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< Freedom on the Net 2016:
Silencing the Messenger
Freedom on the Net 2017
Internet Freedom Scores
(Freedom on the Net Score:
0=Most Free, 100=Least Free)
Internet Penetration:
Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked:
Political/Social Content Blocked:
Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested:
FOTN 2017_Vietnam.pdf
Vietnam: Netizen arrests and intimidation undermined internet freedom in 2017. #netfreedom2017http://freedomhou.se/2hxy7SC
Key Developments:
June 2016–May 2017
Blogger prosecutions intensified in 2017, culminating in a 10-year prison sentence for the activist using the penname Mother Mushroom in June (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities).
Civilian groups attacked bloggers and police obstructed protests organized using digital tools (see Intimidation and Violence).
Legal measures which could undermine encryption came into effect in July 2016, and a draft cybersecurity law threatened further restrictions on internet freedom (see Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity and Legal Environment).
Internet freedom was undermined in 2017 as arrests and intimidation intensified, although there was no repeat of the Facebook disruptions documented in 2016.
The coverage period was dominated by the May 2016 environmental disaster and fish kill attributed to pollution from the Formosa Steel Factory located in Ha Tinh province. The disaster destroyed the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of people in four central provinces, sending the region's fishing and tourism industries into decline and the whole country into crisis. Intimidation and arrests of activists went hand in hand with enduring online and offline protests, which continued into 2017.
The new government under Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, in power since mid-2016, has made no attempt to improve the environment for internet freedom. After the release of some bloggers as Vietnam negotiated the TPP agreement, arrests ramped up in the second half of 2016. By April 2017, at least 19 individuals were in detention for online activities, according to Reporters Without Borders, and a fresh crackdown was reported in summer 2017.
Status Change Explanation:
Obstacles to Access:
(Freedom on the Net Score: 0=Most Free, 100=Least Free)
Availability and Ease of Access
Internet penetration continued to grow in early 2017, according to an International Telecommunication Union estimate, and Akamai reported that the average connection speed improved significantly (see "Key Access Indicators").
Mobile broadband has played a significant role in increasing access to faster internet service. One source estimated smartphone penetration at nearly 30 percent in 2017.1Fixed broadband remains a relatively small market segment. Fixed broadband services have been largely based on DSL technology; more recently, faster fiber-based broadband services are starting to replace it, with FTTH subscriptions overtaking DSL subscriptions for the first time in 2015.2 The cost of service is not prohibitive for the majority; a sample monthly mobile data plan cost around US$10 in 2017, while the average monthly income was US$500.3
The 3G network operating since 2009 is growing fast. As of July 2016, Vietnam had 38 million 3G users, up from 15.7 million in 2012.4 In late 2016, The Ministry of Information and Communication has provided 4G licenses for all mobile service providers. In the first quarter of 2017, VinaPhone became the first provider to roll out a 4G network in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and 11 other provinces.5
Restrictions on Connectivity
While several companies have licenses to build infrastructure, the state-owned Viet Nam Post and Telecommunications Corporation (VNPT) and military-owned Viettel dominate the country's telecommunications sector. Three out of four providers servicing Internet Exchange Points (IXP), which allocate bandwidth to service providers, are state- or military-owned (VNPT, Viettel, and SPT; the fourth, FPT, is private).6
Authorities may employ periodic throttling or restrict access to the internet for political or security reasons. During the coverage period of this report, 3G signal was restricted locally to prevent the use of SMS and social media in at least one case. Around April 19, 3G and phone signal was unavailable for several hours in Dong Tam commune, Ha Noi, where villagers held 30 police officials and district government officials hostage over several days in a violent conflict over land.7
In early 2017, the Inter-Asia (IA) and Asia-America Gateway (AAG) submarine cables, which carry international traffic, were damaged, significantly impairing the speed and quality of access for several weeks.8
ICT Market
The three biggest internet service providers (ISPs) are VNPT, which controls 41 percent of the market; Viettel (40 percent); and the private FPT (10 percent).9 Though any firm is allowed to operate an ISP, informal barriers prevent new companies without political ties or economic clout from disrupting the market.
In the mobile sector, Viettel commands 49.5 percent of mobile subscriptions; MobiFone and Vinaphone rank second and third with 25 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Smaller players which lack infrastructure to provide quality service and coverage, like Vietnamobile and Gmobile, struggle to compete.10
The Vietnam Internet Network Information Center (VNNIC), an affiliate of the Ministry of Information and Communications, is responsible for managing, allocating, supervising, and promoting the use of internet domain names, IP addresses, and autonomous system numbers (ASN). Three additional ministries—information and culture (MIC), public security (MPS), and culture, sport, and tourism (MCST)—manage the provision and usage of internet services. On paper, the MCST regulates sexually explicit and violent content, while the MPS oversees political censorship. In practice, however, guidelines are issued by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in a largely non-transparent manner.
Limits on Content:
Blocking and Filtering
With fewer resources devoted to online content control than in China, the Vietnamese authorities have nevertheless established an effective content filtering system. Social media and communications apps are periodically blocked, but Facebook and Instagram, which were blocked during protests in May 2016, were otherwise available during the coverage period.
Access to Facebook and Instagram appears to have been interrupted as hundreds of people protested against an environmental disaster in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in May 2016. Demonstrators criticized Formosa, a Taiwanese steel plant they held responsible for millions of fish washing up dead along the central coast, and the government for failing to respond to the crisis. The mainstream media failed to cover the rallies, adding to Facebook's importance as a means of sharing information and organizing public events (see "Digital Activism"). Operators of at least three tools used to circumvent blocking reported a dramatic spike in the number of their Vietnamese users on May 15, coinciding with reports that social media platforms were inaccessible and indicating that the platforms had been blocked.11 Some mobile users also reported that they were unable to send SMS messages about the rallies.
Censorship is implemented by ISPs rather than at the backbone or international gateway level. Specific URLs are generally identified for censorship and placed on blacklists. Censorship targets high-profile blogs or websites with many followers, as well as content considered threatening to Communist Party rule, including political dissent, human rights and democracy, as well as websites criticizing the government's reaction to border and sea disputes with China. Content promoting organized religion such as Buddhism, Roman Catholicism, and the Cao Dai group, which the state considers a potential threat, is blocked to a lesser but still significant degree. Websites critical of the government are generally inaccessible, whether they are hosted overseas, such as Talawas, Dan Luan and Dan Chim Viet, or domestically, like Dan Lam Bao, Dien Dan Xa Hoi Dan Su, or Bauxite Vietnam. Access to international sites such as Human Rights Watch, U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia's Vietnamese-language site, or Vietnamese BBC, has been unstable and unpredictable.
ISPs use different techniques to inform customers of their compliance with blocking orders. While some notify users when an inaccessible site has been deliberately blocked, others post an apparently benign error message.
The Party's Department for Culture and Ideology and the Ministry of Information and Culture (MIC) regularly instruct online outlets to remove content they perceive as problematic, through nontransparent, often verbal orders.
In February 2017, the government tightened pressure on international companies to remove content the authorities categorized as "toxic." The Vietnam-based operations of several multinational companies withdrew advertising from popular social media platforms Facebook and YouTube at the request of Vietnamese government ministries.12Vietnamese companies also pulled advertising after government representatives said the advertising appeared next to content violating local laws, including some uploaded by dissidents that criticized the government.13 The impact of the measure on content was not immediately clear. State media said officials had asked YouTube to remove thousands of clips, but Google, which owns YouTube, was quoted as saying it had received fewer than 50 official takedown requests, and reported only 5 total government removal requests between 2009 and December 2016 in its transparency report.14
Other entities with financial and political influence may exert control over online content or discourage free expression. In 2016, online reports of inadequate animal welfare at a safari on Phu Quoc island in southern Vietnam, led to a Facebook campaign questioning the importation and treatment of wild animals. The Vinpearl safari is operated by Vingroup, one of the country's biggest conglomerates. Shortly afterward, Facebook users who had previously discussed the issue temporarily deactivated their accounts, and a Facebook page administrator posted that they had to stop reporting on the case "for security reasons," according to the BBC Vietnamese service, leading observers to believe that they feared reprisals from Vingroup or its supporters.15 Vingroup denied reports that thousands of animals had died at the park and workers had quit in protest.16 In 2017, other activists who posted on Facebook about Vingroup's real estate projects in Hanoi removed content in similar circumstances.
Content removal instructions cover social as well as political content. In 2015, for example, MIC officials ordered local media production company Monday Morning Ltd. Co. to stop producing episodes of the YouTube celebrity gossip series "Bitches in Town," for using offensive language and causing public outrage.17
Intermediary liability was formalized in 2013 with Decree 72 on the Management, Provision, Use of Internet Services and Internet Content Online. It requires intermediaries—including those based overseas—to regulate third-party contributors in cooperation with the state, and to "eliminate or prevent information" prohibited under Article 5. It holds cybercafe owners responsible if their customers are caught surfing "bad" websites. This process was articulated in Circular 09/2014/TT-BTTTT, issued in October 2014, which requires website owners to eliminate "incorrect" content "within three hours" of its detection or receipt of a request from a competent authority in the form of email, text message, or phone call. The circular also tightened procedures for registering and licensing new social media sites. Among other requirements, the person responsible for the platform should have a university or higher degree. It also requires Vietnamese companies who operate general websites and social networks, including blogging platforms, to locate a server system in Vietnam and to store posted information for 90 days and certain metadata for up to two years.18 It is not clear how much service providers removed content for fear of possible reprisals before the decree was introduced, so its immediate impact was not possible to gauge. Further, it did not outline clear penalties for non-compliance.
Media, Diversity and Content Manipulation
Internet content producers face a range of pressures that affect the quality of online information. All content needs to pass through in-house censorship before publication. In weekly meetings, detailed instructions handed out by a Party Committee to editors dictate areas and themes to report on or suppress, as well as the allowed depth of coverage. In 2017, President Tran Dai Quang called for new measures "to prevent news sites and blogs with bad and dangerous content," but none had been introduced in mid-year.19
Editors and journalists also risk post-publication sanctions including imprisonment, fines, disciplinary warnings, and job loss. On June 20, 2016, an announcement on the MIC website said the ministry had revoked press credentials for Mai Phan Loi, head of the Hanoi bureau of the HCMC Law Newspaper, based on the online publication of a single word deemed "not respectful to the military." Loi had discussed the crash of a Vietnamese maritime patrol aircraft in a journalists' group on Facebook the previous week. The post asked why the plane had "exploded into pieces."20 On June 21, Minister of Information and Communications Truong Minh Tuan warned that journalists should be considerate when using social networks. 21
Decree 174, effective since January 2014, introduced administrative fines of up to VND 100 million (US$4,700) for anyone who "criticizes the government, the Party or national heroes" or "spreads propaganda and reactionary ideology against the state" on social media. These fines can be applied for offenses not serious enough to merit criminal prosecution. The decree outlined additional fines for violations related to online commerce. In 2015, the Ministry of Information and Communications reported imposing VND 777 million ($38,000) in 18 cases involving violations of rules governing the provision and use of information on the internet.22 The local government in southwestern An Giang province was forced to withdraw one sanction that attracted national attention in 2015. A secondary school teacher was fined VND 5 million ($220) for describing the provincial chairman as "arrogant" on Facebook. Two other individuals were fined and received disciplinary warnings from the Party for "liking" and sharing the post. The incident attracted dozens of media representatives to press conferences before the fines were withdrawn.23
These economic and social penalties, in addition to the risk of criminal prosecution, foster self-censorship. The unpredictable and nontransparent ways in which topics become prohibited make it difficult for users to know what might be off-limits, and bloggers and forum administrators routinely disable commenting functions to prevent controversial discussions.
The government has also taken steps to manipulate public opinion online. In 2013, Hanoi's head of propaganda Ho Quang Loi revealed the city has a 900-strong team of "internet polemicists" or "public opinion shapers" who are tasked with spreading the party line. The "teams of experts" had set up some 18 websites and 400 online accounts to monitor and direct online discussions on everything from foreign policy to land rights, he said at the time.24 There were no official statements regarding this matter in 2017, but internet users continued to observe signs of possible manipulation in online forums.
In October 2015, the government opened an official Facebook page to provide timely information about the government and the prime minister.25 Other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Health or the Hanoi People's Committee have also started to reach out to citizens on Facebook, apparently signaling a shift away from the perception of such platforms as oppositional, towards more digital engagement for propaganda purposes and improving governance.
Although government-run media continue to dominate, new domestic online outlets and social media sites are expanding the traditional media landscape. Young educated Vietnamese are increasingly turning to blogs, social media, and other online news sources over state TV and radio.26 While some important alternative blogs have stopped operating following the prosecution of their owners, like Que Choa in 2014, new Facebook pages and other sites continue to emerge. In 2015, independent broadcaster Conscience TV began producing YouTube videos on human rights issues in Vietnam.27 Tools for circumventing censorship are well known among younger, technology-savvy internet users in Vietnam, and many can be found with a simple Google search.28
Activists continued to use social media during the reporting period, some with tens of thousands of followers, even in the face of intensifying pressure (see "Content Removal" and "Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities").29 In mid-2016, Mai Khoi, a singer who ran for the National Assembly as an independent member, described social media as the only platform where she could speak freely, though she also said her Facebook account had been disabled twice during her campaign. She suspected that individuals aligned with the security forces reported her account to Facebook in order to silence her.30
Digital mobilization is local rather than national in scale, compared to some other countries in Asia. In 2016, the mass deaths of fish in central coastal provinces sparked a wave of protest on Facebook, which led to street rallies in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City demanding more transparency from the government.31 The protests continued through October 2016 and proved to be a challenge to the government on how to deal with crisis.32 Facebook was restricted when the protests were at their peak (see "Blocking and Filtering").
In March 2015, a Hanoi government plan to remove thousands of trees lining the city's thoroughfares spawned outrage on Facebook in a campaign which gathered 20,000 supporters in 24 hours, some of whom speculated that officials were motivated by the chance of selling the valuable timber. Authorities reversed the plan later that month, after a rare protest where residents took to the streets following several online campaigns by different social groups.33 The previous year, a plan to build a cable car near the UN-recognized world-heritage site Phong Nha-Ke Bang was also stalled by Facebook critics whose page amassed over 33,000 likes, and a petition of over 71,000 signatures.34
Violations of User Rights:
The Constitution, amended in 2013, affirms the right to freedom of expression, but in practice the VCP has strict control over the media. Legislation, including internet-related decrees, the penal code, the Publishing Law, and the State Secrets Protection Ordinance, can be used to fine and imprison journalists and netizens. The judiciary is not independent, and trials related to free expression are often brief, and apparently predetermined. Police routinely flout due process, arresting bloggers and online activists without a warrant or retaining them in custody beyond the maximum period allowed by law.
Articles 79, 88, and 258 of the penal code are commonly used to prosecute and imprison bloggers and online activists for subversion, antistate propaganda, and abusing democratic freedoms. Vietnam's National Assembly amended the penal code on November 27, 2015.35 The amendments were supposed to become effective on July 1, 2016 but were postponed for further revision, with no developments as of mid-2017.36 Under the amended law, Article 79, "carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the people's administration," would become Article 109, and Article 88, "making, storing, disseminating or propagandizing materials and products that aim to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," would become Article 117.37 The amendments newly criminalized preparing to commit those crimes with penalties of one to five years in prison. Article 258, which punishes "abuse of democratic rights to infringe upon the interests of the State, the legitimate rights and interests of organizations and citizens," would become Article 330.
Since 2008, a series of regulations have extended controls on traditional media content to the online sphere. Decree 97 ordered blogs to refrain from political or social commentary and barred them from disseminating press articles, literary works, or other publications prohibited by the Press Law. In 2011, Decree 02 gave authorities power to penalize journalists and bloggers for a series of infractions, including publishing under a pseudonym.38 Decree 72 on the Management, Provision, Use of Internet Services and Internet Content Online replaced Decree 97 in 2013, expanding regulation from blogs to all social media networks. Article 5 prohibits broad categories of online activity including "opposing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," inciting violence, revealing state secrets, and providing false information.
An information security law passed in November 2015 and came into effect on July 1, 2016 (see "Surveillance, Privacy and Anonymity").39 A separate draft cybersecurity law was presented in mid-2017.40
Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities
Reporters Without Borders documented 19 individuals detained for online activity in Vietnam as of April 2017.41 Vietnam released 14 bloggers and activists under pressure from the US in 2014 and 2015, in the midst of negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),42 though those released were not pardoned.43 44 Several new arrests were reported in 2016, and 2017 saw an intensifying crackdown on government critics,45 exemplified by the harsh 10-year sentenced handed to the blogger known as "Mother Mushroom" in June.46
Mother Mushroom, or Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, was one of several bloggers and activists jailed in late 2016 under Articles 70, 88, or 258 of the penal code (see "Legal Environment"). Other examples include Nguyen Danh Dung, who was arrested in Thanh Hoa in December for his alleged involvement with Thien An TV, a YouTube channel critical of the government; and blogger Ho Hai in Ho Chi Minh City for his online criticisms of the government.47
More cases were reported in January. Tran Thi Nga (pen name Thuy Nga), 40, was arrested on January 21, and charged with accessing the internet "to post a number of video clips and articles to propagandize against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam" under article 88 of the Penal Code.48 Former political prisoner and citizen journalist Nguyen Van Oai was arrested the same month for allegedly violating his probation. In 2011 he was sentenced to four years in prison for alleged involvement with the overseas political organization Viet Tan and was placed on probation for another four years.49 On January 11, Nguyen Van Hoa, a human right activist, was arrested by police in Ha Tinh province and charged with "abusing the rights to freedom and democracy to infringe upon the interests of the State," under Article 258 of the Penal Code. He had campaigned against the Formosa Steel Company for their role in the mass death of fish in April 2016 (see "Digital Activism").50
Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity
Limited information is available about the surveillance technology available to Vietnamese authorities, but the legal framework enables officials to undermine privacy.
Decree 72 requires providers like social networks to "provide personal information of the users related to terrorism, crimes, and violations of law" to "competent authorities" on request, but lacks procedures or oversight to discourage intrusive registration or data collection. It also mandates that companies maintain at least one domestic server "serving the inspection, storage, and provision of information at the request of competent authorities," and store certain data for specified periods (see "Content Removal"). The decree gave users themselves the ambiguous right to "have their personal information kept confidential in accordance with law." Implementation is at the discretion of ministers, heads of ministerial agencies and governmental agencies, the provincial People's Committees, and "relevant organizations and individuals," leaving anonymous and private communication subject to invasion from almost any authority in Vietnam. In mid-2016, "correspondence from the Saigon Post and Telecommunications Service Corporation" was the basis of Nguyen Dinh Ngoc's indictment for disseminating antigovernment propaganda; he was charged under Article 88 of the penal code.51
The Law on Information Security passed in November 2015 and came into effect on July 1, 2016, introducing some cybersecurity protections.52 In more troubling provisions, the law allows the sharing of users' personal information without consent at the request of competent state agencies (Article 17.1.c), mandates that authorities be given decryption keys on request, and introduces licensing requirements for tools that offer encryption as a primary function, threatening anonymity.53
Real-name registration is not required to blog or post online comments, and many Vietnamese do so anonymously. However, Vietnamese authorities do monitor online communication and dissident activity. Cybercafe owners are required to install software to track and store information about their clients' online activities, and citizens must also provide ISPs with government-issued documents when purchasing a home internet connection.54 In late 2009, the MIC requested all prepaid mobile phone subscribers to register their ID details with the operator and limited each to three numbers per carrier. As of 2017, however, the registration process is not linked to any central database and could be circumvented using a fake ID. Pay-per-use, SIM cards, can be easily purchased without IDs.
In 2013, Citizen Lab, a research group based in Canada, identified FinFisher software on servers in 25 countries worldwide, including Vietnam. Promoted by United Kingdom-based distributor Gamma International as a suite for lawful intrusion and surveillance, FinFisher offers the power to monitor communications and extract information from other computers without permission, such as contacts, text messages, and emails. Citizen Lab noted that the presence of such a server did not prove who was running it, though it is marketed to governments.
Intimidation and Violence
Bloggers and online activists have been subjected to physical attacks, job loss, severed internet access, travel restrictions, and other rights violations. In June 2017, Human Rights Watch reported 36 attacks targeting activists between January 2015 and April 2017, sometimes in police stations or in view of police who did not intervene.55Examples include Nguyen Trung Ton, a Protestant pastor and blogger who was beaten by a group of men armed with iron rods in February 2017, and prodemocracy blogger To Oanh, who in July 2016 was intercepted while driving a motorcycle by a man who forced him to crash.
Police also responded violently to protests that were organized using digital tools (see "Digital Activism"). In February 2017, police stopped hundreds of protesters from undertaking a 180 km march north from Ha Tinh province to Nghe An province, to present compensation claims against Formosa Steel Factory over the 2016 fish kill. Several protesters were beaten or arrested.56 Police broke up a related protest in Ho Chi Minh City in March, dispersing about 200 people and arresting several participants. In Hanoi, police prevented activists to assemble after a call for protest was posted on social media.57
Other prominent activists and bloggers such as Pham Doan Trang or Nguyen Quang A were put under house arrest so they could not attend a specific event, such as a meeting with foreign diplomats or a protest.58
Technical Attacks
Activists in Vietnam and abroad have been the target of systematic cyberattacks. Research published in 2017 revealed that hackers conducting coordinated cyberespionage campaigns targeted two Vietnamese media organizations in 2015 and 2016 and the Vietnamese diaspora in Australia in 2017, among other targets, largely corporations with interests in Vietnam.59
When the activity was first documented in 2009, the attackers used Vietnamese-language programs to infect computers with malicious software to carry out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on blogs and websites perceived as critical of the government. Google estimated that "potentially tens of thousands of computers" were affected, but Vietnamese authorities took no steps to find or punish the attackers.
Activists have since been subject to account takeovers, where spear-phishing emails disguised as legitimate content carry malware which can breach the recipient's digital security to access private account information. Starting in 2013, attacks using malware to spy on journalists, activists and dissidents became more personal. California-based Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Associated Press journalists reported receiving infected emails inviting them to human rights conferences or offering academic papers on the topic, indicating that the senders are familiar with the activities and interests of the recipients.
1 Statistica Digital Market Outlook, "Smartphone penetration rate as share of the population in Vietnam from 2015 to 2022," Statistica 2017, https://www.statista.com/statistics/625458/smartphone-user-penetration-in-vietnam/.
2 "Telecom agency: still room for new FTTH service providers," Vietnam Breaking News, October 20, 2016, https://www.vietnambreakingnews.com/2016/10/telecom-agency-still-room-for-new-ftth-service-providers/.
3 3G plan from Vinaphon: http://3gvinaphone.vn/cac-goi-cuoc-3g-vinaphone-khong-gioi-han-luu-luong-mien-phi/; World Bank, "GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)," International Comparison Program Database, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD.
4 "Vietnam 3G subscriptions soar to 38 million: data", Thanh Nien News, July 13, 2016, http://www.thanhniennews.com/tech/vietnam-3g-subscriptions-soar-to-38-million-data-64133.html
5 "Cuộc đua 3G đang nóng tại Việtnam" <The 3G race is heating up in Vietnam>, Zing, March 21, 2017, http://news.zing.vn/cuoc-dua-4g-dang-nong-tai-viet-nam-post730022.html
6 Website of the Ministry of Information and Commnunication, http://bit.ly/1oVnHuy.
7 Personal accounts from activists reporting on the outskirts of Hanoi, 2017; "Vụ Đồng Tâm có thêm diễn biễn phức tạp" <Complications in the Dong Tam case>, BBC Vietnamese, April 20, 2017,http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/vietnam-39646209
8 "Cáp quang Liên Á lại lỗi, Internet ra nước ngoài vẫn chậm" <InterAsia cable damaged again; connection to abroad still slow>, VNExpress, March 3, 2017, http://sohoa.vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/doi-song-so/cap-quang-lien-a-lai-loi-internet-ra-nuoc-ngoai-van-cham-3549675.html
9 "So kè giành thị phần cáp quang" <Fighting for optic cable market share>, Đầu Tư, February 7, 2017, http://baodautu.vn/so-ke-gianh-thi-phan-internet-cap-quang-d58454.html
10 "Việt Nam hiện có hơn 128,3 triệu thuê bao điện thoại di động" <Vietnam curently has over 128,3 mio mobilphone subscribers>, ICT News, September 6, 2016, http://ictnews.vn/vien-thong/viet-nam-hien-co-hon-128-3-trieu-thue-bao-dien-thoai-di-dong-142931.ict
11 Sarah Perez, "Facebook blocked in Vietnam over the weekend due to citizen protests," TechCrunch, May 17, 2016 http://tcrn.ch/28KKrG2.
12 Michael Peel, "Vietnam targets multinationals in social media censorship drive," Financial Times, March 17, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/853db6f2-0ae1-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b.
13 Ma Nguyen, "Vietnam leverages Google, YouTube hate speech failings," Asia Times, March 27, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/vietnam-leverages-google-youtube-hate-speech-failings/.
14 Google Transparency Report, "Government requests to remove content: Vietnam," July 2016 to December 2016, https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/by-country/VN.
15 "Safari Phú Quốc 'chưa nhập tê giác'" <Phu Quoc Safari "not imported rhinos yet">, BBC Vietnamese, February 27, 2016, http://bbc.in/1Tkwnaw.
"Safari Phú Quốc 'nên minh bạch'" <Phu Quoc Safari 'should be transparent"> BBC Vietnamese February 26, 2016, http://bbc.in/1LL7koS.
16 "Reports of mass animal deaths at Vietnam safari zoo are false: authorities," Tuoi Tre News, February 24, 2016, http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/33384/reports-of-mass-animal-deaths-at-vietnam-safari-zoo-are-false-authorities.
17 "'Những kẻ lắm lời' bị yêu cầu tạm ngừng vì xúc phạm người khác" <"Bitches in Town" was required to stop for offending others>, Tuoi Tre, November 25, 2015 http://bit.ly/1MhXdgL.
18 Mong Palatino, "Corporate Critics Say Vietnam's New Tech Regulations Are Bad for Business," Global Voice Advocacy, November 3, 2014, http://bit.ly/1LtKLK4.
19 Reuters, "Vietnam's president calls for tougher internet controls," August 20, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-internet/vietnams-president-calls-for-tougher-internet-controls-idUSKCN1B00JW.
20 "Vietnam reporter's press card revoked for insulting military," AP June 20, 2016 http://apne.ws/28OXZRg.
21 Nhà báo phải cân nhắc khi sử dụng mạng xã hội < Journalists should consider when using social networks>, Vietnamnet, June 21, 2016, http://bit.ly/28KtOKa.
22 "VND1.5 billion fines imposed on press agencies in 2015", VietnamNet, December 31, 2015, http://bit.ly/1Tk2JCf.
23 "Chê Chủ tịch tỉnh 'kênh kiệu' trên Facebook: 'Chúng tôi xử phạt không sai" <Criticising Provincial Chairman "cocky" on Facebook: 'Our fine was not wrong," Thanh Nien online, http://bit.ly/1MtVdwN.
24 "Vietnam's propaganda agents battle bloggers online", Bangkok Post, January 19, 2013, http://bit.ly/1L21XH8
25 "Vietnam sets up its own Facebook page to reach its young," AP, October 22, 2015, http://apne.ws/1Tkz6AH.
26 Paul Rothman, "Media Use in Vietnam: Findings from BBG and GALLUP", Cima June 10, 2015,
http://www.cima.ned.org/blog/media-use-vietnam/.
27 Bita Eghbali and Lakshna Mehta, "Vietnam Police Detain Six Over Web Videos," Global Journalist, September 29, 2015, http://globaljournalist.org/2015/09/vietnam-police-detain-six-over-web-videos/; Reporters Without Borders, "Citizen-journalist Nguyen Van Dai badly beaten," via IFEX, December 11, 2015, https://www.ifex.org/vietnam/2015/12/11/citizen_journalist_attacked/; Radio Free Asia, "Authorities in Vietnam Crack Down on New Independent Broadcast Service," September 25, 2015, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/authorities-in-vietnam-crack-down-on-new-independent-broadcast-service-09252015152145.html.
28 The Sec Dev Foundation, "Circum-what? Circumvention Widely Employed, Poorly Understood in Vietnam," February 1, 2016, https://secdev-foundation.org/circum-what-circumvention-widely-employed-poorly-understood-in-vietnam/.
29 Matthew Tostevin, "Vietnam's Facebook dissidents test the limits of Communist state," Reuters, August 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-internet/vietnams-facebook-dissidents-test-the-limits-of-communist-state-idUSKCN1B92UQ.
30 Matthew Clayfield, "Vietnam's National Assembly elections plagued by biased vetting, intimidation," ABC News, May 20, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-20/vietnam-national-assembly-elections-plagued-by-bias/7430010.
31 "Rare rallies in Vietnam over mysterious mass fish deaths," Reuters May 1, 2016, http://reut.rs/23gFOI7.
32 "Outrage Over Fish Kill in Vietnam Simmers 6 Months Later," New York Times, October 3, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/world/asia/formosa-vietnam-fish.html?_r=1.
33 "If a tree falls… online, will the Communist Party hear anything?" The Economist, April 18, 2015, http://econ.st/1DqEUy2.
34 "Son Doong Saved From Cable Car: No Development Until 2030," Caving News, February 13, 2015, http://bit.ly/1OLzzDY.
35 "HRW Submission to EU on Bilateral Dialogue with Vietnam," Human Rights Watch, December 13, 2015 http://bit.ly/1WTky8Q.
36 "Vietnam legislature to postpone revised penal code as implementation day nears," Tuoi Tre News, June 28, 2016, http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/35591/legislature-to-postpone-revised-penal-code-as-implementation-day-nears.
37 Human Rights Watch, "Vietnam's Proposed Revisions to National Security Laws," November 19, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/19/vietnams-proposed-revisions-national-security-laws.
38 OpenNet Initiative, "Vietnam," August 7, 2012, http://bit.ly/1Z4zX9m; The Ministry of Information and Communication, Decree No 97/2008/ND-CP of August 28, 2008, Official Gazette, August 11-12, 2008, http://bit.ly/1j9Ejf5; Ministry of Information and Communications, Circular No. 07/2008/TT-BTTTT of December 18, 2008, Official Gazette, January 6-7, 2009,http://bit.ly/1FSWgs7
Article 19, "Comment on the Decree No. 02 of 2011 on Administrative Responsibility for Press and Publication Activities of the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," June 2011, http://bit.ly/1JPbb1x; Decree 02/2011/ND-CP, [in Vietnamese] January 6, 2011, available at Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj.org/Vietnam%20media%20decree.pdf.
39 Tilleke and Gibbons, "Legal Update: New Regulations in the ICT Sector in Vietnam, March 2016, http://www.tilleke.com/sites/default/files/2016_Mar_New_Regulations_ICT_Sector_Vietnam.pdf; Rouse, "New Law On Cyber Information Security And Its Impact On Data Privacy In Vietnam," March 30, 2016, http://www.rouse.com/magazine/news/new-law-on-cyber-information-security-and-its-impact-on-data-privacy-in-vietnam/.
40 Baker McKenzie, "New Draft Cybersecurity Law 2017," July 31, 2017, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b3fd124e-e230-4859-84a4-e7fe623e57df.
41 Reporters Without Borders, "Violations of press freedom barometer," accessed April 2017, https://rsf.org/en/barometer.
42 "Vietnam: Widespread 'National Security' Arrests", Human Rights Watch, November 19, 2015, http://bit.ly/1OVc8y0.
43 Article 19, "Interview: Activist Le Quoc Quan, one day after his release from prison," via IFEX, June 30, 2015, https://www.ifex.org/vietnam/2015/06/30/interview_le_quoc_quan/.
44 Human Rights Watch, "Vietnam: Events of 2015," World Report, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/vietnam; Reuters, "Vietnam frees anti-state blogger, U.S. calls for more releases," September 20, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-dissident-idUSKCN0RK0D320150920.
45 Bennett Murray, "Vietnam's harsh summer: state launches largest crackdown on dissidents in years," The Guardian, September 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/26/vietnams-state-largest-crackdown-on-dissidents-years.
46 Associated Press, "Vietnamese blogger jailed for 10 years for 'defaming' regime," The Guardian, June 29, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/29/vietnamese-blogger-jailed-for-10-years-for-defaming-regime.
47 "Vietnam: New Wave of Arrest of Critics", Human Rights Watch, January 27, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/27/vietnam-new-wave-arrests-critics.
48 "Vietnam: New Wave of Arrest of Critics", Human Rights Watch, January 27, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/27/vietnam-new-wave-arrests-critics
50 "Vietnam Seeks to Calm Waters One Year after Environmental Disaster", Vietnam Human Right Defenders, April 11, 2017,
http://www.vietnamhumanrightsdefenders.net/2017/04/12/vietnam-seeks-to-calm-waters-one-year-after-environmental-disaster/.
51 Human Rights Watch, "Vietnam: 7 Convicted in One Week," April 4, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/04/vietnam-7-convicted-one-week.
53 Michael L. Gray, "The Trouble with Vietnam's Cyber Security Law," The Diplomat, October 21, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/the-trouble-with-vietnams-cyber-security-law/; "Vietnamese Cyber Security Law Threatens Privacy Rights and Encryption," September 8, 2016, https://www.tiasangvietnam.org/vietnams-cyber-security-law-threatens-privacy-rights-and-encryption/.
54 "Internet Censorship tightening in Vietnam," Asia News, June 22, 2010, http://bit.ly/1yJgoHk.
55 Human Rights Watch, "No Country for Human Rights Activists," June 18, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/06/18/no-country-human-rights-activists/assaults-bloggers-and-democracy-campaigners.
56 "Vietnam police stop fishermen marching to make claims at steel firm," Reuters, February 14, 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-protest-formosa-plastics-idUKKBN15T1MK; "VietNam: Police violently attacked priest and faithful during Formosa protest," VietCatholic News, February 18, 2017, http://www.vietcatholic.net/News/Html/214343.htm.
57 "Formosa protesters defy police threats," Vietnam Right Now, March 5, 2017, http://vietnamrightnow.com/2017/03/formosa-protesters-defy-police-threats/
58 "Vietnam: End Crackdown on Bloggers and Activists," Human Right Watch, January 12, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/vietnam-end-crackdown-bloggers-and-activists.
59 Nick Carr, "Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations," FireEye, May 14, 2017, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html.
Total Score:


text:
Q: why does my icon image not show up on window that i have created while i was making a window, i used .wm_iconbitmap(). it worked but the image showed as blank in the corner of the window. is this because of the size of the file?
there wasn't an error in the code which led me to believe that it was to do with the image it's self.
i have tried resizing the image to as small as possible and tried using different images.
import tkinter
import os
top = tkinter.Tk()
top.title("my_window")
os.chdir("c:\\RILEYHQ\\my images")
top.wm_iconbitmap('my_icon.ico')
top.mainloop()

this results in a window with a title and an empty sheet of paper image as the icon

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
from lib.settings_base import *

ROOT_URLCONF = 'default.urls'

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


Turning a Clipboard to a Message board!
I am tired of leaving my grocery lists and a pen on the countertop, so I decided to make a message board by repurposing a clipboard.
The first steps involved was gathering the supplies and selecting the scrapbook paper and a spray paint to match the paper.
I love the projects where I have everything on hand and do not need to run to the store. I began by spray painting the bottom of the clipboard with chalkboard paint. I spray painted a few coats of chalkboard paint since the first layer absorbed into the clipboard. I than spray painted the handle, again using a few coats. Once everything was dry I used mod podge and adhered the scrapbook paper unto the clipboard, cutting around the handle on top.
I used square velcro tabs to stick the notepads in place, I did this so it will be easy to change out the notepads when empty.
I used a coordinating piece of scrapbook paper to make a holder for the chalk. I just cut a strip of paper and rolled to make a tube that is slightly bigger than the chalk. I cut small slits to the bottom of the tube and folded down each piece. Glue the chalk holder to the clipboard.
I tied my pencil to the clipboard, that way it will not disappear and i will always have something to write on my note pads.
Now my boys know where I keep the grocery list; so if they are wanting something, they need to write it on the list. If it is not on the list, it does not get purchased!
I placed the clipboard on the inside door of our snack cupboard, this way it is seen by all.
What a wonderful idea. It looks great too! Thank you for sharing. I am a new follower from Aloha Friday. Have a wonderful weekend.
Cute DeDe! It's so fun to have something cute and functional!
What a neat idea! I have been wanting to try out that chalkboard paint on something. Now this gives me an idea for what I could use it for. Thanks for sharing.
This is beautiful! I really love it. This would be so pretty hanging in my home.


text:
Georgiana Houghton
Virginia Woolf: An Exhibition inspired by her writings
Front cover of the exhibition catalogue depicting the art of Ithell Colquhoun
Virginia Woolf: An Exhibition inspired by her writings at Tate St Ives from 10 February – 29 April 2018
Discover art from 1850 to the present, inspired by the writing of this celebrated author.
Author of classic texts including To the Lighthouse and the pioneering feminist text A Room of One's Own, Virginia Woolf spent much of her childhood in St Ives where this exhibition was first shown. It then toured to the Pallant House Gallery, Chichester, 26 May – 16 September and the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, 2 October – 9 December 2018.
"Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) had strong ties to the women's suffrage movement in the UK, and it is significant that this exhibition is presented in the year that marks the 100th anniversary of the Representation of the People Act 1918, which gave some women the right to vote for the first time. Woolf's exploration of equality and independence in her writings is pertinent to the ways in which artists in this exhibition investigate timely questions around identity, gender and the representation of the self." Anne Barlow – Tate St Ives
This exhibition is led by her writing, which will act as a prism through which to explore feminist perspectives on landscape, domesticity and identity in modern and contemporary art – with over 250 works by over 80 artists, including Laura Knight, Vanessa Bell, Gwen John, Barabara Hepworth, Romaine Brooks, Georgiana Houghton, Edith Rimmington, Sandra Blow, Ithell Colquhoun, Toyen, Mary Bligh Bond, Ethel Annie Weir, Claude Cahun, Winnifred Nicholson, Gluck, Rebbecca Warren, Frances Hodgkins, Agnes Martin, Prunella Clough, Nina Hamnett, Louise Bourgeois, Eileen Agar, Wilhelmina Barnes-Graham, Julia Margaret Cameron, Emmy Bridgwater, Mary Kelly, Louise Jopling, Joan Jonas, Linder, Sheila Legge, Patricia Johanson, Grace Pailthorpe, Dod Proctor, Penny Slinger and Dora Carrington.
Virginia Woolf: An Exhibition inspired by her writings was curated by Laura Smith and made possible with a Jonathan Ruffer Curatorial Research Grant from the Art Fund. The accompanying catalogue has essays by Maggie Humm, Hana Leaper, Jean Mills, Bonnie Kime Scott, Laura Smith and Claudia Tobin. It was edited by Laura Smith and Enrico Tassi with Eloise Bennett.
A review of the exhibition can be read at The London Magazine.
Copyright © 2020 georgianahoughton.com

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Q: Reduce inside of an apply I'm not 100% if using apply + functools.reduce is the best approach for this problem, but I'm not sure exactly if multi-indices can be leveraged to accomplish this goal.
Background
The data is a list of activities performed by accounts.

*

*user_id - the user's ID

*activity - the string that represents the activity

*performed_at - the timestamp when the activity was completed at

The Goal
To calculate the time spent between 2 statuses. An account can look like this:

user_id
activity
performed_at

1
activated
2020-01-01

1
deactivated
2020-01-02

1
activated
2020-01-03

In this example, the user was deactivated from January 1st to January 2nd, so the total "Time Deactivated" for this account would be 1 day.
Resulting Dataframe
Here's an example of the output I'm trying to achieve. The time_spent_deactivated column is just the addition of all deactivation periods on all accounts grouped by account.

user_id
time_spent_deactivated

1
24 hours

2
15 hours

3
72 hours

My Attempt
I'm trying to leverage .apply with the .groupby on the user_id, but I'm stuck at the point of calculating the total time spent in the deactivated state:
    def calculate_deactivation_time(activities):
        # reduce the given dataframe here
        # this is totally ActiveRecord & JS inspired but it's the easiest way for me to describe how I expect to solve this
        return activities.reduce(sum, current_row):
           if current_row['activity'] == 'deactivated':
              # find next "activated" activity and compute the delta
              reactivated_row = activities.after(current_row).where(activity, '=', 'activated')
              return sum + (reactivated_row['performed_at'] - current_row['performed_at'])

    grouped = activities.groupby('user_id')
    grouped.apply(calculate_deactivation_time)

Is there a better approach to doing this? I tried to use functools.reduce to compute the total time spent deactivated, but it doesn't support dataframes out of the box.

A: I have given it some more thought and I think this is what you are looking for.
import pandas as pd
import numpy as np

def myfunc(x):
    df = x
    # Shift columns activity_start and performed_at_start
    df['performed_at_end'] = df['performed_at_start'].shift(-1)
    df['activity_end'] = df['activity_start'].shift(-1)

    # Make combinations of activity start-end
    df['activity_start_end'] = df['activity_start']+'-'+df['activity_end']

    # Take only those that start with deactivated, end with activated
    df = df[df['activity_start_end']=='deactivated-activated']

    # Drop all that don't have performed_at_end date (does not exist)
    df = df[~pd.isna(df['performed_at_end'])]

    # Compute time difference in days, then return sum of all delta's
    df['delta'] = (df['performed_at_end']-df['performed_at_start'])/np.timedelta64(1,'D')

    return df['delta'].sum()

# Example dataframe
df = pd.DataFrame({'UserId': [1]*4+[2]*2+[3]*1,
                   'activity_start': ['activated', 'deactivated', 'activated', 'deactivated', 'deactivated', 'activated', 'activated'],
                   'performed_at_start': [pd.Timestamp(2020,1,1), pd.Timestamp(2020,1,2), pd.Timestamp(2020,1,6), pd.Timestamp(2020,1,8),
                                         pd.Timestamp(2020,1,1), pd.Timestamp(2020,1,3), pd.Timestamp(2020,1,1)]})

# Show dataframe
print(df)

   UserId activity_start performed_at_start
0       1      activated         2020-01-01
1       1    deactivated         2020-01-02
2       1      activated         2020-01-06
3       1    deactivated         2020-01-08
4       2    deactivated         2020-01-01
5       2      activated         2020-01-03
6       3      activated         2020-01-01

# Compute result
res = (
        df.groupby(by='UserId')
          .apply(lambda x: myfunc(x)).reset_index(drop=False)
        )
res.columns = ['UserId', 'time_spent_deactivated']

# Show result
print(res)

   UserId  time_spent_deactivated
0       1                     4.0
1       2                     2.0
2       3                     0.0


Si Ming Li and Si Yi Qian didn't hesitate at all and immediately ended the video call!
WE HAVE TO RUN QUICKLY!
Otherwise, we'll be dead meat!
The two of them just couldn't figure out how things ended up this way – they were merely trying to capture Ye Wanwan but in the end, they actually captured the little crown prince of the stand-alone island Nie clan as well.
That's the Nie clan's little crown prince, ah! How did we even manage to capture him?
Si Ming Li's hired thugs scattered instantly and Tang Long personally went down to the dungeon.
With the young master Nie's status, how could he be so easily captured by them?
Then there was only one possibility – he had a motive behind allowing them to capture him.
If that was the case, there might still be a chance that these people could be spared.
The little boy turned to Ye Wanwan, who was in the cell, and his face was covered in frostHis mother had seen too much blood today.
Upon hearing that, Tang Long heaved a sigh of relief and hurriedly signaled to his teammates with his eyes. The few of them, who were scared stiff, quickly retreated with Tang Long.
After everyone left, there was only Ye Wanwan, Tang Bin and Song Qiang left in the dungeon.
It only took a glance from the little master and the man immediately understood what he wanted – he strode over to Tang Bin and Song Qiang.
Tang Bin and Song Qiang didn't know the stand-alone island existed, so they obviously didn't know about the Nie clan at all – they were only concerned about which power would allow such a scary expert to be a child's bodyguard.
Just now, only one of the bodyguards took action and the other didn't even have to do anything at all.
Seeing the horrifying, beast-like man coming towards them, the two of them were terrified.
"Clang" – their locks were cut with a knife. The lean man simply cut the ropes and chains around their four limbs.


text:
Home Latest News New WHO Director for the Western Pacific is appointed
New WHO Director for the Western Pacific is appointed
WHO Director-General and Dr Takeshi Kasai, Regional Director for WHO's Western Pacific Region (Photo: WHO/C. Black)
Published on: 13 Feb, 2019
On 26 January, the World Health Organization (WHO) Executive Board in Geneva appointed Dr Takeshi Kasai as its regional director for the Western Pacific region. He began his 5-year term on 1 February, replacing Dr Shin Young-soo and becoming the fifth director of the region.
The Western Pacific region comprises nearly 1.9 billion people, from East Asia and the Pacific Island countries to Australasia. Dr Kasai has pledged to work hard in his new role to help these people face public health challenges: "For more than seven decades, countries have counted on WHO to work with them to solve a variety of public health challenges. My predecessor, Dr Shin Young-soo, transformed WHO in this Region, making it more people-centered and country-oriented. We must continue to evolve as an organisation – building on past accomplishments while being closely attuned to new realities on the ground.
A career in public health
Dr Kasai is a Japanese national and physician by training, with a public health career spanning back nearly 30 years. He started out as posted in a remote area of Northeast Japan where he provided health services for the elderly. There, he learned first-hand the value of a grassroots approach.
The new Regional Director has worked for WHO for over 15 years, including as WHO representative for Viet Nam and most recently as a deputy to former regional director Dr Shin Young-soo.
Priorities for the new term
Dr Kasai's term will last from 2019 to 2024, and he has promised to focus on three main health challenges: health security, noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) and ageing, and the environment and climate change.
In the Western Pacific, NCDs such as cancer and diabetes are becoming increasingly problematic, along with the issue of ageing populations. NCDs are the leading cause of death and disability in the region.
"We must develop new approaches that go beyond advocacy and training, including developing health systems that can effectively address the challenges posed by NCDs – as more people are growing old with one or more chronic conditions," said Dr Kasai.
On top of this, the region, and particularly Pacific island countries, is already feeling the drastic effects of climate change. In places such as Kiribati and the Marhsall Islands, rising sea levels threaten people's very existence, with rising sea levels predicted to wash away entire islands in the coming decades.
While these challenges are significant, Dr Kasai remains optimistic that they can be overcome: "These are huge challenges that we must face together, but they are not insurmountable," he said. "And while the future will bring new challenges, at the same time it is full of opportunity – as innovation and new technology make things possible that we couldn't even imagine not so long ago."
World Health Organization: Dr Takeshi Kasai appointed WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific
World Health Organization: WHO appoints directors for Western Pacific and South-East Asia regions
World Health Day 2019: Universal Health Coverage
Updated WHO guidelines on Tuberculosis
World Immunisation Week 2019
New partnership between POLHN and UniFiji
May (1) April (1) March (1) February (3)
December (1) November (1) October (3) September (3) August (1) July (1) May (1) March (1) February (2) January (1)
December (1) November (6) October (1) July (1) June (1) May (3) February (1) January (3)
November (1) June (1)


text:
Audiograph's Sound of the Week: "Unthanksgiving" on Alcatraz
Jeremy Dalmas
Maori people in the middle of the circle at the Indigenous People's Annual Thanksgiving Sunrise Gathering
Here's the sound we played as a clue. We asked you to guess what exactly it is and where exactly in the Bay Area we recorded it.
This auditory guessing game is part of Audiograph, a crowd-sourced collaborative radio project. Every Thursday, we reveal the origins of that week's sound on Crosscurrents.
Maxwell Love was our original winner.
It's four in the morning on Thanksgiving day, and the ferry bound for Alcatraz is packed.
We're crossing the bay to take part in the Indigenous Peoples' Annual Thanksgiving Sunrise Gathering. More than four thousand people will make this journey today.
On the lower deck, I find two men singing and playing clappers. They're bundled up in big jackets. Wicahpiluta Candelaria is here with his family.
"I'm Rumsen Ohlone from the Bay Area and Mescalero Apache from New Mexico. I live in the East Bay in the village of Huchian — also known as Oakland. We were singing traditional California-style clapper stick songs and that song we just sang was for the bears that are dancing in the night"
It's still dark when we reach the island — people wrap themselves in blankets against the cold. At the docks there are greeters welcoming everyone to the island.
"Good morning everybody, welcome to Ohlone land! You're out here near the village of Yelamu."
Yelamu is the name of the tribe that is indigenous to the city of San Francisco.
People have been coming here every year since 1974 to celebrate native culture and to have an alternative to traditional Thanksgiving. But they also come to celebrate the island's role in the birth of the American Indian Movement - that's the name of Native American civil rights movement. American Indians occupied Alcatraz three times in the 1960s - most notably for 19 months starting in November of 1969. They said that a 19th century treaty allowed all unused federal land to be returned to the Native Americans. Since the prison had been recently closed, they argued they had legal rights to the island
"This is not a photo opportunity. This is Native American church," says an announcement over the loudspeakers.
Up the hill from the docks, on a large ledge overlooking the Bay Bridge and the San Francisco skyline, hundreds gather in a circle around a large bonfire. Inside the circle there are speeches, prayers, and performances from many different groups. All Nations Drum begins an honor dance for veterans of the Occupation of Alcatraz.
Ronnie Almodovar is leaning off to the side of the circle. He goes by Talks.
"That's my native name - Talks"
He was here during the original occupation.
"Yes yes, I was 14 years old. We got shanghaied by an uncle. We thought we were going to the liquor store. He got on the freeway and we ended up here. We were stuck here — they had boats running back and forth."
He stayed here for three months.
Credit Jeremy Dalmas
Ferry Terminal on Alcatraz Island
"On the front we had in big red letters — it said 'Return Surplus Lands Back To Indians.' And when you drive up on the boat it was the first thing you saw, man."
Some of the graffiti is still up. As you dock at the island it says 'Indians Welcome'. He says that they slept in the prison cells that had been abandoned after the prison closed in 1963.
"Where else were we going to sleep? They had mattresses, blankets. We had bonfires out here man. From the city coming in you could see the bonfire out here."
That was more than 40 years ago, but it still gets to him.
"It was a part of history that I never thought I would be a part of! Don't get me wrong, but it makes me feel important just to be a part of it."
Near the bonfire, a group of Aztec dancers gather. While all amateur recording is discouraged - no one at all is allowed to record this prayer. After it's over, I talk to one of the dancers, Karen Marin.
"When we go in there what we're doing is praying. I feel like a lot of people don't understand that. It's not just jumping around and turning and squatting."
Marin lives in San Leandro. She's been coming here with her family for 15 years. All the dancers wear different things depending on what they want to represent in the dance.
"Every thing has it's own little meaning. My mom was wearing skulls. We've been going through a cancer battle with my brother so it's her way of praying for him and asking for healing. It's a medicine and a lot of people that come here take it as a medicine."
As more ferries arrive at the dock, the circle swells to thousands of people. Sampson Wolfe set up a tipi off to the side of the circle.
"I'm an enrolled member of the Muscogee Nation."
Like a lot of people here, he is not a fan of how Americans typically celebrate Thanksgiving.
"This is really an unthanksgiving for us because, I don't know if you heard today, but they're celebrating the slaughter of a tribe of people."
He didn't get to sleep last night, but it's well worth it for him.
"People from all walks of life come here. These nice ladies from Hawaii gave me this beautiful lei and they sang here, sometimes we have monks here from Japan, Maori dancers and singers, the Mochicas, a lot of local tribes, and today we had black people representing Black Lives Matter. This has evolved into a multicultural event and it's really awesome. Did you like it? Did you have a good time? Me too!" Wolfe begins to laugh.
As the sun starts rising over the Bay Bridge people start warming up. In the middle of the circle the emcee gets on the microphone.
"We need a song to welcome the sun so we can all acknowledge another day that grandfather sun is coming."
Everyone faces the glowing horizon as another song begins.
At 9am everyone has to leave the island. Tomorrow Alcatraz will fill up with thousands of tourists. But the first thing they'll see as they come off the ferry is the giant red graffiti left over from the occupation.
CrosscurrentsNative AmericanKALW archivesAlcatrazAudiographindigenous peopleindigenous
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Florida's drug laws are the various strictest within the country. Mere ownership of a managed substance including cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine is a 3rd degree prison, that could carry penalties which includes fines and up to five years in jail. if you are currently dealing with possession costs, but, you aren't without prison defenses.
Florida law acknowledges two varieties of drug ownership – real and optimistic. Actual possession is when police find a drug virtually to your person, for example, in a jacket pocket. Whether you technically own the drug is legally inappropriate. As an example, if you borrowed a chum's jacket that had cocaine in the pocket, the truth that it changed into not your cocaine isn't a defense.
The exceptional manner to undertaking and real ownership price is to name into query the forestall and seek that resulted in the police locating the drugs. An officer should have an inexpensive suspicion which you have devoted, or are about to commit, a criminal offense on the way to legally stop you. (See Fl. Stat. §901.151.) An affordable suspicion requires a foundation in truth considering all of the occasions of a stop; the officer might not depend genuinely on a hunch. Thereafter, an officer need to have probable cause to guide a search. Possibly reason is a higher felony widespread than reasonable suspicion. If the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to forestall you or probable cause to behavior a search, then the charges against you must be dismissed.
The fact that the drugs have been found near you is not enough to demonstrate constructive possession, despite the fact that they have been in plain view. for example, in Williams v. country, referenced above, the defendant Williams turned into arrested after a search of the chair he become sitting in out of doors a pool corridor became up three cocaine rocks beneath the cushion and at the floor below it. Williams changed into surrounded by way of a collection of six to ten other guys on the same time. The court docket dominated that the proof changed into inadequate to prove that Williams knew the cocaine become there or had manipulate over it.
These were only few laws on topics of drug possession and distribution.


text:
Арсан-Дуолай ("господин (господарят) земен корем"), в митологията на якутите е зъл дух, главатар на злите духове-абааси, обитаващи долния свят. Той живее на самото дъно на долния свят; обиталището му се намира край кал, която е толкова рядка, че и паяците потъват в нея. Арсан-Дуолай има жена и седем сина и всеки от семейството е глава на род зли духове. Тези духове-абааси причиняват злини и нещастия на хората, които, за да се избавят от тях, им принасят в жертва добитък.

В някои варианти на якутските митове Арсан-Дуолай се среща и като Буор Малахай тойон и Буор Мангалай.

Източници

 www.edic.ru

Външни препратки
 http://www.zaimka.ru/religion/shamans.shtml
 Мифы якутов

Якутска митология

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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