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Tag Archives: Iraq
Landscapes of intervention
Posted on July 4, 2019 by Derek Gregory
An excellent new edition of Middle East Report (290) on The New Landscape of Intervention; full download details here.
The concept of intervention brings to mind foreign military actions that violate a sovereign jurisdiction. This issue of Middle East Report identifies other, increasingly prevalent, ways in which the lives of people in the Middle East are being shaped by forces beyond their borders. In a context of increasing US retrenchment and neoliberal globalization, powerful states and transnational actors intervene across the region in a variety ways—under the guise of humanitarian assistance, democracy promotion or border security—as well as through new methods like urban planning, infrastructure development, crisis research and health deprivation—what might also be called biopolitical interventions. Even as the 2000's saw the return of traditional forms of imperial intervention—with the US deployment of military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq in pursuit of a quixotic and unwinnable war on terror—there are increasingly new forms of intervention that must be understood, assessed and mapped.
The New Landscape of Intervention – The Editors
The Globalized Unmaking of the Libyan State – Jacob Mundy
Iraqibacter and the Pathologies of Intervention – Omar Dewachi
The Shifting Contours of US Power and Intervention in Palestine – Lisa Bhungalia, Jeannette Greven, Tahani Mustafa
Urban Interventions for the Wars Yet to Come – Hiba Bou Akar
The Palestinian McCity in the Neoliberal Era – Sami Tayeb
Humanitarian Crisis Research as Intervention – Sarah E. Parkinson
The UAE and the Infrastructure of Intervention – Rafeef Ziadah
Israel's Permanent Siege of Gaza – Ron Smith
Border Regimes and the New Global Apartheid – Catherine Besteman
Posted in Afghanistan, cities, humanitarianism, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, journals, landscape, Lebanon, Libya, Middle East, USA	| Tagged Beirut, borders, Gaza, Iraq, landscapes of intervention, Libya, Middle East, Middle East Report, Middle East Research and Information Project, neoliberal urbanism, Palestine
Killing for Show
Posted on March 6, 2019 by Derek Gregory
News from Verso of a forthcoming book (originally announced for Aprl, but now not due until next year) by the multi-talented Julian Stallabrass, Killing for Show:
A history of war photography – from Vietnam to Iraq and the War of Terror – and how photography has changed war.
Today we watch wars from afar, swayed by the images that fill our newsfeeds, social media and screens. Since the Vietnam War the way we see conflict through film, photographs, and pixels, has had a powerful impact on the political fortunes of the campaign, and the way that war has been conducted. In this fully-illustrated and passionately argued account of war imagery, Julian Stallabrass tells the story of post-war conflict, how it was recorded, and remembered through its iconic photography.
The relationship between war and photograph is constantly in transition, forming new perspectives, provoking new challenges: what is allowed to be seen? How are photographs remembered? Does an image has the power to change political opinion? What influence market economics has upon the way we consume visual media, especially images of war. How new forms of distribution change the image's potency. Stallabrass shows how photographs have become a vital weapon in the modern war: as propaganda – from close quarter fighting to the drone's electronic vision – as well as a witness to the barbarity of events such as the My Lai massacre, the violent suppression of insurgent Fallujah or the atrocities in Abu Ghraib. Changes in technology – from shutter speed, use of colour stock, and methods of digital distribution – have also transformed the way photography is used in depicting and even waging accelerated warfare.
Through these accounts Stallabrass maps a comprehensive theoretical re-evaluation of the relationship between war, politics and visual culture. Killing for Show is an essential volume in the history of photography.
A mammoth 688 pages, packed with images – and, since it's Verso, astonishingly reasonable priced.
Posted in books, Iraq, photography, Vietnam, visuality	| Tagged Iraq, Julian Stallabrass, Vietnam, war photography
Posted on January 11, 2018 by Derek Gregory
A postscript to my posts here, here and here on civilian deaths from air strikes in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere: Vice has an extended interview with Chris Woods of Airwars here.
The biggest issue we saw in 2017—particularly if we look at the US-led coalition—was that the war moved very heavily into cities. That, more than any other single factor, resulted in the deaths of many more civilians and casualty events. We saw a similar pattern at the back end of 2016, when Russia and the Assad regime heavily bombed east Aleppo. There's a very strong correlation between attacks on cities and large numbers of civilian casualties. And frankly, it doesn't matter who's carrying out those attacks. The outcome for civilians is always dire…
Things didn't get any better under Trump for civilians—in fact, they got a lot worse. One of the reasons for that was the intensity of the bombardment. We saw an absolutely ferocious bombing campaign by the US and its allies in both Mosul and Raqqa in 2017. Between those two cities, the coalition alone dropped 50,000 munitions. One bomb or missile was dropped on Raqqa every 12 minutes, on average, for the duration of the four-month battle…
When Russia and the Assad regime were bombing Aleppo in late 2016, we had assumed that a key reason for the large number of civilian casualties was down to the fact they were primarily using dumb-bombs. We have actually changed our modeling since then, based on what we have seen with the coalition in places like Raqqa and Mosul. The reason is that even when you use precision bombs on cities, really, the outcome for civilians is the same as a dumb bomb. You can't control what the bombs do when they land.
We saw very little difference between Russian and coalition strikes when it came to bombing cities. This is the big problem we have with a shift to urban warfare —it's really taking us to the limits of any benefits we might have in terms of protecting civilians by using precision munitions.
Chris also has some characteristically smart (and sharp) things to say about transparency and accountability too…
Posted in air wars, casualties, cities, Iraq, Middle East, Syria, USA	| Tagged air strikes, Chris Woods, civilians, Iraq, Russia, smart bombs, Syria, United Kingdom, United States, urban warfare
Killing cities
Posted on January 8, 2018 by Derek Gregory
In a perceptive commentary on the ground-breaking investigation by Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal into civilian casualties caused by the US air campaign against Islamic State (Daesh) in Iraq – see also my posts here and here – Robert Malley and Stephen Pomper write:
The Trump administration has celebrated a no-holds-barred approach to the fight against ISIS, given greater deference to ground commanders, loosened restrictions imposed by its predecessor, and expanded the fight to an ever-growing number of Middle Eastern and African theaters. This adds up to a quasi-automatic recipe for greater civilian casualties. Independent monitoring organizations have tracked the numbers, and invariably they point to a serious uptick in civilian deaths in Iraq and Syria since January 2017. The explanation lies partly in the transition in Iraq and Syria toward the final, more urban phase of the conflict in the heavily populated cities of Mosul and Raqqa. But partly only. It also lies in policy guidance, as well as in matters such as tone, attitude, and priorities set at the very top—including by the commander in chief. These have a way of trickling down and affecting performance on the battlefield.
And yet. Those dead civilians that The New York Times found not to have been counted were not counted by the Obama administration. They were not counted by people who were intent on limiting civilian casualties and ensuring transparency. That those safeguards proved inadequate even in the hands of an administration that considered them a priority raises particularly vexing questions.
Part of the problem, as they note, is the nature of the campaign itself. This is not the sort of counterinsurgency campaign that emerged in Afghanistan and Iraq in which air power was used in support of US and allied ground troops (although we know that also produced more than its share of civilian casualties); neither is it a counterterrorism campaign directed against so-called High Value Targets who supposedly 'present a direct and imminent threat to the United States' (ditto; and as I discuss in 'Dirty dancing' – DOWNLOADS tab – 'imminence' turned out to be remarkably elastic, a deadly process of time-space expansion).
Ultimately, though, their anxieties turn on what they call the 'over-militarization' of the US response to al Qaeda and its affiliates and to IS. They explain, succinctly, what has encouraged this militarized response (not least the lowering of the threshold for military violence allowed by remote operations):
[U]ntil this changes, an increasing number of innocent lives will suffer the consequence. Some will be counted. Others, not. All will have paid a terrible price.
In December the Bureau of Investigative Journalism confirmed an escalation in US air strikes across multiple theatres in Trump's first year in office:
President Donald Trump inherited the framework allowing US aircraft to hit suspected terrorists outside of declared battlefields from his predecessor, Barack Obama. Bar some tinkering, his administration has largely stuck within the framework set by the previous one.
However, the quantity of operations has shot up under President Trump. Strikes doubled in Somalia and tripled in Yemen [in 2017].
In Afghanistan, where the Bureau has been monitoring US airstrikes since it was officially declared a noncombat mission at the end of 2014, the number of weapons dropped is now approaching levels last seen during the 2009-2012 surge.
Meanwhile, there are signs that the drone war may be returning to Pakistan, where attacks were also up, compared with 2016.
Much remains unclear about these actions, apart from Trump's signature combination of machismo and ignorance, but we do know that Obama's restrictions on the use of military force outside Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria have been loosened:
In 2013, Obama introduced measures that meant that strikes in areas of countries that were not active war-zones, such as Pakistan and Yemen, had to go through an elaborate sign-off process with the White House.
The Trump administration effectively side-stepped the restrictions by declaring parts of Somalia and Yemen to be areas of "active hostilities".
In September NBC reported that the Trump administration was planning to allow the CIA to take a more aggressive role and to give the agency more authority to conduct (para)military operations. In consequence a comprehensive revision of Obama's guidelines was in prospect:
The drone playbook, known as the Presidential Policy Guidance, or PPG, includes a provision that no strike should go forward unless analysts determine that there is a near-certainty that no civilians will be harmed. And it includes a provision forbidding the addition of new detainees to the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Trump administration is contemplating removing both of those restrictions.
Pakistan remains a nominally covert area of operations. US drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas resumed in March after a nine-month hiatus – though Trump's latest spat with Islamabad raises questions about the sporadic but systematic co-operation that had characterised so much of the campaign – and (provocatively: again, see 'Dirty Dancing' for an explanation) one strike took place outside the FATA in June 2017. The Bureau's detailed list is here: five strikes are listed, killing 15-22 people.
In Afghanistan the Bureau noted that air strikes had doubled and that this escalation has been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in transparency (Chris Woods told me the same story for Iraq and Syria when we met in Utrecht).
All of this confirms the report released today by Action on Armed Violence.
At least 15,399 civilians were killed in the first 11 months of 2017 according to Action on Armed Violence's (AOAV) recording of English language media explosive violence events. This devastating toll – up to the end of November – strongly suggests that 2017 was the worst year for civilian deathsfrom explosive weapons since AOAV's records began in 2011.
This sharp rise, constituting a 42% increase from the same period in 2016, when 10,877 civilians were killed, is largely down to a massive increase in deadly airstrikes.
Compared to 2011, the first year of AOAV's recording, the rise in civilians killed by explosive violence in the first 11 months of 2017 constitutes an 175% increase (5,597 died in the same period seven years ago).
On average, our records to November show that there were 42 civilian deaths per day caused by explosive violence in 2017.
The report continues:
For the first time since our recording of all English language media reports of explosive weapon attacks began, the majority of civilian deaths were by air-launched weapons. Of the total civilian deaths recorded (15,399), 58% were caused by airstrikes, mainly in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
Civilian deaths from airstrikes in this 11-month period was 8,932 – an increase of 82% compared to the same period in 2016 when 4,902 civilians were killed, or 1,169% compared to 2011, when 704 died.
Significantly, as airstrikes are almost always used by State actors, rather than non-State groups, States were responsible for the majority of civilian deaths from explosive weapons for the first time since our records began.
Iain Overton, Executive Director of AOAV commented:
These are stark figures that expose the lie that precision-guided missiles as used by State airforces do not lead to massive civilian harm. When explosive weapons are used in towns and cities, the results are inevitable: innocent children, women and men will die.
In the same vein, Karen McVeigh's summary for the Guardian quotes Chris Woods from Airwars:
This is about urban warfare and that's why we are getting crazy numbers… War is moving into cities. It doesn't matter whether it's Russia or the US-led coalition or ground forces leading the assault, the outcome for civilians under attack is always dire…. We're becoming too complacent about urban warfare, and militaries and governments are downplaying the effects.
I think that's right, though I also think war is moving back into the cities (if it ever left them); the serial military operations in Mosul and Raqqa are vivid examples of what Chris means, but they also recall the assaults on Fallujah and other cities documented in Steve Graham's still utterly indispensable Cities under siege.
The point is sharpened even further if we widen the angle of vision to take in air campaigns conducted by other air forces: the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Air Force in Syria, or the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
Yet again, killing cities to save them. As a spokesperson for Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently put it last summer, 'This is very similar to the Vietnam war, where entire cities were destroyed… What is happening in Raqqa is like dropping a nuclear bomb in stages.'
Steve's work should also remind us that these dead cities are not produced by air strikes alone. Once reduced to rubble they have often been disembowelled (I can think of no better word) by ground forces; it's as though these now barely human landscapes compel or at any rate license the continued degradation of both the living and the dead: see, for example, Kenneth Rosen on 'The Devil's Henchmen' here or Ghaith Abdul-Ahad's chillingly detailed report on the aftermath of the liberation of Mosul here.
I'm still astonished that all those high-minded theoretical debates on planetary urbanism somehow ignore the contemporary intensification of urbicide and urban warfare (see 'Mumford and sons' here).
Posted in Afghanistan, air wars, casualties, cities, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, drones, Iraq, Middle East, Pakistan, Syria, USA, Yemen	| Tagged Action on Armed Violence, Afghanistan, air strikes, Airwars, Anand Gopal, Azmat Khan, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, civilian casualties, Iraq, Robert Malley, Stephen Graham, Stephen Pomper, Syria, urban warfare, urbicide
Those who don't count and those who can't count
Posted on November 26, 2017 by Derek Gregory
An excellent article from the unfailing New York Times in a recent edition of the Magazine: Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal on 'The Uncounted', a brilliant, forensic and – crucially – field-based investigation into civilian casualties in the US air war against ISIS:
American military planners go to great lengths to distinguish today's precision strikes from the air raids of earlier wars, which were carried out with little or no regard for civilian casualties. They describe a target-selection process grounded in meticulously gathered intelligence, technological wizardry, carefully designed bureaucratic hurdles and extraordinary restraint. Intelligence analysts pass along proposed targets to "targeteers," who study 3-D computer models as they calibrate the angle of attack. A team of lawyers evaluates the plan, and — if all goes well — the process concludes with a strike so precise that it can, in some cases, destroy a room full of enemy fighters and leave the rest of the house intact.
The coalition usually announces an airstrike within a few days of its completion. It also publishes a monthly report assessing allegations of civilian casualties. Those it deems credible are generally explained as unavoidable accidents — a civilian vehicle drives into the target area moments after a bomb is dropped, for example. The coalition reports that since August 2014, it has killed tens of thousands of ISIS fighters and, according to our tally of its monthly summaries, 466 civilians in Iraq.
What Azmat and Anand found on the ground, however, was radically different:
Our own reporting, conducted over 18 months, shows that the air war has been significantly less precise than the coalition claims. Between April 2016 and June 2017, we visited the sites of nearly 150 airstrikes across northern Iraq, not long after ISIS was evicted from them. We toured the wreckage; we interviewed hundreds of witnesses, survivors, family members, intelligence informants and local officials; we photographed bomb fragments, scoured local news sources, identified ISIS targets in the vicinity and mapped the destruction through satellite imagery. We also visited the American air base in Qatar where the coalition directs the air campaign. There, we were given access to the main operations floor and interviewed senior commanders, intelligence officials, legal advisers and civilian-casualty assessment experts. We provided their analysts with the coordinates and date ranges of every airstrike — 103 in all — in three ISIS-controlled areas and examined their responses. The result is the first systematic, ground-based sample of airstrikes in Iraq since this latest military action began in 2014.
We found that one in five of the coalition strikes we identified resulted in civilian death, a rate more than 31 times that acknowledged by the coalition. It is at such a distance from official claims that, in terms of civilian deaths, this may be the least transparent war in recent American history [my emphasis]. Our reporting, moreover, revealed a consistent failure by the coalition to investigate claims properly or to keep records that make it possible to investigate the claims at all. While some of the civilian deaths we documented were a result of proximity to a legitimate ISIS target, many others appear to be the result simply of flawed or outdated intelligence that conflated civilians with combatants. In this system, Iraqis are considered guilty until proved innocent. Those who survive the strikes … remain marked as possible ISIS sympathizers, with no discernible path to clear their names.
They provide immensely powerful, moving case studies of innocents 'lost in the wreckage'. They also describe the US Air Force's targeting process at US Central Command's Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (the image above shows the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division at the CAOC, which 'provides a common threat and targeting picture'):
The process seemed staggeringly complex — the wall-to-wall monitors, the soup of acronyms, the army of lawyers — but the impressively choreographed operation was designed to answer two basic questions about each proposed strike: Is the proposed target actually ISIS? And will attacking this ISIS target harm civilians in the vicinity?
As we sat around a long conference table, the officers explained how this works in the best-case scenario, when the coalition has weeks or months to consider a target. Intelligence streams in from partner forces, informants on the ground, electronic surveillance and drone footage. Once the coalition decides a target is ISIS, analysts study the probability that striking it will kill civilians in the vicinity, often by poring over drone footage of patterns of civilian activity. The greater the likelihood of civilian harm, the more mitigating measures the coalition takes. If the target is near an office building, the attack might be rescheduled for nighttime. If the area is crowded, the coalition might adjust its weaponry to limit the blast radius. Sometimes aircraft will even fire a warning shot, allowing people to escape targeted facilities before the strike. An official showed us grainy night-vision footage of this technique in action: Warning shots hit the ground near a shed in Deir al-Zour, Syria, prompting a pair of white silhouettes to flee, one tripping and picking himself back up, as the cross hairs follow.
Once the targeting team establishes the risks, a commander must approve the strike, taking care to ensure that the potential civilian harm is not "excessive relative to the expected military advantage gained," as Lt. Col. Matthew King, the center's deputy legal adviser, explained.
After the bombs drop, the pilots and other officials evaluate the strike. Sometimes a civilian vehicle can suddenly appear in the video feed moments before impact. Or, through studying footage of the aftermath, they might detect signs of a civilian presence. Either way, such a report triggers an internal assessment in which the coalition determines, through a review of imagery and testimony from mission personnel, whether the civilian casualty report is credible. If so, the coalition makes refinements to avoid future civilian casualties, they told us, a process that might include reconsidering some bit of intelligence or identifying a flaw in the decision-making process.
There are two issues here. First, this is indeed the 'best-case scenario', and one that very often does not obtain. One of the central vectors of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is volatility: targets are highly mobile and often the 'window of opportunity' is exceedingly narrow. I've reproduced this image from the USAF's own targeting guide before, in relation to my analysis of the targeting cycle for a different US air strike against IS in Iraq in March 2015, but it is equally applicable here:
Second, that 'window of opportunity' is usually far from transparent, often frosted and frequently opaque. For what is missing from the official analysis described by Azmat and Anand turns out to be the leitmotif of all remote operations (and there is a vital sense in which all forms of aerial violence are 'remote', whether the pilot is 7,000 miles away or 30,000 feet above the target [see for example here]):
Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian, commander of the United States Air Forces Central Command at Udeid, told us what was missing. "Ground truth, that's what you're asking for," he said. "We see what we see from altitude and pull in from other reports. Your perspective is talking to people on the ground." He paused, and then offered what he thought it would take to arrive at the truth: "It's got to be a combination of both."
The military view, perhaps not surprisingly, is that civilian casualties are unavoidable but rarely intentional:
Supreme precision can reduce civilian casualties to a very small number, but that number will never reach zero. They speak of every one of the acknowledged deaths as tragic but utterly unavoidable.
Azmat and Anand reached a numbingly different conclusion: 'Not all civilian casualties are unavoidable tragedies; some deaths could be prevented if the coalition recognizes its past failures and changes its operating assumptions accordingly. But in the course of our investigation, we found that it seldom did either.'
Part of the problem, I suspect, is that whenever there is an investigation into reports of civilian casualties that may have been caused by US military operations it must be independent of all other investigations and can make no reference to them in its findings; in other words, as I've noted elsewhere, there is no 'case law': bizarre but apparently true.
But that is only part of the problem. The two investigators cite multiple intelligence errors ('In about half of the strikes that killed civilians, we could find no discernible ISIS target nearby. Many of these strikes appear to have been based on poor or outdated intelligence') and even errors and discrepancies in recording and locating strikes after the event.
It's worth reading bellingcat's analysis here, which also investigates the coalition's geo-locational reporting and notes that the official videos 'appear only to showcase the precision and efficiency of coalition bombs and missiles, and rarely show people, let alone victims'. The image above, from CNN, is unusual in showing the collection of the bodies of victims of a US air strike in Mosul, this time in March 2017; the target was a building from which two snipers were firing; more than 100 civilians sheltering there were killed. The executive summary of the subsequent investigation is here – 'The Target Engagement Authority (TEA) was unaware of and could not have predicted the presence of civilians in the structure prior to the engagement' – and report from W.J. Hennigan and Molly Hennessy-Fiske is here.
Included in bellingcat's account is a discussion of a video which the coalition uploaded to YouTube and then deleted; Azmat retrieved and archived it – the video shows a strike on two buildings in Mosul on 20 September 2015 that turned out to be focal to her investigation with Anand:
The video caption identifies the target as a 'VBIED [car bomb] facility'. But Bellingcat asks:
Was this really a "VBIED network"? Under the original upload, a commenter starting posting that the houses shown were his family's residence in Mosul.
"I will NEVER forget my innocent and dear cousins who died in this pointless airstrike. Do you really know who these people were? They were innocent and happy family members of mine."
Days after the strike, Dr Zareena Grewal, a relative living in the US wrote in the New York Times that four family members had died in the strike. On April 2, 2017 – 588 days later – the Coalition finally admitted that it indeed bombed a family home which they confused for an IS headquarters and VBIED facility.
"The case was brought to our attention by the media and we discovered the oversight, relooked [at] the case based on the information provided by the journalist and family, which confirmed the 2015 assessment," Colonel Joe Scrocca, Director of Public Affairs for the Coalition, told Airwars.
Even though the published strike video actually depicted the killing of a family, it remained – wrongly captioned – on the official Coalition YouTube channel for more than a year.
This is but one, awful example of a much wider problem. The general conclusion reached by Azmat and Anand is so chilling it is worth re-stating:
According to the coalition's available data, 89 of its more than 14,000 airstrikes in Iraq have resulted in civilian deaths, or about one of every 157 strikes. The rate we found on the ground — one out of every five — is 31 times as high.
One of the houses [shown above] mistakenly identified as a 'VBIED facility' in that video belonged to Basim Razzo, and he became a key informant in Azmat and Anand's investigation; he was subsequently interviewed by Amy Goodman: the transcript is here. She also interviewed Azmat and Anand: that transcript is here. In the course of the conversation Anand makes a point that amply and awfully confirms Christiane Wilke's suggestion – in relation to air strikes in Afghanistan – that the burden of recognition, of what in international humanitarian law is defined as 'distinction', is tacitly being passed from combatant to civilian: that those in the cross-hairs of the US military are required to perform their civilian status to those watching from afar.
It goes back to this issue of Iraqis having to prove that they are not ISIS, which is the opposite of what we would think. We would think that the coalition would do the work to find out whether somebody is a member of ISIS or not. Essentially, they assume people are ISIS until proven otherwise.
To make matters worse, they have to perform their 'civilianness' according to a script recognised and approved by the US military, however misconceived it may be. In the case of one (now iconic) air strike in Afghanistan being an adolescent or adult male, travelling in a group, praying at one of the times prescribed by Islam, and carrying a firearm in a society where that is commonplace was enough for civilians to be judged as hostile by drone crews and attacked from the air with dreadful results (see here and here).
This is stunning investigative journalism, but it's more than that: the two authors are both at Arizona State University, and they have provided one of the finest examples of critical, probing and accessible scholarship I have ever read.
Posted in Afghanistan, air wars, bombing, casualties, counterterrorism, drones, imagery, intelligence, Iraq, late modern war, Middle East, Syria, USA	| Tagged Al Udeid Air Base, Anand Ghopal, Azmat Khan, Basim Razzo, Christiane Wilke, civilian casualties, Combined Air Operations Center, Iraq, ISIS, Mosul, targeting, USCentral Command
The Death of the Clinic
Posted on December 11, 2016 by Derek Gregory
This is the fifth in a new series of posts on military violence against hospitals and medical personnel in conflict zones. It follows directly from my analysis of the situation in Syria here.
President Bashar al-Assad has consistently denied that his forces have attacked hospitals or doctors. In an interview with SBS Australia on 1 July 2016 he asked his interviewer:
'… the very simple question is: why do we attack hospitals and civilians?… No government in this situation has any interest in killing civilians or attacking hospitals. Anyway, if you attack hospitals, you can use any building to be a hospital. No, these are anecdotal claims, mendacious statements …'
There are at least four answers to Assad's disingenuous question (if you falter at the adjective, see here).
(1) Silencing the witnesses
When Widney Brown from Physicians for Human Rights testified at the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission on 31 March 2016 she provided one clear and compelling rationale for Assad's attacks on doctors:
'… attacks on doctors silence particularly powerful witnesses. When the Syrian government denies its use of chemical weapons, cluster munitions, starvation, or torture, doctors can bear witnesses to these violations because they have seen and treated the victims.'
To be sure, there are other witnesses and even paper trails and photographic records. Ben Taub, who has done so much to bring 'Syria's war on doctors' to the attention of a wider public, has also provided a detailed account of the work done by Bill Wiley and the Commission for International Justice and Accountability whose volunteers have smuggled over 600,000 documents out of Syria detailing mass torture and killings by the regime.
The war crimes have not been confined to attacks on hospitals in opposition-held areas. A photographer known only as 'Caesar', who had been attached to the Defence Ministry's Criminal Forensic Division, smuggled out thousands of high-resolution digital images exposing the horrors of the regime's own military hospitals:
The pictures, most of them taken in Syrian military hospitals, show corpses photographed at close range – one at a time as well as in small groupings. Virtually all of the bodies – thousands of them – betray signs of torture: gouged eyes; mangled genitals; bruises and dried blood from beatings; acid and electric burns; emaciation; and marks from strangulation…
These unfortunates may have lived and died in different ways, but they were bound in death by coded numerals scribbled on their skin with markers, or on scraps of paper affixed to their bodies. The first set of numbers (for example, 2935 in the photographs at bottom) would denote a prisoner's I.D. The second (for example, 215) would refer to the intelligence branch responsible for his or her death. Underneath these figures, in many cases, would appear the hospital case-file number (for example, 2487/B)…
[T]he system of organizing and recording the dead served three ends: to satisfy Syrian authorities that executions were carried out; to ensure that no one was improperly discharged; and to allow military judges to represent to families—by producing official-seeming death certificates—that their loved ones had died of natural causes. In many ways, these facilities were ideal for hiding "unwanted" individuals, alive or dead. As part of the Ministry of Defense, the hospitals were already fortified, which made it easy to shield their inner workings and keep away families who might come looking for missing relatives. "These hospitals provide cover for the crimes of the regime," said Nawaf Fares, a top Syrian diplomat and tribal leader who defected in 2012. "People are brought into the hospitals, and killed, and their deaths are papered over with documentation." When I asked him, during a recent interview in Dubai, Why involve the hospitals at all?, he leaned forward and said, "Because mass graves have a bad reputation."
(2) Multiplying the casualties
This is a radicalisation of an old strategy. As Sam Weber pointed out in Targets of opportunity (2005), 'every target is inscribed in a network or chain of events that inevitably exceeds the opportunity that can be seized or the horizon that can be seen.' So, for example, when the United States or Israel bombs a power plant it often as not explains that it has been careful to bomb in the small hours when only a skeleton staff was in the building in order to minimise collateral damage. But this begs the question: why bomb the power plant at all? In most instances the degradation of the electricity supply means that it becomes impossible to pump water or treat sewage; refrigerators fail and food perishes; hospitals are forced to use unreliable generators. The result – the intended, carefully calculated result – is that casualties rise at considerable distances from the target and over an extended period of time.
Similarly, Dr Abdulaziz Adel notes: 'Kill a doctor and you kill thousands.' Simply put, patients who are sick or injured then go without treatment and in many cases their lives are put at risk. (The images below are from Collateral Damage: more here).
Dr Rami Kalazi, a neurosurgeon from East Aleppo, agrees:
'They are the artery of life in the city. Can you imagine a life in city without hospitals? Who will treat your kids? Who will make the surgeries for the injured people? So, they are targeting these hospitals because they know, if these hospitals were completely destroyed, the life will be completely destroyed.'
(3) 'Moral[e] bombing'
This too is an old strategy. The architects of 'area bombing' during the combined bomber offensive against Germany during the Second World War described it as 'moral [sic] bombing': a sustained and systematic attempt to undermine the morale of the enemy population so that they would demand their leaders sue for peace. If this was a tried and tested strategy, however, the test showed that it was a complete failure (see my 'Doors into nowhere': DOWNLOADS tab).
But the lesson was lost in Syria, where attacks on hospitals have had a central place. As Samir Puri argues, the strategy behind the joint Syrian and Russian air campaign seems to be:
"If there is a total collapse of any kind of trauma care, those are the sort of things that can contribute to collapsing morale very suddenly. The morale of a besieged force can look robust until it collapses."
And Syria is not unique in contemporary wars: Israel has deployed the same strategy in its repeated assaults on Gaza (see here, here and here for 'Operation Protective Edge' in 2014), and the Saudi-led coalition has attacked more than 70 hospitals and health facilities in Yemen since March 2015 (in this latter case Russian media have reported MSF's objections to the 'utter disregard for civilian life' without dissent: see for example here).
'Preventing medicine', as Annie Sparrow puts it, has become 'a new weapon of mass destruction'.
(4) 'Violence legislates'
Following the attack on the UN aid convoy delivering supplies to a Syrian Red Crescent warehouse outside East Aleppo on 19 September 2016, 101 humanitarian organisations issued a joint appeal to the United Nations on 22 September; in part it read:
'Deliberate attacks on humanitarian workers and civilians are war crimes. This must mark a turning point: the UN Security Council cannot allow increasingly brazen violations of international humanitarian law to continue with impunity.
'Heads of state are gathered in New York this week for the United Nations General Assembly. Each one that accepts a lack of accountability for perpetrators and facilitators of war crimes colludes in the ongoing dissolution of international humanitarian law' (my emphases).
The first paragraph is damning enough. Ben Taub in the New Yorker again:
Nowhere has the supposed deterrent of eventual justice proved so visibly ineffective as in Syria. Like most countries, Syria signed the Rome Statute, which, according to U.N. rules, means that it is bound by the "obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty." But, because Syria never actually ratified the document, the International Criminal Court has no independent authority to investigate or prosecute crimes that take place within Syrian territory. The U.N. Security Council does have the power to refer jurisdiction to the court, but international criminal justice is a relatively new and fragile endeavor, and, to a disturbing extent, its application is contingent on geopolitics.
But the sting comes in the second paragraph. As I've noted before, international humanitarian law is not a neutral court of appeal, a deus ex machina above the fray, but has always been closely entangled with military violence. In many respects it travels in the baggage train, constantly pulled by the trajectory of the very violence it supposedly seeks to regulate (or facilitate, depending on your point of view). In short, as Eyal Weizman has it, 'violence legislates'.
There is good reason to fear that the systematic violation of medical neutrality is intended to force its dissolution. Thomas Arcaro writes: 'Humanitarian principles like neutrality and impartiality that once seemed so self-evident have been drawn into question, especially on the politically and ethnically complex battlefields of Iraq and Syria.'
And not only there. In the case of the US airstrike on the MSF Trauma Centre in Kunduz in 2015, I've suggested that some key Afghan officers and politicians chafed at the protections afforded to wounded Taliban combatants by international humanitarian law. They also alleged that the Trauma Centre had breached its conditional immunity because the Taliban had overrun the hospital and were firing at US and Afghan forces from its precincts. There is no evidence to support that assertion, but it is an increasingly familiar claim. On 7 December 2016 US Central Command justified a 'precision strike' requested by Iraqi forces on a building within the al-Salem hospital complex in Mosul by claiming that IS fighters had used it as a base to launch heavy and sustained machine-gun and rocket-propelled grenade attacks. That would certainly have compromised the hospital's immunity, but international humanitarian law still requires a warning to be issued before any attack and a proportionality analysis to be conducted; Colonel John Dorrian said that the US Air Force did not 'have any reason to believe civilians were harmed' but conceded that it was 'very difficult to ascertain with full and total fidelity' whether any medical staff or patients were in the building at the time of the air strike.
But what the Syrian case suggests is a new impatience with medical neutrality tout court: not only a hostility towards the treatment of wounded and sick combatants but also an unwillingness to extend sanctuary to wounded and sick civilians.
And that reluctance is not confined to the Assad regime and its allies. A survey carried out for the International Committee of the Red Cross between June and September makes for alarming reading – even once you've overcome your scepticism about public opinion polls. As Spencer Ackerman reports:
Areas in active conflict record greater urgency over questions of civilian protection in wartime than do the great powers that often conduct or participate in those conflicts. In Ukraine, 83% believe everyone wounded and sick during a conflict has a right to health care, compared with 62% of Russians. A full 100% of Yemenis endorse the proposition, as do 81% of Afghans, 66% of Syrians and 42% of Iraqis – compared with 49% of Americans, 53% of Britons, 37% of the Chinese and 67% of the French.
It's that last clause that is so disturbing: for the last four states listed are all permanent members of the UN Security Council…
So what, then, are we to make of what I've been calling 'the exception to the exception'?
The exception to the exception
I think it's a mistake to treat 'the camp', following Giorgio Agamben's vital work, as the exemplary, diagnostic site of the modern space of exception; the killing fields of today's wars (themselves spaces of indistinction, where it is never clear where war stops and peace begins, where the geometry of the battlefield or, better, 'battlespace' becomes ever more fractured and blurred, and where the partitions between international and internal conflicts have been reduced to rubble) are also spaces within which groups of people are deliberately and knowingly exposed to death through the removal of legal protections that would ordinarily be afforded to them. In short, killing and injuring become legally permissible.
Those exposed groups include both combatants and civilians, but their fate is not determined solely by the suspension of national laws (the case that concerns Agamben) because international humanitarian law continues to afford them some minimal protections. One of its central provisions has been medical neutrality: yet if, through its serial violations in Syria and elsewhere, we are witnessing the slow 'death of the clinic' – which I treat as a topological figure which extends from the body of the sick or wounded through the evacuation chain to the hospital itself – and the extinction of 'the exception to the exception', the clinic as a (conditionally) sacrosanct space – then I think it's necessary to add further twists to Agamben's original conception.
As Adia Benton and Sa'ed Ashtan have argued, medical neutrality – the exception to the exception – represents a fraught attempt to restrict the state's recourse to military violence: it is a limitation on and has now perhaps become even an affront to sovereign power and the state's insistence that it is 'the sole arbiter of who can live and who can die'.
Agamben describes the inhabitants of the space of exception as so many homines sacri – where sacer has the double meaning of both 'sacred' and 'accursed' – and it may be that in today's killing fields doctors, nurses and healthcare workers are being transformed into new versions of homo sacer: once 'sacred' for their selfless devotion to saving lives, they are now 'accursed' for their principled dedication to medical neutrality.
Yet the precarity of their existence under conditions of detention and torture, siege and airstrike, has not reduced them to what Agamben calls 'bare life'. They care – desperately – whether they live or die; they have improvised a series of survival strategies; they have not been silent in the face of almost unspeakable horror; and they have developed new forms of solidarity, support and sociality.
Posted in Afghanistan, biopolitics, casualties, humanitarianism, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, late modern war, law, medical geography, Syria, torture	| Tagged Afghanistan, bare life, Gaza, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, hospital attacks, Iraq, Kunduz, medical neutrality, Mosul, MSF Trauma Centre, space of exception, Syria
Posted on May 6, 2016 by Derek Gregory
Sky News has a report on Launch & Recovery crews responsible for US/UK drone operations against IS in Iraq and Syria based "somewhere in the Middle East".
Much of it will be all too familiar to most readers:
Relentlessly watching their prey. Monitoring every movement a high profile Islamic State target makes.
In the words of the American officer I speak to, "we are the unblinking eye"…
"We are going to be on that target as long as the weather allows and as long as the mission allows.
In many cases there is more than one asset on that individual.
"You know when he's going to go to the bathroom, you know when he's going to go to eat, you know when he's going to go to prayer time.
"You know where he goes, his associates.
"That's all about building that picture so that we know and we can project when he's going and where he's going to be."
But the video embedded in the report repays close attention, not least for the brief glimpses of the video feeds from the drones themselves.
The first two images (above) are clips from the video used by the pilot to control the aircraft – a view of the runway before take-off and an airborne view before control is handed off to the crew who will fly the assault mission from ground control stations in either the US or the UK – while the third (below) is from the imagery used to identify a 'possible target'. The comparison between this last image and the equally 'High Definition' imagery released from an Italian MQ-9 Reaper late last year is instructive: see my post here.
You can find updates on the UK campaign in Iraq and Syria at Drone Wars UK here and here.
As Chris Cole reports there, too, the use of remote platforms [RPAs] to strike targets in Afghanistan has increased dramatically following the draw-down of US and NATO forces:
It is surely not coincidental that last month the US Air Force renamed eight of its RPA reconnaissance squadrons 'attack squadrons':
'Eight RPA reconnaissance squadrons [based at Holloman AFB in New Mexico, Whiteman AFB in Missouri, and Creech AFB in Nevada] will be redesignated as attack squadrons [and]… Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III authorized RPA aircrews to log combat time when flying an aircraft within designated hostile airspace, regardless of the aircrew's physical location.
The changes were two of many recommendations that emerged as part of Air Combat Command's Culture and Process Improvement Program, which seeks to address a number of issues affecting operations and the morale and welfare of Airmen across the RPA enterprise….
"Aerial warfare continues to evolve. Our great RPA Airmen are leading that change. They are in the fight every day," Welsh said. "These policy changes recognize the burdens they bear in providing combat effects for joint warfighters around the world."'
Posted in Afghanistan, drones, imagery, Iraq, Syria, United Kingdom, USA	| Tagged Afghanistan, attack squadrons, drones, imagery, Iraq, Islamic State, Launch & Recovery, Syria
Matters of definition
Since my post on the use of drones to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance over Iraq and Syria I've been thinking about the image stream provided by Predators and Reapers. Then I used an image from what I think must be an MQ-9 Reaper operated by France which was in full colour and – this is the important part – in high definition. Over the weekend the New York Times published a report, culled from the Italian magazine L'Espresso, which – together with the accompanying video clip (the link is to the Italian original not the Times version) – confirmed the power of HD full motion video, this time from a Reaper operated by Italy:
The footage … begins with grainy black-and-white images of an airstrike on what appears to have been a checkpoint on a road in northern Iraq, beneath a huge black flag.
Then there is something altogether different: high-resolution, color video of four distinct armed figures walking out of a house and along the streets of a town. At one stage, the picture suddenly zooms in on two of the suspected militants to reveal that one of them is almost certainly a child, propping a rifle on his shoulder that indicates how small he is relative to the man next to him. The images are so clear that even the shadows of the figures can be examined.
But the significance of all this is less straightforward than it might appear.
First, not all drones have this HD capability. We know from investigations into civilian casualty incidents in Afghanistan that the feeds from Predators but also early model ('Block') Reapers are frequently grainy and imprecise. Sean Davies reports that the video compression necessary for data transmission squeezed 560 x 480 pixel resolution images into 3.2 MBps at 30 frames per second whereas the newer (Block 5) Reapers provide 1280 x 720 pixel resolution images resolution images at 6.4 MBps. The enhanced video feeds can be transmitted not only to the Ground Control Stations from which the aircraft are flown – and those too have been upgraded (see image below) – but also to operations centres monitoring the missions and, crucially, to ruggedized laptops ('ROVERs') used by special forces and other troops on the ground.
The significance of HD full-motion video is revealed in the slide below, taken from a briefing on 'small footprint operations' in Somalia and Yemen prepared in February 2013 and published as part of The Intercept's Drone Papers, which summarises its impact on the crucial middle stage of the 'find, fix, finish' cycle of targeted killing:
As you can see, HD FMV was involved in as many as 72 per cent of the successful 'fixes' and was absent from 88 per cent of the unsuccessful ones.
Second, Eyal Weizman cautions that the image stream shown on the Italian video was captured 'either very early or very late in the day. Without shadows we could not identify these as weapons at all.' Infra-red images captured at night could obviously not provide definition of this quality, but even so-called 'Day TV' would not show clear shadows at most times of the day. In Eyal's view, 'showing these rare instances could skew our understanding of how much can be seen by drones and how clear what we see is.'
Third, no matter how high the resolution of the video feeds, we need to remember that their interpretation is a techno-cultural process. One of the figures shown in the Italian video 'is almost certainly a child', reports the New York Times. So bear in mind this exchange between the crew of a Predator circling over three vehicles travelling through the mountains of Uruzgan in February 2010 (see also here and here):
1:07 􏰀(MC):􏰀 screener􏰀 said 􏰀at least 􏰀one 􏰀child 􏰀near 􏰀SUV􏰀
1:07 􏰀(Sensor):􏰀 bull􏰀 (expletive 􏰀deleted)…where!?􏰀
1:07 􏰀(Sensor): 􏰀send 􏰀me 􏰀a 􏰀(expletive􏰀deleted) 􏰀still,􏰀􏰀 I􏰀 don't 􏰀think 􏰀they 􏰀have 􏰀kids 􏰀out 􏰀at 􏰀this 􏰀hour, 􏰀I 􏰀know􏰀 they're 􏰀shady 􏰀but􏰀 come􏰀 on􏰀
1:07􏰀 (Pilot):􏰀 at 􏰀least 􏰀one 􏰀child…􏰀Really?􏰀 Listing 􏰀the􏰀 MAM [Military-Aged Male], 􏰀uh, 􏰀that 􏰀means 􏰀he's 􏰀guilty􏰀
1:07􏰀 (Sensor):􏰀 well 􏰀may be􏰀 a 􏰀teenager 􏰀but 􏰀I 􏰀haven't􏰀 seen􏰀 anything 􏰀that 􏰀looked 􏰀that 􏰀short, 􏰀granted 􏰀they'e􏰀 all 􏰀grouped 􏰀up 􏰀here,􏰀 but.􏰀..
1:07 􏰀(MC): 􏰀They're 􏰀reviewing􏰀
1:07 􏰀(Pilot):􏰀Yeah 􏰀review 􏰀that􏰀 (expletive 􏰀deleted)…why􏰀 didn't 􏰀he 􏰀say􏰀 possible􏰀 child,􏰀 why􏰀 are􏰀 they􏰀 so 􏰀quick􏰀 to 􏰀call 􏰀(expletive􏰀 deleted) 􏰀kids 􏰀but􏰀 not 􏰀to 􏰀call 􏰀(expletive􏰀deleted) 􏰀a 􏰀rifle􏰀….
03:10 􏰀(Pilot):􏰀 And 􏰀Kirk􏰀97, 􏰀good 􏰀copy􏰀 on􏰀 that.􏰀 We 􏰀are 􏰀with 􏰀you.􏰀 Our 􏰀screener􏰀 updated􏰀 only􏰀 one􏰀 adolescent 􏰀so 􏰀that's 􏰀one􏰀 double 􏰀digit􏰀 age 􏰀range.􏰀 How􏰀 Copy?􏰀
03:10 􏰀(JAG25):􏰀We'll􏰀 pass 􏰀that 􏰀along 􏰀to 􏰀the 􏰀ground 􏰀force􏰀 commander.􏰀 But 􏰀like 􏰀I 􏰀said, 􏰀12 􏰁13 􏰀years 􏰀old 􏰀with􏰀 a 􏰀weapon 􏰀is􏰀 just 􏰀as􏰀 dangerous.􏰀􏰀
In other words – it's more than a matter of high definition; it's also a matter of political and cultural definition.
Posted in Afghanistan, Africa, drones, imagery, Iraq, Somalia, surveillance, technology, Yemen	| Tagged Eyal Weizman, high-definition video, Iraq, Reaper
Airwars
Posted on May 25, 2015 by Derek Gregory
I've taken the maps above from the BBC, which rely on reports from the Institute for the Study of War and news releases from US Central Command on 'Operation Inherent Resolve'.
For readers wanting to follow and analyse the US-led air campaign in Iraq and Syria in more detail, I recommend Chris Woods' new project, Airwars. Chris is a veteran of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's Drone War Project and the author of Sudden Justice: America's secret drone wars (2015) – which really is the gold standard for analysis of US remote operations.
Airwars.org is a collaborative, not-for-profit transparency project aimed both at tracking and archiving the international air war against Islamic State (Daesh), in both Iraq and Syria. We also seek to highlight – and follow up where possible – those cases in which claims of civilian non-combatant casualties from coalition airstrikes have been indicated by credible monitoring agencies. In addition we track reported 'friendly fire' incidents.
The site includes tabulations and also an interactive, zoomable map (see the screenshot below). You can find a detailed discussion of sources and methodology here.
I'm tracking all this for The everywhere war… In case you are wondering why that is taking so long to finish: The colonial present started out as an essay on 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan; I then realised that Sharon was taking advantage of the 'war on terror' to ramp up Israeli dispossession and repression of the Palestinian people, and so started work on a second essay (I'm ashamed to say that at the time I knew as little about the West Bank and Gaza as I did about Afghanistan on 11 September 2001). Then the US invaded Iraq… Much the same is happening with The everywhere war, but I do have the end in my sights. I hope.
Posted in air wars, casualties, Iraq, Syria, USA	| Tagged air strikes, Airwars.org, Chris Woods, Iraq, Islamic State, Syria
'That others may die'
As I am (at last) moving into the finishing stages of my 'Dirty Dancing' essay on CIA-directed drone strikes in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, it's time to round up some of the latest work on drones and civilian casualties across multiple theatres.
First, Afghanistan: the principal theatre of US remote operations. I've noted Larry Lewis's remarkable work before (here and here), based on classified sources, and in particular this claim (see also here):
Drone strikes in Afghanistan were seen to have close to the same number of civilian casualties per incident as manned aircraft, and were an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement.
As I said at the time, the distinction between an 'incident' and an 'engagement' is crucial, though most commentators who have seized on Larry's work have ignored it and focused on the dramatic difference in civilian casualties per engagement. Despite my best efforts, the Pentagon were unwilling to clarify the difference, so here is what Larry himself has told me:
An engagement is probably intuitively what you would expect – the use of force against a target. The distinction is the term incident, which is borrowed from ISAF definitions. I should have said "civilian casualty incident." This refers to an engagement that results in civilian casualties.
This means that, if you look at the collection of civilian casualty incidents, the average number of civilian casualties is close to the same for manned and unmanned platforms. At the same time, the rate of civilian casualties for the two platforms is markedly different, with unmanned platforms being ten times more likely to cause civilian casualties than manned platforms. That doesn't mean that drones caused more civilian casualties than manned aircraft, by the way, since the denominators (number of engagements of manned aircraft versus drones) can and in fact were very different. But it does suggest that the relative risk of civilian casualties was higher for one kind of platform versus the other.
And this is in the specific context of Afghanistan and for a specific time. I wouldn't want to say that this specific rate would be repeated, necessarily. Yet there were certain risk factors I observed in the civilian casualty incidents that I would expect to continue to be factors unless steps were taken to mitigate them.
Larry's most recent report, Improving lethal action: learning and adapting in US Counterterrorism Operations, is available here. It includes an analysis of the Uruzgan air strike that is central to my 'Angry Eyes' essay (next on my to-do list).
[The short clip above is from Baden Pailthorpe's stunning animation MQ-9 Reaper (That Others May Die) (2014) – you can find much more here]
You might think that all of this is now of historical interest since President Obama has declared the end of the Afghanistan war. Not so. Here is John Knefel writing in Rolling Stone this week:
Though many Americans may not have realized it, December 28th marked what the U.S. government called the official end of the war in Afghanistan. That war has been the longest in U.S. history – but despite the new announcement that the formal conflict is over, America's war there is far from finished. In fact, the Obama administration still considers the Afghan theater an area of active hostilities, according to an email from a senior administration official – and therefore exempts it from the stricter drone and targeted killing guidelines the president announced at a major speech at the National Defense University in 2013.
"Afghanistan will continue to be considered an 'area of active hostilities' in 2015," the official tells RS. "The PPG does not apply to areas of active hostilities." (PPG stands for Presidential Policy Guidelines, the formal name for the heightened drone rules.)
That perplexing distinction – that formal combat operations are over but that the U.S. still remains in an armed conflict – in many ways exemplifies the lasting legacy of Obama's foreign policy.
If you assume the situation in Pakistan is somehow less ambiguous, read Ryan Goodman on 'areas of active hostilities' over at Just Security here (I'm having to sort all this out for 'Dirty Dancing', of course).
Second, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism has released its end-of-year report on US drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia in 2014, which includes these tabulations of casualty rates for the first two countries:
The Bureau comments:
While there have been more strikes [in Pakistan] in the past six years, the casualty rate has been lower under Obama than under his predecessor. The CIA killed eight people, on average, per strike during the Bush years. Under Obama, it is less than six. The civilian casualty rate is lower too – more than three civilians were reported killed per strike during the past presidency. Under Obama, less than one. There were no confirmed civilian casualties in Pakistan in the past year, as in 2013….
The frequency of strikes [in Yemen] may have fallen in 2014 but more people were killed, on average, per strike than in any previous year. The casualty rate for last year even outstrips 2012 – the bloodiest year recorded in the US's drone campaign in Yemen when at least 173 people were reported killed in 29 strikes. In 2014 at least 82 people were reported to have died in just 13 strikes.
You can find the Long War Journal's tabulations for Pakistan here and Yemen here.
Third, Israel. I've commented previously on an interview with an Israeli drone pilot, but it's been difficult to put his observations in context (though see here and scroll down to the tabulations). Now Ann Rogers, who wrote Unmanned: drone warfare and global security (Pluto, 2014) with John Hill – as good an introduction to drone wars as you will find – has just released an essay on 'Investigating the Relationship Between Drone Warfare and Civilian Casualties in Gaza'. It's in a special issue of the open-access Journal of Strategic Security 7 (4) (2014) on 'Future challenges in drone geopolitics'. Here's the abstract:
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, are increasingly touted as 'humanitarian' weapons that contribute positively to fighting just wars and saving innocent lives. At the same time, civilian casualties have become the most visible and criticized aspect of drone warfare. It is argued here that drones contribute to civilian casualties not in spite of, but because of, their unique attributes. They greatly extend war across time and space, pulling more potential threats and targets into play over long periods, and because they are low-risk and highly accurate, they are more likely to be used. The assumption that drones save lives obscures a new turn in strategic thinking that sees states such as Israel and the US rely on large numbers of small, highly discriminating attacks applied over time to achieve their objectives. This examination of Israel's 2014 war in Gaza argues that civilian casualties are not an unexpected or unintended consequence of drone warfare, but an entirely predictable outcome.
It's an interesting essay, but I fear that it takes the Israeli military at its word. Ann repeatedly refers to Israel's 'discriminating' targeting:
'The central point is that drones enabled the IDF to undertake detailed, extensive, and discriminating targeting of Gaza, before and during the actual fighting. The killing of civilians may be down to differing interpretations of military necessity, or in some cases, in how combatants and non-combatants are distinguished from one another. But it is the drone gaze that enables these targets to be 'called into being' (p. 102)…
'As Israeli targeting of Gaza appears to have been highly discriminating, a more serious problem may lie in how its view of legitimate attacks differs from the global "norm." (p. 104).'
I commented on Israeli attacks on hospitals and ambulances last summer here, here and here, and on the wholesale destruction of Gaza here and here, so I confess I am at a loss for words. But she is right to emphasise the operative power of international humanitarian law and its protocols of distinction (discrimination) and proportionality – though, as often as not, these seem to have been inoperative in anything other than a rhetorical sense. For much more on this, and the way in which military lawyers are incorporated into Israel's kill-chains, you should click across to Craig Jones's War, Law and Space. All of which makes the Palestinian decision to seek membership of the International Criminal Court all the more important (there's a good commentary on the wider legal issues by David Luban at Jus Security here and by a clutch of commentators at the Middle East Research and Information Project's blog here). Perhaps not surprisingly, Daniel Reisner, the former head of the Israeli military's International Law Department, has condemned the Palestinian application as 'a belligerent act within the framework of the non-physical and kinetic world of lawfare.'
Finally, the US-led air strikes on IS/ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria. Here we know much less than we should, not least because the Pentagon knows much less than it should. Here is Nancy Youssef reporting earlier this week:
In a war fought largely from the air and in places no one can safely go, the impact is as opaque as the war itself, making it difficult to measure whether the U.S. and coalition effort is working.
"We don't have the ability to count the nose of every guy we schwack," as Pentagon spokesman Adm. John Kirby told reporters Tuesday, using military jargon [sic] for killing. "That's not the goal."
Presumably, that also means the Pentagon can't count how many civilians it has accidentally killed in the name of ridding the region of ISIS.
Drone Wars UK has an excellent survey of the logistics of air operations over Iraq and Syria from Chris Cole here, and the New York Times has produced a useful interactive map of US-led air strikes from which I've snipped this summary:
We don't know how many of these were carried out by drones or even orchestrated by them, but as their limitations are becoming clearer it's reasonable to assume that most involved conventional strike aircraft. We do know that targeting involves the analysis of video feeds from both remote and conventional platforms, and that CENTCOM has had considerable difficulty in juggling the competing demands for ISR from Afghanistan and from Iraq/Syria.
According to a report this week from W.J. Hennigan, who visited the USAF's 480th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia:
In a vast windowless room, several dozen intelligence analysts worked under the glow of more than 100 computer screens, quietly studying video streaming from U.S. drones and spy planes hunting for Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria.
One team searched the incoming video to find a firefight underway between Iraqi security forces and militants somewhere south of the insurgent-held city of Mosul in northern Iraq.
For four hours, the analysts pored over the imagery before identifying 20 positions where the militants were dug in with machine guns and other weaponry. After the analysts called in the coordinates, 15 jets from five countries pounded the targets with more than two dozen bombs.
The Dec. 5 airstrike, one of 462 last month, underscores the Pentagon's increased reliance on personnel far from the battlefield… Air Force analysts here stand — or rather sit — on the virtual front lines by tracking Islamic State fighters in a war zone some 6,000 miles away.
But here's the rub:
Unlike in past wars, when U.S. troops on the ground helped provide targeting information and intelligence, commanders in the battle against Islamic State rely chiefly on airborne surveillance, captured communications chatter, signals intelligence and other material that is processed by analysts here.
U.S. officers said the video-watching analysts working half a world away are no match for spotters and other troops feeding intelligence from the front lines.
"We don't have anywhere near the level of intelligence we used to," Lt. Col. Marc Spinuzzi, a senior intelligence officer, wrote in an email from Baghdad. The analysts are under "a lot of pressure … to clearly distinguish friend from foe, and to pick out the enemy from the civilian population" on the battlefield.
That is precisely how mistakes are made and civilians killed. And, as Robert Naiman pointed out,
"There is a big danger here that U.S. air strikes in Syria are going to resemble the drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen in the sense that there is no accountability for who is killed. We have reports of civilian casualties from people in the area and the U.S. government says, 'No, they are bad guys.' There has to be some public accountability for what happens when there are allegations of civilian casualties."
At least the Pentagon has now gone some way towards recognising the problem. Previously it had insisted that it was unaware of any civilian casualties, which is disingenuous: it beggars belief that 1,000 air strikes could have resulted in no civilian casualties – but if your ISR is inadequate it's scarcely surprising that you would be 'unaware' of the consequences. Even so, on 6 January the Pentagon announced that it had investigated 18 allegations of coalition airstrikes causing civilian casualties between 8 August and 30 December. It determined that 13 were 'not credible', but was continuing to review three others; a further two, one in Iraq and one in Syria, are now the subject of formal military investigations. But before you gold your breath, both Iraq and Syria are also exempt from the Presidential Policy Guidelines that require a 'near certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured'. Here is Harold Koh (really):
'They seem to be creating this grey zone… If we're not applying the strict rules [to prevent civilian casualties] to Syria and Iraq, then they are of relatively limited value.'
Posted in Afghanistan, casualties, drones, Israel/Palestine, Pakistan, Somalia, USA, Yemen	| Tagged Afghanistan, Baden Pailthorpe, civilian casualties, drones, Gaza, Iraq, Israel, Larry Lewis, Pakistan, Presidential Policy Guidelines, Syria, Yemen
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text:
Reverberations of Mexico Walmart scandal
April 30, 2012	12:11 PM CST By Emile Schepers
On Apr. 21, the New York Times broke the news of a massive bribery scandal involving the operations of multinational retail giant Walmart in Mexico. Reportedly, Walmart of Mexico had spent millions paying off officials there to facilitate the entry of their big box stores and other operations into cities and towns around the country.
In this way, Walmart was able to displace other small- and medium-sized retail operations and become by far the largest retailer in this country of 109 million inhabitants.
That story led to widespread denunciations in the U.S., and calls for further investigations and, possibly, legal action. It has also led to a revival of interest in the many criticisms of the giant corporation's business practices in the states.
The revelations caused no surprise in Mexico. The accusations, which Mexican workers, small businesspeople, and others have leveled at the giant range from desecration of the important Mexican archeological site of Teotihuacan to the introduction of genetically- modified foods. Walmart is also accused of destroying thousands of small and medium sized competitors, undercutting them with its low labor costs.
But the two biggest complaints about Walmart in Mexico concern the privileged treatment it has been accorded at all levels of government, and abusive labor practices.
Revelations in the Mexican press show that Walmart has received favored treatment from federal governments starting with that of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in '91. Walmart has been given tax breaks, the result of which have had it paying a fraction of the taxes paid by some native Mexican enterprises. In this way, Wal- Mart has been able to build an empire of 2,095 stores in Mexico, with new ones opening practically every day.
The labor abuses are shocking, but in line with general labor conditions in Mexico, a country that has enlightened labor laws that are completely vitiated by non-enforcement and weak unions.
A 2005 study by the Project for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights revealed violations of the rights of women workers, similar to those of which Walmart operations in the U.S. have been accused.
In every Walmart operation in Mexico, one finds that baggers and the people who watch the cars in the parking lot are minor children, none more than 16 years of age. These young people are "volunteers" who receive neither pay nor benefits, and have no enforceable labor rights. They survive entirely on tips.
Enrique Bonilla Rodriguez, coordinator of the organization "Frente Nacional Contra Walmart" (National Front Against Walmart) calculates that around 30 percent of the total labor force of Walmart in Mexico is working for tips and without wages or benefits. Further, he accuses Walmart of making these "volunteer" workers kick back big chunks of the money they get from tips to the company. His organization calculates that this represents an extra savings in labor costs to Walmart of about $85 million since 2006.
Walmart's Mexican subsidiary, WalMex, justifies this by pointing at the low prices it is able to pass on to consumers.
Another accusation is that Walmart in Mexico keeps its labor costs down by having rival corrupt unions bid against each other for the right to provide workers to the company. As in many other Mexican enterprises, employees who object to this setup risk ending up in the street. The Mexican government contributes to this state of affairs by making sure that independent unions, which really stand up for the workers, are repressed.
When this story broke, the government of right-wing President Felipe Calderon, of the National Action Party (PAN), stated that it did not plan to even investigate the situation because any bribes that had been paid had gone to state and local, and not federal officials. This brought howls of derision from the opposition, so the latest news is that the Mexican government says it has asked the U.S. government for any information the latter may have about the involvement of Mexican federal officials in the bribery.
This is an election year in Mexico and the PAN's presidential candidate, Josefina Vazquez Mota, is badly trailing the candidate of the formerly ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party, PRI, Enrique Peña Nieto. The candidate of the left, former Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, is currently vying with Vazquez Mota for second place.
The main issues in the election, besides economic basics, include Calderon's failed drug war, which, by putting the army into the streets, has not stopped the depredations of the feared cartels, but has helped to drive the death toll up to 50,000 people.
The Walmart story began on the PRI's watch but the bribery documented by the New York Times took place during the PAN administration of Vicente Fox. So if this story continues in the headlines, it is bad news for the governing party.
Brennan Cavanaugh // CC BY-NC 2.0
Emile Schepers
Emile Schepers is a veteran civil and immigrant rights activist. Born in South Africa, he has a doctorate in cultural anthropology from Northwestern University. He is active in the struggle for immigrant rights, in solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and a number of other issues. He writes from Northern Virginia.
Periodistas protestan en México por asesinatos de compañeros

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Out of the Abyss
Jonathan G. Nelson
– September 15, 2015Posted in: Tabletop Gaming
Stop the madness and dare to descend into the Underdark! Out of the Abyss, a new Dungeons & Dragons adventure for the tabletop roleplaying game from the Rage of Demons storyline, is widely available at retail stores beginning today. Providing the adventure and support rules needed by Dungeon Masters for the Rage of Demons storyline, Out of the Abyss is for use with the Player's Handbook, Monster Manual, and Dungeon Master's Guide.
Also available today is the first book in the new 'Homecoming' series by New York Times bestselling author R.A. Salvatore. Archmage has everything Drizzt's fans crave: action, adventure, characters that resonate with equal measures of warrior spirit and deep compassion, and no shortage of wicked dark elves!
An epic, action-packed storyline told through multiple Dungeons & Dragons products and program offerings, Rage of Demons players are sent below the surface of the Forgotten Realms to fight chaotic Demon Lords rampaging the Underdark.
Out of the Abyss takes players into the Underdark where fear reigns. It's here that a foul spell is cast and tears open portals to the demonic Abyss. From that moment on, the insanity that pervades the Underdark escalates and threatens to shake the Forgotten Realms to its foundations. Designed for fifth edition of the Dungeons & Dragons tabletop roleplaying game. Players have the opportunity to play the opening chapters from the new adventure via the D&D Adventurer's League, which takes place every Wednesday at Wizards Play Network locations around the country. Now Available: $49.95.
Archmage by R.A. Salvatore
A new day has dawned on a victorious Mithral Hall, but no matter how bright things seem on the surface, Drizzt knows that what lurks under their feet remains steeped in evil. The dark elves of Menzoberranzan, including the powerful Archmage Gromph, aren't done with Drizzt yet. And consumed by their own power struggles, the drow may just be desperate enough to call on demonic forces from the Abyss, and unleash a disaster even the Underdark could never have prepared for.
Feats of Rage
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Tavern Tales #3: It Starts With a Barroom Brawl
Mythic Mini: Feats of Psychic Magic
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Tags: D&D 5e, D&D 5e Underdark adventure, Dungeons & Dragons 5th edition, Out of the Abyss, Underdark adventure D&D 5e
About Jonathan G. Nelson
Jonathan G. Nelson is the editor-in-chief and owner of NERD TREK. He is also owner/publisher at AAW Games / AdventureAWeek.com, a tabletop gaming company based in Snoqualmie, WA. Connect with Jonathan via Facebook.


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$3075 $21000
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Wet Bin
John Adams: Life and Death of the Second President of the United States
by wet bin
Born on October 30, 1735, died on July 4, 1826, John Adams was not only Vice President to George Washington and the second President of the United States of America, but he played a pinnacle role in the drafting of the Declaration of Independence and creation of the free ol' U.S. of A. He was one of four chief fathers of the United States Governnment, standing alongside such great men as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington and Benjamin Franklin.
John Adams was born in Braintree, Massachusetts. He was the oldest of 3 brothers. He first became part of US politics when he opposed the Stamp Act of 1765. Just so you know, the Stamp Act was one of many unfair taxes laid upon the American Colonies by British Parliament, serving to tax all legal documents; such as, wills, permits, and commercial contracts. John Adams was truly a patriot. His opposition stemmed from the belief that the Stamp Act was depriving all Englishmen guaranteed rights set down by the Magna Carta. So in essence, Britain did not think well enough of the American Colonists to grant them the same priveleges of freedom as those still living on the homeland. You might say Britain brought the revolution upon themselves.
At the Boston Massacre of 1772, John Adams regained order and became one of the first people to influence colonists to fight for their freedom. He kept colonists from losing their head while protesting along with them. It's believed Adams declared that colonies weren't being government by British Parliament, but they were being ruled by the King himself.
Alongside such great names as Franklin, Jefferson, Robert Livingston and Roger Sherman, Adams would help draw up America's Declaration of Independence. He would go on to say that the document was merely a formality, that it's creation was the true act of independence. He would also pen, "Thoughts on Government" which was later used in the creation of many state constitutions.
After the war, Adams took office in 1796 after the two-terms of George Washington, becoming the first President to live in the White House. Many didn't think he had the stamina to be as great as George Washington, but the overwhelming number of Federalists wanted him over Thomas Jefferson. Although, Adams did take on Jefferson as his Vice President. During his term, there would be many foreign policy disputes and several acts passed by congress; four Alien and Sedition Acts.
Adams would die on the same day as rival and friend Thomas Jefferson – only a few hours later – on July 4, 1826. His last words were of Thomas Jefferson's well-being. They are two of three Presidents whom have died on Independence Day, alongside Monroe.
Thomas Jefferson: Life and Death of the Third President of the United States
Independence Day 2007: When the President of the United States Pissed on the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, the Ideals of Democracy and All Americans but One
Cultural Differences Between the United Kingdom and the United States: Part 1
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George Washington Facts on Associated Content: Find All You Want to Know About the First United States President in These Associated Content Articles
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