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Results for 'Rule Circularity'
Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity.Jochen Briesen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.details
Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge. For some philosophers, this is a reason to (...) reject reliabilism. Those who try to defend reliabilism have two basic options: (I) accept that reliabilism does not rule out circular reasoning, but argue that this kind of reasoning is not as epistemically "bad" as it seems, or (II) hold on to the view that circular reasoning is epistemically "bad", but deny that reliabilism really allows this kind of reasoning. Option (I) has been spelled out in several ways, all of which have found to be problematic. Option (II) has not been discussed very widely. Vogel considers and quickly dismisses it on the basis of three reasons. Weisberg has shown in detail that one of these reasons is unconvincing. In this paper I argue that the other two reasons are unconvincing as well and that therefore option (II) might in fact be a more promising starting point to defend reliabilism than option (I). (shrink)
Constructing Commitment: Brandom's Pragmatist Take on Rule‐Following.Matthias Kiesselbach - 2012 - Philosophical Investigations 35 (2):101-126.details
According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's "normative pragmatics", i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical (...) attitudes and thereby contribute towards establishing the normative statuses they are about, this circularity is not a mark of Brandom's explanatory strategy but a feature of social practice of which we theorists partake. (shrink)
A Simple Proof of Born's Rule for Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Biswaranjan Dikshit - 2017 - Journal for Foundations and Applications of Physics 4 (1):24-30.details
The Born's rule to interpret the square of wave function as the probability to get a specific value in measurement has been accepted as a postulate in foundations of quantum mechanics. Although there have been so many attempts at deriving this rule theoretically using different approaches such as frequency operator approach, many-world theory, Bayesian probability and envariance, literature shows that arguments in each of these methods are circular. In view of absence of a convincing theoretical proof, recently some (...) researchers have carried out experiments to validate the rule up-to maximum possible accuracy using multi-order interference (Sinha et al, Science, 329, 418 [2010]). But, a convincing analytical proof of Born's rule will make us understand the basic process responsible for exact square dependency of probability on wave function. In this paper, by generalizing the method of calculating probability in common experience into quantum mechanics, we prove the Born's rule for statistical interpretation of wave function. (shrink)
Knowledge of Validity.Sinan Dogramaci - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):403-432.details
What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the (...) basis of reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. (shrink)
Laws of Essence or Constitutive Rules? Reinach Vs. Searle on the Ontology of Social Entities.Barry Smith & Wojciech Zelaniec - 2012 - In Francesca De Vecchi (ed.), Eidetica del Diritto e Ontologia Sociale. Il Realismo di Adolf Reinach. Mimesis. pp. 83-108.details
Amongst the entities making up social reality, are there necessary relations whose necessity is not a mere reflection of the logical connections between corresponding concepts? We distinguish three main groups of answers to this question, associated with Hume and Adolf Reinach at opposite extremes, and with Searle who occupies a position somewhere in the middle. We first set forth Reinach's views on what he calls 'material necessities' in the realm of social entities. We then attempt to show that Searle has (...) not identified a sustainable position somewhere between the Humean and the Reinachian extremes. This is because Searle's position is threatened by circularity, and to steer clear of that danger it must incorporate at least some elements of Reinach's essentialism. (shrink)
Against the Unrestricted Applicability of Disjunction Elimination.Marcel Jahn - 2017 - Rerum Causae 9 (2):92-111.details
In this paper, I argue that the disjunction elimination rule presupposes the principle that a true disjunction contains at least one true disjunct. However, in some contexts such as supervaluationism or quantum logic, we have good reasons to reject this principle. Hence, disjunction elimination is restricted in at least one respect: it is not applicable to disjunctions for which this principle does not hold. The insight that disjunction elimination presupposes the principle that a true disjunction contains at least one (...) true disjunct is applied to two arguments which argue for this very principle. I show that these arguments are rule-circular since they rest on disjunction elimination. I claim that rule-circularity better explains why the arguments fail than the explanations provided by Rumfitt (2015), which, for instance, rely on controversial principles about truth. (shrink)
The Adoption Problem and Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Suki Finn - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):231.details
Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the damage the Adoption Problem (...) causes for anti-exceptionalism, and show that it is also problematic for exceptionalist positions too. My diagnosis of why the Adoption Problem affects both positions is that the self-governance of basic logical rules of inference prevents them from being adoptable, regardless of whether logic is exceptional or not. (shrink)
Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):29–47.details
A priori theories of justification of logic based on meaning often lead to trouble, in particular to issues concerning circularity. First, I present Boghossian's a prioriview. Boghossian maintains the rule-circular justifications from a conceptual role semantics. However, rule-circular justifications are problematic. Recently, Boghossian (Boghossian, 2015) has claimed that rules should be thought of as contents and contents as abstract objects. In this paper, I discuss Boghossian's view. My argumentation consists of three main parts. First, I analyse several (...) arguments to show that in fact, Boghossian's inferentialist solution is not fully satisfying. Second, I discuss the matter further, if one accepts that basic logical rules are constitutive of meaning, that is, they constitute the logical concepts and the content of a rule is an abstract object, then abstract objects — like, for example, rules — could be constitutive of meaning. The question is whether conceptual priority is in the judgment or in the object and what theory of content is pursued. Grasping content as a matter of knowing how a word or concept behaves in inferences is not completely explicative. Finally, I contend that rules come to exist as a result of certain kinds of mental action. These actions function as constitutive norms. Logical rules are not abstract objects but ideal. What one construes as norms or rules of content may involve idealization, but this is because we share a language. (shrink)
Consequentialism and Promises.Alida Liberman - 2020 - In Douglas Portmore (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. pp. 289 - 309.details
I explore the debate about whether consequentialist theories can adequately accommodate the moral force of promissory obligation. I outline a straightforward act consequentialist account grounded in the value of satisfying expectations, and raise and assess three objections to this account: that it counterintuitively predicts that certain promises should be broken when commonsense morality insists that they should be kept, that the account is circular, and Michael Cholbi's argument that this account problematically implies that promise-making is frequently obligatory. I then discuss (...) alternative act consequentialist accounts, including Philip Pettit's suggestion that promise-keeping is an intrinsic good and Michael Smith's agent-relative account. I outline Brad Hooker's rule consequentialist account of promissory obligation and raise a challenge for it. I conclude that appeals to intuitions about cases will not settle the dispute, and that consequentialists and their critics must instead engage in substantive debate about the nature and stringency of promissory obligation. (shrink)
An Essay on Material Necessity.Barry Smith - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy (sup1):301-322.details
Where Humeans rule out the possibility of material or non-logical necessity, and thus of any associated knowledge a priori, the German legal philosopher Adolf Reinach defends the existence of a wide class of material necessities falling within the domain of what can be known a priori, for example in fields such as color and shape, rational psychology, law and economics. Categories such as promise or claim or obligation are, in Reinach's view, exist as nodes in a system of necessary (...) relations, so that anyone who has experience of relevant instances of these categories is implicitly aware also of a corresponding family of relations to certain other categories – as for example that every promise implies a mutually correlated claim and obligation. Midway between the two extremes of Hume and Reinach stands Searle, who accepts necessary relations of the mentioned sorts, but sees them as human creations, following from 'constitutive rules' analogous to the rules of chess. We seek to demonstrate that Searle does not occupy a stable and acceptable half-way house between Hume and Reinach; that he, too, if he is to do justice to the very constitutive rules which form the center of his approach, must on pain of circularity embrace something like the Reinachian position. (shrink)
Anti-Realism, Easy Ontology, and Issues of Reference.Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra - manuscriptdetails
In order to re-contextualize the otherwise ontologically privileged meaning of metaphysical debates into a more insubstantial form, metaphysical deflationism runs the risk of having to adopt potentially unwanted anti-realist tendencies. This tension between deflationism and anti-realism can be expressed as follows: in order to claim truthfully that something exists, how can deflationism avoid the anti-realist feature of construing such claims singularly in an analytical fashion? One may choose to adopt a Yablovian fallibilism about existential claims, but other approaches can be (...) appealed to as well. Amie Thomasson's Easy Ontology is one such approach, whereby the interaction of empirical as well as analytic features within the construction of its ontological theory affords a role for analytical rules without forsaking a link with empirical reality. The development of these analytical and empirical features has resulted in significant critiques regarding, one, potential reference failure of easy-ontological claims, and two, a circularity in how easy ontology explains the relation between its analytical rules and existential claims. This essay offers a response by showcasing how an easy ontological deflationism can reject these criticisms without succumbing to, one, the anti-realism of pure analyticism, and two, a further critique of wholesale referential indeterminacy in its referring terms. (shrink)
The SNePS Family.Stuart C. Shapiro & William J. Rapaport - 1992 - Computers and Mathematics with Applications 23:243-275.details
SNePS, the Semantic Network Processing System 45, 54], has been designed to be a system for representing the beliefs of a natural-language-using intelligent system (a \cognitive agent"). It has always been the intention that a SNePS-based \knowledge base" would ultimatelybe built, not by a programmeror knowledge engineer entering representations of knowledge in some formallanguage or data entry system, but by a human informing it using a natural language (NL) (generally supposed to be English), or by the system reading books or (...) articles that had been prepared for human readers. Because of this motivation, the criteria for the development of SNePS have included: it should be able to represent anything and everything expressible in NL; it should be able to represent generic, as well as speci c information; it should be able to use the generic and the speci c information to reason and infer information implied by what it has been told; it cannot count on any particular order among the pieces of information it is given; it must continue to act reasonably even if the information it is given includes circular de nitions, recursive rules, and inconsistent information. (shrink)
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.details
We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.details
I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and (...) rational decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function. (shrink)
The life cycle of social and economic systems.Sergii Sardak & С. Е Сардак - 2016 - Marketing and Management of Innovations 1:157-169.details
The aim of the article. The aim of the article is to identify the components of social and economic systems life cycle. To achieve this aim, the article describes the traits and characteristics of the system, determines the features of social and economic systems functioning and is applied a systematic approach in the study of their life cycle. The results of the analysis. It is determined that the development of social and economic systems has signs of cyclicity and is explained (...) methodologically by the axiomatics, rules and laws. Understanding of circular patterns has been formed long ago and now is recorded by scientists monitoring the properties of natural and artificial environment of human activity. During the study, it was found out that in scientific literature there is no unified description of the life cycle elements of social and economic systems at personal, micro, meso, macro and global levels. The paper investigates the cyclical patterns in multilevel social and economic systems for a human, employee, family, product, company, city, industry, elite, macroeconomic indicators, humanity, global processes, global economic system and the Universe. It is noted that at grass-roots administrative levels of the global environment of a human life activity system, a thesis about the cyclicity of development and the stages of the life cycle is considered by a wide circle of scientists and is doubtless. On hierarchically higher management levels of the global environment of human activity system, the scientists noticed the similar patterns of the cyclical nature. Problematic and discussion questions about cyclic development of social and economic systems are identified: the uncertainty of the driving force source of repeated changes; the vague distinction between systemic (internal) and off-system (external) influence on development; the lack of a unified description of development nature at different managerial levels; the use of different descriptive terms for the same constituent elements of repeated changes (period, stage, phase, wave, cycle); the uncertainty of the number of repeated changes constituent elements; the absence of an identification mechanism of the exact time of changes in the constituent elements of repeated changes; the surface description of out-of-system period of the subjects activity («before-system» period of creation and «after-system» period of liquidation); attaching more importance to primary and less importance to ultimate component elements of the repeated changes; the lack of reliable mechanism for predicting and forecasting the dynamics of constituent components of repeated changes. It is noted that all social and economic systems are developed within repeated changes and they have the same attributes of cyclicity: the fluctuation of indicators is marked that characterize the condition of the subject; the presence of system (from creation to liquidation) and out-of-system (creation – «design» and liquidation – «disposal») periods are noted; the subjects are created by the actions of other subjects (that is, subjects do not arise «out of nowhere», but are the result of actions of other subjects – «constructors»); after cessation of subjects functioning, their resources are used by other subjects (that is, the subjects do not disappear «nowhere», and they are transformed into the resources of other subjects – «recovery»); a unidirectional life cycle from «birth» to «death» is observed in the subjects; the subjects do not have to undergo the whole life cycle (each time might be the last); the subjects display similar changes of the indicators during their activity; ascending, peak and descending fluctuations of indicators are observed in the subjects; minor fluctuations occur in the constituent elements; the subjects have individual nature of indicator fluctuations and duration of activity. Conclusions and directions of further researches. The scientific novelty of the study is identification structure of life cycle of social and economic system with definitions of: common («before-system state», «growth», «stabilization», «reduction», «after-system state») and specific («creation», «slow growth», «rapid growth», «growth stabilization», «short stabilization», «rapid reduction», «slow reduction», «liquidation») constituent elements of repeated changes; marginal borders of indicators; dynamics of constituent elements of life cycle; key points of changing nature of the indicators dynamics. Identification of the life cycle of social and economic systems characterizes potentially possible limits of their activity in time and provides the possibility of further research of aspects of the cyclical development for methodological basis formation and the development of applied measures of systemic development in the areas of marketing and management innovations. (shrink)
Peirce on Grounding the Laws of Logic.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (4):480.details
This paper is a contribution to the long-standing debate over the coherence of Charles Sanders Peirce's overall system of philosophy. It approaches that issue through the lens of a contemporary debate over the notion of metaphysical grounding, or more broadly, the nature of metaphysical explanation, employing the laws of logic as a case study. The central question concerns how we can take seriously what we shall call Peirce's Rule—that nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable—without being vulnerable to (...) a vicious regress or equally vicious circularity. I first argue that in Peirce's early work he offers a quietist conception of grounding that provides a persuasive and ground-breaking answer to this central question. I then raise a familiar concern, that in Peirce's later work we find hints of a more metaphysical conception of grounding that seems unable to answer that question and is thus inconsistent with his earlier work. The paper ends with a speculative interpretation of Peirce's approach to metaphysics and its possible role in grounding logical principles. (shrink)
Do Rights Exist by Convention or by Nature?Katharina Nieswandt - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):313-325.details
I argue that all rights exist by convention. According to my definition, a right exists by convention just in case its justification appeals to the rules of a socially shared pattern of acting. I show that our usual justifications for rights are circular, that a right fulfills my criterion if all possible justifications for it are circular, and that all existing philosophical justifications for rights are circular or fail. We find three non-circular alternatives in the literature, viz. justifications of rights (...) by consequences, by autonomy or by divine commands. I show that all three alternatives fail, and I conclude that all rights exist by convention. This ontological result has a surprising and beneficial consequence. A common argument against conventionalism is that it implies cultural relativism. I finish by showing that the suggested conventionalism is incompatible with cultural relativism. (shrink)
The Linguistic - Cultural Nature of Scientific Truth.Damian Islas - 2012 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research (3):80-88.details
While we typically think of culture as defined by geography or ethnicity (e.g., American culture, Mayan culture), the term also applies to the practices and expectations of smaller groups of people. Though embedded in the larger culture surrounding them, such subcultures have their own sets of rules like those that scientists do. Philosophy of science has as its main object of studio the scientific activity. A way in which we have tried to explain these scientific practices is from the actual (...) ontological commitments that scientists do through their scientific theories. Certainly, we know scientific theories through some specific scientific language, which is, in its turn, a subset of the natural language developed by a particular culture. This study is conducted to explore and evaluate some of the most important epistemological consequences of these ontological commitments, specially the so-called 'truth-commitment' and its relation with a linguistic-cultural framework. There is an interesting debate between advocates and opponents of scientific realistic view of the natural world. Some lines of scientific realism argumentation assure that: (i) Mature scientific theories are approximately true. (ii) There are entities and organisms in the world that correspond with the ontology presupposed by the best scientific theories within a specific domain of scientific research and (iii) The new acceptable scientific theories should explain why past theories were successful predecessors (Colyvan 2008, Cocchiarella 2007 & Laudan 1981). Contrary, anti- realist positions ensure against the realist's true - claim that is a semantic commitment - that the purpose of scientific theories to found the truth it is simple an unattainable goal, especially if the kind of truth they are looking for is a corresponding relation between scientific theories and the ontology of the world. Anti-realist positions held that this relation could be circular and unknowable. I do believe that there is a deep confusion between the way in which we accede to the knowledge of the constitutive structures, entities and organisms of the world (which is an epistemological matter) and the way these structures, entities and organisms are (which is an ontological matter). It seems that there is a bridge between the epistemological and ontological aspect in need for conceptual clarification. I do propose that the type of link between the two extremes have to be linguistic in nature. (shrink)
Wittgenstein and Stage-Setting: Being Brought Into the Space of Reasons.David Simpson - 2013 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 45 (6):1-16.details
Wittgenstein constantly invokes teaching, training and learning in his later work. It is therefore interesting to consider what role these notions play for him there. I argue that their use is central to Wittgenstein's attempt to refute cognitivist assumptions, and to show how normative practices can be understood without the threat of circularity, grounded not in a kind of seeing, but in doing, and the natural reactions of an organism. This can generate a worry that Wittgenstein's position is quietist (...) and anti-critical: critique, as a challenge to the taken-for-granted grammar of our language game, is technically meaningless. I argue that Wittgenstein does not rule out critique. His own practice demonstrates that critique is possible, but takes place within a language game, and its status as critique is always subject to challenge in the agora of a discourse. (shrink)
The Origin of Cellular Life and Biosemiotics.Attila Grandpierre - 2013 - Biosemiotics (3):1-15.details
Recent successes of systems biology clarified that biological functionality is multilevel. We point out that this fact makes it necessary to revise popular views about macromolecular functions and distinguish between local, physico-chemical and global, biological functions. Our analysis shows that physico-chemical functions are merely tools of biological functionality. This result sheds new light on the origin of cellular life, indicating that in evolutionary history, assignment of biological functions to cellular ingredients plays a crucial role. In this wider picture, even if (...) aggregation of chance mutations of replicator molecules and spontaneously self-assembled proteins led to the formation of a system identical with a living cell in all physical respects but devoid of biological functions, it would remain an inanimate physical system, a pseudo-cell or a zombie-cell but not a viable cell. In the origin of life scenarios, a fundamental circularity arises, since if cells are the minimal units of life, it is apparent that assignments of cellular functions require the presence of cells and vice versa. Resolution of this dilemma requires distinguishing between physico-chemical and biological symbols as well as between physico-chemical and biological information. Our analysis of the concepts of symbol, rule and code suggests that they all rely implicitly on biological laws or principles. We show that the problem is how to establish physico-chemically arbitrary rules assigning biological functions without the presence of living organisms. We propose a solution to that problem with the help of a generalized action principle and biological harnessing of quantum uncertainties. By our proposal, biology is an autonomous science having its own fundamental principle. The biological principle ought not to be regarded as an emergent phenomenon. It can guide chemical evolution towards the biological one, progressively assigning greater complexity and functionality to macromolecules and systems of macromolecules at all levels of organization. This solution explains some perplexing facts and posits a new context for thinking about the problems of the origin of life and mind. (shrink)
Graph of Socratic Elenchos.John Bova - manuscriptdetails
From my ongoing "Metalogical Plato" project. The aim of the diagram is to make reasonably intuitive how the Socratic elenchos (the logic of refutation applied to candidate formulations of virtues or ruling knowledges) looks and works as a whole structure. This is my starting point in the project, in part because of its great familiarity and arguable claim to being the inauguration of western philosophy; getting this point less wrong would have broad and deep consequences, including for philosophy's self-understanding. -/- (...) (i.) is the first pass at elenchos in which the Socratic interlocutor does not reflect on knowledge being the crux of the problem. (ii.) is the second, rarer, reflective pass in which they are, making the investigation explicitly about knowledge. Its centrality in the Charmides makes that neglected dialogue of superlative importance. This structure is also the gateway through which the discussion/dialectic crosses into the Agathology (discussion of the form of the good) at Republic 505. -/- The problem of elenchos, then, grasped as a whole structure, is that it seems that knowledge can neither satisfactorily be included in nor excluded from its own scope. The development of the ti esti ("what is ---?") question leads to the introduction of knowledge into its own scope (i. implicitly, as goodness contrasted with blind rule-following ii. explicitly qua knowledge) while the development of the dual peri tinos ("----about what?) question leads to K's elimination from its own scope. The introductions are motivated to avoid contradiction, but produce regress; the eliminations are motivated to avoid regress, but produce contradiction. In scholarship, and in the history of philosophy, the ti esti question is universally recognized, to the point of being identified with philosophy's origin and essence; the peri tinos question is neglected textually and never recognized as the equal dual to the ti esti. This, I claim, has blocked the development of a nontrivial logical appreciation of what Plato's Socrates is up to. (One rather disastrous effect of this neglect is taking Aristotle as the beginning of the development of logic, rather than, correctly, for the beginning of logic's fatal separation from mathematics and dialectic.) -/- Further, because of this monopticism of the ti esti, the function of consistency in the elenchos has not been understood, even with respect to the ti esti. The ti esti is actually in search of completeness, given a norm of consistency; the peri tinos is in search of consistency, given a norm of completeness. Only appreciating the two questions as dual allows space in the structure to clarify these different orientations relative to consistency. (And, dually, to completeness, whose function in the elenchos is generally entirely missed by scholars and relegated to discussions of eros; it's not out of place there, of course, but its significance is secured here.) Recognizing the duality of the ti esti and peri tinos questions is thus the royal road, in the Socratic-Platonic context, to catching sight of what we post-Cantorians can recognize as the metalogical duality of consistency and completeness. (The salutary disruptive effects of this Plato-Cantor proximity have, of course, been traced in complementary ways by Badiou.) -/- Note that the diagram is supposed to provide a relatively accessible orientation, not to stand on its own, and certainly not to be the last word on any subject. An important qualification (telegraphed in the previous paragraph) is that what elenchos shows is not finally circular or paradoxical, though the problem first presents as such (stubbornly, obdurately, as "difficult" Plato's Socrates always says with characteristic understatement). What is depicted here is meant, at a first pass, to be the shape of that first presentation, the form of the problem of elenchos, rather than of its solution. It's not an accident that this problem strongly resembles "Russell's paradox" (not Russell's not a paradox.) Problem is to solution as RP is to the diagonal theorems. (shrink)
Squaring the Circle in Descartes' Meditations The Strong Validation of Reason STEPHEN I. WAGNER Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014; Xi + 244 Pp.; $99.95 ISBN: 9781107072060. [REVIEW]Andreea Mihali - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):799-802.details
In Squaring the Circle in Descartes' Meditations, Stephen Wagner aims to show that Descartes' project in the Meditations is best understood as a 'strong validation of reason' i.e., as proving in a non-circular way that human reason is a reliable, truth-conducive faculty. For such an enterprise to qualify as a 'strong' validation, Wagner contends, skeptical doubt must be given its strongest force. The most stringent doubt available in the Meditations is the deceiving God. To rule out the possibility that (...) an omnipotent God created humans so that their best functioning cognitive faculties provide misleading information about what the world is like, Descartes must prove that a non-deceiving God exists. Furthermore, only a non-circular proof will count as a 'validation.' Wagner spells out the requirements of non-circularity as involving a proof for God's existence that is not deductive, does not simply achieve a clear and distinct perception of God's existence, and proceeds on the basis of perceptions that remain true even when the reasons underlying them are not attended to any longer by the meditator. (shrink)
Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense.Andrew Ingram - 2012 - American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (3):101-120.details
Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court's finding and a defendant's actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a (...) person's material guilt or innocence and his juridical guilt or innocence. Someone is materially guilty if his actions in fact matched the conduct proscribed by the penal law. Someone is juridically guilty if he is found guilty by a tribunal, i.e., convicted by a judge or jury. When a tribunal convicts a innocent person or acquits a guilty person, the accuracy of its verdicts can be criticized. -/- There are three definitions of the reasonable person extant amongst courts and commentators: the reasonable person is either (1) a hypothetical ordinary, average person; (2) the embodiment of a community ideal; or (3) an embodiment of an objective ethical standard, i.e., ethical principles independent of community opinion. Nonetheless, after observing the circularity, vagueness, and lack of consistency in the definitions, wise courts and commentators have sometimes resorted to identifying the reasonable person with the judgment of the jury. -/- This piece argues that failure to settle on a fixed definition of the "reasonable person" in the criminal law of self-defense effectively conflates material guilt and innocence and juridical guilt and innocence at the doctrinal level. When courts do not clearly and consistently choose between standards one, two, and three, or when they expressly treat the reasonable person as a form of words standing in for the judgment of the jury, they make it conceptually impossible for observers outside the court system to apply a fixed, definite standard to assess the actual guilt of a person apart from the judgments of tribunals. -/- This paper's main purpose is to identify a conceptual knot rather than propose reforms. Still, it recommends two small changes meant to lift the confusion surrounding the reasonable person. First, it urges that courts expressly settle on one of the three definitions canvassed above. Second, it recommends that courts be mindful of the nature of the reasonable person standard and as such, be wary of treating conclusions about reasonableness as ordinary legal precedents, and wield the power of directed verdict aggressively to protect unpopular defendants from abuse by juries. (shrink)
The Justification of Deductive Inference and the Rationality of Believing for a Reason.Gian-Andri Toendury - 2007 - Dissertation, Université de Fribourgdetails
The present PhD thesis is concerned with the question whether good reasoning requires that the subject has some cognitive grip on the relation between premises and conclusion. One consideration in favor of such a requirement goes as follows: In order for my belief-formation to be an instance of reasoning, and not merely a causally related sequence of beliefs, the process must be guided by my endorsement of a rule of reasoning. Therefore I must have justified beliefs about the relation (...) between my premises and my conclusion. -/- The rationality of a belief often depends on whether it is rightly connected to other beliefs, or more generally to other mental states —the states capable of providing a reason to holding the belief in question. For instance, some rational beliefs are connected to other beliefs by being inferred from them. It is often accepted that the connection implies that the subject in some sense 'takes the mental states in question to be reason-providing'. But views on how exactly this is to be understood differ widely. They range from interpretations according to which 'taking a mental state to be reason-providing' imposes a mere causal sustaining relation between belief and reason-providing state to interpretations according to which one 'takes a mental state to be reason-providing' only if one believes that the state is reason-providing. The most common worry about the latter view is that it faces a vicious regress. In this thesis a different but in some respects similar interpretation of 'taking something as reason-providing' is given. It is argued to consist of a disposition to react in certain ways to information that challenges the reason-providing capacity of the allegedly reason-providing state. For instance, that one has inferred A from B partly consists in being disposed to suspend judgment about A if one obtains a reason to believe that B does not render A probable. The account is defended against regress-objections and the suspicion of explanatory circularity. (shrink)
Modeling the concept of truth using the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three valued semantics (in Croatian language).Boris Culina - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Zagrebdetails
The thesis deals with the concept of truth and the paradoxes of truth. Philosophical theories usually consider the concept of truth from a wider perspective. They are concerned with questions such as - Is there any connection between the truth and the world? And, if there is - What is the nature of the connection? Contrary to these theories, this analysis is of a logical nature. It deals with the internal semantic structure of language, the mutual semantic connection of sentences, (...) above all the connection of sentences that speak about the truth of other sentences and sentences whose truth they speak about. Truth paradoxes show that there is a problem in our basic understanding of the language meaning and they are a test for any proposed solution. It is important to make a distinction between the normative and analytical aspect of the solution. The former tries to ensure that paradoxes will not emerge. The latter tries to explain paradoxes. Of course, the practical aspect of the solution is also important. It tries to ensure a good framework for logical foundations of knowledge, for related problems in Artificial Intelligence and for the analysis of the natural language. Tarski's analysis emphasized the T-scheme as the basic intuitive principle for the concept of truth, but it also showed its inconsistency with the classical logic. Tarski's solution is to preserve the classical logic and to restrict the scheme: we can talk about the truth of sentences of a language only inside another essentially richer metalanguage. This solution is in harmony with the idea of reflexivity of thinking and it has become very fertile for mathematics and science in general. But it has normative nature | truth paradoxes are avoided in a way that in such frame we cannot even express paradoxical sentences. It is also too restrictive because, for the same reason we cannot express a situation in which there is a circular reference of some sentences to other sentences, no matter how common and harmless such a situation may be. Kripke showed that there is no natural restriction to the T-scheme and we have to accept it. But then we must also accept the riskiness of sentences | the possibility that under some circumstances a sentence does not have the classical truth value but it is undetermined. This leads to languages with three-valued semantics. Kripke did not give any definite model, but he gave a theoretical frame for investigations of various models | each fixed point in each three-valued semantics can be a model for the concept of truth. The solutions also have normative nature | we can express the paradoxical sentences, but we escape a contradiction by declaring them undetermined. Such a solution could become an analytical solution only if we provide the analysis that would show in a substantial way that it is the solution that models the concept of truth. Kripke took some steps in the direction of finding an analytical solution. He preferred the strong Kleene three-valued semantics for which he wrote it was "appropriate" but did not explain why it was appropriate. One reason for such a choice is probably that Kripke finds paradoxical sentences meaningful. This eliminates the weak Kleene three valued semantics which corresponds to the idea that paradoxical sentences are meaningless, and thus indeterminate. Another reason could be that the strong Kleene three valued semantics has the so-called investigative interpretation. According to this interpretation, this semantics corresponds to the classical determination of truth, whereby all sentences that do not have an already determined value are temporarily considered indeterminate. When we determine the truth value of these sentences, then we can also determine the truth value of the sentences that are composed of them. Kripke supplemented this investigative interpretation with an intuition about learning the concept of truth. That intuition deals with how we can teach someone who is a competent user of an initial language (without the predicate of truth T) to use sentences that contain the predicate T. That person knows which sentences of the initial language are true and which are not. We give her the rule to assign the T attribute to the former and deny that attribute to the latter. In that way, some new sentences that contain the predicate of truth, and which were indeterminate until then, become determinate. So the person gets a new set of true and false sentences with which he continues the procedure. This intuition leads directly to the smallest fixed point of strong Kleene semantics as an analytically acceptable model for the logical notion of truth. However, since this process is usually saturated only on some transfinite ordinal, this intuition, by climbing on ordinals, increasingly becomes a metaphor. This thesis is an attempt to give an analytical solution to truth paradoxes. It gives an analysis of why and how some sentences lack the classical truth value. The starting point is basic intuition according to which paradoxical sentences are meaningful (because we understand what they are talking about well, moreover we use it for determining their truth values), but they witness the failure of the classical procedure of determining their truth value in some "extreme" circumstances. Paradoxes emerge because the classical procedure of the truth value determination does not always give a classically supposed (and expected) answer. The analysis shows that such an assumption is an unjustified generalization from common situations to all situations. We can accept the classical procedure of the truth value determination and consequently the internal semantic structure of the language, but we must reject the universality of the exterior assumption of a successful ending of the procedure. The consciousness of this transforms paradoxes to normal situations inherent to the classical procedure. Some sentences, although meaningful, when we evaluate them according to the classical truth conditions, the classical conditions do not assign them a unique value. We can assign to them the third value, \undetermined", as a sign of definitive failure of the classical procedure. An analysis of the propagation of the failure in the structure of sentences gives exactly the strong Kleene three-valued semantics, not as an investigative procedure, as it occurs in Kripke, but as the classical truth determination procedure accompanied by the propagation of its own failure. An analysis of the circularities in the determination of the classical truth value gives the criterion of when the classical procedure succeeds and when it fails, when the sentences will have the classical truth value and when they will not. It turns out that the truth values of sentences thus obtained give exactly the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics. In that way, the argumentation is given for that choice among all fixed points of all monotone three-valued semantics for the model of the logical concept of truth. An immediate mathematical description of the fixed point is given, too. It has also been shown how this language can be semantically completed to the classical language which in many respects appears a natural completion of the process of thinking about the truth values of the sentences of a given language. Thus the final model is a language that has one interpretation and two systems of sentence truth evaluation, primary and final evaluation. The language through the symbol T speaks of its primary truth valuation, which is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three valued semantics. Its final truth valuation is the semantic completion of the first in such a way that all sentences that are not true in the primary valuation are false in the final valuation. (shrink)
Conhecimento e Definição no Mênon de Platão.Davi Heckert César Bastos - 2020 - Kinesis 12 (31):172-185.details
Through detailed analysis of Plato's Meno, I identify and set general argumentative rules (useful both to scientists and philosophers) concerning how to use definitions. I show how the character Socrates establishes strong requirements for knowledge in general, i.e., that the knowledge of the definition of a thing must be prior to the knowledge of properties or instances of that thing. Socrate's requirements and the way he characterizes a definition (as coextensive to the definiendum, not circular, true and explanatorily relevant) lead (...) Meno to aporia and to enunciate the famous Meno's Paradox concerning the impossibility of inquiry for knowledge. That only occurs because Meno is unable to identify Socrate's dialectical move: strong requirements for knowing a definition, the priority of the knowledge of the definition and the taking of all knowledge to be like the knowledge by acquaintance. After the paradox, Socrate's proceeds the discussion using hypotheses to map the truth conditions of some theses Meno is inquiring about. I explain what are Meno's paradox, the socratic definition and the Method of Hypotheses, in a way só as to find in this classical text in the history of philosophy general principles of argumentation that are still usefull today. (shrink)
On the Notion of Validity for the Bilateral Classical Logic.Ukyo Suzuki & Yoriyuki Yamagata - manuscriptdetails
This paper considers Rumfitt's bilateral classical logic (BCL), which is proposed to counter Dummett's challenge to classical logic. First, agreeing with several authors, we argue that Rumfitt's notion of harmony, used to justify logical rules by a purely proof theoretical manner, is not sufficient to justify coordination rules in BCL purely proof-theoretically. For the central part of this paper, we propose a notion of proof-theoretical validity similar to Prawitz for BCL and proves that BCL is sound and complete respect to (...) this notion of validity. The major difficulty in defining validity for BCL is that validity of positive +A appears to depend on negative −A, and vice versa. Thus, the straightforward inductive definition does not work because of this circular dependance. However, Knaster-Tarski's fixed point theorem can resolve this circularity. Finally, we discuss the philosophical relevance of our work, in particular, the impact of the use of fixed point theorem and the issue of decidability. (shrink)
Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.details
Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
Intrinsically Semantic Content and the Intentionality of Propositional Attitudes.Sudan A. Turner - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Washingtondetails
ABSTRACT -/- A propositional attitude (PA) is a belief, desire, fear, etc., that x is the case. This dissertation addresses the question of the semantic content of a specific kind of PA-instance: an instance of a belief of the form all Fs are Gs. The belief that all bachelors are sports fans has this form, while the belief that Spain is a country in Eastern Europe do not. Unlike a state of viewing the color of an orange, a belief-instance is (...) semantically contentful because it has reference, a meaning, logical implications, or a truth-value. While the intrinsic semantics view holds that either concepts or abstract objects are the source of content for PAs, the extrinsic semantics view holds that symbols of a mental language provide this content. I argue that a successful theory of intentionality must explain: (1) the truth-preserving causal powers of PAs, (2) the failure of the deductive principle Substitutivity to preserve truth over sentences that ascribe PAs, and (3) the truth-evaluability of PAs. As an internalist version of the extrinsic semantics view, I first evaluate Fodor's Computational Theory of Mind, which says the semantic ingredients of mental states are symbols governed by rules of a mental syntax. I argue that in order to meet (1), CTM would have to associate the causal patterns of each thought-type with the inferential relations of some proposition – in an arbitrary or question-begging way. I also evaluate Fodor's causal theory, as an externalist version of the extrinsic semantics view. This view is that lawlike causal relations between mental symbols and objects determine the reference, and thus the truth-value, of a thought. I argue that Brian Loar's circularity objection refutes the ability of this theory to meet (3); and I endorse the intrinsic semantics perspective. I evaluate Frege's theory of abstract, mind-external, and intrinsically semantic objects (senses), as an attempt to meet condition (2). I conclude that mind-external universals are the source of the intrinsically semantic features of concepts. Finally, I put forth a theory called 'Bare Property Intentionality', which describes the features of intrinsically representative and semantic concepts that connect them to these universals. (shrink)
Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
Disagreement and debunking arguments threaten religious belief. In this paper, I draw attention to two types of propositions and show how they reveal new ways to respond to debunking arguments and disagreement. The first type of proposition is the epistemically self-promoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that one reliably believes it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield an epistemically circular argument in response to (...) certain debunking arguments. The second type of proposition is the epistemically others-demoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that others are unreliable with respect to it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield a question-begging argument to respond to certain types of disagreement. (shrink)
Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion.Indrek Reiland - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):136-159.details
Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and (...) speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections. (shrink)
Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure.Patrick Bondy - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):335-348.details
Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in (...) this paper is to argue against the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. My strategy is to give a direct argument against the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments, which rests on a principle of basis-relative safety, and then to argue that reliabilists do not have the resources to resist the argument. I argue that even if the premises of an epistemically circular argument enjoy reliabilist justification, the argument does not transmit that justification to its conclusion. The main goal of my argument is to show that epistemic circularity is always a bad thing, but it also has the positive consequence that reliabilists are freed from an awkward commitment to the legitimacy of some intuitively bad arguments. (shrink)
Finite Circular Definitions.Anil Gupta - 2006 - In Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Andersen (eds.), Self-Reference. CSLI Publications. pp. 79-93.details
Humean Laws, Explanatory Circularity, and the Aim of Scientific Explanation.Chris Dorst - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2657-2679.details
One of the main challenges confronting Humean accounts of natural law is that Humean laws appear to be unable to play the explanatory role of laws in scientific practice. The worry is roughly that if the laws are just regularities in the particular matters of fact (as the Humean would have it), then they cannot also explain the particular matters of fact, on pain of circularity. Loewer (2012) has defended Humeanism, arguing that this worry only arises if we fail (...) to distinguish between scientific and metaphysical explanations. However, Lange (2013, 2018) has argued that scientific and metaphysical explanations are linked by a transitivity principle, which would undercut Loewer's defense and re-ignite the circularity worry for the Humean. I argue here that the Humean has antecedent reasons to doubt that there are any systematic connections between scientific and metaphysical explanations. The reason is that the Humean should think that scientific and metaphysical explanation have disparate aims, and therefore that neither form of explanation is beholden to the other in its pronouncements about what explains what. Consequently, the Humean has every reason to doubt that Lange's transitivity principle obtains. (shrink)
Rules of Use.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Mind and Language.details
In the middle of the 20th century, it was a common Wittgenstein-inspired idea in philosophy that for a linguistic expression to have a meaning is for it to be governed by a rule of use. In other words, it was widely believed that meanings are to be identified with use-conditions. However, as things stand, this idea is widely taken to be vague and mysterious, inconsistent with "truth-conditional semantics", and subject to the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper I reinvigorate the (...) ideas that meaningfulness is a matter of being governed by rules of use and that meanings are best thought of in terms of use-conditions. I will do this by sketching the Rule-Governance view of the nature of linguistic meaningfulness, showing that the view isn't by itself subject to the two problems, and explain why the idea has had a lasting appeal to philosophers from Strawson to Kaplan and why we should find it continually attractive. (shrink)
Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):455-480.details
Reliabilism is an intuitive and attractive view about epistemic justification. However, it has many well-known problems. I offer a novel condition on reliabilist theories of justification. This method coherence condition requires that a method be appropriately tested by appeal to a subject's other belief-forming methods. Adding this condition to reliabilism provides a solution to epistemic circularity worries, including the bootstrapping problem.
Species, Rules and Meaning: The Politics of Language and the Ends of Definitions in 19th Century Natural History.Gordon R. McOuat - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (4):473-519.details
Dispositions, Rules, and Finks.Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.details
This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all (...) cases, at least some of the interfering dispositions are both relatively permanent and intrinsic to the agent. The presence of these intrinsic and relatively permanent states renders the ascription of a rule-following disposition to the agent false. (shrink)
Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons.Attila Tanyi - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):451-470.details
In this paper, I propose a critique of the naturalist version of the Desire-Based Reasons Model. I first set the scene by spelling out the connection between naturalism and the Model. After this, I introduce Christine Korsgaard's circularity argument against what she calls the instrumental principle. Since Korsgaard's targets, officially, were non-naturalist advocates of the principle, I show why and how the circularity charge can be extended to cover the naturalist Model. Once this is done, I go on (...) to investigate in some detail the different ways of responding to the circularity challenge. I argue that none of these responses succeed, at least not without serious costs to their advocates. I then end the paper with a brief summary and some concluding remarks. (shrink)
Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.details
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripke's well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewis' work (...) in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call "Actuality Constraint". The third section of the paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian). This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show (1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist. (shrink)
Unfollowed Rules and the Normativity of Content.Eric V. Tracy - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):323-344.details
Foundational theories of mental content seek to identify the conditions under which a mental representation expresses, in the mind of a particular thinker, a particular content. Normativists endorse the following general sort of foundational theory of mental content: A mental representation r expresses concept C for agent S just in case S ought to use r in conformity with some particular pattern of use associated with C. In response to Normativist theories of content, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Åsa Wikforss propose a (...) dilemma, alleging that Normativism either entails a vicious regress or falls prey to a charge of idleness. In this paper, I respond to this argument. I argue that Normativism can avoid the commitments that generate the regress and does not propose the sort of explanation required to charge that its explanation has been shown to be problematically idle. The regress-generating commitment to be avoided is, roughly, that tokened, contentful mental states are the product of rule-following. The explanatory task Normativists should disavow is that of explaining how it is that beliefs and other contentful mental states are produced. I argue that Normativism, properly understood as a theory of content, does not provide this kind of psychological explanation, and therefore does not entail that such explanations are to be given in terms of rule-following. If this is correct, Normativism is not the proper target of the dilemma offered by Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss. Understanding why one might construe Normativism in the way Glüer-Pagin and Wikforss must, and how, properly understood, it avoids their dilemma, can help us to appreciate the attractiveness of a genuinely normative theory of content and the importance of paying careful attention to the sort of normativity involved in norm-based theories of content. (shrink)
Sustaining Rules: A Model and Application.John Turri - 2017 - In Knowledge first: approaches in epistemology and mind.details
I introduce an account of when a rule normatively sustains a practice. My basic proposal is that a rule normatively sustains a practice when the value achieved by following the rule explains why agents continue following that rule, thus establishing and sustaining a pattern of activity. I apply this model to practices of belief management and identifies a substantive normative connection between knowledge and belief. More specifically, I proposes one special way that knowledge might set the (...) normative standard for belief: knowing is essentially the unique way of normatively sustaining cognition and, thereby, inquiry. In this respect, my proposal can be seen as one way of elaborating a "knowledge-first" normative theory. (shrink)
The Unbearable Circularity of Easy Ontology.Jonas Raab - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3527-3556.details
In this paper, I argue that Amie Thomasson's Easy Ontology rests on a vicious circularity that is highly damaging. Easy Ontology invokes the idea of application conditions that give rise to analytic entailments. Such entailments can be used to answer ontological questions easily. I argue that the application conditions for basic terms are only circularly specifiable showing that Thomasson misses her self-set goal of preventing such a circularity. Using this circularity, I go on to show that Easy (...) Ontology as a whole collapses. (shrink)
Circularities In The Contemporary Philosophical Accounts Of The Applicability Of Mathematics In The Physical Universe.Catalin Barboianu - 2015 - Revista de Filosofie 61 (5):517-542.details
Contemporary philosophical accounts of the applicability of mathematics in physical sciences and the empirical world are based on formalized relations between the mathematical structures and the physical systems they are supposed to represent within the models. Such relations were constructed both to ensure an adequate representation and to allow a justification of the validity of the mathematical models as means of scientific inference. This article puts in evidence the various circularities (logical, epistemic, and of definition) that are present in these (...) formal constructions and discusses them as an argument for the alternative semantic and propositional-structure accounts of the applicability of mathematics. (shrink)
The Rule of Law and Equality.Paul Gowder - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (5):565-618.details
This paper describes and defends a novel and distinctively egalitarian conception of the rule of law. Official behavior is to be governed by preexisting, public rules that do not draw irrelevant distinctions between the subjects of law. If these demands are satisfied, a state achieves vertical equality between officials and ordinary people and horizontal legal equality among ordinary people.
Circularities, Organizations, and Constraints in Biology and Systems Theory.Leonardo Bich - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (1):14-16.details
Open peer commentary on the article "Circularity and the Micro-Macro-Difference" by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: The target article defends the fundamental role of circularity for systems sciences and the necessity to develop a conceptual and methodological approach to it. The concept of circularity, however, is multifarious, and two of the main challenges in this respect are to provide distinctions between different forms of circularities and explore in detail the roles they play in organizations. This commentary provides some suggestions (...) in this direction with the aim to supplement the perspective presented in the target article with some insights from theoretical biology. (shrink)
Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance.Kevin Tobia - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):643-652.details
Most plausible moral theories must address problems of partial acceptance or partial compliance. The aim of this paper is to examine some proposed ways of dealing with partial acceptance problems as well as to introduce a new Rule Utilitarian suggestion. Here I survey three forms of Rule Utilitarianism, each of which represents a distinct approach to solving partial acceptance issues. I examine Fixed Rate, Variable Rate, and Optimum Rate Rule Utilitarianism, and argue that a new approach, Maximizing (...) Expectation Rate Rule Utilitarianism, better solves partial acceptance problems. (shrink)
Circularity in Searle's Social Ontology: With a Hegelian Reply.José Luis Fernández - 2020 - International Journal of Society, Culture and Language 8 (1):16-24.details
John Searle's theory of social ontology posits that there are indispensable normative components in the linguistic apparatuses termed status functions, collective intentionality, and collective recognition, all of which, he argues, make the social world. In this paper, I argue that these building blocks of Searle's social ontology are caught in a petitio of constitutive circularity. Moreover, I note how Searle fails to observe language in reciprocal relation to the institutions which not only are shaped by it but also shape (...) language's practical applications. According to Searle, social theorists that tried to show a connection between society, culture, and language all failed to see the constitutive role of language in the making of social reality. Consequently, I believe that Searle is himself guilty of a certain kind of blind presumption, and argue that Hegel's philosophy of culture, which Searle dismisses as implausible, offers a more cohesive account of the normative transactions between human beings and their social world. (shrink)
The Yablo Paradox and Circularity.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2012 - Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):7-20.details
In this paper, I start by describing and examining the main results about the option of formalizing the Yablo Paradox in arithmetic. As it is known, although it is natural to assume that there is a right representation of that paradox in first order arithmetic, there are some technical results that give rise to doubts about this possibility. Then, I present some arguments that have challenged that Yablo's construction is non-circular. Just like that, Priest (1997) has argued that such formalization (...) shows that Yablo's Paradox involves implicit circularity. In the same direction, Beall (2001) has introduced epistemic factors in this discussion. Even more, Priest has also argued that the introduction of infinitary reasoning would be of little help. Finally, one could reject definitions of circularity in term of fixed-point adopting non-well-founded set theory. Then, one could hold that the Yablo paradox and the Liar paradox share the same non-well-founded structure. So, if the latter is circular, the first is too. In all such cases, I survey Cook's approach (2006, forthcoming) on those arguments for the charge of circularity. In the end, I present my position and summarize the discussion involved in this volume. En este artículo, describo y examino los principales resultados vinculados a la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética. Aunque es natural suponer que hay una representación correcta de la paradoja en la aritmética de primer orden, hay algunos resultados técnicos que hacen surgir dudas acerca de esta posibilidad. Más aún, presento algunos argumentos que han cuestionado que la construcción de Yablo no sea circular. Así, Priest (1997) ha argumentado que la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética de primer orden muestra que la misma involucra implícitamente circularidad. En la misma dirección, Beall (2001) ha introducido factores epistémicos en esta discusión. Más aún, Priest ha también argumentado que la introducción de razonamiento infinitario como complemento de la formalización en la aritmética sería de poca ayuda. Finalmente, se podría rechazar todo intento de dar definiciones de circularidad en términos de puntos fijos adoptando teoría de conjuntos infundados. Entonces, se podría sostener que la paradoja de Yablo y la del mentiroso comparten la misma estructura infundada. Por eso, si la última es circular, también lo es la primera. En todos los casos, presento el enfoque de Roy Cook (2006, en prensa) sobre estos argumentos que atribuyen circularidad a la construcción de Yablo. En el final, presento mi posición y un breve resumen de la discusión involucrada en este volumen. (shrink)
The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure.Jeremy Waldron - 2011 - Nomos 50:3-31.details
Proponents of the rule of law argue about whether that ideal should be conceived formalistically or in terms of substantive values. Formalistically, the rule of law is associated with principles like generality, clarity, prospectivity, consistency, etc. Substantively, it is associated with market values, with constitutional rights, and with freedom and human dignity. In this paper, I argue for a third layer of complexity: the procedural aspect of the rule of law; the aspects of rule-of-law requirements that (...) have to do with "natural Justice" or "procedural due process." These I believe have been neglected in the jurisprudential literature devoted specifically to the idea of the rule of law and they deserve much greater emphasis. Moreover procedural values go beyond elementary principles like the guarantee of an unbiased tribunal or the opportunity to present and confront evidence. They include the right to argue in a court about what the law is and what its bearing should be on one's situation. The provision that law makes for argument is necessarily unsettling, and so this emphasis on the procedural aspect highlights the point predictability should not be regarded as the be-all and end-all of the rule of law. (shrink)


text:
My Achievements in 2014
Posted in Uncategorized on December 31, 2014 by telescoper
It's New Year's Eve and therefore time for me to reflect on all the great things I achieved in 2014.
Well, better luck next year I suppose.
The above map of England and its regions is accurate apart from one detail. The first person to point out the deliberate mistake wins a year's membership of the Ipswich Town FC Supporter's Club, valid for the rest of the year 2014.
The Louvre Museum has 8.5 million visitors per year. This blog was viewed about 450,000 times in 2014. If it were an exhibit at the Louvre Museum, it would take about 19 days for that many people to see it.
Conchita Wurst wins 2014 Beard of the Year poll
Posted in Beards, Biographical with tags Bartosz Bialkowski, Beard of the Year, beards, Conchita Wurst on December 29, 2014 by telescoper
Many congratulations to the fabulous Conchita Wurst, who has won the coveted title of Beard of the Year 2014. I finished in 3rd place. Huge thanks to everyone who voted for me. I'm quite chuffed to have finished in the top 5 actually, and am delighted that Conchita Wurst was the winner in the end.
In fact I was in the lead until two days before the end of polling. However, on Saturday 20th December, I checked the voting and found Conchita already was on top of me, pulling away. The resulting surge was extremely impressive and exciting to witness…
I would have happily settled for second place but then, on Monday 22nd, the last day of voting, Bartosz Bialkowski, who wasn't on the shortlist until that point, made an unexpected appearance and quickly romped up the table. I've never heard of Bartosz Bialkowski before that day, actually. Apparently he plays in goal for Ipswich Town, in the Midlands. Anyway, although many will be surprised that 2nd place went to someone who isn't among the list of official contenders, there's no doubt he has an impressive beard and enthusiastic support from Ipswich Town supporters who no doubt were responsible both for his late inclusion in the list and in the heavy voting on Monday that relegated me to 3rd place.
Anyway, that's it for Beard of the Year. My brief venture into the limelight is over, and I'll now return to my normal state of well-deserved obscurity…
Kmflett's Blog
Beard Liberation Front
Press release 28th December
Conchita Wurst tops Eurovision win with Beard of the Year victory
The Beard Liberation Front, the informal network of beard wearers, has said that in the best supported contest since 1995, the winner of this year's Eurovision in May Conchita Wurst has also won the 2014 Beard of the Year poll with 33.54% of the vote.
The singer narrowly beat Ipswich Town goal keeper Bartosz Bialkowski who made a late bid for the title with 31.89% and University of Sussex academic Peter Coles who polled consistently well throughout the three weeks of the poll to end on 14.58%.
Other well known beard wearers including cricketer Moeen Ali and author Philip Ardagh also polled well.
BLF Organiser Keith Flett said, The Beard Liberation Front stands for diversity of dress and appearance and the breadth of appeal of this year's winners underlines that. Let's…
Well, I made it up to Newcastle on schedule thanks to Easyjet. I probably won't be blogging much over the next few days as I plan to give myself over to sloth and gluttony.
Anyway I couldn't resist sharing this lovely Christmas present I got from the inestimable Dorothy Lamb featuringy suitably dotty headlines from the Brighton Evening Argus…
Here's to a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to you and your loved ones wherever you may be!
The Cliffs of Comet Churyumov–Gerasimenko
Posted in The Universe and Stuff with tags Comet Churyumov_Gerasimenko, ESA, Rosetta on December 23, 2014 by telescoper
I don't often post pictures from the excellent Astronomy Picture of the Day but today's is so beautiful I couldn't resist.
Image Credit & Licence (CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO): ESA, Rosetta spacecraft, NAVCAM; Additional Processing: Stuart Atkinson
The explanation published with the picture goes:
These high cliffs occur on the surface of a comet. They were discovered to be part of the dark nucleus of Comet Churyumov–Gerasimenko (CG) by Rosetta, a robotic spacecraft launched by ESA which began orbiting the comet in early August. The ragged cliffs, as featured here, were imaged by Rosetta about two weeks ago. Although towering about one kilometer high, the low surface gravity of Comet CG would likely make a jump from the cliffs, by a human, survivable. At the foot of the cliffs is relatively smooth terrain dotted with boulders as large as 20 meters across. Data from Rosetta indicates that the ice in Comet CG has a significantly different deuterium fraction — and hence likely a different origin — than the water in Earth's oceans. The Rosetta spacecraft is scheduled to continue to accompany the comet as it makes its closest approach to the Sun in 2015 August.
For me, Rosetta has undoubtedly been the science highlight of the year. It has been an absolute triumph, and it's not over yet as Rosetta will now follow the comet on its journey towards the Sun. With a bit of luck, the lander Philae will also awaken (hopefully in March) as the Sun begins to shine more brightly on its solar panels.
I think we should all wish a special Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to everyone involved with this wonderful adventure!
The Last Song on the Voyager Golden Record
Posted in Music with tags 5th Movement, Beethoven, Cavatina, Opus 130, String Quartet No. 13 on December 22, 2014 by telescoper
Totally spontaneously and without any prompting whatsoever from any reader of this blog (?), I've decided today to post a piece of music. I don't usually like posting single movements from classical works. I much prefer listening to them in the context for which they were orginally devised rather than as "bleeding chunks" because the entire composition should be greater than the sum of its parts. That is true of Beethoven's magnificent late String Quartets, but some of the parts are nevertheless so exquisite on their own that I don't mind at all hearing them separately. I posted the wonderful Heiliger Danksgesang (the third movement of Quartet No. 15 in A Minor, Opus 132) some time ago. That's a piece of music that is very special to me for a number of reasons. This time, though, it's String Quartet No. 13 in B♭ major, Opus 130.
This is an unusual quartet, consisting of no less than six movements. In the original version the last movement was a very long and intricate double fugue, but for all its magnificence this enormous movement perplexed audiences who were no doubt expecting something closer to the traditional structure of a string quartet. Beethoven then wrote an alternative final movement, much shorter and lighter, and published the original final movement as a standalone work, the Große Fuge (Opus 133).
But it's the penultimate, fifth, movement that I wanted to share. This is marked "Cavatina. Adagio molto espressivo." This is one of those pieces of music that makes everything else disappear from my mind whenever I hear it. Its poignancy and lyricism are felt even more deeply when you realise that Beethoven himself never heard it, except in his mind's ear. He was already profoundly deaf when he composed this work and indeed he died before the first performance of the final version of the quartet, so never even saw it being played.
Of all the pinnacles of European culture and civilisation, Beethoven's late quartets must be among the very highest, but this short movement transcends even that level of achievement and reaches something utterly sublime. I think it's entirely apt that this is the last piece of music on the famous Golden Records which the Voyager spacecraft are carrying into the depths of interstellar space. Close your eyes and think of that as you listen to the music.
PS. A "cavatina" is a "short and simple song", hence the use of the word "song" in the title, but it doesn't really do this piece justice, but there really aren't any words that can describe it adequately.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


If you are in the market for vacuums, extractors, pre-separators or HEPA air scrubbers, Pullman Ermator manufactures a full line of professional grade equipment that is ideal for any jobsite or work environment.
With more than 40 years of experience in the dust extraction and air cleaning industries, Ermator engineers are leading the way in the design and manufacture of HEPA vacuums, air scrubbers and dust extractor systems that not only improve worker health and safety, they meet or exceed environmental and safety standards, passing on these benefits to contractors working in construction, abatement and restoration.
In our search for a partner in the dust extraction and air cleaning industry, we looked at several variables. The natural first choice here is the durability and quality of the equipment. We find the Ermator line second to none in terms of durability, ease of use, efficiency and power. The variety of machines also match well with the different grinder and equipment sizes available.
Ermator's approach to quality control is unmatched. For instance, every single HEPA filter is individually tested and certified at filtration rate 99.99% at 0.3 microns. Other recent innovations include the Longopac system for dust-free bag changes, Jet Pulse filter cleaning, a unique power tool power outlet with an automatic on/off trigger, a specially designed drop-down disposal, a sound alarm for clogged/broken HEPA filters and proactive maintenance features like manometers and hour meters, which warn you when filter is clogged or broken.
The service and support Ermator provides is also unmatched. Runyon Surface Prep has had Ermator reps assisting us at all times and when necessary traveling to ensure our customers are taken care of. The staff is knowledgeable, responsive and very easy to work with. The Ermator group has been everything we could ask from a partner manufacturer.
Pullman Ermator vacuums are ideal for a large variety of concrete and general construction applications. These seven short clips demonstrate the many uses and benefits of equipment pairings, wet/dry vacs and each major vacuum model (T18000, T8600, S50, S26 and S13).
Ermator HEPA Dust Extractors are shown working with various grinders, shot blasters, drills and chisels to display their superior dust extraction capabilities.
This video demonstrates how to use the W2000/2 Wet Vacuum with Pre-Separator, and its ability to reduce water usage while maintaining a slurry free environment. Ideal for coring, saw cutting and grinding, it uses a high pressure oil cooled pump to extract the slurry and filter the liquid into clean water that can be re-used by pumping back to the machine, or to a containment tank for disposal.
The most powerful on the market today, this video shows the T18000 HEPA Dust Extractor in action on a variety of equipment, demonstrating amazing dust control. Greatly expanded pre-filter surface area acts as a built-in pre-separator providing superior cyclonic separation for long, uninterrupted service periods. The T18000 produces plenty of airflow to handle a single four-head grinder or two each three-head grinders, and is the only extractor that can keep up with a larger shaver.
This video shows the dust extraction ability of the Ermator T8600 HEPA Vacuum in a variety of different applications. This is one of the most popular and commonly used dust extractors in concrete polishing, as it pairs well with our 32″ floor grinders, namely the HTC 800 and Husqvarna PG 820, and the T8600 Propane unit with our CPS G-320D and STI 3030 floor grinders.
This video shows the Ermator S50 HEPA Dust Extractor, an industrial strength wet dry 120 HEPA vacuum that features dual HEPA filters, an outlet for power tools and a variable speed motor, which allows the operator to adjust suction power according to circuit breaker capacity.
This video shows the dust extraction ability of the Ermator S26 HEPA Dust Extractor, a single-motor wet and dry vacuum that can be operated in conjunction with a power tool. The S26 has two HEPA filters that are specially designed for wet or dry usage. Its tank holds up to 11 gallons, and can be used with or without a bag.
This video shows the single motor Ermator S13 HEPA Dust Extractor, which can be connected to electrical, hand-operated power tools to extract freshly cut, friable concrete dust. The model S13 is also an effective all-around construction vacuum for picking-up a wide range of building materials and debris. Comes with 16-foot, 1.5″ hose, wand and floor tool. Includes a 6 mil, 10-gallon disposable poly bag for dust-free handling and disposal.


text:
Q: Schedule HTTP requests at point in time I need to schedule actions (HTTP requests is enough) at a certain point in time. Every programmed request will only run once.
Sure I could implement this myself; saving the event to a database, then have an event-loop check if an action should be launched.
However this is such a generic need, there must be an existing service for this general type of need, feels like something I shouldn't implement myself. Any ideas where this can be found? I'm thinking one could just specify the http request to be saved (uri, body, headers)
AWS sure has a way of doing this using Cloudwatch events with a cron configured at the specific point in time. But this is way to clunky IMO. Is there an existing service/solution for this?

A: Agenda-Rest is a solution that does exactly what I asked for. It has to be self hosted though, as there seems to be no commercial hosting of it. It's also not actively developed, which could very well be that it's pretty much feature complete. After all it's a small wrapper on top of the library Agenda.
There's an alternative, suggested in a GitHub issue of Agenda-Rest, called AgenDash build on top of the same library. It's actively developed, as of autumn 2022. It's primarily a UI on top of Agenda, but it has rest routes that can be called.
There are also several libraries in various languages that exposes this functionality provided a persistence mechanism

*

*agenda (nodejs + mongodb)

*redbeat (python + redis)

*db-scheduler (java + any rdbms)

I'm quite surprised that I can't find this functionality as a first class citizen in the public cloud providers.
Edit:
AWS introduced the feature EventBridge Scheduler in nov 2022. It does not allow for a http request per see, but things like invoke a lambda or post a message to a queue is possible. They support one-time schedules so no need for cron and no need for removing it later as mentioned in my question above.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Walk the talk.means, use that you found vital. Of what use is knowledge, if you don`t put it on! Commit yourself to try what you have discovered in this book. Knowledge is powerful, but applied actually empowering!
I in no way be so arrogant to think I and my life and everything that entails is the "be all and end all" of survival. Man is a millions year-old species, also it has only been within last two centuries that we moved from truly archaic Man wed to aged time proven ways for this new and enlightened critter that relies upon the grocery store for food, the gas station for fuel, and phoning for help at the end of the fishing line.
While you reside in a superficial xem tin thế giới like ours, you`ll feel insecure in order to seem like getting individuals eyes staring at the surface. Individuals with acne are extremely timid for they might be labeled as "ugly" by others. There`s an excuse for anyone to definitely take good care of the skin and face.
The most frequently found misunderstanding about acne is it might be acquired from eating oily food. If eating an oversized Mac and Fries was the cause of acne you have to all enjoy acne. Desserts, chocolates you simply provide sorts of persons oily food mustn`t be blamed for eating such food or not implementing good care of skin.
Choosing a loo isn`t easy though - it soon becomes clear that doesn`t all toilets are equivalent. Some are designed for budget travellers but don`t look particularly solid. Nicely be worried about how long they`ll last and about exactly when they`ll time.
Here`s a sample meditation to help you get started. Find a quiet place and pleasantly or lay. Begin breathing deeply and rhythmically. Relax and visualize yourself as a channel of positive oomph. Now allow love to flow through you and then send it to your pei. Your pei will draw in your neighborhood in order to bask in the positive energy and soak inside the love. Enjoy and Namast - pei.
The harness is critical because it is your climbing tool belt. Everything you reason to climb is carried on harness. In case you run ropes, the harness is enslaved by to them carabiners. With no harness, noticing feel practically naked!


text:
Q: Change negative number format in Bi-Publisher RTF I am doing an RTF I hope you can help me, how could I change the negative number format?
Change "-" for "()"
For example I have:
821,292.87
-146,983.06
-671.64
503,927.51
And I would like to see them in the following way:
821,292.87
(146,983.06)
(671.64)
503,927.51

A: You can use PR format model to get negative numbers in angle brackets:
SQL> select to_char(-146983.06,'999g999g999d99PR','NLS_NUMERIC_CHARACTERS = ''.,''') l
       from dual;

L
----------------
    <146,983.06>

Or I would do this with regexp_replace and to_char:
regexp_replace( to_char(-146983.06,'tm9','NLS_NUMERIC_CHARACTERS = ''.,'''),
                     '-(.*)','(\1)' )

Example:
SQL> select regexp_replace( to_char(-146983.06,'tm9','NLS_NUMERIC_CHARACTERS = ''.,'''),
                        '-(.*)','(\1)' ) l
       from dual;

L
------------------------------
(146983.06)


text:
Astral Weeks (CD)
Brand: Van Morrison
See more: CD
Astral Weeks is the second studio album by Northern Irish singer-songwriter Van Morrison. It was recorded at Century Sound Studios in New York during September and October 1968, and released in November of the same year by Warner Bros. Records.
Astral Weeks
Cyprus Avenue
The Way Young Lovers Do
Madame George
Slim Slow Slider
Latest Record Project Volume 1 (CD)
Moondance (Vinyl)
Astral Weeks (Vinyl)
Latest Record Project Volume 1 (Vinyl)


text:
Stranglehold è un brano musicale di Paul McCartney, composto da lui e da Eric Stewart, apparso, come traccia d'apertura, sull'album Press to Play del 1986. Nello stesso anno, solamente negli USA venne pubblicato come singolo (b-side: Angry) su due formati: 7" e 12". L'SP raggiunse l'81ª posizione di Billboard Hot 100, diventando uno dei 45 giri di minor successo commerciale dell'ex-beatle.

Tracce singolo

7"
Lato A

Lato B

12"
Lato A

Lato B

Note

Collegamenti esterni

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Our members are a multi-generational mindset. They cannot be defined by simplistic demographics like age, gender or nationality.
We call them Cohort C. They thrive on collaboration, connection and creation.
In business this cohort is unlikely to thrive in steep alienating hierarchies. Because of structural shifts in the global economy Cohort C are taking the concept of retirement out of their lives and therefore redefining the workplace.
Cohort C is collection of resourceful people who want to be successful on their own terms.


text:
Q: Envoy - failover to another control plane instance In our setting, Envoy consumes dynamic configuration from the control plane via GRPC. The control plane discovery is configured as STRICT_DNS:
- name: cplane
    connect_timeout: 5s
    type: STRICT_DNS
    load_assignment:
      cluster_name: cplane
      endpoints:
      - lb_endpoints:
        - endpoint:
            address:
              socket_address:
                address: control-plane-fqdn
                port_value: 1234

Under the control-plane-fqdn DNS record we have multiple instances and Envoy connects to any one of them. The question is - what is the failover mechanism that Envoy uses? From my observations, failover to another instance (upon shutting down the one to which Envoy is connected) takes from 5 to 50 seconds. What is the reason for this spread and is it possible to make the failover time more deterministic?

A: Eventually found the answer. It is the exponential backoff mechanism defined here 1. The parameter RetryMaxDelayMs is not configurable and is hard coded to 30 sec. Moreover, when the DNS has two IPs and one of them becomes unreachable, Envoy tries to reconnect to each IP in a round-robin manner with an exponential backoff between attempts. So, if the secondary IP is not ready to accept connection immediately then the exponential backoff may add another 30 - 40 sec until it reconnects.


Steel welded chassis designed to resist intense use.
2 cranked half axles sliding into an axle holder : track width and clearance settings. Longitudinal setting for the axle position.
All TECNOMA sprayers are fitted with a piston-diaphragm pump to ensure a stable flow at a wide volume and pressure range.
Homogeneous transfer of chemicals is guaranteed.
450 mm fan on the front. 26 hp required. Fan may be disengaged due to a dog clutch system.
Belt drive fan with automatic tensioner on the belt : gas ram keeping the right tension at all time.
Oil bath bearing gearbox with outside oil gauge giving durability and easy access for maintenance.
8 output air manifold with equal distribution.
REGULAIR regulation : regulation by manual pressure adjustment with pneumatic regulator. REGULAIR guarantees good pressure stability during spraying and automatically compensates the section cut off without any calibrated return adjustment.
The regulation valve adapts the spray and flow according to the forward speed to apply the same rate anywhere on the vineyard.
20 fields records : surface, volume and distance sprayed.
Pneumatic spraying : polyethylene hands and cannons can be adapted to any vineyard with a high shock resistance. 3 dimensional settings for the hands.
Monostop : DCV and individual cut off system.
PRECIJET spraying : air flow assisted face by face spraying system.
Polyethylene tube : light, robust and shock resistant. Cone shape tube : fluidity through the rows and equal speed and volume from the top to the bottom of the air output.
Retractable attachment with automatic return in case of collision. 26 hp turbine.
1250 mm high for standard PRECIJET with 4 nozzles/face with orientation adjustment and height settings.
Monostop nozzle holder with anti-drip device.
Spray localization according to vegetation height.
4 PRECIJET face by face sliding along the boom to spray 2 or 3 rows. From 1,50 to 4,50 m plantation width.
2 hydraulic independent lateral folding arms mounted on a horizontal runner giving hydraulic lateral setting at all times.