights.
"As per discussions with the team and Admin, the new Parent Bill of Rights (sic) obligates us to follow the 5th Grade Standards as written," the teacher said by text. "At this time, a Chanukah presentation is not in our standards."
Long asked: "Then, I assume, no Christmas activities will be done?"
The teacher did not immediately reply.
Screenshots of the text exchange between parent Rachel Long and her son's fifth grade teacher. Image via Rachel Long.
The Parents' Bill of Rights, which Gov. Ron DeSantis signed on June 30, 2021, provides that parents can object to — and opt their child out of — instructional materials based on their beliefs about morality, sex and religion.
The only mention of holidays and cultural traditions in the Pasco School curriculum guide for fifth grade says students will read stories from "different cultures" and encourages parents to discuss the meaning of various holidays with their children.
CPALMS, the Florida Department of Education's official source for education standards, includes approved lessons on holidays in world language, history, and civics classes and hundreds of allowances for multicultural education.
Long contacted the school's principal and got a similar answer. The principal, she said, claimed to have spoken with an Assistant Superintendent from the district. The Assistant Superintendent assigned to the school is Kimberly Poe, according to Pasco Schools Director of Employee Relations Kathy Scalise.
Long said the principal told her: "Due to the Parent Bill of Rights (sic), the school could not celebrate any holidays."
Apparently, that doesn't apply to Christmas, Long contended, noting Christmas-themed décor throughout a "holiday shop" in the school and a host of related activities.
"(The) kids are watching the musical, 'Elf Jr.,' during school, the school is completely decorated for Christmas, and there is a 'Santa night' planned," Long told Florida Politics. "(The principal) explained these things by saying they are holiday-themed, not Christmas, and parents are able to opt their students out. Teachers are allowed to have Christmas trees in their rooms but are not allowed to do Elf on The Shelf.
"If students can participate in all these activities or be opted out, I suggested that students could be opted out of my Chanukah presentation."
The elementary school's "holiday shop" has no shortage of Christmas-themed decorations. Image via Rachel Long.
Long stressed that she isn't trying to push her religion on anyone.
"I am just trying to expose my child's classmates to different traditions," she said. Long said the principal agreed to raise the issue again with Poe before rendering a final decision Thursday but suggested that if the school allowed a presentation on Hanukkah, "they would have to teach Kwanza and Diwali."
"I think that would be awesome," Long said. "I told her that if it is me coming in that is an issue; I would be happy to send the materials in for the teacher to use. I explained to her that if I am not able to do my presentation or that the teacher doesn't do it, I will raise hell if I see one Christmas paper come home or I see one Christmas tree in the school."
Florida Politics contacted principal Poe, Pasco Schools Superintendent Kurt Browning, and Deputy Superintendent Ray Gadd. None responded by press time.
But the issue appeared to have been resolved by Wednesday afternoon. Pasco Schools Public Information Officer Stephen Hegarty told Florida Politics that Long could indeed do her Hanukkah presentation once she meets with the teacher and other relevant faculty.
Hegarty confirmed a local TV reporter had also learned of the issue and was seeking answers. He said the district was being cautious when it expressed reticence at Long's request.
"The Parents' Bill of Rights is new, and even though it does not affect a lot of things, it affects some things, and everybody wants to make sure they're doing the right thing," he said. "They're trying to be careful."
He added, "My understanding is the teacher sought clarification from her principal, her principal sought clarification, and that's where we are right now, which is that she's going to work through it, make sure it's all done appropriately, and I expect she's going to go into the classroom and make a fine presentation. My understanding is she's done a great job in the past."
When they talk about Christian nationalism, believe them.
When they talk about religious liberty, see: Christian nationalism. https://t.co/5taIfviEvk
— Julia Ioffe (@juliaioffe) December 1, 2022
Ran afoul of the Don't Say Dreidel law https://t.co/y3jXWQKdnM
— Bill Grueskin (@BGrueskin) December 1, 2022
Ann Kah • 21 minutes ago
Oh, y'mean the "Christian parental rights law"?
Gustav2 Ann Kah • 4 minutes ago
Christian Nationalist parental rights law.
Dirac Majorana • 10 minutes ago
It's like being gay. MAGAts are worried that one exposure or mention 'legitimizing' it will proselytize their kid away from magic Jebus Even Christian bibles mention Judaism.I bet it'll blow the kiddies' minds if someone teaches them about atheism.
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4 thoughts on "Happy holidays? Florida school district walks back decision to nix Hanukkah presentation"
muttpupdad says:
One never knows that you can put an eye out with a driedel, let alone what can happen if you use rainbow candles in a Menorah. We must protect the children from such evil influences in their lives. Who knows they might start the rumor that their own holey person was Jewish.
Gah-we went through this in elementary school, too (late 60s.) Sheesh; a family who observed Hannukah moved into our neighborhood. They were well-liked, many friends, kids were awesome, etc., etc. Their first year, they sat every school morning when we listened to/sang Christmas carols, (I read a book, as did many of us, including those kids.) The next year, a couple of the teachers spoke with the principal about it, so she visited with the kids, then with their parents to make sure the kids weren't feeling excluded. All the carols that year were fun, secular carols only. We never learned or were "taught" religion or Christmas, or Easter, ever, in public school while I attended. We did learn about observances. We were not taught them, we learned that such observances exist.
I'm still alive, as is my sister, and all the other kids with whom we attended.
Scotties Playtime on A little while ago hurt myself bad January 30, 2023
Hello Annie. Thank you. My condition is deteriorating. Thank you for your good wishes and I really need them. I…


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Category: Cars Science Hobbies Technology Travel Internet Business Education Food Beauty Language Miscellaneous Industry Anatomy Health Crafts Home Finance Medicine Fashion Fitness Art United States Environment History People World Law
What is a Whisker Pole?
Telescoping Pole
Sailboat Rigging
Carbon Pole
Sailing Terminology
Sailing Terms
The Rigging Shop
Malcolm Tatum
A whisker pole is a form of spar that is used to help hold the clew portion of the jib when the vessel is sailing off the wind current. These poles belong to a part of basic sailboat and yacht configuration that is known as a spar. Essentially, a spar is a round piece of timber or metal that is part of the basic outfitting of a sailing vessel. Along with the whisker pole, other types of spars include the masts, gaffs, yards, and booms found on the boat. Each of these different types of spars play a role in securing sails into position, so the boat can be directed in any direction desired, using air flow as the force for the movement. The whisker pole is perhaps the lightest of all the different types of spars that are in use as part of standard equipment on a sailing vessel.
Marinas usually keep a number of different sizes of whisker poles in stock.
Whisker poles themselves are also constructed using hardwood that has been sealed against moisture and humidity. Some versions are constructed using steel and similar hard metals. Like their wooden counterparts, the metal poles will be treated and sealed, so that the material will withstand corrosion from the elements. Held in place with a series of bolts, it is not unusual for a spare pole to be stowed somewhere on the sailing vessel, in the event that any type of damage does occur during the voyage.
A whisker pole is used to hold the jib of a sailboat.
The main function of the whisker pole has to do with the proper securing and operation of the jib sail. As a triangular shaped sail, the jib helps to control the speed and direction of the sailboat or yacht during sailing. The whisker pole provides a connection between the main mast and the front section of the vessel, allowing the jib sail to be fully unfurled for use in catching the wind.
The dimensions of the whisker pole are fairly standard, so there is no problem in obtaining the right length for most sailing vessels. Marinas usually keep a number of different sizes in stock, so replacements are readily available when needed. Also, most shipbuilding companies will also manufacture a line of whisker pole types that are custom designed for the sailboats they build and sell.
After many years in the teleconferencing industry, Michael decided to embrace his passion for trivia, research, and writing by becoming a full-time freelance writer. Since then, he has contributed articles to a variety of print and online publications, including wiseGEEK, and his work has also appeared in poetry collections, devotional anthologies, and several newspapers. Malcolm's other interests include collecting vinyl records, minor league baseball, and cycling.
Cars Science Hobbies Technology Travel Internet Business Education Food Beauty Language Miscellaneous Industry Anatomy Health Crafts Home Finance Medicine Fashion Fitness Art United States Environment History People World Law
What Is Boom Brake?
What Is a Yacht Marina?
What Is a Downhaul?
What is a Boom Vang?
What is a Lazy Jack?
What is a Lock Pit&Reg;?
What is Spar Varnish?
parkthekarma
I agree that sailing is an expensive hobby, but recreational sailing is pretty tame compared to the massive money sink that is sailboat racing.
The jib sail can be really important in racing because you have to be able to make the most of whatever wind there is. They also tend to buy the lightest gear they can find, which really adds to the cost.
The owner of the racing boat I crew just replaced the standard whisker pole with a carbon pole. That saved a few pounds on a boat that weighs a few tons, and it cost more than my first car. I thought it was a bit of overkill, but it's really normal in that world.
horsebite
@Viktor13 - I feel your pain about the cost. I was always a believer in the old joke, " a boat is a hole in the water that you throw money into". Whomever said that was not kidding.
Anything to do with sailboat rigging is going to cost you, but what are you going to do? They have a captive audience for this stuff, and you need gear that's going to hold up because you might be hundreds of miles from help when something breaks.
Viktor13
I used to sail in college, and I always loved the name "whisker pole". It's a handy little thing because it lets you use the jib, which can add a few knots of speed to your boat or just take advantage of what wind there is on a calm day.
I was a fan of buying a used whisker pole when I could find them, because they seemed to break or get misplaced often and the expense of losing a new one was annoying.


The train Chennai Central - Kollam Sabarimala Special Fare Special starts journey from CHENNAI EGMO station and stops at QUILON. It's number is 6049 and it stops at 17 stations between the first and last stations. This train runs on Tuesday. If you've booked a ticket on Chennai Central - Kollam Sabarimala Special Fare Special, you can check your PNR status here. It travels 855 kilometre to reach its final destination. Chennai Central - Kollam Sabarimala Special Fare Special (6049) departs from its first station at 14:45:00 and reaches its last station at 05:50:00. Also see the complete list of trains in India.


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Q: Separate scrolling columns in a webpage I'm trying to make a website similar to www.the5th.co where they have two independent columns. Both columns are scrollable but independently. How should I approach in developing a design like this? what languages would I need? I am trying to achieve this design in WordPress if that's possible.
Thanks for the help!

A: First I think you should get basic information about programming languages for developing webpages and after this ask the question again but more accurate. For inspecting websites to check their design, there are several debugging and monitoring tools like FireBug for Firefox. A simple way to do this seperate scrolling is to use simple HTML and CSS. However there are various techniques to implement this. One of them is shown here:

body {
  padding: 0;
  margin: 0;
}
#col_container {
  position: absolute;
  width: 100%;
  height: 100%;
}
#col1 {
  float: left;
}
#col2 {
  overflow: hidden;

}
#col1, #col2 {
  width: 50%;
  height: 100%;
  overflow: auto;
}
.col-content {
  position: relative;
  height: 2000px;
}
.col-content > div {
  width: 60%;
  margin: auto;
  background-color: rgb(200,200,200);
}
.col-content p {
  text-align: center;
  margin: 0 auto;
}

Hallo World!

Hallo World!

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Engaged our largest suppliers in due diligence process to ensure respect for Human Rights and the environment is embedded in our supply chain.
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Le D-37C (ou D37) est le calculateur de l'ensemble de guidage du missile (MSG) tout-inertiel NS-17. Cette fonction informatique lui permet de naviguer avec précision jusqu'à sa cible, à des milliers de kilomètres. Le NS-17 MGS a été utilisé dans l'ICBM Minuteman II (LGM-30F). Le MGS, conçu et produit à l'origine par la division Autonetics de North American Aviation, pouvait stocker plusieurs cibles préprogrammées dans sa mémoire interne.

Voir aussi

Articles connexes
 Minuteman Missile National Historic Site
 Strategic Air Command
 R-36

Liens externes
  Site d'informations
  Son histoire

Missile balistique intercontinental des Forces armées des États-Unis
Arme nucléaire des Forces armées des États-Unis
Missile nucléaire

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ASSERTION: Speculation, in any market, produces a rate of interest in terms of itself. Keynes proved the opposite; therefore, interest is both a necessary and sufficient condition for speculation to take place.
ASSERTION: Store-of-value makes of itself a triangular trap whose equal sides are hoarding, liquidity preference, and speculative demand for money – none of which can be studied independently from the rate of interest.
ASSERTION: Speculative activities with any durable commodity produce the rate of interest in terms of themselves. This is done on the basis of the M-C-M relationship. This is nothing but indirect demand for money; that is, an Islamic interest-free economic system is not only futile and misleading but it is also the result of confusion and misunderstanding.
A corollary to the above assertions is that in the absence of interest (and hence speculation) in any market, stability, full employment and a self-correcting mechanism are brought about in an Islamic economic system.
ASSERTION: In an interest-free Islamic economic system, money can no longer perform the conventional store-of-value function. No speculation in any market is allowable because of the interest (Rate) that it naturally bears. All in all, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the store-of-value function of money and speculative demand for money.
Unlike a grand cooperative Islamic System, capitalism can be visualized as a zero-sum game in which for every gain there has to be found a loss of equal amount. Speculation in any market brings about income for the major speculators behind the scenes. The gains are enjoyed by a few and the losses borne by the rest of society. The money whirlpool, which emerges from every speculative activity does not allow the equality between saving and investment to hold.
This means that speculation and the interest bearing on it produces a savings gap; that is S>I. Hence, the necessary condition for full employment is never satisfied. The loss to society is the cost of unemployment.
The social cost of speculation goes far beyond its private benefits. By allowing interest (rate) to operate, the capitalist system gives speculators the opportunity to hunt the most profitable monetary opportunities and inflict the most harmful consequences on society. The proper expected rate of interest emerging from speculation, particularly in the money market, is necessarily higher than the going rate in any other money markets. This gives another reason for the saving gap to deepen even further, other things being equal. The unavoidable consequence of allowing interest and speculation is unemployment.
ASSERTION: the money whirlpool resulting from speculation in the money market does not allow the equality between saving and investment to hold. The natural consequence of this is unemployment.
ASSERTION: By allowing interest (Rate) to prevail in a society, speculators are given the opportunity to hunt the most profitable chances inflicting an equivalent loss to society in a zero-sum game.
There are two reasons to believe that in an interest- free Islamic economic system, money cannot be speculated upon: firstly, it is an impure public good; and secondly, speculation on any commodity in any market which brings forth with it a rate of interest is totally prohibited. These factors bring about equality between saving and investment, the consequence of which is full employment.
ASSERTION: the abolition of interest and speculation in an interest-free Islamic economic system eliminates the store-of-value function of money. This reduces the demand for money to irrelevance.
People want to hold money, Keynes said, not only for transacting current business but also as a store of value or wealth…The reason … is the existence of uncertainty: uncertainty as to the future of the rate of interest…Once the future of the rate of interest is uncertain people have the opportunity to speculate in the hope of securing profit from knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth. In his analysis of the speculative motive, Keynes considered only one alternative to money as a store of value, namely bonds.
Interest is an obvious attribute of both money and bonds. Less obvious is speculation, which, as Keynes pointed out, is one of the most profound characteristics of capitalism and the root cause of the Great Depression. The clear intention of speculators in both buying and selling commodities is not to hold and consume them but to make profit through the exchange of money for money. From the point of view of Islamic teachings, the importance of intention in transactions cannot be exaggerated. The intention of traders is not hard to trace back in some cases. Uncertainty – artificial risk – is an essential element in all speculative activities, the sole purpose of which is to make the environment suitable for a few speculators to make a profit. Such a risk manifests itself directly in the rate of interest. If my understanding of this point is correct, it makes interest rates even more volatile. What a sound and stable economic system needs is as much certainty as possible for all economic agents. Artificial risk might explain frequent variations in the investment function, via its mutual relationship with interest rates in capitalist economies. Any kind of artificial risk attached to the expectation and put into the future course of interest rates will transform itself into the actions of speculators. Speculators – and the word here is used in a morally neutral sense to mean anyone who buys a financial asset at the lowest expected price in the hope of selling it at a higher expected price in the near or distant future – typically operate on borrowed money. Obviously, the return on such activities must be higher than the interest rate on borrowed funds. Furthermore, sane speculators never bet against central banks, which are the center of the entire financial universe in that they create money, regulate credit, and often decide whether troubled private banks will live or die. The central banks are in fact playing in the market with other people's money.