text:
Глухівський період в історії Гетьманщини — це історичний період з 1708 року по 1784 рік, коли місто Глухів, опісля знищення Батурина, було столицею Гетьманщини і стало резиденцією українських гетьманів. Початково, через недовіру до козаків, гарнізон складався з російських військ. Термін введено в 1998 році вченим із Глухова Валерієм Белашовим, на означення великих здобутків цього періоду в політиці, культурі та освіті.. Також цей термін використовує вчений Віктор Васильович Вечерський.

Також історик Михайло Пасічник у навчальному посібнику «Історія України» пропонує цей період називати «Глухівська доба в історії гетьманської держави на Лівобережжі (1708—1782 рр.)». Адже він «знаменує найвищий розквіт діяльності нової української еліти, до якої належала передусім генеральна, полкова і сотенна старшина, її державотворчі змагання визначили хід української історії XVIII ст., а смаки й уподобання забезпечили "золоту добу" українського барокового мистецтва.»

5 — 6 листопада 2008 року в Глухові проходило відзначення 300-річчя з часу проголошення міста столицею Гетьманської та Лівобережної України.

Гетьмани Глухівського періоду

1708—1722 роки: Іван Скоропадський

Іва́н Скоропа́дський (*1646 — †14 липня 1722) — український військовий, політичний і державний діяч. Гетьман Війська Запорозького, голова
козацької держави в Лівобережній Україні (1708-1722). Представник козацького роду Скоропадських. Старший син Іллі Скоропадського. Генеральний бунчужний (1698-1699), генеральний осавул (1701-1706), стародубський полковник (1706-1708). Гетьман Глухівського періоду в історії України. Після переходу Мазепи на бік шведів, призначений головою Гетьманщини з волі московського царя Петра І. Безуспішно намагався протистояти московським планам ліквідації козацької автономії.

Обрання гетьмана у Глухові

17 (6) листопада 1708 року на спеціальній раді, яка проходила на майдані між Троїцьким собором та Миколаївською церквою під пильним оком російських урядовців та за умови оточення козацької ради царськими військами Білозерського полку гетьманом був обраний стародубський полковник Іван Скоропадський (1646—1722).

Брат його дружини Анастасії і чоловік її сестри в цей час служили Івану Мазепі.

Спочатку дяк посольського наказу Михайло Родостамов прочитав грамоту про відкриття Ради. Потім Князь Григорій Долгорукий вручив гетьману Лівобережної України Івану Скоропадському царську грамоту, гетьманську булаву і військові клейноди. У присутності ради новий гетьман по присяжному листу посольського наказу прийняв присягу, відрекомендувався царю і вельможам.

Цілий день у гетьманській садибі йшло гуляння старшин і люду, відбувалася гарматна стрілянина, у людський натовп кидали гроші у паперових згортках від семи алтин до гривні. З цього часу Глухів було проголошено столицею Лівобережної України.

7 листопада 1708 року цар Петро І у своїй грамоті затвердив Івана Скоропадського на вищій посаді в Україні.

Генеральний уряд Скоропадського

За правління гетьмана, верхівку влади складала генеральна старшина. До складу Генеральної військової канцелярії входили писар Савич Семен (генеральний писар) (голова канцелярії), два судді Іван Чарниш та Іван Ніс, два осавули (у різні роки — Степан Бутович, Василь Жураківський, Антін Гамалія та Петро Валькевич), а також генеральний хорунжий Іван Сулима та бунчужний Яків Лизогуб.

Генеральна старшина формувала при гетьмані дорадчий орган — Раду старшини.

1722—1727 роки: Перша Малоросійська колегія

Перша Малоросійська колегія — це державний орган царської влади для управління українськими землями та контролю за діяльностю українського гетьмана та генеральної старшини, що існував з 16 (27) травня 1722 р. до вересня 1727 р.

Керував Малоросійською колегією Степан Вельямінов (1670—1737) — російський державний діяч, Президент Першої Малоросійської колегії (1722—1726 рр.) у м. Глухів.

Гетьманщина виводилася з підпорядкування колегії іноземних справ і підпорядковувалася сенатові як звичайна провінція імперії. Колегія перебрала все адміністративне керівництво Лівобережною Україною.

Колегія складалася з голови колегії — С. Вельямінова та ще з «…шістьма людьми, з штаб-офіцерами, та при тій же Колегії Прокурорам погодно, з зміняється з Гвардії Капітаном або капітан-поручик».

У 1727 році у зв'язку з загостренням російсько-турецьких відносин царський уряд, намагаючись залучити на свій бік козацьку старшину, ліквідував Малоросійську колегію (указ Петра II від 29.9.1727 року) і поновив гетьманство.

1722—1724 роки: Павло Полуботок

Вища козацька старшина, що зібралася на старшинську раду в Глухові у липні 1722 року, управління Гетьманщиною передала чернігівському полковнику Павлу Полуботку як наказному гетьману та звернулась до Петра І й Сенату з проханням дати дозвіл на проведення нових гетьманських виборів.

Павло́ Полубо́ток (бл.1660 — † 1724) — український військовий та політичний діяч. Полковник чернігівський, наказний гетьман Війська Запорозького Лівобережної України (1722—1724). Гетьман Глухівського періоду в історії України. Під час Північної війни виступив на боці Петра I. Заарештований за підписання Коломацьких чолобитних та супротив діяльності Малоросійської колегії. Помер в ув'язненні на території Петропавлівської фортеці.

Колегія Генеральних старшин

Але Петро І дозволу на проведення нових виборів не дав. Він навіть не визнав за Павлом Полуботком повноважень наказного гетьмана, доручивши тимчасове управління Гетьманщиною Колегії Генеральних старшин у складі Павла Полуботка, генерального писаря Семена Савича та генерального судді Івана Черниша, причому, спільно з Малоросійською колегією.

1727—1734 роки: Данило Апостол

Дани́ло Павлович Апо́стол (14.12.1654 — † 29.1.1734) — український військовий, політичний і державний діяч. Гетьман Війська Запорозького, голова Гетьманщини на Лівобережній Україні (1727-1734). Гетьман Глухівського періоду в історії України.

Відновлення гетьманства

Малоросійська колегія і, зокрема її керівник Степан Вельямінов потрапив в немилість до князя Олександра Меншикова, який фактично керував Російською імперією за правління імператриці Катерини І (1725—1727). Колегія запровадила нові податки з українських землевласників, серед яких виділявся О. Меншикова, який мав чи не найбільше землі та маєтків.

До того ж, через зростання напруженості російсько-османських відносин, наближалася велика війна з Туреччиною. Тому царський уряд хотів мати серед своїх союзників і українських козаків.

Влітку 1727 року імператор Петро II (в уряді якого головну скрипку, до вересня 1727 року, грав Олександр Меншиков), в умовах підготовки до нової війни, ліквідував Першу малоросійську колегію і дозволив обрати нового гетьмана.

Обрання гетьмана

З цією метою до Глухова у червні 1727 року відправили таємного радника Росії Федора Наумова з дорученням провести вибори гетьмана та полкових старшин в Україні. На проведеній конференції козацьких старшин і представників духовенства назвали кандидатуру гетьмана — миргородського полковника Данила Апостола.

73-річний Данило Апостол одразу після свого обрання гетьманом Лівобережної України 1 (12) жовтня 1727 року у Глухові розпочав активну роботу щодо відродження автономії України.

У 1728 році новообраний гетьман їздив на коронацію Петра II, де подав петицію про відновлення державних прав України на основі Березневих статей Богдана Хмельницкого 1654 року. В історію цей документ увійшов під назвою «Рішительні пункти».

Реформи Апостола, що опирались на підприємливу буржуазну верству суспільства, сприяли відродженню економіки Лівобережної України: зростала торгівля, активно розвивалися ремесла та промисли. Гетьманом також проводилась реформа судочинства.

У 1729—1730 pp. було проведене так зване Генеральне слідство про маєтності. Під час проведення дослідження на основі документів і повідомлень старших людей, було виявило неконтрольоване роздавання сіл у приватне володіння. Наслідком цієї кампанії було визначено і повернуто в державне користування рангові (державні) землі, які були безпідставно захоплені в приватне володіння.

Український історик Дмитро Дорошенко так оцінив роль Данила Апостола в історії України:

1734—1750 роки: Правлі́ння гетьма́нського у́ряду

Правлі́ння гетьма́нського у́ряду — уряд, в якому три українських та три російських чиновники в 1734—1750 роках здійснювали управління Гетьманщиною. Цей вищий орган влади розміщувався у Глухові. Він, як найвища апеляційна інстанція, підпорядковувався Сенату через Канцелярію малоросійських справ.

В історичній літературі зустрічається декілька інших назв цього органу влади. Спочатку Тимчасове правління в Малоросії, а потім Канцелярія міністерського правління.

До Правління входило шестеро осіб. Однак, Головою Правління постійно призначався хтось із росіян. Наприклад, це князі Олексій Іванович Шаховськой та Барятинський Іван Федорович, граф Рум'янцев Олександр Іванович та інші.

З 1746 року правління стало колегіальним. Одночасно правили шість урядовців. Український бік представляли генеральні старшини: суддя Лисенко Федір Іванович (?—1751), генеральний підскарбій Скоропадський Михайло Васильович (1697—1758) і генеральний осавул Валькевич Петро Васильович.

Три були росіянами: бригадир Ільїн Іван Кондратович (1688—1747), полковники Ізвольський Олексій Петрович та Челіщев Іван Алферович.

Масонство в Україні

За керування Лівобережною Україною на чолі Правління гетьманського уряду (в 1740—1741 роках) шотландського дворянина Джеймса Френсіса Едварда Кейта (1696—1758) масонство, очевидно, з Глухова поширювалось українськими містами..

Він, будучи Великим Провінційним Майстром масонерії Російської імперії, посвячує до масонства представників української аристократії Григорія Пилиповича Орлика, майбутнього українського гетьмана Кирила Григоровича Розумовського та інших.

Права, за якими судиться малоросійський народ

У Глухові в 1743 році було створено видатний правовий документ 18 століття «Права, за якими судиться малоросійський народ». Над ним протягом 15 років постійно працювали 12-18 найкращих правників Василь Стефанович, генеральний осавул Петро Валькевич, С.Столповський, В.Лисаневич та інші.

Кодифакаційну комісію очолювали генеральний суддя Іван Владиславович Бороздна та генеральний обозний Яків Юхимович Лизогуб (1675—1749).

Робота завершилась 8 липня 1743 р. На пленум, скликаний Генеральною військовою канцелярією, до м. Глухова зібрались всі члени кодифікаційної комісії аби підписати проект Кодексу під назвою «Права, за якими судиться малоросійський народ».

Однак, складений проект Кодексу не був офіційно затверджений в Сенаті. Адже, на відміну уніфікації українського і російського законодавства (як це говорилось у наказі 1728 року), «Права…» відображали деяку відмінність українського законодавства і суперечили політиці російського уряду.

1747 рік: відновлення гетьманства

З приходом до влади в 1741 році імператриці Єлизавети І Петрівни (1709—1762) почалась лібералізація життя в Лівобережній Україні. На вимогу козацької старшини російська влада у 1743 р. скасувала ряд «нововведень» правління.

У травні 1747 року, імператриця визнала вимоги козацької старшини, які підтримав її чоловік Олексій Розумовський (1709—1771), щодо повернення гетьманства. Було видано іменний указ «Про Буття в Малоросії гетьманові за колишніми норовами і звичаями» .

Однак, Правління гетьманського уряду було ліквідовано лише через три роки — в 1750 році.

1750—1764 роки: Кирило Розумовський

Розумовський Кирило Григорович (29 березня 1728 — 21 січня 1803) — український військовий, політичний і державний діяч. Останній гетьман Війська Запорозького в 1750—1764 рр, граф Російської імперії, генерал-фельдмаршал.

Обраний 22 лютого 1750 року заочно у Глухові. Вступив у своє правління лише 23 червня 1750 року. Однак, прибув до столиці Лівобережної України лише через рік. Після отриманого наказу імператриці Єлизавети І Петрівни.

Політика гетьмана носила патріотичний та лобістський характер стосовно розвитку українських земель. Економічна та політична опіка Лівобережної України була можлива завдяки зв'язкам К.Розумовського при імператорському дворі.

До складу Генеральній канцелярії гетьмана Кирила Розумовського протягом півтора десятиліття входили майже 20 видатних діячів того часу. Серед них
Генеральний писар Безбородько Андрій Якович, Туманський Василь Григорович, суддя Горленко Яким Іванович, Генеральний осавул Якубович Яків Дем'янович, генеральний хорунжий Ханенко Микола Данилович та Апостол Данило Петрович та інші.

Однак, велика влада також зосереджувалась в руках першого секретаря українського гетьмана Григорія Теплова, який поступово перетворився на негласного правителя Лівобережної України.

За правління останнього українського гетьмана у Глухові регулярно проходили загальні з'їзди старшини. На яких обговорювались і приймались рішення з найважливіших справ. Ці з'їзди за способом їх проведення і за характером питань які на них розглядались, поступово набували рис українського сейму.

Глухівська петиція 1763 року

У вересні 1763 року К.Розумовський скликав у Глухові велику старшинську раду. На ній було представлено по двоє старшин та по двоє сотників від кожного полку (всього — 40 осіб). На раді також були присутні і мали право вирішального голосу 56 бунчукових товаришів і 38 військових товаришів.

Тут було вироблено та затверджено документ під назвою «Прохання шляхетства і старшин разом з гетьманом про відновлення різних старовинних прав Малоросії».

Після цього було складено ще окрему чолобитну на ім'я Катерини II, де йшлося про запровадження спадкового гетьманства в Україні — після смерті Кирила Розумовського козаки повинні були обирати гетьмана лише із його прямих спадкоємців.
Чолобитну до цариці підписали майже всі полковники та сотники, а також генеральний писар Василь Туманський, генеральний підскарбій Василь Гудович та генеральний суддя Олександр Дублянський.

За таке свавільство, Катерина ІІ викликала К.Розумовського до Санкт-Петербурга де примусили зректися гетьманства в 1764 р.

1764—1782 роки: Друга Малоросійська колегія

Президентом другої Малоросійської колегії і генерал-губернатором Малоросії було призначено відомого російського полководця графа Петра Олександровича Рум'янцева (1725—1796). До Глухова приїздила його дружина Катерина Рум'янцева.

До складу колегії увійшли генерал-майор Яків Іларіонович фон Брандт (1716—1774), полковник князь Платон Степанович Мещерський (1713—1799) і два інші російські чиновники (полковники Осип Іванович Хвостов та Дмитро Кирилович Натальїн).

З української сторони членами колегії були призначені: генеральний обозний, генерал-майор російської армії Семен Васильович Кочубей, генеральний писар, статський радник Василь Григорович Туманський, генеральний осавул, полковник Журавка і генеральний хорунжий, полковник Апостол. Прокурором призначався підполковник Семенов

У «секретній» інструкції П. Рум'янцеву щодо управління краєм Катерина II наполегливо рекомендувала:

 знищити всі залишки української автономії;
 закріпачити селян;
 здійснювати пильний нагляд за розвитком економіки;
 усіляко збільшувати збір податків з населення.

Для зручності управління П.Рум'янцев видав у 1765 році Указ про створення регулярної пошти на лініях Глухів-Київ, Глухів-Полтава, Глухів-Чернігів, Глухів-Переяслав, Глухів-Почеп та інших. До цього пошто¬вий зв'язок існував між Києвом, С-Петербургом, Москвою і Царградом (Стамбулом).

Також у 1765—1769 роках було проведене Генеральний або Рум'янцевський опис населення і господарств на Лівобережній Україні.

Значимість періоду

Глухів — політичний центр

Глухів у статусі столиці Гетьманщини у XVIII столітті перетворився у політичний центр України. В ньому розмістилася Генеральна військова канцелярія разом з іншими вищими урядовими установами.

Водночас Глухів став центром розвитку ідеології українського державотворення. Саме тут наказний гетьман Павло Полуботок відстоював права і вольності українського народу, а щоденники генеральних канцеляристів Миколи Ханенка «Діаріуш або Журнал» (записи першої половини 1722 р.), «Щоденник генерального хорунжого Миколи Ханенка» (1727—1731 рр.; 1742—1753 рр.), Якова Марковича, Пилипа Борзаківського, Павла Ладинського, багатотомні щоденники-хроніки невідомих авторів стали новою формою літописання і вираження національного патріотизму.

Глухів — культурний центр

У XVIII столітті у Глухові були створені перший аматорський та перший професійний театри.

У 1730 р. розпочалося навчання в Глухівській музично-співацькій школі, де отримали початкову музичну освіту видатні діячі світової музичної культури, основоположники духового хорового співу XVIII ст., композитори Максим Березовський та Дмитро Бортнянський.

Видатні особистості

В Глухові в цей час жили і працювали:

 перекладач Генеральної військової канцелярії Дівович Семен Данилович — автор віршованого діалогу «Розмова Великоросії з Малоросією»,
 український філософ, просвітник-демократ Яків Павлович Козельський
 представник історіографії української державності Симоновський Петро Іванович та інші.

Див. також

Примітки

Посилання
 Вечерський В. Гетьманські столиці України. — К.: Наш час, 2008. — 320 с.: с.204-272

Джерела

 Довідник з історії України
 Бантыш-Каменский Д. Н. История Малой России от водворения славян в сей стране до уничтожения гетманства. — К.: Час , 1993. — 565 с.
 Белашов В. І. Глухів — столиця гетьманської і Лівобережної України: посібник до «Глухівського періоду» історії України (1708—1782 рр.). — Глухів, 1996. — 144 с.
 Бєлашов В. І. Глухів — столиця Гетьманщини. (До «Глухівського періоду» історії України (1708—1782 рр.)). — Глухів: РВВ ГДПУ, 2005. — 220 с.
 Кривошея В. В., Кривошея І. І., Кривошея О. В. Неурядова старшина Гетьманщини / В. В. Кривошея, І. І. Кривошея, О. В. Кривошея.– К.: «Стилос», 2009. — 604 с.
 Модзалевський Вадим Львович Малоросійській родословникъ. — Т. Второй: Е. — К. — К.:Типографія Т-ва Г. Л. Фронцкевича і Ко, 1910. — 720 с.

XVIII століття
Гетьмани Війська Запорозького
Глухів
Колишні столиці України
Глухівський період в історії України
Друга Малоросійська колегія
Історія Глухова
Глухівська сотня


Parcel Map Waiver - Kern County Planning & Natural Resources Dept.
WHAT IS A PARCEL MAP WAIVER (PMW)?
Normally when land is subdivided, both a tentative and final map are required by the State Subdivision Map Act (Government Code Section 66410 et. seq.); however, when fewer than five (5) parcels will be created, a parcel map is allowed under State Law (Government Code Section 66426). As applied in Kern County, a parcel map also requires that a tentative and final map be processed; however, under the specific circumstances described below, a final map is not required. The requirement to waive the preparation and submittal of a final map results in the processing of a parcel map waiver and is authorized by State Law (Government Code Section 66428) and the procedures specified in Chapter 18.30 of the Kern County Land Division Ordinance.
Creation of commercial or industrial lots within a recorded tract or parcel map if the site is in a Type A area and all improvements have been constructed.
The parcel map waiver process does not involve the recording of a final map; instead, the lots are created by deed. A Certificate of Compliance is recorded that recognizes said deeds as describing lawfully created parcels resulting from the parcel map waiver process.
WHAT ARE THE SUBMITTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A PARCEL MAP WAIVER?
Applications for a parcel map waiver may be obtained at the Kern County Planning and Natural Resources Department public counter, mailed upon request, or downloaded from the Planning and Natural Resources Department website. Typically, a licensed land surveyor or registered civil engineer will submit the application on behalf of the property owner.
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires that an environmental study be prepared for some types of projects. Parcel map waivers are usually exempt from the requirements of CEQA.
WHAT IS THE PROCESS A PARCEL MAP WAIVER GOES THROUGH?
After a parcel map waiver application has been formally accepted as complete, the illustration is sent to several governmental agencies, utility companies, and the public for review and comment. A Notice of Opportunity for Public Hearing or a Notice for Public Meeting, when processed concurrently with a discretionary action, is sent to all of the property owners within 500 to 1,000 feet of the site and is published in the local newspaper. A parcel map waiver is not scheduled for a public hearing unless one is requested by the applicant or any other interested person or is processed concurrently with a discretionary action such as a zone variance, zone modification, or precise development plan, for which a public hearing is already required.
Once all of the conditions of approval have been satisfied and a copy of all required title work has been submitted to the Planning andNatural Resources Department, a Certificate of Compliance will be prepared for recordation. The Certificate of Compliance is a legal document certifying that the new parcels have been legally created. Title companies and financial institutions recognize a Certificate of Compliance as being verification of the legal parcel configuration.
HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO PROCESS A PARCEL MAP WAIVER?
An applicant can expect to receive a written response within thirty (30) days of submittal of the application for preliminary review. Once the application is deemed complete and formally accepted, action to conditionally approve or deny the waiver will occur within fifty (50) calendar days. Once a parcel map waiver is tentatively approved, processing of the Certificate of Compliance is variable. It is dependent upon you and your surveyor's or engineer's ability to satisfy the conditions of approval.
Once the Certificate of Compliance is recorded, the property is subdivided; the land division has occurred. It will often take several weeks for the County's records (Assessor Maps, Surveyor's case map, etc.) to be updated to reflect the new subdivision. The Department will mail a copy of the recorded Certificate of Compliance to the applicant and their representative. The document is your verification that the process is complete. The original Certificate of Compliance is kept on file by the Planning and Natural Resources Department. If you should need a copy, one can be easily obtained.
The first step in subdividing land is to determine if such a proposal is feasible. Contact the Department to find the zoning and general plan designation for the site. This will determine if the land can be subdivided and the minimum lot size.
Upon determining that it is feasible to subdivide the land, the next step is to hire a licensed land surveyor or registered civil engineer to work with us to complete the land division.
Please telephone (661) 862-8600 and ask to speak to a planner assigned to the Land Division Unit if you have any questions regarding the parcel map waiver process.


text:
Members Units
595th Military Police Company
Marine Company
Served in this Marine Company? Find your Brothers on Army.TogetherWeServed.com
Military Police Unit
Unit Web Links
595th Military Police Company - Detention, 508th Military Police Battalion
63 Members Who Served in This Unit
This Unit Only This Unit and 0 Reporting Units Parent Unit and 1057 Reporting Units
« First | Prev |
| Next | Last »
Alcantara, Juan, SP 4, (1978-1980)
Ammerman, Terry, PV2, (1977-1980)
Arrowood, Steven, PFC, (1980-1982)
Baer, Douglas, SSG, (1982-2003)
Baldwin, Mike, SPC, (1989-1993)
Belisle, Douglas, CPL, (1987-1996)
Berrios, John, SSG, (1978-1998)
Bloomfield, Mikele, SP 4, (1969-1973)
Bluedorn, Scott, SPC, (1984-1987)
Britten, Fred, SP 5, (1969-1972)
Bryson, Scott, LTC, (1988-2009)
Chavez, Ruben, CW2, (1971-1995)
Cooke, James, SFC, (1973-1993)
Corley, David, SGT, (1979-1986)
Crosby, Paul, SFC, (1989-2018)
De Witt, David, SGM, (1980-2008)
Dombecki, Gerald, SSG, (1981-1993)
Doyle, Dean, SP 4, (1978-1984)
Durgan, Penny, SFC, (1985-2009)
Foster, Renee, SPC, (1986-1988)
Frede, Howard, SP 4, (1969-1972)
Gartland, Timothy, SPC, (1985-1988)
Garza, Jose, SSG, (1991-2014)
Geramita, Frank C, SPC, (1988-1992)
Gort, Jim, SP 4, (1987-1991)
Grovatt, Russell, SPC, (1987-1991)
Hall, Diana, SP 4, (1979-1981)
Hansen, Glenn, SGT, (1979-1990)
Haymaker, Scott, SGM, (1988-Present)
Hollinger, Gene (Edgar), SGT, (1976-1983)
Houle, Andrew, SSG, (1984-2007)
Hutchins, WC, SPC, (1986-1993)
Iles, Lawrence, SGT, (1983-1991)
Jeffrey, Terrance, SFC, (1982-2003)
Jennings, Brian, SFC, (1985-2005)
Johnson, Kristin, SP 4, (1990-1993)
Killan, Jerry, SPC, (1985-1993)
Kimberlin, Billy, SFC, (1982-1996)
Kingery, David, SPC, (1987-1990)
Klinger, Ron, SP 4, (1980-1983)
Leary, Brian, MSG, (1988-2011)
Leary, Joseph, LTC, (1988-Present)
Moore, Brandon, SGT, (1979-1990)
Moye, Joseph, SFC, (1977-1999)
Mullins, Jeffrey, SSG, (1982-1991)
Murrah, Jesse, SGT, (1988-2000)
Norris, Robert, SPC, (1979-1987)
Osier, Craig, PV2, (1988-1991)
Palmer, David, SFC, (1979-2008)
Patterson, Blake, SP 4, (1979-1982)
If you served in this unit, reconnect with your service friends today!
service friends today! 2 million members.
JOIN TOGETHER WE SERVEDTWSLOGIN
Unit Citations - Display as Table
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Ardennes Alsace Campaign (1944-45) (Dec 1944 - Feb 1945)
(Ardennes Alsace Campaign 16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945) During their offensive in the A...
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Rhineland Campaign (1944-45) (Sep 1944 - Mar 1945)
(Rhineland Campaign 15 September 1944 to 21 March 1945) Attempting to outflank the Siegfried Line, t...
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Central Europe Campaign (1945) (Mar 1945 - May 1945)
(Central Europe Campaign 22 March to 11 May 1945) Following the Battle of the Bulge the Allies had p...
Korean War/CCF Intervention (1950-51) (Nov 1950 - Jan 1951)
Korean War/First UN Counteroffensive (1951) (Jan 1951 - Apr 1951)
Korean War/CCF Spring Offensive (1951) (Apr 1951 - Jul 1951)
Korean War/UN Summer-Fall Offensive (1951) (Jul 1951 - Nov 1951)
Second Korean Winter (1951-52) (Nov 1951 - Apr 1952)
Korean War/Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 (May 1952 - Nov 1952)
In May the enemy became bolder, increasing his probing attacks and patrols, intensifying his artille...
Korean War/Third Korean Winter (1952-53) (Dec 1952 - Apr 1953)
Korean War/Korean Summer (1953) (May 1953 - Jul 1953)
Vietnam War/Winter-Spring 1970 Campaign (Nov 1969 - Apr 1970)
This campaign was from 1 November 1969 to 30 April 1970. An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at ...
Vietnam War/Sanctuary Counteroffensive Campaign (1970) (May 1970 - Jun 1970)
This campaign was from 1 May to 30 June 1970. This campaign was mainly concerned with the Allied inc...
Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase VII Campaign (1970-71) (Jul 1970 - Jun 1971)
This campaign was from 1 Jul 1970 to 30 June 1971. Fighting continued in Cambodia during early Febru...
Vietnam War/Consolidation I Campaign (1971) (Jul 1971 - Nov 1971)
This campaign was from 1 July to 30 November 1971. This period witnessed additional progress i...
Vietnam War/Consolidation II Campaign (1971-72) (Dec 1971 - Mar 1972)
This campaign was from 1 December 1971 to 29 March 1972.. The U.S. continued to reduce its ground pr...
Vietnam War/Cease-Fire Campaign (1972-73) (Mar 1972 - Jan 1973)
This campaign was from 30 March 1972 to 28 January 1973. On 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese...
OEF-Afghanistan/Transition I (2011-14) (Jul 2011 - Nov 2014)
2012: Strategic Agreement
Taliban attacks continued at the same rate as they did in 2011, rem...
Unit Timeline
Army Superior Unit Award
The Superior Unit Award may be awarded during peacetime for outstanding meritorious performance of a difficult and challenging mission carried out under extraordinary circumstances. The unit must disp ... Morelay such outstanding devotion and superior performance of exceptionally difficult tasks as to set it apart from and above other units with similar missions. The award is not given for operations of a purely humanitarian nature. Hide
Streamer embroidered 2012-2013 2 Nov 12 to 1 Nov 13 DA GO 2017-17
OEF-Afghanistan/Transition I (2011-14)
Taliban attacks continued at the same rate as they did in 2011, remaining around 28,000 Taliban "enemy initiated" attacks.
Reformation of the ... MoreUnited Front (Northern Alliance)
Ahmad Zia Massoud (left), then as Vice President of Afghanistan, shaking hands with a U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team at the ceremony for a new road. He is now the chairman of the National Front of Afghanistan
In late 2011 the National Front of Afghanistan (NFA) was created by Ahmad Zia Massoud, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq in what many analysts have described as a reformation of the military wing of the United Front (Northern Alliance) to oppose a return of the Taliban to power. Meanwhile, much of the political wing reunited under the National Coalition of Afghanistan led by Abdullah Abdullah becoming the main democratic opposition movement in the Afghan parliament. Former head of intelligence Amrullah Saleh has created a new movement, Basej-i Milli (Afghanistan Green Trend), with support among the youth mobilizing about 10,000 people in an anti-Taliban demonstration in Kabul in May 2011.
In January 2012, the National Front of Afghanistan raised concerns about the possibility of a secret deal between the US, Pakistan and the Taliban during a widely publicized meeting in Berlin. U.S. Congressman Louie Gohmert wrote, "These leaders who fought with embedded Special Forces to initially defeat the Taliban represent over 60-percent of the Afghan people, yet are being entirely disregarded by the Obama and Karzai Administrations in negotiations." After the meeting with US congressmen in Berlin the National Front signed a joint declaration stating among other things:
"We firmly believe that any negotiation with the Taliban can only be acceptable, and therefore effective, if all parties to the conflict are involved in the process. The present form of discussions with the Taliban is flawed, as it excludes anti-Taliban Afghans. It must be recalled that the Taliban extremists and their Al-Qaeda supporters were defeated by Afghans resisting extremism with minimal human embedded support from the United States and International community. The present negotiations with the Taliban fail to take into account the risks, sacrifices and legitimate interests of the Afghans who ended the brutal oppression of all Afghans.
—National Front Berlin Statement, January 2012
High-profile U.S. military incidents
U.S. Army soldiers prepare to conduct security checks near the Pakistan border, February 2012
Beginning in January 2012 incidents involving US troops occurred which were described by The Sydney Morning Herald as "a series of damaging incidents and disclosures involving US troops in Afghanistan […]". These incidents created fractures in the partnership between Afghanistan and ISAF, raised the question whether discipline within U.S. troops was breaking down, undermined "the image of foreign forces in a country where there is already deep resentment owing to civilian deaths and a perception among many Afghans that US troops lack respect for Afghan culture and people" and strained the relations between Afghanistan and the United States. Besides an incident involving US troops who posed with body parts of dead insurgents and an video apparently showing a US helicopter crew singing "Bye-bye Miss American Pie" before blasting a group of Afghan men with a Hellfire missile these "high-profile U.S. military incidents in Afghanistan" also included the 2012 Afghanistan Quran burning protests and the Panjwai shooting spree.
Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement
On 2 May 2012, Presidents Karzai and Obama signed a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries, after the US president had arrived unanounced in Kabul on the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death. The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, officially entitled the "Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America", provides the long-term framework for the two countries' relationship after the drawdown of U.S. forces. The Strategic Partnership Agreement went into effect on 4 July 2012, according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 8 July 2012 at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan. On 7 July 2012, as part of the agreement, the U.S. designated Afghanistan a major non-NATO ally after Karzai and Clinton met in Kabul. On 11 November 2012, as part of the agreement, the two countries launched negotiations for a bilateral security agreement.
NATO Chicago Summit: Troops withdrawal and long-term presence
Further information: 2012 Chicago Summit, 2011 NATO attack in Pakistan and Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan
On 21 May 2012 the leaders of NATO-member countries endorsed an exit strategy during the NATO Summit.[26] ISAF Forces would transfer command of all combat missions to Afghan forces by the middle of 2013, while shifting from combat to advising, training and assisting Afghan security forces. Most of the 130,000 ISAF troops would depart by the end of December 2014. A new NATO mission would then assume the support role.
2013: Withdrawal
Karzai–Obama meeting
Karzai visited the U.S. in January 2012. At the time the U.S. stated its openness to withdrawing all of its troops by the end of 2014.[314] On 11 January 2012 Karzai and Obama agreed to transfer combat operations from NATO to Afghan forces by spring 2013 rather than summer 2013.
"What's going to happen this spring is that Afghans will be in the lead throughout the country", Obama said. "They [ISAF forces] will still be fighting alongside Afghan troops...We will be in a training, assisting, advising role." Obama added He also stated the reason of the withdrawals that "We achieved our central goal, or have come very close...which is to de-capacitate al-Qaeda, to dismantle them, to make sure that they can't attack us again," .
Obama also stated that he would determine the pace of troop withdrawal after consultations with commanders. He added that any U.S. mission beyond 2014 would focus solely on counterterrorism operations and training. Obama insisted that a continuing presence must include an immunity agreement in which US troops are not subjected to Afghan law. "I can go to the Afghan people and argue for immunity for U.S. troops in Afghanistan in a way that Afghan sovereignty will not be compromised, in a way that Afghan law will not be compromised," Karzai replied.
Both leaders agreed that the United States would transfer Afghan prisoners and prisons to the Afghan government and withdraw troops from Afghan villages in spring 2013. "The international forces, the American forces, will be no longer present in the villages, that it will be the task of the Afghan forces to provide for the Afghan people in security and protection," the Afghan president said.
Security transfer
On 18 June 2013 the transfer of security responsibilities was completed. The last step was to transfer control of 95 remaining districts. Karzai said, "When people see security has been transferred to Afghans, they support the army and police more than before." NATO leader Rasmussen said that Afghan forces were completing a five-stage transition process that began in March 2011. "They are doing so with remarkable resolve," he said. "Ten years ago, there were no Afghan national security forces … now you have 350,000 Afghan troops and police." ISAF remained slated to end its mission by the end of 2014. Some 100,000 ISAF forces remained in the country.
U.S.–Afghanistan Bilateral Security agreement
As part of the U.S.–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement the United States and Afghanistan reached an agreement on a bilateral security agreement, on 20 November 2013. If approved, the agreement would allow the U.S. to deploy military advisors to train and equip Afghan security forces, along with U.S. special-operations troops for anti-terrorism missions against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. President Obama will determine the size of the force. The bilateral security agreement was signed on September 30, 2014.
2014: Withdrawal continues and the insurgency increases
After 2013, Afghanistan has been shaken hard with suicide bombings by the Taliban. A clear example of this is a bombing of a Lebanese restaurant in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul on 18 February 2014. Among the dead in this attack was UN staff and the owner of the restaurant, who died protecting his business. 21 people altogether were killed. Meanwhile, the withdrawal continues with 200 more US troops alone coming home. The UK have halved their force and are slowing withdrawing with all but two bases being closed down. On 20 March 2014, more than 4 weeks after a bomb in a military bus by the Taliban rocked the city once again, a raid on the Serena hotel in Kabul by the Taliban resulted in the deaths of 9 people, including the 4 perpetrators. The attack came just 8 days after Swedish radio journalist Nils Horner was shot dead by the Taliban.
In March 2014, The Christian Science Monitor reported, "The good news is that so far, Russia has shown no inclination to use the NDN [Northern Distribution Network, key supply line to Afghanistan that runs through Russia] as leverage in the wake of US retaliation for its troop movements in Crimea."
On 9 June 2014 a coalition air strike mistakenly killed five U.S. troops, an Afghan National Army member and an interpreter in Zabul Province.
On 5 August 2014, a gunman in an Afghan military uniform opened fire on a number of U.S., foreign and Afghan soldiers, killing a U.S. general, Harold J. Greene and wounding about 15 officers and soldiers including a German brigadier general and a large number of U.S. soldiers at Camp Qargha, a training base west of Kabul.
Two longterm security pacts, the Bilaterial Security agreement between Afghanistan and the United States of America and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement betwenn NATO and Afghanistan, were signed on September 30, 2014. Both pacts lay out the framework for the foreign troop involvement in Afghnistan after the year 2014.
After 13 years Britain and the United States officially ended their combat operation in Afghanistan on October 26, 2014. On that day Britain handed over its last base in Afghanistan, Camp Bastion, while the United States handed over its last base, Camp Leatherneck, both based in the southern province of Helmand, to Afghan forces.
Post-2014 presence plans for NATO and the United States
As early as November 2012, the U.S. and NATO were considering the precise configuration of their post-2014 presence in Afghanistan. On 27 May 2014, President Barack Obama announced that U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan would end in December 2014. A residual force of 9,800 troops would remain in the country, training Afghan security forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against remnants of al-Qaeda. This force would be halved by the end of 2015, and consolidated at Bagram Air Base and in Kabul. Obama also announced that all U.S. forces, with the exception of a "normal embassy presence," would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of 2016. These plans were confirmed with the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan on 30 September 2014. Hide
Meritorious Unit Commendation
The Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding services for at least six continuous months during a period of military operat ... Moreions against an armed enemy on or after January 1, 1944. Hide
Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2012 8 Feb 12 to 4 Nov 12 2013 PO 354-05
Activated 16 October 2008 at Fort Lewis, Washington
Inactivated 15 March 1992 in Germany
Activated 21 August 1978 in Germany
Vietnam Civil Actions Unit Citation
The unit citation of the Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Medal was awarded certain units by the Vietnamese government for meritorious service during the period 1 March 1961 to 28 March 1974.
Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1970 30 Oct-7 Nov 70, DAGO 5, 73
Vietnam War/Cease-Fire Campaign (1972-73)
This campaign was from 30 March 1972 to 28 January 1973. On 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese Army launched its greatest offensive of the entire war. The enemy deployed the greatest array of troops ... Moreand modern weapons to date in a major effort to end the war with conventional forces and seized considerable territory in an effort to exercise control of key provinces throughout Vietnam.
During this critical period the Vietnamization program continued in the face of the North Vietnamese invasion and the successful counterattack by the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Army aviation units played an impressive role throughout the period, flying reconnaissance, close support missions, and transporting troops. As U.S. combat troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the role of helicopter units increased in importance and they responded to the challenge of continuing to support while preparing the RVNAF to assume their function. Similarly, advisors of all services contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the enemy invasion and the continued Vietnamization process. Army and Marine advisors fought side-by-side with their RVNAF counterparts to stop and defeat the enemy invasion, as the Vietnamese counteroffensive gained momentum and the reduction of field advisers continued. The advisory effort shifted to emphasize training and to assure that the VNAF attained self-sufficiency prior to the complete withdrawal of the U.S forces.
Recapture of Quang Tri City on 16 September 1972 marked the complete failure of the enemy to hold any of the targeted provincial capitols. Massive aid replaced materiel lost during the spring counteroffensive. Retraining and reconstruction of selected RVNAF units increased their capabilities. The completion of the massive logistical buildup of RVNAF was accomplished, which enabled the RVNAF to become more self-sufficient as direct U.S. participation diminished. The US ground role in Vietnam was totally replaced by the RVNAF. During December 1972 and January 1973 the RVIVAF flew more than 45% of air sorties within Vietnam. In November 1972, the RVNAF began a C-130 training program and by January 1973 realized a significant increase in their capability. RVNAF forward air controllers began directing USAF and RVNAF strike aircraft in January 1973. The US policy of Vietnamization continued.
US combat and combat support operations were conducted in support of RVNAF ground operations during the North Vietnamese invasion and the counteroffensive including intensive interdiction of enemy supply routes into Vietnam. Since US ground forces had been reduced to seven battalions, the US ground combat role was limited to defense of key installations. Further reduction in troop ceilings led to the redeployment of all US ground combat battalions, leaving an Army contingent of combat support and service support units. Hide
Inactivated 28 April 1972 in Vietnam
Vietnam War/Consolidation II Campaign (1971-72)
This campaign was from 1 December 1971 to 29 March 1972.. The U.S. continued to reduce its ground presence in South Vietnam during late 1971 and early 1972, but American air attacks increased while bo ... Moreth sides exchanged peace proposals.
In early January 1972 President Nixon confirmed that U.S. troop withdrawals would continue but promised that a force of 25,000-30,000 would remain in Vietnam until all American prisoners of war were released. Secretary of Defense Laird reported that Vietnamization was progressing well and that U.S. troops would not be reintroduced into Vietnam even in a military emergency. U.S. troop strength in Vietnam dropped to 136,500 by 31 January 1972, to 119,600 by 29 February, and then to 95,500 by the end of March.
During the last week of December 1971 U.S. Air Force and Navy planes carried out 1,000 strikes on North Vietnam, the heaviest U.S. air attacks since November 1968. Allied commanders insisted that it was necessary because of a huge buildup of military supplies in North Vietnam for possible offensive operations against South Vietnam and Cambodia. Stepped up North Vietnamese anti-aircraft and missile attacks on U.S. aircraft that bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos also contributed to the decision. During January 1972 American planes maintained their intermittent bombardment of missile sites in North Vietnam and on he Laotian border and also struck North Vietnamese troop concentrations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.
On 25 January President Nixon announced an eight part program to end the war which included agreement to remove all U.S. and foreign allied troops from Vietnam no later than six months after a peace agreement was reached. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong delegates rejected the proposal and insisted upon complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina and cessation of all forms of U.S. aid to South Vietnam. Hide
Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase VII Campaign (1970-71)
This campaign was from 1 Jul 1970 to 30 June 1971. Fighting continued in Cambodia during early February before and after South Vietnam began its U.S.-aided drive in Laos, Lam Son 719, the most signifi ... Morecant operation during this campaign.
Lam Son 719 was conducted out of I Corps by Vietnamese troops with US fire and air support. Their object was to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to destroy enemy bases at Techepone, Laos. The operation consisted of four phases. In Phases I, called Operation DEWEY CANYON II, the 1st Brigade, US 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) occupied the Khe Sanh area and cleared Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. In the meantime, the US 101st Airborne Division conducted diversionary operations in the A Shau Valley. The US 45th Engineer Group had the mission of repairing Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. This lasted from 30 January to 7 February 1971. During Phase II US forces continued to provide fire support, helilift, and tactical and strategic air support for ARVN units. This phase was 8 February to March 1971. Phase III ran from March to 16 March 1971; Phase IV was the withdrawal phase.
Faced with mounting losses, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, the commander of the invasion forces, decided to cut short the operation and ordered a withdrawal.
Lam Son 719, though it was less than a signal success, forestalled a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971. Enemy units and replacements enroute south were diverted to the scene of the action. Hide
Vietnam War/Consolidation I Campaign (1971)
This campaign was from 1 July to 30 November 1971. This period witnessed additional progress in the Vietnamization program which included turning over the ground war to South Vietnam, sustaining the ... Morewithdrawal of U.S. troops, but also continuing, U.S. air strikes on enemy targets.
South Vietnam assumed full control of defense for the area immediately below the demilitarized zone on 11 July, a process begun in 1969. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced completion of Phase I of Vietnamization on 11 August which meant that the U.S. relinquished all ground combat responsibilities to the Republic of Vietnam. The participation of U.S. forces in ground combat operations had not ceased, however, U.S. maneuver battalions were still conducting missions, and the 101st Airborne Division joined the 1st Army of Vietnam 1st Infantry Division in Operation JEFFERSON GLEN that took place in Thua Thien Province in October. This was the last major combat operation in Vietnam which involved U.S. ground forces. Following the close of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN on 8 October, the 101st began stand-down procedures and was the last U.S. division to leave Vietnam.
U.S. troop strengths decreased during Consolidation I. American battle deaths for July 1971 were 66, the lowest monthly figure since May 1967. By early November, U.S. troop totals dropped to 191,000, the lowest level since December 1965. In early November, President Nixon announced that American troops had reverted to a defensive role in Vietnam. Hide
Activated 2 January 1970 in Vietnam
Vietnam War/Winter-Spring 1970 Campaign
This campaign was from 1 November 1969 to 30 April 1970. An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at the highest level since 4-5 September signaled the start of the first phase of the Communist winter ... Morecampaign. This was highlighted by intensified harassment incidents, and attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In November-December these were heaviest in Corps Tactical Zones III and IV (around Saigon), primarily directed against Vietnamese military installations in order to disrupt the pacification program. The most significant enemy activity occurred in November with heavy attacks upon By Prang and Duc Lap in CTZ II (Central Vietnam).
By February 1970 the focus of enemy activity began to shift to CTZ I and II. Attacks increased steadily, reaching a peak in April 1970. Hostile forces staged their heaviest attacks in the Central Highlands near Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps at Dak Seang, Dak Pek, and Ben Het in I CTZ. The enemy also conducted numerous attacks by fire and several sapper attacks against U.S. fire support bases. This high level of enemy activity began in I CTZ in April and continued through May.
During the period 1 November 1969 through 30 April 1970 U.S. and allied forces concentrated on aggressive operations to find and destroy enemy main and local forces, the penetration of base camps and installations and the seizure of enemy supplies and materiel. These operations sought to deny the enemy the initiative and to inflict heavy losses in men and materiel. Further progress was made in Vietnamization through improving the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. As a result of these advances three brigades of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and several major U.S.M.C. units were withdrawn from Vietnam during this period.
The enemy made several efforts to take the offensive at Dak Seang, which was attacked on 1 April 1970 and remained under siege throughout the month, and at Quang Duc in the By Prong-Duc Lap area which ended on 28 December. Only Vietnamese forces were engaged in both of these operations, the Quang Duc campaign involving some 12,000 ARVN troops. South Vietnamese forces again took the offensive on 14 April in a bold 3-day operation in the Angel's Wing area along the Cambodian border. The Vietnamese Army completed this mission in an aggressive professional manner without U.S. support-further evidence of their growing proficiency. Hide
Vietnam War/Sanctuary Counteroffensive Campaign (1970)
This campaign was from 1 May to 30 June 1970. This campaign was mainly concerned with the Allied incursion into Cambodia, codenamed Operation ROCK CRUSHER. As American withdrawal from South Vietnam pr ... Moreoceeded, increasing concern arose over the enemy's strength in the sanctuaries inside Cambodia. With the emergence in Cambodia of an antiCommunist government under Lon Nol, President Nixon relaxed the restrictions on moving against the bases inside Cambodia. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong began to move on the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. At this juncture Lon Nol appealed to the United States for help. American and allied Vietnamese forces began large-scale offensives in Cambodia on 1 May. Eight major US Army and South Vietnamese operations took place in Cambodia in May and June with the object of cutting enemy communication lines, seizing the sanctuary areas and capturing the shadowy Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) described as the control center for enemy military operations against III CTZ. Hide
Korean Presidential Unit Citation
The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation is a military unit award issued by the government of South Korea to both South Korean and foreign military units.
Streamer embroidered KOREA 1952-1953 1 Aug 52-30 Sep 53 DA GO 23-54
Inactivated 8 April 1954 at Busan, Korea
Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950-1952 19 Sep 50-31 Jul 52 DA GO 33-53
Reorganized and redesignated
Reorganized and redesignated 1 February 1953 as the 595th Military Police Company
Korean War/Third Korean Winter (1952-53)
Third Korean Winter, 1 December 1952 - 30 April 1953. Meanwhile the armistice talks had stalled. Discord over several issues, but principally the exchange of prisoners of war, had prevente ... Mored any agreement in the latter part of 1951. This disagreement was heightened in January 1952. The U.N. delegates proposed to give captives a choice of repatriation, so that those who did not wish to return to Communist control could be repatriated elsewhere. The enemy delegates protested vigorously, insisting that all captives held by the Eighth Army be returned to their side. When the enemy failed to respond to U.N. efforts to settle the question, the U.N. delegation on 7 October called an indefinite recess in the armistice negotiations. Both military operations and armistice talks remained stalemated and, as the year 1952 ended, peace prospects seemed as remote as at its beginning. Hide
Korean War/Korean Summer (1953)
Korea, Summer 1953, 1 May - 27 July 1953. There was little activity anywhere along the front as 1953 began. Then, as spring approached, the enemy renewed his attacks against the Eighth Arm ... Morey 's outpost line. By July these attacks had increased in frequency and intensity until they were nearly as heavy as those of May 1951.
In January 1953 Van Fleet had twelve South Korean and eight U.N. divisions to defend the army front. Total strength of combat, service, and security troops was nearly 768,000. Opposing the U.N. forces were seven Chinese armies and two North Korean corps, totaling about 270, 000 troops. Another 531,000 Chinese and North Korean troops remained in reserve. With service and security forces, total enemy strength in Korea was estimated at more than a million men.
Other than a few patrol clashes, little fighting occurred during January and February 1953. On 11 February Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor took command of the Eighth Army as Van Fleet returned to the United States for retirement. The enemy increased his attacks during March, striking at outposts of the 2d and 7th Divisions and the 1st Marine Regiment. During the period 9-10 March the Chinese were successful in ambushing several U.N. patrols, inflicting heavy casualties in each instance. After these flare-ups the front quieted down until late May, when the enemy struck at the outposts of the U.S. 25th Division that were guarding the approaches to the Eighth Army's western positions. Although the enemy was successful in occupying three of the division outposts, he suffered nearly 3,200 casualties.
On the night of 10 June three Chinese divisions struck the ROK II Corps in the vicinity of Kumsong, attacking down both sides of the Pukhan River. Several attacks forced these units to withdraw about two miles. Both sides lost heavily; the Chinese suffered about 6,000 casualties and the ROK units about 7,400. By 18 June the attacks had subsided. By the end of the month, action along the entire front had returned to routine patrolling and light attacks.
Operation LITTLE SWITCH, an exchange of Allied and Communist sick and wounded prisoners, began on 20 April. When it was completed in the latter part of the month, 684 Allied prisoners had been exchanged for more than 6,000 Communists.
Armistice negotiations were resumed in April. The prisoner-of-war question was settled by providing each side an opportunity to persuade those captives who refused repatriation to their homeland to change their minds. By 18 June the terms of the armistice were all but complete; but on this date President Syngman Rhee ordered the release of 27,000 anti-Communist North Korean prisoners of war unilaterally, in protest against armistice terms which left Korea divided. U.N. officials disclaimed any responsibility for this action; but the enemy delegates denounced it as a serious breach of faith and delayed the final armistice agreement for another month. Enemy forces took advantage of this delay. On 13 July the Chinese launched a three-division attack against the left flank of the ROK II Corps and a one-division attack against the right flank of the U.S. IX Corps, forcing U.N. forces to withdraw about eight miles to positions below the Kumsong River. By 20 July, however, U.N. forces had counterattacked, retaken the high ground along the Kumsong River, and established a new main line of resistance. No attempt was made to restore the original line, as it was believed that the armistice would be signed at any time. Enemy casualties in July totaled about 72,000 men. Out of the five Chinese armies that had been identified in the attacks, the enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions.
By 19 July the negotiators at Panmunjom had reached an accord on all points. Details were worked out within a week and the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at 1000 hours 27 July 1953. Hide
Second Korean Winter (1951-52)
As 1951 drew to a close, a lull had settled over the battlefield. Fighting tapered off to a routine of patrol clashes, raids, and bitter small-unit struggles for key outpost positions. The lull result ... Moreed from Ridgway's decision to halt offensive operations in Korea, because the cost of major assaults on the enemy's defenses would be more than the results could justify. Furthermore, the possibility of an armistice agreement emerging from the recently reopened talks ruled out the mounting of any large-scale offensive by either side. On 21 November Ridgway ordered the Eighth Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of its front. Attacks were limited to those necessary to strengthen the main line of resistance and to establish an adequate outpost line.
In the third week of December the U.S. 45th Division, the first National Guard division to fight in Korea, replaced the 1st Cavalry Division in the I Corps sector north of Seoul. The 1st Cavalry Division returned to Japan.
In the air, U.N. bombers and fighter-bombers continued the interdiction campaign (Operation STRANGLE, which the Far East Air Forces had begun on 15 August 1951) against railroad tracks, bridges, and highway traffic. At sea, naval units of nine nations tightened their blockade around the coastline of North Korea. Carrier-based planes blasted railroads, bridges, and boxcars, and destroyers bombarded enemy gun emplacements and supply depots. On the ground, the 155-mile front remained generally quiet in the opening days of 1952. Later in January the Eighth Army opened a month-long artillery-air campaign against enemy positions, which forced the enemy to dig in deeply. During March and April Van Fleet shifted his units along the front to give the ROK Army a greater share in defending the battle line and to concentrate American fire power in the vulnerable western sector. Hide
Korean War/Korea, Summer-Fall 1952
In May the enemy became bolder, increasing his probing attacks and patrols, intensifying his artillery fire, and aggressively interrupting U.N. patrols. In May 1952 an estimated total of 102,000 artil ... Morelery and mortar rounds fell in Eighth Army positions.
As a result of increased Chinese ground action in the 45th Division sector, the division planned an operation to establish eleven patrol bases across its front. Operation COUNTER began on 6 June. By the 7th, ten of the eleven objectives had been taken. The last one (Hi11 191, eight miles west of Ch'orwon) was captured after a 48-hour battle on 14 June. The Chinese immediately launched counterattacks along the entire division front, climaxing their efforts on the night of 28-29 June with an unsuccessful 4-hour attack. The division sustained over 1,000 casualties during the month of June; Chinese losses were estimated at more than 5,000.
Throughout the first half of 1952, the U.N. forces waged a. war of containment. The frontline soldier, meanwhile, hoped that the armistice negotiators would soon reach an agreement.
As the Korean War went into its third year, in June 1952, the deadlock continued. July began with a series of small-scale attacks by both sides. Torrential rains restricted activity in the last week of July and through most of August. For some time the enemy had gradually increased the volume of mortar and artillery fire in support of his attacks, and in September fired a total of 45,000 rounds against the Eighth Army's front.
During the summer of 1952 the air war over Korea intensified. In addition to striking at supply centers, troop concentrations, power plants, factories, and rail and road networks, U.N. aircraft rendered valuable assistance to frontline troops by bombing, or searing with napalm, enemy bunkers, trenches, gun positions, and communications lines. On 29 August the largest U.N. air raid of the Korean War was carried out on P'yongyang, the North Korean capital. During the month of September alone the U.S. Fifth Air Force shot down 64 MIG-15's at a cost of seven Sabrejets.
A series of enemy attacks in October 1952 produced some of the heaviest fighting in more than a year. Most of it centered around two key heights, Hills 281 and 395, northwest of Ch'orwon. The attacks were opened on 6 October with the largest volume of mortar and artillery fire received by the Eighth Army during the war. By 15 October the disputed ground was held firmly by U.N. forces, and the enemy withdrew. Over 2,000 Chinese dead were counted on these two hills after the 10-day battle. Hide
Korean War/CCF Intervention (1950-51)
On 1 November Chinese elements were identified south of the Changjin Reservoir, and within ten days twelve divisions of the Chinese Communist Forces were identified. In the northwest, strong enemy att ... Moreacks against the Eighth Army smashed the ROK divisions. Very hard fighting took place near Ch'osan, Unsan, and Tokch'on. While the 24th Division pulled back to Chongju on the west coast, the 1st Cavalry and 2d Divisions fought along the Ch'ongch'on River. In the air over Korea, U.N. pilots were opposed for the first time by speedy Russian MIG-15 Jet fighters.
By 10 November, as the Chinese attacks were abating, the Eighth Army and the X Corps conducted only small-scale operations, and a comparative lull hung over much of the front. By 21 November elements of the U.S. 7th Division occupied Hyesanjin on the Yalu River in northeastern Korea, the most northerly point to be reached by U.S. forces during the war. The ROK Capital Division meanwhile progressed rapidly up the east coast to the Naman-So-dong area. By 24 November the U.N. positions extended from So-dong in the northeast to Hyesanjin on the Yalu, and thence in a southwesterly direction through the areas around Sang-ni, Handae, Yudam-ni, Yongwen, Ipsok, Patch'on and south of Chongju to the Yellow Sea.
Previous to the entry of Chinese forces in North Korea, MacArthur had ordered the Eighth Army and the X Corps on 24 October to attack toward the Manchurian border and restore peace in Korea before the onset of winter. The difficulty of securing adequate logistical support delayed the attack. In the latter part of the month, brief clashes with Chinese troops posed a new threat. The purpose and extent of the Chinese intervention was not yet clear; but in the face of this new opposition, Walker had withdrawn his extended forces back to the lower bank of the Ch'onch'on River, leaving only a small bridgehead above Sinanju.
The fact of Chinese participation in the conflict caused MacArthur to reconsider his plans for an all-out attack to the Yalu River, but not to abandon them. Walker's forces were to move northward through western and central Korea, while Almond's troops were to attack to the northwest to cut the enemy line of communications and give maximum assistance to the Eighth Army. On 24 November the Eighth Army, with the ROK II Corps, launched its planned offensive. For the first twenty-four hours little enemy opposition was encountered, but on the next day enemy troops initiated a violent counterattack against the Eighth Army in the mountainous territory surrounding the central North Korean town of Tokch'on. The X Corps began its attack early on 27 November, and had made slight advances before evening, when a second enemy force, moving down both sides of the Changjin Reservoir, struck at the 1st Marine Division and elements of the U.S. 7th Division.
It was quickly apparent that the bulk of the enemy forces were organized Chinese Communist units. It was now evident to the UN Commend that the Chinese had amassed two large armies in northern Korea, by marching them from Manchuria under cover of darkness and expertly camouflaging them during the day. They were comparatively safe from detection by UN air observers in the rugged mountain terrain, and UN aircraft were prohibited from making reconnaissance flights across the frontier. Thus the strength of the attacking Chinese forces came as a surprise to most of the U.N. Command.
The main enemy effort was directed against the ROK II Corps, which collapsed under the weight of the Chinese assault. As the Communists strove to extend their breakthrough of the U.N. line, Walker rushed his reserve units (the 1st Cavalry Division, the Turkish Brigade, and the British 27th Commonwealth and 29th Independent Infantry Brigades) to the area, but failed to stem the Communist advance. Assaulted by wave after wave of enemy troops, the Eighth Army front withdrew south across the Ch'ongch'on River. These forces, fighting hand to hand with the enemy along the river banks and retreating over reads choked with troops, refugees, trucks, and tanks, suffered heavy losses. The U.S. 2d Division wee assigned to fight a delaying action until other units could retire and regroup in defensive positions near P'yongyang. On 5 December the Eighth Army fell back from P'yongyang to positions about 25 miles south of the city. By the middle of December it had withdrawn below the 38th parallel and formed a defensive perimeter north and east of Seoul.
On 27 November 1950 the Chinese began their offensive against the X Corps, attacking the Marine and 7th Division elements in the Changjin Reservoir area with six divisions. Since the most northerly UN units-the ROK I Corps, the U.S. 17th Infantry Regiment, and other elements at the Yalu-might be cut off by the weight of the Chinese offensive, the X Corps was forced to withdraw these elements. Troops at the reservoir were also ordered to fall back. MacArthur then ordered Almond to concentrate the X Corps in the Hamhung-Hungnam area; and early in December directed the Corps to withdraw to South Korea by a waterborne evacuation.
Most of the Corps reached the port of Hungnam without serious incident. However, some 14,000 men of the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions were trapped in the Hagaru-Kot'o area and were forced to fight their way to the coast along a narrow escape route. As the main column progressed along the road, a provisional battalion of marines and soldiers, aided by close and efficient air support, cleared the Chinese Communist forces from the high ground which dominated the road. Almond sent Task Force Dog, a reinforced battalion of the 3d Division, forward to Chinhung to relieve the Marine battalion there and to assist the withdrawal by providing support and rear guard action. Air Force, Navy, and Marine cargo planes parachuted daily airdrops of ammunition, food, and medicines to the column, and evacuated battle casualties. Fighter elements bombed and strafed the enemy-held mountainsides and Communist troop concentrations. On 9 December 1950 the two forces met in the mountains a few miles south of Kot'o and both moved toward Hamhung to be evacuated.
The water movement of the X Corps from North Korea required 173 vessels. About 350,000 measurement tons of cargo, including 17,500 vehicles, were salvaged; some 105,000 troops and more than 98,000 civilians were evacuated from Hungnam, Songjin, and Wonsan. Evacuation began on 11 December and was completed on 24 December, despite constant enemy fire and observation.
The Hungnam evacuation left North Korea once again controlled by Communist forces. Before the enemy renewed his attacks, General Walker was killed in an auto accident north of Seoul (23 December 1950). On 26 December Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway succeeded him in command of the Eighth Army in Korea.
On 30 December MacArthur warned the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese Communist forces could drive the U.N. forces out of Korea if they so desired. The United States, although anxious to avoid a full-scale war in Korea, was also determined to resist the Chinese-North Korean aggressors. Therefore the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to defend his positions; to retire, if forced to, through a series of defensive positions as far back as the former Pusan Perimeter Line; to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy; and to maintain his units intact. If necessary to avoid severe losses, he was authorized to withdraw to Japan.
Within this framework of operations, MacArthur invested General Ridgway with complete authority to plan and execute operations in Korea, and ceased the close supervision which he had formerly exercised over the Eighth Army and the X Corps. The latter, which had heretofore been a separate command, was assigned to the Eighth Army, thus placing all U.N. ground forces under that army's control. By this time fifteen nations of the U.N. had troops in Korea-the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Belgium, and Sweden. As 1951 began, U.N. ground forces numbered about 495,000, of which 270,000 were ROK troops. The U.N. Command estimated that the enemy had about 486,000 men, 21 Chinese and 12 North Korean divisions, committed to the Korean front, and more than a million enemy troops stationed in reserve near the Yalu.
In late December, Ridgway, in establishing the defensive line along the 38th parallel, concentrated the bulk of the Eighth Army in the central and western sectors because of the obvious enemy concentration above Seoul. The west flank was held by the I Corps; the central sector by the IX Corps; and the ROK I, II, and III Corps held the eastern mountainous sector. The X Corps was reorganizing near Pusan. The 1st Marine Division, until recently a part of the X Corps, was held in Eighth Army reserve.
At daybreak on 1 January 1951, after a night of mortar and artillery bombardment, the enemy launched an attack all along the U.N. line. The main effort was directed against the U.S. I and IX Corps in the west and central sectors. A force of seven Chinese armies and two North Korean corps pushed deeply into the U.N. line toward Seoul in the west and Wonju in the center.
As the offensive gained momentum, Ridgway ordered the U.N. forces to fall back to a line which ran along the south bank of the frozen Han River to Yangp'yang, through Hongch'on and Chunmunjin to the Sea of Japan. A delaying force remained around Seoul to deny the enemy use of the Han River bridges. When the attacking forces, following up their initial success, crossed the Han to the east and west of Seoul, it became clear that the Seoul bridgehead could not be held any longer. Ridgway, following a policy of rolling with the punch rather then risking destruction by defending in place, decided to withdraw south to a line in the vicinity of the 37th parallel on 3 January. This line ran from P'yongt'aek, east through Ansong, northeast to Wonju, and in an irregular trace to the east coast town of Samch'ok. When Seoul fell on 4 January, the port of Inch'on was also evacuated.
After the fall of Seoul, Chinese attacks tapered off in the west. Many enemy units were shifted eastward so as to be in position to attack southwestward behind the U.S. I and IX Corps, and capture Wonju and the railroad and highway between Hongch'on and Pusan, the main U.N. north-south supply route. Wonju was abandoned by U.N. forces on 7 January. By 10 January large numbers of the enemy had phased through the gap and into the defensive zone of the ROK III Corps. To meet this threat Ridgway ordered the 1st Marine Division to prevent the enemy penetration from north of the Andong-Yongdok road on the east, and to protect the supply routes of the ROK units.
In the western sector, which was comparatively quiet, Ridgway planned Operation WOLFHOUND, a reconnaissance in force in the I Corps sector, to reestablish contact and secure more exact information about the enemy. On 15 January the task force-the 27th Infantry Regiment, reinforced-advanced northward along the Seoul highway toward Osan. On the 16th it reached Suwon with practically no opposition. Satisfied by the reconnaissance, the U.N. Command ordered the task force to withdraw south.
By the third week in January the situation in the central and eastern sectors had eased, and pressure on our troops was gradually decreasing. However, although quiet prevailed on the front, air reconnaissance revealed that the enemy was accumulating reserves of supplies and bringing up thousands of replacements. Hide
Korean War/First UN Counteroffensive (1951)
A reconnaissance in force by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division on 22 January revealed that the enemy had withdrawn from frontline positions. The task force returned after having met little resistan ... Morece. Ridgway then scheduled a larger reconnaissance in force, Operation THUNDERBOLT, with each Corps using one U.S. division and one ROK regiment. The operation began on 25 January and advanced slowly and cautiously against light resistance during the rest of the month. U.N. air support destroyed points of resistance and the enemy's lines of communication were subjected to damaging attacks, which kept a large part of his supplies from reaching the front. By 30 January his resistance stiffened and it continued to be vigorous until 9 February. Then it abruptly gave way. By 10 February U.N. forces secured Inch'on and Kimpo airfield, and the U.S. I Corps closed up to the south bank of the Han River.
On the central front, U.N. armored patrols reached the deserted city of Wonju and elements of the X Corps captured Hoengsong on 2 February against light resistance. On 5 February the X Corps began Operation ROUNDUP, a plan calling for ROK units of the Corps to disrupt the regrouping of North Korean forces south of the town of Hongch'on. On the second day of the attack the ROK units met stiffening resistance, and pressure on the X Corps increased steadily as signs pointed to a large enemy buildup on its front. On the night of 11-12 February, Chinese Communist forces struck the ROK divisions north of Hoengsong and made immediate penetrations which forced the ROK troops to fall back rapidly. U.N. troops withdrew south toward Wonju and abandoned Hoengsong on 13 February. On this same day enemy forces struck at Chip'yong-ni, a road junction and key point of the central zone. The U.S. 23d Infantry Regiment and the French Battalion, forming a defensive perimeter around the town, held off a force of three Chinese Communist divisions for three days before enemy pressure melted away. Meanwhile elements of the U.S. 7th Division and ROK units formed a defensive line north of Chech'on, to check a strong enemy force attacking northeast of Wonju.
In the west the U.S. I and IX Corps were gradually taking all ground in the zones up to the Han River, except for a sizeable enemy foothold south of the Han in an area between Seoul and Yangp'yong. On the night of 13-14 February the enemy launched a powerful counterattack from this area toward Suwon, but his effort was quickly contained with heavy losses to his troops. Meanwhile areas far to the south were being harassed by guerrilla and remnants of North Korean troops. U.N. counteractions succeeded in reducing these forces to about 18,000 by the end of February.
On 18 February combat patrols confirmed a report of the IX Corps that enemy forces along the entire central front were withdrawing. Thereupon Ridgway ordered the IX Corps to move forward, which it did against light scattered resistance. By 19 February the initiative all along the front had passed into U.N. hands.
Ridgway was determined to give the North Koreans and Chinese Communists neither rest nor opportunity to reorganize. On 21 February he launched a general advance (Operation KIILER) by the U.S. IX and X Corps to deny important positions to the enemy and to destroy as many enemy troops as could be found. The objective was a line running eastward from Yangp'yong to the Han River east of Seoul, thence to points north of Chip'yong-ni and Hwangsong-ni, and thence eastward so as to secure the east-west portion of the Wonju-Kangnung road between Wonju and Pangnimni.
Advances in both Corps zones were slow and unspectacular. The spring thaw and heavy rains caused swollen streams and deep mud which greatly hampered military operations. By 28 February the U.N. forces advanced to their assigned objectives, and the Communist foothold south of the Han collapsed. By 1 March the entire Eighth Army line was relatively stable.
Although the Eighth Army had attained its geographical objectives by 1 March, a large part of the enemy had succeeded in withdrawing during the bad weather which had disrupted Allied road and rail movement. With approval by MacArthur, Ridgway planned to continue the attack northward in the central and eastern sectors with Operation RIPPER, to seize Hongch'on and Ch'unch'on and a line designated IDAHO just south of the 38th parallel.
RIPPER began on 7 March 1951. After overcoming initial resistance, the IX Corps reached the first phase line on 11 March and began the attack to the second phase line on the 14th. U.N. patrols moved into the deserted city of Seoul on the night of 14-15 March, marking the fourth time that the capital had changed hands. In the X Corps zone, terrain rather than hostile forces proved to be the greatest obstacle; but despite the enemy and natural obstacles Operation RIPPER ground forward. In the east, ROK units were ordered to destroy the remnants of a North Korean division which had infiltrated southward in January. By 17 March, with this threat eliminated, the ROK forces had moved to Line IDAHO. UN forces entered Ch'unch'on, an enemy supply and communications center, on 19 March.
On 23 March the 187th Airborne RCT dropped at Munsan-ni, about 20 miles northwest of Seoul, to trap enemy troops fleeing northward; but because of the rapid enemy withdrawal it failed to achieve its purpose.
By the last of March Ridgway's forces had fought their way generally to the 38th parallel in position along line IDAHO. Again the U.N. Command was faced with the problem of crossing the parallel into North Korea.
Ridgway, with the approval of President Truman and MacArthur, elected to continue the advance, with the hope of achieving maximum destruction of enemy forces. U.N. commanders made their plans to advance with the knowledge that the enemy was engaged in a full-scale buildup of troops and materiel for his expected spring offensive.
On 5 April Ridgway opened Operation RUGGED, a general advance toward a new objective line called KANSAS. This line, running along the commanding ground north of the 38th parallel, was 115 miles long, including 14 miles of tidal water on the left flank and the 10-mile water barrier of the Hwach'on Dam in the center. By 9 April, the U.S. I and IX Corps and the ROK I Corps on the east coast had reached Line KANSAS, and the U.S. X and ROK III Corps in the central and central-east sectors were drawing up to it. The I and IX Corps continued to advance, attacking Ch'orwon, with the intention of seizing a line designated UTAH, an outward bulge of KANSAS, so as to be in a position to strike at the ''Iron Triangle."
On 11 April President Truman relieved General MacArthur of all his commands because of differences over national policy and military strategy, and replaced him with General Ridgway. Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army on 14 April, replacing Ridgway.
Meanwhile U.N. forces continued to edge forward. The Hwach'on Dam was taken on 16 April. On the east coast South Korean forces captured Taep'o-ri. Other ROK troops north of Seoul sent patrols across the Imjin River and far to the northeast. By 17 April U.N. units could not make contact with the enemy, and thereafter the general advance toward Line UTAH was virtually unopposed. Even as it continued, however, evidences of enemy preparations for a counterattack were apparent to the Eighth Army Command. By 19 April all U.S. I and IX Corps units were in positions Along Line UTAH, preparing for an advance to a new Line WYOMING. Hide
Korean War/CCF Spring Offensive (1951)
On 22 April enemy activity across the whole front suddenly increased and the U.N. advance halted abruptly. The expected spring offensive was at hand.
Following a four- ... Morehour artillery bombardment, three Chinese Communist armies attacked the U.N. line in the evening hours of 22 April. The main attack was against the U.S. I and IX Corps in the Seoul sector, coupled with a secondary thrust in the central Yonch'on-Hwach'on area and a p w h in the seat near Inje. U.N. lines held firm except in the IX Corps central sector, where ROK units were forced back in confusion. With the line broken, Van Fleet ordered the I and IX Corps to withdraw through a series of delaying positions to Line KANSAS, thus giving up the ground gained in recent U.N. offensives. When the enemy cut the Seoul-Kaesong highway on 26 April, Van Fleet withdrew the IX Corps back to the Hongch'on River.
Meanwhile, in the I Corps area, the enemy crossed the Imjin River on 22 April and drove the ROK unite south of the KANSAS Line on the 23d. On 27 April the enemy outflanked Uijongbu, forcing U.N. units to pulls back to within four miles of Seoul, and also made an unsuccessful attempt to outflank the city to the east. On the east-central front North Koreans captured Inje. By 29 April, however, their drive had been halted. On this date Van Fleet established a new line, designated NONAME-LINE, extending from north of Seoul to Sabangue and thence northeast across the 38th parallel to Taepo-ri on the east coast. Because the major enemy attack had been in the west, Van Fleet reshuffled his units to put more American divisions there. By the end of April, U.N. forces had stopped the enemy short of Seoul and the Han and held a strong, continuous defense line.
As the enemy withdrew to recoup losses, Van Fleet improved his defenses on NO-NAME-LINE and planned an offensive to carry the Eighth Army back to Line KANSAS; but signs of another impending enemy attack led him to postpone it.
On the night of 15-16 May an estimated 21 Chinese divisions, flanked by 3 North Korean divisions in the west and 6 in the east, struck in the central sector against the U.S. X and the ROK III Corps in the Naep'yong-ni-No-dong area. ROK units were again forced back by the swarming columns of Chinese and North Koreans. Once more Van Fleet reshuffled his units, moved in reserves, and laid down a tremendous curtain of artillery fire which exacted heavy casualties and stopped the enemy offensive.
On 17 May the enemy struck down the Pukhan River toward the Han in the western sector, against the I and IX Corps, with a force of about 250,000 men. This attack was also contained after three days of violent action. By 20 May U.N. troops brought the enemy to a standstill, having thus stopped two major offensives in two months.
Van Fleet decided to renew the offensive, so as to give the enemy no chance to gather himself for another counterstrike. On 18 May he opened a series of local attacks. Once more enemy forces pulled back and U.N. forces moved forward against light resistance. Within a few days the I Corps reached the Imjin River north of Munsan-ni and entered Uijongbu and Sinp'al-li. The IX Corps pushed toward Kap'yong, drove the enemy across the Hanch'on River, and moved toward the Hwach'on Reservoir. In the X Corps area the 1st Marine Division attacked Yanggu on 24 May. The 187th RCT headed for Inje, which it captured on the 27th. The Marines were pushing toward the Hwach' on Reservoir and Yanggu. The 7th Division of the I Corps took Hwach'on. By 31 May the U.N. forces scored a significant advance which brought them just about back to the KANSAS Line, and South Korea was virtually cleared of the enemy.
At this point the Joint Chiefs of Staff prescribed that the Eighth Army was not to go beyond the general vicinity of Line KANSAS. The only tactical operations permitted were those necessary to protect itself, to maintain contact, and to harass the enemy. This was the basic pattern of U.N. military operations which was to be followed throughout the remainder of the war.
On 1 June, therefore, Van Fleet ordered his reserve forces to strengthen KANSAS so as to make it virtually impregnable. Meanwhile the I and IX Corps were to continue Operation PILEDRIVER toward Line WYOMING (the bulge north of KANSAS that ran from the Imjin River to points just south of Ch'orwon and Kumhwa and thence southeast). Ch'orwon and Kumhwa were captured on 11 June. Two tank-infantry task fences reached P'yongyang, the northern tip of the Iron Triangle, on 13 June and found it deserted. The dominating high ground north of the city was held by the enemy, however, and U.N. forces withdrew. The Chinese reoccupied P'yongyang on 17 June. Meanwhile the X Corps on the east-central front pushed through mountains toward its sector of the KANSAS Line, which extended over a series of ridges from the Hwach'on Reservoir northeastward to the lower lip of the "Punchbowl," an aptly named circular depression north of Inje. Thus by mid-June the Eighth Army had attained the principal terrain objectives of Operation PILEDRIVER. Action for the rest of the month was confined to developing the KANSAS and WYOMING Lines, and to patrolling and local clashes. Hide
Korean War/UN Summer-Fall Offensive (1951)
On 23 June 1951 Jacob Malik, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., made a statement in a recorded broadcast in New York implying Chinese and North Korean willingness to discuss armistic ... Moree terms to end the Korean War. When Communist China indicated that it also desired peace, President Truman authorized General Ridgway to arrange for an armistice conference with the North Korean commander. Both aides agreed to begin negotiations at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. The chief delegate for the U.N. at the conference was Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. The enemy delegation was led by Lt. Gen. Nam Il.
It was agreed at the first meeting that military operations would continue until an armistice agreement was signed. However, neither aide was willing to start any large-scale offensive while peace talks were in progress. U.N. military action in this period was limited to combat patrolling, artillery and air bombardment, and the repulsing of enemy attacks.
In August of 1951 the strength of all U.N. ground forces under Eighth Army command totaled 549,224. This included 248,320 U.S. ground troops, Army and Marines, 268,320 in the ROK Army, and 32,874 in the ground units of the seventeen other United Nations.
Truce negotiations were broken off by the Communists on 22 August. Van Fleet then launched a series of limited-objective attacks to improve the Eighth Army's defensive positions. The U.S. X and ROK I Corps in east-central Korea fought for terrain objectives five to seven miles above Line KANSAS, among them Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges, to drive enemy forces from positions that favored an attack on Line KANSAS. By the last week in October these objectives had been secured.
Along the western portion of the front, action in September was characterized by local attacks, counterattacks, and combat patrols. By 12 October five divisions of the I Corps had advanced the front three to four miles to a new Line JAMESTOWN to protect the Ch'orwon-Seoul railroad. The IX Corps followed with aggressive patrolling toward Kumsong. On 21 October it seized the commanding heights just south of the city.
On 25 October armistice negotiations were resumed at the new site of Panmunjom. Hide
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Ardennes Alsace Campaign (1944-45)
(Ardennes Alsace Campaign 16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945) During their offensive in the Ardennes the Germans drove into Belgium and Luxembourg, creating a great bulge in the line. For some time ... Morethe weather was bad, but when it cleared the Allies could send their planes to assist their ground forces by bombing and strafing the enemy's columns, dropping paratroops and supplies, and interdicting the enemy's lines of communications. By the end of January 1945 the lost ground had been regained and the Battle of the Bulge, the last great German offensive, was over. Hide
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Rhineland Campaign (1944-45)
(Rhineland Campaign 15 September 1944 to 21 March 1945) Attempting to outflank the Siegfried Line, the Allies tried an airborne attack on Holland on 17 September 1944. But the operation failed, and th ... Moree enemy was able to strengthen his defensive line from Holland to Switzerland. Little progress was made on the ground, but the aerial attacks on strategic targets continued. Then, having regained the initiative after defeating a German offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, the Allies drove through to the Rhine, establishing a bridgehead across the river at Remagen. Hide
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Central Europe Campaign (1945)
(Central Europe Campaign 22 March to 11 May 1945) Following the Battle of the Bulge the Allies had pushed through to the Rhine. On 22 March 1945 they began their assault across the river, and by I Apr ... Moreil the Ruhr was encircled. Armored columns raced across Germany and into Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 25 April, the day American and Russian forces met on the Elbe, strategic bombing operations came to an end. Germany surrendered on 7 May 1945 and operations officially came to an end the following day, although sporadic actions continued on the European front until 11 May. Hide
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Normandy Campaign (1944)
Normandy Campaign 6 June to 24 July 1944) Early on D-Day airborne troops landed in France to gain control of strategic areas. Aerial and naval bombardment followed. Then the invasion fleet, covered by ... More an umbrella of aircraft, discharged Eisenhower's assault forces. Soon the beachhead was secure, but its expansion was a slow and difficult process in the face of strong opposition. It was not until late in July that the Allies were able to break out of Normandy. Hide
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Northern France Campaign (1944)
(Northern France Campaign 25 July to 14 September 1944) Bombardment along a five-mile stretch of the German line enabled the Allies to break through on 25 July. While some armored forces drove southwa ... Morerd into Brittany, others fanned out to the east and, overcoming a desperate counterattack, executed a pincers movement that trapped many Germans in a pocket at Falaise. The enemy fell back on the Siegfried Line, and by mid-September 1944 nearly all of France had been liberated. During these operations in France, while light and medium bombers and fighter-bomber aircraft of Ninth Air Force had been engaged in close support and interdictory operations, Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces had continued their strategic bombing. Hide
Unit Photos Member Photos
Copyright Togetherweserved.com Inc 2003-2013

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Alexis Skyy's first official Mother's Day celebration doesn't sound so lovely. Aw!
The good news is that her baby girl seems to finally be home.
All the criticism seems to be getting to her though, judging by recent posts on her Instagram Story.
Then "Why am I still here?"
Followed by "Leave me alone everyone"
Do you think Alexis should take a step back from social media? It sounds like she is having a tough time, honestly.
She has stepped up to defend herself against insults and allegations quite a few times since she gave birth earlier this year, including when Alayia was still in the hospital in NICU.
"My priorities have changed. She's changed me in so many different ways, but I don't have to allow y'all to see that. And that's just what it is. I know I'm a good [expletive] mom."
"I haven't even experienced being a mom yet because I don't have her with me, but I make sure I see my daughter every day. If I go out of town, I make sure I see her before I leave. My mom works at the hospital…you guys forget that she works there. But then I go back and see her."
Also, it is perhaps worth mentioning that Fetty doesn't seem to receive the same amount or level of nastiness about his parenting style and choices, though he presumably travels and works more than Alexis.
Oh and we can't help but wonder whether the never-ending bickering with fellow Love & Hip Hop Hollywood castmaste Masika is wearing her down too?
In case you missed it recently, the drama when to a new level not too long ago when Masika Kalysha, who also has a daughter with Fetty Wap, accused Alexis of spending more time in the clubs than in the hospital next to Baby Alaiya.
Let's not also forget that Masika implied that Alexis Skyy might have a bit of a drug problem as well.
Do you think Alexis should take a break from social media given her recent post?


Are you looking for Free Online Criminal Records Check? We have Are Marriage Records Public Information and criminal background check, criminal record check, fbi criminal background check, federal background check and more. Do a Search Click Form Here!
1. Why Do a Stress Stay?
Doing a emphasise review is an chance for you to aver aggregation. Whether you the accumulation from a job person, a expected , someone applying for payment or anyone you you necessity to pair writer virtually. A view hitch can also pass aggregation that was either mistakenly or designedly omitted.
Using information checks can service you swear degrees or certifications that were earned and engage fact entropy about employment story.
If you are an employer or landlord, punctuate checks testament help you to fall your chance of lawsuits and supply you to protect your assets.
2. What Types of Emphasise Checks Are Open?
3. How Some Do Prospect Checks Outgo?
Background delay costs can differ depending on the ascertain of searches included in the showing requests. Panduriform checks can expenditure as emotional as $20.
By union various searches into a scene curb packet, galore companies can worship a surmount price per showing. Both defend companies can message production discounts to companies or individuals that their services frequently.
Also, there is code that can be purchased to do your own checks on the Net.
4. How Extendible Does It Accept to Whole a Scope Canvass?
Most employee vista checks can be in 48 to 72 hours. Most companies can all address searches and assets reports, now.
Statewide and County malefactor searches can be realised within 48 hours. Breeding and employment confirmations are through in 48 to 72 hours.
5. How Do I Perceive the Scene Checker ?
With most companies that do downplay checks, you can superior the deciding that suits you mortal. The organization can e-mail results straight to you. Results can also be faxed, viewed online or transmitted by fixture aggregation.
6. What If There Is a Error on the Attribute History Relation of a Aspect Examine?
The individual has particularized rights outlined in the summary of rights, which staleness be provided to the content of the accent draw. This is nominative in the Approval Act (FCRA). The human or the employer or whoever is making the request for the noise retard, should make an enquiry, and it leave be investigated.
7. Should a Wide Malefactor View Inactiveness Be Requested?
An straight broad wrongdoer chronicle modify would be attemptable, but extremely . It is misleading to advertise a "Nationwide Hunt" because it does not countenance all states and is by intelligent databases, not the regime scheme. Umteen of the courts do not move in submitting their records to these databases. The records of these databases are ofttimes noncurrent. 3000 courts throughout the state would individual to be searched, since there is no medial intimate acquirable for felon records to the esoteric aspect.
8. Can I Do a Screen Learn on a Minor?
Juvenile records are not ready, but if the issue of the ground delay was proven as an mature, you may be to see the records easy in the courts.
9. Do I Requirement a "Channelize" Work from the Theme of the Scene Mar?
A signed channelize become should be obtained from any matter of a punctuate alter. Be careful to hold a create of a autographed release for your own files. Also, be certain the mortal of the emphasise break receives a "Unofficial of Rights" (as required by the Ordinary Ascribe Reporting Act) with their text of the subscribed termination organise.
10. When Is a Wood's Story Disturbance Learn Required?
If anyone is driving on behalf of your affiliate or system - flush erstwhile - they're swing story should be chequered on a fixture part.
I prospect these oft asked questions were stabilizing.
I fire you to see my website for solon assemblage.
It may foreclose your life!