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NGUYEN v. FEC: Case 1:17-mc-01048-RBW
adminDC
SOURCE: FEC in Week of August 28 – September 1, 2017
Nguyen v. FEC (Case 1:17-mc-01048-RBW). On April 25, Tu Nguyen filed a Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On August 30, the Commission filed its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.
Plaintiff: TU NGUYEN
https://transition.fec.gov/law/litigation/nguyen_complaint.pdf
Case 1:17-mc-01048-RBW Document 1 Filed 04/25/17 Page 1 of 61
Case 1:17-mc-01048-RBW Document 1 Filed 04/25/17 Page 10 of 61
Defendant: FEC
FEC's Motion to Dismiss
https://transition.fec.gov/law/litigation/nguyen_fec_mtd.pdf
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) TU NGUYEN, )
) Civ. No. 17-mc-1048 (RBW) )
v. )
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
) MOTION TO DISMISS )
Defendant. ) )
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), defendant Federal Election Commission ("Commission" or "FEC") hereby moves to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint challenging, under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8), the Commission's dismissal of his administrative complaint. This Court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiff's suit is time-barred, he does not have Article III standing, and he has failed to perfect service as required by Rule 4. In addition, plaintiff has failed to state a claim, because it was not contrary to law for the Commission to dismiss his inadequate administrative complaint, under the highly deferential standard of review.
A supporting memorandum of points and authorities and a proposed order accompany this motion.
Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) Acting General Counsel lstevenson@fec.gov
Kevin Deeley
Associate General Counsel kdeeley@fec.gov
Harry J. Summers Assistant General Counsel hsummers@fec.gov
s/ Benjamin A. Streeter III Benjamin A. Streeter III Attorney bstreeter@fec.gov
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 999 E Street NW
Plaintiffs,
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
) OF MOTION TO DISMISS )
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS
Benjamin A. Streeter III Attorney bstreeter@fec.gov
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND …………………………………………….. 3
A. The Federal Election Commission…………………………………………………………………. 3
B. FECA's Reporting Requirements and Prohibitions Against Contributions by Corporations and Foreign Nationals ………………………………………………………………. 3
C. FECA's Administrative Enforcement Process and Judicial Review …………………… 5
D. The Administrative Complaint and Commission Action in This Matter ……………… 6
THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(1) BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS UNTIMELY AND HE LACKS STANDING………………. 7
A. The Complaint Is Untimely, Warranting Dismissal with Prejudice ……………………. 7 B. Plaintiff Lacks Article III Standing to Bring This Suit …………………………………….. 8
1. Standing Requires a Concrete and Particularized Injury ……………………………… 8
2. Nguyen's Desire to Compel the FEC to "Get the Bad Guys" Is Not a
Legally Cognizable Injury …………………………………………………………………….. 10
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(5) BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PERFECT SERVICE ………………………………………. 14
THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) BECAUSE
IT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED ……….. 16
A. The Commission's Dismissal of Plaintiff's Administrative Complaint Was Reasonable Under the Highly Deferential Standard of Review ……………………….. 16
B. The Administrative Procedure Act Provides No Basis for Review Here, Where FECA Provides an Adequate Judicial Review Mechanism ……………………………… 20
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 23
III. IV.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
All. for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2004)………………………………….12 All. for Democracy v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2005)…………………………….11, 13 Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2000)…………………………………………….. 11 Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994) …………………………………… 11 Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 900 (2016)………………. 8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)……………………………………………………………………….8-9, 20 Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Henderson, 862 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2017)…………………….19 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ………………………………………………………………. 20 Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)…………………………………………………………… 21 Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)………………………………………………………………….. 22 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ………………………………………………………………………………….. 3 Candido v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 151 (D.D.C. 2007)……………………………….14, 15-16 Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm. v. FEC, 711 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1983)…………………………. 7 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337
(D.C. Cir. 2007) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 17, 19
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, No. 16-259, 2017 WL 1080920
(D.D.C. March 3, 2017)………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 113
(D.D.C. 2015) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, IRS,
21 F. Supp. 3d 25 (D.D.C. 2014)………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)……………………………………………………………………… 4 Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, 751 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014)………………………………………. 22
Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) …………………………………. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ……………………………………………………. 5-6
Darby v. McDonald, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 307 F.R.D. 254
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998)………………………………………………………………………………… 6, 11 FEC v. Club for Growth, 432 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2006) ………………………………………………. 20 FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981)……………………6, 16-17, 19 Flores ex rel. J.F. v. District of Columbia, 437 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2006) ……………………….. 9 Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ………………………………………. 10 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ………… 9, 10 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990)…………………………………………………………… 9 Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ……………………………………………………………… 22 Hagelin v. FEC, 411 F.3d 237 (D.C. Cir. 2005)…………………………………………………………… 17, 19 Jordan v. FEC, 68 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1995) …………………………………………………………………….. 8 Judd v. FCC, 276 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2011) ……………………………………………………………………….. 15 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003) …………………………………………. 10 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) ……………………………………………………….. 21 Koerner v. United States, 246 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 2007) …………………………………………………….. 15 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ……………………………………………………….. 9, 10, 13 Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) …………………………………………………………… 16 Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368 (D.C. Cir. 2012)…………………………………………………………… 14, 16 Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1993) …………………….. 16 McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) ……………………………. 9 Nader v. FEC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2011)……………………………………………………………… 20
NRA v. FEC, 854 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1988) …………………………………………………………………….. 7 Ojelade v. Unity Health Care Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2013)……………………………….. 15 Olson v. FEC, 256 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2009)………………………………………………………………………. 15 Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)…………………………………………………………………. 16 Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996)………………………………………………………………….. 6, 22 Salmeron v District of Columbia, 113 F. Supp. 3d 263 (D.D.C. 2015)…………………………………. 14 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) ………………………………………………………………………… 6 Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) …………………………………………………………………….. 23 Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ……………………………………………………………….. 8 Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1998)………………………………………………………………… 22 U.S. ex rel Cody v. Computer Servs. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 22 (D.D.C. 2007)……………………………. 16 Vroom v. FEC, 951 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.D.C. 2013)…………………………………………………………… 10 Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.D.C. 2001) ………………………………………………………. 10, 11 Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 704………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13, 21 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A)………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4 52 U.S.C. § 30102…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 52 U.S.C. § 30103…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 52 U.S.C. § 30104…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
52 U.S.C. § 30104(c) …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 52 U.S.C. § 30106…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3 52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5 52 U.S.C. § 30107…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(8)……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3, 23 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1)…………………………………………………………………………………….. 3, 5, 19, 20 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i) ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)…………………………………………………………………………………………… passim 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(B) …………………………………………………………………………………… 1, 5, 7, 8 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) ……………………………………………………………………………… 6, 13, 16, 21 52 U.S.C. § 30111(a)(8)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(C) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(3) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5
11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) ……………………………………………………………………………………. 2, 4, 13
11 C.F.R. § 111.4 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2) ………………………………………………………………….. 2, 14, 15
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)……………………………………………………………………….. 2, 14, 15
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)………………………………………………………………… 2, 14, 15, 16
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) ……………………………………………………………………….. 1, 7
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) ……………………………………………………………………… 1, 14
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ………………………………………………………………… 1, 16, 20
Political Committee Status: Supplemental Explanation and Justification, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595 (Feb. 7, 2007) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
U.S. Const. Art. III…………………………………………………………………………………………………..1, 8-11
Plaintiff Tu Nguyen's pro se action challenging the Federal Election Commission's ("Commission" or "FEC") handling of his administrative complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). The Court lacks jurisdiction, both because plaintiff failed to meet the sixty-day filing deadline and because he lacks Article III standing to compel the FEC to pursue his allegations. In any event, the FEC's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was not contrary to law under the highly deferential standard of review.1
Plaintiff filed his administrative complaint with the FEC on June 11, 2016. In that complaint, Nguyen alleged that the Human Rights for Vietnam Political Action Committee ("HRV PAC") had violated the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA" or "Act") in connection with dealings with the Vietnam Reform Party ("Viet Tan"), the Saigon Broadcasting Television Network ("SBTN"), and Loretta Sanchez for Senate, the authorized candidate committee of then-Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez ("Sanchez Committee"). On February 22, 2017, the FEC found no reason to believe that the Act had been violated, and the agency dismissed Nguyen's administrative complaint. On April 25, sixty-two days later, Nguyen filed this action. Plaintiff now alleges that the dismissal of his complaint was contrary to law because of the existence of "potential" unlawful foreign and corporate contributions to the Sanchez campaign, as well as "potential" reporting violations. (Compl. for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Docket No. 1) ("Compl.") at 1.)
Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. First, Nguyen has failed to comply with the jurisdictional time limit for filing his Complaint. The D.C. Circuit has recognized that 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(B) requires such suits to be brought within sixty days of
Because the paragraph numbering in plaintiff's court Complaint (including its attachments) is not consistent, this brief will cite the pagination contained in the ECF version of the Complaint (Docket No. 1) when necessary.
the dismissal of an administrative complaint. This Nguyen failed to do. In addition, Nguyen has failed to establish Article III standing to pursue this suit because he has demonstrated no concrete and particularized injury and relies instead upon a broad desire to see federal law enforced, i.e., to have the FEC "get the bad guys." Nor, as a Texas voter complaining about past political activities in California, can he show any deprivation of information that would be useful to him in voting. Plaintiff's Complaint also purports to include a challenge to 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi), an FEC regulation governing disclosure of independent expenditures, but Nguyen fails to explain this claim. (Compl. at 1-2.) In any event, he has no standing to pursue it because there was no allegation regarding independent expenditures in the administrative matter.
Nguyen has also failed to perfect service in this case, in violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2), 4(i), and 4(m). Despite this failure, plaintiff filed on August 23, 2017 a Motion for Entry of Default (Docket No. 4) asking that the clerk enter default, as well as a Motion for Default Judgment (Docket No. 5) the next day wrongly asserting that the clerk had actually entered default. Plaintiff's motions are baseless because the FEC has yet to be properly served, and in any event his motions are now moot in light of the FEC's motion to dismiss.
Even if there was jurisdiction in this case, plaintiff's complaint would fail to state a claim because review of the FEC's enforcement decisions is highly deferential and the agency's action here was not contrary to law. The Commission permissibly determined that there was no reason to believe HRV PAC had violated FECA and no reason to pursue any of the other entities the Commission chose to designate as respondents in the matter. Plaintiff also purports to bring this action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), but no such action is available where a statute like FECA provides an adequate review mechanism.
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Election Commission
The FEC is a six-member independent agency of the United States government with
exclusive jurisdiction to administer, interpret, and civilly enforce FECA. See generally 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106-07. Congress authorized the Commission to "formulate policy" with respect to FECA, id. § 30106(b)(1); "to make, amend, and repeal such rules . . . as are necessary to carry out the provisions of [FECA]," id. §§ 30107(a)(8), 30111(a)(8); and to investigate possible violations of the Act, id. § 30109(a)(1)-(2). The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to initiate civil enforcement actions for violations of FECA in the United States district courts. Id. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30109(a)(6).
B. FECA's Reporting Requirements and Prohibitions Against Contributions by Corporations and Foreign Nationals
Entities meeting FECA's definition of "political committee" are subject to rules regarding the making and reporting of contributions and expenditures in federal elections. FECA defines "political committee" as "any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives" more than $1,000 in "contributions" or "which makes" more than $1,000 in "expenditures" in any given calendar year. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A). The Act further defines contributions and expenditures to cover those contributions and expenditures that are made "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i), (9)(B). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that only organizations whose major purpose is federal campaign activity may be deemed political committees. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., 1, 79 (1976); see also Political Committee Status: Supplemental Explanation and Justification, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 5597, 5601 (Feb. 7, 2007). A group that qualifies as a political committee under FECA is subject to recordkeeping and disclosure requirements; it must register with the FEC,
appoint a treasurer, and file periodic financial disclosure reports with the Commission that include lists of contributions, expenditures, and donor information. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30102, 30103, & 30104.
The Act prohibits corporations from contributing their treasury funds to candidate committees. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a). Corporations are, however, permitted to form separate segregated funds (commonly known as "PACs"), which may make contributions using funds raised from certain persons affiliated with the corporation. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(C), (b)(3).
"Independent expenditure[s]" are expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate and not made in concert, cooperation with, or at the request of a candidate or political party. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17). Although it is prohibited by FECA, corporate treasury funds may now permissibly be used to finance independent expenditures after the Supreme Court struck down the prohibition on corporations financing independent expenditures. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
FECA also requires any person who makes an independent expenditure in excess of $250 to file a statement disclosing certain information. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1), (c)(2). Among other things, the Act requires the identification of "each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person filing such statement which was made for the purpose of furthering an independent expenditure." 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C). Accordingly, an FEC regulation requires identification of "each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person filing such report, which contribution was made for the purpose of furthering the reported independent expenditure." See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi).
FECA also prohibits the making of a contribution by a foreign national. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1) ("It shall be unlawful for a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make … a
contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State or local election."). Foreign nationals are defined as persons who are not citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States. Id. § 30121(b).
C. FECA's Administrative Enforcement Process and Judicial Review
FECA permits any person to file an administrative complaint with the Commission alleging a violation of the Act. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); see also 11 C.F.R. § 111.4. After reviewing the complaint and any response filed by the respondent whose conduct is at issue, the Commission considers whether there is "reason to believe" that FECA has been violated. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). If at least four of the FEC's six Commissioners vote to find such reason to believe, the Commission may investigate the alleged violation; otherwise, the Commission dismisses the administrative complaint. Id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(2).
If an investigation is conducted, afterwards the FEC must determine whether there is "probable cause" to believe that FECA has been violated. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). If the Commission votes to find that there is probable cause, the agency is statutorily required to attempt to remedy the apparent violation informally and attempt to reach a conciliation agreement with the respondent. Id. If the Commission is unable to reach a conciliation agreement, FECA authorizes the agency to institute a de novo civil enforcement action in federal district court. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A).
If the FEC determines that no violation has occurred or decides to dismiss the administrative complaint for some other reason, FECA provides the complainant with a narrow cause of action for judicial review of the dismissal decision. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). "Any petition" seeking such review "shall be filed, in the case of the dismissal of a complaint by the Commission, within 60 days after the date of that dismissal." 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(B).
In challenges to FEC dismissals, the judicial task "is limited." Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing judicial review under section 30109(a)(8)). The Commission "has the 'sole discretionary power' to determine in the first instance whether or not a civil violation of the Act has occurred," and "Congress wisely provided that the Commission's dismissal of a complaint should be reversed only if 'contrary to law.'" FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) (citations omitted). FECA also expressly limits the scope of relief available to a plaintiff challenging an FEC dismissal decision. The reviewing court may (a) declare that the Commission's dismissal was "contrary to law" and
(b) order the Commission to "conform with" the court's declaration within 30 days. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C); see Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 557-59 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A judicial order to "conform with" a contrary-to-law declaration cannot mandate a different outcome on remand; the Commission remains free to reach the same outcome based on a different rationale. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998) (explaining that the Commission "(like a new jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the same result for a different reason" (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943))).
D. The Administrative Complaint and Commission Action in This Matter
On June 20, 2016, Tu Nguyen filed his administrative complaint, which was designated FEC Matter Under Review ("MUR") 7059 for administrative purposes. The administrative complaint alleged FECA violations by HRV PAC in 2015 and 2016. The Commission also named as respondents in the matter Don Le in his official capacity as HRV PAC's treasurer, SBTN, former Congresswoman Sanchez, the Sanchez Committee, and Ashleigh Aitken in her official capacity as the Sanchez Committee's treasurer. The complaint's allegations stemmed from HRV PAC's alleged dealings with the political party Viet Tan.
Using the information contained in the administrative complaint, responses provided by respondents, and publicly available information, the Office of General Counsel identified three areas of allegations potentially involving FECA: potential corporate contributions from SBTN to Sanchez and HRV PAC, alleged contributions to the Sanchez committee by foreign nationals, and alleged reporting violations by HRV PAC. (See Compl. (Docket No. 1) Exh. 1, FEC Factual & Legal Analysis ("F&LA"), ECF p. 35.) The Office of General Counsel recommended that the Commission find no reason to believe that any respondent had committed any of these alleged violations of the Act, and on February 22, 2017, the Commission unanimously approved the General Counsel's recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint. The FEC letter informing Nguyen of this action was dated March 3, 2017, and sent to him by certified mail. (Compl. at 33.) Plaintiff filed this action on April 25, 2017, sixty-two (62) days after the FEC's dismissal.
II. THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(1) BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS UNTIMELY AND HE LACKS STANDING
A. The Complaint Is Untimely, Warranting Dismissal with Prejudice
The Commission dismissed plaintiff's administrative complaint on February 22, 2017. The FEC informed plaintiff of this decision in a letter dated March 3, 2017 and sent to plaintiff by certified mail, along with a detailed Factual and Legal Analysis explaining the reasons for the decision. (Compl. at 33-41.) The deadline in 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(B) for filing challenges to FEC dismissals is 60 days. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on April 25, 2017, 62 days after the Commission's February 22 dismissal. As a result, Plaintiff failed to file his Complaint on a timely basis.
The Court of Appeals has held that the deadline in section 30109(a)(8)(B) is "jurisdictional and unalterable." Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm. v. FEC, 711 F.2d 279, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cited in NRA v. FEC, 854 F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Thus, the failure to file complaints in the district court within the sixty-day period "divests the district court of jurisdiction." Jordan v. FEC, 68 F.3d 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see Spannaus v. FEC, 990 F.2d. 643, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]his court has declared mandatory, i.e., 'jurisdictional and unalterable,' statutes that fix time for seeking judicial review."). Moreover, although plaintiff appears to believe that the operative dismissal date is the date of the FEC staff's notice to him or his receipt of that notice (see Compl. at 10 (alleging that the dismissal occurred on March 3 or 7, 2017)), it is well-established that the time period begins on the date of the Commission's vote to dismiss, not the date the notification is sent by the FEC or received by the complainant. The Court of Appeals has specifically noted that "[Plaintiff] cannot save his case on the ground that the 'date of dismissal' in [52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(B)] is the date of the letter from the Commission's general counsel informing him of the Commission's vote, rather than the date of the vote." Jordan, 68 F.3d at 519. As the court concluded, "the 'date of dismissal' is the date of the Commission's vote." Id. Here, that dismissal occurred on February 22, 2017.
Plaintiff failed to meet the "jurisdictional and unalterable" sixty-day deadline to file his Complaint. Because the untimeliness of the filing divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction, this case must be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Plaintiff Lacks Article III Standing to Bring This Suit
1. Standing Requires a Concrete and Particularized Injury
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, including showing that he has standing. See Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 900 (2016). To survive the FEC's motion to dismiss, Nguyen's complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim [of standing] that is plausible on its face.'" Id., 797 F.3d at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor … clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff "must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction," McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), and "'the necessary factual predicate may not be gleaned from the briefs and arguments,'" FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 235 (citation omitted). However, this Court "may look beyond the allegations contained in the complaint" to "materials outside the pleadings" to determine whether plaintiffs can carry their burden of proving they have standing. Flores ex rel. J.F. v. District of Columbia, 437 F. Supp. 2d 22, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In general, to demonstrate Article III standing a plaintiff must establish that: "(1) [he] has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)). Particularized means that "the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. In addition, when, as here, "the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not
precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish." Id. at 562 (citation omitted). Accord Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, courts "may not entertain suits alleging generalized grievances that agencies have failed to adhere to the law." Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
2. Nguyen's Desire to Compel the FEC to "Get the Bad Guys" Is Not a Legally Cognizable Injury
This Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims because Nguyen cannot demonstrate that he has Article III standing. Nguyen's Complaint shows that he disagrees with the Commission's finding of no reason to believe that the respondents violated FECA and its decision not to proceed with an investigation. But the FEC's dismissal caused no "concrete and particularized" injury to Nguyen. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-181.
Plaintiff seeks, in essence, to compel the FEC to enforce the law against respondents. But
"[w]hile 'Congress can create a legal right . . . the interference with which will create an Article III injury,' . . . Congress cannot . . . create standing by conferring 'upon all persons . . . an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law.'" Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573). And the D.C. Circuit has explicitly refused "[t]o hold that a plaintiff can establish injury in fact merely by alleging that he has been deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation of [FECA] has occurred." Id. at 418; see id. (explaining that such a holding "would be tantamount to recognizing a justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law"). Courts have
law has been violated" is not legally cognizable. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2003); see Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek a legal determination that certain transactions constitute
repeatedly
emphasized that "an injury that occurs when a person is deprived of information that a
coordinated expenditures); Vroom v. FEC, 951 F. Supp. 2d 175, 178-79 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to seek a legal determination that certain political committees were affiliated). As this Court explained in Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 138, 148 (D.D.C. 2005), "[n]othing in the FECA requires that information concerning a violation of the Act as such be disclosed to the public." In sum, what plaintiff "desires is for the Commission to 'get the bad guys,' rather than disclose information. [Plaintiff] has no standing to sue for such relief." Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418.
In this case, Nguyen makes many claims regarding alleged unlawful acts by HRV PAC, Viet Tan, and others (Compl. at 10-31), but these allegations are insufficient to give Nguyen standing to pursue FECA claims because none show concrete and particularized harm to him. Nguyen has demonstrated no cognizable legal injury from a lack of law enforcement against the respondent entities. What he seeks, in essence, is merely "a legal conclusion that carries certain law enforcement consequences" for others. Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075.
Courts have in limited circumstances found informational standing to challenge FEC dismissals under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8), but plaintiff's conclusory allegations are insufficient to make the required showing. An injury for purposes of Article III standing can arise from a statute that has "'explicitly created a right to information.'" Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 97 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). "For a plaintiff to successfully claim standing based on an informational injury, he must allege that he is directly deprived of information that must be disclosed under a statute." Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. ("CREW") v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, IRS, 21 F. Supp. 3d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2014). Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that to constitute a legally cognizable injury for an action seeking review of an FEC
dismissal, the information of which plaintiff claims to have been deprived must be "directly related to voting." Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25. The D.C. Circuit has similarly noted that an alleged informational injury is sufficiently particularized to create standing where plaintiffs have alleged that "voter[s] [were deprived of useful [political] information at the time" of voting, and the denied information is "useful in voting and required by Congress to be disclosed." Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, courts in this District have recognized that the sought-after information must "have a concrete effect on [plaintiff's] voting," i.e., that plaintiff must be a participant in political elections and campaigns. All. for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis added).
Nguyen cannot meet these standards. Nguyen's court Complaint contains broad assertions that appear designed to support a showing of informational injury, but he supplies no factual basis for those claims. (See Compl. at 3-5.) Nguyen asserts that "exercising his right to an informed vote" is harmed when contributions or independent expenditures are not properly reported, that he is a blogger who seeks to disseminate information publically about persons who violate FECA, and that his "core programmatic activities" are harmed when the FEC refuses to "properly administer" the Act. (Id. at 3-4). He also claims to pursue a wide range of policy goals related to the electoral process and government integrity. (Id.) However, Nguyen provides no evidentiary support for these conclusory claims about his own informational injury, and he never explains specifically how his right to cast an informed vote or his alleged blogging activities are currently hindered by the Commission's dismissal of his administrative complaint. He makes no effort to show how the California-based HRV PAC's alleged past activities could affect him or his future voting where he is registered in Texas. (Id. at 3.) He also never explains how he has any informational interests as a voter regarding former California candidate Sanchez,
who has now left federal office and is no longer a federal candidate. Nguyen did allege potential reporting omissions by HRV PAC (id. at 40-41), but again there is no showing of how this affects him in any tangible or specific way. Nguyen clearly has a strong desire for law enforcement action against dealings of the Viet Tan, but that "generalized" desire to see the law enforced, even as to disclosure rules, is not sufficient to constitute an informational injury. He fails to show how any of the alleged deprivations of information harmed his own ability to vote, and his effort to have the Commission "get the bad guys" does not provide a basis for standing. Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); All. for Democracy, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
In addition, Nguyen plainly has no standing to pursue the challenge he purports to include as to the FEC's regulation regarding disclosure of independent expenditures. Plaintiff's complaint states that "[t]his action further challenges a regulation promulgated by the FEC, 11 C.F.R. §109.10(e)(1)(vi), as FEC's response is arbitrary, capricious, and in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) and 5 U.S.C. §706(2) because it is inconsistent with a provision of the FECA, 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)." (Compl. at 2.) But Nguyen fails to provide any elaboration of this apparent challenge to an FEC regulation governing disclosure of independent expenditures. In any event, he has no standing to pursue such a challenge because there was no allegation of a violation of any restrictions relating to independent expenditures in his administrative complaint, nor was any considered by the FEC in its evaluation of the matter. Nguyen can show no injury.
In sum, Nguyen has failed to meet his burden to allege a threat of harm stemming from a violation of FECA that is "concrete and particularized." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. This case should therefore be dismissed for a lack of Article III standing.
III. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(5) BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PERFECT SERVICE
The Commission also moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) because of plaintiff's multiple failures to perfect service of the summons and complaint. Specifically, plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4(i)'s requirement that he serve the United States Attorney and the U.S. Attorney General, Rule 4(c)'s requirement that service be made by a person who is not a party to the litigation, and Rule 4(m)'s requirement that proper service occur within ninety days of the filing of the complaint. Despite these failures, plaintiff has filed misguided motions for Entry of Default and for Default Judgment. See supra p. 2.
Whenever questions are raised regarding the service of process, "the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the validity of service of process; to do so [a plaintiff] must demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other applicable provision of law." Salmeron v. District of Columbia, 113 F. Supp. 3d 263, 267 (D.D.C. 2015) (alteration in original and internal quotations omitted); Candido v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2007). Indeed, "'federal courts lack the power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant 'unless the procedural requirements of effective service of process are satisfied.'" Salmeron, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 266 (citation omitted). In fact, insufficient service of process imposes no obligation on the government to respond to a complaint. Darby v. McDonald, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 307 F.R.D. 254, 257 (D.D.C. 2014) (entry of default vacated because of improper service). "Service is therefore not only a means of notifying a defendant of the commencement of an action against him, but a ritual that marks the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the lawsuit." Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4(i)(1) by neglecting to serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General of the United States. Under this Rule, "service on the United States requires service on the Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney, and the agency whose action is at issue … and the United States is 'not served' until and unless all three entities are served." Koerner v. United States, 246 F.R.D. 45, 48 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Nguyen has not even requested that a summons be issued to either of the two Department of Justice entities. (See Docket No. 2.) And no return of service for either entity appeared on the docket within the prescribed ninety days following the filing of the Complaint.
Moreover, Nguyen violated Rule 4(c)(2), which requires that service of the summons to be made by a person who is "not a party" to the case. This rule is not limited to personal service of a summons; "a plaintiff may not effect service by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint herself." Ojelade v. Unity Health Care Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 258, 262 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis added); see Judd v. FCC, 276 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2011); Olson v. FEC, 256 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2009). Although Nguyen failed to file a Proof of Service affidavit pursuant to Rule 4(l)(1), he did file a Notice of Summons Served (Docket No. 3), which attached the signed certified mail card and U.S.P.S. tracking material for the attempted service on the FEC. He attached these same materials to his improper Motion for Entry of Default (Docket No. 4).
These filings indicate that Nguyen himself mailed the summons, since only his name appears on the tracking material. In addition, only his return address appears on the envelope received by the FEC. Because Nguyen tried to serve the FEC himself, he violated Rule 4(c)(2).
Finally, plaintiff failed to perfect service within the 90-day period required by Rule 4(m) because he failed to serve all the required entities within that period, which ended on July 14,
2017. Rule 4(m) does provide the Court with discretion to lengthen that time period, but plaintiff has the burden of showing good cause for a failure serve within the required time, and "[m]istake of counsel or ignorance of the rules of procedure usually does not suffice to establish good cause." U.S. ex rel Cody v. Comput. Servs. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2007); Candido, 242 F.R.D. at 160. Rather, plaintiff must offer something more than his own inaction, because good cause exists when "'some outside factor … rather than inadvertence or negligence, prevented service.'" Mann, 681 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). In this case, there is no indication that plaintiff's failure to effect proper service was the result of any outside factor. The case should be dismissed and Nguyen's premature motion for default should be denied.
IV. THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) BECAUSE IT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
A. The Commission's Dismissal of Plaintiff's Administrative Complaint Was Reasonable Under the Highly Deferential Standard of Review
In the context of judicial review of final agency action, "[t]he entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law[,] [a]nd because a court can fully resolve any purely legal question on a motion to dismiss, there is no inherent barrier to reaching the merits at the 12(b)(6) stage." Marshall Cty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1993). "[T]he sufficiency of the complaint is the question on the merits, and there is no real distinction in this context between the question presented on a 12(b)(6) motion and a motion for summary judgment." Marshall Cty. Health Care Auth., 988 F.2d at 1226. The party challenging the agency action bears the burden of proof to show that it is entitled to relief. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 884-85 (1990).
Under FECA, a court may set aside a Commission order dismissing an enforcement complaint only if it is "contrary to law." 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). This means that the
Commission's decision to dismiss cannot be disturbed unless it was based on "an impermissible interpretation of the Act" or was otherwise "arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In other words, the Commission's decision need only be "sufficiently reasonable to be accepted by a reviewing court." Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). The contrary to law standard is "[h]ighly deferential" to the Commission's decision, and it "permits reversal only if the agency's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or the agency has made a clear error in judgment." Hagelin v. FEC, 411 F.3d 237, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see CREW v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("[J]udicial review of the Commission's refusal to act on complaints is limited to correcting errors of law.").
Nguyen's court Complaint alleges generally that the Commission's dismissal of his administrative complaint was "based on unwarranted assumptions instead of thorough investigation" and that the agency "misconstrued the facts." (Compl. at 10-11.) In support of these claims, he alleges past and present Viet Tan misdeeds (id. at 12-15), a resemblance between names appearing on Sanchez disclosure reports and the purported membership of Viet Tan (id. at 15-24), and a Sanchez fundraiser held on the SBTN premises (id. at 24-30). As explained below, none of these allegations establishes that the FEC's dismissal was contrary to law.
The Commission's Factual and Legal Analysis in the administrative matter (Compl. at 34-41) demonstrates that each of Nguyen's main claims was carefully considered and unanimously rejected as lacking a sufficient factual basis to support a finding of reason to believe any FECA violation had taken place. Specifically, the Commission evaluated "(1) potential corporate contributions from [SBTN] to the Sanchez Committee and HRV PAC, (2)
potential foreign national contributions to the Sanchez Committee, and (3) potential reporting omissions by HRV PAC." (Id. at 35.)
The Commission's analysis addressed each of these issues in turn. With respect to the alleged corporate contributions from SBTN, the Commission evaluated the material provided by Nguyen and the respondents. It concluded that there was insufficient evidence that SBTN was even involved in a 2016 fundraising event Nguyen identified, and that as to a 2015 event he cited, available evidence indicated that HRV PAC had paid Saigon Broadcasting for the use of its facilities and air time, which does not constitute an unlawful in-kind contribution. (See Compl. at 35-38.) The FEC also evaluated allegations that SBTN had unlawfully established and funded HRV PAC, but the agency found no evidence to support that conclusion. (Id. at 38.) With respect to the alleged foreign national contributions to the Sanchez Committee, the FEC found no facts to support the allegations; it noted that Nguyen had failed to submit any evidence showing that the persons he named were actually foreign nationals, and that all the contributors he referenced had U.S. addresses. (Id. at 39-40.) Finally, with respect to Nguyen's allegations that HRV PAC had failed to report all cash contributions, the FEC evaluated materials he provided but it found them "mostly incomprehensible." (Id. at 40-41.) Regarding a supplemental submission from Nguyen making similar claims as to a 2013 HRV PAC fundraising event, the FEC evaluated the response from HRV PAC and even conducted a sample review, comparing the contributors Nguyen identified with HRV PAC's FEC reports, but that analysis showed that the contributions were reported in accordance with FECA. (Id.)
Nguyen's Complaint provides no basis to conclude that any of these determinations were contrary to law under section 30109(a)(8). Nguyen essentially restates his allegations and supporting evidence, but he makes no showing that the Commission's decisions regarding the
alleged corporation contributions, foreign national contributions, or alleged unreported cash contributions were erroneous based on the materials it had before it at the time. Nguyen disagrees with the Commission's conclusions, but that is not enough. He identifies no "clear error in judgment," nor does he show that the agency's factual determinations were unsupported or an abuse of its broad discretion, based on the deferential standard of judicial review applicable to such determinations. Hagelin, 411 F.3d at 242; see Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 37; CREW, 475 F.3d at 340. In sum, the FEC had a reasonable basis for its unanimous decision in light of plaintiff's inadequate factual allegations.
To the extent Nguyen contends that the FEC identified as a respondent an entity that was not the "Viet Tan" he meant in his administrative complaint, specifically Viet Tan North America Corporation (Compl. at 11), he cannot show the Commission acted unreasonably because he only asked that the agency investigate HRV PAC.2 See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) (requiring the FEC to notify only those "alleged in the complaint to have committed [] a violation"). Nguyen can hardly be heard to complain that the agency acted contrary to law because it failed to locate an entity that he had not even asked the agency to investigate. The agency's choice to name additional respondents as part of its review of the matter fails to provide grounds for a complainant to challenge the efficacy of any notice provided to respondents identified by the Commission. And even if any error was identified, it would be a harmless one that would not justify overturning the FEC's decision in this matter. See Nader v. FEC, 823 F.
See Admin. Compl. at 1, 16, Human Rights for Vietnam Political Action Comm., FEC MUR 7059, https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/118033.pdf (requesting investigation of "alleged improprieties by" HRV PAC and of various "allegations against HRVN PAC") (emphasis added). This Court may consider the administrative complaint in evaluating this motion to dismiss because it is a document to which plaintiff's court complaint refers. "In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which it may take judicial notice." Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v. Henderson, 862 F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Supp. 2d 53, 67 (D.D.C. 2011); FEC v. Club for Growth, 432 F. Supp. 2d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2006). In Nader, the Commission did not name as respondents all of the more than 50 entities that an administrative complaint had alleged violated FECA. The district court found that the failure to do so was a violation of section's 30109(a)(1)'s notification requirement, but the court found it to be harmless error: "The Court finds no reason to believe that had the FEC properly notified all alleged 'respondents,' it would have reached a different decision in this case." Nader, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 67-68. The same would be true here, even if the FEC had any obligation to name a different "Viet Tan" entity. Nguyen provides no reason to conclude that obtaining a response from a different Viet Tan entity would have changed the agency's decision to dismiss his complaint based on inadequate evidence of FECA violations. Thus, any mistake would be at most harmless error.
The Commission's decision to dismiss plaintiff's administrative complaint was reasonable and well within its discretion, so plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
B. The Administrative Procedure Act Provides No Basis for Review Here, Where FECA Provides an Adequate Judicial Review Mechanism
Dismissal of a court complaint is appropriate where, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the complaint fails as a matter of law to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . A claim must be dismissed "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
Nguyen purports to rely on the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") as a separate and independent basis for challenging the Commission's dismissal of his administrative complaint. He asserts that the "FEC's dismissal is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law, in violation of
52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(c)(C) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)." (Compl. at 30.) However, no separate APA claim exists where a statute like FECA provides an adequate judicial review mechanism.
52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) provides the exclusive mechanism for judicial review of any FEC dismissal of an administrative complaint. In addressing such issues, courts examine the relevant statute's language, structure, and legislative history. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (explaining that a "detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the behest of particular persons" may demonstrate that other forms of judicial review are "impliedly precluded"); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2013) (considering the express language, structure, objectives, and legislative history of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and concluding that the statute precluded plaintiffs' claim for judicial review pursuant to the APA).
In section 30109(a)(8), Congress delineated the scope of judicial review available in an action challenging an FEC dismissal of an administrative complaint. The statute specifies that (a) the statutory cause of action is available only to a complainant who is "aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party," (b) any petition for judicial review of an FEC dismissal must be filed (i) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and (ii) "within 60 days after the date of the dismissal," and (c) the available relief is a judicial declaration that "the dismissal of the complaint . . . is contrary to law" and an order "direct[ing] the Commission to conform with such declaration." 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). FECA's "detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the behest of particular persons" clearly precludes other forms of judicial review, including review under the APA. See Block, 467 U.S. at 349. Where, as here, Congress has "fashion[ed] . . . an explicit provision for judicial review" of certain agency action and has "limit[ed] the time to raise such a
challenge," the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has found that "it is 'fairly discernible' that Congress intended that particular review provision to be exclusive." Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, 751 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("'Congress did not intend to permit a litigant challenging an administrative denial . . . to utilize simultaneously both [the review provision] and the APA.'") (alteration in original). Judicial review of agency action under the APA is available only where there is "no other adequate remedy." 5 U.S.C. § 704. "Congress did not intend the general grant of review in the APA to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action." Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988)). Thus, the APA "'does not provide additional judicial remedies in situations where the Congress has provided special and adequate review procedures.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
Every court that has considered the nature of the judicial-review procedures in section 30109(a)(8), including the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, has found that those FECA procedures are exclusive. In fact, the D.C. Circuit stated that section 30109(a)(8) was "as specific a mandate as one can imagine" and accordingly concluded that "the procedures it sets forth — procedures purposely designed to ensure fairness not only to complainants but also to respondents — must be followed before a court may intervene." Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d at 559. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly found "substantial evidence that Congress set forth the exclusive means for judicial review under [FECA]" in section 30109(a)(8). Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144, 156 (5th Cir. 1998). More recently, courts in this District have reaffirmed that the review procedure in section 30109(a)(8) precludes an APA claim for dismissal of an administrative complaint. See CREW v. FEC, No. 16-259, 2017 WL 1080920 *8 (D.D.C. March 3, 2017) (FECA provides an adequate remedy so there is no parallel claim for
relief under the APA); CREW v. FEC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 113, 120 (D.D.C. 2015) ("This [section 30109(a)(8) judicial review] precludes review of FEC enforcement decisions under the APA.").3
Because section 30109(a)(8) provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging the Commission's dismissal of plaintiff's administrative complaint, the portions of his court Complaint that purport to rely on the APA fail to state a claim and should be dismissed.
V . CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss plaintiff's Complaint. Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Benjamin A. Streeter III Benjamin A. Streeter IIII Attorney bstreeter@fec.gov
By contrast, FECA does not provide a mechanism for judicial review of the FEC's formal rulemaking actions, 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(8), and such rulemaking actions, unlike FEC administrative dismissals, are subject to APA review. See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reviewing FEC regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority). Here, although the Complaint purports to include a challenge to an FEC regulation regarding independent expenditures, Nguyen lacks standing to pursue it. See supra p. 13.
) TU NGUYEN. )
Plaintiff, v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )
) ) )
[PROPOSED] ORDER
Upon consideration of the defendant Federal Election Commission's Motion to Dismiss and any opposition filed by plaintiff Tu Nguyen, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Federal Election Commission's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Nguyen's complaint petitioning for review is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated: _______________, 2017 ____________________________ The Honorable Reggie B. Walton
United States District Judge
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G.B. Piranesi
Veduta della Facciata della Basilica di S. Croce in Gerusalemme
Paris, 1750. Very Good. , Artists Piranesi (Veduta di Roma);Views Europe Italy;Hind 11 (4th State, First Paris Edition)John Wilton-Ely 173The watermarks that is present is difficult to determine due to the heavy inkFrom the important series "Veduta de Roma"Giovanni Battista Piranesi was one of the leading figures in the development of the neoclassical style in the late 18th Century. As architect, archaeologist, artist, designer, collector, and antiquities dealer, he produced a series of etchings and engravings depicting the glories of ancient Rome. These fine prints served as source material for other architects and designers. He was born in Venice on the 4th October 1720. The son of a stone-mason, he was educated as an architect under his maternal uncle Matto Lucchesi and under Carlo Zucchi. In 1740 Piranesi left Venice for Rome, there he studied etching under Giuseppe Vasi. He appears to have had little success in these early years in Rome and as his father was unable to continue his allowance returned to Venice in 1744. He was soon, however, encouraged to return to Rome by Giuseppe Wagner, a successful engraver and publisher of Venice. This time he achieved success, and a constant series of works, illustrating architecture and antiquities, issued from his studio until his death in 1778. His output in etched plates is enormous (about 1000 numbers in all). While he achieved a work of magnitude in pictorial records of Roman monuments of antiquity and of the Renaissance, and gave immense archæological, antiquarian, and topographical value to this work, the artistic quality … [Click Below for Full Description]
Bookseller: Alexandre Antique Prints, Maps & Books [Canada]
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text:
Trump administration asks SC to take up military transgender ban
Edited By IANS Published By IANS On Nov 24, 2018 - 11:06 AM
Washington: US President Donald Trump's administration has asked the Supreme Court to hear a challenge to Trump's policy that bars most transgender individuals from military service.
The policy, first announced by the President in July 2017 via Twitter and later officially released by Secretary of Defence James Mattis, blocks individuals who suffer from a condition known as gender dysphoria from serving with limited exceptions, CNN reported.
It also specifies that individuals without the condition can serve but only if they do so according to the sex they were assigned at birth.
District courts across the country have so far blocked the policy from going into effect.
On Friday, Solicitor General Noel Francisco filed petitions asking the justices to take up the issue in three separate cases that were still in lower courts so it could be decided definitively this term.
Francisco argued that lower court rulings imposing nationwide injunctions were wrong and warrant immediate review.
He said that because of the injunctions, "the military has been forced to maintain that prior policy for nearly a year" despite a determination by Mattis and a panel of experts that the "prior policy, adopted by (Defence Secretary Ash Carter), posed too great a risk to military effectiveness and lethality".
Earlier in the month, the Department of Justice warned the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that it planned to ask for emergency relief to lift the nationwide injunction.
The filing comes after Chief Justice John Roberts and Trump got into a public dispute about the independence of the judiciary this week.
Roberts issued a statement on Wednesday criticizing the President for calling one lower court judge who ruled against him an "Obama judge".
The President responded via Twitter criticizing Roberts and accusing the American judiciary of undermining national security.


text:
Q: PIG: Calculate highest monthly growth in wiki pagecount data requests per article I have several wiki dump data from https://dumps.wikimedia.org/other/pagecounts-raw/2015/
now I want to calculate the monthly growth of requests for each wiki article for the year 2015, and then find out whats the month with the highest growth of requests for an article, and how high that growth is...
for explanation: the wikidata is of format:
"wikiproject" "article-url" "number of requests" "size of page in bytes", e.g:
fr.b Special:Recherche/Achille_Baraguey_d%5C%27Hilliers 1 624
en Main_Page 242332 4737756101
our cluster setting up is still "work in progress", so I have to try it out on the cloudera quickstart VM with smaller dataset.. I used only pagedumps from 1 hour of the 3 months... however when I try to illustrate it, it runs out of JAVA heap space, or I get message GC overload....
This is my code:
m1  = LOAD '/user/cloudera/2015/2015-01' USING PigStorage(' ') as(proj:chararray, url:chararray, req:long, size:long);
m2  = LOAD '/user/cloudera/2015/2015-02' USING PigStorage(' ') as(proj:chararray, url:chararray, req:long, size:long);
m3  = LOAD '/user/cloudera/2015/2015-03' USING PigStorage(' ') as(proj:chararray, url:chararray, req:long, size:long);

m11 = SAMPLE m1 0.1;
m22 = SAMPLE m2 0.1;
m33 = SAMPLE m3 0.1;

a = COGROUP m11 by url, m22 by  url, m33 by  url;
b = FOREACH a generate group, SUM(m11.req) as s1, SUM(m22.req) as s2, SUM(m33.req) as s3;
c = FOREACH b generate group, ((s2-s1) > 0 ? (s2-s1): 0) as dm2, ((s3-s2)> 0 ? (s3-2): 0) as dm3 parallel 10;
d = FOREACH c generate group as Artikel, MAX(TOBAG(dm2,dm3)) as maxZugriffe;
e = order d by maxZugriffe desc;
f = limit e 10;

so what I'm trying to do is, first I sample 10% of original data, then I group my monthly datasets by article (=url), then I cogroup them together. Then I calculate the sum of requests for each article and each month, to calculate the growth in requests, I use the sum of requests from next months and subtract the sum of requests of the same article from previous month and check if it's >0 (if there is any growth), then I calculate the maximum of all growth values and orther my relation by maxRequests (=maxZugriffe) in descending order and limit output to 10...
can somebody infer from the code if that's right like that, or am I missing something? As I said, it seems to be too much for the quickstart VM to calculate the result, but it doesn't seem so complicated to me...
my 2nd question is: Is it possible to use an alias for the bincondition expression in pig? e.g :
c = FOREACH b generate group, ((s2-s1) as 'diff' > 0 ? diff: 0) as dm2;
so I want to replace the first case with the alias 'diff' that I already calculated, instead of calculating (s2-s1) again...
edit: some weeks have past.... and still no answers, can anybody help?

A: Answer to your second question "Is it possible to use an alias for the bincondition expression in pig?"
We can't use the alias in bicondition expression.This is case not only with the pig, in SQL we can't use it as well.
We can not give alias name to a expression without ( = ) assignment operator.
If you do really want to avoid the use of expression repetitively, do as below
b = FOREACH a generate group, SUM(m11.req) as s1, SUM(m22.req) as s2, SUM(m33.req) as s3;
x = FOREACH b generate group,s1,s2,s3,(s2-s1) as diff;
c = FOREACH x generate group, (diff > 0 ? diff: 0) as dm2;

In this what we have done, we have created another column for (s2-s1) with alias diff and have used it in a expression.
Hope you find this answer useful.
Thank you.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Athens Elementary will become a Computer Science Academy beginning fall 2018.
Brookhill Elementary will become a Fine Arts Academy beginning fall 2018.
Julian Newman Elementary will become a Health and Medical Academy beginning fall 2018.
Cowart Elementary will become SPARK Academy beginning fall 2017.
All current Cowart students will be SPARK students in the fall of 2017. They will follow all existing guidelines and policies that currently govern SPARK Academy, including the uniform policy. SPARK Academy welcomes the leadership of a new principal, Dr. Beth McKinney. Athens City Schools has an open door policy regarding discussion of any concerns or questions parents may have. For information regarding uniforms, policies or questions in general, please contact Dr. McKinney at beth.mckinney@acs-k12.org or call 256.233.6600.
We are in a season of tremendous change as a district. While every effort has been made to keep parents informed of the changes in our district, we understand that you still may have questions. Athens City Schools has an open door policy regarding questions and comments and welcomes discussion.
There are many specifics to be determined over the next year for the AES, BES and JNES Academies. Decisions regarding things like uniforms, academy names, curricula and more will be made between now and fall 2018.
To discuss any issue related to the academies, please contact Athens City Schools to schedule a time to talk. We will do our best to put you in front of the very best person available to answer your particular questions.You may call central office directly at 256.233.6600.
We also encourage you to contact members of the board. The Board of Education represents our community with matters related to our schools. Reach out to them to discuss the academies or any questions you have regarding Athens City Schools. A list of board member emails can be found by scrolling down this page. Their phone numbers are available on the Athens City Schools district website.
There is a plan to have Advisory Councils set up at each academy. The details and particulars of these councils is currently being developed by the leadership team at Athens City Schools. For more questions regarding Advisory Councils, please contact the ACS Director of Curriculum and Instruction, Mr. Garner Ezell by email at garner.ezell@acs-k12.orggarner.ezell@acs-k12.org or call 256.233.6600.
Have you read all the available material on the academies and you still have questions? We will answer every question to the best of our ability.
The academy theme selection process began with an initial survey distributed to the community. The first survey asked parents, teachers and community members to share their ideas for academy themes for the district. The purpose was to cast a wide net regarding ideas and possibilities and to offer the invitation to stakeholders to be a part of the transformation process.
The field of academy themes has been narrowed down to six possible themes. The system invites you – parent, teacher, community member – to partner with us again. Please complete this short survey. You will be asked to select four academy themes that you believe would be relevant, useful and meaningful for ACS elementary schools.
We ask that you select four. Three will be selected for Athens Elementary, Brookhill Elementary and Julian Newman Elementary. The fourth selection will be the academy for any future elementary school, should growth demand it.
Your participation and input will be a factor in determining the academy themes for Athens City Schools. We earnestly urge you to consider completing this survey.
The academy theme selections will be presented to the Board of Education at the May 11, 2017 meeting.
A community wide meeting regarding the transition of existing elementary schools in Athens city to academies is scheduled for Tuesday, April 18 at 6:30 p.m. at Athens Intermediate School. The meeting will be held in the "cafetorium". Speakers will be Dr. Trey Holladay, Superintendent and Mr. Garner Ezell, Director of Curriculum and Instruction for Athens City Schools system. There will be a question and answer session following the presentation.
Athens Intermediate School is located at 1916 US Hwy 72 W, Athens, Alabama 35611.
Imagine better. Imagine more. Imagine the future.
Athens City Schools invites the community to imagine the possibilities of a new landscape in elementary education in the city. It takes courage to let go of the familiar and embrace the new. I've read that change is hard at first, messy in the middle and gorgeous at the end. However, progress is impossible without change, and the mission of ACS is to be progressive.
Superintendent Trey Holladay announced in March a plan for elementary academies. Existing elementary schools in the district will transition and become themed academies serving grades K-3 beginning fall 2018.
The academy concept will look similar to today's elementary school with the fundamental difference being the academy teaches through a specific "lens" or focus.
"Each elementary will continue teaching to the same standards. The difference is that these standards will be taught through academy specific themes," said Holladay.
To continue the long-standing tradition of excellence, ACS must adapt to change that pushes one outside the box, outside comfort zones and into a space where intuition, creativity and the power of "and" can be experienced. This fundamental shift in thinking has the power to positively influence the way students experience school – and the world – for years to come.
Because public education is trending toward school choice at an ever-increasing rate. Given the changing landscape of education, it is important to the continued success of ACS that it demonstrate public schools can be the choice. Parents are looking for choices. ACS has a unique opportunity to provide the choices. To provide these choices, it requires ACS to think about public education in a different way. Academies are a way to bring choice to ACS and be the owners, makers and creators of the choices and the future.
Because SPARK is an indicator for choice. SPARK Academy is the first of the new academies concept in Athens. It was the first step out of the box. The overwhelming interest in SPARK Academy by virtue of increased applications and enrollment along with the response from parents was a major indicator that parents in this community want choice. It sent a clear signal to ACS leadership that school choice was important to them.
Because ACS leadership believes a rising tide lifts all boats. Dr. Holladay and his team believe that every student in ACS deserves a special, amazing and high-quality education. "I am committed, convicted and motivated to do whatever it takes to deliver the very best educational opportunities for each and every student in this district," said Holladay. From north to south, east to west, he cares. He will continue to press forward, onward, upward and outside the box to deliver the brightest futures possible for all students.
Because the academies will provide greater opportunity for parent involvement in the shaping of each academy at the neighborhood school level. Parent boards will be formed for each school and will have great influence on the particulars of how the academies are shaped, what options are offered and more. It opens up possibilities for partnership, collaboration, parent investment and engagement in a meaningful way.
The academy theme selections will be determined through a collaborative and transparent process that will include teachers, parents, and community members. A public meeting will be held next week to provide parents the opportunity to learn about the academy concept, provide input and ask questions.
Athens Academies Parent Information Night is at Athens Intermediate School on Tuesday, April 18 at 6:30 p.m. The meeting will be in the Cafetorium.
Imagine linking teachers and students with their true passions and interests. Imagine discovery, ingenuity and partnerships.
ACS invites you to imagine the "and", the gain, the better. Imagine the flight.
Athens City Schools will host Athens Academies Information Night on Tuesday, April 18 at 6:30 p.m. at Athens Intermediate School. This will be an important informational session for all community members. Superintendent Dr. Trey Holladay and Mr. Garner Ezell, Director of Curriculum and Instruction for ACS, will be the speakers. The purpose of the meeting is to share what the academies are about in general, how they are being developed, why the academies are good for Athens and how the community can be a part of the process. Following the presentation, there will be an opportunity ask questions and provide input on the future of the elementary landscape in Athens City.
ACS prides itself on being a community connected by education. This progressive approach to restructure the elementary experience is visionary, and it is the defining characteristic of an innovative school district. ACS believes that with the academies come great gains for our students. This transition will bring the opportunity for our students to learn, grow and develop in relevant ways that prepare them for success in the modern world. ACS is listening to regional business partners, researching and analyzing data and preparing our students for a bright future.
The plan to transition existing elementary schools in the district to themed academies is currently underway. Administrators and instructional leadership teams have been working diligently to lay the foundation for this new chapter in elementary education in Athens. The implementation of the academies will usher in a new era of innovation and excellence in ACS. The academy concept will look similar to today's elementary schools with the fundamental difference being that the academy teaches through a specific "lens" or focus.
Standard curriculum will continue to be taught. Reading, writing, math and science will still be taught to the highest standards. "Each elementary will continue teaching to the standards of the Alabama Course of Study per the Alabama State Department of Education. The difference is that these standards will be taught through academy specific themes," said Dr. Trey Holladay, Superintendent.
As promised, the academy theme selections are being determined through a collaborative and transparent process that includes teachers, parents, and community members. The district has sought input from the community, administrators and teachers. A survey collected ideas for possible themes for the academies. The information session is another important step in inviting the community to be a part of the process.
"We believe it is important for our community to partner with us during this transition. Right now we are dreaming big and considering what the academies could potentially look like," said Ezell. "It is critical that the academies be relevant, logical and make sense for our students, parents, community and regional industry interests." Ezell goes on to say that over the course of the next year, parent involvement through school specific boards will be a major determining factor in how the academies will take shape. The details possibilities are numerous, and parent board involvement will be key in shaping each academy after the themes are determined.
The academy theme selections have been narrowed to six possibilities: Fine Arts, Classical Studies, Computer Science, Health and Medical, Environmental Sustainability and Business and Entrepreneurial Design. Please note: these are not the names of the academies. Names will be decided at the local school level by each school in conjunction with their board. These are the final six themed areas from which four will be chosen. Three academy themes will be selected for Athens Elementary, Brookhill Elementary and Julian Newman Elementary. The fourth will be held aside for the eventuality of another school in the future.
The nature of the academies allows for partnerships between the community and our schools in a new and meaningful way. Academies tend to create more opportunities for practical application of the things students learn in school everyday. The Athens academies will have true partnerships with the community in direct ways. ACS is creating a culture of collaboration that will result in the development of authentic relationships between our schools and community.
The first school to make the transition to an academy will be Cowart Elementary. Cowart has housed SPARK Academy this year and will become a full STEM Academy in August 2017. The remaining elementary schools will open as academies in fall 2018.
The plan is expected to go before the board for a vote at the May 11 Board of Education meeting at the ACS central office.
Athens City Schools Superintendent Trey Holladay announced a plan to transition existing elementary schools in the district to themed academies beginning fall 2018. The elementary academies will be grades K-3.
The announcement came at the Board of Education meeting Thursday, March 23.
The first school to make the transition to an academy will be Cowart Elementary. Cowart has housed SPARK Academy this year and will become a full STEM Academy in August 2017. Plans for transitioning the remaining three elementary schools are in the beginning stages and are being led by the ACS Instructional Leadership Team under the direction of Garner Ezell, Director of Curriculum and Instruction for ACS. Timelines are under development for the roll out of the plan's specific details and implementation.
The academy concept will look similar to today's elementary school with the fundamental difference being that the academy teaches through a specific "lens" or focus.
"Each elementary will continue teaching to the standards of the Alabama Course of Study per the Alabama State Department of Education. The difference is that these standards will be taught through academy specific themes," said Holladay.
The academy theme selections will be determined through a collaborative and transparent process that will include teachers, parents, and community members. A public meeting will be held at Athens High School, April 18 at 6:30 p.m. to provide parents the opportunity to ask questions and learn about the academy concept. Various surveys will also be distributed as a way to obtain input.
Existing zoning for elementary schools will not change. However, a family may apply to a different academy outside their school zone. The criteria for students requesting enrollment in an academy outside their school zone will be determined after input is received from all stakeholders. Busing will be provided.
Along with this change, Athens City Schools will see a school realignment. Beginning fall 2018, all elementary schools will be K-3. Fourth and fifth grades will become Athens Intermediate School. Athens Middle School will consist of grades 6-8 and will be moved to the current Athens High School building. Grades 9-12 will be at the new Athens High School currently under construction next to the Board of Education central office.
Another innovative opportunity that will be available to Athens High School sophomores, juniors and seniors in fall 2017 is the Athens Creative Exchange. This program is designed to be a partnership between Athens City Schools, students, parents and the business community to provide real-world opportunities for students to develop hands-on skills outside the classroom.
The program will meet in Downtown Athens during school. While there, students will take pre-approved courses in which the curriculum is blended seamlessly into the program. The program is designed to be flexible. It will allow students to participate in athletics or band. It will also combine participation in this program with Advanced Placement or dual enrollment courses. The program is designed to be completely personalized, meeting the needs and interests of students.
The first Athens Creative Exchange information session is April 24, 6:00 p.m., at Athens High School. Registration opens April 25. Interested students and parents may call Dr. Rick Carter at 256-233-6600 for more information.
For questions regarding the Athens Elementary Academies, please call 256-233-6600.


European women are only 55.8 percent likely to live five years after contracting any kind of cancer, compared to 62.9 percent for American women.
In five cancers — breast, prostate, thyroid, testicular and skin melanoma — American survival rates are higher than 90 percent. Europeans hit a 90 percent survival rate for only one of those — testicular cancer.
Most disturbingly, many cancers in Europe are discovered only upon the victim's death — twice as many as in the U.S. Consequently, the European study simply excluded cancers that were first noted on the death certificate, so as not to give the U.S. too great an advantage.
I didn't know about that last manipulation of the cancer survival rates.


text:
Q: How to change user input into a link? Here is my code:
input

    Job Name
    <input type ="text" class="text" name ="jobname" class="sup">

Time
    <input type ="text" class="text" name ="jobtime">

Day
    <input type ="date" class="text" name ="jobday">

Venue
    <input type ="text" class="text" name ="venue">

No. Of Worker
    <select id="worker" name="worker">
        <option value="">Select</option>
        <option value="1">1</option>
        <option value="2">2</option>
        <option value="3">3</option>
        <option value="4">4</option>
        <option value="5">5</option>
    </select>

Phone Number
    +601 <input type ="text" class="phone" name ="phonenum">

Job Scope
    <textarea id="inform" rows="2" cols="19" name ="inform"></textarea>

output
<?php
    include("DB.php");

    $query = "SELECT * FROM createjob";
    $result = mysqli_query($link,$query);

    if (mysqli_num_rows($result) > 0) {
        // output data of each row
        while ($row = mysqli_fetch_assoc($result)){
            $id = $row["id"];
                $jobname = $row["jobname"];
                $jobtime = $row["jobtime"];
                $jobday = $row["jobday"];
                $venue = $row["venue"];
                $worker = $row["worker"];
                $inform = $row["inform"];
                $phonenum = $row["phonenum"];
                ?>

                    <?php echo $jobname ; ?>
                    <?php echo $jobtime; ?>
                    <?php echo $jobday; ?>
                    <?php echo $venue; ?>
                    <?php echo $worker; ?>
                    <?php echo nl2br($inform);?>
                    <?php echo $phonenum; ?>
                    <button>Apply

    <?php
        }
    }else {
        echo "0 results";

    }
    ?>

Based on the code above, I have tried to change the <?php echo nl2br($inform);?>	 to a link but I failed to do so. So what I want to do is that whatever users insert in the inform text-area it will change the user's input to a link.

A: If i understood you correctly, you want to replace URLs (e.g. https://example.com/) within the $inform variable to be rendered as HTML anchors (e.g. https://example.com/).
If so, you could have a look at this question.
For your example it should be a simple replacement of
$inform = $row["inform"];

with the following code:
$inform = preg_replace(
    "#https?://\S+#i", '$0',
    $row["inform"]
);

However, reflecting user input without any form of validation,
sanitization or output encoding is a potential security issue! Please
consider reading the article from OWASP about XSS first.


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A mask sheet with tight adhesion that soothes and moisturizes the skin with the clean ingredient from Jeju.
Highly adhesive mask sheet that comfortably wraps around your face while providing skin therapy with beauty energy made in Jeju.
Real Mask that makes your skin lifting and healthy thanks to Green Kernel Black Bean.
After washing your face, apply basic skin care with toner.
Take the mask out of the package and attach it to your face while the film is still on.
Eliminate the film, adjust the mask to the eye/nose/mouth, and press the wings of the nose part with your fingers to make the mask more adhesive. Thanks to the flexible sheet, stretch it to fit into your face size.
After 15-20, take off the mask and pat the leftover essence to get it absorbed.