text:
\section{Introduction}
An autonomous vehicle (AV) is defined as a system that can conduct dynamic driving tasks with the limited human intervention~\cite{sae2016taxonomy}. While creating a fully autonomous vehicle for everyday usage is still a big challenge, personal cars have advanced self-driving features implemented~\cite{SMofAS_Survey},~\cite{hagenziekerautomated}.
Despite the autonomous vehicles' intelligence, a human is still kept on-the-loop and conduct supervisory control over the system and monitor the autonomous system. Thus with the increase of vehicle system automation, there is a concept switch from Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) to Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). Such a shift takes place as the nature of interaction design changes from control-oriented to supervisory control~\cite{HMIvsHRI}. However, according to~\cite{HCI_grandChal
, the increase of  systems interconnectivity on which HRI is based leads to ``scalability issues making traditional security countermeasures inapplicable.'' That is why it is essential to define whether there is a difference between information security risk management (ISRM) in HCI and HRI, and whether the methods to treat ISRM in HCI can be applied to Human-AV interaction.

Security failure may cause vehicle damage, financial losses, disclosure of sensitive personal data, and road accidents~\cite{ENISA_SmartCars}. While much attention is paid to making autonomous driving ready-to-use technology, the urgency of security risk management is omitted.
Infotainment systems that give a passenger understanding of the vehicle's behaviour and surroundings is considered as the one that presents the biggest attack potential for vehicle networks~\cite{hodge2019vehicle}. Numerous successfully implemented proof-of-concept attacks~\cite{ENISA_SmartCars} proves the possibility of remotely taking control of a vehicle's infotainment system and manipulating driving function. They demonstrate a lack of proper addressing security risks during the development. For the successful launch of autonomous vehicle projects, implementation of security measures and conducting risk management are required phases of AV system and supporting services lifecycles~\cite{ENISA_CAM2021}.

One way to address this task is to separate AV's functionality into use cases and conduct risk analysis for each of them separately. The developed AV subsystems and their use cases should be reviewed from different perspectives to conduct an in-depth security risks analysis. One use case to be researched is the interaction of AV with the end-user - Passenger. This use case enables Passenger to get information about the AV functioning and conduct supervisory control over the vehicle. The case includes sharing personal and critical for safe transporting data between intelligent transportation system (ITS) components, e.g., AV controllers, a ride-hailing service provider, and the other infrastructure components.
This study aims to investigate \textbf{\textit{how information security risks in Passenger-Autonomous Vehicle interaction can be managed}}.

In this paper, we propose an approach of security requirements elicitation based on the developed threat model, which was initially presented in~\cite{PassengerDataProtection} by one of the paper authors. The approach is created relying on the business process and the AV system architecture designed within the autonomous driving lab. The designed ecosystem is supposed to be used by a ride-hailing service provider to allow customers to use driverless ride-hailing services. As shown on Fig.~\ref{fig:AV_general_model}, the considered ITS incorporates (\textit{i}) AV system which is in charge of dynamic driving tasks of a single-vehicle, and (\textit{ii}) a service provider information system (IS) that offer infotainment service to passengers and help them to set interaction with a vehicle (later referred to as `Central System'). The systems can be either managed by the same or different service providers. It should be noted that a set of attacks on the in-vehicle network and central IS is still present but remains outside the scope of this study.

\begin{figure}[!ht]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=0.45\textwidth]{AV_system_generalPicture}
    \caption{The researched autonomous vehicle ecosystem and its architecture~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}} \label{fig:AV_general_model}
    \Description{The researched ecosystem where Passenger-AV interaction takes place consists of the following elements: (i) AV system installed in the car - embraces components which compose perception, network and application layer; (ii) Service Provider System - information system (IS) used by ride-hailing service provider. Passenger uses electronic devices (e.g., personal on installed in the AV tablet or smartphone) for interaction with the systems. Electronic devices establish a connection with the AV system via an external connection.}
\end{figure}

The paper is organised as follows: in Sect.~\ref{sec:CaseDescription}, we describe the case, followed by the background in Sect.~\ref{sec:Background} and the description of the research method in Sect.~\ref{sec:ResearchMethod}. Sect.~\ref{sec:CaseAnalysis} contains security analysis of the researched AV ecosystem.
Sec.~\ref{sec:Validation} introduces preliminary validation results of the elicited requirements. Finally, Sect.~\ref{sec:Discussion} concludes the paper by the discussion of the results, the lessons learned, and provides directions for the future research.

\section{Case Description} \label{sec:CaseDescription}

The Passenger-AV interaction occurs during the \textit{Ride Fulfilment} process, which consists of three parts that deliver value to a Passenger -- \textit{Ride Initiation}, \textit{Ride Execution} and \textit{Ride Post-Processing}. As the baseline of the surveyed processes, we used a user interface prototype
designed in the autonomous driving lab\footnote{More information about the autonomous driving lab can be found at \textcolor{blue}{\url{https://www.cs.ut.ee/en/autonomous-driving-lab}}}. The prototype aims to increase trust in autonomous vehicles. We depict the Ride Fulfilment business process using Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) language to capture the process from the business perspective and show the data flows within it. The process model is presented in Fig.~\ref{fig:RideFulfilmentsProcess}. The analysis presented in this paper covers the second part of the described process – Ride Execution sub-process as only in this phase of \textit{Ride Fulfilment} a passenger actively interacts with the AV.

\begin{figure*}[!ht]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{RideFulfilmentProcess_valueChain
    \caption{Ride Fulfilment business process~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}} \label{fig:RideFulfilmentsProcess}
    \Description{The Passenger-AV interaction is a part of the Ride Fulfilment process, consisting of three parts that deliver value to a Passenger, namely Ride Initiation, Ride Execution and Ride Post-Processing. Ride Initiation sub-process covers the handling of Passenger's request by a Central IS. It also covers the preparation of the AV system for the ride by conducting preliminary Ride Details processing and getting to the ride's starting point. The Ride Execution sub-process covers the phase of active Passenger-AV interaction where Central IS initially helps to set the interaction. Finally, Ride Post-processing takes places after Passenger left the vehicle. AV System should transfer Ride Update Request Storage copy to Central IS. Central IS finalises the ride by analysing the captured during the ride data to improve future services and archive Ride Detail to the storage to access them on demand.}
\end{figure*}

The Ride Fulfilment starts when a \textit{Passenger} initiates a ride by submitting a Ride Request in the Service Provider's App using a personal device. \textit{Central IS} processes the request and sends it to the \textit{AV System} of the assigned vehicle to execute the ride. When the AV achieved the starting point of the ride, \textit{Passenger} authenticates themselves and initiates the ride start. Once the ride started, \textit{AV system} controls the ride by executing dynamic driving tasks. Meanwhile, \textit{AV system}  informs \textit{Passenger} about the current location, and \textit{Passenger} can change the destination point or the vehicle behavior (e.g., speed) by making a request on the In-Vehicle Tablet on which the web client of the system is opened. When approaching the destination point, the vehicle asks \textit{Passenger} to select a spot to get off among the available spots near the destination. As soon as the selected spot achieved, \textit{Passenger} is notified and asked to leave the vehicle. Finally, \textit{Central IS} finishes the ride by processing the captured during the ride data to improve future services.

\section{Background} \label{sec:Background}

\subsection{Security Risk Management}

While such standards as ISO/IEC 2700x series, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) special publications generally guide security risk management, the introduced methods, perspectives, and terminologies of security risk management vary from one standard to another. Depending on the risk analysis approach (quantitative or qualitative), the nature of the problem, and the analyst preferences, organisations are employing different security risk management methods \cite{ISSRM_alignment}, \cite{FundSecSysMod_RaimMat} like OCTAV
, the NIST Cybersecurity Framewor
,  MEHAR
. The domain model for information systems security risk management (ISSRM) has been developed~\cite{Dubois2010} to avoid misunderstanding between security experts and orchestrate standards mentioned above. According to the survey results \cite{ISRM_ISO27_Survey}, ISSRM was assessed as one of the most proficient concepts that implement ISO/IEC 27001 standard requirements. Security modelling languages support the ISSRM domain model \cite{ISSRM_alignment}, which helps cover the model's concepts using the corresponding tools. To analyse the selected case scenario, we are using the ISSRM domain model as the baseline.

According to the ISSRM domain model (see Fig.~\ref{fig:fnDomainModel}), there are three key groups of concepts. The \textit{asset}-related concepts describe the organisation's assets, their value, and the reasoning why they should be protected. The \textit{risk}-related concepts correspond to risk itself and its components. The \textit{risk treatment}-related concepts describe how risks can be treated.

\begin{figure*} [!ht]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{ISSRMdomainModel}
    \caption{The ISSRM domain model~\cite{FundSecSysMod_RaimMat}: yellow entities represent asset-related concepts, red entities - risk-related concepts, and green entities - treatment-related concepts} \label{fig:fnDomainModel}
    \Description{The asset-related concepts describe the organisation's assets and their value to the organisation. The business asset represents any type of information vital for the proper processes flows and for achieving business needs. The (IS) assets support the defined business assets and are responsible for generating, manipulating, and storing new business assets. The security criteria of a business asset are defined by security objectives, which describe the security need of a system. The CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) triad forms the main security criteria that can characterise business asset and should be delivered by the corresponding IS assets. The next group contains risk-related concepts, which correspond to risk itself and its constituent components. According to the model, risk is composed of a threat that exploits IS asset's one or few vulnerabilities, that leads to a harmful impact on the assets by negating the business asset's security criteria. In turn, a threat is an incident that is defined by a threat agent (also referred to as an adversary) who uses an attack method intending to target the selected IS asset. Finally, risk treatment-related concepts describe decision regarding risk treatment. Risk treatment is refined by the security requirements that mitigate one or more risks and which are implemented by means of controls.}
\end{figure*}

\subsection{Related Work} \label{sec:RelatedWork}

Numerous studies have attempted to address information security and correspondent risk management in autonomous vehicles looking at the problem from different perspectives. Most of the researches, like~\cite{AVsecurity_AttacksDefTaxonomy_Thing_Wu}, \cite{CybSecChallengesInVehicularCom} and \cite{PotentialCyberAttacksOnAV}, are focusing on the security of in-vehicle components, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication. While AV-Human communication is mostly considered as interaction with pedestrians, the passenger's role is not widely discussed as well as the role of external service providers (e.g., ride-hailing service or ride-sharing).

In ~\cite{PotentialCyberAttacksOnAV}, authors have discussed security and privacy threats in the case of autonomous and cooperative automated vehicles (CAVs) covering In-Vehicle, V2I, and V2V interaction. The study highlighted some attacks which can take place in the Passenger-AV interaction such as attacks targeting in-vehicle devices (e.g., hand-held devices connected to the infotainment system via USB, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth), other electronic devices and maps (used by a vehicle in case of non-real-time detection of the road). Mostly, authors reviewed the users' personal devices that help viruses and malware invade into the vehicle's electronics through the infotainment system and harm the in-vehicle network and its components functionality. Thus, considering autonomous vehicle security there are various attack vectors which researchers are addressing. With respect to it and the increase of AV technologies development, Thing and Wu in~\cite{AVsecurity_AttacksDefTaxonomy_Thing_Wu} proposed a comprehensive taxonomy of AV attacks and defenses that assist AV system architectures development. In~\cite{Parkinson_cyberThreats_CAVs} authors emphasize the increase of potential risks that affect or are conducted by the vehicle passengers as they have direct physical access to the system. Moreover, the research identified the following knowledge gap: ``it is unclear what personal data will be generated and stored, ... and what potential risks there are.''
In~\cite{KHAN2020} authors presented a taxonomy of threats and generalized attack surfaces for CAV applications. In the same paper, the role of the vehicle's components security within the CAVs supply chain was highlighted. For example, testing, anti-malware updates, and physical access to the AV components by original equipment manufacturers and vendors are recommended to be logged to preserve the security of the whole vehicle system and users' privacy. Additionally, human factor in the safety and security of CAVs was discussed. Our work is complimentary to the studies in~\cite{Parkinson_cyberThreats_CAVs, AVsecurity_AttacksDefTaxonomy_Thing_Wu, KHAN2020} as we study the scenario that covers security attacks which target vehicular network, vehicle system components and passenger's device, and propose measures to address corresponding security risks. The current work also embraces the scope of the mentioned works by illustrating their findings on a particular scenario.

Concerning the security risk management of AV systems, there exist several comprehensive guidelines that worth mentioning. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) project~\cite{ENISA_SmartCars} considers the passengers of AV only in the context of how different attacks threaten the passenger's safety and pinpoints a need of raising awareness of passengers``with respect to security issues and how to prevent them, on a regular basis.'' In contrast, the guide~\cite{IPA_VehicleIS}, provided by Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan, overviews the potential threats to autonomous vehicles on the high level of abstraction. It gives the general recommendations regarding security efforts in phases of automotive systems' lifecycle, which are not scenario oriented, but rather system functionality focused. However, they consider a passenger as a passive system user, which only obtains information from the infotainment system. In~\cite{hodge2019vehicle} authors defined in-vehicle infotainment systems as the one that presents the biggest attack potential for vehicle networks. Additionally, the mitigation techniques and procurement recommendations for infotainment systems which enables passengers' interaction with a vehicle was presented. Therefore, this work aims to build an analogue guideline with less focus on system functionality for the AV system developers and service-providers which use enable active Passenger-AV interaction.

 In the latest report~\cite{ENISA_CAM2021} ENISA highlighted the need for security risk management over the products and services lifecycles in the sector of connected and automated mobility, which includes an ecosystem of services, operations and infrastructure autonomous and connected vehicles. They also recommend conducting threat modelling for revealing relevant threat scenarios and address security issues in the early stages of system development. Additionally, the high level of the interconnectivity of the ecosystem components means that lack of security protection may lead to compromising the system at the scale of a fleet of vehicles. Thus, this paper complements the high-level recommendations in~\cite{ENISA_CAM2021} as we propose the security risks management approach to the scenario where the perimeters of ecosystem components intersect so that security measures and risk management should be considered holistically for preserving AV ecosystem protection.

To sum up, previous works discussed either general attack vectors on autonomous vehicle systems and defenses rather than examples of their applicability for the systems, or the general guides of security risk management of vehicular system, while none of the studies comprises a comprehensive overview of managing information security risks on a scenario level. Therefore, this paper aims to illustrate the the first stages of information risk management by incorporating a more technical and detailed attack methods discovery, and higher-level risk management approaches.

\section{Research Method} \label{sec:ResearchMethod}

The paper demonstrates the case analysis of the scenario, presented in Sect.~\ref{sec:CaseDescription}. This research aims to investigate \textit{how to manage information security risks in Passenger-Autonomous Vehicle interaction}. We are using the ISSRM domain model as a baseline for guiding the security risks and requirements definitions to address the main research question, therefore the sub-questions correspond to the domain model groups:

\textbf{RQ1}: \textit{What assets should be protected in the Passenger--AV interaction?}

\textbf{RQ2}: \textit{What are the security threats in the Passenger--AV interaction?}

\textbf{RQ3}: \textit{What are the security requirements to mitigate security threats in the Passenger--AV interaction?}

The research process is depicted in Fig.~\ref{fig:ResearchMethodProcess}. Two parallel processes are conducted: theoretical artefacts development based on the literature review and the case analysis that illustrates the derived artefacts' application.
Thereby, the paper demonstrates the results of the applied exploratory research of the under-researched case of Passenger--AV interaction.

\begin{figure} [ht]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=0.45\textwidth]{ResearchMethod}
    \caption{The research conduction map~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}} \label{fig:ResearchMethodProcess}
    \Description{The research of security risk management in Passenger-AV interaction consists of two parallel processes: theoretical artefacts development based on the literature review and the case analysis that illustrates the derived artefacts' application.}
\end{figure}

The activity \textit{1.1.} answers the question \textit{RQ1} by defining the assets that should be protected based on the designed case. The business assets are extracted from the data structure of the researched system. For that, a class model is created using unified modeling language (UML) to define the key data entities and their dependencies. The combination of the flows depicted in the business process diagram and the data structure enables us to identify which assets should be protected, which security criteria assured and how assets are interconnected (see Sec.~\ref{sec:protectedAssets}).

For answering the question \textit{RQ2}, the threat-driven approach is chosen for defining the risks in the research scenario. The attack libraries, taxonomies and the threat modeling framework are employed to determine a threat model on the step \textit{2.1} (see Sect.~\ref{sec:ThreatModel}). After, the threat model is applied to the defined protected assets (activity \textit{1.2}), resulting in the developed risks.
Security countermeasures should be defined to mitigate the risks. Thereby, Sect.~\ref{sec:SecReqs} answers the question \textit{RQ3} demonstrating the security requirements elicitation (activity \textit{2.2}) based on the security countermeasures literature.

\section{Security Risk Management} \label{sec:CaseAnalysis}

This section aims to provide readers with the necessary background about threat modelling, including common threats taxonomies and libraries from which a threat model for Passenger-AV interaction is developed. Also the section demonstrates the results of security risks analysis for the presented in Section~\ref{sec:CaseDescription} scenario that results in the derived the threat model and security risks. Finally, the possible security measures to address risks are presented in the form of security requirements.

\subsection{Protected Assets} \label{sec:protectedAssets}

This section answers the \textbf{RQ1} by defining the assets that should be protected. In the Passenger-AV interaction, \textit{business assets} (BA) are presented by transmitted data, vital for the proper processes flows. The \textit{system assets} support these business assets and are responsible for generating, manipulating, and storing new BAs. The \textit{security criteria} of a business asset are defined by security objectives, which describe the security need of a system. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability, also known as CIA triad, forms the main security criteria which can characterise business assets.

The general data structure of the system is depicted in Fig.~\ref{fig:fnDataStr} in the form of a UML class diagram. The identified business assets are illustrated on the diagram as green entities, and system assets are depicted as red entities.

\begin{figure*} [ht]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{Model}
    \caption[Data structure of the system]{Data structure of the system~\cite{PassengerDataProtection} (green entities - business assets; red entities - system assets)} \label{fig:fnDataStr}
    \Description{The data structure is depicted in the form of a UML class diagram. The identified business assets are illustrated on the diagram as green entities, and system assets are depicted as red entities.}
\end{figure*}

As it case be seen from Fig.~\ref{fig:RideFulfilmentsProcess} and \ref{fig:fnDataStr}, \textit{Ride Details} is a central asset used by \textit{In-Vehicle Controller} for the ride execution. This entity contains such fields as a \textit{starting point}, and a \textit{destination} of the ride, collects information about \textit{selected routes}, \textit{ride spots} to get off, an involved in the ride \textit{vehicle}. Also, it contains the reference to the entity, which corresponds to \textit{Passenger} and stores her personal data, e.g. payment details. Meanwhile, \textit{Passenger Validation} asset contains credentials which a Passenger should use for starting a dialog with the system, and, consequently, start the ride. As a result, the \textit{Ride Details} asset aggregates all the other assets to enable Passenger conduct supervisory control over the AV during Ride Fulfilment.

Now let us consider how the system assets are organised. A service provider system consists of the two main components: Central IS and AV System.  \textit{In-Vehicle Controller} represents the back-end part of the AV system, and it is in charge of accessing data storage, conduction most of the calculation, and data manipulation functions. \textit{User-Device Controller} is a back-end part of Central IS. \textit{Passenger UI Client} in the observed system represents the front-end part and is separated into \textit{Web Client} and \textit{Mobile Client}, which corresponds to the front-end part of AV System and Central IS, respectively. Thus AV system communicates with a Passenger via Web Client opened on the In-Vehicle Tablet, while Central IS interacts with a Passenger via a mobile app installed on the Personal Mobile Device. Other components of the architecture is application programming interfaces (APIs), which facilitate communication between the system components - \textit{Central IS API} and \textit{AV System API}.

\subsection{Threat Model} \label{sec:ThreatModel}

According to ~\cite{ThreatModeling_Shostack} and~\cite{FundSecSysMod_RaimMat}, information security risks are mostly defined by the attacks that an adversary employs to target a system assets. Thus, threat-driven approach for risks identification is commonly used~\cite{InfoSec_4thEdition, ThreatModeling_Shostack} for guiding the ISRM. The threat model should be defined as a primary step for risks identification. This subsection reviews the common threat taxonomies, and attack libraries focused on the attacker's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)~\cite{CyberThreatModSurvey}. The primary deliverable of this subsection is a threat model for the Passenger-AV interaction scenario defined in Section~\ref{sec:CaseDescription}.

\subsubsection{Threat taxonomies}

The selected four resources of the threats and attacks were chosen due to the following reasons: (\textit{i})
the repositories are enterprise-neutral and technically focused as they do not put any limitations on a specific enterprise, its architecture, or assets but instead concerned with the overall technological environment; (\textit{ii}) the threats and attacks within the repositories are described in details, illustrated by real case implementations and the attacks supported by high-level mitigations; (\textit{iii}) the classified attacks and threats are relevant for the researched system architecture and process; and, finally (\textit{iv}) the combination of the repositories, taxonomies enable to derive threats for the system starting from the general attack vectors until the concrete threats covering the full scenario.
The \textit{STRIDE} approach~\cite{Stride} is designed for eliciting system security threats. STRIDE is supposed to be used at the beginning of ISRM during the defining potential risks and attack vectors.
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification~\cite{Capec} (\textit{CAPEC}) is a comprehensive, community-created catalog of attack patterns. It defines the informal taxonomy of attack-pattern classes and provides the formal description of each attack class. The taxonomy is organised hierarchically based on its domain and mechanisms of attack specifying the vulnerabilities it addresses. CAPEC is supported by references to the targeted vulnerabilities and possible mitigations.
Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (\textit{ATT\&CK}) framework~\cite{Mitre_ATT_CK} is a knowledge base of adversarial techniques which helps to classify attacker's actions for different platforms (e.g., Windows, Android).
It is focused on techniques in the context of tactics an adversary wants to apply to attack a specific component or endpoint. Concrete procedure examples support each technique an adversary may use, system requirements for implementing the tactics, possible detection methods, and mitigations. The techniques are mapped to the corresponding attack patterns. Another resource for the threat model creation is the list of vulnerabilities provided by the Open Web Application Security Project (\textit{OWASP})~\cite{OWASP_webPage} is considered a starting point for developing secure software focused on defensive mechanisms and controls.
The approach does not consider the prospect of a threat agent or any application implementation details.
Thus, for each specific case, a threat agent, assets, and corresponding impact should be considered besides, respectively.

\subsubsection{The threat model for Passenger-AV interaction}

Fig.~\ref{fig:fnThreatMap} illustrates the derived threat model for the Passenger--AV interaction. The model contains 17 threats that an adversary can exploit during the Ride Execution process. The threats are organised into six groups. Each threat is supported by the reference to the source it was elaborated from. The detailed description of the threats (targeted vulnerability, threats agent, attack method, and potential impact) can be found in~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}.

\begin{figure*} [h]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=0.77\textwidth]{ThreatModel}
    \caption{The threat model for the Passenger--AV interaction~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}} \label{fig:fnThreatMap}
    \Description{The proposed threat model is based on the attacks and system vulnerabilities from CAPEC, ATT\%CK, OWASP Top Ten taxonomies and libraries. The categories from the STRIDE approach group the threats. The proposed threat model is supposed to be used as a baseline for security risks identification and further security requirements elicitation.}
\end{figure*}

\textit{\textbf{Spoofing}} refers to identity spoofing attacks where an attacker pretends to be a legitimate passenger. To violate the system's \textit{authentication} mechanism, an attacker uses the obtained credentials (ST1). In the case of \textit{\textbf{tampering}}, an attacker intentionally modifies a system, network, its behavior, or the data to violate their \textit{integrity}. These threats target data storage (TT1) and software source code files (TT3), which are used during the ride execution and are critical to the general trip safety and data reliability. As the Passenger-AV interaction includes communication between few separate entities (AV system and Central IS), API parameters can be manipulated for changing the normal entities communication (TT2). \textit{\textbf{Repudiation}} attacks are targeting the business layer during which the system cannot track and log actions accurately. As a result, the system claims that the activities were not done even if they were, or vice versa. By manipulating the system log files that keep track of both passenger's activities during the ride and the data about the driving task execution, an attacker can influence the current and the future ride that uses the historical data (RT1). \textit{\textbf{Information Disclosure}} groups the threats in which the confidentiality of the data is violated by providing access to it to someone who is not supposed to have access. It refers to accessing data while it is stored locally (IT3), displayed on the mobile device to a passenger (IT1, IT2), or in the transmission between systems or their components (IT4). Such attacks intend to gather information required for further attacks. \textit{\textbf{Denial of Service}} attacks are focused on consuming resources needed to provide service to a Passenger, and as a consequence, the \textit{availability} of the information is violated. The threats target either the communication channels' resources (DT1 and DT4) or computational resources (DT2 and DT3). \textit{\textbf{Elevation of Privileges}} threats refer to allowing an attacker to have authorisation permissions that he was not supposed to have, thereby violating the system's \textit{authorization}. It can be achieved either using the obtained legitimate credentials (ET3 and ET4) or by a more sophisticated manual bypassing the existing authentication mechanisms (ET1 and ET2). It should be noted that the identified threats are interconnected as implementation of one of them  enables execution of another. For example, successfully implemented\textit{ IT4. Man-in-the-Middle attack} enables execution of \textit{TT2. API Parameters Manipulation} which in turn may result in \textit{DT2. Forced Service Deadlock}.

\subsection{Security Risks} \label{sec:SecRisks}

The current subsection answers \textbf{RQ2} by identifying security risks based on the developed threat model for Passenger-AV interaction.
The risk model for the observed scenario can be derived by instantiating attacks from the threat model to the business assets and its vulnerabilities. As a result, for the assets identified in Sec.~\ref{sec:protectedAssets}, the risk model includes 22 information security risks that can take place in the Service Provider System. The complete model can be found in~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}. Among the derived risks 13 risks are targeting Passenger Notification, and 8 out of 22 risks are targeting confidentiality of Passenger Notifications. Furthermore, some risks includes the harm to the system components, which as a result may result in getting access to any sensitive data which is visible to the system. To illustrate the attack implementation, we are using the security extension to BPMN~\cite{BPMNExt}, which supports the ISSRM domain model. Fig.~\ref{fig:fnIR5MitM} contains an example of the derived security risks -- namely, IR5 the Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack execution which targets \textit{Passenger Notification}. According to CAPEC, the MitM attack required medium skills level required, but has high impact, as it enables an adversary to conduct further attacks on the system. In Fig.~\ref{fig:fnIR5MitM}, we see an attacker as an additional entity that intercepts in the transmission channel aiming to define when the AV with the Passenger reaches the desired place on their route.

\begin{figure*} [htbp]
\begin{tabular}{cc}
  \begin{minipage}{0.7\textwidth}
        \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{MitM}
    \end{minipage}
&
  \begin{minipage}{0.3\textwidth}
        \begin{tabular}{p{3.5cm}}
            \scriptsize{\textbf{Business Asset}: Passenger Notification}\\ \hline

            \scriptsize{\textbf{System Asset}: Transmission channel used for Web-Client to In-Vehicle Controller communication}\\ \hline

            \scriptsize{\textbf{Vulnerability}: The \textit{transmission channel} used for Web-Client to In-Vehicle Controller communication is not protected with mutual authentication; The communication between system components is conducted without data encryption.}\\ \hline

            \scriptsize{\textbf{Threat}: IT4. An attacker places himself in the communication channel between Web-Client and In-Vehicle Controller to passively or actively listen to the transferred data flows.} \\ \hline

            \scriptsize{\textbf{Impact}: Compromises \textit{confidentiality} of \textit{Passenger Notification}}\\ \hline

            \scriptsize{\textbf{Risk}: An attacker places himself in the transmission channel between Web-Client to In-Vehicle Controller to passively listen to the transferred data flows and exploit the lack of data encryption that leads to compromising the confidentiality of Passenger Notification.}\\ \hline
        \end{tabular}
    \end{minipage}
\end{tabular}
    \caption{Risk IR5: Man-in-the-Middle attack~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}} \label{fig:fnIR5MitM}
    \Description{To illustrate the attack implementation, we are using the security extension to BPMN, which supports the ISSRM domain model. The diagram shows an attacker as an additional entity that intercepts in the transmission channel aiming to define when the AV with the Passenger reaches the desired place on their route. The figure also contains the components of the risk - business asset and supportive system asset, the targeted vulnerability,threat, its impact on the business asset.}
\end{figure*}

The implementation of Man-in-the-Middle attack (threat IT4) primarily aims to negate the confidentiality of Passenger Notification. However, the effective delivery enables an attacker to conduct a set of further attacks that already may target the vehicle's functions, which may provoke the loss of passenger's safety. Therefore, during the risk assessment and further decision about its treatment, it is vital to consider the direct impact and the impact of the risks that may be provoked by it — consequently, a threat-driven approach helps make requirements prioritisation. A higher priority should be given to the requirements that prevent risks with the highest impact and which stop an attacker from conducting further attacks.

\subsection{Security Requirements} \label{sec:SecReqs}

The current subsection contains a list of the derived security requirements that answers the last research question (\textbf{RQ3}).

\subsubsection{Security requirements elicitation}
According to~\cite{SecReqsFiresmith} and~\cite{FundSecSysMod_RaimMat}, a \textit{security requirement} is a condition of the domain environment that should be met in order to mitigate one or more security risks and utilising security controls implemented in the system.
In \cite{NHTSA}, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) presents the recommended guideline to the automotive industry for the vehicle's electronic architecture. It is intended to improve vehicle cybersecurity by implementing security controls. They also emphasise the necessity of using information technology security suite and standards (ISO 2700x series, CIS\cite{CISControls}). Similarly, the report by ENISA~\cite{ENISA_SmartCars} contains a set of good practices for smart cars. It stresses that for conducting information security management, it is important to use aforementioned standards along with SAE J3061~\cite{sae2016j3061} and NIST 800-53\cite{nist_sp800_63b}. IPA proposes the guide~\cite{IPA_VehicleIS} for achieving a security level in the automotive systems. They highlight the security management by implementing the security function design (in the sense of encryption, authentication, and access control), which should be enhanced with secure coding, security testing, and user training.

Meanwhile, threat-driven requirements elicitation approach supports security requirements categorisation: (i) \textit{preventive}; (ii) \textit{detective}; (iii) \textit{corrective}. The analogue taxonomy of security countermeasures for the AV defence is presented in  \cite{AVsecurity_AttacksDefTaxonomy_Thing_Wu}. Such requirements categorisation enables their prioritisation based on the impact of the risks. For example, a higher priority could be given to preventive requirements that preserve threats that enable further attacks execution.

\subsubsection{Defined security requirements}
For mitigating the defined risks in the Passenger-AV scenario, we considered the security controls from the aforementioned standards and libraries. The requirements were later defined using the inductive approach from the found controls.
Using \cite{OWASP_webPage}, \cite{Capec}, \cite{CISControls}, \cite{nist_sp800_63b}, \cite{Mitre_ATT_CK} as the main primary sources, we have elicited 56 requirements which are supported with the possible implementations (i.e. security control components), organised in groups of the correspondent treated threats. The full list of elicited requirements can be found in~\cite{PassengerDataProtection}, while Table~\ref{tab:SecReqsIdentification} represents few examples.

\begin{table*}[htbp]
\caption{Security countermeasures identification (P - preventive, D - detective, C - corrective)
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|p{2.6cm}|p{0.4cm}|p{3.4cm}||p{2.4cm}|p{0.4cm}|p{3.4cm}|}
\hline
\scriptsize\textbf{Security Requirements}&\scriptsize\textbf{Class}&\bf\scriptsize{Security Control Components}&\scriptsize\textbf{Security Requirements}&\scriptsize\textbf{Class}&\bf\scriptsize{Security Control Components} \\
	\hline
    \multicolumn{3}{|c||}{{\scriptsize{\textbf{IT2. Device Notification Manipulation.}}}}&  \multicolumn{3}{c|}{{\scriptsize{\textbf{DT3. Service Flooding.}}}}\\ \hline
	\scriptsize{\textbf{IT2.R1.} The system should protect sensitive data provided to the mobile app.}& \scriptsize{P} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT2.C1.} Include only non-sensitive data in the app notification text~\cite{Mitre_ATT_CK}.}& 	\scriptsize{\textbf{DT3.R1.} The system should define limitations to the user provided data input.} & \scriptsize{P} & \scriptsize{\textbf{DT3.C1.} Setting a maximum password that can be processed~\cite{OWASP_webPage}.}\\ \hline

	\scriptsize{\textbf{IT2.R2.} The system shall guide users to set particular configuration settings on the mobile devices used for interaction with the system.} & \scriptsize{P} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT2.C2.} Advise not to grant consent for device  manipulation~\cite{Mitre_ATT_CK}.} & \scriptsize{\textbf{DT3.R2.} The system should allow income traffic communications from the authorized sources.} & \multirow{2}{*}{\scriptsize{P}}& \scriptsize{\textbf{DT3.C2.} White-listening source addresses ~\cite{NistSP800_53}.}  \newline \scriptsize{\textbf{DT3.C3.} Router access control lists and firewall rules~\cite{NistSP800_53}.}\\ \hline
	\multicolumn{3}{|c||}{{\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4. Man-in-the-Middle Attack.}}}} & \multicolumn{3}{c|}{{\scriptsize{\textbf{ET1. Command Injection.}}}}\\ \hline

	\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.R1.} The system should verify integrity of the transmitted data.} & \multirow{2}{*}{\scriptsize{D}} &\scriptsize{ \textbf{IT4.C1.} Cryptographic hash functions: message authentication code (MAC) algorithms~\cite{AVsecurity_AttacksDefTaxonomy_Thing_Wu}, \cite{NistSP800_53}, digital signature, and checksums~\cite{NistSP800_53}.} & \scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.R1.} The system should conduct input data validation.} & \scriptsize{C} & \scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C1.} Server-side validation~\cite{OWASP_webPage}.} \newline\scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C2.} Client-side validation~\cite{OWASP_webPage}}\\ \hline

	\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.R3.} The system should ensure the confidentiality of transmitted information.}& \multirow{2}{*}{\scriptsize{P}} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C4.} Cryptographic mechanisms: SSL/TLS protocol~\cite{CISControls}, IPSec protocol suite~\cite{NistSP800_53}.}  \newline\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C5.}  Advanced encryption standard (AES) to encrypt wireless data in transit~\cite{CISControls}.} & \scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.R2.} The system should exploit security frameworks and libraries to validate input data before its usage.} & \multirow{2}{*}{\scriptsize{D}} & \scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C3.} Hibernate Validator for Java~\cite{OWASP_webPage}.} \newline\scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C4.} Data Transfer Objects for binding HTTP requests input parameters to server-side objects directly~\cite{OWASP_webPage}.} \newline\scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C5.} Query parameterization~\cite{OWASP_webPage}.}\\ \hline

	\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.R5.} The system should authenticate device before establishing connection.} & \scriptsize{P} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C9.} Bidirectional cryptographically based authentication~\cite{NistSP800_53}.} & \multirow{2}{2.4cm}{\scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.R4.} The organization security personnel should conduct dynamic program analysis for the launched system.}} & \multirow{2}{0.4cm}{\scriptsize{P}} & \multirow{2}{3.4cm}{\scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C8.} Whitelisting ~\cite{FatalInjection}(e.g., SWAP, XSS-GUARD, DIDAFIT, SQLGuard).} \scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C9.} Instruction set randomization~\cite{FatalInjection}.}
    \newline\scriptsize{\textbf{ET1.C10.} Runtime tainting~\cite{FatalInjection}.}}  \\ \cline{1-3}

	\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.R6.} The system should follow the wireless capabilities policies.} & \scriptsize{P} &\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C10.} Usage of wireless networking capabilities only for essential functions~\cite{CISControls}, \cite{NistSP800_53}.}&&&\label{tab:SecReqsIdentification}\\\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table*}

As can be seen, along with the elicited system requirements, organisational policies, and user guidelines clauses are derived. It supports the claim about the complexity of the researched scenario. Thus, the key to managing it lies in the interception of system security and human behavior management.
To illustrate how the elicited requirements can be addressed in the presented system, Table~\ref{tab:ReqsCaseAnalysis} contains examples of the concrete requirements, which mitigate risk IR5.

\begin{table}[htbp]
\caption{Security countermeasures to mitigate risk IR5}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|p{6.5cm}|p{7.5cm}|}
\hline
\bf\scriptsize{Security Requirement} &\bf \scriptsize{Security Control Components}\\
\hline
	\scriptsize{\textbf{R1.} \textit{In-Vehicle Controller} should identify unauthorized connections to the local area network.} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C3.} Authenticated application layer proxy for the network traffic that comes goes to or from the Internet~\cite{CISControls}.} \\ \hline

	\scriptsize{\textbf{R2.} \textit{In-Vehicle Controller} should ensure the confidentiality of transmitted via \textit{Transmission Channel} information.} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C4.} Cryptographic mechanisms: SSL/TLS protocol~\cite{CISControls}, IPSec protocol suite~\cite{NistSP800_53}.} \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C5.} Advanced encryption standard (AES) to encrypt wireless data in transit~\cite{CISControls}.} \\ \hline

    \scriptsize{\textbf{R3.} The service provider who owns the vehicles should control physical access to \textit{transmission channel} within organizational facilities.} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C6.} Wiretapping sensor~\cite{NistSP800_53}.} \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C7.} Locked wiring closet~\cite{NistSP800_53}.}\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C8.} Protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays~\cite{NistSP800_53}.}\\ \hline

	\scriptsize{\textbf{R4.} \textit{In-Vehicle Controller} should authenticate mobile device before establishing connection.} & \scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C9.} Bidirectional cryptographically based authentication~\cite{NistSP800_53}.} \\ \hline

	\scriptsize{\textbf{R5.} \textit{Service Provider System} should follow the wireless capabilities policies.} &\scriptsize{\textbf{IT4.C10.} Usage of wireless networking capabilities only for essential functions~\cite{CISControls},\cite{NistSP800_53}.}\label{tab:ReqsCaseAnalysis}\\\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

The provided controls should not be considered must-to-implement, but instead they give system developers and owners the understanding of possible ways to fulfil the requirements. It should be noted in the presented table, requirements are not prioritised yet, but for the usage in the system development lifecycle, the prioritisation must be done based on the earlier risk assessment, existing system architecture, and related costs.

\subsection{Preliminary Evaluation} \label{sec:Validation}

In this section, we evaluate the proposed approach of security requirements elicitation based on the developed threat model using coverage assessment criteria. The requirements comparison based on their coverage was utilised in~\cite{ahmed2014SREBP} and is based on comparison of coverage by different requirements elicitation methods. Thus, selecting an alternative method, the level of delivered security by each requirements set needs to be compared. The SQUARE~\cite{mead2007Square} and SREBP~\cite{ahmed2014SREBP} methods for eliciting security requirements can be used as alternatives. Similarly to the proposed one, these methods are applicable at the early stages of system analysis and design~\cite{pattakou2017security} but differ on the approach (risk-driven and asset-based, respectively).

After defining a set of security requirements for the Ride Fulfilment process using an alternative elicitation method, one needs to conduct a qualitative and quantitative assessment of both requirements sets. Requirements from the received sets should be categorised. Then the coverage should be assessed by analysing how many asset's attributes can be delivered by implementing the requirements. Such requirements qualitative analysis will enable the quantitative assessment of requirements categories and further comparison of the results. To avoid the carry-over effect, it is recommended to conduct requirement elicitation using an alternative method by a person unfamiliar with the results from another elicitation method. The number of elicited requirements should not be used for the assessment of the methods.

So far we have applied the SREBP method to the Ride Fulfilment process that resulted in 36 elicited security requirements. The comparison is conducted based on 11 security requirements categories~\cite{SecReqsFiresmith}: identification, authentication, authorisation, accounting, audit, non-repudiation, privacy, survivability, integrity, system maintenance, and intrusion detection.

The coverage assessments\footnote{Set of requirements elicited usign SREBP method and the requirements coverage assessment can be accessed in \textcolor{blue}{\url{https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14724957.v3}}.} shows that the requirements set elicited using the presented in the paper approach covers 37\% of security, while the set elicited using SREBP results in the coverage of 19\%. The elicited by SREBP requirements are asset-oriented, and therefore, more detailed in terms of system architecture. Consequently, they can be described as functional rather that system requirements. Nevertheless, the requirements sets are highly overlapping in such categories as identification, authentication, authorisation, and privacy. The SREBP method resulted in none requirements which would address system maintenance and intrusion detection, while these categories were addressed by the proposed set of requirements. One key difference is that SREBP is an asset-based approach, and therefore covers patterns of assets protection common for any business processes. In contrast, the proposed approach enables to introduce requirements which treat exactly those vulnerabilities which an attacker would target in the Passenger-AV interaction scenario. Therefore, the demonstrated in the paper elicitation method pinpoints more security aspects than SREBP.

To sum up, the set of security requirements elicited based on the developed threat model specially for the Passenger-AV interaction mitigate the more risks than the set elicited using an alternative method. The proposed set contains more general system requirements, and the comparative one - more granular but having less impact on the system overall. Therefore, we conclude that the presented on the paper requirements are valid and can be used by the developers of AV systems as a baseline for protection Passenger-AV interaction from the malicious attacks.

\section{Concluding Remarks} \label{sec:Discussion}

To address the case analysis's main goal, we have conduct the literature review to find the methodology of information risks analysis for Passenger-AV interaction.
We observe a knowledge gap in the autonomous vehicle technology research. Hence, to conduct case analysis, we have chosen the existing ISRM practices from the software development sphere and applied that to the case with intention to check their applicability in the context of AV system.
Thus, we have applied the threat-driven approach to security requirements elicitation for Passenger-AV interaction. The research's main result is a developed threat model, which can be used as a baseline for threat-driven requirements elicitation. The developed model contains threats applicable for the Passenger-AV interaction in the case of ride-hailing service usage. It is assumed that an external provider delivers an infotainment system, meaning that it is not integrated into the AV. For the further usage of the presented approach, the system architecture should be considered since security risks may differ from the presented as they are assets-oriented.

The presented threat model and approach of ISRM aim to address risks related to the intentional harmful attacks, leaving out of scope unintentional threats caused by the system users. For applying the presented result to other cases, one should pay attention to the used stack of technologies in the system implementation, as there may exist several technology-specific attacks, and thus, they are not relevant to the purpose of our research.

The research is conducted using the case study analysis. This method in the autonomous vehicle field is especially prominent and applicable, as the field is relatively new and the technology is still under development. Consequently, the phenomenon is not yet determined, and the approaches for tackling it are not standardised either. Therefore, to check the applicability of the existing methods in the autonomous vehicle context, a case analysis is a fruitful method for discovering valuable insights into current theories usage and broad field.

\paragraph{Limitations}
The further validation of the derived security requirement are needed to evaluate its coverage. We do not declare that the created threat and countermeasure models are complete, but we aim to propose them as a baseline for a systematic approach for improving autonomous vehicles' system quality for the ride-hailing service providers. The paper scope is limited by Passenger--AV interaction and focused on the application layer of the AV system. However, for ensuring information security in the on-the-move autonomous vehicle, similar research should be conducted to analyse information security risks in the other processes in AV (e.g., vehicle-to-infrastructure and vehicle-to-vehicle interactions).

\paragraph{Future Work} In our study we considered the complex system consisting of AV, an external service provider, and a human (passenger in our case). Thus the requirements for treating security risks should be defined not only for the system; but one should also assess the expectations for the companies and users to behave according to the internal security policies and user guidelines. Further research should be done to extend our result with attacks assessment, including likelihood and impact of the threats and overall assessment of the risk level. Additionally, evaluation of the derived requirements elicitation approach should be extended by comparing the requirements set with another created using an alternative elicitation method - SQUARE, coverage comparison of need to be finished.

Based on the preliminary results of requirements evaluation, we conclude that the elicited requirements are characterised by low granularity. Thus a set consists of system non-functional requirements, and organisational guidelines may be transformed into a set of more detailed requirements. Nevertheless, the proposed approach of elicitation is based on the best practices of treating attacks implementation; therefore, the elicited requirements are supported with the possible security controls which developers may use. Therefore, in future work, we will combine the demonstrated elicitation method with another to increase the level of requirements granularity.

The presented results, namely the threat and risk models also can be generalized by applying them to another case of Passenger-AV interaction, for example, in case of the other system architecture. Also, we strive to raise the discussion about the importance of implementing the security requirements for the Passenger-AV interaction for treating security and privacy issues that would increase the trust of society in general and single users to autonomous systems to ensure a high-quality user experience.

\begin{acks}
 This paper is supported in part by EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 830892, project SPARTA and European Social Fund via Smart Specialisation project with Bolt.
\end{acks}

\bibliographystyle{ACM-Reference-Format}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaArXiv


The US president's attacks on America's truth-seeking institutions jeopardize its continued prosperity and very ability to function as a democracy. As corporate giants capture the institutions that are supposed to protect ordinary citizens, a dystopia once imagined only by science fiction writers is emerging before our eyes.
Adam Smith tried to provide an answer in his classic 1776 book The Wealth of Nations. For centuries, Smith noted, standards of living had been stagnant; then, toward the end of the eighteenth century, incomes start to soar. WhySmith himself was a leading light of the great intellectual movement known as the Scottish Enlightenment. The questioning of established authority that followed the earlier Reformation in Europe forced society to ask: How do we know the truth? How can we learn about the world around us? And how can and should we organize our society?From the search for answers to these questions arose a new epistemology, based on the empiricism and skepticism of science, which came to prevail over the forces of religion, tradition, and superstition. Over time, universities and other research institutions were established to help us judge truth and discover the nature of our world. Much of what we take for granted today – from electricity, transistors, and computers to lasers, modern medicine, and smartphones – is the result of this new disposition, undergirded by basic scientific research (most of it financed by government).
That process of experimentation, learning, and adaptation, however, requires a commitment to ascertaining the truth. Americans owe much of their economic success to a rich set of truth-telling, truth-discovering, and truth-verifying institutions. Central among them are freedom of expression and independent media. Like all people, journalists are fallible; but, as part of a robust system of checks and balances on those in positions of power, they have traditionally provided an essential public good.Since Smith's day, it has been shown that a nation's wealth depends on the creativity and productivity of its people, which can be advanced only by embracing the spirit of scientific discovery and technological innovation. And it depends on steady improvements in social, political, and economic organization, discovered through reasoned public discourse.
Posted in Economic and Public Policy, Economics, fiscal Policy, Global Issues, Human Rights, Human Security, Leadership, Political Economy, Project-Syndicate.org, Social Policy, Trumpianism, US Economy, US foreign policy.
The collapse of last month's summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was perhaps the inevitable result of a process in which the two leaders dominated, optimistic about their personal relationship and confident in their abilities. The question is what to do now.
NEW YORK – When last month's summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ended without a deal, the result was not surprising. One or both countries came to Hanoi with a misunderstanding of what was possible.
Posted in China, Diplomacy, Donald J Trump, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Geo-Politics, North Korea, Project-Syndicate.org, Realpolitik, Russia, US Congress, US Department of State, US foreign policy, US Presidency, Valdimir Putin, Xi Jinping.
At this year's Munich Security Conference, appearances by former US Vice President Joseph Biden and current Vice President Mike Pence offered the trans-atlanticists in attendance a portrait in contrasts. Yet to achieve the bright future promised by Biden, Europeans need to heed Pence's dark warnings.
MUNICH – Two Americas were represented by two different vice presidents at the Munich Security Conference this year. Between them, former Vice President Joseph Biden certainly received the warmer reception, but Vice President Mike Pence may have unwittingly emerged as the savior of transatlantic relations.
In his address, Pence duly championed his boss, US President Donald Trump, as the "leader of the free world." But the "free world" he described was scarcely recognizable to the Munich audience. In the world Trump wants to lead, America is not the exceptional power, but merely a normal country putting its own interests first. By that logic, it is only reasonable to break from multilateral institutions that allow weaker countries to free-ride on American largesse.
In keeping with this vision, Pence used his speech to demand that Europeans spend more on defense, and to extol the virtues of the Trump administration's trade war against China. But the climax came when he enjoined Europe to get in line with the US in suspending the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – and restoring sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
According to Pence, Iran is plotting another Holocaust, for which Europeans will bear partial responsibility unless they stop undermining US sanctions. This warning came on the tail of a US-hosted conference in Warsaw, which was designed to drive a wedge between European Union countries and derail the bloc's efforts to salvage the JCPOA.
Biden ended his remarks to great applause, declaring, "We will be back." Was he referring to an outward-looking America, or to a future Biden presidency? Many of those present hoped for both.
The rapturous applause following Biden's appearance was markedly at odds with the awkward, stony silence that followed Pence's address. The contrast was reminiscent of the early 2000s, when disillusioned transatlanticists took refuge in The West Wing, wherein the cerebral character of President Josiah Bartlet (played by Martin Sheen) stood in stark contrast to George W. Bush and his administration's disingenuous brutality.
But such escapism yields only false hope. Rather than being lulled into complacency by Biden's reassuring words, Europeans would be better off heeding Pence. Only by growing up, paying its way, and clarifying its goals can Europe repair the transatlantic relationship and ensure a healthy and durable partnership.
The fact is that Europeans and Americans have long lied to themselves and each other about the extent of their common interests and values. European and US strategic interests have been diverging at least since the end of the Cold War. America rescued a hapless Europe in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. But by the time of the Kosovo War at the end of that decade, Europeans had begun to wake up to their responsibilities. In the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and in the conflict in Ukraine since 2014, it was Europeans, not Americans, who led the diplomatic response and imposed the strongest sanctions on Russia.
Moreover, Europe is the only party ever to have mobilized in the name of collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Europeans sent forces to distant wars in the Middle East, over which they had little control.
In hindsight, it is clear that those wars destabilized Europe's neighborhood and, eventually, Europe itself. America's exclusive focus on counter-terrorism left war-torn Middle Eastern countries with fragile governments, or none at all. And in recent years, Europeans have increasingly borne the costs in the form of terrorism and influxes of refugees.
As for the US, many of its 320 million citizens no longer understand why they should have to protect 500 million Europeans, who live, after all, on a relatively peaceful and prosperous continent. They know that their country is in an escalating competition with China in the Indo-Pacific, and are thus shocked that Europeans would join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Ultimately, Europeans are left between a rock and a hard place. They, too, want to push China harder on trade and investment issues. But the best way to do that is through the World Trade Organization, which the Trump administration is actively undermining.
The divergence in values is no less pronounced. For their part, Europeans support international institutions, rules-based arrangements, and multilateralism generally. But America has always been ambivalent about treaties and institutions that might constrain its sovereignty or defy its objectives.
While Trump and Pence crudely state what today's America wants, Biden is selling a vision of America that it no longer obtains. The US government does not have the American people's consent to act on the world stage as it once did. While Americans still recognize the importance of sustaining US economic and military primacy vis-à-vis China, they appear to have rejected the elite consensus on trade, defense spending, and diplomacy.
The transatlantic partnership will always be Europe's most important relationship. But it can last only if both sides take responsibility for their own affairs. The alliance would be immeasurably stronger if it were based on an honest assessment of each side's interests and values, rather than on quaint illusions of fellow feeling.
Pence's blunt speech in Munich may have been painful to hear; but one hopes that it will bring an end to European complacency and point the way to a renewal of transatlantic relations on realistic terms. If that turns out to be the case, Pence will have won the title of transatlantic hero – whether he wants it or not.
Posted in American Politics, Diplomacy, Donald J Trump, European Union (EU), US foreign policy.
In the ongoing US-China trade talks, considerable progress has been made on several key trade issues, such as intellectual-property rights protection. But to defuse tensions in any sustainable way will require a more comprehensive approach, based on a fundamental shift in mindset.
HONG KONG – Trade negotiations between the United States and China are closing in on the March 1 deadline, after which the bilateral tariff war will resume – beginning with an increase from 10% to 25% on $200 billion worth of Chinese products. While global financial markets are fluctuating wildly, investors seem to assume that too much is at stake for the US and China to fail to reach a deal. Their optimism could prove short-lived.
To be sure, there has been considerable progress on several key issues, such as technology transfer, protection of intellectual-property rights, non-tariff barriers, and implementation mechanisms. But to defuse tensions between the US and China in any sustainable way will require a more comprehensive approach, based on a fundamental shift in mindset.
Over the last 40 years, Sino-US engagement has been largely cooperative, reflecting a holistic approach that takes into account the interests of the entire global system. US President Donald Trump's administration, however, does not seem to believe that engagement with China (or anyone else for that matter) can benefit both sides. As Trump's "America First" agenda shows, the US is now playing a zero-sum game – and it is playing to win.
For example, the US has threatened to punish or desert its closest allies unless they increase their defense spending. Under pressure from the Trump administration, South Korea just agreed to increase its contributions to US forces in Korea by 8.2%, to $923 million, in 2019.
Similarly, Trump has repeatedly disparaged fellow NATO members for insufficient defense spending. Most recently, Trump has criticized Germany for spending only 1% of GDP for defense, compared to America's 4.3%. German Chancellor Angela Merkel responded by condemning US isolationism at the Munich Security Conference, and calling for the revival of multilateral cooperation.
The Trump administration's myopic approach is also apparent in its preoccupation with bilateral trade imbalances. Any US deficit with another economy is, from Trump's perspective, a loss. Given this, if China agrees to cut its bilateral trade deficit with the US, other economies with bilateral surpluses vis-à-vis the US – including close allies, such as the European Union and Japan – may find themselves facing intensifying pressure to do the The weakening of trade that could result in this scenario would compound existing negative pressure on global growth, hurting everyone. A global economic downturn is the last thing the world needs at a time when it is already beset with risks, including a possible no-deal Brexit and populist gains in the European Parliament election in May.
Of course, while Trump does not spare his allies, his primary target remains China. After all, the competition between the US and China extends far beyond trade. Although the US maintains military, technological, financial, and soft-power superiority, China has been steadily catching up, leading to bipartisan support in the US for a more confrontational approach.
And yet America's tools are hardly useless. The US authorities have mobilized a broad range of domestic and international resources – from law and diplomacy to national security measures – to stop the overseas expansion of the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. If Western countries allow Huawei to build their 5G infrastructure, America's hawks and their allies argue, they will be vulnerable to cyberattacks from China in some future war.
All of this has shaken business and market confidence to the core, wiping out trillions of dollars in market capitalization. And the Trump administration's apparent insistence that countries choose sides in its dispute with China is further heightening fears. As the rest of the world's trading countries understand, Trump's approach will fragment business and reverse the globalization-enabled economies of scale that have fueled growth for decades.
"Ending the Sino-US trade war will require considerable statesmanship on the part of Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. But, beyond that, both sides need to recognize that supporting global peace and prosperity requires less ideology and more respect for diversity of political, social, and cultural systems. Failing that, the fault lines will continue to deepen – much as they did in the 1930s – potentially setting the stage for full-blown war"- .
More broadly, the Trump administration's rejection of multilateralism undermines the global cooperation needed to confront a range of issues, including migration, poverty and inequality, climate change, and the challenges raised by new technologies. Trump's focus on geopolitical rivalry – and the associated rise in security and defense spending – will dramatically reduce resources available for global public goods, such as infrastructure investment and poverty-reduction programs.
Posted in Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Geo-Economics, Multilateralism, Trade and Finance, Trade and Investment, Trumpianism, US foreign policy, US-China Relations, Xi Jinping.


TORONTO–When cannabis legalization in Canada was implemented on October 17, federal regulations for the industry were in place, even as Canadian provinces are currently developing regional industry regulations and policies.
"I was speaking on panels a couple weeks ago and I brought this up. I said Canada doesn't want you to have any branding at all–and we're all branding people [on the panel]. For us, it's unfathomable that they're requiring this," said California-based Hippo Packaging's co-founder Kary Radestock.
"They're getting a lot of pushback but [branding] has gotta be very, very understated; it can only be two-color. It can be on-brand but it's not supposed to be made to be attractive to the consumer, and that just goes against everything that every single packager wants. So, it's kind of crazy that way," Radestock added.
So, when Canadians lined up to purchase recreational cannabis on the first day it was legal, they received flower packaged in plain, opaque, one-color bags and plastic prescription containers, which were labeled with a bright red stop sign symbol emblazoned with a marijuana leaf and "THC", a health warning on a bright yellow, rectangular background, as well as a listing of active ingredients required by the government. Company logos cannot be larger than the yellow warning label or contain imagery. Companies are allowed one branding element other than their name.
The restrictions are motivated by a "noble" logic, KushCo Holdings, Inc. co-founder and CEO Nick Kovacevich wrote for Forbes, but may hurt Canadian producers in the long run–especially if the U.S. were to legalize and enter the global legal market for export and trade. In legal U.S. states, though restrictions vary, leading producers already have long-range strategies for establishing brands that they'll bring with them, to the free market.
"New customers, who may benefit from using cannabis to treat pain or anxiety, will have a tough time navigating the product landscape… New users will have to do some research and experimenting to figure out which strains might provide their desired outcomes," Kovacevich wrote.
President and general counsel of Ottawa-based cannabis investment firm (formerly known as) CannaRoyalty Corp. Afzal Hasan echoed Kovacevich's concerns the day after Canadian recreational legalization, going so far as to say that while Canada is currently the largest legal cannabis market in the world, it wouldn't remain that way for long without changes to branding restrictions. CannaRoyalty Corp. has recently rebranded as Origin House.
"The people that for whatever foolish reason thought Canada was going to dominate the world of cannabis, they need to disabuse themselves of that notion because it was never founded on any reality," Hasan frankly told Bloomberg.com in an interview. Origin House, who have active interests in the California market, had plans to bring some 50 brands to Canada next year when vaping and edible products become legal.
Canadian cannabis brand Tweed was featured in international headlines when their location in Newfoundland was the first to make a recreational cannabis sale, minutes after midnight on October 17, guaranteeing them a mention in Canadian cannabis history.
The brand was also profiled the same day by online outlet Quartz, for their strategy to leverage "brand-preference branding," which is allowed under Canadian regulations. Simply put, the brand is allowed to promote its own image but not its cannabis products, while still complying with restrictions for imaging and packaging.
As a subsidiary of Canada's largest cannabis producer Canopy Growth (with the world's largest cannabis grow facility, located in Vancouver B.C.), the Tweed retail store chain was established with aggressive expansion into multiple provinces including Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island.
The store chain's approach to promotion complies with government restrictions; Quartz described billboard advertisements that simple read, "Hi," with Tweed's distinctive font logo, simplified messaging, and social media links. They also offer consumers a range of logoed apparel, which converts fans into walking billboards for the brand.
With its Tweed Collective, the company's social responsibility project has pledged $20 million (CAD) through 2022, dedicated to "finding, funding, and fostering ideas that energize neighbourhoods, feed culture, and leave lasting impacts on Canadian communities." Tweed also has sponsored community events, and even collaborated with Mothers Against Drunk Driving-Canada on a national campaign to raise awareness about impaired driving.
A partnership with recycling company TerraCycle allows Tweed customers to recycle their used product packaging, with bins in Tweed locations where discards can be deposited for processing.
At Tweed HQ, a former Hershey's chocolate factory that has been resurrected as part of the Tweed Visitors Center, consumers and cannabis tourists can go and get a look at a real, working cannabis production facility, as well as indulge in chocolates produced at the location. The chocolates are not infused with any cannabis-based ingredients for now, Tweed said, because edibles aren't legal in Canada until 2019.
But when they are legal, Tweed will be ready. Until then, factory visitors can get acquainted with Tweed while sipping coffee in the factory Study area or shop curated products in the factory's gift shop.


The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), in partnership with Microsoft, is launching the nationwide InnovateHER competition again.
Businesses must have a product, service or technology that has a measurable impact on the lives of women and families, and has the potential for commercialization.
AWEEc, ASU, and SEEDSPOT will host a local InnovateHER, competition where businesses have the opportunity to do fast pitch. One local winner will be selected for further review by the SBA.
There will be 10 national finalists selected to present a live pitch in Washington D.C. to a panel of expert judges and compete for up to $70,000 in cash prizes.
InnovateHER Final round will be held in Washington, D.C. metro area.


text:
home > Calendar & News > Latest News > Whole School > WGScommunity > First week back at School for Prep Pupils
First week back at School for Prep Pupils
3rd June 20
Wisbech Grammar worked hard to prepare the school, ready for the return of Kindergarten, Reception, and Prep 6 on 1 June. Our focus has been on ensuring that staff, children, and families feel confident and reassured by the measures we have put in place. Support and Teaching staff worked tirelessly through the half term to make the environment as inviting as it could be under the circumstances.
Teachers also prepared videos for parents and children to show them what the School would look like when they returned on Monday 1 June. The first week has been exceptionally well received by pupils and their families and teachers have been thrilled with the positive feedback so far.
"My daughter has been really anxious about returning with school being different to normal but after watching your video several times she is actually now excited to be returning. In particular, she loved the number spots going into school, that she will have her own tray, and will be able to have lunch on a picnic blanket! We have also been able to talk about you having to wear a mask at times etc. and she was fine with this. Over the past week she has been asking lots of questions but this weekend she hasn't asked any and I think the video has given her some reassurance of what school will be like. I'm sure there will still be lots of challenges ahead but I just wanted to thank you for taking the time to do this as it has certainly helped a great deal for us preparing our daughter to come back". Parent of Reception pupil
"I am so proud of how well the children have observed the social distancing rules and it was an absolute delight to see them in school, smiling, after 10 weeks at home. Many parents commented on how happy their child had been at the end of their day and was looking forward to coming in again". Keryn Neaves, Senior Deputy Head of Prep School
The School has implemented COVID-19 control measures by following the 5 main risk areas that the Government advised schools to focus on.
Minimising contact with unwell people. We are temperature screening all staff and pupils. Staff have access to PPE equipment and there are smaller groups of staff and children; each group staying in their own teaching bubble.
Cleaning hands. Pupils are being encouraged to wash hands regularly and use the hand gel in their section of the School.
Catch it, kill it, bin it. This advice is something that the school encourages at any time, particularly during this Covid outbreak.
The school is being cleaned on a rota during the days and evenings, and our cleaning and maintenance team have been focused on cleaning the sections of the school that are being used by the bubbles. Every night these areas are also being sprayed with a virucidal fogger which offers an extra layer of protection to every surface in those areas.
Minimising contact and mixing with others. Alongside our pupil groups being separated, the children are being given their own personal equipment to use and where helpful, can also bring in their own items from home.
The biggest challenge was always going to be the younger children in Early Years but we have certainly underestimated their resilience and understanding of how they need to behave in School. Mrs Oram, our Reception teacher, summed this up beautifully; "I've had an incredible few days with the children and I am so amazed and proud of all them. They have adapted so quickly to the new classroom environment and been so happy to be back at school playing and interacting together and yet apart. It was truly humbling to realise how adaptable and resilient such young children can be and I feel privileged to be able to spend my day teaching and caring for such wonderful children"

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


New bra for indoor cycling - Clip-In Long Line Bra. Love, love, love! I wish they had a tank version of this. I love the mesh in the front.
New tank for indoor cycling - Clip In Tank. I don't love it but I can how it would be breezily cool for spin class. According to the text you are supposed to tie it shut during class and untie it for cool down. Hmm, maybe I'll order one to check it out. My favorite spin tank is the Right Round Tank from a couple of years ago.
Size 12 ladies like to spin, too, you know.
New Black Grape Clip In Crops and Shorts. I like these except they don't come in a 12.
Heathered Berry Yum Yum Inspires and they come in a 12! I was tempted to order these but I already ordered a bunch of stuff and didn't want the husband to blow a gasket.
Canada got a Heathered Black Grape 105F Singlet.
New Forme Jackets in Black/Deep Coal Texture (Diamond Jacquard Space Dye?) and Coco Pique. I ordered the Coco Pique Forme.
Reversible Wunder Under Pant in Bark Chocolate/Black.
Diamond Jacquard Space Dye Black Deep Coal Wunder Under Pants. I ordered these, too. I read the Flaming Tomato crop version of these were soft and thick so hoping the same for the black ones. Not sure whether I'll keep these but wanted to give them a try.
Heathered Black Turn Around Tights. I ordered these, too. I'm looking forward to their rulu cozy softness.
More &Go/Co-Lab type stuff - the Out of this World LS and Tee, Everyday Pant (like those), and Everything She Wants Vest.
The UK got a Light and Bright Vest. The UK price is 158 pounds. I hate to think how much it'll be when it gets here. It's very functional but so charmless. I would think you could spent a lot less to find similar functionality.
Hong Kong got Flaming Tomato and Heathered Slate Cool Racerbacks.
Hong Kong also got this pretty Going Grape No Limit Tank.
Update - Ok, I went back and ordered the Clip In Bra and Tank to try. I didn't want to wait to see whether my store would get them or not.
Nothing for me tonight. That going grape no limits tank is gorgeous. I also have my eye on those coco pique gloves. I'm not sure I can justify $28 for a pair of gloves though. But they sure look cozy and wonderful. I'm actually a little grateful they switched from the define to the form because I would not have been able to resist the define jacket in coco pique.
I picked up the diamond jacquard space dye WU. Also grabbed a Radiant Long Sleeve in purple fog. I love my black Radiant, so I wanted to get it in another color. I was eyeing out the heathered black Turn Around pants as well, but holding off since I'm getting the WUs. If they are still around later on, I'll get them.
Are the Diamond Jacquard Space Dye Black Deep coal wu's supposed to be like the coco pique material?
I was excited about the Everyday pant until I saw that the zipper placket doesn't lie flat on the models - not a good sign. I ordered the diamond jacquard WUP.
Got the WUP FullOn Luon Roll Over Waist Black Grape.
I scanned so quickly I missed the clip in shorts and crops. Love the black grape in both.
LLA do you think the 105 Singlet could possibly be Going Grape? Looks a lttle lite for black grape, altho it is heathered. I love it whatever it is.
I agree the reflective vest could have a little more soemthing...shape for starters. That being said, I bought the fully reflective jacket that came out 2 years ago and was carried over last year. I walk the dog in it every night up in the hills where I live...narrow roads, very limited lighting. I have never felt safer in my life. Amazing piece.
Hi, I wanted to buy the bra but when I added it to my cart it said final sale. Has anyone else had this problem?
I ordered the Black/Deep Coal Forme jacket and Flaming Tomato Power Y. I still really want the Flaming Tomato WUC -- where are they, US?
thinking about the grape refresh racer - i am one of those people who loves this tank. i have tons of CRBs and love those too, but i'm sort of being wooed by the refresh. the skinny straps are, well, refreshing! and i like how it's a little tighter. i always get 8 in CRB and they are always a little too big, but the 8 in these fits perfectly. the scoop bottom works, even though i am not usually into scoop bottoms. it feels more proper for when i want to wear it for everyday, whereas CRBs always feel almost too sporty for that.
Can I just say I got a reflective jacket earlier this year, I believe around April-May that was on super markdown like from $300 to $150 and it looks EXACTLY like this. I really think they took all the jackets they couldn't sell, chopped the arms off, and called it a vest.
Nothing for me. I like the heathered black turnaround tights but I have too much stuff and can control myself.
The Light and Bright Vest is dismal. Everything She Wants Vest is bad. Evidently LLL makes "jeans" now as that's what the Everyday Pant is.
Clip In Tank, I get the concept, but sorry, that looks like a maternity top.
Only got Coco pique forme today. I have my eyes on the heathered black turn around tights but haven't pulled the trigger yet. Debating if I should keep the heathered herringbone black white turn around tights ..does anybody else think they look like PJs? I don't think they do but read some comments online said they do.
@ Stephanie Zatyko - You could be right. Or maybe they had left over reflective material and made these vests out of them.
I want that 105f singlet and NLT. WHY YOU NO IN U.S.? I'll take a Going Grape or Black Swan CRB while I'm at it too. I was looking forward to the Black Swan DSPs, but wanted them unlined. In short, I didn't order anything, though the purple Journey and Inspire crops were a little tempting.
I got the going grape NLT and the new plaid speeds in berry yum yum.
I got the berry yum yum wheezy check speeds. Glad I picked one up...they sold out pretty fast!
Light and Bright vest. Good eye re: they just chopped off the sleeves. But if you look at pics of the prior run reflective jackets, they are slightly different. This is new manufacture and it is pretty bad. To me it looks like a vest someone in construction would wear. For that matter, the Everything She Wants vest looks like that too.
I love the new Out of this world line but not for those prices - $108 for the long sleeve tee when the dress is only $20 more seems ridiculous to me. I can wait till it gets to WMTM.
Is this coco pique forme the same that was out last year? I remember it was highly coveted last year and when I finally found one and tried it on I really loved the fabric but never bought it. Regretted it ever since!
Anon @ 9:07 PM: I personally like my heathered herringbone black white turn around tights. At least the facts they are not extra expensive as a full length running tight, the herringbone material is very opaque although it's such a light color, plus we already have so many dark colors, black and greys, don't you think? Do they look like PJs? Depend on how you pair it, with an oversized cozy hoodie or a boyfriend shirt, yes it can look like that, but let's say if you put it on with a solid black form like running top, you can rock this tight, totally depend on if you want it look sporty or lazy IMO. Oh, one more thing, don't keep it if you have very very big thighs, the light color is going to make them worse, and that's probably why some people think it made them look like wearing PJs or long underwears, it should look good only with athletic bodies or legs. It's not for everybody.
i didn't order anything. i want to check things out in the store because i'm just not sure. i like the Turn Around Tights, but they don't have real pockets, so i wouldn't wear them to run (i need a zippered pocket and prefer larger pockets on the legs like the Speed Tights).
i'm still trying to decide between the Bahkti and the Forme. I have the Bahkti already. i like everything about the Forme except for the neck.
and i am definitely not paying Lulu prices for those Everyday pants. i could get multiple pair of something that looks similar at Gap.
I too am trying to decide whether to get the black turn around tights and return my white herringbone ones. I do not think they look like PJs... I actually think they are super cute. My concern is that they will pill really badly. Isn't that why they typically make run pants out of luxtreme and recommend not running in WUPs? I mean, I run in WUPs anyways, but not any of my pique/herringbone ones. Can anyone advise on this? Does running in these "fuzzier" materials lead to horrific pilling? I know they made herringbone runder unders awhile back... do those pill?
I got the wheezy speeds in berry yum yum. I really don't wear shorts when running and they seem quite short. How do most of you like the Run Speed short: 2 way stretch?
I got the Textued black jacquard WUP, going grape 105f singlet, striped FTBW and the fuel green coco fly away tamer. So excited! Cute stuff. I ordered size up in the WUP because i ordered the light blue jaquard's from ivivva and could barely get them up in my regular size 12.
Nothing for me this week. Like the everyday pants, but why don't they make them in a size 12?
Had the diamond jacquard space dye WUPs in my cart, but opted against them b/c the fit of the textured WUs has been off for me this season (coco pique = terrible CT, other piques have been way too tight and sheer, and I don't want to order 2 pairs to compare sizes). I plan to try them on in the store soon in hopes the dreaded CT streak of 2014 ends. I ended up ordering the black En Route crops since I'm really in need of some new longer basic bottoms. I'm hoping they'll be thick and opaque like the recent reviews suggest.
I tried the coco pique forme on in a local store with full intention of buying it, but couldn't pull the trigger. The seams puckered too much in the back on me, but going down a size wasn't an option if I wanted to be able to wear long sleeves underneath. I also wish the stitching was thicker or darker, or something - not sure how to explain it. I'm hoping they put out a herringbone version this year.
Overall the upload was a little meh for me, which is good. I got the herringbone tights in-store yesterday and I've had them on all day. I'm trying to decide if I like them. (Is it because they really are pajama-y?!!) They're not as versatile as I was hoping they'd be. Maybe they'll grow on me, but I am slightly longing for athleta's return policy.
Hi, I picked up the flaming tomato, space dye WUC crop, it's awesome, a bit heavy for the NZ summer but will be great for next winter. Really compressive and thick I picked up my usual size 10 and it's slightly tighter than usual but not enough to size up.
Anyone bought the clip in crops ? Reviews?
@ anon 7:10 pm - I am dying to see some of the new Clip In items being modeled on real people. None of it has arrived in stores yet from what I can tell.
Thanks LuluAddict, cos I leave in another part of the world so don't dare to take a leap of faith by ordering something without reviews. Will keep my eyes peeled on your blog.
I ordered the Rebel runner vest in petal camo, LS swiftly in going grape and En route crops in black.
7:55 the speed shorts are my favorite to run in. (I am Petite)I prefer the 4 way fabric because it does not chaffe.


text:
Park Soon-kyung (    ; nascida em 1923 - 24 de outubro de 2020) foi uma teóloga metodista sul-coreana.

Biografia
Nascida em Yeoju, na província de Gyeonggi, Park estudou enfermagem antes de se formar em teologia na Universidade Teológica Metodista de Seul e em filosofia na Universidade Nacional de Seul . Ela realizou estudos adicionais nos Estados Unidos, buscando um M.Div. na Emory University e um Ph.D. na Drew University, concluindo uma dissertação em 1966 sobre "O homem na doutrina da eleição de Karl Barth".

Park voltou para a Coreia do Sul e foi professora de teologia por 22 anos na Universidade de Mulheres Ewha (1966–1988), onde continuou a exercer o cargo de professora emérita. Ela é conhecida pelo seu trabalho em direcção a uma teologia para a unificação da Coreia do Norte e do Sul, extraindo e criticando a teologia <i id="mwGg">minjung'', e pela promoção da teologia feminista sul-coreana.

Metodistas da Coreia do Sul
Alunos da Universidade Emory
Alunos da Universidade Duke
Mortos em 2020
Nascidos em 1923

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Q: Material UI: How can I change the border color of the Select component? I am trying to customize the Select component from Material UI.
This is what it looks like:

However, when the select component is focused, I want to change the border-color from material UI's blue to a custom red color.
I tried setting the styles but it doesn't do anything at all
import FormControl from '@material-ui/core/FormControl';
import InputLabel from '@material-ui/core/InputLabel';
import MuiSelect from '@material-ui/core/Select';
import MenuItem from '@material-ui/core/MenuItem';
import { makeStyles } from '@material-ui/core/styles';

const useStyles = makeStyles((theme) => ({
  formControl: {
    margin: theme.spacing(1),
    minWidth: 120,
  },
  select: {
    borderColor: '#FF0000',      //<------------ this does nothing
  },
}));

const Select = () => {
  const classes = useStyles();
  return (
    <FormControl variant="outlined" className={classes.formControl}>
      <InputLabel>Months</InputLabel>
      <MuiSelect label="Months" className={classes.select}>
        <MenuItem value="1">January</MenuItem>
        <MenuItem value="2">February</MenuItem>
        <MenuItem value="3">March</MenuItem>
        <MenuItem value="4">April</MenuItem>
      </MuiSelect>
    </FormControl>
  );
};

Select.propTypes = {};

export default Select;

A: Try this:
const useStyles = makeStyles((theme) => ({
  formControl: {
    margin: theme.spacing(1),
    minWidth: 120,
  },
  select: {
    '&.Mui-focused .MuiOutlinedInput-notchedOutline': {
        borderColor: 'red',
    },
  },
}));

A: If someone is interested in the latest version of MUI 5.
import {
  Select,
} from '@mui/material';
import { SxProps } from '@mui/material/styles';
import classes from './component.module.css';

const styles: SxProps = {
  select: {
    '.MuiOutlinedInput-notchedOutline': {
      borderColor: '#color',
    },
    '&:hover .MuiOutlinedInput-notchedOutline': {
      borderColor: '#color',
      borderWidth: '0.15rem',
    },
  },
};

<Select
     variant="outlined"
     sx={styles.select}
     inputProps={{
       classes: {
         icon: classes.icon,
           },
       }}
  >

For the icon, you can create a separate file component.module.css
.icon {
    fill: #color;
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange