Present: Coffey, P.J., Tochka & Poole, JJ.
Jocelyn J. Campbell for the plaintiff.
Jeffrey Strom for the defendants.
TOCHKA, J. On October 21, 2003, Plaintiff, Milan Kosanovich (Kosanovich), entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with the Defendant, 80 Worcester Street Association, ILC ("WSA"), to purchase a newly renovated condominium at 80 Worcester Street, Boston Massachusetts. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Defendant, Jeffrey Feuerman (Feuerman), WSP's manager and sole member, signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement on behalf of WSA.
An addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement (Addendum) listed tasks that needed to be completed before the scheduled closing date. These items included, among other tasks, painting, masonry repairs, and installation of missing lights. The Addendum stated that if any tasks were not completed by closing, suitable escrow funds would be established.
On December 18, 2003, Kosanovich and Feuerman completed a final walk through of the condominium. The escrow agreement was executed acknowledging that tasks remained to be completed, and set aside a fund of $1000. It was agreed that the tasks would be completed by January 31, 2004. If the tasks were not completed, $500 from the escrow fund would be released to Kosanovich and, per the agreement, the "seller shall be discharged and released of all obligations. ... " However, an agreement, titled "Final Walk-Thru 12/18/03," was attached to the Escrow Agreement. It listed seven, numbered, tasks that seller agreed to complete and provided the date for completion. Line numbered eight contained the following: "seller will return to the property to repair any damage or installation issues due to settlement or other problems not caused by the Buyer for up to a year after closing. ... " Kosanovich and Feuerman, as manager for WSA signed the agreements and the parties closed on December 18, 2003.
skylights, and cracks in the interior wall and stairway. Kosanovich further claimed that other tasks in the Escrow Agreement remained unfinished. He repeatedly contacted Feuerman regarding these matters by phone, and by email. Feuerman responded to some but not all of Kosanovich's requests.
On December 15, 2006, Kosanovich brought suit against WSA, and its sole owner, Jeffrey M. Feuerman, in Boston Municipal Court. He alleged breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of habitability, and violation of Massachusetts General Law chapter 93A.
On February 23, 2010, the judge, after a jury-waived trial, found for Kosanovich on his breach of contract and breach of implied warranty of habitability claims, and awarded $9,000 in damages. The judge found for Feuerman and WSA on the 93A claim. All parties appealed the decision.
The parties did not request the trial judge to make written findings of fact or rulings of law. However, a trial court's decision, even without written findings of facts, necessarily imports "a finding of every fact essential to sustain it within the scope of the pleadings and supported by the evidence." Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131, 134 (1966). This Court may not "reverse the [factual] findings of the judge, express or implied, unless we are satisfied that they are plainly wrong." Id. (quoting McMahon v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 345 Mass. 261 (1962)). When the contested evidence is the written record this Court is "in the same position to judge its weight as was the trial judge." Id. However, the trial judge has the advantage of observing the oral testimony in person. Id. Therefore, when evaluating the oral transcript, this Court will give "all the weight the judge could justifiably give to it," and only reverse when the factual "findings are nevertheless plainly wrong." Id.
Kosanovich brought suit against WSA and its sole owner Jeffrey M. Feuerman. The trial court pierced WSN's corporate veil and found Mr. Feuerman personally liable. Feuerman appealed the judge's decision.
result is not a simple exercise in counting.
It is undisputed that Feuerman had sole ownership and pervasive control of WSA However, pervasive control, standing alone, is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Scott, 450 Mass. at 768. Here, in addition to pervasive control, the judge had sufficient evidence to conclude that corporate records did not exist or were not properly kept. Feuerman testified that any documents he had were turned over to his attorney. However, the only evidence submitted by his counsel was the article of incorporation. He admitted that he ran his business "out of my house and out of my car.'" He further stated he "ran the books, the bookkeeping, filed the returns and handled whatever paper work and legal work needed to get handled." When asked about the records specifically however his responses were: "My ex-partner had papers that he disappeared. So he might have had stuff. They could have been moved." When asked about tax records and whether he sought any records from his accountant Feuerman responded: "I don't remember. I don't remember what happened with them and if I asked them for any paper work they might have had or tax returns that are filed." When asked if he kept any records, such as checkbooks, dealing with payments to any subcontractors Feuerman stated: "Not to my knowledge." When asked if his "ex-partner" was a member of WSA, or whether he had a formal partnership with him, Feuerman stated, "[Nlo, it was a bit informal." When asked whether the ex-partner received a W-2 or a 1099 for tax purposes Feuerman stated he would have received something from the accountant but was "not sure what" he would have received.
Feuerman argued that the lack of records was not surprising because of the passage of time. However, Feuerman was on notice of complaints with the unit by August 2004, and the potential for litigation by November 2004. Indeed, Feuerman testified that he did not "have a specific time frame" to keep any paper work, and could not identify when records were lost or destroyed.
The trial judge had sufficient evidence to conclude that Feuerman had pervasive control of the LLC and failed to properly maintain corporate records. While Feuerman testified to the contrary, the judge, with the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses, was in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses. Feuerman's failure to maintain or produce records hindered the court's ability to establish the twelve factors, including intermingling of assets, thin capitalization, and insolvency. [Note 3] This failure could not be excused due to naivety or inexperience. Feuerman testified that he had been in the renovation business for over 20 years, and had established LLCs for 15 to 20 projects. He testified that he would "open an LLC" for each project. The remaining two units of the WSA project were sold by late 2004. As an experienced owner, Mr. Feuerman's failure to maintain business records in light of potential litigation unjustifiably hindered the court's ability to exercise its oversight role over WSPis corporate affairs. Feuerman's failure to maintain business records coupled with his sole ownership and pervasive control of WSA supported the judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil.
Kosanovich claimed that Feuerman and WSA breached the Addendum and Escrow Agreement by failing to perform repairs and remedy defects to the unit. Feuerman and WSA claimed they were only obligated to make the repairs that were specifically referenced in the Agreement.
A trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous written contract constitutes a ruling of law, and is reviewed de novo. Baby Furniture Warehouse Store, Inc. v. Meubles D & F Ltee, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 29 (2009). A contract is ambiguous when the "phraseology can support a reasonable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the words employed and the obligations undertaken." Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 638, 648 (2008) (internal citations omitted). A trial court's determination that a contract is ambiguous also constitutes a ruling of law that is reviewed de novo. Thermo, 451 Mass. at 648. If a contract is found to be ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to serve as an interpretive guide. MacKenzie, 449 Mass. at 835-36. In the instant case, Kosanovich and WSA signed an Escrow Agreement and Walk-Thru Agreement that is the basis for the disagreement. The Escrow Agreement included a punch list of agreed-upon repairs to the unit, the time limit to make the repairs, and the consequence of the seller's default. It also contained the agreement that the seller would return to the property up to a year "to repair any damage or installation issues due to settlement or other problems not caused by the Buyer .... " Feuerman claimed the remedy for failing to complete the listed repairs is contained within the Agreement. The Agreement states "if the punch-list items on the attached list are not completed by January 31, 2004, then Escrow agent shall release the sum of $500 to Buyer and Seller shall be discharged and released of all obligations .... " Kosanovich did not dispute at trial that this was the remedy related to the punch list of unfinished but agreed to repairs. His dispute was that WSA agreed to "repair any damage or installation issues," beyond the punch list, that arose "due to settlement issues not caused by the Buyer .... "
The difficulty with Feuerman's position that Kosanovich's sole remedy was $500 in damages is two-fold. A reading of the Escrow Agreement to release Defendants of all obligations after January 2004 would be inconsistent with the year-long obligation of the same agreement. In other words, Feuerman's interpretation would require the court to find that on the same day that the parties agreed to the seller's duty to repair for up to a year, the parties also agreed to limit this same duty to less than 2 months. This reading would essentially render Feuerman and WSA's year-long duty meaningless, and would contradict the common sense notion that "no part of the contract is to be disregarded." Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. 178, 190 (1995). Secondly, Feuerman's and WSA's interpretation would contradict common sense since the $500 would release them within two months from as yet unknown damages or installation issues that might occur within one year from the closing date that were due to "settlement or other problems not caused by the buyer."
needed for the common area, and typical issues, including settlement issues, may surface and require repair." The purpose of this "catch-all clause" according to the witness was designed to assure that the seller would return to make the necessary repairs.
A contract should "be construed to give a reasonable effect to each of its provisions." McMahon v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 345 Mass. 261, 264 (1962). It should "give it effect as a rational business instrument and in a manner which will carry out the intention of the parties." Id. (internal citation omitted). Based on the preference to give each provision of the contract a reasonable meaning, along with the testimony of Kosanovich's closing attorney, the judge could have concluded that the Escrow Agreement's $500 release applied only to enumerated tasks in the punch list that could be reasonably completed in the less than two months between closing and January 31, 2004. In agreeing to fix "any damages or installation issues" that might go undiscovered for up to one year the $500 release was not applicable.
The judge was correct to conclude that because WSA and Feuerman failed to repair damages and correct installation issues despite Kosanovich's repeated phone calls, emails and letter before the one year deadline, they were liable for damages resulting from that breach.
Kosanovich claimed that because the newly renovated condominium contained latent defects, WSA and Feuerman breached an implied warranty of habitability. WSA and Feuerman claimed that 1) the defects were not latent; 2) immaterial to safety or habitability; and 3) not caused by improper design, material or workmanship. The judge found for Kosanovich, and Feuerman and WSA appealed.
To establish a breach, Kosanovich was required to prove that "(1) he purchased a new residential condominium unit from the builder-vendor; (2) the condominium unit contained a latent defect; (3) the defect manifested itself to the purchaser only after its purchase; (4) the defect was caused by the builder's improper design, material, or workmanship; and (5) the defect created a substantial question of safety or made the condominium unit unfit for human habitation." Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 264 (2002).
renovators, even if the renovators did not construct the original building.
Kosanovich was next required to prove that his condominium unit contained a latent defect, which manifested itself only after its purchase, was caused by Defendants' improper design, material, or worlananship, and created a substantial question of safety or habitability. The existence of a breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a question of fact Smith v. Ferreira, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2013). The trial judge has broad discretion in "determining whether the conditions in any given rental unit amount to a material breach of the implied warranty of habitability." Kelly v. Jones, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 477-78 (2011) (citing Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184,200-01 n.16 (1973)). When there is conflicting testimony, this Court should give "deference to the trial judge's credibility determination." Kelly, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 477. The trial court's factual determination will only be disturbed if it is clearly erroneous. Id.
The parties did not request findings of fact, and the judge did not identify which of the alleged defects led to a breach of the implied warranty. The trial court must have found at least one, but not necessarily all, of Kosanovich alleged defects lead to this breach.
Kosanovich alleged defects with the doorstop and exterior walls. However, there was no evidence that these defects were located within Kosanovich's condominium unit. An individual unit owner does not have a right to "bring a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability when there are latent defects in the common areas." See Bornstein, 437 Mass. at 265. Accordingly, the trial court likely did not find a breach arising from defects in the common area.
Kosanovich also alleged defects with the drywall and stairway. However, there was no evidence at trial that the cracks in the drywall, even if latent, rendered the unit unsafe or uninhabitable. The implied warranty does not protect against "any and all defects in a home," or impose "an obligation to deliver a perfect house." Albrecht, 436 Mass. at 711. Thus, the trial court likely did not find a breach arising from the cracking of interior walls and stairway.
Kosanovich claimed defects with the leaking roof and improper installation of the skylight. He testified that he noticed water stains on the ceiling during the walk-thru. However, there is no evidence that Kosanovich should have known or was told what caused these stains. Testimony at trial showed that unfilled pipes, holes in the roof, and improper installation of the skylights caused the stains. The judge could have credited Kosanovich's testimony that to discover these defects, he would have had to climb to the roof, which was not readily accessible. The trial court could further have credited Kosanovich's testimony that because the leaky roof required him to set out pots and plastic bags to catch rainwater, the defects made the unit unsafe or unfit for human habitation. We affirm, the judge's implied finding that defects resulting in a leaky roof breached the implied warranty of habitability.
Kosanovich claimed that Feuerman and WSA's willful failure to make repairs violated the state's consumer protection law's prohibition against "immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous tactics." Kobayashi v. Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 505 (1997). Feuerman and WSA claimed that there was no evidence of unfair and deceptive conduct rising to a level of commercial extortion. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451 (1991).
The "boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a c. 93A violation is a question of law," and is reviewed de novo. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., Ltd., 217 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2000). Not every unlawful act is automatically an unfair or deceptive one. Kobayashi, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 505 (citing Mechanics Natl. Bank v. Killeen, 377 Mass. 100, 109 (1979)). The failure to perform obligations under a contract, "even [if] deliberate and for reasons of self-interest does not present an occasion for invocation of c. 93A remedies." Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 219, 226 (1992). Only when a party's breach "has an extortionate quality that gives it the rancid flavor of unfairness," does that breach give rise to a 93A violation. Id.
Here, as in Kobayashi, the existence of Feuerman and WSA's contractual obligation to repair after January 31,2004 is not without dispute. However, there was no evidence that WSA or Feuerman's breach was intended to "to force [Kosanovich] into an unfavorable settlement." See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., Ltd., 217 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2000). Additionally, there was no evidence that Feuerman and WSA's delay was intended to "coercing [Kosanovich] to settle for substantially less compensation than the parties had agreed .... " Cmty. Builders, Inc. v. Indian Motorcycle Associates, Inc., 44 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 558 (1998). Where, as here, the breach merely resulted from a dispute over contracted terms or liability, there was no 93A violation. See Anthony's Pier, 411 Mass. at 474 (citing Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc. v. Checkers, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1985) (where liability was found when Defendant withheld payment, not because of dispute over liability, rather, as wedge to enhance bargaining power). Consequently the judge's decision denying the 93A claim is affirmed.
[Note 1] Jeffrey M. Feuerman.
[Note 2] The twelve factors are: "(1) common ownership; (2) pervasive control; (3) confused intermingling of business assets; (4) thin capitalization; (5) nonobservance of corporate formalities; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) no payment of dividends; (8) insolvency at the time of the litigated transaction; (9) siphoning away of corporation's funds by dominant shareholder; (10) nonfunctioning of officers and directors; (11) use of the corporation for transactions of the dominant shareholders; and (12) use of the corporation in promoting fraud." Attorney General v. M.C.K, Inc., 432 Mass. 546, 555 n.19 (2000).
[Note 3] Moreover, the judge would have been warranted in concluding, based upon Feuerman's testimony, that WSA was no longer in existence.


text:
Az Arches Nemzeti Park (angolul Arches National Park) természetvédelmi terület az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban, Utah állam délkeleti részén, a Colorado mentén fekvő félsivatagban. A 310 km² területű nemzeti park eróziós tevékenység nyomán kialakult homokkő alakzatairól – természetes kőhídjairól, sziklatornyairól, ablakairól – híres. Nevét a mintegy kétezer természetes kőhídról (angolul arch, többes számban arches) kapta. A terület 1929-ben kapta meg a nemzeti emlékhely (national monument) besorolást, 1971 óta pedig nemzeti parkként működik.

Természetföldrajza
A terület tengerszint feletti magassága 1245 és 1723 méter között váltakozik, legmagasabb pontja az Elephant Butte. Az átlagos éves csapadékmennyiség meglehetősen alacsony, 250 milliméter körül mozog.

Az Arches Nemzeti Park alatt helyenként az ezer méteres vastagságot is elérő sóréteg található, amelyre mintegy 300 millió évvel ezelőtt kezdett rátelepülni a Colorado-fennsík a területet elöntött tenger üledékéből. A tenger elpárolgását követő évmilliók során a terület felszínét a széljárás és a többszöri időszakos víz alá kerülés tovább alakította, újabb üledékrétegek képződtek, míg végül ez a mezozoikumi kőzetréteg elérte az 1,6 kilométeres vastagságot. E hatalmas tömeg nyomásának az alatta húzódó sóréteg nem volt képes ellenállni, így a só tömörülésével és átrendeződésével a kőzet több helyütt beszakadt, s törések, vetődések, hasadékhálózatok keletkeztek. E mozgások következtében a fiatalabb és kevésbé szilárd felszíni kőzetek elaprózódtak, a hasadékokba áramló víz és jég pedig a kőzetanyag további mállásához, pusztulásához vezetett. A szél a regolitot (mállási terméket, kőzettörmeléket) elszállította, s nyomában csak az ellenállóbb kőzetek, a ma ismert bizarr homokkő alakulatok maradtak vissza. A felszíni erózió ma is végzi munkáját, s 1970 óta több mint harminc kőhíd vált a természet pusztító erejének martalékává.

A több ezer sziklaalakzat közül a legnevezetesebbek:
 A Utah állam egyik szimbólumává vált, 16 méter magas Delicate Arch.
 A 39 méter magas sziklatorony, a hatalmas sziklát egyensúlyozó Balanced Rock.
 A Double Arch néven ismert kettős kőhíd.
 A föld egyik leghosszabb természetes kőhídja, a 30 méter magas és 88,4 méter hosszú Landscape Arch.

Története
Az ember az utolsó jégkorszakot követően, 10 ezer évvel ezelőtt telepedett meg a környéken. Körülbelül a 14. századig fremonti és pueblo indiánok népesítették be a vidéket, de az 1775-ben erre járt spanyol misszionáriusok már pajút indiánokkal találkoztak. Az első európai telepesek, a mormonok 1855-ben itt alapították meg Elk Mountain nevű missziójukat, amelyet hamarosan el is hagytak, s csak az 1880-as években alapították meg pásztorok (rancherek), farmerek és bányakutatók a közeli Moab városkát.

A táj turisztikai értékét a telepesek hamar felismerték, s a 20. század elejétől arra törekedtek, hogy a Colorado-fennsík ezen része természetvédelmi védettséget, ezzel együtt kellő ismertséget kapjon. A közelben lakó, magyar származású bányakutató, Alexander Ringhoffer meghívására 1923-ban a vidékre érkezett az egyik nagy nyugati vasúttársaság szállítmányozási vezetője, Frank A. Wadleigh, aki a látottaktól meggyőzve indítványozta a nemzeti parkokat felügyelő National Park Service igazgatójának nemzeti emlékhely alapítását a Moab környéki területen. Végül 1929. április 12-én, röviddel elnöki beiktatása után Herbert Hoover aláírta az Arches Nemzeti Emlékhely alapításáról szóló rendeletet. 1938-ban az emlékhely területét megnövelték, és a turisták kényelmét biztosító létesítmények kiépítésére is engedélyt adtak. 1971. november 12-én Richard Nixon rendeletében jelentősen csökkentette, ugyanakkor nemzeti parkká minősítette át a védelem alatt álló területet.

Fordítás

Források

További információk

 Az Arches National Park hivatalos honlapja

Nemzeti parkok az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban
Utah földrajza

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
<?php
namespace Foundry\Core\Auth;
use \Foundry\Core\Core as Core;

require_once("AuthServiceTest.php");

Core::configure('\Foundry\Core\Auth\Auth', array(
    "admin_group" => "svn_administrators",
    "service" => 'Foundry\Core\Auth\Service\LDAP',
    "service_config" => array(
        "connectionString"      => "ldap://webfoundri.es",
        "baseDN"                => "dc=phpfoundry,dc=com",
        "managerDN"             => "cn=admin",
        "managerPassword"       => "r-vq398rEuj",
        "userDN"                => "ou=people",
        "usernameAttr"          => "cn",
        "userFirstNameAttr"     => "givenName",
        "userSurnameAttr"       => "sn",
        "userDisplayNameAttr"   => "displayName",
        "userEmailAttr"         => "mail",
        "userGroupAttr"         => "memberOf",
        "userPasswordAttr"      => "userPassword",
        "userObjectClass"       => "inetOrgPerson",
        "groupDN"               => "ou=groups",
        "groupObjectClass"      => "groupOfUniqueNames",
        "groupNameAttr"         => "cn",
        "groupDescAttr"         => "description",
        "groupMemberAttr"       => "uniqueMember",
        "roleDN"                => "ou=roles",
        "roleObjectClass"       => "groupOfUniqueNames",
        "roleNameAttr"          => "cn",
        "roleDescAttr"          => "description",
        "roleMemberAttr"        => "uniqueMember"
    )
));

Core::requires('\Foundry\Core\Auth\Auth');

class LDAPAuthServiceTest extends AuthServiceTest
{
    public function  __construct() {
        $auth_service = Core::get('\Foundry\Core\Auth\Auth');
        parent::__construct($auth_service);
    }
}
?>

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


A day pass costs $10 and an annual pass is $50.
Photographers and videographers are required to acquire and carry a Portrait Photography Pass, available at the Education Center reception desk.
Photographers and videographers agree to abide by the Portrait Photography Rules.
Portrait photography at Conservation Garden Park is defined as wedding, engagement, family portraits, or other posed portraiture of individuals by professional photographers/videographers or by amateurs acting in the role of a professional.
Photographers and videographers who conduct portrait photography at Conservation Garden Park are required to acquire and carry a Portrait Photography Pass which is available at the Education Center reception desk. All portrait photography sessions must be scheduled in advance.
For reservations please call 801-256-4400 or email info@conservationgardenpark.org. Portrait photography requires payment prior to the session. A day pass costs $10 and an annual pass costs $50. We reserve the right to turn away unscheduled portrait sessions.
The photographer/videographer agrees to abide by the Portrait Rules and Guidelines outlined below. Failure to follow these rules may result in expulsion from the garden and/or denial of future requests.
Stay on paths and lawn areas. Walking in flower beds is not allowed under any circumstances.
Flowers and/or foliage must never be removed from any plant.
Plant labels or other signs should not be removed or disturbed.
Be courteous of our other visitors and keep pathways accessible for them. Access to pathways, garden areas, hallways, stairways and rooms may not be blocked.
Patrons may not wear articles of clothing that may be taken as profane, vulgar, racial, sexist, or sexually suggestive, including slogans and illustrations.
Clothing changes are not permitted outdoors.
Groups who have booked private events in the garden have exclusive rights to that reserved area.
Garden staff may be working at any time, please do not interrupt their work by asking them to move.
No balloons are permitted in the garden.
Personal belongings may not be left in the restrooms during the photo shoot. Conservation Garden Park assumes no liability for loss, theft, or damage to personal belongings. Any belongings left unattended may be removed by garden staff.
Portraits must conclude and participants ready to leave by closing time. The Garden reserves the right to limit groups arriving less than two hours before closing time.
Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District assumes no liability for loss, theft, or damage to equipment as a result of visiting the Conservation Garden Park.
Smoking is prohibited on the premises.
No visitors allowed outside of Garden hours.
No skateboarding, bicycling, or rollerblading allowed.
Visitors must stay on paths and lawn areas. Please stay out of flower beds.
Dogs must be kept on leashes while in the Garden.
Owners are responsible for their pet's waste and must clean and dispose of it properly.
Do not remove plant tags or in any way modify Garden signage.
Do not remove or collect flowers, seeds, fruits or vegetables.
No climbing on walls, rocks, or exhibits.
Dispose of garbage in appropriate waste receptacles.
Keep personal items with you at all times.
Loud music, alcohol, and firearms are prohibited.
Be aware, the Garden is under 24 hour surveillance.


2 April 2004, Paris, France. The 2nd EIR/OECD Conference on Pensions and Long-run Investments focused on pension fund investment in both Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution systems.
Manila, Philippines, 30 March–1 April 2004. Organised by the ADB and the OECD under the aegis of the INPRS, this conference discussed issues relevant to the regulation and supervision of private pensions and insurance companies.
19-20 November 2003, Tokyo, Japan. Established in 1999, the Tokyo Roundtable offers an annual forum for discussion on specific topics of interest from the viewpoint of capital market reform in Asia.
This conference provided an international forum for discussion of the key policy issues related to implementation of the new, privately funded pension system in Russia and "best practice" regulatory and supervisory mechanisms used in OECD countries.
This publication contains an in-depth analysis of the assessment, management and compensation of the so-called "expanding systemic risks", to which market players and insurers are exposed.
10-11 July 2003, San Jose, Costa Rica. This conference focused on major regulatory and supervisory issues relevant to private pension systems in Latin America, particularly AIOS members, and in the OECD member countries.
The decline in private saving rates in the 1990s in OECD countries: How much can be explained by non-wealth determinants?
Based on an empirical analysis of private saving determinants, there is little evidence that consumers have responded to the unsustainable stock market boom during the late 1990s in the way standard estimates of wealth effects would have suggested. OECD Economic Studies No. 36.
29-30 May 2003, Hyderabad, India. The objective of the Conference was to discuss the various important issues regarding the regulation and supervision of private pensions in the Asia-Pacific region, with a particular focus on India.
29-30 May, Hyderabad, India. The objective of this meeting was to pursue dialogue on major policy issues related to the private pension reform, regulation and supervision in the Asia-Pacific region.