text:
Bridge Cameras Compared
January 21, 2013 by spwordpress
Canon PowerShot SX50 HS Vs. Panasonic LUMIX DMC-FZ200 Vs. Sony Cyber-shot DSC-HX200V
Bridge cameras, or Super-zooms as they are called, are very popular among amateur photographers for their versatility.
These cameras bridge the gap between compact cameras and interchangeable lens systems. But why are they so popular? Without any doubt, it is the zoom range of their lenses. Most of these come with 20 to 50x zoom ranges starting from wide-angle up to super telephoto, covering everything that a person is likely to shoot. Matching this range on an interchangeable lens camera, such as a D-SLR, would be a very expensive affair. Even if you have the budget, it would be very cumbersome to carry those huge lenses around. This time, we are pitching three popular bridge cameras against each other in a head-to-head comparison to see which one would be more sensible to buy. The cameras featured here are Canon PowerShot SX50 HS, Panasonic LUMIX DMC-FZ200, and Sony Cyber-shot DSC HX200V.There are few other cameras competing in the same space, but unfortunately, we were unable to get our hands on them in time for the review.
Bridge cameras are very sophisticated, and so, comparing them head-to-head is no mean task. These are feature-filled and there is no way to judge which of these would be important to a particular group of people. However, this comparison will give you a fair idea as to what features each camera is good at. Please note that all focal lengths are expressed in 35mm- equivalent, unless specified.
All the three cameras are well-built with rugged engineering plastic outer body. We could not see any major difference in the construction of the cameras. All the three feature metal tripod receptacles. All the three cameras have single-barrel lens construction. The only major difference we could find was the LCD. Both the Canon SX50 and the Panasonic FZ200 have fully articulated LCDs that can be folded inward to protect the screen when not in use, but the Sony HX200V's LCD has only tilt motion and cannot be folded. So in the case of Sony, the LCD is exposed all the time, which is not a very good idea.
Manufacturers have their own way of making a feature look completely new by calling it by a name different from their competitors. For example, one camera might specify 50 different scene modes,
while another one might specify only 15. But in reality, you may be able to achieve the same result by combining 5 of the basic modes. So in a comparison like this, it is very important that we take into account only the 'key' features, ignoring the trivial ones. Both the Canon SX50 HS and the Panasonic FZ200 are 12.2 megapixel models while the Sony HX200V is 18.2 megapixels. This is definitely an advantage for the Sony as it allows you to make larger prints. SX50 provides a whopping 50x optical zoom (24-1200mm equivalent), which is unmatched in this category. The HX200V offers 30x optical zoom (29-870mm) while the FZ200 offers the lowest, 20x optical zoom (25-600mm). But when it comes to the utility of the zoom range, we think the Sony should have started from a wider range, around 24mm. The Sony offers the maximum sensitivity range of ISO 100 to 12,800, followed by the Canon with ISO 80 to 6400 and then the Panasonic with ISO 100 to 3200. The Panasonic FZ200 offers an aperture range of f/2.8-8 throughout the zoom range; the maximum aperture of f/2.8 throughout the zoom range is rare and difficult to achieve at this price point. The Sony offers f/2.8 to 8 at the wide-angle end and f/5.6 to 8 at the telephoto end, while the Canon offers f/3.4 to 8 and f/6.5 to 8 at the wide- angle and telephoto ends respectively. In the Shutter Speed range also, the Panasonic offers one stop more than the Sony, which in turn offers two stops more than the Canon. Though the Sony HX200V appears to offer more shooting modes because of the fact that it accommodates more of these on the mode dial, the other two cameras offer most of these shooting modes through the Scene mode. The Sony and Panasonic have 3-inch LCD screens while the Canon has a 2.8-inch display. This will not make a huge difference in the user experience. Both the SX50 and the FZ200 have fully articulated LCDs while the HX200's display is capable only of tilt motion. Here clearly, the Sony is at a disadvantage. Panasonic has the highest screen resolution of 1,312,000 dots followed by Sony with 921,600 dots and Canon with 461,000 dots. Both the Canon and Panasonic have the advantage of having accessory shoes (hot-shoe) for triggering an external flash or a studio strobe, but the Sony does not have this advantage. Both the SX50 and the FZ200 can record images in Raw format, whereas the HX200 does not offer any uncompressed format. Both the Sony HX100 and the Panasonic FZ200 have more powerful built-in- flashes, which is certainly advantageous for these two cameras in comparison with the Canon SX50 HS.
All the three cameras are similar in size, though the Panasonic FZ200 appears slightly larger than the rest. The Sony Cybershot HX200V provides the best grip amongst the three. It is really deep and lined with rough rubber so that the camera sits firmly in your hand. Next comes the Panasonic FZ200, which too has a rubber lined grip, but it is not as deep as the Cybershot. After ruling for almost seven years, the Powershot's familiar ergonomic design is crying for improvement. Compared to the two others, the grip of the SX50 HS is small and does not have a rubber lining, making it slippery. You will realise this if you hold either the HX200 or the FZ200 and then suddenly pick up the SX50. The Sony LCD displayed rich colours, while the Canon introduced a slight yellow cast. The Panasonic was somewhat pale. But the Panasonic FZ200 produced the least pixel jitter followed by the Sony HX200 and the Canon SX50. Both the Canon and the Panasonic have quick menu buttons to enable setting up the camera fast, while the Sony does not feature any such button. Also, the Canon SX50 and Panasonic FZ200's built-in flash does not pop-up on its own. The Panasonic has a dedicated button, whereas the Canon's This is a very good feature because it is very easy to disable flash if it is left on accidentally. The Sony HX200V's flash has to be enabled or disabled from the menu, which is tedious when on the field.
All the three cameras focussed fast, and the speeds were so close that we could not determine which one is best in this. The Canon SX50 produced flare, but we did not observe any chromatic aberration. Both the Panasonic and the Sony produced prominent flare and chromatic aberration. The Panasonic FX200 produced darkening of corners at the extreme corners, but overall, the illumination remained even. The Canon SX50 produced a soft gradation from centre to the periphery, but the darkening was not very disturbing. The Sony HX200 produced heavy darkening throughout the image. Please note that darkening of corners and flare tests were conducted at the wide-angle end with the lens wide-open.In the test for sharpness, we considered the widest focal length and the common maximum focal length of 600mm. Images from the Canon SX50 was found to be the sharpest, while Panasonic and Sony followed in the same order. We also found that all the three cameras produced the best results close to the widest aperture. In the case of distortion, the Sony emerged champion. We did not observe any perceptible distortion in the HX200 throughout the zoom range. The Canon SX50 produced slight barrel distortion up to 80mm, while the Panasonic produced slight barrel distortion up to 100mm.
In the White Balance front, the Canon SX50 HS was accurate under daylight (both on auto and pre-set mode), while Auto White Balance (AWB) under cloudy lighting was acceptable. Panasonic FZ200 produced desirable results in AWB under cloudy and acceptable under daylight. The Sony HX200V produced excellent result in AWB under cloudy lighting, while all other settings produced distinct cast. Please note, however, that these can be corrected easily using Photoshop. Noise was compared side-by-side for each ISO sensitivity. The Canon SX50 produced noise-free images up to ISO 3200 and the Panasonic FZ200 produced noise-free images up to ISO 1600, while the Sony HX200 produced noise even at ISO 200, which was rather surprising since we thought Sony 's BSI CMOS sensors were excellent in handling noise.
The Sony HX200V is least priced with an MRP of Rs.24,990, while the Canon SX50 HS retails at an MRP of Rs.29,995. The Panasonic FZ200 is the most expensive with an MRP of Rs.34,990. But the value for money is determined by taking the price in relation to the overall points. So at the price point, Sony HX200 is ahead of Panasonic FZ200, but the superior performance of Canon SX50 HS still keeps it in the number one position in value for money.
Choosing a bridge camera is very tricky since there is an exhaustive list of parameters to compare. For some, the megapixels are more important than the zoom range, while some others require better wide-angle capabilities. Yet some others crave for a supertelephoto range. While it is not possible to satisfy everyone with a single review, we have done our part in bringing out a fair comparison between the three cameras. While the Canon SX50 HS emerged the best performer, the Sony offers a very competitive price. The Panasonic, on the other hand, comes with the lure of a fast f/2.8 aperture throughout. However, in overall comparison, the Canon PowerShot SX50 HS edges past others with the highest overall performance. The Panasonic Lumix FZ200 comes second and the Sony Cyber-shot DSC HX200V third.
Sujith Gopinath
Canon Powershot SX50HS
Panasonic Lumix FZ200
Sony Cyber-shot DSC-HX200V
Build Quality ********** ********** **********
Key Features ********** ********** **********
Ergonomics ********** ********** **********
Performance ********** ********** **********
Value For Money ********** ********** **********
Filed Under: Head-to-Head, News


MachinesPlus is a tech mod which is currently on hiatus until the release of Minecraft 1.14 and a stable Minecraft Forge for it. The final version will feature its own power system, which can be wired or wireless, with four tiers of various machines. Among the most advanced available machines will be a fully programmable computer with an emulated 6502 processor, complete with a custom assembler, disassembler, debugger, and BASIC compiler.
There have been at least two previous permutations of MachinesPlus, neither of which got far before being abandoned due to lack of planning. With a solid plan in mind, I hope that this third version will become a balanced and useful tech mod for automation and other conveniences.
MachinesPlus is licensed under GNU General Public License v3.0. When its development continues, its entire source code will be made available on GitHub.


We are proud to offer the Auburn Chandelier by Arteriors Home. This amazing item is sure to make a unique addition to any home or office. A more modern and industrial take on an Arteriors favorite, the Auburn Chandelier is a 6-light geometrical masterpiece. Its slender, vintage silver silhouette gives way to six, torch-like arms. Shown with small clear tubular bulbs. Additional chain available (CHN-144). Also available in antique brass (89295).
1975 points will be rewarded to you when you buy this item.


text:
package com.intellij.vcs.log;

import com.intellij.util.Function;
import com.intellij.util.containers.ContainerUtil;
import com.intellij.vcs.log.graph.parser.CommitParser;
import com.intellij.vcs.log.impl.HashImpl;
import com.intellij.vcs.log.impl.TimedVcsCommitImpl;
import javax.annotation.Nonnull;

import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.List;

public class TimedCommitParser {

  /**
   * @param line 1231423|-adada|-193 adf45
   *             timestamp|-hash commit|-parent hashes
   */
  @Nonnull
  public static TimedVcsCommit parseTimestampParentHashes(@Nonnull String line) {
    int firstSeparatorIndex = CommitParser.nextSeparatorIndex(line, 0);
    String timestampStr = line.substring(0, firstSeparatorIndex);
    long timestamp;
    try {
      if (timestampStr.isEmpty()) {
        timestamp = 0;
      }
      else {
        timestamp = Long.parseLong(timestampStr);
      }
    }
    catch (NumberFormatException e) {
      throw new IllegalArgumentException("bad timestamp in line: " + line);
    }
    com.intellij.vcs.log.graph.GraphCommit<Integer> commit = CommitParser.parseCommitParentsAsInteger(line.substring(firstSeparatorIndex + 2));
    List<Hash> parents = ContainerUtil.newArrayList();
    for (int p : commit.getParents()) {
      parents.add(intToHash(p));
    }
    return new TimedVcsCommitImpl(intToHash(commit.getId()), parents, timestamp);
  }

  private static Hash intToHash(int index) {
    return HashImpl.build(Integer.toHexString(index));
  }

  @Nonnull
  public static List<TimedVcsCommit> log(@Nonnull List<String> commits) {
    return ContainerUtil.map(commits, new Function<String, TimedVcsCommit>() {
      @Override
      public TimedVcsCommit fun(String commit) {
        return parseTimestampParentHashes(commit);
      }
    });
  }

  @Nonnull
  public static List<TimedVcsCommit> log(@Nonnull String... commits) {
    return log(Arrays.asList(commits));
  }

}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Hegel's Science of Logic
Remark 1: The Opposition of Being and Nothing in Ordinary Thinking
Nothing is usually opposed to something; but the being of something is already determinate and is distinguished from another something; and so therefore the nothing which is opposed to the something is also the nothing of a particular something, a determinate nothing. Here, however, nothing is to be taken in its indeterminate simplicity. Should it be held more correct to oppose to being, non-being instead of nothing, there would be no objection to this so far as the result is concerned, for in non-being the relation to being is contained: both being and its negation are enunciated in a single term, nothing, as it is in becoming. But we are concerned first of all not with the form of opposition (with the form, that is, also of relation) but with the abstract, immediate negation: nothing, purely on its own account, negation devoid of any relations — what could also be expressed if one so wished merely by 'not'.
It was the Eleatics, above all Parmenides, who first enunciated the simple thought of pure being as the absolute and sole truth: only being is, and nothing absolutely is not, and in the surviving fragments of Parmenides this is enunciated with the pure enthusiasm of thought which has for the first time apprehended itself in its absolute abstraction. As we know, in the oriental systems, principally in Buddhism, nothing, the void, is the absolute principle. Against that simple and one-sided abstraction the deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward the higher, total concept of becoming and said: being as little is, as nothing is, or, all flows, which means, all is a becoming. The popular, especially oriental proverbs, that all that exists has the germ of death in its very birth, that death, on the other hand, is the entrance into new life, express at bottom the same union of being and nothing. But these expressions have a substratum in which the transition takes place; being and nothing are held apart in time, are conceived as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction and consequently, too, not so that they are in themselves absolutely the same. ®
Ex nihilo nihil fit — is one of those propositions to which great importance was ascribed in metaphysics. In it is to be seen either only the empty tautology: nothing is nothing; or, if becoming is supposed to possess an actual meaning in it, then, since from nothing only nothing becomes, the proposition does not in fact contain becoming, for in it nothing remains nothing. Becoming implies that nothing does not remain nothing but passes into its other, into being. Later, especially Christian, metaphysics whilst rejecting the proposition that out of nothing comes nothing, asserted a transition from nothing into being; although it understood this proposition synthetically or merely imaginatively, yet even in the most imperfect union there is contained a point in which being and nothing coincide and their distinguishedness vanishes. The proposition: out of nothing comes nothing, nothing is just nothing, owes its peculiar importance to its opposition to becoming generally, and consequently also to its opposition to the creation of the world from nothing. Those who maintain the proposition: nothing is just nothing, and even grow heated in its defence, are unaware that in so doing they are subscribing to the abstract pantheism of the Eleatics, and also in principle to that of Spinoza. The philosophical view for which 'being is only being, nothing is only nothing', is a valid principle, merits the name of 'system of identity'; this abstract identity is the essence of pantheism.
If the result that being and nothing are the same seems startling or paraodoxical in itself, there is nothing more to be said; rather should we wonder at this wondering which shows itself to be such a newcomer to philosophy and forgets that in this science there occur determinations quite different from those in ordinary consciousness and in so-called ordinary common sense-which is not exactly sound understanding but an understanding educated up to abstractions and to a belief, or rather a superstitious belief, in abstractions. It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of being and nothing in every example, in every actual thing or thought. The same must be said of being and nothing, as was said above about immediacy and mediation (which latter contains a reference to an other, and hence to negation), that nowhere in heaven or on earth is there anything which does not contain within itself both being and nothing. Of course, since we are speaking here of a particular actual something, those determinations are no longer present in it in the complete untruth in which they are as being and nothing; they are in a more developed determination, and are grasped, for example, as positive and negative, the former being posited, reflected being, the latter posited, reflected nothing; the positive contains as its abstract basis being, and the negative, nothing. Thus in God himself, quality (energy, creation, power, and so forth), essentially involves the determination of the negative-they are the producing of an other. But an empirical elucidation by examples of the said assertion would be altogether superfluous here. Since the unity of being and nothing as the primary truth now forms once and for all the basis and element of all that follows, besides becoming itself, all further logical determinations: determinate being, quality, and generally all philosophical Notions, are examples of this unity. But self-styled sound common sense, if it rejects the unseparatedness of being and nothing, may be set the task of trying to discover an example in which the one is found separated from the other (something from limit or limitation, or, as just mentioned, the infinite, God, from energy or activity). Only the empty figments of thought, being and nothing themselves are these separated things and it is these that are preferred by 'sound common sense' to the truth, to the unseparatedness of both which is everywhere before us.
We cannot be expected to meet on all sides the perplexities which such a logical proposition produces in the ordinary consciousness, for they are inexhaustible. Only a few of them can be mentioned. One source among others of such perplexity is that the ordinary consciousness brings with it to such an abstract logical proposition, conceptions of something concrete, forgetting that what is in question is not such concrete something but only the pure abstractions of being and nothing and that these alone are to be held firmly in mind.
Being and non-being are the same, therefore it is the same whether this house is or is not, whether these hundred dollars are part of my fortune or not. This inference from, or application of, the proposition completely alters its meaning. The proposition contains the pure abstractions of being and nothing; but the application converts them into a determinate being and a determinate nothing. But as we have said, the question here is not of determinate being. A determinate, a finite, being is one that is in relation to another; it is a content standing in a necessary relation to another content, to the whole world. As regards the reciprocally determining context of the whole, metaphysics could make the — at bottom tautological — assertion that if a speck of dust were destroyed the whole universe would collapse. In the instances against the proposition in question something appears as not indifferent to whether it is or is not, not on account of being or non-being, but on account of its content, which brings it into relation with something else. If a specific content, any determinate being, is presupposed, then because it is determinate, it is in a manifold relationship with another content; it is not a matter of indifference to it whether a certain other content with which it is in relation is, or is not; for it is only through such relation that it essentially is what it is. The same is the case in the ordinary way of thinking (taking non-being in the more specific sense of such way of thinking as contrasted with actuality) in the context of which the being or the absence of a content, which, as determinate, is conceived as in relation to another, is not a matter of indifference.
This consideration involves what constitutes a cardinal factor in the Kantian criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God, although here we are only interested in the distinction made in that proof between being and nothing generally, and determinate being or non-being. As we know, there was presupposed in that so-called proof the concept of a being possessing all realities, including therefore existence, which was likewise assumed as one of the realities. The main thesis of the Kantian criticism was that existence or being (these being taken here as synonymous) is not a property or a real predicate, that is to say, is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. By this Kant means to say that being is not a determination of the content of a thing.' Therefore, he goes on to say, the possible does not contain more than the actual; a hundred actual dollars do not contain a whit more than a hundred possible ones; that is, the content of the former has no other determination than has the content of the latter. If this content is considered as isolated, it is indeed a matter of indifference whether it is, or is not; it contains no distinction of being or non-being, this difference does not affect it at all. The hundred dollars do not diminish if they do not exist, or increase if they do. A difference must come only from elsewhere. 'On the other hand,' Kant reminds us, 'my fortune benefits more from a hundred actual dollars than from the mere concept of them or from their possibility. For in actuality, the object is not merely contained analytically in my concept, but is added synthetically to my concept (which is a determination of my state), although the hundred dollars in my thought are not themselves increased one whit by this being which they have apart from my concept.'
There are presupposed here two different states (to retain the Kantian expressions which are not free from a confused clumsiness): one, which Kant calls the concept (by which we must understand figurate conception), and another, the state of my fortune. For the one as for the other, my fortune and the figurate conception, a hundred dollars are a determination of a content or, as Kant expresses it, 'they are added to such a concept synthetically'; I as possessor of a hundred dollars or as not possessing them, or even I as imagining or not imagining them, is of course a different content. Stated more generally: the abstractions of being and nothing both cease to be abstractions if they acquire a determinate content; being is then reality, the determinate being of a hundred dollars; nothing is the negation, the determinate non-being of them. This determinate content itself, the hundred dollars, also grasped isolatedly in abstraction is unchanged the same in the one as it is in the other. But since, furthermore, being is taken as a state of my fortune, the hundred dollars stand in relation to this state, as regards which the determinateness which they are is not a matter of indifference; their being or non-being is only an alteration; they are transposed into the sphere of determinate being. When, therefore, it is urged against the unity of being and nothing that it is nevertheless not a matter of indifference whether anything (the hundred dollars) is, or is not, we practise the deception of converting the difference between whether I have or have not the hundred dollars into a difference between being and non-being-a deception based, as we have shown, on the one-sided abstraction which ignores the determinate being present in such examples and holds fast merely to being and non-being, just as, conversely, the abstract being and nothing which should be apprehended is transformed into a definite being and nothing, into a determinate being. Determinate being is the first category to contain the real difference of being and nothing, namely, something and other. It is this real difference which is vaguely present in ordinary thinking, instead of abstract being and pure nothing and their only imagined difference.
As Kant expresses it, 'through its existence something enters into the context of the whole of experience. ... we obtain thereby an additional object of perception without anything being added to our concept of the object'. As our explanation has shown, this means simply that something, through its existence, just because it is a determinate existence, is essentially in relationship with others, including also a percipient subject. The concept of the hundred dollars, says Kant, gains nothing by their being perceived. Concept here means the hundred dollars previously noted as thought in isolation. As thus isolated they are, it is true, an empirical content, but cut off, having no relationship with any other content and possessing no determinate character relatively to such; the form of identity-with-self strips them of any connection with an other, so that it is a matter of indifference whether they are perceived or not. But this so-called concept of the hundred dollars is a spurious concept; the form of simple self-relation does not belong to such a limited, finite content itself; it is a borrowed form attached to it by the subjective understanding; the being of the hundred dollars is not self-related but alterable and perishable.
The thinking or figurate conception which has before it only a specific, determinate being must be referred back to the previously-mentioned beginning of the science made by Parmenides who purified and elevated his own figurate conception, and so, too, that of posterity, to pure thought, to being as such and thereby created the element of the science. What is the first in the science had of necessity to show itself historically as the first. And we must regard the Eleatic One or being as the first step in the knowledge of thought; water and suchlike material principles are certainly meant to be the universal, but as material they are not pure thoughts; numbers are neither the first simple, nor the self-communing thought, but the thought which is wholly external to itself. ®
The reference back from particular finite being to being as such in its wholly abstract universality is to be regarded not only as the very first theoretical demand but as the very first practical demand too. When for example a fuss is made about the hundred dollars, that it does make a difference to the state of my fortune whether I have them or not, still more whether I am or not, or whether something else is or is not, then-not to mention that there will be fortunes to which such possession of a hundred dollars will be a matter of indifference-we can remind ourselves that man has a duty to rise to that abstract universality of mood in which he is indeed indifferent to the existence or non-existence of the hundred dollars, whatever may be their quantitative relation to his fortune, just as it ought to be a matter of indifference to him whether he is or is not, that is, in finite life (for a state, a determinate being is meant), and so on — si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae was said by a Roman, and still more ought the Christian to possess this indifference.
There remains still to be noted the immediate connection between, on the one hand, the elevation above the hundred dollars and finite things generally, and on the other, the ontological proof and the Kantian criticism of it we have cited. This criticism, through its popular example, has made itself universally plausible: who does not know that a hundred actual dollars are different from a hundred merely possible ones? that they make a difference to the state of my fortune? Because this difference is so obvious with the hundred dollars, therefore the concept, that is, the specific nature of the content as an empty possibility, and being, are different from each other; therefore the Notion of God too is different from his being, and just as little as I can extract from the possibility of the hundred dollars their actuality, just as little can I extract from the Notion of God his existence; but the onotological proof is supposed to consist of this extraction of the existence of God from his Notion. Now though it is of course true that Notion is different from being, there is a still greater difference between God and the hundred dollars and other finite things. It is the definition of finite things that in them the Notion is different from being, that Notion and reality, soul and body, are separable and hence that they are perishable and mortal; the abstract definition of God, on the other hand, is precisely that his Notion and his being are unseparated and inseparable. The genuine criticism of the categories and of reason is just this: to make intellect aware of this difference and to prevent it from applying to God the determinations and relationships of the finite.
Remark 2: Defectiveness of the Expression 'Unity, Identity of Being and Nothing'
Another contributory reason for the repugnance to the proposition about being and nothing must be mentioned; this is that the result of considering being and nothing, as expressed in the statement: being and nothing are one and the same, is incomplete. The emphasis is laid chiefly on their being one and the same, as in judgments generally, where it is the predicate that first states what the subject is. Consequently, the sense seems to be that the difference is denied, although at the same time it appears directly in the proposition; for this enunciates both determinations, being and nothing, and contains them as distinguished. At the same time, the intention cannot be that abstraction should be made from them and only the unity retained. Such a meaning would self-evidently be one-sided, because that from which abstraction is to be made is equally present and named in the proposition. Now in so far as the proposition: being and nothing are the same, asserts the identity of these determinations, but, in fact, equally contains them both as distinguished, the proposition is self-contradictory and cancels itself out. Bearing this in mind and looking at the proposition more closely, we find that it has a movement which involves the spontaneous vanishing of the proposition itself. But in thus vanishing, there takes place in it that which is to constitute its own peculiar content, namely, becoming.
The proposition thus contains the result, it is this in its own self. But the fact to which we must pay attention here is the defect that the result is not itself expressed in the proposition; it is an external reflection which discerns it therein. In this connection we must, at the outset, make this general observation, namely, that the proposition in the form of a judgment is not suited to express speculative truths; a familiarity with this fact is likely to remove many misunderstandings of speculative truths. Judgment is an identical relation between subject and predicate; in it we abstract from the fact that the subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of the predicate, and also that the predicate is more extensive than the subject. Now if the content is speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the judgment this is not expressed. It is the form of simple judgment, when it is used to express speculative results, which is very often responsible for the paradoxical and bizarre light in which much of recent philosophy appears to those who are not familiar with speculative thought.
To help express the speculative truth, the deficiency is made good in the first place by adding the contrary proposition: being and nothing are not the same, which is also enunciated as above. But thus there arises the further defect that these propositions are not connected, and therefore exhibit their content only in the form of an antinomy whereas their content refers to one and the same thing, and the determinations which are expressed in the two propositions are supposed to be in complete union-a union which can only be stated as an unrest of incompatibles, as a movement. The commonest injustice done to a speculative content is to make it one-sided, that is, to give prominence only to one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. It cannot then be denied that this proposition is asserted; but the statement is just as false as it is true, for once one of the propositions is taken out of the speculative content, the other must at least be equally considered and stated. Particular mention must be made here of that, so to speak, unfortunate word, 'unity'. Unity, even more than identity, expresses a subjective reflection; it is taken especially as the relation which arises from comparison, from external reflection. When this reflection finds the same thing in two different objects, the resultant unity is such that there is presupposed the complete indifference to it of the objects themselves which are compared, so that this comparing and unity does not concern the objects themselves and is a procedure and a determining external to them. Unity, therefore, expresses wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which it is asserted show themselves to be sheer opposites. So far then, it would be better to, say only unseparatedness and inseparability, but then the affirmative aspect of the relation of the whole would not find expression.
Thus the whole true result which we have here before us is becoming, which is not merely the one-sided or abstract unity of being and nothing. It consists rather in this movement, that pure being is immediate and simple, and for that very reason is equally pure nothing, that there is a difference between them, but a difference which no less sublates itself and is not. The result, therefore, equally asserts the difference of being and nothing, but as a merely fancied or imagined difference.
It is the common opinion that being is rather the sheer other of nothing and that nothing is clearer than their absolute difference, and nothing seems easier than to be able to state it. But it is equally easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, that it is unsayable. Let those who insist that being and nothing are different tackle the problem of stating in what the difference consists. If being and nothing had any determinateness by which they were distinguished from each other then, as has been observed, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure being and pure nothing that here they still are. Their difference is therefore completely empty, each of them is in the same way indeterminate; the difference, then, exists not in themselves but in a third, in subjective opinion. Opinion, however, is a form of subjectivity which is not proper to an exposition of this kind. But the third in which being and nothing subsist must also present itself here, and it has done so; it is becoming. In this being and nothng are distinct moments; becoming only is, in so, in so far as they are distinguished. This third is an other than they; they subsist only in an other, which is equivalent to saying that they are not self-subsistent.
Becoming is as much the subsistence of being as it is of non-being; or, their subsistence is only their being in a one. It is just this their subsistence that equally sublates their difference.
The challenge to distinguish between being and nothing also includes the challenge to say what, then, is being and what is nothing. Those who are reluctant to recognise either one or the other as only a transition of the one into the other, and who assert this or that about being and nothing, let them state what it is they are speaking of, that is, put forward a definition of being and nothing and demonstrate its correctness. Without having satisfied this first requirement of the ancient science whose logical rules they accept as valid and apply in other cases, all that they maintain about being and nothing amounts only to assertions which are scientifically worthless. If elsewhere it has been said that existence, in so far as this at first is held to be synonymous with being, is the complement to possibility, then this presupposes another determination, possibility, and so being is not enunciated in its immediacy, but in fact as not self-subsistent, as conditioned. For being which is the outcome of mediation we shall reserve the term: Existence. But one pictures being to oneself, perhaps in the image of pure light as the clarity of undimmed seeing, and then nothing as pure night — and their distinction is linked with this very familiar sensuous difference. But, as a matter of fact, if this very seeing is more exactly imagined, one can readily perceive that in absolute clearness there is seen just as much, and as little, as in absolute darkness, that the one seeing is as good as the other, that pure seeing is a seeing of nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness (light is determined by darkness and so is darkened light, and darkness is determined by light, is illuminated darkness), and for this reason, that it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.
Remark 3: The Isolating of These Abstractions
The unity, whose moments, being and nothing, are inseparable, is at the same time different from them and is thus a third to them; this third in its own most characteristic form is becoming. Transition is the same as becoming except that in the former one tends to think of the two terms, from one of which transition is made to the other, as at rest, apart from each other, the transition taking place between them. Now wherever and in whatever form being and nothing are in question, this third must be present; for the two terms have no separate subsistence of their own but are only in becoming, in this third. But this third has many empirical shapes, which are set aside or ignored by abstraction in order to hold fast, each by itself, these its products, being and nothing, and to show them protected against transition. Such simple procedure of abstraction can be countered, equally simply, by calling to mind the empirical existence in which that abstraction is itself only a something having a determinate being. Or else it is some other form of reflection which is supposed to effect the separation of what is inseparable. Such determination carries within itself its own opposite, and, without referring back and appealing to the nature of the thing itself, the determination of reflection can be refuted in its own self by taking it just as it presents itself and pointing out in it its own other. It would be favour in vain to attempt to intercept all the shifts and turns of reflection and its arguments in order to cut off and render impossible to it all the evasions and digressions by which it conceals from itself its own self-contradiction. For this reason I, too, refrain from taking notice of many of the so-called objections and refutations which have been advanced against the proposition that neither being nor nothing truly is, but that their truth is only becoming. The intellectual training which alone can afford an insight into the nullity of such refutations, or rather spontaneously dispell such random fancies, is effected only by a critical knowledge of the forms of the understanding; but those who are most prolific with such objections straightway launch their reflections against the first propositions without first acquiring or having acquired, by a further study of logic, an awareness of the nature of these crude reflections.
We shall consider some of the results which appear when being and nothing are postulated in isolation from each other, each outside the sphere of the other, with the consequence that their transition is denied.
Parmenides held fast to being and was most consistent in affirming at the same time that nothing absolutely is not; only being is. As thus taken, entirely on its own, being is indeterminate, and has therefore no relation to an other; consequently, it seems that from this beginning no further progress can be made — that is, from this beginning itself — and that progress can only be achieved by linking it on to something extraneous, something outside it. Hence the progress made in affirming that being is the same as nothing appears as a second, absolute beginning-a transition which is independent of being and added to it from outside. If being had a determinateness, then it would not be the absolute beginning at all; it would then depend on an other and would not be immediate, would not be the beginning. But if it is indeterminate and hence a genuine beginning, then, too, it has nothing with which it could bridge the gap between itself and an other; it is at the same time the end. It is just as impossible for anything to break forth from it as to break into it; with Parmenides as with Spinoza, there is no progress from being ot absolute substance to the negative, to the finite. If, nevertheless, there is progress — which as has been remarked, in the case of relationless, and so progress-less being can be accomplished only in an external manner-then this progress is a second, a fresh beginning. Thus Fichte's absolutely primary, unconditioned principle: A = A, is thesis; the second is antithesis. This latter is supposed to be partly conditioned, partly unconditioned (and so an internal contradiction). This is a progress by external reflection which, having negated the absolute with which it began-the antithesis is the negation of the first identity-straightway expressly converts its second unconditioned into a conditioned. But if there were any justification at all for the progress, that is, for sublating the first beginning, then this first would itself have to be of such a nature that an other could connect itself with it; and therefore it would have to be determinate. But neither being, nor even absolute substance, claims to be such: on the contrary. Being is the immediate, that which is still utterly indeterminate. ®
The most eloquent, perhaps forgotten, descriptions of the impossibility of advancing from an abstract first to something beyond it, and effecting a union of both, are made by Jacobi in support of his polemic against the Kantian a priori synthesis of self-consciousness in his Treatise on the Undertaking of the Critical Philosophy to Bring Reason to Understanding. He states the problem thus: that there be demonstrated the originating or producing of a synthesis in a pure [unity], whether of consciousness, of space, or of time. "Let space be one, time be one, consciousness be one ... Now tell me how does any one of these three ones purely make itself into a manifold within itself ... each is only a one and no other; a one and the same sort, a self-sameness without any distinction of one from the other; for these distinctions still slumber in the empty infinitude of the indeterminate from which each and everything determinate has yet to proceed! What brings finitude into those three infinities? What impregnates space and time a priori with number and measure and transforms them into a pure manifold? What brings pure spontaneity (ego) into oscillation? Whence does its pure vowel get its consonant, or rather how does its soundless, uninterrupted sounding interrupt itself and break off in order to gain at least a kind of 'self-sound' (vowel), an accent?" It is evident that Jacobi recognised very clearly the insubstantial nature, the non ens, of abstraction, whether so-called absolute (i.e. only abstract) space, or abstract time, or abstract pure consciousness, the ego; he remains fixed in such abstraction in order to maintain the impossibility of a transition to an other (the condition of a synthesis), and to the synthesis itself. The synthesis, which is the point of interest, must not be taken as a connection of determinations already externally there; the question is partly of the genesis of a second to a first, of a determinate to an indeterminate first principle, partly, however, of immanent synthesis, synthesis a priori — a self-subsistent, self-determined unity of distinct moments. Becoming is this immanent synthesis of being and nothing; but because synthesis suggests more than anything else the sense of an external bringing together of mutually external things already there, the name synthesis, synthetic unity, has rightly been dropped. Jacobi asks how does the pure vowel of the ego get its consonant, what brings determinateness into indeterminateness? The what would be easy to answer and has been answered by Kant in his own manner; but the question how means: in what peculiar manner, in what relationship, and so forth, and thus demands the statement of a particular category; but there can be no question here of a peculiar manner, of categories of the understanding. The very question how itself belongs to the bad habits of reflection, which demands comprehensibility, but at the same time presupposes its own fixed categories and consequently knows beforehand that it is armed against the answering of its own question. Neither has it with Jacobi the higher sense of a question concerning the necessity of the synthesis; for he remains, as has been said, fixed in the abstractions in order to maintain the impossibility of the synthesis. Especially graphic is his description of the procedure for reaching the abstraction of space. 'For a time I must try clean to forget that I ever saw, heard, touched or handled anything at all, myself expressly not excepted. Clean, clean, clean must I forget all movement, and precisely this forgetting, because it is hardest, I must make my greatest concern. just as I have thought away everything in general, so I must also completely and entirely get rid of it, retaining nothing but the forcibly arrested intuition alone of infinite immutable space. I may not therefore again think into it my own self as something distinct from it and yet connected with it; I may not let myself be merely surrounded and pervaded by it: but I must wholly pass over into it, become one with it, transform myself into it; I must leave nothing over of myself but this my intuition itself, in order to contemplate it as a genuinely self-subsistent, independent, single and sole conception.'
With this wholly abstract purity of continuity, that is, indeterminateness and vacuity of conception, it is indifferent whether this abstraction is called space, pure intuiting, or pure thinking; it is altogether the same as what the Indian calls Brahma, when for years on end, physically motionless and equally unmoved in sensation, conception, fantasy, desire and so on, looking only at the tip of his nose, he says inwardly only Om, Om, Om, or else nothing at all. This dull, empty consciousness, understood as consciousness, is — being.
In this void, Jacobi now continues, he experiences the opposite of what Kant assures him he should experience; he does not find himself to be a many and manifold, but rather a one devoid of all plurality and variety; indeed, 'I myself am the impossibility, the annihilation of all that is manifold and plural — cannot from my pure, absolutely simple, immutable being produce again or spook into myself even the least bit of anything ... Thus all separatedness and juxtaposition, and all manifoldness and plurality based thereon, are revealed (in this purity) as a sheer impossibility.'
This impossibility amounts to nothing else than the tautology: hold fast to abstract unity and shut out all plurality and manifoldness, confine myself to the differenceless and the indeterminate and shut my eyes to all that is differentiated and determinate. The Kantian a priori synthesis of self-consciousness, that is, the function of this unity to differentiate itself and in this differentiation to preserve itself, is attenuated by Jacobi into the same abstraction. That 'synthesis in itself', the 'original act of judgment', he converts one-sidedly into 'the copula in itself — an "is, is, is", without beginning or end and without what, who or which. This repetition of repetition ad infinitum is the sole business, function and product of the absolutely pure synthesis; it is itself empty, pure, absolute repetition itself.' Though, in fact, since there is no breaking off, that is, no negation or distinguishing in it, it is not a repetition but merely undifferentiated, simple being. But, then, is this still a synthesis if Jacobi omits precisely that which makes the unity a synthetic unity?
In the first place, it must be said that when Jacobi thus fixes himself in absolute or abstract space, time and consciousness, he places and fixes himself in this way in something which is empirically false; there is, that is, there is empirically present, no such space and time which is not spatially and temporally limited, or whose continuity is not filled by manifoldly limited determinate being and change, so that these limits and changes belong, unseparated and inseparable, to the nature of spatiality and temporality; similarly, consciousness is filled with determinate sensation, conception, desire and so on; it does not exist separated from some particular content. The empirical transition, moreover, is self-evident; consciousness can of course make empty space, empty time, and even empty consciousness itself or pure being, its object and content, but it does not stop at that; it goes beyond it or rather presses forward out of such a vacuity to a better content, that is, to a content which in some way or other is more concrete, and which to that extent is better and truer however bad it may be in other respects; just such a content is in general synthetic, this word being taken in its more general sense. Thus Parmenides has to reckon with illusion and opinion, the opposite of being and truth; Spinoza likewise, with attributes, modes, extension, movement, understanding, will, and so on. The synthesis contains and demonstrates the falsity of those abstractions; in it they are in unity with their other, not, therefore, as independently self-subsistent, not as absolute, but purely as relative.
The demonstration of the empirical nullity of empty space, and so forth, is not, however, what we are concerned with. Consciousness by making abstraction can, of course, fill itself with such indeterminates also and the abstractions thus held fast are the thoughts of pure space, pure time, pure consciousness, or pure being. It is the thought of pure space, etc. — that is, pure space, etc., in its own self — that is to be demonstrated as null: that it is as such already its own opposite, that its opposite has already penetrated into it, that it is already by itself the accomplished coming-forth-from-itself, a determinateness.
But this is found immediately in them. They are, as Jacobi profusely describes them, results of abstraction; they are expressly determined as indeterminate and this — to go back to its simplest form — is being. But it is this very indeterminateness which constitutes its determinateness; for indeterminateness is opposed to determinateness; hence as so opposed it is itself determinate or the negative, and the pure, quite abstract negative. It is this indeterminateness or abstract negation which thus has being present within it, which reflection, both outer and inner, enunciates when it equates it with nothing, declares it to be an empty product of thought, to be nothing. Or it can be expressed thus: because being is devoid of all determination whatsoever, it is not the (affirmative) determinateness which it is; it is not being but nothing.
In the pure reflection of the beginning as it is made in this logic with being as such, the transition is still concealed; because being is posited only as immediate, therefore nothing emerges in it only immediately. But all the subsequent determinations, like determinate being which immediately follows, are more concrete; in determinate being there is already posited that which contains and produces the contradiction of those abstractions and therefore their transition. When being is taken in this simplicity and immediacy, the recollection that it is the result of complete abstraction, and so for that reason alone is abstract negativity, nothing, is left behind, outside the science, which, within its own self, from essence onwards will expressly exhibit the said one-sided immediacy as a mediated immediacy where being is posited as existence and the mediating agent of this being is posited as ground.
In the light of such recollection, the transition from being into nothing can be represented, or, as it is said, explained and made intelligible, as something even easy and trivial; of course the being which is made the beginning of the science is nothing, for abstraction can be made from everything, and if abstraction is made from everything then nothing is left over. But, it may be continued, the beginning is thus not an affirmative, not being, but just nothing, and nothing is then also the end, at least as much as immediate being, and even more so. The shortest way is to let such reasoning take its course and then wait and see what is the nature of its boasted results. That nothing would be the result of such reasoning and that now the beginning should be made with nothing (as in Chinese philosophy), need not cause us to lift a finger, for before we could do so this nothing would no less have converted itself into being (see Section B above). But further, this abstraction from everything (which 'everything' nevertheless is an affirmative being) having been presupposed, then it must be understood more exactly; the result of making abstraction from all that is, is first of all abstract being, being as such; just as in the cosmological proof of the existence of God from the contingent being of the world, in which proof we rise above such contingent being, being is still taken up with us in our ascent and is determined as infinite being. Of course, one can also abstract from this pure being, being can be thrown in with the all from which abstraction has already been made; then nothing remains. Now if we want to forget the thinking of nothing, that is, its conversion into being, or are ignorant of it, we can proceed in the style of 'one can'; we can for example (God be praised!) also abstract from nothing (for the creation of the world, too, is an abstraction from nothing), and then what remains is not nothing, for it is just from this that we have made abstraction; we have in fact arrived at being again. This, 'one can', gives an external play of abstraction, in which the abstracting itself is only the one-sided activity of the negative. It is directly implied in this very form of 'one can', that for it being is just as indifferent as nothing, and that with the vanishing of either of them there is equally an arising of the other; but it is equally a matter of indifference whether one starts from the doing of nothing, or from nothing; for the former, that is the mere abstracting, has neither more nor less of truth in it than mere nothing has.
The dialectic employed by Plato in treating of the One in the Parmenides is also to be regarded rather as a dialectic of external reflection. Being and the One are both Eleatic forms which are the same thing. But they are also to be distinguished; and it is thus that Plato takes them in that dialogue. After removing from the One the various determinations of whole and parts, of being-within-itself, of being-in-another, etc., of shape, time, etc., he reaches the result that being does not belong to the One, for being belongs to any particular something only in one of these modes. Plato next deals with the proposition: the One is, and we should refer to Plato himself to see how, starting from this proposition, he accomplishes the transition to the non-being of the One. He does it by comparing the two determinations of the proposition put forward: the One is; it contains the One and being, and 'the One is' contains more than when we only say: the One. It is through their being different that the moment of negation contained in the proposition is demonstrated. It is evident that this course has a presupposition and is an external reflection.
Here the way in which the One is connected with being is such that being, which is supposed to be held fast abstractly by itself, is demonstrated in the simplest way and without any effort of thought, to be in a union which implies the contrary of what is supposed to be maintained. Being, taken as it is immediately, belongs to a subject, is something enunciated, has an empirical existence in general and stands therefore in the field of limitation and the negative. In whatever phrases or turns of speech understanding may express itself in attacking the unity of being and nothing and appealing to what immediately confronts us, it will find just in this very experience nothing but determinate being, being with a limitation or negation — that very unity which it rejects. The assertion of immediate being thus reduces to an empirical existence, and it cannot reject the demonstration of this because it is to the immediacy which is outside of thought that it wants to cling.
The same is the case with nothing, only contrariwise, and this reflection on it is familiar and has been made often enough. Nothing, taken in its immediacy, shows itself as affirmative, as being; for according to its nature it is the same as being. Nothing is thought of, imagined, spoken of, and therefore it is; in the thinking, imagining, speaking and so on, nothing has its being. But, further, this being is also distinguished from it; it is therefore said that although nothing is in thought or imagination, yet for that very reason it is not nothing that is, being does not belong to nothing as such, but only thought or imagination is this being. With this distinguishing it is equally not to be denied that nothing stands in relationship to a being; but in the relation, even though it contains the difference, there is present a unity with being. In whatever way nothing is enunciated or indicated, it shows itself connected with, or if you like in contact with a being, unseparated from a being, that is to say in a determinate being.
But when the presence of nothing in a determinate being is thus demonstrated, there still lingers on the thought of this difference of it from being, namely that the determinate being of nothing does not at all pertain to nothing itself, that nothing does not possess an independent being of its own, is not being as such. Nothing, it is said, is only the absence of being, darkness thus only the absence of light, cold only absence of heat, and so on. And darkness only has meaning in relation to the eye, in external comparison with the positive factor, light, and similarly cold is only something in our sensation; on the other hand, light and heat, like being, are objective, active realities on their own account, and are of quite another quality and dignity than this negative, than nothing. One can often find it put forward as a weighty reflection and an important piece of information that darkness is only the absence of light, cold only absence of heat. About this acute reflection in this field of empirical objects, it can be observed that darkness does in fact show itself active in light, determining it to colour and thereby imparting visibility to it, since, as was said above, just as little is seen in pure light as in pure darkness. Visibility, however, is effected in the eye, and the supposed negative has just as much a share in this as the light which is credited with being the real, positive factor; similarly, cold makes its presence known in water, in our sensations etc., and if we deny it so-called objective reality it is not a whit the worse for our doing so. But a further objection would be that here, too, as before, it is a negative with a determinate content that is spoken of, the argument is not confined to pure nothing, to which being, regarded as an empty abstraction, is neither inferior nor superior. But cold, darkness, and similar determinate negations are to be taken directly as they are by themselves and we shall then see what we have thereby effected in respect of their universal determination which has led them to be introduced here. They are supposed to be not just nothing but the nothing of light, heat, etc., of something determinate, of a content; thus they are a determinate, a contentful, nothing if one may so speak. But, as will subsequently appear, a determinateness is itself a negation, and so they are negative nothings; but a negative nothing is an affirmative something. The conversion of nothing through its determinateness (which previously appeared as a determinate being in a subject thinker, or in some other form) into an affirmative, appears to the consciousness which is fixed in the abstraction of the understanding as the acme of paradox; the insight that the negation of the negation is something positive, simple as it is, or rather because of its very simplicity, appears as a triviality to which haughty understanding need pay no heed, although the correctness of the insight is admitted-and the insight is not only correct, but, because of the universality of such determinations, it has its infinite extension and universal application, so that it were indeed well to pay attention to it.
A further remark can be made about the determination of the transition of being and nothing into each other, namely that it is to be understood as it is without any further elaboration of the transition by reflection. It is immediate and quite abstract because the transient moments are themselves abstract, that is, because the determinateness of either moment by means of which they passed over into each other is not yet posited in the other; nothing is not yet posited in being, although it is true that being is essentially nothing, and vice versa. It is therefore inadmissible to employ more developed forms of mediation here and to hold being and nothing in any kind of relationship-the transition in question is not yet a relation. Thus is it impermissible to say: nothing is the ground of being, or being is the ground of nothing or nothing is the cause of being, and so forth; or, transition into nothing can only occur under the condition that something is, or into being only under the condition of non-being. The kind of connection cannot be further determined without the connected sides being further determined at the same time. The connection of ground and consequent, etc., has no longer merely being and nothing as the sides which it connects, but expressly being which is a ground, and something which, although merely posited and not self-subsistent, is yet not the abstract nothing.
Remark 4: Incomprehensibility of the Beginning
What has been said indicates the nature of the dialectic against the beginning of the world and also its end, by which the eternity of matter was supposed to be proved, that is, the dialectic against becoming, coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be, in general. The Kantian antinomy relative to the finitude or infinity of the world in space and time will be considered more closely under the Notion of quantitative infinity. This simple, ordinary dialectic rests on holding fast to the opposition of being and nothing. It is proved in the following manner that a beginning of the world, or of anything, is impossible:
It is impossible for anything to begin, either in so far as it is, or in so far as it is not; for in so far as it is, it is not just beginning, and in so far as it is not, then also it does not begin. If the world, or anything, is supposed to have begun, then it must have begun in nothing, but in nothing — or nothing — is no beginning; for a beginning includes within itself a being, but nothing does not contain any being. Nothing is only nothing. In a ground, a cause, and so on, if nothing is so determined, there is contained an affirmation, a being. For the same reason, too, something cannot cease to be; for then being would have to contain nothing, but being is only being, not the contrary of itself.
It is obvious that in this proof nothing is brought forward against becoming, or beginning and ceasing, against this unity of being and nothing, except an assertoric denial of them and an ascription of truth to being and nothing, each in separation from the other. Nevertheless this dialectic is at least more consistent than ordinary reflective thought which accepts as perfect truth that being and nothing only are in separation from each other, yet on the other hand acknowledges beginning and ceasing to be equally genuine determinations; but in these it does in fact assume the unseparatedness of being and nothing.
With the absolute separateness of being from nothing presupposed, then of course — as we so often hear — beginning or becoming is something incomprehensible; for a presupposition is made which annuls the beginning or the becoming which yet is again admitted, and this contradiction thus posed and at the same time made impossible of solution, is called incomprehensible.
The foregoing dialectic is the same, too, as that which understanding employs the notion of infinitesimal magnitudes, given by higher analysis. A more detailed treatment of this notion will be given later. These magnitudes have been defined as such that they are in their vanishing, not before their vanishing, for then they are finite magnitudes, or after their vanishing, for then they are nothing. Against this pre notion it is objected and reiterated that such magnitudes are either something or nothing; that there is no intermediate state between being and non-being ('state' is here an unsuitable, barbarous expression). Here too, the absolute separation of being and nothing is assumed. But against this it has been shown that being and nothing are, in fact, the same, or to use the same language as that just quoted, that there is nothing which is not an intermediate state between being and nothing. It is to the adoption of the said determination, which understanding opposes, that mathematics owes its most brilliant successes.
This style of reasoning which makes and clings to the false presupposition of the absolute separateness of being and non-being is to be named not dialectic but sophistry. For sophistry is an argument proceeding from a baseless presupposition which is uncritically and unthinkingly adopted; but we call dialectic the higher movement of reason in which such seemingly utterly separate terms pass over into each other spontaneously, through that which they are, a movement in which the presupposition sublates itself. It is the dialectical immanent nature of being and nothing themselves to manifest their unity, that is, becoming, as their truth.
2. Moments of Becoming: Coming-to-Be and Ceasing-to-Be
Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing; but as the unity of being and nothing it is this determinate unity in which there is both being and nothing. But in so far as being and nothing, each unseparated from its other, is, each is not. They are therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments. They sink from their initially imagined self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are sublated.
Grasped as thus distinguished, each moment is in this distinguishedness as a unity with the other. Becoming therefore contains being and nothing as two such unities, each of which is itself a unity of being and nothing; the one is being as immediate and as relation to nothing, and the other is nothing as immediate and as relation to being; the determinations are of unequal values in these unities.
Becoming is in this way in a double determination. In one of them, nothing is immediate, that is, the determination starts from nothing which relates itself to being, or in other words changes into it; in the other, being is immediate, that is, the determination starts from being which changes into nothing: the former is coming-to-be and the latter is ceasing-to-be.
Both are the same, becoming, and although they differ so in direction they interpenetrate and paralyse each other. The one is ceasing-to-be: being passes over into nothing, but nothing is equally the opposite of itself, transition into being, coming-to-be. This coming-to-be is the other direction: nothing passes over into being, but being equally sublates itself and is rather transition into nothing, is ceasing-to-be. They are not reciprocally sublated — the one does not sublate the other externally — but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself.
3. Sublation of Becoming
The resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is in the first place becoming itself. But this equally settles into a stable unity. Being and nothing are in this unity only as vanishing moments; yet becoming as such is only through their distinguishedness. Their vanishing, therefore, is the vanishing of becoming or the vanishing of the vanishing itself. Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result.
This could also be expressed thus: becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing in being and the vanishing of being and nothing generally; but at the same time it rests on the distinction between them. It is therefore inherently self-contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself.
This result is the vanishedness of becoming, but it is not nothing; as such it would only be a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations, not the resultant of nothing and being. It is the unity of being and nothing which has settled into a stable oneness. But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as a determination on its own but as a determination of the whole.
Becoming, as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which is in the form of being or has the form of the onesided immediate unity of these moments, is determinate being.
Remark: The Expression 'To Sublate' - next section
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INDUSTRY CHALLENGE
Circle of Love team page
Has made a self-donation toward his/her personal goal.
Anita Coretti
Goal: $1,250.00
Achieved: $1,520.00
Antonella Morina $50.00 ---------- Carolina Cabrera $15.00 ---------- Défi express/Flash Challenge $100.00 ---------- Erika Petosa ---------- Family A & S Liberta $50.00 ---------- Fundraiser $300.00 ---------- Journée pour faire une différence $100.00 ---------- Kayla Petosa ---------- Lina $25.00 ---------- Mark Orsini $100.00 ---------- Mme./Mrs. Nancy Galle Di iorio $20.00 ---------- Ms. Rita Coretti $150.00 ---------- Patricia Fiori ---------- Paula Orsini $50.00 ---------- Sofia C. ---------- The Macri Family $100.00 ---------- The Petroni Family $50.00 ---------- Vescio Family ---------- Vous l'avez bien mérité! You deserve it! $200.00 ----------
Circle of Love Team
Donate to my journey and make this Weekend matter!
Pharmaprix(MD) Weekend to End Women's Cancers™ is a 1-day 32-kilometre walk through the neighbourhoods of Montreal. It's going to be a challenge, but I'm ready to do something bold and powerful in effort to end women's cancers once and for all.
My commitment is based on love for my fellow sisters, mothers, grandmas, daughters, nieces, and friends everywhere. It's based on the realization that we each need to do our part in this fight. I can walk.
My dedication is to my neighbour Maria Vescio who lost the battle to cancer. She was a loving and caring person. She always put priority to her family and went out of her way to help her neighbors. My drive for this walk is to support a close friend Sabrina, who has the courage and selflessness to think of others in a time of mourning. She recently lost her gorgeous 6 year old boy, Matteo who was outgoing, funny, and loving and would put a smile on everyone's face.
No one should feel alone. I walk to support all women in times of hurt, pain, anger, defeat, and accomplishments.
I would like to share my team name creation: I wanted to find a team name that would reflect our dedication and strenght therefore, we took a phrase that Sabrina would tell Matteo every day. "I Love you like a circle with no beginning and no end". In addition, Matteo's favourite color was green therefore; we will be imprinting our team name on our pink shirts with a green circle to represent how Matteo is forever in our thoughts and hearts.
I've committed to raising at least $1,250.00, so I need your help. Please help me by making a donation. Please keep in mind how far I'm walking - and how hard I'll have to train.
The raised funds will benefit the Segal Cancer Centre at the Jewish General Hospital – a leader in the fight against all women's cancers. I can and choose to be a part of this movement to take down women's cancers!
2014 is our Tenth Anniversary of working to end women's cancers! This year is the culmination of a decades worth of efforts by the Segal Cancer Centre, so if you've ever considering supporting me, now is the time.
I ask you to take a stance with me and join this life-saving adventure for all women. Be a part of my very personal journey - by giving, by walking with me, or simply by sharing my story with your circle of influence. Don't stand back and think about what you could have done – take that first step today! Take a chance with me – we have the opportunity to change thousands of lives, beginning with our own.
Make it a Weekend you'll never forget.
Print & Mail Donation Form
666 Sherbrooke O, Suite 202, Montreal QC H3A 1E7
© 2014 CauseForce, LLC. The Weekend to End Women's Cancers name and logo are registered trademarks of The Princess Margaret Cancer Foundation, used under license. Pharmaprix is a registered trademark of 911979 Alberta Ltd., used under license.


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Trek route leading to the hidden kingdom behind the Himalaya, still un spoilt Tibetan ethnic culture and way of life. It is the one of the most challanging treak to Mustang and Upper Dolpo.It is a also known as the desert of the Nepal.
Upper Dolpo Trek -Dolpo is remote region of Nepal and the focal point of this area is Shey Phoksumdo National Park, the largest National Parks of Nepal.
Mustang - Lo Manthang Trek has lured intrepid travelers to its remote realm for centuries, but only the most adventurous made it to this mountainous and inaccessible bastion of Tibetan Buddhism.


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The Highway Song
So we started in the cornfield
And I know we did not slack
We got everything in order
But we forgot to bring the bucket back
The foreman he went crazy
And ran around the field
Said we must be lazy
Had to be seen to be believed
Seen to be believed.
But it was a long way
From this highroad
It was a far away from here.
The farmer had a daughter
And she worked at the wishing well
Put one leg in the water
'til she found the mission bell
The old man went crazy
And ran to get his gun
We had a bad time explaining
We were just having drunken fun
Just having drunken fun.
From this high road, Oh!
It was a long way from here
So we walked along this road
Just tellin' stories as we go
We just walk along.
Well the farmer had a daughter
And she did not speak a word
We used to kiss her in the orchard
Till one morning we were overheard
The old man he went crazy
Running around the field
Said we must be crazy
Seen to be believed
The Stealer
I went down to the centre of town
And my feet was a burning ground
She stood on the corner merrily as can be
I said hey good lookin won't you come with me
She said yeah
I am the stealer
Came to steal your love
The sun was shining
The world was right
I said "tell me baby wha'cha doin' tonight"
I'm goin' round the corner
Where the music's loud
I'm tired of the city
Won't you come on round
I said yeah!
I'm the stealer
Come to steal your love
Steal your love oh yeah!
Goin' round the corner
I said yeah
Steal your love
I am going to steal you love away
Songwriters: PAUL RODGERS / ANDY FRASER / PAUL KOSSOFF
The Stealer lyrics © Blue Mountain Music Ltd.
I'm sorry but
Don't wanna talk, I need a moment before I go
It's nothing personal
I draw the blinds
They don't need to see me cry
'Cause even if they understand
They don't understand
So then when I'm finished
I'm all 'bout my business and ready to save the world
I'm taking my misery
Make it my bitch; can't be everyone's favorite girl
So take aim and fire away
I've never been so wide awake
No, nobody but me can keep me safe
And I'm on my way
The blood moon is on the rise
The fire burning in my eyes
Lo siento mucho (Farru), pero me voy (Eh)
Porque a tu lado me di cuenta que nada soy (Eh-ey)
Y me cansé de luchar y de guerrear en vano
De estar en la línea de fuego y de meter la mano
Acepto mis errore', también soy humano
Y tú no ve' que lo hago porque te amo (Pum-pum-pum-pum)
Pero ya (Ya) no tengo más na' que hacer aquí (Aquí)
Me voy, llegó la hora 'e partir (Partir)
De mi propio camino, seguir lejos de ti
The blood moon is on the rise (Is on the rise, na-na)
The fire burning in my eyes (The fire burning in my eyes)
I'm on my way
Everybody keep me safe
Everybody, everybody on my way
Songwriters: Alan Walker / Anders Froeen / Anton Rundberg / Carlos Efren Reyes Rosado / Franklin Jovani Martinez / Fredrik Borch Olsen / Gunnar Greve / Jesper Borgen / Julia Karlsson / Marcos Perez / Oeyvind Sauvik / Sabrina Carpenter
On My Way lyrics © Warner/Chappell Music, Inc, Walt Disney Music Company, Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC
Be My Friend
All I need is a friend
Someone to give a helpin' hand
When I'm afraid in the night
Someone to squeeze me
And tell me it's alright
You know I worry such a lot
And I would give all I've got
Just to have someone believe in me
Just to do that and put me
Back on evenly
Baby, baby, be my friend
I will love you till the very end
You make me feel
A stronger love than anyone
I've ever know
Oh, I need someone like you
You give me something so strong and true
Oh, baby, baby, be my friend
Want you baby, baby, baby be my friend
I will love you I will love you till the very end
Baby, baby, baby, baby, baby, baby, baby, baby be my friend
I will love you
Love you till the very end
Baby baby be my friend
I got to love you, love you till the very end
Baby, baby, baby, baby I will love you
I need your loving baby
I will love you, I need you
Songwriters: Andy Fraser / Paul Bernard Rodgers
Be My Friend lyrics © Kobalt Music Publishing Ltd.
Oh, sunny day
Melting away
Oh sunny day
Some say she was good for no one
But I say
She was bad for every one
Help me now' cause I feel
I'm fallin'
Maybe somehow
You will hear me callin'
Baby you didn't take everything
If you want it
You know I would bring
All the love you left behind
When you said goodbye.
Inside she was really nothing
I was a fool and I gave her everything
Help me now
'Cause I feel I'm fallin'
Maybe somehow you will hear me callin'
Baby you didn't mean what you said
Things that you told me
Are still in my head
And though it's too late
I realise all you did was lie.
Falling away
Songwriters: Andy Fraser / Paul Rodgers
Sunny Day lyrics © Blue Mountain Music Ltd., BLUE MOUNTAIN MUSIC LTD
Ride on a Pony
Baby won't you tell me
What you're tryin' to do
You don't mean to say
That our love is through
And I've go to see it through
I lives on the mountain
A hundred mile from town
That's a long way to go
Baby now
But soon I'm gonna be around
And I've got to see it through
I'm gonna steal you baby away with me
I want to love you
Because you see
I am riding on a pony
I'm gonna be there in the morning
And I hope that it's all right
Sometimes when I am loney
I think about your face, baby
So I get on my pony
And I ride over your place
I wanna take you, far away
I wanna love you, no matter what you say
Because I am riding on a pony
And I hope that it's all right.
Songwriters: PAUL RODGERS / ANDY FRASER
Ride on a Pony lyrics © Blue Mountain Music Ltd., BLUE MOUNTAIN MUSIC LTD
Love You So
And by the way before you go
I'd like to say
I love you so
If it's goodbye maybe for good
Maybe I should
And I
Oh how this year has slipped away
We shed no tears
So why today
And all this time has made me feel
Love is no crime
And love is real
Ooh! and I love you so
And I ooh I love you so
Remember me when you're far away
I'll remember you
No matter where I stay
I like to say
Love is no crime and love is real
I ooh I love you
I ooh I love you so
Ooh I love you
I love you and I love you baby
More then words can say
I know you can't stay
I love you anyway
Baby I love you
I love you babe
I got to say
Anyway I love you baby
Songwriters: Simon Kirke / Paul Rodgers
Love You So lyrics © Warner/Chappell Music, Inc
Bodie came from the hills
To see the world
Looking for different thrills
He found a girl
Showed him the city sights
Opened his eyes wide
No he finds
Bodie had changed his mind
Changed his mind
Came from the heart of town
She was no fool
Keeping him hanging around
She played it cool
Showed him the good life
And made herself his wife
Now he finds
I did not come
Just to lose my way
Things I've done there anyway
He found his girl
Bodie has changed his mind
Bodie lyrics © Blue Mountain Music Ltd., BLUE MOUNTAIN MUSIC LTD
Soon I Will Be Gone
Watch my hand
Writing this last letter
Knowing I won't forget her
No I won't forget her
Take my things
Everything is over
All my things
Leave behind my love
La la la la la la la
La la la la la la
Now lighting a cigarette
Now knowing I will regret
The way our love had to end
In her room
Standing all alone
Soon I will
Soon I Will Be Gone lyrics © Kobalt Music Publishing Ltd.
Highway is the fourth studio album by English rock band Free. It was recorded extremely quickly in September 1970 following the band's success at the Isle of Wight Festival but with an attitude of relaxation, the band having achieved worldwide success with their previous album Fire and Water (26 June 1970) and the single "All Right Now". It is a low-key and introspective album compared with its predecessors.
From a writing point of view Highway continued in the same vein as previous albums, with vocalist Paul Rodgers and bassist Andy Fraser collaborating on seven of the nine songs. For the most part it was the easiest of their albums to record as they had achieved their desire to have a hit single and returned to the studio with renewed confidence. Guitarist Paul Kossoff however found sudden fame more difficult to deal with, and remembered the aftermath of "All Right Now" as being "a great increase in pressure from every angle" (quoted in Phil Sutcliffe's liner notes). He preferred the more serious, weighty songs on the album such as "Be My Friend", which he saw as an antidote to the "frivolity" of "All Right Now".
It was their last album to be recorded in a position of success and security, as its failure contributed to the emotionally insecure Kossoff's growing drug addictionand the band's temporary split, from which it never truly recovered. Some, including drummer Simon Kirke, also cite the death of Kossoff's idol Jimi Hendrix (which occurred during the sessions for this album on 18 September 1970), as an important factor in his eventual breakdown.
Much to the band's disappointment, the album only reached No. 41 in the UK album charts (the previous album Fire and Water had reached #2) and only reached No. 190 in the US. The single release "The Stealer" failed in the UK also, and only reached No. 49 in the US. (Rodgers and Kirke would later re-record "The Stealer" with Bad Company in 1975 during the sessions for band's third album Run with the Pack (1976), but the track was not included on the album).
The album received a lukewarm critical reaction. The single release "The Stealer" had not been Island Records boss Chris Blackwell's first choice: He had wanted to release "Ride on a Pony" but this was changed at the band's insistence. Some, such as engineer Andy Johns, blamed the album cover which was aesthetically flat compared to previous releases and did not prominently display the band's name. It was believed that some fans who otherwise would have bought the album failed to notice it because of this.
They returned to the studio in early 1971 and managed to record four tracks before they eventually split, after fulfilling contracted tour dates. These 'limbo' tracks included the surprise UK #4 hit single "My Brother Jake"; the other three have surfaced on various other albums over the years. A notable cover version in 1971 is "Be My Friend" by Sylvia McNeill, produced by Tony Hall, on RCA 2058 (UK 45rpm).
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