Plans to build a 10-mile barrier along the Thames to protect London from flooding are being considered.
The embankment, from Sheerness in Kent to Southend in Essex, would contain gates to allow water to flow in and out of the Thames estuary.
Climate change experts say the existing Thames barrier, built in the 1970s, may not be able to cope with rising tides.
The Big Ben clock tower, Westminster Abbey and the Tower of London would be damaged by flooding to central London.
Scientists for the Thames Estuary 2100 project, set up by the Environment Agency to assess flood risk and river management over the next century, say the barrier would be an option if sea levels started rising faster than expected.
Peter Borrows from the Environment Agency told BBC News: "London enjoys a very high standard of defence thanks to the Thames Barrier, other barriers and the embankments downstream.
"But man's activities are causing global warming leading to rising sea levels."
He said the Agency was considering how best to protect London up to the year 2100.
"The Thames Barrier will continue to be operational after 2030 although the standard of defence it provides will gradually decline - which is why we are looking to maintain that standard."
Under the new scheme, the barrier would contain numerous gates to allow water to flow in and out of the Thames estuary according to the tides.
But the gates would be shut if a flood seemed likely.


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text:
Updated 2013 by Richard Rothschild, 2016 by Jeffrey S. Gutman
Court-awarded attorney fees are critical in preserving access to the courts for poor people. Some legal aid programs depend on fee awards for their very survival.1 Without attorney fees, numerous federal laws protecting rights to housing, health care, and other necessities would remain unenforced. The risk of having to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees frequently induces settlement and deters illegal governmental and corporate conduct. Therefore, legal aid advocates need to have a working knowledge of fee issues.
The subject of court-awarded attorney fees has inspired books, even multivolume treatises.2 This section instead focuses chiefly on the major issues presented in fee litigation: how a plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party; entitlement to fees; how to calculate a reasonable fee; timing of fee motions and the "Jeff D. problem" of defendants forcing plaintiffs' counsel to waive fees as a condition of achieving a settlement on the merits.
9.4.A. Prevailing Party Standard After Buckhannon
To qualify for a fee award under most federal fee-shifting statutes, a litigant must be a "prevailing party."3 Two issues that often arise are (1) how much the litigant has to win and (2) what form the victory must take.4
As for the first question, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff need not win every single issue or even the "central issue" in order to obtain prevailing party status. A prevailing party is "one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought . . . ."5 Losing on some issues may or may not result in a reduced fee-award amount.6 It does not affect "the availability of a fee award vel non."7
In CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC,8 the Supreme Court considered the circumstances under which the defendant was deemed to be a prevailing party. In that case, the defendant company prevailed in a Title VII sexual harassment case on grounds that did not reach the merits of the EEOC's claims. The Court held the defendant may nevertheless be a prevailing party "even if the court's final judgment rejects the plaintiff's claim for a nonmerits reason."9 As noted below, the defendant prevails for merits or nonmerits reasons if the plaintiff's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."10 It would make little sense if Congress' policy of "sparing defendants from the costs of frivolous litigation,"11 depended on the distinction between merits-based and non-merits-based frivolity. Congress must have intended that a defendant could recover fees expended in frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless litigation when the case is resolved in the defendant's favor, whether on the merits or not. Imposing an on-the-merits requirement for a defendant to obtain prevailing party status would undermine that congressional policy by blocking a whole category of defendants for whom Congress wished to make fee awards available.
The second question—what form the victory must take for the plaintiff—became problematic after Buckhannon Board v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources.12 In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that voluntary change in behavior by a defendant caused by a pending lawsuit did not qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party for fee purposes. After Buckhannon, whether a plaintiff who is victorious in a practical sense is a prevailing party for fee purposes depends roughly on how much judicial involvement was involved in the victory.
At one end of the spectrum, winning a judgment obviously qualifies a plaintiff as a prevailing party in most cases. The major qualification is that the judgment must require "some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant."13 The relief awarded must "materially alter the legal relationship between the parties."14 An injunction or declaratory judgment typically does so.15 The judicial declaration alone does not suffice. The judgment may be for nominal relief, although in such cases a court may deny fees altogether to the prevailing plaintiff.16
At the other end of the spectrum, under Buckhannon, simply filing a lawsuit that prompts defendants to change illegal behavior voluntarily (i.e., acting as a "catalyst") does not qualify the plaintiffs as prevailing parties. The Buckhannon Court disapproved the catalyst theory of recovery because it permitted an award "where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties."17 Even in such situations, however, plaintiffs' counsel may still seek a final judgment if the interests and desires of the clients permit. Defendants are likely to claim that their voluntary changes in policy render the case moot. As the Buckhannon Court noted, however, mootness is to be found only when "it is clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."18
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum are victories achieved either by interlocutory orders or by settlement. Even in pre-Buckhannon jurisprudence, winning an interlocutory order that merely kept a suit alive did not transform litigants into prevailing parties.19 Preliminary injunctions, however, are a different matter because, as with final judgments, they order defendants to act or to refrain from acting. Most lower courts have held that a preliminary injunction based on a finding that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits can qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party.20 By contrast, where an injunction merely preserves the status quo without reaching the merits, the plaintiff's victory may lack sufficient "judicial imprimatur" to qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party.21 While expressly declining to decide whether a preliminary injunction victory can qualify a plaintiff as a prevailing party, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs who obtain preliminary injunctions but ultimately lose on the merits are not entitled to fees.22
Another difficult question is how much "judicial imprimatur" for the change of the legal relationship between the parties is needed for a settlement agreement to qualify a plaintiff as a prevailing party.23 Buckhannon states that a plaintiff who secures a court-ordered consent decree is a prevailing party.24 However, a litigant who achieves success through a "private settlement" is not.25 Private settlements lack the "judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees" and often cannot be enforced in federal court.26 In a case where the claim to prevailing party status is based entirely on a settlement agreement, the court must determine whether a particular agreement is closer to a consent decree or to a private settlement.27 The major factors that the courts have looked at are the extent to which the district court was involved in approval of the settlement terms and whether the district court retains jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.28
In response to Buckhannon, Congress restored the ability to recover fees as a catalyst in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases. An FOIA complainant has "substantially prevailed" and is eligible for fees if the complainant has obtained relief through "a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant's claim is not insubstantial."29
9.4.B. Entitlement to Fees Under Major Fee-Shifting Statutes
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that she is a prevailing party, showing entitlement to fees usually is not difficult under most federal fee-shifting statutes.
9.4.B.1. Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act and Other Statutes: Double Standard for Plaintiffs and Defendants
Some statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, provide that a prevailing plaintiff "shall" be entitled to fees.30 Other statutes, such as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, specify that a court "may" award fees to the prevailing party.31 Recognizing, however, that statutes such as Section 1988 are private attorney general measures intended to encourage litigation enforcing important rights, the courts employ a double standard. A prevailing plaintiff "'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'"32 By contrast, a prevailing defendant may recover an attorney fee only where the suit was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."33
Section 1988, the most widely used fee-shifting statute, authorizes fee awards in actions to enforce civil rights laws, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A lawsuit that redresses a state or local government violation of rights guaranteed by federal statute is a Section 1983 action within the meaning of Section 1988 and may thus qualify for a fee award.34 State governments do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity against Section 1988 fee awards.35
9.4.B.2. Equal Access to Justice Act—Substantial Justification Standard
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) presents different entitlement questions. Under the EAJA a party who prevails in litigation against the federal government "shall" be awarded fees "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified . . . ."36 If either the government's prelitigation position or its litigation position lacks substantial justification in both law and fact, the court shall award fees.37
While the government is not automatically assessed fees merely because it loses a case, neither does it escape a fee award just because its position is not frivolous. To meet the substantial justification test, the government's position must be "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person," which requires the government to carry its burden to demonstrate "a reasonable basis both in law and fact."38
Although parties often argue that EAJA motions should be controlled by "objective factors" such as the number of times the issue on the merits was litigated previously, the Supreme Court has stated that none of these factors is dispositive in itself.39 Most district courts decide substantial justification questions on an "I know it when I see it" basis. Once the district court grants or denies a motion, the court of appeals is required to use a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard on appeal.40
Another practical hurdle EAJA litigants may have to surmount is the Supreme Court's decision in Astrue v. Ratliff that attorney fees belong to the litigant rather than counsel and therefore are subject to offsets when the prevailing plaintiff owes money to the federal government.41 When there is no preexisting debt, however, courts generally have honored retainer agreements assigning the right to plaintiff's counsel to collect attorney fees.42
9.4.C. Calculation of Reasonable Fees: The Lodestar Calculation
Under the leading case of Hensley v. Eckerhart, the amount of a statutory fee award is determined by the lodestar method: "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."43
9.4.C.1. Reasonable Number of Hours
What constitutes "hours reasonably expended" is the most frequently debated question in fee litigation.
9.4.C.1.a. Documentation Requirements
Courts and opposing counsel examine whether the hours are well documented. Some courts permit attorneys to reconstruct hours.44 However, inadequate documentation may result in a reduced fee award.45 Attorneys, paralegals, and law clerks should begin keeping contemporaneous time records as soon as they realize that a matter may become a case, erring on the side of overinclusiveness. They should record the date, the time spent to complete a task broken down into six-minute increments, and, most important, a sufficiently detailed description of what was done. As one court stated, records should give "enough information as to what hours were devoted to various activities and by whom for the district court to determine if the claimed fees are reasonable."46 For example, "telephone call" or "research" are inadequate entries, but a court will approve "telephone call with Smith re failure to produce administrative record" or "research re summary judgment motion."47 Ideally, there should be a separate entry for each telephone call, research project, or other activity. Bundling several activities into one entry, which is known as block billing, can be costly. One circuit court has approved a 20% reduction in compensation for the block-billed hours.48 Block-billing makes it difficult for courts to assess the number and reasonableness of the hours billed for each task.
9.4.C.1.b. Overall Billing Judgment Decisions
Hensley states that,"[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . ."49 However, attorneys seeking court-awarded fees are expected to exercise voluntary "billing judgment," excluding from a fee request "hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary . . . ."50 In lengthy, multi-counsel litigation, where justifying every time entry or use of personnel would be difficult, some plaintiffs' attorneys propose a voluntary across-the-board billing judgment reduction, which courts often appreciate.51 In other instances, where particular recorded activity seems vulnerable, plaintiffs' counsel should consider making discrete reductions.
Where counsel has exercised appropriate billing judgment, district courts do not have unlimited discretion to reduce fees. At least one Court of Appeals has held that while the district court "can impose a small reduction, no greater than 10 percent-a 'haircut'-based on its exercise of discretion and without a more specific explanation," greater reductions require clear explanations.52
9.4.C.1.c. Compensable Phases of Litigation
A court may award fees for work on all phases of a lawsuit from prelitigation work,53 through postjudgment monitoring,54 including time spent on the fee issue itself.55 There are some limits, however, on awards for prelitigation services. Time spent "years before the complaint was filed" is unlikely to be compensated.56 Time spent in administrative proceedings must be "both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the . . . litigation . . . ."57 When a plaintiff can make that showing, however, a court may award fees for administrative advocacy even when that advocacy was directed at third parties.58
9.4.C.1.d. Compensable Activities
Space does not permit a discussion of which litigation activities are compensable and which are not. When a fee opponent challenges a particular activity, such as attorney travel time, a good place to start researching is one of the fee treatises.59
Perhaps the most frequently occurring challenge is to time spent by co-counsel communicating with each other. The Supreme Court has held that district courts have discretion to include conferencing time in a fee award.60 No court, to our knowledge, has denied compensation altogether for conferences.61
A subsidiary issue in some cases is the number of hours spent on counsel communications. Plaintiffs may need to demonstrate to a district court, through copies of agendas or through lead counsel's declarations, why the number of meetings held was necessary and how the meetings actually contributed to the efficiency of the litigation. When counsel do so, some courts award fully compensatory fees even when large numbers of conferencing hours are at issue.62
9.4.C.1.e. Compensation for Less than Complete Success
Fee opponents often seek reductions based on the argument that the plaintiffs were only partly successful. Plaintiffs rarely win all conceivable relief while prevailing along the way at every stage on all legal theories advanced. Courts do not, however, require that level of success to award fully compensatory fees.
Less than Complete Relief. Frequently plaintiffs win some, but not all, of the equitable relief prayed for, or relatively small amounts of money in damage cases. In neither event is a reduction in fees necessarily warranted. The Hensley Court deemed it insignificant that a prevailing plaintiff did not receive all the relief requested. For example, a plaintiff who failed to recover damages but obtained injunctive relief, or vice versa, may recover a fee award based on all hours reasonably expended if the relief obtained justified that expenditure of attorney time.63 Lawsuits seeking only damages present different issues. The Supreme Court in Farrar v. Hobby held that if a plaintiff wins only nominal damages, a court "usually" denies fees altogether.64 Even in nominal damage cases, however, as suggested by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, a court may award higher fees. Whether it does depends on factors such as the difference between the damage amounts sought and awarded, the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and whether the litigation vindicated a public purpose.65 Several circuit courts have adopted Justice O'Connor's analysis as the rule for nominal-damages cases.66
The Court has rejected limiting the amount of fees in a civil rights damages suit to the same percentage that a personal injury lawyer would receive and affirmed a fee award that was nearly eight times the damages recovery.67 Limiting fees to a percentage of the damages recovery would be inconsistent with the purpose of Section 1988, which "was enacted because existing fee arrangements were thought not to provide an adequate incentive to lawyers particularly to represent plaintiffs in unpopular civil rights cases."68
Unsuccessful Proceedings. A prevailing plaintiff need not prevail at every stage in a suit to receive fully compensatory fees. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in refusing to reduce fees for time spent unsuccessfully defending against a writ of certiorari: "Rare, indeed, is the litigant who doesn't lose some skirmishes on the way to winning the war."69 Relying on Hensley, the Ninth Circuit analogized unsuccessful claims to unsuccessful proceedings where the plaintiff ultimately prevailed.70
Unsuccessful Issues. Neither does a plaintiff need to win every issue raised in the complaint. Rather, fees for time spent litigating an unsuccessful claim are denied only where that claim "is distinct in all respects from . . . successful claims . . . ."71 By contrast, where "a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised."72 Claims are "related" under this analysis when they arise from the same facts or related legal theories.73
9.4.C.2. Reasonable Hourly Rates
In Blum v. Stenson the Supreme Court held that Section 1988 fees awarded to legal aid programs that do not charge their clients fees should be calculated at rates comparable to those charged by private attorneys in the community with comparable experience.74 The Court rejected as inconsistent with the legislative history of Section 1988 the argument that fees should be limited to the internal costs of the relatively low salaries paid by legal aid programs.
9.4.C.2.a. Market Rates and How to Prove Them
The Blum Court noted Congress' direction that "'the amount of fees awarded under [Section 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases . . . .'"75 The fee applicant has the burden of proving relevant market rates through evidence "in addition to the attorney's own affidavits . . . ."76 This evidence often includes:
declarations from attorneys in a range of private law firms in the relevant community reporting hourly rates charged by those firms for attorneys with the same law school graduation date as the fee applicant;77
excerpts from hourly rate surveys;78
fee award orders specifying past hourly rates awarded for the work of attorneys in the case; and
other fee award orders in the jurisdiction stating hourly rates for attorneys of comparable experience.
9.4.C.2.b. Frequently Occurring Hourly Rate Issues
Five frequently recurring issues concerning reasonable hourly rates follow:
First, the parties may disagree on which city's prevailing rates apply when plaintiff's counsel practices outside the forum jurisdiction. While this issue can cut both ways, it appears to occur most frequently when an out-of-town big-city lawyer wins in a jurisdiction where prevailing rates are relatively low. Generally the forum community's rates are applicable unless the plaintiff can show that "local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the case.'"79 A declaration from the director of the legal services program serving the forum community sometimes can help prove this point.
Second, in suits lasting many years, the defendants may argue that compensation must be limited to "historical rates": the market rates prevailing for each of the years the suit was litigated. The Supreme Court has held, however, that "an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment—whether by the application of current rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise—is within the contemplation of [Section 1988]."80 Thus, in multiyear litigation against a defendant other than the federal government, a court should either award current rates for the entire case—the easiest solution—or award historical rates augmented by a multiplier to compensate for delay in payment.81
Third, if the defendants are represented by law firms charging relatively low hourly rates, they may argue that plaintiffs' counsel should be limited to those same rates. Noting that firms representing large institutional defendants such as governments and insurance companies charge low rates to keep repeat business, the courts have rejected these arguments. These firms are "not in the same legal market as private plaintiff's attorneys who litigate civil rights cases."82
Fourth, defendants often seek reduction in hourly rates or an overall fee reduction by contending that too much of the work on behalf of the plaintiffs was done by experienced attorneys at the high end of the hourly rate scale. Fee opponents often argue that plaintiffs' counsel should not be awarded "big firm rates" because a large firm would have litigated the case differently, assigning most of the work to associates. Some courts have accepted this argument.83 Most have rejected it for two reasons. First, small firms and legal aid programs do not have the same luxury as do big firms in choosing to throw armies of associates into the fray.84 More important, the reason experienced attorneys command higher hourly rates, the courts have realized, is that they are often much more efficient: "Presumably, the skill and experience of the partners places them further along the learning curve and enhances their ability to operate efficiently so that the higher partner rate is likely to be offset, at least in part, by a reduction in the number of hours multiplying that rate."85
Fifth, defendants may argue that compensation for the work of paralegals and law clerks should be limited to the amounts that plaintiffs' counsel paid them rather than market rates. The Supreme Court, however, has held that courts should compensate paralegal and law clerk time at market rates if the prevailing practice in the relevant community was to bill that time separately.86
9.4.C.2.c. Equal Access to Justice Act Hourly Rate Issues—Statutory Cap and Exceptions
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) presents an entirely different framework for computing hourly rates. Under the EAJA attorney fees are limited to $125 per hour, subject to certain exceptions.87
Inflation Adjustment. Hourly rates may be adjusted to account for increases in the cost of living since March 1996, when Congress set the EAJA hourly rate limit at $125.88 Although an inflation increase is not automatic, in practice most courts award it, usually unopposed. The adjusted hourly rate equals $125 per hour increased by the percentage increase in the consumer price index for urban consumers (CPI-U).89 Unlike with other fee statutes, courts must use historical rather than current rates in awarding EAJA fees because of sovereign immunity concerns.90 Thus, in multiyear litigation the rate for each year is $125 increased by the percentage CPI-U hike from March 1996 through that year.91
Market Rates for Special Expertise and in Other Situations. An EAJA fee applicant may be awarded higher market rates if "the court determines that . . . a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee."92 This requires an extensive showing that (1) the prevailing attorneys possessed specialized expertise; (2) the expertise was needed in the litigation; and (3) the skills needed could not have been obtained at the normal EAJA rates.93
As for the first factor, the Supreme Court held that possessing exceptional litigation skills is not good enough. The prevailing attorney must have "distinctive knowledge or specialized skill . . . ."94 The circuit courts have taken different approaches in construing the Underwood requirements. The First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Underwood to allow an enhancement in situations where the attorneys had specialized expertise in a particular area of law.95 By contrast, the D.C., Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have construed Underwood quite narrowly.96 Most other circuit courts have not squarely addressed this issue.
Even when the prevailing attorney possesses specialized expertise, the attorney must make a strong factual showing that the case could not have been brought by a smart generalist. Lead counsel should demonstrate to the court how the suit could only have been litigated by attorneys with existing contacts in the field or knowledge of hard-to-access rules and authorities. Plaintiffs also need to submit a declaration from a knowledgeable attorney showing the absence of other qualified counsel to litigate such a case.
In addition to authorizing fees generally against the government when no substantial justification can be shown for the government's position, the EAJA subjects the federal government to fees "to the extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specially provides for such an award."97 Under this provision, market rates are awarded under equitable fee doctrines such as when the government acts in bad faith, and under statutes other than the EAJA that both apply to the federal government and have fee-shifting provisions.98
9.4.C.3. Multipliers
Earlier Supreme Court cases such as Hensley contemplated that the lodestar could be augmented by a multiplier in appropriate circumstances.99 Later cases, however, rendered the multiplier rare in federal court. Most prominently, the Court in City of Burlington v. Dague held that courts may not award contingency multipliers to account for either the exceptional riskiness of a particular case or the riskiness of certain kinds of litigation.100 Previously, the Court had discouraged the use of multipliers based on such factors as the novelty and difficulty of the litigation or the exceptional quality of the representation; the Court reasoned that these factors are generally subsumed within the lodestar.101 Post-Dague, two courts have approved multipliers based on the extreme unpopularity of a case.102 Another court ordered a multiplier for exceptional results after a 36-year landmark desegregation lawsuit.103 In addition, where a federal court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over state claims and state law permits multipliers, federal courts are free to augment the lodestar.104
In Perdue v. Kenny A.,105 the Court held that there is a "strong presumption" that the lodestar calculation is reasonable, but that there may be a "few" circumstances in which superior attorney performance is not represented in the lodestar calculation. In such cases, the lodestar amount would not have been sufficient to attract competent counsel initially. The Court identified three bases for a possible enhancement: that the hourly rate does not adequately measure the attorney's true market value, such as when the rate is keyed only to the number of years out of law school, 2) the performance involves an "extraordinary" outlay of expenses and litigation is protracted and 3) the performance involves an unanticipated delay in the recovery of fees.106 Any enhancement must be objective, reasonable and subject to meaningful appellate review.
While Perdue left the door slightly ajar for future multipliers, the opinion and its predecessors suggest a more practical approach for fee applicants. The Perdue Court recognized that "'brilliant insights and critical maneuvers sometimes matter far more than hours worked or years of experience.'"107 But "'in those cases, the special skill and experience of counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates.'"108 Counsel who have performed exceptionally can use this reasoning to justify seeking higher hourly rates than would normally be warranted by their number of years of experience.
9.4.D. Timing of Fee Petitions
Neither Section 1988 nor most federal fee-shifting statutes specify when the fee motion must be filed.
9.4.D.1. Civil Rights Act and Most Other Cases—Governed by Rule 54 and Local Rules
Rule 54(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires fee motions to be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court . . . ." For purposes of this rule, a local rule setting a different fee motion deadline is an "order of the court," and the local rule governs.109
Some local rules, however, also impose short deadlines for fee motions, which may require counsel to seek an order postponing the deadline or to postpone having a judgment entered until fee papers are prepared. Rule 54 requires only that the fee applicant state the basis for an award and either the amount or "fair estimate" of the amount; thus, the rule appears to permit counsel to file placeholder motions with details to be filled in later.
9.4.D.2. Equal Access to Justice Act Timing Issues
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requires fee motions to be filed within 30 days of "final judgment."110 This in turn is defined as "a judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement."111
Fee petitions may also be filed pending appeal; the EAJA merely precludes fee petitions after the 30-day limit.112 Fee claimants and the government argued for years over what starts the EAJA clock running in Social Security Act cases until the Supreme Court decided the issue in Shalala v. Schaeffer.113 A plaintiff is a prevailing party, the Court held, when she obtains a "sentence four remand" under the Social Security Act: "a judgment modifying or reversing the decision of the Secretary . . . ."114 By contrast, a "sentence six remand," which merely contemplates that new evidence will be introduced is not a judgment for attorney-fee purposes.115 Thus, a sentence four remand has the potential to start the clock running for an EAJA fee motion.
The Schaeffer Court also held, however, that a sentence four remand order merely triggers the duty to enter judgment and is not a judgment itself. For the 30-day clock to begin running, the district court, pursuant to Rule 58, must enter a judgment "on a separate document."116
9.4.E. The "Jeff D." Problem--Forced Fee Waivers and Lump Sum Settlement Offers
Ordinarily a legal aid organization agrees to represent the client without charging a fee, except for recovering court-awarded fees. There are two potential problems with defense settlement offers in most cases handled by legal aid attorneys: (1) the offer is conditioned upon waiver of attorney fees or (2) in cases seeking monetary relief, the defendant offers a lump-sum inclusive of all damages and attorney fees and does not identify the amount of the award allocated to fees. Simultaneously negotiating the best settlement terms for the client and an award of fees for the legal work can create a conflict of interest between attorney and client.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this problem, but has decided that encouraging settlements is a more important policy objective than helping plaintiff's attorneys avoid an ethical challenge. In Evans v. Jeff. D., the Court held that conditioning a settlement offer on the merits on plaintiffs waiving their claim for Section 1988 fees is permissible.117 Jeff D. has made it very difficult to challenge attorney fee waiver settlement offers, but not impossible. At least two courts, relying upon dictum in Jeff D., have held that suits may proceed challenging an alleged wholesale government policy of demanding fee waivers to deny counsel to disfavored classes of litigants.118
Because such suits would not be easy to litigate and win, the goal should be to avoid Jeff D. offers in the first place. Some private attorneys have done so by including a provision in the client retainer agreement stating the attorney's hourly rate, and specifying that the client owes that amount if the client, against attorney's advice, accepts a settlement offer that precludes a fee recovery.
This is not a viable option for legal aid programs. For legal aid attorneys, the key to minimizing Jeff D. problems is appropriate communication with opposing counsel and with clients. Some opposing counsel, who would never think to make a Jeff D. offer to a private attorney, might make such an offer to a legal services attorney, seeking to take advantage of the attorney's perceived idealism. Legal services attorneys need to convey to opposing counsel and the entire legal community, through consistent word and action, that of course, in addition to relief for their clients, they expect their programs to be paid no matter what. Consistently conveying this attitude will discourage Jeff D. offers. Client communication is also critical. Clients who are educated on the importance of the case and kept well informed throughout the litigation have been known to reject Jeff D. offers.
Even when there is no demand for waiver of fees, incorporating fees in a lump-sum settlement offer presents a serious challenge to the plaintiff's attorney. The attorney must negotiate the maximum monetary and non-monetary relief for the client while also trying to recover fees. Because law firms representing indigent civil rights plaintiffs typically limit their requirement for the client to pay attorney fees to what can be recovered from the defendant, there is also an ethical challenge when the lump-sum does not allocate the portion of the award that represents the amount included for the fees of the plaintiff's attorney. Where damages will be sought, the client retainer agreement needs to address specifically the possibility of a lump-sum settlement offer. The agreement needs to specify that the fees will be calculated in a certain way, and that an accounting of the total fees will be shown to the client at the time a settlement offer is made. Even with full disclosure and agreement from the client, negotiating these lump-sum settlement offers is challenging.
1. From 1995 to 2009, annual legislation appropriating funds to the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) prohibited LSC grant recipients from claiming attorney fees in most cases. The appropriation measure for 2010 eliminated the prohibition, and LSC then suspended its corresponding regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3. The National Legal Aid and Defender Program Enhancement Committee subsequently prepared a useful memorandum setting forth guidance to LSC funded organizations (but useful to any legal aid office) on how to document time, revise retainer and co-counseling agreements and collect attorney fees. See the Ohio Legal Services website for more information, www.ohiolegalservices.org. In addition, programs should seek attorney's fees in cases pending at the time of passage of the appropriations bill. See Rochelle Bobroff, Legal Services Attorney Fees Are Obtainable in Pending Cases, 44 Clearinghouse Review 157 (July-Aug. 2010).
2. See, e.g., 2 Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation, Statutory Attorney's Fees (4th ed. 2013-2 Supplement).
3. Not all statutes require a recipient of attorney fees to be the prevailing party. Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, a court may award attorney fees in connection with an unsuccessful petition for compensation for injuries caused by vaccines if the petition "was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). In Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886 (2013), the Court held that fees could be awarded under this statute even for an untimely petition brought in good faith. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, 560 U.S. 242 ( 2010) (holding that under ERISA provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), which allows court to award fees to either party in its discretion, party must demonstrate "some degree of success on the merits" to be awarded fees).
4. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Gill Deford, The Imprimatur of Buckhannon on the Prevailing-Party Inquiry, 42 Clearinghouse Review 122 (July-Aug. 2008).
5. Texas Teachers Association v. Garland School District, 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989).
6. See Section 9.4.C.1 of this MANUAL.
7. Texas Teachers Association, 489 U.S. at 793.
8. 136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016).
9. Id. at 1651. The Court declined to decide whether the nonmerits grounds of a decision must be preclusive in nature. Id. at 1653.
10. Id. at 1652 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)).
11. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 840 (2011).
12. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001).
13. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987).
14. Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (per curiam).
16. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
17. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
18. Id. at 609 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Incorporated v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Incorporated, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). Mootness is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this MANUAL.
19. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Higher Taste, Incorporated v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2013); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 2009); People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008) ("nearly every Court of Appeals to have addressed the issue has held that relief obtained via a preliminary injunction can, under appropriate circumstances, render a party 'prevailing.'"); Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 523-24 (5th Cir. 2008); Preservation Coalition of Erie County v. Federal Transit Administration, 356 F. 3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2004). But see Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2002) (doubting that winning a preliminary injuncti0n can ever qualify a plaintiff as the prevailing party).
21. See, e.g., Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 858-59 (1st. Cir. 2002).
22. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007).
26. Id. at 604 n.7.
27. For a discussion on how to structure settlements in light of Buckhannon, see Section 9.2 of this MANUAL.
28. See, e.g., Perez v. Westchester County Department of Corrections, 587 F.3d 143, 149-53 (2d Cir. 2009); Aranov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 88-95 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc); Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. Food and Drug Administration, 511 F.3d 187 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2003); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002); American Disability Association, Incorporated v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 278-81 (4th Cir. 2002) ; Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002).
29. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For a list of other federal attorney-fee provisions, see Gary F. Smith, Federal Statutory Attorney Fees: Common Issues and Recent Cases, 28 Clearinghouse Review 744, 746 (Nov. 1994).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A potentially illuminating recent example outside the traditional legal services context involved an interpretation of the identical fee-shifting language in the Copyright Act. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016). There, the Court tried to interpret the fee provision in a manner that would further the purpose of the Copyright Act. It determined that this purpose would be better served by a test that gave "substantial weight to the reasonableness of a losing party's position" and considered other relevant factors than one that gave "special consideration to whether a lawsuit resolved an important and close legal issue and thus 'meaningfully clarifie[d]' copyright law." Id. at 1985, 1986-89. In this context, the "substantial weight" test is not equivalent to a presumption against fee shifting."
32. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 428 (1983) (citations omitted).
33. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016) (per curiam).
34. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980).
35. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130-33 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The fee petition must, among other things, affirmatively allege that the government's litigation position was not substantially justified. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 408 (2004).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
38. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
39. Id. at 568-69. In Pierce itself, for example, the Court did not find it dispositive that the government had lost 11 straight times on the same issue. Id. at 569. Neither did the Court agree with the government that a Supreme Court grant of certiorari and a stay on the same issue compelled a conclusion that the government's position must have been substantially justified. Id.
41. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010).
42. See Gors v. Colvin, No. Civ. 12-4162 (D.S.D. March 12, 2013) ("Post-Ratliff the approach of most courts has been to honor such fee assignments in the absence of the litigant's pre-existing debt to the United States.") (citing Walker v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-960 (M.D. Ala. April 5, 2011) (Ratliff does not explicitly reject the practice of awarding fees to attorneys where the litigant has assigned them "'in cases where the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government . . .'"); Wigginton v. Astrue, No. 3:09CV00101 (E.D. Ark. April 4, 2011) (same); Blackwell v. Astrue, No. CIV 08-1454 (E.D. Cal. March 21, 2011) (same); Dornbusch v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-1734 (D. Minn. March 1, 2011) (same)).
43. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
44. See Kline v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, Fire Department, 245 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2001); Riordan v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Comapny, 977 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1992); Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1542 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993); Carter v. Sedgwick County, 929 F.2d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1991).
46. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1191 (3d Cir. 1990).
47. For a comparison of what one court considered to be adequate and inadequate time records, see Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal Inc., 583 F. Supp. 40, 47 (N.D. Ind. 1983). Interestingly, the time summaries the court approved broke down time by quarter hours rather than tenths, and several of the entries were block billed. Neither practice is likely to pass judicial muster today.
48. Welch v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9thCir. 2007). At the same time, the Court of Appeals stated that the reduction could not be imposed across-the-board because many of the time entries were not block-billed. See also Torres-Rivera v. O'Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 340 (1st Cir. 2008).
51. See, e.g., Davis, 976 F.2d at 1543.
52. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).
53. Webb v. County Board of Education, 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
54. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 559 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 ( 2d Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), cited with approval, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 162 (1990). In Jean the Court held that, under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), fees for time spent on the fee issue should be awarded without a separate inquiry over whether the government's position on the fee issue was substantially justified.
56. Webb, 471 U.S. at 242.
58. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. at 558-59.
59. See, e.g., Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 2, § 4.07[F] at 4-101 (collecting cases dealing with compensability of travel time).
60. Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 573 n.6 (1986).
61. See, e.g., In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that unjustified across-the-board cuts in attorney fees for time spent in conference was an abuse of discretion); Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (in "a difficult case with significant social effects . . . the participation of [four] attorneys . . . in . . . strategy conferences and negotiations 'may indeed have been crucial . . . .'"); Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Incorporated, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 645 F. Supp. 437, 450 (D.D.C. 1986) ("conferences between attorneys to discuss strategy and prepare for oral argument are an essential part of effective litigation . . . there is no reason or authority for allowing only one lawyer to charge for time that more than one lawyer justifiably spent").
62. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Davis, 976 F.2d 1536 (counsel compensated for 3,500 hours in conferences with co-counsel and clients); Riverside, 477 U.S. at 573 n.6 (affirming compensation for 197 hours of conversation between two attorneys); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D. R.I. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980) (attorneys fully compensated for 208 hours spent in conference). See also In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (limiting compensation for conferencing hours to 10 percent of total fee request).
63. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 n.11.
65. Id. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Incorporated, 254 F.3d 1223, 1229-33 (10th Cir. 2001) (evaluating factors); O'Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming a lodestar fee award, where nominal damages award achieved individual plaintiff's goal and served as a deterrent).
66. See, e.g., Hawa Abdi Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, 577 F.3d 169, 174-76 (3rd Cir. 2009); Mercer v. Duke University, 401 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2005), and cases cited there.
67. Riverside, 477 U.S. at 564-65, 581 (plurality opinion); id. at 581-86 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (rejecting argument to limit fees to one-third of damages).
68. Id. at 586 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).
70. Id. ("Just as time spent on losing claims can contribute to the success of other claims, time spent on a losing stage of litigation contributes to success because it constitutes a step toward victory").
72. Id. By contrast, when a portion of a suit is frivolous, entitling the defendant to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 and similar statutes, the defendant is entitled to reimbursement only "for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims." Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (2011).
74. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-96 (1984).
75. Id. at 893 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976)).
76. Id. at 896 n.11.
77. Specific hourly rate information is more persuasive than a declaration of a private attorney that merely says the attorney has looked over the rates sought and thinks they are "reasonable." The latter type of declaration "might properly be characterized by a reviewing court as one given out of courtesy, but it provides little or no evidentiary support for an award." Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988).
78. See, e.g., Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8,14 (D.D.C. 2000) (relying upon National Survey Center and National Law Journal surveys to determine reasonable hourly rates in the District of Columbia). But see Davis, 976 F.2d at 1547 (rejecting reliance on a different survey because, among other reasons, the survey reported only statewide average rates rather than rates specific to San Francisco, where case was litigated).
79. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827 (1998) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992)).
80. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989).
81. Because waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed, fee awards against the federal government after multiyear litigation may not include a multiplier for delay or be based on current hourly rates. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 317-20 (1986).
82. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 925 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117 (1997). Accord Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996); Brooks v. Georgia Board of Elections, 997 F.2d 857, 869-70 (11th Cir. 1993).
83. See, e.g., Lopez v. San Francisco Unified School District, 385 F. Supp. 2d 981, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that attorney fees should be reduced when tasks could have been delegated to less experienced attorneys in typical firm environment); Finkelstein v. Bergna, 804 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (awarding 0 per hour for some of work by plaintiffs' lead counsel and 0 per hour (still a high rate for 1992) for less complex work). See also McDonald v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 98 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006) (approving cautiously of district court's reduction in solo practitioner's rate based on fact that larger firms incur greater overhead.
84. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic Supply, Incorporated, 42 F.3d 1037, 1048 (7th Cir. 1994) ("plaintiff asserts that her counsel was essentially a sole practitioner with only part-time associates and law clerks during much of this litigation. If true, the district court's reduction for what it saw as top-heavy staffing cannot be sustained.").
85. American Petroleum Institute. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 72 F.3d 907, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("often, as audits reveal, there is so much senior time billed for reviewing, revising, and discussing the document that it usually would be cheaper to have the senior lawyer simply sit down and draft it"). Accord Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1987); Muehler v. Land O'Lakes, Incorporated, 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1379 (D. Minn. 1985); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Incorporated, 572 F. Supp. 354, 366 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Gary Greenfield, Efficient Litigation: An Ethical Imperative? 20 American Lawyer 38 (April 1994).
86. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284-89. Accord, Richlin Security Service Company v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007 (2008) (same conclusion for fees awarded under Equal Access to Justice Act).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
88. Id.; Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Before 1996, the limit was per hour, subject to the same statutory exceptions. Id.
89. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148. See Zheng Liu v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1124 (D. Minn. 2008) ("Court may use the CPI-U to adjust EAJA rate for inflation"); Associationn of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Food and Drug Administration, 391 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 n.5 (D.D.C. 2005) (accepting plaintiff's request for increase over 5 limit for cost-of-living expense based on CPI).
90. Kerin v. United States Postal Service, 218 F.3d 185, 194 (2d Cir. 2000); Masonry Masters, Incorporated v. Nelson, 105 F.3d 708, 711-13 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
91. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
93. Rueda-Menicucci v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 132 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying rate increase where special expertise was unnecessary to successful result); Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (7th Cir. 1995); Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1989).
94. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572.
95. See Raines, 44 F.3d at 1361 ("an identifiable practice specialty not easily acquired by a reasonably competent attorney" can be considered a special factor warranting fee enhancement); Pirus, 869 F.2d at 541-42 (fee enhancement available for specialized expertise in social security class actions); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 774 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 496 U.S. 154 (1999) (immigration law expertise may qualify). See Atlantic Fish Spotters Association. v. Daley, 205 F.3d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that practice experience in fisheries can be special factor, but such expertise was not required in this case).
96. Select Milk Producers, Incorporated. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding that "expertise acquired through practice" was not a "special factor" that could warrant an enhanced fee); F.J. Vollmer Company v. Magaw, 102 F3d. 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (market rate fees "available only for lawyers whose specialty 'requir[es] technical or other education outside the field of American law'"); Estate of Cervin v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2000); Hyatt v. Commissioner, 315 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2002).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
98. See, e.g. Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (refusal of federal government to follow binding circuit precedent in social security cases amounted to bad faith warranting market rate fees); D & M Watch Corporation v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (market rate fees when Customs Service acted in bad faith); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986) (noting that Congress waived sovereign immunity to permit Title VII lawsuits and attorney-fee awards against the United States).
100. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
101. See, e.g, Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-99. Counsel may wish to use this discussion to support relatively high hourly rates.
102. Oberfielder v. Bertolli, 67 Fed. Appx. 408, 411 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying multiplier where "the undesirability of the case is at least partially confirmed by Oberfelder's difficulty in obtaining legal representation and the consequent need for the district court to appoint pro bono counsel"); Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1996); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
103. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 795-96 (6th Cir. 2004).
104. Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 2.0 multiplier under California state law in discrimination case).
105. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (2010).
106. Id. at 554-56. The Supreme Court previously approved of an enhancement to account for unanticipated delays in payment. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284. But see Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321-23 (no compensation for delay in suits against federal government).
107. Id. at 555 n.5.
108. Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984)).
109. Tire Kingdom, Incorporated v. Morgan Tire & Auto, Incorporated, 253 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Supreme Court has held that a timely fee petition could be amended after 30 days to cure a failure to allege that the government's litigation position was not substantially justified. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G).
112. Pierce v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2006); Scafar Contracting, Incorporated v. Secretary of Labor, 325 F.3d 422, 431-32 (3rd Cir. 2003); McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1983); accord Cervantez v. Sullivan, 739 F. Supp. 517, 519 (E.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Adams v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 287 F.3d 183, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that Congress, in amending EAJA, adopted McDonald approach).
113. Shalala v. Schaeffer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
114. Id. at 300, citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), fourth sentence.
115. Id. at 298.
117. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
118. Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2002) (Section 1988 suit); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42-44 (D.D.C. 2002) (provision in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), court relied in part on IDEA's right to counsel provision to distinguish Jeff D.).

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Jacob Rees-Mogg Invites Moggmentum Tattoo Man for Tea at Commons
Jacob Rees-Mogg today pledged to meet the young man who had "Moggmentum" tattooed on his chest and take him for tea at the House of Commons. Giving his blessing to 24-year-old tattooee Ross Atkinson, the North East Somerset MP said he was "enormously honoured and flattered… it's a huge compliment, very flattering". The Mogg has spoken to Ross on the radio twice today; first as the lead item on BBC Radio Sheffield's breakfast programme and later on TalkRadio with Paul Ross. Rees-Mogg said:
"I just hope he doesn't become a socialist when he gets older and might have to change it… It's a great honour a young man should be so interested in politics, so keen about Conservative principles that he wants to wear it on himself."
Ross spoke to Guido on Monday just moments after he had the tattoo. As the ink dried, he said:
"I understand that a lot of working class people actually share beliefs with Jacob and I reckon he could be the one to push into Labour heartlands."
Today Ross revealed to Guido that he has fixed a date to meet his hero in Westminster in October. Moggmentum forever…
mdi-timer 2nd August 2017 @ 3:12 pm 2nd Aug 2017 @ 3:12 pm mdi-comment Comments Moggmentum Tattoo Man: "I Love Jacob"
A Doncaster man has had a "Moggmentum" logo tatooed on his chest in tribute to his favourite parliamentarian. Ross Atkinson, 24, from Doncaster, tells Guido:
"I got it at Limited Edition Tattoo in Doncaster. It cost £50 – I paid for it with a bonus from my previous job. I love Jacob because he stands for a lot of the same things as me philosophically, but he also has the integrity to not try and change his opinions to meet public opinion. He also stands for a very old caring kind of Conservatism that doesn't support unlimited individualism but understands that the state has to take charge sometimes. I was in the Tories between 2008 and 2011 but left, I joined again last year just after Brexit. I understand that a lot of working class people actually share beliefs with Jacob and I reckon he could be the one to push into Labour heartlands like my town. Unfortunately I think I'm the only lad with one in Doncaster but who knows – maybe it will start a national trend?"
The newly-inked e-commerce manager had the tattoo done this afternoon. On the possibility of the Mogg becoming leader, Ross said: "Personally I don't think he should be leader for the next election, but for the one after that definitely." Keeping the Mogg close to his heart…
mdi-timer 31st July 2017 @ 3:43 pm 31st Jul 2017 @ 3:43 pm mdi-comment Comments


text:
Singapore and UK financial watchdogs announce new cooperation efforts to strengthen cybersecurity
John Timmons
Jonah Anderson
Julia Smithers Excell
Jon Bowden
Berny Chong
Cyber attacks are a national security concern in the UK. While individuals can be victims of such attacks, private sector institutions are often the direct targets1. Cyber attacks can critically damage a commercial reputation and a firm's infrastructure. Cyber crime is an international and cross-border issue. In response to the threat from cyber criminals, financial sector regulators are working together on a cross-border basis to help strengthen cybersecurity in the financial sector.
Businesses operating in the financial services sector have been experiencing year-on-year growth in the number of cyber attacks to which they are subject, together with an increase in the costs associated with successful, or partially successful, cyber attacks. Financial services firms are faced with the challenge of defending against continually evolving and sophisticated threats.
Access to a broad range of information concerning the latest cyber threats is a foundational component of a robust cyber defence strategy. The information may come from other financial services firms (e.g., through industry forums such as the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") cyber coordination groups) and from guidance and insights published by financial services regulators, who necessarily have a broader view of the issues being faced in the sector.
The threat landscape is complex and the origination of threats is not limited to a single jurisdiction. Understanding current threats, and defending against these, requires cross-border cooperation. The Monetary Authority of Singapore ("MAS"), the Bank of England ("BoE") and the FCA have announced a collaboration aimed at strengthening cybersecurity in their financial sectors. This initiative underlines the importance of such cross-border collaboration and information sharing. MAS, BoE and the FCA will work together to identify ways in which information can be shared effectively, including through staff exchanges. Experiences and information shared between these bodies, operating in leading global financial services markets, will increase awareness of the key threats, will allow developing trends to be identified more quickly, and will ultimately help to improve the cyber defences of financial services firms in their respective markets.
Click here to download PDF.
1 National Crime Agency National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organized Crime 2019
This publication is provided for your convenience and does not constitute legal advice. This publication is protected by copyright.
© 2019 White & Case LLP


text:
Q: BERT uncased + a layer of GRU for Sentiment Analysis I am trying to fine tune BERT uncased on sentiment analysis by adding a single GRU layer at the end.
The problem is the output shape of the BERT model not corresponding with the needed input shape for the GRU layer.
I have 2 classes: positive and negative, and a batch size of 25. BERT outputs a tensor of shape (25, 2). GRU needs a 3D input.
The code:
class BERT_Sent(nn.Module):

    def __init__(self, bert, batch_size, input_size, hidden_size, num_layers, dropout=0.2):

      super(BERT_Sent, self).__init__()

      self.bert = bert
      weight = next(self.parameters()).data
      self.relu = nn.ReLU()
      self.softmax = nn.Softmax()
      self.h0 = weight.new(num_layers, batch_size, hidden_size).zero_()
      self.h0.requires_grad = True

      # GRU
      self.gru = nn.GRU(input_size=input_size, hidden_size=hidden_size, num_layers=num_layers, dropout=dropout)

    def forward(self, token_ids, attention_masks, labels=None):
        out1 = self.bert(token_ids,
                        token_type_ids = None,
                        attention_mask = attention_masks,
                        labels = labels)

        out1 = self.relu(out1.logits)    #relu: felt cute might delete later
        out2, h1 = self.gru(out1, self.h0)
        return self.softmax(out2)

optimizer = torch.optim.AdamW(model_.parameters(), lr = 2e-5, eps = 1e-08)

Also I don't know if h0 is useful when I have only one GRU layer, so I would like someone to explain. I added "requires grad" just in case it can be changed through training.
I am using these parameters as an initial try-out:
model_ = BERT_Sent(model, batch_size, 15, 256, 1)

Please help me understand how to add the GRU layer correctly. I have never worked with BERT, not with any RNNs/GRU.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


You have a lot on your plate studying for the CPA and CIA exams. At TAPA Institute we acknowledge that you have to learn the essentials to become certified and you have a limited amount of time to do so. That's why TAPA Institute has created tailored CPA and CIA Boot Camps to get you where you need to be for the exam without wasting your time. This podcast is about the best ways to study on a limited budget of time.


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Home ▸ Parenting ▸ Single Parenting Statistics On The Rise
Single Parenting Statistics On The Rise
The Census department of the U.S. government has many vehicles for obtaining statistics nationwide. Whether it be the official U.S. Census, the Current Population Survey (CPS), or the American Community Survey (ACS), one thing is certain: single parent households are on the rise. These single parenting statistics are crucial to determining population demographics and areas where people may be vulnerable to poverty.
The U.S. Census
The census is taken twice every 10 years (dicennial) and the last was in the year 2000. The findings from the U.S. Census from 1970, when it was first established, to 2000 indicates that the number of female single family households has increased steadily over the years, with mothers who have never been married now outnumbering single female heads of households that have divorced.
In the 2000 Census it is estimated that 54.5 million were married couple households. Another 12.9 million were female single parent head of households. This outnumbered the male single parent household by 3 to 1, with male single parenting averaging 4.4 million households. This was a 10% increase in single female parent households and a 23% increase in single male parent households since the 1990 Census.
The Current Population Survey
This survey shows the same trends. Traditional family households with two or more people related by birth, marriage, or adoption decreased from 85% to 68% throughout the U.S. At the same time there was an increase in single parenting statistics from 9% to 28% overall.
The American Community Survey
This survey had some of the more interesting single parenting statistics. It followed the same trends, but was also able to break them down by states in some cases. In 2003 it was estimated that four cities actually had approximately 50% of female-headed households as compared to the total respondents of this survey. They were: Detroit, Newark, Cleveland, and Baltimore.
In addition, these single parenting statistics broke down the poverty levels from single female heads of households by ethnicity. In 2003, Hispanics and American Indians were at 46% and 47% respectively in the poverty category of female heads of households. Black female heads of household were at 42% and White Non-Hispanics at 29%. These parenting statistics clearly show the link between poverty and single heads of households.
Many different agencies use these single parenting statistics to determine need and demographics of their constituents. The Department of Education uses it to decide where to issue grants in high poverty areas. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) uses it to pinpoint programs for low-income housing assistance. Other social programs like the Nation School Lunch Program and even Social Security look at these parenting statistics to help meet the needs of households that are at risk for living in poverty.
Men Have Issues Dating Single Mothers
Having A Young Single Mother's Right Attitude
Single Moms and Time Constraints
What's The Advantages of Single Parenting?
Single Parenting In General
The Biggest Disadvantage sf Single Parenting
Types Of Low Income Single Mother Housing Options
Single Parenting Advice For Flourishing


This stylish first communion dress features sheer organza neckline accented with rhinestone beading. The tulle skirt is fully lined and a satin banding at the waist accented with rhinestone decorations. The back of this tea length first communion dress features a zipper closure with organza tie back.


The new national park in the Southern Highlands will cover nearly 3680 hectares. The new park is centered around Tugalong Station – about 25 kilometres northwest of Bowral.
The NSW Government will also provide $150 million to improve access to national parks across the state. This will include upgraded walking tracks, better visitor infrastructure and facilities, and new digital tools such as virtual tours and livestreaming cameras.
$1 million expansion of the Think before you Trek safety program for bushwalkers and to deliver other priority safety programs like rock fishing and enhanced mobile connectivity in the parks.
Premier Gladys Berejiklian said NSW boasts some of the most majestic and picturesque coastal lookouts, outback walking tracks, camping grounds and beaches in the world.
"The NSW Government wants more visitors to experience the natural beauty and wonder of our national parks," Ms Berejiklian said.


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Q: Show the total amount of a column I'm currently making a game to teach myself PHP as I go. I've already progressed quite a bit but I'm stuck now at the statistics where I want to show how many of each player-class there currently is in the game.
Thanks everyone, finally managed to fix it - not in the way as answered but the answer did help me getting to a result!
Which is:
<?php
echo 'Current Classes in the Game :' . '
';

$result = $db->query("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE role='Warrior'");
$row = $result->fetch_row();
echo $row[0] . ' Warriors' . '
';

$result = $db->query("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE role='Mage'");
$row = $result->fetch_row();
echo $row[0] . ' Mages' . '
';

$result = $db->query("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE role='Priest'");
$row = $result->fetch_row();
echo $row[0] . ' Priests' . '
';

$result = $db->query("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE role='Rogue'");
$row = $result->fetch_row();
echo $row[0] . ' Rogues' . '
';
?>

A: You need execute an sql query like this using mysqli :
select
    count(*) as nb,
    class
from
   yourTable
group by class


Lee Phanurat-Bennett asks: Does the thought of public speaking make you feel like this?
If, like many other people, you are nervous about public speaking and delivering presentations, then we can help you overcome such difficulties. We offer a bespoke, relevant, and empathetic service, where we work with each client as part of a team.


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Where They're Headed: Stephen Davis Hernandez '17
The Spanish major is continuing his work in marketing with tech startup Hidrate Inc., which produces smart water bottles.
Post categories In Alumni, News & Updates
While many Fords begin their post-grad job searches during their final year of college, Stephen Davis Hernandez '17 had his plans settled well before he started his senior thesis. Davis began work with the startup Hidrate Inc., which produces "smart water bottles" that track water intake levels and connect with smartphone and smartwatch apps to create personalized water intake goals, back in January 2016.
The Minneapolis native has been working with the company, which, since he started, has grown from five to 12 employees in offices in both his hometown and Chicago. The Spanish major has helped develop and evolve the company's marketing strategy as it has rapidly grown over the past year and a half. Part of his goal in marketing is to think outside the box when constructing narratives for consumers.
"I fully anticipate continuing my work in it and continuing to construct marketing narratives that are empowering and challenge established and reductive stereotypes that are frequently used as default frameworks for marketing," he said.
Davis, who recently moved to the Windy City for the job, faces changing duties as Hidrate expands its consumer base and develops new products. Recently, he has optimized social media ads, developed marketing and sales programs that work with fitness and health care professionals, and coordinated a new marketing campaign that will be seen by over a million people.
"I get to meet so many social media personalities [who] are so down to earth and engaging," he said. "People with hundreds of thousands of followers can be totally chill and a lot of fun to hang out with."
Though he says he hasn't made any ads in Spanish yet, Davis is grateful for the foundation his college education gave him. In particular, he credits his work with the College Libraries for sparking his interest in marketing. And as he rethinks conventional marketing narratives, he values his alma mater's encouragement of open-mindedness.
"Haverford has taught me that there is so much value to being able to provide a perspective that is fresh and may come completely from left field," he said. "Sometimes the connections are difficult to make, but they can lead to incredible insights that the rest of the team hadn't thought of."
"Where They're Headed" is a blog series reporting on the post-collegiate plans of recent Haverford graduates.
Post author By Michael Weber
Tags alumni, Class of 2017, marketing, spanish, start-up, technology, Where They're Headed
←Previous post:WHAT THEY LEARNED: Matthew Abruzzo '17
→Next post:WHAT THEY LEARNED: Malia Wenny '17


A building that is used for another purpose than the purpose of the principal building on a lot. For example, a garage or outbuilding can be an accessory building. Typically does not refer to a separate building used for commercial purposes.


Ever since the breakup issue of Medikal dumping Sister Derby for Fella Makafui l many have shared their opinion including top celebrities and the latest to add his add his voice is Kumawood actor Yaw Dabo.
After Medikal confirmed that he is done with the self-acclaimed 'African Mermaid', Sister Derby threw shots at Medikal and his new lover Fella Makafui in her latest song titled "Kakalika Love" featuring Chameleon.
Derby described the two as cockroaches and further revealed that Medikal saved Fella's name as 'carpenter' when they were still dating.
Well, actor Yaw Dabo in an interview on Accra FM described Sister Derby as a person who does not believe in God.
According to the actor, it wasn't necessary for Sister Derby to record a diss song targeted at her ex-boyfriend Medikal if she believes in God.


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The Ron Burgundy wave
How Will Ferrell's fake newsman became a real cultural force
By Barry Hertz December 6, 2013
Photo illustration by Sarah MacKinnon
Even though he has a voice that makes wolverines purr, and suits so fine they make Sinatra look like a hobo (his words), Ron Burgundy is an odd cultural hero. Yet Will Ferrell's mustachioed and sexist newsman has become something of a cultural force over the nine years since he graced the screen in Anchorman: The Legend of Ron Burgundy, a relatively small-scale effort that has, defying Hollywood logic, become one of the most influential comedies of our time.
That's not just Burgundy-esque hyperbole. Anchorman is responsible for not only Ferrell's outsized film career, but also the success of the some of the funnier men in entertainment today, from co-stars Steve Carell and Seth Rogen to director Adam McKay. The film pioneered what would become the go-to method of comedy filmmaking for the next decade, with its improv-heavy style, which found McKay and producer Judd Apatow urging cast members to do dozens of takes using alternative dialogue. The technique, which Apatow brought over from his television days on Freaks and Geeks and Undeclared, quickly became the standard in big-screen comedies, popping up in everything from Apatow's own The 40-Year-Old Virgin and Knocked Up to Bridesmaids and This Is the End.
And now, with a highly anticipated sequel on the horizon, Ron Burgundy has become an industry unto himself. The fictional newsman is hawking everything from Ben & Jerry's ice cream (the manufacturer has released a new flavour called Scotchy Scotch Scotch) to a line of low-rise Jockey briefs (ad slogan: "Don't act like you're not impressed").
Ron Burgundy may even save Detroit, thanks to an unprecedented tie-in campaign with Chrysler that has an in-character Ferrell making wise-ass sales pitches for the company's Durango SUV ("Its glovebox comfortably fits two turkey sandwiches, six ball-peen hammers, 70 packs of gum and 20 rulers!"). While Ferrell was only supposed to deliver half a dozen commercials, his creative team produced more than 70 spots—"enough content to span over three months and beyond," says Olivier François, Chrysler Group's chief marketing officer. "We've seen an almost 80 per cent increase in web traffic alone since the campaign launched in October, and sales increased by 59 per cent that month over October 2012."
The Burgundy wave has rolled into real-world news, too. Last month, the Newseum in Washington, hoping to capitalize on the trend, or perhaps just a really big fan, opened Anchorman: The Exhibit, featuring props and costumes. "The exhibit has a two-layered approach: to examine the movie and the art of parody, but also to take a look at the serious side of news, and the reality of sexism in 1970s newsrooms," says Cathy Trost, vice-president of exhibits and programs, who boasts that she now speaks "fluent Ron Burgundy."
She's not alone. During a bizarre promotional stop in Winnipeg—where Ferrell-as-Burgundy hosted the Olympic curling trials—the actor got a taste of just how high fans' expectations are. "It was amazing. People actually came out dressed up as Ron Burgundy, and they seemed awestruck when I walked out," says Ferrell in an interview, his voice perhaps betraying more doubt about his creation than Burgundy himself would ever allow.
But what fans, as well as non-believers who are tiring of seeing Ferrell's mustachioed mug everywhere, may forget is that Ron Burgundy was a joke that was never meant to get this far. Earning $90 million at the global box office on a $25-million budget—decent, but nothing compared to the top comedies of the day—Anchorman was initially dismissed as just another mediocre project for an actor still struggling to establish a post-Saturday Night Live identity. Chronicling the bizarre trials and tribulations of a local TV newsman (Ferrell, playing it broad and boozy), the film had its critical defenders—Variety praised its "inspired lunacy"—but was largely passed over by general audiences. And though it contained a wealth of sex jokes—one buffoonish line from Burgundy about the false gynecological origins of the name "San Diego" is particularly memorable—the film lacked any actual sex or nudity, a seeming prerequisite for any successful big-screen comedy at the time (American Pie, Van Wilder).
Yet, after the theatrical dust settled, Anchorman's off-the-wall antics—talking dogs, news-team rumbles, impromptu musical numbers—helped garner the film a second life on DVD, where it sold more than six million copies, becoming a cable staple for years to come. Slowly, the film became this generation's Caddyshack—an endlessly quotable piece of pop culture that fostered a sense of belonging among fans, forging friendships for those who can carry on whole conversations in Burgundy-ese.
That the sequel was shelved for years while Ferrell and McKay watched for a glimmer of interest is part of the Anchorman charm. After the pair moved on to Talladega Nights and Step Brothers (the next instalments of what they call their "mediocre American man trilogy"), they tossed around the idea of a follow-up, eventually announcing plans in 2008—four years after the original, an eternity in comedy sequels (the Austin Powers films had two years between them).
"At first, Adam and I were just wondering why anyone would ever want to make a sequel. Just do a different story! We had so many other films that we wanted to make," Ferrell says. "But then the film just started to grow in popularity in a very strange way. We basically got, in the best possible way, worn down by journalists and fans. I'd be on a press junket for some other movie, and a third of the interview would be, 'When are you guys doing an Anchorman sequel?' "
But even with increasing word-of-mouth and brisk DVD sales, Paramount couldn't be convinced that the Anchorman effect was real, and shelved the sequel. Undaunted, McKay and Ferrell kept trying. Ferrell and co-stars Carell, Paul Rudd and David Koechner—who had turned into bigger and more expensive names—offered to take severe pay cuts. McKay even proposed an Anchorman musical on Broadway, which could be adapted to the big screen or cable, à la Ferrell's You're Welcome America: A Final Night with George W. Bush. Finally, in March 2012, eight long years after the first film was released, Paramount succumbed to the growing powers of Anchorman. Ferrell, as Burgundy, appeared on Conan O'Brien's talk show to confirm the good news: "There will be a sequel to Anchorman!" He then played the jazz flute—Burgundy's speciality—to the roar of the crowd, who acted as if they had just won the late-night lottery. (O'Brien's show has served as a platform for Anchorman promotion ever since, with Ferrell periodically popping up in character to either jam with the band or profess support for his "dear, dear friend," Toronto Mayor Rob Ford.)
This time, Ferrell and McKay's film was no under-the-radar affair. Gossip websites and overzealous fans tripped over themselves to report on the latest plot development or high-profile cameo. (The first film featured surprise appearances from Ben Stiller and Vince Vaughn, but the sequel has more celebrities than a Golden Globes luncheon.) Suddenly, Ferrell and crew were in the land of watermarked scripts and clandestine shoots. "It was the first time we had ever been in a process where we had to watch who was coming in and out of the set," Ferrell says. "Even at the table reads, we had to make sure everyone turned their scripts back in. Paramount was incredibly protective."
Ferrell, meanwhile—whose latest in-character appearance involved co-hosting a local six-o'clock newscast in Bismarck, N.D.—cautions that he's only pulling out all the promotional stops because it's his passion project: "The only thing that does scare me is that all the other studios are now thinking, 'Oh look, he'll do anything! Absolutely anything!' "
He may be able to keep studio demands at bay. But as much as Ferrell jokes, fans are expecting the world from Anchorman 2. Nine years' worth of constant teasing can build up expectations.
FILED UNDER: anchorman movie comedy Ron Burgundy Will Ferrell


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Huawei Mate 30 to have 25W fast wireless charging support, rumor says
Vlad 15 August 2019
Huawei Android Rumors
With the Note10, Samsung finally has a flagship device that can fast charge at more than 15W, which is what previous generations of its high-end smartphones have been stuck with for years. The 25W fast wired charging in the Note10 is commendable, but Huawei is looking to soon match that - only not through wired charging, but wireless.
According to a new rumor from China, the Mate 30 and Mate 30 Pro will support 25W wireless charging. That's the fastest that this method of topping up your battery has ever been, one-upping even Xiaomi's 20W system that's built into the Mi 9. Obviously as this is just a rumor at this point, do take it with a healthy dose of skepticism.
Alleged Mate 30 Pro in a transparent case
But also don't be surprised if this does pan out, as it wouldn't be at all out of character for Huawei, a company that has had 40W fast wired charging since last year's Mate 20 Pro. Samsung has only now managed to beat that, with the 45W that the Note10+ supports, although to actually get that you'll have to purchase a $50 dedicated charger, whereas with Huawei's solution the brick that comes in the box with your Mate 20 Pro or P30 Pro is all you need.
The Mate 30 and Mate 30 Pro are set to become official on September 19, with the yet-unannounced Kirin 990 SoC powering them. We've also heard tales of these phones using not one, but two huge 40 MP camera sensors on the rear, alongside a third snapper encased in a circular camera island this time around, the approximate design of which may have been leaked by some case renders recently (see above).
We're also expecting a 6.71-inch 90Hz OLED screen for the Mate 30 Pro, 55W wired charging, and the large notch is apparently staying for one more round.
Huawei Mate 30 Pro reportedly caught in the wild
Huawei Mate 30 Pro spotted in the wild once again
Huawei Mate 30 Lite could be the first phone with HarmonyOS
Huawei Mate 30 Lite shown off in live images
Adul Al Salami Kebab
No CPU, GPU & modem is all made at TSMC with the design made from hisilicone(a huawei sub-brand) so no they do not make all of it, also RAM will soon be made in China as well...
ILoveSmartphones
which tech does huawei bring...every huawei phone is made with samsung parts and other us tech companies,, hahaha, you dont know anything about technology. Samsung holds 85% of displays, nand, ssd, ram, cpu in the whole world we are dangerous. tell m...


A criminal investigation by the Oregon Attorney General into Kitzhaber and Hayes into Kitzhaber's and Hayes' conflicts of interest is ongoing.
When Kitzhaber steps down, Secretary of State Kate Brown will take his place. Brown reported earlier this week that Kitzhaber asked her to fly back early from a conference in DC only to ask her why she had returned, leading some to question his memory and mental state.
"I am ready, and my staff will be ready, should he resign," Brown said.


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Tag Archive for: UCLA Humanities
Crowning 60 Years of Support and Advocacy
January 4, 2016 /in Faculty, Featured Stories /by UCLA College
Marcia Howard '54 considers UCLA her second home – no great surprise given that 20 campus committees and organizations have benefited from her leadership, advocacy and philanthropy for more than 60 years. Most recently, she contributed a lead campaign gift of $1 million to establish the Marcia H. Howard Term Chair in Literary Studies – with a preference given to environmental humanities or Shakespeare studies – in the English department. The inaugural holder of the Howard Chair is English professor Ursula K. Heise, who holds a joint appointment in UCLA's Institute of the Environment and Sustainability.
A retired insurance broker, Howard is a member of the Dean's Centennial Campaign Steering Committee and past recipient of the Alumni Association's University Service Award. In addition to the humanities, she has supported many other units and initiatives on campus, and she underwrites an annual faculty recognition event for the Fiat Lux undergraduate seminar program.
But it is her fervent belief in the importance of a humanities education that compelled her to endow a chair in the English department.
"The study of humanities is essential to all aspects of life," Howard said. "It teaches us to think, reason, write, and explore the meaning of what it is to be human."
Dean of Humanities David Schaberg said, "We are incredibly fortunate to have in Marcia Howard such a vocal and passionate advocate for the humanities. Her recent gift has highlighted the importance of endowed chairs, which recognize the work of our most distinguished faculty."
Longtime love of UCLA
A native Angeleno, Howard made frequent childhood visits with her family to UCLA from their home in west Los Angeles. In particular, she recalls building a snowman in the main quad after a rare snowfall. Much later, as an undergraduate, Howard was involved in several campus organizations including the homecoming and junior prom committees. She worked closely with Bill Ackerman, head of Associated Students from 1933 to 1967 and for whom Ackerman Union is named, who used to joke that she "majored in activities."
Howard studied at the Center for European Studies in Strasbourg, France, during her junior year, igniting a lifelong love of travel and European history and literature. After graduating with a B.A. in history, she resisted her mother's advice to go into teaching and worked as an activist in Georgia in the budding civil rights movement. Returning to Los Angeles in 1961, she found a job at an insurance company where she not only discovered her vocation but also met her future husband, Herbert, with whom she spent many happy years until he passed away in 2007.
Professor Heise awarded inaugural chair
Howard was gratified to learn that Heise, a renowned scholar in environmental humanities, would be the first to hold the chair. Environmental humanities is an emerging interdisciplinary field that brings together anthropologists, philosophers, geographers, literary scholars, historians, and new media scholars to study the influence of cultures on how we define nature. The field prepares graduates for a variety of careers including museum work, civic engagement, community organizing, nature education, literacy education, advocacy, business, writing, and the arts.
Heise received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2011 and is past president of the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment. Her research and teaching focus on contemporary environmental culture, literature and art in the Americas, Western Europe and Japan; theories of modernization and globalization; literature and science; and the digital humanities.
Heise, who currently works on stories and images of endangered species in different countries, said, "You cannot even begin to think about these issues without knowing something about the sciences. In addition, you often have to know about certain social sciences and about the legal, governmental and historical dimensions that frame our concerns with endangered species. But the narratives are crucial: In the end, biodiversity conservation comes down to values, ideas and stories we tell about what animals and plants we want around, and which ones we'd rather do without."
Bringing literary scholarship to environmental discussions
According to English department chair Ali Behdad, literary scholars have until recently been left out of the debate regarding the environment, a field dominated by scientists.
"I believe that literary scholars like Ursula have a lot to contribute by educating citizens to make better decisions in an era of rapid environmental and social changes," Behdad said. "We are grateful to Marcia Howard for helping us to increase the visibility and impact of this important field."
Since joining the faculty in 2012, Heise has helped UCLA become a leader in the field, capitalizing on its location in a city marked by dense and diverse populations as well as an impressive mix of environments, from a thriving metropolitan region to ocean and desert landscapes and mountain ranges.
"Marcia's gift is very forward-looking," Heise said. "I so appreciate her belief in my work, which I hope will help people better understand and appreciate biodiversity and the stories we tell about endangered species."
For her part, Howard is convinced that faculty like Heise are vital to educating well-informed citizens of the future, and she feels privileged to have been able to make an impact.
Howard's philosophy is very simple. She said, "By making a gift, you receive a gift, and UCLA has certainly been a great gift to me."
For more information about supporting the Humanities at UCLA, please contact Sarah Murphy at (310) 794-9005 or smurphy@support.ucla.edu.
https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/marcia_ursula21.jpg 1600 2400 UCLA College https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Uxd_Blk_College-e1557344896161.png UCLA College2016-01-04 11:11:272016-01-13 08:24:02Crowning 60 Years of Support and Advocacy
New app helps students learn to read ancient Japanese writing form
December 11, 2015 /in Faculty, Featured Stories /by UCLA College
Can a new app that takes a scholarly yet playful approach to studying calligraphy help students learn to read classical Japanese texts the way people in 11th century Japan did?
https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IMG_0779_mid.jpg 426 640 UCLA College https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Uxd_Blk_College-e1557344896161.png UCLA College2015-12-11 10:48:262015-12-11 10:48:26New app helps students learn to read ancient Japanese writing form
Creative writing at UCLA: not just for English majors anymore
Starting in Fall 2016, non-English majors will for the first time be able to enroll in a creative writing course — specifically a general education introductory class — currently under construction and to be taught by UCLA professor and acclaimed novelist Mona Simpson, and newly hired head of creative writing, Fred D'Aguiar.
https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Fred_DAguiar_2_mid.jpg 426 640 UCLA College https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Uxd_Blk_College-e1557344896161.png UCLA College2015-11-13 08:15:262015-11-13 08:15:26Creative writing at UCLA: not just for English majors anymore
Q&A with UCLA history professor Joan Waugh on baseball in America's Gilded Age
October 14, 2015 /in Faculty, Featured Stories /by UCLA College
UCLA history professor Joan Waugh is one of the country's pre-eminent scholars on American history in the latter half of the 19th century and in particular the Civil War. She's also a lifelong baseball fan who during her class "United States History 1865–1900," spends one lecture focused on how baseball became American's national pastime.
https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/1888-Chicago-White-Stockings_mid.jpg 425 640 UCLA College https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Uxd_Blk_College-e1557344896161.png UCLA College2015-10-14 16:51:092015-10-14 16:51:09Q&A with UCLA history professor Joan Waugh on baseball in America's Gilded Age
$5 million gift will ensure UCLA Center for Jewish Studies remains among the best in U.S.
March 17, 2015 /in Alumni & Friends, Featured Stories /by UCLA College
A$5 million gift from Alan Leve, a UCLA alumnus and the founder and president of Culver City, California-based Ohmega Technologies, will establish several endowments at the UCLA College's Center for Jewish Studies. Leve said he hopes the gift, which will benefit students, faculty and the community, will honor his family's legacy of giving — one that started with his late grandmother, Hinda Schonfeld.
https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Leve_mid.jpg 425 640 UCLA College https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Uxd_Blk_College-e1557344896161.png UCLA College2015-03-17 15:59:552015-03-17 16:00:29$5 million gift will ensure UCLA Center for Jewish Studies remains among the best in U.S.
Literary translator brings Japanese novelist posthumous acclaim
March 16, 2015 /in Faculty, Featured Stories /by UCLA College
Michael Emmerich, an associate professor of Japanese at UCLA, never worked as a journalist. Neither has he written 50 novels, much less 150 short stories.
https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Emmerich_large3-pr-1ll_thmb.jpg 210 301 UCLA College https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Uxd_Blk_College-e1557344896161.png UCLA College2015-03-16 16:42:312015-03-16 16:42:31Literary translator brings Japanese novelist posthumous acclaim
Gift from top international businessman will propel Japanese studies at UCLA
October 15, 2014 /in Alumni & Friends, Featured Stories /by UCLA College
A $2.5 million gift from Tadashi Yanai, the chairman, president and CEO of global apparel retailer Fast Retailing and founder of Uniqlo, will help transform UCLA's Department of Asian Languages and Cultures into one of the world's leading centers for the study of Japanese literature and culture.
https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Tadashi-Yanai_mid.jpg 425 640 UCLA College https://www.college.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Uxd_Blk_College-e1557344896161.png UCLA College2014-10-15 10:16:562014-10-15 10:16:56Gift from top international businessman will propel Japanese studies at UCLA