text:
Dust to Dust es el tercer álbum de la banda francesa de Power metal Heavenly. Fue lanzado a la venta en 2004 por Noise Records.

Músicos
 Benjamin Sotto - Vocalista
 Maxence Pilo - Baterista
 Frédéric Leclercq - Guitarrista
 Pierre-Emmanuel Pelisson - Bajista
 Charley Corbiaux - Guitarrista

Lista de canciones
Ashes To Ashes... - 1:54
Evil - 6:13
Lust For Life - 6:13
Victory (Creature of the Night) - 6:51
Illusion Part I - 2:08
Illusion Part II (The Call of the Wild) - 5:02
The Ritual - 0:57
Keepers of the Earth - 6:15
Miracle - 9:08
Fight For Deliverance - 6:57
Hands of Darkness - 5:33
Kingdom Come - 8:11
...Dust to Dust - 4:51

Álbumes de 2004

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


"After unveiling our perfectly prepared precious cargo, we were both mesmerized, as "Mystic Owl" continued unfolding before us on the table.
She is a masterpiece, holding all of the energetics of her mother-channel Elle Divine. The photo's paled in comparison to her magnificence. This is certainly a testament to having felt it before actually seeing it.
We set her in-place, sat back in our chairs and just stared. The experience was quite emotional and surreal, evoking deep conversation between us. At different times of the day, with the light changing in the room, she changes. The blues in the piece are nothing short of magical! She has certain depth, movement and style and continues to reveal a variety of meanings/truths.
How does one manage to put words to all of this?


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All our trees made from PVC or PVC/PE mix are inherently fire resistant.


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text:
Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools
From International cyber law: interactive toolkit
© maradon 333. Licensed from Shutterstock.
This scenario concerns the leak of State-developed hacking tools, the failure of a State to inform software companies of vulnerabilities in their products, and the repurposing of the hacking tools for criminal purposes. The legal analysis of this scenario examines the obligation of due diligence, the obligation to respect sovereignty, and the prohibition of intervention.
1 Scenario
1.1 Keywords
1.2 Facts
1.3 Examples
2 Legal analysis
2.1 Attribution to State A
2.2 Breach of an international obligation by State A
2.2.1 Due diligence
2.3 Attribution to State B
2.4 Breach of an international obligation by State B
2.4.1 State B's obligation not to violate the sovereignty of State A
2.4.2 Prohibited intervention by State B
3 Checklist
4 Appendixes
4.2 Notes and references
4.3 Bibliography and further reading
4.4 Contributions
Scenario[edit | edit source]
Keywords[edit | edit source]
Malware, sovereignty, prohibition of intervention, due diligence
Facts[edit | edit source]
[F1] A website appears on the Internet, offering the sale of various hacking tools, including zero-day vulnerabilities, spyware, and ready-made exploits. The sellers allege that all of the tools on offer had been developed by State A's intelligence services (incident 1). Independent security researchers confirm that the advertised tools indeed resemble a number of different tools previously used in cyber operations in which State A had been implicated. After initial hesitation, State A officials confirm the leak of the hacking tools caused by unknown attackers.
[F2] Website hosting the tools is immediately noticed by the authorities and the content is taken down. However, once exposed on the Internet, the tools are considered as leaked and almost certainly spreading further.
[F3] Software companies whose products are said to contain the vulnerabilities launch a formal protest with State A for not having informed them of the existence of those vulnerabilities, before and especially after the leak (incident 2).
[F4] The tools are later repurposed by State B's military unit and used in a ransomware (or mock ransomware) campaign, causing substantial losses globally, including paradoxically in State A. In particular, the spread of the ransomware results in the encryption of data in several of State A's governmental information systems (incident 3). The facts as stated above have been verified by independent security researchers.
Examples[edit | edit source]
The Shadow Brokers publishing the NSA vulnerabilities (2016)
WannaCry (2017)
NotPetya (2017)
Legal analysis[edit | edit source]
For a general overview of the structure of analysis in this section, see Note on the structure of articles.
[L1] The legal analysis of the present scenario is divided into four parts: the first two parts discuss the potential responsibility of State A due to a breach of the obligation of due diligence and the following two parts deal with the potential responsibility of State B for a violation of sovereignty and prohibited intervention based on the ransomware campaign.
Attribution to State A[edit | edit source]
[L2] Internationally wrongful acts of States may consist of actions as well as of omissions.[1] However, whether there is an omission relevant for the purposes of attribution is intertwined with the existence of a concomitant international obligation and, therefore, with the identification of a subject by which this obligation is owed.[2] It is in this sense that the failure of State A to prevent the theft of its tools (incident 1) and to report the existence of specific vulnerabilities to software manufacturers (incident 2) must be assessed.
[L3] Attribution of incident 3 to State A is not realistic. State A would only be responsible for the conduct of State B's military unit if the unit was placed at the disposal of State A and acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of State A (see attribution).[3]
Breach of an international obligation by State A[edit | edit source]
Due diligence[edit | edit source]
According to the traditional formulation by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, every State is under an "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States".[4] In the cyber context, the UN General Assembly urged States already in 2000 to "ensure that their laws and practice eliminate safe havens for those who criminally misuse information technologies".[5]
It is the matter of some controversy whether the principle of due diligence reflects a binding obligation applicable to cyber operations.[6] Some States have framed it within their national positions as one of the "voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour"[7] in cyberspace, including Israel,[8] New Zealand,[9] the United Kingdom[10] and Canada.[11]
It has also been proposed that in the cyber context, it is preferable to construe due diligence as a standard of attribution rather than as a standalone primary rule of international law.[12] Nevertheless, the present analysis proceeds on the basis that as a matter of lex lata, due diligence constitutes a general international obligation for every State not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using cyber means.[13] This view has also been endorsed by a growing number of States, including Australia,[14] Czech Republic,[15] Estonia,[16] Finland,[17] France,[18] Germany,[19] Italy,[20] Japan,[21] the Netherlands,[22] Norway,[23] Switzerland,[24] and Sweden.[25]
Due diligence does not entail a duty of prevention,[26] but rather an obligation of conduct.[27] A State breaches its due diligence obligation in the presence of the following cumulative elements:
The existence of acts (by a non-State actor or a third State[28]) contrary to the rights of a victim State,[29]
which are conducted from or through the territory of the potentially responsible State (or from or through the territory or cyber infrastructure under its control),[30]
which would have been unlawful if conducted by the potentially responsible State,[31]
which have serious adverse consequences for the victim State,[32]
with respect to which the potentially responsible State has actual or constructive knowledge,[33] and
upon which the potentially responsible State can act, but fails to take all feasible measures.[34]
Publicly available national positions that address this issue include: (2020), (2022), (2020), (2019), (2021), (2019), (2021), (2020), (2021), (2021), (2019), (2020), (2021), (2021), (2021), (2022), (2021), (2021), (2021).
[L4] In the present scenario, all the required elements would likely not be met. First, the leak of the hacking tools and failure to inform the software manufacturers from State A (incidents 1-2) could be contrary to the rights of third States, because it makes their cyber infrastructure more vulnerable to malicious activities. However, the leak is a fairly remote cause of the malicious activities, because an intervening act of a malicious actor is required; it is, therefore, questionable whether the consequence can still be attributed to State A (condition 1).
[L5] The leak utilised the computer systems (cyber infrastructure) of State A. However, it is questionable if the leak itself is the harmful activity: rather, the abuse of the hacking tools is. Nevertheless, even if cyber infrastructure is interpreted broadly to include software[35] such as some of the hacking tools originally developed by State A, these tools were nonetheless no longer under the sole control of State A when they were repurposed and used to cause harm to third parties (condition 2).
[L6] If State A had purposefully sold or transferred their hacking tools to a third party, be it a State or a non-State actor, it would be responsible for further operations utilizing the hacking tools only if these were attributable to State A – for instance, if State A also exercised direction and control over the non-State actor - and those operations amounted to a breach of an international legal obligation (condition 3).
[L7] The leak led to substantial losses, which might qualify as "serious adverse consequences" if they cause, for instance, serious disruptions of societal functions, but again, the leak is causally remote from these consequences (condition 4).
[L8] State A knew about the leak. The scenario does not say since when exactly, but it is assumed that State A knew at the latest when the origin of the hacking tools was confirmed by independent researchers (condition 5).
[L9] State A did not inform the software manufacturers, which could have mitigated the consequences. This was an omission on its part to take all feasible measures in response to acts harmful to third parties (condition 6).
[L10] In sum, it would be difficult to determine a breach of the due diligence obligation by State A. The major stumbling blocks are the absence of an unqualified international obligation not to transfer State hacking tools to third parties (condition 3), remoteness of the causality (conditions 1 and 4), and the uncertainty about the seriousness of the adverse consequences (condition 4).
Attribution to State B[edit | edit source]
[L11] Incidents 1-2 are not attributable to State B – there is no indication of State B's involvement in the leak of vulnerabilities. Incident 3 (the ransomware campaign) is attributable to State B, because the operation was conducted by one of its military units, which qualifies as an organ of the State.[36]
Breach of an international obligation by State B[edit | edit source]
State B's obligation not to violate the sovereignty of State A[edit | edit source]
Sovereignty is a core principle of international law. According to a widely accepted definition of the term in the 1928 Island of Palmas arbitral award,
[s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.[37]
Multiple declarations by the UN,[38] NATO,[39] OSCE,[40] the European Union,[41] and individual States have confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace. Accordingly, so too does the principle of sovereignty. However, there is some debate as to whether this principle operates as a standalone rule of international law, the breach of which gives rise to state responsibility.
For the proponents of this view, the prohibition on violating the sovereignty of other States is a substantive primary rule of international law, the breach of which is an internationally wrongful act. This view was unanimously accepted by the experts who prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0.[42] It has also been adopted by several States including Austria,[43] the Czech Republic,[44] Finland,[45] France,[46] Germany,[47] Iran,[48] and the Netherlands.[49]
By contrast, the opposing view is that sovereignty is a principle of international law that may guide State interactions, but it does not amount to a standalone primary rule.[50] This view has now been adopted by one State, the United Kingdom,[51] and has been endorsed by the U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel.[52] By this approach, cyber operations cannot violate sovereignty as a rule of international law, although they may constitute prohibited intervention, use of force, or other internationally wrongful acts.
The remainder of this section proceeds on the basis of the former "sovereignty-as-rule" approach. Those espousing the latter "sovereignty-as-principle" approach should refer to other relevant sections of the legal analysis (such as that on the prohibition of intervention).
It is understood that sovereignty has both an internal and an external component.[53] In the cyber context, the "internal" facet of sovereignty entails that "[a] State enjoys sovereign authority with regard to the cyber infrastructure, persons, and cyber activities located within its territory, subject to its international legal obligations."[54][55]
As a general rule, each State must respect the sovereignty of other States.[56] It is clear that a cyber operation with severe destructive effects, comparable to a "non-cyber" armed attack or a use of force against a State, constitutes a violation of its sovereignty; however, with more subtle cyber operations, the question is far from settled.[57]
The following modalities, highlighted in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, represent different ways of determining what a "sovereignty violation" might mean in the context of cyber operations:
A State organ conducting cyber operations against a target State or entities or persons located there while physically present in the target State's territory violates the target State's sovereignty.[58] This was agreed by all Experts drafting the Manual; however, "a few" of the Experts thought that the extensive State practice carved out an exception for espionage operations.[59]
Causation of physical damage or injury by remote means;[60] again, "a few" Experts took the position that this is a relevant but not a determinative factor by itself.[61]
Causation of a loss of functionality of cyber infrastructure: although the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that a loss of functionality constituted "damage" and thus a breach of sovereignty, no consensus could be achieved as on the precise threshold for a loss of functionality (the necessity of reinstallation of operating system or other software was proposed but not universally accepted);[62] Below this threshold, there was no agreement among the Experts whether operations that do not cause physical consequences or a loss of functionality qualify as a violation of sovereignty.[63]
Interference with data or services that are necessary for the exercise of "inherently governmental functions";[64] although the Experts could not conclusively define the term "inherently governmental functions", they agreed that, for example, the conduct of elections would so qualify.[65]
Usurpation of "inherently governmental functions", such as exercise of law enforcement functions in another State's territory without justification.[66]
The Tallinn Manual's view of what constitutes a violation of sovereignty has been expressly endorsed by several States including Germany[67] and the Netherlands.[68] An alternative test has been proposed by France, which argues that a breach of sovereignty occurs already when there is "any unauthorised penetration by a State of [the victim State's] systems".[69]
Attributing the relevant cyber operation to a State different from the target State is a necessary prerequisite for qualifying the cyber operation as a violation of the target State's sovereignty.
Whether non-State actors can violate territorial sovereignty on their own is a matter of disagreement.[70]
Publicly available national positions that address this issue include: (2020), (2021), (2022), (2021), (2020), (2019), (2021), (2020), (2019), (2021), (2020), (2020), (2021), (2021), (2021), (2019), (2020), (2021), (2021), (2021), (2022), (2021), (2018), (2021), (2022), (2012), (2016), (2020), (2021).
[L12] In the present scenario, State B's ransomware campaign was not conducted from State A's territory (option 1) nor did it result in physical damage or injury (option 2), despite having caused significant economic losses. However, the cyber operation did cause a loss of functionality of many computer systems, including in State A, which is relevant for option 3. Additionally, it is possible the cyber operation interfered with State A's inherently governmental functions (option 4), although the information about State A's public information systems is not detailed enough to conclude what their function was. In sum, there is some evidence, albeit not conclusive on the facts provided, which suggests that State B may have violated its obligation not to violate the sovereignty of State A.
Prohibited intervention by State B[edit | edit source]
Prohibition of intervention
The obligation of non-intervention, a norm of customary international law prohibits States from intervening coercively in the internal or external affairs of other States. Prohibited intervention was authoritatively defined by the International Court of Justice in the judgment on the merits in the 1986 case Nicaragua v United States:
A prohibited intervention must … be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.[71]
In order for an act, including a cyber operation, to qualify as a prohibited intervention, it must fulfil the following conditions:
The act must bear on those matters in which States may decide freely. The spectrum of such issues is particularly broad and it includes both internal affairs (such as the "choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system"[71] or the conduct of national elections[72]), and external affairs ("formulation of foreign policy";[71] "recognition of states and membership of international organisations"[73])—the so-called domaine réservé of States.[74] The content of the domaine réservé is determined by the scope and nature of the State's international legal obligations.
The act must be coercive in nature. There is no generally accepted definition of "coercion" in international law. In this respect, two main approaches have emerged in the cyber context:[75]
Under the first approach, an act is coercive if it is specifically designed to compel the victim State to change its behaviour with respect to a matter within its domaine reservé.[76] Under this approach, the "key is that the coercive act must have the potential for compelling the target State to engage in an action that it would otherwise not take (or refrain from taking an action it would otherwise take)".[77]
Under the second approach giving meaning to "coercion", it is sufficient for an act to effectively deprive the target State of its ability to control or govern matters within its domaine reservé.[78] This latter approach distinguishes itself from the former by accepting that mere deprivation of the target State's control over a protected matter, without actually or potentially compelling that State to change its behaviour, may constitute intervention.[79]
Under both approaches, however, merely influencing the target State by persuasion or propaganda or causing a nuisance without any particular goal is insufficient to qualify as coercion.[80] The element of coercion also entails the requirement of intent.[81]
Finally, there has to be a causal nexus between the coercive act and the effect on the internal or external affairs of the target State.[82]
Publicly available national positions that address this issue include: (2020), (2021), (2022) (2021), (2019), (2021), (2020), (2020), (2021), (2021), (2019), (2020), (2021), (2021), (2021), (2022), (2021), (2018), (2021), (2022), (2016), (2020), (2021).
[L13] In the present scenario, there is nothing to suggest that State B's ransomware campaign was targeting State A's sovereign right to decide its own internal affairs freely. The fact that the ransomware campaign is designed to coerce State A to transfer funds to State B in and of itself is not sufficient to meet the requirements for an intervention. The element of coercion must be related to the form of interference that State B engages with a view to forcing a change to State A's policy or decision regarding its own internal affairs.
[L14] Compared to the economic losses caused by the incidents, the collected ransom was likely negligible. States in similar situations are not very likely to pay the ransom, which undermines the argument that the acts were coercive, rather than disruptive.[83]
[L15] In sum, it is difficult to label the operation as prohibited intervention.
Checklist[edit | edit source]
Due diligence:
In what circumstances would a State violate international law if it transferred the hacking tools to a non-State actor or another State on purpose?
Are State-developed hacking tools "cyber infrastructure" of that State, even if they are used outside its territory and without its control?
How proximate is the causal link between the stealing of the hacking tools and the consequences caused by their use?
Did the stealing and sale of the hacking tools result in serious adverse consequences for the victim State?
Did State A have actual or constructive knowledge that its territory was bring used for the stealing or sale of the hacking tools contrary to the rights of and resulting in serious adverse consequences for other States?
Did the potentially responsible State take all feasible measures to put an end to the malicious cyber activities?
Sovereignty:
Was the ransomware campaign conducted by a State organ of State B physically present on the territory of State A?
Did the ransomware campaign result in physical damage or injury on State A's territory?
Did the ransomware campaign cause a loss of functionality of State A's computer systems?
Did the ransomware campaign interfere with State A's inherently governmental functions?
Prohibition of intervention:
Did the ransomware campaign bear on the internal or external affairs of State A?
Did the ransomware campaign coerce State A by depriving it of its freedom of choice concerning its internal or external affairs?
Appendixes[edit | edit source]
Notes and references[edit | edit source]
↑ ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 2.
↑ Franck Latty, 'Actions and Omissions' in James Crawford et al (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 361.
↑ Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22.
↑ UN GA Res 55/63 (4 December 2000), Doc A/RES/55/63, para 1(a).
↑ Cf. UN GGE 2015 report, paras 13(c) and 28(e) (using non-mandatory language to express the due diligence principle in the cyber context: "States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using [cyber means]" and "States ... should seek to ensure that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit such acts", respectively) (emphases added); See also UN Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security, A/76/135 (14 July 2021) paras 29-30.
↑ Dapo Akande, Antonio Coco and Talita de Souza Dias, 'Old Habits Die Hard: Applying Existing International Law in Cyberspace and Beyond', EJIL Talk! (5 January 2021)
↑ Roy Schöndorf, Israel's Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations (8 December 2020) 403-4. The position states that "we have not seen widespread State practice beyond this type of voluntary cooperation, and certainly not practice grounded in some overarching opinio juris, which would be indispensable for a customary rule of due diligence, or something similar to that, to form".
↑ New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace' (1 December 2020) 3. According to the position, "An agreed norm of responsible state behaviour provides that states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs. Whether this norm also reflects a binding legal obligation is not settled".
↑ United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 'Application of international law to states' conduct in cyberspace: UK statement' (3 June 2021) para 12. According to the position: "the fact that States have referred to this as a non-binding norm indicates that there is not yet State practice sufficient to establish a specific customary international law rule of 'due diligence' applicable to activities in cyberspace".
↑ Government of Canada, International Law applicable in cyberspace (April 2022) para. 26. According to the position, this does not "precludes the recognition of a binding legal rule of due diligence under customary international law. Canada continues to study this matter".
↑ See Luke Chircop, 'A Due Diligence Standard of Attribution in Cyberspace' (2018) 67 ICLQ 643.
↑ See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 4 (unanimously endorsing this view).
↑ Australia, 'Australia's International Cyber Engagement Strategy - Annex A: Australia's Position on How International Law Applies to State Conduct in Cyberspace' (October 2017) 91, stating that "if a state is aware of an internationally wrongful act originating from or routed through its territory, and it has the ability to put an end to the harmful activity, that state should take reasonable steps to do so consistent with international law".
↑ Czech Republic, Comments submitted by the Czech Republic in reaction to the initial "pre-draft" report of the Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (undated), stating that "ICT-specific norms reflect a general principle of international law obliging States to ensure that territory and objects over which they enjoy sovereignty are not used to harm other States' rights."
↑ Estonia, 'President of the Republic at the opening of CyCon 2019' (29 May 2019), stating that "states have to make reasonable efforts to ensure that their territory is not used to adversely affect the rights of other states."
↑ Finland, 'Statement by Ambassador Janne Taalas at the second session of the open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security' (11 February 2020), stating that "States have an obligation not to knowingly allow their territory to be used for activities that cause serious harm to other States, whether using ICTs or otherwise."
↑ French Ministry of the Armies, 'International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace' (9 September 2019) 6, stating that "In compliance with the due diligence requirement, [France] ensures that its territory is not used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs. This is a customary obligation for States, which must (i) use cyberspace in compliance with international law, and in particular not use proxies to commit acts which, using ICTs, infringe the rights of other States, and (ii) ensure that their territory is not used for such purposes, including by non-state actors."
↑ Federal Government of Germany, 'On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace', Position Paper (March 2021) 3.
↑ Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 'Italian position paper on International law and cyberspace' (2021) 6-7.
↑ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Basic Position of the Government of Japan on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations' (28 May 2021) 5.
↑ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Letter to the parliament on the international legal order in cyberspace' (5 July 2019), stating that 'The Netherlands ... does regard the principle [of due diligence] as an obligation in its own right, the violation of which may constitute an internationally wrongful act.'
↑ 'Official compendium of voluntary national contributions on the subject of how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States' UNODA, A/76/136 (August 2021) 71-2.
↑ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Switzerland's position paper on the application of international law in cyberspace' (May 2021) 7.
↑ Government Offices of Sweden, 'Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace' (July 2022) 4.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 5.
↑ Cf. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgement) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 430; see further James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 226–32 (on the distinction between due diligence and obligations of prevention); Rudiger Wolfrum, 'Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some Thoughts About the Implementation of International Obligations' in Mahnoush H Arsanjani et al, Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of Michael Reisman (Brill 2010).
↑ While, in general, it is States, not individuals or private entities, which are able to violate international law, cyber operations carried out by individuals or private entities that nevertheless result in serious adverse consequences fall within a State's due diligence obligation. See Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 21.
↑ Corfu Channel judgment, para 22; Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 2 and 15.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 6.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 18-24.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 43; commentary to rule 7, para 2 and 18.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, Glossary.
↑ ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 4(1); Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 15, para 1; see also ICRC Customary IHL Study, vol 1, 530–531 ("The armed forces are considered to be a State organ, like any other entity of the executive, legislative or judicial branch of government.").
↑ Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 RIAA 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
↑ UNGA Res 71/237 (30 December 2015) UN Doc A/RES/20/237.
↑ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'Wales Summit Declaration' (issued by the Head of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales (5 September 2015) para 72.
↑ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Decision No. 1202, OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (Permanent Council, 10 March 2016) PC.DEC/1202.
↑ Council of the European Union,"Council Conclusions on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU" (Council conclusions, 20 November 2017).
↑ Michael N Schmitt, 'Virtual Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law' (2018) 19 ChiJIntlL 30,40; Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 4, para 2 ('States shoulder an obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States as a matter of international law').
↑ Austria, Pre-Draft Report of the OEWG - ICT: Comments by Austria (31 March 2020), stating that 'a violation of the principle of State sovereignty constitutes an internationally wrongful act – if attributable to a State – for which a target State may seek reparation under the law of State responsibility'.
↑ Czech Republic, Statement by Mr. Richard Kadlčák, Special Envoy for Cyberspace, 2nd substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (11 February 2020), stating that '[t]he Czech Republic concurs with those considering the principle of sovereignty as an independent right and the respect to sovereignty as an independent obligation.'
↑ Finland, 'International law and cyberspace: Finland's national positions' (15 October 2020), 3, stating that 'Finland sees sovereignty as a primary rule of international law, a breach of which amounts to an internationally wrongful act and triggers State responsibility. This rule is fully applicable in cyberspace.'
↑ French Ministry of the Armies, 'International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace', 9 September 2019, stating that 'Any unauthorised penetration by a State of French systems or any production of effects on French territory via a digital vector may constitute, at the least, a breach of sovereignty'.
↑ Germany, 'On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace: Position Paper' (March 2021), p. 3, noting that 'Germany agrees with the view that cyber operations attributable to States which violate the sovereignty of another State are contrary to international law'.
↑ Iran, 'Declaration of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Regarding International Law Applicable to the Cyberspace' (July 2020), para 4 ('Any utilization of cyberspace if and when involves unlawful intrusion to the (public or private) cyber structures which is under the control of another state, maybe constituted as the violation of the sovereignty of the targeted state.').
↑ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Letter to the parliament on the international legal order in cyberspace' (5 July 2019), stating that 'countries may not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another country'.
↑ Gary P. Corn and Robert Taylor, 'Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber' (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 207, 208 (arguing that sovereignty is 'a principle of international law that guides state interactions').
↑ Jeremy Wright, 'Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century' (23 May 2018) (stating that he was 'not persuaded that we can currently extrapolate from that general principle a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that of a prohibited intervention. The UK Government's position is therefore that there is no such rule as a matter of current international law'); see also Memorandum from JM O'Connor, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, 'International Law Framework for Employing Cyber Capabilities in Military Operations' (19 January 2017) (considering that sovereignty is not 'a binding legal norm, proscribing cyber actions by one State that result in effects occurring on the infrastructure located in another State, or that are manifest in another State'), as cited by Sean Watts & Theodore Richard, 'Baseline Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace' (2018) 22 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 771, 829.
↑ Paul C. Ney, DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference, 2 March 2020, arguing that 'the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations in another State's territory'.
↑ Cf. James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2012) 448.
↑ Sovereignty over cyber infrastructure derives from the traditional concept of sovereignty, independent of the use of cyberspace. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, 'Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace' (2013) 89 Int'l L. Stud. 123 (noting that '[t]erritorial sovereignty [..] implies that, subject to applicable customary or conventional rules of international law, the State alone is entitled to exercise jurisdiction, especially by subjecting objects and persons within its territory to domestic legislation and to enforce these rules.')
↑ UN GA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) (Friendly Relations Declaration), preamble (emphasizing "that the purposes of the United Nations can be implemented only if States enjoy sovereign equality and comply fully with the requirements of this principle in their international relations"); Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 4.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 4, para 5 and 12.
↑ See, eg, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) [2015] ICJ Rep 665, 704–05, paras 97–99 (holding that the presence of Nicaragua's military personnel in the territory under Costa Rica's sovereignty amounted to a violation of Costa Rica's territorial sovereignty); see also Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 4, para 6.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 4, para 7; commentary to rule 32, para 9.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 4, para 11.
↑ Germany, 'On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace: Position Paper' (March 2021), p. 4.
↑ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Letter to the parliament on the international legal order in cyberspace' (5 July 2019), p. 3.
↑ French Ministry of the Armies, International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace, p. 6.
↑ In favour: see, eg, Theodore Christakis, 'The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law Something to Say about Secession?' (2011) 24 LJIL 73, 84; Marcelo Kohen, 'The Court's Contribution to Determining the Content of Fundamental Principles of International Law' in Giorgio Gaja and Jenny Grote Stoutenburg (eds), Enhancing the Rule of Law through the International Court of Justice (Brill 2012) 145. Against: see, eg, Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 4, para 3.
↑ 71.0 71.1 71.2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 205.
↑ Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Letter to the President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace – Appendix: International Law in Cyberspace' (5 July 2019), 3; Finland, 'International law and cyberspace: Finland's national positions' (15 October 2020), 3; Germany, 'On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace: Position Paper' (March 2021), 5.
↑ Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Letter to the President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace – Appendix: International Law in Cyberspace' (5 July 2019), 3.
↑ See, for example, Katja Ziegler, "Domaine Réservé", in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2008) (updated April 2013) (defining the domaine réservé as those "areas where States are free from international obligations and regulation").
↑ See also Harriet Moynihan, 'The Vital Role of International Law in the Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace' (2020) 5 Journal of Cyber Policy __, ___ [10–12 in pre-print].
↑ See, eg, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Letter to the President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace – Appendix: International Law in Cyberspace' (5 July 2019) 3, defining coercion as 'compelling a state to take a course of action (whether an act or an omission) that it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue' and noting that '[t]he goal of the intervention must be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state'; Germany, 'On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace: Position Paper' (March 2021), 5, defining coercion as a situation in which a State's 'will is manifestly bent by the foreign State's conduct' and noting that 'the acting State must intend to intervene in the internal affairs of the target State'; see also Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 19 ('The majority of Experts was of the view that the coercive effort must be designed to influence outcomes in, or conduct with respect to, a matter reserved to a target State.').
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 21. See also Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Letter to the President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace – Appendix: International Law in Cyberspace' (5 July 2019), 3.
↑ See, eg, Australia, 'Supplement to Australia's Position on the Application of International Law to State Conduct in Cyberspace' (2019) 4 ('A prohibited intervention is one that interferes by coercive means (in the sense that they effectively deprive another state of the ability to control, decide upon or govern matters of an inherently sovereign nature), either directly or indirectly, in matters that a state is permitted by the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely.'); New Zealand, 'The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace' (1 December 2020), para 9(b) (stating that a State cyber activity is coercive if 'there is an intention to deprive the target state of control over matters falling within the scope of its inherently sovereign functions'); see also Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 19 ('A few Experts took the position that to be coercive it is enough that an act has the effect of depriving the State of control over the matter in question.').
↑ Harriet Moynihan, 'The Vital Role of International Law in the Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace' (2020) 5 Journal of Cyber Policy __, ___ [11 in pre-print].
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 21.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, paras 19 and 27.
↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 24 (the exact nature of the causal nexus was not agreed on).
↑ For analyses of prohibited intervention in similar real-world incidents, see Michael Schmitt and Sean Fahey, 'WannaCry and the International Law of Cyberspace', JustSecurity, 22 December 2017; and Michael Schmitt and Jeffrey Biller, 'The NotPetya Cyber Operation as a Case Study of International Law', EJIL: Talk!, 11 July 2017.
Bibliography and further reading[edit | edit source]
Luke Chircop, 'A Due Diligence Standard of Attribution in Cyberspace' (2018) 67 ICLQ 643.
James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2012).
James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013).
Gary P. Corn and Robert Taylor, 'Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber' (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 207.
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, 'Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace' (2013) 89 Int'l L. Stud. 123.
Franck Latty, 'Actions and Omissions' in James Crawford and others (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010).
Michael N Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (CUP 2017).
Michael N Schmitt, 'Virtual Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law' (2018) 19 ChiJIntlL 30.
Michael N Schmitt and Jeffrey Biller, 'The NotPetya Cyber Operation as a Case Study of International Law', EJIL: Talk!, 11 July 2017.
Michael N Schmitt and Liis Vihul, 'Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace' (2017) 95 Tex L Rev. 1639.
Michael N Schmitt and Sean Fahey, 'WannaCry and the International Law of Cyberspace', JustSecurity, 22 December 2017.
Sean Watts & Theodore Richard, 'Baseline Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace' (2018) 22 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 771.
Rüdiger Wolfrum, 'Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some Thoughts About the Implementation of International Obligations' in Mahnoush H Arsanjani and others, Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of Michael Reisman (Brill 2010).
Katja Ziegler, "Domaine Réservé", in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2008).
Contributions[edit | edit source]
Scenario by: Taťána Jančárková & Tomáš Minárik
Analysis by: Tomáš Minárik
Reviewed by: Hitoshi Nasu; Petr Novotný; Barrie Sander
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Mirror Lake, Dell Creek Watershed (LW26)
Mirror Lake SP Beach, Mirror Lake (1296000)
Impounded Flowing Water
This classification includes waterbodies created by dams (mill ponds, reservoirs, flowages, and other impoundments) with a residence time of 14 days or more (under summer (June – Sept) mean low flow conditions with a 1 in 10 year recurrence interval (US EPA 2000)). Many natural lakes also have dams or water level control structures. However, to be included in the Impounded Flowing Waters category, the dam or water level control structure, must account for more than half of a waterbody's maximum depth. Impoundments with a residence time of less than 14 days should be covered under the rivers and stream assessment methodology process.
Mirror Lake is a 137-acre impoundment of Dell Creek above Lake Delton. Mirror Lake
consists of two bodies of water, sometimes considered Upper Mirror Lake and Lower Mirror
Lake. These two bodies of water are separated by a one-mile stretch of Dell Creek. Public
ownership of part of the shoreline and public access to the lake is provided by Mirror Lake
State Park, which surrounds the perimeter of the lake. The fishery of the lake includes
bluegill, walleyes, largemouth bass, northern pike and other panfish.
The lake is eutrophic and has relatively poor water quality, which is common to eutrophic
lakes and impoundments. Self-help monitoring on the lake indicates the lake to have generally
poor water clarity conditions. Sedimentation, particularly in the upper end of the lake is a
problem. It is thought that this sedimentation may be part of the reason for the decline of the
wild rice bed in the lake. In addition, nuisance growth of aquatic vegetation exists on the
lake, particularly the growth of duckweed. Eurasian water milfoil has been found in the lake.
Recently, the Town of Delton sponsored a Lake Planning Grant for the improvement of the
lake.
Mirror Lake is an impoundment of Dell Creek above Lake Delton. Public ownership of
part of the shoreline and public access to the lake is provided by Mirror Lake State
Park. This lake also has relatively poor water quality common to eutrophic lakes and
impoundments (WDNR, 1991). Self-help monitoring of the lake indicates the lake to
has generally poor water clarity conditions (Betz, 1990). Sedimentation in the upper
end of the lake is a problem (Trumm, 1991), and may be part of the reason for the
decline of the wild rice bed (WDNR, 1991). Nuisance growth of aquatic vegetation exists
on the lake, particularly duckweed.
Author Surface Water Inventory Of Wisconsin
Source: 1971, Surface Water Resources of Sauk County Mirror Lake T13N R5-6E, Sec. 29, 31, 32, 36
A drainage impoundment created by a dam with a 14-foot head across Dell Creek near the western city limits of Lake Delton. The Timme Dam separates Mirror Lake and Lake Delton within the narrow scenic gorge through which Dell Creek flows. Mirror Lake is sometimes considered as Upper and Lower Mirror Lake because a one-mile long narrow channel separates the two main bodies of water. The westernmost body, or Upper Mirror Lake, is relatively shallow with a maximum depth of only five feet. Lower Mirror Lake has a maximum depth of 19 feet. Largemouth bass, panfish and northern pike comprise the major sport fishery. Ice fishing and snowmobiling are important activities on the lake during the winter months. The lake is used extensively for boating and swimming during the tourist season. A motorized Duck trail on Mirror Lake by way of the Wisconsin River, Dell Creek and Lake Delton is currently in the planning stage. A large amount of siltation and subsequent aquatic weed growth are major use problems on Upper Mirror Lake. Aquatic weeds have been removed by private concerns in the past. Dredging of Upper Mirror Lake has been proposed in the past but considered unfeasible because of the cost. Some dredging has been done, however, to improve swimming in the state park. Game assets found in the area include deer, squirrels, ruffed grouse and puddle ducks. Public frontage totals 2.13 miles within the 1,970 acre Mirror Lake State Park located primarily on the southern shore. Two public boat launching ramps are located on Lower Mirror Lake. One is located on the northwestern shore and one within the State Park on the southeastern shore. Additional access is also possible from three bridge crossings and Dell Creek. Many private dwellings are located along the shores but an attempt is being made by the Department of Natural Resources to purchase all adjoining land in order to preserve the aesthetic value of the area
Surface area 137.22 acres, S.D.F. = 4.98, Maximum depth 19 feet
Mirror Lake State Park Beach was assessed for the 2018 listing cycle; E. coli data sample data were clearly below the 2018 WisCALM listing thresholds for the Recreation use. This beach was meeting this designated use and was not considered impaired.
Mirror Lake (WBIC 1296000) was assessed during the 2018 listing cycle; total phosphorus sample data clearly exceeded the 2018 WisCALM listing thresholds for the Recreation use and Fish and Aquatic Life use. This impounded flowing water was proposed for listing for total phosphorus in 2018.
Lake Bathymetry Map for Mirror Lake
Final Assessment Data from TSI Package and Assessment Units 2018
AIS Early Detection2013 Data Form Sauk Mirror Lake 1296000
Mirror Lake - Sauk County, Wisconsin - Comprehensive Management Plan
Mirror Lake - Sauk County, Wisconsin - Comprehensive Management Plan [Appendices]
Mirror Lake Sediment & Nutrient Reduction Study Report - Mirror Lake Management District - Lake Delton, Wisconsin
Mirror Lake, Sauk County - Aquatic Plant Sampling Map (1)(37 mpts)
Mirror Lake, Sauk County - Aquatic Plant Sampling Map (37 mpts)
Mirror Lake, Sauk County - Garmin Text File
MIRROR LAKE WATER QUALITY STUDY
TOWN OF DELTON: Mirror Lake Sediment Reduction Strategy 2002
MIRROR LAKE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT: Mirror Lake Planning Project 2011
TOWN OF DELTON: Mirror Lake Water Quality Study 1992
MIRROR LAKE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT: Mirror Lake Clean Boats Clean Waters Project 2014 2014
MIRROR LAKE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT: Mirror Lake 2015 Clean Boats Clean Wates Project 2015
MIRROR LAKE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT: Mirror Lake Tributary Erosion Control Planning 2009
MIRROR LAKE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT: Mirror Lake Management District 2018 CBCW 2018
TOWN OF DELTON: Mirror Lake Improvement Study 1999
MIRROR LAKE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT: Mirror Lake Management District 2016 Clean Boats Clean Waters 2016
1296000 Mirror Lake 10005448 Mirror Lake (Sauk County) 3/29/1994 12/1/2020 Map Data
Mirror Lake is located in the Dell Creek watershed which is 133.73 mi². Land use in the watershed is primarily forest (48.30%), agricultural (22.50%) and a mix of grassland (11.20%) and other uses (18.00%). This watershed has 231.97 stream miles, 193.10 lake acres and 4,715.88 wetland acres.
This watershed is ranked High for runoff impacts on streams, Medium for runoff impacts on lakes and High for runoff impacts on groundwater and therefore has an overall rank of High. This value can be used in ranking the watershed or individual waterbodies for grant funding under state and county programs.However, all waters are affected by diffuse pollutant sources regardless of initial water quality. Applications for specific runoff projects under state or county grant programs may be pursued. For more information, go to surface water program grants.
Mirror Lake SP Beach, Mirror Lake is considered a Impounded Flowing Water under the state's Natural Community Determinations.
Mirror Lake - Sauk County, Wisconsin - Comprehensive Management Plan [Maps]


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MUSAE'S LAUREL GARDEN by CCD
Image courtesy of © CCD / Cheng Chung Design
CCD was inspired by tree rings as the concept for the desing of MUSAE'S LAUREL GARDEN. They created a place that creates and records wonderful memories. Like a tree, it coexists with four seasons, silently watches people come and go, listens to and witnesses what happens under the tree, and records the stories here via its "annual rings". Discover the complete story after the jump.
From the architects: Heart touching moments found here, with respect to the beauty of the city and its people.
Annual rings of trees increase with time. Every circle carries the story of the time, and is rooted in the memory of its surroundings. When combined together, they form aesthetic patterns, which embody the beauty of time.
RELATED: FIND MORE IMPRESSIVE PROJECTS FROM CHINA
Taking "tree ring" as the concept, CCD turned MUSAE'S LAUREL GARDEN into a place that creates and records wonderful memories. Like a tree, it coexists with four seasons, silently watches people come and go, listens to and witnesses what happens under the tree, and records the stories here via its "annual rings".
MUSAE'S LAUREL GARDEN
The geometric building is characterized by undulating pitched roofs. With points, lines and planes interweaving, it's like a simplistic yet aesthetic "time box" which blends into its natural surroundings and the city.
The foyer is reorganized in combination with the garden and architecture. Artworks featuring wooden mortise-and-tenon structures are brought in to create a unique experience and first impression.
Life is full of changes. Time records the moments we have experienced, which often echo with our minds. The space is created not merely to serve the current moment, but also to preserve the wonderful memories here as time goes by. People come, and spend enjoyable time here, which will be engraved in their memories after they leave.
The space has a 13-meter-high ceiling, with orderly full-height screens creating a sense of formality. Just like the doors of a time tunnel, these screens lead people to a world where they can totally relax and set the mind free.
The design touches the heart, and the space accommodates moments. Every moment spent here will become a meaningful part of the memory.
The full-height wall and bookshelf provide a stage for sunlight, which moves freely on the surface and generates playful shadows.
The design connects nature with emotional feelings, brings in order and the play of light and shadows, and creates the contrast of the old and new, in order to interpret the meaning of time. The archaized brushed bronze and the modern glass bricks generate the dialogue between the old and new, it signifies the flow of time and the passage of life.
The interior also uses low wall and adopts the concept of "room in room" that is usually applied in tea house, planting bamboos on the periphery, which enriches the layering of the space and highlights its towering storey height. Besides, the scenery of the outdoor bamboo grove is brought in, which generates a refreshing and oriental-style elegant atmosphere.
Why are we always in a hurry every day? Perhaps we can treat our time from a new perspective. Don't worry that past time never comes back, since the memories have been already imprinted in our minds.
This space allows us to temporarily stay away from the hustle and bustle of daily life, listen to the voice of our inner mind, enjoy and preserve the wonderful moments here, which will soothe our soul and help us to get through tiring days.
Project name: MUSAE'S LAUREL GARDEN
Interior design: CCD / Cheng Chung Design (HK) – www.ccd.com.hk
Area: 1,100 m2
Completion time: December 2019
Photo credit: CCD / Cheng Chung Design (HK)
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Tower C at Shenzhen Bay Super Headquarters Base by Zaha Hadid Architects
FURNITURE: TIMELESS MID-CENTURY INSPIRED DESIGN SOFAS
White Penthouse by Capital Construction


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Comic Books 2018: The Year In Review
The Cost Happy New Year! No matter where you live, 2018 wasn't a dull one and comic books certainly offered a welcome respite from the real world. Here's hoping that 2019 is a little calmer. Let's...
Patrick Hayes December 31, 2018 639 0
In Review: Revenge of Wonderland #5
The covers: Here's a surprise: there are no chase covers to track down! Just the four covers that all Zenescope books have. The A cover by Igor Vitorino and Ivan Nunes is awesome for some striking...
The Cost Happy New Year, everyone! It's now 2018 and there's a lot to look forward to in comics, but let's see what you had to spend if you bought books like I did last year....
Patrick Hayes January 2, 2018 1003 0
In Review: Red Agent: The Human Order #8
The covers: A lucky seven for you to find for the penultimate issue of this series. The first cover is the A by Sean Chen and Ivan Nunes. Set before Tower Bridge in London, Britney, Silk, and...
Patrick Hayes June 24, 2017 1862 0
In Review: Cinderella Serial Killer Princess #3
The covers: A fierce four for fervent fans to find. Looking extremely proud of herself, Cindy holds the severed head of the Lion from Oz up to her face on the A cover. This twisted image...
In Review: Grimm Fairy Tales #1
The covers: There are twelve different covers for this reboot to Zenescope's flagship title. The A cover is by David Finch and Ivan Nunes and features Britney Waters walking down a street with a slight smile...
The Cost The year's been over for a few days, but let's see how much you would have had to spend to read the books that I reviewed last in the last twelve months. 2016 had...
Fantasia Comic Con
There's a new convention coming to California, and it's got a big goal. Fantasiacon is looking to start something big in Indio, California. In its own words, "Fantasia Comic Con brings together America's three greatest mediums...
Patrick Hayes November 2, 2016 2100 0
In Review: Red Sonja #5
The covers: Three different covers that I could locate online. Marguerite Sauvage created the Main cover which is a great image of Sonja in the middle of a mighty battle. Several trees are seen high above,...
In Review: Hellchild #2
The covers: Six covers to seek if you feel you're up to the task. Anthony Spay and Ivan Nunes have the recently resurrected Angelica confronting a trio of biker werewolves on the A cover. She's surrounded,...
Patrick Hayes April 23, 2016 1325 0
In Review: Grimm Fairy Tales #120
The covers: Five covers to find as things come to a head with attacks from Bloody Bones and his minions. The A cover, by Sean Chen and Hedwin Zaldivar, is a good example of this. Skye...
In Review: Escape From Monster Island #2
The covers: Five covers to find before they find you! Josh Burns is responsible for the A cover which features a monstrous cyclops being attacked by six smaller goblin-like creatures with flaming staffs. The action is...


Cannabis advocates have praised the renewal of the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment, which restricts the U.S. Department of Justice from spending money on stopping states from implementing their legal, medicinal pot laws.
Some feared that a federal justice department overseen by Attorney General Jeff Sessions would push to remove the amendment. Instead it appears in a federal spending plan that will keep the government open through September.
Hezekiah Allen, executive director of the California Growers Association, praised the amendment's inclusion. However, he noted that it only applies to medical cannabis.
"We'd love to see it expanded to include adult use," he said of recreational marijuana.
Heather Burke, a Nevada City attorney, echoed Allen. She said a continuation of the amendment means medical cannabis enjoys far greater protections from the federal government than adult use.
"The feds still haven't given clear guidance on adult-use production/distribution in states that have a robust regulatory scheme, such as Colorado and Washington (and California once our adult-use regulations are in place), so we're all still waiting and watching and hoping and praying," Burke said in an email.


What if it's the middle of the night and you don't want to sit up, turn on the light, find your glasses, find the pencil, and start writing? What if you're going 75 mph on the freeway and really should not take your hands off the steering wheel? What if you're typing along at 60 wpm and what's flowing across your screen is brilliant—and suddenly someone knocks on your door? Or the phone rings and it's someone selling carpet cleaning or asking for a donation to some political cause? If you're focused on traffic or an important task, you can't start writing in your notebook or typing on your electronic thingie. And it's tacky not to answer the door or the phone.
Here's the solution. Try to remember. More than that, learn to remember. Train your memory. Develop or practice some kind of mnemonic system that helps you remember what that 3 a.m. idea was or where the sentence ends that was interrupted when you had to get up to answer the door. This very thing just happened to me. I was a couple of paragraphs back, and a neighbor came to ask about cat food for the feral cats we feed in the parking lot. She also needed a bandage for her finger. Then we had to gossip about one of our other neighbors. Five, ten minutes later, I finally sat back down at my computer. Now, I asked myself, where was I? What on earth was I writing about? I could have just lost it and never finished this blog.
Editors learn to remember. We get lots of practice. We remember details our authors forgot. We remember the names of characters whose names change from chapter to chapter. We remember what the author said on a previous page that he has suddenly contradicted on this page. We remember useful and germane books on the topic at hand and recommend them to our author for additional research. We remember historical facts that the author has gotten wrong. Whether you're a writer or an editor, remembering is a useful skill.
Try to remember. Learn to remember. Learn to use a system of cues and associations, learn mnemonic aids like the one medical students learn the bones of the human body, count on your fingers and assign a phrase or key word to each finger. Over the years I have developed my own system. I'll share it with you. When you're in that hypnagogic state before you fall asleep, tell yourself that you will remember good ideas. Say it out loud. Further, I also tell myself that if I seem to have forgotten, the idea will come back. This is a common principle in guided meditation, where you recall what the Goddess or the wizard taught you in your meditation. Still further, I tell myself that if I don't remember, then the idea wasn't worth remembering anyway, and I just let it go and go on to the next one that sleets into my head. When you begin your next project, remember what you're doing and where you're going, and you'll be more productive.


After a spell in the Falkland Islands Charles Martell came to Gloucestershire where he met and fell in love with a Gloucester cow………!
At the time (1972) this ancient Gloucestershire breed numbered just 68 head worldwide – mostly in Gloucestershire. Determined not to watch the breed becoming extinct he bought a farm, half a dozen cows and a bull and put his small herd to doing what Gloucester cows do best which is producing milk for the making of Double Gloucester cheese. And since the making of Single Gloucester cheese had died out he re-established that variety also. Over the last 40 years his farm has become a hot destination for press and television which in turn has caused his small farm cheesemaking business to thrive. He has introduced a number of new cheese varieties including Slack-ma-Girdle, sheep milk Nuns of Caen, and Stinking Bishop. This cheese is washed in perry from Charles's collection of perry pear trees – which is another story in itself.


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Seven communities selected for Main Street Iowa program
Seven Iowa communities were selected this week to participate in the Main Street Iowa program. Thom Guzman with the Iowa Department of Economic Development (IDED) says Ames, Fort Madison, Manning and Colfax will participate in the traditional program that helps communities revitalize their downtown business districts.
The other three projects are located in commercial districts in Cedar Rapids, Davenport and Des Moines. "What's interesting about these three districts is they're not downtowns…but they all are historic commercial districts within those communities," Guzman said.
The projects in Cedar Rapids, Davenport and Des Moines will be part of Main Street Iowa's new Urban Neighborhood District program. In Cedar Rapids, officials will focus on the Czech Village/New Bohemia district.
That area of town was buried under flood waters last year. "All the more reason for us to say 'let's work together and try to bring back what was there once before and make it better,'" Guzman said. The Davenport project will involve the Hilltop Campus Village, while officials in Des Moines will work fix-up the 6th Avenue Corridor, just north of downtown, that includes a number of minority-owned businesses.
Guzman says all seven communities will receive "hundreds of thousands of dollars" in technical assistance from the I.D.E.D. The Main Street Iowa program was launched in 1986 and now includes 47 projects.
Guzman says two examples of the program's success can be found in downtown Cedar Falls and downtown Dubuque. "You can go there today and be totally impressed with the culture, the arts and the shopping opportunities in both districts that didn't exist 20 years ago," Guzman said.
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Morningside and Grand View collide for NAIA crown
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A Tale of Two Transitions
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.
That's perhaps an opening so predictable as to wander blithely into the terrain of the cliché, but it captures all too well the weirdness of the last month for someone who's trying to write about academic leadership in chaotic times. Part of me wishes everyone and everything would settle down long enough for me to get this book revised and out. And part of me recognizes the altogether — "instructive" might be the most diplomatic word I could select here — examples by which I'm surrounded right now, and the ways that they're challenging me to think hard about the arguments I'm making.
If you pay much attention at all to the higher education press, you'll no doubt have seen that there's been a month-long battle going on between MSU's upper administration and its board of trustees. It's not entirely clear when hostilities commenced, but they became public when one or more members of the board anonymously leaked a story to the Detroit Free Press saying that they'd given President Samuel Stanley a deadline by which he needed to announce his resignation or be fired. This salvo not only caused grave concern among higher education leaders about the board's interference in campus operations (see, for instance, the statement released by the president of the Association of American Universities) but also set off waves of anxiety and anger on campus as everyone tried to find out, not to put too fine a point on it, what the fuck was going on.
For a couple of weeks, the battle was carried out via a wide variety of statements and stories, each of which managed to make the situation less clear. Was the president under fire because he'd supported the provost in her decision to relieve the dean of the business school of his duties due to his failure to fulfill his obligations as a mandatory reporter? Or was it that the president had failed in his responsibilities to properly certify the campus's annual Title IX report? Did it have to do with the ongoing failures of the Office of Institutional Equity to handle cases in a timely fashion? Or was it something else entirely? The radical lack of transparency around what was going on left everyone on and around campus guessing.
It came, however, to seem that the original assumption — that it had to do with the dismissal of the dean of the business school — was the correct one. Senior members of the business school faculty had apparently reached out to key members of the board (and perhaps to other influential donors as well), and in response the board hired an external law firm to investigate the dean's dismissal. It's a significant move, not least for a board that refused to commission such an external investigation into how Larry Nassar's sexual assault of hundreds of young women was abetted by administrative inaction. The board defended its move in an unsigned statement from "the majority" of its members in which they claimed that the review was appropriate because, among other points of support, the preamble to the board's bylaws states that the board "exercises the final authority in the government of the University." This quotation leaves out some key details, however:
The Board of Trustees, elected by the voters of the State and responsible to all of the people of Michigan, exercises the final authority in the government of the University, within the limits fixed by the State Constitution. In exercising its responsibility, the Board delegates to the President of the University and through the President to the faculty, appropriate authority and jurisdiction over matters for which they are held accountable by the Board. These matters include educational policy and the development of a strong and efficient organization with which to accomplish the objectives of the University.
"Responsible to all of the people of Michigan" seems like an important bit, as do the limits to their authority and the delegation of "appropriate authority and jurisdiction" to the president and the faculty. "Held accountable by the Board" can't be overlooked, of course, but one might be within bounds to insist that such accountability run both ways.
In any case, this unsigned statement was delivered to the entire faculty on October 11, just minutes before the Faculty Senate gathered and issued a 93% vote of no-confidence in the board. And on October 13, President Stanley issued his own vote of no-confidence in the form of a video message accompanying his official letter of resignation. That resignation is in the letter qualified by the term "without Good Reason," making clear per his contract that he's abandoning a substantial golden parachute as he leaves.
But with good reason or without, the president's departure and the board's responsibility for it leave the campus in turmoil. As I write this, we don't know who our interim president will be, whether there will be a real search for a new president, and what kinds of repercussions campus strategic planning will face. What we do know is that several years of delicate work trying to repair trust on a campus torn by the Nassar horrors has been utterly undone.
The worst of times, indeed. But what's the other transition?
Alongside my work as a member of the faculty of MSU, I am currently the president of the board of directors of the Educopia Institute, a nonprofit organization focused on supporting communities that develop, share, and preserve knowledge both inside and outside the academy. Educopia is, as its about page describes, a values-enacted organization that strives, among other principles, for "radical transparency coupled with reliability and responsiveness."
Educopia was founded in 2006 by Katherine Skinner, executive director, and Martin Halbert, then board president, in order to provide administrative and strategic support for collaborations growing across the information management landscape. After 16 years, however, Katherine recognized that Educopia was at risk for one of the problems she'd long seen facing the communities with which she and her colleagues worked: "founder syndrome." As she noted in her blog post this July in which she announced that she'd be stepping down at the end of September,
Founder-led organizations often begin with visionary leaders who can marshal resources and create a safe, secure atmosphere that appeals to funders and community members. If founders stay too long, though, their organizations tend to become too reliant upon and too influenced by the founders' personalities, which can lead to stagnation and an unhealthy reciprocal dependence between the founder and the organization.
Replacing such a visionary leader, however, and especially one as successful, respected, and frankly loved as Katherine Skinner is no easy task. I count myself among those who love Katherine and who had a hard time imagining Educopia without her, and I admire beyond words the selflessness and ethical conviction that led her to say that that was precisely why it was time for her to step down.
Katherine began planning for Educopia's leadership transition at least two years ago, thinking carefully about ways to share her knowledge with other members of the staff, as well as about the work the board needed to do in order to help see the organization into its next stage. In that vein, the board began a development process late last year, plotting out our own needs for growth in this moment of significant change. We worked with Tracy Kunkler and Dee Washington of Circle Forward to think about what the role of the board of directors of an organization committed to equity and collaboration should be, and how we might best support the work of the staff rather than governing from above. In the process of that work, we came to the realization that Educopia might be better served by establishing a shared leadership model rather than by investing leadership in a singular executive, and that such a distribution of authority and responsibility might help make the organization more resilient (and less subject to the turmoil involved in executive transitions) in the years ahead.
And so September ended with celebrations both within Educopia and among its many friends of the extraordinary work that Katherine Skinner did over the years, and with a warm welcome to its three amazing new co-directors, Jessica Meyerson, Katherine Kim, and Raquel Asante. While we have a lot of work ahead, I am honored to get to collaborate with them as the board and the staff figure out the organization's path forward together.
The best of times, without doubt.
So what am I carrying away from this experience of two radically different leadership transitions, and what does it mean for my ideas about the future of academic leadership?
First, that transparency is not just a good idea but an absolute necessity for organizations that are (or claim to be) "mission-driven."1 Without transparency there can be no trust, and without trust the people that make up the organization cannot sustain the level of care that the work requires.
Next, that while it's not often possible to plan for a leadership transition with the level of thoughtfulness that Educopia has done, there are many ways to avoid plunging an institution into chaos by forcing a transition without any preparation. If an institution's governing board is going to uphold the values it claims to espouse, it must undertake transitions carefully and with respect for the many lives that will be affected in the process.
And finally, that a leadership transition conceived and enacted as a means of sharing power, of creating collective strength, is radically different from one conceived and enacted as a means of coalescing power and of augmenting individual strength. One builds commitment. The other crushes it.
I'm not going to close with Dickens's last words from A Tale of Two Cities ("It is a far, far better thing that I do" is a little on the nose this week), but rather with his admonition from the beginning of the final chapter:
Crush humanity out of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself into the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit according to its kind.
A damaging leadership transition isn't just damaging in the moment; it does lasting damage to the organization's ability to function, by twisting the relationships between the people that make up the organization and the people that control it into tortured forms that cannot easily be reshaped. Changing that — reshaping the relations and recovering the institution — will require change throughout the structure. We have an election coming up, in which voters in the state of Michigan will select two members of the MSU board of trustees — but only two of eight, and for eight-year terms. These elections cannot change the relationship between the board and the university without additional pressure. And that pressure can likely only come through organizing and protest at all levels — among faculty and staff, among students, and among voters who want a state university that they can trust.
About which more, I hope, in the weeks ahead.
Noting here something I want to take up in another post: the idea of "mission" is awfully laden with settler-colonial freight. My own team is working toward substituting "purpose" instead, but "purpose-driven" loses a little of the intended idealism of the common phrase. Something I want to keep pondering. ↩
Categories: reflecting


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Molgula enodis is een zakpijpensoort uit de familie van de Molgulidae. De wetenschappelijke naam van de soort is voor het eerst geldig gepubliceerd in 1912 door Sluiter.

Molgulidae


WASHINGTON, Aug. 24, 2016 /PRNewswire/ -- Slowed by frustratingly low inventory levels in many parts of the country, existing-home sales lost momentum in July and decreased year-over-year for the first time since November 2015, according to the National Association of Realtors®. Only the West region saw a monthly increase in closings in July.
Slowed by low inventory levels in many parts of the country, existing-home sales lost momentum in July and decreased year-over-year for the first time since November 2015, according to the National Association of Realtors.
Total existing-home sales1, which are completed transactions that include single-family homes, townhomes, condominiums and co-ops, fell 3.2 percent to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 5.39 million in July from 5.57 million in June. For only the second time in the last 21 months2, sales are now below (1.6 percent) a year ago (5.48 million).
Lawrence Yun, NAR chief economist, says existing sales fell off track in July after steadily climbing the last four months. "Severely restrained inventory and the tightening grip it's putting on affordability is the primary culprit for the considerable sales slump throughout much of the country last month," he said. "Realtors® are reporting diminished buyer traffic because of the scarce number of affordable homes on the market, and the lack of supply is stifling the efforts of many prospective buyers attempting to purchase while mortgage rates hover at historical lows."
Adds Yun, "Furthermore, with new condo construction barely budging and currently making up only a small sliver of multi-family construction, sales suffered last month as condo buyers faced even stiffer supply constraints than those looking to purchase a single-family home."
The median existing-home price3 for all housing types in July was $244,100, up 5.3 percent from July 2015 ($231,800). July's price increase marks the 53rd consecutive month of year-over-year gains.
Total housing inventory4 at the end of July inched 0.9 percent higher to 2.13 million existing homes available for sale, but is still 5.8 percent lower than a year ago (2.26 million) and has now declined year-over-year for 14 straight months. Unsold inventory is at a 4.7-month supply at the current sales pace, which is up from 4.5 months in June.
"Although home sales are still expected to finish the year at their strongest pace since the downturn, thanks to a very strong spring, the housing market is undershooting its full potential because of inadequate existing inventory combined with new home construction failing to catch up with underlying demand," adds Yun. "As a result, sales in all regions are now flat or below a year ago and price growth isn't slowing to a healthier and sustainable pace."
NAR President Tom Salomone, broker-owner of Real Estate II Inc. in Coral Springs, Florida, says in addition to affordability concerns, an issue seen earlier in the housing recovery may be reemerging. Realtors® are indicating that appraisal complications are appearing more frequently as the reason why a contract signing experienced a delayed settlement.
"Appraisal-related contract issues have notably risen over the past year and were the root cause of over a quarter of contract delays in the past three months5," he said. "This is likely a combination of sharply growing home prices in some areas, the uptick in home sales this year and the strong refinance market overworking the already reduced number of practicing appraisers. Realtors® are carefully monitoring this trend, and some have already indicated they're extending closing dates on contracts to allow extra time to accommodate the possibility of appraisal-related delays."
Coming in at the lowest share since NAR began tracking in October 2008, distressed sales6 – foreclosures and short sales – were 5 percent of sales in July, down from 6 percent in June and 7 percent a year ago. Four percent of July sales were foreclosures and 1 percent were short sales. Foreclosures sold for an average discount of 18 percent below market value in July (11 percent in June), while short sales were discounted 16 percent (18 percent in June).
2Primarily because of contract delays related to the rollout of Know Before You Owe, November 2015 was the last year-over-year decline (3.6 percent). Prior to that, the last annual sales decrease was September 2014 (2.1 percent).
5According to the Realtors® Confidence Index, 27 percent of contracts between May and July with a delayed settlement were because of appraisal related issues. This is up from 18 percent the first quarter of this year.
6Distressed sales (foreclosures and short sales), days on market, first-time buyers, all-cash transactions and investors are from a monthly survey for the NAR's Realtors® Confidence Index, posted at Realtor.org.
NOTE: NAR's Pending Home Sales Index for July will be released August 31, and Existing-Home Sales for August will be released September 22; release times are 10:00 a.m. ET.


Lately, I've been extra-obsessed with packing as many nutrients as possible into our family meals thanks to the book "How Not To Die" by Michael Greger and Gene Stone. I've always been health-conscious, but after reading this book, I've been inspired to take things to another level. As I prepare meals, I play the "how many superfoods can I incorporate" game. It's actually fun!
One superfood I add to almost every dish is hemp hearts (I use the brand Manitoba Harvest), a super plant that's high in protein (including all ten essential amino acids), healthy fats (omega-3 and omega-6) and iron. They contain twice the amount of protein found in chia and flax seeds and are lower in carbs. It's nice to have a sustainable protein option that is so amazingly versatile!!!
In a bowl, combine oats, plant milk, cinnamon and vanilla.
in a small pot, add chopped apples and about 1/8 c. water and cook on medium heat. Cover with a lid. When water evaporates add another splash so apples don't stick to pot. Add cinnamon and stir. Cook until soft (about 12-15 min).
Pour molasses on the inner sides of a glass jar or container (preferably with a lid), then add half the apples to the base of the jar. Cover apples with oat mixture and top with remaining apples. Sprinkle with hemp hearts and drizzle with maple syrup if you like it sweet.
Preheat oven to 400F and cut squash lengthwise and stab a few times with a small, sharp knives. Spritz with oil and rub with spices.
Place squash cut-side down on a parchment or silpat-lined bake tray and bake until soft, about 40 minutes.
To make sauce: add all ingredients to a high-powered blender and puree until silky smooth.
Remove squash from oven, drizzle on the sauce (I use a squeeze bottle, available at any food equipment store), sprinkle with hemp hearts, fried onions, cilantro and salt + pepper.
For the spiced jackfruit: heat oil in a pan on medium heat and add jackfruit. Using a wooden spoon, mash the jackfruit to break it apart. Add spices and cook for about 5 minutes.
Build the sliders: toast buns in toaster then add spinach to the base. Top with slaw, jackfruit, then a generous sprinkling of hemp hearts.
Hope you enjoy these recipes!!! If you'd like to incorporate more hemp seeds into your diet, Manitoba Harvest also makes Hemp Heart Toppers, Hemp Heart Bites, Toasted Hemp Seeds, Hemp Proteins, Hemp Protein Smoothies and Hemp Oil. For more hemp seed recipes that you can make at home, head to manitobaharvest.com.
Manitoba Harvest and I are giving away a nutritious prize pack to one lucky winner!!!
Over on Instagram here, share your favourite way to eat hemp hearts in the comments and tag a friend (maybe they'll want to enter, too!). Winner will be chosen on Friday, December 1st. Check back here or on Instagram to see if you won! The prize will be shipped to the winner. UPDATE: Congrats to @KatieB642 who is our winner!! Thanks to all who entered!!
Thanks to Manitoba Harvest for sponsoring this post! All opinions are my own.


Just added a stream in my Archaeology Jobs and Job conditions UK page. So you can now check out the latest job postings in Europe.
You are certainly welcome to include archaeologyfieldwork.com's feed if you decide to list US jobs as well.
Cool, thanks. put it with shovelbums in the american jobs tab.


Fassy. . Wallpaper and background images in the Michael Fassbender club.
This Michael Fassbender fan art contains sign, poster, text, and chalkboard. There might also be long trousers, long pants, pantleg, sunglasses, dark glasses, and shades.


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Infoline 2017
Infoline Home
B.C.'s Key Indicators
Issue 17-63: Input Indicators of the B.C. Technology Sector, 2016
British Columbia's high technology sector is a vital part of the province's economy. This was reinforced in 2016, when the B.C. government launched a new tech strategy, including a $100-million technology innovation fund to fuel the venture capital market in the province. High technology firms tend to be innovative and efficient. They create goods and services that confer benefits on other parts of the economy by improving productivity and profitability, while at the same time providing relatively high-wage employment.
The picture of British Columbia that emerges from the most recent input indicators is varied. In many areas, British Columbia compares quite favourably with other provinces, and has shown notable growth. On the other hand, performance has lagged in some areas. As such, the detailed indicators have great potential for offering tangible direction for government policies and industry growth strategies.
In general, British Columbia fares quite well in performance in the education sector. B.C.'s universities have excelled in terms of technology licenses, start-up companies formed, and patents issued. The province also fares relatively well in funding for researchers in its educational institutions. B.C. also excels in many aspects of educational attainment. However, although the province continues to have the highest percentage of the population with high school education, a rank it has held for nearly two decades, there is a deficiency with respect to the training of new graduates in some specific disciplines. The education-based components of the B.C. government's new technology strategy, such as the addition of coding to school curricula and providing high-speed internet access to 100% of the province, could potentially have an impact on the province's educational and tech-adoption indicators in the future.
Business Sector
British Columbia returns above average ratings in many of the business stimulus indicators. Most notably, B.C. leads the country in per capita venture capital investment. Also, although the province's ratio of research and development (R&D) performance by business to provincial GDP remains below the national average, B.C. still holds a solid ranking of third in Canada. Conversely, British Columbia scores below average on some other business stimulus indicators, such as patents awarded per capita. The provincial government's strategy to boost the number of tech companies connected to foreign markets, as well as the establishment of a $100 million fund to provide local start-ups with more venture capital, has potential to improve some of these indicators in coming years.
Taxation of individuals, small businesses and corporations is more favourable in B.C. than in most other provinces. All three levels of tax rates in the province have decreased over the last decade and remain among the lowest in the country. The province also fares somewhat favourably in terms of gross expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP. On the other hand, combined federal and provincial government performance of R&D (as a share of GDP) is lower in B.C. than in every other province.
British Columbia is on par with other regions in attracting skilled foreigners in relation to its population size, although their average level of education tends to be slightly lower than in some other provinces of destination. In recent years, the province has seen a strong net inflow of people from other provinces, bolstering the supply of well-trained, educated workers. B.C. imports of high technology goods—which can be an indicator of future production, since imported components are often used to produce high tech products—have been climbing for six straight years. The B.C. government's support for shortening the waiting period for skilled foreign workers coming to B.C. under the B.C. provincial nominee program, as well as its support for the federal government's Express Entry immigration program for workers with specialized tech skills, have the potential to impact many of these indicators in the future.
Unemployment rates among workers in the natural and applied sciences in B.C. remain substantially lower than for the economy as a whole. In terms of researchers per capita, British Columbia maintains a third-place standing. The province's largest city, Vancouver, remains among the most desirable places to live in the world, ranking first in the Americas for quality of life, despite its high cost of living.
Post-Secondary Outcomes
Results from the most recent BC Student Outcomes surveys indicate that graduates from high technology-related disciplines continued to be satisfied with their education and found that what they learned was useful in the workplace. Of those employed in high technology occupations at the time of the survey, the majority said that their educational training was relevant to their current position. Graduates working in high technology fields earned substantially more, on average, than those working in non-high technology occupations.
Download and read the complete report


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Micromitrium densifolium är en bladmossart som beskrevs av Brotherus 1925. Micromitrium densifolium ingår i släktet Micromitrium och familjen Ephemeraceae. Inga underarter finns listade i Catalogue of Life.

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Egentliga bladmossor
densifolium