The New World population of Common Moorhen is split from the Eurasian population and renamed Common Gallinule (Gallinula galeata) on the basis of differences in vocalizations as well as bill and shield morphology (AOU, 2011).
The English name Whip‐poor‐will has been changed to Eastern Whip‐poor‐will to distinguish it from the southwest population now renamed Mexican Whip‐poor‐will (2010). MacGillivray's Warbler has been removed from the Ontario list (2010).
The English common name Nelson's Sharp‐tailed Sparrow has been shortened to Nelson's Sparrow (2009). The Tanagers family is removed and the three species formerly in that family are moved to the beginning of the Cardinals & Allies family (2009).
In 2008, the order of the gulls was changed on the Ontario Checklist to reflect the AOU order. Hoary Redpoll (2013), Black Scoter (2008) and Trumpeter Swan (2007) were added as breeding species. The common name Mongolian Plover is now Lesser Sand‐Plover (2004) to agree with modern Old World literature. The common name Rock Dove changed to Rock Pigeon (2003). The name Three‐toed Woodpecker changed to American Three‐toed Woodpecker (2003) as a result of a split from the Eurasian species. The name Common Snipe was changed to Wilson's Snipe because of a split from the European species (2002).
To find out how to order a printed field checklist please go to our merchandise page.
Ontario is divided into Lowlands, Central and South regions (see map above); thus, the cities of Sault Ste. Marie, Sudbury and North Bay are in the South region of the province.
L – Species recorded in the Lowlands Review Zone; (L) indicates the OBRC requests documentation when the species is recorded in the region.
C – Species recorded in the Central Review Zone; (C) indicates the OBRC requests documentation when the species is recorded in the region.
S – Species recorded in the South Review Zone; (S) indicates the OBRC requests documentation when the species is recorded in the region.
* – Species recorded as breeding in Ontario.
This checklist is at the species level only.


text:
"Innovative, Offbeat and Downright Bizarre"
studioquinn All Ages April 15, 2022 April 14, 2022 6 Minutes
"His writing is filled with energy and insane ideas and off-the-wall mystical concepts and the sort of dark lunacy typically associated with Neil Gaiman and Grant Morrison's work for DC / Vertigo."
Ben Herman, In My Not So Humble Opinion
Doctor Strange, Sorcerer Supreme Omnibus, by David Quinn, Peter Gross, et al, Volume 3, Marvel, April 2022
Coming April 26
At your friendly neighborhood Local Comic Shop (And every retailer that sells Marvel and Penguin Random House books) later this month, in synchronicity with the theatrical release of Doctor Strange in the Multiverse of Madness, the 28th Marvel Cinematic Universe flick, starring an ensemble led by Benedict Cumberbatch, Elizabeth Olsen and Benedict Wong… this, the third and final omnibus collection of the 1988-1996 series of Stan Lee and Steve Ditko's master of the mystic arts.
Over a thousand pages of magic and madness.
Stephen Strange, with his fingertips tracing the multiverse while his shoes wander dirty old Bleecker Street – one of my favorite Marvel characters since the first issue I picked up as a kid in Ann Arbor, Michigan. You know those books you never let go of, even when you move and sell off half of what you've collected? (I've done that three times since 1974.)
Yeah, this is one of them, for me.
Doctor Strange, Marvel, by Steve Englehart and Frank Brunner, 1974
Thank you, Stan Lee and Steves Ditko and Englehart and Frank Brunner!
And this omnibus above will also shelve in the dusty permanent library of my Sanctum Sanctorum, AKA The Temple of Rotting Paper, because it includes a couple dozen of the three dozen or so stories I contributed to the Marvel Comics Universe between 1993 and 1996. As Stan Lee himself once told me, "Hey, I'm my own biggest fan."
Some of these stories have never been reprinted, and I am grateful to all the classic comics retailers and Doc fans new and old who support the collection with your hard-earned quarters.
Please do check it out!
"As Stan Lee himself once told me, 'Hey, I'm my own biggest fan.'"
Strange Magick
Recently, I enjoyed a conversation with Kurt Anthony Krug, a Detroit-based journalist in preparation for his Doctor Strange related feature for Current magazine. (Don't worry, when it's in print and online I will update this to include a live link.) Kurt was keen to learn a bit about where I came from, how I came to comics and Doctor Strange, and the story behind these stories, and as we got into it, I found I still feel a considerable investment of emotional, visceral, and spiritual energy when I talk about the Doc I knew. Serious fun.
I think these stories work, especially in a long form story medium (think: serial comic books, serial soap operas and other long form television shows, serial movie franchises) and I think I know why.
T. S. Eliot (not a comic book magician, but worth reading anyway) thought that good writing was simply, "The making the familiar strange, and the strange familiar." Eliot was praising the worth of the poetry of Andrew Marvell when he penned this, but he nailed the secret to good comics, particularly the kind the superhero stores sell every week – work-for-hire stories that ultimately live as chapters in a thousand (or more) chapter narrative owned not by an author, but by a media company.
What else would you call Marvel Comics since Fantastic Four? The MCU since Iron Man? (Star Wars since Joseph Campbell?
Doctor Strange, Sorcerer Supreme, Marvel, Art: Johnson/Harper
Writers like change, but radical change breaks the trust, the bond, the secret pact with that audience dedicated / addicted to these kinds of stories. Radical change renders the characters and conflicts we came for into… chaos. So when someone asks, "What would you do if we let you write our characters?" you don't change the game, so much as turn the game on its head with a spin to offer a look at what everyone expects… a way they don't expect.
I think Tom Brevoort, one of the best editors I ever worked with in comics, called this "the illusion of change" in his advice to creators. There's a reason that Tom's been trusted with the pieces on the game board since (I'm guessing) Janet Jackson had the number one song on the charts and your standard floppy comic cost a buck.
This is the strange magick, the illusion of innovation, the creative spin I shot for.
Despite a post-Faust rep for bizarre and dangerous, when invited to, I pitched Marvel consciously focused on telling Doctor Strange mega story that called back his very essential primal origin – a genius whose arrogance costs him everything he values, then risks his life and his world, humbly accepting the magick of the all creation to stand up on his own two feet again, renewed. Since Ditko and Lee, Doctor Strange may fight the Big Bad in funky colorful costume… but his true conflict is ever within himself.
Personality Crisis
So, my Doctor Strange – no longer Sorcerer Supreme – defends his Mansion from demons from another dimension, creating a "stasis spiral" that stops time long enough for him to disappear. As time resumes, we learn that his Sanctum has fallen, his allies have become enemies and a prehistoric mage called Salome has come to our dimension to claim her former mantle, Sorcerer Supreme. Soon, we will see that Stephen Strange has created a null space, a new extra dimensional Dark Sanctum, if you will, where he can heal his wounds and recover to fight again. But not before he has found a new source of magick… for he has been infected by "Salome's Dance." If he leaves the null space and re-enters his homeward, he will disintegrate.
And that was just the first chapter.
Doctor Strange, Marvel, Art: Max Douglas
In the moments (comic book issues) that follow, Earth is infiltrated by two strange beings. The first, a faceless powerhouse calling itself Strange, wreaks havoc, using forceful magick to find and capture mystic artifacts, clashing with superpowers like Namor the Sub-Mariner, the X-Men and Doctor Doom. The second force to be reckoned with beguiles and manipulates the globes social and business markets, throwing lavish parties for his fellow elites. We soon realize that this latter character is Dr. Vincent Stephens, the man Doctor Strange would be if he hadn't ruined his hands in his famous origin story, sought the Ancient One for a quick fix, and tempered magic power with human empathy. The other mysterious nemesis, Strange, is the nightmare that Doctor Strange would become if he ever lost his humanity.
Yes, in the moment he stopped time, Stephen Strange created two aetheric spells to do his work for him while he hid "underground."
Doctor Strange, Marvel, Art: Peter Gross
Doctor Strange, Marvel, Original Art: Gene Colan
Integrity Crisis
This was a new perspective from which we could look at our hero, even though long-time readers caught that the look of Strange was a visual echo of the masked version of his costume favored for a while in the issues by Roy Thomas and Gene Colan.
And this was not the only change that was actually "the illusion of change." Even with pyrotechnical battles around the globe, even with a mad woman rattling human skull jewelry screaming she's here to destroy Stephen Strange, the real conflict at the heart was within Doctor Strange's soul itself. For he's unaware, or unwilling to see, that the two Strangers gradually become independent entities, fighting tenaciously to life. (Like Pinocchio, they want to be real boys.) Despite his boastful vow to no longer treat "those who trusted me like mere chess pawns," Doctor Strange is – at first – unwilling to accept the consequences of his creating the Strangers, a blind spot he ultimately faces, and works through in the story called Last Rites.
"This is the strange magick, the illusion of innovation, the creative spin, and despite my rep for the bizarro, I consciously tried to tell a Doctor Strange mega story that called back his very essential primal origin – a genius whose arrogance costs him everything he values, then risks his life and his world, humbly accepting the magick of the all creation to stand up on his own two feet again, renewed. Since Ditko and Lee, Doctor Strange may fight the big bad in a funky colorful costume… but his true conflict is within himself."
I could say more about Doctor Strange, including notes about a few of my favorite stories in this big book and an idea I keep revisiting that he's interesting because in most stories, someone with his personality and power would very likely be the villain, not the hero… but you know, this is getting a little long and I have to let it go to you… till next time.
Are you looking forward to checking out the new collection, or the new movie?
How long have you been a Doctor Strange disciple?
And for your hardcore nerds, don't you enjoy it when Spider-man and Stephen Strange, two of the most famous oddball heroes from the pencil of Steve Ditko, face off in the comics or the movies?
Keep in touch, be good to each other, give Mom a call on Mother's Day, that's all for now!
What is the Anomaly Rue? Established 1963, Named 1993
See ya at the movies or the comic rack, True Believers! (And I love that I caught Eduardo Pug watching the birds, here!)
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Next Post "In the '90s, ambitious creative ideas met the limitations of mainstream superhero comics."

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Hammer will automatically compile .coffee files to .js files and .scss and .sass files to .css files. You don't need to anything to make this happen, Hammer handles it for you.
## SASS Mixins Hammer includes [Bourbon's set of SASS mix-ins](http://thoughtbot.com/bourbon/) for use in your app. Whether you're using SCSS or SASS, mix-ins are a useful trick for avoiding vendor prefixes in your code.
You don't have to use mix-ins, but they're a great way of writing clean, concise code. A full list of the mix-ins included is available on the [Bourbon site](http://thoughtbot.com/bourbon/).


1. La Rovere M.T. Autonomic markers of prognosis after myocardial Infarction. Gin Set 1996; 91 (Suppl): 133-5.
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6. Head G.A., Burke S.L. Comparison of renal sympathetic baroreflex effects of rilmenidine and alpha-methylnoradrenaline in the ventrolateral medulla of the rabbit. J Hypertens 2000; 18: 1263-76.
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9. Muenter Swift N., Cutler M.J., Fadel P.J. et al. Carotid baroreflex function durum and following voluntary apnea in humans. Am J Physiol Heart Circ Physiol 2003; 285: H2411-9.
10. Mohanty P.K., Sowers J.R., McNamara С., Thames M.D. Reflex vasoconstrictor responses to cardiopulmonary baroreceptor unloading, head-up tilt, and cold pressor testing in elderly mild-to-moderate hypertensives: effect of clonidine. J Cardiovasc Pharmacol 1987: 10 (Suppl. 12): S135-7.
11. Medvedev O.S., Kunduzova O.R., Murashev A.N., Medvedeva N.A. Influence of sino-aortic barodenervation on the cardiovascular effects of imidazoline-like dings. J Auton Nerv Syst 1998; 72: 205-9.
12. McKaigue J.P., Harron D.W. The effects of rilmenidine on tests of autonomic function in humans. Clin Pharmacol Ther 1992; 52: 511-7.
13. Head G.A., Burke S.L. II imidazoline receptors in cardiovascular regulation: the place of rilmenidine. Am J Hypertens 2000: 13: 89S-98S.
14. Mayorov D.N., Burke S.L., Head H.A. Relative Importance of Rostral Ventrolateral Medulla in Sympathoinhibitory Action of Rilmenidine in Conscious and Anesthetized Rabbits J Cardiovasc Pharmacol 2001; 37: 252-61.
15. Tamaki N., Obtani H., Yamashita К. et al. Metabolic activity in the areas of new fillin after thallium-201 reinfection: Comparison with positron emission tomography using fluorine-18-deoxyglucose. J Nucl Med 1991: 32: 673-8.
16. Katoh N., Sheriff D.D., Siu C.O., Sagawa K. Relative importance of four pressoregulatory mechanisms after 10 % bleeding in rabbits. Am J Physiol 1989; 256: H291-6.
17. Nasqez E.S. Contribution of the cardiopulmonary baroreflex control to the cardiovascular regulation in normal and pathophysiological states. Brasil J Med Biol Res 1994: 27: 1043-64.
18. Osterziel K.J., Hanlein K., Willenbrock R., Dietz R.Z. (Interaction between the renin system and parasympathetic nervous system in heart failure). Kardiol 1993: 82: 406-10.
19. Kawano Y., Yoshimi H., Matsuoka H., Omae T. Changes in plasma endothelin-I concentration during blood volume depletion and expansion: role oj the cardiopulmonary baroreflex. Hypertens Res 1995; 18: 43-6.
20. Stevens P.M., Lamb L.I. Effect of lower body negative pressure on the cardiovascular system. Am J Cardiol 1965: 16: 506-15.
21. Скардс Я.В., Витолс А.Я. Гибкий онкометр для определения объема кровотока предплечья и предплечья методом венозной окклнюзионной плетизмографии. Физиол. журн. СССР. 1974: 10: 16-8.
22. Cuspidi С., Michev I., Meani S. et al. Non-dipper treated hypertensive patients do not have increased cardiac structural alterations. Cardiovasc Ultrasound 2003; 14 (1): 1.
23. Head G.A. Central imidazoline- and alpha 2-receptors involved in the cardiovascular actions of centrally acting antihypertensive agents. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1999: 881: 279-86.
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25. Jokasalo E., Enlund H., Halonen P. et al. Factors related to poor control of blood pressure with antihypertensive therapy. Blood Pressure 2002; 12: 22-7.


The Jagga Jasoos pair has been avoiding each other, and it's the second very obvious instance now.
The first happened when the duo came for shooting a dance sequence for the film in separate cars and left at different times in their private vehicles. No interactions other than on sets.
And now the Bollywood couple who were dating for some months has flown to Morocco for their film's shooting, But at different times leaving a gap of a couple of hours.
Ranbir Kapoor and Katrina Kaif were seen boarding different flights to Morocco for the filming.
The pair had refused to shoot internationally and almost made Anurag Basu create a full fake studio.
But now it seems unnecessary as they have agreed to fly to Morocco.
While the couple has kept their distance after breaking up, going to Morocco is quite surprising for the team.
Ranbir left four hours earlier via Abu Dabhi while Katrina came in via London. The shooting in Morocco will get the delayed film schedule back on track.
Sushant Singh Rajput Is Passionate In Theatre Plays!


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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Perceptual Content Defended
Susanna Schellenberg
Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750 (2011)
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Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem.Alex Moran - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):368-382.details
This paper sets out a novel response to the 'screening off problem' for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any (...) particular view about the psychological nature of hallucinatory experience to handle the screening off problem. Consequently, room opens up for naïve realists to endorse whatever theory of hallucinatory experience seems to best capture the distinctive nature of such episodes. (shrink)
Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Keith Wilson & Roberta Locatelli - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.details
Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
I consider the 'inferentialist' thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (2000) and Ginsborg (2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical (...) costs and tensions associated with endorsing inferentialism. (shrink)
Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.details
Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and being (...) fine-grained. However, only the latter have furthermore a perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and related dualities of perspectivality/completion and variation/constancy. Second, I elaborate on the reasons for thinking that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences need to be distinguished from accompanying seemings that passively assign things into conceptual categories and thereby tell you something about them. For example, when you look at a red apple and have the relevant recognitional abilities it will also normally seem to you that this is an apple. Finally, I argue that the best version of the popular dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it's neither experiences nor seemings by themselves, but rather the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence. (shrink)
Why Do We Need Perceptual Content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.details
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.details
Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the 'Content View.' I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...) in itself and in attribution to Kant, it promises to make sense of central claims within his critical philosophy. (shrink)
Kant: Philosophy of Mind.Colin McLear - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
Kant: Philosophy of Mind Immanuel Kant was one of the most important philosophers of the Enlightenment Period in Western European history. This encyclopedia article focuses on Kant's views in the philosophy of mind, which undergird much of his epistemology and metaphysics. In particular, it focuses on metaphysical and epistemological doctrines forming the … Continue reading Kant: Philosophy of Mind →.
Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...) given that intentionality and ratio- nality are both normative phenomena, the main theme of the articles is the relationship between consciousness and normativity and the centrality of this relationship to our first-personal perspective. -/- This focus culminates in the defense of two specific views, experiential rationalism and experiential intentionalism. The first is, very roughly, the view that how our mental episodes are given in consciousness reflects their rational role in our mental lives: it is part of what our mental episodes subjectively are like that we phenomenally experience them as providing and/or responding to certain kinds of reasons. The central claim of the second view, on the other hand, is that the intentionality of our mental episodes is essentially linked to consciousness and involves a token-reflexive element: they intentionally present not only the world, but also themselves as being a certain way. -/- Some of the essays also deal with the contrast between our first- and our third-personal perspectives and the — to some extent related — division of labour between philosophy and the empirical sciences. Both perspectives have their limitations and sometimes conflict with each other, raising the question of what the consequences are for accounts of our first-personal knowledge and its internal or external objects. (shrink)
Experience and Introspection.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. The MIT Press. pp. 175-220.details
One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot— and need not—be characterized in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or "naive realist") disjunctivism—the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapter, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to experiential (...) disjunctivism called experiential intentionalism. This view not only enjoys some advantages over its rival but is also compatible with the epistemic conception of hallucinations, as well as with the disjunctivist view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their third-personal structures (e.g., their causal, informational, or reason-providing links to reality). It also maintains that there are actually two aspects to the subjective indistinguishability of mental episodes: (i) we cannot distinguish their first-personal characters in introspective awareness; and (ii) we cannot distinguish their third-personal structures in experiential awareness—that is, in how they are given to consciousness. While experiential disjunctivism makes the mistake of ignoring (ii) and reducing subjective indiscriminability to (i), experiential intentionalism correctly identifies (ii) as the primary source of the subjective indistinguishability of perception-like hallucinations. Accordingly, the intentional error involved in such hallucinations is due to the fact that we consciously experience them as possessing a relational structure. (shrink)
Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended: Replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.details
This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I (...) show why a perceiver's belief is better justified than the belief of someone who suffers a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination. I show, moreover, why the capacity view is compatible with standard Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. In response to Ram Neta, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence, as well as the notion of evidence in light of an externalism about perceptual content. (shrink)
Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, (...) it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases. (shrink)
De Se Content and De Hinc Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):334-345.details
Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer Verlag.details
According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If some thinker with the same type of evidential support has a path that they can take, so do you. The paths exist because of the evidence you possess and the support it provides. Evidential support (...) grounds propositional justification. -/- The principle is mistaken. There are permissible steps you may take that others may not even if you have the very same evidence. There are permissible steps that you cannot take that others can even if your beliefs receive the same type of evidential support. Because we have to assume almost nothing about the nature of evidential support to establish these results, we should reject evidentialism. (shrink)
Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon‐Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.details
Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive (...) penetration less well-explained, even when formulated with so-called 'standpoints' or 'third relata.'. (shrink)
Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Noûs:1-50.details
I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.details
Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
This paper aims to shed new light on certain philosophical theories of perceptual experience by examining the semantics of perceptual ascriptions such as "Jones sees an apple." I start with the assumption, recently defended elsewhere, that perceptual ascriptions lend themselves to intensional readings. In the first part of the paper, I defend three theses regarding such readings: I) intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions ascribe phenomenal properties, II) perceptual verbs are not ambiguous between intensional and extensional readings, and III) intensional perceptual (...) ascriptions have a relational form. The second part of the paper describes the implications of I-III for theories of perceptual experience. I argue that I-III support and reconcile the three main views of perceptual experience, relationalism, disjunctivism, and representationalism. However, I-III leave open at least one important point of contention: particularism, the view that we experience external objects. I conclude by exploring the implications of accepting or denying particularism given I-III. (shrink)
The Hybrid Contents of Memory.André Sant'Anna - forthcoming - Synthese.details
This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...) hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project. (shrink)
Husserl, Impure Intentionalism, and Sensory Awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.details
Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to (...) the impure intentionalist account of states of sensory awareness. On the basis of Husserl's phenomenological work, I argue that a focus on intentionality at the level of sensory awareness is phenomenologically implausible. The final part offers an alternative functional account of sensory awareness based on what Husserl called 'immanent association'. (shrink)
Some Reflections on Husserlian Intentionality, Intentionalism, and Non-Propositional Contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
This paper discusses Husserl's theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In (...) the third part, I show that Husserl also offers resources against intentionalism's exclusive concern with propositional content. (shrink)
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
Perception and Ordinary Objects.Alex Byrne - 2019 - In Javier Cumpa & Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
The paper argues -- against the standard view in metaphysics -- that the existence of ordinary objects like tomatoes is (near-enough) established by the fact that such things are apparently encountered in perception.
The Epistemic Significance of Experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:947-67.details
According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the "good case" are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.
Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.details
Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional view of experience (...) is mistaken. For reasons explained here, I think that the epistemological argument for metaphysical disjunctivism rests on mistaken assumptions about reasons and their rational role. Neither disjunctivist view is needed to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. (shrink)
Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):529-578.details
Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant's claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...) perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The resultant view is middle way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant, holding that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding. (shrink)
Looks Indexing.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):138-152.details
Charles Travis influentially argued in "The Silence of the Senses" that the representational theory of perceptual experience is false. According to Travis, the way that things look cannot index the content of experience as the subject of the experience cannot read the content off from the way things look. This looks indexing is a central commitment of representationalism. The main thrust of Travis' argument is that the way things look is fundamentally comparative, and this prevents the subject from reading a (...) single content off from the way things look. If content were looks indexed, the subject would be able to do this. I argue that Travis' argument rests on an illicit transition from an argument about the way objects look in themselves—i.e. an argument about the visible properties that they have—to a conclusion about the way that objects look to subjects in experience. (shrink)
Post-Perceptual Confidence and Supervaluative Matching Profile.Tony Cheng - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.details
ABSTRACTIssues concerning the putative perception/cognition divide are not only age-old, but also resurface in contemporary discussions in various forms. In this paper, I connect a relatively new d...
Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content.Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.details
A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...) several ways. The most significant problem is that his approach does not sit well with mainstream perceptual psychology. (shrink)
Pains and Sounds.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):143-163.details
I argue that an analogy between pains and sounds suggests a way to give an objective account of pain which fits well with a naïve perceptualist account of feeling pain. According to the proposed metaphysical account, pains are relational physical events with shared qualitative nature, each of which is constituted by tissue damage and the activation of nociceptors. I proceed to show that the metaphysical proposal is compatible with platitudes about pains being animate, private, and self-intimating states.
Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. (...) Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience. (shrink)
Thisness and Visual Objects.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):17-32.details
According to the traditional view, visual objects can be characterized as bundles of features and locations. This initially plausible idea is contested within the contemporary psychology and philosophy of perception, where it is claimed that the visual system can represent objects as merely 'this' or 'that', in abstraction from their qualities. In this paper, I consider whether philosophical and psychological arguments connected with the rejection of the 'bundle' view of visual objects show that it is needed to postulate an additional, (...) purely individualizing characteristic, known in the philosophical tradition as 'thisness', within the structure of visual objects. I argue that the phenomenon of asymmetry of errors observed in Multiple Object Tracking experiments strongly suggests that reference to 'thisness' is needed if we are to formulate a proper diachronic identity criterion of visual objects. (shrink)
Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (5):491-506.details
This paper argues that the accuracy of perceptual experiences cannot be properly characterized by using the particular notion of content without breaking one of the three plausible assumptions. On the other hand, the general notion of content is not threatened by this problem. The first assumption is that all elements of content determine the accuracy conditions of an experience. The second states that objects needed for the accuracy of experiences are physical entities that stand in a perceptual relation to a (...) subject. According to the third assumption, common experiences do not have accuracy conditions that are impossible to satisfy. The above point is demonstrated by analysing illusions of identity in which the number of objects is represented incorrectly. In the concluding parts of the paper, I investigate how an alternative account of particular content can be developed by rejecting the first assumption. (shrink)
Daubert's Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.details
Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl's close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert's views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl's. The author argues, (...) in conclusion, that Daubert's views are superior to those of Husserl's specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. (shrink)
Kind Properties and the Metaphysics of Perception: Towards Impure Relationalism.Dan Cavedon‐Taylor - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):487-509.details
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception is between those who hold that perception is a detection relation of sensory awareness and those who hold that it is representational state akin to belief. Another key debate is between those who claim that we can perceive natural or artifactual kind properties, e.g. 'being a tomato', 'being a doorknob', etc. and those who hold we cannot. The current consensus is that these debates are entirely unrelated. I argue that this consensus is (...) wrong: the perception of natural or artifactal kinds favours representationalism. Naïve realists who wish to accommodate such perception should embrace a disunified metaphysics of perception, one that combines relational and representational events; call such a view 'impure relationalism.'. (shrink)
Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.details
I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source of both phenomenal and (...) factive evidence lies in employing perceptual capacities that we have in virtue of being perceivers. In showing that both kinds of evidence have the same rational source, I provide a unified account of perceptual evidence and its rational source in perceptual experience. (shrink)
The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach.Clinton Tolley - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):107-36.details
There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of 'content' in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of 'sense ', understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that (...) Kant takes intuitions to have a content in this sense, and, secondly, that Kant clearly takes the content of intuitions, so understood, to be distinct in kind from that possessed by concepts. I then show how my account can respond to the most serious objections to previous non-conceptualist interpretations.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the 'name' part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. '@free.kindle.com' emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. '@kindle.com' emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New ApproachVolume 18, Issue 1Clinton Tolley DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000313Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle email.@free.kindle.com@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New ApproachVolume 18, Issue 1Clinton Tolley DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000313Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New ApproachVolume 18, Issue 1Clinton Tolley DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000313Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)
Talking About Looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):781-807.details
In natural language, looks-talk is used in a variety of ways. I investigate three uses of 'looks' that have traditionally been distinguished – epistemic, comparative, and phenomenal 'looks' – and endorse and develop considerations in support of the view that these amount to polysemy. Focusing on the phenomenal use of 'looks', I then investigate connections between its semantics, the content of visual experience, and the metaphysics of looks. I argue that phenomenal 'looks' is not a propositional attitude operator: We do (...) not use it to ascribe propositional attitudes to subjects, but to directly ascribe looks to objects, where looks are relational properties. However, I go on to argue that, given the way we use phenomenal 'looks', these relational properties are ultimately best understood as phenomenal relational properties, i.e. in terms of relations involving experiences. Along the way, I endorse Byrne's argument against Jackson's claim that phenomenal 'looks F' only takes predicates for colour, shape, and distance, and raise the issue of compositionality for the resulting view according to which phenomenal 'looks F' is context-dependent in a way that allows it to take a vast range of predicates. I conclude by arguing that these considerations concerning the natural language use of 'looks', and in particular its phenomenal use, are water on the mills of phenomenal intentionalism, a position in the philosophy of perception according to which experiences are propositional attitudes with phenomenal looks-contents. (shrink)
What Motivates Fregean Anti-Individualism?Johan Peter Gersel - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):153-172.details
The Nature and Role of First and Second Person Content.Christopher Peacocke - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):345-354.details
Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism.Mattia Riccardi - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):443-454.details
Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler's view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and (...) hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler's case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide. (shrink)
Can We See Natural Kind Properties?René Jagnow - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):183-205.details
Which properties can we visually experience? Some authors hold that we can experience only low-level properties such as color, illumination, shape, spatial location, and motion. Others believe that we can also experience high-level properties, such as being a dog or being a pine tree. On the basis of her method of phenomenal contrast, Susanna Siegel has recently defended the latter view. One of her central claims is that we can best account for certain phenomenal contrasts if we assume that we (...) can visually experience natural kind properties. In this paper, I argue that certain kinds of low-level properties, namely shape-gestalt properties, can explain these phenomenal contrasts just as well as high-level properties. If successful, this is a modest, but nevertheless significant result. Even though it does not prove the falsity of Siegel's proposal, it nevertheless secures the existence of a plausible alternative. (shrink)
Openness to the World:: An Enquiry Into the Intentionality of Perception.Giananti Andrea & Soldati Gianfranco - 2015 - Dissertation, L'Université de Fribourgdetails
When we perceive we are under the impression of being directly aware of concrete, mindindependent objects. We also consider perception as a basic, reliable source for acquiring beliefs and an effective means for coping with the environment. In the philosophical literature, this direct and basic character of perception is sometimes captured by saying that perception is openness to the world. Articulating, refining and vindicating as far as possible this commonsensical view of perception as openness to the world is the main (...) objective of this work. In order to make the metaphor of openness tractable in theoretical terms, I set up the dialectic in terms of a contrast between representationalism, which holds that perception represents things as being a certain way, and pure relationalism, which holds that perception can be openness to the world only by being a non-representational relation between a subject and objects in the world. The main thesis that I defend with several arguments in this work is that perception is both representational and relational. Indeed, it intelligibly relates us to the world in virtue of its representational content. In chapter one, I place perception in the broader context of intentional states. I articulate a view on which intentional states are directed toward their objects in virtue of having representational content, and show that prima facie the arguments for thinking that paradigmatic intentional states such as belief have content apply to perception too. I also explain why pure relationalists would reject the application of the content-model to perception. Chapter two is devoted to Charles Travis's argument that perceptual experience does not have content. I counter his argument by offering a phenomenological account of perceptual constancy, and I show that content is necessary for capturing constancy in theoretical terms. Further, I argue that content helps us to better explain how the mind-independent nature of concrete objects is manifest in the phenomenology of perceptual experience. Chapter three concerns the question of how we should elucidate perceptual experience as openness to the world in the face of illusion and hallucination. I consider three possible approaches, and I argue that a view on which perceptual experience is both representational and relational can best make sense of the relevant phenomena. In the fourth chapter, I consider the debate on phenomenal character between representationalist and purely relationalist views in light of a distinction between particularity and generality. I show how representationalists are committed to there being an element of generality in perception, and how pure relationalists construe perception as wholly particular instead. I defend the representationalist view on the grounds that generality is necessary to make sense of the phenomenal and epistemic determinacy of perception. In the concluding remarks, I consider the question of whether my view can make room for the relationality of perception, and I argue again that only a distorted view of the metaphor of openness to the world could lead one to think that content and relationality are incompatible. (shrink)
The Origins of Perceptual Knowledge.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):311-328.details
Perception and Evidence.Alex Byrne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170:101-113.details
Critical discussion of Susanna Schellenberg's account of hallucination and perceptual evidence.
Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.details
According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the "defeasibility problem". This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further (...) plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call "phenomenal intentionalism". Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having "phenomenal" or "looks contents": contents of the form Lp. (shrink)
Husserl, Impure Intentionalism, and Sensory Awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):333-351.details
Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
Non‐Conceptualism and the Myth of the Given.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (3):331-363.details
Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism.Laura Gow - 2018 - Ratio 31 (S1):35-50.details
Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the 'common (...) fundamental kind claim' and adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival at all. (shrink)
Please Mind the Gappy Content.Johan Gersel - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):219-239.details
Representationalist theories of experience face the problem that two sets of compelling intuitions seem to support the contrary conclusions that we should ascribe, respectively, singular contents and general contents to experience. Susanna Schellenberg has, in a series of articles, argued that we can conserve both sets of intuitions if we award a central explanatory role to the notions of gappy-contents and content-schemas in our theory of experience. I argue that there is difficulty in seeing how gappy-contents and content-schemas can fulfil (...) the explanatory role envisioned for them by Schellenberg. The central problem is that both gappy-contents and contentschemas lack truth-conditions. Schellenberg attempts to support her view by suggesting an analogy between the role of content-schemas in our account of experience and the role of Kaplan's notion of character in our account of demonstrative statements. However, I show that this analogy breaks down at crucial places when it is explored in detail. Hence, gappy-contents and content-schemas cannot fill the explanatory roles that the representationalist awards to fully truth-evaluable contents. Therefore, Schellenberg's theory provides no way for the representationalist to conserve both sets of competing intuitions. (shrink)


text:
Divinity (School of)
Divinity Theses
Bible and theology at work : the creative energy of Dorothy L. Sayers' 'The man born to be king'
Wehr, Kathryn Hannah
Wolfe, Judith (Judith E.)
Sayers
Dorothy L. Sayers
The man born to be king
BBC radio drama
BBC World War II
Lay theology
Anglo-Catholic theology
Kurt Aland's 'Synopsis of the four Gospels'
This study centres on the biblical and theological work behind Dorothy L. Sayers' 12-part play-cycle, The Man Born to be King, aired on the BBC between 1941-42. Investigation begins by testing various unsubstantiated statements by biographers and scholars through a line-by-line analysis of the scripts, the results of which can be found in two large tables of information about how Sayers used each pericope in the Gospels (Appendix A) and a list of every known biblical reference within the play-cycle (Appendix C). Sayers' reported privileging of the Gospel of John gives way to evidence that Synoptic content outweighs Johannine by sheer bulk of material while preference is clearly given to stories that appear in both John and the Synoptics. Sayers' reported avoidance of the Authorized Version gives way to limited but consistent use of the AV for the narrator, for Old Testament quotations, and a special use of the Coverdale Psalms from the Book of Common Prayer. A study of Sayers' six secondary sources shows significant influence upon historic details and characterisation. By covering new ground through in-depth script and source analysis, these studies reveal, expand upon, and often contradict previous assumptions regarding Sayers' sources and working process. In the area of theological studies, investigation begins with Sayers' own claim that she had no original theology—that she merely re-stated the Church's teaching. First, Sayers' identity as an Anglo-Catholic is explored to understand what she means by 'Catholic' and 'the Church'. Having thus located Sayers within a particular tradition, Sayers' Christology (building upon her emphasis on the Creed) and Eschatology (building upon her chosen theme of the Kingship of Christ) within the plays are considered within their broader context of early twentieth-century Anglo-Catholic and wider theology. Sayers' theological originality is then proposed in relation to how she brought theology to life in dramatic form.
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
Embargo Date: 2022-10-26
Embargo Reason: Thesis restricted in accordance with University regulations. Print and electronic copy restricted until 26th October 2022
Description of related resources
The Man Born to be King by Dorothy L. Sayers


text:
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Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code in appellants' ejectment suit.= who claims to be the co-sharer or/and co-owner with the plaintiffs (appellants herein) of the suit property is neither a necessary and nor a proper party in the eviction suit of the appellants against respondent Nos. 2 to 5. In the eviction suit, the question of title or the extent of the shares held by the appellants and respondent No. 1 against each other in the suit premises cannot be decided and nor can be made the subject matter for its determination.= the Lis in the suit is between the appellants on the one hand and respondent Nos. 2 to 5 on the other hand and the decision in the suit would depend upon the question as to whether there exists any relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and respondent Nos. 2 to 5 in relation to the suit premises and, if so, whether the grounds pleaded in the plaint for claiming eviction of respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are established or not. For deciding these two main questions, the presence of respondent No. 1 is not necessary.- respondent No. 1 is neither a necessary and nor a proper party in the suit.; whether directly or indirectly, if recorded by the Trial Court touching the question of title over the suit property, would not be binding on respondent No.1 regardless of the outcome of the suit and respondent No. 1 would be free to file an independent civil suit against the appellants for a declaration of his right, title and interest in the suit premises and in any other properties, if so, and claim partition and separate possession of his share by metes and bounds in all such properties.


Comment on Indecent assault, home invasions by Matt Lemmens.
At 7am this morning I was stopped cycling along Larapinta Drive near Milner Road by a small group of kids and told to hand over my bike. I ignored them and rode on. 100 meters further I looked back and they were harassing a young tourist female walking into town. They then separated when I headed back towards them.
It seems that there is an army of bureaucrats out there, all with huge resources to secure their own position / seat yet contribute little logical positive development.
Thumbs down for nuke dump: time for rethink?
Aaah … slowly you are shifting towards the Right, Richard.
A guy is driving back from Adelaide and he sees a sign in front of a road house 90 klm from Alice Springs: 'Talking Dog For Sale.' He stops and enters and asked the owner about the dog. He tells him the dog is in the backyard.
The guy goes into the backyard and sees a nice looking dingo sitting there.
The dingo looks up and says, 'Well, I discovered that I could talk when I was pretty young. I wanted to help the government, so I told the CIA.
In no time at all they had me jetting from country to country, sitting in rooms with spies and world leaders because no-one figured a dog would be eavesdropping.
I was one of their most valuable spies for eight years running.
But the jetting around really tired me out and I knew I wasn't getting any younger so I decided to settle down. I signed up for a job at the airport to do some undercover security, wandering near suspicious characters and listening in.
I uncovered some incredible dealings and was awarded a batch of medals.
In regards to "the visual environmental pollution that exists": We love it … next year it will be "art". The following year "heritage". lol.


There is no right way to pack your hospital bag, but for any first time mothers wondering what on earth you will need ahead of this never-before-experienced event, we have put together a handy list to help you out.
For 9 months you have waited for this moment, imagined how it will go, planned your perfect labour and breathing techniques… write it all down, and make sure you pack it somewhere so your birthing partner can easily find it during labour to give to your midwives and obstetrician.
Loose fittings dresses, comfy t-shirts or baggy pants are perfect for during labour and throughout your hospital stay. Don't even think about packing your pre-pregnancy jeans… It's likely they won't fit, but also… no one wants to be that uncomfortable!
This could be used by your birthing partner during the labour and/or birth – set the ground rules beforehand - but you'll definitely need it for those first few precious snaps taken just after your little one has joined you.
During labour you might get hungry (who knows - but Dad might be hungry too); perhaps you'll be a little peckish at a random hour of the night while stuck under your new baby soaking up all the cuddles. Give yourself a snack that will tide you over until breakfast is served!
5. A nursing bra (or two).
Other mothers will tell you they now live in these. Perfect for no-fuss breastfeeding. Especially if you have visitors.
Just the simple basics will do, but you might like to pack some makeup as well. Lip balm, facial moisturiser, toothbrush and toothpaste. And maternity pads.
You probably have a few specias ones waiting to wrap up your precious new bundle. Bring them to the hospital to keep baby warm when having cuddles or in the bassinet.
You might be staying in hospital longer than one day especially if you had a caesarean birth so you might want to take a few little onesies to dress baby in each day and night.
Again yours should be comfortable, but still make you feel nice. Baby should wear something super cute. Choose one of your favourites!
Thongs for the hospital shower.
A pillow if you would prefer your own, or an extra one.
A nursing pillow if you need.
Paperwork (insurance etc) if any.
And don't forget to have the baby capsule installed in the car BEFORE you go into labour so nobody has to race around and organise it.


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Thalaivar Rajinikanth spotted driving a Lamborghini Urus
Lamborghini rolls out 10,000th unit of Urus, the performance SUV was launched in India in January 2018 at Rs 3 crore
Thalaivar Rajinikanth is regarded as one of the greatest actors to grace the Indian cinema. A living legend, he is known for his stylish dialogues, dramatic fighting sequences and hard-hitting movies. Rajinikanth was recently clicked by shutterbugs as he drove a Lamborghini Urus. Fans went berserk on social media after spotting Thalaivar driving the powerful SUV. The interesting detail is Rajinikanth donning a face-mask and a seat belt. The Indian Cinema Superstar brought social media to a standstill as his fans started a trend on Twitter- #LioninLamborghini. Him wearing a face mask is an important message to the general public about the importance of it in COVID-19 crisis.
The actor was wearing plain white clothes, a complete contrast to his colourful on-screen persona. It's not clear whether Rajinikanth owns the Lamborghini Urus but this image of him driving the car certainly brought attention to the vehicle. Affectionately called Thalaivar meaning leader or a boss in Tamil, Rajinikanth car collection is stunning with models like Rolls Royce Phantom, Mercedes-Benz G-Class, Premeir Padmini, Hindustan Motors Ambassador, Honda Civic, Toyota Innova among others.
Lamborghini Urus was the first-ever SUV developed and marketed by the Sant'Agata Bolognese based outfit. Within a short span of time, it quickly became the best selling model for Lamborghini in 2019. The Urus SUV is not equipped with the usual Lamborghini's naturally aspirated V10 or V12 engines. It is rather powered by a 4.0-litre twin-turbocharged V8 petrol engine. Thus the powertrain delivers an impressive 641 bhp of maximum power output with 850 Nm of peak torque. While the transmission duty is handled by an 8-speed automatic gearbox. In terms of performance, Lamborghini Urus can accelerate from 0 to 100 kmph in just 3.6 seconds as it has a top speed of 305kmph.
It's not just Rajinikanth who is a fan of the imposing and stylish SUV, people all over the world had spent over $1 billion on Urus in 2019. Famous hip-hop artist Kanye West owns a customized Lamborghini Urus. Further proof of Urus's success is that the Italian auto manufacturer Automobili Lamborghini announced on Tuesday that it has produced the 10,000th Urus SUV since its introduction. In India, Lamborghini Urus was launched in January 2018 at a cost of Rs 3 crore (ex-showroom). The Italian luxury automaker recently launched a new design edition, Pearl Capsule for 2021 Urus. The new edition features updated interior customization plus a new colour palette.
Read Also: Ducati Panigale V2 Bookings Open in India


Does the weather shift have you down too? Don't fret folks, let these fiery photos of the clouds warm you up! I always have my head up in the clouds and find plenty of inspiration from cloudscapes. We're pretty lucky in Calgary to have natural phenomena like this regularly. Hope you like 'em!


For this week I chose Herve Tullet's books: The Game of Finger Worms, The Game of Light and Carnival of Colours.
We came across them at a bookstore when Defne was a baby. These are gorgeous so we bought them immediately. Herve Tullet combines learning and play through his beautiful illustrations and beautiful cut-outs.
The Game of Finger Worms introduces kids to the imaginary world at their fingertips.
The Game of Lights is a game of storytelling with shadows. The Carnival of Colours is a great way to introduce colors.
If you visit Herve Tullet's website, you can see more of his work and extracts from his books.
Discovered your blog for the first time today and LOVE it!! Have been making a list with all the books you recommend!! Thank you!!
Love these and must find them. What fun at your finger tips. Thanks!
These Herve Tullet board books are fun. I especially like The Game of Finger Worms. While they are board books, many seem best for older kids. I'm curious to try them out on my 6, 4, and 2-year-olds to see which kids get the most out of them.
Wow, what gorgeous books! I am adding them to my wish list, thank you!
What are the odds we'd review books from this author in the same week? Glad to see you liked the board books. Now I'm even more interested in finding copies to read.
Aah, I wish we had these books too!


text:
Datuk Abdul Latif bin Romly   (born 31 March 1997 in Perlis, Malaysia) is a Malaysian Paralympic athlete who broke T20 long jump world record 3 times on the same day and won Malaysia's third gold medal on September 11 at the 2016 Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. He also won the gold medal in the men's long jump T20 event at the 2020 Summer Paralympics held in Tokyo, Japan.

Athletics career
In 2015, Latif set a record-breaking 7.43 m leap to defend his T20 (intellectual disabilities) long jump gold medal at the 2015 Para Asean Games in Singapore. In 2016 Rio Summer Paralympics Games, Latif broke his own world record three times in the same day. He also earned Malaysia's third gold medal of these Paralympics Games. He was chosen as the Malaysian flag bearer at the opening ceremony.

In 2021, Latif became the first Malaysian to defend his Paralympics title in the Men's long jump (F20) event with a leap of 7.45 m.

Honours

Honours of Malaysia
  :
  Officer of the Order of the Defender of the Realm (K.M.N.) (2017)
  :
  Knight Commander of the Order of the Territorial Crown (PMW) – Datuk (2022)

References

External links

2016 Summer Paralympic- Rio 2016 profile

Paralympic athletes of Malaysia
Paralympic gold medalists for Malaysia
Living people
1997 births
People from Perlis
Malaysian male long jumpers
Malaysian Muslims
Malaysian people of Malay descent
World record holders in Paralympic athletics
Track and field athletes with disabilities
Intellectual Disability category Paralympic competitors
Officers of the Order of the Defender of the Realm
Competitors in athletics with intellectual disability
Paralympic medalists in athletics (track and field)
Athletes (track and field) at the 2016 Summer Paralympics
Athletes (track and field) at the 2020 Summer Paralympics
Medalists at the 2016 Summer Paralympics
Medalists at the 2020 Summer Paralympics

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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text:
Tau Malachi (full name: Tau Malachi eben Ha-Elijah; born Brett Cagle in 1962) is an American neo-Gnostic religious leader and writer. He is currently the bishop of Ecclesia Pistis Sophia, also known as the Sophia Fellowship.

Tau Malachi is the current spiritual leader of the Sophian Gnostic tradition, a neo-Gnostic group. Although members claim that the lineage dates back to the 1700s, the current tone of Ecclesia Pistis Sophia was innovated in the 1880s by Tau Miriam, an Englishwoman. She initiated her protégé Tau Elijah, who left England in the early twentieth century to establish the lineage in the Bay Area of Northern California. In the 1950s, Tau Elijah retired from public teaching and initiating to live in the Lake Tahoe basin, where he died in the 1970s.

Biography
Tau Malachi was born Brett Cagle in 1962 in the United States, and was 8 years old when he met his spiritual leader Tau Elijah. As a disciple of Tau Elijah during the 1970s, he received the spiritual name Tau Malachi eben Ha-Elijah.

In 1983, Tau Malachi founded the Sophia Fellowship.

Tau Malachi is also a Martinist. Other than Christianity and Gnosticism, he has also studied and participated in Vajrayana Buddhism, Vedanta, Sufism, and Native American shamanism.

Tau Malachi currently resides in Grass Valley, California.

Books
Books by Tau Malachi:

See also
Stephan A. Hoeller

References

External links

Ecclesia Pistis Sophia
YouTube channel of the Ecclesia Pistis Sophia
Facebook page of the Ecclesia Pistis Sophia

Living people
1962 births
Gnostics
American spiritual teachers
American Christian mystics
People from Grass Valley, California


HAFIZABAD: A labourer died and another received critical injuries after a gas tank exploded at a Mobil oil factory, late on Monday, Aaj News reported.
A loud explosion was heard, after which the factory caught fire, eye witnesses said. A fire engine reached the location and rescue work began.
Locals claimed that the factory produced sub-standard oil. The gas produced in the factory has also turned the water reservoir in the land poisonous.
Police has begun an inquiry, but no arrests have been made so far.


The course is fun and informative and has been enjoyed by hundreds of participants so far. The aim of this course is to provide you with basic information that you can remember, it will also give you lots of confidence to cope with emergencies. There's always time to ask questions, giving you plenty of reassurance. On completion of this course you will receive a Certificate of attendance, 'Paediatric First Aid Made Easy' manual and useful handouts and material. Please wear comfortable clothing as you will be expected to carry out practical skills.


text:
> Wed. May 23, 2018
M (Multidisciplinary and Interdisciplinary) » M-IS Intersection
[M-IS14] Biogeochemistry
Wed. May 23, 2018 1:45 PM - 3:15 PM Poster Hall (International Exhibition Hall7, Makuhari Messe)
convener:Keisuke Koba(Center for Ecological Research, Kyoto University), Hideaki Shibata(Field Science Center fot Northern Biosphere, Hokkaido University), Naohiko Ohkouchi(海洋研究開発機構, 共同), Youhei Yamashita(Faculty of Environmental Earth Science, Hokkaido University)
[MIS14-P08] The effect of Sasa dwarf bamboo on dynamics of Aluminum in forest soil.
*Takuya Ono1, Hideaki Shibata2, Karibu Fukuzawa2 (1.Graduate school of environmental science,Hokkaido University, 2.Field Science Center for Northern Biosphere,Hokkaido University)
Keywords:Sasa dwarf bamboo, Soil, Aluminum
Since large amount of carbon accumulation in soil can contribute to suppression of global warming, it is important to understand the fates, patterns and mechanism of carbon accumulation in soil. One of the mechanisms is known that metal ions such as aluminum (Al) and iron associate with organic matter (OM) in the soil. It has been reported that chemical weathering related by plants affect the relationship between metal ions and OM. Previous studies indicated that exudates of plant roots increase production of secondary minerals, enhancing the leaching of metal ions from soil. It was also suggested that Si leaching due to chemical weathering was enhanced in soil under gramineous plants such as bamboo and rice, which is known to take up a large amount of Si. Furthermore, it was reported that the amount of Al associated with OM increased in the soil under gramineous plants. However, the effect of chemical weathering on Al dynamics in the soil due to Si uptake by Sasa dwarf bamboo, a Si accumulating plant has not been clarified yet. In this study, we focused on differences of Si uptake by Sasa dwarf bamboo, and investigated their influence on Al dynamics in soil, by comparing with trees. Since Sasa dwarf bamboo absorbs takes up much of Si than tree, we hypothesized that chemical weathering was promoted by existing of Sasa dwarf bamboo, resulting in an increase in the amount of Al in the soil. We established at four plots in the naturally mixed conifer and broadleaf forest in Nakagawa Experimental Forest of Hokkaido University located in the northern part of Hokkaido. In these four plots, oak (Quercus crispula Blume) and fir (Abies sachalinensis) and Sasa dwarf bamboo (Sasa senanensis) are dominant species as upper trees and understory vegetation, respectively. All plots are located on sedimentary rocks and dominant soil is Cambisols (acidic brown forest soil). Two type of sub-plots were established in each site; one is the points with low density of Sasa dwarf bamboo that was about 1 m apart from the tree stem of oak, and the other is the points under canopy gap with high density of Sasa dwarf bamboo (hereafter called Sasa). Three spots were established as replicates in each sub-plot. To evaluate the influence of root invasion and nutrient uptake, we conducted a field incubation experiment of soil with an ingrowth core and a root blocking core during about 3 months at all spots. In each spot, 10 cm of soil was collected from the surface of A layer excluding organic litter layer. The coarse root was removed from soil sample using a 4 mm mesh sieve, and then soil sample was filled into each core. The soil before the in-situ incubation was collected and analyzed as the initial soil condition. Aluminum in the soil was extracted and analyzed for their concentration using inductively coupled plasma atomic emission spectrometry (ICP-AES). For the Al associated with OM, copper chloride extraction method was used. The Al strongly associated with OM was fractionated by sequential extraction method by extraction with sodium pyrophosphate (pH 10.0). There was a significant difference (p <0.01) in the amount of Al associated with OM in the surface soil between the plots with high and low density of Sasa, while no significant difference was found in the Al contents between with and without roots and nutrient uptake. In addition, there was no significant difference in the Al content by sodium pyrophosphate extraction with respect to the density of Sasa and the presence of roots. Our results suggested that the amount of Al associated with OM in the soil changed due to the long-term environmental difference between under tree canopy and canopy gap. It was also suggested that the long-term effect includes the influence of high Sasa density at the canopy gap. It is important to consider the timescale in the influence of Sasa root invasion because significant changes in the amount of Al in the soil between with and without roots were not observed for the three months experiment.


Support and manage attendance building and registration for all monthly and signature SBA events.
Assistance in event planning and strategy for all monthly and signature events.
Enter and manage registrations via phone, email and online.
Manage social media, including the SBA LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter and Pintrest pages.
2 years experience working with customer service.
they are not intended to be ALL responsibilities or qualifications of the position.


Lightning System is a comprehensive 6 month program for students that have completed all senior gradings in the Wu Xing Dao curriculum, and who show dedication and commitment to achieving the highest level of Kung Fu skill and mastery.
The final stage of learning in order for a student to be ready to progress to Master Level instruction, Lightning will evolve your abilities to such an extent, that you will be able to make your own unique contributions to the art of Kung Fu. This training program is available only on assessment and approval of Master Marko Vesse, the founder of Wu Xing Dao.
The aim of Lightning system is to develop your physical centre, referred to in Chinese culture as the Lower Dan Tian, the energy centre of the body, and source of all Qi accumulation used in the manifestation of internal power. Once completed, a practitioner of Lightning will truly understand how every movement can be initiated by, and travel through, the Dan Tian, connecting the body and unifying all movement through the core.
Mastering this discipline will enable you to fully open the meridians of the body, allowing Qi to flow to the extremities without restriction, enhancing vitality and longevity, and providing you the ability to generate enormous power in even the smallest of movements. The fluidity of a master of lightning is awe inspiring, at full speed they can move faster than the eye can see.