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Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. App. 2d › Volume 90 › Pastorino v. Greene Brothers
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Pastorino v. Greene Brothers
[Civ. No. 13806. First Dist., Div. Two. Mar. 29, 1949.]
JOHN L. PASTORINO, Appellant, v. GREENE BROTHERS (a Partnership) et al., Respondents.
W. C. Black, Jr., and A. F. Mack, Jr., for Appellant.
McCarthy & Rowell for Respondents.
GOODELL, J.
Appellant sued for $7,250 damages for the breach of a contract whereby he was employed as master of a fishing vessel owned by respondents. By cross-complaint respondents claimed $999.47 as expenses incurred in repossessing the vessel, plus $239.91 alleged damage to the vessel, and $2,000 exemplary damages. The court awarded respondents judgment for $520 on their cross-complaint and this appeal was taken.
Appellant has been a commercial fisherman on this coast since 1926 and a master of fishing vessels since 1942. Respondents are in the construction business in San Mateo county, but in 1945 they had a fishing vessel 62 feet in length and of 15-foot beam, built for themselves, at a cost of $45,000. She was named the "Green Dolphin." On July 30, 1945, respondents and appellant entered into a contract providing in paragraphs one and three that Pastorino would act as her captain for one year from July 31, 1945, to July 31, 1946. By paragraph [90 Cal. App. 2d 843] two Pastorino agreed "in his capacity of Captain ... to operate and take care of the said vessel to the best of his ability at all times." By paragraph four Greene Brothers agreed to pay Pastorino "for acting as Captain" 5 per cent "of the Boat share," and by paragraph five the parties agreed that Pastorino should receive in addition thereto "a regular Crew Member's one (1) share, as per the common method of dividing the Fishing vessel's Shares." Those were its only provisions.
The vessel's first trip was to fish for tuna off the Oregon coast. Respondent Ralph Greene, who had just made a six-months' study of the fishing business, went along on this trip, which lasted from August 16 to November 1, 1945. The day after the vessel returned she sailed from San Francisco to fish for tuna out of San Pedro. While so engaged appellant made arrangements to haul clams from the coast of Lower California to a cannery at San Pedro which, according to appellant's judgment, was the only profitable activity for the boat as she was then equipped. Respondents were consulted by appellant about this expedition and did not object to it. This trip lasted for the first two weeks of December, and the vessel then returned to San Francisco for a copper painting job, also for a checkup by her builders. She remained from December 20, 1945, to January 5, 1946, during which time respondents attempted to find marine-ways on which she could be painted. The shipyards were crowded, a machinists' strike was on, and it appeared that there would be a further delay of two or three weeks. From the record it fairly appears that appellant became restive and impatient; of course he was earning nothing during this lay-up and was under expense. Moreover, it appears that while engaged on the clam hauling operation appellant had made a commitment to return on January 9, for another tour carrying clams from the coast of Lower California to San Pedro, and time was running short. Respondents had brought up the question of dragnet fishing out of San Francisco and had told appellant that they disapproved of any further hauling of clams. The vessel was equipped only for tuna fishing; new and different gear would be required for dragnet fishing and respondents had taken no steps toward procuring it beyond the making of inquiries. In this situation appellant on January 5 sailed from San Francisco for San Pedro to keep the engagement he had made for the hauling of clams. The first the owners knew of his [90 Cal. App. 2d 844] departure was a radio message which he sent after getting out to sea. Respondents immediately radioed him to return, which he refused to do, and they had the Coast Guard send out a cutter which ordered the "Green Dolphin" into Santa Barbara. Ralph Greene went there at once, ordered appellant to take the vessel back to San Francisco, which he refused to do, and Greene discharged him and took possession of the vessel.
Appellant's action in sailing from San Francisco on January 5 without consulting respondents and after they had disapproved any further clam operations indicates his position with respect to his power and authority as master; respondents' action in ordering him back indicates theirs.
It is appellant's contention that what he did was fully justified by the custom and usage surrounding contracts such as the one in question.
The court sustained objections to every question by which appellant attempted to prove custom and usage and he followed up these adverse rulings with offers of proof--four or five of them--all of which were rejected.
Appellant's contention on this appeal is fairly indicated by the following tender: "I would like to make an offer of proof that there is a common custom or usage amounting to uniform practice as followed in the commercial fishing business as to whether or not the owners or master or Captain shall have full control of the operation of the vessel under such circumstances as I enumerated in my preamble. This common custom or usage isn't a local custom, but pertains to the ... entire coastal country. This custom or usage is followed by all of the people in the fishing business and it is of universal application to all those in the commercial fishing industry and isn't just used occasionally and there is absolutely no exception to it. It is well known in the fishing business. This common custom or usage ... is that the master of the ship has complete control of his own ship for the term of the contract. He can take the vessel out and he can decide when and where the vessel should operate and the owners of the vessel have no authority to determine when and where the vessel is to be taken over the captain's decision under such circumstances."
Appellant also made the following tender which involved the question of damages by way of prospective profits. After he had described the modus operandi of the initial clam hauling venture he was asked whether, while on that trip he had made arrangements for a future trip. Respondents objected [90 Cal. App. 2d 845] on the ground that "The owners didn't authorize any future trips and on the contrary specifically refused to permit any future trips." Appellant's counsel argued that the question bore "on the question of damages as to what he could do and how much he could make." The court sustained the objection. Appellant then offered to prove that while appellant was on the first clam hauling operation he had arranged for another similar trip; "that he made arrangements for 400 of these Mexicans to be digging clams so he could leave on the trip January 9th from San Pedro, meet them down there with fresh water and pick up the clams ... that this same canning company made an agreement with him, a verbal one, that they would guarantee him one trip a month for the next 7 months and that they would purchase the clams that he would bring up on each of these trips for the next succeeding 7 months, and ... that in boats of this size and equipped as this boat was, they made more money and profit than any other boat in any other type of fishing equipped the same as this boat."
The trial court's view of the case is illustrated by one of the rulings rejecting evidence of custom, namely, "The contract is the basis of this whole affair, this whole action."
[1] The court erred in sustaining the objections and in rejecting the proffered evidence of custom. The contract is, of course, "the basis of this whole affair" but it is absolutely silent respecting control, and upon that question this case must turn. If appellant had the right as master to take the vessel south on January 5 the respondents breached the contract; if not, then he did. In the absence of a written provision or oral testimony of an understanding (see Buckner v. A. Leon & Co., 204 Cal. 225, 227 [267 P. 693]) the court had to be informed from some source as to what the contract meant and that source was evidence as to custom and usage.
In Hind v. Oriental Products Co., 195 Cal. 655, 667 [235 P. 438], it is said: "It is the general rule that when there is a known usage of the trade, persons carrying on that trade are deemed to have contracted in reference to the usage unless the contrary appears; that the usage forms a part of the contract, and that evidence of usage is always admissible to supply a deficiency or as a means of interpretation where it does not alter or vary the terms of the contract [citations]." This was quoted in Buckner v. A. Leon & Co., supra, 204 Cal. 225, 227. And in the recent case of Isenberg v. California etc. [90 Cal. App. 2d 846] Commission, 30 Cal. 2d 34, 37 [180 P.2d 11], the court again followed the Hind case, saying: "Clearly, the existence of a contractual right may be shown by usages and customs." This need not be elaborated nor further authorities cited since the rule is definitely settled not only by case law but by statute. Section 1637, Civil Code provides that "For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, if otherwise doubtful, the rules given in this chapter [Interpretation of Contracts] are to be applied." Sections 1646, 1655 and 1656, Civil Code, state such rules, while section 1870, Code of Civil Procedure, provides that evidence may be given of "Usage, to explain the true character of an act, contract, or instrument, where such true character is not otherwise plain, but usage is never admissible, except as an instrument of interpretation; ..."
[2] One of the objections to the proffered evidence was that "it doesn't appear that any such custom, if there ever was one, was known to the owners and agreed by them" and that point is now pressed by respondents, the argument being that they were in the building business and this fishing venture was new to them. Miller v. Germain Seed & Plant Co., 193 Cal. 62, 69 [222 P. 817, 32 A.L.R. 1215] answers this contention. It is there said: "The rule seems to be uniform that a party to a contract may be bound by a custom not inconsistent with the terms of the contract, even though he is ignorant of the custom, if that custom is of such general and universal application that he may be conclusively presumed to know of the custom ... The rule that a person will be presumed to have contracted with reference to a general custom or usage whether he knew of that custom or not has frequently been invoked."
Appellant's tender represented to the court that he proposed to prove that the custom was general and universal up and down the Pacific coast. He was precluded from doing so. Whether he could have convinced the court that such general and universal custom existed is not now before this court. Appellant could not prove his whole case by one question and answer but was entitled to take one step at a time. The rule of the Germain Seed case was applied in Newcomb & Co. Ltd. v. Sainte Claire Realty Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 437, 440 [130 P.2d 793], where the same claim was made of ignorance of the custom. [3] Over and above what has been said, Ralph Greene's own testimony shows that it was he who drew the contract. Appellant's testimony shows that the contract was [90 Cal. App. 2d 847] the same as those "commonly used, whether oral or written, in the operation of fishing vessels." Ralph Greene had spent the six months just before the vessel was completed making a study of the fishing business, journeying up and down the coast to familiarize himself with its operations and practices. When the $45,000 vessel was commissioned respondents had definitely embarked in the commercial fishing business and could not claim to be strangers to its practices, hence Latta v. Da Roza, 100 Cal. App. 606 [280 P. 711, 281 P. 655] and People v. Seymour, 54 Cal. App. 2d 266 [128 P.2d 726], relied on by respondents are not in point.
There is enough in this record to show that commercial fishing is decidedly unlike ordinary business enterprises. The evidence shows, for instance, that the captain and crew of this vessel got no stated compensation whatever from the owners but had to depend on a share of the proceeds of the catch--the result of their own skill, experience and industry. Judging by this record, an owner does not even supply the provisions for a fishing vessel; these are paid for by those who man it.
It would appear (but on this question we make no holding) that the contract of July 30, 1945, is what is known as a "fishing lay" of some type or other. Definitions of a "fishing lay" are found in 24 Words and Phrases (perm. ed.), page 444. See, also, 56 Corpus Juris, page 1058, title "Lay or share of earnings." The cases of Cromwell v. Slaney, 65 F.2d 940 cited by appellant and The Carrier Dove, 38 C.C.A. 73 [97 F. 111] cited therein give some idea of what "fishing lays" are and how they operate. Such authorities show at a glance the necessity for admitting evidence of custom and usage in a case of this kind. They are not cited by us as authority on any point herein, but simply because of the general discussions found therein of fishing contracts.
There was considerable testimony as to the claimed unseaworthiness of the vessel, and her condition when she was repossessed at Santa Barbara, but it is not necessary to review that part of the record in view of the prejudicial errors already discussed.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Nourse, P. J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
of California Court of Appeal opinions.


So since we all labored on Labor Day why not take the hank's sailing on the Makani for a relaxing day on the ocean! First foodie scrabble and picnic lunch at kewalo basin park then off sailing! What a great day, thanks for all the hard work guys!


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As medicine has lent itself progressively to innovation in the field of antenatal screening at various cellular stages of fetal growth, ethical and moral dilemmas follow these innovations in a parallel fashion. Along with the myriad options currently available in screening a fetus for chromosomal and genetic anomalies, comes the inevitable question of finding the most cost-effective and non-invasive form of screening tailored towards mothers of varying demographics. Currently, the legal policies with regards to prenatal screening (a detection of chromosomal aneuploidies often confused with pre-implantation diagnosis) present themselves rather vaguely. Legal policies are ambiguous as the "standard" procedures of management and counseling among mothers with fetuses suffering from these genetic anomalies are still in flux. The ethical precinct of "non-directiveness" in counseling cannot realistically be fulfilled as most genetic counselors cannot maintain an impartial stance throughout a whole genetic counseling session.[1. Asbury, B. D. (2016). Fostering Informed Choice: Alleviating the Trauma of Genetic Abortions. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 293-333. Retrieved September 13, 2017, from http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/JLPP/upload/Asbury-final.pdf.]
From a medical perspective, prenatal and preimplantation screening seem to be advantageous tools that can aid pregnant women in making informed decisions regarding the fetus's health. However, the ethical dilemmas surrounding these screening methods and their consequences seem to outweigh the benefits in particular instances. The advantages of these screening techniques in detecting abnormalities range from the detection of chromosomal aneuploidies to major structural anomalies (limb and organ malformations) such as exomphalos, cleft palate, gastroschisis and anencephaly to name a few.[2. Jong, A. D., Maya, I., & Lith, J. M. (2014). Prenatal Screening: Current Practice, New Developments, Ethical Challenges. Bioethics, 29(1), 1-8. doi:10.1111/bioe.12123.] Prenatal screening varies from pre-implantation screening in its method and in its target of detection.
Prenatal screening follows a series of steps taking place over a time-interval of as early as the 1st week of pre-conception to approximately the 28th-week gestation. Initially, the mother's first prenatal visit involves prescribing her folic acid supplementation (to prevent neural tube defects) along with a panel of tests to confirm her status regarding rubella, syphilis, HIV immunity and Rhesus D status (done to confirm whether an RhD- mother is or is not having an RhD+ baby–to prevent erythroblastosis foetalis from developing in case they have mismatched blood ). This test is followed up by a Down's Syndrome Screening at the next prenatal visit (in which the baby can also be screened for major structural deformities and trisomies 13 and 18 if the mother wishes to have it done) is considered a non-invasive prenatal test (NIPT) which harnesses the use of cell-free foetal DNA –a major watershed in the field of fetal chromosomal analysis.[3. B., B., Ke, R. W., & Kutteh, W. H. (2013). Preimplantation Genetic Screening: A Practical Guide. Clinical Medicine Insights: Reproductive Health, 37. doi:10.4137/cmrh.s10852] Once NIPT takes place, invasive testing which is more accurate (in terms of its exclusion of false positives and negatives which occur in NIPT) takes place in the next visit, concluding the screening process.2
Preimplantation genetic screening is only different in the sense that it is a form of screening that takes place at an earlier stage of preconception and targets identification of certain diseases at the cell stage of the embryo (often the third or fifth day of embryo development). As many other screening techniques it has evolved to evaluate the genetics of the embryo with more accuracy, and currently evaluates all 23 chromosomes utilizing the methods of microarray technology.3 Two methods this microarray technology consists of are analyzing single nucleotide polymorphisms and comparative genomic hybridization. A disadvantage of this screening method is that it uses microarrays which involve amplification of DNA (which can potentially amplify a false result changing the detection of a disease).
Both screening methods offer an endless avenue of possibilities in the way of detecting certain anomalies as they lead to a population of pregnant women who become more cognizant of the well-being of their fetuses. However, the threat of trauma resulting from genetic abortions prevent these methods of screening from being solely beneficial. One main conflict stemming from prenatal screening is that genetic abortion is more psychologically painful than an abortion done due to stillbirth. In the case of an abortion due to stillbirth, the mother has no choice in the matter of termination to her pregnancy as it has been decided for her. Yet, in the case of a genetic abortion, if her fetus has a genetic defect such as Down's syndrome or spina bifida, she has to decide whether she must terminate her pregnancy or not.1 If the woman chooses to terminate her pregnancy for these reasons, she can often suffer deleterious psychological consequences due to a sense of guilt. At its worst, this sense of guilt often leads to complex grief reactions in women who choose termination of pregnancy due to fetal abnormality).1 A complex grief reaction often consists of significant weight loss, significant sleep disturbances, intense feelings of guilt and worthlessness, hallucinations or delusions, and even considerations or attempts at suicide. Essentially, a complex grief reaction can reach into the domain of severe depression.
Another study supporting this outcome, concluded that post-traumatic stress was more frequently found in women who terminated their pregnancy due to a fetal abnormality. Often, these negative reactions to termination also arise from the astonishingly brief amount of genetic counseling that pregnant women receive. One study found that medical professionals spend an average of only 2.5-6.5 minutes discussing genetic counseling with pregnant women.2 Perhaps more confounding than all these reasons, is the quandary of whether the fetus's quality of life will be compromised if he or she is afflicted with Down's syndrome and the range to which he or she could be affected by a disease. Should the mother terminate her pregnancy even though she does not know the range of the disease that her child would be afflicted with (the possibility of a milder manifestation of any disease process)?Associated with this reason, is the argument of how disability should be perceived and if a pregnancy should be selectively terminated just because the fetus could suffer the possibility of handicap physically or mentally. Disability activists continue to argue that if there are far fewer handicapped individuals in society, society will be less inclined to 'value individuals and provide the necessary services for them to survive and thrive'.[4. Allyse, M., Minear, M., Rote, M., Hung, A., Chandrasekharan, S., Berson, E., & Sridhar, S. (2015). Non-invasive prenatal testing: a review of international implementation and challenges. International Journal of Women's Health,113. doi:10.2147/ijwh.s67124],[5.Buchanan A 1996 Choosing who will be disabled: genetic intervention and the morality of inclusion. Social Philosophy and Policy 13, 18–46.][6. Coghlan, A. (2007). Genetic testing: informed choice or waste of money? New Scientist,196(2624), 8-9. doi:10.1016/s0262-4079(07)62496-8.]
Concomitant with these arguments of negative psychological outcomes for women who undergo genetic abortions and moral perception of disability, arises the ethical dilemma from the point of view of a medical professional regarding beneficence and nonmaleficence. One of the core ethical principles medical professional follow, is to do no harm (nonmaleficence) and to act in the patient's best interest (beneficence). Would it truly be in the patient's best interest to tell her to terminate her pregnancy? For society, the burden of an impaired individual would be lessened by termination of her pregnancy, but for her and her fetus, would this decision truly be the best? Another ethical contention of nonmaleficence also begs the question of whether fetuses should be selectively eradicated so as to not have any disability.5 Physicians and genetic counselors must do not harm, yet at the end of the day, what constitutes harm cannot easily be defined either by the patient or by the medical professionals involved. Additionally, is genetic abortion at the stage of preimplantation screening more justified than at the level of prenatal screening, since the child to be born is not considered as a fetus (and therefore not a life yet) in the stage of preimplantation screening?
Finally, in the case of NIPT, genetic testing done earlier may allow mothers to more easily follow through with a genetic abortion as the bond between the mother and the unborn child is not as strong at this stage of pregnancy (when the testing takes place).[7. Follow-up of multiple aneuploidies and single monosomies detected by noninvasive prenatal testing: implications for management and counseling. (2016). Prenatal Diagnosis, 36(6), 594-594. doi:10.1002/pd.4839.] Moreover, if NIPT becomes one of the 'routinized' sequences of tests that are done in prenatal screening, mothers will not be informed and will not have the independent right of decision to have the test or to not. In the case of low-income countries, NIPT may be used to selectively decide the sex of a fetus.1 Apart from this, the steep stratification of society would make it so that the poorer population would not be able to afford the test compared to the higher income families.
Ultimately, the burden falls on the mother of whether she should terminate her pregnancy or not. The psychological trauma also falls on her as she must make the final decision. The mental and social factors compound to make the decision a more difficult one, but genetic screening will continue to advance in its efficacy and accuracy regardless of these issues. Even though these conflicts cannot be avoided, the government, medical institutions, and views upon disability must evolve to fit the advancements of technology in diagnostic screening.
I thank Teneille Brown for her guidance and her supervision.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Neinar Seli (born 7 December 1959 in Tartu) is an Estonian sports figure (hammer throw), entrepreneur and politician.

He was a member of IX Riigikogu.

From 2012 to 2016 he was the president of Estonian Olympic Committee.

In 2006 he was awarded with Order of the White Star, III class.

References

Living people
1959 births
Estonian male hammer throwers
Estonian businesspeople
Estonian Reform Party politicians
Members of the Riigikogu, 1999–2003
Recipients of the Order of the White Star, 3rd Class
University of Tartu alumni
Academic staff of the University of Tartu
People from Tartu
Sportspeople from Tartu

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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Offensive fouls do not count towards the team foul penalty. The team foul penalty applies in a period after a team commits one foul in the final two minutes if the team had not reached the penalty phase in the first ten NBA or eight WNBA minutes of that period.
In other words, within any period free throws are awarded starting from the fifth foul OR from the second foul in the last two minutes of the period, whichever comes earlier.
If a game enters overtime , the foul counts are reset to 0, and are similarly reset before each subsequent overtime period. The penalty phase starts with the fourth foul in each overtime period rather than five for regulation periods, since overtime periods are much shorter than regular game periods 5 minutes vs.
As in regulation play, two free throws are awarded for non-shooting defensive fouls during the bonus period, and one foul in the final two minutes automatically puts the team in the team foul penalty.
The player cannot be ejected from the game for a technical foul caused by such. This type of technical foul serves in effect as a "player foul penalty" of a bonus free throw, similar to the team foul penalty.
However, this bonus free throw is awarded regardless of the foul being an offensive or defensive foul, unlike a team foul penalty, where the two free throws only applies for defensive fouls.
The basic bonus rules remain the same, but the limit for team fouls is six per half. Upon committing the seventh foul of the half, a team is penalized and the opposing team is awarded at least one free throw for any defensive or loose-ball foul, no matter if the foul was shooting or non-shooting offensive fouls are never awarded free throws in the NCAA.
In the case of a non-shooting foul, the opposing player must make the first free throw in order to be awarded a second free throw.
This is commonly referred to as "one-and-one". Beginning with the tenth foul of a half, the fouled team is awarded two free throws on non-shooting fouls regardless of whether or not the first shot is made often referred to as the "double bonus".
For purposes of bonus, team fouls accrue from the second half on, as all overtimes are extensions of it.
In both the and editions, the NCAA has done the following with regard to the bonus: Even though the NFHS rules divide the game into quarters, the team foul count resets only at halftime.
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These fouls reset every quarter or half depending on the rules in use i. Under FIBA rules, used for all competitions involving international teams and most leagues outside the U.
All subsequent non-shooting defensive fouls committed by that team in the same quarter concede two free throws. All fouls committed by players count towards the team foul count.
Team fouls accrue from the fourth period on, as all overtimes are extensions of it for the purpose of team foul accumulation.
The 3-man game, known as FIBA 3x3 , has a slightly different penalty rule. The penalty is triggered when a team commits more than six fouls in a game.
Each penalty situation involves two penalty free throws, and the tenth and subsequent fouls will also include possession of the ball. The bonus rule specifically supersedes the normal rules for defensive fouls on shot attempts.
Instead of the 1 shot awarded on a made basket or a missed 1-point shot attempt, or the 2 free throws awarded on a missed 2-point shot attempt, 2 free throws are always awarded regardless of the result of the shot attempt.
However, as in standard basketball rules, offensive fouls if not technical or unsportsmanlike never result in free throws, regardless of the number of team fouls.
If a game enters overtime , the foul counts are reset to 0, and are similarly reset before each subsequent overtime period.
The penalty phase starts with the fourth foul in each overtime period rather than five for regulation periods, since overtime periods are much shorter than regular game periods 5 minutes vs.


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Home » Actors/Actresses » Comedy » Post BBC Showcase in The Big Easy – Comedy
Post BBC Showcase in The Big Easy – Comedy
On: October 18, 2013, By: Bill Young
As we leave The Big Easy in the Southwest jet's rear view mirror, this year's BBC Syndication Showcase was no different than any in recent memory. Nothing but good telly to choose from to bring to public television in the States for 2014. Here are a few of the comedy highlights that many of you can look forward to in the coming year….
Starring Darren Boyd (Whites, Dirk Gently), Rebekah Staton and Mathew Baynton (The Wrong Mans), Spy tells the story of Tim Elliot, a divorced and single father disliked by his precocious son Marcus and ex-wife Judith. He decides to quit his job as a sales assistant in a computing store learning of a data processing position in Westminster. Unknown to him, he is taking an exam for MI5, and passes to be a spy. When the bosses, including the Examiner (Robert Lindsay) learn of the misunderstanding, they still offer him the position anyway, and Tim accepts.
2. Twenty Twelve
Sporting an all-star cast, headed by Hugh Bonneville, Amelia Bullmore and Jessica Hynes, Twenty Twelve chronicles the work of the management of the fictional Olympic Deliverance Commission (ODC) as they plan the logistics of the 2012 Summer Olympics in London. Shot in the mockumentary style of both The Office and People Like Us, Twenty Twelve 'organizers' must overcome logistical difficulties, production errors, infrastructure problems and troublesome contributors.
3. Moone Boy
This Irish comedy features Chris O'Dowd as Seán, the imaginary friend of 12-year-old Martin Moone, the youngest child of a family living in a small town in the rural Ireland. Martin, aided by his imaginary friend, has a unique perspective on life. His imagination comes into play both in his childish drawings, which come alive through animation, and in the ridiculous schemes he comes up with, against Seán's better judgement. With Seán's help, Martin negotiates life as the youngest in a chaotic, scatter-brained family.
We'll hit the dramas and docs tomorrow. Combined with the offerings coming directly from PBS and the BBC, it's going to be a great telly year on public television.
In: Actors/Actresses,Comedy
London Twenty Twelve…365 days and counting
Spy – tonight on Sky1
As UK 'Spy' comes to an end, the future of a U.S. 'Spy' is looking up with the addition of Rob Corddry
British comedy in the pipeline
More SPY and TROLLIED coming your (our) way in 2012
Art imitates life once again as 'W1A' filming begins next month on S3