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Latin America – Multilateralism without Multilateral Values
GIGA Focus Latin America
Number 7 | 2019 | ISSN: 1862-3573
Latin America and the Caribbean are considered natural allies for German foreign policy efforts to strengthen liberal multilateralism. However, an analysis of cooperation in the region presents an ambiguous picture. Particularly with respect to core elements in the liberal canon of values such as democracy and human rights, Latin American governments primarily pursue their own political interests.
The most successful element of Latin American multilateralism is the intergovernmental settlement of disputes, which has been institutionalised since 1948 in the Pact of Bogotá. In acute crises, however, ad hoc institutions take the place of established multilateral mechanisms. Ideological proximity is more important than values and norms.
The core elements of liberal multilateralism are democracy and human rights. The Latin American countries have not only signed the most international agreements on these values but have also anchored them in the inter-American system. In practice, however, implementation has proven to be difficult.
The crisis in Venezuela demonstrates the ambiguous nature of multilateral cooperation at the interface between regional stability and countries' own political interests. The Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the increasing authoritarianism early on, but has failed at implementing sanctions due to polarisation along ideological and party lines. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) disintegrated as a result of the crisis.
Reliable partnerships within the multilateral system, in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as elsewhere, are contingent on the protection and implementation of democracy and human rights in the partner countries themselves. Lip-service commitments are not enough. This should be at the forefront of German and European foreign policy. Only when the domestic and foreign policy standards are in harmony can stable partnerships emerge.
Germany Seeks Partners
With the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote, the crisis facing liberal multilateralism reached the heart of German foreign policy. In his search for multilateral cooperation partners, federal foreign minister Heiko Maas invited his colleagues from Latin America and the Caribbean to a conference in Berlin in 2019. The region's countries were said to be "natural allies" in strengthening multilateralism which agreed with Germany "that democracy, the rule of law, and fair and free trade are the only way" (Federal Foreign Office 2019).
The reference to the shared community of values and interests between Germany or the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean is nothing new, but has rather been a recurring mantra since the end of the Cold War and the democratisation of Latin America (Federal Foreign Office 2010). However, nationalist governments with little interest in liberal cooperation (Flemes 2018) have increasingly been asserting themselves across the continent, and not just since the election of Jair Bolsonaro at the end of 2018. Simultaneously, fundamental structural problems are currently erupting throughout the entire region, showing how fragile the supposed consensus in the areas of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is. An analysis of multilateral cooperation on these topics in and with the region therefore presents a rather ambiguous picture. Multilateral cooperation in and with Latin America has been successful in the area of classical security policy intended to prevent violent interstate conflicts. When it comes to the core elements of the liberal canon of values, which are more closely linked to domestic developments, governments either cite the principle of national sovereignty or pursue their own political interests. The crisis in dealing with Venezuela in recent years shows very clearly the challenges and ambiguities of multilateral cooperation in and with Latin America.
A Zone of Peace – in Interstate Relations
In January 2014, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) declared Latin America and the Caribbean a "zone of peace." The heads of state stressed respect for international law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the promotion of a culture of peace.
The region has indeed enjoyed a long history of regional cooperation since its independence 200 years ago. In 1826 the Panamanian Congress established a system of cooperation between the former Iberian colonies, which the USA also became part of with the First International Conference of American States in 1889. At the Ninth Inter-American Conference of American States in 1948, the states founded the Organization of American States (OAS) as a regional organisation within the framework of the United Nations system. The Pact of Bogotá outlines comprehensive mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution and is intended to prevent the use of violence and to regulate when a case is brought before the International Court of Justice or the UN Security Council.
For a long time the pact was replaced by ad hoc mechanisms established specifically for particular conflicts. One example is the Contadora Group, which was founded in the mid-1980s to avoid the escalation of internationalised civil wars in Central America into a regional war. The OAS was paralysed due to the existing ideological polarisation. The governments of the neighbouring states Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela mediated and laid the foundation for the Esquipulas regional peace agreement. Other bilateral conflicts – for example, between Argentina and Chile – were also defused through the mediation of various actors (Flemes and Radseck 2009). In recent years the International Court of Justice has made a number of arbitration rulings on old border disputes. The governments of Chile and Peru adopted the ruling on the delimitation of the maritime boundary in 2014 (Wehner 2014); Colombia's government, in contrast, left the Pact of Bogotá following a ruling on its Caribbean maritime boundary that benefited Nicaragua (Urueña 2013).
Overall, multilateral cooperation to de-escalate and resolve interstate conflicts is considered to have been largely successful. This may also be because the Latin American states have very similar structures historically and culturally speaking, and because control of the border regions has always only been of interest when it has involved the control and exploitation of valuable natural resources. Whether the relatively peaceful interstate interactions are linked to the existing conflict management mechanisms or rather to a low-level of conflict in interstate relations or a peace-inducing dominance on the part of the USA (Pax Americana) remains the subject of debate (Kacowicz and Mares 2016; Mares 2012).
Protecting Democracy
In order to protect and implement core liberal values – democracy, human rights, accountability – Latin America has signed comprehensive treaties, particularly in the context of the OAS. Latin American countries were a central element of the third wave of democratisation that began in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe with Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Mainwaring and Bizzarro (2019) identify 91 cases of democratisation up to the year 2017, including 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean. In contrast to other regions, only four cases of collapse can be identified here (Dominican Republic, 1990; Peru, 1992; Nicaragua, 2008; and Honduras, 2010). The authors observe an erosion of democratic progress in Ecuador and stagnation in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic (following renewed democratisation in 1996), and Panama. The remaining eight countries (Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay), on the other hand, are making progress, albeit based on very low initial values. Latin America has therefore been far more successful than other regions. Venezuela is not included in this analysis as it was already democratic before the third wave of democratisation.
On 11 September 2001, the 34 OAS member states signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter at a special session in Lima, Peru (OAS 2001). In 1985, the OAS had adopted a protocol that declared democracy to be essential to "stability, peace, and development." Now people's right to democracy and governments' obligation to promote and defend it were enshrined in the charter. The charter explicitly refers to representative democracy, and Article 3 states that the central components are respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; access to and exercise of power on the basis of the rule of law; the holding of regular, free, and fair elections with secret ballots and universal suffrage; a pluralist system of political parties and organisations; and the separation of powers.
The charter has since been applied in relation to two countries. The first time was in 2002, when an attempted coup against Hugo Chávez took place, though he was already back in power after three days, which meant that the OAS could not take any action. However, the recognition of the "transitional government" by the US government under George W. Bush shows that old friend–enemy patterns remained predominant. Starting in 2016, OAS general secretary Luis Almagro made several attempts to sanction the increasing authoritarianism of the Maduro government. For a long time, these efforts failed due to the support Maduro received from Nicaragua, Bolivia, and numerous other Caribbean states that received preferential conditions for oil imports under Petrocaribe. When a majority in favour of the implementation of sanctions was finally achieved, the Venezuelan government declared its withdrawal from the OAS, which was to take effect in May 2019.
The sanction mechanisms were applied for a second time following the coup against Honduran president Manuel Zelaya in 2009. The OAS's preventive efforts to defuse the domestic crisis failed, and on 28 June 2009 soldiers pulled the president out of bed in the middle of the night and put him on a plane to Costa Rica. The OAS reacted immediately with the strongest sanction and suspended Honduras's membership. This had no consequences, however, because the transitional government played for time and the USA quickly broke ranks with the front rejecting the coup. The OAS was once again deeply divided in its evaluation of the subsequent elections in November 2009, and in 2011 Honduras was admitted again (Legler 2012).
Ultimately, four factors influence the application of existing regional mechanisms to protect democracy (Feldmann, Merke and Stuenkel 2019): First, the fact that there are competing rules and regulations. Using sanctions in response to violations goes against the rejection of interventions in other states' domestic affairs, which has strong roots in Latin American history. Ribeiro Hoffmann (2019) also correctly points out that there are strong differences in the region between the advocates of representative and participatory democracy regarding the central cornerstones of democracy. Second, the mechanisms lack suitable leverage that would actually force the governments involved to give in. Third, the USA's ongoing and considerable influence continues to be viewed critically. Its support for the coup against Chávez in 2002 and its about-face in favour of the transitional government in Honduras were seen as yet more signs that the priority is not the enforcement of liberal norms and values, but that these are instead a pretext for securing US economic and strategic interests. Finally, the heavily consensus-oriented mechanisms impede robust and concrete action.
The Implementation of Fundamental Human Rights
A second element of liberal multilateralism is the protection and implementation of fundamental human rights, an area in which Latin America has taken on a pioneering role. Nine months before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed on 10 December 1948 and shortly before the official founding of the OAS at the Ninth Inter-American Conference of American States in Bogotá, the organisation adopted the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Latin America's pioneering role in the codification of human rights has only recently received increased attention and recognition (Sikkink 2014). However, the focus on human rights issues in the region has always been overshadowed by a lack of implementation and serious human rights violations. An initial phase of democratisation in the 1940s and 1950s was followed by decades of military dictatorships and internal wars. Even though the wars have mostly ended and the region remains in large part formally democratic, it is still the most violent region in international comparison (UNODC 2019).
The Inter-American human rights system is based on the American Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1969 and entered into force in 1978. In 1959 the states founded the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the central responsibility of which was to produce regular reports on the human rights situation in the member states and to advise the participating states on human rights issues. A third element is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which was founded in 1979 as an organ of the convention and not of the OAS. Here both individuals and states can take legal action against human rights violations (Medina 1990).
Although these instruments have been unable to prevent the violation of fundamental human rights, they play an important role in working through and documenting these violations. With democratisation and the ending of the internal wars, Latin America has also contributed significantly to the development of innovative human rights instruments. Examples include the truth commissions in Argentina and Guatemala and, currently, Colombia's Special Jurisdiction for Peace.
With respect to both democracy and human rights, Latin America's central problem is not a lack of rules or institutions. The lack of implementation can instead be explained by the fact that the political, economic and military elite have prevented or undermined the application of these rules. This is true above all for the rule of law, which must enforce adherence to democratic rules and the observation of fundamental human rights at the national level. The implementation of the regional rules and regulations has failed primarily due to widespread impunity – even in the case of capital crimes – and due to corruption, not only but also within the judicial system.
The example of Venezuela demonstrates how the lack of consensus regarding the core elements of democracy and human rights has impeded a regional response to the crisis.
The Failure of Latin American Cooperation in Venezuela
When Hugo Chávez was elected Venezuelan president in 1998, the differences with regard to democracy and human rights, as well as regional cooperation, became evident. From the beginning Chávez propagated a model of democracy that foregrounded participation and privileged social human rights over political human rights. In practice, however, this led to the erosion of democratic institutions and the abolition of the separation of powers. While Chávez won the bulk of the generally mostly free elections with a large majority, his successor Nicolás Maduro (in power since 2013) faced growing criticism because of increasingly authoritarian tendencies, not only from the national opposition but also from regional organisations. Particular milestones in the direction of an authoritarian system were the manipulation of the electoral system and the militarisation of the state apparatus (Jácome 2018; Legler and Nolte 2019). However, data from the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2019) shows that there has been a massive decline in all four dimensions of democracy (Figure 1).
In the case of Venezuela, the OAS attempted relatively early on to stop the further deterioration of core elements of democracy. When the opposition received an overwhelming majority in the 2015 National Assembly elections, it appeared that a turning point might be possible. However, the Maduro government did not give in: it did not recognise the victory of two opposition MPs, which meant the opposition did not have the two-thirds majority in parliament that would have allowed it to block all of the government's initiatives. Maduro undermined the opposition's attempt to remove him from office legally via an impeachment referendum (permitted during the first two years in office) – a measure introduced in 2004 via OAS mediation – by refusing to recognise the signatures that had been collected. The ultimate turning point was Maduro's convening of a constituent assembly in 2017 to take over the parliament's tasks.
The OAS tried to invoke the relevant articles within the Democratic Charter, but this failed due to the polarisation within the organisation. In April 2017, the Maduro government finally withdrew from the OAS. In response, 12 mostly conservative governments founded the Lima Group, in keeping with the tradition of ad hoc groups to deal with regional conflict management. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Mexico – as well as Costa Rica and Canada – took part. Uruguay, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, on the other hand, did not join the initiative. While Uruguay tried to position itself as a neutral mediator, Bolivia and Nicaragua sided openly with the Maduro government.
The year 2017 was when the Maduro government used massive repression against opposition protesters who had taken to the streets. The protests were no longer gaining ground "only" within the traditional parties, but also among the population that had supported and elected Chávez. According to figures from the Observatorio de la Violencia (Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia 2019), 5,535 people died resisting the state security forces in 2017 and 7,523 in 2018. Mediation efforts in the Dominican Republic on the part of the former Spanish prime minister Zapatero and the Vatican failed because Maduro was unwilling to make any concessions and primarily tried to gain time. His rapidly sinking popularity was likely one of the main reasons that he moved the elections set for the end of 2018 up to May. A large segment of the opposition boycotted the elections and refused to recognise Maduro when his term ended on 10 January 2019. In this situation, the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaido, declared himself interim president and demanded "the end of the usurpation and new elections" in the context of renewed mass protests.
Latin America remained divided. The USA and most of Latin America's conservative governments, as well as Canada and most of the EU, recognised Guaido's claim to the presidency. This recognition was associated with the hope that rapid regime change was possible, either through the implosion of the regime or the military changing sides. The threat of military intervention under US leadership was also made. The fact that numerous Latin American governments openly discussed this option, above all Colombia and Chile, represented a rhetorical break with the previously emphasised ban on intervening in the domestic affairs of other states. In these tense circumstances, some European and Latin American governments then founded the International Contact Group, which advocated for a negotiated solution – so far without success.
Latin America's handling of the Venezuela crisis aligns seamlessly with the problems of multilateral cooperation in the region:
Cooperation to defuse acute interstate crises does take place, but it generally relies on newly founded ad hoc mechanisms rather than existing institutions.
With respect to democracy, different conceptions that depend on the ideological or political leanings of the particular government collide. Aside from the holding of elections, there is no minimum consensus in the region as to which core elements are indispensable. And elections also take place in authoritarian contexts.
When governments use force against their own populations, this still – even in the twenty-first century – falls largely under the rule of non-intervention, or it is criticised if the repressive government belongs to the "other" political camp. Here the logic of the Cold War, which fuels well-known notions of the enemy in Latin America using Cuba and Chavism, has survived.
Latin America – A Difficult Partner
The region's handling of the Venezuela crisis shows that the optimistic assumption that new regional organisations such as UNASUR represented a qualitative leap in regional cooperation was premature. Current developments tend to support the sceptics, who point out that regional cooperation is primarily based on presidential cooperation and continues to involve traditional forms of working together (Legler 2013).
The crisis in and surrounding Venezuela, as well as other conflicts, demonstrate the highly ambivalent relationship of many governments to national and international regulations. Instead of pacta sund servanda (contracts must be honoured), the colonial motto se obedece pero no se cumpla (rules are formally respected but not actually implemented) applies. Against this backdrop, Latin America represents a rather difficult partner for reliable multilateral cooperation.
However, this relatively ambivalent relationship to international rules and contracts is not limited to Latin America. Rather than ideological orientation, it is the protection of basic liberal values such as democracy and human rights that is a good indicator in support of partnership on values and norms. This correlation should guide European and German foreign policy much more strongly than geostrategic and economic interests. Only when the standards for domestic and foreign policy are at least somewhat in harmony can stable partnerships emerge.
Coppedge, Michael et al. (2019), V-Dem [Venezuela 1990-2018] Dataset v9, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19.
Federal Foreign Office (2019), Gemeinsam für Multilateralismus und Frauenrechte! [Together for Multilateralism and Women's Rights!], www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/lateinamerika/maas-lak-frauenmultilateralismus/2193808 (27 November 2019).
Federal Foreign Office (2010), Deutschland, Lateinamerika und die Karibik: Konzept der Bundesregierung [Germany, Latin America and the Caribbean: The Federal Government's Concept], www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/213420/e134842d489660405b58c361489b78e7/lak-konzept-dt-data.pdf (27 November 2019).
Feldmann, Andreas E., Federico Merke, and Oliver Stuenkel (2019), Argentina, Brazil and Chile and Democracy Defence in Latin America: Principled Calculation, in: International Affairs, 95, 2, 447–467, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz025.
Flemes, Daniel (2018), Brazil's Elections: Nationalist Populism on the Rise, GIGA Focus Latin America, 5, September, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/brazil's-elections-nationalist-populism-on-the-rise (27 November 2019).
Flemes, Daniel, and Michael Radseck (2009), Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America, GIGA Working Paper 117, www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publication/creating-multilevel-security-governance-in-south-america (27 November 2019).
Jácome, Francine (2018), Los Militares En La Política y La Economía de Venezuela Nueva Sociedad, in: Nueva Sociedad, 274, March–April, 119–128.
Kacowicz, Arie M., and David R. Mares (2016), Security Studies and Security in Latin America. The First 200 Years, in: Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 11–29.
Legler, Thomas (2013), Post-Hegemonic Regionalism and Sovereignty in Latin America: Optimists, Skeptics, and an Emerging Research Agenda, in: Contexto Internacional, 35, 2, 325–352, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-85292013000200001.
Legler, Thomas (2012), The Democratic Charter in Action: Reflections on the Honduran Crisis 1: The Democratic Charter in Action, in: Latin American Policy, 3, 1, 74–87, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2012.00057.x.
Legler, Thomas, and Detlef Nolte (2019), Venezuela: la protección regional multilateral de la democracia, in: Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 19, 2, 43–51.
Mainwaring, Scott, and Fernando Bizzarro (2019), The Fates Of Third-Wave Democracies, in: Journal of Democracy, 30, 1, 99–113, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0008.
Mares, David (2012), Latin America and the Illusion of Peace, London: Adelphi Papers.
Medina, Cecilia (1990), The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, in: Human Rights Quarterly, 12, 439–464.
OAS (2001), Inter-American Democratic Charter, 11 September, www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm (10 December 2019).
Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia (2019), Informes, https://observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve/category/informes/# (10 December 2019).
Ribeiro Hoffmann, Andrea (2019), Negotiating Normative Premises in Democracy Promotion: Venezuela and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, in: Democratization, 26, 5, 815–831, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1576033.
Sikkink, Kathryn (2014), Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea of International Human Rights, in: Global Governance, 20, 3, 389–404.
UNODC (2019), Global Study on Homicide, Wien: UNIS.
Urueña, Rene (2013), Colombia se retira del Pacto de Bogotá: Causas y Efectos, in: Universidad Diego Portales (eds), Anuario de Derecho Público, 511–547.
Wehner, Leslie (2014), Internationale Rechtsprechung in Grenzkonflikten: der Fall Chile – Peru, GIGA Focus Latin America, 1, February, www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publication/internationale-rechtsprechung-in-grenzkonflikten-der-fallchile-–-peru (27 November 2019).
General Editor GIGA Focus
Prof. Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach
Lead Research Fellow / Editor GIGA Focus Latin America Editor GIGA Focus Global
Editor GIGA Focus Latin America
Prof. Dr. Bert Hoffmann
Lead Research Fellow / Head GIGA Berlin Office
Editorial Department GIGA Focus Latin America
Petra Brandt
Dr. James Powell
English Copyeditor
T. +49 (0)40 - 428 25-570sabine.kurtenbach@giga-hamburg.de
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The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the Internet and downloaded free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus. According to the conditions of the Creative-Commons license Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0, this publication may be freely duplicated, circulated, and made accessible to the public. The particular conditions include the correct indication of the initial publication as GIGA Focus and no changes in or abbreviation of texts.
The German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) – Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien in Hamburg publishes the Focus series on Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and global issues. The GIGA Focus is edited and published by the GIGA. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are responsible for the content of their articles. GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors and omissions, or for any consequences arising from the use of the information provided.
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Q: Exception: AttributeError: 'DefaultAzureCredential' object has no attribute 'signed_session' using Azure Function and Python I wrote an Azure function that runs Python3 to simply turn on an Azure VM.
The function app has a system assigned managed identity that I've given VM contributor role. To have the function use the Managed Identity, I am using the DefaultAzureCredential() class.
The error I am getting is:
Exception: AttributeError: 'DefaultAzureCredential' object has no attribute 'signed_session'
I've done tons of research and can't seem to find the solution.
Here is the code that is related:
from azure.identity import DefaultAzureCredential
credentials = DefaultAzureCredential()
compute_client = ComputeManagementClient(credentials, subscription_id)
# Starting the VM
print('\nStarting VM ' + VM_NAME)
vm_start = compute_client.virtual_machines.start(
    RG_NAME, VM_NAME)
vm_start.wait()

You'll have to forgive me, I'm only new to Python, but very interested in learning.

A: EDIT May 2022:
As of May 2022, all SDKs have been re-released with native support for azure-identity. If you still encounter this error with a given SDK on its latest version, please open an issue asking for a re-release of that SDK here: https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-python/issues
Original response:
This is addressed here: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/python/azure-sdk-authenticate?tabs=cmd
Search "Using DefaultAzureCredential with SDK management libraries" on this page and it will take you to the section that covers your problem in more detail.
In a nutshell....
They updated the DefaultAzureCredential class and it no longer has a 'signed_session' attribute.  The newest versions of the management libraries should be updated to handle this.  As mentioned in another solution, update your azure-cli library to ensure you have the latest.  However, not all of the management libraries have been updated yet.  You can use this wrapper created by a member of the Azure SDK engineering team for the time being.
https://gist.github.com/lmazuel/cc683d82ea1d7b40208de7c9fc8de59d
# Wrap credentials from azure-identity to be compatible with SDK that needs msrestazure or azure.common.credentials
# Need msrest >= 0.6.0
# See also https://pypi.org/project/azure-identity/

from msrest.authentication import BasicTokenAuthentication
from azure.core.pipeline.policies import BearerTokenCredentialPolicy
from azure.core.pipeline import PipelineRequest, PipelineContext
from azure.core.pipeline.transport import HttpRequest

from azure.identity import DefaultAzureCredential

class CredentialWrapper(BasicTokenAuthentication):
    def __init__(self, credential=None, resource_id="https://management.azure.com/.default", **kwargs):
        """Wrap any azure-identity credential to work with SDK that needs azure.common.credentials/msrestazure.
        Default resource is ARM (syntax of endpoint v2)
        :param credential: Any azure-identity credential (DefaultAzureCredential by default)
        :param str resource_id: The scope to use to get the token (default ARM)
        """
        super(CredentialWrapper, self).__init__(None)
        if credential is None:
            credential = DefaultAzureCredential()
        self._policy = BearerTokenCredentialPolicy(credential, resource_id, **kwargs)

    def _make_request(self):
        return PipelineRequest(
            HttpRequest(
                "CredentialWrapper",
                "https://fakeurl"
            ),
            PipelineContext(None)
        )

    def set_token(self):
        """Ask the azure-core BearerTokenCredentialPolicy policy to get a token.
        Using the policy gives us for free the caching system of azure-core.
        We could make this code simpler by using private method, but by definition
        I can't assure they will be there forever, so mocking a fake call to the policy
        to extract the token, using 100% public API."""
        request = self._make_request()
        self._policy.on_request(request)
        # Read Authorization, and get the second part after Bearer
        token = request.http_request.headers["Authorization"].split(" ", 1)[1]
        self.token = {"access_token": token}

    def signed_session(self, session=None):
        self.set_token()
        return super(CredentialWrapper, self).signed_session(session)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    import os
    credentials = CredentialWrapper()
    subscription_id = os.environ.get("AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID", "<subscription_id>")

    from azure.mgmt.resource import ResourceManagementClient
    client = ResourceManagementClient(credentials, subscription_id)
    for rg in client.resource_groups.list():
        print(rg.name)

Your code would then look like:
from cred_wrapper import CredentialWrapper
credentials = CredentialWrapper()
compute_client = ComputeManagementClient(credentials, subscription_id)
# Starting the VM
print('\nStarting VM ' + VM_NAME)
vm_start = compute_client.virtual_machines.start(
    RG_NAME, VM_NAME)
vm_start.wait()

You should be cooking from there!

A: Looks like it's fixed if you use the preview version of azure-mgmt-compute (17.0.0b1)
Another gotchya because of the version bump is they changed the start function from start to begin_start.
Hope this helps somebody!

A: I ran into this issue and cannot upgrade the Azure management libraries in question. However, the wrapper does not work as it leads to another error:
self._token = self._credential.get_token(*self._scopes)
AttributeError: 'CredentialWrapper' object has no attribute 'get_token'

To get around this I had to pass through the get_token call in the CredentialWrapper class:
class CredentialWrapper(BasicTokenAuthentication):
    def __init__(...):
        ...
        # Set credential to instance variable
        self.credential = credential

    ...

    def get_token(self, *scopes, **kwargs):
        # Pass get_token call to credential
        return self.credential.get_token(*scopes, **kwargs)

For reference the library versions I'm using are:
azure-common==1.1.25
azure-core==1.9.0
azure-identity==1.5.0
azure-mgmt-compute==17.0.0
azure-mgmt-core==1.2.2
azure-mgmt-network==16.0.0
azure-mgmt-resource==10.2.0
msrestazure==0.6.4

A: I have faced the similar (Signed_Session) kind of issue while working with Azure nsgs and have fixed it. There might be 2 causes.

*

*Azure library versions mismatch.
for me combination of below 2 libraries are working.
azure-identity==1.6.1 and azure-mgmt-network==19.0.0

*May be you are importing the incorrect library.
I am working with nsgs for this. I installed the library called "azure-mgmt" and imported the "NetworkManagementClient" class then I have faced "signed session" issue. Later, I uninstalled the "azure-mgmt" library and installed another library, "azure-mgmt-network==19.0.0" and now it is working fine.
To import/work with "azure.mgmt.network import NetworkManagementClient", we need to install "azure-mgmt-network==19.0.0" library but not "azure-mgmt.
Just think on above 2 ways..it may helps you.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


With a stunningly diverse range of landscapes and climates, the U.S. is filled with countless scenic roads from coast to coast. Mountains, valleys, forests, canyons, coastlines—you'll see all of these and more when you embark on the best drives in the country. Though you can find beautiful stretches of highway just about anywhere you look, we've picked out the most beautiful ones, which will take you through the most thrilling landscapes around the U.S. Get ready to be inspired by our journey across America's most scenic roads.
Cruise against the backdrop of the Appalachian Mountains on 469 miles of natural splendor. Nestled among more than one hundred species of trees as well as habitats for 59 species of birds, the Blue Ridge Parkway brings nature lovers amazingly close to constantly changing landscapes. Make time to stop at Milepost 5.8 at the Humpback Rocks for hiking trails and scenic picnic opportunities amidst the 19th-century farm buildings and natural rock formations. The Marby Mill at Milepost 176, originally built as a sawmill and gristmill, now stands as a landmark and gathering place for the community, with live music on Sunday afternoons. The best sunrises and sunsets can be seen from Waterrock Knob, Milepost 451.2.
The Cades Cove Drive is an eleven-mile, one-lane scenic loop around the Great Smoky Mountains National Park in Tennessee. Free and open to the public, from sunrise through sunset, the drive brings riders deep into a region where bears and deer roam free. Along the paved road, you'll pass deserted yet well-preserved cabins, stores, barns, and mills dot the way. Pick up the $1.50 guidebook at the beginning of the loop for an informed tour as you cruise along. The speed is kept to a low average of about ten miles per hour throughout the loop to optimize wildlife sightings.
The Kancamagus, pronounced "Kank-ah-mah-gus," is a 34.5-mile scenic byway that cuts through the middle of White Mountain National Forest. The area is known for exquisite fall foligage, drawing leaf enthusiasts here annually. Be sure to make time to stop at the famed Sabbaday Falls, where water rushes from 45 feet into a serene brook. The Lower Falls on the byway are also worth stopping for, as the myriad waterfalls pour into a natural swimming area. As it is unsupervised, it is advised only to swim in The Lower Falls when water is calm and not at full force. Note there are no gas stations, restaurants, or hotels along the route, so be prepared for a half-hour plus journey through the woods.
Travel through paradise along the 50-mile Road to Hana, Hawaii's treasured scenic roadway. With 620 curves along coastlines and mountainsides, as well as 59 bridges, the Road to Hana connects Kahului with Hana in east Maui. Waterfalls, scenic outlooks, and opportune swim holes are mapped out by local guidebooks available at the beginning of the drive—best planned as a day trip, returning before sunset. Be sure to take turns driving as the harrowing curves and steep cut-offs require a driver's full focus on the narrow roads. Along the way, be sure to pick up some of the locally-made banana bread.
The San Juan Skyway is a scenic, 233-mile loop in southwest Colorado through the San Juan Mountains. The drive, which takes an estimated seven hours to complete, is a wonder to behold as you pass peaks that reach up to 14,000 feet. The Million Dollar Highway stands as the skyway's most rewarding and challenging stretch—a 25-mile passageway through the Uncompahgre Gorge, where sharp turns, no guardrails, and narrow roads rewards drivers with immense scenic vistas of mythical landscapes, waterfalls, and off-the-grid exploration.
Connecting Parowan and Panguitch, the 55-mile Patchwork Parkway takes drivers through Dixie National Forest, where majestic geological rock formations, lakes, and streams abound. The road hugs the eastern edge of Panguitch Lake, a glistening body of water known for its excellent fishing. Make a pit stop between Milepost 8 and 9 for a mile hike to the Hidden Haven, where a secret oasis awaits with a waterfall and rock climbing. Despite its short distance, the route offers a surprisingly dense collection of ecological experiences. Be sure to make your way 30 miles south from Panguitch to Bryce Canyon. The spectacular rock formations (known as hoodoos) create a mesmerizing stone forest.
When you're driving on Carmel's 17-Mile Drive, your destination is the journey itself. At $10 per car for non-residents, the route circles the exclusive Pebble Beach and Pacific Grove neighborhoods on the coast of the Pacific Ocean. Upon paying the toll, visitors receive a map with the best spots for turnouts to capture the perfect photo. Drive alongside some of the world's most exclusive golf courses, many of which offer fine dining to the public. Among the attractions, the Lone Cypress, a single Monterey cypress tree, stands as a landmark and the official symbol of Pebble Beach. Save your toll receipt, as some Pebble Beach resort restaurants will credit the fee towards your tab.
Situated on an island, the 27-mile route explores the park's eastern terrain delivering Atlantic beaches, fresh-water lakes, forests, and multiple hiking and climbing trails along the way. There is a $20-per-car fee to complete the loop, but the solitude and serenity of Maine's landscapes is worth it. Along the way, stop by Thunder Hole to experience the force of the sea, as this small inlet provides thunderous bursts of water as high as 40 feet on windy days. Cadillac Mountain, part of the loop, is the highest point along the North Atlantic seaboard and the first place to view the sunrise in the U.S. from October 7 through March 6.
Journey through remnants of Old Spain set in the rolling Sangre de Cristo Mountains as you travel from pueblo to pueblo along this 56-mile stretch. Beginning just north of Santa Fe, the byway heads north, where 360-degree views of endless mountainous terrain await. Make time to stop in the pueblos for authentic New Mexican crafts like woodcarvings, pottery, and rugs. The recognizable San Francisco de Asis Mission Church stands as a landmark and must-see in Taos. This quaint town is brimming with culture, boasting remarkable galleries of contemporary and classic artwork and a summer scene filled with family activities. Before you go, indulge in the delicious red and green chile at Ranchos Plaza Grill (8 Ranchos Plaza); no trip is complete without the indomitable sopapilla.
Tap into Vermont's untethered scenic beauty with the sprawling 200-mile Route 100, which runs nearly the entire length of the state. Start in the south, heading north from Stamford, and prepare to pass through more than 20 towns offering unique local goods and fine dining. Drive along the east edge of the Green Mountains, where lakes and rivers are prime for fishing and swimming, as well as canoeing and kayaking. The Route is dotted with art and craft studios, all dedicated to local workmanship. One weekend a year, these studios open their doors for an Open Studio Weekend. Check out the detailed map here and be sure to stop for some of these local gems. Vermont takes great pride in its local beer brewing culture. Seek out The Alchemist's famed Heady Topper double IPA beer along the way. Retailers usually sell out of their weekly shipments within an hour.


text:
> January
> Botulism alert for injecting drug users
Botulism alert for injecting drug users
Botulism alert for injecting drug users NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde's Public Health Protection Unit, Police Scotland and Health Protection Scotland are investigating two probable cases of Botulism in drug injecting heroin users. Both patients are from the Greater Glasgow and Clyde area and are receiving treatment in Glasgow hospitals, both are in a serious condition. The cause of these infections are being investigated with the focus on intravenous drug use. Dr Catriona Milo?ević, NHS Greater Glasgow Consultant in Public Heath Medicine, said: ?I urge all drug injecting heroin users to be extremely alert and to seek urgent medical attention from Accident and Emergency if they experience any early symptoms such as blurred or double vision, difficulty in swallowing and speaking and/or inflammation at the injection site. "It is important for injecting drug users to engage with the wide range of services we offer designed to help them tackle their addictions. However for those who continue to inject it is extremely important that they seek urgent medical help if they show these early symptoms. "Heroin users should avoid injecting heroin into their muscles. Injecting heroin into a vein or smoking can reduce the risk of botulism, although not using heroin at all is by far the best course of action." We are not aware of any other cases in Scotland at this time. Ends For information contact NHSGGC Press Office on 0141 201 4429. NOTES TO EDITORS What is Botulism? Botulism is caused by botulinum toxin, a poison produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum. The organism is can be found in soil, dust, and river or sea sediments and can survive in these environments as a resistant spore. The bacteria themselves are not harmful, but they can produce highly poisonous toxins when they are deprived of oxygen (such as in closed cans or bottles, stagnant soil or mud, or occasionally the human body). Symptoms often begin with blurred or double vision and difficulty in swallowing and speaking. There may be local inflammation at an injection site in cases associated with intravenous drug use. If the condition is not treated quickly the disease can progress to a paralysis that can affect the arms, legs, and eventually the muscles that control breathing. The way in which the condition is treated depends on the type of botulism you have, but treatment will usually involve neutralising the toxins with injections of special antibodies while the functions of the body (such as breathing) are supported. Most cases make a full recovery, but the recovery period can be many months. Death can occur in between 5 and 10 per cent of cases. ENDS

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Many of us know the feeling of drowning in the guilt, shame, or regret from something that we have done.
Make no mistake about it. We all mess up. We all make mistakes. This is part of the human experience.
We do things that we aren't too proud of. Things that hurt others. Things that break trust and destroy relationship. Things that force us into places we do not want to be. Some are little things. But some...aren't so little.
Mistakes. Pains. Moments we do too much. Or too little. Things that are part of our human experience, but can very easily become define our whole human experience.
Last week for the holidays, I had an unusually long amount of time to reflect on the past year. I drove eleven hours from Ohio to Boston with a friend. On the way back, we took turns asking one another questions that made us reflect on the past year. I'll be the first to confess. I had to sift through many dark memories before I could recall the joyful ones. I'll be honest with you.
When reflecting on these dark moments of the past year, I can't help but ask…is God missing?


Smooth and controlled ride, excellent fuel economy with 1.8-liter engine, attractive and ergonomic interior design. Extremely reliable, handles well, very dependable little car. Have had no service issues at all with it.


text:
Stamford Civic Society was formed by a small group in the early 1960s to defend the town's heritage and actively fight for its preservation and improvement.
Since then, it has grown to a membership of over 200 people; in addition to our concerns about the town's heritage and conservation, we orgainise visits to local places of interest, organise talks on a variety of subjects, run projects to enhance the town, work with local schools to encourage the children to take an interest in their town, run an awards scheme and when necessary, campaign on issues affecting Stamford.
We invite you to join us.
One of the Society's main roles is to monitor the planning applications that affect Stamford, especially in the Conservation Areas. The Society regularly appears at District Council planning meetings when applications of particular importance are being discussed, and also makes representations to the Planning Inspectorate when decisions are appealed. Although our primary focus is on Stamford's conservation area, we are always happy to discuss developments elsewhere in Stamford wherever it may be helpful. Please contact us if you would like our advice or support. A variety of publications have been produced over the years, and many of them are available in our archives section of the website.
The Stamford Urban Group became part of the Civic Society in early 2013, thus extending our practical involvement in helping to keep Stamford looking great.
A quarterly newsletter is distributed to members.
The Society's objectives are set out formally in its Constitution.


text:
7 Royal Navy jobs currently available - how to apply and how much they pay
Portsmouth has a long history and strong association with the naval forces
William BradleyContent Editor
10:08, 7 MAR 2021
Updated 16:43, 13 APR 2021
Portsmouth Naval Base has been an integral part of the city since 1194 (Image: Getty Images)
The Royal Navy continues to hold a strong presence and history in Portsmouth and remains one of the biggest employers in the area.
And with many people possibly looking for work due to the coronavirus pandemic, it might be a good place to start if you're considering a change of direction.
It's more of a lifestyle than a career, which potentially offers opportunities to travel the world, as you serve your country.
Portsmouth Naval Base has been an integral part of the city since 1194 and is home to almost two-thirds of the Royal Navy's surface ships.
This includes the new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, the formidable Type 45 destroyers, Type 23 frigates and mine countermeasures and fishery protection squadrons.
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It will also be home to HMS Prince Of Wales, the sister ship of HMS Queen Elizabeth.
The base is a major employer and provides lodging facilities to RN personnel serving at the base and in Portsmouth-based ships.
Below are just some of the many roles available, including three high priority roles. To see a full list of jobs and for more information on them click here.
Royal Navy Promotion Audit Assistant
Location: Portsmouth
The Royal Navy Promotion Team is responsible for implementing all aspects of RN promotion, contract extension and appraisal policy, the job advert explains.
The Promotion Audit Assistant position will be directly accountable to the Promotion Board Audit Manager, for the accurate assessment of promotion and contract extension eligibility for RN personnel.
An excerpt from the advert reads: "The unique opportunities offered within HMNB Portsmouth are varied, challenging and exciting and support Navy Command's role to generate and operate forces for today and to ensure we are ready for tomorrow by developing and delivering the Navy of the future."
Two positions are currently being advertised in this role, at 37 hours per week.
Sounds good? For more information and to apply click here.
Navy Finance Corporate Governance Policy Support
Navy Command Headquarters (NCHQ) in Whale Island, Portsmouth, is the nerve centre of the Naval Service. It supports operations around the globe and provides the ships, people, aircraft and equipment to deliver the UK's defence policy.
An excerpt from the advert reads: "Activities associated with supporting the Finance Specialist Services Team's work, such as Skype meeting bookings, diary management, visitor escorting.
"Provide a flexible resource for administrative support to the Finance Specialist Services team and the wider finance team as required."
According to the advert, the headquarters in Portsmouth offer an impressive range of on-site facilities including a gymnasium, tennis courts, and other sporting facilities, a children's nursery, a bistro restaurant, a shop and plenty of car parking spaces.
The position is advertised at 37 hours per week. Fancy knowing more? For more information click here.
The Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth arrives back in Portsmouth (Image: Andrew Matthews/PA Wire)
Communications Specialist (CIS)
Salary: £20,000, after basic training, rising to over £51,000 if career progresses
According to the job role, it is a position that would put the right candidate into the thick of the action, as they transmit and receive crucial messages.
Responsibilities include administering and providing specialist communications and IT equipment including classified information and cryptographic material to guarantee operational capability is delivered to the command.
An excerpt from Royal Navy site says: "Being an Engineering Technician Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Specialist means that you are always in the thick of the action working as an online network engineer at the heart of every mission solving complex issues, enabling the secure exchange of mission critical and often top-secret information.
Sounds good? For more information on the position click here.
Communications Specialist (Submariner)
This is a high priority role advertised, and is part of the elite silent service - where a successful candidate will be a central member of the engineering team for a vessel.
On the RN site, an except from the role says: "Using ultramodern radio and satellite systems to communicate with off-vessel command, you're key to tactical and strategic communications.
"But it's much more than that. Because a submarine's first line of defence is stealth, you'll have to know every tiny detail about communication with the outside world. Not giving your boat's position away is crucial. It means the safety of the submarine – and your crewmates - is in your hands."
If you would like more information on this position, click here.
Engineering Technician (Weapon Engineering) (Submariner)
A engineer technician is responsible for the nation's nuclear deterrent, where a successful candidate will be tasked with maintaining and preparing advanced defence technology.
The RN describe the role as: "You might be working with ballistic missile systems one day, and state-of-the-art sensors and radars the next. It takes something special to be a submariner, living below the surface and being responsible for our nation's nuclear deterrent.
"And as a Weapon Engineer in the Silent Service, your role has never been more essential. You provide the firepower, and the stealth."
For more information and to request an application click here.
A job for those wanting to embark on a medical career which has the potential to offer more variety and adventure than traditional civilian medicine.
Role responsibilities include making a real difference to essential operations. That might mean being the only medic on board a ship, and taking responsibility for the general healthcare of an entire crew.
An except from the advert reads: "From the day you join, you'll gain new skills, pushing yourself to the limit in some unique and challenging environments. You could be training with Special Forces in West Africa, or working in primary care on board a ship in the Persian Gulf."
Want to know more? To request an application click here.
Portsmouth's Ant Middleton is axed by Channel 4 over his 'personal conduct'
HMS Queen Elizabeth leaves Portsmouth Naval Base as hundreds wave her off
Warfare Specialist
Salary: £20,000, after basic training, rising to over £51,000 if career progresses.
Being a Warfare Specialist in the Royal Navy means you're the person who identifies targets, and threats, the job descriptions explains.
An except from the advert says: "Whether working in the Operations Room or on the ship's Weapon Systems you will be the heartbeat of the war-fighting effort.
"This job comes with serious responsibility, get it wrong and the ship could sustain damage, get it right and the enemy is defeated."
Benefits include the opportunity to travel all around the world. For more information and to request an application form click here.
All job listings were live at the time of publication. More career opportunities with the Royal Navy can be found here.
IYA Alert County
HMS Queen Elizabeth


He was difficult to be with. She was amiable, as if positive energy radiates from her. Different tastes, contrasting personalities, sitting in the same class, born in the same year. With all of those said, they only know one thing-- They were meant for each other.