text:
  1. Title Page
  2. Acknowledgments
  3. Introduction
  4. Geopolitical Constructs
  5. The Scope of the Mulberry Harbour Project
  6. Bureaucratic Constructs
  7. Good Geopolitical Subjects
  8. The Business of Making the Mulberry Harbours
  9. Making Places
  10. Making Regions
  11. Conclusion
  12. Bibliography
  13. Index
  14. About the Author

Geopolitical Constructs

Geopolitical Constructs

The Mulberry Harbours,
World War Two, and the Making of a
Militarized Transatlantic

Colin Flint

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

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Copyright © 2016 by Rowman & Littlefield

_All rights reserved._ No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Names: Flint, Colin, 1965– author.

Title: Geopolitical constructs : the Mulberry Harbours, World War Two, and the making of a militarized transatlantic / Colin Flint.

Other titles: Mulberry Harbours, World War Two, and the making of a militarized transatlantic

Description: Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016018579 (print) | LCCN 2016025473 (ebook) | ISBN 9781442266674 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781442266681 (electronic)

Subjects: LCSH: Mulberry harbors. | World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—France—Normandy. | Geopolitics—Case studies. | Military planning—Great Britain—Case studies. | Military planning—United States—Case studies. | World War, 1939–1945—Amphibious operations. | United States—Relations—Great Britain. | Great Britain—Relations—United States.

Classification: LCC D761 .F55 2016 (print) | LCC D761 (ebook) | DDC 940.54/21421—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016018579

  TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

To the memory of A. E. Page, grandfather and good geopolitical subject

# Index

A

ABC-1 See American British Conversations

Abyssinian War of Famagusta,

Acheson, Dean, 1.1-1.2

Admiralty,  , 2.1-2.2

British War Office tensions with,

Hickling memo to, 1.1-1.2

Joseph L. Thompson and Sons Ltd. relationship with, 1.1-1.2

on labor supply, 1.1-1.2

micromanagement demands of, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry Harbours interference on work by, 1.1-1.2

Reyrolle Ltd. letter on trade disputes from, 1.1-1.2

Air Ministry, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

air raids,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 , 4.1-4.2 ,  ,

Allied Naval Command Expeditionary Force,

American British Conversations (ABC-1),  ,

American Red Cross Clubs,

American soldiers

British opinion of, 1.1-1.2

Coughtrie on, 1.1-1.2

in Mulberry Harbours, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

See also "yanks"

amphibious warfare

Great Britain importance of,

Mountbatten research on,

number of boats in, 1.1-1.2

Andrews, R. W. B., 1.1-1.2

Anglo-American High Command,

"

"Anglo-American Orbit,"  ,  ,  ,  ,

A

Anzac Cove,

Arromanches, 1.1-1.2 ,  ,  ,

Atkinson, John, 1.1-1.2

Atlantic Pact, 1.1-1.2

Atlantic Wall,

Auxiliary Territorial Service,

Ayre, Amos, 1.1-1.2 ,  ,

B

Bandung Conferences,

Bartram, R. M., 1.1-1.2

Bartram & Sons,

air raid distress fund and rules of, 1.1-1.2

Coxwell electronic welding and productivity letter to, 1.1-1.2

Lithgow letter to, 1.1-1.2

Battle of the Atlantic,  ,

Battle of the Somme,

Bayreux, France,

Beckett, Alan,  ,  , 3.1-3.2

Benhall Farm, agricultural production to military base of,

Benner, P. K.,

Benton Methodist Church

air raid shelter use of, 1.1-1.2

"Chapel Affairs" memo to, 1.1-1.2

civil responsibility and national war effort balance of,

as emergency feeding centre, 1.1-1.2

sanitary arrangements regarding, 1.1-1.2

Berlin crisis,  ,  ,

Bernal (professor),

Bessell (colonel),

Bevin, Anthony,

Bevin, Ernest,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

on full use of manpower, 1.1-1.2

on government responsibility for workers, 1.1-1.2

miners' annual conference speech of, 1.1-1.2

vision of, 1.1-1.2

on war, 1.1-1.2

on worker productivity, 1.1-1.2

"

"big picture,"  ,  , 3.1-3.2

B

billeting,  ,  ,  , 4.1-4.2 ,

"

"Black Market Joe," 1.1-1.2

B

Blair, Tony, 1.1-1.2

Blyth Dry Docks and Shipbuilding Company,

Bolero Combined Committee,

bombing,  , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

Booker, W. H., 1.1-1.2

Braithwaite and Kirk of West Bromwich,

Brest, France,

British Army,  ,  ,  ,

British Communist Party, 1.1-1.2

British Empire, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

British Harbour Committee,

British War Office,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Admiralty tensions with,

civilian contractors integration in,

demands of businesses and workers of,

employees as security concern of, 1.1-1.2

floating piers and roadways plan of,  , 2.1-2.2

geographical boundaries of "Protected Places" in, 1.1-1.2

invasion logistics of,

monitoring of mail and advertising by, 1.1-1.2

Brock (lieutenant colonel), 1.1-1.2

on maximum security, 1.1-1.2

Reyrolle Ltd. new designation from, 1.1-1.2

Towns exchange regarding Nathorff with, 1.1-1.2

Bronson, Harry E.,

Brooke, Alan,  ,

Brown, D. A., 1.1-1.2

Bushey Park, Watford, 1.1-1.2

C

Caen, France,

Carline, J. G.,

Carlisle (lieutenant),

Carter, C. H. G., 1.1-1.2

CCS See Combined Chiefs of Staff

Cherbourg, France,  ,

Cheyne, Alex,  ,  , 3.1-3.2

Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC),  ,

Chief of Works in Surrey Commercial Docks, London,

Churchill, Winston,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Bolero opinion of, 1.1-1.2 ,

on economic circumstances requiring aid from US, 1.1-1.2

Gallipoli landing failure of, 1.1-1.2

geopolitical commitment of, 1.1-1.2

"Iron Curtain" speech of,  ,

in Meader war diary,

Mountbatten orders of, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry Harbour plan convincing of, 1.1-1.2 ,

"Piers for Use on Beaches" memo of, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Roosevelt high-level political and strategic relationship with,

Sledgehammer opposition of,

Walter on meeting,

Civil Defence Act,

civilian contractors,  , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

Civil War,

Clark, A. Dayton,

CO See Combined Operations

code breaking, 1.1-1.2

Cohen, Saul,

Cold War,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2 , 7.1-7.2

Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech on,  ,

geopolitical setting of,

as "grand pacification," 1.1-1.2

Great Britain code breaking role in, 1.1-1.2

Palmerston foreshadowing of, 1.1-1.2

US projection of power in,

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS),

Combined Operations (CO),  , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,

_Combined Operations, 1940–42_ (Ministry of Information),

Commander US Naval Forces, Europe (ConNavEu),

Committee of Consulting Engineers,

communism,  ,

concrete caissons,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,  ,

drawings of,

Hughill on, 1.1-1.2

labor to build, 1.1-1.2

problems with,

Taylor on management of construction of, 1.1-1.2

See also Phoenixes

ConNavEu See Commander US Naval Forces, Europe

"

"Continental Commitment,"  ,  ,  ,

Great Britain avoidance of,  ,  ,  ,

C

Coodes,  ,

Corncobs,

Corporation Quay, Newcastle,  ,

COSSAC See Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Coughtrie, Thomas

on American soldiers, 1.1-1.2

on health deterioration, 1.1-1.2

Cowan, Ronnie,

Luck letter to, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry reflections of, 1.1-1.2

on recruitment, 1.1-1.2

Cox, Kevin,

Coxwell, C. S., 1.1-1.2

Creasy, George,

Cuneo, Terence,

D

Dalgliesh, Robert Stanley,

Davies, Peter,

Davison, W. W., 1.1-1.2

Dawson, Joseph T., 1.1-1.2

D-Day invasions, 1.1-1.2 ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

artificial harbor for,

Dawson on, 1.1-1.2

division landings on, 1.1-1.2

geopolitical resonance of,

Harris on Mulberry Harbours and, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

location of,

Marshall, M., involvement in, 1.1-1.2

name and date of,

pathway to,

_Delivering Security in a Changing World_ (Ministry of Defence),

Dennis, Alex,

Department of Docking and Inland Water Transportation,

"

"De-Reservation of Workpeople," 1.1-1.2

D

determinism,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Dieppe Raid,  ,  ,

Dierkes, Raymond, 1.1-1.2

Director of Contract Labour (Admiralty), 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Director of Experiments for Operational Requirements (DXOR),

Dittmer, Jason,

Dixon, C. A., 1.1-1.2

Dover Harbour,  ,

Duncan, Andrew,

Dunkirk, France,  , 2.1-2.2 ,  ,

evacuation of,  ,  ,

military strategy change due to,

DXOR See Director of Experiments for Operational Requirements

E

Edwards, June, 1.1-1.2

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1.1-1.2 ,

Ellis, Joan,

Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill,

_Emergency Rest and Feeding Centre Scheme_ (Newcastle City Town Clerk),

engineers,  ,  ,  , 4.1-4.2 , 5.1-5.2 , 6.1-6.2 , 7.1-7.2

English Channel,  , 2.1-2.2 ,  ,  ,  ,

ESTB See Everall Sectional Trans Bridging

ETOUSA See European Theater of Operations for US Army

Europe,  ,  ,  ,  , 5.1-5.2

division of postwar,  ,  , 3.1-3.2

US military presence in, 1.1-1.2 ,  ,

European Theater of Operations for US Army (ETOUSA),

Everall, W. E.

Rolfe on, 1.1-1.2

trestle bridge construction of, 1.1-1.2

Everall Sectional Trans Bridging (ESTB),

F

first aid post and shelter dispute, 1.1-1.2

flexible landing pier prototype,

floating piers,  ,  ,  , 4.1-4.2

Ford, Henry,

Forrestal, James, 1.1-1.2

Foucault, Michel,

France,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

invasion of,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,  ,

Freeman, Ralph,

"

"Friendly Invasion," 1.1-1.2

G

Gallipoli landing failure, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Gaunt (sergeant major),

GCHQ See Government Communications Headquarters

Gearing, John Walter, 1.1-1.2

General Purpose Committee of the Methodist Church, 1.1-1.2

geopolitical constructs,  ,

agency of individuals in,  , 2.1-2.2

assemblages difference from,

combination of agents and structures in, 1.1-1.2

complexity of,

concretization in,  ,

geopolitical landscapes in,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

good geopolitical subject in,  ,  ,  ,  ,

historical-geographical scope of,  ,  , 3.1-3.2

historical legacy and geographical reach of, 1.1-1.2

human agency in, 1.1-1.2

institutional arrangements of state and business in,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2 , 7.1-7.2

no "expiration date" of,

places and regions as, 1.1-1.2

as spatially and historically unbound,

state as, 1.1-1.2

structure, agency and context in,

from structure to constructs in, 1.1-1.2

three constructs as illustrative, 1.1-1.2

war making as,

geopolitical regions,  ,

as geopolitical constructs, 1.1-1.2

geopolitics in, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry Harbours making of,

as social constructs,

geopolitics,  , 2.1-2.2

coming together of different constructs in,

"cultural turn" in,

current focus of,

definition of,

feminist perspective in,  , 2.1-2.2

global and individual perspectives in,

"God's eye view" in,  ,  ,

"great man" tradition in, 1.1-1.2

history of,

idea of context in,

Marxist approaches to structure in, 1.1-1.2

postmodernism in,

structurationist perspective in, 1.1-1.2

structure vital to, 1.1-1.2

war pervasiveness of,

German Air Force,

See also Luftwaffe

Germany,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

northeast of England as bombing target for,  ,

Gibson, John (Jack) W.,  ,  ,  ,

Gilbert, S. K., 1.1-1.2

good geopolitical subject,  ,

bureaucratic constructs in, 1.1-1.2

civilian life to military duty switch as, 1.1-1.2

Cowan as, 1.1-1.2

in geopolitical constructs,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Gilbert on recruiting people as, 1.1-1.2

Halcrow as,

Hughill as, 1.1-1.2

individuals as, 1.1-1.2

Lancaster as special type of, 1.1-1.2

legacies of, 1.1-1.2

Marshall, M., as, 1.1-1.2

in Mulberry Harbours,

new roles and lifestyles as, 1.1-1.2

normalcy of, 1.1-1.2

places of,

postwar success of, 1.1-1.2

pride in team effort as, 1.1-1.2

process of making war as, 1.1-1.2

sense of achievement and self-worth as, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Taylor as, 1.1-1.2

teamwork as, 1.1-1.2

Walter as,

war effort and protection of rights balancing of,

Wernher as,  , 2.1-2.2

Witcomb as, 1.1-1.2

workers expectations of being,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Govan, Doreen,

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),  , 2.1-2.2

Grace, Tim, on "Black Market Joe," 1.1-1.2

Gray, G. J. M.,

Great Britain,  , 2.1-2.2 ,  ,

amphibious warfare importance in,

big picture of, 1.1-1.2

British opinion of American soldiers in, 1.1-1.2

Cold War code breaking role of, 1.1-1.2

constitutional monarchy of, 1.1-1.2

continental allies commitment of,

"Continental Commitment" avoidance of,  ,  ,  ,

cooperation between United States and, 1.1-1.2

as dominant economic power, 1.1-1.2

empire unraveling of, 1.1-1.2

foreign policy of,

Gallipoli landing failure of, 1.1-1.2

geopolitical roles changing of,

global geopolitical change of,

grand strategic reorientation of,

Janus tendency of,

Lend-Lease program regarding,  ,  ,

making of postwar,

manpower and experience in global empire of, 1.1-1.2

Marshall Memorandum to,

Mediterranean commitment of,

military tension regarding US,

Mountbatten strategic orientation change of, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry Harbours actions of, 1.1-1.2

new military bureaucracy in, 1.1-1.2

postwar legacies of, 1.1-1.2

as predominant world power, 1.1-1.2

Quebec Conference as power play between United States and, 1.1-1.2

rank and role relationship regarding,  , 2.1-2.2

security of, 1.1-1.2

shift in global geopolitics of,

tension between Army and Navy in,

Trident system in,  , 2.1-2.2

troop buildup in,  ,

as "unsinkable aircraft carrier,"  ,  , 3.1-3.2

US forces build up in, 1.1-1.2

US military land use in, 1.1-1.2

US worldview difference between, 1.1-1.2

war mobilization peak of,

women as new workforce of, 1.1-1.2

Grenfell, D. R.,

Gwyther, R. D.,  , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2 ,  , 5.1-5.2 ,

H

Halcrow, William,  ,  ,

as good geopolitical subject,

Mulberry Harbours notes on contractors and consulting engineers of, 1.1-1.2

on steel fabricators,

Harris, Alan,

on civilian lifestyle, 1.1-1.2

on Mulberry deployment, 1.1-1.2

on Mulberry Harbours and D-Day, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

on role change of, 1.1-1.2

Harvey, David,

Hawaii,

Hickling, Harold,  ,  ,

Top Secret Memo to Secretary of Admiralty from, 1.1-1.2

"

"hierarchizing process,"

H

High Water Mark at Ordinary Spring Tides (HWMOST),

Hinrichs, Andrew H., 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

historical-geographical scope, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 ,  ,  , 5.1-5.2 , 6.1-6.2

Hitler, Adolf,

Hodge, W. J.,

Hodnett, Parkin, & Baker, 1.1-1.2

Horan, Henry, 1.1-1.2

House of Commons,  ,  ,  ,

Hughes-Hallett, John,  ,  ,  ,  ,

blockships idea of, 1.1-1.2 ,  ,

frustrations of, 1.1-1.2

on Spud Pontoon Piers, 1.1-1.2

Hughill, Ms.

on caissons and engineers, 1.1-1.2

on camaraderie and self-worth, 1.1-1.2

on constant scrutiny on job, 1.1-1.2

on domestic tasks and socializing,

as good geopolitical subject, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry Harbours personal experience as secretary by, 1.1-1.2

on working on national security project, 1.1-1.2

Hull, John E, 1.1-1.2

HWMOST See High Water Mark at Ordinary Spring Tides

I

Ince, Godfrey,

Industrial Capacity Committee of the Production Council for Emergency Service,

Industrial Catering Association,

Institute of Civil Engineers,  ,

Institute of Welding, 1.1-1.2

institutional arrangements of state and business,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2 , 7.1-7.2

"

"Interim Scheme for the Training and Resettlement of Disabled Persons" pamphlet, 1.1-1.2

I

International Monetary Fund,

Inter-Services Training and Development Centre,

"

"intersubjective spacetime," 1.1-1.2

I

iron curtain,  ,  ,

Ismay, Hastings, 1.1-1.2

J

Jefferes, Jim, 1.1-1.2

J. H. Holmes & Co. Ltd., 1.1-1.2

Jobling, George, 1.1-1.2

Johnson, C. R., 1.1-1.2

Joint Engineers,  ,  , 3.1-3.2

Joint Planning Committee,

Joint US Strategic Committee,

Joint War Plans Committee,

Joly de Lotbinière (brigadier),

Joseph L. Thompson and Sons Ltd.

Admiralty in constant communication with,

Admiralty relationship of, 1.1-1.2

Ayre on ship orders of, 1.1-1.2

Director of Contract Labour letter to, 1.1-1.2

honorary perk of, 1.1-1.2

Lithgow letter to, 1.1-1.2

K

Kasperson, Roger E.,

Keller, Karl Otto,

Keyes, Roger, 1.1-1.2

King, Ernest J.,

King, William Mackenzie, 1.1-1.2

L

labor, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 ,  , 4.1-4.2 , 5.1-5.2

Lambe, C. E., 1.1-1.2

Lancaster, Masika,  ,

description of, 1.1-1.2

great secret of,

scale models of Harbours by,

as special type of geopolitical subject,

as World War Two construct,

Largs Conference, 1.1-1.2 ,  ,

Lee, John, 1.1-1.2

Lend-Lease program,  ,  ,

Lindsay (colonel),

Lithgow, James, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 ,  ,

Lobnitz pier-heads,  ,

Local Authorities,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2

logistics,  , 2.1-2.2 ,  , 4.1-4.2

Lord President's Committee,

Luck, John, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Luftwaffe,

Lyndale Hotel,

M

MacAlpine, Malcolm,

Mackinder, Halford,  ,  ,

Mahan, Alfred,

Mais, A. R., 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

manpower, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Manpower Requirements Committee,

Marshall, George,

"Europe first" view of,

North Africa invasion opinion of, 1.1-1.2

Marshall, Margaret, 1.1-1.2

Marshall Memorandum,

Marshall Plan,  , 2.1-2.2

Martin, Peter J.,  ,

McConville, Charles,

M-Day,

Meader, A., war diary of, 1.1-1.2

Melville, Alan, on reconstruction of countryside, 1.1-1.2

Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs, 1.1-1.2 ,

Methodist Trust Insurance Co.,

micromanagement demands, 1.1-1.2

Mieville, A. L., 1.1-1.2

Minghi, Julian V.,

Minister of Labour and National Service,

"Interim Scheme for the Training and Resettlement of Disabled Persons" pamphlet of, 1.1-1.2

welfare of workpeople letter of, 1.1-1.2

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1.1-1.2

Ministry of Aircraft Production,  , 2.1-2.2 ,

Ministry of Defence,

Ministry of Information,

Ministry of Supply,  ,  ,  ,

on labor supply, 1.1-1.2

production arrangements of, 1.1-1.2

Reyrolle Ltd. involvement with, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

Ministry of Transport,  ,

on electric crane need of,

emergency lighting demand of, 1.1-1.2

equipment letter of, 1.1-1.2

Modelski, George,

monitoring of mail and advertising, 1.1-1.2

Montgomery, Bernard, 1.1-1.2 ,

Moore, Robert Henry,

Morgan, Frederick,

Mountbatten, Louis,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,

as Advisor of CO,

Churchill's orders to, 1.1-1.2

Great Britain strategic orientation change of, 1.1-1.2

Ismay memo of authority to, 1.1-1.2

Largs Conference of, 1.1-1.2 ,

research on amphibious warfare of,

scope of task of, 1.1-1.2

on Wernher appointment, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry B,

Mulberry Harbours,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Admiralty and War Office tensions in,

American soldiers and international work-settings in, 1.1-1.2

artificial breakwaters of,

Britain role change after,  ,

bureaucratic arrangements of state and business in, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

bureaucratic constructs in,  , 2.1-2.2

bureaucratic politics of,

civilian life to military duty switch in, 1.1-1.2

"coming together" behavior of,

committee making of, 1.1-1.2 ,

connecting suppliers and production companies in, 1.1-1.2

construction of, 1.1-1.2

constructs central to,  ,

Cowan reflections on, 1.1-1.2

cultural norms sharing in,

D-Day division landings at, 1.1-1.2

demand for secrecy in,

Dieppe Raid failure as impetus for,

employees as biggest security concern in, 1.1-1.2

engineering innovation of,

engineers in,  ,  ,

ESTB essential for, 1.1-1.2

as example of cooperation between US and Great Britain, 1.1-1.2

floating piers of,

as geographic and historic bridge,

as geopolitical project,

geopolitical regions making of,

Gilbert on recruiting people for, 1.1-1.2

good geopolitical subjects in,

government interference in work on, 1.1-1.2

Great Britain actions of, 1.1-1.2

Halcrow's notes on contractors and consulting engineers on, 1.1-1.2

Harris on D-Day and, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

historical and geographical scope of, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Hughill personal experience as secretary in, 1.1-1.2

hybrid military-private nature of, 1.1-1.2

individuals involved in making,  , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2

invade Continent decision key role of,

Johnson evaluation of, 1.1-1.2

Joint Engineers involvement in, 1.1-1.2

as key "appurtenances,"

labor to build concrete caissons for, 1.1-1.2

Lancaster as construct of, 1.1-1.2

legacy of,

logistical and psychological role of, 1.1-1.2

logistical support for invasion enabled by, 1.1-1.2

Mais on, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

management of employees in,

memos as essential tool in, 1.1-1.2

military and strategic success of,

morale in, 1.1-1.2

multinational makeup of,

new roles and lifestyles in, 1.1-1.2

Operation Bolero regarding,

Passchendaele and Dunkirk shadows in, 1.1-1.2

plan at Quebec Conference of,

planning and committee meetings regarding,

as political-military engineering project,

positive opinion of US servicemen in, 1.1-1.2

postwar success of geopolitical subjects in, 1.1-1.2

postwar world of, 1.1-1.2 ,

private contractors and government oversight in, 1.1-1.2

problems with,

as process of global strategy and bureaucratic muddling,

promotions in, 1.1-1.2

"Protected Places" in, 1.1-1.2

recruitment difficulties in, 1.1-1.2

Rolfe participation in, 1.1-1.2

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin interaction regarding, 1.1-1.2

scope of, 1.1-1.2

sense of identity and self-worth from, 1.1-1.2

strategic purpose of,

subcommittees of, 1.1-1.2

system of offices construction for, 1.1-1.2

Taylor on, 1.1-1.2

teamwork in, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

technology used in,  ,

throughput of,

Tn5 in, 1.1-1.2

transformation of,

as war makes example, 1.1-1.2

war of "fire and movement" facilitated by,

Wernher in charge of, 1.1-1.2

White on, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

workers as precious commodity in,

workforce dynamics in,

workplaces created in,

work practices in, 1.1-1.2

Wrens participation in, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry, Port Construction Force N,

Munn, Nancy,  ,

Mutual Defense Assistance Act,

Acheson on, 1.1-1.2

Truman on, 1.1-1.2

N

Nathorff, Alfred Gunther, 1.1-1.2 ,

NATO See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Nazis,  ,  ,  ,

Nazism,  ,  ,  ,

Newcastle,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Admiralty "passive defence" memo to,

air raids in,  ,  ,  ,  ,

Anderson shelters use in,  ,

billeting memo for,  ,

"Celebration of Termination of Hostilities in Europe" in, 1.1-1.2

city engineer on cost of Admiralty memo, 1.1-1.2

global geopolitics shift in,

Ministry of Transport demands on, 1.1-1.2

Port Emergency Committee letter to town clerk of, 1.1-1.2

war changes in, 1.1-1.2

wartime shipbuilding activity in,

Newcastle City Town Clerk,  , 2.1-2.2

_New York Times_ ,  , 2.1-2.2

on communist regime in Czechoslovakia, 1.1-1.2

"The Effects of Russia's Bomb on Our Military Strategy: Defense of Western Europe and Implementing of North Atlantic Pact Now Assume Greater Importance" headline in, 1.1-1.2

9

935 O. C. & R. Coy,

932 Port Construction Company,

927 Port Construction Company,

969 Port Floating Equipment Company,  ,

N

No. 10 West African Engineers, 1.1-1.2

Normandy invasion,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 ,  , 4.1-4.2

"

"North Tyneside Co-ordination Committee, Care of the Homeless" report

appointment of committee in,

scheme for evacuation of homeless persons in,

temporary hutted hostels for workers in, 1.1-1.2

N

Nye, Archibald,  ,

O

Oakley Farm, agricultural production to military base of,

Operation Bolero,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 7.1-7.2

British view of, 1.1-1.2

Churchill opinion of, 1.1-1.2 ,

geopolitical resonance of,

global strategic shift in,  ,

as joint project,

landing craft shortage in,  ,

Mediterranean operations undermining, 1.1-1.2

as platform for global stability,

sharing of cultures in, 1.1-1.2

stationing of troops in,  ,

strategic geography of,  ,

transformations resulting from, 1.1-1.2

wavering commitment to, 1.1-1.2

Operation Gymnast,  ,

Operation Overlord,  , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2 ,

Operation Roundup, 1.1-1.2

Operations Division Theater Group,

Operation Sledgehammer, 1.1-1.2

P

Palmerston (lord), 1.1-1.2

Passchendaele,  , 2.1-2.2

Pearl Harbor,  ,  ,

Petrie, RN (captain),  ,

Philippines,

Phoenixes,  , 2.1-2.2 ,  ,  , 5.1-5.2 ,  ,

_Picture Post_ , 1.1-1.2

"

"Piers for Use on Beaches" memo, 1.1-1.2 ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,

P

places

adaptations of cities and people in,

adequate facilities for welfare of workpeople in, 1.1-1.2

American troop transformations of, 1.1-1.2

city managers handling of war bureaucracy in, 1.1-1.2

economic activity forms in, 1.1-1.2

everyday practices and physical landscape change in, 1.1-1.2

first aid post and shelter dispute in, 1.1-1.2

as geopolitical constructs, 1.1-1.2

good geopolitical subjects in,

legacies of, 1.1-1.2

Local Authorities actions in, 1.1-1.2

making of,

Ministry of Supply production arrangement in, 1.1-1.2

provisions for workers affected by bombings in, 1.1-1.2

Reconstruction Panels in, 1.1-1.2

social actions in,

"Urgent Economic Problems" document regarding, 1.1-1.2

war effort use of churches and garden allotments in, 1.1-1.2

wartime imperatives in,

war time training of canteen workers in, 1.1-1.2

Port Construction and Repair,  ,

Port Emergency Committee, 1.1-1.2

Port Operating Committee,

postwar,

Europe division in,  ,  , 3.1-3.2

good geopolitical subject success in, 1.1-1.2

Great Britain legacies of, 1.1-1.2

of Mulberry Harbours, 1.1-1.2 ,

Tyneside economic decline in, 1.1-1.2

White success in,  ,

Powell, Bob, 1.1-1.2

power relations,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,  ,

"

"Protected Places," 1.1-1.2 ,  ,  ,

civil factories declared as, 1.1-1.2

geographical boundaries of, 1.1-1.2

Q

Quadrant Conference,  ,  ,  ,  , 5.1-5.2

Quebec Conference,  ,  ,

Mulberry Harbour plan at,

as power play between United States and Great Britain, 1.1-1.2

R

RAINBOW 4 plan,  ,  ,

RAINBOW 5 plan,  ,  ,

"

"rally around the flag,"

R

Ramsay, Bertram,

recruitment, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Reyrolle Ltd.

Admiralty letter on trade disputes to, 1.1-1.2

Air Ministry involvement in, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

Brock and Town exchange regarding Nathorff at, 1.1-1.2

Brock on fencing of,

coal production machines from, 1.1-1.2

geographical boundaries of, 1.1-1.2

Ministry of Aircraft Production involvement in, 1.1-1.2

Ministry of Supply involvement in, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

new designation of, 1.1-1.2

paperwork volume at,

police sergeants "test" of security at, 1.1-1.2

Protected Place cancellation of,

Town's response to "test" of security at, 1.1-1.2

War Office monitoring of mail and advertising of, 1.1-1.2

Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence request of, 1.1-1.2

Rhinos,

Rigbye, W. W., 1.1-1.2

River Clyde,

_River Clyde_ (collier ship),  ,

River Maas,

Robert White & Partners,

Robson, Rosemary,

Rolfe, J. A.,  ,

on Everall, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry Harbours participation of, 1.1-1.2

Roosevelt, Franklin,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,  ,

Roswell, Ms.,

Royal Engineers,  ,  ,  , 4.1-4.2 ,

Royal Hussars,

Royal Navy,

Royal West of England Academy,

Ryton Allotments Committee, 1.1-1.2

"

"Seabees" See United States Naval Construction Forces

S

self-worth, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

Shepheard, R. B.,

"

"Signals Intelligence Authorities,"

S

SOS See US Army's Services of Supply Command

Soviet Union, 1.1-1.2 ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,

Spencer (company quartermaster sergeant),

Spud Pontoon Piers,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,  ,

Stalin, Joseph,  ,  , 3.1-3.2 ,

Standing Group,

Steer-Webster (colonel), 1.1-1.2 ,

Stimson, Henry, 1.1-1.2

structural determinism,  ,  ,  ,

T

_The Structure of Political Geography_ (Kasperson and Minghi),

"

"Substitute for Deterrent," 1.1-1.2

S

Sunderland,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

air raids in,  ,  ,  ,  ,

wartime shipbuilding activity in,

Sunderland Forge, 1.1-1.2

Sutherland, Arthur Munro,

Swinburne, F. W., 1.1-1.2

T

Taylor, Charles

on management of caisson construction, 1.1-1.2

on promotion, 1.1-1.2

on sense of duty and pride, 1.1-1.2

Taylor, Peter,

teamwork, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 , 3.1-3.2

Tehran Conference,

Thompson, Cyril,  ,

on Admiralty micromanagement demands, 1.1-1.2

on BBC announcement of shipbuilding activities, 1.1-1.2

on provision of labor, 1.1-1.2

on Sunderland Forge bombing, 1.1-1.2

Thompson, Joseph L.,  ,

Thompson, R. C.,

Thrift, Nigel,

Tn5 See Transportation 5

Tombs, J.,

"

"Total Time" strike,

T

total war

broad historical and geographical scope as theme of, 1.1-1.2

contexts and scope of, 1.1-1.2

as historic process,

transformation in,

war is process theme of,

war makes theme of, 1.1-1.2

Towns, H. M., 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

Trades Union Congress (TUC),

Trades Union Congress Special Conference,

transatlanticism,  ,

Transportation 5 (Tn5),  ,  ,  ,

allegations of "empire building" in, 1.1-1.2 ,

coordinating production as duty of, 1.1-1.2

organizational diagram of,

White responsible for, 1.1-1.2

Transportation Department of War Office,

Trident system,  , 2.1-2.2

Truman, Harry S., 1.1-1.2

Truman Doctrine,  ,  ,

TUC See Trades Union Congress

Tulip, W. W.,

air raid shelter letter to, 1.1-1.2

on church damage, 1.1-1.2

emergency feeding centre letter to, 1.1-1.2

Tyne and Wear rivers,  ,  ,  , 4.1-4.2 ,

Tyneside

Civil Defence Act regarding,

as "danger spot,"

postwar economic decline in, 1.1-1.2

"Total Time" strike in,

Tyneside Apprentices' Guild strike in,  ,

wartime employment in,

U

United Nations Security Council,

United States (US),  ,  ,  , 4.1-4.2 , 5.1-5.2

big picture of, 1.1-1.2

British opinion of soldiers from, 1.1-1.2

changing geopolitical vision of, 1.1-1.2

Continental Commitment of,  ,

cooperation between Great Britain and, 1.1-1.2

deployment to principal theaters of,

"Europe first" policy of,

forces build up in Great Britain of, 1.1-1.2

geopolitical construction of transatlantic militarized region by,

geopolitical relations altered by, 1.1-1.2

geopolitical roles changing of,

global strategic view of,

Great Britain worldview difference between, 1.1-1.2

isolationists and interventionists debate in,

Lend-Lease program of,  ,  ,

logistics of hemisphere defense in,

Marshall Memorandum of,

military presence in Europe of, 1.1-1.2 ,  ,

new regionalization of geopolitics in, 1.1-1.2

North Atlantic area defense concept of, 1.1-1.2

Quebec Conference as power play between Great Britain and, 1.1-1.2

RAINBOW 4 and 5 plan of, 1.1-1.2

rank and role relationship regarding,  , 2.1-2.2

shift in global geopolitics of,

strategic thinking change in, 1.1-1.2

"Substitute for Deterrent" in, 1.1-1.2

trajectory of,

transatlantic movement of military equipment of,

transatlantic presence of,  ,

troop deployment of,

United States Naval Construction Forces ("Seabees"),

Dierkes on, 1.1-1.2

Witcomb on, 1.1-1.2

Unwin, Edward,

"

"Urgent Economic Problems" (War Cabinet Offices), 1.1-1.2

U

US See United States

US Army's Services of Supply (SOS) Command,

US Hydraulics Laboratory,

US National Security Agency,

US troops,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2

V

Vaughan, H. B.,

VE-Day,  ,

VIII USAAF Fighter Command,

W

Wake-Walker, W. Frederic,

Wallerstein, Immanuel,

Walter, Arthur Edward (brigadier),  ,  ,

as good geopolitical subject,

on meeting Churchill,

on Montgomery speech, 1.1-1.2

Mulberry N task of,

other memories of, 1.1-1.2

suitcase incident of,

Walton, J. W.,

War Cabinet Offices, 1.1-1.2

war is process,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

war makes theme, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 ,  , 4.1-4.2 ,

War Office Experimental Engineering Group,

Watts, George,

Wernher, Harold,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2

civilian engineers panel of, 1.1-1.2

as good geopolitical subject,  , 2.1-2.2

on housing practices after war, 1.1-1.2

labor force concerns of, 1.1-1.2

"Most Secret" Directive and Letter of Introduction to, 1.1-1.2

Mountbatten appointment of, 1.1-1.2

Western Front,  ,  ,  ,

Whales,  ,  ,

White, Bruce,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 6.1-6.2 ,

allegations of "empire building" against, 1.1-1.2 ,

appointed committee of,

bureaucratic politics and interservice rivalry handling of, 1.1-1.2

Gilbert on, 1.1-1.2

on Mulberry Harbour project, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

postwar success of,  ,

on project efficiency, 1.1-1.2

Whitehall,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

geopolitical bureaucratic construction in,  ,  ,

Williams, Alun, 1.1-1.2

Witcomb, E. W., 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

on No. 10 West African Engineers, 1.1-1.2

paternalistic role of,  ,

pier-head crews responsibility of,

"Seabees" recollections of, 1.1-1.2

Wolf Barry & Partners,  ,  ,

women, 1.1-1.2 ,

Andrews on hiring, 1.1-1.2

Mieville on employment of, 1.1-1.2

as new workforce, 1.1-1.2

See also Hughill, Ms. See also Lancaster, Masika

Women's Royal Naval Service (Wrens),

Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence, 1.1-1.2

workers

adequate facilities for welfare of workpeople in, 1.1-1.2

Bevin, E., on government responsibility for, 1.1-1.2

as biggest security concern, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

bombing affected provisions for, 1.1-1.2

class or nation identification of, 1.1-1.2

control and management of,  , 2.1-2.2

"De-Reservation of Workpeople" in, 1.1-1.2

good geopolitical subject expectations of,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,

"industrial conscription" of,

labor shortages pressure on,  , 2.1-2.2

local authority intervention for, 1.1-1.2

pace of production and accident rates of,

as precious commodity,  ,

protection of rights of,

reasons for leaving current employment by, 1.1-1.2

on same right to risk as soldiers, 1.1-1.2

temporary hutted hostels for, 1.1-1.2

three categories of aliens as,

use of disabled people as, 1.1-1.2 ,

war effort and protection of rights balancing of,

war time training of canteen, 1.1-1.2

women as new workforce of, 1.1-1.2

World Bank,

world-systems analysis,

World War One, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2 ,  ,  ,

Chiefs of Staff memo regarding, 1.1-1.2

Gallipoli landing failure of, 1.1-1.2

World War Two,  ,  ,  , 4.1-4.2 , 5.1-5.2 ,

Anglo-American orbit in,  ,  ,  ,

Britain code breaking in,

Britain end of dominance in,  ,  ,  ,

historic scope of,  , 2.1-2.2 ,

Lancaster as construct of,

post–,

US intervention in,

victory in,

Wren, R., 1.1-1.2

Wrens See Women's Royal Naval Service

W. T. Halcrow & Partners,

"

"yanks," 1.1-1.2

British view of, 1.1-1.2 , 2.1-2.2

# Acknowledgments

This book has taken a number of years to come to fruition. Some individuals have been essential in helping me figure out what the book could and should be. It began with conversations with my Mum and Dad and reflections on their youthful wartime experiences. It was sustained by frequent comments, jibes, and questions from my good friend Richard Mason; and the interested and motivating heckling of John Madsen. The very foundations of the book go back all the way to my time as an undergraduate at the University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne and the mentoring I received from Peter Taylor and Mark Overton. Peter remains an inspiration to me, and I also benefitted from his and Enid's hospitality while conducting research for this book in Newcastle.

The book would not have been possible without the dedicated and professional support of the staff in the archives and records departments of the Imperial War Museum, London, and the Tyne and Wear Archives, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. Thank you so much.

The artwork on the front cover and the photos for figures 1.1 and 1.2 are reproduced with the permission of the Imperial War Museum. Figures 3.1 and 8.1 are reproduced from Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, _Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943_ , Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1955. Figure 4.1 is adapted from Michael Harrison, _Mulberry: The Return in Triumph,_ London: W. H. Allen, 1965, p. 183. The source for figure 5.1 is unknown. Table 8.1 is reproduced from Maurice Matloff, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944_ , Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1959, p. 555. Figure 8.2 is reproduced from Committee on Foreign Affairs, Eighty-First Congress First Session: Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Charts for Use in Connection with Supplemental Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5895 (H. Rept. No. 1265, pt. 2).

Initial versions of this project were presented in colloquium series at the University of South Carolina and the University of Washington, as well as to the Political Geography Specialty Group of the Association of American Geographers. The comments and questions I received at these venues are greatly appreciated. I am especially grateful for Julian Minghi's thoughtful input and support.

I am appreciative of the financial support for research related to this book given by the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Utah State University. I am also thankful for the excellent and dedicated assistance provided by the staff of the Merrill-Cazier Library at Utah State University, especially Becky Thoms and Robert Heaton. Thanks also to the research assistance provided by Mandy Hoggard.

Last but not least anything would be impossible and so much is possible because of Courtney, Doug, and Jack.
Chapter 1

# Introduction

The Mulberry Harbours and Ways to Think About War

The D-Day invasions hold a very special place in the memory of western European countries and the United States. Ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the battle are a combination of political theater, national remembrance, and a celebration of the heroism of the soldiers who landed on the beaches. The successful invasion was a vital step towards liberating Europe from Nazism and ending World War Two. We can all conjure up images of the event, either from photos and descriptions from the many books written on the topic, or from the host of Hollywood depictions, from _The Longest Day_ to _Saving Private Ryan_. Given the amount written about D-Day, and the numerous documentaries and films, it is fair to ask what another book can offer.

I plan to tell a different story about D-Day, a story that does not concentrate on the soldiers who hit the beaches or the admirals and generals who commanded them. I am going to tell a story about D-Day in which engineers, businessmen, and bureaucrats are center stage. In telling the story this way I hope to encourage a different way of thinking about war; one that sees war as an ongoing set of processes in which seemingly isolated acts are part of broader historical developments. I introduce the term geopolitical constructs to understand wars, and other types of geopolitical events, by connecting specific events to long-term and global geopolitical arrangements. The goal is to return the "big picture" back to geopolitical analysis.

Modern warfare has become total war involving the whole of society.[1] By participating in total war, individuals are changed. Understanding war as a historic process requires us to conceive of wars having no clear beginning and end, and more than a set of isolated events we call battles.[2] Telling the story this way requires us to think about a different geography of war, one in which the shipyards on the River Clyde and the Tyne and Wear are just as important as the beaches of Juno and Sword. Also, the historic scope of World War Two must be considered. The war had historical precursors and legacies that continued throughout the twentieth century in the divided Europe of the Cold War and the US's militarized transatlantic presence.[3] The war had a geographical scope that connected individuals and place-specific events to a global context.

The focus of the story is the construction of the Mulberry Harbours, massive artificial structures dragged across the English Channel in the immediate wake of the invading force.[4] Two Mulberry Harbours were built, one for the American beaches and one for the British. Each was about the size of Dover Harbour. They were made of sunken ships to create a breakwater, and huge concrete and steel structures to provide inner protection from the ferocity and whims of the sea. Sophisticated piers that floated up and down with the tides and extended far out into the sea allowed cargo ships to dock and unload the personnel and equipment needed to sustain the thrust against the might of the German army. They were an engineering miracle that gave the Allies a degree of confidence that they would not be pinned down on the beaches, and would have a secure supply-line to sustain the march towards Berlin.

A conventional way to tell the story of the Mulberry Harbours would be to focus on the drive and determination of Winston Churchill who saw the need for them and understood the difficulties of invasion. Churchill's role should not be downplayed, but war is not just about the actions of leaders. War leads to the transformation of individuals, places, whole continents, and the global geopolitical context. By focusing on key political events, such as a prime minister's wartime decision or a noteworthy and transformative speech, we tend to think of wars as events clearly bounded in time and space. Instead, I introduce three themes with the aim of emphasizing how the process of making war connects many people, institutions, and places, as well as past events and future outcomes. The nineteenth century geopolitical strategy of Great Britain and the post–World War Two strategy of the United States are connected, though contingent and unplanned, through a myriad of actions aimed at completing interconnected projects, one of which was the Mulberry Harbours.

### _The themes of the book_

The first theme is that _war makes_. Through their involvement in war individuals are changed. This is clearly the case for individuals who are fueled by an adrenaline rush of battlefield heroism or who must carry the physical and emotional scars of war with them for the rest of their lives. It is also true for the more mundane war experiences of those in places and parts of society that are not the battlefield per se. Participation in war changes the experiences, outlooks, and beliefs of people, and these changes have a lasting legacy on society, politics, and collective identity. The making of war and the individuals who do the making require building new, or adapting existing, bureaucracies, industrial work-settings, and places. It is in the making and remaking of these social settings that war is made, and the identities and roles of people are remade. The perceived need to construct a specific "thing," the Mulberry Harbours, to make war required changing the roles and sense of self of the people, and the future of the factories and places, involved in their construction.[5]

Following the idea of remaking, the second theme is that _war is a process._ People, bureaucracies, factories, and places are changed by the impact of war and their participation or role in the making of war. These changes are interconnected so that the changing sense of self is partially caused by the new bureaucracies or worksites where they experience war-making. In turn these new workplaces are changed by the actions of the people within them. Making war is a process of change that constantly reshapes people, and their social settings—including the home, the workplace, and the societies and clubs that form civil society.

The third theme of the book is that _war has a broad historical and geographical scope that extends far beyond the events of the conflict_. War should not be understood as a historic event bounded by the declaration of hostilities and the moment of victory or surrender.[6] Nor should its geographic extent be restricted to where the battles and operations took place, an atlas of movement of lines of advance and retreat. The causes of war and the way it is fought emerge from decades, if not centuries, of political relations, and have implications that extend into postwar politics, perhaps for a number of generations. The historical antecedents and implications of war are seen in the construction of geopolitical regions that frame the actions of war, are remade by the war, and, at the conclusion of hostilities, form new regional arrangements of power.

The causes and outcomes of war are not necessarily direct or intended. The unintended consequences of the reasons war was fought, and the manner in which it was fought, have important legacies. The scope of war extends back into the past and forward into the future. The scope of war connects individuals, and the places in which they participate in the war, to distant places and broader global change. Such geopolitical changes of people, places, and regions are made and remade through the prosecution and outcomes of war.

The three themes are connected in a far more complex way than I have introduced them. Rather than separate themes, they are an interrelated set of ideas that shows that the prosecution and impact of war implicates individuals in a variety of linked settings; especially their homes, workplaces, and the villages, towns, and cities where they live and work. The linkage between individuals and these settings is dynamic; they all change in a multidirectional way. For example, an individual assigned to a newly constructed government office may change that bureaucracy as much as working in that new office may change the person. The dynamic connections between individuals and these settings require us to think about change across a breadth of history and geography that extends beyond immediate wartime actions. The actions of individuals are framed within the contexts of the places they work and live in, but also the historical processes and geographical settings of global power shifts. Such shifts help create new and semipermanent regional arrangements of political influence and exclusion. The making of a "thing" of war, such as the Mulberry Harbours, connects individuals to the prosecution of war that can only be understood within a dynamic historical-geography of global conflict. The Mulberry Harbours were part of a transatlantic military operation that deployed over a million US military personnel in Britain, Operation Bolero, and laid the foundations for a continued presence through the Cold War division of Europe.

Tying these themes together is the concept of _geopolitical constructs_ , a mostly intentional interaction of agents and structures for a political purpose and with tangible material expressions. I will define geopolitical constructs in greater detail later in this chapter, and discuss its theoretical roots in the next one. First, I will introduce the feat of engineering at the center of the story.

### _The Mulberry Harbours_

The immensity of the Mulberry Harbours is staggering, especially when you consider how quickly they were made, in secret, and at a time of war (figure 1.1). Two harbors were built, each about the size of Dover Harbour, which was a seven-year-long peacetime project. Each harbor covered an area of about 310 hectares and was designed for a throughput of 6,000 metric tons of supplies and 1,250 vehicles a day. Construction was immediate after the invasion, and they were operational just three days after the D-Day landings.

The Mulberry Harbours.

_Source_ : Imperial War Museum.

The plan was to land three divisions on D-Day, to be dramatically increased to ten divisions by D-Day + 5, and then one division a day. In addition to the soldiers, it was believed that 10,000 metric tons of supplies were needed on D-Day + 3, and 18,000 metric tons by D-Day + 18 to sustain the breakout. Actually, in the first week of the invasion the average daily landing was: 25 Liberty ships, 38 coasters, 9 troop ships, 40 tank landing ships, 75 tank landing craft, and 20 infantry landing craft. To complicate the proceedings a strong storm on June 19 left just the one port operational, the one built offshore from the British invasion beaches. Hence, this lone port had to handle a flow of personnel and material above the capacity it was designed for. A further complication was the difficulty in liberating channel ports from the German army and then making them operational after the retreating army's sabotage. The sole existing Mulberry Harbour had to remain operational longer than originally planned and handled more landings than expected. Through the ten months after D-Day, the Mulberry Harbours had successfully landed 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles, and 4 million metric tons of supplies.[7]

The Mulberry Harbours consisted of artificial breakwaters (called Gooseberries) that were constructed from huge blocks of concrete encased in iron (called Phoenixes), floating steel tanks (called Bombardons), and scuttled ships (called Corncobs). In combination, the Phoenixes and Corncobs made for sheltered water that enabled landing people and material along pontoon rafts (known as Rhinos) serving as piers and jetties (Whale), secured by a new type of kite anchor (figure 1.2).

Floating Piers.

_Source_ : Imperial War Museum.

The Mulberry Harbours were a tangible example of the first theme of this book, war makes. The success of the Mulberry Harbours, above and beyond expectations, was the result of engineering ingenuity and bureaucratic organization that coordinated construction sites across Great Britain, squabbles between the services of the British military, and the different cultures of the United States and Great Britain. But what, exactly, was built? The answer is more than just the tangible engineering products that were the Mulberry Harbours.

The harbors and their component parts were constructed. Though it may be said that they were the products of engineering, politics, and military strategy, it is more accurate to say that the harbors were built by engineers, politicians, bureaucrats, and military commanders. Changing the language in this way puts the focus on those individuals whose hard work, determination, and ingenuity made the Mulberry Harbours possible. In making the harbors the men, and it was mainly men who were involved, were themselves made; their war experience was a life-changing event. War made the Mulberry Harbours, and it made the people who made the harbors. The harbors played a vital role in the liberation of Europe, a victory that was the beginning of the making of the Cold War geopolitical organization of the world. Hence, the everyday actions of those who made the component parts of the Mulberry Harbours helped construct the geopolitical events of D-Day and the subsequent breakout that in turn made the historical regional geography of Cold War Europe. War is made and war makes, but the starting point is a geopolitical context that requires strategic vision, and a set of orders to put the making of war in motion.

### _The orders and the legacy_

The actions and statements of Winston Churchill do not provide neat bookends to the story of the Mulberry Harbours. However, two of his statements help us situate them in a broader geopolitical context. Much attention has been given to Churchill's memo of May 30, 1942 entitled "Piers for Use on Beaches" that added impetus to the project at a key moment in the tense strategic discussions between the United States and Great Britain. The short memo to the Chief of Combined Operations stated, in its entirety:

> They must float up and down with the tide. The anchor problem must be mastered. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.[8]

Brusque and to the point, and illustrating that thought had already been given to the project, Churchill's memo energized the ongoing creation of individual tasks, committees, interservice cooperation, and civilian-military collaboration that, ultimately, enabled the transfer of military personnel and their equipment across the expanse of Western Europe.

Churchill can be envisioned in the dark and musty bowels of the Cabinet War Rooms under the streets of Whitehall. From this mole-like existence in which the weight of the world was on his shoulders and the very existence of his beloved Britain and its empire seemed threatened, Churchill thought grandly and boldly. The war had seen the British army chased into the sea, barely making it home after the evacuation at Dunkirk. How he must have looked at the English Channel, from the vantage point of the command and control center in tunnels, originally dug at the time of the Napoleonic wars, running through the soft chalk of the white cliffs of Dover, and seen it as a double-barrier: one that might prevent Britain becoming the next outpost of Nazism but also one that would complicate any subsequent Allied invasion of Europe to reset the geopolitical balance.

In hindsight, we know that the English Channel did both—preventing a Nazi invasion of Britain but not an Allied invasion of Nazi Europe.[9] But the invasion of Europe was complicated by the narrow English Channel with its complex tides, currents, and storms. The Mulberry Harbours were an essential link in Churchill's global vision; a feat of wartime engineering that made invasion of the Continent possible. They connected the involvement of the US military through Operation Bolero to the liberation of Europe that would allow Britain to survive. It was an extraordinary vision at a time of entrenchment.

However, Churchill's vision had unintended consequences. Rather than protecting Britain's global position and its imperial role, the bridge he ordered to ensure that US forces traveled through Britain to liberate Europe ushered in a new geopolitical world order in which Britain played an increasingly minor role. The United States was unfriendly to the idea that European countries would keep their empires after the war, something that Churchill only reluctantly and partially accepted. Also, to defeat Nazism Churchill had to ally himself with a different leader of another totalitarian system he detested: Joseph Stalin and his brutal style of Communism. The Mulberry Harbours Churchill ordered to be built to help land thousands of US troops on the Normandy coast to defeat Nazism were the initial deployments of a commitment to a military presence in Europe that remains to this day, and appears to be still in demand in the wake of conflict in Ukraine and the perceived threat of Russia to Eastern Europe.

The fact that US troops stayed in Europe was identified as a necessary geopolitical commitment in a famous and catalyzing Churchillian moment. In this speech Churchill gave us the key phrases with which we still picture the geography and politics of the Cold War. On March 5, 1946 at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri he proclaimed:

> A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies . . . From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an _iron curtain_ has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow . . . The safety of the world requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in Europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung. Twice in our own lifetime we have seen the United States, against their wishes and their traditions, against arguments, the force of which it is impossible not to comprehend, drawn by irresistible forces, into these wars in time to secure the victory of the good cause, but only after frightful slaughter and devastation had occurred. Twice the United States has had to send several millions of its young men across the Atlantic to find the war; but now war can find any nation, wherever it may dwell between dusk and dawn. Surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe.[10]

The making of the Cold War was in motion. In fact it had begun before World War Two even ended.[11] But as this book shows, the Cold War was made not by "irresistible forces," as seductive and inspiring as that term is, but by the actions of people of ranks and visibilities far lesser than Churchill's. The people who made the Mulberry Harbours helped in the making of the liberation of Europe, and, unintentionally and unknowingly, enabled the military presence of the United States in the "grand pacification" that was more commonly known as the Cold War. The role of the Mulberry Harbours as a "bridge for the Americans to come through"[12] helped make the political-military division of Europe.

In the process of making the Mulberry Harbours people were made themselves; they became particular types of people because of their participation in much bigger geopolitical changes. Hence, my focus is on the individual soldiers and citizens, and the offices, bureaucracies, and the shipyards they worked in that all came together to make the Mulberry Harbours; one important component of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and, unbeknownst to them, the initial foundations of the Cold War.

By giving voice to the individuals involved in the construction of the Mulberry Harbours, the three themes of the book are addressed. The geopolitical world (by which I mean the competition between states and other groups and related changes in territorial control, boundaries, ideologies, and alliances) is made and has an enduring legacy. Wars, and the individual acts that make them, are not separate events but are connected across time and geography to be part of something bigger, the ever-changing geopolitical pattern of our world. The roles of individuals, the bureaucracies, workplaces, and towns they worked in, and the regions of war, peace, liberation, and occupation they made all come together to make up our geopolitical world. War connects the individual riveter or engineer, and the way they were changed, to grand geographical and historical change. Making World War Two was a combination of a myriad of individual actions, a coming together of people in different places to perform particular tasks, and all this activity was part of the bigger picture of a global conflict and its aftermath.

War-making is a constant connection of individuals, the projects they are involved in, and global geopolitics. Individuals act within historical contexts, such as war, and those actions are the results of orders, such as Churchill's memo. People make sense of orders and the roles they have to take on within these contexts, such as leaving civilian workplaces to become part of an industrial project integral to a global war. People make war and war makes people; and in making war, people make places and regions that have a long historic shelf life and an impact on what future generations do. The making of a particularly awe-inspiring project, the Mulberry Harbours, is one way to show how people and places are made in the making of war, and how individual actions and particular events are just one moment in a continual process of making war and peace.

### _Geopolitical constructs_

If war is made and war makes then the key questions are how is it made and what does it make? The answer is a series of interconnected _geopolitical constructs_ , each a combination of agents and structures with their own geographic scope and historic reach. I define geopolitical constructs fully, and discuss their theoretical heritage, in the following chapter. Simply, they are the coming together of the behavior of agents within structures of physical settings, norms, and rules that allow for geopolitical actions, the operation and outcome of which can only be understood by the connections with other geopolitical constructs. Each construct has a particular geographic scope and historical lifespan.

The story of the Mulberry Harbours puts three geopolitical constructs on the stage. The first is the _good geopolitical subject_ , the individuals who behaved, mostly, within sets of norms and rules that made the prosecution of war possible. The good geopolitical subject is an individual whose behavior is formed and framed within geopolitical contexts and imperatives. I emphasize individuals who enabled the practice of warfare through their active compliance, even celebration, of the roles they assumed and sought in wartime. These are the engineers, workers, and members of the military whose job it was to design, build, and deploy the Mulberries. The term "good" does not imply these people were duped or particularly pro-war or nationalistic. Rather, the term emphasizes the power of structures and contexts to frame or limit the possibilities of action through the establishment of rules and norms that become "common sense." The good geopolitical subject is someone who, along with the vast majority of people in particular geographic and historical contexts, conduct themselves within taken-for-granted rules and norms. The second geopolitical construct is the _institutional arrangements of state and business_ in which individuals worked and came together to make the Mulberry Harbour project possible. New government bureaucracies, such as Transportation 5 (Tn5) in the British War Office, interacted with new military offices, such as Combined Operations; together they required cooperation with engineers and contractors. The third geopolitical construct is a set of _geopolitical landscapes_ , places and regions, that were the setting and the product of the individual actions shepherded into a coherent project and successful outcome by the institutional arrangements.[13] For example, the shipbuilding cities of Newcastle and Sunderland, and towns and villages across the west of England that hosted the troops deployed in Operation Bolero, were places that had to adapt and transform to their wartime role. The regional division of Cold War Europe was partially the product of the activity that came together in workplaces, private and government, in particular places.

The three constructs I choose to study are illustrative rather than all-encompassing. The commonality is that their form and the social relations that define them are to some degree sustained;[14] they have a degree of physical and political permanence. Furthermore they are mutually constructed, so that the good geopolitical subject is situated within the complex, reinforcing vortex of multiple geopolitical constructs.[15] The Mulberry Harbours and their component parts are constructs, the products of engineering, politics, military strategy, and the social relations associated with them. By examining in depth the process of the construction of the Mulberries, the actions of geopolitical subjects within geopolitical contexts may be explored. Moreover, the institutional and geographic legacies of the success of the Normandy invasion—significantly enabled by the component part of the Mulberries—created other geopolitical constructs such as, broadly speaking, the politics of transatlanticism, the division of postwar Europe, and the ongoing US presence in Western Europe. The legacy of one geopolitical engineering project, the Mulberry Harbours, within an array of geopolitical constructs, had reach across time and space that continues to frame and partially determine geopolitical subjects.

### _The contexts and scope of war_

Thinking of war as a set of interconnected events in a long process begs the question, how long? In other words, how do we situate the moment of the making of the Mulberry Harbours in history? Simply thinking of D-Day as a key moment in World War Two is not sufficient. Instead, we need to consider longer trajectories of the countries involved, especially Great Britain and the United States. Individuals were performing their roles in making the Mulberry Harbours within these historical trends. Situating the individuals who made the Mulberries in multiple contexts of other geopolitical constructs, such as bureaucracies, factories, and industrial cities, creates an understanding of war-making behavior as occurring within, and simultaneously creating and recreating, a set of contexts. The connectivity between these contexts, or sites of activity, reaches, ultimately, to a global setting of geopolitical change with broad historic scope.

Great Britain had been the predominant world power since the end of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in 1815. It had, over the course of a century, established the British Empire that stretched across the globe. Victorian era celebrations of Britain's imperial role had established a British identity of global dominance. For many the British role in "ruling the world" seemed natural, almost a birthright. World War One had shaken such a sense of individual and national purpose to a large degree. Popular novels prior to World War One played upon fears of invasion by Germany.[16] The massive loss of life in the war was a shock to the nation, and changed the way people thought about war.[17] The experience of the war, and the social and economic changes made to fight it, also ushered in a new politics in which the working classes were finding their voice to challenge the assumed authority of the aristocracy. World War Two threatened the very existence of Britain and its way of life. The enormity of the war brought to light the difficulties in mobilizing the economic and manpower resources of the British Empire, and made people aware that many of its imperial subjects wanted independence. Though victory and survival were achieved, the end result was bankruptcy and the need to go cap-in-hand to the United States to sustain the war effort. After the war Great Britain maintained its global status only by being the chief ally of the United States.

The United States was experiencing a very different trajectory. Since the resolution of the Civil War it had steadily grown in economic power and territorial reach to exert an ever-increasing role in the globe. Expansion into the Pacific, through control of Hawaii and the Philippines, was an expression of increasing naval power and global reach that Britain had been wary of throughout the nineteenth century. The role of US financial institutions in brokering the reparation settlements of World War One showed its growing role in global finance. Henry Ford's ability to create new things, and new ways of making them, suggested the economic future that other countries would have to follow.[18]

Just like wars, trajectories of countries are made and do not follow an inevitable pathway. The debate in the United States between the isolationists and the interventionists suggested different tracks for the country. In hindsight we know that the interventionists won, leading to the important partnership between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Yet, the form of US intervention in World War Two was the result of choices and negotiation. A remarkable decision made by US politicians and military commanders was to press ahead with the "Europe first" policy, a focus on winning the war in Europe against Nazi Germany before turning full attention to the war against Japan in the Pacific. The "Europe first" policy was strongly debated, with not everyone agreeing with the outcome, and it was not strictly adhered to, with regional commanders pushing ahead with the war in the Pacific as much as they could get away with.[19] Nevertheless, the outcome was a massive US military commitment to the European continent.

### _The reluctant strategy of Continental Commitment_

The process of hegemonic decline required Britain to wage war in a way that was alien to its established strategic culture. Britain's hegemonic rule had been predicated on the avoidance of the "Continental Commitment."[20] The British had long acknowledged that "the dominance of the European landmass by an alien and hostile power would make almost impossible the maintenance of our national independence, to say nothing of our capacity to maintain a defensive system to protect any extra-European interests we may retain."[21] The best strategy was to conduct diplomacy, rather than waging war, to ensure no one state was able to dominate the Continent and threaten Britain's security.

The changing geopolitical situation at the beginning of the twentieth century marked the need to calculate a Continental military commitment, rather than the existing policy of global force projection. A pre–World War One Chiefs of Staff memo said:

> No one can doubt our necessity for a strong Navy and Air Force. Nevertheless, unless we possess some land forces capable of early intervention on the Continent of Europe potential enemies as well as potential allies will probably consider . . . our power to influence a decision by arms inadequate. The influence which this may have on international policy and the cause of peace may be far-reaching in the extreme . . . It is not so much the size of the forces we can send as the moral effect which their arrival would have on Belgian defence, and the knowledge that behind those forces is the whole might of the British empire ready and determined to wage war with all its available resources in defence of the independence of the peoples whose frontiers we have guaranteed . . . Quite apart from any questions of implementing our guarantees under the various Pacts and Covenants which we have signed, the security of this country, demands that we should be prepared to fight for the integrity of Belgium and Holland.[22]

The issue was not put to rest with the conclusion of World War One. As the storm clouds of war gathered again in the 1930s, the Chiefs of Staff hoped that the Munich agreement would preclude a return to the Continent. This was to be wishful thinking. Within a year of Munich the Chiefs said: "It is difficult . . . to say how the security of the United Kingdom could be maintained if France were forced to capitulate, and therefore defence of the former may have to include a share in the land defence of French territory."[23]

British leaders had to accept the fact, as they had done in World War One, "that the British Isles could only be defended on the Continent of Europe, and that in consequence a firm commitment to continental allies was inescapable."[24] In turn, this strategy required recognition that Britain needed the United States as an ally. Through the course of World War Two, the United States was to come to a similar conclusion, that its ability to act as a global power required an ongoing military presence on the European continent. The construction of the Mulberry Harbours was necessary in enabling the allied invasion of Western Europe and establishing the new Continental Commitment of the United States.

The cooperation between Britain and the United States complemented their different trajectories of decline and rise. The United States became essential to the defense of Britain through victory in a European war, something that would have been impossible to envision a generation or two prior to World War Two. The Mulberry Harbours were one tangible feature of the relationship between the two countries; a cooperation that put the US military onto the European continent and ensured Britain's survival. But to survive is not, necessarily, to thrive. While the establishment of a US presence in Europe was part of its new role as the global power leading allies in the Cold War, Britain saw its role, reputation, and resources diminish. As part of this process, the industrial centers of Britain, such as Newcastle and Sunderland, crucial to the production of the Mulberry Harbours and the war effort in general, faced the harsh realities of deindustrialization and economic decline. For the United States, and the rest of Europe, the legacy would be decades of sustaining a military presence on the Continent, an ongoing feature of US global projection of military power.

The individuals who made the Mulberry Harbours lived within the grand historical trajectories of Britain and the United States. Some of them were very aware of the bigger picture, others were not. Whether or not they were conscious of the global changes afoot they still played a role in making them happen. By making the Mulberry Harbours they were part of global geopolitical shifts. By making the Mulberry Harbours they changed the sense of who they were and what they had achieved. One of the legacies of the Mulberry Harbours was how the individuals changed by the war were to live in a new geopolitical world in two countries that had experienced shifts in their geopolitical status.

### _The organization of the book_

The three themes of the book frame the story of the making of the Mulberry Harbours. The diaries, letters, and memoirs of the people who made the Harbours illustrate their actions in making war and how, in the process, they were made by war. The way people, places, regions, and global politics were changed by direct or indirect association with the Mulberry Harbours and Operation Bolero highlights war as a process that connected one global conflict to the next, and connected people in particular places to global geopolitical change.

The following chapter introduces and defines the term geopolitical construct through a discussion of the idea of structure in political geography, in particular, and social science. Three constructs are introduced as the focus of the book; the good geopolitical subject, institutional arrangements of states and business, and geopolitical landscapes. The connection of the individual, as a geopolitical subject, to the context of regional and global geopolitical change allows political geographers to reclaim an understanding of the "big picture" while avoiding the theoretical trap of structural determinism and the political trap of creating global histories to promote particular national projects.

Chapter 3 engages the three themes of the book by discussing the historical and geographical scope of the Mulberry Harbour project. The new institutional arrangements of the British state are situated within Britain's wartime need to reevaluate its historic strategic attitude towards the Continent and increasing cooperation with the United States. The imperatives of military reorganization were a symptom of a context in which established military-political understandings of the world had to be abandoned. In turn, these new arrangements made the construction of the Mulberry Harbours possible, along with the intended and unintended geopolitical consequences.

Chapter 4 describes the Mulberry Harbours as a political-military-
engineering project that had to be coordinated through a suite of new bureaucracies. The geopolitical construct of new arrangements of the state and business was situated within the process of geopolitical change that required military cooperation between Britain and the United States. Within Britain, interservice competition had to be overcome to achieve the necessary cooperation, further complicated by the need to entwine the practices and habits of two very different national military organizations as the first steps in constructing the institutions of a transatlantic geopolitical region. The coordination of US-British strategy through one set of bureaucratic organizations required another set of bureaucracies to plan the Mulberry Harbours and coordinate military demands with the capacity of private contractors to build them.

Chapter 5 concentrates on how involvement in the project made the people who were involved into good geopolitical subjects. Diaries, letters, and memoirs provide a window into the hearts and minds of the people involved in the Mulberry Harbour project to see what it meant to them. Engineers, military commanders, shipyard workers, and others in a whole range of roles made sacrifices and suffered hardships in their commitment to the Mulberries. Yet there was also a strong sense of purpose and achievement that created a particular sense of self-worth because they knew they were playing a role in an essential wartime project.

Chapter 6 examines the parts of the institutional arrangements of state and business required to cajole private companies into meeting deadlines and managing their employees in a certain way to build a whole new type of harbor, and to participate in the war economy in general. The construction of new forms of government control, on a daily and somewhat prosaic basis,[25] in the shipyards on the Tyne and Wear rivers in the northeast of England illustrates the new practices that were deemed necessary for wartime industrial production.

Chapter 7 begins a discussion of the third geopolitical construct, geopolitical landscapes,[26] by examining the changes the war brought to the city of Newcastle beyond the immediate setting of the shipyards. The demands on land-use and property rights, coupled with the stresses of coping with aerial bombing, created new everyday practices and realities, not all of which were taken with good grace. The way places were changed, or remade, by war shows that not all citizens embraced the roles expected of the good geopolitical subject with enthusiasm.

Chapter 8 combines the themes of what war makes and war as a process by continuing a discussion of the role of the Mulberry Harbours in making geopolitical regions and a new geopolitical world, or larger-scale geopolitical landscapes, in other words. The strategic purpose of the Harbours was to ensure a large and rapid movement of soldiers and their equipment onto the European continent. The men and machines were largely American, reflecting the different trajectories of decline and rise for Britain and the United States respectively. The victory in Europe and the subsequent transition to the Cold War blurred a sense of postwar peace with the realization that a new enemy and conflict had emerged. The first part of the chapter discusses Operation Bolero, and the manner in which the deployment of over a million US troops in Britain was, simultaneously, a matter of place transformation, the construction of a new geopolitical region, and a shift in the geopolitical understanding of the world. The second half of the chapter concentrates on the legacies of Bolero, the Mulberry Harbours, and victory in World War Two: Britain became the "unsinkable aircraft carrier"[27] that was the essential military base for the projection of US military power across Western Europe. Seeing war as a process identifies two, seemingly contradictory, legacies of the making of the Mulberry Harbours: peace through victory and the foundations of a new conflict.

The conclusion continues the focus on the making of the postwar British nation to reinforce the themes of the book. The people of Britain made war successfully; the Mulberry Harbours were a strategic success, the Allies liberated Europe, and the Axis powers were defeated. Yet the victory ushered in some harsh realities for Britain as it lost its empire and geopolitical prominence in the world, with dire economic consequences. We end the book with a look at a sad tension that comes about through the intersection of the themes: making war can make a particular type of person proud of the role they played in the defense of their country, but the process of war may mean that such pride clashes with economic and political realities that come about after victory.

### _Notes_

1.

Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, "Are We There Yet? World War II and the Theory of Total War," in _A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945_ , ed. Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greiner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–16.

2.

Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Total War: The Global Dimensions of Conflict," in _A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945_ , ed. Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greiner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 19–31; Colin Flint, "Intertwined Spaces of Peace and War: The Perpetual Dynamism of Geopolitical Landscapes, " in _Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies_ , ed. Scott Kirsch and Colin Flint (Farnham, Surrey, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 31–48.

3.

See Andrew Baker, _Constructing a Post-War Order: The Rise of US Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War_ (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011).

4.

Michael Harrison, _Mulberry: The Return in Triumph_ (London: W. H. Allen, 1965); Jane Evans, Elizabeth Palmer, and Walter Roy, _A Harbour Goes to War: The Story of Mulberry and the Men Who Made It Happen_ (Garlieston, Scotland: Brook House Publishing, 2000); Alfred Stanford, _Force Mulberry: The Planning and Installation of Artificial Harbor Off U.S. Normandy Beaches in World War II_ (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1951); Guy Hartcup, _Code Name Mulberry: The Planning, Building and Operation of the Normandy Harbours_ (Newton Abbot: David & Charles Publishers, 1977; Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006).

5.

The way that war makes tangible things as well as states of mind is explored in James Tyner, _Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War_ (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

6.

Weinberg, "Total War"; Flint, "Intertwined Spaces of Peace and War"; see the connection between trade and war in Deborah Cowen, _The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence and Global Trade_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015) and the connection between labor migration and war in Tyner, _Iraq, Terror and the Philippines' Will to War_.

7.

See Harrison, _Mulberry_ ; Hartcup, _Code Name Mulberry_.

8.

Imperial War Museum (henceforth IWM), H 41067.

9.

Andrew Roberts, _Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941–1945_ (London and New York: Harper Perennial, 2009).

10.

Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," a speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946.

11.

Giles MacDonogh, _After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation_ (New York: Basic Books, 2007); David Stafford, _Endgame, 1945: The Missing Final Chapter of World War II_ (New York, Boston, London: Back Bay Books, 2007).

12.

Gearing, IWM 11032.

13.

See Rachel Woodward, "Military Landscapes: Agendas and Approaches for Future Research," _Progress in Human Geography_ 38, no.1 (2014): 40–61 for a survey of contemporary research on military landscapes.

14.

Peter J. Martin, "On the Retreat from Collective Concepts in Sociology," in _Human Agents and Social Structures_ , ed. Peter J. Martin and Alex Dennis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 34–51.

15.

Hence, the good geopolitical subject displays a complex but largely reinforcing and stable intersubjectivity.

16.

Niall Ferguson, _The Pity of War: Explaining World War I_ (New York: Basic Books, 1998), pp.1–10 for a discussion of novels such as Erskine Childers's _The Riddle of the Sands_ (1903), L. James's _The Boy Galloper_ (1903), and William Le Queux's _The Invasion of 1910_ (1906) as well as German equivalents.

17.

Paul Fussell, _The Great War and Modern Memory_ (London, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Jay Winter, _Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century_ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006).

18.

Peter J. Taylor, _Modernities: A Geohistorical Interpretation_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

19.

Maurice Matloff, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943–1944_ (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959).

20.

Michael Howard, _The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars_ (London: Temple Smith, 1972).

21.

Ibid., 9–10.

22.

Ibid., 107–108; citing Chiefs of Staff (COS) 335 CAB 52/53.

23.

Ibid., 127, citing "European Appreciation" by Chiefs of Staff Committee, 20 February 1939, Defence Plans (Policy) 47.

24.

Ibid., 128.

25.

Joe Painter, "Prosaic Geographies of Stateness," _Political Geography_ 25, no. 7 (2006): 752–774.

26.

Woodward, "Military Landscapes"; Paul Virilio, _Bunker Archeology,_ trans. George Collins (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994).

27.

Duncan Campbell, _The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain_ (London: Michael Joseph, 1984).
Chapter 2

# Geopolitical Constructs

Understanding Global Geopolitical Change

War is an ongoing process of making and remaking people, things, bureaucracies, places, and regions. The process stretches backwards and forwards in time and out from immediate settings to the global. In this process, the multiple things that are made, and connected to each other through the process of making, are best thought of as _geopolitical constructs_. The term enables us to understand geopolitics in broad historic and geographical terms without resorting to the determinism that has haunted past geopolitical theories. Geopolitical constructs are both the product and the venue of the agency of individuals. The form and purpose of that agency is situated within contexts of clustered geopolitical constructs. Through their agency individuals become geopolitical subjects within the contexts they are in the process of making.[1]

The three constructs central to the Mulberry Harbour project are illustrative rather than all-encompassing. The commonality is that their form and the social relations that define them are to some degree sustained;[2] they have a degree of physical and political permanence. The Mulberry Harbours and their component parts were the products of engineering, politics, military strategy, and the social relations associated with them. The institutional and geographic legacies of the success of the Normandy invasion—significantly enabled by the component parts of the Mulberries—created geopolitical constructs with broader historic and geographic scope: the division of postwar Europe, a US presence in Western Europe, and the politics of transatlanticism. The array of geopolitical constructs related to the Mulberry Harbours had reach or legacy across time and space that continues to frame and partially determine the actions of geopolitical subjects.

Geopolitical constructs are spatially and historically unbound. They have an influence or reach that extends beyond the immediate "here and now." The mutuality of agent and construct produces geopolitical constructs that both enable agency and have a lasting impact that reaches across time and space.[3] The actions in one geographic-historic setting are partially framed by those in distance spaces at previous times. Actions within, and of, geopolitical constructs have lasting impacts that stretch beyond the immediate, in both spatial and historic terms. Understanding war in this way tackles the tension between approaches to geopolitics that emphasize structure over agency, and those that focus on individual actions without theorizing the setting of those actions. Geopolitical constructs are a particular way to discuss the idea of _context_ that has been at the center of the geographic approach to understanding politics.[4]

By examining the construction and operation of Mulberry Harbours, insight into the complexity of one set of geopolitical constructs may be examined. The complexity will never be fully uncovered—there are many connections that could be explored that I do not. I hope I will outline enough connections to show how Mulberry Harbours were the "coming together"[5] of behavior that can be interpreted within the connection of three geopolitical constructs. They were geopolitical constructs in that they enabled the expression of power relationships that had a lasting causality across time and space. This way of thinking stems from a belief that the individual behaviors that make war can only be understood within a much bigger picture: A geopolitical approach that is contextual rather than structural avoids seeing people as acontextual or atomized actors and the opposite pitfall of being determined by structural imperatives. Instead, people have agency, roles, and identities that they embody in different ways partially depending on their contextual setting (figure 2.1).

Structure, Agency, and Context.

_Source_ : Colin Flint.

### _Geopolitics: From structure to individuals_

What is the starting point to examine geopolitics? Or to put it another way, what should be looked at, and how, to "see" or understand geopolitics? To make the point, two extreme positions, each with their own credibility and tradition in geopolitics, can be identified. First, the starting point is nowhere in particular and the perspective is a global one with a long historical view. This is the so-called "God's eye view."[6] Alternatively, the starting point is a very particular somewhere, and often a someone, whose actions "made" a geopolitical outcome. This perspective was primarily the "great man" tradition of history, focusing on political and military leaders. Recently, the focus on individuals has highlighted the victims, marginalized groups, and other actors as history-makers of geopolitical situations.[7] The everyday actions of nonelites and the politics of resistance they have embodied have been made visible. Between the two perspectives of the grand view and the focus on the individual is the rationale of the discipline of geography. The most appropriate and fruitful perspective is one of context in which particular situations exist and produce context-specific behavior.[8]

Over the course of the history of political geography, the relative influence and relevance of the global and individual perspectives have waxed and waned.[9] The use of classic geopolitics to paint ostensibly, but deceptively, "objective" global theories has long fallen out of favor in academia.[10] Moreover, the critique of the global perspective has challenged the explanatory worth of social scientific approaches to defining global structure. Approaches such as Modelski's cycles of world leadership, Wallerstein's world-systems analysis (particularly the notion of cycles of hegemonic power), as well as the work of Saul Cohen to map a regional pattern within a global geopolitical system are marginal to contemporary political geography.[11] The classic geopoliticians, figures such as Alfred Mahan and Sir Halford Mackinder, have been exposed for their false claims of scientific objectivity while they were, in fact, promoting narrow national agendas.[12] Social scientific models of global change have fallen foul of postmodern and poststructuralist critiques of structural determinism and the apparent denial of the existence and power of agency. The current focus in political geography has been led by the fundamentals of a feminist perspective that brings focus upon the embodied nature of geopolitics and the related need to see the role of multiple actors, each with a blend of identities and goals, and their geopolitical actions.[13]

But what do embodied actors do, what are the constraints and opportunities within which they operate, and what is the lasting legacy (if any) of their actions? Context frames actions as constrained but with limited opportunities. However, the idea of context has been only loosely defined and its value in explaining things has been strongly challenged by other disciplines.[14] Despite its nebulous nature, context is, arguably, the cornerstone of the discipline of geography: The world is heterogeneous and people behave differently in different geographic settings.[15] But what is context, how is it made, how does it change, and in what ways does it influence behavior? These questions are still largely unasked in the discipline, let alone given theoretical form that enables analysis.

The underlying issue in these debates is the question of structure, a debate that has had an impact on the whole of social science rather than just geography. Since the identification and promotion of the structurationist perspective, the whole notion of structure and structural determinism has been debated.[16] For political geography, the critiques of structural approaches and structurationism, have been part and parcel of the retreat from a global perspective that identifies broad geographic regions and historical eras. The two main sticking points that detract from structural approaches are the notion of determinism and the construction of a false separation between agent and structure.[17]

The resurgence of political geography was largely led by a reference to structuralist approaches, namely the world-systems analysis adopted by Peter Taylor and more conventional Marxist approaches that informed scholars such as Kevin Cox and David Harvey.[18] The engagement of structuralism was central to the very definition of the newly defined subdiscipline, as evident in the seminal volume edited by Kasperson and Minghi published in 1969 and tellingly entitled _The Structure of Political Geography_.[19] This collection of classic texts and groundbreaking research aimed at creating a "coherent conceptual structure"[20] for political geography that would allow for integration within the broader discipline of geography and the social sciences in general. Their working definition of political geography as the " _study of the spatial and areal structures and interactions between political processes and systems_ "[21] displays the challenge of the time: moving political geography from a largely descriptive and proscriptive endeavor to a field of academic inquiry that analyzed behavior within societal and geographic settings. The tensions that Kasperson and Minghi saw in their approach were immediately evident and prefaced existing debates on the duality of structure and agency. The tendency of structural functionalism to overemphasize the causal power of structure soon ushered in different views of structure based on Marxist theory.

Marxist approaches to structure emphasized two points. First, that social action is politicized—behavior is not free but constrained by structures of power relations.[22] Second, was the move to "denaturalize" the world; the world was not a matter of biological or physical analogies and imperatives but socially constructed. Though some of these points remain axiomatic, the "cultural turn" in geography marginalized the role of structure in political geography.[23] Rather than being the driver of political geography, Marxist analyses became just one of many approaches within geography. Contemporary Marxist frameworks wrestle with retaining economics as the foundation for understanding politics without being all-encompassing or deterministic.[24]

The imprint of postmodernism and, subsequently, poststructuralism further removed structure from the focus of political geography.[25] Postmodernism, especially in the manifestation of critical geopolitics, has resulted in opposition to any attempt to create a global understanding of the world.[26] Though the original intention of critical geopolitics was an essential step in the development of the subdiscipline of political geography, it has had negative consequences. The noble intention of disrupting the "God's eye view"[27] of the world, that either directly or indirectly enabled policies of militarized domination and control, rehabilitated the term geopolitics. However, the critique of global and historic frameworks extended into academic constructs too. Practical geopolitical structures that were clearly intended to justify and inform the actions of a particular state (Mackinder's Heartland model or Ratzel's organic state, for example) and academic heuristic devices (such as world-systems analysis or Cohen's geopolitical system) became tainted with the same brush.[28] Both were deemed structural metanarratives. The result was that political geographers have struggled to create and disseminate understandings of global geopolitics while practitioners, with their usually odious agendas, have cornered the market.[29]

The poststructural turn, notably the important contributions made by feminist geopolitics, had further implications for structural approaches. Importantly, an emphasis upon contingency rather than structural causation emerged. As with critical geopolitics, feminist geopolitics made necessary and positive changes to political geography. It reoriented the discipline to grounded field work rather than the focus on texts in the critical geopolitical approach. In the process it emphasized the everyday and the marginalized with the result that multiple power relations became the gamut of political geographic inquiry.[30] Especially, gender and race were brought to the center of the analysis to break the focus on class, capital, and the state that was a legacy of the varieties of Marxism that had catalyzed the resurgence of political geography.

Feminist approaches worked in conjunction with the influence of Foucault to focus attention to the individual (or "the body").[31] But such a focus still demands attention to context and, indirectly, structures. The multiple forms of power relations identified by feminists may be interpreted as rules, norms, institutionalized forms of behavior that fit definitions of structure; so too can the institutions and societal practices that create and maintain forms of Foucauldian biopower. For example, the state, sovereignty, and territory are understood as different ways in which power relations create strategies of control over the behavior of people within particular spaces.[32] Though usually eschewing the term, the rules and behavior of states,[33] and other geopolitical entities, fit easily into some definitions of structure.

Structure is vital to political geographic inquiry but lingers in the background. There are good reasons for the reluctance to use the language of structure. In general the problem stems from structures being reified as causal entities, prior to human behavior and separate from social subjects. Such a distinction is no longer viable given theoretical advances that stress the mutuality of subject and structure formation.[34] In an attempt to revive a focus on structure in geopolitical analysis it is important to state what is not being resurrected, namely a call for structuralist explanations. Instead, geopolitics is about the construction and maintenance of settings or contexts with broad geographical scope and long-lasting implications for social behavior. Furthermore, geopolitics must emphasize that there are constraints on social behavior, in the form of both rules and norms, which are the product of and medium for social behavior.[35] In turn, social behavior is dynamic and transformative: changing people as they face new situations and in the process creating geopolitical settings.

Geopolitics has an inheritance demanding a grand view of the global, and contemporary relatives that begin by considering the scale of the individual. To make for a family reunion in which both perspectives are accommodated, the idea of geographic context can be reinterpreted as a setting for action. Geopolitical constructs are contexts formed by agency but given meaning and purpose within a broader geopolitical situation. By considering the individual as a geopolitical subject, actions are situated within overarching, even global, settings without resorting to structural determinism.

### _The good geopolitical subject_

The political actions of people, such as making war, occur within settings that guide and limit those actions. Once the idea of the autonomy of individuals is rejected, the consideration of "the fields in which the person was active, to the networks that he or she helped to construct, and to the social background connections that influenced, shaped or even prompted individual decisions and actions" is required.[36] In other words, action should not be equated with autonomy but seen as the product of prior and existing relations that come together in geographic contexts of unique combinations of relationships.

Individuals, as participants in geopolitical projects, should be understood "not as agents in some general sense but carefully contextualized in specific societal contexts."[37] Geopolitical actions are given meaning and lasting impact through a network of relations with other actions in other settings. Actions and obligations are certainly adaptable and can be challenged, but only to a certain extent and only at particular moments. Within geopolitical situations agents are required to act in a variety of ways, and very often comply. Their agency makes things, attempts to achieve political and military goals, and creates normative thought. Action is inseparable from a clustered set of contexts, an agglomeration of geopolitical constructs. Individuals, such as those in the settings that came together to make the Mulberry Harbours, became subjects; their roles and purpose were framed within the broader geopolitical project.

The geopolitical subject is an individual whose physical appearance, demeanor, attitudes, identity, and actions are the product and generator of other geopolitical constructs. The process of making war connects people and settings across time and space, from the immediate to the global. Geopolitics as global strategy is product and producer of individuals and the myriad of settings they operate within. The body is a site of geopolitics, in which the individual is not a discrete entity but connected to those forces that make, sustain, and control it.[38] The means and outcomes of such connectivity are contextualized within different geopolitical constructs, each with a particular geographic and historic scope. Geopolitics is a particular form of contextualized subject formation, or a particular expression of "the spatiality of social life."[39]

Though it is, arguably, more exciting to think of transformative actions, it should be recognized that most social behavior, even within a time of war, is repetitive and normalizing.[40] Within geopolitical constructs "we subject ourselves"[41] within the rules and norms of the setting to sustain dominant beliefs that are internalized by the subject. The outcome is the "good subject" in that "what may seem intensely intimate and personal really is nothing more than a subject position we hold in relation to a larger system."[42] The good geopolitical subject is one of the three geopolitical constructs addressed in the making of the Mulberry Harbours. It is an individual who behaves in a "normal" way, by which I mean they largely follow the rules of a geopolitical setting to sustain its mission in a broader geopolitical project. Normalcy may be new, if a new setting is created as part of the geopolitical project. Or it may be a continuation of established behavior if the contextualizing geopolitical construct existed prior to the project. For example, engineers involved in the Mulberry Harbour project continued existing behavior if they remained employed in civilian settings, but adapted their behavior when assigned into newly formed military offices.

The normalcy of the good subject, the possibility of awareness of difference and marginalization within dominant rules and norms, the iterations of the routine, and the possibility of transformative events are all framed within, and constitutive of, spatial-temporal settings, or geopolitical constructs. The good geopolitical subject is "configured across space and places."[43] Geopolitical constructs often act in a restrictive or defining manner. They rarely provide opportunities for transformative action and more often than not are the "hard 'facts of life'" that restrict possibility of actions and promote the maintenance of the good subject.[44] Once in a geopolitical construct it is hard to behave in a way that will change it. This does not mean that the good geopolitical subject should be seen as unidimensional or completely compliant to the geopolitical demands pressing upon them. At any time, an individual is situated within a complex set of power relations that creates multiple pressures to conform but also avenues for mild or overt resistance. The good geopolitical subject could certainly resist some demands, and be cynical or critical towards others, but they largely go along with, and enable, the political projects within which they were situated. The subjects in this book were actively engaged in transformative projects required to wage war that made new geopolitical constructs that had a legacy defining future behavior.

The reach or scope of geopolitical constructs is interconnected in a way that individual action helps create the global structures which classical geopoliticians and social scientific structuralists were both interested in. Geopolitical constructs are spatially and historically unbound. However, by seeing the actions of the good geopolitical subject as situated within other geopolitical constructs, rather than predetermined and functional scales, we understand the process of war-making as a combination of contingent actions and lasting sets of rules and norms. The actions of multiple geopolitical constructs are made within contexts formed by other geopolitical constructs. The scope, or potency, of these constructs varies. Some are best considered immediate and local while others are lasting and global. One such geopolitical construct is the state.

### _The state as geopolitical construct_

The good geopolitical subject cannot be understood outside of the context provided by the state; "what we imagine ourselves and others to be in relation to the world is absorbed into, refracted through and reproduced by state practices."[45] Certainly at a moment when two countries are at war with each other, the role of the state and one's national affiliation become very much related to a sense of self. That is why we can relate to the phrase "rally around the flag." The process of making war reinforces the geopolitical norm of the belief in nation-states as the "obvious" form of political organization.[46] "Thus, to some extent, what we think of ourselves in relation to the world, what we imagine ourselves to be in relation to the world, is also, under most circumstances, at least partially a state project."[47]

The Mulberry Harbours were a particular geopolitical project within the historical trajectory of Great Britain. World War Two was a particular moment in Britain's trajectory when it faced, arguably, an existential threat.[48] The British state was a geopolitical construct, or more accurately a combination of a number of geopolitical constructs, the coming together of "all acts of the state apparatus in the domestic and international arenas."[49] The geographic scope of the state is simultaneously national, but present in different places across the country, for the purposes of extending its global presence. This spatially unbound Janus tendency of the state, looking inwards and outwards, is quite normal but was exacerbated for an imperial country like Britain facing military challenges across the world.[50] The historical scope of the state is also understood through the Janus analogy. Britain at war was looking to the future, in terms of its continued existence and the wishful belief in the retention of the Empire. It acted towards these goals by looking to the past in two ways. Britain mobilized its imperial resources, by using soldiers from its imperial possessions, for example, and it also used a sense of imperial identity and achievement to encourage Britain's wartime morale.

The state is a product of many actions. In the case of wartime Britain, such actions were partially a result of institutionalized rules, societal norms, and intangible conditions of identity and belonging that had been established over a long period of time. Such actions, in specific projects such as the Mulberry Harbours, were done with the view of defending the state and maintaining its global role. Making the Mulberry Harbours was one project within a complex set of associations: The project was part of individuals' identity, made through their interactions with other people, adopting and manipulating rules and norms that had a degree of historical and geographical permanence. These associations made, and were made by, geopolitical subjects. People and their associations were made within particular settings, such as the workplaces that made the Mulberries, and they came together as one of many projects that made the state.

The state is a combination of different actions that includes business practices, or what we can think of as the private sector, within the geopolitical construct of the state. The symbiotic relationship between state, economy, and war-making,[51] is experienced as a prosaic presence in our everyday lives.[52] The way that firms and state institutions combine or interact varies historically and geographically.[53] Suffice to say that in the process of making war the state relies upon private enterprise to a large degree and interjects its power into the activity of businesses. Hence, the _institutional arrangements of state and business_ are treated as a single geopolitical construct. A more kaleidoscopic approach could readily identify different institutions of the state as particular, or somewhat stand-alone, geopolitical constructs. However, I emphasize that different settings within state bureaucracies and individual firms were strongly defined by the necessary interconnection between them to complete the making of the Mulberry Harbours. We may think of multiple settings, specifically those directly related to the Mulberry project, constituting the one geopolitical construct.

The multiple settings in which the Mulberry Harbours were designed and constructed came together within the realm of a particular mission of the British state.[54] The material aspect of these settings had a constitutional power that created a sense of ordinariness within them.[55] The ordinary, with its root in the word ordinarie, to order, is a set of practices that are enacted within daily life—simultaneously creating a sense of the normal and a setting that enables that daily life to continue.[56] In the places in which the Mulberry Harbours were made, the outcomes were the good geopolitical subject and a key engineering project vital to the Allies' prosecution of the war.

The combination of legal structures, norms, experiences, and practices that create ordinariness are coalesced by organizations and the mission they steer people towards. The state, including its connection to business, is a particular form of construct or organization that stabilizes or anchors the world for good geopolitical subjects.[57] State bureaucracies and businesses are types of organizations that are particularly important in their ability to create a sense of mission with historic and geographic scope while also providing an everyday sense of ordinariness. The connection between the everyday construction of the geopolitical subject and their role in a broader geopolitical mission is seen in the _institutional arrangements of state and business_ that came together in the making of the Mulberry Harbours.

### _Places and regions as geopolitical constructs_

The state, as a combination of institutional settings, is also a territorial entity that is made up of a variety of different places. In turn, places are agglomerations of different settings in which people experience their everyday lives.[58] People work, play, love, laugh, and cry in particular places. Places are the somewhat stable, but not static, settings in which good geopolitical subjects do more than work on geopolitical projects, such as making the Mulberry Harbours.[59] Within places the emotional and social support of home, family, and friends is found, that makes individuals complex people rather than one-dimensional geopolitical subjects only understood through their work. Places also comprise the infrastructure that enables the social relations of work and society.

The different forms of economic activity within a place, the institutions and organizations within which people interact, and the traditions and sense of identity of a place are the basic ingredients that come together to make places unique.[60] We can more clearly see places as spatially and historically unbound geopolitical constructs when we think of them as a blending of social relations that have a historical basis, and are formed through connections with other places, both near and far.[61] This is especially true for places with specific military functions.[62] Places are made, or constructed, by a host of social actions—work, play, the state, civil society, etc.—that are relatively stable but inherently dynamic. Places change, but usually slowly and not dramatically. People's material circumstances, as well as their beliefs and identity are formed, questioned, and maintained or changed within the uniqueness of particular places. Traditional ways of doing things and a local sense of identity are features of a place. Places may support or oppose, to varying degrees, the geopolitical project of the nation-state.[63] The relationships within Newcastle and Sunderland, that are explored in later chapters, show that these places were committed to Britain's war effort, but also resisted some of the demands made upon established work practices by the national government. Hence, places can be seen as geopolitical constructs.

As with the good geopolitical subject and the state, places are not reified things, but the combination of different social relations. Places are not simply local or bounded, but partially formed by their connections to more distant places. Places are made by the actions of their residents and the forms of interaction with other places. A town that suffers large-scale destruction from aerial bombing, for example, is made by the actions of its residents who try to fight the fires and rebuild. Such action is necessary because someone else in a foreign place saw the town as having "strategic value." Hence, places as geopolitical constructs have geographical scope. What happens in a particular place has an impact in more distant places, while also being effected by actions emanating from elsewhere. Wartime shipbuilding activity, including that related to the invasion of the Continent, in Newcastle and Sunderland had an impact upon the places in France occupied by the Nazis. Life in these two northern English cities was disrupted by German bombing campaigns directly related to the wartime business activities they hosted. Places have historical and geographical scope. They are connected to other places, and the forms of behavior within them are partly established through traditions and the organizing role of institutions.

The region is the final geopolitical construct that is vital for understanding the legacy and scope of the Mulberry Harbours. Regions are formed at different geographical scales: For example, within states ("the northeast") or as an aggregation of states ("Western Europe"). Like places, regions are not reified or bounded things that are stable in time. Rather, regions are dynamic social constructs with fuzzy boundaries.[64] They are also politicized features of the world through the types of institutions they include or exclude, and the sense of identity or meaning with which they are imbued.

Europe as a region has a long history of being a contested geographical entity.[65] The Cold War division of Europe was made by political actions in which different forms of political institutions defined the East and West of the continent. This process was nested within the broader historical and geographical scope of the Cold War. As we shall see, the Mulberry Harbours, and those involved in their construction, were implicated in the construction of the postwar geopolitical regions of Europe: a process of war-making that connected the daily activities of geopolitical subjects to global geopolitics through the interactions between states, business, and places.

Places are the settings of everyday life that, in aggregate and through their connectivity, form states and regions. Places, states, and regions are territorial expressions of social relations at different geographical scales. They are different but related _geopolitical landscapes_ , a geopolitical construct with the clearest territorial expression.

### _The historical-geographical scope of geopolitical constructs_

Individuals, the state and businesses, places, and regions are constructs within a wider constellation of constructs, making it hard to analytically delimit the temporal-spatial extent of a particular construct.[66] Subject formation is contextualized within the broader scope of material objects and political settings.[67] Subjects are made, partially consciously and to some degree in a haphazard unintentional and unaware manner, through participation in geopolitical projects with historical and geographical scope.[68] Geopolitical constructs illuminate the regional or global scope of geopolitics by beginning at the scale of the individual or subject, rather than with a deterministic or top-down approach.

Situating geopolitical subjects in a historically-geographically grand geopolitical scope requires a "broader relational meaning of the body."[69] An individual involved in war, such as a Mulberry engineer, was an ongoing construct, becoming within a set of relations. Geopolitical constructs bring our attention to not only what individuals do, but where they do it, and so to whom and what they are connected. Participating in a geopolitical project, like making war by engineering the things that make war possible, situates individuals in the time and space of geopolitical constructs. Within these constructs, individuals interact or meet with others. Making war is only possible through the "congruences and disparities of _meeting_ , that is on the _structural interdependence_ of life."[70] The practices of the individual are moments in a process of becoming, in which being is a "process of provisional and open-ended movement" within and through a variety of geopolitical constructs.[71]

The making of war is a process that changes individuals in immediate circumstances, but also makes larger settings, such as battlefields, state bureaucracies, places, and regions. The interaction of a variety of geopolitical constructs in the process of making war constantly remakes settings or constructs of different historical-geographical scope.[72] The process of making war is one in which people and worlds are connected in a dynamic of making and remaking, which is at once immediate and global.[73]

Geopolitical constructs are a useful way to think of war as a process in which people and the globe are connected in these processes of becoming, because geopolitics is seen not as either global and given or individual and fluid. Rather geopolitics is the coming together of different constructs, each with a different geographic scope and historic lifespan. The formative role of geopolitical constructs and their legacies requires thinking of events not as isolated incidences but as moments within the process of war-making. Events, as things done by and to individuals, occur within geographical settings that form ongoing geopolitical dynamics.

War is a process that is made up of many mundane and repetitious events and actions, and not just the heroic drama our attention is often drawn to. The repetition is a function of how geopolitical settings are constantly remade and subjects come to have stable roles and identities. Such meanings and roles are also a product of the interaction of different geopolitical constructs.[74] The contextualizing structure of events is "one of essential iterability, in which repetition rather than novelty prevails."[75] War-making is a stable and conforming process, combining people and the places in which they live and work, and making possible the things required to prosecute war, such as the Mulberry Harbours. Geographic context is a way to think of that stability, for it establishes ways of doing things that are semipermanent and understood, and so makes goals achievable.

Thinking of war as the semi-stability of settings is, of course, only part of the story. War is also disruptive. It ends lives and alters bodies, it results in the demise of states or reorganization of how they operate, places may be severely damaged, the politics of whole regions may change. These disruptions, seen as the very essence of the purpose and practice of war, depend on the tension between the formation of new geopolitical constructs and the relative stability of others. Some moments in the process of war-making "radically upend their contexts and, far from being submitted to a horizon of power meanings, are themselves the origin of meaning for any interpretation, in that they can be understood less from the world that precedes them than from the posterity to which they give rise."[76] In other words, some events or moments in the process of war are transformative; they make new geopolitical constructs, while others maintain existing ones. Transformative actions produce new worlds, settings, and people that are likely to have some longevity. For example, and as we shall see later, making the Mulberry Harbours required the long-lasting transformation of some work practices and settings in the shipyards of the Tyne and Wear.

Geopolitical constructs have geographical scope and temporal reach, which serve as an "intersubjective spacetime"[77] for individual actions. Some actions have a "potency"[78] to reach beyond the immediate time and space vicinity of the actor to construct a set of social relations that have geographic expanse and historical longevity.[79] Individuals, as geopolitical constructs themselves, are made within other geopolitical constructs.[80] In turn, individuals remake the geopolitical constructs that are the settings of their actions and, possibly, create others. The good geopolitical subject may be aware or unaware of their interpellation as good subjects, and whether their acts are transformative or not.

The connectivity and mutual construction of a host of geopolitical constructs is a complex context within which subjects create themselves and other geopolitical constructs beyond their immediate setting.[81] Especially, there is a necessary interaction between the creation of good geopolitical subjects, lasting institutions, and geopolitical landscapes.[82] An engineer in the Mulberry Harbour project was (mainly) acting within norms and rules of their particular work setting, the place in which they lived, their country, and the geopolitical world. A Mulberry engineer lived in a different national context, with different norms and rules, than a German engineer working on the Atlantic Wall. However, they shared the norms of warfare at the time, such as the acceptance that their home and family were susceptible to aerial bombing.

Geopolitical constructs situate individuals in settings that are long-lasting and not completely immediate. Sometimes individuals may be only vaguely aware of the scope of their situation. The geopolitical context may not be identified as a key reason for behaving in a certain way at a certain time. At other moments, the immediacy or potency of the construct may be very dramatic, or causal, for the individual's behavior. In both cases, their actions are likely to have broad geographical reach and historic legacy.

### _From structure to constructs_

Geopolitical constructs are a way to see the individual as a component of broader geopolitical projects. The geographic and historic scope of geopolitics is not determined by history, and settings are not pre-given by their geographical position in a simplified "God's eye view" of the world. Rather, individuals are just one form of geopolitical construct whose behavior is both product and producer of other geopolitical constructs. The legacy of geopolitical constructs creates largely normalized patterns of behavior that ensure geopolitical projects are achieved in somewhat stable settings.

Subject formation is human agency as "a collective product, germinated with others and dependent upon social networks in which we all exist. Human agency is better understood as the collective product of social relations . . . than as autonomous individual power."[83] Places, business and the state, and individuals are all examples of the collective or coming together of social relations. Geopolitical agency is both the product and the process. What is being made by geopolitical agency is more geopolitical agency, but it is done through a web of relations, some of which are institutionalized and somehow made "concrete."[84] Geopolitical constructs are the result of such concretization.[85]

Geopolitical constructs emphasize agency, and hence contingency and fluidity, and not the determinism of reified structures. However, geopolitical constructs also acknowledge the stability of settings that limit or frame agency. Indeed, "it is precisely the ability to understand how enduring institutional patterns are generated and maintained through situated interactions that is the greatest challenge to the 'sociological imagination', a challenge which conventional sociology has conspicuously failed to meet."[86] These institutional patterns can be seen as the "hard facts of life" that are the outcome and arena of geopolitics.[87]

In a line much quoted in geography, it is the "little things" that matter;[88] but it is the way that they are both the product of bigger things and go on to create bigger things that seems to matter just as much. For it is in the bigger things that power relations are legitimized and projected across space and time.[89] The interaction between bigger and smaller, nearer and farther, immediate and future, things is explored through the identification of geopolitical constructs as contexts of geopolitical action. It is through the varying scope of interacting geopolitical constructs that we can understand the formation and maintenance of global patterns of power in a nondeterministic manner.

### _Geopolitical constructs_

Geopolitics, such as war-making, is the coming together of actions in a set of semipermanent settings, each of different historical and geographical scope. These settings are geopolitical constructs: combinations of social relations put together, largely but not completely intentionally, for a political purpose and with tangible material expressions. Geopolitical constructs are the combination of the process of interaction between people, things, workplaces, and towns and cities that comprise the first two themes of the book. The lasting impact of the outcome of this process provides geopolitical constructs with historical legacy and geographical reach, the book's third theme.

Geopolitical constructs:

  1. Are concrete/tangible/meaningful—they create institutions, places, regions, identities, technological-complexes.

  2. Are long-lasting—more exactly they may be long-lasting, though long is a relative and flexible term. Postwar Europe is a geopolitical construct that lasted, arguably, until 1991. Though NATO was a geopolitical construct that was formed as a component of postwar Europe it has outlasted the East-West division of the continent.

  3. Have geographical scope—interactions and institutions that emanate in a geopolitical construct in one spatial setting may have an impact upon geopolitical constructs in other spatial settings.

  4. Possess a legacy—their existence influences the behavior of geopolitical actors that maintains, changes, promotes, or challenges other geopolitical constructs.

  5. Are a process rather than a reified entity—constantly being reshaped and negotiated within different contingencies and settings.

In the story of the Mulberry Harbours three connected geopolitical constructs are particularly relevant. The first is the _good geopolitical subject_ , individuals who, mainly, willingly behave according to the norms, rules, and expectations of a broadly accepted and established geopolitical project. The second are the _institutional arrangements of the state_ _and business_ necessary to define and harness the behavior of good geopolitical subjects in an attempt to ensure that the geopolitical project is achieved. Finally, the broader context is a set of _geopolitical landscapes_ that are a material imprint of built or "lived" environments and territorial arrangements.[90] Engineers, bureaucracies, places, and regions came together, as contexts and as agents, to make the Mulberry Harbours within the process of World War Two, and its legacies.

### _Notes_

1.

See also Jason Dittmer, "Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity," _Progress in Human Geography_ 38 (2014): 385–401, and Jason Dittmer, "Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages," _Annals of the Association of American Geographers_ 105 (2015): 604–619, and Katharine Meehan, Ian Graham Ronald Shaw, and Sallie A. Marston, "Political Geographies of the Object," _Political Geography_ 33 (2013): 1–10 for a related argument. The idea of geopolitical constructs is similar to Dittmer's idea of assemblages but intends to provoke questions of scale, scope, and long-term impact more explicitly. In that sense, the two ideas are complementary. Assemblages tend towards the contingent and ephemeral while constructs tend towards the structural and lasting. The concept of geopolitical construct requires the political mobilization of certain objects. In this sense a geopolitical construct places more emphasis upon the relational, material, and lasting than the contingent and representational. Geopolitical constructs are the outcome and actors of processes that create structural settings for future action, and hence emphasize lasting structural settings that frame ongoing actions. Though certain actions and outcomes are contingent, the limits and contexts of geopolitics that are relatively fixed in time-space contexts are emphasized by thinking of geopolitical constructs rather than assemblages.

2.

Martin, "On the Retreat from Collective Concepts in Sociology."

3.

James Tyner, _Military Legacies: A World Made by War_ (New York and London: Routledge, 2010). For similar arguments regarding architecture see Virilio, _Bunker Archeology_ ; Gary A. Boyd and Denis Linehan, _Ordnance: War + Architecture & Space_ (Farnham, Surrey, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013); and Keith Mallory and Arvid Ottar, _The Architecture of War_ (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).

4.

Doreen Massey, _For Space_ (London: Sage, 2005); John O'Loughlin, "Geography as Space and Geography as Place: The Divide between Political Science and Political Geography Continues," _Geopolitics_ 5 (2000): 126–137.

5.

Nigel Thrift, "On the Determination of Social Action in Space and Time," _Environment and Planning D: Society and Space_ 1, no. 1 (1983): 22–57; Steven Pile and Nigel Thrift, "Mapping the Subject," in _Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural Transformation,_ ed. Steven Pile and Nigel Thrift (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 13–51.

6.

Judith Butler, _Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity_ (New York: Routledge, 1990).

7.

Lynn A. Staeheli, Eleonore Kofman, and Linda Peake, eds., _Mapping Women, Making Politics: Feminist Perspectives on Political Geography_ (New York: Routledge, 2004); Lorraine Dowler and Jo Sharp, "A Feminist GeoPolitics," _Space and Polity_ 5, no. 3 (2001): 165–176.

8.

Massey, _For Space_ ; O'Loughlin, "Geography as Space and Geography as Place."

9.

John Agnew and Luca Muscarà, _Making Political Geography_ , 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012); Virginie Mamadouh, "Geography and War, Geographers and Peace," in _The Geography of War and Peace,_ ed. Colin Flint (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 26–60.

10.

Mamadouh, "Geography and War"; Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, _Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought_ (London: Routledge, 2002).

11.

George Modelski, _Long Cycles in World Politics_ (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); Immanuel Wallerstein, _The Politics of the World-Economy_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Saul Cohen, _Geopolitics of the World System_ (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

12.

Gearóid Ó Tuathail, _Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Dodds and Atkinson, _Geopolitical Traditions_.

13.

Staeheli et al., _Mapping Women, Making Politics_ ; Dowler and Sharp, "A Feminist GeoPolitics."

14.

Ian McAllister, "Social Context, Turnout, and the Vote: Australian and British Comparisons," _Political Geography Quarterly_ 6, no. 1 (1987): 17–30; Gary King, "Why Context Should Not Count," _Political Geography_ 15, no. 2 (1996): 159–164.

15.

O'Loughlin, "Geography as Space and Geography as Place."

16.

Anthony Giddens, _A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 1: Power, Property, and the State_ (London: Macmillan, 1981); Martin, "On the Retreat from Collective Concepts in Sociology."

17.

See Gérard Dussouy, "Systemic Geopolitics: A Global Interpretation Model of the World," _Geopolitics_ 15 (2010): 133–150 and responses by Alexander B. Murphy, "Gérard Dussouy's 'Systemic Geopolitics,'" _Geopolitics_ 15, no. 1 (2010): 151–156 and Robert Jervis, "Thinking Systemically about Geopolitics," _Geopolitics_ 15 (2010): 165–171.

18.

Peter J. Taylor, "A Materialist Framework for Political Geography," _Transactions, Institute of British Geographers_ NS7 (1981): 15–34; Kevin R. Cox, _Conflict, Power and Politics in the City: A Geographic Approach_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973); David Harvey, _The Limits to Capital_ (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982); Colin Flint, "Geographic Perspectives on World-Systems Theory," in _International Studies Association Compendium_ , ed. Robert Denemark (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 2828–2845.

19.

Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi, "Introduction," in _The Structure of Political Geography_ , ed. Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), xi–xii.

20.

Ibid., ix.

21.

Ibid., xi.

22.

Richard Peet, _Modern Geographical Thought_ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 112–146.

23.

Ibid., 216–218.

24.

J. K. Gibson-Graham, _A Postcapitalist Politics_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith, "After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoeconomics," _Antipode_ 41 (2009): 22–48; Julien Mercille, "The Radical Geopolitics of US Foreign Policy: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Logics of Power," _Political Geography_ 27 (2008): 570–586.

25.

Michael Dear, "The Postmodern Challenge: Reconstructing Human Geography," _Transactions, Institute of British Geographer_ s 13 (1988): 262–274.

26.

Ó Tuathail, _Critical Geopolitics._

27.

Butler, _Gender Trouble_.

28.

Ó Tuathail, _Critical Geopolitics_ ; Dear, "Postmodern Challenge."

29.

For example see Simon Dalby, "The Environment as Geopolitical Threat: Reading Robert Kaplan's 'Coming Anarchy,'" _Ecumene_ 3 (1996): 472–496; Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," _Political Geography Quarterly_ 11 (1992): 190–204.

30.

Jennifer Hyndman, "Mind the Gap: Bridging Feminist and Political Geography through Geopolitics," _Political Geography_ 23 (2004): 307–322.

31.

Arun Saldanha, "The Political Geography of Many Bodies, " in _The Sage Handbook of Political Geography_ , ed. Kevin R. Cox, Murray Low, and Jennifer Robinson (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), 323–333; Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, eds., _Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography_ (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007).

32.

Merje Kuus and John Agnew, "Theorizing the State Geographically: Sovereignty, Subjectivity, Territoriality," in _The Sage Handbook of Political Geography_ , ed. Kevin R. Cox, Murray Low, and Jennifer Robinson (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), 95–106; Stuart Elden, _Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Matthew G. Hannah, _Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth Century America_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Tyner's _Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War_ connects the extraterritorial practices of labor migration with a nationalized Catholic sense of self.

33.

Louise Amoore, "Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror," _Political Geography_ 25 (2006): 336–351.

34.

Peter J. Martin and Alex Dennis, eds., _Human Agents and Social Structures_ (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010).

35.

Murphy, "Gérard Dussouy's 'Systemic Geopolitics,'" 153.

36.

Simone Lässig, "Introduction: Biography in Modern History—Modern Historiography in Biography," in _Biography between Structure and Agency: Central European Lives in International Historiography_ , ed. Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lässig (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 10–11.

37.

Merje Kuus, "Policy and Geopolitics: Bounding Europe in EUrope," _Annals of the Association of American Geographers_ 101, no. 5 (2011), 1142.

38.

Pamela Moss and Isabel Dyck, "Embodying Social Geography," in _Handbook of Cultural Geography,_ ed. Kay Anderson, Mona Domosh, Steve Pile, and Nigel Thrift (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), 60.

39.

Peter Jackson, "Introduction: The Social in Question," in _Handbook of Cultural Geography_ , ed. Kay Anderson, Mona Domosh, Steve Pile, and Nigel Thrift (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 38.

40.

Thrift, "On the Determination of Social Action in Space and Time."

41.

Elspeth Probyn, "The Spatial Imperatives of Subjectivity," in _Handbook of Cultural Geography_ , ed. Kay Anderson, Mona Domosh, Steve Pile, and Nigel Thrift (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), 293.

42.

Ibid., 292.

43.

Ibid., 296, following Kathy E. Ferguson, _The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

44.

Ibid., 298.

45.

Sallie Marston, "Space, Culture, State: Uneven Developments in Political Geography," _Political Geography_ 23, no. 1 (2004), 12–13.

46.

Michael Billig, _Banal Nationalism_ (London: Sage, 1995).

47.

Marston, "Space, Culture and State," 12–13 referring to Wahneema Lubiano, "Like Being Mugged by a Metaphor: Multiculturalism and State Narratives," in _Mapping Multiculturalism_ , ed. Avery Gordon and Christopher Newfield (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 65–66.

48.

Michael Walzer, _Arguing about War_ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 33.

49.

Kuus and Agnew, "Theorizing the State Geographically," 98.

50.

Tom Nairn, _The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism_ (London: New Left Books, 1977); Colin Flint and Peter Taylor, _Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality_ , 6th ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2011), 140–144.

51.

Charles Tilly, _Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990_ (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990); Bob Jessop, _The Capitalist State_ (Oxford: Robertson, 1982); Cowen, _The Deadly Life of Logistics_.

52.

Painter, "Prosaic Geographies of Stateness."

53.

John Agnew, "Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics," _Annals of the Association of American Geographers_ 95, no. 2 (2005): 437–461.

54.

Martin Müller, "Opening the Black Box of the Organization: Socio-material Practices of Geopolitical Ordering," _Political Geography_ 31, no. 6 (2012), 382.

55.

Lynn A. Staeheli, Patricia Ehrkamp, Helga Leitner, and Caroline Nagel, "Dreaming the Ordinary: Daily Life and the Complex Geographies of Citizenship," _Progress in Human Geography_ 36, no. 5 (2012): 628–644.

56.

Ibid., 631.

57.

Ian G. R. Shaw, "Towards an Evental Geography," _Progress in Human Geography_ 36, no. 5 (2012), 621.

58.

John Agnew, _Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society_ (Boston and London: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

59.

Yi-Fu Tuan, _Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience_ (London: Edward Arnold, 1977).

60.

Agnew, _Place and Politics_.

61.

Doreen Massey, _Space, Place, and Gender_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 120.

62.

Rachel Woodward, _Military Geographies_ (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Woodward, "Military Landscapes"; Mark Gillem, _America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Stephen Graham, _Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism_ (London: Verso, 2010); Richelle Bernazzoli and Colin Flint, "Embodying the Garrison State? Everyday Geographies of Militarization in American Society," _Political Geography_ 29, no. 3 (2010): 157–166.

63.

Andrew Kirby, _Power/Resistance: Local Politics and the Chaotic State_ (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

64.

Mary Beth Pudup, "Arguments within Regional Geography," _Progress in Human Geography_ 12 (1988): 369–390; Peter J. Taylor, "A Theory and Practice of Regions: The Case of Europes," _Environment and Planning D: Society and Space_ 9, no. 2 (1991): 183–195.

65.

Taylor, "A Theory and Practice of Regions"; Luiza Bialasiewicz, "Spectres of Europe: Europe's Past, Present, and Future," in _The Oxford Handbook of Post-War European History_ , ed. D. Stone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 98–101.

66.

Müller, "Opening the Black Box of the Organization"; Shaw, "Towards an Evental Geography"; Cowen, _The Deadly Life of Logistics_.

67.

Keith Woodward, John Paul Jones III, and Sallie A. Marston, "The Politics of Autonomous Space," _Progress in Human Geography_ 36, no. 2 (2012): 204–224; Sallie Marston, "The Social Construction of Scale," _Progress in Human Geography_ 24, no. 2 (2000): 219–242; Sallie Marston, John Paul Jones III, and Keith Woodward, "Human Geography without Scale," _Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers_ 30, no. 4 (2005): 416–432.

68.

Woodward et al., "The Politics of Autonomous Space" and their use of Butler, _Gender Trouble_.

69.

David Harvey, _Spaces of Hope_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 98.

70.

Pile and Thrift, "Mapping the Subject," 26.

71.

Ibid., 19.

72.

Or, as Nigel Thrift stated: "Through the processes of socialization, the extant physical environment, and so on, individuals draw upon social structure. But at each moment they do this they must also reconstitute that structure through the production or reproduction of the conditions of production and reproduction. They therefore have the possibility, as, in some sense, capable and knowing agents, of reconstituting or even transforming that structure." (Thrift, "On the Determination of Social Action in Space and Time," 29 quoted in Pile and Thrift, "Introduction," 3–4). Thrift's subsequent work has followed broader trends and focused less on structure, but the quote is useful to bring attention to two pressing issues if we are to understand geopolitical constructs: How do we understand events or actions, and what, precisely, does Thrift mean by "and so on"? If the individual, as a geopolitical construct, is constantly becoming, it is through a never-ending sequence of events or practices. It is this connection between the individual who is somehow "structured" and a temporal sequence of the established and the yet-to-happen that has led Thrift to concentrate on how events play a role in geopolitical processes (see Nigel Thrift, "It's the Little Things," in _Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought_ , ed _._ Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (London: Routledge, 2000), 380–387). For Thrift mundane individuals produce people and broader worlds, as argued by Dittmer "Everyday Diplomacy" and "Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity."

73.

Jervis, "Thinking Systemically about Geopolitics," 165.

74.

For a similar discussion see Richard Jenkins, _The Foundations of Sociology: Towards a Better Understanding of the Human World_ (Basingstoke: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2002), 65–71.

75.

Martin Jay, "Historical Explanation and the Event: Reflections on the Limits of Contextualization," _New Literary History_ 42 (2011), 564.

76.

Claude Romano, _Event and World_ , trans. Shane Mackinlay (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 38 quoted in Jay, "Historical Explanation and the Event," 564.

77.

Nancy Munn, _The Fame of Gawa: A Symbolic Study of Value Transformation in Massim (Papua New Guinea) Society_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 10.

78.

Ibid., 9.

79.

In Munn's words, the "agents produce the world in a particular form, but they may also be seen as producing themselves or aspects of themselves in the same process." Ibid., 11.

80.

See Dittmer, "Everyday Diplomacies" and "Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity." In addition to the cultural connections and scope that are built by everyday actions of geopolitical subjects, I stress the construction of strategic practices and institutions.

81.

Munn, _The Fame of Gawa_ , 15.

82.

Furthermore, these actions, and the potency to construct that they hold, occur in what Munn calls a "hierarchizing process" (18) of given cultural premises that, in turn, create a "communal order" (20), or the "governing premises about the appropriate and possible relations of power that pertain in the society" (20).

83.

Anthony King, "How Not to Structure a Social Theory: A Reply to a Critical Response," _Philosophy of the Social Sciences_ 36, no. 4 (2006), 475 quoted in Peter J. Martin and Alex Dennis, "Introduction: The Opposition of Structure and Agency," in _Human Agents and Social Structures_ , ed. Peter J. Martin and Alex Dennis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 14.

84.

Ibid.

85.

Concretization has been called different things. Martin and Dennis, "Introduction," 14 refer to "specific situations" and they supportively quote W. W. Sharrock, "Individual and Society," in _Classic Disputes in Sociology_ , ed. R. J. Anderson, J. A. Hughes, and W. W. Sharrock (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 152 and his reference to "the stable relationships which we find in society" as a result of the process of agency.

86.

Martin and Dennis, "Introduction," 16.

87.

Probyn, "Spatial Imperatives of Subjectivity."

88.

Thrift, "It's the Little Things."

89.

Indeed, in a perhaps surprising appeal which illustrates the extent to which we have become focused on the individual, the unique, and the contingent, Martin, "On the Retreat from Collective Concepts in Sociology," 51, states that focusing on situated interactions "need not entail a neglect of power relations, social structures, and the other apparently 'macro' phenomena of social institutions. On the contrary, it is argued that the latter must be understood not as ontologically independent entities but as arising out of, sustained by, and changed through, collaborative interaction."

90.

Tim Cresswell, "Landscape and the Obliteration of Practice," in _Sage Handbook of Cultural Geography,_ ed. Kay Anderson, Mona Domosh, Steve Pile, and Nigel Thrift (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), 279. A geopolitical landscape may be a site (such as a military base), a place, a strategic arena (i.e., the Western front), or a region (such as the Cold War division of Europe). Clearly such geopolitical constructs only have meaning through mutual construction, and other geopolitical scenarios (such as the contemporary War on Terror) would require the identification of other geopolitical constructs. See Tyner, _Military Legacies_ and Cowen's _The Deadly Life of Logistics_.
Chapter 3

# The Scope of the Mulberry
Harbour Project

Demanded by Strategy, Made by Committee

The construction of the Mulberry Harbours occurred within the context of the trajectory of Britain's declining global power, and the consequent need to mesh its strategic needs with those of the United States. The identification of the necessity of the Mulberry Harbours, and the subsequent organization to get them built, required and developed connections between a number of geopolitical constructs. The process can be summed up as a mixture of grand global strategy and bureaucratic muddling. Strategic imperatives were the context and product of interservice wrangling within Britain, dramatic bureaucratic reorganization, brinksmanship at crucial international conferences, and personal struggles as the pressures of war and office politics met. Setting the scope of the Mulberry Harbour project provides a glimpse into the formation of all three geopolitical constructs that will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. Situating the Mulberry Harbours in a broad geographical and historical scope illustrates how all geopolitical constructs, especially the British state, are relational constructs tied to other countries and regions of the world and linked to the past and the future.

### _"Ducks and drakes" and the British way of war_

The historic scope of the Mulberry Harbours extends beyond the constrained timeline of World War Two bureaucratic memos and empire building. In hindsight, we can see that the war marked the end of Britain's century-long dominance of global politics. Britain had achieved hegemonic power through its defeat of France at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For over a hundred years, and despite ongoing tensions with Russia, Britain had been the dominant economic power in the world and had set the agenda of global politics.[1] The geopolitical role of Britain had been summarized in the influential theory of Sir Halford Mackinder, who identified Britain as a sea power, facing threats from land powers based in the Eurasian "heartland."[2] Britain's foreign policy was based on the idea of global presence through naval power, while standing aloof from Continental politics but making sure no other country dominated Europe.[3] Such geopolitical generalities had given expression to a particular "British way in warfare," in which mobility through sea power was the essential strategy.[4]

This strategy had been betrayed in World War One and the impact was felt throughout Britain:

> The dual cost of the Somme and Passchendaele, which are so often excused and even acclaimed for their coincident drain on the enemy's manpower, has been deducted from our moral power. There for a generation, if not for ever, has been sunk the faith that created the Empire. And, even if a moral recovery should come, it is almost inconceivable that we could recover the political and economic consequences of the original moral bankruptcy.[5]

It was such "exhaustion of the spirit"[6] that weighed heavily on British policy-makers tasked with enabling the invasion of the Continent in World War Two. The Mulberry Harbours played a pivotal role in providing the confidence that an invasion could take place, with enough men and material and over a long enough period of time to facilitate a war of "fire and movement"[7] rather than the static carnage of trench warfare.

The mud of the Somme was not the only specter haunting the prosecution of World War Two. The difficulty of landing on the Continent was as much a concern as what would happen once the troops had invaded. The Mulberry Harbours were seen as a way to ensure the landing of a sufficient force to make the advance to Berlin possible. The memories of the failed beach landings of Gallipoli were just as jading as those of the Somme. In 1917, as part of his strategic thinking in World War One, Churchill had suggested building an artificial harbor to land troops behind enemy lines in Flanders.[8] Though this invasion never came to fruition, Churchill was the chief protagonist for the Gallipoli landings; the other epic failure that haunted British thinking about its military relationship with the Continent. Two issues were made clear by the slaughter in Gallipoli. First, invasion was not just a matter of landing troops; it also required the continual flow of material and men to sustain the subsequent advance. Second, the technical difficulties in landing men on a hostile shore were manifold.

At Gallipoli, a collier ship, the _River Clyde_ , had been adapted to hold 2,000 men who were to emerge out of sally ports once the boat had been run aground and a steam hopper and two lighters had been brought to the bows of the grounded boat to form a bridge to the shore.[9] But the hopper was swept away by the current and the progenitor of the idea, Commander Unwin, had to dive into the water under intense fire to lash the lighters in place. Less than 200 soldiers reached the shore and about 1,000 were trapped within the _River Clyde_. This particular landing in the Gallipoli assault was abandoned with horrific casualties.[10] The memory of Gallipoli weighed heavily on Churchill's strategic thinking. If invasion was to be undertaken it required an army large enough to have a sustained momentum. In turn, that strategic necessity required the support of a vast engineering project to make sure the invasion force was not trapped on the beaches as they had been at Anzac Cove.[11] The result was the massive and complex technical achievement of the Mulberry Harbours.[12]

The realization that invasion was likely to be a necessary part of the British military's arsenal was evident in 1932, when the Admiralty established a small department to explore amphibious warfare.[13] The role of amphibious warfare grew in importance over the course of the war. After Dunkirk, the British strategy was to not merely resist invasion but to start, slowly but surely, to change the very nature of the war.[14] Beginning with commando raids, such as those on Lofoten and Spitsbergen in 1941, the goal was to make Hitler think defensively rather than offensively. The initial seeds of the Mulberry Harbour project were sown in the context of the overall shifts in British strategy, and the baby-steps required to move from niggling and morale-boosting commando raids to the Western Front invasion of the Nazi-held continent.

The pathway to D-Day was not just a matter of grand strategy. It also required the innovation and vision of engineers, and the particular, but unglamorous, skill of bureaucratic politics. Much has been written about the strategic tensions of the war. Notably, Stalin's constant, and very understandable, pushing for a Second Front to be opened up against the Nazis as soon as possible.[15] Also, the US decision to concentrate on the European theater was not without its tensions. Particularly, US Admiral King's desire to focus on the Pacific, despite his government's policy, meant that the supply of landing craft and other vessels that would support the invasion were reluctantly provided and in amounts much smaller than the British desired.[16]

The three-way interaction between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin was a cautious dance in which the Mulberry Harbours played a key role. Roosevelt and his commanders, sympathetic to Stalin's appeals, wanted an early invasion. But Churchill and his staff would only consider an invasion if its chances of success were raised by having the logistical backup necessary for a large-scale force to be landed and supported. Ultimately, the grand strategic debate between the Allied leaders and military staff was resolved when the British were clear that Mulberry would work. Large lumps of concrete, ingenious new anchors, and floating piers were part of the conversation that brought the Combined Chiefs of Staff to a consensus. To get to that point took a lot of engineering design and bureaucratic politics. At the beginning the British were groping with new ideas with little coherent plan.

One barrier was the need to change the way the British military was run. To perform amphibious operations a new military entity, Combined Operations (CO), was created. In May 1938 the Inter-Services Training and Development Centre at Fort Cumberland, near Portsmouth, had been established, but it was soon closed in September 1939. The stuttering commitment to the idea of amphibious warfare led to the reopening of the Centre, only for it to be closed again in April 1940.[17] The dedication to Combined Operations was, as recalled by Admiral Horan, piecemeal:

> it was felt by all those taking part in the various activities which fell to the lot of the Directorate of Combined Operations that they were the Cinderella of all Ministries and Departments. They had come into the picture late, and of course all the best localities had already been snapped up; they had to take what was left, and that was very little.[18]

The task of constructing a new military bureaucracy was a struggle, despite its strategic necessity and the support of the Prime Minister.

Louis Mountbatten was appointed to run the fledgling CO in October 1941. He replaced Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, who had established COHQ in Richmond Terrace, London, and HMS Quebec in Scotland, the first CO training center away from the south coast.[19] Churchill initially gave Mountbatten the rather flaccid title of Adviser, but this was a clever bureaucratic trick to make him less threatening to the established army, navy, and air force commands. Within six months Mountbatten had gained powers beyond Keyes's responsibilities and had become a chief of staff.[20] As adviser of CO, Mountbatten was given the task to "direct and press forward" R and D (research and development) pertaining to amphibious warfare. Moreover, he was empowered to "study tactical and technical developments in all forms of combined operations varying from small raids to a full-scale invasion of the Continent,"[21] a phrase that reflects a shift from over a century of British political-military assumptions.

Churchill's verbal orders to Mountbatten reflected the combination of strategic and bureaucratic changes that were required:

> I want you to succeed Roger Keyes in charge of Combined Operations. Up to now there have hardly been any Commando Raids. I want you to start a programme of raids of ever-increasing intensity so as to keep the whole enemy coastline on the alert from the North Cape to the Bay of Biscay. But your main object must be the reinvasion of France. You must create the machine which will make it possible for us to beat Hitler on land. You must devise the appurtenances and appliances which will make the invasion possible. You must select and build up the bases from which the assault will be launched. Before that you must create the various Training Centres at which the soldiers can be trained in the amphibious assault. I want you to bring in the Air Force as well, and create a proper inter-Service organisation to produce the technique of the modern assault. I want you to consider the great problem of the follow-up, and finally, I want you to select the area in which you feel the assault should take place and start bending all your energies towards getting ready for this great day.
>
> All other headquarters in the United Kingdom are at present on the defensive. Your headquarters are being created to be on the offensive. You are to give no thought to the defensive. Your whole attention is to be concentrated on the offensive.[22]

Changing the strategic orientation of Great Britain required Mountbatten to coordinate a number of interconnected geopolitical constructs. He had to make military personnel into invaders, the bureaucracy to coordinate the three military services, and, central to the whole project, were the key "appurtenances" that were to become the Mulberry Harbours. In sum, he was tasked to shake up the attitude and structure of the British military establishment, and coordinate the engineering projects necessary for invasion. In doing so, he reoriented the military wing of the British state away from historic legacies and towards new geographic imperatives.

The Prime Minister and Mountbatten knew that an aggressive interpretation of the remit was at the heart of changing the nature of the war, and would ultimately require an engineering project to support invasion.[23] With the gravity of the historical shift in mind, the establishment and actions of Combined Operations were given meaning and justification by reference to the history of British naval power. A Ministry of Information wartime booklet entitled _Combined Operations, 1940–42_ "placed two years of raiding in the context of a long and honourable tradition, dating back to the days of Drake and Grenville."[24]

Within a few months, once Mountbatten had got his feet under the table, he was given authority through a memo, March 18, 1942, written by General Ismay, Churchill's Chief of Staff:

> (3) The title of the appointment of "Adviser on Combined Operations" has been altered to "Chief of Combined Operations". The appointment will in future carry with it the rank of Vice Admiral in the Navy, Lieutenant General in the Army and Air Marshal in the Royal Air Force.
>
>
>
>
> (4) The Chief of Combined Operations will attend meetings of the Chiefs of Staff as a full member whenever major issues are in question, and also, as heretofore, when his own Combined Operations, or any special matters in which he is concerned, are under consideration.[25]

The mundane and innocuous phrases "has been altered" and "any special matters" were the language necessary to mobilize the construction of new bureaucracies needed to produce the ideas and inventions that came with enacting historic strategic shifts. Mountbatten initiated the new thinking that was to result in the engineering project necessary to open the Western Front and address the Continental Commitment.[26]

The scope of Mountbatten's task was simultaneously intra-bureaucratic, national, and transatlantic. He commissioned an armada of state-of-the-art vessels from British and American yards. An amphibious invasion of the Continent was going to need a lot of boats:

> In December 1941 Admiralty projections were for "500–700 tank landing craft and 2,000 smaller craft manned by 2,000 officers and 20,000 men within the next 16 months". By April 1943 naval personnel was well over double the predicted numbers, with nearly 90 assault ships and around 3,600 assorted landing craft and barges.[27]

Mountbatten needed to build bridges between bureaucratic entities and renegotiate long-standing assumptions within them. He parlayed between the Chiefs of Staff, and dealt with a skeptical and stubborn Admiralty, while also thinking about those who would have to take the fight to Germany. He "toured training establishments convincing 'Hostilities Only' cadets that Combined Operations was no longer the Service's poor relation."[28]

Mountbatten's actions necessarily altered the existing assumptions of the British military bureaucracy. Echoing the historic identification of the British as a sea power, the tensions over military division of labor were defined by where the land met the sea:

> What was probably the most acute internal conflict was that which took place between the so-called movement staffs of the Navy and Army branches of COSSAC. The duties of these two sub-divisions of a combined staff are of course bound of their very nature to overlap, and it is almost inevitable that friction should be set up. Over long years the general line of demarcation between Army and Navy has been set as High Water Mark at Ordinary Spring Tides. But this last war has played ducks and drakes with many land and sea marks, amongst them "HWMOST". Largely owing to the great work of the Combined Operations staffs, it no longer rouses comment to find soldiers attired in lammies manning ships at sea or sailors dressed in khaki battledress driving trucks in the heart of a continent. When, as was the case with the COSSAC Staff, the whole affair virtually hinged upon rates of movement and men, vehicles and material from shore to sea and from sea to shore again, there was present every sort of opportunity, not only for inter-service rivalry but for inter-service jealousy and ultimately inter-service conflict.[29]

The pressure of wartime strategic imperatives catalyzed the historic shift in British geopolitical axioms. In hindsight we can see debates over British military strategy as a component of geopolitical decline. Strategic recalculation was not simply a matter of British decisions. Rather, the process played out as part of global geopolitical change, and the changing relationships with other countries and their imperatives and choices. The decisions Britain was making regarding its military organization and strategy were made in relation to those of other countries. The goals and capabilities of the United States became part of Britain's wartime calculations, and vice versa. The decisions made, especially regarding the invasion of the Continent, were to have a lasting impact on the geopolitical transition from wartime Europe to Cold War Europe.

US strategic thinking changed in mid-1940 with the publication of the RAINBOW 4 plan to defend the Western Hemisphere against Japanese aggression.[30] From the outset, US planning recognized that a global view required specific consideration of Britain's strengths and weaknesses. The US military connected their commitments in the Pacific to reliance upon the British fleet to guard the Atlantic. In 1940, US military planners had conceded that defense of the Western Hemisphere required the survival of Britain and her fleet, and that would likely require, at some stage, an invasion of the Continent, in conjunction with the British.[31] Or, as the Joint Planning Committee put it "The issues in the Orient will largely be decided in Europe."[32] Mutual strategic benefits for the United States and Great Britain were already pointing to what was to be D-Day before the United States entered into the war. And the driver for this calculation was the Pacific and not the European Continent.

Similar to developments in Britain, US strategic thinking required the creation and operation of a new set of bureaucracies. In the spring of 1941 RAINBOW 5 had appeared as part of the broader ABC-1 (American British Conversations).[33] But such steps were tentative with more than a dash of mutual suspicion. The United States wanted a bold commitment to defeating Germany, rather than attacking at the exposed edges of German military power through a projection of force in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the US military was very aware of the changing balance of power. As one staff paper argued, the United States would be the dominant force and would "constitute the final reserve of the democracies both in manpower and munitions."[34] The United States would not simply reinforce the British across the whole of their weakening Empire, but be concentrated in major campaigns that reflected US interests. With these concerns in mind, ABC-1 established that the forces of each country should operate, largely, under their own commanders "in areas of responsibility of their own Power"[35] as, from the US viewpoint, "partial insurance against the absorption of American forces anonymously into the patterns of Britain's war."[36]

Planning before M-Day, the anticipated date of US entry into the war, reflected the global strategic view of the United States (figure 3.1). It sought defense of the eastern front of the Western Hemisphere by balancing military independence with the formation of an alliance with the British. The tensions in this strategy were reflected in the US realization that homeland defense meant force projection. Just as the British had concluded in the past and ongoing world wars, the Rhineland was to be the US's new military frontier.[37] Planned US deployments for the first six months after US entry into the war totaled 413,900 Army troops, of which 236,000 were assigned within the Western Hemisphere and another 109,500 to defend its approaches. This was offensive projection to ensure defense. The remaining troops were to be sent to the British Isles, "within the orbit of Anglo-American power and on the direct approaches to northwestern Europe."[38] The morphing of US geopolitical power from hemispheric defense to a projection of global power, that was, in hindsight, a key military component of the transition from British to US global hegemony, was set in motion through the calculations of US strategists and logisticians. Operation Bolero was to be the cornerstone of the strategy. An "orbit" of power was in the process of being made, and as a consequence the relative power and global roles of the United States and Great Britain were changing. Strategic planning and bureaucratic memos put in motion the construction of geopolitical landscapes: the transformation of the British countryside to host US forces and the construction of a region of US force projection that became today's transatlantic security regime.

The Logistics of Hemisphere Defense, 1941.

_Source_ : Richard M. Leighton & Robert W. Coakley, _Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943_ , Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1955.

After the United States entered the war, the US military's concern with the European theater was sharpened by concerns of the potential collapse of the Red Army and its effect upon the global picture.[39] On March 6, 1942 the Joint US Strategic Committee agreed "the only means for quickly applying available force against the German war machine" was "use of the British Isles as a base area for an offensive to defeat the German armed forces."[40] The identification of Britain as a strategic pivot was made with an eye towards the need to restrict, as much as possible, the deployment of troops in other parts of the world.

On April 15, 1942 Roosevelt sent a cable to Stalin promising a second front. The pressure on the British to act continued with a June 17, 1942 meeting in Washington in which Churchill resisted what he saw as a poorly thought out proposal to attack Cherbourg and Brest (Operation Sledgehammer). This was not to say that the British were doing nothing. In March Mountbatten had informed General Marshall, US Chief of Staff, that "active plans for the invasion of the Continent were contemplated,"[41] and Mountbatten was pulling strings to piece the invasion plan together. These decisions were made around the same time that the buildup of American forces in Britain (what was to become Operation Bolero) was agreed upon. On the one hand, this buildup was just another piece in the puzzle—the manpower that would ultimately go through the Mulberry Harbours. On the other hand, this decision did not just require the Mulberry Harbours, it also ushered in a dramatic shift in the global geopolitical pattern defined by the long-term presence of US forces on the European continent.

In April 1942 the Marshall Memorandum was presented to the British identifying northwest Europe as the proposed point of attack, specifically a site near Calais. The ability to invade the Continent was contingent upon global geopolitical calculations that: the Alaska-Hawaii-Samoa-Australia line would be held; the US commitment of troops to New Zealand, the Middle East, and the China-India theater would be met; and the USSR would be able to draw the attention of Germany while Axis force strength would remain somewhat constant.[42] However, tensions between the Allies over their worldviews were evident. While the United States saw Europe and support for the USSR as imperative, they also recognized that the British commitment was partial, as they retained the view that it was essential to maintain presence in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region.[43] The historic strategy of Empire, rather than Continental Commitment, remained on the mind of the British.

Despite the tension and suspicion between the United States and Great Britain, the spring of 1942 did see a commitment in principle to US-British cooperation towards an invasion of the Continent. But the devil was to be in the details. General Eisenhower was enthusiastic with General Marshall's return from London: "at long last, and after months of struggle, . . . we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting! If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing around in the dark."[44] The pathway was open to planning for Bolero, and on June 8, 1942, a European Theater of Operations for the US Army (ETOUSA) was created, and General Eisenhower selected as commander.[45] The emerging coordination of the grand strategy of the Allies was to require memos and new staffing appointments, the essence of bureaucratic machinery. Interservice reorganization, understanding between the United States and Britain, and bureaucratic control of a massive engineering project all had to come together to prosecute the war; and the Mulberry Harbours were the focus of these developments.

### _"Made by committee"_

By mid-1942 military planners were realizing the problems of invasion in the vicinity of Calais, and hence were looking for an alternative site. The intersection of physical geography and military geography was to finally identify the Normandy beaches as the site of D-Day. A shoal off the coast of Arromanches, originally found by Vice Admiral Hughes-Hallett on nautical charts, was seen as a suitable physical foundation for sunken blockships that would make an outer breakwater.[46] To compound this advantage provided by nature, Arromanches was also in-between the two key sites of Bayreux and Caen that would play a role in the subsequent military advance from the beachheads.[47] The failed raid on Dieppe in August 1942 gave the Mulberry Harbour project further impetus.[48] The loss of life made clear the difficulties of trying to seize a well-defended port. The Mulberry Harbour project, spurred on by Churchill's memo, now had greater strategic justification.

Through 1942 and into 1943 it was clear that individuals in largely unconnected offices were making their own plans for the engineering schemes necessary for invasion. Hughes-Hallett recalls being told of a prototype of the Spud Pontoon Pier, designed by Brigadier Bruce White in the Transportation Department of the War Office, being tested on the Solway Firth.[49] Similarly, the Admiralty was coming up with its own plans. Hughes-Hallett, by then Chief of Naval Staff to Allied Naval Command Expeditionary Force recalls: "It was not until June 1943 . . . that the idea of creating a large area of artificially sheltered water occurred to me, and my idea at the time was to create this by sinking blockships. It transpired that suitable shoal water existed off Arromanches which created, as it were, a foundation for the blockships."[50]

Hughes-Hallett was convinced that blockships, to be sunk on D-Day + 4, were sufficient to create a sheltered anchorage within which boats could disgorge men and material. However, the multitude of ideas that had been generated in different offices affiliated with different branches of the military meant that things were not to be so simple. The disparagement of being "designed by committee" may be cast at the Mulberry Harbours. The ultimate combination of gooseberries, bombardons, caissons, spuds, whales, and kites was a product of the way that the project stuttered into existence. Hughes-Hallett, who was very dismissive of additions to his idea of a simple breakwater of blockships, went along with a plan to have two or three Spud Pontoon Piers inside the sheltered water area. This was not the only irritation Hughes-Hallet had to deal with:

> Also, at about the same time, the usual crowd of prima donnas moved in from the wings, and suggested better methods of making the breakwater. These included compressed air, which I flatly refused to have considered; the bombardons, favoured by the Admiralty, which were quite useless; and finally, the great concrete "Phoenixes", which were backed by Bruce White.[51]

Hughes-Hallett's frustrations portray a brainstorming atmosphere in which engineers and scientists were throwing ideas around like confetti. Different branches of the military had been incubating their own ideas and, as the whole project was coming together, each branch felt the need to make sure that their idea was part of the finished item. The Mulberry Harbours were truly a wonderful creation, despite, not because, they were designed by a committee comprising competitive combatants.

Perhaps a stronger hand would have prevented the project becoming so complicated. Instead, the initial atom of the project, the blockships, were soon forgotten. Or, in another interpretation, bureaucratic politics came into play and Hughes-Hallet's idea was demoted in favor of the caissons:

> I was succeeded as Chief-of-Staff at Norfolk House by Sir George Creasy, and I told him he need not give another thought to the artificial port, since Sir Harold (Wernher) would take it in his stride. Sir George interpreted this rather too literally and I know from hearsay that there was a phase in which the entire project depended on Phoenixes, etc. However, at a late stage, the Admiralty insisted on the introduction of a number of blockships, if only as an insurance against possible difficulties in getting the Phoenixes into position.[52]

We should be somewhat wary of Hughes-Hallett's recollections, as he was very opinionated about the merits of sheltered water protected only by blockships. Indeed, he believed that all that was needed was the "harbour" made of lines of sunken ships and that the Whales, Rhinos, and Phoenixes were "wasteful and ridiculous excess."[53] However, his frustration does illustrate that the final form of the Mulberry Harbours was very much a result of office politics, and not simply rational planning and comradely cooperation in face of a common foe.

The British Army's thinking of how to get back to the Continent since the British Expeditionary Force had been hurriedly evacuated from Dunkirk had also been in motion. Civil engineer Sir William Halcrow recalls that in 1940, Sir Bruce White had asked him "whether he could form a group of dock and harbour engineers for the purpose of designing ports, and suggested the names of a number of well-known firms." Halcrow approached the firms of Coode's and Wolf Barry (Du Cane), who both accepted the invitation to participate. The "Joint Engineers were thus formed and were consulted on a number of matters concerning ports and landings and they helped select sites for emergency ports in this country."[54] The first two ports built, Military Ports Nos. 1 and 2, were located at Gairloch and Loch Ryan in Scotland.[55]

The experience of working on these ports was to be crucial for the Mulberry Harbours. "The Joint Engineers were consulted at different times about an organisation for the purpose of preparing schemes for the repair of ports likely to be damaged by enemy action. [Halcrow] was chairman of a Committee of Consulting Engineers dealing with matters arising out of this organisation."[56] This cooperation formed the kernel of the bigger project that was to come: "The members of the Group were also closely connected with the design and construction of the artificial harbours in Normandy, principally Mulberry. Mr. Gwyther attended a conference in America when the decision was taken to prepare the harbours."[57]

Mr. R. D. Gwyther (employed by Coode, Wilson, Vaughan-Lee & Gwyther) and other engineers attended conferences in America to insert discussion of the construction of the component parts of the Mulberry Harbours into the US-British debates over military strategy. Ultimately, the competing ideas of engineers and officers with loyalties to either the Admiralty or Army were able to show that the Mulberries made the invasion and the subsequent logistics possible. The Mulberry Harbours enabled the landing of personnel and equipment in the immediate aftermath of D-Day. Perhaps their primary role in the war was showing that a large-scale invasion was possible, thereby allowing the United States and Britain to agree to go ahead with the opening of the second front. The consequences were Britain renouncing its Continental Commitment and the United States beginning its own decades-long transatlantic presence.

### _"Trimmings and all"_

Bureaucratic developments were just one of the driving forces behind the construction of the Mulberry Harbours. The project was also a carefully wielded tool in the strategic negotiations between the US and British military, as well as the separate national services. The outcome of the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in Casablanca, January 1943, was to delay any invasion of France until 1944, a decision made whilst Churchill was still pressing for an invasion through southeast Europe, and to begin earnest planning for a D-Day.[58] Mulberry was to be the logistical tail that wagged the dog of invasion. No time and place for the invasion was agreed, but plans for the Mulberry Harbours continued to be discussed. The ability of the engineers to show that a scheme to enable logistical support was possible gave the strategists confidence that an invasion of the Continent, at a scale large enough to ensure success, was feasible. There was also recognition that the engineering accomplishments to date were fragmented and disorganized. The decision was made to appoint Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan as COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander) to serve as coordinator of the various offices, each working out their "invasion ideas."[59]

Further groundwork was made by the end of May 1943 when the Anglo-American High Command, in a Washington, DC meeting, decided on a name and date for the invasion of France: Operation Overlord, May 1, 1944.[60] Consequently, Mountbatten called the Largs Conference in June of 1943 to ensure adoption of the COSSAC plan, called Quadrant, for the attack in the Cherbourg area.[61] In minutes sent from conference to the Chiefs of Staff, it was decided:

> That a single authority should be appointed who, in consultation with the Service Departments, will tackle the whole problem of the construction of special piers (of which the design has already been produced) to accelerate unloading on the beaches. A decision is urgently needed as to the types and numbers required. This authority should also deal with the provision of artificial ports and breakwaters and the development of the Continental ports we shall capture.[62]

The goal of the Largs Conference, for Mountbatten at least, was to make sure that the planning process became more decisive and purposeful. It marked the end of a haphazard formative period and the attempt to wed disparate and experimental groups of engineers into a coherent project.[63] This required coordination at a time when Mountbatten realized that his days as CCO (Chief of Combined Operations) were numbered. Sometime soon a Supreme Commander would be appointed, and with that Mountbatten would have to pass on the baton whilst ensuring that the lessons he had learned, and the progress that had been made, were not lost. Mountbatten knew that different groups had produced their own ideas and innovations to enable a beach invasion, but that these groups were, at best, uncoordinated and, to some degree, at loggerheads. For example, he knew that Bruce White's Transportation Department (Tn5) had been working on building floating pier-heads and roadways, but that other groups had their own irons in the fire.

Mountbatten's strategy was to include rather than exclude. He invited everyone and anyone who had up to then been involved in the invasion plans to the Largs Conference.[64] However, the key decisions had already been made. Mountbatten went in to the Largs Conference aware that the War Office plan for the invasion logistics had already been approved. With a rank of Major at the time, Steer-Webster recalls being summoned to a Chiefs of Staff meeting chaired by Lieutenant General Nye in May 1943: "Item 7 on the Agenda concerned the Prime Minister's Minute—Piers for Use on Beaches—and as it was certain that Churchill would fire some pretty direct questions at the meeting, Captain Hussey, the DXOR [Director of Experiments for Operational Requirements] of COHQ, telephoned the War Office that I was to come over immediately to Richmond-terrace to brief CCO on the DTn scheme."[65] Steer-Webster, with somewhat the weight of the world on his shoulders, recommended the DTn scheme.

Though Steer-Webster was called in to give an objective recommendation, his bureaucratic loyalties lay with DTn:

> I got back to the War Office feeling a little smug. I immediately reported to DTn—then Major-General McMullen—and told him what the Chiefs of Staff meeting had decided. He was both surprised and pleased—but Bruce White was furious with me: he always was.
>
> I suppose to please Bruce White—save his face—it was decided that, in case I'd misunderstood what General Nye had told me, nothing would be done until a directive arrived from the Chiefs of Staff. These directives usually appeared straight away, and, in fact, it came as we were talking. A special messenger brought it in, and we immediately put into operation all that we had planned [where] the Phoenix and Whale equipment was concerned.[66]

Grand strategy, bureaucratic competition, and the daily fears induced by office politics combined to make Steer-Webster a good geopolitical subject. Though he had the major role of giving daily briefings to Churchill,[67] Steer-Webster still believed he was the victim of an overbearing boss. Despite this, he was to provide the impetus necessary to break a bureaucratic logjam and give Mountbatten the ammunition he needed to manage the Largs Conference in a way that would move the invasion project forward. Mountbatten made a convincing argument that the Tn5 design was actually a joint All-Service project. The Admiralty had no option but to go along with Mountbatten's pitch.[68]

Despite his criticisms, Hughes-Hallett, as a good geopolitical subject, worked within the bureaucratic system to combine his favored idea of blockships with the War Office's plans for floating piers and roadways. He recalls:

> Partly in order to make the project appeal to the Prime Minister, and partly to ensure the support of COHQ (on whom we were supposed to rely for technical advice), we planned to have two or three Spud Pontoon Piers inside the sheltered water area, on condition that this could be arranged without unduly restricting the anchorage from which big ships would be discharging stores into barges and DUKWs.[69]

Hughes-Hallett believed that his compromise proposal of blockships plus some other devices was short-lived as Wernher took the plan farther to include "trimmings and all."[70]

Made by committee, perhaps, but glued together by bureaucratic politics that could also be the venue for personal "empire building," the Mulberry Harbours were crucial in breaking the strategic stalemate that had prevented deciding on a definite date for D-Day.

### _"A terrific shot in the dark"_

If the interservice rivalries were not disruptive enough, minefields within offices had also to be negotiated. After the Largs Conference, Mountbatten recommended that Harold Wernher be appointed to COSSAC as coordinator of ports, sheltered anchorages, and port and landing facilities that would be required on the Continent for the invasion. Mountbatten did so in a Minute to the Chiefs of Staff, dated July 7, 1943—which led to Wernher being promoted to Major-General.[71] The minute recommended:

> that a single authority should be appointed who, in consultation with the Service Departments, will tackle the whole problem of the construction of special piers (of which one design has already been produced) to accelerate unloading on the beaches. A decision is urgently required as to the types and numbers required. This authority should also deal with provision of artificial ports and breakwaters and the development of those continental ports we shall capture.[72]

On the one hand, we can see Largs as a classic bureaucratic compromise that Mountbatten made to keep an unruly squad of departments happy. But this misses the point. Mountbatten had to balance the concerns of efficiency, so volubly expressed by Hughes-Hallett, with the imperatives created by the transatlantic scope of the project. The Largs Conference created an image, actually a façade, of unity underlying British plans for the logistics of invasion. This achievement was to allow Mountbatten to be successful in his other major challenge. He had to go to the Allied Chiefs of Staff Conference (Quadrant) to be held in Quebec and persuade the United States that the British had not only a plan for the invasion but a fully-fledged engineering project in progress.[73]

There was recognition that bureaucratic politics had to be squelched. Two paragraphs in the directive, dated August 6, 1943, to Harold Wernher appointing him coordinator of ports and landing facilities for Overlord stand out:

> 5. You will be appointed to the Staff of the Supreme Commander (Designate) and will be directly responsible to him for ensuring that his requirements in connection with Continental ports, sheltered anchorages, port and landing facilities for Operation Overlord are adequately co-ordinated and presented for keeping the Supreme Allied Commander informed as to progress. The Commanding General, ETOUSA, is appointing an officer who will be his representative for US co-ordination.
>
> 6. In order that you may accomplish your task, you will:
>
>
>
>
> (i) Act as the Liaison between the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiralty, War Office, the appropriate US authorities and all other British [sic] Departments concerned with the development of ports, sheltered anchorages, ports and landing facilities.[74]

Wernher assembled a panel of civilian engineers to help him achieve these lofty goals. The project needed an everyday grind of meetings to integrate civilian contractors within the War Office. The final project was still very much fluid and "in-the-making" less than one year before the planned date of invasion—a hybrid of Admiralty and War Office visions. The engineers were slowly given an idea of how the plan was taking shape, as Mr. R. D. Gwyther recalls:

> The first meeting took place on 17th July, when Colonel Rolfe (War Office), in the chair, explained that a sheltered anchorage of about one square mile in area was required to harbor some 10–12 large coasters, and that consideration should be given to the following:
>
>
>
>
> A. Method of securing sheltered anchorage for coasters and lighters, and the construction of jetties and piers.
>
> B. The equipment required for building piers or wharves.
>
> C. Methods of handling cargo and clearance facilities.[75]

The committee went on to discuss the still very experimental options on the table. Included in this discussion were a large fabric balloon to reduce the height of waves (given the name Lilo), a concrete pontoon with tethered balloon equipment, and treadway equipment for tanks that was so new that Colonel Rolfe "assured the meeting that arrangements would be made"[76] for experiments to tests its viability. There were still many cooks in the kitchen, and the final menu was not decided upon.

With the crucial Quebec Conference on the horizon, the committee meetings came thick and fast. The best means for providing sheltered water had to be found. Hughes-Hallett's proposal of a line of blockships was evaluated and found wanting. The committee believed that the profile created by the line of ships would not provide a constant resistance to wave patterns, and that the ships might break up under the stress. Concrete caissons were seen to be the most promising option, as the technology was already used in harbor construction—though admittedly not ones that had to be dragged across an ocean war zone. The use of an air bubble was dismissed as impractical, but, even at this late stage, the committee gave authority to create a report on the feasibility of the caisson-balloon combination.[77] Pressing deadlines did not disrupt an engineer's capacity to dream-up innovations.

Though there were engineers' speculations in the air, increasingly the committee was given more details and the demand for specific accomplishments within precise criteria. On August 9, 1943 Mr. Gwyther said the committee heard that they had to come up with a plan to install the harbor in just four days from D-Day, the depth at low water (22 feet), the description of the Lobnitz pier-heads, and that six Spud Pontoons had been ordered. Design, planning, and actual construction were happening at the same time. The overall project remained ad hoc with eight months to go to the planned invasion.[78]

The frenzy of summer 1943 appointments, plans, decisions, production, and speculations had a clear goal in mind, one that can only be understood by seeing the broad geopolitical scope of the project. It was not just a matter of creating an invasion plan that would work, it was also a matter for the British of driving the plans forward in a way that would ensure the invasion went the way they wanted. The British were aware that the balance of power was drifting further away from them, while they retained a sense that their strategy was the more effective one. This tension was to play out in the personnel politics of the appointment of the Supreme Commander,[79] but it was also a matter of coming to the table with a British plan that could not be refused.

Wernher went to Quebec with the goal of presenting a fait accompli: a Mulberry Harbour plan with the illusion of detail and form that would demand adoption of the British plan. However, the last person to be convinced to allow Wernher's plan to succeed was also the most crucial and stubborn. Churchill was still wary of invasion plans that did not have the required logistic support to make them big enough and sustainable to ensure the drive off the beaches and to victory.[80] Traveling across the Atlantic on the _Queen Mary_ , Hughes-Hallett and Professor Bernal, acting as scientific advisor, filled a bathtub and floated paper ships. Taking a loofah to act as a breakwater, they demonstrated to Churchill the way a breakwater would produce sheltered water.[81] Churchill was now convinced that the invasion plan, supported by the Mulberry Harbours, would work, and he would go in to the conference ready to back the D-Day invasion plan. Only on the journey over to the Quebec Conference could the Mulberry team convince Churchill to give the green light.

The Americans had plans of their own though. The Quebec Conference was not going to be a mutual sharing and discussion of ideas to come up with an agreeable plan. Instead, it was a power play between the United States, with the authority gained from having the weight of economic strength and the supply of the necessary manpower the invasion required, and the weaker British. The British planners had made all the necessary decisions about the invasion already. Hence, when the conversation came to the technical issues, the British team assumed moral authority and threatened to walk out if their plan was not adopted. Without a plan to call their bluff, the United States had to accept.[82]

The Quebec Conference was just one of many incidents of tension between the US and British senior officers, in which the Mulberry Harbours played a significant role. Yet the Quebec Conference did produce enough cooperation and agreement to make the Mulberry Harbour project achievable. The decision put pressure on the good geopolitical subjects who were tasked with making the Mulberry Harbours, with its strategic imperatives, a success. Sir Bruce White, interviewed in 1983 at the age of ninety-eight, recalls being asked at the conference whether a ten-month production schedule was doable. His reply was positive as long as the United States was able to guarantee the supply of timber and tugs. He remembered the personal weight of his task many years later:

> this answer was a great responsibility, I was able to do so as I knew that an organization I had formed was available, both militarily and civilian, and that it was therefore possible to carry out this very difficult operation in the very short time available. It was really a terrific shot in the dark. It was only when I got coming back I thought "My God now I could hang for this alright if it didn't work."[83]

At the conclusion of Quadrant the British delegation went on to Washington, DC where they had the task to convince the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) of the Mulberries' viability.[84] Despite the success of the British team in Quebec it was clear that their job was not done. They believed that CCS acceptance of the plan required a presentation of all the details to make it convincing.[85] Inevitably, more committees were seen as the best pathway to success. To be able to make the case to the CCS, the delegation thought up a series of committees, established at a general meeting held in Washington as soon as possible after arrival from Quebec. The meeting held on August 26, 1943 formed six subcommittees:

  1. Steering Committee

  2. Physical Factors and Design Criteria Committee

  3. Ship Breakwater Committee

  4. Concrete Caisson Committee

  5. Lilo Committee

  6. Compressed Air Committee

Mr. Gwyther, who served on committees 1, 2, 4, and 5, and Colonel Steer-Webster, who served on committees 2, 5, and 6, were apparently indispensable geopolitical subjects.

The committees had to work fast. The findings were collated in a Most Secret report dated August 28,[86] though the speed was probably down to the amount of work done in previous meetings in Britain and Canada. Anticipating that the Chiefs of Staff would accept the plan, Bruce White asked Mr. Gwyther to draw up a memo describing the immediate action to be taken on the Harbour Committee's return to England. The plan was approved by the CCS on September 3, 1943.[87]

The success of Mountbatten's strategy at the Quebec Conference was built upon a foundation of the mundane practice of committee building, and the urgency and decisions from the conference begat more committees. Especially, Bruce White's Tn5 was organized into a bureaucratic structure of a series of committees that was an essential component of the broader geopolitical construct of the institutional arrangements of state and business that were to make the Mulberry Harbours possible. It was such committees that were the arenas for the actions of good geopolitical subjects, and made possible the myriad of smaller tasks that in aggregation created global geopolitical change.

### _"Insurance against prolonged unfavourable weather"_

The geopolitical constructs of good subjects, state-business arrangements, and geopolitical landscapes were coming together as both a result and a driver of the ongoing war. The back and forth between Britain and the United States, and the tensions within the British wartime bureaucracy, were given meaning and purpose within the context of global military commitments, acting as opportunity costs for the invasion of the Continent. The strategic decisions were made with an eye to securing victory, but contained the legacies of past strategic tendencies. The need to look globally and consider the defense of the Middle East, the situation in China, and the need to support the Soviets through the lend-lease program, let alone the defense of the Pacific "line," meant that it was hard to come to a full commitment to an invasion of the Continent. The result was a wavering commitment to Bolero on both sides of the Atlantic, with uncertainty regarding the timing of D-Day.[88] On top of British suspicions that the US commitment to a Continental invasion was too early and too weak, there was also the historical concern for the imperial geography of protecting lines of communication to India through the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

It took a lot of meetings, focused on the nitty-gritty of shipping rates and opportunity costs across the globe, to make Bolero, and hence D-Day, happen. Without Bolero the Mulberries were pointless, and without the Mulberries the troops to be stationed through Bolero were going nowhere. Much of the argument revolved around the strength of the commitment to Operation Gymnast,[89] though the US planners, in a draft memo tried to remain optimistic:

> Prior to the acceptance of the Bolero Plan, British deployments and operations apparently were undertaken primarily with a view to maintaining the integrity of the British Empire. The Bolero Plan insures coordination and cooperation within the United Nations and envisages the creation of conditions that will facilitate continuity of offensive effort to bring about the decisive defeat of the enemy.[90]

British strategy was like a huge oil tanker, reluctant and difficult to maneuver to a different course. Ongoing committee meetings, increasingly dominated by the United States, slowly defined the new direction. The grand strategic reorientation of Britain was in motion. The change in course was global and historic in scope; it was made possible by careful planning of shipping rates and troop deployments and the input of the Mulberry engineers.

The planning and drudge of endless committee meetings was giving momentum and coherence to the Mulberry project. Through 1943 there was a shift from a "departmentalized" war to a more coherent, though still ad-hoc, plan. COSSAC Report No. 2, covering the month of September 1943 and published October 6, 1943, noted that experiment and production were still proceeding independently; caissons remained the only known method of creating a harbor, suggesting that innovation was still sought just months before the invasion. There were also concerns about labor shortages for the caisson construction, with an urgent request for US workers.[91]

The tensions over the timing of the invasion of the Continent were exacerbated by the British commitment to the Mediterranean. This gained a momentum of its own and, consequently a drain on shipping resources, troops, and landing craft. After the conference in Casablanca in January 1943, the projected rate of troop buildup in the United Kingdom for 1943 was 80,000 in the first quarter, 169,000 in the second, 375,000 in the third, and 359,000 in the fourth—a total of 983,000. By the end of 1943 it was estimated that 1,118,000 US troops would be in Britain.[92] Rather than Mediterranean operations disrupting Bolero, Churchill saw them as leading up to the commitment to the invasion of France.[93]

This opinion was not shared within the US military. Lieutenant General John E. Hull, chief of the Operations Division Theater Group, thought that the Mediterranean operations were undermining Bolero:

> Although from the very beginning of this war, I have felt that the logical plan for the defeat of Germany was to strike at her across the channel by the most direct route, our commitments to the Mediterranean have led me to the belief that we should now reverse our decision and pour our resources into the exploitation of our Mediterranean operations . . . As to Germany, in my opinion, the decision should be an all-out effort in the Mediterranean.[94]

The fact that this may not have been just bluffing to encourage British commitment to Overlord is supported by the opinions of other senior US military staff. Colonels Bessell and Lindsay—senior Army and Air members of the Joint War Plans Committee—believed they had been "outmaneuvered" by the British who were more concerned in the restoration of "the balance of power in Europe" in the postwar period than in the early defeat of Germany.[95] Such concerns were supported by the actual troop deployment numbers: By the end of June 1943 there were only 185,532 US troops in Britain in comparison to 520,087 in the Mediterranean area.[96]

With the devil still being in the details, and tensions rising amongst the British armed services and between the US and British allies, it is not surprising that progress on the Mulberry Harbours was nerve-wrackingly slow. The increasing involvement of US officers in Overlord led to greater concern about the seemingly chaotic state of the operation. Mulberry A (the harbor for the American invasion beaches) was under the command of US Navy Captain A. Dayton Clark, Commander, of Task Force 128. He immediately identified three problems: the lack of anchorages to store the completed Mulberries prior to the invasion, the lack of places to moor the tugs that would transport the Harbours, and no training for the tug drivers.[97] The general sentiment of the US officers involved, reinforced to the present day in the way the operation is portrayed, was that their expertise arrived in the nick of time to pull the whole thing together.[98]

It was not until February 27, 1944 that the first Phoenix unit was completed.[99] The pace of the construction was a cause of, and effected by, the dangers of the work. At Stokes Bay a caisson had collapsed causing casualties and a six-week delay in completing other units at that site.[100] Yet somehow, progress was made and all the necessary units built and put into their respective parking spots. Wernher resigned as coordinator at the beginning of May 1944 as the equipment had been assembled and it was now the Admiralty's job to park it.[101]

The key role of the Mulberry Harbours was in their combined logistical role _in_ the war and the psychological role it played _before_ the war in making policy-makers believe invasion was possible:

> Finally, I would say that the importance of the artificial port lay not so much in the actual use made of it, as measured in the proportion of all the stores and equipment which passed through it, as in the fact that it was regarded as an insurance against prolonged unfavourable weather. I think it fair to say that the Overlord plan would never have been _approved_ without the artificial port included in it, just as the plan could never have been _made_ without the experience which had been gained at Dieppe.[102]

The traditional British strategy of controlling the sea remained, but with a completely different goal: The English Channel was now a vector for, rather than a barrier to, invasion. Britain saw fighting on the Continent as essential to its security rather than something to be avoided. The dramatic change in strategy included the need to look across the Atlantic for military help, and the new role for Britain of junior partner. Simultaneously, the United States recalculated its defense interests and saw an inevitable commitment to European deployment. The new strategic equations were brought into practical action through a sequence of military planning meetings that focused on the when and where of the Continental invasion. These meetings were only resolved once the British had confidence that the ghosts of the Somme and Gallipoli could be exorcised. The Mulberry Harbours were the instrument of exorcism. The creation of the instrument required the geopolitical constructs of bureaucracies that connected the military, government, and industry. In participating in this bureaucratic process people became good geopolitical subjects, in which their everyday practices were situated within the grand drama of global war and geopolitical shift.

### _Notes_

1.

Wallerstein, _Politics of the World-Economy_ , 37–46; Taylor, _Modernities_ ; Flint and Taylor, _Political Geography_ , 50–58.

2.

Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," _Geographical Journal_ 23, no. 4 (1904): 421–442; Brian W. Blouet, _Halford Mackinder: A Biography_ (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1988); Gerry Kearns, _Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

3.

Howard, _Continental Commitment_.

4.

Basil Liddell Hart, _The British Way in Warfare_ (London: Faber & Faber, 1932).

5.

Ibid., 14.

6.

Ibid., 14.

7.

Peter Hart, _Fire and Movement: The British Expeditionary Force and the Campaign of 1914_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

8.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 201.

9.

Alan Moorehead, _Gallipoli_ (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2002), 112.

10.

Ibid., 133–135.

11.

David Stevenson, _Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy_ (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 97–98.

12.

The idea of an artificial harbor had been adopted in 1935 during the Abyssinian War of Famagusta, a fact that served as a catalyst for the initial proposer of an artificial harbor for D-Day, Captain Hughes-Hallett (Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 155). Some of the technology used in the Mulberry Harbours had already seen action in the calmer waters of civil engineering. Concrete caissons were being used before the start of the war in road tunnel construction under the River Maas (Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 274). The technology behind the Lobnitz pier-heads was adapted from an existing form of dredging equipment (Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 275).

13.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 24.

14.

Roberts, _Masters and Commanders_ ; Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 19–22.

15.

Ibid., pp. 284–285; Antony Beevor, _The Second World War_ (New York, Boston, London: Little, Brown and Co., 2012), 323; Charles B. MacDonald, _The Mighty Endeavor: The American War in Europe_ (New York: Da Capo Press, 1986), 219.

16.

Roberts, _Masters and Commanders_ , 519–524; MacDonald, _Mighty Endeavor_ , 78.

17.

Adrian Smith, _Mountbatten: Apprentice War Lord_ (I. B. Tauris (ebook), 2010), 172; Bernard Fergusson, _The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), 43.

18.

Quoted, with no source, in Fergusson, _The Watery Maze_ , 59.

19.

Smith, _Mountbatten_ , 172; Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 86–87.

20.

Smith, _Mountbatten_ , 176.

21.

Smith, _Mountbatten_ , 170.

22.

Quoted, without source in Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 87–88.

23.

From Smith, _Mountbatten_ , 170. COSC (Chiefs of Staff Committee) directive on the role of Adviser of Combined Operations, 16 October 1941, COS (41) 629; see also Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 87–90; and Philip Ziegler, _Mountbatten: The Official Biography_ (London: Phoenix Press, 2001).

24.

Smith, _Mountbatten_ , 172.

25.

Quoted in Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 41.

26.

Howard, _Continental Commitment_.

27.

Smith, _Mountbatten_ , 179.

28.

Ibid., 179.

29.

Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) quoted in Jon E. Lewis, ed., _Eye-Witness D-Day: The Story of the Battle by Those Who Were There_ (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1994), 7.

30.

Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, _Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943_ (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955), 16.

31.

Ibid., 43.

32.

Ibid., 43 quoting memo from Joint Planning Committee to Joint Board, 21 December 1940: "National Defense Policy for the U.S. in Response to a 14 Dec 40 Dir. from JB," JB 325, Ser. 670.

33.

Ibid., 54.

34.

Ibid., 55.

35.

Ibid., 56.

36.

Ibid., 55–56.

37.

Liddell Hart, _British Way in Warfare_ ; Howard, _Continental Commitment_.

38.

Leighton and Coakley, _Global Logistics and Strategy_ , 56.

39.

Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942_ (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, 1999 (1953)), 174.

40.

Ibid., 178.

41.

Quoted in Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 68.

42.

Matloff and Snell, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942_ , 185.

43.

Ibid., 187.

44.

Quoted in ibid., 190.

45.

Ibid., 196.

46.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 119.

47.

Ibid., 156.

48.

The Dieppe Raid with a force of about 6,000 men, mainly Canadian, was a disaster with almost 4,000 casualties. It led to the conclusion that the defended ports of the Continent could not be taken without a massive operation including aerial and naval bombardment. Also, the realization that the invasion of France would have to be postponed until 1944 further irritated Stalin (Beevor, _Second World War_ , 339–340).

49.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 80.

50.

Ibid.

51.

Quoted in ibid., 81.

52.

Ibid.

53.

Quoted in ibid., 82.

54.

Halcrow IWM K08/235.

55.

The geographic focus of the deployment for subsequent harbors was to be for an invasion of Africa, specifically, Egypt, and particularly on the Suez Canal at Port Ibrahim, Safaga, Adabiya, Kad el Marakeb, and Aqaba. Sir William Halcrow (IWM K08/235) recalls that the Joint Engineers prepared the designs and had civilian Resident Engineers and Inspectors on the sites, but that the Royal Engineers constructed the ports. At this early stage of planning the authorities were figuring out how to get private contractors and military engineers to work with each other, and had yet to contend with the particular maritime issues presented by the English Channel.

56.

Halcrow IWM K08/235.

57.

Ibid.

58.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 126; Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 216–217.

59.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 126; Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 219.

60.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 129; Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 265.

61.

IWM 88/2206 autobiography of Major-General Sir Harold A. Wernher.

62.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 134.

63.

Ibid., 130.

64.

Ibid., 132.

65.

Ibid., 135.

66.

Ibid., 137.

67.

Ibid.

68.

Ibid.

69.

Ibid., 149–150.

70.

Ibid., 150; see also Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 280.

71.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 133; Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 281.

72.

The "one design" mentioned in the memo was a reference to the successes of the War Office Experimental Engineering Group, catalyzed by Churchill's 1942 memo, in creating a flexible landing pier prototype that was being tested at Luce Bay Scotland by Colonel J. G. Carline, RE. See Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 134.

73.

Ibid., 150.

74.

Quoted in ibid., 214.

75.

As recalled by Mr. Gwyther in ibid., 151–153.

76.

Ibid., 152.

77.

Ibid., 152–153.

78.

More appointments and mobilizations were necessary. Wernher appointed Jack Gibson to run the construction side of the Mulberry project, particularly the caissons (ibid., 162). Sir W. Frederic Wake-Walker, at Wernher's request, appointed Captain (now Vice Admiral) Harold Hickling as liaison officer between Wernher and the Admiralty (ibid., 162–163). Wernher went to Sir Godfrey Ince, at the Ministry of Labour, with the request to make 10,000 building workers available by the end of September 1943 (ibid., 164). And Brigadier-General (later Major-General) H. B. Vaughan, Corps of Engineers, to represent American interests (ibid., 163).

79.

Brooke was bitterly disappointed at not being appointed Supreme Commander of Operation Overlord, and believed Churchill had promised him the position but gave in to pressure from President Roosevelt (Roberts, _Masters and Commanders_ , 395).

80.

Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 286–290.

81.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 170; Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 286.

82.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 174.

83.

Sir Bruce White IWM 6827 (recording)

84.

The engineers in the delegation also took the opportunity to use the superior water tanks in the US Hydraulics Laboratory to experiment with models of the Mulberry Harbours (Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 179).

85.

Ibid., 182.

86.

Ibid., 183.

87.

As soon as the delegation returned to Britain, Mr. Gwyther went back to his engineering firm. Movement of personnel between private companies and government was part of being a good geopolitical subject in a state-business geopolitical project. The connections between the committees and the contractors also guaranteed as rapid a transition to production from design and planning as possible. Being a good geopolitical subject meant that people like Mr. Gwyther worked on War Office committees as a "spare-time consultancy" arrangement, while also working in the private sector (ibid., 187–188). Contemporary linkages between war and private enterprises are explored in Tyner, _Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War_ and Cowen, _The Deadly Life of Logistics_.

88.

Matloff and Snell, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942_ , 198.

89.

Operation Gymnast, which became Operation Torch, was the US-British invasion of North Africa.

90.

Quoted in ibid., 242.

91.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 239–240.

92.

Matloff, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944_ , 26.

93.

Ibid., 128.

94.

Quoted in ibid., 165.

95.

Ibid., 166.

96.

Ibid.

97.

J. Wandres, "Bringing Order out of Chaos: Rescuing Force Mulberry," _Naval History_ 18 (2004): 25.

98.

As evident in the title of the article by Wandres, ibid.

99.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 238–239.

100.

Ibid., 239.

101.

Ibid., 272.

102.

Hughes-Hallett, quoted in ibid., 81.
Chapter 4

# Bureaucratic Constructs

"Millions spent on a plan which had not been approved"

The Mulberry Harbours played a key role in securing the strategic decision to invade the Continent by creating a sense of faith in the likely success of the operation. The decision signified a break from established military strategy and history that had shrieked caution towards the Continental commitment. The process within which the decision was made resulted in the dominant role to be played by the United States in European geopolitics. Such decisions and changes necessitated the construction of new bureaucratic arrangements to redesign the way the British fought their wars and acted as a global power.

The scope of the Mulberry Harbour project required the coordination of many actors in a new strategic situation. A military command in which the traditional high water mark dividing responsibility between the Royal Navy and the British Army had to be washed away with the changing tides of history. New equipment had to be designed and constructed to make this type of war possible. In addition, new forms of military cooperation had to be fostered and institutionalized as the British recognized that their global reach was eclipsed by the twin developments of challenges to its Empire and the emergence of the United States as the preeminent naval power.[1]

The geopolitical construct of bureaucratic arrangements of the state and business was necessary to coordinate the military operation with engineering and production demands. Shifts in strategy and geopolitical context, with future regional and global impact, required and were enabled by new administrative arrangements that coordinated transatlantic military cooperation. The twin national and transatlantic bureaucracies were the sites for engineers and military personnel to adapt new roles and responsibilities. Multiple new arrangements of state and business were the connection between the making of good geopolitical subjects and the making of a new geopolitical world. The British state, which was composed of these arrangements, was reorganized in the context of war and national emergency through connections across the globe and recognition of historic legacies. Building the Mulberry Harbours was an essential factor in these arrangements and constructing a spatially and historically unbound state.

### _"Work proceeded as under normal conditions"_

Someone had to be in charge of all the nuts and bolts (somewhat literally) necessary to build the Mulberries. The man chosen for this task was Brigadier Sir Harold Wernher. He was a good geopolitical subject tasked with ensuring the efficacy of bureaucratic constructs entwining military and other government offices with private business. On April 20, 1942 the Chief of Combined Operations sent Wernher a "Most Secret" Directive and Letter of Introduction (Reference: O.2/120) in which he was told:

> The Prime Minister has approved the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff that you should be responsible, under my general direction, for the Coordination of port facilities and general shipping. [At] the request of the Director of Movements of the War Office, I have agreed that your title should be Co-ordinator of Ministry and Service Facilities (for Combined Operations); Short title: CMSF (CO); for internal use: CMSF.
>
>
>
>
> 2. Your responsibility will embrace the whole problem of preparing facilities for the launching of the Assault and of maintaining supplies and reinforcements during the regular phase of a major combined operation against Northern France. The phase of the operation with which you are chiefly to be concerned is that between the time that the assault force is about to embark in England and the time that sufficient French ports have been captured and put into operation, for the supply problem to proceed on normal lines.[2]

The seemingly mundane task to "maintain supplies and reinforcements" was inextricably linked to the strategic imperative of coordinating the various offices necessary for the Mulberry project that would, in turn, be a key component in the shifting geopolitical balance of the world.

Wernher's appointment in 1942 along with Mountbatten's at Combined Operations were part of the strategic shifts and changes that defined the scope of the Mulberry project. Within these broad historical and geographical processes, mundane actions, especially memo writing, created the bureaucratic arrangements that were the context for the actions of good geopolitical subjects. For example, Churchill's famous memo of May 1942 was a bureaucratic cattle prod that Mountbatten thought necessary to end the frustration of slow and chaotic progress, rather than being the alleged Mulberry "eureka" moment. Mountbatten had a conversation with Churchill at Chequers pointing out the problems of invasion over open beaches and that not enough effort was being made to construct the floating piers. At the time, bureaucratic arrangements were seen as inadequate for the task at hand. According to Mountbatten, Churchill said, "I'll soon put _that_ right! I'll give you a Minute which'll show that I'm behind all your ideas in this connection!" and the famous memo was written.[3]

Churchill's memo gave coherence to the existing piecemeal ideas about how an invasion force could be landed. Churchill's brief memo was soon followed by others; longer, more detailed, and seemingly tedious. Looking behind their turgid language reveals the magnitude and complexity of what people were being asked to do, and how a coherent project was made. The engineering innovation of the Mulberry Harbours required a bureaucratic organization of private business, military units, and government offices that brought together people and places not just across Great Britain, nor just the Atlantic, but the world.

The cogs of the machinery of war were committees, and the cogs turned through relentless committee meetings. The ability for Britain to portray a sense of strategy at the Largs and Quadrant Conferences was built on a foundation of mundane bureaucratic actions. William Halcrow was at the center of the bureaucratic organization that was set in motion by the call for the Mulberry Harbours and was asked by Sir Bruce White to examine all the proposals for harbors, breakwaters, caissons, and other components, and to:

> bring in one or two engineers who were not concerned with the subject to form a small Committee. He wanted Mr. Gwyther and Mr. Ralph Freeman and reported to the War Office that they considered the reinforced concrete caisson type of breakwater would be the most practical and the one most suitable for the purpose. The report was accepted and the Phoenix units were designed in detail by the War Office staff and constructed to their drawings.[4]

The idea of the caissons was ultimately adopted in the construction of the Mulberry Harbours. But at the time, it was just one idea amongst many; and those ideas were being dreamt up in separate, if not competing, offices. In another bureaucratic corner of Whitehall the talents of Lieutenant Colonel Everall had been recognized. Especially, it was Everall's lead role in constructing a type of trestle bridge, the Everall Sectional Trans Bridging (ESTB) that was seen as essential for the Mulberry Harbour project. The ESTB was based on the design of the German Roth-Wagner military bridging, photographs of which had fallen into British hands. After Churchill's "Piers for Beaches" memo Everall was summoned to the War Office with a prototype designed by Alan Beckett:

> With the help of Sgt. Major Gaunt, who was skilled with the soldering iron, I made a tin plate model of my proposed flexible floating roadway. It consisted of one torsion-free lozenge shaped bridge span and part of an adjacent span to show how the span-to-span junction could be made using spherical bearings.[5]

Then things began to move very quickly.

> When Everall returned [from the War Office] he was on top of the world. "Beckett" he said, "they want six spans built right away and I have promised that you will produce the works drawings by the end of the week!"[6]

Orders for the prototype were placed with Messrs. Braithwaite and Kirk of West Bromwich, and a test site was established at Cairn Head near Garlieston in Scotland. The strategic imperatives, the global workforce, and individual expertise were coming together in a tectonic shift of bureaucratic reorganization and a tsunami of manufacturing orders:

> The War Office enthusiasm for the floating bridge seemed to intensify, and Everall was instructed to bring his whole design team to London [from their location at No. 2 Railway Training Establishment, Kings Newton, near Derby]. This he did and we were accommodated in County Hall and given the title of "Tn 5d" in the Department of Docking and Inland Water Transportation. I was appointed Deputy Assistant Director with Staff Major Rank.[7]

But it was not just a matter of design and evaluation of component parts. The construction of the engineering project that would convince British policymakers that invasion of the Continent was feasible required connecting suppliers and production companies to create the finished product. Bureaucratic machinery also had to be created:

> The construction of the units to form the Mulberry ports was undertaken by the Ministry of Supply under Mr. (later Sir John) J. W. Gibson. The Joint Engineers could have had the whole of the work to do but they advised the Ministry to spread it among a number of Consulting Engineers to obtain the benefit of their Resident Engineers and Inspectors. The Joint Engineers constructed roughly one-half of the total number of units. [I] was appointed chairman at the meetings of the Consulting Engineers held to discuss points common to all parties.[8]

The role of the government was to coordinate, but to let innovation take place. The Mulberry Harbours, despite their essential strategic role in a global war, were treated like any other engineering project as much as possible; a staggering strategy given the short time frame of the project, and the realization that nothing of the kind had been attempted before. And yet:

> The Joint Engineers were responsible for agreeing with the Contractors for the prices for the greater part of the work . . . When the Ministry allocated the number and sites for the construction of the units, individual members of the Joint Engineers supervised separate groups of Contractors and work proceeded as under normal conditions.[9]

Conditions were hardly normal as a global war hung in the balance. To prosecute the war, the Mulberry Harbours were made by keeping work practices as similar to peacetime circumstances as possible. The idea of normal circumstances held potential pitfalls, rather than being a smooth pathway to the completion of the project. Mr. W. H. Booker, an engineer on the project, remembered a concern with how standard work practices could disrupt the timetable:

> My own recollection is also that a powerful contractors organization did not over-ride the designers on many points of detail. The work I did on the R. C. Beetles it certainly didn't happen [sic]. There was a short get-together before I started work but the points discussed were only of a general nature and again it was all so urgent. I detailed at least a panel a day and the next day they started producing them. No time for argument.[10]

It was not just work practices that had to be negotiated to ensure the progress of the Mulberry Harbour project. Materials also had to be in the right place, at the right time, and in an adequate quantity. Particularly, "steel was the bottleneck of the war effort"[11] and to make logistics happen, a new special office of the Ministry of Supply was set up and staffed by people recruited from the contractors. The office was run by Sir John (Jack) Gibson who managed to persuade twenty-four of Britain's big contractors to work on the Mulberry Harbour project.[12] Despite the strategic necessity of the Mulberry Harbours, contractors could choose whether to participate or not, and could set the terms of the contract. This also required government intervention to secure enough workers at a time when many were employed in the military and other key industries that needed to be staffed. The Ministry of Supply was given powers to get supplies and labor for the project, including the release of workers from the military back to contracting firms.[13]

The management of military demands and the constraints faced by private contractors created many a bureaucratic challenge. William Halcrow's extensive notes, in which he refers to himself in the third person, provide an insight into the mountains that had to be moved, and at a sharp pace:

> In 1940 Major (now Brigadier Sir) Bruce White discussed with Mr. Halcrow a scheme for utilizing the services of Consulting Dock and harbour Engineers to design ports and other works for the War Office, the work being carried out by Royal Engineers.
>
> As a result of the discussion a group of three Consulting Engineers were formed consisting of Coodes, Wolfe Barry, Robert White [STRUCK OUT IN DOCUMENT] & Partners, and W. T. Halcrow & Partners. Steps were immediately taken to select sites for harbours and the Group designed and supervised the construction of harbours at Garelochhead and Loch Ryan, also Suez and district. The Group had civilian Resident Engineers and inspectors to supervise the work on site and the Army provided all labour and materials and designed and built their own railway connections and sundry works. In this case the designs for Gareloch and the steel wharf at Loch Ryan were prepared in Mr. Halcrow's office, Wolfe Barry & Partners doing the timber wharves at Loch Ryan. The wharves at Suez were designed by Mr. Halcrow. There were no coopted engineers in this case.
>
> It is difficult to put a value on the work carried out which would probably be of the order of three million pounds.
>
> Subsequently, a member of the Group, Mr. Gwyther visited Canada to attend the preliminary conferences relative to the invasion of Normandy and all major problems regarding the design of pre-fabricated harbours (Mulberry) and the reinforced concrete caissons (Phoenix) were referred to members of the Group. Later when the Phoenix units for the artificial harbours were to be constructed by the Ministry of Supply, the Group became principal consultants to the Ministry through Mr. Gibson's Department. Sir William Halcrow recommended that the works of supervising construction of units should be spread over to other Consulting Engineers so as to have the benefit of their regular staffs of Resident Engineers and inspectors, and this the Ministry did.
>
> The cost of the Phoenix units supervised by the group was about 5 million pounds. With the exception of the work for Phoenix, the cost of the services of the Consulting Engineers was paid by means of an annual fee paid quarterly for the services of all partners in the Group. This was a moderate sum. In addition, actual out-of-pocket expenses of the Consulting Engineers were refunded with a percentage added to cover the cost of overhead charges.[14]

Many different ingredients had to be put together to make the project work. The project combined everyday practices by contractors, government bureaucrats, and military planners that largely maintained the way things had been done. Individuals like William Halcrow were acting as good geopolitical subjects within the constructs of state and businesses: They were making and remaking each other in the process. Connecting people, places, government offices, and engineering firms through bureaucratic arrangements ensured the rapid design, testing, and production of the component parts of the Mulberry Harbours:

> The manufacture of so much bridging in so short a time put great strain on the British steel fabricators, yet the objective was achieved very much through the skill of Col. P. K. Benner in the Ministry of Supply. The bridge components were made in small pieces by firms all over the country, some of them developing expertise in precision fabrication by welding that had previously not been thought possible.[15]

The wartime context required grand changes in military organization and government intervention into workforce dynamics that were brought together by the geopolitical construct of state-business bureaucracies. The everyday, the dramatic, the local, and the global were fused in the Mulberry Harbour project. Cooperation between the army and private contractors and the identification of particular sites of production were situated within the transatlantic military planning of global war and carefully coordinated through memos and meetings. People who had made their living in civvy street as engineers were plunged into the top secret world of military planning. Such a change in lifestyle and responsibility created a lot of stress for the individuals becoming good geopolitical subjects.

### _"Growing like a cuckoo in a sparrow's nest"_

The intersection of individual roles, bureaucratic changes, and strategic shifts was further complicated by the transatlantic scope of the project, connecting individuals and the settings of state and business within which they worked to regional and global scopes. Despite the strategic uncertainty that had existed prior to the Quadrant Conference, the British had already been creating the new bureaucratic constructs necessary for the Mulberry Harbours. Indeed, if they had not done so they would not have been able to conduct the negotiations regarding the date of the invasion. One set of bureaucracies was necessary to conduct transatlantic strategic planning, and another intersecting set was necessary to coordinate design plans within the military and the resulting business between the British government and private contractors.

During the Quadrant Conference the British Harbour Committee had presented itself as unified. It had to in the face of what it saw as US opposition or, at the least, stiff competition. However, at the very first meeting held back in Britain on September 13, 1943, disunity appeared as a result of concern over whether the deadline of D-Day May 1, 1944 could be reached.[16] Also, with the departure of Mountbatten as a coordinating, cajoling, and driving force, space was made for the Admiralty to raise objections.[17] Vice Admiral Hickling (Admiralty liaison officer for the Mulberry project) raised concerns when presented with the plans for Mulberry B, notably that the entrance was too small and there was too little room in the harbor for vessels to turn.[18] For the whole project to remain on track there needed to be an established bureaucratic structure.

Tn5 does not sound like anything dramatic or a thing that could help win a war. However, it was one of the bureaucratic spaces essential in the construction and deployment of the Mulberry Harbour project. Tn5 was a new department, run by Sir Bruce White, set up in the existing Transportation Directorate. Its prime job was coordination, but it was still just one of a number of coordinating offices in a seemingly Byzantine sprawl of offices (figure 4.1). The preparations for the Mulberry Operation were integrated through the Port Operating Committee, housed in Ashley Gardens, opposite Westminster Cathedral, and chaired by Senior Naval Office Captain Petrie, RN. The Army Port Construction Force was commanded by Brigadier Walter, who assumed command from Petrie a few days before D-Day.[19]

Tn5 Organizational Diagram.

_Source_ : Michael Harrison, _Mulberry: The Return in Triumph_ , London: W. H. Allen, 1965, p. 183.

The need for Tn5 to coordinate production was imperative given the time constraints. With nine months left before the planned invasion, no Phoenixes had been built. It was time for bureaucracy to get a helping hand from less formal contacts. Sir Bruce White, feeling the pressure of his position, reflected that "Considering my responsibility on this matter" he spoke with Sir Andrew Duncan "an old friend of mine" who was the Minister of Supply. The outcome was the formation of another new department, headed by an engineer to control the large number of contractors involved. Given the required pace of the program, Sir Andrew finalized the appointment in the same afternoon.[20]

Demands for secrecy complicated the bureaucratic arrangements. The three hundred contractors employed throughout the country were kept in the dark about what the component parts they were making would become. The "drawings did not represent the whole of the equipment or their likely use."[21] This put pressure on the contractors to innovate without full information, but also meant that for those in coordinating roles the bigger picture was hard to grasp. Luckily for Sir Bruce White, he was able to use one of the nation's best artists, Terence Cuneo, who drew "colored crayon pictures representing my ideas of the equipment."[22]

Sir Bruce White was not the only one who found bureaucratic channels easier to navigate because of personal friendships, blending individual subjects with bureaucratic settings. Brigadier Rolfe combined official expertise with established connections:

> I then instructed Capt. W. J. Hodge who was in charge of our drawing office to prepare a sketch of a caisson unit two hundred long by sixty feet width and sixty feet high. Hodge was a talented concrete man and he set to work and produced an outline design. In the meantime I consulted my friends Kent and Todd of the Ship Division, national Physical Laboratories, Teddington regarding the problems of towage.[23]

Brigadier Rolfe also relied on the offices above him in the bureaucratic hierarchy, that wedded military and engineering know-how; a role that combined crushing responsibility with a sense of purpose and thrill:

> Bruce White appointed a committee formed of consultants, contractors and the Ministry of Supply to advise on all aspects having a bearing on completion within the set time (I was in the Chair and to this day I still think that my suggestion that Sir Malcolm MacAlpine should take charge was a heaven sent inspiration) . . . The whole was a tribute to the skill and downright determination and sticking power of wartime sappers, civilians to a man, almost all of the officers being corporate Members of the Institute of Civil Engineers. It was a great achievement and even though its cause was serious, it was great fun.[24]

But it was not all fun. The explosion of different offices with different responsibilities, all run with men with their own personal goals, experiences, and pressures inevitably led to tension. The creation of Tn5, apparently so crucial to the Mulberry Harbour project was, through the wisdom of hindsight, met by some cynicism:

> Strain could also be felt between the main body of the Transportation Directorate and its upstart child Tn5, growing like a cuckoo in a sparrow's nest . . . Bruce White's empire . . . was manned at the top by regular soldiers who resented the intrusion of this powerful personality. As they saw it he had inflated a minor branch unduly, he had been "empire building."[25]

Allegations of "empire building," perhaps the necessary collateral damage of new state bureaucracies, had a particular interservice flavor as the new offices were designed to enable a new form of warfare that blurred established spaces of military responsibility. On the very eve of D-Day, when most was done but some felt things still needed to be said, Vice Admiral Hickling wrote a Top Secret Memo to the Secretary of the Admiralty. It was scathing in its criticism of the decision to treat the caissons as army equipment, rather than something that was akin to a fleet, seeing as they had to be floated across the channel:

> Top Secret Memo to the Secretary of the Admiralty
>
> 1st June 1944
>
> Mulberry Mistakes . . .
>
>
>
>
> 7. The initial mistake was made when the concrete caissons (PHOENIX) were entrusted to the War Office. . . .
>
>
>
>
> 9. As was expected the equipment of the units was neither orderly nor seamanlike. Ultimately the preparation of the units had to be taken over by the Navy and the towing arrangements modified. Even so, on the eve of the operation, some of the equipment was not found and had to be extemporized. . . .
>
>
>
>
> 11. The initial blunder of not entrusting the preparation of what was in effect a fleet of concrete vessels aggregating over half a million tons to seamen was to have unfortunate consequences.
>
>
>
>
> Rear Admiral for Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expedition France[26]

Despite the interservice squabbling, and before the Harbours were dragged across the English Channel, they had to be made. The bureaucracy put in place may well have been composed of personal "empires," glued together by memos and personal connections, with atmospheres and work practices that were based on mutual respect and common purpose, but still with their fair share of tension. However, it did get the job done. The many memos that were drafted, typed, and circulated had one goal in mind: getting concrete, steel, and manpower together at the right place at the right time, with the right set of blueprints to make the Mulberry Harbours. The following is a prime example of the care, detail, and constant questioning and testing that were involved; the questions were typed and the answer was written by hand in the margin:

> h) in view of the bottom conditions as reported from site, how can the danger of scour best be dealt with?
>
> By dumping rubble or by dropping bundles of torpedo netting into the openings. Concentrating on the knuckles and on West end generally.[27]

The memo was an essential tool in making sure different government offices were able to talk with each other. The memo was also the tangible product of the good geopolitical subject. The need to communicate across bureaucratic settings was particularly pressing because of the innovative nature of the engineering project. The timetable for construction and deployment of the Mulberry Harbours meant that the evolving product had not only to be conceptualized, but also built to the precise specifications of any complex engineering project. For example:

> Memorandum numbered 120/Gen/2197
>
> Tn 2(ii)
>
> Composite Piers
>
> Demand Tn. 2/11/6530-Prototypes
>
>
>
>
> The decision that a set of Composite Pier ports was to be supplied from prototype material at short notice made it necessary to arrange provision of some items by verbal request and these have not yet been covered by a formal demand.
>
> May [all] of the following materials which have been supplied please be covered by demand Tn. 2/11/6530:
>
> 12 No. 3 S.W.R. Slings 20' long Mark IG2 to Sketch No. Tn. 5/1130 with 2 No. 5T shackles each
>
> 8 No. 3 S.W.R. Slings 7'6" long Mark LG3 to Sketch No. Tn. 5/1130 with 1 No. 5T shackle each[28]

Reference to Tn. 2/11/6530 indicates the complex system of cross-checking. The memo was accompanied by pages of legal-size squared paper with many specifications, including one with a handwritten note saying "Capt. Haswell Not checked." The files were placed in a standard issue memo cover with the generic title "Branch memoranda (B. M.) Cover."[29] The secrecy of the project demanded that production of the component parts be spread out across the country so the form and purpose of the end product remained obscure. The compartmentalization of the security protocols created a need to record, report, and circulate specifications. And, the importance and proliferation of the technical memos, and the preciseness of the specifications they contained, required the ever-watchful eye of engineers checking test results and mathematical calculations. For example the typed memo "Notes on P. C. Unit Pontoon Equipment":

> The Equipment is of a standard unit construction and is designed to meet some of the operational needs of Port Construction & repair and Docks Operating Groups. Units can be readily assembled to form floats for constructional plant, barges, floating land stages, floating piers, causeways and floating docks.
>
> Particular attention has been given to such consideration as ease of manufacture, interchangeability, simplicity, and ease of assembly, transport, and strength.[30]

was complemented by handwritten calculations and a note entitled:

> P. C. Pontoons
>
> Test on Strength if Lateral Connexion
>
> Marchwood 16 & 17 Nov. 44[31]

The construction of a system of offices, if sometimes competing entities, was necessary for the making of the Mulberry Harbours. The work within them was both dramatic, the waging of war, and prosaic, typing and responding to memos. The prosaic and dramatic nature of this work meant good geopolitical subjects created bureaucratically correct memos that were the mundane micro-activity that in aggregation created global geopolitics. The offices were also the settings within which the people dedicated to the project worked; they were the contexts in which good geopolitical subjects were made. It was people, feeling the weight of the responsibility of conducting a global war and a fight for survival on their shoulders, who kept the cogs of the bureaucratic machinery turning.

### _"We were squeezed into the offices"_

Personal and bureaucratic wars that seem to occur in all workplaces were not eliminated because of the essential strategic nature of the Mulberry Harbours. The pressure individuals were under—coordinating people and material, in secrecy, and handicapped by wartime shortages—increased the tensions between different offices. However, the success of the project was a result of the everyday professionalism and competence of the staff involved. The coordination of military branches, planning offices, and private contractors required secretaries whose skills had to be matched by an ability to keep secrets and work within military rules. The Wrens (Women's Royal Naval Service) played an important role in keeping the paperwork moving through the right channels.

The personal experience of one Wren, Ms. Hughill, rank and first name unknown,[32] shows the same combination of professionalism and satisfaction in serving her country as that of the men involved in the Mulberry Harbour project. However, she felt the added pressure of operating in a "man's world"—the arena of war and military command. Her behavior was under constant scrutiny, which added to the stress of the situation, as her subjectivity was constructed within twinned settings of geopolitics and patriarchy. When asked about her personal confidence in her role Hughill replied, "No not at all. Far from it. I had blotted my copy book twice." One error was wearing too much makeup, in an atmosphere in which "We were being watched all the time." The second error, recalled as a "terrible crime," was during an air raid. The order was "to muster fully dressed" but "What good would you be with flying glass around. Of course I had my bedroom slippers on."[33]

The way a woman looked and behaved was clearly an additional stress that a Wren faced:

> I was quite confident about the paperwork side of the course. I didn't have any problems with that. And I knew my sort of social chit-chat and remembering to pass the salt and those sort of things at the table. I knew all that was totally fine. I wasn't bothered about that at all. Because we had to be able to know how to behave as well as being good at our jobs.[34]

Though such scrutiny would seem to create a miserable work experience, the sense of working for an essential national security project trumped the day-to-day stress of dressing and acting the way the men in the office expected. "I was on cloud nine. I was elated. This was better than anything I could have hoped for"[35] was Hughill's reaction to being assigned to work for Admiral Ramsay during the Dunkirk evacuation. This joy continued in her work on the Mulberries despite being asked to quickly change roles from plotter to typist:

> I had no idea. I was a short-hand typist . . . I was horrified to find, when I eventually found my way to Admiral Tennant's office . . . I was expected to take the minutes . . . I had to pull myself together very quickly.[36]

Hughill's job was an odd combination of what was, at the time, seen as a woman's traditional domestic tasks and a brand new experience of being at the heart of an essential national security project; "One of my earliest jobs was to dust the model of [the Harbour] and "[t]he key to the model room lay in my desk drawer."[37] All in all, the job was high pressure, "This position of trust I found quite onerous . . . I had a sort of nightmare being injured in an air-raid and blurting out in hospital a secret under anaesthetic."[38] The pressures of acting in ways deemed appropriate for a woman in a male-dominated world while also being responsible for one of the war's biggest secrets took its toll and meant that any chance of normal pre-war socializing had to be put on hold: "The day to day living of working was tough . . . The work was very very heavy . . . I don't think during that time I got much to the cinema or theatre."[39]

Hughill's attitude to the Harbours was also different from those of the engineers, who had a boyish excitement about the puzzle they were putting together. She recalls the caissons as "very ugly looking sort of monsters."[40] And she also remembers the work of the scientists and engineers with a sense of maternal care:

> There were continual problems. People were working under great pressure. The Boffins, to use that word, who had been planning construction of the Mulberries. The vast labour force needed to build them and all these elderly, elderly gentlemen they seemed to me; I suppose they were probably in their forties but they seemed old to me at that time—they were working in very close quarters . . . We were squeezed into the offices . . . people's tempers could fray. The fact that people did not come to blows is a tremendous tribute to their self-control.[41]

Nonetheless, Hughill shared with her male colleagues, whatever their role in the Mulberry Harbour project, a sense of camaraderie, self-worth, and purpose in the drive towards victory: "There were so many people with which we could not talk it was such a relief . . . to talk with each other was a tremendous release . . . We all felt confident . . . We had no alternative but to succeed."[42] As far as we can tell from her recorded recollections, Hughill's construction as a good geopolitical subject was as much a consequence of, rather than a resistance to, the norms of militarization and patriarchy within which she operated.

The "continual problems" and "great pressure" were the means and ends of the new geopolitical constructs of state bureaucracy: The offices were made by the people within them, who were themselves made as good geopolitical subjects by their everyday work contacts and mundane behavior. These work practices and settings were necessary for the prosecution of a global war. They also relied on a scope of practice that fused the mobilization of manpower from across the Empire with the combined needs and established ways of doing things set by the military and private contractors.

### _"Indoctrinated into this wonderful secret"_

To fight a global war, Britain called on the manpower and experience it had gained from creating a global Empire. The British state that fought the war was a geographically and historically defined imperial state. Bureaucratic constructs coordinated manpower resources from across the world and put them in particular places, with specific roles, and as part of a grand timetable. Expertise was found in military officers who had been building infrastructure in colonial possessions. Brigadier Walter had been serving as Director of Transportation in SE Asia Command when he was ordered back to London in February 1944. He was then appointed to 21 Army Group as Director of Ports and Inland Water Ways. It was a thrilling move for him as he became "indoctrinated into this wonderful secret of the construction of an artificial harbour."[43] As part of Port Construction Force Mulberry N, his task was to construct the port and ensure the distribution of stores over the Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches until D-Day + 20. For Brigadier Walter, there was a sense that his experience in the far reaches of the Empire had allowed him to enter an inner chamber of military planning and need; almost as if he now became a member of a special club: "I couldn't believe it. I spent all those months from February to D-Day learning about it . . . I had to get indoctrinated."[44]

Other commanders in the Mulberry Harbour project realized that expertise gained in making the Empire was now needed in the protection of the homeland. Brigadier Rolfe recalls:

> My chief worry was in the provision of the floating roadway and on my return to the War Office I sent for my Assistant Director (Bridges) Col. W. E. Everall. I had met Everall years before in India where he was a Bridge Engineer on the North Western railway where he had the reputation of being able to build main line bridges out of the most likely materials in an emergency.[45]

Hindsight suggests irony in the movement of expertise from across the globe, where it had been used to expand the British Empire, to offices in London, where it was needed to protect the homeland. The irony is especially strong when we now know that one of the consequences of victory was the unraveling of the Empire, but such is the conclusion drawn when seeing the Mulberry Harbour project as a moment in long-term geopolitical processes.

Part of the reason that the Empire unraveled was the sense of political confidence, and the moral right of independence, that imperial subjects gained from fighting in the war. It was not just technical expertise of British officers that was gained from the Empire, but also the manpower of imperial citizens. Major E. W. Witcomb of the 976 Port Floating Equipment Company had postings in both Port Gareloch, Scotland and Southampton. He was responsible for the crews working on the pier-heads, including men from African regions of the Empire:

> No. 10 West African Engineers had a very valuable asset. Recruitment of this unit took place in the summer of 1942. The majority of its sappers were steel erectors and lumbermen by trade. A majority of the men were posted after their return from West Africa to 976 Company, and formed a good cadre for NCO's of that Company particularly for the bridge building crews. I often think of them in West Africa as sappers or very junior NCO's with frustration of living in the tropics with little to do under rather primitive conditions. In contrast to them as Sargents [sic] and Warrant officers in Normandy carrying out their responsibilities with skill and resourcefulness . . . Most of the names of men that remain in my memory are those who had problems with their military service due to so many causes, family problems, poor health, lack of education or maturation. Of the pierhead crews, I cannot remember any names. They were a well balanced, responsible group of men. As they caused no problems, and those they that [sic] had were easily helped, I can only remember them as a fine group of NCO's and sappers as any officer could ever hope to be associated with.[46]

Witcomb displayed the sense of paternalism that came from being an officer in an imperial military. The West African home of the men under his command was seen as a frustrating and primitive place, and Witcomb assumed that being displaced from their homeland into a Europe at war was somehow a positive experience. The individuals were also largely anonymous, with the exception of those who needed special attention to keep them productive.

The broad geographical and historical scope of Britain's geopolitical trajectory intersected with the everyday practices of personnel management. It was the coming together of these different experiences and scopes that created good geopolitical subjects within bureaucratic constructs. The individual experiences of the Major and the members of No. 10 West African Engineers were personal moments. They occurred within particular work settings with a limited goal. The construction and deployment of the pier-heads, the work setting for Witcomb and his African engineers, was one of many construction endeavors linked together to make the Mulberry Harbours. Witcomb and his men were brought together within the colonial relations of the British Empire, and the precarious state of the Empire was because of a world at war and in flux.

### _"At least one jug of Royal navy rum"_

The British sense of how the world worked, from the settings of Empire through changes in military strategy and into new work practices, was about to be severely disrupted. Fighting World War Two was making it very clear that reliance on the United States was something that had to be accepted, if somewhat reluctantly. There was tension within the highest ranks of the British military about the new role played by the United States. These tensions were manifest in new bureaucratic arrangements designed to enable transatlantic strategic cooperation. The geopolitical process provoked reaction to the end of the British military's ability to act independently; a realization aggravated by a belief that the United States did not have the know-how or experience to lead successfully.

However, the opinion of the British officers and men who worked in close cooperation with US servicemen in actually making the Mulberry Harbours was very different. It was the "Seabees" or United States Naval Construction Forces,[47] who were the main point of contact, and the consensus of opinion was positive. For example, Andrew H. Hinrichs, who commanded the 935 Port Construction and Repair Company at Marchwood in early 1944, thought:

> As far as inter-allied politics were concerned, at my level relations could not have been better. Not once did I have anything but help from the SeaBees and I can always remember their CO saying to me when on one occasion I was thanking him for something or other "Hell, we're all fighting the same war aren't we" and that says it all.[48]

This positive attitude can also be seen in Major Witcomb's recollections:

> The Sea Bee [sic] crews were a fine bunch of men. There was a COP per pierhead. They were seldom visited by any of their officers, so I often had to act in pater familias to them. Many of the crew members were oil-rig operators from South Western USA and their skills were invaluable to the Lobnitz riggers and dock contractors who had to weave the spud hoisting and pierhead riding cables on the spuds to the electric powered winches. The pierheads were assigned alternatively to RE and Seabee crews. Each CPO in charge of a pierhead to be assigned to Omaha beach left Southampton with at least one jug of Royal navy rum.[49]

As with the West African engineers, Witcomb cannot help remembering his role as paternalistic. This is not surprising given that young American men were ripped out of a civilian role in a very different and peaceful world into a country at war. The technical expertise learned in the oil fields of the United States was ordered and cajoled into a war effort that, in the workplaces of the Mulberry Harbours, was managed by British officers. The sharing of cultural norms, in the form of navy rum, helped lubricate the mechanism of cooperation, and a spirit of shared tasks. The elitism and sniping in the highest ranks of the British military was less evident amongst those getting their hands dirty putting the Mulberry Harbours together. Bureaucratic machinery put very different people together to complete the project, and in so doing these people gained new insights into other cultures, and hence their own.

The multinational makeup of the Mulberry Harbour project involved Britons brushing shoulders with Africans or Americans, some sampling British rum. Yet the success of the Mulberry Harbours, and the whole Western Front of the European theater of war, depended upon being able to bring this global workforce together in a production process that was dramatically pressed for time.

The US military had established a Commander US Naval Forces, Europe (ConNavEu), and this section of the military bureaucracy was becoming increasingly concerned with the pace of the project. In early 1944, Captain C. R. Johnson, CEC, USN was dispatched to London under "mounting suspicion that optimistic British progress reports were based on wishful thinking."[50] Captain Johnson's evaluation, mere months before the planned invasion, was that the project was suffering from particular problems with regard to the concrete caissons, a view with which Hughes-Hallett with his early objections would surely have concurred. Specifically:

  1. labor not half recruited

  2. work at majority of Phoenix sites not begun

  3. space to store finished caissons nowhere available in U.K. All harbor space allocated

  4. no moorings available or provided for launched units

  5. no pumping gear

  6. no space for crew's living quarters[51]

The very tight time frame of the project, and the realization of the crucial role it was to play, made the situation very tense for those in positions of responsibility. It was not until September 28, 1943, at 20 Grosvenor Square, that the plan for Mulberry A was presented to the Americans.[52] But after that meeting, in October, when Tennant and Hickling saw the 230 drawings of Phoenix designs put forward by the War Office, they objected to the over-complication of the plan (retaining the Admiralty's skepticism that had begun with Hughes-Hallett) and believed it would prevent timely completion.[53] The project was completed by the "skin of the teeth." The drawings of the caissons were not presented to contractors until the end of October 1943.[54]

Tensions between the War Office and Admiralty continued until the bitter end as, upon completion and being towed to assembly points at Dungeness,[55] the Cant, or Selsey Bay, the caissons became "ships" and under the command of the Admiralty.[56] The complex Mulberry Harbour project was completed through the construction and interaction of multiple bureaucratic sites, each with their own agenda. But the whole process was experimental, fraught, and down to the wire. The geopolitical construct of bureaucratic arrangements of state and business was an ongoing process rather than a rationally planned and monolithic structure. The offices necessary for the Mulberry Harbours were a process of everyday negotiation, as much sites of competition and jealousy as they were coordinated cooperation towards the goal of national survival. Bureaucratic competition blended with the professional competence and duty of individuals so that mini- and macro-geopolitical projects were entwined.

### _"Shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque still hang too heavily"_

The scope of the Mulberry project and the tension between the bureaucratic sites necessary for its deployment were a product, and the making, of a new form of warfare for the British within the realities of a new strategic reality. Though the weight of technical authority may have favored the British, the realization of the final shifts in the geopolitical tectonics that were to relegate the British and promote the United States were also to carry weight. The Harbours themselves were a British innovation but the military operation was inevitably an American one. British bureaucratic arrangements connecting state and business were part of a bigger scope of bureaucracy that spanned the Atlantic. The United States dominated this second aspect of the bureaucratic structure, and the arrangements were replete with historic legacy and the sense of dramatic geopolitical change.

US Secretary of War Stimson, in his letter appointing the American General Marshall as Commander of Overlord rather than the British General Alan Brooke (who presumed the appointment was to be his) said:

> We cannot now rationally hope to be able to cross the Channel and come to grips with our German enemy under a British commander. The Prime Minister and his Chief of the Imperial Staff are frankly at variance with such a proposal. The shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque [Dunkirk] still hang too heavily over the imagination of his government. Though they have rendered lip service to the operation, their hearts are not in it.[57]

The tense cooperation between the United States and Britain was just one part of the changing geopolitical roles of the two countries. The invasion was made possible by the foundation of Operation Bolero, the buildup of American forces in Britain, and the bureaucratic constructs required to coordinate such plans. President Roosevelt stated, "We should have more soldiers in Britain dedicated for that purpose [D-Day] than the British."[58] In fact, it was the very nature of this buildup and the transformation of the British landscape, even when no plan for D-Day had been approved, that shows that the British had taken invasion seriously, contrary to US allegations.[59] As Captain C. E. Lambe, RN recalls:

> Vast amounts of construction work had to be done—hard roads, railways to beaches, exits, fuel and storage tanks, railway sidings. The amount of construction in southern England was terrific. It is interesting to note that millions of pounds were spent from early 1943 onwards, when there was only COSSAC Staff; millions spent on a plan which had not been approved.[60]

The Mulberry Harbour project required the geopolitical constructs of the entwined bureaucracies introduced in this chapter. They were necessary to coordinate the scope and diverse venues of the project: manpower, strategic negotiations, engineering design and construction, and deployment. The geopolitical constructs of particular offices, like Tn5, were part of broader constructs, such as Operation Bolero. But it was people, or good geopolitical subjects, that drove the whole process forward.

The tight deadlines, interservice rivalries, bureaucratic tussles, the mobilization of the resources of the British Empire, fears over the success of the operation, and the historic baggage of the "shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque," and the realization that whatever the outcome Britain's geopolitical role was to be diminished were the impetus, context, and result of the Mulberry Harbour project. The completion of the project required the geopolitical construct of bureaucratic arrangements of state and business that were simultaneously new, dramatic, mundane, contemporary, historic, immediate, and global. These bureaucracies were the context and outcome of the daily work practices of those who staffed them. Through their participation in the project they made the harbors and the geopolitical construct of the wartime state bureaucracy. In the process they became good geopolitical subjects. It is to these people, the pressures they felt, and the self-identities they forged, that we turn to next.

### _Notes_

1.

Modelski, _Long Cycles in Global Politics_ ; George Modelski and William Thompson, _Seapower in Global Politics_ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988).

2.

Quoted in Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 76.

3.

Ibid., 119.

4.

Halcrow, IWM K08/235. Drafted 24.10.44. Typed 24.9.47.

5.

A. H. Beckett, IWM 1542 91/43 1 and 1A.

6.

Ibid.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Halcrow, IWM K08/235. Drafted 24.10.44. Typed 24.9.47.

9.

Ibid.

10.

W. H. Booker, IWM MISC, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing Mulberry Harbours, June 1975–February 1991."

11.

Adcock, IWM 14141.

12.

Ibid.

13.

Ibid.

14.

Halcrow, IWM K08/235.

15.

A. H. Beckett, IWM 1542 91/43 1 and 1A.

16.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 187.

17.

Ibid., 190.

18.

Ibid., 192.

19.

Gilbert, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434.

20.

Sir Bruce White, IWM 6827 (recording).

21.

Ibid.

22.

Ibid.

23.

Brigadier J. A. Rolfe, IWM MISC 2434.

24.

Ibid.

25.

Gilbert, IWM MISC 157 Item 2434.

26.

The Papers of Vice Admiral H. Hickling (microfilm), IWM DS MISC 52.

27.

Major J. H. R. Haswell, IWM 97/19/1.

28.

Ibid.

29.

Ibid.

30.

Ibid.

31.

Ibid.

32.

Hughill, IWM 28403.

33.

Ibid.

34.

Ibid.

35.

Ibid.

36.

Ibid.

37.

Ibid.

38.

Ibid.

39.

Ibid.

40.

Ibid.

41.

Ibid.

42.

Ibid.

43.

Brigadier Walter, IWM 12555.

44.

Ibid.

45.

Brigadier J. A. Rolfe, IWM MISC 2434.

46.

Major E.W. Witcomb, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434.

47.

Seabee comes from CB or Construction Battalion.

48.

Andrew H. Hinrichs, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434.

49.

Major E. W. Witcomb, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434.

50.

Stanford, _Force Mulberry_ , 72.

51.

Ibid., 73.

52.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 197.

53.

Ibid., 221.

54.

Ibid., 225.

55.

Fergusson, _Watery Maze_ , 297.

56.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 221.

57.

Roberts, _Masters and Commanders_ , 394.

58.

Ibid., 394.

59.

Ibid., 403.

60.

Quoted in ibid., 403.
Chapter 5

# Good Geopolitical Subjects

"Did we, Sir, do well?"

The invasion of the Continent, and the Mulberry Harbour project in particular, needed new products, ideas, and places of work. It also needed the people to create the products and ideas and to staff the workplaces. Those who built the Mulberry Harbours felt a sense of new opportunities, new responsibilities, new identities, and a new world. The experiences of these people, captured in their own words, show how people were changed, becoming different people through their roles in making the Mulberry Harbours. They became good geopolitical subjects, people who, through their participation in the Mulberry Harbour project, behaved in a certain way and self-identified in a certain way. The people involved in the Mulberry Harbour project were "subjected" by being in the contexts they were also making through their actions.[1] Their attitudes and behaviors certainly were not determined by their situation within geopolitical constructs of the state and business and geographic settings. However, to an important degree, making the Mulberries helped make people who they were, and together the constructs of the good geopolitical subjects and the places where they worked drove British action in broader geopolitical processes.

In what ways were the individuals who made the Mulberry Harbours changed? Being situated within other geopolitical constructs created the very newness of the situations in which they were placed that helped create a sense of duty and responsibility, a sense of purpose in a context of global war. These new roles led to feelings of great stress for the people involved, but also a sense of achievement and self-worth that stayed with them into their postwar civilian careers. Hence, we also see the second theme of the book: War is a process that has legacies that last well into what we commonly understand as "peacetime."

### _"We didn't dare laugh . . . but felt slightly sick"_

The task of recruiting people for the Mulberry Harbour project was a combination of individual effort and bureaucratic organization. For those, such as Colonel Gilbert, with the responsibility to recruit, the process also required self-reflection on their own strengths and experiences:

> Many of the things done before the Quebec Conference—things without which the Mulberry Harbours could not have been built, were done by Bruce White. He created a design "Brains Trust" of consulting engineers and organized a consortium of engineering contractors. Acting on a minute of Churchill's the development of the Whale and Spud Pontoon equipments surged ahead. Perhaps equal in importance, he created units of Port Construction and Repair troops as a new branch of the Royal Engineers.
>
>
>
>
> In February 1941, whilst peacefully sowing mines and similar things on the east coast, I was summoned to the War Office where Lt. Col. Bruce White told me that my name had been put forward by the Institution of Civil Engineers as someone with experience of port construction work. Would I like to join his new branch? I was over age for promotion to Lt. Col. (C.R.) in Divisional Engineers, so I accepted. He told me to let him have the name of other officers with port construction experience whom he would immediately have transferred; the branch had a very high priority. Also I was to collect capable N.C.O.s, good tradesmen. He would appoint me immediately to raise and command a Port Construction and Repair company.[2]

The trickle-down of commands from the Prime Minister and through the War Office resulted in individuals like Colonel Gilbert touring the country and putting together the teams that were to build the Mulberry Harbours. These teams led to the reuniting of old colleagues, the bringing together of new partnerships, and the chance for promotion. In the process individuals took on new roles and responsibilities that were to change them:

> Having a few days' leave before my new appointment I set off on a round of our major ports, pointing out to their chief engineers that if any of their assistant engineers were in the army already, they could be transferred to the new branch and, at the end of the war, returned to their peacetime employment with an increased experience of port work. My itinerary from port to port was closely followed by the Luftwaffe with a rain of bombs. However I acquired many useful names.
>
> My field company had several excellent sergeants who, like me, were a bit long in the tooth, also some excellent officers. By a happy chance I was able to transfer the sergeants and one of the officers, Lt. Carlisle to 932 Port Construction Company. Due to this happy chance I had members of my much loved Territorial unit with me for nearly all of the war. These included the invaluable CQMS Spencer, the youngest CQMS in the army in 1918 and the most capable in 1940. Thanks to the special establishment of the Port Construction Company, all those sergeants became warrant officers.[3]

The individuals recruited felt a combination of pride, fear, and amazement that in combination formed them as good geopolitical subjects. They had to reflect upon their own abilities, the efficiency (or lack of it) of the bureaucratic system that now controlled their lives, and the very success of the war effort. Colonel Ronnie Cowan, with more than a hint of false modesty, recalls at the time of his recruitment:

> A vast project indeed and we were most impressed; but then they told us that the whole thing had to be towed across the Channel and put together, in days, at some un-named place on the enemy shore. We didn't dare laugh—because they seemed serious—but felt slightly sick.
>
> We were told that we should be proud to have been selected from the Corps of Royal Engineers to take part in this operation; that we (the 969th and 970th Port Floating Equipment Companies) would be responsible for the construction of the piers and pierheads in the field. The success of the invasion of Europe depended (they said) on us. In fact, they told us that "This project is so vital that it might be described as the crux of the whole operation."
>
> I was not at all thrilled by this information; quite apart from a natural reluctance to get involved in anything that looked so dangerous, I was appalled to think that the British Army was so desperate, so near the bottom of the barrel, that they had to choose me. And, if it were really true that the success of the assault on Europe depended in any way on me, then I could not see much hope for the Allied Armies.
>
> Something of these unhappy thoughts must have shown in our faces (my forebodings were shared by the others); we were assured that orders had already been passed to every R. E. Unit in the United Kingdom to send, immediately, their finest, bravest and most highly skilled soldiers to join this crack invasion force, because "Mulberry Must Not Fail."
>
> It all sounded most impressive and, as we left the War Office and walked along Northumberland Avenue, we envisaged a stream of clear eyed, fit, keen, splendid, young soldiers on their way to join the various sections of the Company—in Scotland, in the Isle of Wight, and Selsey.
>
> Alas, what really happened was that every unit in the U.K. seized this golden opportunity to "unload" on to us their most formidable and desperate criminals—tough looking men arrived clutching Crime Sheets covering every known offense—insolence, larceny, theft, wife beating, assault and battery, robbery with violence, larceny and desertion etc. etc. As they paraded we eyed each other—it was obvious that they didn't think much of us, while we could tell that Mulberry and the invasion was not going to be a success.[4]

The special circumstances of the Mulberry Harbour project helped some people get promoted and also provided a fluid move from private engineering to military life. Becoming a particular form of subject was a process that was situated within multiple geopolitical constructs. The hybrid military-private nature of the Mulberry project gave some the chance for successful postwar careers. But at the time eyes were on the immediate prize that working on the Mulberry Harbours offered—a step up in their social and professional situation. Charles Taylor, the Chief of Works in the Surrey Commercial Docks in London, was very excited for the promotion that his work with the Mulberry Harbour project brought:

> This was a lift up for me and it meant that I had a secure job with a better wage and a pension on reaching the age of 65. This put me on top of the world. I decided to put heart and soul into the job and make it a success.[5]

But being part of the project meant more than just promotion, it was also being part of a team that required Mr. Taylor's careful and competent management to make the construction of the caissons possible. Such work created a sense of pride:

> The plans were now really for the new project. It was very interesting and I could not wait to get started. Our Chief Engineer was Mr. Nelson; he was a very clever engineer. He had a good staff of assistant engineers and draughtsmen and they were responsible for the whole project. Orders were issued and I was given a good briefing as to what it was all about. The first job was to take over one whole dock. This was the south dock. It had good strong walls and a good level bottom. The lock gates were shored up with 12x12 good strong timber. The water was pumped out and it had now become a dry dock. The bottom of the deck was level and covered in hard core. Fourteen of these monster concrete ports were set out and work commenced. This involved a lot of concrete shuttering and we employed about 40 carpenters. A concrete mixing plant was erected at the top of the quay wall. The concrete units were constructed of reinforced concrete and steel. The whole site was flooded with lights. This was controlled by a major switch which was in our control office.[6]

The sense of duty and taking pride in a job well done was amplified by being part of a project that mobilized and created a set of geopolitical constructs and was perceived to be crucial for the success of the war:

> When we talked about the project we called it Mulberry. When France was invaded we could see what these units were for. The Mulberry Harbour. I was very pleased to have had an active part in the construction of this project. On several occasions during the construction of these units we were attacked by the German Air Force, but they were very unlucky; not one of the units was damaged. Several other units were constructed in other docks. The day came when the units were ready to move up the river. The docks were flooded and the units floated 3,500 tons each of reinforced concrete. They moved down the river Thames just before D-Day and I felt very pleased to have had a hand in helping to win the war.[7]

The transition people experienced did not come completely out of the blue. Many individuals involved in the project were continuing the tasks they had been trained for before the war. The Mulberry Harbour project was just an extension of what they had been doing. Captain D. A. Brown, attached to the 927 P. C. & R. Company to survey the Harbours, had to reacquaint himself with his old tools of the trade:

> I had to obtain by post from home my own copy of Bruhn's 7 figure logarithms together with my notes for adjustment of rectangles, etc. for triangulation.[8]

For others, working on the Mulberry Harbour project opened up a whole new world. This was true for Margaret Marshall, a Junior Commander in the Auxiliary Territorial Service. In a letter to her mother in July 1944 she was clearly thrilled by her involvement in the D-Day landings:

> My darling Mum
>
>
>
>
> Our journey was slow but they all kept in good fettle until they flopped into blankets on the floor of tents at 1:30 am on Sat: The navy were very good to us & some of the officers turned out of their cabins so we could have them. The captain took us all around the ship—onto the flag deck, into his cabin, the galley, etc. It was all very interesting.
>
>
>
>
> But yesterday I really enjoyed. To begin with I had my first afternoon off. At least I got off at 3. Five of us had been invited (by someone we had met about a fortnight ago) to be shown round a port. I cannot give you its name but Churchill referred to it when he said "Better ports than Dover will be _made_ on the Continent." Anyway we were taken on a landing craft out to a cargo ship for tea. After creating a crisis in the tin mug shortage etc. which was overcome, we were shown more (up & down the most precarious ladders). And then they took us in the landing craft all around the port. It was tremendously interesting. Of course we were the first women to have seen it all but I have been very lucky in having been shown so much already. I think I have described Caen in Abbe's [sic] letter. None of the others have been there yet. The same applies to Cherbourg. We are not allowed in the American sector.[9]

Part of Margaret Marshall's excitement is her access to what was largely a man's world, sleeping in Royal Navy officers' cabins and being shown around the Harbours, something so secret she could not use the name. Being one of the first women to see the Mulberry Harbours must have given her a sense of playing a special role at an extraordinary time. But she was still a woman, carrying the contemporary expectations of what a woman should do and how she should act. She concludes the letter with this request:

> Oh yes. There is a nice Major in "Civil Affairs" branch whose wife has just gone to live near Sudbury. She has 2 infants but no friends. If you go that way please will you look her up or ask Sheelagh Crawford or anyone nice you can think of.

The Mulberry Harbour project created many different workplaces but, as Margaret Marshall's trips into what had been inaccessible places show, it was predominately a man's world. As for others serving in the military, the men who made the Mulberry Harbours had to cope with being separated from women for long periods of time. Major E. W. Witcomb of the Royal Engineers recalls:

> One thing I had to do was to obtain permission of the Royal navy every time I left the waters of the Isle of Wight. The Boom officer was a WREN whose pleasing, cultured voice haunted me for months after leaving England. I wish I had had the luck to meet her in person.[10]

The new workspaces people found themselves in, and their new roles, brought a whole new set of responsibilities that were the day-to-day actions that led to subject formation. The people who made the Mulberry Harbours certainly found satisfaction in these new responsibilities but they also brought with them a higher level of stress than they had ever experienced before. W. W. Rigbye, rank and company unknown but later attached to 969 PFE Company, recalls the pride of being involved in a team effort:

> I look back on the whole episode with a feeling of satisfaction of being part of a dedicated body of men who by sheer determination overcame difficulties and completed a great though rewarding work.[11]

These sentiments were echoed by Andrew Hinrichs who took command of 935 O. C. & R. Coy in early 1944:

> it certainly was one the most notable engineering operations of all time and I shall always be extremely proud that I was part of it, no matter how small.[12]

Teamwork also came with the price of feeling that at any moment you could slip-up and let everyone else down. Brigadier Walter had the gut-wrenching feeling of such an experience. While enjoying a lunch with Captain Petrie at the In and Out Club he made sure that the briefcase containing the suitcase containing the Mulberry Harbour plans was safely between his feet. Upon leaving the club he had "feelings of utter horror" when he realized that he had left the suitcase behind. Luckily the Hall Porter at the club had it. Brigadier Walter confessed "I would have willingly of [sic] died" if the secrets in the case had been lost prior to D-Day.[13] Such was the pressure of responsibility and the stress of becoming a good geopolitical subject.

### _"Locked in a specially blacked-out and secret room"_

The particular geopolitical subject that Brigadier Walter was, a committed professional with a sense of national responsibility and the stress it entailed, cannot be separated from the other components of self and subject. He was also a man with a high military rank. The construction of good geopolitical subjects as the coming together of many different aspects of self within particular work contexts and the intersection of multiple geopolitical constructs is particularly clear through the story of a woman's role at the heart of the secret project. Mrs. Masika Lancaster was constructed as a special type of geopolitical subject within the Mulberry Harbour: "a woman who can keep a secret."[14] Though there is no evidence she committed as potentially significant a blunder as Brigadier Walter felt so ashamed of, her gender created a particular wonder that she should be involved so deeply in anything so secret at all (figure 5.1).

Masika Lancaster, "A woman who can keep a secret."

_Source_ : None, public domain.

Mrs. Masika Lancaster was a construct of World War Two in a number of ways, or as the result of numerous political settings and power relations. She was married to an officer in the Royal Hussars who had been captured by the Japanese and remained a prisoner of war throughout the conflict. Her pre-war career as an artist qualified her with the skills necessary to make the scale models of the Harbours at the War Office. Post D-Day Mrs. Lancaster was revealed to the public, after an October 1944 presentation of the Mulberry Harbour models to Members of Parliament at the House of Commons. The way she was described by the press reveals that constructing geopolitical subjects is a public as well as a private matter. The sense of Mrs. Lancaster as a good geopolitical subject for public consumption mattered in order to create the sense of taken-for-granted norms, rules, and everyday behaviors which framed the construction of all individuals' "good" self. Though Mrs. Lancaster reinforced the ideal of the good geopolitical subject in some ways, she was also described in a certain way to ensure that common sense gender roles of the time were not disrupted.

Mrs. Lancaster was described as "young and attractive" to reinforce the dominant or primary way women were to be thought of. However, and in direct contrast to Brigadier Walter's jaunts to lunch carrying a briefcase of secrets, she was "locked in a specially blacked-out and secret room"[15] and the uniqueness of her role as "the only woman in Britain who knew this great secret of invasion for nearly a year"[16] was proclaimed. The good geopolitical subject was, in wartime Britain, presumed to be a man with manly traits. The very fact that the "war has produced a woman who can keep a secret"[17] illustrates a social understanding of inherent gender traits and the causal power of the wartime context. Also, such a unique geopolitical subject had to be situated in a unique everyday setting, placed under lock and key. And yet, despite what comes across now as patriarchal patronizing and control, Mrs. Lancaster's sense of being a good geopolitical subject shines through. She is quoted as saying "Often there were hectic rushes, but I didn't mind staying late and working on Sundays if necessary."[18] For Mrs. Lancaster it seems that her self-construction as a good geopolitical subject was reinforced, rather than challenged, despite the unique way she was treated and thought of because she was a woman. On the other hand, the press described her special treatment to show the public that good geopolitical subjects should not disrupt other aspects of subject formation, in this case normative gender roles.

### _"I lined up behind a Brigadier . . . or someone great"_

Participation in the Mulberry Harbour project gave people new roles and a new lifestyle. They became different people because of what they had to do, why they thought they were doing it, where they had to do it, and with whom they worked. Hence, it is not surprising that being part of the massive team building the Mulberry Harbours had its mix of pleasure and pressure. Necessary and everyday interaction with others in various work settings, and the interaction between different settings, was the immediate context within which the good geopolitical subjects of the Mulberry Harbour project were formed.

Alan Harris has fond memories of how his civilian work allowed him the fun and benefits of a bachelor lifestyle:

> It was the gracious life in Coventry. I was well paid, shared a stylish flat with two architects, Tommy Pinion and John Mallorie. We had a wide circle of friends and lovely ladies would look in from time to time to cook us a hot meal.[19]

But with deployment on the Mulberry Harbour project came dramatic changes:

> Then the cultural shock. "Tea" on arrival at Newark was a hunk of bread with margarine and a mess tin of near tea, eaten sitting on a heap of slag. Where was the napery, the dainty china, the toasted tea-cakes?[20]

The change in role that Alan Harris experienced required some soul-searching and a test of his abilities:

> I had a certain talent for protective coloration, so when I was made a temporary unpaid acting lance-corporal it was not universally acclaimed; I was one of the lads, was I not?
>
>
>
>
> Our corporal, a grim faced Scot, ordered me: "Get your lot formed up on parade." I went into the hut and said "F-F-Form up outside." The response was loud and definite: "Eff off, Arrissy." I seized on the sapper who I knew to be the mildest and most inoffensive of the lot and said "What's your name and number?" "What me?" he said. "I ain't done nothing." Soon they all drifted out on to the road. Crisis of authority; had I failed we might have lost the war.[21]

Despite the irony and offhandedness of his last sentence, it is not hard to see this as a way of downplaying his role, and the stress attached, some twenty-five years after the event. At the time, Alan Harris was facing the pressures of new roles with new responsibilities in a very different work environment than the one he had been used to.

For some the stress they experienced because of their roles in the Mulberry Harbours resulted in a deterioration of their health, closely monitored by the military bureaucracy. Writing in the third person, the engineer Thomas Coughtrie recalls:

> Thomas had collapsed during a transformer test in Edinburgh—it had been an exhausting month with exposure and infrequent meals and too often no meals during the day at all. The old trouble of pleurisy again, and as it was now the eighth time, he now had to face a vituperative Doctor whose advice had been scorned, and was once more having to be pacified. After a long week-end he was back on the job and was then told to report to H.Q. where he was told the Chief wanted to see him. With his weight just 10 stone at 6 foot 1 inch and looking like a ghost, he was asked if he felt able to carry on—"you see, we know your health background." The evident concern was an uplift and he asked for one concession and that was, as soon as the Mulberry was totally completed, could he be given a transfer to the Midlands Department where he would be able to recover his health at home and reduce his work load as there the Department had a small staff of electrical engineers with whom the burdens could be shared. To his surprise, this was granted, indeed guaranteed, and the return to full duty was thus lightened in anticipation because he had not had a holiday or a break and his body was protesting somewhat.[22]

The success of the Mulberry Harbour project was not just a matter of coordination, planning, and teamwork. It also required the talents of the individuals involved. A military engineering project, put together at a time of war, meant that the switch from civilian life to military duty had to be as seamless as possible. The use of individuals who had been engineers made the Mulberry Harbour project possible, though the status of the newly minted Royal Engineers was somewhat ambiguous:

> We were all specialists. All officers from construction companies. We had little to do with regular Army officers.[23]

But such competence was not so easily found for others, as we just saw with Alan Harris's first attempts at getting his men on parade. One way to assume new responsibilities was to embellish one's past. A few small white lies about previous military service could go a long way in establishing a reputation. The role of the Mulberry Harbours in an invasion of the European continent meant that Gallipoli could have some cache in establishing one's credentials. Corporal Gearing recalls he "had a big job to do" and his superiors told him to "Polish yourself up."[24] So, as part of the polishing up, he let the men around him "think I had been a soldier in Gallipoli." Creating a sense of self that was connected to a previous historic event in a different war in another part of the world helped Corporal Gearing get the stature and confidence he needed to do his job managing the cranes and barges needed to get the component parts of the Mulberry Harbours around the British coast, from production to parking space.

He recalls working with Americans to learn how to steer the barges and tugs, and the US military "brass" saying, "If you had been in the American army you would have had a commission," though he was promoted to Sergeant.[25] On D-Day he helped pull the Harbour across the channel, with memories of the disaster at Gallipoli, as well as sense of his previous experience as a bargeman:

> Harbour was finished . . . I was surprised out of my life. I said, "This is a lot better than Gallipoli" . . . I was so pleased . . . and all the barges were there . . . and I spoke their language [with the bargemen]. But now, with his time being part of the Mulberry Harbour project, he was something other than a civilian bargeman. "I was cocky because I had three stripes." He was part of a military machine, and reveling in the success of the invasion, compared to his experience in World War One. "I lined up behind a Brigadier . . . or someone great. We couldn't do that in World War One."[26]

Though the need for military hierarchy and discipline remained, Sergeant Gearing could reflect on broader changes in society.

The teamwork behind the success of the Mulberry Harbours was a combination of planning, military orders, discipline, and individual competence and sense of responsibility. Major Luck of the Royal Engineers was surely right when he said:

> I suppose that no matter how much planning goes in to such a mammoth scheme, a large part has to be played "by ear" when the time comes. Somebody, I think, showed a great deal of sense by getting together practical men, who were accustomed to getting over difficulties without Text Book knowledge.[27]

The timing of the Mulberry Harbour project compounded recruitment difficulties. Coming relatively late in the war, when much manpower had already been assigned, meant that the construction of the Harbours, deemed essential for the war effort, was often undertaken by scratch teams of misfits:

> It may be of interest at this point to look at one of the difficulties for Port Construction troops. These ships were manned by sappers and officered by sapper officers who had the appropriate Board of Trade certificates. However men with Masters certificates who also held commissions in the Royal Engineers were, at this stage of the war, somewhat thin on the ground, and apt to be odd. The first captain was removed from the Progress just before she sailed from Gareloch. The second was removed at Gibraltar, both for inefficiency and drunkenness. The Progress then called at Oran. When leaving the harbor she turned through 180 degrees and ran onto the outer face of the breakwater. I went to Oran and removed the third captain. After that all went well.[28]

The recruitment of personnel "apt to be odd" was, sometimes, balanced by being able to reunite teams of officers that had cut their teeth in earlier campaigns. And yet, the officers had their work cut out for them because of the character of the men they commanded. The officers of existing units had no desire or incentive to give up their best men to the new Port Construction units, with inevitable consequences:

> The construction of the Mulberry was to be conducted in the face of the enemy, which meant that any sort of unpleasant event might occur whilst we were doing it. We therefore needed troops experienced not only in Port Construction work but also in enemy action. There was only one such unit. The priority of our operation was sufficient for me to have No. 1 Port Construction Group brought back from Italy. (Once again I had the old gang who had been with me so long.)
>
>
>
>
> To start raising the new companies I went to the Engineer Depot at Longmoor and saw the Commanding Officer, Brigadier Joly de Lotbinière (who had long ago been adjutant to my Territorial Divisional Engineers). He was very helpful. He said "It is no use coming here at this stage of the war. All I have are the throwouts from units, the useless, the worthless, the men with long crimesheets." So we had them.
>
>
>
>
> Major Ronnie Cowan, back from Italy, was saddled with 969 Port Floating Equipment Company. He was stationed near Ryde, in the Isle of Wight, the Whale bridge being moored in the Solent. On one occasion, going to visit him, I did not arrive until eight at night. I saw what I thought was the whole company on parade. Ronnie said no, it was just the defaulters.
>
>
>
>
> Perhaps this is the right time to look a little into the future and see how these scalliwags behaved. Many of them sailed on the whale equipment and Phoenixes from different ports in England to Arromanches. The decks of the Whale bridges were perforated metal and only some five feet above the sea surface. The men lived in little tents. They were wet, cold and the best they had for food was tins of self heating soup. At times almost every tow sank and the men had to be taken onto the tugs and brought back to England, perhaps in the case of the Phoenix crews to some port other than that on which they were based. A few of the crews were drowned. The men on the Phoenix crews were a little better off because they were farther from the sea surface and with less risk of sinking, although some of the Phoenix units sank, one torpedoed, one mined. With so many separate parties, so many ports and the general confusion of that time it was difficult to arrange for pay, mail, welfare, change of clothing or any other amenity for these men. They lead a miserable life.
>
>
>
>
> Every time they returned to an English port they had an opportunity to desert, but, and it is a massive but, they knew that they were doing an important job and they never saw a sergeant major. No one could have wished for better men. There is a very important message here for all concerned with discipline and military man-management.[29]

Extraordinary times required extraordinary measures, and the Mulberry Harbours were not just any engineering project. This was a project within the broader contexts of wartime national emergency. For the individuals involved this meant an environment of discipline or control that resulted in what must have been, to some degree, an unsettling personal experience as "We were being watched all the time."[30]

The scope of the Mulberry Harbour project, namely its pivotal role in transatlantic cooperation and the contrasting geopolitical trajectories of the United States and Great Britain, meant that the work-settings in which good geopolitical subjects were made were international in nature. Part of the new experience was interacting with American forces with their new foods, gadgets, and way of approaching life:

> To add to the general air of expectancy, a team of American Soldiers arrived who had been allocated pierheads. Their appearance was not at all dramatic, they were quiet and well behaved and amazingly generous. Large tins of tomato juice and tinned fruits of kinds, never seen since the War begun, were handed over, not for barter (although some were believed to be used in exchange for Whisky, and for this stimulant, they were also reputed to quite abnormal prices even for inferior brands) but for sheer kindness. Cigarettes were disbursed by the carton of 200, not by the packet! The brands used were already known from American films, but the tobacco was toasted, and a taste, which Thomas never acquired, had to be developed. Nevertheless, these and small cheroots were much enjoyed all round. Their general Kit too, was quite extraordinarily fine. They were white, thick, woolen jackets and sheepskin capotes and fine shirts and tee-shirts, and the boots!! All this was noted, not enviously but, as a matter of interest and, in general, the Americans were splendid.[31]

For Thomas Coughtrie mingling with Americans was a way to consider the relative geopolitical trajectory of the two nations. The stark difference in the quality and amount of equipment that the Americans brought with them was one thing, but so was the way that they seemed to be unconfined from rules and established forms of behavior, a marvelous observation for someone raised in the strictures of British society:

> They had a quite noticeable lack of fear of retribution if things were done wrongly. They just seemed not to be afraid of any consequences—this became evident when the first pierhead was taken over and became theirs. At once, [acetylene] cutting gear was borrowed and they set about burning away all the cross-struts and stays inside compartments such as crews' accommodation and sleeping areas, where the bunks were placed. An intending occupant had to slip under criss-crossed angle beams and so he couldn't sit up in bed! With all the structural members removed, and with their prodigality and the fact that over and above being highly paid, their dollars had a high exchange rate, they took immediate action. The generous supply of vehicles to their troops ensured that some were available at once and the nearest local town had a small bonanza! Carpets, chairs, sofas, tables, paint, pictures in frames, and decent cutlery and china were bought, "cash down" and the "tween-deck" areas were transformed![32]

Though the relationship between the United States and Britain was good at relatively junior levels of the officer class, "at the very top there was too much political jockeying for prestige for cooperation to have been complete, or completely friendly."[33] Depending on their rank and role, the people within the Mulberry Harbour project had a very different sense of the meaning and impact of the broader geopolitical context. For lower ranks, Britain's class structure and relative poverty were on display. For the higher ranks the loss of Britain's global leadership role was increasingly evident. Both views and situations were to have a lasting impact beyond D-Day and the conclusion of the war.

### _"Others who watched and noted as a result became famous"_

The experiences of those who worked on the Mulberry Harbours remained with them throughout their lives. Being a good geopolitical subject in wartime carried over to the postwar context. One legacy of the memories was a sense of identity and self-worth that came with being part of such a crucial military operation. The other legacy was, for some, the gainful postwar employment that came through the technical expertise put into practice to build the Harbours.

Many of the people involved in the Mulberry Harbour project were able to use the experience they had gained on the Mulberry Harbours to achieve postwar success in the private sector and government, or to just find the quiet life:

> Brigadier Gage retired happily to Halstead but not, unhappily, for a long enough life. Brigadier Walter capitalized on his work at SHAEF and became the Ministry of Transport's expert on Europe—subsequently working on the export of railway material. Admiral Hickling wrote happily about fishing in New Zealand but alas is dead. Lord Mais shot up in the city. The great man of the Mulberry Sir Bruce White, now 94, only recently abandoned work as a consulting engineer. I moved via the reconstruction of Rangoon and a spell in India, to Whitehall where they kept me on until I was 69 for work on the Thames Barrier . . . From time to time, living in Sherborne I pass by Portland Harbour where two of the last batch of Phoenix units are parked; we nod gravely to each other as I pass by. Like me, they are peacefully retired.[34]

Alan Beckett made the connection between his work on the Mulberry Harbours and his postwar jobs and the personal connections that they provided:

> After demobilization in 1946, I initially set up as a freelance Civil Engineer, then joined Brigadier Bruce White (who had now been knighted) in his family firm of Consulting Engineers, Sir Bruce White, Wolfe Barry & Partners.[35]

But for Beckett the value of the experience was much more than a successful postwar career. There was also the satisfaction of the recognition he received for the role he had played at a time of national crisis:

> For my work at Arromanches I was awarded MBE (military). I received a special award for inventors for the development of the kite anchor. I received a special award for inventors for the design of the floating bridge.[36]

For Colonel Cowan it was a matter of a reflection of what his Mulberry Harbour experiences could have led to:

> Many lessons were learned at that time, much useful experience was gained (which has been of value in the North Sea Oil Operations); had I but paid heed I might have become a Director of Design for the Malawi Government, or a high executive of Anaconda Copper, or Lord Mayor of London, perhaps _even_ [underlined in original] a Professor of Engineering, because others who watched and noted as a result became famous.[37]

For others, the postwar experience was a mix of ups and downs, despite the benefits of a lifetime of references one could get from officers involved in the Mulberry Harbour project. In a letter to Colonel Cowan, Major John Luck noted:

> Dear Ronnie
>
>
>
>
> A few words about myself—and here I have to thank you for the testimonial you sent to my then Employers—now called Esso—which enabled me to break away from the environment of the Thames as a lighterman for them, and on my return to Civvy St. was employed as a Salesman, and this was really the break I needed. My wife and I have been very happy although no children appeared, and we built ourselves a nice house here in Epping which if nothing else will be our monument!
>
>
>
>
> I was made redundant some 5 years ago from Esso, but immediately started with another Oil Distributor and Mechanical Works (Boiler Houses) contractor.
>
>
>
>
> Yes, I think it has not been a bad life so far, with much to be thankful for.[38]

The Mulberry Harbour project was also a potential stepping-stone to other military endeavors. After the success of the D-Day invasion, attention and the focus of military strategy was cast to the Pacific theater of war. Some, such as Major E. W. Witcomb, thought that a construction akin to the Mulberry Harbour might be necessary in the series of invasions leading to the ultimate landing on the Japanese mainland:

> Before demob[ilization], when on leave in England from Germany, I remember being briefed in the War Office on the general scheme of the construction of a floating port in the South China Sea. Someone had my name on a list. This was before the surrender of Japan.[39]

Overall, the sentiment of those involved in the project was of a job well-done. They had made, under the pressure of time, wartime shortages, and secrecy, a breathtaking feat of engineering. It had been deployed successfully and played a crucial role in the war. In light of the achievement it is only fitting to reflect on the awe that the participants themselves felt towards what they had done:

> One knows nothing of those days if not of their exaltation. Time later to be windy but for a moment we were not in favour of Justice, we were Justice, armed with care. Nothing would ever have been hit the way we meant to hit the crust on the far side.
>
>
>
>
> Can more be said about Mulberry?
>
>
>
>
> The road from Bayeux takes a sharp turn on the hill behind Arromanches, revealing a panorama of the harbour. It is not the most worthy of memories but nor is it the least vivid—that of the dropping of jaws as columns of POWs rounded that corner.
>
>
>
>
> We won. Thank God. Come that day I shall ask did we, Sir, do well?[40]

In terms of military and strategic success, all those involved did very well indeed. The job well done by these individuals changed them in ways that would stay with them for the rest of their lives, and also played a role in changing the course of the war. The irony for the British is that they helped bring about a victory that was partially Pyrrhic. Though the defeat of Nazism was complete and the existential threat to Britain removed, the Empire was not to be maintained, global status was to be diminished, and national economic prospects were to wane.

### _"An interference of people, for service reasons"_

The idea of geopolitical constructs requires an understanding of the _mutual_ construction of a number of different entities. Perhaps the clearest example is how the new bureaucratic constructs made the people who staffed them and how, in turn, the everyday practices of people made the bureaucracies what they were. One result of working in these settings was an individual construction of a sense of self that was tied to the role one's work setting played within the grand theater of global geopolitics. The process of the war effort meant the coordination, control, and direction of the many individuals involved through bureaucratic practices. Organizing these bureaucracies, and working within them, made people into good geopolitical subjects.

From the very top of the Mulberry Harbour hierarchy, Sir Bruce White could reflect "this is my duty" upon reading Churchill's memo, and see that his particular purpose was to "make sure what I really do is really what is wanted, some sort of direction."[41] Yet this was not as smooth as it could have been, partially because of a bureaucratic politics made more complicated by the traditions of interservice rivalry. The everyday practices of Sir Bruce White made him, the bureaucracy, and those who worked within it. One feature of this process was the tense interactions with the Royal Navy. Sir Bruce was confident in his role and abilities, but he was also frustrated with the politics of rank. Though he thought "no one could tell me what to do except myself" he also had to deal with:

> an interference of people, for service reasons . . . I suffered because I did not have the status . . . [but] it was really a full General's responsibility but I was only a Brigadier.[42]

Sir Bruce White's personal experience, as for many others involved in the Mulberry Harbours, was somewhat defined by his rank and what that meant for his relations with other people. Rank is position relative to others and also defines roles or bureaucratic responsibilities. Performing one's rank ensures everyday construction of self, others, and their offices.

Sir Bruce did what was essential for the success of the Mulberry Harbour project, and the pursuit of the war in general. But the decision of who did what was complicated by the imperfect operation of the bureaucracies involved and the difficulties of allies with very different national cultures trying to learn how to work with each other. For Sir Bruce:

> The lesson to be learned is that there should be no domination of any service at all. The US always sent a rank higher so they could dominate the meeting . . . I really didn't mind. [laughing][43]

But when it came to the efficiency of the project he was less able to laugh things off.

> The American harbor was lost because of this ignorance—tugs were commanded by stock brokers because they had a yacht. Capt. Clarke in charge of Mulberry Harbour A was a member of New York yacht club . . . he was in my estimation the most polished American I had ever met. Not too American in his speech.[44]

It was not just the problems of interservice and cross-cultural tensions that hampered the construction of the Mulberry Harbours. The sheer magnitude of the project and all that had to be put in the right place at the right time was very hard to manage. Making sure the bureaucracy functioned also created those responsible as good geopolitical subjects. Feeling the tension of the demands of having the Mulberry Harbours completed for when they would be needed but never quite being let in on the secret of the date for D-Day was a strong concern for the Rt. Hon. Lord Mais of Walbrook:

> Suffice to say at this stage that I was very disturbed by the state of production of this equipment and the training of the troops, bearing in mind that I was unaware of the actual date of "D Day" although I knew it must be or almost certainly would be within four to five months, and in my view neither the equipment nor the training of personnel were sufficiently far advanced to be ready within this time span.[45]

And yet Lord Mais had every confidence in the success of the project because he believed the bureaucratic structure of the British military would be effective in enabling individuals to actually make the Mulberry Harbours:

> the Companies . . . whatever they may have lacked in Military bearing they more than made up for in technical know-how and determination and I have formed a very high opinion of the Officers and the non-commissioned Officers.[46]

As Lord Mais noted, the making of the Mulberries was achieved through the construction of a workforce, and this required the mutual construction of the government offices and military postings in which they worked.

The fact that the Harbours were built and operated successfully, and hence able to play such a crucial role in the liberation of Europe, was also down to the successful cooperation with the United States. The mutual construction of British and US strategy dovetailed with the mutual construction of the two countries' bureaucracies and individual service personnel. Many senior British officers smarted at the involvement of the United States, possibly upset by the obvious need of the once-mighty British forces to rely on American money, military equipment, and soldiers. For those actually involved in putting the Mulberry Harbours together, relationships between the two national militaries was not just cordial but seen as vital to the success of the mission:

> This would be an appropriate point at which to mention our good comrades and friends the Beach Battalion of the United States Engineers commanded by one Colonel Harry E. Bronson whom I had met and come to know well during the planning stage and he had in fact spent several weekends at my home and borrowed my golf clubs on occasion. So we knew each other intimately when we both set sail for Normandy.[47]

The high-level political and strategic relationships, nurtured between Roosevelt and Churchill and made into military cooperation through meetings like the Quebec Conference, were made to work on the ground by individuals who had gotten to know each other by sharing homes and rounds of golf. Making new friends, and learning new ways of talking and doing things, was just one way in which involvement in a grand piece of transatlantic strategy changed the individuals involved.

Yet putting the right people together and getting them to work successfully was, for Lord Mais, done more by luck than judgment. The pressure of time likely made it difficult for a fully-fledged organization of the workforce. The result was that the Mulberry Harbour project was made to work because of the way the individuals involved responded to the extraordinary circumstances they found themselves in:

> The fact that the piers were built and the port was completed is largely, if not entirely, due to the obstinacy, tenacity and courage of the Units that had the task of building them and holding it together during the storm. Nevertheless a grave risk was taken in forming two entirely new Units to carry out this vital piece of engineering upon which the whole invasion depended. One would have thought that Units which had been together for some time would have been chosen. However, in making the comment I criticize the planners, not the Units who had not been together all that long who were absolutely magnificent when the time came and no Unit no matter how experienced or well-trained could have done better. But this was a risk which in my view the planners should not have taken . . . strangely enough because of the inadequate training with the equipment before we left England nobody had any fixed ideas and therefore everyone had a flexible approach to the project . . . nobody expected anything to go right and therefore morale remained high.[48]

The reason morale stayed high was because of the perception of the individuals involved that they were playing a role in something bigger, the geopolitical destiny of their country: Such inspiration was heightened at particular moments by key individuals giving rousing speeches. Brigadier Walter recalls the speech given by Montgomery on the eve of D-Day:

> It was terribly inspiring. Here I was with my own little corner of the invasion getting more and more puzzled and not quite knowing where it fitted in. He suddenly put everything into perspective. He raised my morale just like that.[49]

The speech was the culmination of something much more mundane that made the Mulberry Harbours and the invasion possible—the slow turning of the wheels of bureaucracy and the everyday practices of those who staffed them. Other than the speech by Monty, Brigadier Walter's other main memories were:

> meetings, planning and cancelling and planning . . . I still go cold over . . . The success of our Mulberry was down to the fact we got on . . . We worked together as one though we were two different services.[50]

Morale was not high for everyone, and Monty was not always inspiring. This was especially the case for the labor force in the industrial work settings where the Harbour components were actually made. Major-General Sir Harold A. Wernher recalls the problems of managing the Irish labor force at the East India Dock construction site, a concern magnified by the tensions between the two nations over Ireland's neutrality in the war. During a visit by General Montgomery, Wernher dressed up in civilian clothes to mingle with and spy upon the workers. He heard one of them say: "If we are such fine men as Montgomery says, why don't they give us more money?"[51]

Money was just one part of the problem of staffing the construction sites. Wernher had conversations with Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, to free up scaffolders and steel fixers by releasing them from military service:

> There was considerable opposition to this from the Services, but when I pointed out that the Americans were unable to contribute, and that it would be undesirable at this stage to mix civilian and military labour owing to the differences in pay, agreement was reached and the men were drafted as civilians.[52]

The demand of the military, with their obvious need for manpower, was complicated by the established rules of the civilian labor force, especially union rules. The emergency situation of war, and the frenetic time-scale of the Mulberry project, required other mutual constructions that bridged the government and military on the one hand, with the private sector on the other hand. Wernher saw the need for flexibility in the workforce to get the job done. He pushed through a change that would release carpenters from the dockyards and allow them to be retrained as steel fixers: "because a skilled man can readily learn another trade." Fortunately Trade Union laws were elastic at this time. By this means the difficulties were solved.[53]

For Wernher getting the job done was not just a matter of reassigning and retraining workers. The job could be done by management efficiency and a dash of nationalistic competition; to ensure national identity was both a motivation and outcome of the ongoing interaction between the geopolitical self and the project at hand:

> the military labour employed was unlikely to achieve the results in time, as they were not organized in a businesslike manner . . . I also advised that if teams of Sea Bees and British Engineers were placed side by side healthy competition would ensue. It was by this means that the equipment was all completed and assembled in time.[54]

The way business and state bureaucracy interacted through the Mulberry Harbour project will be the focus of the following chapter. The relation between them was introduced here to emphasize that geopolitical constructs are the product of many mutual constructions: national identity, established labor relations, military rank and service rivalry, bureaucracies, and individual career ambitions.

### _"That was a great honor for me"_

The previous quotes from Sir Harold Wernher emphasize that the making of people and their everyday settings was a continual process of creating a context for one's actions. In so doing, Wernher continually built on his role as a good geopolitical subject, carrying much weight on his shoulders. Over time this built up into an enormous amount of stress, which could only be relieved once the mission of building and deploying the Mulberry Harbours was complete by burning the vital papers he had been responsible for:

> having concluded the funeral pyre, I felt happy to be rid of so many papers marked TOP SECRET which had been a worry over the preceding months.[55]

But it was not all just stress and responsibility. Wernher felt the sense of personal achievement and self-worth that we have seen others speak about. He received a letter of congratulations, but Lord Mountbatten reflected on the costs of the bureaucratic battles Wernher had had to fight to get the mission accomplished:

> but I do not think that this will ever be recognised, except by the few who knew. He made too many enemies in official circles by his forceful methods.[56]

For Wernher, the lack of public recognition he reflected upon in his autobiography was the cost of the bureaucratic politics that had bedeviled the project:

> The above is described to indicate the petty jealousy and short-sightedness of certain people in authority who appeared to be more intent on defeating each other than the common enemy.[57]

Wernher was just one of many, of various ranks and roles, whose identity as a good geopolitical subject was reinforced through their part in making the Mulberry Harbours. Acting out their roles occurred within the contexts provided by other geopolitical constructs in a dynamic and relational process of mutual construction. The individuals experienced new work places, new duties, and new responsibilities. The work conditions required people to adapt by making new things with new techniques, surrounded by new people, some of them with strange national habits. The difficulties of this newness were compounded by the wartime context of danger and secrecy: "You were working in blitzes, you were working night and day, on something that you did not know, and you did not try to find out."[58]

The stress and fear was, to some degree, compensated for by the sense of identity and self-worth that came with working on the Mulberry Harbours. Those involved believed that the project was crucial, or the "crux of the whole operation and it must not fail."[59] In the end, thanks to the endeavors and adaptations of the individuals involved, the Mulberry Harbours were "a success unsurpassed in warfare."[60] And for those individuals involved it was a defining moment in their lives, one of which they could be forever proud. For some, like Brigadier Walter, such memories were given a greater glow through rubbing shoulders with some of the biggest names in history. He recalls meeting Churchill and getting the endorsement of a prime ministerial "'well done, me boy.' That was a great honor for me."[61]

### _Notes_

1.

Probyn, "The Spatial Imperatives of Subjectivity."

2.

Col. S. K. Gilbert, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

3.

Ibid.

4.

Colonel R. J. P. Cowan, RE, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991," quoted from a Memo to the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5.

Mr. Charles Taylor, IWM 9992 01/8/1.

6.

Ibid.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Captain D. A. Brown, RE, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

9.

Margaret Marshall, National Army Museum (NAM) 1995-02-99-1.

10.

Major E. W. Witcomb, MBE, RE, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

11.

W. W. Rigbye, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

12.

Andrew H. Hinrichs, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

13.

Brigadier Walter, IWM 12555.

14.

"Woman works in secret for a year preparing vital D-day port model," _The Maple Leaf_ (October 30, 1944).

15.

"Woman who knew D-Day secret," _Glasgow Herald_ (October 6, 1944).

16.

Ibid.

17.

"Woman works in secret for a year preparing vital D-day port model," _The Maple Leaf._

18.

Ibid.

19.

Alan Harris, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

20.

Ibid.

21.

Ibid.

22.

Coughtrie, IWM 95/1748.

23.

May, IWM 13762.

24.

Gearing, IWM 11032.

25.

Ibid.

26.

Ibid.

27.

Major John Luck, RE, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

28.

Col. S. K. Gilbert, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

29.

Ibid.

30.

Hughill, IWM 28403 (Wren).

31.

Coughtrie, IWM 95/1748.

32.

Ibid.

33.

Harrison, _Mulberry_ , 87.

34.

Col. S. K. Gilbert, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

35.

A. H. Beckett, IWM 1542 91/43 1 and 1A.

36.

Ibid.

37.

Colonel R. J. P. Cowan, RE, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

38.

Major John Luck, RE, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

39.

Major E. W. Witcomb, MBE, RE, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

40.

Alan Harris, article written by Harris in _New Civil Engineer_ (12 February 1987): 32, 34. IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

41.

Sir Bruce White, IWM 6827 (recording).

42.

Ibid.

43.

Ibid.

44.

Ibid.

45.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Mais of Walbrook, IWM MISC 157, Item 2434, "Accounts Describing the Mulberry Harbours June 1975–February 1991."

46.

Ibid.

47.

Ibid.

48.

Ibid.

49.

Brigadier Walter, IWM 12555.

50.

Ibid.

51.

Autobiography of Major General Sir Harold A. Wernher, IWM 88/2206, 54.

52.

Ibid., 46–47.

53.

Ibid., 47.

54.

Ibid., 55–56.

55.

Ibid., 58.

56.

Ibid., 68.

57.

Ibid., 69.

58.

The Papers of Vice Admiral H. Hickling (microfilm), IWM DS/MISC/52.

59.

Brigadier Walter, IWM 12555.

60.

Ibid.

61.

Ibid.
Chapter 6

# The Business of Making the
Mulberry Harbours

"War may be an intensification in the
development of our lives"

Engineers, politicians, and officers created the design and vision of the Mulberry Harbours from within the government bureaucracies and offices of Whitehall and the military services. Building the harbors in time for the invasion was a matter for private contractors, who were already under pressure to satisfy wartime demand. The call for contractors to produce was complicated by competition for workers, as the military sought more men and all businesses were in the market for people with the right skills. Added to this mix was government intervention, or interference, in the face of security fears and nervous glances at the calendar as D-Day got steadily nearer. The intense and pervasive level of government oversight, the frequency of communication between businesses and ministries, and the mutual benefit gained by making the Mulberries suggest that rather than seeing the state and the private sector as completely separate entities, they were a single geopolitical construct— _the institutional arrangements of state and business_. In exploring this geopolitical construct we are able to further illustrate the processes of mutual construction, as people and places were also constructed. Specifically, the workers, businesses, and towns of the northeast of England were made and remade by their involvement in wartime production.

The contractors who gained military orders had to accept continual oversight and micromanagement from the government. Their factories and worksites became "Protected Places" and were subject to mandates regarding security. Their workers became security risks who had to be monitored, while being exhorted to be good geopolitical subjects. Workers also became an increasingly precious commodity that companies tried to retain in the face of demand from other companies and the military. The politics of requiring an industrial workforce to respond to the pressures of wartime construction demands was framed and contested within a politics of what the nation at war could become—or what type of society would be the reward in the hoped-for victory. By focusing on the way businesses and government bureaucracies interacted we see that making the Mulberry Harbours made factory floors part of the process of making war. War was made by the typewriter and the memo, as much as the gun and the battleship. The geography of making war extended far beyond the battlefield into spaces of everyday work practices in the towns connected to the war by their role in the Mulberry project.

### _"I shall have to direct young men to you"_

A host of new government committees were created to coordinate sectors of the economy to meet war priorities, including the making of the Mulberry Harbours. The Lord President's Committee had the key role of transferring resources to war production.[1] The problems of finding people to satisfy the demands of fighting the war while maintaining production across industrial sectors led to a severe shortage of labor in some areas of the economy. Employers and employees felt the strains in particular places, with their own established industrial relations. Ernest Bevin, as Minister of Labour and National Service, was responsible for ensuring the right amount of workers, with the requisite skills, were in the right locations to get the work done. Residents of particular places, with particular skills tied to local firms, faced the possibility of the government forcing them to move somewhere else and work in a different industry. The justification was the success of the national war effort, but this often jarred with an individual's sense of self and shows that the good geopolitical subject was a partial and contested construct.

As the D-Day invasion approached, the realizations of how the change in the prosecution of the war would put further pressure on British industry became clear. At a speech to the miners' annual conference in Blackpool on July 20, 1943 Bevin said:

> At the end of this coal year there won't be enough men or boys in the industry to carry it on. It is one great difficulty in this war effort . . . At the same time we are carrying out this invasion and every bit of territory we take from the enemy we have got to find coal for . . . It is quite obvious that I will have to resort to some desperate remedies during the coming year. I shall have to direct young men to you.[2]

The need to "direct young men to you" was to have a big impact on the workers on the Tyne and Wear, who feared forced relocation and an order to work down the pits. This particular issue was part of broader employment concerns. In September 1943 Britain reached its peak of wartime mobilization. Twenty-two million, out of a population of thirty-three million men and women between ages of fourteen and sixty-four, were serving in the Armed Forces and Civil Defense or were employed in industry. This was an expansion of 3,750,000 over the past four years.[3]

These general trends played out within place-specific contexts. The engineering, shipbuilding, and coal mining industries accounted for about one-third of all Tyneside wartime employment.[4] Moreover, the engineering industry was highly dependent upon governmental contracts, especially from the Admiralty, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, and the Ministry of Supply.[5] For employers and employees the presence of the government was felt through the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill 1937 and in September 1938, the identification of reserved occupations that restricted the movement of skilled workers (and limited the practices of "headhunting" to prevent high wage demands).[6] The act was a "visionary ideal of war organization . . . each single citizen in his appointed war station."[7] Yet the reality of such "vision" for workers was a set of workplace restrictions, though the right to strike was protected to retain morale.[8]

The specific demands of the Mulberry Harbours played a significant role in the demand for labor. To build just the concrete caissons:

> required 20,000 men drawn from the reduced building and civil engineering industries. To assemble the prefabricated parts of pier heads and pontoons (Whale), 1,600 men were needed, 600 of them electric welders of the highest proficiency who could only be found by loans or withdrawals from war production. A third part of the project—Bombardon, the erection of steel structures to form a shelter for ships in the deep water anchorage outside the Phoenix breakwater—required 6,000 men engaged on prefabrication of the parts and another 2,000 (including 500 skilled men) on the site at Southampton chosen for assembly.[9]

For Bevin, with his roots in the trade union movement, the demands put on labor to satisfy the war effort were seen as a blend of creating a certain type of worker-citizen and a worker-oriented society. The wartime context was seen as a catalyst, as Bevin had outlined in House of Commons debate on wages policy on October 21, 1942:

> I have never accepted the view that war, post-war and pre-war are separate things. War may be an intensification in the development of our lives, but there is no definite break. Everything you do before a war determines largely what will happen in the war, while everything you do in the war will largely determine what will happen after the war.[10]

In other words, the politics of labor, with a view to a more progressive future, were part of the war, and not necessarily a disruptive one. Just as labor was vital to the conclusion of the war, the war was important in redefining the nature of labor. In another House of Commons speech in September 1943 Bevin argued:

> Those who vote against complete mobilisation and full use of the manpower and the resources of this country at this moment should ask themselves what would be the result if others supported them. The result would be to carry on this war, and every minute it is being carried on, there is a greater sacrifice than calling women of 46–51 to serve in the factories, a far greater risk to the rising generation of this country, the most precious portion of the body politic. Everything you can do to turn out weapons of war helps to carry out the policy of the Government—that is, that metal is cheaper than men, and if we can use men and women in the factories to build up the most mighty equipment, the most powerful force, and with the sheer weight of that force shorten this war by a minute, or a day, or a month, then we shall be doing the most humane thing we can to end this holocaust.[11]

As workers were exhorted to make the war, the war was also a context for politics that would make the labor force and individual workers. Bevin used his twin sympathies for the war effort and the need to improve the lot of British workers to make sure the industrial needs of the war were met but that compulsory orders upon workers were limited. Moreover, he envisioned that the commitment of the workers was a pathway to a postwar socialist society. Making workers good geopolitical constructs within a wartime context was connected to a sense of new political possibilities in the yet-to-be-achieved postwar context.

In a speech given in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne on March 8, 1941 Bevin had asked the workers to maximize their productivity:

> The next battle is to be the Battle of the Atlantic . . . We know the preparations that have been made by the enemy to strangle us, and we know that the Navy has to meet the same or even greater intensity than existed at the end of 1917 or 1918. I put it to the employers and managements and to the men in these great shipyard districts to feel that they are part of the Navy and that it is not right to expect that great force to carry all our burden . . . It is up to us to shorten the turn-round of the ships by co-operation between the dockers and the managements . . . Ship management in ports—repairs, turning round and clearance—is not as good as it ought to be. In my opinion it is possible on every turn-round, by a combined effort of ship managements, repair yards, dockers and railway companies, to save eleven days on every trip. You can do it.[12]

Such increased productivity and explicit inclusion of labor in the war was, in theory, to have its rewards in the form of a society in which the government took greater responsibility for the welfare of workers:

> I explained to employers and trade unions the need to remember that the worker inside the factory is a different person from the worker outside the factory; that we must not have a kind of industrial feudalism growing up in war, under which firms would take responsibility of looking after their people even when they had left the factories. A person will accept discipline inside the factory, but immediately he is outside the door he becomes a free citizen. Therefore it is necessary to have a different organisation to deal with him after he leaves the factory gate.[13]

In combination, for Bevin, and others in the labor movement or sympathetic to the cause, the result would be the worker as a good geopolitical subject—one who worked for the British state and its military and imperial goals, while being cared for by the state. This had been Bevin's vision, outlined at a May 1940 TUC (Trades Union Congress) Special Conference in the early stages of the war:

> I have to ask you virtually to place yourselves at the disposal of the State. We are Socialists and this is the test of our Socialism. It is the test whether we have meant the resolutions which we have so often passed. I do not want you to get worried about every individual that may be in the Government. We could not stop to have an election; we could not stop to decide the issue. But this I am convinced of: if our Movement and our class rise with all their energy now and save the people of this country from disaster, the country will always turn with confidence to the people who saved them. They will pay more attention to an act of that kind than to theoretical arguments or any particular philosophy. And the people are conscious at this moment that they are in danger.[14]

However, the pressures of labor shortages, in general and in specific locations and industrial sectors, meant that workers were often concerned about the immediate impact on their lives rather than the promise of a better society to come. The required pace of production was mirrored by an increase in the industrial accident rate, with a gross increase of 40 percent during 1940.[15]

What was potentially a conflict between identification with nation or with class was eased, to some degree, with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The British Communist Party echoed the government's calls for maximizing industrial output. Instead of calling for a "people's peace," the party called for workers to work as hard as they could to protect the socialist motherland.[16] This change in attitude coincided with an increase in Communist Party membership to a 1942 peak of 56,000,[17] despite the Party's opposition to strikes.[18] Some workers protested this change in the party line, but "many working-class residents [were] feeling a closer affinity with the Russian people than they did with the country's American allies."[19] Ironically, in hindsight given the postwar geopolitical setting of the Cold War, the construction of the worker as a good geopolitical subject was aided by the sense of affinity with the people of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist party as the vanguard of the labor movement.

Workers' identification with both the national war effort and a labor movement seemingly on the cusp of progressive political achievements resulted in an ongoing tension between calls for greater productivity and the protection of workers' rights. In the Tyneside area there were strikes and other forms of industrial action throughout the war. The region mirrored the national pattern, with an increase in strikes in 1944 and 1945, with 1944 seeing the most industrial action.[20] The Tyne area was less strike-prone than the Clyde, but it was the site of the October 1942 "Total Time" strike.[21] The strike made clear that the Tyneside workers were feeling specifically local resentments. The "Total Time" strike was aimed as much towards spurring on the local negotiators to press their claims as it was protesting the employers' actions.[22] The place-specific nature of labor relations made the strike particularly troubling for the authorities as a general grievance about the nature of local labor relations, rather than grievance towards a particular company, provoked industrial action across the whole region.

Overall the workers of the Tyne and Wear did support the war effort, but felt resentment at national bureaucratic control of their conditions.[23] The Tyneside Apprentices' Guild strike of 1944 was a protest at the ability of the government to switch labor to the mining sector in the name of national wartime needs.[24] The judge assigned to arbitrate the case felt that the national imperative took precedence over workplace rights, and his comments were reinforced by Bevin's opinion that the northeast was especially problematic in terms of labor relations.[25] For the apprentices, they felt the importance of challenging the right of the government to move workers across the country and into different industries to meet the overall wartime need.[26] The strike exemplified the tension between acting as a good geopolitical subject to ensure wartime production while also being aware of the erosion of one's rights as a worker and threats to future employment opportunities. Workers were faced with a context in which both the government and the Communist Party advocated for productive and compliant workers as forms of the good geopolitical subject. However, if workers felt the expectations and demands were excessive, they challenged them through strikes when individuals saw their own situation and ambitions being harmed.[27] The place-specific tension between workers' rights and government mandates produced both workers as subjects and the industrial components to maintain the national war effort.

### _"I am, Gentlemen, Your obedient servant"_

When it came to actually building things, the level of interference from the government matched the control of workers' rights. Shipbuilders Bartram & Sons received a letter from James Lithgow, Controller of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs, at the Admiralty in June 1942 informing them:

> I believe that you are aware that Mr. R. B. Shepheard has been appointed to this Department to assist Sir Amos Ayre in maintaining contact with electronic welding development within the Shipyards.[28]

The communication continued to reveal that the Lords of the Admiralty were, apparently, deeply concerned with the techniques of electronic welding and raising productivity. A letter from C. S. Coxwell at the Admiralty said:

> I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that, after full consideration of the problems and difficulties of ship production at the present time, They [sic] are strongly of opinion that an increase in output can be rapidly achieved by extension of the application of electronic welding in the shipyards . . . My Lords are prepared to make contributions equal to 50 [presumably 50 percent] of the total cost of any such scheme fulfilling the following conditions.[29]

Joseph L. Thompson and Sons Ltd., shipbuilders in Sunderland, had to communicate almost constantly by letter with the Admiralty to settle on the micro-specifications of government-ordered ships. In December 1941, the company and the Admiralty wrote back and forth on matters such as the "arrangement of heavy derricks, winches, leads, etc." on two ships and even how many bunks should be built for "greasers" and "firemen" with an overall concern about how space constraints would affect the overall performance of the ship.[30]

The relationship between the company and the Admiralty was clearly tense, despite the use of cordial language in the letters. On December 18, 1941, just after the attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into the war, Sir Amos Ayre, Director of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs at the Admiralty, wrote to Cyril Thompson at the company in response to what he saw as excessive lobbying for new ship orders:

> Although I had the impression that your letter of 16th instant was somewhat of the flavor of stampeding me, I thought I would enquire first of all as to what you say about the Enginebuilders, but I cannot ascertain that what you tell me is correct.
>
>
>
>
> If it had been the case, I am afraid my only alternative would have been to have asked you to have gone on with the other two vessels to your account. We have already gone out of our way to let you have the arrangement you want in the case of [ship order] 621 and it has been recommended by the Committee accordingly, but as I have already told you, other considerations must be given in regard to the subject concerning any more vessels of this type.[31]

The tension between demands from the Admiralty and the quality and quantity of the product being built by private companies is also seen in the letters of September and October 1940 between Sir James Lithgow, Controller of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs and Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, and Joseph. L. Thompson and Sons. In September the Admiralty demanded of the company:

> In order to make the best and most immediate use of the substantial quantity of steel material coming in from America in standard sizes, further steps are required in dealing with specifications for requirements. You are therefore instructed to take the following steps in regard to _all plates and sections of ship quality_ [underlined in original].[32]

These micromanagement demands were not received lightly by the company. In a reply to Sir James, Cyril Thompson noted:

> Thanks for your letter regarding the criticisms against the standard vessel we are building.
>
>
>
>
> First of all I must say that I am somewhat disappointed to hear that you are content to sit back and say nothing in answer to these criticisms. What I would like settled is are these criticisms expressing their views in the National interest, or are their views purely selfish? To illustrate my point—Haldin a member of Sir Vernon Thomson's committee fixed up a contract with us before the war, power and speed were discussed and agreed. After war broke out we suddenly are informed that the vessel has not enough power. I think in my previous letters I have suitably answered the criticisms which have been leveled against this type of ship. I was therefore very disappointed indeed to find that you had agreed under pressure to give the extra horse power if labour and material will allow. We have the Wear full of ships awaiting engines. Shipbuilders are well ahead of the Engineers. To alter the present programme which will increase the work to be carried out by engineers seems to me to be wrong.[33]

The mutual benefit, if not need, of state and business interactions meant that such tensions had to be overcome or reluctantly accepted for the sake of new production orders and wartime goals. Some of the individuals involved were rewarded for behaving as good geopolitical subjects within the wartime mission. In May 1941, Cyril Thompson was to receive a letter on 10 Downing Street notepaper, signed by Anthony Bevin, enquiring whether R. C. Thompson was "agreeable" to being nominated by the Prime Minister to "be appointed a Commander of the Order of the British Empire."[34] The stresses and strains of being a businessman at the beck and call of the Admiralty were rewarded with honorary perks.

Not only were the things being built strictly monitored by the government, so were the means of making them. Industrial production was the tangible outcome of state and business interaction. In November 1942, Reyrolle Ltd., a firm of electrical engineers, was informed by the Director of Weapon Production at the Ministry of Supply that:

> Your attention is drawn to the necessity for the utmost economy in the use of, and the demand for additional machine tools, both in your own works and in the sub-contracting capacity.[35]

Earlier in the year the company had been told by D. R. Grenfell, Secretary for Mines, that:

> Our safety depends on the production of tanks, guns, aircraft, ships, and other munition and we have converted much of our industrial capacity to this end.
>
> But to use this capacity to the full we must have power. Coal is the source of all power in the country.
>
>
>
>
> Therefore, I ask you and everyone at present working with you to give me the machines and equipment essential to coal production over the coming year. In doing so you will help to produce the one basic munition without which all other plants must fail.[36]

Companies were being put under a lot of pressure to build certain products to certain specifications while being told that they had to play second fiddle to other tasks deemed more important through the machinery of bureaucracy.

The pressure on companies was not only felt at the production line. Wartime put further demands on the office staff through increased volume of paperwork. At the outset of the war Reyrolle received a letter from the Director of Contracts at the Air Ministry:

>   1. I am directed to enclose a copy of Air Ministry Notice to Contractors No. 1 dealing with foreign exchange requirements. It is most important that the procedure indicated in this Notice should be clearly adhered to.
>
>   2. It is proposed to circulate a series of Air Ministry Notices to Contractors as circumstances may require. Contractors are accordingly asked to ensure that all these Notices are filed by them for subsequent reference even if they may not be immediately concerned with the matter therein. The information may be necessary in connection with contracts that may be placed at a later date.
>
>

>
> I am, Gentlemen, Your obedient servant.[37]

It may be fair to ask who was actually servant and who master in this relationship that underpinned state-business interaction.

Control of business matters was not only achieved through the remote tool of memos and letters. In April 1941, Reyrolle was politely informed by the Ministry of Supply that:

> I am directed by the Minister of Supply to inform you that it is considered desirable that occasional visits to factories engaged in the production of equipment for the Army, should be paid by Senior Military Officers.
>
>
>
>
> It is not intended to arrange an organised system of visiting, but under arrangements made between the War Office and the Ministry, Senior Military Officers in your district may, from time to time, visit your factory. In the event of your receiving notification of such a visit, the Minister would be grateful if steps are taken to ensure that the visitor is given every facility and, so far as possible, unnecessary formalities are waived.[38]

Businesses were to be open to government and military inspection. Within the context of ongoing warfare, the offices of the state could play a dominant role in state-business interactions. At the same time, as we shall see, the military and the government made demands that the worksites be closed to all others. Control of the physical space of a business was one of the demands made by the state as a feature of state-business interactions.

### _"Civil factories are being declared by the Government as 'Protected Places'"_

The worksite of Reyrolle Ltd. was dramatically changed because of the wartime contracts the company received. As soon as war was declared the company began to receive correspondence from a Major Brock, from the precise yet untitled address of Room 427, War Office, Whitehall. In September 1939 Major Brock sent a letter giving Reyrolle a new designation:

> Certain important Government Establishments, Public Utility Services and civil factories are being declared by the Government as "Protected Places."
>
>
>
>
> The object of this would be to provide stronger measures to control the conduct of all persons permitted to be present in these "Protected Places." Such measures would be authorized by the issue of Bye-Laws made under Defence Regulations.
>
>
>
>
> It should be clearly understood that these protective measures have nothing to do with the physical protection offered by the presence of troops or police.
>
>
>
>
> At each "Protected Place" there should be a Person in Charge known as the "Approved Authority" who would be responsible for the administration of the Bye-Laws. He would usually be the official who is normally in charge of the establishment for its working purposes.
>
>
>
>
> He would have power to delegate his authority to others in respect of particular purposes under the Bye-Laws—for example to act as a "Permit Officer" for handling applications to enter the place.
>
>
>
>
> It has now been decided that your premises at Hebburn-on-Tyne shall be declared a Protected Place.[39]

The War Office was also eager to know the exact geographical boundaries of these "Protected Places." The letter went on:

> As for legal purposes it is also necessary to know the boundaries of the premises to be declared. I shall be grateful if at the same time you will say if they are wholly enclosed by some form of fence, railing or wall, and, if they are not, you will send me a detailed description of the boundaries as they would be described in a lease or other legal document.[40]

Mr. H. M. Towns was duly appointed Reyrolle's "Approved Authority," and reported the description of the premises and boundaries to Major Brock.

In August 1943 Mr. J. W. Walton, on behalf of (now) Lieutenant Colonel Brock, wrote to Reyrolle regarding a visit to the company's new Ashington factory "where it was noted that a section of fencing was only 6 feet high and not the required 7. Col. Brock agreed that it need not be altered but the remainder should be the correct height."[41] Such inspections were not enough, apparently. In April 1944 two police sergeants undertook a "test" of security. Their report was presented to Reyrolle in a rather frosty letter:

> The grounds were entered at 1935 hours with the permission of the gate watchman at the west gate to the works under the pretext of visiting the sports ground to witness a football match then in progress.
>
>
>
>
> The works were entered at 2020 hours and cards were clocked along with the employees who were entering for the night shift which commenced at 2030 hours.
>
>
>
>
> An extensive tour of the works was carried out quite openly . . . Conversation was carried out with various employees, a great many of whom appeared to be idling.[42]

The reply from the company by Mr. Towns has an air of a different sense of frustration, one based in dealing with the everyday habits of ordinary people going to and from work in a world not defined by the fears and surveillance of security imperatives:

> With regard to the Sports Field, employees are not supposed to pass from and to the Works gates but the dividing fence has been damaged so many times in different places that we have not been able to prevent people passing over without going through the gates.[43]

There was also a shade of putting the blame back on the War Office in Mr. Towns's reply:

> I am pleased to note that you have asked the Admiralty to issue to us the required barbed-wire and staples and we are getting into touch with the Admiralty here to hurry the matter along.[44]

It was not only the physical spaces of the worksites that came under government scrutiny. The War Office monitored the manner in which companies handled their mail and advertising. Again, Reyrolle serves as an example of the detailed concern the government was paying to private companies involved in crucial and secret government contracts like the Mulberry Harbours. In June 1941, the company received a letter from the Director of Contracts at the Air Ministry:

> I am directed to inform you that a number of cases have been reported of the loss of official documents issued to Government contractors through failure on the part of contractors or members of their staff to take reasonable precautions against loss.
>
>
>
>
> I am to point out that all documents issued by the Department to contractors must be safeguarded whether marked "secret" or "confidential" or not. Official documents which might appear to be innocuous might disclose vital information to an unauthorised person, particularly if collated with information obtained from other sources, and it is therefore essential that steps should be taken by Air Ministry contractors to safeguard all documents and correspondence in their possession relating to Air Ministry contracts. In particular, care should be exercised to ensure that papers are not left in public vehicles or in unattended private cars.[45]

The business correspondence of firms was subject to censorship, with the intention to not only safeguard worksites by means other than putting seven-foot barbed-wire fences around them but by trying to obscure their very location. As the physical space of businesses was circumscribed by a variety of policing actions, the same businesses were being told to construct themselves ageographic entities. The Ministry of Supply told Reyrolle:

> The Minister wishes to call attention to the following security precautions which, if correspondence that may be of an urgent nature is not to suffer censorship and delays, should be strictly observed when firms are placing orders abroad.
>
>
>
>
> If a firm has an office address distinct from its factory premises, the former address should, whenever possible, be given in the address heading and in the contents of the correspondence.[46]

The tension was to maintain production at the speed that the urgency of the war demanded, without delays imposed by censorship. This tension was heightened when firms had to conduct business beyond the national reaches of the British security apparatus. An April 1941 letter marked "Confidential" from the Ministry of Supply exhorted:

> I am directed by the Ministry of Supply to state that it has been brought to his notice that telegrams containing information likely to be of use to the enemy are being sent en clair by British firms engaged on important Government business to destinations abroad.
>
>
>
>
> The necessity for exercising the greatest care in phrasing telegrams for dispatch overseas need scarcely be emphasized.
>
>
>
>
> . . . telegrams should be forwarded under cover of a letter addressed to The Secretary, Ministry of Supply . . . for dispatch through official channels.[47]

There were even controls over the business necessity of advertising, as companies had to come to terms with the negative impacts that came along with the benefits of having order books full of government contracts. In April 1941, the Ministry of Aircraft Production wrote to Reyrolle:

> I am directed by the Minister of Aircraft Production to draw your attention to the dangers of disclosing in advertisements and otherwise by publication, the whereabouts of your factories and the nature of the work carried on in them.[48]

The places of work had not only to be protected and, hence, delineated but also, paradoxically, made invisible. The construction of state-business interactions required the mutual construction of the state security apparatus and business practices. Furthermore, the workers within these businesses were closely monitored to ensure they were good geopolitical constructs.

### _"His internment has caused a great deal of inconvenience to us"_

The security problems of perimeter fences, the movement of people across company sports fields, and the unintentional lapses in advertisements paled in comparison with the biggest security issue: could the employees be trusted, or were they spies? The spy was the exact opposite of the good geopolitical construct. Foreign (or "alien") workers employed in workplaces that were conducting government contracts were the biggest concern. In October 1939 aliens were organized into three categories: A—deemed a threat and immediately arrested; B—movements restricted and the threat of immediate internment applied; and C—no threat and allowed complete freedom. Initially 87 percent of aliens were classified as C.[49] However, those under closer scrutiny were enthusiastically pursued.

Mr. Towns's most dramatic exchange with Lieutenant Colonel Brock involved questions regarding an experienced and trusted employee. Early in the war, just after Reyrolle was designated a Protected Place and Mr. Towns an Approved Authority, Brock wrote:

> I would be grateful if you would let me know whether Alfred Gunther NATHORFF, who we understand is employed in your Works, is employed on work in connection with contracts for any of the three fighting services, or whether in the course of his employment he has access to, or is able to obtain any information about, such contracts.[50]

Mr. Towns responded on October 11, 1939:

> In reply to your letter of the 9th inst. We beg to advise you that Mr. A. G. Nathorff is employed by us on the design of a new type of Airbreak Switchgear for which he has special knowledge.
>
>
>
>
> He is not employed in connection with contracts for any of the fighting Services and has not in the course of his employment direct access to information thereon but I cannot say that he is not able by indirect means to obtain such information.[51]

Such carefully constructed double negatives and the suggestion of Mr. Nathorff's importance to the company did not satisfy or deter Brock. A quick exchange of letters arranging a visit by Brock to the company was followed by a rather disappointed and put out Mr. Towns writing in January 1940:

> Dear Major Brock,
>
>
>
>
> Alfred Gunther Nathorff
>
>
>
>
> As you are no doubt aware the above was interned on Monday of this week.
>
> His internment has caused a great deal of inconvenience to us by the reason of the nature of his work and we are wondering whether it would be possible for him to continue the work on which he was engaged by us, i.e. the design of a new type of switchgear for which he has special qualifications.
>
>
>
>
> Before taking any action on this matter I shall be glad to know if you have any observations to make.[52]

Brock was unmoved and dodged the issue by suggesting Mr. Towns go down bureaucratic rabbit holes in pursuit of leniency for Mr. Nathorff:

> In reply to your letter SY of the 10th [of] January, I am instructed to advise you to write to the Secretary, War Office (A.G. 3), explaining the situation and asking if Mr. Nathorff can continue his research work for you in the Internment Camp.
>
>
>
>
> I realize the inconvenience you may have been put to, but after what you told me at our last meeting I Presume you are not surprised at what happened.[53]

Reminding him of whatever was said at the meeting seemed enough to dampen the ardor of Mr. Towns. No more letters about Mr. Nathorff are in Reyrolle's archived correspondence. Apparently, Mr. Nathorff's everyday work practices had not been enough to remove suspicion that he was far from the ideal of the good geopolitical subject.

As the war intensified and the world of government contracts became focused on producing for the invasion of the Continent, Lieutenant Colonel Brock ensured that maximum security was practiced. In March 1943 he wrote:

> My Admiralty Colleague informs me that an Admiralty contract placed with you for "One Ohm Resistances" (No C.P. 1B/64065/43 dated 17th March) is specially secret and he is anxious that every precaution should be taken in connection with it. For secret contracts we advise special security measures which are detailed on the attached paper of which I enclose two copies.[54]

Protected Places had to become even more protected, and two copies of a memo and a stern letter were the ways in which Protected Places were made. The mutuality of state-business interactions was, when it came to security, biased towards the government demands for security.

### _"We object to the release of this man"_

Protected Places had to produce vital components for the war effort, including the components of the Mulberry Harbours, but they were only worth protecting if the work could be done. This required ensuring a large enough workforce with the necessary skills, a difficult task in a time of war-enforced labor shortage. The overall situation demanded the policing of workers, not just in the sense of the internment experienced by the unfortunate Mr. Nathorff, but also in the form of everyday management, control, and assignment of the shipyard workers. The directives emanating from Bevin's Ministry were a burden felt by workers and the managers of the firms.

The result was a bureaucratic arrangement of London-based ministries trying to see the big picture, and hoping that what they had come up with was working. The sense of hope that things planned at a distance were effective is evident in a long letter, sent in August 1941, to Messrs. Joseph L. Thompson Ltd. from the Director of Contract Labour in the Admiralty:

> I am to inform you that the Department has under consideration the effectiveness of the present Machinery for increasing the Labour force in the Shipbuilding and Ship-repairing industry, as a result of the Industrial Registration (No. 1) Order 1941. As you are aware, the object of this Order was to obtain particulars of men with previous shipbuilding experience.
>
>
>
>
> It has been alleged that the class of men submitted by the Local Officers of the Ministry of Labour and National Service bore little or no relation to the maintenance of the balance in trades employed in shipyards. Further, that of the numbers of men submitted to and accepted by employers, only a small proportion actually reported for work. If your demands for Labour are dependent on receiving men in certain order in proportion do you inform the local Exchange of this fact?
>
>
>
>
> In order to examine the position and determine to what extent it is possible to effect an improvement in the present arrangement, it is desired to obtain information as to the experience of three or four specimen firms. I am accordingly to enquire whether you would be so good as to furnish information as to numbers of workpeople your establishment applied for in response to the request of the Ministry of Labour following the making of the Order in March 1941, together with particulars of the submission of works by the Ministry, and the engagement made by your establishment. It would also be helpful if you would show how far the men who have actually presented themselves for employment have remained at their work.
>
>
>
>
> I am to explain that it is extremely difficult to form a real appreciation of the operation of the Order on the basis of information at present available, and I am to express hope that it will be possible for you to co-operate in supplying this information.[55]

Though there was some tension between companies and the Government regarding the management of the company properties and the products being made, there was a greater sense of cooperation when it came to manpower. Both parties knew that manpower was an essential commodity that had to be treated carefully. There was a shortage of skilled workers, amplified by the demand for men from the military and the potential for workers to disrupt production if they thought rewards were too low or demands upon them too high. The construction of workers as good geopolitical subjects, committed to the nation's wartime mission, had to balance the expectations of individuals who had a historic sense of worth within established workplace practices.

In March 1941, Joseph L. Thompson reported to Sir Amos Ayre that "we are having great difficulty with regard to Plumbing Labour, and we cannot obtain more plumbers. This position I understand is general on this river."[56] The attempt to control or police workers was done locally, but with the oversight of various Ministries in London. For example, Cyril Thompson wrote to Sir James Lithgow with a very self-satisfied tone:

> I was particularly pleased with your reference to the contribution which the River Wear is making to the National effort. Personally I am quite proud of the arrangement we have been able to make through our local Association, both with regard to labour and the provision of labour. We have a small committee which deals with any disputes that arise, which has functioned so far without a hitch and without any outside interference. We have also combined all firms on the River so that we are able to supply Greenwells, which is the only single repairing establishment we have, with the necessary extra labour, without, I hope, interfering to any great extent with the output of the shipyards. I know that this firm and Laings will again beat all our previous records provided work goes on at present and we are left alone by the enemy, and I feel sure the other firms will also be on the same basis, which is very satisfactory.[57]

The control and management of workers was done in a partly voluntary and partly government-enforced manner. Institutions representing the interests of sectors of the industrial economy worked as mediators between the demands of the government and the needs and constraints facing companies. In June 1941 the Secretary of the Institute of Welding, in London, wrote to Messrs. J. H. Holmes & Co. Ltd. located in Hebburn-on-Tyne as part of an outreach to all of its corporate members. As a result of the Institute working with the Allocation Committee, and pending Ministerial approval:

> it will be necessary for each of the Institutions concerned to furnish details of the numerical requirements of the branch of Industry concerned, of University Undergraduates required for employment and to be recruited from undergraduates now in their final year.
>
>
>
>
> In order to provide this information at the earliest possible moment, I should be pleased if you would notify me of the number of such young engineers required by you, differentiating between:
>
>   1. University Graduates
>
>   2. Higher National Certificate holders (including any sitting for this year's examinations and already employed by you.)
>
>

>
>
> The information should include the names of any undergraduates already interviewed and earmarked for employment, and also state what your usual peace time requirements have been.
>
>
>
>
> This step is necessary to ensure a fair distribution of such trained personnel to industry, supply departments, and the services and it is hoped that you will give your support to this project.[58]

The problem of labor shortages for firms was made worse by the security concerns the Government had about the trustworthiness of foreign workers. We have already seen the level of scrutiny that resulted in the internment of Mr. Nathorff. The focus on this one individual was part of a more general system of control that the firms involved in making the Mulberry Harbours had to contend with. For example, in June 1942 the Air Ministry wrote to Reyrolle Ltd.:

> I am commanded by the Air Council to inform you that the conditions relating to the employment of aliens has been modified. Any contract existing between the Secretary of State for Air and the contracting firm should be deemed to be amended in accordance with the provisions of this letter . . .
>
>
>
>
> firms on whose premises it is necessary to take special precautions with regard to the employment of aliens, owing to the nature of the work, have been placed on a "Special List" . . . they must either:
>
>   1. give an understanding that no alien is to have access to
>
>     1. research or development work or information pertaining thereto or
>
>     2. secret production or information pertaining thereto.[59]
>
>

It was not just the aliens who had to be policed. Each worker in a firm vital to military contracts, a category that included businesses working on the Mulberry Harbours, had to be managed. The degree of control and management was intense and seen as vital to ensuring production. On the other hand, it was seen as unreasonable by many workers and disruptive to their work prospects and commitments to loved ones. Such restrictions challenged their willingness to be good geopolitical subjects.

As part of the general management of the national workforce, the government imposed a system of Essential Work Orders, a form of "industrial conscription."[60] Firms were required to complete a special form from the Ministry of Labour and National Service for "Essential Work," in the case of the Tyne and Wear area for "Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing." The form was used to " _refuse permission_ " (bold and underlined in original) for a worker to leave the employment of a specific firm. For some, like Charles McConville, the reason for wanting to leave was the nature of the work: "Reason for wanting to leave Employment is because I have always been in the wood trade and I can't manage Shipyard work." But such personal career ambitions were waived away: "This boy is employed as a Catcher and also as a Relief Heater, and as Heaters are very difficult to obtain the applicant's services would be more usefully employed in this Yard."[61] It was a bold claim to know what was best for Charles and the economy as a whole.

The controlling company even deemed an individual's personal business as worthy of sacrifice. Mr. George Jobling applied for release on the basis that:

> My daughter having been attending to my business while I volunteered for War Work has had her appeal for exemption refused and, having no one else to look after it I must ask for my release.

Volunteering for work, with a personal business at risk, did not gain sympathy from the company: "Owing to the scarcity of this type of workman we object to the release of this man."[62]

For others more sympathy was given. Robert Henry Moore, a nineteen-year-old single man, as the form declares, asked to leave the employment of Bartram & Sons because "My father is dead & my mother is a patient at a Mental Hospital . . . I live with a stepsister and am not happy. I feel that if I can be released from the shipyard & allowed to work out of the town I should be happy & live a useful life."[63] The company gave him permission to leave, saying: "No objection. The lad works well & is a good employee. The home life is against Moore living a natural happy life for a lad of his age."[64] Apparently, being a young lad wanting to pursue a happy life allowed for more leniency than someone wanting to take care of their own business, depending on the worker's skills.

The pressure on the workforce of firms was heightened by the recruitment demands of the military. A letter dated April 14, 1942, from District Admiralty Electrical Engineer, based in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne regarding "De-Reservation of Workpeople" stated:

> Your attention is drawn to the necessity for taking steps in adequate time (not less than 16 days ahead) in cases where you wish to retain the services of workpeople who are becoming de-reserved through the raising of the age of reservation or through the expiry of deferment granted.[65]

In the light of the pressures firms faced in keeping their workforce at the necessary strength, the management of workers had to be done carefully. It was not a matter of an individual's goals and circumstances. The bigger picture was one of concern of widespread protest and strike at a moment when wartime production was seen as being crucial for national security. In February 1941 the Secretary of the Admiralty wrote a letter to Reyrolle Ltd., designated both _PERSONAL_ and _STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL_ (underlined in original):

> I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that they view with much concern the number of working days lost owing to trade disputes during 1940 in the Shipbuilding and Engineering Industries. They desire to enlist the co-operation of Managements in reducing, as far as possible, hindrance to Naval Production arising from such causes.
>
>
>
>
> My Lords regard it as of the highest importance that the normal machinery whereby the interests of workers are represented and their grievances dealt with, should be kept running as smoothly as possible, and that every encouragement should be given to the workers to use it.
>
>
>
>
> This is in the interests of employers and employed as well as of the nation as a whole.
>
>
>
>
> In order that the established machinery may function as rapidly and effectively as possible, it is essential, in the early stages of any dispute that may occur, that the facts be reported to any Employers' Association of which you may be a member and that contact be made with the appropriate trade union official.
>
>
>
>
> It is, further, important that, in relations with work-people, every care be exercised to avoid any action which may weaken their reliance on established procedure and lead them to follow irresponsible elements.
>
>
>
>
> I am to request that you will ensure that all members of your staff concerned bear these matters constantly in mind.
>
>
>
>
> I am, Sir.
>
> Your Obedient Servant[66]

"Established procedure" was a mechanism of counting and controlling the workforce to maintain production at a time of national crisis which "irresponsible elements" might take advantage of. There was a clash between the very personal ambitions of workers who felt trapped within an industry they did not feel happy in or that threatened their family commitments and economic needs, and the Admiralty, declaring itself to be the firms' "Obedient Servant," who subjugated individuals to national demands. Cyril Thompson's satisfaction, seen at the start of this section, with the way labor was being managed was the outcome of demands made upon him by the government; the happiness of the workers was not to get in the way of company profit and the military projects of a nation in crisis. The worker was expected to be a good geopolitical subject by making sacrifices for the national wartime good.

### _"Producing the women we need"_

It was not just a matter of control and fear of disruption. There was also a sense that new opportunities could satisfy national needs and also placate a workforce that was, apparently, prone to protest and strike. The worker could be constructed as a good geopolitical subject through incentives within the wartime context. In a letter sent in April 1941 the Ministry of Supply enthused:

> I think you will agree that nowadays the question of Labour Supply must be [of] paramount importance to every employer, and increasingly the use of trainee labour is being adopted in all sections of the Munitions Industry.
>
>
>
>
> I should like you to know that there are in this Region Government Training Establishments managed by the Ministry of Labour and National Service, where workers hitherto engaged on non-essential work and in distributive trades, are being trained as munition workers.[67]

Workers were not just to be observed, managed, and policed; a new workforce had to be created at the same time.

The overall problem was a shortage of workers. The Admiralty, as a major generator of contracts, including those related to the Mulberry Harbours, was acutely aware of the situation. In February 1941 they wrote to companies:

> I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state that they have had under consideration the labour force necessary to ensure the carrying through to time of the Naval Programme. Many delays and difficulties in the production of material for the Navy are at present occurring owing to shortages of labour. The demand for Naval production will very greatly increase in the course of 1941. It is obvious, that every possible step must be taken to increase the effective labour force.[68]

In 1940 the interdepartmental Manpower Requirements Committee identified a "famine of men" in the labor force.[69] For example, demand for men in the armed forces would require taking 18 percent of men employed in the munitions industry which would, in turn, require the recruitment of older men, youths below military age, and men unfit for military service.[70] Inevitably, the result was an economic "hunger for women" to be part of Britain's workforce.[71] Engineer Rear Admiral R. W. B. Andrews of the Northern Region, Admiralty Regional Office encouraged firms to hire women:

> I enclose herewith a leaflet issued by the Ministry of Labour entitled "War Time employment of women in Shipbuilding and Allied Industries" received by me from the Admiralty, and I am instructed to inform you that Their Lordships hope that the issue of the leaflet will assist the campaign for an extension of the employment of women in the Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing and the Marine Engineering Industries.[72]

State-business interactions, driven by national wartime demands, were a context and driving force for making women into good geopolitical subjects in the form of new entrants to certain workplaces.

Though the military services were eager to expand the workforce through the employment of women, they were also aware that such changes could increase tension within the male-dominated workforce; simultaneously men had to be maintained as good geopolitical subjects. In a letter sent August 1942 from A. L. Mieville, responsible for Light Metals Control (Castings) at the Ministry of Aircraft Production the answer seemed to be to introduce women while "upgrading" the status of men. In other words, women were to start at the bottom rung of the industrial employment ladder:

> As you will know the expanding light alloy production programme demands a great increase in labour strength.
>
>
>
>
> The demands upon our manpower, and especially upon younger men, will obviously become more and more severe as time goes on.
>
>
>
>
> The employment of women is the only solution.
>
>
>
>
> We must be ready to upgrade men and replace by women for work which women can do in this time of emergency.
>
>
>
>
> Will you please make a special and immediate analysis of the jobs which are done in your Foundries and list those which can be done by women after the necessary training.
>
>
>
>
> The fact that the Ministry of Labour is not at present producing the women we need must not be allowed to affect the scouting which you are now asked to carry out, for this position is being corrected.[73]

The women that were "produced" were asked to take on arduous tasks. A Ms. Rowell worked at The Ropery in Sunderland. Of the ropes she made the "biggest one was [for] the Mulberry Harbour."[74] The rope work took about a year to complete, though its ultimate purpose was kept a secret. The work was very hard with "a team of girls" standing in a circle passing cable around a coil and winding it over and over to make a rope that "got heavier and heavier."[75] The women were allowed "a break about ten minutes every hour."[76] For Ms. Rowell, there were long-term costs to her body but also the satisfaction of participation in a project that made her a good geopolitical subject: "We always used to say we'd never be able to have families the way we twisted our bodies about. But I enjoyed it."[77]

A new and notably progressive approach was to encourage the use of disabled people in the workforce, though the imperative was mainly the necessity and costs of war. A 1941 pamphlet published by the Ministry of Labour and National Service titled "Interim Scheme for the Training and Resettlement of Disabled Persons" stated:

> A large increase in the numbers of disabled men and women is one of the inevitable results of war.
>
>
>
>
> The resettlement in civil life of these disabled men and women (including training for a new occupation where that is desirable) is a matter of importance. Not only is there a national obligation to give all possible help to those citizens who have suffered the ill-fortune of war, but it is in the interest of the country as well as of the disabled citizen that he should get back to suitable employment as soon as possible—not to _any_ employment, but to the most skilled work of which he is capable.[78]

National obligation, war, and ensuring workers were good geopolitical subjects were the contexts and outcomes of the mutual construction of a number of geopolitical constructs. The businesses necessary for making the component parts of the Mulberry Harbours, and other industrial products for the prosecution of the war, had to adjust their everyday practices because of the demands of the state-business interactions. In turn, workers were expected to behave in a certain way, a particular manifestation of the good geopolitical subject away from the battlefield or even military service. Furthermore, new types of workers were created to ensure the prosecution of the war.

The creation of new bureaucratic arrangements in London was required to design and build the Mulberry Harbours. A related set of bureaucracies was necessary to manage their construction. Businesses and their managers and workers became closely tied to the demands of the War Office in a relationship that changed the physical appearance of the businesses and their management practices. In the process the career opportunities and everyday work experiences of their employees were changed. Businesses were constructed in a particular way as was the workforce, through security controls, restrictions on changing employment, and the "production" of female and disabled workers. Though there was always concern about the impact of industrial action on the production needs of the war effort, there was a pervasive sense that people would, as good geopolitical agents, comply with the demands. The back-and-forth between Whitehall and contractors made the wartime geopolitical construct of the institutional arrangements of the state and business, within the context of national emergency.

Private contractors were both sources of wartime production and targets of enemy action. City managers and their residents also had to adjust to living in a war zone: As we will see some were more willing to make sacrifices than others. In the process, the places where private contractors were located and workers lived became constructed as geopolitical landscapes.

### _Notes_

1.

W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, _British War Economy_ (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), 221.

2.

Alan Bullock, _The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Volume Two, Minister of Labour 1940–1945_ (London, Melbourne, Toronto: Heinemann, 1967), 257.

3.

Ibid., 292.

4.

Craig Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ (Chichester, West Sussex: Phillimore & Co. Ltd., 2007), 1.

5.

Ibid., 2.

6.

Ibid., xiv.

7.

Hancock and Gowing, _British War Economy_ , 284.

8.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , xiv.

9.

Bullock, _The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin_ , 318.

10.

Ibid., 188.

11.

Ibid., 253 quoting _Hansard_ , Vol. 392, cols. 674–675.

12.

Ibid., 76.

13.

Ibid., 81 quoting speech in House of Commons, _Hansard_ , Vol. 382, cols. 52–53.

14.

Ibid., 20.

15.

Richard Croucher, _Engineers at War_ (London: Merlin Press, 1982), 15.

16.

Ibid., 143.

17.

Ibid., 144.

18.

Ibid, 10–11.

19.

Ibid., 134.

20.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 19.

21.

Croucher, _Engineers at War_ , 180.

22.

Ibid., 184.

23.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 21–22.

24.

Ibid., 13–16; Croucher, _Engineers at War_ , 233–235.

25.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 9 and 16.

26.

Croucher, _Engineers at War_ , 241.

27.

It was not just a matter of overt industrial action, there were also complaints of the "slackness" amongst Tyneside workers, including those found fishing while at work or making toys at Christmas time (Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 19). Also, some employers were accused of dubious behavior. For example, Sir Arthur Munro Sutherland, the High Sheriff of Northumberland, and Robert Stanley Dalgliesh, managing director of Blyth Dry Docks and Shipbuilding Company, were accused of bribing Admiralty officials in order to secure tenders (Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 138). There were also attempts to use the increased wartime demand for ships to improve the overall economic situation of the region. A move to reopen the Jarrow shipyard as a special "Naval" yard broke down because of distrust of local and national organizations (Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 30–31), a recurring theme in understanding the area's reaction to the national politics of war mobilization.

28.

Tyne and Wear Archives (TWA) 990/40.

29.

TWA 990/40.

30.

TWA DS.JLT/6/1/1.

31.

Ibid.

32.

Ibid.

33.

Ibid.

34.

Ibid.

35.

TWA DS/REY/36.

36.

Ibid.

37.

Ibid.

38.

Ibid..

39.

TWA DS/REY/35.

40.

Ibid.

41.

Ibid.

42.

Ibid.

43.

Ibid.

44.

Ibid.

45.

Ibid.

46.

Ibid.

47.

Ibid.

48.

Ibid.

49.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 127.

50.

TWA DS/REY/35.

51.

Ibid.

52.

Ibid.

53.

Ibid.

54.

Ibid.

55.

TWA DS.JLT/6/1/1.

56.

Ibid.

57.

Ibid.

58.

TWA DS/REY/36.

59.

Ibid.

60.

Hancock and Gowing, _British War Economy_ , 309.

61.

TWA DS.BM/2/35.

62.

Ibid.

63.

Ibid.

64.

Ibid.

65.

TWA DS/REY/36.

66.

Ibid.

67.

Ibid.

68.

Ibid.

69.

Hancock and Gowing, _British War Economy_ , 284.

70.

Ibid., 285.

71.

Ibid., 287.

72.

TWA DS/REY/36.

73.

Ibid.

74.

IWM 20801 Rowell.

75.

Ibid.

76.

Ibid.

77.

Ibid.

78.

TWA DS/REY/36.
Chapter 7

# Making Places

"You are probably aware that a scheme
has been prepared"

The components of the Mulberry Harbours, dreamt up in the new wartime bureaucratic structures of Whitehall, were made in the industrial centers of Great Britain. The adaptations made by firms to make the Mulberries occurred within place-specific contexts in which city managers and residents had to cope with new realities. By dint of the firms and workers of their cities being central to the war effort, by making products such as the Mulberry Harbours, the citizens of Newcastle, Sunderland, and industrial centers across Britain, were _in_ the war. Their cities had to be remade as war zones through new everyday practices. Places were geopolitical constructs in the broader geopolitical context of a war effort that required mobilization of local firms. Places were also a context within which residents adapted as geopolitical subjects. As we will see, such adaptations were often not accepted willingly and cheerfully. However, many civilians saw the added responsibility and stress as a positive life-defining moment that defined them as good geopolitical subjects.

Dunkirk marked a moment that the military strategy of Britain changed from a defensive to an offensive posture.[1] This required a change in the economic calculations of the country. On June 3, 1940, the last day of the Dunkirk evacuation, the economists of the War Cabinet Offices published a document called "Urgent Economic Problems." The document contained proposals regarding "the scientific programming of imports, the resolute building-up of stocks, the increase of dollar-earning exports wherever they could be produced without detriment to war production, the intensive mobilisation of fighting and working manpower, the drastic curtailment of civilian consumption, the policies of distribution and finance that would make the sacrifices of civilians equitable and endurable."[2] It was felt that making such changes to the British economy and society would not win the war in themselves, but buy time to enable Britain to fight a protracted war which would favor victory in the long-term.[3] Such changes were catalyzed by the global strategic situation, and were to be enacted as national policies. They were experienced by individuals in particular places.

The previous chapter showed how these demands had an impact on businesses and workers. The process was played out in the context of particular places with their specific traditions and identities.[4] In the case of the northeast of England, the war did nothing to either alleviate or inflame long-standing tensions between the region and the distant control of London, or worker-employer relations. Workers tried to balance their support for the national war effort with protection of their rights, reflected in a regional history of labor politics.[5] Workers had to manage different roles and identities to protect their everyday work practices while acknowledging the demands of the national war effort, all framed in a global context of a belief in the emergence of a new socialist future. The situation was further complicated by the immediacy of the local context. Beyond the factory gates bombs were falling, putting pressure on citizens and city managers. Being a good geopolitical subject also meant acting within the war zone that the cities of the northeast, as across Britain, had become. Places were the context of people's everyday lives in which the changing strategic course of the war, producing for the war as well as civilian consumption, and living and working in a war zone all came together. The resulting pressure and demands were met with varying degrees of enthusiasm in the specific settings of places across the country.

### _"I suppose it will have to be done, but I regret to say that I am not in favour of it"_

Those responsible for managing cities felt the changing context through micromanagement that began early in the war and came right from the top. In September 1941, as the Battle of the Atlantic raged, the Town Clerk of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, who was in charge of the Corporation's Quay, received a letter from the Port Emergency Committee, relaying an order from the Ministry of Transport:

> The Prime Minister is taking an exceptional interest in port matters these days, in view of the vital importance of defeating the enemy's attempt to strangle our imports and, in this connection, he has asked us to report weekly to the appropriate Cabinet Committee upon the progress made in improving the ports by new works, new equipment, or equipment transferred from elsewhere.
>
>
>
>
> I should be glad, therefore, if, to enable me to make this report, you would submit a weekly statement of any works which, during the week, have become wholly or partially operative in your port, together with a list of equipment, whether new or transferred, which has been added to the port's facilities. If no works have matured, or equipment been added, during the week, the fact should be stated . . . The report should reach me not later than Tuesday of each week and the information should cover the week ending on the previous Saturday.[6]

Such improvements were not voluntary. Rather, they came at the demand of a number of Ministries. In October 1941, the Corporation Quay was faced with another mandate:

> that the Ministry of War Transport required the Corporation to install emergency lighting to facilitate Port work during hours of darkness to the cost of which a grant of 85% would be made. The matter was being attended to by the City Engineer.[7]

These demands, even at the height of a national crisis such as the Battle of the Atlantic, were not eagerly awaited or willingly acted upon. In April 1941 the Ministry of Transport had written to the Town Clerk with a beseeching and detailed demand: "The War Office are in urgent need of Electric Cranes and would like to take the 5 ton Crane 40 foot radius on a gauge of 15' acquired by you in 1924, and the Minister will be glad to hear that you approve of this crane being transferred."[8] The City Engineer responded to the Town Clerk: "as all the cranes on the Newcastle Quay are fully engaged on the important task of rapid unloading to facilitate the quick turn round of ships, I regret that I cannot approve of the 5 ton crane being transferred to the War Office."[9]

Those responsible for the day-to-day running of the City were prone to have their own opinions about the demands coming from the war bureaucracy in London. In 1940, the Admiralty had sent a memorandum regarding "passive defence" against air raid attack, especially the need to fend moored ships away from the quayside. George Watts, the Quaymaster and Traffic Manager, wrote to the Town Clerk: "If this is an order from the Admiralty I suppose it will have to be done, but I regret to say that I am not in favour of it."[10] He was supported by the City Engineer, who also wrote to the Town Clerk in November 1940 and raised the question of who would have to pay for these demands:

> Fending as recommended in the Admiralty memorandum can only be carried out at considerable expense, the work is of a temporary nature, that is for the duration of the war only, is it your opinion that the cost should be borne by the [Newcastle] Corporation?[11]

Similar to the firms to which they played host, places in wartime Britain were expected to act independently but within a defined set of wartime imperatives. As mandates were sent to the city managers of Newcastle, budgetary decisions remained localized. Places were constructed through the actions of local people, but within contexts of greater scope that were beyond their control. Within the changing strategic imperatives post-Dunkirk, and the transformation of Britain into a wartime economy facing a blockade in the Atlantic, people within places were expected to act in certain ways, whether local knowledge held national directives to be wise or not. To make matters worse these actions were not just part of wartime demands; they had to take place within a war zone as the bombs began to fall.

### _"The importance of provision of adequate facilities for the welfare of workpeople"_

The northeast of England was a regional cluster of vital wartime industries. Hence, the places in the region became a strategic target for Germany. Safety fears were also directly tied to the war, specifically the threats of air raids. An article in the October 1940 _Picture Post_ juxtaposed whether workers had the same "right" to risk as a soldier in the battlefield or, on the other hand:

> Maximum production in a factory calls for the utmost concentration from the worker, especially on rapid jobs requiring an accuracy of half one thousandth of an inch. The soldier's job, they say, is to be prepared for risks. He is trained and disciplined for months to just this end. The factory worker's job is to concentrate on his lathe or drill, so as to produce efficient work as quickly as possible . . . [the workers] would tell you that if they are working a ten-hour shift and assured of adequate warning, they can work cheerfully and fast. Whether they can work at top speed if they are always thinking of whether there will be an adequate warning, is a subject which causes a lot of controversy. At any rate, they know the Government wants to get more production. And they don't want to interfere with that.[12]

There seems to be much obligatory wartime patriotism in this quote, creating a sense of the "cheerful" and willing worker, but the point was that workers were now in a war zone. They experienced physical risks, while being asked to change established work practices in the name of the war effort.

The mutual construction of people, businesses, national and local government, and places was made into a tangible experience in the demands put upon companies to provide training for women to serve as caterers in emergency facilities for those suffering the consequences of enemy bombing. In 1940, the awareness of the costs of bombing raids provoked the Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence to write to Reyrolle Ltd. with a request:

> You are probably aware that a scheme has been prepared for the War Time Training of Canteen Workers, designed to give theoretical training in conjunction with good practical training. The scheme is sponsored by the W.V.S. and is to be operated through Technical Institutes working with canteens of the Industrial Catering Association and other non-profit making canteens. Volunteers are divided into three Grades, briefly thus:
>
> _Grade C._ For servers and washers-up—a fortnight's training in a canteen.
>
> _Grade B._ For large scale cooks—75 hours theoretical work in a Technical Institute, and 75 hours practical work in an Industrial Canteen.
>
> _Grade A._ For canteen managers and supervisors—a month in either a Technical College or a canteen.
>
>
>
>
> The intention is to fit women to cater and cook and serve more efficiently in the many canteens and feeding centres which have been opened and are likely to be opened as a direct result of the war. It is not intended to compete with the trained professional worker.
>
>
>
>
> I shall be glad to hear whether you would be prepared to assist in this piece of national work by taking volunteers into your canteen for training, and for what numbers and for what grades you could offer places. There can be no doubt that the work is of great importance, and that the results of training may be far reaching in our national life both during and after the war.[13]

The letter addressed the need to expand the wartime workforce without upsetting established practices. It is also another example of the relentless need for the bureaucratic classification and control of the workforce. The main thrust of the letter was to encourage a partnership between a private firm and a volunteer force of women to meet the needs of the public authorities facing a growing problem of a population devastated by bombing raids.

The division of responsibility between private firms and public authorities seemingly required precise bureaucratic oversight. In June 1941, the Director of Contract Labour in the Admiralty wrote:

> I write with reference to Admiralty letter P. 01103/41 of 17th February 1941, in which were set out the measures considered necessary to increase the effective labour force so as to ensure the carrying through to time of the Naval Programme. This circular, among other matters, stressed the importance of provision of adequate facilities for the welfare of workpeople, with particular reference to canteens, improved transport, and housing. Reference was also made to the assistance in dealing with welfare questions which could be obtained from the Factory and Welfare Departments of the Ministry of Labour.
>
>
>
>
> It should, perhaps, be explained that for the advice and assistance in regard to canteens, and other matters affecting the workers _inside_ the Factory, reference should be made in the first instance, to the Factory Inspectorate. Assistance in regard to transport facilities, housing and billeting, entertainments, wartime nurseries, and other matters affecting the welfare of the workers _outside_ the factory, (or outside working hours) may be obtained from the Welfare Officers of the Ministry of Labour, who may be contacted through the nearest Employment Exchange.
>
>
>
>
> In order to co-ordinate the handling of these questions where firms are engaged on Admiralty contracts are concerned, a Welfare and Public Relations Section has now been formed within the Directorate of Contract Labour. The section will work in close collaboration with the Factory and Welfare Departments of the Ministry of Labour, and will not normally deal directly with matters which can be settled locally by the Factory Inspectors or Welfare Officers of that Ministry. It will, however, be prepared to intervene in cases of difficulty, and to advise and assist firms on all welfare questions where required.
>
>
>
>
> I should be glad if you would let me have:
>
>   1. Brief particulars of any arrangements in operation in your firm for welfare supervision (especially in the case of women and young persons), provision of meals (canteens, mess rooms, etc.), and mutual aid for the assistance of workpeople after heavy air raids.
>
>   2. A note of any problems or difficulties, arising in regard to these and other welfare questions, including housing, transport, etc., which cannot be solved by local action.
>
>   3. Copies, as issued, of any house magazine, journal, or news bulletin published for your employees.[14]
>
>

Though welfare of the workers was the goal, the means was more observation and micromanagement of what firms were doing. State bureaucracy retained its pervasive presence. But we can also see that there was a sense that firms and local authorities were meant to take the lead and central bureaucracies were to be the last resort. All of these concerns were driven by the imperative to maintain wartime production levels within the context of the enemy's ability to bomb key sites of industrial production. The indiscriminate nature of bombing meant that firms and towns had to make contingency plans for the consequent damage. The Ministry of Supply was involved with ensuring arrangements were put in place to make sure production could be restored as soon and smoothly as possible after a bombing raid.

Local Reconstruction Panels were authorized by the Industrial Capacity Committee of the Production Council for Emergency Service to all Supply Ministries. The "Scope and Activities" of the Panel were described:

> It assists in restoring to a state of production in the earliest possible time certain Factories on supplies for the various Fighting Services, if they are damaged by enemy action.
>
>
>
>
> The Reconstruction Panel is composed of voluntary officers acting under authority and is advisory only and not intended to diminish a firm's own efforts or interfere at all in their own actions, taken either beforehand in anticipation of possible damage by keeping stocks of replace material [sic], etc., or after damage, but it can and will assist after damage on account of having powers over certain stocks and authority to issue Priority Certificates (ranking in urgency above all normal demands) to get materials if firms cannot get these themselves, for the purpose of repair to restore production to normal.[15]

The managers of firms were expected to act as good geopolitical subjects under the general direction of state bureaucracy. The government saw places as sites of essential production and it was up to the locals to maintain their towns in the face of enemy attack.

### _"Not interfering with production to any very great extent"_

The response of the city and its people to bomb attacks was an example of the mutual construction of people, firms, and places within the context of war. Bevin may have hoped for a future government to care for people outside of their workplace. The wartime reality was a degree of friction, or at least muddling through, between the bureaucratic war machinery and the residents and managers of places, heightened by the very real dangers of bombing attacks. Tyneside was officially categorized as a "danger spot" because of the combination of industrial concerns, its role as a center of the armaments industry and an important port, as well as being easily identifiable by enemy bombers by being at the mouth of a river.[16]

The cities of Tyne and Wear, along with the rest of the country, had to pay heed to the Civil Defence Act of 1939 and ARP department Circular 91/1939. The act mandated local authorities to offer free shelter to those in need, empowering the city to designate private property a shelter or an aid post.[17] By March 1939 1,800 Anderson shelters had been built in the Newcastle area and 9,000 more were on their way. By late October 1938, 800,000 sandbags had been delivered and another 900,000 had been ordered.[18] As we shall see, the designation and use of shelters was not completely smooth.[19] The first bombs fell on Newcastle on July 12, 940,[20] and Local Defence Volunteers units were formed at twenty-eight workplaces, including each of the three Vickers-Armstrong sites.[21]

The local response of Newcastle and Sunderland was framed within national demands of industrial productivity and maintaining public morale. These twin needs often clashed, as illustrated by correspondence between Cyril Thompson and Sir James Lithgow, Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty:

> Dear Sir James, Further to my conversation with you in London on the question of the First Lord's speech at Newcastle, the following are the facts which I want to bring to your notice.
>
>
>
>
> The First Lord spoke at Newcastle on 7th August [1941]. The speech was quoted by the B.B.C. in their News Bulletin the next morning and referred in glowing terms to the Shipbuilding activities on the Tyne, Wear and Tees—this seemed to us to be asking for trouble. Since the broadcast on 8th August there have in fact been numerous warnings and quite a number of bombs have been dropped in this area and further the German announcements have referred several times since 8th August to heavy attacks on Shipyards in this area. The whole effect of the last 16 days has been to disturb the workpeople of this district and the general opinion is that the B.B.C. announcement caused the bombing. Frankly, I feel that this speech should never have been quoted by the B.B.C.[22]

Though Mr. Thompson was clearly upset about the risk to the people of the northeast, he refers to them as workpeople. Production was clearly on his mind, as seen in an earlier letter to Sir Amos Ayre, Director of Shipbuilding and Repairs for the Ministry of Shipping, in May 1941:

> we have had two bombs on the Sunderland Forge which, unfortunately, killed five of our workpeople and a considerable amount of damage was done in the Test House, but it is not interfering with production to any very great extent.[23]

To ensure production, owners and managers had to be concerned about the welfare of their workers and the disruptions they faced when neighborhoods were bombed. R. M. Bartram, of Bartram & Sons wrote to Mr. White, a Fitters Shop Steward in the company, in December 1942:

> Dear Mr. White
>
> _AIR RAID DISTRESS FUND_
>
>
>
>
> I enclose copies of suggested rules, which differ very slightly from the ones you drew up, and which I would be glad if you would consider with your fellow Shop Stewards . . .
>
>
>
>
> I suggest you tell the other Shop Stewards that we propose putting up a notice to the effect that the contributions will be deducted from employees as from January 1, 1943, unless objection in writing is made.[24]

The letter was accompanied by a document laying out the rules.

> _BARTRAM'S AIR RAID DISTRESS FUND_
>
> _Suggested Rules_
>
>   1. A Committee should be formed consisting of 7 members of the Shop Stewards who will elect a Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer, and three Trustees.
>
>   2. . . .
>
>   3. Inside and outside staff to be represented on the committee.
>
>   4. An investigator shall be appointed by the full Committee to assess and report on each case.
>
>   5. All claims will be made through each representative Shop Steward, who will forward same to the committee who will consider claims in order as received.
>
>   6. The Shop Steward of the person making the claim will proceed to the applicant's house, with the investigator, who will report back to the full Committee.
>
>   7. To relieve immediate distress the Chairman and Treasurer, on receiving the Investigator's report are authorised to make an immediate cash payment of [pounds] 5 to help the affected employee until the local Bodies take action.
>
>   8. The full Committee will consider the report of each case with a view to granting a further sum of [pounds] 5 if the employee's home has been rendered permanently uninhabitable.
>
>   9. . . .
>
>   10. All employees of 21 years of age and over will contribute 6d per week, and all employees under 21 years of age will contribute 3d per week. All contributions will cease when the Fund amounts to [pounds] 200, and will re-commence first full pay week following subsequent withdrawals.
>
>   11. Messrs. Bartram & Sons, Ltd., will guarantee the solvency of the Fund up to a maximum contribution by the Company equal to the amount which has been contributed by the employees.[25]
>
>

Air raids were certainly a problem. Karl Otto Keller, an engineer working for the Sunderland shipbuilders Doxford & Sons, spoke of an August 15, 1940 "biggish midday air raid."[26] Though it does seem churlish to point the finger of blame towards the BBC, the location of key industries in the northeast of England made the area a targeting of bombing. Local firms made some steps to providing relief funds to those whose homes were destroyed or damaged, but the overall concern, matching the government's call for increased productivity, was to ensure industrial production was not disrupted. The state-business geopolitical construct set the rules and tone for how and why people in bombed places were expected to act.

### _"To exercise on behalf of the Minister the powers conferred
by the regulations"_

The actions of firms were only part of the local response. The community was also forced to make sacrifices as citizens were encouraged to take up garden spades and hand over control of church buildings in the name of the war effort. However, not all citizens embraced the everyday practices required of the good geopolitical subject.

Somewhat inevitably, the march towards total war,[27] with an impact on all aspects of society, meant more committees and more memorandums. One such venue for decisions to be made, and for people and places to be organized, was garden allotments. The Ryton Allotments Committee held a meeting in September 1939. The newly appointed chairman, Councillor R. Wren, JP, opened the meeting:

> A letter was submitted from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries setting out the powers provided under the Defence Regulations 1939 with the object of increasing the food supplies of the country by extending the existing powers of providing land for cultivation, and enclosing an Order empowering local authorities in urban areas to exercise on behalf of the Minister the powers conferred by the regulations with a view to the cultivation of the largest possible area of land as allotments.[28]

The context of the national war effort led to Councillor Wren corralling fellow committee members to act so that residents could get digging as the Ministry desired. The Allotments Committee went on to make the following decisions:

>   1. That notices be published throughout the district stating that the Council are prepared to acquire land for allotments and inviting applications for same.
>
>   2. That the Stella Coal Co. be asked to publish a notice at the pits drawing attention to the vacant allotments at Greenside and Clo Vale, and that a similar notice be issued by the Crawcrook Small Holding Association.
>
>   3. That where uncultivated gardens are attached to vacant houses the owners be asked if arrangements could be made for the gardens to be cultivated.
>
>   4. That a posters [sic] under the Defence Regulations drawing attention to the penalties for trespassing on allotments and gardens be displayed on the various allotment sites.[29]
>
>

The Committee was not shy in exercising the powers it had been granted from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. In March 1941 it "Resolved that Mrs. Cook, Garden House, Rockwood Hill Road be asked if she is willing to grant the use of her garden for allotments."[30] The belief that private property was to be made readily available for the greater good, in the name of the war effort, was taken for granted by some, such as the Ryton Allotments Committee, but raised the eyebrows of some owners.

The general appeal to make sure all available land was cultivated, was paralleled by orders to make buildings available for bomb shelters, first aid posts, or shelters for the temporarily homeless. Though most owners performed in the expected way to advance the war effort, others protested the disruption of established everyday practices and use of property. A legal dispute between Mr. F. W. Swinburne of Bill Quay, handled by Hodnett, Parkin, & Baker solicitors in December 1940 shows that not everyone thought that their property could be readily sacrificed for the war effort. The solicitors wrote to Mr. Swinburne:

> Referring to your instructions to endeavour to effect a settlement with the Local Authority with reference to the first aid post and shelter created by them in your Sunday School premises, we have pleasure in reporting as follows:
>
>
>
>
> [The Council will inspect the premises at the outset] This will protect the Trustees when they make their claim for delapidation [sic] after the premises have been vacated. We have also discussed the question of maintenance costs with the Local Authority. The position as we understand it, is, that the Trustees do not wish to make any profit out of the loan of the premises to the authorities, but on the other hand are not desirious [sic] of being out of pocket and particularly wish to retain as much control over the premises as the circumstances will permit.[31]

Lengthy correspondence throughout the war between Mr. Swinburne and the Local Authority, ably managed by Messrs. Hodnett, Parkin & Baker, show that the Trustees were vigilant about the use, maintenance, and heating costs incurred through the use of the premises as a shelter. The Local Authority vacated the premises on April 26, 1945, but the desire of the Trustees to regain full control, and get the money they felt they were owed, lingered on. A letter of October 10 from the Trustee Treasurer to the County Surveyor's Department regarding estimates for the costs incurred went on "to request that the Trustees may be given permission to immediately proceed with the redecoration of the premises on the lines already agreed. I trust that the permission may be given immediately, as the Hall is to be used for a very important church event in the very near future."[32]

Complaints such as Mr. Swinburne's should not be dismissed as particular individual quirks, or an isolated case of a less-than-perfect geopolitical subject. The Benton Methodist Church embarked on a similar tussle with the authorities about the use of their property. They took guidance from the national General Purpose Committee of the Methodist Church, a pillar of British civil society prepared to provide guidelines regarding the appropriate level of commitment to the war effort. A memo entitled "Chapel Affairs" said:

> No building devoted to public worship is to be claimed by the national or local authorities for any emergency purpose, nor, as far as we are informed, is it intended to use any of our Church buildings for purely military purposes.
>
>
>
>
> Sunday Schools and Institute premises have been and will be claimed in certain areas for use in whole or in part for purposes connected with Civil Defense, Evacuation, or temporary billeting of soldiers which is a civil responsibility. In all these cases it is important that ministers and Church officials, while being as helpful as possible in meeting national needs, should by rearrangement of the work and maintaining the fullest use of the rooms by mutual arrangement, keep in fullest activity the spiritual work for which our premises are built. If we abandon or seriously curtail our public services in Reception or Neutral areas the argument in favour of opening cinemas on Sunday evenings will be greatly strengthened.
>
>
>
>
> Where premises are taken over by the authorities a definite agreement should be arranged and every said agreement should incorporate the following points:
>
>   1. A payment at least fully adequate to cover lighting, heating, and cleaning and other expenses falling upon the Trustees.
>
>   2. The making good of any damage and an undertaking to return the rooms or building, furniture and fittings in a condition similar in all respects to the condition when taken over.
>
>   3. The payment of any rates or local charges made in consequence of the letting of the building.
>
>

>
> You will receive a letter from the Methodist Trust Insurance Co. with which we fully concur, setting out the position respecting the insurance of our property.
>
>
>
>
> When the general understanding has been contravened it would be well that we should be informed, and in conjunction with the Special Emergency Committee we will take whatever action is possible.[33]

Armed with the missive from the national organization, the Trustees of the Benton Methodist Church strictly policed the balance between civil responsibility, the national war effort, and the need to ensure the Church's "spiritual work," not to mention its property values. An October 17, 1939 letter from W. W. Davison (solicitor), an Assistant Public Assistance Officer, South Poor Law Area Guardian Committee, County Northumberland to W. W. Tulip, Esq. set the ball rolling:

> Dear Sir
>
> _Emergency Feeding Centres_
>
>
>
>
> With reference to my attendance at the meeting of the Trustees of the Benton Methodist Church on the 15th ultima, I am now authorised to agree on behalf of the County Council to the conditions of the resolution adopted by the Trustees at that meeting (a copy of which was handed to me at the meeting) for the use of the Benton Methodist Church Hall for the purpose of a Feeding Centre etc., in the event of such a centre being required in the district.[34]

Another letter from Mr. Davison to Mr. Tulip two days later made the position of responsibility for staffing the centre clearer to the Trustees:

> The Police have now been notified that the Hall is to be used as an Emergency Feeding Centre should the necessity for such use arise.
>
>
>
>
> The County Council are not providing any staff for the manning of these centres except the Relieving Officer in charge of each centre and probably his Assistant.
>
>
>
>
> In accordance with the views expressed by the Ministry of Health the Council are relying almost entirely upon voluntary helpers at each of the centres which they have established. Mr. Dixon is proposing taking an early opportunity of seeing you regarding voluntary helpers at your Hall and at the same time would be glad to have a list of names and addresses of the Trustees etc. who hold the keys of the Hall.[35]

The matter of staffing was soon eclipsed for Mr. Tulip by the actual use and control of the property. In a letter dated October 16, 1939, simultaneous with the correspondence about staffing, Mr. Alex Cheyne, County Surveyor, County of Northumberland wrote to Mr. Tulip:

> Dear Sir
>
> _A. R. P. Shelters_
>
> _Longbenton—Site No. 6a_
>
>
>
>
> Adverting to the conversation you had today with Mr. Backhouse, I have to confirm that the land on the southern side of the Wesleyan Chapel is required for the construction of a public Air Raid Shelter.
>
>
>
>
> The powers under which these shelters are constructed are the Civil Defence Act 1939 and the Emergency Powers Regulation 1939.[36]

Mr. Tulip acquiesced to the use of the property, but he was ever vigilant about its use and any detrimental effects upon the church. A March 5, 1940 letter he wrote to the County Surveyor noted:

> I am directed to draw your attention to the fact that this shelter appears to have become a playground for the children of the neighbourhood, one of the consequences being that during the past week a window of the adjacent Church was damaged, apparently through the throwing of lumps of clay. The Trustees feel sure that it is not your intention to have the shelters and their surroundings mis-used in this way, and we suggest that a word from your department to the Police Authorities would perhaps prove effective in securing such supervision as would prevent this sort of thing happening.[37]

Mr. Cheyne dutifully replied that the Chief Constable, no less, had been informed.

For Mr. Tulip it was not just a matter of who should not be on the property, unruly urchins, but who had priority to use the shelter. Again, it was up to Mr. Cheyne to clarify the situation. A July 15, 1940 letter to Mr. Tulip said:

> Further to your letter of the 2nd inst. I have consulted with the County Controller with regard to this matter, and I have to state that whilst appreciating the use of the land on which the shelter is erected, we cannot agree to allow anyone to have a particular right to use this shelter.
>
>
>
>
> As, however, the congregation would be on the spot if a warning were given, they would appear to have an advantage over the public, in reaching the shelter first.[38]

Though it is not clear whether Mr. Cheyne expected bombing raids only on Sunday mornings, or a constant presence by the congregation, he clearly had to rebuff a sense of continued ownership or possession by the local church members. Money was also an issue. In November 1940, Mr. C. A. Dixon, the Relieving Officer, wrote to Mr. Tulip regarding the payment of 5 shillings per week for the use of Church Hall Storage.[39]

The protracted use of the Church, over the course of the war began to take its toll. In November 1940 the Rev. C. H. G. Carter wrote to Mr. Dixon:

> I have to inform you that the County Council are advised by the Sanitary Inspector that the existing arrangements at the Methodist Church Hall are inadequate in view of the number of people it is estimated to feed therein in an emergency.
>
>
>
>
> He proposes that two additional temporary closets (chemical) for the use of Males should be set up in the shrubbery at the south-east end of the building, under suitable covering. It is not suggested to erect them for permanent purposes, but to have them stored on the premises if that is at all possible or convenient until actually required.[40]

The needs of war did not impress Mr. Tulip and his fellow Trustees. They replied:

> on the subject of sanitary arrangements, the Trustees have considered this matter, and while they agree that in the emergency some additional sanitary accommodation may be necessary, they raise serious objection to the proposed provision of chemical closets. They would prefer that water closets should be installed.[41]

The Local Authorities objected to the installation of a permanent brick extension because of the cost and the Trustees consented to the installation of the temporary chemical toilets.[42] The Local Authority control of the Church Hall was not relinquished until October 14, 1946—over a year after the conclusion of the war in Europe.[43]

Wartime national bureaucracies were the heart of the geopolitical construct of state and business interactions. The increasing presence of the state in the everyday practices of firms was mirrored by calls for action and new regulations that permeated into all aspects of society. Established everyday practices were disrupted and new ones created. People and places had to change. Committees encouraged land to be cultivated as allotments, and church buildings were requisitioned. The physical landscape of places changed. Vacant land was made into gardens, homes destroyed by enemy bombs, and the function of buildings changed. As places were constructed anew, some citizens embraced and enabled the change as the duty of the good geopolitical subject; others took on the demands and disruptions of the war effort with a bit less grace.

### _"The actions to be taken by the various local authorities"_

As can be seen from the correspondence that local officials had to field from Mr. Tulip, the Local Authorities faced a great burden of responsibility, especially towards those whose homes had been damaged or destroyed by enemy bombing. The physical destruction of the city required the construction of committees and physical spaces to accommodate the displaced. Though these actions were done with care and concern for the human loss involved, they were also undertaken so that the industrial function of the city should be disrupted as little as possible. The pressure on city managers to do much with few resources was done in the context of the need to keep making the industrial components of the war.

In June 1942, Mr. John Atkinson, the Town Clerk, wrote a memo entitled "North Tyneside Co-ordination Committee, Care of the Homeless. Report of Committee on Matters Dealt with During the Past Twelve Months":

>   1. _Scheme for the Evacuation of Homeless Persons_. In June 1941, a Conference was held in Newcastle which was attended by representatives of practically all the local authorities for the North Tyneside Area to discuss arrangements for dealing with a large scale exodus which may take place from the North Tyneside Towns into the surrounding country districts as a result of heavy and continuous air attack. At that Conference, a Sub-Committee was appointed to prepare a Scheme for the organised transfer from the Target areas of homeless persons who could not be accommodated in their own towns. The Scheme, which was duly prepared, sets out in detail the actions to be taken by the various local authorities, billeting authorities and police when it is clear that the resources of the target are inadequate to deal with the number of homeless persons. The Clerks to the Local Authorities have been furnished with a copy of the Scheme.
>
>   2. _Appointment of Committee to deal with matters arising out of the scheme_. Following the preparation of the Scheme, on June, 1941, it was felt by the Ministry of Health to be most essential that all authorities dealing with the homeless problem in the area should keep in close contact with each other in order that the arrangements made for the transfer, reception and billeting of the homeless may be known to the representatives of each authority.
>
>   3. _Temporary Hutted Hostels for Workers engaged in Essential War Occupation_. Temporary Hutted Hostels are to be constructed for the North Tyneside area to accommodate 2,750 persons. The purpose of the temporary hostels is to accelerate the clearance of Rest Centres by providing temporary accommodation and meals for workers and their families who have been made homeless by enemy action and are engaged on work of national importance, which necessitates their being found accommodation in the district to enable them to continue with their work . . . No rent will be charged for the first two weeks' residence; thereafter the charge will be 5/per week for a single adult and 10/per week for a family party.[44]
>
>

Some people could evacuate the areas under threat from bombing, but others, identified as essential to the war effort, had to stay. The goal of the Local Authority was to provide some kind of housing to ensure workers would still work for the war effort, though they were given some leeway in demands on rent payments. Firms, for example Bartram's relief fund, and the city recognized the threats and losses to workers, but saw their role and responsibility in getting people back to work as quickly as possible. Disruption through loss of homes, and even loved ones, was to be as temporary as possible. The key everyday practice was for the worker to make the industrial components of the war machinery, and the city was charged with ensuring that such practice was maintained.

In some ways the nature of the local authority intervention was ephemeral, though ubiquitous. In response to a raid on March 12, 1943 it was reported:

> Following the above an Administrative Centre was opened next morning (Saturday) at the Wharrier Street Rest Centre and was in operation from 9 a.m.
>
>
>
>
> The Centre as such was closed at 7:30 p.m. although the Rest Centre remained open during the following day.
>
>
>
>
> As there were only two casualties, one of them a soldier, there was no business for the representative of the Ministry of Pensions who accordingly departed about 11 a.m. and the Town Clerk's department was closed down at 3 p.m.
>
> Up to closing time the Centre dealt with 42 applicants relating to 144 persons (adults and children) from The Oval, Bakewell Terrace and Walker Road, and also from Oxsted Place which had been evacuated owing to an unexploded bomb.[45]

The purpose of such immediate intervention was to direct people to more lasting assistance, especially shelters or other forms of temporary housing.

The pressure on city managers to minimize the disruption to industrial output was ongoing, and the work of the committees and representatives of the Local Authorities was constantly evaluated and revised. In July 1942, Mr. G. J. M. Gray, Senior Regional Officer for the Ministry of Health in Newcastle wrote a long report to the area's Local Authorities which began with:

> I am directed by the Minister of Health to say that the renewal of air raids and the change in the methods adopted by the enemy in attacking towns of little military importance render it essential that the arrangements made by all local authorities, for billeting and furnishing information to those who have suffered from enemy action, should be revised.[46]
>
>
>
>
> The Newcastle City Council Town Clerk's office issued a memo on 19th November 1942:
>
>   1. No. of Billeting Officers within the City—179, many of whom are members of the various Departments of the Town Hall.
>
>   2. . . .
>
>   3. A number of Billeting Officers, in proportion to the number of homeless reported at each Centre, is dispatched as early as possible after 9.0 [sic] a.m., complete with lists and books, and other essentials.
>
>   4. As a temp. measure Hostels are provided for the homeless who cannot be placed in private billets. In all 378 can be so accommodated.
>
>   5. Male war-workers who are expected to remain at their duties can be given accommodation at the Queens Hotel, Westmorland Road, which can provide for 70.
>
>   6. A number—which is unfortunately below the figure desired—of houses is held under requisition for the homeless, and the houses are placed at the disposal of the dehoused immediately.
>
>   7. Furniture on loan can be purchased.
>
>   8. . . .
>
>   9. . . .
>
>   10. There is close co-operation between the City Engineer's Dept. from whom reports to the Billeting Dept. on the damage to houses are received as soon as information is available.[47]
>
>

Local government had to establish everyday practices of evaluation and adaptation as they were tasked in making their places both war zones and functioning industrial centers. Processes of geopolitical bureaucratic construction took place in Whitehall and local authorities across the country. The outcome was the construction of wartime places, and the hope that residents would be good geopolitical subjects. Such demands were all done in the name of the war effort. In places like Newcastle and Sunderland this meant people were occupied with a combination of industrial production and the changing day-to-day practices of being workers while suffering as the victims of air raids. The little things of daily life made, and were made in, the broader geopolitical process of war.

### _"Shall our armies leap the channel?"_

Despite the hardships of the war experienced by the residents of the Tyne and Wear region, there was always the need to consider the progression of the war. Especially, thoughts were focused upon the invasion of the Continent, even if local workers involved in making the Mulberry Harbours were unaware of their specific contribution.

The war diary of Mrs. A. Meader of Jesmond, Newcastle was full of speculation and expectation. On January 1, 1944 she noted "1944 Leap Year. Shall our armies leap the channel?"[48] As the year progressed the imminent invasion became common knowledge. On April 29, 1944 Mrs. Meader wrote "Hitler's west wall hit by U.S. fortresses twice yesterday—the 11th day of blitz. Neutral experts say invasion may be by day—between May 2nd and 17th."[49] She was aware of the need for a daytime invasion, despite the presumed secrecy of the military deliberations on this matter. Also Mrs. Meader used the plural, armies. She, and surely many others, was aware that the operation was dependent upon the contribution of the United States.

On May 21, 1944 Mrs. Meader noted "Yanks here in thousands and 300,000 waiting to cross Atlantic if and as needed in invasion effort."[50] The expectation began to mount. Her June 2, 1944 entry read, "Mr. Stimson says 'the hour of action is at hand' When and where?"[51] This was followed, on June 2, by anxiety: "London flash sent inadvertently by Joan Ellis of Ass. Press to America News of Allied Landings in France. Is this true and if a dangerous thing what will be done to her? America in ferment when disclosed as error. Is it?"[52] Finally on June 6th Mrs. Meader was able to enter the news she, and the rest of the country, had been waiting for: "France invaded. The King calls the people to prayer. Mr. Churchill speaks to nation."[53] The next day she was pleased to report "Great news, of invasion progress says radio."[54]

The "yanks" were certainly in Britain in the thousands. Operation Bolero had been transporting military personnel and their equipment across the Atlantic, especially to the south of Britain. The war effort required the remaking of industrial centers, such as Newcastle and Sunderland, in order to ensure wartime productivity levels were attained and the industrial components of war, such as the Mulberry Harbours, were built and assembled in time for the invasion. In the southern part of the country, places were becoming a different form of geopolitical construct, not a factory but a warehouse. The immediate outcome, as the Mulberries and a host of other machines and people came together, was D-Day. The longer-term impact was the successful prosecution of the war against Germany. The lasting presence of the US military that leapt the channel was part of the construction of the regional division of Cold War Europe.

### _Notes_

1.

Roberts, _Masters and Commanders_ , 38.

2.

Hancock and Gowing, _British War Economy_ , 211.

3.

Ibid., 211.

4.

Agnew, _Place and Politics_.

5.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 40.

6.

Tyne and Wear Archives (TWA) 376/12.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Ibid.

9.

Ibid.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Ibid.

12.

Croucher, _Engineers at War_ , 109; source _Picture Post_ (12 October 1940).

13.

TWA DS.REY/36.

14.

Ibid.

15.

Ibid.

16.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 41.

17.

Ibid., 42.

18.

Ibid., 44.

19.

There was evidence of incompetence or even corruption at high levels of the civic managerial structure. "This is at odds with the accepted view that the wartime situation led to a pulling together of all sections of society and that selfish attitudes were subsumed by the national need" (Ibid., 73).

20.

Ibid., 103.

21.

Ibid., 76.

22.

TWA DS.JLT/6/1/1.

23.

Ibid.

24.

TWA DS.BM/2/20.

25.

Ibid.

26.

TWA DS.DOX/2/2/26.

27.

Chickering and Förster, "Are We There Yet?"

28.

TWA UD.RY/3.

29.

Ibid.

30.

Ibid.

31.

TWA C.FER/7.

32.

Ibid.

33.

TWA C.L02/26/1.

34.

Ibid.

35.

Ibid.

36.

Ibid.

37.

Ibid.

38.

Ibid.

39.

Ibid.

40.

Ibid.

41.

Ibid.

42.

Ibid.

43.

Ibid.

44.

TWA 359/802–803.

45.

TWA 376/16.

46.

TWA 359/802–803.

47.

TWA 376/13. This memo had been preceded in December 1940 by a 39-page book published by the Newcastle City Town Clerk called "Emergency Rest and Feeding Centre Scheme" that listed "Doctors, Nurses, Midwives, Rest Centres, and Feeding Centres" and the equipment available at each.

48.

TWA DX769/1/5.

49.

Ibid.

50.

Ibid.

51.

Ibid.

52.

Ibid.

53.

Ibid.

54.

Ibid.
Chapter 8

# Making Regions

From "bridge" to "unsinkable aircraft carrier"

The actions of good geopolitical subjects, in bureaucratic settings, factories, or any of the myriad workplaces necessary for the prosecution of the war, were contextualized within, and by a coming together of, a set of geopolitical constructs that drove global geopolitical shifts. Towns, villages, and workplaces were connected geopolitical constructs in which good geopolitical subjects were formed. The change in places like Newcastle during the war was not just a matter of the way its business leaders, city officials, and citizens reacted to demands from government offices in London. Changes in places across Britain were part of a dramatic shift in global geopolitics that, in hindsight, we can see as moments in the process of the United States becoming the global power in place of Britain. Places were the building blocks of the broader geopolitical shift as well as the venues in which the changes were played out. The process included Operation Bolero, the move to station more than a million US troops in Britain. The troops would ultimately move across the Channel through the "bridge for the Americans to come through,"[1] of which the Mulberry Harbours were a crucial part. The process did not stop with D-Day, or even VE-Day. Rather, Bolero consisted of the initial moments in which Britain was transformed into a permanent offshore base, or the "unsinkable aircraft carrier,"[2] that enabled US projection of power across Western Europe—a new geopolitical world order we know as the Cold War.[3]

### " _We should stand stripped to the bone_ "

As the northeast of England was being transformed into a production site for the war effort, other parts of the country were being transformed into a giant warehouse for US forces. Operation Bolero was part of strategic thinking global in scope (figure 8.1). Yet the impacts and experiences were very local. The formal entry of the United States into the war after Pearl Harbor had been preceded by creeping US involvement through the Lend-Lease program. The program reflected the dire economic circumstances of Britain. In 1940 Churchill told the United States that:

The Strategic Geography of Operation Bolero.

_Source_ : Richard M. Leighton & Robert W. Coakley, _Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943_ , Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1955.

> The moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies. While we will do our utmost, and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make payments across the Exchange, I believe you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous in effect, if at the height of this struggle, Great Britain were to be divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilization saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone. Such a course would not be in the moral or the economic interests of either of our countries.[4]

But US help came with strings attached that were put into place by the bureaucratic arrangements that were the sinews of the geopolitical transfer of power between the two Atlantic Allies. Especially, the infamous article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement identified the imperatives of not impeding world trade and required the "elimination" of discriminatory trade practices and the "reduction" of tariffs—in other words, the end of British Commonwealth trade preferences and the continuation of Empire coveted by Churchill.[5]

Once the United States had entered the war, the next step was the commitment of fighting personnel. The global strategic question was where? The debate was between those who favored focusing on the Pacific to fight the Japanese versus those who saw a more holistic strategy that required fighting Germany first to protect the Soviet Union and Great Britain before reorienting towards the Pacific. In early 1942 General Marshall pushed the "Europe first" view through to formal acceptance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shortly after, on April 1, 1942, he presented a War Department plan for the invasion of Europe to President Roosevelt.[6] The buildup of US forces in Britain was named Operation Bolero. The United States saw its purpose to be an invasion of the Continent (Operation Roundup) that was tentatively scheduled for April 1943, with the option of an emergency invasion for the end of 1942 (Operation Sledgehammer) if there were signs of the Soviet Union being defeated.[7]

However, and perhaps ironically, the commitment to Europe by the United States created reservations within Britain. The fear was that even Roundup, let alone Sledgehammer, would be too premature, pitting an underprepared Allied force against a still-too-strong German army. Churchill's opposition to Sledgehammer enraged Marshall. In a July 10, 1942 meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff he raised two questions: should the United States agree to invade North Africa, as the British were pushing, and did Britain really intend to invade the Continent in 1943? Marshall believed that an invasion of North Africa would cost too much with no beneficial outcome.[8] He also believed that the British enthusiasm for an invasion of North Africa showed a lack of dedication to Bolero, and "without full aggressive British support" it would be impossible to launch Sledgehammer or an invasion of Europe in 1943: "If the British position must be accepted [the United States] should turn to the Pacific for decisive action against Japan."[9]

Marshall's threat was largely bluff and the President rejected any going back on the "Europe first" strategy.[10] Instead, the global strategies and agendas of erstwhile partners, the United States and Britain, were steadily entwined and led to transformations in places across Britain. Though Churchill had reservations about the timing of the invasion of the Continent, he was aware that Bolero could help future operations other than the invasion of the Continent. Also, the presence of US forces could be crucial if the unthinkable happened—a backs-to-the-wall defense against German invasion if the Soviets collapsed.[11] Britain's transition between offense and defense was a slow process. The mingling of US and British strategic goals at the high levels of diplomacy and military planning became apparent in the mixed, even ambiguous, reception of locals to the arriving Americans in the places that were remade through the appearance of US military might on their doorsteps.

The uncertainty and hesitancy diminished with the eventual appearance of the Overlord plan that had first seen the light of day in the spring of 1942 and had been "sedulously nurtured" by the US military since, despite the tensions between the strategic imperatives of the two Allies.[12] Committees had kept the plan alive despite the pressures of reorientation to the Mediterranean. The US Operations Division had created the Bolero Combined Committee in the spring of 1942, and in the middle of 1943 it had been given fresh life when the commitment to Overlord became clearer.[13] Though committees could come and go at the whim of strategic thinking, they could also display resiliency and have a steering effect on strategy once the moment allowed.

After the commitment to Overlord was made, which was not finally established until the Tehran Conference at the end of November 1943,[14] the rate of shipping to Britain was impressive. Considerable pressure was put upon the British ports as well as inland transportation networks. The operation could only be completed by the British agreeing to limit other imports, a strain upon the economy and society.[15] The planning process had begun before the war with the Rainbow plans and ABC-1. The result was a staggering transformation in the military geography of the world (table 8.1). In January 1942, just seven weeks after United States declared war on Germany, the first units of the US Army arrived in Northern Ireland. Two days later it was officially announced that a US Army headquarters was being established in England.[16] By May 31, 1943 certain categories of service troops were still facing shortages and it was recognized some combat units would not be in place in time for the invasion, while the means of getting replacements in position was still unresolved.[17] In late 1943 the buildup program was accelerated and by mid-January 1944 there were 750,000 US Army personnel in the United Kingdom. Over the next five months this increased to over 1,500,000.[18]

US Deployment to Principal Theaters, 31 December 1942–30 September 1944

_Theater_ | _31 Dec 1942_ | _30 Sept 1944_ | _Peak_

---|---|---|---

European Theater | 119,702 | 2,053,417 | 3,065,505 (Apr 45)

Mediterranean Theater | 227,092 | 712,915 | 742,700 (Aug 44)

Africa and Middle East | 24,943 | 9, 354 | 40, 654 (June 43)

Persian Gulf Command | 5, 907 | 27,739 | 29, 691 (Feb 44)

Pacific Theaters | 350,720 | 1,102,422 | 1,552,303 (Sep 45)

China-Burma-India | 17,087 | 149,014 | 199,035 (May 45)

Alaska Command | 96,061 | 63,495 | 148,167 (Aug 43)

Caribbean Command | 119,286 | 70,556 | 119,286 (Dec 42)

_Source:_ Maurice Matloff, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944_. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1959, p. 555.

### " _Over here . . . ostensibly to help us win the war_ "

The global strategic shift put in motion through Operation Bolero meant that places were changed, in some ways temporarily, but in others the results were part of a long-term trend of emerging military roles. For example, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire was chosen as the HQ of US Army's Services of Supply (SOS) Command. In June 1942 General John Lee, appointed to command SOS, inspected and approved a site that covered Benhall Farm and Oakley Farm. There had been plans to use these premises as an evacuation point for the British War Office if Germany had invaded.[19] They were later to be occupied by the new spy agency, GCHQ; a lasting legacy of their transformation from agricultural production to military base in Operation Bolero.[20] The wartime occupation of the site by the US military was crucial in the choice of its new location for GCHQ as the US presence had led to trunk cable communications being laid.[21] Cheltenham became a unique place, through its hosting of GCHQ, and peculiar accommodations had to be made: Newspaper reporters covering the local team's football matches were unable to print the names of the goal scorers.[22]

Places across Britain were transformed by the arrival of US military force. Trooper Peter Davies, of the 1st East Riding Yeomanry noted that "Tanks, lorries and everything was lined up on the roads of every town and village that we went into down on the South Coast. Streets, roads—all filled both sides with military vehicles."[23] The change resulted in a strange hybrid landscape of bucolic English village and arsenal. The surreal blend is captured by the reflections of Alan Melville, an RAF war correspondent:

> Our assembly camp was in Hampshire, near a little village called Hambledon . . . Three-ton lorries, trucks, tanks and Jeeps lined its meandering main street and every house had three or four vehicles attached to it by camouflage nets, like barnacles on the side of a ship . . . The nature of the countryside was ideal for concealing huge quantities of men and supplies: rolling hills covered with glorious woods . . . But, however hard one concentrated on the setting, it was impossible to get away from what was being hatched in it . . . The King came down one day to inspect troops: several thousands of them were drawn up in a great green well formed by a dip in the hills. When the first part of the inspection was over, the men of the Armoured Brigades concerned in it were allowed to fallout until the rest of the ceremony had finished. I had been watching the King walk along the long lines of Lord Lovat's special brand of Commandos, and hadn't noticed the others falling out. I thought at first, on looking back at the hillside, that it was completely covered in the rhododendrons. Then I realized that it was completely covered in men. There was a solid mass of them, only distinguishable as human beings when the sun glinted on some buttons or on someone wearing glasses. It was like that all over the south of England in the days before the balloon went up: the rhododendrons were as plentiful as ever, but they were crowded out by men in uniform.[24]

The reconstruction of the English countryside into a blended garden/tank park brought an intermingling of cultures, or a so-called "Friendly Invasion."[25] English people noted that a new way of doing things came along with the military machines. Sub-Lieutenant Alun Williams, RNVR, recalled:

> About six weeks before D-Day I moved to Dartmouth to take charge of the minesweeping base there, and I found the transformation staggering. The width of the Dart appeared to have been halved by LST [landing ship, tank] after LST moored alongside one another, manned by US Navy personnel. My abiding recollection is that endless records of Glenn Miller and his band were played over the public address equipment of such ships, presumably to boost the morale of the homesick American troops.[26]

The views of the American soldiers were tinged with the realization that their "invasion," though friendly, was not fully welcome. An anonymous GI, 1st Infantry Division said:

> You always had the feeling that the Brits were looking down their nose at you. It didn't matter how low-born they were themselves. They obviously thought every Yank was a hick, a country cousin with no breeding. Someone actually used that word to me once, "breeding." They weren't exactly friendly, the men especially, but it improved after a while, when we'd rubbed shoulders a bit.[27]

Operation Bolero was not only a tense and fraught commitment within the higher echelons of the US-GB strategic partnership, it was also a mixed experience for hosts and guests. Doreen Govan recalls seeing the slogan "Go home Yanks" appearing in prominent places around Bristol. "Rather ungrateful really since the reason they were 'over here' was ostensibly to help us win the war."[28] But for most, there was also a tremendous sense of relief, that at last "we [in Britain] had a friend. No longer were the British and her Commonwealth allies fighting alone."[29] The word, "ostensibly" is important to reflect upon; even at the height of the war, when Britain was in desperate need of US help, a sense of what was to come postwar, an assertion of US power, was felt on the streets of Britain.

And yet the relief felt at the arrival of the US troops cannot be underestimated. Jim Jefferes remembers the day the US military arrived in Fairford, Gloucestershire:

> "This was tremendous and visual evidence that we were no longer fighting the war on our own," he states, "but that this huge and powerful country had thrown itself steadfastly behind us. As the tracked vehicles rumbled by the soldiers threw us packs of army field rations. However frugal these rations were, they had a profound effect. For the first time since the beginning of rationing somebody was giving us something freely."[30]

The antagonism between hosts and guests can easily be overstated. For many, the experience was a pleasant and important time in their lives in which making new friends prepared the ground for a lasting geopolitical alliance. As just one example of how sharing a dining room was part of developing a strategic partnership, consider Bob Powell, a US Officer who joined the 352nd Fighter Group based at Bodney in Norfolk. After two combat tours his newspaper experience in the United States led to a posting at Bushey Park, Watford, the headquarters of the VIII USAAF Fighter Command.[31] He was billeted with the Edwards family, who lived in Silverdale Road, Bushey, a short walk from Bushey Hall.

> "We had our own mess hall," he says, "and we took our meals there, but the officers were housed with British families under the Lend Lease agreement with the US. I don't know the details, but these families were financially rewarded for taking us in . . . the Edwards family were very nice to me and I enjoyed the opportunity to experience living with a British family and being 'accepted' by them almost as a member of the family."[32]

He also spent long evenings with the family talking about America and what the Americans thought of "jolly ole England." "Needless to say," Bob states, "I fell in love with England and its people. I found some a little hard to know, possibly because of what they had been told about the 'Yanks', or maybe what they had observed. But being a hillbilly from West Virginia, I never met a stranger, so to speak. My wife always says I didn't have any problems because I could 'talk to a rock.'"[33]

The sharing of cultures that Operation Bolero made necessary was part of the transformation of places. Bob Powell was just one of many US officers working at nearby Bushey Park. June Edwards remembers that it had previously been a golf and country club, and the main building was turned into the administration offices and mess for the officers. Nissen huts were built for the enlisted men and a guardhouse constructed at the entrance:

> "There were lots of Jeeps roaring up and down Aldenham Road," writes June, "much to the annoyance of cranky residents and the recruits of a Coldstream Guards battalion who were in an empty large house—which they wrecked. They were jealous of the GIs, their uniforms and their rate of pay, which was much more than they were receiving. Bob Hope and his gang, and also Glenn Miller and his band all performed at HQ."[34]

Getting to know the Americans had, for June Edwards at least, led to less than positive reflections on her country's own military.

The transformations that resulted from Operation Bolero were not just cultural. There were economic benefits too. One of these was the opportunity presented to black marketeers by the presence of the US military personnel customer base. Tim Grace and the 368th Fighter Group were based at Greenham Common, and soon got used to the regular visits of an Englishman who became known as "Black Market Joe":

> One afternoon shortly after the group's arrival he appeared at the Greenham Common living area, inviting people to purchase _The London Times_ or _The Daily Mail_. His skinny figure, red, weather beaten face, and shock of unruly silver hair soon became almost a permanent feature at the camp, selling items such as bouillon cubes, writing paper, bread and other essentials.[35]

A number of economic opportunities other than the black market became available, for people living near bases. Rosemary Robson lived in the village of Warmington near Oundle, near the Polebrook base for the US 94th Combat Wing. Her mother was a tailoress, skills that were eagerly sought by the neighboring airmen. Amongst all the clutter of cloth in the house she recalls "a large amount of parachute silk from which she would make petticoats or frilly, smocked dresses for her daughter. I remember her Sunday best blouse was made from this silk and beautifully smocked on the front and cuffs."[36]

The personal transformations that resulted from Operation Bolero were not just short-term and economic. More importantly were the long-term changes in people's views of the world; something that lingered into the postwar period. As one British woman says:

> We are now all old people, but all the same I am so glad I did not miss those years. Everyone helped and shared what little we had and it left me with so many memories. When the Americans came to England, it was a huge boost for us all and I am so proud to have known them.[37]

The generally favorable view of Americans gained through the contacts that Operation Bolero made necessary had a resonance within British culture that was to last into different geopolitical times. As Mrs. J. Tombs from Bury St. Edmunds says, "Although I am 71 now I have vivid memories of them—they were nice guys and brought us hope in those grey days."[38] Hope was going to be important in the dark days of postwar Europe and the coming of the Cold War.

### " _They carried their rifles the 'wrong way'_ "

The many personal and place-specific experiences of the newly arrived US military personnel and their British hosts were the building blocks of regional scale transformations. The west of the country was the main location of the warehousing of US forces. This was because it was situated next to the West Coast ports at which they arrived from the United States and the South Coast ports where they would embark for the invasion. Acres were covered with huts and tents, or served as parking lots for tanks, other vehicles, and 26,300,000 jerry cans of petrol.[39] The use of land by the US military meant that farmlands, private property, former British army camps, and even entire villages were taken over, often in the face of legal difficulties and local opposition.[40]

For the cities of the West Country the result of the global strategic shift and consequent changing role of the region could be seen in the transformation of the function of familiar buildings. The Lyndale Hotel and the Royal West of England Academy were used as American Red Cross Clubs, but for white troops only.[41] The pubs of Bristol received an influx of American customers from the boats. In Bristol the American civilian seamen had their own club in Park Street, but they also went to the Prince's Bar in Park Row and other nearby pubs. Their distinctive dress of drape-style jackets, loud ties, two-tone shoes, and wide-brimmed trilby hats made them stand out from the crowd.[42] The use of English pubs, especially welcome when the monthly 48-hour passes were issued but also on weekday evenings, meant that GIs had to get used to warm beer and new games, such as darts, dominoes, and shove ha'penny. "At 9 pm many GIs joined the locals in the ritual of listening to the BBC news on the pub's 'wireless', and at 10 pm drank up to the landlord's uniquely British call of 'Time, gentlemen, please!'"[43]

Operation Bolero brought to the fore the ambiguities of the cultural interactions that emerged:

> In general, however, the Americans were not well received by the more reserved British who, as a race, were renowned for an alleged inherent distrust and dislike of foreigners. Many GIs, as the Yanks were also known, behaved impeccably, but the high spending, often boisterous behavior of others fuelled the fires of animosity. Accordingly, before long the now well known complaint that they were "over-paid, over-sexed, and over here" was being expressed with conviction.[44]

The presence of the Americans provoked a change in English attitudes. Initially, opinion of the US soldiers was poor:

> I saw my first two Americans—two army officers—one quiet Sunday afternoon in 1942. They were standing on the corner of Victoria Street and Temple Way, Bristol, and I imagine they had been sight-seeing and viewing the extensive bomb damage in that part of the city. The thing that struck me immediately—and which I found very odd—was their "two-tone" uniform. With "pink" trousers and olive jackets they looked quite unlike any other army officers I had seen. Very unsoldierly, I decided, and this first impression of the US Army was confirmed when I later saw American troops on parade in the city. To young but critical British eyes—I was only 14 years old at the time—they carried their rifles the "wrong way," and their marching lacked something. Unlike the exaggerated stamping and noisy clatter of British army boots (now seen as faintly ridiculous, but then considered smart), the rubber-soled shoes of the Americans produced a sound more akin to a soft-shoe shuffle.[45]

But there was also a sense of self-awareness, that maybe the British didn't come across too well either: "The Americans, I decided, were going to be poor partners in battle, much as the Italians were to the Germans. I failed to realise, of course, that many Yanks felt the same way about us—and after our so-called evacuations from Norway and France who could blame them?"[46] Despite this self-reflection, the dominant memory is one of ambiguity:

> In general the Americans were not popular with the more reticent British, not least because many of them were inclined to be boastful and exuberant. They also freely expressed the view that they were over here "to win the war for the British," and this did not go down at all well . . . However, my own rather jaundiced view of the Americans changed when I got to know several of them . . . I began to recognise, too, that there had been more than a hint of nationalistic jealously in my initial attitude—their equipment was clearly first class and their well-cut uniforms were vastly superior to our own.[47]

Operation Bolero was the outcome of bold global strategic vision and cooperation between the United States and Great Britain. It meant that many Americans lived in English towns and villages, a learning experience for all involved. The result was a mixture of curiosity, animosity, judgment, self-evaluation, and socializing. Places and the English landscape were transformed as the south of England became a giant military warehouse. The English people, acting as hosts, took notice of the differences between them and their guests, and in the process were reflectively aware of their own culture but also the vulnerability of their country. The fondness of the memories that lasted indicates a reluctant awareness that friendship and military cooperation with the United States had become a postwar geopolitical necessity. Such changes and self-reflections of the British hosts illustrate a sense of geopolitical subject formation in flux. What it meant to be British in the world, the expected roles of the nation and its citizens, was to be very different pre- and postwar.

### " _A most unfortunate diplomatic situation_ "

Changes in what it meant to be British were brought to the fore by the local experiences of hosting US military forces. Fully understanding Bolero requires situating the operation within global geopolitical shifts. Personal ambiguity over the presence of US forces was one expression of the tensions between British and US interests and views of the world, and the manner in which these general views translated into strategic evaluation of different parts of the world. Underlying these calculations were the different trajectories of the two countries: the United States was negotiating becoming a global power, while Britain was fighting to retain its Empire. Operation Bolero was a key moment in the process of geopolitical change that spanned the end of Britain's global role and the emergence of the United States as a constant presence in Europe.

In this context, Bolero was, ostensibly, a joint project but one that the British approached much more cautiously than the Americans. Both sides saw a way to win the war while casting an eye to the postwar future. The British, wary of their experiences in World War One, saw the global advantage of focusing upon the Mediterranean as a means to defeat Germany while also securing established lines of imperial communication. The United States, frustrated by the British arguments that delayed Bolero and the invasion of the Continent, saw the operation as a means to project their power across the globe to defeat Germany and enable them to focus on the Pacific.

Despite these significant differences in worldviews between the two allies, it is too dramatic to draw sharp lines of disagreement between them over the timing and size of Bolero and the invasion of the Continent. Much of the reason for the delay of the invasion was down to logistics rather than strategy. Shortages of cargo shipping and troop ships, as well as landing craft,[48] were important constraints, and these were interwoven with national imperatives of geopolitical trajectory.

During the planning stages of Bolero, some strategists had the postwar situation in mind. In March 1943, at a time of strategic uncertainty, it was realized that D-Day would resonate geopolitically for some time to come. Though the Soviet advance was ushering the Allies towards their goal of defeating Germany, it was also seen as a process that would affect European politics. The imperative was to match the Soviet advance, or as General Marshall noted, "if we were involved at the last in Western France and the Russian Army was approaching German soil, there would be a most unfortunate diplomatic situation immediately involved with the possibility of a chaotic condition quickly following."[49] While these strategic calculations were being made, the United States still believed that British plans retained an attempt to revive imperial strategies when the war was over.[50]

As in the past, global pretensions required a European balance of power. But this time the balance was to be different as it meant the division of Europe into camps under the leadership and occupation of external powers—the Soviet Union and the United States. Balance of power as part of global leadership was to be a thing of the past for the British; Bolero set in motion a very different geopolitical role. Britain was to be the staging post for the global projection of power by the United States. As Churchill had recognized, Bolero was necessary for the defense of the British homeland. When looking at the operation as part of a geopolitical process, we can see that such necessity was a stepping-stone towards a subordinate role as the baton of global power was passed.

### _"An integrated defense concept for the North Atlantic area"_

The oncoming Cold War that Winston Churchill had made clear to the world in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech was to lead to a reevaluation of the US military presence in Europe. In 1948, in response to the establishment of a Communist regime in Czechoslovakia the _New York Times_ proclaimed:

> Just as the Nazi seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939 forced a political realignment of Europe before the war, so the Communist seizure of power in Prague this week now is forcing a reconsideration of the United States security arrangements with Britain and France.[51]

The article went on to say: "What to do now to counter the extension of Soviet power in the West and to rebuild confidence in the dependability of the United States is the question before the United States Government." The answer seemed to lie in provisions for regional security agreements enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The detonation of a nuclear device by the Soviet Union in August 1949 changed the perception of the geopolitical landscape. The United States had assumed any Soviet aggression could be countered by nuclear destruction of its centers of industrial and military power without fear of retaliation. Now that cities in the United States were, at least theoretically, at risk, a new sense of geopolitical commitment had to be created. The geopolitical bridge between the United States and Western Europe was to be made bigger, stronger, and permanent.

The headline in the _New York Times_ brought the need for a rethink to the attention of its readers: "The Effects of Russia's Bomb on Our Military Strategy: Defense of Western Europe and Implementing of North Atlantic Pact Now Assume Greater Importance." The detonation of the Soviet nuclear bomb had created a context that had "put a new and high priority upon the task of building the politico-military security structure of the West. The building of this structure, which means, in brief, the restoration of a balance of power in Europe, may be the only military substitute possible for the atomic bomb as a deterrent to Soviet aggression."[52]

A new geopolitical construct, one that was to span two continents and an ocean, was to be created—the North Atlantic security operation. The story of the Mulberry Harbours takes us full circle via the long historical process of geopolitics. The reference to "the restoration of a balance of power" in the _New York Times_ alludes to the geopolitical visions of Sir Halford Mackinder and the traditional British policy towards the European continent. The Mulberry Harbours were indeed a bridge in two senses of the word. Geographically they enabled the movement of emerging US military power across the Atlantic and onto the European continent. Historically the Harbours were a component of a geopolitical transition that spanned the British and US engagement with Europe through a similar imperative of "balance of power" in different geopolitical contexts.[53]

The presence of Soviet nuclear weapons required, from the US point of view, a new regionalization of geopolitics:

> From now on, the atomic deterrent may become less and less significant, for if we know that atomic attack by Russia upon our cities is possible we are far less likely to wish to use the bomb. Even if the time comes when we have, for instance, 1,000 bombs to Russia's 100, this ten-to-one quantitative advantage will be of small comfort, for the threat of the bomb to our cities and to our way of life would be a deterrent to our use of it against Russian cities and the Russian way of life.[54]

The need was to construct a geopolitical "Substitute for Deterrent"—and that was to be a new regional geography of US power:

> As a fundamental first step in the new chapter now opening, there must obviously come—not only and not chiefly because of the President's announcement, but primarily as a result of the Atlantic Pact—a fundamental change in some of our past strategic concepts. How great a change, few Americans—and few in Washington, even in the Pentagon—seem yet to realize. If our atomic monopoly is broken, the whole idea of destroying Russia's industrial-military potential by atomic bombardment must be studied carefully.
>
>
>
>
> The Atlantic Pact was a logical outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Before the Atlantic Pact, which envisages an attack upon one signatory as an attack upon all, before the Russians had the atomic bomb, the strategy of long-range atomic attack upon Russia from bases outside Europe and eventual "liberation" of a conquered Western Europe was a popular concept, even if never a wholly sound one.
>
>
>
>
> It promised an "easy war." Today such a concept no longer makes political or military sense.
>
>
>
>
> We are committed to the defense of Western Europe, not to its liberation after conquest. Only such a commitment can insure the full support of Western Europe and the growth of its military strength; only such a strategy of a successful defense, can make sense out of all our policies since the war.
>
>
>
>
> If this reorientation in our politico-military thinking be accepted and Americans henceforth identify their fate with the future of Western Europe, the road ahead is clearer.[55]

The consequence of this thinking was to be a full-scale armament program enhancing navy, army, and air force capacity and, crucially, a commitment to transatlantic mutuality. The geopolitical construction of a transatlantic militarized region required a new sense of America's position and role in the world, the manufacture of the military-industrial complex, and transatlantic political bureaucracies. The same constructions of people, material things, and bureaucracies that were the ingredients of the Mulberry Harbour project were set in motion in a new military scheme with a similar global scope. This time the broad historical-geographical context was the Cold War rather than World War Two.

Congress soon passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the statutory expression of the Truman Doctrine, originally stated in 1947, to "support free peoples who are resisting armed subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[56] In a statement made at the signing of the Act, President Truman deemed it "a notable contribution to the collective security of the free nations of the world." The vision went far beyond a narrow sense of military security:

> The dominant objective of our foreign policy is to create peaceful and stable conditions throughout the world, so that men may lead happier and more fruitful lives. This objective cannot, however, be achieved if the economic efforts of free men are overshadowed by the fear of aggression.
>
>
>
>
> By strengthening the common defense, this act will do much to allay that fear. The security which this act offers will aid in promoting the economic welfare of the free nations and in restoring their confidence in a peaceful and prosperous future.[57]

Just as the geopolitical strategy of nineteenth-century Britain was to ensure a stable or "balanced" Europe to enable its global economic superiority, the United States was in the process of establishing a similar geopolitical project. The regionalization of Europe to prevent outbreaks of war enabled, and was justified by, an economic project that was portrayed as beneficial for the whole world.

In October 1951, a _New York Times_ editorial reinforced the idea of a bridge between the United States and Western Europe by placing emphasis on the word "mutual." Apparently, midwestern farmers were "convinced as far as the principle goes, but they do want to make sure that money and manpower are not wasted." The editorial went on to say:

> True mutuality also demands that our European friends and allies do their part too. General Eisenhower warned the newly elected executive board of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . that their countries must not let down to their efforts to rearm. If they were to do so, the primary effect on European defense would be serious, and the effect on American public opinion dampening indeed. We can afford to put more money and more materials into the common defense effort than any other country, but we must count on other countries doing as much as we ourselves in proportion to their resources.[58]

The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, and the associated Foreign Economic Aid legislation, was not simply bilateral largesse. The United States was to fundamentally alter the nature of geopolitical relations, in an unprecedented manner, by insisting that the national defense of European countries was part of an "integrated" transatlantic scheme dominated by Washington (figure 8.2). The act required that only the first $100,000,000 of the planned $1,314,010,000 of assistance could be spent "prior to a Presidential finding that an 'integrated defense' is planned."[59] This required the establishment of a Military Committee, consisting of ten of the twelve signatory states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and a powerful new Pentagon committee, the Standing Group, "appointed to function continuously in Washington."[60] The Standing Group would establish the "assignment of roles and missions" that would hopefully reflect established and historical geopolitical stances. "For example, it would be logical for France to concentrate on ground forces, and not to branch out in a naval building program, since the United States and the United Kingdom already possess overwhelming naval strength between them."[61]

Transatlantic Movement of Military Equipment.

_Source_ : Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Congress 1st Session: Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Charts for Use in Connection with supplemental report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5895 (H. Rept. No. 1265, pt. 2).

The "British way of war" and the reluctance to establish a "Continental commitment," that had been disrupted by World War Two, were to be reestablished.[62] The difference now was that Britain was no longer a great power, or even able to act independently, rather it was to be subsumed in a subordinate role to the US plans for global projection of power as part of a series of "integrated" regional alliances.

The new arrangement was, as secretary of state Dean Acheson noted in a speech on June 2, 1950, a means for European countries to maintain their territorial sovereignty and independence, but only by becoming junior partners in a multinational geopolitical effort. Acheson stressed that the treaty's "full effectiveness, however, depends on each member's lending his full support to the difficult task of building a collective defensive capacity equal to realistic requirements for defense."[63] Though the diplomatic language spoke of the mutual defense of Europe, the motivation and material power behind the agreement were new calculations of the geography of US defense. Mutuality meant that the US Congress was satisfied that European countries would pay their way as much as possible while US security concerns prevailed. As Acheson spelled out:

> The members of the Congress were therefore rightly concerned that unless our aid were specifically dependent upon the adoption of an integrated defense concept for the North Atlantic area, its effectiveness in increasing the security of the area would be seriously diminished.
>
>
>
>
> They were also concerned that unless the other members considered our aid as only supplementary to their own efforts of self-help and mutual aid, the achievement of our objectives would place an impossible burden on the resources of this country. They believed, and very properly, that unless a collective defense, as distinguished from individual national defenses, could be devised, the security of the North Atlantic area would be in perpetual jeopardy.
>
>
>
>
> This concern was shared by all of us, and was wisely reflected in those provisions of the law which placed specific conditions on the furnishing of military assistance in the North Atlantic Area. These conditions were:
>
>
>
>
> First, the conclusion of an agreement with each prospective recipient nation which included an undertaking, among others to engage in self-help and mutual aid in furtherance of the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty; and, second, the approval by the President of recommendations for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area which were to be developed by the treaty organization.[64]

In other words, US politicians had been forced to recognize a reality that their British counterparts had, in the past, also reluctantly accepted—defense of the homeland began at the Rhine. The US Continental commitment was made early in their acquisition of global power, and was cemented in a structure that tied the states of Western Europe into a system of mutuality driven by the strategic needs of the United States. The Anglo-American orbit that was constructed during World War Two, beginning with the Rainbow plans, was transformed into a transatlantic geopolitical projection of power that extended far beyond Britain and to the eastern border of the new Federal Republic of Germany. The projection of force across the English Channel, made possible in part by the Mulberry Harbours, was maintained after the war by the transformation of "Allies" into "integrated defense," and given a more permanent geographical expression.

The changing geopolitical vision of the United States combined understanding of national, regional, and global geographies. The State Department saw that the idea of mutual defense and self-help reflected the hope that European countries would help foot the security bill but also the understanding that "we cannot count on our friends in western Europe to resist [Soviet aggression] if our strategy in the event of war is to abandon these friends to the enemy with a promise of later liberation. That strategy would be costly, since it could produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned allies in the event of war."[65] British military thinking had come to the same conclusion prior to the two world wars.

National defense required a transatlantic security arrangement. However, the vision went beyond the "orbit" that had begun to be constructed in World War Two. The State Department plan went on to say:

> Plans for the common defense of the free world must provide for the security of western Europe, or the new world may one day stand alone, an island of embattled freedom in a hostile world. Western Europe must count on us if it is to survive, and we must count on Western Europe if we are to endure.[66]

The new geopolitical construction was a new world order of "freedom-loving nations of the world"[67] with force projection emanating from, in a neat rhetorical twist, the "new world" itself, or more accurately the rapidly growing institutions of military, economic, and political power in Washington, DC. The US military intended to mirror the strategy of Britain in the nineteenth century and to embed military power across the globe to "project our operations . . . to enlarge our strategic frontier."[68] The basic goal of the "Maintenance of the territorial integrity and security of the United States" led to the imperative to "take military action abroad."[69] The US military presence in Europe has been a constant geopolitical feature ever since. But to what degree was the new projection of power "integrated" and "mutual"?

### " _Unsinkable aircraft carrier_ "

Britain's history, traced through the Mulberry Harbours, is one of transition from global power to subordinate lackey to the new US geopolitical agenda. Britain's role in World War Two makes clear the process in which its power was diminished through strategic shifts that resulted in a new form of "Continental commitment." Britain's role changed from being a "bridge" for Americans to an "unsinkable aircraft carrier."[70] The former has connotations of joint interests and roles, the latter of ownership, permanence, and an unequal relationship.

Critics of the relationship saw it not only as unequal but, counterintuitively, increasing the insecurity of Britain. From being one end of a bridge in which engagement with the Continent could be initiated, the country became a target to be destroyed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Winston Churchill had foreseen the implication. Though an advocate of the fight against Communism, as propagated by his "Iron Curtain" speech, he was also critical of the consequences of the new form of US military presence in Britain that he had so carefully nurtured at a time of national existential crisis. In a speech to Parliament on February 15, 1951 he warned "we must not forget that by creating the American atomic base in East Anglia, we have made ourselves the target, and perhaps the bull's eye of a Soviet attack."[71]

Despite this risk, Britain embraced an unequal partnership with the United States that saw US military presence in the form of nuclear bombers and, subsequently, cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, signals intelligence, and global communications systems. Britain had to pay the bills for much of this infrastructure, despite the fact that the access to the intelligence gathered was not fully shared, and, most importantly, the British never established a clear role in the decision-making process behind the launch of nuclear weapons based on their soil.[72] It was even up to the RAF to defend the US bases, stretching their ability to defend the British coastline.[73]

Though this situation evolved over time, it was put into place immediately after World War Two at the time of the Berlin crisis. It was an extension of the "Anglo-American Orbit" that had become a reality through Operation Bolero. The US military did not fully leave Britain in 1946; a US Naval headquarters, an airfield, and a radio station had remained. They returned in force in 1948. For the United States, the Berlin blockade was a convenient way to station US bombers on the other side of the Atlantic. The Joint Chiefs of Staff planned "to 'seize and hold', if need be, airfields in the United Kingdom and the Far East, from which to mount atomic bomb raids against the USSR."[74] A subcommittee of the British Cabinet, believing the move was temporary, agreed to the stationing of US bombers. However, "US Defense Secretary James Forrestal wrote in his diary on the day the bombers arrived in Britain, 17 July 1948, that: 'We have the opportunity now of sending these planes, and once sent, they would become somewhat of an accepted fixture.'"[75] And they have stayed ever since, with an expansion in numbers and destructive capability.

Though the global geopolitical shifts entailed a dramatic demotion for Britain's role in the world, the British justification for its relationship with the United States was based on historical geopolitical calculations. Sense of diminished national geopolitical self was given succor by reference to the past, through a reinterpretation of the Continental commitment. The 1983 Defence Estimates included a short analysis: "There has been an American military presence in the United Kingdom for an almost unbroken period of 40 years . . . American forces have remained in this country ever since [1948] as a major symbol of the United States' commitment to defend Europe . . . their presence in Europe in substantial numbers is essential if deterrence is to be effective."[76] Concerns about Britain being targeted by Soviet nuclear attack were shrugged off:

> [Although] some maintain that the presence of American forces in our country increases our chance of becoming a target in war . . . to argue thus is to miss two crucial points: first, that in any conceivable conflict affecting Western Europe, the facts of geography and the United Kingdom's strategic importance would alone be enough to make this country a target for attack; and secondly that the solidarity of the NATO alliance, and its strategy of deterrence, are themselves our surest guarantee against war . . . So far from putting the United Kingdom at greater risk, the presence here of United States forces is a vital element in ensuring that war does not breakout.[77]

The security of Britain was still seen as being dependent on a stable European Continent, and war on the other side of the Channel would inevitably involve the British. This calculation had existed, at least, since Napoleonic times. But it was not British diplomacy and projection of naval power that would maintain that European peace. Instead, Britain had become a military outpost of the new hegemonic power. The process had involved the movement of US forces into Britain to launch the western front of the Allied counteroffensive against Nazi Germany. The Mulberry Harbours had been a key construction in making the plans for that strategy feasible enough for D-Day to occur and the post-invasion logistics to be effective. Over time, the "bridge" morphed into the expansion of US bases on British soil in what was, ostensibly, peacetime. The Mulberry Harbour project, with all the committees, meetings, and memos it entailed, was a series of moments in a process of geopolitical change that saw a new form of threat, new weaponry, a new geopolitical world order, and new realities of relative power for the committees of Whitehall to ponder. And they still do.

### _Notes_

1.

Gearing, IWM 11032.

2.

Campbell, _Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier_.

3.

Peter J. Taylor, _Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as Geopolitical Transition_ (London: Pinter and New York: Guilford, 1990).

4.

Quoted in Hancock and Gowing, _British War Economy_ , 234.

5.

Ibid., 246–247.

6.

MacDonald, _The Mighty Endeavor_ , 69.

7.

Ibid., 70.

8.

Ibid., 78.

9.

Quoted in ibid., 78.

10.

Ibid., 78.

11.

Ibid., 77.

12.

Matloff, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare_ , 168.

13.

Ibid., 406.

14.

Beevor, _Second World War_ , 509.

15.

Ibid., 408.

16.

Ken Wakefield, _Operation Bolero: The Americans in Bristol and the West Country, 1942–45_ (Manchester: Crécy Books, 1994), 23.

17.

Matloff, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare_ , 408.

18.

Wakefield, _Operation Bolero_ , 24.

19.

Henry Buckton, _Friendly Invasion: Memories of Operation Bolero, 1942–1945_ (Chichester, West Sussex: Phillimore & Co. Ltd., 2006), 1.

20.

Richard J. Aldrich, _GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Community_ (London: HarperCollins, 2010), 102.

21.

Ibid., 102.

22.

Ibid., 103.

23.

Lewis, _Eye-Witness D-Day_ , 25.

24.

Quoted in Ibid, 26.

25.

Buckton, _Friendly Invasion_.

26.

Lewis, _Eye-Witness D-Day_ , 25.

27.

Quoted in ibid., 19.

28.

Quoted in Buckton, _Friendly Invasion_ , 4.

29.

Ibid., 4.

30.

Quoted in ibid., 4.

31.

Quoted in ibid., 32.

32.

Quoted in ibid., 33.

33.

Quoted in ibid., 34.

34.

Quoted in ibid., 35.

35.

Quoted in ibid., 70.

36.

Quoted in ibid., 71.

37.

Quoted in ibid., 182.

38.

Quoted in ibid., 182.

39.

Wakefield, _Operation Bolero_ , 25–26.

40.

Ibid., 25–26.

41.

Ibid., 39–40.

42.

Ibid., 55.

43.

Ibid, 48.

44.

Ibid., 26.

45.

Ibid., 1–2.

46.

Ibid., 1.

47.

Ibid., 1–2.

48.

The shortage of landing craft was crucial in delaying the invasion of the Continent. I do not discuss it in depth because it has been covered extensively elsewhere and focusing upon shipping logistics and strategy better illustrates the ideas of geopolitics as process and global relations that I want to convey. See Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, _Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945_ (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1968), 49.

49.

Quoted in Matloff, _Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare_ , 68–69.

50.

Ibid., 166.

51.

James Reston, "Red Threat Spurs Movement for Western Security Pact," _New York Times_ (February 27, 1948), ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2010), 1.

52.

Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Effects of Russia's Bomb on Our Military Strategy: Defense of Western Europe and Implementing of North Atlantic Pact Now Assume Greater Importance," _New York Times_ (September 25, 1949), ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2010), E5.

53.

Taylor, _Britain and the Cold War_.

54.

Baldwin, "The Effects of Russia's Bomb on Our Military Strategy," E5.

55.

Ibid.

56.

President Harry Truman, "The Truman Doctrine" extract printed in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, eds., _The Geopolitics Reader_ , 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 75.

57.

"President's Statement," _New York Times_ (October 7, 1949), ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2010), 9.

58.

"For Mutual Security," _New York Times_ (October 12, 1951), ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2010), 26.

59.

Harold B. Hinton, "2 Foreign Aid Acts Put Into Operation," _New York Times_ (October 7, 1949), ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2010), 1.

60.

Ibid.

61.

Ibid.

62.

Liddel Hart, _The British Way in Warfare_ ; Howard, _The Continental Commitment_.

63.

"Text of Acheson's Statement on Foreign Arms Aid Program," _The New York Times_ (June 3, 1950), ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2010), 2.

64.

Ibid.

65.

"State Department's Outline of Plan to Help Western Europe Arm," _The New York Times_ (May 15, 1949), ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2010), 3.

66.

Ibid.

67.

Ibid.

68.

Joint Chiefs of Staff document JCS 151819 September 1945 in JCS files CCS373.11 (US National Archives).

69.

Joint Chiefs of Staff document JCS 1496/3 19 September 1945 in JCS files CCS373.11 (US National Archives).

70.

Campbell, _Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier_.

71.

Quoted from Hansard by Campbell, _Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier_ , 11.

72.

Ibid., 308–311.

73.

Ibid., 279.

74.

Ibid., 27 citing Joint Chiefs of Staff documents JCS 1496/3 and JCS 151819 September 1945; in JCS files CCS373.11; and JCS 1477/1, 30 October 1945 (US National Archives).

75.

Campbell, _The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier_ , 29.

76.

Quoted in ibid., 298.

77.

Quoted in ibid., 298–299.
Chapter 9

# Conclusion

The Legacies of Geopolitical Constructs

War is a process rather than an event. In the process of making war many other entities are made as well, notably individuals as geopolitical subjects, state-business interactions, and places and regions. The variety of geopolitical constructs that are formed in the process of making war have a legacy. The impact of war on people, institutions, places, and regions extends into what is ostensibly, and usually falsely, labeled peacetime. War is a particular form of geopolitics, and geopolitics is an ongoing process in which many geopolitical constructs are made, remade, and unmade. They interact to form a global mosaic of geopolitical constructs, each with varying geographic and historic scope. Geopolitical constructs and the way they interact create a myriad of contexts in which agency is performed in a way that maintains, challenges, and disrupts existing geopolitical constructs, and makes new ones. The process is not deterministic, but it is laden with legacies.

Geopolitical constructs are the semipermanent contexts with a legacy that extends beyond their immediate time-space existence, or into future times and places near and far. A geopolitical construct has no clear "expiration date" and no precise geographical delineation. To fully illustrate geopolitics in this way is impossible; it rests on what has been described as the first law of geography, everything is related to everything else.[1] The process is endless in time and pervasive across geography. A brief look at the legacies of the three geopolitical constructs of the good geopolitical subject, state-
business interactions, and geopolitical landscapes will illustrate the general principle. These geopolitical constructs and their legacies come together to create the ultimate geopolitical construct, the global pattern of power. By concluding with the big picture of geopolitics we can understand the sense of who we are, the contexts we live in, and our possible futures.

### _The legacies of the good geopolitical subject_

A significant and immediate legacy of the Mulberry Harbours was that the D-Day invasions and subsequent breakout and advance were a success. The Allied forces were able to advance across Western Europe and squeeze the retreating German army between the sweep of the Soviet forces from the east. The push to victory in Europe was to presage, or meld into, the new conflict that was to define the rest of the twentieth century, the Cold War. As Captain Joseph T. Dawson, US 1st Infantry Division reflected:

> I have come to realize very deeply, that the moment of D-Day marked a turning point of the twentieth century—it was perhaps _the_ most dramatic moment of the twentieth century, because it enabled the freedom of the world. There's something sacred about it.[2]

For those individuals involved in the "dramatic moment" of D-Day the change within them was permanent. Being molded into good geopolitical constructs was not bounded by the limited historical extent of World War Two, nor something that was to be limited to military settings. For example, Raymond Dierkes of the Seabees recalls:

> When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor I was listening to the radio and I remember how they broke into the regular broadcast to announce the news. I was working as a plumber's apprentice at the time for the J. P. Valenti Plumbing Company in St. Louis.
>
>
>
>
> I settled into a really good life after the war. I went back to work for Mr. Valenti and worked there for 15 years, counting the time I was there before the war. I married my wife, Virginia, on May 29, 1948. We had two girls, Barbara and Nancy. In 1958, I bought the business from Mr. Valenti and changed the name to the Dierkes Plumbing Company, which I operated until my retirement in ___________.
>
>
>
>
> As for my service, I guess once you're a Seabee, you'll always be a Seabee. I'm still involved with the 97th and 108th NCB reunions, and I still publish Beelines, a quarterly newsletter that is mailed to a list of about 300 Seabees and their surviving family members. The only members of pierhead crew 408 who have survived to this day are Bill Van Eck, Sam Marmino and me.[3]

The legacy of being a good geopolitical subject was also seen in one's personal conduct; the wartime experience was etched onto the body and a matter of public display:

> V-12 and Midshipmen's School taught us a lot, and a couple of things have stuck with me my entire life. One. Always leave a place cleaner than you found it. Since then, quite a few people using washrooms on commercial flights have benefited! Two. Standing to attention. You'll often see non-
> military men with hands in their pockets, grasped behind their backs, folded in front or some other self-conscious position. But once you learn to simply lightly press each thumb onto the forefinger and second finger at your side—as if there's a satin stripe going down the seam of your trousers—you'll look relaxed, and the appearance is that of nobleness rather than slouchiness.[4]

Nobility and a sense of self-worth and personal achievement were carried into the postwar world. But was the world able to live up to expectations of what the world could and should be? Playing a role in a war against fascism and in the name of freedom created optimism that a better world should emerge. It was such a sense of looking forward that led to Churchill's rejection by the British electorate after the war. A belief in the public need to continue building projects for the common good was also felt by those who had participated in the Mulberry Harbour project.

Sir Harold Wernher believed that the practices of the Mulberry Harbour project could be continued into postwar Britain. His vision was "homes for heroes" in which competition between cities, rather than between different military units which he had used to raise wartime productivity, would be employed:

> It was clear that, with the imminent Normandy landings, the War would be soon coming to an end. It would leave a shattered homeless Britain. He had been impressed with the ease with which problems of organisation could be solved in war-time and he saw no reason why similar methods should not be used to tackle the immense problem of the coming peace. Why should not the housing problem be approached as had been the problems of MULBERRY? If a caisson of concrete and steel could grow quickly, in spite of war-time scarcity, why not houses for the bombed-out multitudes? His plan worked out. Jack Gibson was to keep the team of MULBERRY contractors together, and backed by a vast scheme of publicity, one municipality was to be pitted against another in a competition to get house[s] built and a weekly competition maintained between them.[5]

However, as for the other good geopolitical subjects we have encountered, the harsh economic realities of the postwar context were to disrupt Wernher's dreams and good intentions. "He never heard anything more of the plan and shortly afterwards the Minister of Health, Mr. Willink, said there were more important things than housing."[6] The dissonance between the purpose and belief that the war generated and the bleak future of many of the places that had played a crucial role in the war was to be a cruel legacy.

### _The legacies of places_

On August 2, 1945 Reyrolle Ltd. was informed "that the declaration of your premises as a Protected Place under No. 12 of the Defence Regulations has now been cancelled by the Secretary of State."[7] The businesses of the cities of the northeast of England were allowed to bring the war to closure. The Local Authority required some pomp and circumstance to mark the change. On May 7, 1945, the Lord Mayor of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne outlined the "Celebration of Termination of Hostilities in Europe": "Half-an-hour after pronouncement by Prime Minister I propose to proceed in State to St. Nicholas' Square to make Proclamation of the cessation of Hostilities, and shall be glad of the support of my fellow members of the Council."[8] The day after VE-Day there was to be "Music in Parks as announced in Press" and the Sunday following there was to be a Service of Thanksgiving at St. Nicholas Cathedral.[9]

There was much to celebrate and be proud of. Local firms and the city had made an important contribution to the war effort, and had made sacrifices in the process. However, the new society, with benefits for workers in the region, that Bevin had pronounced to create a compliant and committed wartime workforce did not emerge. The legacy of the war shows that active participation in the national war effort, including manufacture of the components of the crucial Mulberry Harbours, did not guarantee long-term prosperity. For a short time the heavy industry of the region remained successful. Yet it was clear that the economic future of the northeast of England, and other industrial regions of Britain, required diversification in the form of industry and employment. In 1944 heavy industry accounted for over 57 percent of male employment on Tyneside.[10] Though there was awareness that change was necessary, it was harder to enact:

> The post-war report on Tyneside by the Board of Trade is damning in its indictment of the area's over-dependence upon the heavy industries of the past. It is clear that the increased wartime demand for the goods produced by these concerns achieved little and, indeed, served to worsen Tyneside's post-war prospects by stifling development in other areas.[11]

Tyneside's experiences were part of a regional political and economic pattern that created a lasting north-side divide in Britain.[12] The economic decline of the industrial and manufacturing areas of the north of England, and parts of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, established a geographically divided Britain that remains today.[13] In terms of employment, income, education, and health there is a clear regional pattern. London and the southern part of the country have, generally, experienced better economic and social fortunes. For those workers, offered Bevin's promises, in the industrial heartland that made the big component parts of Britain's World War Two machinery the postwar world has been much bleaker.[14] Making the Mulberry Harbours did not make for a secure economic future.

### _The legacies of the postwar British state_

The north-south economic divide reflected the political geography of Britain. The historical process of English conquest and control of Scotland, Wales, and Ireland had a legacy on the very nature of the state. Britain was, and remains, a state created by the "internal colonialism" of England.[15] Especially, the dominance of the City of London has had long-lasting repercussions on the economic fortunes of manufacturing regions in the north of England, as well as Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland,[16] the places where the component parts of the Mulberry Harbours and other industrial ingredients of the war-machine were made. The quasi-imperial and financial nature of the British state is reinforced and maintained by its peculiar form of politics, a constitutional monarchy.[17]

Participants in World War Two, and earlier and later wars, fought for the Crown and country. In fact, especially in terms of service in the name of Northern Ireland, it was often the former that garnered greater loyalty than the latter.[18] The exciting new socialist world that Bevin had promised to workers to encourage their productivity in World War Two was never likely to occur given an elitist state based on patronage and appointment rather than a deep commitment to democracy.[19] The suspicion of, and barriers to, any sort of progressive politics that the workers who made the Mulberry Harbours may have believed was in their future is evident in the spying operations conducted by the intelligence services on Labour party politicians long into the postwar period.[20] The Cold War context was to make the Soviet Union, an energizing factor in World War Two productivity when an ally, an enemy to be fought and one that made organized labor a focus of suspicion for the establishment.

Britain remained a constitutional monarchy and an internally colonialist state. It also continued to believe that it had a duty, if not a right, to "punch above its weight" in global politics.[21] Despite the realities of its bleak economic foundations, Britain attempted to maintain a military and diplomatic presence across the world. This required a new geopolitical construct, National Service, which maintained military manpower under the pressures of demobilization while also creating a new postwar generation of good geopolitical subjects.[22] Two security policies were to continue the militarized and global nature of the British state: intelligence cooperation with the United States and the development of nuclear weapons.

Britain used its successes in code breaking in World War Two and the global scope of the Commonwealth to establish a key role in the geopolitics of the Cold War. On February 22, 1946 Britain led a two-week Commonwealth conference for "Signals Intelligence Authorities" to create a global presence before the crucial agreement with the United States the following month.[23] The relationship with the United States was generated through World War Two cooperation and became the UKUSA global signals intelligence alliance, a "complex network of different alliances built up from many different overlapping agreements."[24] The interlocking geopolitical constructs of bureaucratic arrangements and global geopolitical strategy were manifest in a set of new places with a new military mission:

> GCHQ's strategy for cooperation with the Americans was to rapidly reorientate its collection towards Russia. Typically, the vast Forest Moor wireless station near Harrogate in Yorkshire, with an aerial farm of some ten square miles, was switched from collecting German traffic from the Eastern Front to Russian traffic as soon as the war drew to an end. British field units in Germany, Austria, and Italy joined the suborned Italians in collecting Russian military traffic. The re-established sigint stations in Singapore and Hong Kong also focused on Russian traffic, with the latter specialising in KGB messages. All this made Britain an attractive partner for the United States. The core of Anglo-American cooperation was a "relentless attack" on the wartime generation of Russian cyphers.[25]

Ongoing controversy over the role of GCHQ and the US National Security Agency over access to private data is a continuing legacy of the signals intelligence alliance as an evolving geopolitical construct that has an insidious yet mundane impact on daily British life in the name of global security.

The interaction of the global context and everyday experiences is also a feature of another security issue that has been central to the postwar British state—nuclear weapons. Creating and maintaining nuclear weapons capability has been central to Britain's ability to play a global role, including its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The Polaris submarine-launched missile became the centerpiece of Britain's nuclear deterrence strategy in 1968 and was replaced by the current Trident system in the 1990s. In 2006 the British government announced its decision to maintain Britain's nuclear capability, despite the conclusion that "the White Paper cost estimates . . . are not yet sufficiently robust to support the future deterrent programme through its planned life."[26] The cost of the program is a burden on the whole military budget, and opponents of the Trident system refer to the opportunity costs of reduced investment across the British economy and society. However, the government's commitment to Trident rests on its role in a set of geopolitical constructs. On the one hand is the role of Trident in creating industrialized places, as Mulberry Harbour construction had done before:

> The 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy sets out the Government's intention that Royal Navy submarines will be built in the United Kingdom. Suppliers to the submarine industry constitute a highly specialised industrial sector with a number of monopoly suppliers. There are difficulties inherent in providing the right incentives for monopoly suppliers to deliver to time and budget. Currently, there is no single document which sets out convincing evidence of how the Department intends to assure value for money from its suppliers throughout the life of the programme. The Department is aware of this and will include criteria for assessing value for money in the procurement strategy it has under preparation.[27]

The connection between the state and business, central to the completion of the Mulberry Harbor project, remained a crucial geopolitical construct:

> Both the Department and its industrial suppliers have identified skills shortages and are considering how to address them. These shortages relate to submarine building expertise within the industrial supply chain and financial, commercial, programme management and nuclear-related expertise within the Department.[28]

On the other hand, the Trident system is crucial to Britain's sense of geopolitical self within the wider world, and hence part of national identity.[29] During the debate over renewal of the Trident system, prime minister Tony Blair reinforced the sense that Britain should play a global role, for which possessing nuclear weapons was necessary:

> If we want to secure our way of life, there is no alternative but to fight for it. That means standing up for our values, not just in our own country but the world over. We need to construct a global alliance for these global values; and act through it.[30]

These were not just the beliefs of one politician. They were the commitment of a state that rested on a sense of history and future purpose. The Ministry of Defence's 2004 White Paper _Delivering Security in a Changing World_ reiterated a geopolitical vision that had been generated many decades before in which Britain "must be given to meeting a wider range of expeditionary tasks at greater range from the United Kingdom."[31] Force projection, the reason behind the construction of the Mulberry Harbours, is retained to this day in Britain's geopolitical strategy.

The commitment to Trident, and by extension Britain's global geopolitical role, is under increasing challenge. Protest over the Faslane base in Scotland, where Britain's nuclear submarines are based, is central to the ongoing process of the breakup of the British state.[32] The Scottish independence movement opposes the system and wants the base relocated to a port somewhere in England.[33] Questioning the efficacy and cost of nuclear weapons dovetails with the political geography of the British state and whether the Kingdom will remain United. Renewing Trident would sustain one element of the geopolitical construct of British state-business interactions, but it may also be an ingredient in a recipe that creates an independent Scotland and the restructuring of the British state. The 2016 Brexit vote has only served to reinforce and accelerate these processes.

### _The big picture_

The world changed faster and more dramatically than the British state. The context of the Cold War harshly exposed the diminished global role Britain was to play. The Berlin crisis was used by the United States to establish Britain as an outpost for force projection. The British intelligence services became a junior party in what was, ostensibly, an information-sharing pact.[34] Britain's role in this relationship was weakened by the concerns of Soviet penetration into the very heart of MI5 and MI6. The Suez crisis made it clear that the United States was to call the shots in the Middle East. The trend of the geopolitical process was clear: Britain's ability to project force across the globe and manage a balance of power in Europe was compromised. These tasks were assumed by the United States. The dramatic change in the geopolitical context, as wartime friend became postwar foe, is captured by Canadian prime minister William Mackenzie King's diary entry:

> As I dictate this note I think of the Russian embassy being only a few doors away and of them being a centre of intrigue. During the period of the war, while Canada has been helping Russia and doing all we can to foment Canadian-Russian friendship, there has been one branch of the Russian service that has been spying on [us] . . . The amazing thing is how many contacts have been successfully made with people in key positions in government and industrial circles.[35]

In addition to the emergence of the Cold War, decolonization changed the global geopolitical arena. The age of formal imperialism was over, even if it was to take a series of ugly wars before Britain, and other states, let go. Even then the British managed to fight insurgencies against their colonial states in a way that retained some form of political control over the newly independent states.[36] Decolonization did not fundamentally alter the global geopolitical structure in which a minority of powerful states benefited from economic and political control of a majority of weaker and poorer states. This general global pattern had been in existence for centuries and remains.[37] The specifics of the relationship were to change. The politics of formal empire were replaced by a system of client states whose allegiance was defined within the language of the Cold War. Some countries sought to break free from the established hierarchical relationship through the nonaligned movement and the Bandung Conferences.[38] However, a global picture of "dependency" has been maintained via the operation of the new institutions established by the United States, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[39]

The geopolitical picture of global inequalities, at the time identified by the label "the Third World" and today as "the Global South," was part and parcel of the Cold War. The United States established military might in Western Europe, the operational extensions of Operations Bolero and Overlord, in order to create a platform for global stability. Britain had followed the same policy in the nineteenth century. The vision of Lord Palmerston, in a speech to the House of Commons in 1832 foreshadowed the Cold War Truman Doctrine of the defense of free peoples everywhere:

> the independence of constitutional states, whether they are powerful, like France or the United States, or of less relative importance, such as the minor states of Germany, never can be a matter of indifference to the British Parliament, or, I should hope, to the British public. Constitutional states I consider to be the natural allies of this country; and . . . no English ministry will perform its duty if it be inattentive to the interests of such states.[40]

Though lacking the catchy brevity of Cold War idioms such as "domino theory," Palmerston's geopolitical agenda to create a Concert of Europe was the geopolitical construct that had enabled Britain's force projection.

It was the failure of this geopolitical project that had led to Britain's Continental Commitment:[41] "The Battle of the Somme was the direct result of the British government abandoning their traditional maritime geopolitical strategy."[42] The abandonment was made within the context of geopolitical challenge from Germany. World Wars One and Two were the result of this challenge, and led to US involvement in what had been, until then, European struggles. The everyday actions of engineers and industrial workers that helped make the Mulberry Harbours played a role in this process. The following moments in the geopolitical process were the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO. These policies required explicit US presence in the sovereign affairs of Western European states. Britain had been able to avoid a "Continental Commitment" for a number of decades during its reign as world power. For the United States, military presence in the Rhineland was to mark the beginning of its term as global power and not the end.

Stability in Europe was a key component in a bigger geopolitical project—the projection of US power across the globe. Pre–World War Two plans to establish an American strategic "orbit" to secure its eastern flank in the Atlantic had been designed to enable force projection in the Pacific. Operation Bolero, and the role of the Mulberry Harbours, had been successful for the European theater of the US World War Two strategy. In the new context of challenge from the Soviet Union and China, a military, economic, and political presence in Europe remained essential to US plans. The Marshall plan, NATO, and the US militarization of Great Britain were all essential geopolitical constructs in the manifestation of US global force projection, and the ways in which it was challenged. The Cold War was an everyday and mundane experience that created a new form of geopolitical subject;[43] it required dramatic economic and political changes that turned the United States into a "garrison state"[44] whose economy was increasingly militarized,[45] and it created a new global geopolitical setting in which east-west conflict reinforced, and was played out across, gross global inequalities of wealth.

### _The pervasiveness of war_

War, and geopolitics in general, is a process that makes geopolitical constructs with geographic reach and historic legacy. Thinking of war and peace as clearly separate historic-geographic events gives a false understanding of the world. Though it is false it is also comforting. It allows us to see ourselves as, largely, peaceful. Instead, understanding geopolitics as a process illustrates that we are all implicated in geopolitical and military affairs. Rather than creating a view of the world in which an array of war-mongering characters are located in either the past or other parts of the world, we must recognize that we are all somewhat implicated in the process of geopolitics. We are all, to some degree, consciously or not, a geopolitical construct being shaped by the legacies of former geopolitical constructs and helping to make existing and emerging forms of geopolitics. Perhaps for some, these actions are explicit progressive attempts aiming for cross-cultural understanding and peace.[46] More often we are unconscious of the geopolitical nature of our actions, or we willingly ignore the implications, and the mundane role they play in promoting global inequalities in wealth, security, and life-chances from which many of us benefit. We are geopolitical constructs, whether we choose to recognize it or not. But recognizing the process of geopolitics, and the role of geopolitical subjects, means that it is harder to deny how embedded we are in the formation and maintenance of a divided and violent world. The good geopolitical subjects who helped make the Mulberry Harbours believed that they were fighting "a good war"; even that conflict had unintended consequences. What can we say about how conscious we are of our role in the processes of ongoing conflict, and to what degree have we considered the legacies and unplanned future?

### _Notes_

1.

Waldo Tobler, "A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit Region," _Economic Geography_ 46 (1970): 234–240.

2.

Lewis, _Eyewitness D-Day_ , 282.

3.

<https://sites.google.com/site/seabeedierkes/seabee-stories/raymond-s-feature-story---new-book>.

4.

Dick Reiter, US Navy, quoted in Colin John Bruce, _Invaders: British and American Experience of Seaborne Landings, 1939–1945_ (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 60.

5.

Sir Harold Wernher, biography by John Langdon-Davies, IWM 86/890, 178–179.

6.

Ibid., 179.

7.

Tyne and Wear Archives (TWA) DS/REY/35.

8.

TWA 359/827.

9.

Ibid.

10.

Armstrong, _Tyneside in the Second World War_ , 165–166.

11.

Ibid., 166.

12.

Ron L. Martin and Bob Rowthorn, _The Geography of De-Industrialisation_ (London: Macmillan, 1986).

13.

For a general overview of the north-south divide see <http://www.sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/maps/nsdivide/>. Accessed May 15, 2015.

14.

Andrew Gamble, _Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy, and the British State_ (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994).

15.

Michael Hechter, _Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development_ (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998).

16.

Martin J. Wiener, _English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980_ , 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

17.

Tom Nairn, _The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy_ (London: Radius, 1989); Perry Anderson, "The Figures of Descent," _New Left Review_ I/161 (1987): 20–77.

18.

For example see Hart, _Fire and Movement_ , 39–40.

19.

Nairn, _The Enchanted Glass_ ; Anderson, "The Figures of Descent."

20.

Christopher Andrew, _Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5_ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 526–527.

21.

David Edgerton, "Liberal Militarism and the British State," _New Left Review_ I/185 (1991): 138–169.

22.

Richard Vinen, _National Service: Conscription in Britain 1945–1963_ (London: Penguin, 2014).

23.

Andrew, _Defend the Realm_ , 367; Aldrich, _GCHQ_ , 93.

24.

Ibid., 89.

25.

Ibid., 96.

26.

National Audit Office, _The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability_ (London: The Stationery Office, 2008), 5.

27.

Ibid., 5.

28.

Ibid., 5.

29.

Nick Ritchie, _Trident and British Identity: Letting Go of Nuclear Weapons_ (Bradford: Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, 2008).

30.

Tony Blair, "Global alliance for global values," 2006 quoted in Ritchie, _Trident and British Identity_ , 4.

31.

Quoted in ibid., 5.

32.

Nairn, _The Break-Up of Britain_.

33.

Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2015, "Stronger for Scotland." <http://www.snp.org/sites/default/files/page/file/04_16d_snp_election_manifesto_290x280x.pdf>. Accessed May 15, 2015. A poll in 2013 estimated that 75 percent of the Scottish population opposed renewing the Trident program: "Even pro-UK voters reject Trident move," _The Herald_ (13 March 2013) <http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/referendum-news/even-pro-uk-voters-reject-trident-move.20481478>. Accessed May 15, 2015.

34.

Andrew, _Defend the Realm_ , 367.

35.

Quoted in Andrew, _Defend the Realm_ , 342; quoting H. Montgomery Hyde, _The Atom Bomb Spies_ (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980), 43.

36.

Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, _Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire_ (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

37.

Immanuel Wallerstein, _The Capitalist World-Economy_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

38.

Peter Willetts, _The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance_ (New York: Nichols Publishing Co., 1978).

39.

Andre Gunder Frank, _Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment_ (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

40.

Quoted in David Brown, _Palmerston: A Biography_ (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 164.

41.

Howard, _Continental Commitment_.

42.

Peter Hart, _The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front_ (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008), 15.

43.

Fred Inglis, _The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life and the Cold War_ (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

44.

Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State," _The American Journal of Sociology_ 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–468.

45.

Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick, _The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

46.

Nick Megoran, "Towards a Geography of Peace: Pacific Geopolitics and Evangelical Christian Crusade Apologies," _Transactions, Institute of British Geographers_ NS 35, no. 3 (2010): 382–398; Philippa Williams and Fiona McConnell, "Critical Geographies of Peace," _Antipode_ 43, no. 4 (2011): 927–931; Sara Koopman, "Alter-geopolitics: Other Securities Are Happening," _Geoforum_ 42, no. 3 (2011) 274–284.

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# About the Author

**Colin Flint** , a geographer by training, is professor of political science at Utah State University. His research interests include geopolitics and world-
systems analysis. He is the author of _Introduction to Geopolitics_ (2011) and coauthor, with Peter J. Taylor, of _Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality_ (6th edition, 2011). He is editor of _The Geography of War and Peace_ (2004) and coeditor, with Scott Kirsch, of _Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies_ (2011). His books have been translated into Spanish, Polish, Korean, Mandarin, Japanese, and Farsi.

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