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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions
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Cite as: [2017] EWHC 634 (Ch)
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Neutral Citation Number: [2017] EWHC 634 ( Ch)
Case No: HC-2016-003289
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
MASTER CLARK
GERARDO MORENO DE LA HIJA
CHRISTOPHER FRANK CARANDINI LEE
Madeleine Heal (instructed by Manuel Martin & Associates) for the Claimant
Jessica Simor QC and Jonathan Fowles (instructed by Kobalt Law LLP) for the Defendant and Lady Birgit Lee
Hearing dates: 6, 10 March 2017
Master Clark:
In this application, the claimant seeks an order, pursuant to CPR 3.1(7), revoking the order dated 3 February 2014 of Master McCloud ("the 2014 order"). That order ordered the stay of enforcement until further order of an EEO certificate dated 13 June 2011 ("the EEO") made by the Commercial Court of Burgos, Spain ("the Burgos court").
The application is made in paragraph (3) of an application notice dated 23 June 2016 (and amended on 20 July 2016). The applicant, Gerardo Moreno de la Hija, is the judgment creditor named in the EEO. I refer to him as the claimant. The named respondent to the application is the well known actor, Sir Christopher Frank Caradini Lee, who, sadly, died on 7 June 2015, aged 93. I refer to him as the deceased. His executrix is his widow, Lady Birgit Lee, to whom probate was granted on 18 December 2015. At the first hearing of the application before me, on 6 March 2017, I made an order substituting Lady Lee as a defendant in these proceedings in her representative capacity.
The proceedings for enforcement were commenced in the Queen's Bench Division (no. FJ14/14), and the 2014 order was made in that Division. The application was originally listed before Master Eastman on 26 October 2016, but at its first hearing he transferred it to the Chancery Division.
At the first hearing of the application before me, the claimant's counsel initially also sought the revocation of what she referred to as Master McCloud's order dated 5 January 2016. This is a direction in a letter of that date that "the stay granted on 03/02/14 shall remain in force until the conclusion of the Spanish proceedings". However, at the adjourned hearing on 10 March 2017, her position had altered and she no longer seeks an order in respect of the direction of 5 January 2016.
European Enforcement Orders
To understand the legal context in which the 2014 order and the various subsequent challenges in Spain to the EEO and the judgment on which it is based were made, it is necessary to turn to Council Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 "creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims" ("the regulation") and the national provisions relating to it. The following provisions of the regulation are directly relevant:
" CHAPTER I	SUBJECT MATTER, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
The purpose of this Regulation is to create a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims to permit, by laying down minimum standards, the free circulation of judgments … throughout all Member States without any intermediate proceedings needing to be brought in the Member State of enforcement prior to recognition and enforcement.
Enforcement titles to be certified as a European Enforcement Order
1. This Regulation shall apply to judgments … on uncontested claims.
A claim shall be regarded as uncontested if:
(b) the debtor has never objected to it, in compliance with the relevant procedural requirements under the law of the Member State of origin, in the course of the court proceedings; …
CHAPTER II	EUROPEAN ENFORCEMENT ORDER
Requirements for certification as a European Enforcement Order
1. A judgment on an uncontested claim delivered in a Member State shall, upon application at any time to the court of origin, be certified as a European Enforcement Order if:
(c) the court proceedings in the Member State of origin met the requirements as set out in Chapter III where a claim is uncontested within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) or (c);
Rectification or withdrawal of the European Enforcement Order certificate
1. The European Enforcement Order certificate shall, upon application to the court of origin, be
(b) withdrawn where it was clearly wrongly granted, having regard to the requirements laid down in this Regulation.
Chapter III	MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR UNCONTESTED CLAIMS PROCEDURES
Scope of application of minimum standards
1. A judgment on a claim that is uncontested within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) or (c) can be certified as a European Enforcement Order only if the court proceedings in the Member State of origin met the procedural requirements as set out in this Chapter.
Service without proof of receipt by the debtor
1. Service of the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document and any summons to a court hearing on the debtor may also have been effected by one of the following methods:
(a) personal service at the debtor's personal address on persons who are living in the same household as the debtor or are employed there;
(c) deposit of the document in the debtor's mailbox;
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, service under paragraph 1 is not admissible if the debtor's address is not known with certainty.
Minimum standards for review in exceptional cases
1. Further to Articles 13 to 18, a judgment can only be certified as a European Enforcement Order if the debtor is entitled, under the law of the Member State of origin, to apply for a review of the judgment where:
(a)	(i) the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document or, where applicable, the summons to a court hearing, was served by one of the methods provided for in Article 14; and
(ii) service was not effected in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, without any fault on his part;
(b) the debtor was prevented from objecting to the claim by reason of force majeure, or due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault on his part,
provided in either case that he acts promptly.
2. This Article is without prejudice to the possibility for Member States to grant access to a review of the judgment under more generous conditions than those mentioned in paragraph 1.
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Chapter, the enforcement procedures shall be governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement.
A judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order shall be enforced under the same conditions as a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement.
2. The creditor shall be required to provide the competent enforcement authorities of the Member State of enforcement with:
(a) a copy of the judgment which satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity; and
(b) a copy of the European Enforcement Order certificate which satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity; and
(c) where necessary, a transcription of the European Enforcement Order certificate or a translation thereof into the official language of the Member State of enforcement …
Refusal of enforcement
2. Under no circumstances may the judgment or its certification as a European Enforcement Order be reviewed as to their substance in the Member State of enforcement.
Stay or limitation of enforcement
Where the debtor has
- challenged a judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order, including an application for review within the meaning of Article 19, or
- applied for the rectification or withdrawal of a European Enforcement Order certificate in accordance with Article 10,
the competent court or authority in the Member State of enforcement may, upon application by the debtor:
(a) limit the enforcement proceedings to protective measures; or
(b) make enforcement conditional on the provision of such security as it shall determine; or
(c) under exceptional circumstances, stay the enforcement proceedings."
CPR 74.27 to 74.33 contains the national procedural rules relating to EEOs, of which only CPR 74.33(1) is relevant:
"Where an EEO certificate has been lodged and the judgment debtor applies to stay or limit the enforcement proceedings under Article 23 of the EEO Regulation, such application must be made in accordance with Part 23 to the court in which the EEO is being enforced."
The relevant practice direction, PD 74B, also provides:
"Rule 74.33 – Stay or limitation of enforcement
7.1	Unless the court orders otherwise, an application must be accompanied by evidence of the application in the court of origin, including –
(1)	the application (or equivalent foreign process) or a copy of the application (or equivalent foreign process) certified by an appropriate officer of the court of origin; and
(2)	where that document is not in English, a translation of it into English –
(a)	certified by a notary public or person qualified to certify a translation in the Member State of the court of origin under Article 20(2)(c) of the EEO Regulation; or
(b)	accompanied by written evidence confirming that the translation is accurate.
7.2	The written evidence in support of the application must state –
(1)	that an application has been brought in the member state of origin;
(2)	the nature of that application; and
(3)	the date on which the application was filed, the state of the proceedings and the date by which it is believed that the application will be determined."
The factual background to the application is complex and I set it out as briefly as possible.
The Spanish claim
On 20 June 2007, the claimant brought a claim in the Burgos court (case no. 548/07 – "the Spanish claim"). The defendants to that claim were (1) The Quaid Project Ltd; (2) Mr. Juan Aneiros ("on the representation of Christopher Lee Web") and (3) the deceased.
The Spanish claim is based on the claimant's copyright in a painting made by him pursuant to a contract dated 17 February 2004, to which the parties were the claimant and Juan Aneiros (who is or was the deceased's son-in-law), described as a sole trader trading as ' Christopher Lee Webb'. The particulars of claim, judgment and order are in the bundle only in Spanish, though the evidence includes a summary of the particulars of claim by the deceased's solicitor. From this, it appears that the claim relates to use of the painting for the artwork of a film entitled "Jinnah" ("the film"), on the inside, the cover and the menu of the DVD of the film. This, it is said, was use outside the terms of the consent given by the agreement, and in breach of it and in infringement of the claimant's copyright.
The basis of the claim against the deceased is unclear, but cannot be contractual, because he was not a party to the relevant contract. The witness statement dated 3 February 2014 of the deceased's solicitor, Stefano Lucatello, states that the deceased's only involvement (contractual or otherwise) in the film (in which he had a starring role) was as an actor.
The particulars of claim show the address of all 3 defendants as 37 Elsynge Road, London SW18 2HR ("Elsynge Road"). Mr Lucatello's evidence is that this is Mr Aneiros' residential address, and has never been the address of the deceased.
It is common ground that the claim was not served on the deceased at his home address or any other address with which he has a connection. His case is that he had no knowledge of it before receiving the EEO under cover of the claimant's solicitors' letter dated 22 January 2014. Following apparently unsuccessful requests to the English Consulate in Madrid and the (presumably Spanish) Ministry of Justice as to the address of the deceased, the Burgos court ordered service by the affixing of notices on the Court's notice board. Not surprisingly, the proceedings did not come the deceased's notice by this means, and judgment in default in the sum of 710,000 euros was granted on 20 March 2009. The judgment was then published in the Official State Bulletin, and in the absence of any appeal by the deceased, declared final on 26 May 2009.
By an order of 26 October 2009, the Burgos court authorised enforcement of the judgment. Again, the claimant applied for service of the judgment by the affixing of notices on the court's notice board on the basis that no other address was known for the judgment debtors; and that application was granted.
The EEO
On 13 June 2011, the EEO was issued by the Burgos court. The initial EEO misspelt the deceased's middle name, showed his address as Elsynge Road and stated the date of the judgment as 26 April 2010 (no judgment of this date has been produced by the claimant). The EEO was also not fully completed: boxes 11.1 (confirming that service of the originating process was in compliance with the regulation), 12.1 (confirming that service of the "summons, where applicable" was in compliance with the regulation and 13.1 (confirming that service of the judgment was in compliance with the regulation) were not completed. Finally, boxes 13.3 and 13.4, which confirm that it is was possible for the debtor to challenge the judgment and that he had failed to do so (compliance with article 19 of the regulation) were also not completed.
On 14 October 2013 on the claimant's application, the EEO was rectified to correct the misspelling of the deceased's middle name and to add "enforcement costs" in the sum of 213,000 euros. No judgment in respect of the sum has been served on the deceased, nor was it in the evidence before me.
On 9 January 2014, the EEO was submitted to the High Court (Queens Bench Division), and on 20 January 2014 it was sealed by it.
The first occasion on which the claimant's solicitors wrote to the deceased was 22 January 2014, enclosing the EEO and requiring payment of the total of 923,000 euros within 14 days. This letter was sent to the deceased's home address of Flat 3, 45 Cadogan Square, London. There is no evidence as to when and how the claimant first became aware of the deceased's address. The deceased replied on 24 January 2014 asking for 28 days to instruct solicitors. This was refused by the claimant's solicitors, who informed him that unless a reasonable offer of payment was received within 14 days of 24 January 2014 i.e. by 7 February 2014, enforcement would proceed without further notice. This was confirmed in an email dated 31 January 2014.
The stay application and the 2014 order
On 3 February 2014, the deceased applied to Master McCloud without notice for a stay of enforcement of the EEO. The evidence in support of the application referred to the letter dated 22 January 2014 from the claimant's solicitors. It set out that the deceased had no knowledge of the Spanish claim or the claimant, had not been served with the proceedings, and had never lived at Elsynge Road. It also set out that the only contract entered into by the deceased in relation to the film was in respect of his appearance in it. Finally, it stated that on that day, 3 February 2014, the deceased had instructed a Spanish law firm to apply to set aside the judgment, and exhibited the letter of instruction.
Although CPR 74.33 provides that an application to stay an EEO certificate must be made under CPR Part 23, and the general rule (CPR 23.4) is that applications must be made on notice, the deceased's solicitors did not notify the claimant's solicitors of the application. However, the court has power to deal with an application without notice if it considers it appropriate to do so (CPR 23.8), and Master McCloud was willing to deal with it without requiring service of the claimant (I have not been provided with a note of the reasons for her decision), and made the 2014 order. The order was sent by email to the claimant's solicitors on the day it was made, although they required postal service, which I assume took place a few days later.
Regrettably, although CPR 23.9(2) requires that where an order is made without service of the application notice, the application notice and evidence in support be served on the respondents to the application, the deceased's solicitors did not do so. The claimant's solicitors therefore sought copies from the court, which were received by them on 13 February 2014.
CPR 23.10 entitles a person who has not been served with an application notice to apply to set aside or vary the order made, but the application must be made within 7 days after service of the order. It seems likely that this time had expired by the time that the claimant received the application notice and evidence; although the claimant's counsel did not accept that an extension of time would have been granted to make such an application, in my judgment there is no doubt that it would have been. In the event, no application was made to set aside the 2014 order.
The Spanish challenges
On 20 February 2014, the deceased commenced the first of three challenges in the Spanish courts ("the Spanish challenges"). The evidence as to the nature and basis of the steps taken by the deceased (and Lady Lee as his successor) is contained in a report dated 7 July 2016 ("the Atencia report") prepared by the defendant's Spanish lawyers, GVA & Atencia. This was sent to the claimant's solicitors on 16 July 2016, and no evidence has been served by them in response to it. In addition, the evidence before me included several (but not all) of the relevant judgments (in Spanish) accompanied by English translations. Inevitably, there is not complete congruence between the meaning of the expressions used in the translations of the Spanish documents, and their meaning in English procedural law; but neither side suggested that the congruence was insufficient for present purposes.
Since as mentioned, the deceased died on 7 June 2015, and Lady Lee was substituted for him in the Spanish challenges, I refer to each of them as "the defendant", the identity of the defendant depending on the time of the relevant event.
The first challenge
The first challenge (Amparo appeal no 4306/2014) on 20 February 2014 sought to set aside the proceedings, on the ground that service on the defendant of them was irregular and invalid. This was rejected by the Burgos court on 22 May 2014, on the ground that service was in accordance with the relevant national civil procedure law. This rejection was appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court on grounds that two specific requirements of the Spanish Constitution were violated. That appeal was rejected on 25 February 2015; and no further steps are being taken to pursue the first challenge.
The second challenge
The second challenge (Amparo appeal no 4657/2014) on 21 February 2014 sought to set aside the order of 26 October 2009 providing for the enforcement of the judgment under the Spanish Civil Procedure Act ("SCPA"), on the grounds of the "irregularity of the notifications throughout the enforcement proceedings". This challenge was rejected by the Burgos court on 3 June 2014.
The defendant brought a constitutional appeal (recurso de amparo) of this order on 15 July 2014 to the Spanish Constitutional Court, again on the grounds of violation of Spanish constitutional law. Permission to proceed with the appeal was granted on 30 November 2015, and the appeal is pending. The defendant also applied in that appeal for a stay of enforcement in those appeal proceedings. This application was determined under Spanish procedural law, and refused on 1 February 2016, on the ground that the defendant had not shown she would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were not granted.
The third challenge
The third challenge (amparo appeal no 442/2015) by the defendant sought the withdrawal of the EEO under article 10 of the regulation on two grounds:
(1)	That the judicial decision on which the EEO was based was not enforceable under the regulation and the SCPA;
(2)	That in the Spanish proceedings the "minimum standards for uncontested claims procedures" provided for in Chapter III of the regulation (which does not permit service by public notice) were not met.
This challenge was rejected by the Burgos court on 3 June 2014, again on 31 July 2014 on an application to it for "reversal" and again on 2 December 2014 on an extraordinary application to set the proceedings aside.
A constitutional appeal (recurso de amparo) to the Spanish Constitutional Court on 23 January 2015 against the orders of the Burgos court was given permission to proceed on 30 November 2015. This appeal also included a petition to suspend the enforceability of the EEO. That was refused on 1 February 2016, again under Spanish procedural law, on the ground that the defendant had not shown irreparable harm if a stay were not granted. However, the court added:
"The foregoing is in addition to the fact that because this recurso de amparo has been admitted, as has Recurso de amparo no 4657-2014, relating to the terms of the order whose certification is the subject matter of this appeal, the certified decision could be regarded as having been challenged for the purposes of Article 23 of the Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 and the stay or limitation referred to in that article could take effect by operation of law in the State of enforcement."
The two appeals have been consolidated and are due to be heard within the next 12 months.
Revoking an order under CPR 3.1(7) – the legal principles
CPR 3.1(7) provides:
"A power of the court under these Rules to make an order includes a power to vary or revoke the order."
The principles applicable to an application to revoke an order pursuant to CPR 3.1(7) are set out Tibbles v SlG PLC (trading as Asphaltic Roofing Supplies) [2012] 1 WLR 2591, paras. 39, 41-42 per Rix LJ, cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Thevarajah v Riordan and others [2016] 1 WLR 76, paras. 15, 18-19 per Lord Neuberger.
They can be summarised as follows (see [39]):
(1)	CPR r 3.1(7) is apparently broad and unfettered, but considerations of finality, the undesirability of allowing litigants to have two bites at the cherry, and the need to avoid undermining the concept of appeal, all push towards a principled curtailment of an otherwise apparently open discretion.
(2)	It is not possible or desirable to formulate an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which a principled exercise of the discretion may arise.
(3)	Subject to that, however, the primary circumstances in which the discretion may be appropriately exercised, are normally only where
(i)	there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made;
(ii)	the facts on which the original decision was made were (innocently or otherwise) misstated;
(iii)	there has been a manifest mistake on the part of the judge in the formulation of his order: see Edwards v Golding [2007] EWCA Civ 416.
(4)	In the case of misstatement, factors going to discretion include:
(i)	whether the misstatement was an omission or a positive misstatement;
(ii)	whether the misstatement concerned argument as distinct from facts;
(iii)	whether the misstatement (or omission) is conscious or unconscious;
(iv)	whether the facts (or arguments) were known or unknown, knowable or unknowable;
(5)	However, where the facts or arguments are known or ought to have been known as at the time of the original order, it is unlikely that the order can be revisited, and that must be still more strongly the case where the decision not to mention them is conscious or deliberate.
(6)	The successful invocation of the rule is rare: such is the interest of justice in the finality of a court's orders that it ought normally to take something out of the ordinary to lead to variation or revocation of an order, especially in the absence of a change of circumstances in an interlocutory situation.
(7)	Promptness in applying is an important factor in the exercise of discretion – the court is unlikely to assist an applicant once much time has gone by.
The basis of the application
The basis of the application has altered twice since it was first issued. The application notice, as issued, stated as follows:
"No grounds were shown by the Defendant pursuant to CPR 74.33 to stay or limit the enforcement proceedings under Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 (the EEO Regulation). Service of the document instituting the Spanish proceedings having been effected on the Defendant in accordance with Article 14 of the EEO Regulation, the judgment in the Spanish proceedings could not be reviewed. The court in Burgos certified that there is no possibility of challenging the judgment. Applications by the Defendant dated 15 July 2014 and 23 January 2015 respectively to the Constitutional Court of Spain First Chamber for a Constitutional Appeal (recurso de amparo) were dismissed on 1 February 2016."
This was factually inaccurate in four material respects:
(1)	Service on the defendant was not in accordance with art 14 of the regulation, which does not permit service by notices on a court notice board; and, in any event, provides that there can be no effective service where, as here, the debtor's address is unknown: see G v de Visser Case C-292/10; [2013] QB 168;
(2)	The judgment is capable of being reviewed, and is being reviewed by the Spanish Constitutional Court;
(3)	The Burgos court has not certified that there is no possibility of challenging the judgment;
(4)	The two constitutional appeals have not been dismissed.
The application notice was supported by a witness statement dated 27 June 2016 of the claimant's solicitor (who is also a qualified Spanish "abogado"), Manuel Martin, inaccurately stating that
(1)	service had been in accordance with article 14 of the regulation;
(2)	the constitutional appeals had been dismissed;
(3)	the constitutional court had concluded that there were no grounds for further delaying enforcement of the Burgos court's judgment.
Following receipt of the Atencia report, the application notice was amended to refer to the stay applications in the appeals, but the other inaccuracies were not corrected. No explanation has been given by Mr Martin as to the genesis of that error, which, given Mr Martin's dual qualification, would appear to be at best grossly negligent, and, until corrected by the defendant, capable of misleading the court.
In the claimant's counsel's skeleton argument for the first hearing before me, the only basis on which the application was pursued was on the first of the grounds stated in the application notice, namely that Master McCloud had no jurisdiction to make the order she made, because the conditions required by Article 23 of the regulation were not satisfied. However, the fact, if established, that the Master was wrong to make the order she did, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the court to revoke its order, as is clear from Tibbles.
At the hearing itself, the claimant's counsel accepted that the applicable principles to the application were set out in Tibbles. She then put forward for the first time orally submissions directed towards showing that the circumstances of this case justified the court exercising its power to revoke.
Issues in the application
In these circumstances, at the conclusion of the adjourned hearing of the application on 10 March 2017, the following issues arose for determination:
(1)	Whether arguments not previously made can found a power to revoke; and, if so, whether the claimant is entitled to rely on this factor;
(2)	Whether or not this application falls within any of the categories identified in Tibbles:
(i)	Whether there was a material misstatement of fact at the hearing on 3 February 2014;
(ii)	Whether there has been a material change in circumstances since February 2014;
(iii)	Whether there was a manifest error in the formulation of the 2014 order.
(3)	Whether, in all the circumstances, the 2014 order should be revoked
Arguments not previously made
As can be seen above, in Tibbles itself, the court contemplated a misstatement concerning argument as capable of justifying the power to revoke. The claimant's counsel relied upon Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945, in which Dyson LJ (at [120]) said that jurisdiction under r.3.1(7) "should not normally be exercised unless the applicant is able to place material before the court, whether in the form of evidence or argument, which was not placed before the court on the earlier occasion" (emphasis added).
She also relied upon Edwards v Golding, in which, Buxton LJ after citing from Collier, said (at [24]):
"The basis of that jurisprudence is that the jurisdiction under order 3.1(7) is not a substitute for an appeal. There must be additional material before the court in the form of evidence or, possibly, argument. I would reserve the issue of whether additional argument in itself is enough to attract the jurisdiction of rule 3.1(7), but the general thrust of Collier is that the case before the court before which rule 3.1(7) is moved must be essentially different from one of simple error that could be righted on appeal."
The claimant's counsel then sought to rely on the following additional arguments which she said were not placed before Master McCloud, because the deceased wrongly applied to the Master without notice to the claimant:
(1)	that the mere prospect of a challenge (as opposed to a subsisting challenge) to a judgment certified as an EEO in the court of origin or application for rectification or withdrawal of an EEO does not satisfy the first pre-condition in Article 23;
(2)	that a challenge or application for withdrawal in the court or origin is not an 'exceptional circumstance' under the second pre-condition in Article 23(c); and
(3)	that no evidence of exceptional circumstances justifying a stay of enforcement was before Master McCloud on 3 February 2014.
An immediate objection to this submission is that the claimant was not in fact prevented from making these arguments, because he was entitled to apply under CPR 23.10 to vary or revoke the order, but did not do so.
The claimant's counsel submitted that the deceased's failure to serve the application notice and evidence on the claimant prevented him from applying under CPR 23.10, as by the time they were obtained from the court the application would have been out of time. However, as I have said (in para 22 above), I have no doubt that an extension of time would have been granted. I do not therefore consider that the claimant was prevented from relying upon the arguments he now relies upon before the Master. This is not, however, conclusive as to whether the 2014 order should be revoked.
The defendant's counsel submitted, firstly, that the authorities did not support the proposition that arguments not previously made can found the power to revoke. However, it is clear from Tibbles itself that the categories justifying revocation are not fixed or closed, and that a "misstatement concerning argument" may do so.
She also submitted that where an order has been made at a without notice hearing, at which, by definition, the respondent has not put forward his arguments, then that of itself cannot justify revocation of the order made. The arguments now being put forward could, she said, have been put forward in an application under CPR 23.10 or on appeal; and the power to revoke cannot properly be used to avoid the time limits for those steps.
I do not accept the general proposition that a respondent to a without notice application is confined to applying under CPR 23.10 or appealing, and is not permitted to apply to revoke the order. For instance, an application may be made to revoke an injunction made without notice on the grounds of material non-disclosure. In Edwards, the relevant facts and arguments justifying revocation showed that the Master had no power to make an order joining a new defendant because (a) there was no live action and (b) the limitation period had expired. In those circumstances, to revoke the order was "not to usurp the power of the Court of Appeal, but rather to correct a fundamental procedural error"[26].
It is necessary therefore to consider carefully the nature and genesis of the error said to have been made by the Master. The claimant's primary submission was that since there was at the date of the order no subsisting challenge to the judgment or application for withdrawal of the EEO (both of which are required to be made in the court of origin), the Master simply lacked jurisdiction to grant a stay. This, the claimant submitted, resulted in an error analogous to that in Edwards, a fundamental procedural error capable of justifying revocation of the order. I accept that the error which the claimant alleges the Master made is one which falls within the Tibbles principles as sufficiently fundamental to be capable of justifying revoking the order.
I turn therefore to whether the Master in fact made an error. It is clear that the defendant had not commenced his challenge at the date of the order, since he had been unable to do so in the time scale for payment stipulated by the claimant. The defendant's counsel did not argue that the English court had an inherent jurisdiction to stay enforcement on a quia timet basis. She urged me to construe " challenge" in a broad purposive way, so as to include a clear intention to challenge, but did not provide any authority for doing so. In my judgment, the wording of the regulation, although capable of producing manifestly unjust results, is clear; and that since there was no subsisting challenge on 3 February 2014, the Master had no jurisdiction under art 23 to make the 2014 order.
However, the defendant's counsel also submitted that the Master had jurisdiction to stay enforcement of the EEO, on the grounds that the EEO on its face was manifestly lacking; and, in particular, that it did not set out that the minimum requirements for service had been complied with (see para 15 above). She submitted that although art 21(2) prohibits the enforcing court from reviewing an EEO as to its substance, it does not preclude it from declining to enforce an EEO which is manifestly bad on its face. An extreme example would be an EEO containing only the name of the debtor and the amount of the debt. This, she submitted, the enforcing court could decline to enforce by granting a stay. The claimant's counsel submitted that the enforcing court would be obliged to enforce such an EEO, by reason of the fact that article 21(2) requires any challenge to it to be brought in the court of origin.
In my judgment, the failures in this case to fully complete the EEO are not matters of its "substance" of the EEO, but of its formal validity. I refer in particular to recital (17) of the regulation (which should be read in conjunction with preceding recitals (11) to (16) – I do not lengthen this judgment by setting them out):
"The courts competent for scrutinising full compliance with the minimum procedural standards should, if satisfied, issue a standardised European Enforcement Order certificate that makes that scrutiny and its result transparent."
Where the certificate itself does not make its result transparent, by, for instance, containing only the name of the debtor and the amount of the debt, the enforcing court would not in my judgment be obliged to enforce it. In this case, the EEO was not on its face capable of satisfying the enforcing court that the requirements of the regulation had been complied with; and Master McCloud was entitled to stay its enforcement on that ground alone, not under art 23, but under the court's inherent jurisdiction.
On this basis, it is not necessary to consider the other arguments which the claimant says he would have put forward on 3 February 2014, and the absence of which justify revoking the order.
If, however, I am wrong in concluding that the Master lacked jurisdiction under article 23, these arguments are relevant. They are also relevant if I am wrong in concluding that the Master was entitled to stay enforcement because of the manifest deficiencies on the face of EEO; because, even if the 2014 order was wrongly made at the time, the power to revoke is a discretionary one, to be exercised with regard to the current circumstances (see para 69 below).
I turn to the position if, contrary to my decision, the Master did have jurisdiction under article 23. The question then would be whether the absence of these arguments resulted in her making a fundamental procedural error.
As for the argument that a challenge to the judgment is not an "exceptional circumstance" within the meaning of art 23(c) of the regulation, this is self evident on the wording of the article: the existence of the challenge (or an application to withdraw the EEO) is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the granting of a stay.
As for the argument that there was no evidence of exceptional circumstances justifying a stay of enforcement, the claimant would need to show that that argument is capable of justifying revocation of the 2014 order.
The claimant's counsel submitted that the matters set out in the evidence in support of the stay application were matters going to the merits of the claim against the deceased, and whether the requirements as to service of the proceedings and judgment required by the regulation had been met. She relied upon article 21(2) as prohibiting the enforcing court from taking these matters into account for any purpose. She submitted therefore that this argument also undermined the jurisdiction of the Master to make the order, independently of her first argument. I agree that this is an argument that goes to the Master's jurisdiction and for that reason capable of justifying revocation. I turn to its merits.
The defendant's counsel submitted that the Master was entitled to take into account, as exceptional circumstances, the merits (lack of) of the claim, the failures to comply with the service requirements of the regulation and the manifest non-compliance with those requirements.
I accept the defendant's counsel's submission on this issue. Art 21(2) refers to a "review". This is, in my judgment, to be construed in the context of the regulation as a whole. Article 19 refers to a review of the judgment, which is a formal act by the court (of origin) applied for by the debtor. Similarly, art 23 refers to an application for a review within the meaning of art 19 as being one of the ways of challenging a judgment. The expression is not properly to be construed broadly as referring to any process which involves consideration of the matters relied upon by the defendant in this case. It follows that in my judgment the Master would have been entitled to take into account the prospects of success of the Spanish challenges; and if she concluded that they were sufficiently high, to treat them as exceptional circumstances, had she had jurisdiction to do so under art 23.
Material misstatement of fact
The claimant relied upon the defendant's assertion in the application notice in the box responding to the question "Who should be served with this application?" "N/A Ex parte application" as being a material misstatement of fact. I have already referred to CPR 23.8. In addition, CPR PD 23A, para 3 provides that an application may be made without serving an application notice in certain circumstances, which include exceptional urgency, where the court gives permission, or where the overriding objective is best furthered by doing so. It cannot be said that the factual position was not made clear to the Master: the application notice referred to and identified the claimant's solicitors.
I must therefore assume that Master McCloud considered whether the application was suitable for determination without service of the application notice on the claimant; and decided that it was. The defendant's statement on the application notice was a request that the court do so, which the Master could have declined. It was not a misstatement; and, even if it was, the Master was required to, and no doubt did form her own view.
Material change in circumstances since February 2014
The claimant relied upon the fact that, in both the constitutional appeals by the defendant, the applications for stays of enforcement have been refused by the Constitutional Court.
She initially submitted that the defendant's applications for a stay were dismissed by the Spanish Constitutional Court because it found that the Article 23(c) condition of 'exceptional circumstances' had not been made out by her. However, it is clear from the translations provided of the relevant judgments that the Spanish Court was applying its national law to the question of whether to grant a stay, and that article 23 was not in play at all. This is not surprising as applications under article 23 can only be made to the enforcing court, not the court of origin.
At the second hearing, the claimant's counsel had moderated her position to submitting that the court of origin had canvassed a question relevant to this court's consideration of art 23(c) and held that there is nothing exceptional about the circumstances.
I have already held that Master McCloud was entitled to take into account the deceased's prospects of success in the Spanish challenges as being exceptional circumstances. I reject the submission that the decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court refusing a stay have any relevance to the basis of the Master's decision, so as to amount to a material change in circumstances: because those decisions were based on Spanish national law, and made on the basis of the evidence presented to that court. I also note that one of the grounds set out for refusing the stay was that the stay referred to in article 23 "could take effect by operation of law in the State of enforcement" (see para. 29 above).
Manifest error in the formulation of the 2014 order
The claimant's submissions under this heading were a repetition of her submissions as to the merits of the 2014 order. No error in formulation is identified, and in my judgment there is no such error.
Whether in all the circumstances it would be right to revoke the 2014 order
I have held that at the date of 2014 order, the Master lacked jurisdiction under art 23, but was nonetheless entitled to stay enforcement of the EEO because of the manifest deficiencies on its face. However, if I am wrong, and the Master was not so entitled, it would nonetheless not be right in my judgment to exercise my discretion to revoke the 2014 order for the following reasons.
First, this court has had jurisdiction under art 23 since 20 February 2014, and will continue to do so until the final determination of the Spanish proceedings. Secondly, as I have concluded in para 60 above, the factual matters presented to the Master, namely the absence of any merits of the Spanish claim, the failure to serve the proceedings or the judgment, and the failure to comply with the minimum procedural requirements of the regulation are cumulatively properly to be regarded as exceptional circumstances which justify the grant of a stay. To these may be added that the evidence now before me shows that the claimant is wholly impecunious (qualifying for fee remission, and instructing his legal representatives under a conditional fee agreement), so that if enforcement is not stayed and the Spanish challenges succeed, there must be a serious risk that the defendant would not recover the sums paid to him, or any costs in seeking recovery.
Thirdly, and in any event, there has been significant delay (nearly 2½ years) between the 2014 order and the application. As stated in Tibbles, the court is unlikely to assist an applicant once much time has gone by. During this time, the defendant has gone forward in reliance on the 2014 order, and expended time and no doubt significant amounts of money pursuing the Spanish challenges. The claimant's primary argument that the Master lacked jurisdiction is one that could have been made at any time after the 2014 order was made.
The claimant sought to justify not having applied to revoke the order, by relying on the fact that, by 20 February 2014, the deceased had made the first of the Spanish challenges. The claimant then made, his counsel submitted, a purely pragmatic decision based on the fact that an order setting aside enforcement by the Spanish courts would have rendered irrelevant any interim order for a stay by the English court. The difficulty with this submission is that the current position does not differ in any material respect from that on 21 February 2014, namely, the Spanish challenges are ongoing, and may result in the withdrawal of the EEO. The claimant's delay was not, therefore, in my judgment, justified. The claimant's deliberate decision to delay making this application is a further factor against revisiting the 2014 order.
For these reasons, therefore, I refuse the application.


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Lansing — Attorney General Bill Schuette spent more than $2 million in the first six months of his Flint water crisis investigation on a team of attorneys, investigators and support personnel that totaled 42 people in June, according to records obtained by The Detroit News.
About $1.86 million of the expenses went to paying lawyers, retired police officers investigating the widespread contamination of Flint's water, law clerks and an unnamed expert witness, according to invoices The News obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request.
The records show Schuette spent another $178,000 on computers, printers, copiers and cellphones for 23 attorneys, investigators and aides to keep communication about the investigation separated from the day-to-day work at the Attorney General's Office, which is separately representing state agencies subject to the wide-ranging criminal probe.
Thirteen attorneys who have worked on the case racked up more than $987,000 in charges through mid-June, including $226,500 billed by Royal Oak attorney Todd Flood as the lead special prosecutor in the case through his firm, Flood Law PLLC. In July, the State Administrative Board approved a $3.4 million increase in the Flood law firm's original $1.5 million contract that can be spent through September 2017 investigating and prosecuting individuals responsible for Flint's lead-tainted water.
The attorney general's probe so far has resulted in criminal charges against eight current and former state employees and one city of Flint utility worker.
Schuette also has sued two engineering firms that worked at the Flint water treatment plant, claiming the companies "botched" treatment of corrosive Flint River water blamed for leaching lead into the city's drinking water supply.
Three other attorneys working on the investigation as special assistant attorneys general have billed more than $100,000 for their work through June 15.
Flood and 10 other attorneys were initially working on the investigation at $400 per hour. But a May 31 amendment to the contract eliminated the hourly pay scale in an attempt to contain monthly expenses to $198,000. The contract allows for monthly billings to exceed the $198,000 soft cap as long as the total cost doesn't exceed $1,511,087 from April through September.
The monthly cost containment clause came after billings topped $703,000 for February, March, April and May topped $1 million combined.
The amended contract requires a minimum 640 attorney hours, 640 investigators and 100 hours from support personnel each month.
"This is a way for the budget to remain on budget and ensure we're accomplishing what we need to," Bitely said.
Nearly all expenses for attorneys, investigators, clerks and other support personnel are being run through Flood's law firm, with the exception of Special Agent Jeff Seipenko, an employee of the Attorney General's Office assigned to the case.
The investigators, led by former Detroit FBI chief Andrew Arena and Flint native Ellis Stafford, had billed about $307,000 through mid-June. Stafford is a retired Michigan State Police inspector.
The remaining costs of a legal services bill totaling $1.75 million were for law clerks, a records analyst and an expert witness, whose name is redacted from records but was paid $69,750.
Schuette also hired retired appellate judge William Whitbeck to serve as his top legal adviser in the investigation. Whitbeck, who served on the Court of Appeals with Schuette, has billed nearly $114,000 through the end of June for his services, records show.
Schuette hired Whitbeck because his top chief legal counsel, Matthew Schneider, and Chief Deputy Attorney General Carol Isaacs are walled off from the investigation because of the Attorney General's Office's representation of state department and officers, Bitely said.
Whitbeck's contract contains a provision disclosing that he will recuse himself from an appellate court training program run by the Warner, Norcross & Judd law firm if the practice proceedings for attorneys "in any way relate to the Flint water situation." Attorneys at Warner, Norcross & Judd have a $800,000 contract with Gov. Rick Snyder's office to provide the governor and his staff representation in Schuette's criminal investigation.
The Attorney General's Office is providing Snyder and numerous state employees with legal representation in criminal investigations conducted by Schuette, U.S. Attorney Barbara McQuade and Genesee County Prosecutor David Leyton, as well as numerous civil lawsuits filed against the Snyder administration over Flint's water contamination while the city was under state control.
To keep a firewall between attorneys and investigators all working under Schuette, Flood's team has been operating in an office in Detroit with a computer system that is "completely separate and walled off from the state of Michigan," Bitely said.
"When you're looking at the state of Michigan, you want to make sure you're completely walled off," she said.
Records show the number of people working on the investigation grew from 31 in March to 42 in June.
Flood he has not sought reimbursement for the cost of renting the office space and also isn't billing the state for his own travel and meals, Bitely said.
Bitely said Flood paid for his own plane ticket, hotel and meals to take a March trip to Washington, D.C., where he sat through two days of Flint hearings conducted by the U.S. House Oversight Committee, including Snyder's congressional testimony.
The Verizon cellphones all contain Flint's 810 area code, though the specific numbers were redacted from the records. Schuette has one of the phones and a separate iPad for the investigation, according to the records. Schuette's top advisers Rusty Hills and John Sellek were also given phones for the investigation, according to the records.
The $178,000 in equipment purchases includes a bullet-proof vest among the invoices for computers, printers, copiers and cellphones. An April 26 invoice billed the Flint water investigation $650 for a Armor Express Halo Threat Level II concealable vest with a shock plate for added protection, records show.
The vest was purchased for Special Agent Jeff Seipenko when he joined the Attorney General's Office in April, Bitely said.
Initially, Seipenko was hired to work in the health care fraud division. But before he started that job, he was immediately reassigned to work on Flood's investigation, according to Bitely.
Special agents in the Attorney General's office, who are typically police officers, are routinely issued a gun, badge and bullet-proof vest, Bitely said.
The Flint team equipped all of its investigators with identification badges for conducting interviews of witnesses, which Schuette has said now exceeds 200 different people.
Records show an extra badge costing $18.95 was bought in late March as a "replacement for stolen ID belonging to Ellis Stafford," according to a hand-written note on the invoice.
The badge went missing after someone rummaged through Stafford's vehicle, Bitely said.


text:
Rare 1971 Dodge Challenger V8 Needs Only Quick TLC, Still Running
29/12/2021 60 Views 2 Min Read
Toyota Drops New Standing-Type BEV in Japan, It's All About Comfort and Convenience
Dodge built close to 22,500 Challengers for the model year 1971, and it goes without saying the hardtop accounted for the biggest part of the production. Over 20,000 units therefore rolled off the assembly lines with this body style, and out of them, nearly 19,000 cars were fitted with a V8. When it comes to the convertible, this body style was much rarer on this model year, as Dodge produced only a little over 1,800 units. It's believed some 1,770 vehicles came with a V8 under the hood, as less than 100 customers wanted their Challenger convertibles to run on six-cylinder power. The 1971 Challenger we have here was also born with a V8 inside, and eBay seller brandomielen0 says the 318 (5.2-liter) is still inside, running, and everything. This is without a doubt good news for someone who wants to bring this Challenger back to mint condition, with the seller explaining some fixes in this regard has already been made. For instance, the interior is completely new, and the convertible top was replaced a few years ago. The car is described as "mostly original," and the only big part that's missing is the air conditioning system. The original Dark Green Metallic paint looks good as well, and judging from the photos shared by the seller, it only comes with a few rust issues that should be resolved quite fast. Buying this Challenger clearly won't be easy, as the car has already attracted the attention of no less than 35 people who are trying to buy it as part of the auction. The top offer at the time of writing is getting very close to $23,000, but this still isn't enough to trigger the reserve. If you want to see the car in person and inspect everything thoroughly, it's parked in Albany, New York.
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


"misery tourism" is an evocative, compact, and powerful phrasing.
At Amberleaf Fair is so great! Apart from the virtues you mention, it's so low-key original and unusual.
It is, and thinking over it more, it is one of those books in which the worldbuilding is so tightly integrated into the story that there is something interesting on every single page, even when it is just breakfast or what to wear in the rain -- which I am beginning to think is a better description of my favourite sort of speculative fiction than 'nothing happens'.
Phyllis Ann Karr! I loved The Idylls of the Queen and have not read anything else of hers, but this post provides all the more reason why I should.


If you've got lots of initiative, this is where you can really make things happen! You might be a budding entrepreneur with an exciting business idea or want to explore the opportunities beyond a 9 to 5 career.
Enterprising people have a very specific set of life skills that include learning how to handle uncertainty, how to embrace change, how to have and implement ideas and develop a can-do approach.
If this sounds exciting to you, Enterprise is the way to go.
Get inspired – check out Young Enterprise, self-employment, Working Knowledge, Enterprise days and activities and the Prince's Trust.
To enter the Embark award simply complete 18 STAR activity records in total. 6 of these must be in the 'My courses and careers' category. You then need to write one reflective statement. Explore other categories and find out more about how to enter.


This gorgeous Personalised Plant Atomiser is made of enamel and has a plastic mechanism that provides a fine water mist.
The Plant Atomiser is ideal for watering delicate indoor plants along with having some fun expressions or quotes on them.
The Atomiser is a traditional design with screw top, pump and finger handle, which unscrews to refill with water.
This Atomiser is available in a choice of three contemporary colours, green & gold, white & grey and charcoal & grey.
You can personalise your atomiser with any message, quote or expression, the list is endless! You can have up to 3 lines of personalisation, 10 characters per line. You do not have to have text on line 2 or 3, just leave it blank if you do not want any text.
We will complete your text in the font shown which is only available in capitals.
As this product is made to order please triple check your requested colours, as once ordered it is unlikely to be able to be changed!
Dimensions: 9.7 x 9.7 x 19.4cm. Holds approx 600mls of liquid.


text:
CBA Influence Submissions
Being there: CBA supports occasionally travelling Supreme Court
SCC hearings outside Ottawa could enhance Canadians' appreciation for their democratic institutions.
BY Kim Covert 25 Feb 2019
Photo by Kira auf der Heide on Unsplash
Canadians are losing confidence in their justice system, says Supreme Court Chief Justice Richard Wagner, who's thinking of taking the high court on the road to bring it closer to the citizens it serves.
"The idea is to be close to the people," he told the Globe and Mail last June, outlining his proposal to take the court out of Ottawa for a few days of hearings, and maybe making it an annual event.
"It's all in line with our policy to be present in each province, to make sure that every citizen feels that the Supreme Court is there for them. And to give the chance to those people who cannot be in Ottawa, to look at how it's done. How the arguments are made. How the judges are doing their thing."
A 2015 Statistics Canada report suggests that just over 50 per cent of Canadians have some degree of confidence in the justice system. And the CBA's own Reaching Equal Justice report noted that many Canadians, particularly those in poor and marginalized communities, do not believe they will be treated fairly by the justice system.
In a recent letter to Chief Justice Wagner, CBA President Ray Adlington noted that technology isn't always the be-all and end-all when it comes to taking the message to the people, and that the Supreme Court's investment in webcasting and broadcasting still only reached those with the financial and technological resources to access television or the Internet.
The CBA supports the idea of occasional Supreme Court sittings outside Ottawa, as a way to enhance public appreciation of Canada's law and democratic institutions. The CBA also suggests some factors to take into consideration, such as the case's relationship to the region where the hearings would be held, the cost to the court and the parties, the ability to take advantage of opportunities for public engagement and education, and public perception of the stressors in the justice system generally. The suggestions were taken from consultations with national Sections and Branch presidents.
"Additional dimensions of understanding and appreciating of the SCC's work are available for those able to attend in person," noted President Adlington.
Kim Covert is Manager of media relations and public affairs with the Canadian Bar Association.
Submissions Helping charities to carry out advocacy
There is too much confusion about the distinction between a charitable purpose and a charitable activity.
BY Kim Covert
Submissions Rethinking reimbursements for reproductive donors and surrogates
Bringing a child into the world costs money – and we should make more of it available to donors and surrogates.
Submissions Suggestions for improving CASL? We have a few…
What's a commercial electronic message, and other questions for the CASL review?


text:
Рындино — название населённых пунктов.

Россия
 Рындино — деревня в Грязовецком районе Вологодской области.
 Рындино — деревня в Бабынинском районе Калужской области.
 Рындино — деревня в Дзержинском районе Калужской области.
 Рындино — деревня в Мещовском районе Калужской области.
 Рындино — деревня в Горшеченском районе Курской области.
 Рындино — деревня в Бежаницком районе Псковской области.
 Рындино — деревня в Усвятском районе Псковской области.
 Рындино — село в Порецком районе Чувашии.
 Рындино — село в Цивильском районе Чувашии.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
STDs Stories
7 Best STD Testing Kits On Amazon
At-home STD testing kits test you from the safety and privacy of your own home, and here are 7 of the best at-home STD testing kits.
July 3, 2019 11:11 AM By Denise Nellasca
Chlamydia, Gonorrhea, Syphilis Rates Hit New High In California
STD cases in California have increased by 45 percent compared to five years ago while chlamydia, gonorrhea, and syphilis reach highest numbers since the 1980s.
May 15, 2018 12:49 AM By Sadhana Bharanidharan
Male Virgins Can Still Get HPV
You don't need to have sex to catch HPV, according to these male virgins with the STD.
December 13, 2017 4:24 PM By Elana Glowatz
Certain Transgender Groups Get Tested Most For HIV
Researchers have found that some transgender people get three times as many HIV tests than others.
November 1, 2017 4:14 PM By Elana Glowatz
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study And Two Other Inhumane US Experiments
Although it's been 45 years since the end of the Tuskegee Syphillis Study, it's important not to forget what happened to these men, as well as other men who suffered at the hands of American scientists.
May 11, 2017 3:40 PM By Dana Dovey
How Gonorrhea Uses Manipulation To Infect The Uterus
A new study has finally figured out how the gonorrhea bacteria overcomes the female body's protections against invaders.
April 14, 2017 5:42 PM By Dana Dovey
Genital Herpes Vaccine Is On The Way
A vaccine for genital herpes could stop both that STD and HIV from spreading.
January 23, 2017 12:36 PM By Elana Glowatz
Is That A Pimple Or Herpes?
You have a bump on your genitals. Is it a pimple? Is it herpes? Here's how to know.
January 20, 2017 2:15 PM By Elana Glowatz
Common Trichomoniasis Symptoms In Women
Most people with the STD trichomaniasis don't show any symptoms, but the parasite is highly infectious and can hurt unborn babies.
December 21, 2016 11:22 AM By Elana Glowatz
Common Herpes Symptoms In Women
Herpes is one of the most common STIs contracted in the United States, and is slightly more prevalent in women than men. Here are common herpes symptoms in women.
December 14, 2016 2:35 PM By Dana Dovey
World AIDS Day: Vaginal Ring Can Prevent HIV
A treatment that works like a birth control ring has been shown to cut HIV infection risk by a third for women in sub-Saharan Africa, where the AIDS epidemic is the worst.
Syphilis And The Male Body
Many men can go years without knowing that they have syphilis, but letting it go untreated could lead to serious organ damage.
October 31, 2016 4:31 PM By Elana Glowatz


text:
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using resume.business.entities;
using FluentNHibernate.Mapping;

namespace resume.maps.nhibernate
{
    /// <summary>
    /// Mapping for <see cref="WorkResourceCategory"/> class.
    /// </summary>
    /// <seealso cref="FluentNHibernate.Mapping.ClassMap{resume.business.entities.WorkResourceCategory}" />
    public class WorkResourceCategoryMap : ClassMap<WorkResourceCategory>
    {
        public WorkResourceCategoryMap()
        {
            Id(x => x.Id);
            Map(x => x.Version);
            Map(x => x.CreationDate);
            Map(x => x.CreationUser);
            Map(x => x.ModificationDate);
            Map(x => x.ModificationUser);
            Map(x => x.Name);
            Map(x => x.NameFR);
            HasMany(x => x.WorkResourceTypes)
                .Inverse();
        }
    }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Holland Testifies on Affordability
Clyde Holland, chairman and CEO of Holland Partner Group, testifies at House hearing on affordability
Clyde Holland, chairman and CEO of Holland Partner Group, testified on Capitol Hill yesterday in front of the House Committee on Financial Services Housing and Insurance Subcommittee on the challenge of meeting the increasing demand for multifamily homes for millions of working Americans.
Testifying on behalf of NMHC and NAA at the hearing entitled, The Future of Housing in America: Government Regulations and the High Cost of Housing, Holland outlined the key reasons why America faces a growing affordability problem - stagnant wages, a supply-demand imbalance and numerous hurdles and regulations in developing new apartments - along with potential solutions.
"Almost 75 million young adults are entering the housing market, primarily as renters. At the same time, Baby Boomers and empty nesters are trading single-family houses for rental apartments," said Holland. "This combination of factors is forecast to lead to four million new renter households over the next decade."
The Increasing Affordability Divide
Holland detailed the key reasons why Americans are facing high rents and finding too few affordable rental units. The costs to develop and operate rental housing increases each year, while median household income today is virtually unchanged since 1981 on an inflation-adjusted basis.
In addition, Holland pointed to the enormous deficit when it comes to aligning the supply of rental apartments with the demand. "Between 300,000 and 400,000 apartments must be constructed annually to simply keep pace with demand," he said. "Yet, on average, just 208,000 apartments were delivered in the four year period from 2011 to 2015.
And finally, Holland detailed that the development of new apartment homes is exceptionally difficult and in many markets where apartments are needed most, "simply impossible."
"Even if, hypothetically, developers agreed to take no profit, the cost to build still exceeds what people can afford to pay."
He noted the litany of hurdles and regulations that often slow down or even stop the process.
"Even in communities that want and desperately need new multifamily development, the numerous hurdles that must be overcome include: entitlement expenditures; zoning rules; environmental site assessments; impact fees; mandates like inclusionary zoning or rent control; labor expenses; and building code requirements," said Holland.
Further, "Before a project even breaks ground, we often encounter organized community resistance known as "Not in My Back Yard," or NIMBY actions," said Holland. He emphasized that these anti-renter efforts are rarely based on legitimate concerns, but can still significantly impede the construction process by two to ten years and require upfront investments of $1 million or more.
"All of these barriers ultimately translate into higher construction costs and rents for residents," he stressed. "In fact, Point Loma Nazarene University studied the San Diego housing market and found that regulations increased the cost of housing by a staggering 40 percent!"
Holland then outlined that policymakers must recognize that addressing local workforce housing needs requires a partnership between government and the private sector. "Local governments can do this by bringing down barriers to development and incentivizing for-profit entities to build apartment homes at a price that is affordable for the community," he said. "When both the public and private sectors bring all their tools and assets into play, the greater the likelihood of finding viable solutions to meet our housing challenges."
Some of the key solutions Holland touched on at the local level included deferring taxes and other fees for a set period of time, in addition to leveraging their tangible assets like buildings, raw land and entitled parcels. At the federal level, he noted that Congress must enable new development, preserve subsidy programs that make units available at below-market rates, and rehabilitate existing stock at-risk of loss due to obsolescence and other factors.
He concluded by emphasizing that Americans work hard and deserve quality housing at a price they can afford, but that we as a nation are "falling short" of that goal.
"What is needed is a bold, fresh vision that sets aside historic approaches that have only marginally succeeded," said Holland. "We invite policymakers to convene a task force to bring together the public and private sectors so as to embrace all the tools at our disposal in order to meet the tremendous challenge of affordable housing production."
To read Mr. Holland's full written testimony, please click here.


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dyb·buk - noun (in Jewish folklore) a malevolent wandering spirit that enters and posseses the body of a living person until exorcized.
Kya Brickhouse (Messenger), Christina Euphrat (Fradde) Sydney Silver (Old Woman/Gitl), Patrick Romano (3rd Batlon/2nd Chasid) Grainne Ortlieb (Leah), Jayson Lee (Chonen), Jack Lancaster (1st Batlon/Very Homely Man/Menashe,Scribe), Cody McGlashan (2nd Batlon/Rabbi Mendl/Michl), Jeremy Deshaun Willis (Henech/Rabbi Shimshin), Matthew Wade (Mayer/Rabbi Azriel), and Ryan Kirby (Sender).
Ensemble: Alec Deske (Yeshiva Student and Others), Aly Easton (Poor Woman With Baby and Others) , TJ Harris (1st Rabbinical Judge and Others), Eamon Hurd (1st Chasid and Others), William Kanter (Osher and Others), Jesi Mullins (Very Old Poor Woman and Others) , Lauren Skelton (A Tall Pale Women and Others), Jeffery Todd Parrott (2nd Rabbinical Judge and Others), and Antonio Rodriguez (Nachman and Others).
Musicians: Lucie Greene (Clarinet), Alex Koffman (Violin), Jack Lancaster (Accordion), and Jacque Harper (Bass).
The performance of A Dybbuk or Between Two Worlds on 2/24 at 2:00 PM will include a live audio-description of the visual and physical events on-stage for patrons who are blind or have low vision. We also invite you to join us that day for a pre-performance program with a touch tour, which begins at 1 PM in the Watts Theatre lobby. The touch tour program will include information about the characters and design choices that add to the world of the play. Patrons who are participating in the audio-described event may also request the playbill in Braille, large print, and audio formats. Please indicate interest in the Touch Tour when you order your tickets. Call our Box Office at (773) 325-7900.


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Киндулкино () — деревня в Медведевском районе Марий Эл Российской Федерации. Входит в состав Ежовского сельского поселения.

Численность населения —  человек ( год).

География
Располагается в 9,5 км от административного центра сельского поселения — села Ежово.

История
Киндулкино впервые упоминается в XVIII веке.

Население

Национальный состав на 1 января 2014 г.:

Описание
Улично-дорожная сеть деревни имеет грунтовое покрытие. Просёлочная дорога, ведущая к посёлку, имеет грунтовое покрытие.

Жители проживают в индивидуальных домах, не имеющих централизованного водоснабжения и водоотведения. Дома не газифицированы.

Примечания

Населённые пункты Медведевского района


MICRO-PURCHASES: Micro-purchase means an acquisition of products or services where the aggregate amount does not exceed $3,500.
COMPETITION: Purchases within the micro-purchase threshold can be awarded without soliciting competitive price quotations if the price is reasonable.
PURCHASES: To the extent practicable, purchases must be distributed equitably among qualified suppliers with reasonable prices.
choose one supplier for the purchase of the apples and another supplier the next time apples need to be purchased (each of the purchases cannot exceed $3,500).
REASONABLE PRICE: Ways to verify the reasonableness of a price is to compare previous purchases, have personal knowledge of the item being purchased, or compare to similar items being purchased.
RECORDS: Records still need to be kept for all purchases regardless of the procurement method used, including micro-purchases.
Micro-purchase means a purchase of supplies or services using simplified acquisition procedures, the aggregate amount of which does not exceed the micro-purchase threshold. Micro-purchase procedures comprise a subset of a non-federal entity's small purchase procedures. The non-federal entity uses such procedures in order to expedite the completion of its lowest-dollar small purchase transactions and minimize the associated administrative burden and cost. The micro-purchase threshold is set by the Federal Acquisition Regulation at 48 CFR Subpart 2.1 (Definitions). It is $3,500 except as otherwise discussed in Subpart 2.1 of that regulation, but this threshold is periodically adjusted for inflation.
Procurement by micro-purchase is the acquisition of supplies or services, the aggregate dollar amount of which does not exceed the micro-purchase threshold (§200.67 Micro-purchase). To the extent practicable, the non-federal entity must distribute micro-purchases equitably among qualified suppliers. Micro-purchases may be awarded without soliciting competitive quotations if the non-federal entity considers the price to be reasonable.


text:
With a canny balance of contemporary freshness (in the form of a Lil Wayne guest spot) and well-calibrated nostalgia (via a Smokey Robinson sample, a Missy Elliott cameo, and production by Timbaland), Code Red offers proof that '90s teen R&B icon Monica has pulled off a successful second act. The album includes swaying slow jams ("Hustler's Ambition," "Anchor"), retro-futuristic funk ("Suga"), and effervescent hip-hop–goosed pop-soul ("Just Right for Me," the title track). Monica deftly navigates between styles, facing forward with her ambitions while wistfully reminiscing about musical heroes from days gone by.
Code Red Monica
Code Red (feat. Missy Elliott & Laiyah)
Just Right for Me (feat. Lil Wayne)
Love Just Ain't Enough (feat. Timbaland)
All Men Lie (feat. Timbaland)
Hustler's Ambition (feat. Akon)
Alone in Your Heart
Ocean of Tears
I Miss Music
℗ 2015 RCA Records, a division of Sony Music Entertainment
More By Monica
New Life (Deluxe Version)
Miss Thang
The Boy Is Mine
More Issues Than Vogue
Rated Love (Deluxe Edition)
KeKe Wyatt
Calling All Lovers (Deluxe)
Tamar Braxton
Smoove Jones
Mýa


text:
Here's how Ontario's new restrictions affect Ryerson
Alexandra Holyk Campus News, COVID-19, News, Student Politics January 15, 2021
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Assoc. dean sues Rye for $575,000
In News May 19, 2011 4 Comments
By: Mariana Ionova
The associate dean of the Ted Rogers School of Management is suing Ryerson University for breach of contract and defamation after he was banned from campus amid allegations of harassment, according to a Toronto Star report.
James Norrie was placed on paid leave in March when the university began investigating rumours accusing him of "profanity directed at persons, ridiculing or belittling persons and other inappropriate action," according to court filings. The university told Norrie to stay off campus but allowed him to keep teaching one course because no replacement could be found.
In a court hearing on May 18, Ryerson's legal representative, Stephen Gleave, said a large number of complaints had been made against Norrie and the university is currently conducting an investigation that could involve up to 20 people, reports the Star. Gleave also said Norrie defied the university's orders and went on campus last month to confront the people who had complained about him.
Janet Mowat, director of public affairs at Ryerson, said the university would refuse to comment on the issue out of respect to Norrie. Ryerson has yet to issue a statement of defence.
Norrie became a tenured professor in 2007 and signed a five-year contract for the TRSM associate dean position in 2008. Norrie taught in the department of Information Technology and was an active member in the Digital Media Zone and SIFE Ryerson. Norrie is well known for his stint on season one of Dragon's Den where his interruption caused the Dragons to rip up a $200,000 cheque for a group of Ryerson entrepreneurs.
He is seeking damages totaling $575,000, a public apology in a national newspaper of his choice and a court injunction allowing him to attend convocation ceremonies in June. Norrie's request for an injunction is scheduled for June 13.
Photos: Ryerson University and file photo
With files from Rebecca Burton
June 15, 2012 Reply
I am not surprised. I attended one presentation from Dr. Norrie at our workplace at the City of Edmonton few months ago on Social Media. I was not impressed.
He can be rude.
One co-worker had asked him a question about the US Patriot Act and the effect it has on data when organizations move to the Cloud, he was rude and distorted what she said. He answered in a unprofessional way that "Anyone who thinks the data is kept in the US doesn't know what they are talking about" and the way he answered was intimidating. The lady never mentioned anything about data being kept in the US.
I am disappointed that some Organizations are still hiring him to give presentations. After I've seen his presentation on Social Media and the way he reacted to a legitimate question, I will never waste my time attending his talks even when provided for free by our organization, let alone pay for one.
Unfortunately he is one of the keynote speakers at the Technocon 2012 taking place here in Edmonton next week.
Judy,
Drew Madsen
This asshole needs to be sued to the maximum. LOUD MOUTHED! ARROGANT! NO CLASS! FAILURE. Listening to him makes me want to jump off the CN Tower!
Totally agree with you.
I heard him give a keynote presentation today at the 2012 Technocon Conference hosted by the City of Edmonton and the University of Alberta, and was not impressed at all. If anything it was a waste of my time. He either thought the audience had no intellectual capacity or his is limited.
I don't understand why they paid him to speak.
Drew, as a graduate of the program, let me tell you that the faculty is a joke. I've never had Norrie but it's no loss to the university if he's anything like his colleagues.
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Gadget News	• 31 Oct 2011
Samsung to introduce flexible smartphones, tablets by 2012
By Steven Norris: grumpy curmudgeon
Read nextHelp! My console's a PC
Flexible screens have been knocking around trade shows and gadget events for ages now. It took Samsung, one of the world's most successful electronic developers to make it a palatable reality.
Last week, Samsung said that it is aiming to have tablets and mobile phones with flexible displays by 2012. Following on the monumental success of the Galaxy S II, which has sold well over ten million phones in half a year, Samsung is now well on its way to manufacturing a flexible screen for the masses and is spurred on by its own success.
Despite its operational profit soaring almost double during its July to September period, its overall profit fell US$3.1-billion, a 23% drop in profit. Samsung stated that it lost money on display and chip operations.
Robert Yi, a Samsung spokesperson said, "The flexible display, we are looking to introduce sometime in 2012, hopefully the earlier part. The application probably will start from the handset side". He noted that mobile and tablets will be first out of the production line.
Samsung purchased Liquavista, a tech company which produces electrowetting displays. These are bright, flexible, transparent and above all, low-cost.
What technology Samsung has currently shown off, impresses. Its flexible OLED is contained inside a rigid shell and is similar to Nokia's offering, in that with a twist and a pull of the screen, interaction is possible. Its technology incorporates light generating pixels within flexible screens that lack backlights.
Flexible displays have been in fashion since early 2008 when a bending e-Reader made its way from Plastic Logic. Following this, Sony created and demoed one of the world's first flexible displays in 2009 named the "Flex OLED"
Samsung is slowly winning the endless smartphone battle against rival Apple. In the third fiscal quarter 27.8 million Galaxy S II's were shipped, in stark comparison to the 17.1 million Apple devices.
Steven Norris: grumpy curmudgeon
Steven Norris is a born writer, living in Tamboerskloof, Cape Town and educated in the ways of graphic design but destined to follow in the footsteps of the worlds greatest authors. He has had many years of experience as an SEO copywriter, learning the ropes the hard way before utterly mastering them. He loves training others to write, how to create stories from nothing and how to deliver them to a wider audience. His passion is gadgets, video games, and sorting jellybeans by colour and weight.
Posted in Gadget NewsTagged Flex OLED, Samsung, Sony
Help! My console's a PC
Consoles • 31 Oct 2011


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← Consider it joy??? Are you nuts???
Some families are not very tight. Some are hostile and some don't even speak. That makes me sad.
I think my mom and dad, both turning 80 today, fed us glue when we were kids. They did something that stuck to us. It's made us stick together. And now, I see it has gone all they way down to our kids.
Dad went to all our activities and mom fixed our broken stuff and helped us through our heartbreaks. They scolded us when we screwed around, grounded us when we broke the rules, dragged us to church and pushed us to never give up. We celebrated every holiday big and laughed loud at life, together.
Big fights brought roses, "I love you's" were frequent and a quick goose in the kitchen always brought loud responses of "Donald!" Mom and Dad lived and loved in front of us and all around us.
We love because they loved. Amidst our own set of dysfunction there was always love.
I put our family in a storm this year. If we're honest, except for maybe Gail and Robin, I think we all doubted if I would be here today, alive. I had times I was sure I would die soon and times I begged God to stop my heart and end my pain.
We had times they huddled around me, protecting me, while the winds of my storm battered their backs.
They lined up offering to put themselves in danger so that I might live. They squabbled about who would "get to" give me half of their own liver. Love.
This weekend a good portion of my family will be with me as I attempt to bicycle ten miracle miles in the Fight Back Festival cancer fundraiser. We have matching Donate Life t-shirts for our Team Transplant group.
My son-in-law will ride with me at my slow pace encouraging me and keeping an eye on me, I'm sure. My wife and sister Gail will run a 5k to join me in Fighting Back and Gloria, Tom, Rebecca and Aleana will complete the 1 mile walk. And … yes … I am so blessed to still have my mom and dad with me, and all of us, attempting the walk as well. That glue has us stuck together. Its bond has strengthened through this storm.
Each and every mile I ride will be a miracle mile, each hill a hallelujah. Each peddle stroke represents an act of love from my family, my friends, the Church and even complete strangers.
Every breath I take and every beat of my heart is a testimony of God's care for me. Rescue. Redemption. Healing. Salvation. Love.
Today is both of my parents birthdays. (I know! What are the odds?) I should get them a gift but nothing could even come close to what they have given us – strong, unyielding love for one another. Family glue.
I am blessed beyond measure. My life is a miracle.
This entry was posted in Liver disease and tagged family, fight back festival, life after transplant, Liver, love, love of God, miracle, transplant. Bookmark the permalink.
Scott this is beautiful. Our families are so important to us. I am not good with words but we love you and have prayed for you always.
There are not enough stars to rate this post. Family glue is taught and caught. It can be learned and copied, but never manufactured. I'm praying with you through the miles today. I'll be eagerly awaiting the finish line pictures of the whole glued together masterpiece!
Thank you Diane. I feel like you're part of the family as we prayed so hard through you sister's fight. You WIILL climb! And the view on top is nothing short of spectacular!


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Q: Firefox freezes for about 10 seconds at startup Every time I launch Firefox and go visiting some websites, I notice it freezes for about 10 seconds. Not always in the same websites, but it always happens sometime in the first 2 or 3 minutes of running. I can see the hard disk led is ON all the time the browser is hung.
My operating system is Linux and I don't currently have any extension/plugin installed here.
I have no form completion, no history and have no more than 20-30 bookmarks.
Has somebody noticed something similar, or know how can I debug this to find out what Firefox is doing or trying to do?

A: I had the same problem on Win XP SP3.  After updating from FF 3.6 to FF 11, I noticed that FF would freeze for about 20 seconds on startup. Hard drive LED light is lit up solid. This freezing continued with FF 12 and FF 13.
Cause: The cause was the old versions of urlclassifier.sqlite from previous FF versions, going back to FF 2.
For some reason, FF was reading and compiling all of those old files upon startup.
Solution: Log on as an administrator and delete all urlclassifier variants ('urlclassifier.sqlite', 'urlclassifier2.sqlite', 'urlclassifier3.sqlite') from all of your FF profiles.
In Win XP, search the Documents and Settings folder for all files beginning with "urlclassifier", example: urlclassifier*.*
Delete all that you find. FF will rebuild just the urlclassifier3.sqlite on the next startup.
Result: After I deleted and allowed FF to re-download only the urlclassifier file that it needs, the freezing disappeared.

A: Make sure you have the relevant debug packages if any. Try running strace firefox and also running it in gdb and producing a backtrace after the freezing stops (you can google for info on how to produce a backtrace with gdb). Both will likely slow down firefox but will give quite a bit of useful info. You can post them on pastebin and link here, but it might also be prudent to submit a bug report to mozilla or your distro.

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